

LOGOS OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY  
OF THE LOGOS. BOOK ONE

ANALECTA HUSSERLIANA  
THE YEARBOOK OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH  
VOLUME LXXXVIII

*Founder and Editor-in-Chief:*

ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

*The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning  
Hanover, New Hampshire*

For sequel volumes see the end of this volume.

LOGOS OF PHENOMENOLOGY  
AND PHENOMENOLOGY  
OF THE LOGOS. BOOK ONE

*Phenomenology as the Critique of Reason  
in Contemporary Criticism and Interpretation*

*Edited by*

ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

*The World Phenomenology Institute, Hanover, NH, U.S.A.*

Published under the auspices of

*The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning*

A-T. Tymieniecka, President



Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available

ISBN-10 1-4020-3678-7 (HB)  
ISBN-13 978-1-4020-3678-1 (HB)  
ISBN-10 1-4020-3680-9 (e-book)  
ISBN-13 978-1-4020-3680-4 (e-book)

---

Published by Springer,  
P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands.

*www.springeronline.com*

*Printed on acid-free paper*

All Rights Reserved  
© 2005 Springer

No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.

Printed in the Netherlands.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ix
------------------	----

### THEMATIC INTRODUCTION

ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA / The Logos of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of the Logos	xiii
--	------

### SECTION I

#### CRITIQUE OF REASON

ARION KELKEL / <i>Phenomenologie transcendente et critique de la raison. Théorique, pratique et axio logique</i>	3
MAFALDA DE FARIA BLANC / The Phenomenology and Hermeneutics of Traditions	37
GRAHAME LOCK / Some Comments on Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology	49
MANUEL BREMER / Lessons from Sartre for the Analytic Philosophy of Mind	63
NANCY MARDAS / A New Copernican Revolution: Moving Beyond the Husserlian <i>Epoche</i> to a New Critique of Reason: Tymieniecka and the Role of Creative Imagination	87

### SECTION II

#### ONTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES OF CLASSIC PHENOMENOLOGY IN THEIR PRESENT DAY INTERPRETATION

ANATOLY F. ZOTOV / Ontological Intentions of Twentieth- Century Transcendentalism	105
NIKOLAY MILKOV / The Formal Theory of Everything: Exploration of Husserl's Theory of Manifolds	119
PIOTR BŁASZCZYK / On the Mode of Existence of the Real Numbers	137

JESÚS ADRIÁN ESCUDERO / Hermeneutische versus reflexive Phänomenologie	157
DAVID GRÜNBERG / On the Ontological Structure of Husserl's Perceptual Noema and the Object of Perception	175
PETER ABUMHENRE EGBE / The Phenomenological Approach to Ontology in the Argument of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka: Differentiation and Unity as Dynamism of Logos and Life	197

### SECTION III

#### CRITERIA OF VALIDITY IN TRANSFORMATION: EVIDENCE, CERTAINTY

JORGE GARCÍA-GÓMEZ / Descartes and Orgeta on the Fate of Indubitable Knowledge	225
HELENA DE PREESTER and GERTRUDIS VAN DE VIJVER / Evidence and Structure: Perspectives on the Metaphysics of Presence and Non-Presence	277
JONATHAN LAHEY DRONSFIELD / The Resistance of the Question to Phenomenological Reduction: Husserl, Fink and the Adequacy of the <i>Sixth Cartesian Meditation</i> as a Response to Heidegger	293
FILIP KOLEN / An Interpretation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution in Terms of Symmetry	307
TZE-WAN KWAN / Hegelian and Heideggerian Tautologies	317

### SECTION IV

#### EPOCHE AND REDUCTION TODAY

DAISUKE KAMEI / The Problem of the 'Idea' in Derrida's <i>The Problem of Genesis</i>	339
LUCA VANZAGO / Body or Flesh? The Problem of Phenomenological Reduction in Merleau-Ponty's Philo- sophical Development	355
CEZARY JÓZEF OLBROMSKI / Conceptions of Time in Husserl's Social Worlds – Modern Perspective of <i>Metaxy</i>	367
GARY BACKHAUS / Alfred Schutz's Critical Analysis of Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology	381

KRISTANA ARP / The Joys of Disclosure: Simone de Beauvoir and the Phenomenological Tradition	393
---	-----

## SECTION V

## THE SENSIBLE AND THE IDEA

WAYNE J. FROMAN / Merleau-Ponty and the Relation between <i>Logos Prophorikos</i> and the <i>Logos Endiathetos</i>	409
LEONARD LAWLOR / A Miniscule Hiatus: Foucault's Critique of the Concept of Lived-Experience ( <i>Vécu</i> )	417
LUCA VANZAGO / The Invisible and the Unpresentable. The Role of Metaphor in Merleau-Ponty's Last Writings	429
APPENDIX / The Program of the Oxford Third World Congress	441
INDEX OF NAMES	465



Maja de Keijzer representing Springer (formerly Kluwer Academic Publishers).



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is with considerable pride that I present to the public this volume opening a five-volume set in which are gathered essays presented at the Third World Congress, *Phenomenology World-Wide*, held at Wadham College, Oxford on August 15–21, 2004.

To Professor Grahame Lock from Queen's College and Matt Landrus from Wolfson College are due warm thanks for their contribution to the organization of this great event. Our great appreciation and thanks go to Professor William J. Smith from Bridgewater State College, Massachusetts, who being linked with Wadham College for many years, too, and with his wife, Jadwiga Smith, a member of our Phenomenology and Literature Society, and with the help of Gary Backhaus from Morgan State University, carried out in masterly fashion the local arrangements on site. The contribution of Tadeusz Czarnik, from Jagiellonian University, Krakow, cannot be forgotten.

Our secretary Jeff Hurlburt merits thanks for his expert and assiduous efforts in the preparation of the Congress.


The enthusiasm and expertise of the authors, who joined us from throughout the world – forty countries – made this Congress an epoch-making event.

A-T.T.



Wadham College.

## THEMATIC INTRODUCTION



Brian McGuinness.

THE LOGOS OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND  
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE LOGOS

*STATUS QUAESTIONIS*

What is phenomenology? I submit that proceeding from within phenomenological inquiry and following the various paths and byways that this inquiry has taken from its inception by Edmund Husserl and as continued by his numerous followers, the essential answer to this question is: phenomenology is the philosophical pursuit of Reason, or the Logos. Did not Husserl himself intend that, going in Kant's footsteps, phenomenology be a critique of reason? However, the Kantian as well as the Husserlian critiques of reason were basically critiques of cognition (*Erfahrung*), of the specifically human cognition, of the human mind. These pursuits of rational structurations, links, articulations of genetic processes, etc. had as their essential reference the cognitive reason of the human mind, specifically human intellectual cognition.

1. Already at the fringes of the Husserlian inquiries there lurk the cognitive systems of living beings other than humans as well as human entanglements within the world of life and its processes, which escape the human cognitive grasp and which indicate the interworldly *logos of life* that does not depend on the cognitive rationalities. And then Husserl appears to have stepwise pursued the critique of reason – of human reason – to the point at which the rational chain that had sustained his interrogation, the thread of the cognitive logos, in fact, broke down. Despite Husserl's painstaking efforts "phenomenology of phenomenology" was not accomplished, and in fact, I submit could not have been on Husserl's assumption that cognitive intentionality can fathom essential or primordial rationale.

Phenomenology's intentional/cognitive logos could not account for its own absolute validity. Intentional/cognitive rationality had to admit limits beyond that it could not legitimately reach. However, Husserlian investigations rooted in pure intellectual reason have themselves, as we will see, led to the discoveries of other levels of rationality, toward the revelation of various perspectives of the logos, underestimated if not ignored by Husserl and his followers.

2. The question of the Logos traces to the beginning of Occidental philosophy and runs through its entire course. Only the conviction that phenomenological inquiry in its already developed, full-fledged body of investigations shed novel and definitive light on its enigmas can justify raising it again.

Is Husserl's failure to account for an absolute cognitive ground the last word on phenomenology? Maybe phenomenology is capable of performing such an ultimate reduction upon itself, but on a different track. Maybe by shifting perspectives on the constitutive role of consciousness we may, after all, reach such a "reduced" level this time of the ultimate grounding, one at which the cognizing subject finds itself to be an integral part of the preconstituted lifeworld.

In the full spread of phenomenology, throughout its founder's investigations and beyond them, we will indeed find all the main constructive arteries of the great Logos of Life. Phenomenology's intentional/constitutive/cognitive perspective may be essential for our philosophical undertaking as such, but it constitutes only one perspective among the logos's many modalities and its initial vast and ambitious enterprise falls short of reaching its proposed aim. And yet this approach, which has reached its ultimate point, prompts the new investigation mentioned above.

3. This brings us to ask whether the phenomenological pursuit has not ultimately been hiding an ampler conception of rationality than was acknowledged by its founder Husserl and his followers. Husserl proposed to undertake an inquiry into phenomenology's own procedures along its unfolding path, but his attempt was made in vain. That suggests first, that we may and should bring phenomenology to undertake that inquiry *in another way* in order to see whether it does not then reveal its innermost thread. Second, we may and can now, with the advent of another essential approach to phenomenology, one anticipated by many explorations by its leading adherents, specifically, the phenomenology of life, see what this very spread of the phenomenologically inspired effort in its full expanse teaches us about the ultimate nature of rationality in all of its modalities.

That is to say, although we plan to subject in what follows the phenomenological enterprise to an inner "critique", our critique will be far from the one proposed in Fink's *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* (and approved by Husserl) that of a "last" transcendental reduction of transcendentalty, of transcendental constitution as such.

Unique among efforts in philosophical history, phenomenology made the effort to justify its philosophizing procedure from all possible angles. Husserl's followers presented numerous interpretations of phenomenology, each claiming to improve the same. Is ours yet one more effort to interpret phenomenology through its method? Not so. We aim, in contrast to follow the progress of the method in order to inquire into its very logos and its yieldings.

Our investigation here will, nevertheless undertake an ultimate questioning of phenomenology, attempting to discover thereby the nature of the essential rationality in its differentiations that *carries* it. We hope to learn from the strength and the weakness of the specifically phenomenological rationalities the nature of the universal rationality that is involved in the emergence and run of our reality that subtends its genesis – the *logos* reaching beyond it and yet essentially engaged in the constitution of ourselves within our lifeworld and its horizons. But in sharp contrast to the Husserlian proposal of a self-critique of phenomenology upon its very own transcendental/subjective assumptions, our enlarged inquiry will advance not by virtue of the intentional/constitutive functioning of the human subject, but by virtue of rationalities that are not identical with constitutive/cognitive/intentional transcendentality. We will, I submit, be able to unearth the universal logos and solve the quandry that puzzled Husserl, the impossible situation of the subject's constituting the world and being simultaneously an objective element of it.

4. Anticipating the final phase or our escalating backwards the ladder of the Husserlian reductive steps which unveils the constitutively successive levels of reality let us surprise the reader by lifting the veil from the last phase of our query. We encounter there *mirabile dictu*, the *ontopoietic* plane of the logos of life, which I have been investigating in my writings, in lengthy research winding throughout the givenness of life, the world's existence, beingness.

Accomplished upon assumptions different from Husserl, it encompasses still in a zigzag fashion all the reduced levels of Husserl's investigations. We find working there all their threads of the rationalities as they will appear in a consistent fashion in our following directly analyses of phenomenological reductions.

Does then our phenomenology/ontopoiesis of life represent the ultimate absolute reduction? Reduction not of the life-world but life itself?

## CHAPTER ONE

*In Quest of the Logos of Phenomenology:  
Interrogating the Thread of Intellectual Intentionality*

It is specific to the Husserlian procedure that it departs from philosophers' customary manner of exposition of a theory. Contrary to exposition, it consists in pursuing the philosophical quest itself by means of a continuous and progressing interrogation. Husserl's progress in unfolding his thought is already marked in the formulation of the questions to which his findings are the follow-up. That might be the natural state of affairs, as it is often pointed out that in the question lies half the answer. However, in following one stage of inquiry upon another, one finds a unique consistency in Husserl's proceeding which merits attention. It is as if he touched upon an inner thread binding the questioning attitude of mind on the specific points in question, or the mode of the questioning mind with the yield of the questioning itself. We will follow the various stages of this interrogative quest, the more easily because Husserl, proceeding by numerous paths and attempts at advancing his pursuit himself, distinguishes phases of the search at which significant breakthroughs into the nature of the phenomena of reality have been gained, indicating the means by which this has been accomplished by way of "reduction/epoche."

Therefore, to reach the gist of his reflection we have to proceed along the double line of interrogation/reduction.

I start out by reminding that phenomenology in its project as well as in the form it took in its expansion amounts in Husserl's own description to a specific attempt at a definitive critique of reason. In its very nucleus lies the desire to solve tantalizing questions that ever lurk at the fringes of the philosophical mind – questions that even the sphinx would hesitate to ask – and to know with certitude the answers pertaining to anything that concerns the human being. What are human beings more concerned to know of besides all about their existence: "How does the human being emerge as a living individual among other beings from within the universal whirl of forces? How does this living beingness manage with its minute very own virtual potentialities to stir a uniquely singular course upon, to use Kant's expression, the 'uncharted sea' – of life, amid the great waves of the universal becoming? How may this flux of becoming be constantly measured up and 'tamed' by the individual beingness to meet the needs of the infinitely small but precise instrument it unfolds from within? What is its origination and telos, if any?"



To ask these questions amounts to the thinker's throwing his intuitive ray into the air like a coin; he or she finds himself/herself upon an uncharted sea; and the only support he or she may expect will, in Husserl's view, and here he follows Descartes, come from himself/herself.

Indeed for the philosopher/phenomenologist these questions are doubled by another – the other side of the coin cast into the air or upon the waves – namely, that of “How may the inquirer – the navigator without a compass – *ascertain* the adequacy of his discoveries?” In this last question, the first we mentioned, in fact, lies the crux of the phenomenological query.

Kant asked these questions most sharply and having found in the *a priori* of synthetic judgement the indication of an *a priori* source from which he believed comes all the rational ordering of reality, all the articulations and interconnectedness of human experience in the *a priori* structuring of the fleeting givens of sense within the human mind, and found then in human pure reason an intuitive self-validation. Hence he proceeded forthrightly to outline a system in which the human being assumes the role not only of navigator but, first of all, of purveyor (constructor) of the transcendental constitution of reality by the human mind.

In contrast to Kant, the Husserlian approach to formulating the answers to all the questions above by giving an account of reality is devised in a twofold approach that correlatively investigates both sides of the coin, with an intuitive grasp of the givens paralleling a cognitive constitutive scrutiny of the cognitive procedure, one that is meant to validate and legitimate them. Here we come to the above-mentioned unique manner in which Husserl conducts his query: the double procedure of *interrogation* and *reduction*.

It is for an essential reason that phenomenology has been identified with its “method”: “*epoche*” or “*reduction*.” In a fashion unprecedented in Occidental philosophy, Husserl from the time of his so-called “transcendental turn,” in which he embraced Descartes’ philosophical call for an absolutely certain beginning in philosophical thinking and assumed its source to be within the cognizing human subject, devoted his reflections to a quest for the systematic uncovering and exfoliation of essential, indubitable cognition. This quest moving down numerous investigative paths for the proper access was presented by Husserl as delineating a continuing advancing itinerary that is punctuated by the introduction of new major approaches that he distinguished as “*reductions*” of the uncovering of the essential from its appearances, as the lifting (suspending) of

the validity of the spurious to let the true nature of reality's phenomenal authentic face reveal itself. The progress in the exfoliation of the levels of authentic reality has been marked by the successive stages of the reductive procedures validated by them. Thus not only are reductions performed in the very depths of the progress of interrogative investigation, but concurrently in their consecutive phases they make up the body of phenomenological doctrine. Hence, from the decisive moment at which Husserl decided to turn toward the pursuit of certain knowledge/cognition he outlined a preliminary itinerary of his quest in major interrogative phases, using for the first time the term "reduction" to indicate the project and its aim and the prospective steps of interrogation. We will present succinctly the main phases of the so-called "reduction" as marking this interrogative itinerary or as being marked by the interrogative move. First a few words about the understanding here of interrogation as a modality of human reason instrumental in cognition but also as I have brought it out earlier, one of the crucial modalities of the logos of life involved in harnessing becoming. We will start by outlining the steps by which Husserl has marked the phases of reduction.

Husserl's great project of transcendental phenomenology as "first science," as he has outlined it in his *Five Lectures*,<sup>1</sup> was not the unexpected turn of mind of which his disciples speak. First of all, as Walter Biemel points out in his editor's introduction to that work, it followed a critical period in the great thinker's life, namely, one in which, as he mentions in a letter, he felt the greatest urgency to find for himself absolute certainty. This demand for absolute certainty led him naturally to his critique of knowledge/cognition. But this felt urgency to have absolute certainty of cognition followed from his previous work. As a matter of fact, proceeding from his treatment of the question of the nature of number, Husserl had brought out in his *Logical Investigations*<sup>2</sup> the "absolutely certain" sphere of meanings that subtend as universal possibles the entire realm of knowledge. Hence it was but a naturally indispensable continuation of this trend in his thought, and the only one possible, for him to move as he did in the second volume of that work to inquire into the psychological/mental processes in which those meanings are formed.

The new proposal simply picks up this thread with a new twist. Its first phase, that announced by Husserl in the *Five Lectures*, is to follow Descartes in locating the demanded certainty of cognition within the ego-cogito itself.

And so Husserl's plan was not framed all of a sudden. It was not started *de novo*. On the contrary, the critique of cognition that it

announced was from the outset tributary to the previous inquiries and had the reservoir of an absolutely certain sphere of meanings already isolated, that of the possibles, of eidetic essences, to work with. Husserl would take the sphere of the ideal essence as the standard of reference for cognition/knowledge throughout the entire course of his project.

To begin with, Husserl, in the footsteps of Descartes, states that the philosopher having no possible recourse to anything but himself can be certain only of his *cogito*. But going far beyond Descartes, who drew from the evidence of the *cogito* merely the evidence of the *cogitans*' existence, Husserl opened up within the ego-*cogito* and his/her *cogitationes* a new platform upon which these *cogitationes* may yield the objects of cognition in an essential manner and with their full endowment as phenomena. Turning then to subjectivity, Husserl proposed to unfold *first philosophy*, philosophy's absolutely necessary beginning, which will unfold out of its own inner necessity.

For Husserl "I am – the world is" is the "principle of all principles" (this he repeated in the "systematic" part of *Die Erste Philosophie* in the 32nd lecture). Here he set already the line of an absolutely necessary interrogative process and its corresponding discoveries.

Equipped with his discovery of ideally possible meanings as fruits of the cognitive activity of the mind, Husserl in a second major step went beyond Descartes' agnosticism and sought within the objectivities given in conscious acts the platform of the phenomena as the true nature of givenness. But it follows that in order to reach this platform of "clear and distinct" ideas the data of cognition have to be purified of all their natural, contingent features – a step that Descartes did not take; in other words, the objectivities of cognition will be revealed only after all their contingent features have been "reduced."<sup>3</sup>

So following on Husserl's reflective discoveries establishing "first philosophy" – the groundwork for all scientific knowledge and all philosophy in its uncovering in various stages the ultimate grounding of reality with the human being at its center – comes the second step, the major effort by Husserl, to purify the objectivities of cognition within their conscious origin of all contingencies, proceeds with the various stages of reduction. Husserl's philosophical doctrinal achievements go hand in hand with the reductive procedures by which they are reached. No wonder that they are all but identified with the "method" of reduction that he was always perfecting, uncovering new planes of the constitution of reality. The bringing to light of the successive spheres of the constituted objectivities necessitated their being stepwise purged of contingencies by an appro-

appropriate reductive procedure in virtue of which that unveiling may occur. *Thus each step of reduction belongs in a congenital way to the sphere of objectivity being discovered.* Husserl, being profoundly aware of this, saw himself as a traveler whose itinerary led him almost despite himself ever onward. It was in this sense that he spoke not of “being” a phenomenologist, but of “becoming” one.

We may say that in the second step of reduction we have to exfoliate the givens of consciousness in their absolute sense as well as the necessary interconnections unique to them; no reference may be made to any natural, scientific, popular knowledge nor to convictions, opinions, etc. derived from induction, deduction, speculation, etc. The clarification of the possibilities of cognition indicates that we may bring to light “things in themselves” as they are constituted in absolute consciousness *reposing entirely in themselves* and coming forth in absolute evidence as self-given, that is, free from all natural references. We recognize that there is a novel sense of objectivity in the field of objects so-conceived as cogitations. This is objectivity consisting of seeing in “idealizing abstraction” (*idealisierende Abstraktion*) the general objectivities in generalizing consciousness (*das Allgemeinheitbewußtsein*), which allows us to develop an “essential science of cognition.”<sup>4</sup>

Within this sphere the cognitive objectivities in their universal, essential self-giveness, are “absolute,” that is, are as they appear *in themselves*, purified of all the singularization of the natural cognition from which they come. They appear in their own right in “pure evidence,” a novel type of objectivity.

The next step, which follows with necessity, is precisely the emergence of the sphere of absolute givenness in its universality, which is given within the field of cognition as its universal indispensable field. Its foundation is, as Husserl expresses it, “das Erfassen des Sinnes der absoluten Gegebenheit, der absoluten Klarheit daß jeden sinnvollen Zweifel ausschließt, [...] der schauenden, selbst erfassenden Evidenz.”<sup>5</sup>

Universal objectivities and state of affairs are the concepts that emerge as categories, along with rules allowing *a priori* valid judgements in absolute givenness and laws that reside in these concepts.<sup>6</sup>

In this critique of the objects of experience, experience itself comes into question. We have to move to the nature of the constitutive consciousness in which this experience takes place, namely, to the distinction between the cognized object and the act of its appearance within absolute consciousness in the modalities of its acts. This brings intentionality to light: the intentional relationship of both the intentionality of consciousness

and the purely intentional sense of the immanent reality; the door opens on the enlarged field of the intentional nature of consciousness itself.

In this third, or fourth, reductive procedure, the nature of intentional consciousness manifests constitutive principles of objectivity in its pure form, as the *cogitatum* in intentional acts and processes, as well as the constitutive nature of temporality itself. And so we move to the subjective and intentional constitution of time.

Thus with the entire “static” and “genetic” nature of objectivity in its absolute sense of phenomena being attributed to the constitutive role of consciousness, we find ourselves enclosed within a transcendental circle in virtue of the intentional functioning of human consciousness.

Yet the quest to unveil this absolutely certain groundwork of givenness in its absolute beginning is far from being complete. There remains the question of the world. Let us recall that Husserl, following Descartes, already at his announcement of the absolute beginning of philosophy, immediately separated himself from the Cartesian cogito by affirming that the first decisive principle of all principles is: “I am – the world is”.<sup>7</sup> So with the establishment of the full constitutive role of intentional consciousness, the further task imposes itself of clarifying the status of objectivity extended to the entire world, the entire spread of givenness. Hence the last reduction to which Husserl’s quest led him, and the last that he was able to operate, was the reduction of all scientific, naturalistic, prejudice concerning the world, the world of life.

In clearing away from objectivities, the universal content of cognition, all of the “preconceptions” with which we naturally cover them, the next step is to turn directly toward the consciousness within which they are constituted. The cognizing subject and the *cogitatum* stand in a generative conjunction. It is this subject, that is, human consciousness that has to be cleared, to be “reduced” to its essential operational functioning. And here Husserl focuses on the functioning decisive for his enterprise, that of intentionality.

On setting forth the formal structures of this correlation – thing and world on the one side, and thing-consciousness on the other – we move to the invariant structures of the world as they appear in transcendental constitution. Thus bridging the world and consciousness, or rather converting them, promises to open an absolute, *subjective science of the world*, one founded transcendently, in contrast to the objective of natural science. Here, as all the way along, all of the previous stages of the epoche and reduction meet, with the addition of a new one that is meant to be a “total epoche” and which consists in a total change, total transformation

of our natural attitude in and toward life.<sup>8</sup> This subjective science of the lifeworld epitomized by the working formula *ego-cogito-cogitatum* grounded in the transcendental absoluteness of constitution with its ramified correlations in all directions and toward others is meant to be pre-given to the grounding of the world and life. The transcendental circumference of reality with its world-horizons seems complete. Is, however, the thread of Husserl's quest after the absolute foundation of cognition and reality also followed to its very end?

With this reduction (the fourth major one but the fifth in the consecutive order), with the establishing of the absolutely valid correlation between transcendental consciousness, with the dominating role the ego plays therein, and the outlining of the lifeworld as that ego's transcendently constituting field, one would have expected that the phenomenological project reached completeness. All the horizons of consciousness and of the world in the flux of the living present is grasped at its absolutely valid (i.e., cognitively purified of all natural naiveté) structural level, opening its pattern of *passio* and *actio* for inspection as the seemingly ultimate transcendental level – ontological level – grounding empirical reality and the positive sciences of reality. With all that now being revealed it would seem that Husserl had indeed reached the goal of his quest for the “pure phenomenon” of givenness as such.

And yet that is not so. To the contrary, the rational thread of inquisitiveness did not stop at this juncture but sought further clarifications of new issues that then surged. For while the seeming opposition between reality and consciousness is resolved in these operations, the question of the legitimacy of consciousness itself and of the reductive procedures that led us to this point now comes up.

This question has its very own specific situation: first it is consciousness which appears as constituting the world, reality, but then it is obviously itself an existential part of this constituted world, this very grounding of the natural world in which the transcendental ego is equally rooted. This led Husserl – as mentioned in the outset, to postulate the performance of yet another, this time final, step of reduction of constitutive consciousness, that of transcendental constitution itself. How would such a reduction be possible? Is there a link to a further rational advance of questioning available? This step of *epoche* – putting the transcendental progress of the quest itself into question by means of its very own lights – is asking, in fact, after the ultimate grounding of consciousness and its correlate, reality / the world. It reaches beyond the intentional constitutive powers of consciousness; it asks, indeed, after the very condition of these

powers. With these questions, which emerge with rational necessity along the thread that led the entire progress of the transcendental unfolding, we are reaching beyond the very powers of intentional constitutive rationality.

Husserl, indeed, did not advance in the solving of these questions and did not elaborate the “phenomenology of phenomenology” that was expected to deal with them. Before we come again to this question, let us dwell some more on the nature of the quest.

#### THE LOGOS OF INTERROGATION – DISCLOSING THE UNIVERSAL LOGOS

##### *a. The Zig-Zag Continuity of the Husserlian Quest to Ground Phenomenology as First Philosophy in an Absolute Beginning*

We may say that there is a cogent strictly rational thread running through the entire span of Husserlian philosophical reflection. The numerous paths that he took during his elaboration of the absolutely certain cognitive status of his procedure, which he called the “phenomenological method,” leading to knots most significant for his consecutive steps of a progress and consisting in clearing the naturalistic assumptions and attitudes toward reality, peeling away first at the invisible phenomenon as at an onion hiding it to our sight, and sharpening simultaneously our intuitive gaze – epoche or/and reduction – these paths follow precisely the discovery of this thread.

Each advancing step picks up the valid elements of the preceding one “cleared” of their remnants of the “naïve” natural attitude, which remnants are “reduced,” that is, left behind and no longer considered for the sake of the novel intuitive steps of advance. And although Husserl speaks explicitly only of three phases of reduction and begins with that which focuses already on transcendental constitution, it is, in fact, as mentioned above, it was already at the *level of logical investigation* that the reduction essentially began.

Attempting ceaselessly to legitimate his changing procedures of investigation and to give an account of their reasons and of the results obtained in “reductions” or “epoche,” he gave us not only an account of his searching itinerary but also a *most precise itinerary of the interrogative order* directing it. Following first of all its major stages as emphatically marked by the project’s being reworked (see *The Idea of Phenomenology, First Philosophy, The Crisis of European Thought and Transcendental*

*Phenomenology*), each time into a more advance probing, we witness a most strict necessary following of pointers to the successive query and the appropriate formulation of answers given by the investigations carried out in the direction indicated. It is within this necessary succession of appropriate answers to foregoing questioning that Husserl finds the necessity, the rigor, he calls for in establishing phenomenology as a universal first philosophy with the guarantee of "clear and distinct ideas" that that requires. It is the *logos of interrogation* that founds and grounds an apodictically universal science. Would an elucidation of this logos of interrogation amount to function as the "Phenomenology of phenomenological Reduction" that Husserl speaks of in *Cartesian Meditations*?<sup>9</sup>

We find this necessary interconnectedness and the stepwise progressing continuity to be the assumed prerequisite for Husserl's ever repeated steps of transcendental reduction and the progressive additions to its performance as it unveils deeper and deeper subjective structures: its *filum Ariadne*. It is following this line of questing that Husserl takes his next step, always one proposed to him by the progress of his investigations, one that registers the need for further clarifying, legitimating. The next reduction of the entire investigation is postulated with unavoidable necessity by the preceding one. The reduction to the lifeworld was expected to be final, but Husserl called for the "phenomenological reduction of phenomenology itself,"<sup>10</sup> a transcendental reduction of the phenomenological procedures that he developed. He did not accomplish this further reduction and so did not reach the completion of the phenomenological procedure.

Let us now look more closely at the interrogative nature of the transcendental quest, first, at the conditions intrinsic to this continuity and, second, at the very rules structuring transcendental consciousness.

I have in an earlier writing brought out succinctly the interrogative way in which the logos of life proceeds.<sup>11</sup> It appears that neither in the cognitive realm nor in this concrete becoming does a statement of fact nor state of affairs remains ever complete enclosed within itself. What is stated or accomplished refers always with necessity to some factor or factors for its further completion; what is stated points out to what is "possibly" missing its logos by stating or accomplishing a state of affairs is concurrently referring to its "possible" but not definitely indicated continuation; continuation in an interrogative mode.

We will turn now to a closer examination of this crucial feature of the logos within the progress of Husserlian epoche/reduction.



To review again more quickly Husserl's itinerary, let us begin by recalling phenomenology was initiated when he undertook to discover or isolate in our cognitive and practical experience recurring, perduring distinctive nuclei, postulated to be the "certain" and "necessary" foundation of reality as it manifests itself in phenomena, what he called "essences," "eidoi," that is, clusters of tightly articulated significant moments having ideal necessity, which as inherently subjacent structures subtend the nature and coherence of the respective phenomena. As such these essences are seen to account for the regularity of the otherwise fleeting appearances of empirical cognition. It is through direct intuitions that their distinctiveness presences itself to the mind. As these structures guarantee a measure of stability in the flux as well as certainty of cognition in the corresponding intuition – "eidetic" intuition in this case – they stand above empirical becoming, not being subjected to change and transformation *a la manière* of Platonic ideas. This intuitive apprehension exhibits the modes of cognitive certainty as well as of necessity grounded in the necessary interconnectedness of the intuited objectivities themselves.

This inquiry guided by eidetic rationality was enthusiastically elaborated in various regional ontologies by Husserl's followers, but it did not – something the dissention among Husserl's numerous disciples, notably of those of the so-called Göttingen School made abundantly clear – remain the sum of phenomenology. Phenomenological inquiry did not halt here. As had been obvious already in the second volume of *Logical Investigations*,<sup>12</sup> the level of the eidetic logos, as appealing as it was in its clarity and despite being a level on which phenomenological researchers could easily communicate their results, was not, as at first appeared, self-explanatory. This first quest did not come to fulfillment. On the contrary, it prompted further questing. It may appear that the very nature of the intuitive givenness – eidetic, "ideal" givenness – in which the phenomena of beings, things, processes, events, states of affairs presence themselves in the human mind would suffice to legitimate the phenomenological procedure. Not so. The nature of the mode of this givenness came into question. This very presencing spurred the quest on toward elucidating its modality in the very acts of this presentation, that is, the conscious/cognitive acts in which it occurs.

Hence Husserl's much disputed turn toward human consciousness in the second phase of his inquiry. A turn postulated by the logos of interrogation as the necessary second level of its unveiling, this turn was greatly misunderstood by Husserl's Göttingen students, including Roman Ingarden, as giving priority to epistemology over the prime level of

ontology, and they were roused to counter that. But Husserl's further reduction of human consciousness did not privilege epistemology but was a further elucidation of the eidetic logos. Eidetic reduction was not rejected for its insufficiency. Husserl retained it for its relevancy within the entirety of his investigation.

This turn toward the fuller unveiling of the foundation of reality in discovering and clarifying the ways in which we construct the presencing of the eidetic structures within our conscious acts of cognition focuses with necessity on the nature of the consciousness that performs the presencing. This shift was by no means an arbitrary decision by the philosopher to change his course. To investigate the modes of presencing was a thrust of interrogative intuition *prompted by its own intrinsic* (not ideal) *necessity*. At this juncture the insufficiency of the previous account of reality's rational foundation became obvious, and the interrogation in its very own, exhaustive, manner simply proceeded.

Phenomenology remains a path of inquiry focused on the very *sense* of phenomena, on what makes them "phenomena" for the acting and cognizing subject, what maintains articulation and order amid the fleeting, ungraspable appearances in which the real manifests itself and so grounds our vital, psychic, and mental existence. As it seeks this foothold on the articulated basis of being, phenomenology proceeds by interrogating and revealing that sense in phases. These phases of interrogation and subsequent inquiry would resemble a "staircase" or "ladder" were it not for the fact that, as I will argue further on, there lie vast intermediary spaces between the phases that do not come to the inquiring light of the mind even as the clearly evident objectivity of the evident planes focused on and clarified in each of the phases correspond to the gradation of the essential modes of becoming and hence manifest "objective" reality itself. Even in this brief outline of the main phases of the monumental quest of phenomenological philosophy, this interrogation of the logos may be seen anew as culminating in the onto-poiesis of life.

## CHAPTER TWO

### *The Emergence of the Multifold Logos through the Unveiling of Phenomena in the Intentional Mode*

In the light of the foregoing arguments I submit again now in a clearer fashion that concurrently scrutinizing in the Husserlian way the various types of intuitive evidences and their distinct, specific modes of unveiling,

this inquiry progressively comes upon the nature, the full and infinitely diversified nature, of rationality, of *the logos tout court*. The logos that humanity has been pondering for centuries and which we cannot fail to encounter all over again now through phenomenology we may seek to pursue either in full light or by unearthing it from thus far inaccessible locations as it radiates through the entire sequence of life and beingness-in-becoming pointing to further areas through the relevancies of each segment.

We see here in Husserl's progressive reductions, a chain of philosophical questioning as a subjective activity of the mind that pertains to particular moments of the changeable composition of the field of consciousness as well as to the subject's network of participatory links within the world's dynamics, with each moment – as is often emphasized – incipiently indicating our next question. This “foreknowledge” expresses itself in the “proper formulation” of the question of how would we seek the grounding of this proper formulation? Of course, several clues may be found within the very experience. Missing factors, links, moments might be indicated by those already present, by essential links to some elements thus far hidden “that we are asking about.” The formulation of questions concerning the essential moments missing to those presently available within our question refers, in the first place, to the underlying essential connectedness of objectivized factors, to their rational substructure or its outline (for example, “How many sides does a triangle have?”). However, when questioning as a subjective activity concerns matters immersed in empirical facts or in psychic phenomena for which the essential references are not immediately visible and involve manifold factual data or intertwined situations, to formulate “what” we are looking for indicates already that we presume an “underlying” network of rational interconnectedness between the innumerable moments on which our inquisitive intuition dwells in an inventive fashion. Can we simply assume that this push of intuition toward the unknown comes from the subjective ground? How could the human mind ceaselessly at work with matters at hand of its *own* impetus move beyond the immediately needed moments that imply each other? Could elements dynamized by life suffice to move one beyond focus on the missing factors and project a provisory, tentative network of interconnections in an attempt to pursue them? Where would one find the groundwork of connections to formulate the tentative object of the search?

In short, going through the subjective/objective questioning there is to be presumed, first, an intrinsic rational network to which all the elements,

facts, events, processes of life may be referred in all their possible intricacies. Second, behind the questioning we will see a foundational answer of a “meta-poietical question.”

If we will with penetration review the entire course that phenomenological inspiration has so far taken – and I submit that it is an absolutely consistent course even if appearing somewhat fragmented – we will see that its shifts in points of interest, approaches, tendencies amount to nothing less than the step by step pursuit of the diversified route taken by the logos to establish the reality of life and existence in its manifestation of living beingness, ultimately in its human expression.

*a. The Interrogative Thrust Marking Necessary Steps*

At each level of intuition emerging into light with the advance of the interrogative quest, there has concurrently, even congenitally, appeared a host of appropriate intuitive hints. I call these ciphers provoking first an intellective grasp of the findings and then their formulation as concepts. That is to say, the intuiting mind has to delve into the domain newly revealed in order to “thematize it.” We find that at each intuitive level reached the concepts used (e.g., “essence,” “eidos”) do not speak for “themselves,” that the entire conceptual apparatus of the essential domain of “objective” structures, eidoi, things only approximately indicate the nature of the intuitive cluster sought. With the further conjoined pointer to their origination in consciousness the entirely new field of the *constitutive* procedures opens with a wealth of glimpses at their formation corresponding to the manifested reality they disclose. These glimpses of constitution at work show an intrepid élan largely hid from sight; the operations of constitution await the philosophical mind to give them proper sense and visibility, to bring them into the elucidating framework of reality. Indeed, to arrive at constitution’s intuitive intentional givenness is to once again come upon a corresponding, correlated wealth of intuition, of sense within which we may seek to retrieve its operations from obscurity and frame them, that is, thematize them as concepts. The network of the transcendental analysis of conscious constitution of reality thematizes the transcendental logos of human intentionality extending by postulation of further inquiry into the sheltered genesis of the transcendental constitution of the individual within its lifeworld, following along the thread of the same although enlarged logos of conscious intentionality. And again analysis finds the appropriate intuitive means for its thematizing elucidation within the logos of the intentional system.

A dramatic situation in this elucidating quest develops when the logos prompting genetic query onwards postulates reaching beyond the human intentional system, into the not “possible” but factual sphere of the world.

As a matter of fact, when it came to the genesis of the living being within the world, Husserl, following the pointers of the logos, was prompted to reach into the empirical sphere of beingness, the very sphere that he had at the outset provisionally bracketed, separated out from application of his method of universal inquiry, though we have to keep in mind that Husserl always strongly emphasized the elementary significance of empiria and of factual reality. Let us, however, keep in mind that it was for the sake of achieving *certainty* in our cognitive results, and indeed *necessity* in those findings that eidetic analysis lifted the aprioric – the only *possible* – beyond empirical cognition and that this proviso was held to throughout as analysis moved on to the levels of transcendental constitution and genesis, albeit with progressively weakening resolve.

But on reaching the underpinnings of the genesis in which living individuals would be originating and throwing their hooks into the generative processes of other living beings within the same world network, we have to reach over into the empirical – “suspended” as evidence on behalf of the authority of the certitude enjoyed by intellectual intentionality. Here, despite the fact that Husserl had extended intentionality down to the living body, to the kinesthesia basic to the motility of living beings, nothing in his arsenal was of help in bridging this gap and in providing intuitive clues pregnant with hints for thematizing and intellectually grasping the empirical realm into which the transcendental constitutive genesis should extend.

To grasp this realm Husserl resorted to what he originally had bracketed, that is, he had to bring in the scientific concepts of “instinct,” “drive,” etc., which are alien to the transcendental network and undermine transcendental authority. And yet, and this is of great significance for our argument, the very logos of transcendental genesis has been leading toward and into this factual realm. It led from the initial realm of conceptually harnessed eidoi to analysis of consciousness in its transcendental genesis; and now it has led to this breaking point between the universal shaping patterns referring to the constitutive nature of human consciousness, to one side, and the vibrating play of forces subtending the entire edifice of the lifeworld, to the other. This situation is the drama of intentionality understood as the exclusive and dominating function in human constitution of reality. Is intentionality truly the basic, decisive

factor? Perhaps it is, rather, a residuum of the Kantian perspective, an epistemological slant, when it comes to approaching the origin of human reality.

*b. A Fuller Revelation of the Universal Logos in the Critique of Intentional Consciousness*

At this juncture it is clear that all previous levels of the logos alone cannot account for reality, not even those levels scrutinizing the nature of consciousness. The rational-logic outlay of human consciousness is too well known to merit more than a pinpointing discussion here. To center on its essential nature, it is seen as a streamlike flow of acts. These conscious acts in which the structural phenomena present themselves cannot be dissociated items coming into and disappearing from sight, as acts are. A crucial factor emerging into sight at this point is the specific nature of conscious acts, their essential reference to the eidetic forms of the objective clusters of phenomena to be received through intuition and appropriately shaped into cognition. This is the intentional nature of consciousness as such. Consciousness in its flow of acts becomes a processor of the logos – how consciousness as such originated and how it acquired its status we do not learn at this juncture. We will come to that later on in the last leg of the quest. It is in its workings that the articulations, interconnections, forms of the eidetic objectivities come together into an apperceptive glance. At this point it is the nature of intentionality that amid the conscious whirl of acts and against the background of sentient, sensing, and emotive elements it projects networks of organizing that stand out by leading toward the presencing of objectivity.

The intentionality of consciousness is, indeed, the key to its functioning. As we know all too well it orients the act of consciousness in a triangular setup (the ego pole, the acts streaming from the flux, and being directed toward an objective aim); it organizes the cognitive context as the constitutive context of objects, a context that establishes our reality. Husserl famously distinguished noetic and noematic sides of this very act of aiming at an objective grasp. That means that the logos whose objective intention carries the act splits into subjective and objective sides, one representing the side of active performance and the other that of objective shaping. Yet it is the “same” logos as it proceeds in its intimately correlated twofold way to bring forth the *presencing* of phenomena. Is it not extraordinary how the logos accommodates the “exterior” to conscious acts that by “interior” activity presence themselves to the living subject

through its own personal mechanism? The intentionality of consciousness acquires in the Husserlian schema this unique role of operating simultaneously a distinction, an operative split, such that the logos carries out its work of constituting human reality within and without, first by prompting the flux of acts, and second by endowing them with the three-directional orientation to be acts of and “for” the self (seen as the central point of reference) and shaping a presentational content. As I have described succinctly this life of consciousness, by its instauration inaugurates the life we live.

In this conception of presencing reality through consciousness, Husserl introduces a distinction between conscious but empirical acts, which presence reality in its changeable, fleeting appearances, and intrinsic “pure” intentional acts conceived in an aprioric Kantian fashion, in which the noetico-noematically revealed phenomena emerge. The “method” of legitimating the validity of this procedure accordingly changes according to which act is being considered. The emphasis falls now on the nature of consciousness with its pivotal function of intentionality. Purified analytically from its empirical aspects, intentional consciousness – “pure” consciousness – acquires now a preeminent autonomous if not “absolute” status and now becomes guarantor of the certitude of cognition as well. Consciousness’ noetico-noematic structurations assume the character of necessity. The structural validity of the eidetic findings is not thereby disclaimed, but the eidetic findings are now to be seen in relation to their formation within intentional consciousness. This entire novel intuitive level, the level of consciousness in its intentional workings, brings with it vast possibilities for intentional ciphering, for thematizing and conceptualizing. The logos of intentionality abounds in these.

Now, this revelation of consciousness by way of its intentional functioning’s being the crucial device of the logos for establishing the human reality could have been expected to satisfy the phenomenological quest. Not so, not so.

For the time being, let us see that whatever the necessity of the intentional shaping of reality may be, it does not suffice to account for it. On the contrary, from its very bowels there surges the call to advance our query.

The interrogation is prompted by the very rules of consciousness toward their application to the constitutive processes and their dynamic unfolding. A new intuitive phase opens with its very own arsenal of ciphering signs and conceptual grasp.

Out of attention to the nature of constitutive consciousness comes the interrogative focus on this constitution itself. Consciousness reveals the basic internal temporality of the constitutive moment. Although ascertained in its basic modalities, it has still to yield the key to the phenomena presented as well as to their genetic progress.

With the reduction to the lifeworld that was the apex of all the reductions and which was meant to purify the intentional content of our world-experiences from all the misconceptions of the positive sciences, opinion, etc., and present it in its authentic intentional nature, goes the culminating transformation of our naive attitudes towards the issues that it poses into a truly transcendental attitude. The transcendental turn of Husserl's quest to find an absolutely certain plane of cognition seems to be fulfilled. It seems that with it we may consider ourselves truly phenomenologists. Not so.

Having reached this point, phenomenology stirred great waves of interest and a passion for a renovating investigation in many fields of learning. It seems as if the conception of the lifeworld with its loosening of intentional ties and its seeming putting of "method" with its transcendental or eidetic restrictions (strictures) out of the game at last allowed phenomenology to gain territorial rights in general scholarship. But that recognition was gained at a high price.<sup>13</sup>

With the loosening of intentional networks, with the recognition of the importance of the empirical in the transcendental genesis, with even the transmitting to the lifeworld the prerogative of providing the criteria for some validity, certainty and necessity grounded in intentional contextual consistency have lost their bite. In the perspective of the phenomenology that once began with the postulate of a logos that is the rational bearer, guarantor of our human universe, relying only on intentionality, the logos of the lifeworld in the meanders of its intergenerative articulations, shaping formations, interlinkages, and transformatory resourcefulness – all of which reaches its apex in the intersubjective communicative skills of human consciousness, with its infinite modalities of linguistic, artistic, and technical expression of life-forms – is a diluted and contaminated logos.

On the contrary, with the regaining of resorting to the empiria the very foundation of absolute transcendental certainty was lost; it is this foundation that the logos of the inquiry is prompting us onward to seek. Having traversed the entire circuit of the constructive logos, approaching it first from the eidetic summit, we are now led to investigate its incipient phase.



But at this crucial point we have reached with Husserl a dramatic situation. To prepare to capture the logos in its incipient constructive stage a proper field must be cleared, and that means nothing less than putting the Husserlian notion of intentionality in doubt. This drama is that of intentionality, which has been conceived from the outset of the phenomenological project as the intellectual modality of the logos. Although it has been variously ramified in the quest (e.g., in intersubjectivity, empathy, and even lifeworld generic processes acquiring flexibilities), it has still – some fidelity to the original project being maintained – always been conceived of as an offspring of intellectual consciousness having direct reference to its entire functioning. As such, it stood as a bastion of the human mind, playing an exclusive dominating role in the constitution of reality. It is that role that now cries out for scrutiny. Is intentionality really the exclusive basic factor in constituting our world as it manifests itself? At this point its logos puts intentionality in the spotlight.

In fact, the intentionality of consciousness, having revolutionized not only philosophy in the twentieth century, but also all domains of scholarship, is now revealed to have limitations. It is not capable of carrying on the conclusive test outlined by Husserl in the early stage of working out his project that would yield the crowning achievement of his quest for the certain and necessary foundation of all knowledge, the “phenomenology of phenomenology.” The radical reduction of the lifeworld was all-inclusive of the givenness that it is, and allowed us finally to feel we were “phenomenologists,” but that reduction did not meet its intrinsic postulates. There remained, indeed, a further step of interrogation calling for a final reduction, the reduction of the lifeworld as comprising all preceding phase-levels of reduction, the whole of the transcendental of intentional consciousness, a reduction that would free it from the lifeworld, from all “naivete” and establish definitively its absolute validity. Without such a final reduction the status of transcendental consciousness – of the full reach of intellectual (that is conscious) intentionality – remains without apodictic certainty and necessity. It hangs in the thin air. And yet, as we see from the strenuous search of Husserl and Fink in the discussions of the Sixth Cartesian Meditation for the point of reference by which we may proceed from the lifeworld and accomplish this last reduction, no such point of reference may be found. In other words the interrogative quest of the logos that has carried the course of the progressive unveiling of the constitutive work of intentional consciousness in all its levels does, indeed, point beyond the level of the constitutive lifeworld, but here the

intentional thread that it is following runs out. We are encircled within the transcendental realm and although the interrogative logos indicates a further step for its definitive justification, the carrier of the intentional/intellective thread of the interrogation breaks off.

Should we conclude with Husserl that the “dream” of the apodictically certain cognitive ground is “ausgeträumt”?

We will answer, not so, not so.

### *Status investigationis*

Before we enter into the argument determining the nature of intentionality – now recognized as the intentional conscious or intellective mode of the universal logos – let us gather what our inquiry into phenomenology’s itinerary has discovered about the “reason of reasons” that is the logos.

First of all, the analysis of this itinerary reveals the thread running through all the reductive procedures: 1) the logos of intentional consciousness in its human realm; 2) the intellective intentionality of human consciousness; 3) a specific modality of the universal logos that manifests itself to carry the inquiry along and which continues to interrogate even when the intentional vehicle fails; 4) which modality in its universal play manifests itself as a *driving force*; 5) and what is to be brought out at this point, that that force’s unique device for progressing towards its aims is an alternation of impetus and equipoise, that the progress of this force is punctuated.

As this driving force “moves onward” it reveals itself as a constructively oriented dynamis that breaks the already established current of becoming having an intrinsic endowment and answers a call already issued for the completion of the state of affairs given and that simultaneously launches a project of potential constructive continuation. With each impetus a constructive outline, articulations, links, etc. are projected. The consequent actualization brings the impetus from potentiality to a new balance in reality achieving a measure of equipoise therein as the deployed energies are constructively adjusted, attuned to their circumambient conditions.

Although it seems that we have made considerable progress in our inquiry, it would amount to nothing more than an intimation of the status quo if further investigation were not pursued. This final investigation, however, has to take another path, more, another track, namely, one leading to the unraveling of the creative function of constitutive consciousness and leading to the exfoliation of the ontoipoiesis/phenomenology of life.

Bringing out the crucial role of the surging *logos of life*, this investigation, proceeding from premises different from those of Husserl, takes them and the Husserlian reductive acquisitions into full account and surprisingly appears to bring the truncated Husserlian quest to fulfillment and completion.

Upon this new track the above-discussed gains in insight into the nature of the logos are fully confirmed and corroborated. Above all, however, this “last reduction,” not of the world but of life itself, will in answering the final interrogation yield an opening of the entire logicoic field in which the logos will exhibit fully its potential in an absolutely certain and necessary fashion without further need to reduce it to establish authority. Having not found the reductive, interrogative fulfillment in the lifeworld, we find it in *ontopoiesis* – logos of life.

### CHAPTER THREE

#### *The Emergence of the Logos of Life in Its Constructive Elan*

##### *a. Changing Course: From Intentionality to Creativity in the Constitution of Givenness*

To return to our main argument, as long as we do not directly address the issue of Husserl’s binding intentionality to consciousness as its basis, we will remain on the stalled treadmill of the critique of reason. Ultimately Husserlian phenomenology by its identifying the intentionality of consciousness with cognition does not allow us to escape the trap that these identifications set. This has indeed been the question of paramount significance: Are we, following Descartes and chiefly Kant, to see cognition/constitution as the main, even the only, prerogative of human consciousness, as the only definitive access to reality? In a bold move this classic assumption has had to be put not only in doubt but after a long philosophical maturation an alternative approach has been elaborated, one avoiding the circumscribing difficulties of the originary Husserlian bet on the intentionality and constitutive bent in consciousness and so getting us out of that cul-de-sac and into the open. New access to the reality of the manifestation of things and beings, of being and becoming, of living and cognizing is indispensable.

Just such access is opened by *human creative experience* and its trajectory in its function of establishing the lifeworld and the living human being within it.<sup>14</sup> With entirely fresh focus on the creative function of the

constituting/constructing project of the human agent, and in particular with recognition that as a raw constructive force that essential function of the constituting human subject stands prior to human conscious intentionality, our entrapment in consciousness ends and we confront beingness and life.

In the last two decades doubt over the primacy of conscious intentionality has been raised on several counts. For one thing eidetic intentionality could not find a connection with sensibility. Merleau-Ponty who dissected the Husserlian conception of intentionality, which is his great contribution to philosophy as well as to psychology and other fields, struggled in his last writings *The Visible and the Invisible* to establish a connection, but in vain.

And many philosophers and practitioners became more keenly aware that sensibility, emotions, and other felt phenomena are left out of intentional-conscious experience. Ricoeur thus spoke of a "surplus of meaning" that remains after we grasp experience with the constitutive apparatus. And nowadays on many sides we see the vindication of the emotional and sensing realm that eludes constitutive grasp. However, there is need for more than just acknowledging the play of emotions in human experience. In order to find the missing bridge or link between constitutive intentionality with its intellectual streak and the emotional substratum of the sensing-emotive realm that carries it a *tertium quid* is indispensable, namely, an approach to experience that will recognize both in their respective roles and prerogatives, an approach that will not identify each with the other but will bring both out as to the proper distribution of their roles and their functional interplay.

The critique of phenomenological reason would thus expand to territory beyond the direct role of consciousness in the intellectual specifically human constitutive function. We have such a fresh approach to the origination of human reality when we acknowledge the priority of the creative function of the human being within the Human Creative Condition.

For the last three decades I have spoken of the primogenital priority of the creative act and creative imagination and so rekeyed phenomenology.<sup>15</sup> What else but the very creative act of the human being itself, which brings to the sense-giving apparatus of living being the specifically human virtualities that fashion sensorial, emotional, even preexperiential material into human constitutive-conscious life-significance sustains this task? So I speak of the ontopoiesis/phenomenology of life, not separating the process and the examination of it.

The majority of phenomenological thinkers are paying attention to the artistic creativity of man. Merleau-Ponty, on one side, and Heidegger, on the other, have provided interesting vistas on the metaphysical aspect of creativity. They have failed, however, to reach the bottom of things. They do not reach its essential constructive/constitutive role. But the phenomenology of creative experience, as I have called it, in following the human creative act through all the three phases of Husserlian phenomenology, disregarding none, but to the contrary being in its very own way still tributary to each in its own right, reaches the point of the authentic creative interplay of both human consciousness and the *elementary forces* from which typically human sensibility and emotionality emerge. Standing in the platform of the origination of self-individualizing, differentiating life itself, we have inaugurated the fourth, ultimate phase of the phenomenological logos.

We witness a crucial transformation in our grasp of the logos itself when we admit into our investigation the immensely significant area in which the logos of life first devises the transformatory “creative forge” in which its originally and vitally significant sensing, pulsating, and emotional reactivities as major carriers of life are transformed into the appropriate *elemental stirring* of specifically human significance.

We witness here a crucial transformation in the logos itself. This “bridging,” calls for a network of thematizing apparatus that is missing in intellectual constitution. It calls for a descent to an originary plane from which the constitution of givenness takes off. It is creative experience that opens the way to uncovering this plane, the plane of the *logos of life*.

The creative act of the human being through its logos encompasses the entire field of preconstitutive and constitutive experience of the human being in its harmonious fashioning of the full human experience, from which we then distill and select the pragmatically decisive feature for the objectified manifestation of our existence. Truly, the logos already prompts us to descend to this last and ultimate phase of phenomenological investigation at Husserl’s phase of generic/genetic constitution, but the needed thematizing apparatus is not there at hand. But when prompted by the creative impetus, inquiry finds the specific thematizing ciphering clue of human creativity’s itself reaching its initial originary point in the *self-individualizing differentiation of originating life*. Since this differentiation carries virtualities for the delineation of the individualizing lifeworld as well as for the poietic becoming of the individual as a being, I have called it the *ontopoiesis* of life.

How the creative phase of phenomenology with its discovery of the logos of life resolves the aporias previously detailed may be here only briefly described. Taking our lead from creative experience and following the creative act of the human being in its constructive thread, we descend to the plane from which the constructive design of self-individualization in beingness takes off.<sup>16</sup>

This is the plane of the *logos of life*, of the constructive logos that carries the entirety of the givenness discovered on the previously encountered track of impetus and equipoise; it harnesses the universal becoming into the genesis of self-individualizing beingness as it both participates in the universal flux of life within the world, constituting it, and simultaneously makes it present to itself in innumerable perspectives. Here at the onto-poietic level the logos of phenomenological interrogation as logos of life, losing nothing of its postulated cognitive rigor, does not need any further clarification: it reposes in itself as the ultimate that is absolute because in need of no further “reduction,” being the yield of the very last reduction.

When we ponder just how the logos itself prompts our inquiry from one level of its major modalities to another, we must presume an infinite variety of links. But we are not to think of these as purely structural links. What we have discovered about the origination and unfolding of the logos of life – but I do not want to enter here territory to be surveyed at another opportunity – is that the shaping devices of life are carried by forces of the logos. It is by its forceful *impetus* that the logos leads us from one level to the next even withholding light on its innumerable steps in between. *Logos reveals itself as a force*. Reason is force, shaping force.<sup>17</sup>

*To be continued in the next volume.*

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, “Note on Edmund Husserl’s late breakthrough to the plane of nature-life completing his itinerary” in the Encyclopedia of Learning, *Phenomenology World-Wide*, A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.) (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), pp. 685–687.

<sup>2</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, Vol. I *Prolegomena* & 7o. cf. also a study in the Encyclopedia of Learning, *Phenomenology World-Wide* by Bianca Maria d’Ippolito, “The concept of the Lebenswelt from Husserl’s *Philosophie of Arithmetik* till *Krisis*”, p. 161.

<sup>3</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Die Erste Philosophie, zweit er Teil Theorie der Phaenomenologischen Reduktion*, Hrsg. Rudolf Boehm, Husserliana, Bd. VIII, Martinus Nijhoff, 1959, 32nd lecture, pp. 41.

<sup>4</sup> Edmund Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, trans. Lee Hardy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), *passim*.

<sup>5</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Die Idee der Phanomenologie, Fünf Vorlesungen*, Hrg. Walter Biemel, 2. Auflage Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1958, pp. 9–10.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. among others the prequoted *Erste Philosophie*, +p. 40 “*Ich bin -die Welt ist. Wie konnte ich darauf zweifeln?*”

<sup>8</sup> Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, pp. 14, 148.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. the prequoted *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, p. 164. As is well known, in the last period of his philosophical activity Husserl planned to completely overhaul transcendental phenomenology through a new approach supposed to emerge from the reworking of the last version of *Cartesian Meditations* (which Husserl considered the main presentation of his thought). This was a work he undertook in an intimate cooperation with his assistant Eugen Fink. This project was not completed. Only a fragment was written, namely, a Sixth Meditation, one elaborated by Fink with the full endorsement of Husserl, which meditation came to be simply added to the main corpus. The crucial issue begging to be resolved in a penetrating way was precisely that of the tranascendental subject supposed to constitute the world. We cannot enter here into the profound intricacies of this investigation. It is, however, important to remark that here was at stake the “phenomenology of phenomenology” that Husserl was being led to seek in the prior meditations. In order to clarify in a “reductive” fashion the specific status of phenomenology, he undertook to unfold this task as a “transcendental theory of method,” holding “transcendent self-criticism” to be basic to all other clarifying reductions. He would subject phenomenology to a final test. Yet already in the draft of the foreword and unfolding in various ways in the text of the Sixth Meditation, this final test of self-reduction is by no means conclusive. In Fink’s words, “the transcendental theory of method ... is determined by an anticipatory look at a meontic philosophy of absolute spirit.” That shows definitively the inconclusiveness of the great transcendental quest, which appears then to demand another philosophical approach and speculative theory. See Eugen Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation: The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method*, Ronald Bruzina (trans.) (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1995), p. 3. As the translator emphasizes, the term “meontic philosophy” occurs only once in the work. But it dominates its course.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *Logos and Life*, Book I: *Creative Experience and The Critique of Reason*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988. Book IV: *Impetus and Equipoise in The Life-Strategies of Reason*, Kluwer, 2000.

<sup>11</sup> See Ronald Bruzina, *Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink – Beginnings and Ends in Phenomenology, 1928–1938*. Yale Studies in Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).

<sup>12</sup> See Husserl, *op. cit.*, *Logical Investigations II*.

<sup>13</sup> It should be told parenthetically that Husserl’s originary idea of the lifeworld was meant to be the level from which the transcendental constitutive work sets out: a pristine originary field, a foundational, ontological field. However, there was a contradiction in conceiving matters in this way, one lying in Husserl’s seeing intentionality as conducting the entire course of the constitutive world process lying before it, setting it at work, upon which that intentionality cannot be apprehended. Whatever it is, it is on this assumption already constituted. But the wealth and fecundity of the lifeworld conception does not close but actually reopens at the crucial level of the origins of the individualizing of each of the beingnesses

making up the lifeworld. It is striking to think that in asking this very last question, we might be being led by the logos of interrogation to frame its proper formulation only at the end of a long route.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *Logos and Life*, Volume I, *Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*, *Analecta Husserliana*, Volume XXIV, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* and the following volumes of the treatise *Logos and Life* (Book II, *The Three Movements of the Soul*, *Analecta Husserliana*, Volume XXV. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988. *Logos and Life*, Book III, *The Elemental Passions of the Soul. Poetics of the Elements in the Human Condition*, *Analecta Husserliana*, Volume XXVIII. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990. *Logos and Life*, Book IV, *Impetus and Equipose in the Life-Strategies of Reason*, *Analecta Husserliana*, Volume LXX. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000).

<sup>16</sup> For the role of creative experience in the discovery of the logos of life consult the above mentioned treatise, *Logos and Life*.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. For the explorations leading to the conception of reason-logos-as force, cf. the following: *Life. Energies, Forces and the shaping of life: vital, existential*, *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. LXXIV; *The creative matrix of the Origins; Dynamisms, Forces and the Shaping of life*, *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. LXXVII.



SECTION I  
CRITIQUE OF REASON

## PHENOMENOLOGIE TRANSCENDANTALE ET CRITIQUE DE LA RAISON

*Théorique, pratique et axiologique*

*«..parmi les tâches qui me sont assignées, je nommerai en premier lieu la tâche générale qu'il m'incombe de résoudre pour moi-même si je dois pouvoir me nommer un philosophe, je veux dire une critique de la raison, une critique de la raison logique et pratique, de la raison axiologique en général. Tant que je ne serai pas parvenu au clair, dans ses grandes lignes, sur le sens, l'essence, les méthodes et les principaux points d'ancrage d'une telle critique de la raison, tant que je n'aurai pas conçu, établi et fondé le projet général d'une telle critique, je ne pourrai vraiment pas vivre ...»*

*E. Husserl, Annotation de son Journal du 25/09/1906*

### I. HUSSERL À L'OMBRE DE KANT ET DU KANTISME, UN BREF APERÇU HISTORIQUE

Au début du siècle dernier, au moment où retentit dans la philosophie allemande, l'écho du mot d'ordre, célèbre depuis lors: «*Zu den Sachen selbst !*» par lequel une nouvelle pensée philosophique s'affirmait avec vigueur, nombreux étaient ceux qui n'attendaient de salut pour la philosophie, menacée de sombrer dans un déluge de scepticisme et d'irrationalisme envahissant, que d'un fervent «retour à Kant» ou pour d'autres d'un «retour à Hegel». Depuis on n'a pas cessé de s'interroger sur les rapports réels entre la phénoménologie de Husserl et la philosophie critique de Kant (ou du néo-kantisme régnant dans l'Université allemande). Le nombre d'articles et d'ouvrages écrits sur le thème est impressionnant et la polémique ajoutant aux malentendus allait bon train du vivant même de Husserl. Les uns situaient la phénoménologie aux *anti-podes* du kantisme, les autres voyaient en Husserl un *néo-kantien* qui s'ignore ou ne veut pas se l'avouer, et dans la phénoménologie un effort pour sauver la philosophie critique de son échec patent par une opération de rajeunissement; d'autres encore apercevaient depuis lors dans la *Critique de la raison pure* des éléments phénoménologiques et dans la phénoménologie husserlienne l'épanouissement d'une problématique transcendante initiée par Kant.<sup>1</sup>

Quoi qu'il en soit de ces interprétations divergentes, il y a place pour autant de lectures différentes et plus nuancées, mais qui toutes oscillent plus ou moins entre les deux extrêmes et reposent sur une préconception soit de la philosophie de Kant, soit de la pensée de Husserl. Plutôt que de reprendre ces débats bien connus, bornons-nous à constater la réalité des convergences existant entre la pensée phénoménologique de Husserl et la philosophie transcendantale de Kant, à noter que le *dialogue* de Husserl avec Kant tantôt négatif, tantôt positif, a été jalonné d'approches critiques et d'admiration appropriée, d'oppositions ouvertes et de ralliements tacites. Prenant acte des nombreux points de rencontre et de convergence entre les deux philosophes, nous essaierons d'éclairer, à travers les *affinités* kantienne relevées dans la pensée husserlienne, le sens profond du projet philosophique de Husserl sans nous hasarder à engager une confrontation systématique entre la phénoménologie husserlienne et la philosophie kantienne.

Rappelons tout d'abord quelques données historiques significatives: les relations directes de Husserl avec le kantisme remontent aux années 1887–1895, c'est-à-dire bien avant la période de maturité où Husserl, aux dires de certains, se serait « brusquement » converti au néo-kantisme. La seconde période dans l'évolution de la pensée husserlienne qu'on peut repérer va des *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900/01) à la publication des *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (1913): elle sera capitale et décisive, s'il est vrai qu'elle consacra la *mutation* de la phénoménologie *descriptive* initiale en phénoménologie *transcendantale*. Elle révèle à quel point la pensée de Husserl portait l'empreinte de l'inspiration kantienne, que l'œuvre publiée ne reflète qu'imparfaitement. Puis viendra une période de rapprochement intense avec la grande tradition philosophique, qui s'opère, du moins en partie, au cours des bouleversements engendrés par la grande guerre et la crise morale que traversait Husserl dans les années difficiles qui suivirent. Les rapports que Husserl a entretenus avec son illustre prédécesseur et avec ceux de ses contemporains qui avaient l'ambition de s'approprier le lourd héritage kantien sont complexes, ambigus, souvent critiques mais jamais indifférents.

Paradoxalement, au départ le contact intellectuel de Husserl avec la philosophie kantienne était plutôt négatif dès lors qu'il lui fut ménagé par Franz Brentano qui décida de sa vocation philosophique. Aristotélicien convaincu et adversaire résolu du kantisme, Brentano voyait en Kant un parfait sceptique et le grand responsable d'une nouvelle *décadence* de la philosophie. L'« *anti-kantisme* » initial de Husserl reflète

l'influence que cette forte personnalité exerça sur le jeune mathématicien venu à la philosophie. Néanmoins les critiques qu'il formule dans son premier ouvrage original à l'endroit du kantisme révèlent une solide lecture de la *Critique de la raison pure*, sans doute encore quelque peu entachée de scepticisme et non exempte de prévention à l'encontre du kantisme. Un tournant décisif dans ses rapports avec Kant se produira au cours des années 1894–95, pour partie sous l'influence de Paul Natorp et peut-être aussi de celle plus sourde et insinuante qu'il subit en cette période à l'Université de Halle du milieu intellectuel profondément marqué par le courant philosophique dominant en Allemagne à la fin du siècle, l'école néo-kantienne.

Les premiers symptômes d'un changement d'attitude à l'égard de Kant apparaissent avec les *Prolégomènes à la logique pure* (1900) où il rattache sa propre idée de la logique à celle des «grands penseurs du passé, et notamment à Kant», qualifiant expressément sa propre définition de l'objet de la logique pure de généralisation nécessaire de la question kantienne sur les conditions de possibilité de l'expérience.<sup>2</sup> Certes les appréciations désormais positives n'empêchent pas que subsistent des désaccords et des critiques non négligeables, mais, nonobstant, en ces années avant et après la publication des *Recherches logiques*, Husserl s'adonne à une étude approfondie de la pensée kantienne, comme le prouvent certains manuscrits de l'époque et les annotations abondantes figurant sur son exemplaire personnel de la *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*.

Un autre rapprochement avec Kant, plus décisif cette fois se dessinera entre 1905 et 1907, au moment où prend naissance dans l'esprit du philosophe «l'idée de la phénoménologie» conçue comme philosophie transcendante. Orientation que plusieurs de ses disciples déploreront en la considérant comme une régression de sa pensée. Dans les cinq conférences connues depuis sous le titre *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*<sup>3</sup> où se trouve exposé pour la première fois le principe de la *réduction*, la philosophie de Kant est tout aussi présente que celle de Descartes, notamment dans la question de la légitime revendication d'objectivité de la connaissance. En outre, s'y trouve formulée clairement la nécessité d'une «critique de la raison» que, depuis 1904, Husserl considère comme sa principale tâche de philosophe. Si la méthode de la «déduction transcendante» selon Kant lui semble peu compatible avec l'intuitionnisme et l'idéal cartésien d'une science apodictique, qu'il affirme avec vigueur, il reste que des motifs d'origine kantienne agissent de façon latente mais non moins essentielle sur sa pensée, et contribueront à déterminer le sens ultime de la réduction phénoménologique.

Toutefois, c'est après sa découverte de la réduction que Husserl prendra conscience de la profonde *parenté* entre sa propre visée philosophique et celle de Kant. Si initialement il avait manifesté une certaine hostilité à l'égard du kantisme et une nette prédilection pour la philosophie cartésienne et l'empirisme anglais (Locke, Hume), il reconnaît désormais que la science philosophique à laquelle il travaille comprendra finalement toute la problématique kantienne. D'où le besoin d'une explication (*Auseinandersetzung*) plus poussée avec la pensée kantienne. La communauté d'intention philosophique avec Kant s'exprimera, dès 1908, par l'adoption du terme kantien de «philosophie *transcendantale*» pour définir la phénoménologie. Même *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* (1911) et le tome premier des *Ideen* confirmeront ce rapprochement positif avec Kant. Prenant conscience de l'appartenance de la phénoménologie à l'histoire, Husserl la rattache désormais à la grande tradition philosophique et la considère comme la «secrète nostalgie» de la philosophie moderne dont Kant avec Descartes fut l'un des plus illustres représentants. De fait, dès les *Recherches logiques*, ou en tout cas dès 1905 et les conférences sur l'*Idée de la phénoménologie*, Husserl n'a cessé de s'engager dans cette «*Selbstbesinnung*» historique et a été amené à approfondir le sens de son propre projet philosophique par une réflexion – qu'il n'a cessé de poursuivre tout au long de son oeuvre – sur «l'essentielle parenté entre la phénoménologie et la philosophie transcendante de Kant».<sup>4</sup>

Ainsi notre objectif n'est pas le vaste débat historique dans lequel s'inscrit l'œuvre de Husserl, mais simplement montrer comment, non-obstant toutes les divergences qu'on pourra relever, il a pensé la phénoménologie comme un *approfondissement* de la pensée kantienne. Car plutôt que de chercher à en rectifier ou améliorer la problématique, Husserl a pour ambition de se porter «au-delà» de Kant mais dans le sens même de sa pensée en assumant résolument et pleinement, dans la phénoménologie transcendante, l'héritage de la critique kantienne. La permanence du dialogue avec Kant, qu'il reprend activement à partir de 1917, est attestée à nouveau dans les cours de 1923/24 parus depuis sous le titre de *Erste Philosophie* et surtout par le grand article écrit en 1924 à l'occasion du bicentenaire de la naissance de Kant.<sup>5</sup> Loin d'être un écrit de circonstance, il donna à Husserl l'occasion d'exprimer la conscience qu'il avait désormais de son intime parenté avec Kant, quoiqu'il lui répugnât toujours qu'on interprêtât sa pensée à partir de la philosophie kantienne et surtout qu'on la confondît avec le néo-kantisme. Il juge au contraire que la philosophie critique et son sens véritable s'éclairent en

quelque sorte *rétrospectivement* à partir de la phénoménologie transcendante.

L'ombre de Kant ne cessera de planer sur la philosophie de Husserl dans les années qui suivirent. *Formale und transzendente Logik* (1929), le seul ouvrage qui ait vu le jour au cours de cette période et qu'on a pu considérer comme le livre de Husserl, le plus révélateur de la destination de la phénoménologie,<sup>6</sup> fait expressément référence à Kant et pas uniquement par son sous-titre «Essai d'une critique de la raison logique». Et pourtant la même année Husserl semble avoir oublié Kant puisque les Conférences de Paris de 1929 (parus en traduction française d'abord sous le titre significatif de *Méditations cartésiennes*) placent à nouveau la phénoménologie sous l'égide de Descartes. L'auteur de la *Critique de la raison pure* n'y est guère cité, mais il serait abusif de prendre ces *Méditations* pour le symptôme d'une rupture définitive avec Kant, pour un véritable «adieu au kantisme». Si le point de départ est indéniablement cartésien, le point d'arrivée, l'idée de la phénoménologie comme idéalisme transcendantal fait tout aussi clairement signe en direction de Kant.<sup>7</sup>

Il n'en va pas autrement du dernier écrit de Husserl publié plus tard sous le titre *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*, avec le texte de la conférence de Vienne de 1935. Peut-être Husserl l'a-t-il conçu poussé par le sentiment de l'échec des *Méditations cartésiennes*, dont le texte allemand pourtant annoncé n'a pas été publié du vivant du philosophe? Quoi qu'il en soit, l'auteur de la *Krisis* s'éloigne quelque peu de la voie cartésienne vers la phénoménologie transcendante pour s'engager, à travers une «*Selbstbesinnung*» historique, dans une «évaluation» critique de la philosophie de Kant, qu'il juge être une tâche impérieuse à laquelle il ne veut ni ne peut se dérober.<sup>8</sup> En fait, dans son effort pour saisir le sens profond de son propre projet philosophique, Husserl semble toujours avoir oscillé entre les deux pôles constants de sa pensée, Descartes et Kant. S'il voit en eux les deux grands précurseurs de la phénoménologie, la «révolution copernicienne» de Kant n'est pas pensable sans la découverte cartésienne de l'*ego cogito* posé comme évidence apodictique primordiale de toute pensée rationnelle.

D'une certaine manière, la *Krisis* est conçue comme une explication avec Kant, comme une confrontation de la «rationalité» kantienne avec la «scientificité» cartésienne, elle est censée montrer comment l'opposition entre «l'objectivisme» et le «transcendantalisme» a dominé toute l'histoire moderne de la pensée européenne. Cependant Husserl remet à plus tard la critique systématique de Kant, d'autant plus incontournable à ses yeux qu'il se sent proche de lui. La conférence de Prague (texte de base de la

*Krisis*) tendait à expliquer pourquoi la «révolution copernicienne» inaugurée par Kant n'a pas été définitivement acquise dans l'histoire de la philosophie moderne et pourquoi l'objectivisme physicaliste, cause de la crise actuelle que traversent et la science et l'humanité européennes, n'a pas été vaincue une fois pour toutes.<sup>9</sup> Quelque hétérogènes que paraissent être les différentes parties de l'ouvrage, toutes n'en présentent pas moins la philosophie transcendantale de Kant comme triomphant de l'objectivisme et consacrant la découverte d'une dimension toute nouvelle de la connaissance, le *subjectivisme* transcendantal issu d'un esprit scientifique radicalement nouveau. Le dernier grand écrit de Husserl plutôt qu'une «critique de la raison pure» se présente ainsi comme une «critique de la raison historique» et implique, au moins indirectement, une «critique de la raison pratique et axiologique». Si Husserl y réfléchit sur Kant, il n'y réfléchit pas moins sur Descartes et même autant sur Hume, Locke, Berkeley et d'une façon générale sur l'empirisme et le rationalisme modernes.

Voilà pourquoi il faut écarter résolument l'idée fallacieuse que, pour comprendre le sens ultime et l'originalité de la phénoménologie, il faille la débarrasser de toutes les références historiques dont elle s'est nourrie. Husserl lui-même, dans *Ideen I* comme dans *Erste Philosophie* ou dans la *Krisis*, s'emploie à la relier à la «motivation originelle» qui a animé toute l'histoire de la pensée et il voit en elle l'aboutissement et l'élucidation d'un projet qui a été le souci permanent de la philosophie depuis ses origines grecques anciennes où a pris naissance l'idée de philosophie. L'auto-compréhension de la phénoménologie implique de toute nécessité la confrontation avec l'histoire de la philosophie. Que l'une des figures de cette confrontation, outre Descartes, ait été naturellement Kant, ou du moins l'intention fondamentale du kantisme, ne saurait surprendre le lecteur attentif. Notre propos est dès lors clairement défini par l'affirmation expresse de Husserl selon laquelle la réflexion sur sa propre situation par rapport à Kant a fait progresser la compréhension qu'il avait de lui-même et de sa vocation de phénoménologue, l'«évaluation (*Auswertung*) critique de la philosophie de Kant» étant pour lui une tâche impérieuse à laquelle il ne voulait ni ne pouvait se dérober.<sup>10</sup>

## II. EMERGENCE D'UN PROJET DE CRITIQUE DE LA RAISON?

C'est au cours de la période qui va de la parution des *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900/01) à celle des *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (1913) que Husserl a vraiment conçu

le projet d'une *philosophie phénoménologique*, qui a mûri dans son esprit à la faveur des efforts qu'il faisait pour préciser les intentions implicites de «l'ouvrage de percée» de la phénoménologie. Néanmoins la période qui sépare les deux ouvrages marque un tournant décisif dans sa pensée: quelque six ans après la parution du premier ouvrage, Husserl connaît des moments de découragement voire de désespoir au cours desquels il prenait peu à peu conscience de lui-même et de sa tâche de philosophe, mais en même temps ressentit l'impérieuse nécessité d'avoir à résoudre pour lui-même le problème universel d'une «critique de la raison», pas seulement de la raison logique, mais aussi de la raison pratique et axiologique. Quelques annotations significatives de son Journal, datant de 1906, témoignent explicitement que ce fut là pour lui une tâche sans laquelle il ne pensait pas pouvoir mériter le nom de philosophe. Bien plus, sans avoir élucidé le sens, la méthode et les points essentiels d'une telle «critique de la raison», il ne pense pas pouvoir vivre, déclare-t-il.<sup>11</sup> Cette allusion au titre de l'oeuvre principale de Kant n'est pas pur hasard, c'est au cours de ces années durant lesquelles Husserl s'est intensément occupé de la pensée kantienne qu'est née en lui l'idée d'une «phénoménologie conçue comme philosophie transcendante et critique de la raison» et qu'il s'emploie en même temps à préciser l'idée centrale de toute la phénoménologie, celle de la *réduction* phénoménologique ainsi que le problème de la *constitution* des objets dans la conscience ou, comme il aime encore à le formuler, de la «dissolution de l'être dans la conscience», qui consacrera sa conception de l'*idéalisme* transcendantal. Plus exactement, dès 1903/04, Husserl se résout à abandonner le stade de la phénoménologie *descriptive*, qui l'emportait encore dans les *Recherches logiques* pour s'engager dans une critique de la raison, une «critique phénoménologique de la raison».<sup>12</sup>

Néanmoins, en dépit d'un progressif rapprochement de la phénoménologie de la raison avec la critique de la raison kantienne, une divergence capitale subsiste d'emblée: contrairement à Kant, Husserl ne parle jamais de «critique de la raison *pure*» qui aurait pour seul objet de réduire les prétentions de la raison *spéculative* ambitionnant de s'élever au-dessus de l'expérience et d'atteindre ainsi à un «absolu». Idée qui paraît absurde à Husserl car la raison est dans son essence «intuitive» et «expérimentale». En désaccord avec Kant depuis les *Recherches logiques*, Husserl conçoit tout différemment l'idée de *Raison* puisque pour lui la source de toute rationalité est à chercher dans l'évidence intuitive originaire. Raison et objectivité sont dans un rapport intentionnel de donation de sens et de validation d'être.<sup>13</sup> Pour le phénoménologue, la question n'est pas le



«*quid juris*» de la connaissance *a priori*, le problème qu'il pose n'est pas celui que pose le philosophe criticiste qui s'interroge sur la légitimité et la validité de la connaissance *a priori*. L'évidence naïve immédiate de la connaissance intuitive n'est pas véritablement «illégitime», simplement sa légitimité reste encore «non élucidée», elle n'est pas encore «fondée en raison». L'exigence méthodologique fondamentale que Husserl ne se lasse pas de mettre en exergue est celle d'un «radicalisme» de la pensée qui, à l'encontre de toutes les «idoles» de la connaissance, de toutes les puissances de la tradition, des préjugés de tous ordres, des constructions et spéculations métaphysiques, fait valoir le «droit de la raison» à s'imposer comme seule autorité en matière de vérité.<sup>14</sup> Formule que Kant n'aurait sans doute pas démentie, mais Husserl, paradoxalement, en attribue le mérite à l'empirisme anglais. Pour lui, ce qui est saisissable de façon originaire, sans la médiation d'aucune espèce de pensée construite à coup de concepts *a priori*, c'est bien par l'intuition que nous y accédons, c'est bien l'intuition qui précède toute pensée théorique. Cependant, il ne l'ignore pas, ce qui est à saisir par une conscience originairement donatrice de «la chose même», ce n'est justement pas le donné immédiat, on ne peut le préjuger, il faut le *voir* et le *décrire*, et donc tout d'abord se détourner des concepts objectifs et explicatifs pour porter tout l'effort sur l'élucidation (*Aufklärung*) du phénomène. Si l'intuition donne l'objet «en personne», elle ne le réduit pas à une simple apparence. Au contraire, elle indique en même temps que le phénomène tel qu'il se présente recèle tout autre chose que ce que nous croyons d'abord voir et distinguer en lui. Et c'est la tâche justement de l'analyse intentionnelle de mettre à nu les horizons de sens et les implications et motivations cachées de l'évidence naïve. L'analyse phénoménologique est ainsi pour Husserl le pendant de la «déduction subjective» de Kant et constitue une étape essentielle de la critique de la raison lors même qu'elle n'est pas au premier plan dans la première *Critique* de Kant.<sup>15</sup>

Témoignant de ce tournant dans sa pensée, les cinq Conférences de 1907 éditées sous le titre *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* étaient conçues comme une introduction à un cycle de conférences intitulées «*Phénoménologie et critique de la raison*» dans lesquelles Husserl essaie de cerner la tâche générale d'une critique de la connaissance. Ces textes montrent comment la «question fondamentale» de la philosophie a émergé chez Husserl comme chez Kant à un moment où l'un comme l'autre se trouvent confrontés à la menace d'un *scepticisme* radical. Husserl considère ainsi que la tâche urgente à laquelle il devait s'atteler sans délai et s'appliquer de longues années durant, c'était «l'élucidation de l'essence

de la connaissance et de l'objectivité de la connaissance», autrement dit oeuvrer à l'édification d'une véritable «théorie ou critique de la connaissance», au sens kantien du terme. Ce fut là le point de départ de la phénoménologie: «Comment la conscience peut-elle sortir d'elle-même et atteindre son objet de façon certaine?» Comment une connaissance qui transcende la conscience est-elle possible? Voilà la question première que pose le phénoménologue en tant qu'il vise à constituer une véritable critique de la raison théorique, et tout d'abord une critique de la raison logique et judicative.<sup>16</sup>

Plus largement, la critique phénoménologique de la raison selon Husserl interroge sur le sens d'être de toute objectivité, c'est l'être du monde dans son rapport à la subjectivité constituante qui est en question, et plus fondamentalement encore l'être de la subjectivité elle-même. Problème que Kant n'a pas totalement ignoré mais qu'il n'a abordé vraiment que dans la *Critique de la raison pratique*. Une même motivation animait leur projet commun d'une critique de la raison; en un sens, l'un comme l'autre luttent, chacun à sa manière, contre un *absolutisme* fallacieux et un *scepticisme* envahissant, quoique dans des circonstances historiques qui diffèrent sensiblement. Kant vivait à l'époque du rationalisme métaphysique triomphant qui «absolutisait» les concepts purs de l'entendement et les idées transcendentes de la raison théorique. Husserl se trouve confronté à un absolutisme d'un autre ordre, encore qu'il soit également – et paradoxalement – une forme de rationalisme, celui imposé par le positivisme des sciences de la Nature. Kant mit fin à l'absolutisation des concepts purs en restreignant leur validité objective à l'expérience, Husserl de son côté comprenait qu'il fallait soumettre à une critique rigoureuse l'expérience objective elle-même, à laquelle le positivisme en appelle comme à un principe absolu. Ainsi la visée de la «critique» kantienne et celle de la critique phénoménologique de la raison se rejoignent, mais diffèrent en raison de la situation historique dans laquelle l'un et l'autre s'efforçaient de la mettre en oeuvre. Plus d'une fois Husserl déclare que le questionnement kantien sur les conditions de possibilité de l'expérience objective et les sciences empiriques et «exactes» de la nature, en dernière analyse, conduit, du moins implicitement, à leur nécessaire «mise entre parenthèses» et par suite à la découverte de la dimension de la subjectivité transcendante fondatrice de toute objectivité. Le «retour critique» de l'a priori objectif à l'a priori subjectif (qu'il décèle dans la déduction transcendante de la première édition de la *Critique de la raison pure*) a le même sens que la méthode phénoménologique tendant à révéler la subjectivité constituante sur laquelle est centrée

la phénoménologie de la raison théorique. Husserl n'a jamais cessé d'apercevoir dans la critique de la raison de Kant une profonde intuition de l'essence de la subjectivité transcendante connaissante et constituante de toute objectivité. Seulement pour lui, «la critique, première en soi, de la connaissance, dans laquelle toute autre critique prend racine, c'est l'autocritique transcendante de la phénoménologie elle-même» alors que par ailleurs sa démarche est nécessairement ancrée dans une certaine «naïveté provisoire» qu'il a à surmonter.<sup>17</sup>

C'est avant tout dans le cours de 1923/24 édité dans l'oeuvre posthume sous le titre de «*Erste Philosophie*» et dans les textes publiés en appendice intitulés «Kant et l'idée de philosophie transcendante» et «Kant et la révolution copernicienne» qu'on découvre le portrait le plus complet que Husserl ait tracé de Kant. Il renvoie ainsi explicitement à Kant en déclarant que «la théorie transcendante de la connaissance est la condition de possibilité de toute métaphysique», elle doit donc nécessairement la précéder et, une fois élaborée, accompagner toute démarche métaphysique.<sup>18</sup> Théorie transcendante de la connaissance, elle sera dès lors pour Husserl, comme elle le fut pour Kant une «critique universelle de la raison». C'est là une problématique absolument nouvelle et l'inauguration d'une «science tout à fait nouvelle» dans l'histoire de la philosophie, déclare Husserl, car l'humanité jusqu'à Kant a accepté le monde de l'expérience tel qu'il se donne et a situé le sujet connaissant lui-même en tant qu'homme dans le monde. Pour la pensée dogmatique, il allait de soi que l'homme ait le pouvoir de connaître la vérité du monde puisqu'elle avait la «certitude de croyance» de posséder le monde, la seule question qui se posait était de savoir comment il est et comment l'atteindre dans son être-donné lui-même.<sup>19</sup>

Or, «s'il est vrai qu'un monde existe pour moi dans une évidence qui va de soi, et que l'expérience m'en fait découvrir des aspects toujours nouveaux en me révélant à moi-même comme être psycho-corporel, comme chose parmi les choses», alors la seule question qui se pose à la subjectivité connaissante est de savoir quelles sont les conditions de possibilité a priori lui permettant d'acquérir et de justifier la conviction qu'il a de l'existence d'un tel monde réel et de sa capacité de le connaître objectivement. Seulement, son existence pour moi désigne d'abord un véritable processus subjectif: les objets, les vérités du monde pour moi sont des événements subjectifs se produisant dans l'immanence de ma conscience; même l'espace et le temps, selon Kant formes a priori de la sensibilité, à travers lesquels le monde m'apparaît, appartiennent à ma subjectivité propre. Pareille interprétation ne revient pas à priver le monde

de sa valeur, cela va de soi, elle correspond simplement à la «mise en évidence» d'un état de fait nécessaire. D'où le problème qui en résulte: comprendre «comment la subjectivité, en vertu de sa propre autonomie, et en se comprenant elle-même, connaît légitimement l'être du monde et justement ce monde-ci».<sup>20</sup>

Voilà le pas décisif vers une philosophie transcendante que Kant a initiée par la «révolution copernicienne» en inaugurant une véritable science fondamentale nouvelle qui prendra le nom de *philosophie transcendante*. Si Kant a eu l'insigne mérite d'avoir étendu la problématique transcendante à toutes les formes d'objectivité possibles, tant celles du monde moral que celles de l'univers esthétique, et ce lors même qu'il est parti de l'examen des sciences exactes de la nature, il n'a pas achevé le grand projet d'une «science transcendante du monde».<sup>21</sup> En revanche, il a réellement jeté les bases de cette science nouvelle qui, par l'explicitation des conditions eidétiques de la conscience du monde se constituant dans la subjectivité pure, rend intelligible le monde lui-même dans son sens vrai et authentique. Il a été le premier à considérer la science non pas seulement comme un ensemble de connaissances objectives, mais comme une *opération subjective* de la connaissance, s'accomplissant dans l'immanence de la conscience. Voilà pourquoi, paradoxalement, il a fondé l'*objectivité* et la validité de la connaissance sur une théorie transcendante de la *subjectivité* laquelle prendra, chez lui aussi par nécessité, la forme d'un *idéisme transcendantal*.<sup>22</sup>

La méthode à laquelle il recourt n'est pas moins originale: elle consiste en un questionnement régressif, une sorte de «*Rückfrage*», dira Husserl, qui remonte aux sources ultimes de l'expérience du monde, aux *origines* des formations de la connaissance et la prise de conscience de soi du sujet connaissant; elle se formule en ces termes: «Sous quelle forme doit apparaître un monde objectif pour qu'il soit l'objet d'une expérience possible et pour qu'il soit connaissable comme un monde un et identique, et ce à travers les expériences les plus variées possibles»?<sup>23</sup> Sous le titre de «déduction transcendante», et par opposition à l'objectivisme pré-scientifique mais aussi scientifique, Kant remonte à *l'a priori* de la conscience donatrice de sens, observe Husserl, il «fait retour à la subjectivité connaissante elle-même comme lieu originaire de toutes formations de sens et validations d'être objectives».<sup>24</sup>

Kant n'en donne pas pour autant dans le *scepticisme* à la manière de Hume qui «dissout le monde en purs phénomènes subjectifs», le réduit à n'être que pure «fiction». L'*idéisme transcendantal* de Kant, loin de mettre en doute le monde de l'expérience ou la vérité objective des sciences

positives, tend au contraire à leur assurer un fondement scientifique rigoureux et solide, note Husserl.<sup>25</sup> L'être-en-soi du monde est un *fait* indubitable, mais c'est un fait que seule la philosophie transcendante est à même de fonder en raison. Husserl va jusqu'à affirmer qu'une fois fondée une philosophie transcendante en tant que science rigoureuse, toutes les autres sciences pourront accéder au niveau de rationalité théorique ultime qu'elles exigent en vertu de leur essence propre. Toutefois, si Kant a su tracer les grandes lignes de «l'édifice monumentale de la science transcendante», selon Husserl, il n'a pas réussi à mener jusqu'à son terme le projet qu'il avait initié.<sup>26</sup> En fait, sa philosophie transcendante n'est pas cette science dernière qu'elle avait pourtant l'ambition d'édifier, comme Kant lui-même semble en avoir fait l'aveu. Finalement, Husserl en arrive à conclure – et ce n'est pas contradictoire – que «la critique de la raison» de Kant est tout aussi éloignée d'une philosophie transcendante conçue comme science absolument fondamentale, ce qui veut dire fondatrice et fondée en dernière instance, que ne l'était celle de Leibniz.<sup>27</sup>

En un mot, la perspective transcendante dans laquelle s'était engagé Kant est restée trop *limitée* puisqu'elle a laissé en dehors de son domaine de compétence tout un pan de la vie de la conscience transcendante. Le radicalisme insuffisant de la critique kantienne a donné lieu à un certain nombre de contradictions et de difficultés, repose sur des présuppositions dogmatiques, des concepts mythiques: par exemple la conception de la *chose en soi*, la doctrine de *l'intellectus archetypus*, de l'aperception transcendante ou de la «conscience en général». Or, sans la doctrine de la «chose en soi», tout son système philosophique s'écroule, et pourtant en même temps on ne saurait admettre pareille doctrine *métaphysique* dans une théorie *transcendante* radicale, juge Husserl en affirmant qu'un subjectivisme transcendantal mis en œuvre dans toute sa pureté «ne laisse nulle place à des hypothèses «métaphysiques» au sujet d'un «être-en-soi» derrière l'être se constituant dans les fonctions intentionnelles de la conscience transcendante.<sup>28</sup>

L'adoption par Husserl du nom kantien de *philosophie transcendante* résulterait-elle pour autant d'une rencontre purement fortuite, d'une simple analogie des termes retenus pour désigner la philosophie phénoménologique dès lors qu'elle n'est plus science purement descriptive? Certains le pensent en n'en voulant pour preuve que l'insistance avec laquelle Husserl se réfère à Descartes voire à Hume plutôt qu'à Kant lorsqu'il s'agit de justifier la phénoménologie transcendante. On va jusqu'à soutenir que Husserl, *in fine*, aurait délibérément ignoré le «transcendentalisme» kantien jusque dans un texte où la référence à Kant –

certaines implicites – ne se limite pas au seul sous-titre.<sup>29</sup> On explique la différence capitale entre le projet philosophique de la «Critique» kantienne et celui de la phénoménologie par leur divergence irréductible sur la notion même de «transcendental». Eugen Fink, fidèle entre les fidèles disciples de Husserl, avait jadis suggéré que, chez Kant, «transcendental» s'oppose à «empirique» tandis que chez Husserl le concept anti-thétique de «transcendental» est «mondain» (*weltlich*). Chez le premier, il s'agirait de la forme a priori de l'expérience du monde, chez le second «transcendental» renverrait à la notion de la transcendance du monde et finalement définirait la subjectivité constituante du monde qui, en tant que telle, ne peut plus être une subjectivité mondaine.<sup>30</sup> N'est-ce pas oublier que la confrontation établie par Fink visait plutôt le néo-kantisme que Kant lui-même?

A la vérité, dès 1908 Husserl trouve troublant le «double sens» du concept de *transcendental* chez Kant, le premier lui paraissant définir la question de la possibilité de la connaissance objective, d'une connaissance qui, d'une part, est «subjective» et, d'autre part, porte sur un être «objectif» indépendant de la subjectivité connaissante. Le premier concept évoque pour lui le problème de la corrélation nécessaire entre objectivité et subjectivité et implique la nécessité d'un questionnement «transcendental», c'est-à-dire d'un retour copernicien, d'une sorte de «*Rückfrage*» de la subjectivité sur elle-même, un «retour aux origines» de la connaissance. C'est ce concept qu'il adoptera pour définir la phénoménologie quoiqu'il n'ignorât pas que son interprétation du transcendentalisme kantien ne concorde pas exactement avec la définition du «transcendental» par Kant. Quant au second sens de «transcendental» chez Kant, le sens «méthodologique» tel qu'il est proprement à l'œuvre tant dans *l'Esthétique* que dans *l'Analytique* transcendantales, Husserl ne peut l'approuver en raison de toutes les «présuppositions dogmatiques» dont il est grevé.<sup>31</sup> Malgré tout, c'est bien par référence à Kant que Husserl définira la phénoménologie comme philosophie transcendante car pour lui il fut bien ce philosophe qui, face à l'objectivisme dogmatique, a tenté de mettre en œuvre une science nouvelle, une science de la subjectivité connaissante, «lieu et source originaires» de toute objectivité, de toute donation de sens et validation d'être.<sup>32</sup> Si néanmoins, dans le texte de la *Krisis*, il qualifie de «motif cartésien» le concept de «transcendental», cela prouve tout au plus que Husserl ne songeait pas à opposer Descartes et Kant, mais au contraire à les situer tous deux avec Hume dans une même lignée de penseurs qui ont inauguré le courant moderne de la philosophie transcendante.

La problématique du transcendantal, immanquablement, nous confronte à l'un des points les plus controversés parmi les interprètes de la philosophie husserlienne, à savoir son option résolue pour *l'idéalisme transcendantal*. Le principe suprême de toute philosophie transcendantale, à savoir que les conditions de possibilité de l'expérience sont aussi les conditions de possibilité de l'objet de l'expérience, selon la formule même de Kant, n'impose-t-il pas inévitablement à l'un et à l'autre une solution idéaliste au problème de la connaissance? Husserl voyait là le sens de la révolution copernicienne, plus exactement dans l'effort kantien d'une interprétation foncièrement nouvelle du sens d'être du monde objectif. Il revendique explicitement, notamment à partir des années vingt, pour sa propre philosophie le nom d'idéalisme transcendantal.<sup>33</sup> A la vérité, l'hypothèse idéaliste est présente – du moins tacitement – dès le tome I des *Ideen* et même déjà dans *l'Idée de la phénoménologie* et est expressément évoquée en 1929 dans les *Méditations cartésiennes*, dans *Formale und transzendente Logik* et en 1930 dans le «*Nachwort zu den Ideen*». Si la *Krisis* ne semble pas recourir à l'expression d'idéalisme transcendantal, ce n'est pas parce que Husserl aurait totalement renoncé à l'interprétation idéaliste du monde. En revanche, il est vrai aussi qu'à ses yeux l'idéalisme kantien n'est recevable qu'à la condition de faire abstraction des «composantes métaphysiques» de la *Critique*, c'est-à-dire de l'absurde doctrine de la «chose en soi» et de *l'intellectus archetypus*, selon Husserl une hypothèse en contradiction avec «le sens le plus profond de l'idéalisme transcendantal».<sup>34</sup>

Le *scepticisme* qui a présidé à la naissance de la phénoménologie et qui a motivé le commencement de la réflexion philosophique de Husserl n'est pas foncièrement différent de la situation dans laquelle Kant fit effort pour réagir contre le danger du scepticisme envahissant dans lequel il sentit qu'il risquait de tomber après le «sommeil dogmatique» d'où il fut tiré par sa lecture de Hume. L'attitude de pensée que Kant appelait dogmatique et que Husserl nommera «attitude naturelle» désigne la naïveté avec laquelle la conscience saisit les objets à connaître sans se poser les questions préjudicielles telles que: que pouvons-nous savoir? Quelles sont les possibilités réelles et les limites du pouvoir de connaître de la raison théorique? En d'autres termes, avant de nous fier tranquillement à ce que nos facultés de connaître nous apprennent, il faut procéder, pense Kant, à un examen sérieux de *l'organe* de notre connaissance, à une véritable critique de l'instrument employé.<sup>35</sup> D'où le besoin impératif d'une science préalable à toute doctrine de l'être, à toute métaphysique. Seule une théorie transcendantale de la connaissance pourra nous éclairer

sur les pouvoirs réels de la raison, sur sa portée et ses limites, et finalement aussi sur la validité des enseignements qu'elle nous apporte. La manière dont Kant abordera et résoudra le problème implique un changement d'attitude radical, une véritable «révolution» de la pensée, unique voie possible permettant de fonder la philosophie, une métaphysique «qui pourra se présenter comme science». Voilà le point de départ et le problème capital de la *Critique de la raison pure*.

Husserl partira lui aussi de «l'attitude naturelle» dans laquelle est ancrée notre connaissance naïve. Primordialement orientée vers les choses données à la conscience dans une évidence certaine, elle est à sa façon *dogmatique* dès lors que la possibilité de la connaissance va de soi pour elle et qu'à travers la conquête des sciences elle progresse de découvertes en découvertes toujours nouvelles. Pour elle, la connaissance est un *fait* indéniable, elle n'est pas un *problème* car confiante en son pouvoir et en quelque sorte insouciant d'elle-même, elle n'a pas de motifs pour s'interroger sur elle-même, pour sortir de son champ de compétence, de sa «limitation» naturelle. Seulement pour peu que nous nous mettions à réfléchir, nous voilà confrontés à des erreurs, entraînés dans des égarements et condamnés à nous enliser dans des contradictions quasi insurmontables. Nous voilà en proie au *scepticisme* qui menace d'emporter la confiance que nous avons spontanément en notre faculté de connaître. Dès lors, note Husserl, la connaissance, la chose la plus évidente du monde, devient d'un coup pour nous le plus grand des *mystères*. Avons-nous le droit de nous résigner et d'affirmer avec le sceptique que notre connaissance n'est rien d'autre qu'un état *subjectif*, qu'il n'y a pas d'autre vérité que la *nôtre*, qu'à chacun *sa* vérité, que la connaissance n'est que connaissance *humaine*, incapable d'atteindre la nature même des choses?<sup>36</sup>

Le terrain sur lequel s'affrontent ces diverses conceptions sur le pouvoir et l'impouvoir de la raison est celui de la théorie de la connaissance et de la métaphysique. Voilà pourquoi la tâche incontournable pour le philosophe est justement une «critique de la raison théorique», juge Husserl. Cependant avant de procéder à la critique de la connaissance naturelle, il faut opérer un radical changement d'attitude, une véritable «révolution copernicienne» dont surgira la pensée proprement philosophique qui a son site «dans une *dimension* toute nouvelle».<sup>37</sup> La phénoménologie, qui adopte d'emblée ce nouveau mode de penser, a pour vocation d'être cette science unique comme le fut jadis pour Kant la *Critique de la raison pure*: à elle incombe l'impérieuse tâche d'élucidation du sens, de l'essence et de la validité de la connaissance. De la réussite de cette science à laquelle la phénoménologie assurera sa vraie refonda-



tion, et qui devra dissiper les doutes et les contradictions qui tourmentent et déroutent la pensée, dépendra comme chez Kant la possibilité d'une «métaphysique qui puisse se présenter comme science».<sup>38</sup>

Pour Husserl comme pour Kant, ce qui est énigmatique dans la possibilité de la connaissance, c'est bien le problème de la *transcendance*, autrement dit, la prétention de la connaissance d'atteindre, au-delà d'elle-même, un objet qui lui est extérieur et qui constituera, selon Husserl, «le point de départ et le fil conducteur de la critique de la connaissance» et de la philosophie transcendante.<sup>39</sup> Une divergence capitale avec la position du problème défendue par Kant se fait jour ici car, aux yeux de Husserl, quelle que soit l'absolue certitude que nous avons *en fait* d'une connaissance transcendante, le fait demeure *énigmatique*, et quels que soient les résultats positifs auxquels aboutissent les sciences positives, nous ne saurions en déduire la *possibilité* de l'objectivité de la connaissance transcendante. Le problème n'est plus de savoir *comment* une connaissance *transcendante* est possible, mais plutôt d'*expliquer* comment naît ce «*préjugé universel*» sur lequel se fondent toutes les sciences, ni la question kantienne «comment le monde doit-il être constitué pour qu'il soit accessible à la connaissance en général» pas plus que la question inverse «comment doit être la connaissance pour que, en elle, un monde soit connaissable, et le soit scientifiquement».<sup>40</sup> D'où le principe fondamental de toute théorie de la connaissance dans lequel est en germe aussi le principe fondateur de la phénoménologie, à savoir la nécessité d'une «*réduction épistémologique*» qui affectera de «l'indice d'indifférence voire de nullité» toutes les transcendances entrant en jeu dans le processus de la connaissance.<sup>41</sup> Il est vrai que la «*révolution copernicienne*» initiée par Kant, que Husserl entend pleinement prendre à son compte, grâce à laquelle nous comprenons le monde en faisant de l'objet connu retour au sujet connaissant, n'a pas le sens radical que prendra la réduction phénoménologique transcendante lors même que la critique kantienne de la raison théorique est une «*phénoménologie commençante*» mais qui n'a pas poussé jusqu'au bout le mouvement du retour à la subjectivité transcendante.

Voilà comment Husserl comme Kant nous confrontent à ce qui constituera la thèse centrale de l'idéalisme phénoménologique transcendental, qu'il convient tout d'abord de rapporter à l'analyse bien connue que Husserl a développée dès le tome premier des *Ideen*. La thèse n'en fait pas pour autant du monde un produit, une création de la subjectivité. Tant que l'intentionnalité ou la constitution n'avait qu'un sens *statique*, l'expérience du monde pouvait être considérée comme «pro-ductive» au

sens strict du terme. La seule chose que soutienne la phénoménologie statique, c'est que le monde est *relatif* à la subjectivité connaissante, constituant le sens que ce monde a pour nous. Pour que le monde puisse apparaître comme un «produit de sens», il faut encore que l'intentionnalité soit comprise comme «opérante» (*leistende*) et la constitution comme «génétique», comme pendant de la «genèse de sens» (*Sinngeneration*) du monde. La relativité de principe du monde à la conscience connaissante se révèle dans l'analyse des modes d'être donné du monde objectif: on en retiendra en particulier que l'objet réel de l'expérience est donné seulement à titre de «pôle identique» des multiples modes d'apparaître de l'objet à travers des «esquisses» unilatérales. L'objet est un X qui se donne tantôt sous tel aspect, tantôt sous tel autre. Modes d'apparaître naturellement «subjectifs» en ce qu'ils dépendent de la «position» du sujet dans son environnement naturel, de sa nature corporelle organique. Pour autant ils ne sont pas uniquement déterminés par les conditions d'existence du sujet corporel humain, ils dépendent aussi de l'essence de la chose réelle elle-même et de sa place au milieu du monde chosal, avec ses diverses interconnexions eidétiques objectives.<sup>42</sup>

Or, selon Husserl, même si l'objet X ne correspond pas à la «chose-en-soi» de Kant, il nous est impossible de parcourir intégralement la totalité des apparitions à travers lesquelles il se donne à voir dans son identité d'objet déterminé. On peut le percevoir sous des aspects toujours nouveaux, il n'est jamais donné dans sa totalité d'être, à tout moment, la perception peut se révéler simple illusion, l'objet n'être que pure apparence. Dans une formule que Sartre n'aurait pas démentie, Husserl déclare que «tout être de l'apparaître est en suspens entre l'être et le non-être».<sup>43</sup> En dépit des confirmations qu'elle ne cesse de recevoir, la réalité du monde existant est une «présomption» sans fin, en quelque sorte sans cesse «en sursis». Le monde vrai est de part en part «anticipation» d'expériences de confirmation voire d'infirmité, «le monde», en dernier ressort, n'est qu'un «*Sinnprodukt*», une oeuvre résultant des opérations constitutives de la subjectivité transcendante, *in fine*, il n'est qu'une «idée située à l'infini», rappelle Husserl dans plus d'un texte et précisément dans le grand article commémoratif du bicentenaire de la naissance de Kant.<sup>44</sup> En d'autres termes, chose ou monde de l'expérience ne sauraient être absolument exempts de tout non-être possible qu'à la condition qu'ils soient donnés et appréhendés dans une parfaite adéquation. Or, ce n'est qu'une idée, un *idéal*, certes nécessaire mais en définitive inaccessible, vers lequel tend la connaissance toujours plus parfaite de la chose et qui, pour

Husserl aussi, est seulement une idée au sens d'une «*idée régulatrice*» telle que l'entendait Kant.<sup>45</sup>

Dès lors s'éclaire le sens de l'*idéalisme* transcendantal selon Husserl: il signifie avant tout la «*délivrance*» de la conscience de «l'absolutisation du monde» dans laquelle elle s'est embourbée, l'abandon de la fallacieuse idée d'un monde absolument déterminé et existant sans faille. Manière d'absolutiser le monde qui procède en vérité plutôt de la conscience métaphysique et plus exactement de l'objectivisme rationaliste et positiviste de la science de la Nature, que Husserl combat avec fermeté surtout dans les écrits de la *Krisis*. Pour le «*subjectivisme*» transcendantal qu'il défend, la subjectivité seule est un être absolu, est absolument «être-pour-soi», capable de s'apparaître à soi-même sans dépendre, à l'instar du monde, de la donation de sens effectuée par une subjectivité étrangère. Autrui non plus, par son originalité et son statut d'*alter ego*, ne coïncide pas avec son être-relatif et ne saurait se dissoudre en simple corrélat intentionnel de ma propre vie de conscience.<sup>46</sup>

La question de l'idéalisme phénoménologique transcendantal ne saurait guère être tranchée sans que soit mise au clair la question du statut ontologique et des fonctions constitutives de la subjectivité transcendantale laquelle n'est nullement pour Husserl la raison suffisante et ultime de l'être du monde. Certes tout existant quel qu'il soit, en dernière analyse, «se constitue» dans la subjectivité transcendantale, affirmation qui pour Husserl ne souffre pas de restriction, et dont la signification s'éclaire à partir de cette notion centrale. Husserl n'ignore pas que, si l'on veut éviter de graves malentendus au sujet de l'idéalisme phénoménologique transcendantal, on ne saurait trop insister sur la véritable ambition de la phénoménologie, à savoir qu'elle n'a rien à voir avec une «construction métaphysique», et qu'elle n'a pas d'autre ambition que celle d'«*explicitement le sens que ce monde a pour nous tous avant toute philosophie*», comme il le souligne dans les *Méditations cartésiennes*.<sup>47</sup> On se gardera aussi de perdre de vue que, à la différence de l'idéalisme kantien, l'idéalisme phénoménologique transcendantal s'affirme résolument comme une «*monadologie*» qui, en dépit des affinités avec Leibniz, procède exclusivement de l'auto-explicitation phénoménologique de l'expérience de l'ego transcendantal. Tout être existe et reçoit sens et valeur d'être de la vie de la subjectivité transcendantale conçue sous la figure de l'«intersubjectivité transcendantale».<sup>48</sup>

Pourtant tout se passe comme si *in fine* Husserl avait fait retour à une vision métaphysique dès lors qu'il apparaît que la subjectivité transcendantale n'est pas le garant ultime de la genèse ni de la continuité de

la constitution du monde en tant que «*cosmos*» constamment menacé de se dissoudre en *chaos*. Qu'elle puisse engendrer un monde harmonieux, un *cosmos*, et justement ce cosmos-ci, n'est pas vraiment au pouvoir de la subjectivité transcendante, mais en dernier ressort lui est concédé comme une sorte de «*grâce*». L'univers rationnel n'est pas l'oeuvre propre de la subjectivité constituante, il est une *donnée*, un véritable «*miracle*», note assez singulièrement Husserl.<sup>49</sup> Mais révéler la source nécessaire et non contingente de ce fait *irrationnel* qu'est l'existence d'un monde doué de sens, d'un univers harmonieux constitué dans et par la conscience transcendante, d'une Nature, d'une Culture, d'une conscience rationnelle, ne serait-ce pas comme «démontrer l'existence de Dieu», se demande-t-il ailleurs. Interprétation métaphysique voire théologique que plusieurs autres textes inédits pour la plupart semblent confirmer. Le passage cité montre à tout le moins que le problème de la «*facticité*» et de la contingence du monde relève de la *métaphysique* et non de la phénoménologie pure ou de la logique. Toutefois, gardons-nous d'oublier que pour Husserl si toute recherche «commence par des *miracles*, elle s'accomplit en les démasquant et en les transfigurant en une connaissance lumineuse».<sup>50</sup>

### III. VERS UNE CRITIQUE DE LA RAISON PRATIQUE ET AXIOLOGIQUE

Contrairement à une opinion qui a eu longtemps les faveurs des commentateurs, au moment où parut «l'ouvrage de percée» de la phénoménologie, les «*Logische Untersuchungen*», Husserl n'avait pas pour seule ambition d'établir les principes d'une «logique pure», d'une théorie de la science ni de proposer «les éléments d'une élucidation phénoménologique de la connaissance». A peine une année après la publication en 1913 de son livre majeur, les *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie*, qui jetait les fondements d'une «*philosophie phénoménologique*» et d'une «phénoménologie de la raison», il se tourne vers un domaine problématique fort éloigné de ses préoccupations initiales de philosophe réfléchissant sur le statut logique des mathématiques. En 1914, il consacre un cours à des «questions fondamentales touchant l'éthique et la théorie des valeurs» qui avait en outre pour objectif majeur la clarification des rapports entre la raison logique et la raison pratique et axiologique.<sup>51</sup> Si, dans ces *Leçons sur l'éthique*, Husserl vise, à jeter les fondements d'une «éthique phénoménologique» et d'une «théorie des valeurs», la «*phénoménologie de la raison pratique*» qu'il y esquisse, et qui en est l'objectif majeur, était encore largement tributaire des principes qui fondaient la logique phénoménolo-

gique. En témoigne le thème central des *Leçons*: élucider le *parallélisme* qui doit exister entre la logique pure, d'une part, et l'éthique formelle d'autre part, conçue à la fois comme une «axiologie pure» (*Wertlehre*) et comme «théorie de la praxis (*Praktik*) a priori», plus exactement, précise l'auteur, faire apparaître *l'analogie* devant exister entre la *raison judiciaire* (*urteilenden*) et la *raison pratique* (*paktischen*), en d'autres termes, entre la phénoménologie en tant que théorie de la connaissance et la phénoménologie des actes d'évaluation et de volition. Enfin il entend établir que le même parallélisme existe entre la «*raison loique*» et «la *raison axiologique*» (*wertenden*) qui gouverne tout autant le domaine esthétique que le domaine éthique.<sup>52</sup>

Ce qui motive implicitement sa réflexion, qu'annonce déjà le livre premier des *Ideen* où il attire l'attention sur l'entrelacement de tous les genres de raison, théorique, pratique et axiologique, semble être l'idée qu'il y a une étroite intrication de toute une série de disciplines formelles, que la grande tradition philosophique a largement méconnue et qu'il se donne pour tâche de mettre en lumière. Tel est le thème principal que Husserl assignait à ces *Leçons* qui devaient en outre aborder une autre problématique, fort difficile mais à l'évidence importante pour la philosophie, à savoir que la *phénoménologie* devait à son tour assumer la tâche d'une radicale *critique de la raison*, tâche qui lui tenait à coeur à cette période durant laquelle il ressentait une vive affinité avec la pensée kantienne.<sup>53</sup>

C'est en termes tout à fait similaires à ceux des *Prolégomènes* que Husserl définit le statut d'autonomie de la logique pure. Née dans le combat historique contre le *scepticisme* que menait la philosophie grecque depuis Platon, la logique moderne continue, aux yeux de Husserl, à assumer sa mission de défense de la raison logique et théorique contre les assauts incessants du scepticisme radical. Comme il l'avait clairement établi dans les *Prolégomènes*, pourvu qu'on se garde de tomber dans les préjugés du *psychologisme*, on se rend compte que la logique pure est une discipline a priori tout à fait originale, distincte des autres sciences qui cependant «entrent toutes dans le champ d'application pratique possible qu'elle gouverne». <sup>54</sup> La logique, au sens étroit de «logique apophantique», est la science des propositions et jugements en général, portant non pas sur des phrases au sens grammatical du terme, mais sur les «significations idéales» des propositions sans prendre en compte le sujet qui juge ni ses actes de juger. En un mot, elle est une discipline qui explore les lois *a priori* de validité fondées dans les formes de propositions *a priori* possibles. Autrement dit, elle traite de la vérité et de la fausseté des propositions,

«uniquement du point de vue de leur forme»; elle est une véritable «algèbre des propositions», déclare Husserl, et n'a en aucune façon à se préoccuper des actes ou vécus de jugement ni du sujet jugeant ou de son acte de juger, au sens psychologique du terme.<sup>55</sup>

C'est à travers l'opposition classique entre *empirisme* et *absolutisme* que Husserl aborde le problème de l'éthique qui, selon lui, relève d'une critique de la raison pratique. Il rappelle que, tout comme la logique, l'éthique a pris naissance sous la forme d'une discipline *normative* et *pratique*, et qu'elle l'est restée tout au long de l'histoire. Depuis l'époque moderne, l'éthique *a priori* s'est ainsi définie comme un *système de principes* absolus de la raison pratique qui, indépendamment de toute référence à l'homme empirique et ses conditions d'existence concrète, établit les règles absolument normatives de l'agir humain. L'analogie avec la logique s'impose à l'évidence car l'éthique a elle aussi ses fondements théoriques non pas dans la psychologie des fonctions de la connaissance et de l'affectivité, mais dans des lois et des principes *a priori* qui serviront de normes rationnelles pour tous nos jugements de valeur, nos jugements éthiques et logiques, et qui sont censés nous guider dans notre action rationnelle, dans l'exercice pratique de la raison.<sup>56</sup>

L'histoire des doctrines éthiques tout au long a été jalonnée de débats incessants entre *l'apriorisme* (que défend encore Kant) sous la forme de «l'éthique de l'entendement» et *l'empirisme* sous la forme de «l'éthique du sentiment». En fait, l'empirisme éthique s'est présenté lui aussi sous les traits du *psychologisme* voire du *biologisme* et ses partisans ont prétendu découvrir les mobiles du comportement humain dans les particularités de la nature humaine et de la vie affective et volitive des hommes. Or, la querelle entre empirisme et apriorisme, aux yeux de Husserl, est loin d'être superfétatoire, bien au contraire, elle implique des problèmes éminemment philosophiques. De même que le psychologisme et l'anthropologisme en logique avaient pour conséquence le *scepticisme* théorique, l'anthropologisme en éthique devait inévitablement entraîner un scepticisme éthique et dès lors la négation de la validité universelle des normes morales, voire de toute idée de devoir et d'obligation. Des concepts tels que le bien et le mal, le juste et l'injuste, le raisonnable et le déraisonnable ne devaient plus traduire que des faits psychologiques de la nature humaine telle qu'elle est, telle qu'elle s'est développée au cours de l'évolution biologique et culturelle de l'humanité à travers des circonstances fortuites de sa «lutte pour la vie».<sup>57</sup>

Pour le philosophe empiriste, affirmer que des «normes éthiques sont valides» et inconditionnelles signifie simplement que des hommes agissant

sous la contrainte d'une causalité purement psychologique se sentent poussés, par une impérieuse impulsion intérieure, à se comporter d'une certaine manière dans leur vie pratique afin d'échapper à un intolérable malaise psychologique ou à la menace d'une sanction sociale. Autrement dit, tout n'est qu'une affaire d'utilité biologique ou d'opportunité psychosociale. Et voilà comment a pris naissance chez les humains ce qu'on nommera une «conscience morale» (*Gewissen*), ce qui veut dire la conscience qu'il y a quelque chose comme le «bien» et le «mal», le juste et l'injuste, en un mot des valeurs auxquelles on mesurera désormais les comportements et les intentions des hommes, soit pour les louer soit pour les blâmer.<sup>58</sup> Il se pourrait même, observe Husserl, «qu'un jour cette fonction morale se révèle biologiquement superflue, qu'elle dégénère et qu'à sa place une autre fonction apparaisse» qui fera que les principes ou catégories du bien et du mal finissent par s'inverser, et que se produise ce que Nietzsche en son temps a appelé «*Umwertung aller Werte*».<sup>59</sup>

Selon le partisan de l'empirisme psychologiste, tout se passe comme si les humains avaient imaginé un monde idéal de valeurs et de normes, nées fortuitement et ne valant que pour un temps, «inventé la fiction d'une *raison absolue* ayant la dignité d'un «principe ontologico-téléologique ultime». Or, si la manière empiriste d'*hypostasier* et d'*absolutiser* des idées biologiquement utiles à leur existence peut avoir elle-même une valeur biologique, prendre ce genre d'hypostase au sérieux revient selon Husserl tout simplement à sacrifier à une sorte de «*Begriffsmythologie*».<sup>60</sup> Pour qui croit aux thèses du *scepticisme* éthique, les concepts du «bien en soi» ou «mal en soi» n'expriment rien d'autre que des contingences de la culture et de l'évolution de l'humanité et il récusera l'idée qu'en ce domaine il puisse être question d'attitude raisonnable ou déraisonnable: il n'y a pas plus de déraison que de raison, il n'y est plus question que d'utilité biologique, psychologique ou sociale.

Ainsi, d'un côté, le partisan d'une éthique rationnelle soutient que, pourvu qu'on soit logique avec soi-même, on ne peut faire autrement que suivre sa raison, ordonner sa vie conformément à des normes éthiques si bien qu'en vertu d'une conviction intime, on choisira ce que sa raison pratique ordonne. A l'opposé, le partisan de l'empirisme éthique conteste justement toute idée de raison pratique et par suite toute idée d'obligation qui ait quelque prétention de rationalité que ce soit. La querelle a son analogie dans la sphère du logique car la question de «la validité objective et absolue des normes éthiques» correspond à la question de la validité absolue des normes logiques.<sup>61</sup>

Convaincu que la doctrine psychologue a pour conséquences fâcheuses non seulement un «doctrine anti-éthique» mais aussi inévitablement une «pratique anti-éthique», tout comme de manière analogue la négation de la validité absolue du logique conduit nécessairement à une «pratique anti-logique», Husserl dénonce tout scepticisme extrême en logique comme en éthique; il en souligne le contresens pour ainsi dire congénital qui l'affecte depuis l'antiquité, et il rappelle les critiques sévères dont il été l'objet de la part de Platon et d'Aristote dans le combat qu'ils ont mené contre le scepticisme des Sophistes qui ne pouvaient que s'enliser dans leurs propres contradictions. Cependant, l'argumentation fondée sur les conséquences pratiques du scepticisme ou négativisme en éthique ne saurait donner lieu à une réfutation tout aussi incontestable, Husserl le concède, car le «contresens pratique» n'est pas vraiment l'équivalent du contresens théorique, d'une contradiction objective. Après tout, le refus de l'attitude anti-éthique du sceptique qu'est-il sinon une affaire de sentiment et non de raisonnement?<sup>62</sup>

Rappelant les arguments qu'il avait déjà développés à l'appui de la réfutation du scepticisme en logique, dans les *Prolégomènes à la logique pure*, Husserl juge que «sont sceptiques toutes les thèses et théories qui nient qu'il y ait de quelconques conditions de possibilité rationnelle d'une vérité en général, d'une théorie en général»: c'est en contradiction avec lui-même que le sceptique établit et prétend justifier, par la teneur même de sa thèse, ce que toute thèse et justification présupposent en vertu de leur sens général.<sup>63</sup> Pour l'*empiriste* radical, les principes régissant la validité de tous les raisonnements d'expérience et donc de toutes les théories et sciences empiriques sont dénués de toute rationalité et de toute validité universelle. Ils n'ont d'autre fondement que psychologique, révélant tout au plus certaines caractéristiques de la nature humaine qu'expriment les lois bien connues de «l'association des idées» et de «l'habitude». Le philosophe empiriste s'appuie sur la psychologie, une science empirique qu'il traite pourtant comme une science ayant une réelle validité. Telle est la contradiction voire l'absurdité qui frappe toutes ces doctrines: pour elles, les lois logiques ne sont rien d'autre que des lois *psychologiques*.<sup>64</sup>

Or, comment, se demande Husserl, pourrait-on fonder une éthique scientifique sans avoir au préalable clarifié le rôle de la raison, dans le domaine pratique comme dans le domaine théorique, sans avoir recherché «les principes de la raison pratique en tant que principes rationnels de la *praxis*», bref, avant d'avoir posé la question: «Qu'est-ce qu'agir selon la droite raison et quels sont les principes auxquels il faut obéir?» Si l'éthique a bien pour vocation de définir les règles rationnelles de nos



jugements de valeur, de nos volitions et de nos actions, elle relève indéniablement d'une nécessaire «critique de la raison pratique et axiologique» tout comme les règles du penser rationnel relèvent d'une «critique de la raison théorique». D'où la question préjudicielle: «qu'est-ce au juste qu'une *règle*»? Dire «admetts et suis telle règle!» veut dire en fait tout d'abord «admetts la validité rationnelle de la règle pratique! admetts qu'il est raisonnable d'agir conformément à cette règle!». <sup>65</sup>

En revanche, dire «ne reconnais aucune règle pratique !» c'est énoncer une règle pratique qu'il serait raisonnable d'admettre et qu'il serait juste de suivre dans la pratique. Telle est la *contradiction* que Husserl reproche au sceptique de commettre tant dans le domaine éthique que dans le domaine théorique. <sup>66</sup> Finalement, la querelle sur l'idée du «bien en soi» ou de la «valeur en soi» a son analogie dans la querelle logique sur l'existence d'une «vérité en soi»; le psychologisme *éthique* va de pair avec le psychologisme *logico-théorique*. La «*psychologisation*» des lois et principes en général (tant logiques qu'éthiques) ôte à ceux-ci leur caractère d'idéalité et donc de validité objective. Or, dans la sphère logique comme dans la sphère pratique, l'*idéalité* et l'*objectivité* qui fondent aussi l'*universalité* des principes et des normes sont indissociables. Voilà pourquoi dans la sphère de l'éthique aussi le *psychologisme* universel et le *scepticisme* radical se confondent et se valent. <sup>67</sup>

Le scepticisme qu'est-il sinon la négation de toute rationalité, la négation en particulier de toute raison pratique en général, la négation de toute espèce de validité et d'universalité objectives dans la totalité du champ de la *praxis*? Tout se passe comme si le sceptique affirmait en théorie que l'unique façon raisonnable d'agir était de ne reconnaître aucune rationalité à l'action, bref, comme s'il énonçait la règle générale: «n'admetts la validité d'aucune règle !», à l'évidence une revendication contradictoire. Husserl en déduit que des normes pratiques radicalement sceptiques s'abolissent elles-mêmes comme «formellement absurdes» de manière analogue dont s'abolissent des «énoncés théoriques» du même genre, les unes par leur «contradiction pratique», les autres en vertu de leur «contradiction théorique». <sup>68</sup>

En fait, dans un cas comme dans l'autre, le débat porte sur la possibilité de fonder, avec une validité absolue, des concepts rationnels et normatifs régissant respectivement les deux disciplines, logique et éthique. C'est qu'il faut bien admettre qu'il y a une «raison théorique absolue», du moins en tant qu'*idée régulatrice*, dirait Kant. Et comment ne pas voir que la *raison théorique* a son analogue dans une *raison pratique*? Et s'il en est ainsi, on doit pouvoir, en vertu de l'essence des deux genres de

raison, établir dans les deux sphères un ensemble complexe de principes et de lois qui constitueront les légalités formelles qui régissent toute *praxis* rationnelle. On en déduira dès lors que tout comme la logique décrit les conditions de possibilité *a priori* de la vérité, l'éthique doit pouvoir établir les conditions de possibilité de la validité pratique d'une action. Or, que sont les «*principes éthiques*» et les *lois éthiques* sinon des propositions *impératives*, des *normes* qui énoncent voire prescrivent ce qui est bien, ce qui est juste, ce qui mérite raisonnablement d'être accompli, ce qui est le *meilleur*, ou ce qui dans le domaine global des biens accessibles, raisonnablement, mérite d'être recherché *pour lui-même* et non simplement en raison d'autre chose. Telle est la conviction de Husserl.<sup>69</sup>

Naturellement, comme Kant l'a fermement souligné, l'éthique n'a pas à prendre en compte le cas particulier ni la situation singulière dans laquelle, en agissant, j'ai à me décider *hic et nunc*. Car les «*principes*» universels et les lois de l'éthique établissent des *critères* applicables à n'importe quelle situation concrète, et tout un chacun doit pouvoir s'y référer raisonnablement pour savoir dans quel cas la décision à prendre sera moralement juste et dans quel cas elle ne le sera pas. *L'impératif catégorique* selon Kant est non seulement un «*principe purement formel*» qui exclut tout élément «*matériel*» (sensible ou affectif), mais aussi le *critère unique*, nécessaire et suffisant de l'agir moral, et il a pour seul fondement le principe de *l'universalité* dont procède l'obligation inscrite dans l'idée de loi morale qui est une loi de la raison pratique. Husserl admet lui aussi que les *lois pratiques a priori* doivent pouvoir se décrire comme les «*normes ou règles formelles de la raison pratique*», qu'à la sphère éthique s'applique également une «*analytique de la raison pratique*» portant sur la sphère de la *praxis*, où la rationalité est d'ordre purement formel. Il estime par contre que, dans la sphère pratique, la rationalité ne peut être fondée que par la prise en compte aussi de la matière particulière du vouloir et de l'agir.<sup>70</sup>

A quoi Husserl ajoute que ce qui vaut pour l'idée d'une éthique ou d'une «*théorie de la praxis*», au sens le plus large du terme, peut naturellement se transposer au domaine de l'axiologie, à des jugements de valeur, de sorte qu'on doit pouvoir envisager une «*axiologie formelle*» qui aurait justement pour objet une «*critique de la raison axiologique*». Son domaine recouvre naturellement tout le domaine d'une *praxis* formelle qui embrasse aussi bien l'éthique que l'esthétique. Là aussi il doit y avoir des *lois* formelles *a priori* et *parallèles* à elles des «*normes a priori*» équivalentes, des normes de l'évaluer, du désirer ou du vouloir rationnels. De ces lois procèdent des règles du «*vouloir rationnel en général*» qui

déterminent les motifs de toute action éthique prétendant à la validité rationnelle.<sup>71</sup>

Pour illustrer les rapports existant entre raison *logique* et raison *pratique* et *axiologique*, Husserl aborde le problème bien connu des rapports formels existant entre le *moyen* et la *fin* que Kant a formulé en ces termes : « *Qui veut la fin, veut aussi ... le moyen (l'unique moyen) qui est en son pouvoir et qui est absolument nécessaire pour y parvenir* ». <sup>72</sup> Husserl ne partage pas entièrement l'explication de Kant, pour lui le vouloir du moyen est «pensé conjointement» avec le vouloir de la fin, mais n'est pas proprement «*mit-gedacht*» puisque nous pouvons vouloir une fin sans le moins du monde avoir une idée claire du moyen nécessaire pour y parvenir. Tout au moins dans la représentation de la fin est tout naturellement impliqué, conjointement et nécessairement, le moyen à mettre en oeuvre. Le rapport entre la fin et le moyen n'a rien de proprement *psychologique*, le vouloir du moyen est fondé et impliqué rationnellement dans le *sens* même du vouloir de la fin.<sup>73</sup>

Or, selon Husserl, la proposition «qui veut la fin *doit* vouloir le moyen nécessaire pour l'atteindre» n'est justement pas une proposition analytique, elle traduit une obligation *rationnelle*, un «devoir» (*Sollen*) rationnel. Comme telle, elle ne relève pas de la raison théorique, donc de la raison qui a en charge la connaissance de «faits», même s'il est vrai que celui qui évalue le rapport de moyen à fin aura à juger de faits empiriques. La raison logique ne peut rien m'apprendre sur le devoir rationnel qui n'est pas un *fait* de l'expérience. La rationalité de l'obligation morale et la loi déontologique: «Qui veut la fin doit raisonnablement vouloir le moyen nécessaire» sont *a priori* et ont leurs fondements dans une tout autre dimension que celle des faits, elles valent dans une «*universalité et nécessité absolues*» alors que les constatations de faits à découvrir par l'expérience en sont justement dépourvues.<sup>74</sup>

Qu'en est-il au juste de la *loi morale*, de sa «validité *a priori*» et de sa légitimation ou fondation? Si toute loi est un énoncé et donc d'ordre logique, n'est-ce pas la raison logique qui en établit la vérité et la validité, la légitime et la fonde? Ne faut-il pas prendre acte alors de «l'empire (*Herrschaft*) universel de la raison logique», interroge Husserl?<sup>75</sup> Pourtant, nonobstant «l'action universelle de la *raison logique*», ne devrait-il pas être possible d'établir qu'il y a au moins deux sinon une *pluralité* de genres de devoir (*Sollen*) et de valoir (*Gelten*) se rapportant à plusieurs genres d'actes et donnant lieu à diverses formes de conscience rationnelle? Certains inclinent à conjuguer ensemble raison logique et raison axiologique estimant que ce qui distingue la connaissance vraie d'autres formes

de jugement tient au sentiment d'évaluation qui valide et attribue valeur à la première et ils finissent par considérer «la *raison logique*» elle-même comme une espèce de «*raison évaluante*». Sans contester que la mise en parallèle de la *raison axiologique* et pratique avec la *raison logique* rencontre une difficulté principielle, Husserl observe néanmoins que toutes ces disciplines théoriques, pratiques ou axiologiques sont régies par des lois logiques formelles et relèvent par suite toutes de la compétence de la «raison logique». Finalement il en vient à conclure qu'il n'y a qu'«une seule et même raison», la raison logique dont l'empire universel est incontestable, *raison pratique* et *raison axiologique* n'étant que des «domaines d'application particuliers» de la raison logique.<sup>76</sup>

Toutes les idées que nous subsumons sous le titre de «*raison*» sont justement des idées et donc des *entités logiques* et «le parallélisme des genres de raison a sa racine dans le parallélisme des genres fondamentaux d'actes; dans chacun d'eux, se découvre un genre fondamental d'intentions, de visées et de prises de position en un sens très large du terme», mais aussi des actes de croyance, des actes que Husserl nomme actes *doxiques* (tenir-pour-existant, tenir-pour-vrai, pour-juste, etc.).<sup>77</sup> Or, entre ces divers genres d'actes cognitifs, volitifs et affectifs en tant qu'ils sont des «prises de position», des actes de visée, il existe une réelle analogie. Les actes de jugement, plus généralement les actes *doxiques* tout comme les actes affectifs en tant qu'ils sont à leur tour des prises de position impliquent des «estimations idéales selon l'idée de la validité ou de la non-validité». Ce constat ne tend-il pas à confirmer «l'action universelle» (*Allwirksamkeit*) de la raison logique qui, justement, «embrasse le champ total du connaissable»? En un sens large, «toutes les prises de position intentionnelles sont des «attitudes axiologiques», et toutes il faut poser la question axiologique de leur «justesse» ou validité. Mais, de nos jours, on mêle tout confusément, déplore Husserl, on a «tendance à confondre raison *judicative* et raison axiologique», et même à considérer que l'acte de juger est une espèce d'évaluation, au sens d'un acte affectif (*Gemütsakt*). On n'hésite pas à réinterpréter la raison logique en la traitant de raison axiologique telle qu'elle se manifeste dans la sphère des sentiments, on finit par assimiler la raison logique à une «raison émotionnelle».<sup>78</sup>

Husserl condamne évidemment pareille conception comme outrancière, il reconnaît cependant que «l'omnipotence de la raison logique» traduit une certaine interconnexion essentielle de la conscience *doxique* et de la conscience *affective*, qui fait que toute prise de position, tout jugement de valeur esthétique ou éthique peut être transformé en prise de position judicative. Car «la raison axiologique est pour ainsi dire celée à elle-

même», elle ne devient manifeste qu'à la faveur de la connaissance. Seulement, celle-ci «se borne à mettre en lumière ce qui d'une certaine manière est déjà là». <sup>79</sup> Si le sentiment ou le vouloir n'impliquait pas déjà des actes de visée et des «prises de position», la connaissance ne pourrait rien y découvrir en matière de valeurs, mais seulement des vécus aveugles telles des sensations de rouge ou de bleu. La volonté ne perçoit ni ne préjuge rien, elle ne déduit ni n'induit quoi que ce soit, et malgré tout – métaphoriquement parlant – la volonté juge, elle n'est pas un simple fait psychologique sur lequel la raison logique porte un jugement, mais exprime pour ainsi dire un voeu, elle est une sorte de jugement de valeur. Sans doute, pour que la volonté accède à la parole, il est besoin d'actes logiques dont le résultat est alors «un jugement déontique (*Sollensurteil*)» qui est bien un jugement et non une volition. «La raison logique doit pour ainsi dire porter son regard sur le champ de la raison pratique, lui prêter l'oeil de l'intellect, déclare Husserl, pour qu'apparaisse objectivement ce que réclame la volonté rationnelle». <sup>80</sup>

Toutefois, l'entrelacement étroit entre la raison logique et la raison pratique et axiologique ne laisse-t-il pas soupçonner que le concept de *rationalité* ou de *raison* doit s'entendre en un sens tout nouveau? Pour Husserl le terme de «*raison*» ne désigne point une «faculté de l'âme humaine», donc rien de psychologique, au contraire, il indique clairement «une classe cohérente d'actes et de corrélats d'actes qu'on peut subsumer sous l'idée de la *légitimité* et de l'*illégitimité*, corrélatives à l'idée de vérité ou de fausseté, d'existence ou de non-existence». <sup>81</sup> Aussi juge-t-il qu'autant il y a des genres fondamentaux d'actes qu'on peut différencier (actes doxiques, actes de la certitude de croyance, avec leurs modalités, etc.), autant il y a de genres fondamentaux de raison, lors même que, pour lui, la «*raison logique*» a ce «*privilege unique*» que, non seulement dans son domaine de compétence propre, mais «dans toute autre sphère de rationalité», elle définit ce qui est légitime et valide, et ce qui ne l'est pas, établit et énonce des lois en tant que lois *a priori*. <sup>82</sup>

En revanche, la «raison axiologique et pratique» est pour ainsi dire «muette et aveugle», affirme tout uniment Husserl. Il a même cette formule catégorique: «Une raison purement évaluante ne perçoit, ne comprend ni n'explique rien», il faut, déclare-t-il avec quelque emphase, «*brandir l'étendard de la raison logique*» pour qu'éclate en pleine lumière «ce que la sphère affective et volitive cache de formes et de normes», les actes logiques et doxiques se bornant à «éclairer et rendre visible» ce qui est déjà là. <sup>83</sup> Voilà selon Husserl à tout le moins des problèmes qui requièrent encore bien d'analyses et d'investigations difficiles et

qui devraient faire l'objet d'une «phénoménologie de la raison logique, pratique et axiologique».

#### IV. CONCLUSION

Ces indications plutôt programmatiques d'une «critique de la raison» que Husserl esquisse tout au long de son oeuvre ne l'empêchent pas d'être pleinement conscient des limites de son projet. Il n'ignore point que la «phénoménologie en tant que critique de la raison», qui a pour vocation d'explorer la conscience rationnelle dans toutes ses configurations pré-suppose la phénoménologie en général laquelle «englobe l'ensemble du monde naturel et tous les mondes idéaux» qu'elle embrasse en tant que «sens du monde».<sup>84</sup> La phénoménologie de la raison a nombre de domaines d'application, nous l'avons entrevu, qui vont de la logique formelle aux ontologies formelles et matérielles, mais incluent aussi bien l'axiologie que la théorie de la raison pratique. Ces dernières ont pour objet essentiel les actes affectifs et volitifs, les actes de préférence et d'évaluation qui tous contribuent à déterminer notre existence d'homme et nos actions dans le monde. Toutes ces disciplines tendent à mettre en lumière les conditions de possibilité a priori de toute validité y compris celles de la «vérité» axiologique et pratique, la manière dont se mesure la rationalité de ces actes. Il reste que c'est seulement lorsque sera achevée la critique phénoménologique de la raison théorique qu'on pourra comprendre aussi la nature et la problématique de la philosophie de la raison pratique et axiologique, juge Husserl. Le combat à mener contre le scepticisme, que Kant a initié avec fermeté et vigueur, et dont Husserl assume l'héritage, il importe selon lui de l'entreprendre aussi dans le domaine des valeurs et de la raison pratique. Mais, ajoute-t-il, «les batailles pour ainsi dire décisives sont elles livrées sur le terrain de la philosophie théorique».<sup>85</sup> Il lui arrive même de reconnaître que «la solution complète des problèmes équivaldrait manifestement à une phénoménologie de la raison exhaustive selon toutes ses configurations formelles et matérielles», et qu'une telle phénoménologie de la raison intégrale se confondrait avec la phénoménologie en général, seule capable de dévoiler l'horizon concret et total de la philosophie transcendante, «la première de toutes les philosophies» dès lors qu'elle nous habilite à engager la «critique» de la totalité des activités de la raison puisqu'elle remonte avec méthode jusqu'à la source ultime de toutes les «*Sinnbildungen*» qui constituent notre monde.<sup>86</sup>

En un sens, il s'agit donc bien pour Husserl d'«*aller au-delà de Kant*», de s'élever de la «*naïveté transcendantale*», qui affecte encore la *Critique de la raison pure*, jusqu'au niveau de la «*réflexion transcendantale*» que vise à atteindre la philosophie phénoménologique. Et, pour ce faire, on n'a pas le droit de laisser en dehors du champ transcendantal ni la logique – la philosophie phénoménologique comportera du moins un «*essai de critique de la raison logique*» (objectif de *Formale und transzendente Logik*) – ni le monde de la vie – et la philosophie phénoménologique transcendantale ne s'achève-t-elle pas sur une «*ontologie du monde de la vie*»?<sup>87</sup> Le sens que Husserl assigne dès lors à sa démarche et à une *succession* de Kant, c'est non pas reprendre son système tel qu'il est pour l'amender et réformer dans les détails, mais «*de le comprendre mieux que Kant lui-même, qui en fut l'initiateur mais non le réalisateur*», ne semble l'avoir compris, ajoute Husserl; en un mot, il importe d'élucider la tâche qu'il a assigne à toute philosophie qui «*doit pouvoir se présenter comme science*», non pas renoncer à l'héritage qu'il nous a légué, mais «*comprendre le sens ultime de sa révolution*» et rendre justice à la «*valeur éternelle*» de son oeuvre.<sup>88</sup> Peut-être ne faut-il pas faire grief à Kant de n'avoir pas su mener jusqu'au bout son projet d'une critique universelle de la raison et d'une philosophie transcendantale authentique et achevée s'il est vrai, comme Husserl l'admettra volontiers, que la réalisation d'un tel projet «*n'est point la tâche d'un seul homme et d'un «système», mais la plus exaltante des tâches scientifiques qui incombent à l'Humanité tout entière*».<sup>89</sup>

Université de Paris 8

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> P. Ricoeur, «Kant et Husserl», in *Kant-Studien* 46, 1954, depuis in *A l'Ecole de la phénoménologie*, p. 227 sq.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, § 58, pp. 237–239.

<sup>3</sup> *Husserliana* t. II, La Haye, 1950.

<sup>4</sup> *Erste Philosophie*, I, in *Husserliana*, t. VII, p. 230.

<sup>5</sup> «Kant und die Idee der Transzendentalphilosophie», *op. cit.*, I, in *Husserliana* t. VII, pp. 230–287.

<sup>6</sup> S. Bachelard, *La logique de Husserl*, Paris, 1957, p. 14.

<sup>7</sup> *Cartesianische Meditationen*, in *Husserliana*, t. I, § 41.

<sup>8</sup> *Krisis*, *Husserliana* t. IV, p. 438.

<sup>9</sup> «Die Krisis des europäischen Menschentums und die Philosophie», in *Krisis*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 314–343 et les manuscrits des conférences de novembre 1935, K III, I/II (1935).

<sup>10</sup> *Krisis*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 437–438.

<sup>11</sup> «An erster Stelle nenne ich die allgemeine Aufgabe, die ich für mich lösen muss, wenn ich mich soll einen Philosophen nennen können. Ich meine die *Kritik der Vernunft*. Eine Kritik der logischen und der praktischen Vernunft, der wertenden überhaupt.” Cf. Annotation de son Journal du 25/ 09/ 1906, citée par W. Biemel dans son introduction à *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, in *Husserliana*. t. II, 1950, p. VII.

<sup>12</sup> Sur le passage de la phénoménologie descriptive à la critique de la raison, cf. Ms. B II, 1, p. 47 a et aussi *Ideen I*, loc. cit., IIIème section, ch. I et IVème section, ch. II et III.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, § 137, p. 293.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, § 19, pp. 42–44.

<sup>15</sup> E. Kant, *op. cit.* A XVI–XVII et A 51/B 75 et E. Husserl, *Ideen I*, loc. cit., pp. 43–44 et § 24, pp. 52–53.

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 22 et 36–38, de même *Erste Philosophie*, I, loc. cit. p. 233.

<sup>17</sup> *Erste Philosophie I*, loc. cit., p. 236 et *Formale u. transzendente Logik*, pp. 255 et 237.

<sup>18</sup> «Kants Kopernikanische Umdrehung» loc. cit., pp. 208–229 et «Kant und die Idee der Transzendentalphilosophie», *ibid.*, pp. 230–287, ainsi que dans plusieurs autres suppléments consacrés à Kant, notamment XVI à XXI, pp. 350–408, et p. 369.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. l'article commémoratif consacré à Kant, loc. cit. p. 240 sq. et aussi p. 225.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 225–226.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 286.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 386.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *Krisis*, § 26, pp. 100–101 et *Erste Philosophie*, I, loc. cit., p. 383.

<sup>24</sup> *Krisis*, loc. cit., § 27, p. 102. Dans ce § Husserl fait référence à la première édition de *Critique de la raison pure* de Kant.

<sup>25</sup> *Erste Philosophie*, I, loc. cit. p. 246.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 241–242.

<sup>27</sup> Kant, *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik*, Vorrede, p. 10–11 et Husserl, *Erste Philosophie I*, loc. cit., p. 197.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 235–236. Sur les différentes thèses kantienne que Husserl repousse comme des «spéculations métaphysiques» ou des «présuppositions dogmatiques», on se reportera aussi aux Annexes XX et XXI qui remontent aux années 1908 à 1915, *ibid.*, pp. 381–408.

<sup>29</sup> S. Bachelard, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

<sup>30</sup> «Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwärtigen Kritik», in *Kant-Studien* 38 (1933), p. 376.

<sup>31</sup> *Erste Philosophie*, I, Beilage XX, loc. cit. pp. 382–386.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 240–241 et *Krisis*, loc. cit. t. VI, § 26 et 27, pp. 100–104.

<sup>33</sup> *Erste Philosophie*, II, *Husserliana* t. VIII, p. 181.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, I, loc. cit., p. 235 et surtout p. 277 sq.

<sup>35</sup> *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, préface et Introduction.

<sup>36</sup> Pour toute cette analyse, on se reportera à la première des cinq Conférences éditées sous le titre *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, loc. cit., pp. 17–26. A propos du scepticisme et de «la révolution du mode de penser naturel», cf. *Erste Philosophie*, I, ch. IV, 9<sup>ème</sup> leçon, et l'article «Kant et l'idée de la philosophie transcendante» figurant en annexe, loc. cit., pp. 58–63 et pp. 240–248.

<sup>37</sup> *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, loc. cit. p. 22–24.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Kant, *Prolégomènes à toute métaphysique future*, préface et aussi *Critique de la raison pure*, préface et Husserl, *Erste Philosophie*, I, loc. cit., pp. 240–247 et 369.

<sup>39</sup> *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, loc. cit., p. 36.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 36 et 38 et *Erste Philosophie*, I, loc. cit., p. 383.



<sup>41</sup> *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*, loc. cit., p. 39.

<sup>42</sup> *Op. cit.*, §§ 44 sq. et 142 et 149, surtout pp. 366–367 ainsi que *Erste Philosophie*, I, loc. cit. pp. 270–276.

<sup>43</sup> *Erste Philosophie* II, loc. cit., p. 406.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* I, loc. cit., p. 274.

<sup>45</sup> *Ideen*, t. I, § 143, pp. 350–351.

<sup>46</sup> *Formale u. transzendente Logik*, §§ 103–104, pp. 240–244, mais aussi *Cartesianische Meditationen*, loc. cit., IV<sup>ème</sup> et V<sup>ème</sup> Méditation, surtout §§ 40 et 41. Ajoutons que la question de «l'idéalisme transcendantal ne surgit pas seulement à partir du tome premier des *Ideen* mais se trouve déjà annoncée en 1907 dans *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* (Cf. Ms. B II, 1, p. 25 a).

<sup>47</sup> *Op. cit.*, § 62, p. 177.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 176.

<sup>49</sup> Dans l'Annexe XX portant sur une explication avec Kant où Husserl note *expressis verbis* : «Das Wunder ist hier die Rationalität». *Erste Philosophie* I, loc. cit., p. 394.

<sup>50</sup> Manuscrit B I, 4, pp. 2–3, cité par Iso KERN, *Husserl und Kant*, 1964, p. 300 et p. 337.

<sup>51</sup> *Vorlesungen über Grundfragen der Ethik und Wertlehre* 1914 (cours paru en 1988 dans l'œuvre complète, *Husserliana*, t. XXVIII). Le problème est déjà évoqué auparavant, dès 1907, dans les conférences sur l'*Idee de la Phénoménologie*, loc. cit., pp. 52 et 58.

<sup>52</sup> Husserl consacre au problème du «parallélisme» entre la logique pure et l'éthique formelle, plus exactement entre la «raison judicative» et la «raison pratique», et plus largement entre l'axiologie et la «praxéologie» pure toute la première section des *Leçons*, notamment le § 1, pp. 3 sq.

<sup>53</sup> La phénoménologie comme «critique de la raison» a été déjà largement abordée dans les *Ideen* I, par ex. au § 138.

<sup>54</sup> *Vorlesungen*, loc. cit., p. 6.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.* p. 13.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14. Husserl ne fait qu'indirectement allusion à l'«Umwertung aller Werte» de Nietzsche.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.* p. 14.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 17 et 29.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.* § 4 a et b, pp. 19–29, surtout pp. 20–23.

<sup>63</sup> *Prolégomènes*, §§ 34–38 et *Vorlesungen*, loc. cit., pp. 21–23.

<sup>64</sup> *Vorlesungen*, loc. cit., § 4, pp. 22–23.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 27–28.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 28–29.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 32 et 33.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 37–38 et 40–41.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, § 43, b, pp. 40–44 et Kant, *Critique de la raison pratique*, livre Ier, ch. I.

<sup>71</sup> *Vorlesungen*, loc. cit., pp. 48–50.

<sup>72</sup> *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, IV, p. 417 et 420.

<sup>73</sup> *Vorlesungen*, loc. cit., § 6, pp. 51 sq.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 54–55.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

- <sup>76</sup> “Die Allherrschaft der logischen Vernunft”, *ibid.*, pp. 57–59.  
<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59.  
<sup>78</sup> Sur l’ensemble de cette analyse, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 61–62.  
<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 63.  
<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64.  
<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 68 et aussi *Ideen I*, *loc. cit.*, § 139, pp. 341–344.  
<sup>82</sup> *Vorlesungen*, *loc. cit.*, p. 68.  
<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69.  
<sup>84</sup> *Ideen I*, *loc. cit.*, pp. 302–3.  
<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, § 147 pp. 304 sq.  
<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 323.  
<sup>87</sup> *Krisis*, III A, *loc. cit.*, §§ 34 et 51.  
<sup>88</sup> *Erste Philosophie I*, *loc. cit.*, p. 286.  
<sup>89</sup> Cf. «Kant et l’idée de philosophie transcendante», Avant-propos, *loc. cit.*, p. 236.

## THE PHENOMENOLOGY AND HERMENEUTICS OF TRADITIONS

### 1. THE CRISIS OF MODERNITY AND THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROPOSAL

Phenomenology, as a theoretical and methodological proposal for the reform of reason and philosophy, begins from the keen awareness felt by Husserl of the historical failure of the Hellenistic ideals of an all-encompassing universal knowledge about the world and about life, and of a self-foundation of the human on reason and through reason. Such a failure of Metaphysics, already pointed out by Kant in the undecidable controversies and contradictions in which philosophising entangles itself in contrast with the cumulative progress of scientific knowledge, derives, according to Husserl, from the growing suspiciousness of the European man about the abilities of reason to reach the being's truth in its whole, nature and humanity, and to interpret it in the light of the divine teleology which inhabits it (*viz* this author's work, *Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften*, §§ 1–7).

Such scepticism, which erodes, from the inside, the trust in a possible rational sense of life, is in fact the remote consequence of the nominalist criticism of the universal which, at the inception of Modernity, steered reason from the intuitive contemplation of essences towards observation and the mathematical instrumentalization of external nature.

The adoption by the sciences of a positivist and naturalist model of knowledge would come to relegate the sphere of subjectivity, as far as the human and the possible sense of his actions are concerned, to the residual domain of philosophy. The latter, however, undergoing a crisis in terms of its metaphysical goal and the possibility of a knowledge of being in general – a crisis extending, indeed, to the sciences themselves which are, after all, its ramifications – then finds itself left to the difficult and unsatisfactory choice between an objectivist, yet simplistic, methodology and a blind fideism unable to validate a true practical autonomy.

Divided between the plurality of knowledge on which it cannot bestow more than a formal unity, and the compartmentalisation of life into distinct scopes of action, modern reason, critical of the metaphysical-religious fundament of life, will growingly seek refuge in the task of

technically mastering and transforming the world, leaving behind myth and tradition, in a global movement which Max Weber justly called *de-deification* (*Entgötterung*).

With the growing abstraction and complexification of the mathematical sciences, the need arises simultaneously for their restructuring and grounding. It is thus that Cantor's and Russell's works on the fundamentals of arithmetic would bestow on logic, in the meantime axiomatized, the normative status of a paradigmatic language and an indispensable tool to eliminate any ambiguity or possible inconsistency.

Husserl's early works pertain to this problematic context, the philosopher having initiated, after a fleeting passage through psychologism, an original approach to the issue of the validity of those sciences, halfway between the subjectivism of an F. Brentano and the objectivism of a G. Frege or a B. Bolzano. In this way, though recognising along with the latter the ideality of *signification* (*Bedeutung*), he manages not to reify it, however, rather referring it, along with the former, to those acts by which consciousness is always already, in the course of its existence, a process of aiming at, or concerning itself with, something *objective* which may or may not be effected through intuition.

For Husserl, therefore, it is in intentionality that the key to the gnoseological riddle lies, and consciousness does not constitute, at the level of perception, a "cogito" enclosed in its representations or a simple intuitive apprehension of reality, but a working dynamic of constitution which is already, in its orientation towards the object, virtually an act of identification and recognition.

In the "*a priori*" of the intentional correlation between "noesis" and its "noema", Husserl discerns the source of all meaning and evidence to which the sceptical reason of the moderns needs to be redirected with the intent of reforming and thoroughly restructuring. In fact, he constitutes the primal ground for all certainty in which, free from all presupposition or arbitrary construct, consciousness carries out the immediate experience of the genuine emergence of *things themselves* (*Sache selbst*) as they appear.

## 2. PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY: CLASSIC PHENOMENOLOGY

However, in order to create an effective starting point for philosophy capable of finally establishing the system of ideas of a universal knowledge, the discovery of intentionality should be explored so as to enable a theoretical approach to consciousness, of a progressive and cumulative

nature, that is, according to a term already used by Hegel, a *phenomenology*. It will distinguish itself, for the intuitive and descriptive approach to the contents of consciousness, from that other constructive and explicative approach practised by the positive sciences in relation to nature.

In fact, with the *principle of all principles* (Prinzip aller Prinzipien) established as a guiding rule for all explicative procedure, Husserl wishes to deprive phenomenology of the possibility of any uncertainty, making reason return from the formalism of theories to the fundament of all evidence, that is, the *originally presentive intuition* (originär gebende Anschauung), regarded as the only legitimate source of knowledge (*viz* the work of *Ideen I*). This is an immanent and reflective, yet ample, view, as it extends from the pre-eminent plane of perception to that of intellection, through imagination; in it, i.e. in intuition, things give themselves without any intermediary concept or representation, "(...) that is to say, in their corporeal reality (...)" (*ibid.*, p. 43), though according to reasonably adequate degrees of phenomenality, i.e. of presence.

In this way, the whole collection of pure data (essences, categories) which shape the general propositions of science and which Kantianism, the negator of intellectual intuition, reduced to the logical form of judgment, is legitimised and taken back to its phenomenological basis.

With this, Husserl returned to philosophy its original ontological vocation, constituting Phenomenology as the starting point of a new "first philosophy", based on the premise of phenomenality as *givenness* (Gegebenheit). Meaning by this the product of the correlation between a significant intention and an intuition, Husserl tried to link the old intuitionism of Hellenistic roots to the modern perspective of a philosophy of constitution. However, with this he would not avoid the objectification associated with it, especially when, after the *reduction* (Reduktion) to the transcendental "ego", he considers that the abstract plane of possibility (of the object in general) rules in a logical and *a priori* way that other concrete and factual plane of the free emergence of phenomena.

Reversing this tendency, demonstrating the dependent character of a philosophy of reflection and "cogito" on a previous existential and hermeneutic moment, and stressing, in short, the primacy of the ontological over the gnoseological, seems, on a first approach, to make up Heidegger's decisive intervention within the phenomenological movement.

The author of *Sein und Zeit* sets out from the Husserlian legacy of categorial intuition, in particular his interpretation of the *predicative being* as a concept abstracted from a real state of affairs given to sensitive perception (*viz* Husserl's work, *Logische Untersuchungen*, VI, § 44) to raise

the overlooked issue of its *sense* (Sinn) and bring about its radical hermeneutic explicitation.

If, as Heidegger tells us, phenomenon, in its formal sense, is "(...) what presents itself, such as it presents itself from itself (...)" ("Das was sich zeigt, so wie es sich von ihm selbst her zeigt (...)"), *Sein und Zeit*, § 7, c, 34), i.e. those qualities of being of the beings manifest to empirical intuition, such as the essence and other categorial determinations, then phenomenon, in the phenomenological sense of what, because it is hidden, requires express thematization, is the *being itself* (Sein selbst), whilst constituting the fundament and the deep meaning of what is manifested.

So, if the signification pertaining to the manifest is, as Husserl had seen, the *presence* (Anwesenheit) immanent to intuition, should not this then be understood on the basis of the act of its givenness as phenomenality? And should not the latter, in turn, be understood in terms of the *event* (Ereignis) of its emergence and constitution as reality, i.e. as the temporization of time itself from possibility and future?

These are the questions that Heidegger asks himself about his reading of Husserl, which lead him to consider perception, as well as its possible reflective and cogitative thematization, as second moments, already dependent on a previous opening to truth, i.e. that in which the very being manifests itself as the modal *difference* or the temporal hiatus through which the *world* (Welt) always *gives itself* (gibt) in the present beings as an horizon of existence and understanding.

In this way, being itself takes on, in Heidegger's phenomenology, an unquestionable primacy over all constitution, guiding, through the initiative of its historical revelation, the *what* and the *how* of its hermeneutical explicitation by which man is always led to the freedom of an instaurative decision.

### 3. PHENOMENOLOGY AND PROTO-ONTOLOGY: ON THE PATH TO THE GENESIS OF THE PHENOMENON

From Husserl's late works on the passive synthesis of perception as the basis of predicative idealities, other interpretations of phenomenality developed, more concerned with the problematics of the genesis of phenomena than with their eidetic or categorial determination. Critical of the idea of a general ontology for the "in principle" incompatibility they discern between the phenomenic contingency and its *a priori* regimentation, they fit better into the design of a "proto-ontology" (J. Garelli), all the more so because they foster the issue of origin as the search for a

source-point of the manifestation in which form and content reciprocate each other and combine for the circular constitution of an absolute self-givenness (following the example of what Husserl thought in his "*Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*" when he glimpsed the founding phenomenon-event in the Ur-impression of the living present).

The reflection of the latest work of M. Merleau-Ponty on the phenomenon of *flesh* (chair) as reversibility or chiasmatic entwining of sensed and sensible, constitutes, in various respects, the central reference of a whole series of contemporary works about affectivity as the matrix of phenomenalisation (M. Henry, Levinas, H. Maldiney, M. Richir). They echo German romantic philosophy and psychoanalysis as they refer to a primordial unconscious (a proto-time without the presence of consciousness) in which phenomena phenomenalise themselves in a disorderly manner, though not without a certain inner cohesion, in the innocence of a blind and eternal becoming. It is a transcendental past of the spirit, which consciousness only manages to access through the hyperbolic "bracketing" of language itself, since this always determines in a coercive way, based on its code, what "for us" makes sense, i.e. belongs to the domain of the recognisable and the identifiable.

#### 4. PHENOMENON AND LOGOS: A PRIMAL ARTICULATION

Along the lines of classical philosophy which, with Parmenides, recognises, in the homology of being and thinking, the condition of all Ontology, Phenomenology, in spite of its penchant for idealisation, always considers the phenomenalisation of the phenomenon, its intuitive and sensitive presentation, as the essential reference in the elicitation of the sense to be formed. In this way it corroborates the phenomenological realism of some sectors of the epistemology of sciences (R. Tom, J. Petitot) which, in line with a certain neo-Aristotelianism, endeavour to think the dynamics of morphogenesis geometrically and mathematically.

Thus, in the objectifying perspective of a Husserl, it is at the antepredicative level of the lived and the praxis that operative subjectivity gives rise passively to the horizon in which reality unveils itself in its true sense, perceiving aspects of the intuited, that predicative synthesis will later make explicit notionally, as signifying such and such ideality.

In the same line of reflection, but more attentive to the hermeneutical and ontological content of the structure of sense which always accompanies the intentional consciousness than to its possible objectifying orienta-

tion, Heidegger stresses, with the anteriority of the being, the apriority of its understanding. This permits, through a future-oriented and anticipatory dynamism, the significant accommodating of the multimodal manifestation as the disjointed and procedural presentation of the paradigmatic historialisation “Event” (Ereignis) of the being itself.

Disputing Heidegger’s ontological monism, as well as the tautological character of his phenomenology, in which time and being reciprocate each other and combine in an undifferentiated saying of the ever same presence/absence, some authors have insisted on the excessive and truly in-finite character of the manifestation, as if the transcendent and non-positated One should only be schematised in a diversity of rhythms and topical instances of partial and transient individuation, in its game between the determined and the undetermined, the form and the substance, the visible and the hidden (Richir and Garelli, but also, in a different perspective, G. Deleuze and A. Badiou, amongst others).

As a result of this, it is considered an indispensable requirement of phenomenological work to return from the signic plane of *instituted signification* to the previous moment of its *hermeneutical and discursive formation*. In it, language, in its genesis, opens up to an extra-linguistic dimension which, for its furtive and reclusive nature, it only strives for expressing analogically and metaphorically in an indirect and ever polysemous enunciation. We are referring to the primordial unconscious, that inhuman origin of the spirit, from which emanate each time, in an inaudible source-like whisper, fulgurations of plural worlds which nothing prevents from being interpreted as the transcendence into action of a non-positional Absolute.

Although the possibility of an apophantic language, isomorphic to the texture of the phenomenal field is questionable, by virtue of the ever-existing hiatus between the concrete and wild essences of phenomena and the formal essences of language and their concepts, some authors endorse the possibility of an apophantics of a poetic-musical nature which, following the example of poetry, may reflect and transcribe, with its own expressive means, the incipient and prolific “logicity” of the manifestation, always significant in the texture its partial and conditional individuation presents. Its pre-requisite is the abandoning of the logic of the articulated language, as well as its lexicon, for they hinder the free listening of what, giving itself from the nothingness of a radical indetermination, is each time offering itself as an unheard-of possibility of temporalisation in presence (M. Richir).



## 5. AT THE GENESIS OF LANGUAGE: THE HERMENEUTIC SENSE FORMATION

The design of phenomenology follows from what we have said, i.e. to circumscribe the essence of language by returning to its phenomenological origin, which presupposes from the start its understanding, not as a mere vehicle for expressing already thought-of contents (images, ideas), but as the inner elicitation of the sense inherent in the cognitive act by which the truth of phenomena, implicit in their phenomenality, receives its primary explication in the *what* and *how* of their manifestation, even before their signic inscription.

This perspective only becomes fully implanted with the hermeneutical shift operated by Heidegger in phenomenology. In fact, language still has in Husserl a designative rather than apophantic function as the expression of contents previously aimed at and intuited in a significant intention (see the 1st *Logische Untersuchungen*). On the contrary, in the author of *Sein und Zeit*, language is thought of, hermeneutically, as an indispensable mediator between the being and the thinking. In fact, for the existential dynamism that prompts it as *discourse* (Rede), leading to intelligibility schemes, preferential modes of opening the way to reality, it will not only frame but guide the gradual outline and fixation of notional contents.

Such a rehabilitation of the discourse over language, which at its core evokes the stoic thesis of the “logos prophorikos” or the Augustinian thesis of the “verbum mentis” and the linguistic thesis of a Humbolt, not only fostered the idea of a transcendental inter-subjectivity, but also contributed to the emancipation of semantics from semiology. Thus, for example, in his dialogue with structuralism, Ricoeur could stress the irreducibility of language to a mere signic combination of discreet elements, meaning requiring, as genuinely occurs inside the phrase, the indispensable integrating function of synthesis (organic composition of significant units in wider groups).

Ricoeur, too, taking the same line as Kant, Heidegger and other advocates of an instaurative hermeneutics (H.-G. Gadamer, G. Bachelard, G. Durand) drew attention to the poetic and symbolic character of productive imagination, capable of renewing the image of the world and life as it tried to express the pathos of infinitude through figured and imagetic representations which surpass every limit of the conceivable.

In this way, it pertains to language, thought of at its phenomenological genesis as “parole opérante” (Merleau-Ponty), to effect the ontological splitting of phenomenality into world, in the *in-forma-tion* (Ein-bildung)

it achieves, as free and active thinking, of the unthought-of and the unsaid in the horizon of the sayable, adding to the already made and immemorially given sense, the sense to be formed and sought so as to gather from the ineffable an enunciation that is richer and richer, yet never univocal or transparent.

#### 6. THE SYMBOLIC INSTITUTION OF SENSE: THE CONSTITUTION OF LANGUAGE AND TRADITION

If, as we stated, a significant saying has as its condition the prior presentation of the phenomenon, its coming into presence in a founding event, nevertheless it is not possible to access the pure intuitive vision of the manifested without the signitive mediation which, for its facticity, interposes itself between consciousness and the phenomenal field, preventing man from accessing, in transparency, the pure dawning of manifestation.

In fact, because of its constitutive temporality, reflecting thought is already part of a vast process of symbolisation which accompanies man's life in society and determines the understanding he has of himself and the whole of reality. Languages, in particular, as a semiotic and logical-eidetic system in which the set of apperceptions of phenomena, recognised throughout time, are condensed and articulated, are the operators of this consensual intelligibility by which and in which communication occurs within the various communities. Place of all *a priori*, of the privilege of the essence and oblivion of the genesis, they are, for their inner form (semantic and syntactic), the bearers of an *image of the world* (Weltbild) which reflects and, at the same time, structures a set of collective ways of life. In reality, with their categories, determinations and relationships, languages open up possibilities, demarcate domains of objective validity or even prescribe values which, as insurmountable "preconceptions" or "pre-judgments", exist prior to individuals, and shape their behaviour.

Contemporary hermeneutic philosophy (Heidegger, Gadamer) has stressed the importance of *tradition* – understood as a process of handing down contents pertaining to a culture, an age, a society – in the formation of that initial understanding, of a pre-critical nature, in which man is always already situated and interpreted as having already answered, existentially or pre-ontologically, the question of the sense of (his) being. An accumulated deposit of meaning that language carries and hands down, first in oral and then in written form, tradition constitutes, for the virtualities it contains, an indispensable mediator between past and pre-

sent, especially if understood in an open-minded, non-dogmatic way, providing the critical work of questioning and researching the truth with perspectives that are eventually capable of consistently integrating new forms of life and relationship with reality that have arisen in the meantime.

The bond, recognised in this way, between the givenness of the phenomenon, language and tradition has led some authors, more attentive to the categorial structures of the discourse than to its conditions of objective reference, to endorse a certain semantic relativism. This is so in the case of Heidegger and Gadamer, in the field of hermeneutics, or L. Wittgenstein and W. V. O. Quine, in that of analytical philosophy, who, based on a holistic and transcendental conception of language, consider that it is not possible to determine an absolute anchoring point in the extra-linguistic reality, liable to establish universal conditions of validity and normativeness of the truth, these always being from the very start inscribed in a system of coordinates of a given theory or language.

All the same, however, it seems to us that language possesses a certain universal dimension which enables the phenomena of communication and translation of languages from one into another. On the one hand, the sharing of meaning inherent in conversation, as well as the mutual agreement of speakers on a subject, presupposes the possibility of the latter referring to the same object and this being taken, each time, as the gauging norm for the truth of the discourse (K.-O. Apel, J. Habermas). On the other hand, the translatability of languages reveals that they only apparently make up a closed system since, at the deep level of structure, they present a common logic configuration which imposes restrictions on them at the level of phonetics, semantics and syntax. This is what, contemporarily, the linguistics of an N. Chomsky or an R. Montague, for example, has revealed, from the perspective of a universal grammar, indicating how *modes of signification*, across the various languages (linguistic universals such as conceptual contents and functional homologies of the predication, assertion or referential process kinds) determine universal conditions for the correct formation of utterances. These are procedures that have been acquired in the course of human evolution and that respect the brain's neuronal structures and their possibilities of intellection.

Actually, according to the data of historical and compared linguistics, language evolved from a global symbolism endowed with a rudimentary and hardly stabilised differentiation of contents to their fixation into primitive structures, capable of integrating supra-segmental symbols, the "double articulation" typical of the linguistic sign having constituted a decisive level in the maturation stage of languages (vowel/consonant

contrast, birth and complication of the syllabic structure, growing intellectualisation of contents and their logical-conceptual structuring, with an influence on the differentiation of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes of the discourse).

Static and genetic phenomenology, unable to return to the historical origin of languages or to make the phenomenological language of the sense under formation in the “parole opérante” correspond to its linguistic register, might somehow aid understanding of the reason for structural homologies between the various languages and traditions, as well as the sense of their differences.

To this end, one would have, on the one hand, to enhance the transcendental structure of the discourse, i.e. that schematism of spatio-temporalization which presides over the elicitation of the constitutive sense of an horizon of presentiality; on the other hand, on the basis of its linguistic register, one would have to return to the “transcendental occurrences” which have, at every turn, marked the phenomenological field, causing the transposition into language of the present phase of the *sense in formation*, i.e. its crystallization in an *objective signification* liable to constitute a transmissible and teachable habitualness of the “social we”.

This would be a work of reactivation of the sense which would endeavour to lead what appears back to the forgotten horizon of its phenomenality, always richer and more multifaceted, after all, in the concrete texture of its emergence, than its simple, univocal and idealized, perception.

As we have already noted, Husserl wanted to make phenomenological “significations” correspond to the significations of the discourse – as if there were a “pre-established harmony” between the modes of intuiting, signifying and saying – falling in this way into the platonic postulation of an eidetic of phenomena transparent to language, since it leads back to the logical distinction of genre and species.

Such an assumption, also present in the medieval conception of a “speculative grammar”, would be denounced and disputed by later phenomenologists, such as Merleau-Ponty, Richir, Garelli ... , who, along the lines of a certain Kantianism, stress the insurmountable hiatus between the concrete and wild “logicity” of phenomena and the formality of languages, always surpassed, in their expression of the sense of the manifestation by other, *a priori* indeterminate and in-finite, possibilities of presentation of phenomena.

From this latter point of view, it is therefore considered that the plane of signification presupposes more archaic levels of meaning, of an imagetic

and associative nature, more able than the grid of the logical-formal structure of the phrase to describe the complex articulation of phenomenic essences in their multiple harmonic relationships, so often unprecedented and unexpected. Thus, for example, the phenomenologist Marc Richir proposes, with the project of a “transcendental eidetic without concept”, a systematic exploration of phenomena in their concreteness, which the formalising nature of instituted language tends to reduce to the uniformity of the concept or the categorical forms. It is basically about returning to a primordial stage of language in which naming and saying did not mean identifying or classifying, but revealing phenomena in their original texture.

## 7. THE PHENOMENOLOGY AND HERMENEUTICS OF TRADITIONS

If, during the time interval between experience and the knowledge about it, man is already his own heir and the unconscious product of events that transcend him and determine the way in which he understands himself and the world – all the more so that he does not exist as a solitary, but as an interdependent being, in the collective sharing of a language and a tradition which have already, somehow, answered by themselves the question of the sense of his being and of being – such conditioning is neither absolute nor final, consciousness always having the power to examine and question itself, as well as the possibility to renew itself by opening up to new forms of experience and ascertaining his being-in-the-world.

It is even this openness of mind to the sources of phenomenality, to its perpetual givenness of sense, that has since time immemorial given rise to the questioning and transformation of symbolic systems (languages, practices, representations ... ) which make up and structure the being, the thinking and the acting of man in society.

In fact, languages crystallize and become obsolete when they close in on themselves, self-reproducing as a coded set of interdependent significations in a mechanical repetition which automates behaviour and consciousness. They require, therefore, continuous recycling, either through confrontation with other ways of signifying the world or by periodically returning to their phenomenological matrix. In spite of the contingency of their historialisation, the latter is, in its proliferating excess, the common and transcendental ground of our humanity from which the various cultures and traditions initially emanated, but from which they gradually

moved away as contents and values became more complex and rationalised.

It is for this reason that one needs to return, now in a pondered and conscious way, to this phenomenological origin of language in which meaning, as much yesterday as today, has its genesis and is welcomed, before being interpreted and instituted, so as to contradict and make up for the modern propensity to empty and deprive of significance the forms of communication and living.

At heart, it is about gathering from the reckless and intuitive soil of the existential experience the freshness of a primal intelligibility, in a similar way to what had occurred at the beginning of time when man, viewing and figuring the contrasting totality of life in large archetypical and symbolic images, had begun to interpret and express the open, variegated scope of the being.

*Center of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon*

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* "Gesamtausgabe", t.2 (Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1977).

<sup>2</sup> E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen II* (Halle, Niemeyer, 1913).

<sup>3</sup> E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen philosophie. I- Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* (Halle, Niemeyer, 1928).

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, "Jahrbuch", 9 (1928), 367–496.

<sup>5</sup> E. Husserl, *Die Krisis des europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Ein Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*, "Husserliana" VI, 1954.

## SOME COMMENTS ON ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

For the Third World Congress of Phenomenology to be hosted at Oxford is, rather inevitably, for the question to be posed of the historical as well as systematic relation between phenomenology and Oxford philosophy.

Oxford philosophy, in the relevant sense, is the analytic or ordinary language philosophy developed in the 1930s by Gilbert Ryle, J. L. Austin and quite a few other Oxford figures, each in his own way, but in a shared overarching spirit – a spirit partly imported, as it happens, from Cambridge. This spirit seems at first sight to have little in common with that which inspired Husserlian phenomenology. And yet, as it paradoxically happens, the most analytic of the analytic philosophers were among those most interested in the work of Husserl and the phenomenological movement. I shall make a brief examination of this phenomenon, with the help of some of the recent commentators.

Ryle himself, properly called “the best-known of Oxford ‘ordinary-language’ philosophers”,<sup>1</sup> lectured and published on Husserl and Heidegger, as well as on Brentano and other precursors of the phenomenological movement. Indeed, Ryle visited Husserl in Freiburg in 1929; and his first publication was a brief review of Ingarden’s *Essentiale Fragen*. At the same time he refused to accept that there was any real convergence between analytic philosophy and the Husserlian current, this on account of the fact that Ryle believed phenomenology to place doctrine before description, which he refused to do. Yet on one occasion, Ryle conceded that his well-known 1949 study on *The Concept of Mind* could be called “phenomenology” – in which case, it would be a kind of “linguistic phenomenology”, he thought.<sup>2</sup>

This same phrase, “linguistic phenomenology”, was also applied to the work of Austin, that other Grand Old Man of Oxford analytic philosophy. In his 1956 essay on “A Plea for Excuses”, Austin himself notes that, in preference to names like “analytic philosophy” or “linguistic philosophy”, it might be better to call his way of philosophizing “linguistic phenomenology” – only, in his rather typically British aversion to words of many syllables, he concludes that this name is after all “something of a mouthful”. The point for Austin is in any case that his analytic method is not to be understood as concerned only with words, but also with

phenomena of everyday life.<sup>3</sup> Paul Ricoeur commented positively in 1971 on Austin's project, noting that a "linguistic phenomenology ... could escape both the futility of mere linguistic distinctions and the unverifiability of all claims to a direct intuition of lived experience. Thanks to this grafting of linguistic analysis onto phenomenology", he added, the latter "may be cured of its illness and find its second wind" – whatever illness he may have been thinking of.<sup>4</sup>

Ryle and Austin were of course not the only linguistic phenomenologists: such a thing existed outside of Oxford, and outside of Britain too, for instance in the work of Fernando Montero, who I see is the subject of a piece in the recently published *Phenomenology World-Wide Encyclopedia*.<sup>5</sup> But today I shall focus on British currents.

The key figure in this connexion is Ludwig Wittgenstein. The reader will immediately object that Wittgenstein was Cambridge, if not Vienna, rather than Oxford. But his influence on British philosophy generally was enormous, and Oxford was no exception in this respect: on the contrary. In this last regard I am going to take a short cut and make reference to some theses of the anthropologist Ernest Gellner – the author of *Words and Things* (1959), which by the way Ryle notoriously refused to have reviewed in the journal *Mind*. I do this not because I agree with Gellner, but just because he paints a picture with few nuances – and thus some force.

In the posthumously published work called *Language and Solitude*,<sup>6</sup> Gellner puts forward a number of provocative claims: to begin with, that the Wittgenstein movement in the years following the Second World War can be characterized as "revelational", "charismatic" and "absolutist". By around 1950, he adds, "the movement had spread from being a Cambridge-based clique to becoming the dominant force in the teaching of philosophy, above all in Oxford, and was indeed referred to at times as 'Oxford philosophy'." Now whether or not one agrees, on the one hand, with this harsh social-psychological claim; or on the other hand endorses Wittgenstein's philosophical innovations, and approves their passage to Oxford, we can say that Oxford shared to a very considerable extent in the philosophical tendency associated especially with Wittgenstein's name. But – and here I already depart from the gist of Gellner's account – in Oxford the tendency functioned according to a far less charismatic modality.<sup>7</sup> I mention this point because it concerns the way in which philosophical movements and institutions reproduce themselves. In Wittgenstein's case, this was indeed in not insignificant part a matter of "personal charisma". But in the case of Ryle and Austin, who



were perfectly anchored in the Oxford academic establishment, that element was far less important. I would hazard by the way that Husserl's case lies somewhere in between.

Let us now however turn to the matter of Wittgenstein's own interest in phenomenology. As you know, Wittgenstein made some comments about phenomenology in his 1929–30 typescript, posthumously published as *Philosophical Remarks*;<sup>8</sup> there also exist reports of his conversations in Vienna with Friedrich Waismann, Moritz Schlick and others; and there are some other relevant documents in the *Nachlass*.<sup>9</sup>

Herbert Spiegelberg analyzed some of the pertinent passages in a 1968 article called “The Puzzle of Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Phänomenologie*”.<sup>10</sup> The puzzle in this case is that, while Wittgenstein does say quite a few things about what he calls phenomenology, it is clear neither exactly how his claims fit in with his thinking more generally, nor why their significance has not been more closely studied by the critics.

Let me say a few words, to begin, about the opening section of the *Philosophical Remarks*, where Wittgenstein notes in § 1 that “phenomenological language or ‘primary language’, as I have called it, does not appeal to me as a goal; now I no longer consider it necessary”; but that “a realization of what is necessary to our language and what is essential for presentation, a realization of what parts of our language are idling wheels, amounts to the construction of a phenomenological language”.

Some commentators believe that Wittgenstein is here referring to his *Tractatus*. This is for instance the interpretation by Karl Wuchterl, who holds that Wittgenstein regarded his own *Tractatus* language as phenomenological. Wuchterl adds: “This obviously is connected to the fact that the ultimate bases in the completely analyzed form of the proposition must be understood as free of all hypotheses, so as an immediately given ‘phenomenon’”<sup>11</sup> – by which I take Wuchterl to mean that in carrying out the complete analysis of a proposition, we ought finally to reach elementary propositions, which themselves do no more than assert the existence of a state of affairs and are therefore free of any hypothetical character.

This is an essential point. Let us see what Jaako Hintikka has to say about it in his recent article “The Idea of Phenomenology in Wittgenstein and Husserl”.<sup>12</sup> Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, he argues, is “pure phenomenology”. For the *Tractatus* account of propositions as pictures “amounts to the thesis that a purely phenomenological language is possible, a language which represents faithfully what is immediately given to me”. And “immediately given” here means: in a “hypothesis-free” manner.<sup>13</sup>

And indeed, where Wittgenstein and Husserl seem to meet is just on this point: on the matter of their suspicion of the unobservable, of the merely hypothetical, considered in their putative role as a foundation for knowledge.

Hintikka claims that Wittgenstein's use of the term "phenomenology" is drawn not so much from Husserl as from his knowledge of the work of Ernst Mach and Ludwig Boltzmann.<sup>14</sup> This is relevant to the question at hand: thus for instance, "in physics, atoms were at the time of the old Ernst Mach and the young Ludwig Wittgenstein the prime examples of unobservable, non-phenomenological entities".<sup>15</sup> So, in respect of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, it would be wrong to assimilate his simple objects to physical atoms, which some pundits have done. One of the key ideas of the *Tractatus* was on the contrary precisely to dispense with all such hypothetical entities.

The phenomenological approach, in Wittgenstein's sense, is thus characterized by its "independence of all hypotheses". But this is a formulation which might well be applied to the phenomenology of Husserl too: we may agree with William Barrett that "for Husserl, phenomenology was a discipline that attempts to describe what is given to us in experience without obscuring preconceptions or hypothetical speculations".<sup>16</sup> And what is "given us" is of course not, as the phenomenologists supposed, sense data, but "the things themselves", the *Sachen selbst*.

David Pears writes, in his *False Prison*,<sup>17</sup> that "phenomenology penetrates to the essential nature of the world as we experience it and describes the underlying possibilities". So its task is identical with that assigned to logic in the *Tractatus*; and it is equated with grammar in the *Big Typescript* and in various other texts. When Wittgenstein writes in 1929 (I already quoted the passage) that he no longer believes that a phenomenological language is necessary, he is, Pears argues, retracting in particular "a certain view about the results to be attained" by the kind of investigation engaged in the *Tractatus*: "he used to think that [these results] would be expressed in a unique way, the complete analysis of factual discourse which would hold up a mirror to the one and only phenomenal world, but he now thinks that what is needed is a comparative study of different ways of speaking" – roughly, what he would come to call language games – but all sharing the same function.<sup>18</sup>

Wittgenstein insists at various moments that he is concerned, in his study of the world, not with what there is, but with possibilities – and of course impossibilities: something like what Husserl called "essences". This kind of study is what Wittgenstein alternatively or at least almost equiva-

lently dubs “phenomenology” or “logic”. Later he makes use of a third term, “grammar”. Thus he titles a section in the Big Typescript: “Phenomenology is Grammar”; in a 1929 meeting with Waismann and others he had noted that, whereas physics merely deals in the establishing of regularities, phenomenology concerns itself with possibility, that is, with meaning.<sup>19</sup>

What Wittgenstein repudiates in 1929 is not this function of philosophy, namely of dealing in the study of possibilities and impossibilities, but rather the need for a *separate* language – separate from ordinary or everyday language – to fulfill this task. That is the background to the turn made by Wittgenstein, from the 1930s onwards, towards the careful study of ordinary or everyday linguistic usage. He was of course not alone in taking this path: Norman Malcolm (Wittgenstein’s pupil), writing about the Cambridge philosopher G.E. Moore, has argued for example that “the essence of Moore’s technique of refuting philosophical statements consists in pointing out that these statements go against ordinary language”.<sup>20</sup> Gilbert Ryle, in his article “Systematically Misleading Expressions” of 1932, applies the method of the analysis of ordinary language to the task of clarifying our understanding – for instance by revealing the manner in which certain assertions, as a consequence of their superficial grammatical form, confuse us and in some cases cause the philosophers to draw mistaken metaphysical conclusions.

Recall that, on Wittgenstein’s account, phenomenology – not now conceived of as a “separate language” – deals in the establishment of possibilities. It is therefore, he notes, “the grammar of the description of those facts on which physics builds its theories”.<sup>21</sup> This characterization of his method, which functions via the careful study of “ordinary language” and the struggle against our “bewitchment” by linguistic misuse, is accompanied by a new conception of the role of philosophy as such: for instance that – in contrast to science, understood in a more or less naturalistic, or what Wittgenstein calls “physicalist” sense – philosophy propounds no theories, proposes no hypotheses, does not seek to prove anything, explains nothing but only describes, and discovers nothing.<sup>22</sup>

It looks as if the new philosophy being developed by Wittgenstein from around 1929, which as we saw he sometimes speaks of as using a phenomenological method, is thus a sort of non-naturalist or non-physicalist study of the “grammar for the description of facts”, as illustrated for instance in his suggestion that “the theory of [musical] harmony [is] at least in part phenomenology, hence grammar”.<sup>23</sup> Such a study of grammar is, as we just saw, a matter of description and therefore deals in the non-

hypothetical. Wittgenstein says in *Philosophical Remarks* § 67 that someone could, say, describe all the sense impressions he had had: "This would be a description. And why shouldn't I be able to leave everything hypothetical out of this description?"

Hintikka however argues that "in Wittgenstein's new sense, phenomenological (hypothesis-free) discourse is possible only as a special kind of sub-language or dialect of a more comprehensive physicalist language".<sup>24</sup> I am not sure that this is quite right. Wittgenstein's point, as Hintikka himself notes, is that in such phenomenological ways of speaking "the person himself or herself serves as a reference point": that is to say, in one kind of language, the physicalist kind, the framework of reference for the identification of objects in the world is "impersonal"; in the other kind, the phenomenological kind, "the person's vantage point plays a crucial role". Now Hintikka's ground for arguing that Wittgenstein's phenomenological language use is only a dialect of the physicalist language (and presumably in that sense not a "separate language") is that the former is "characterized by a different mode of identification rather than by a different ontology".<sup>25</sup> But in any case it is not, I think, so much a matter just of a different mode of identification as of two types of objects of knowledge: on the one hand facts, theories, covering laws; on the other hand possibilities, where possibilities means essences. For the purpose of the study of the second we don't need a separate language, but rather to pay attention to the grammar of one and the same language. For, as Wittgenstein also writes, "essence is expressed in grammar" (*Philosophical Investigations*, § 371);<sup>26</sup> and, as we know, grammar concerns precisely the description of fields of possibilities.

Nicholas Gier, in his study on *Wittgenstein and Phenomenology*, claims that Wittgenstein's phenomenological method is a transcendental method, since it is an investigation of the formal conditions that make our experience of facts possible.<sup>27</sup> Gier also quotes James L. Marsh's comment to the effect that "such grammar ... seems to approximate the phenomenological notion of essence".<sup>28</sup> The goal, says Wittgenstein himself in § 1 of the *Philosophical Remarks*, is "grasping the essence of what is represented". John Hems concludes: "Like Husserl, Wittgenstein brackets existence."<sup>29</sup> Gier notes: "the only legitimate data for Wittgenstein and the phenomenologists are the phenomena of direct experience". But as we saw, these phenomena are nothing like the sense data of phenomenalism; they are rather the (in principle) untheorized things found in the world, considered in respect of their essential characteristics. Gier quotes, in comparison, a parallel claim by Husserl, from the *Crisis*:<sup>30</sup> that the "categorical features

of the *Lebenswelt* ... are not concerned, so to speak, with the theoretical idealizations and the hypothetical substructions of the geometrician and the physicist".<sup>31</sup>

Wittgenstein and Husserl thus seem to share a concern – for the grammar of the world – as well as an aversion – to the domination of a naturalistic or physicalistic world-view; and this even if their positive methodologies are different, Wittgenstein relying much more on an appeal to language use itself.

Let us at this point return for a moment to Gellner's controversial reading of Wittgenstein's philosophical development. The *Tractatus*, he writes, is a "poem to solitude", an expression of the individualist or atomic vision of knowledge. The central proposition of the *Tractatus*, he adds, is thus that the world is "without culture". But from the 1930s onwards Wittgenstein revised his position, abandoning this individualism or atomism. In his second philosophy he "views human thought and language as embodied in systems of social custom", each tied to a particular community.<sup>32</sup> Gellner's picture of both of Wittgenstein's philosophies is over-simplified and probably reductionist. But it has the advantage of allowing us, in a broad-brush manner, to pose the question as to whether we can find a parallel development in Husserl's thought – between on the one side the idealism of the concept of "absolute or pure transcendental consciousness" (*Ideas* § 55), of the transcendental ego in its original version (an account which is by the way, according to Hans-Georg Gadamer, as a transcendental solipsism a dead-end) and on the other side the intersubjectivity or "transcendental we" of the *Lebenswelt* or life-world.

In one British study of Husserl, by David Bell, the author puts it this way: that the line of thought pursued by Husserl in the 1930s leads us "away from solitary, immaterial, self-subsistent consciousness" and indicates "the importance of the body, of the existence of a plurality of conscious beings, and of the life-world or *Lebenswelt* which they share".<sup>33</sup> So while Husserl's earlier works display atomistic tendencies – they introduce "isolated, disembodied, self-contained centres of consciousness" – he later adopts what Bell calls a "profoundly holistic point of view".<sup>34</sup> What becomes central to Husserl's philosophical concerns is the intersubjective community of conscious beings. So, especially in the *Crisis*, "history comes to perform the same role ... that (individual) psychology had performed in his earlier works".<sup>35</sup>

But we have to be careful about some formulations. Again the question of possibility and impossibility, or contingency and necessity, arises. As

Gier points out, the *Lebenswelt* is not a “cultural-historical” world. The cultural-historical world is rather what Husserl calls the *Umwelt*; the *Lebenswelt* in contrast is, to use Husserl’s terminology, something like the total horizon of all possible experiences – or, in another formulation, “the life world is pure essence”.<sup>36</sup> But something comparable, though not identical, seems to be true of Wittgenstein’s *Lebensform* too: the form of life in Wittgenstein is “not to be taken as a factual theory”. Forms of life are rather “the formal framework that make society and culture possible”; the “formal conditions” that make a meaningful world possible.<sup>37</sup>

A significant difference between Husserl and Wittgenstein in this connexion is however that Husserl’s *Lebenswelt* is necessarily singular, not plural, which Wittgenstein’s forms of life are; and this for the very good reason that it is the “universal horizon for the plurality of cultural worlds”.<sup>38</sup> Wittgenstein’s account of the *Lebensform* is also concerned with possibility and impossibility, but in another sense: the meanings contained in the various forms of life are not transcendental but immanent, because conventional. But within a given form of life, the rules determine what is possible and what is not possible: what makes sense and what does not.<sup>39</sup> That is to say, the relation between a rule and our acts – in so far as these are (or are not) in accordance with the rule – is “grammatical”. And grammatical (or “logical”) normativity is a matter of hard necessity. Wittgenstein writes that “the logical ‘must’ is a component part of the propositions of logic, and these are not propositions of human natural history. If what a proposition of logic said was ‘Human beings agree with one another in such-and-such ways’ ... then its contradictory would say that there is here a lack of agreement.”<sup>40</sup> But this, Wittgenstein argues, cannot be right. From a certain point of view we might indeed say that a rule is “founded on agreement”. This however, as Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker point out, has to be understood as referring to the framework within which it make sense to talk about following a rule at all. A framework of agreement or convention in behaviour “is presupposed by each of our shared language-games”, but this does not “abolish logic” or soften the “hardness” of the “logical must”, since logic belongs to the rules of our language-games – “and the framework conditions in general and agreement in particular are not included in those rules”.<sup>41</sup>

Still, in spite of all the important differences between them, both Wittgenstein and Husserl, as I already said, are – in their anti-naturalism or anti-physicalism – averse to the “merely hypothetical” or unobservable or theoretical in philosophy, just because of their insistence on the central-

ity in philosophy of the question of possibility and impossibility, that is to say, to repeat the point, of essence or grammatical necessity. How the world happens to be is one thing; how we might – theoretically or speculatively – explain how it happens to be is an extension of this first concern; but what can and cannot be in, or perhaps about, the world is something quite different. Let me shortly quote a well-known passage from Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (§ 109) in this connexion: "Our considerations could not be scientific ones. ... We must do away with all *explanation*, and description alone must take its place ... These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language" – and that, he adds, "in such a way as to make us recognize these workings", in spite of "an urge to misunderstand them". Thus we return, full circle, to a central concern of the analytic philosophy of the British or Oxford variety: the battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by language.

There remains one last theme to be briefly touched on today. I have already talked about Husserl's *Lebenswelt* and about Wittgenstein's *Lebensform*. But what conception of life do these ideas involve?

In the case of Husserl, the notion of life points us to the non-physicalist realm, to the world as it is lived, as it is constituted by transcendental intersubjectivity. In Wittgenstein life is similarly not the life process studied by the natural sciences, in the first place biology. Baker and Hacker insist that Wittgenstein's notion of the form of life "is not biological, but cultural": it is human life.<sup>42</sup> Gier suggests that "for Wittgenstein, *Lebensphilosophie* even takes precedence over *Sprachphilosophie*". And there is a good reason for this, connected to the point just made about the function of philosophy in the struggle against our bewitchment by language. Wittgenstein writes: "If we surrender the reins to language and not to *life*, then the problems of philosophy arise!"<sup>43</sup>

Moving finally back from Wittgenstein to Oxford philosophy, I was interested to read in an article by Ingvar Johansson a number of remarks on the relation between the phenomenological conception of the life-world and the ordinary-language approach. Gilbert Ryle, Johansson writes, and the Oxford philosophers made the explicit claim that the central aim of philosophy is the analysis of ordinary language; or, to use Ryle's phrase, to determine the logical geography of concepts as well as to rectify the logical geography of the "knowledge" which we already possess. In Ryle's *Concept of Mind*, he adds, "this move amounts to exactly the same thing as the *epoché* of the phenomenological move-

ment”.<sup>44</sup> Whether the two are exactly the same thing may be doubted, but it may be rewarding to look at the relation between the two. What we bracket, on this interpretation, is in particular all speculative, theoretical doctrines – in the case at hand, the Cartesian ghost-in-the-machine doctrine – which, as Ryle puts it, “conflict with the whole body of what we know about minds when we are not speculating about them”.<sup>45</sup>

If there are indeed, as the above considerations suggest, common features – common concerns and common ways of approaching them – between Husserlian phenomenology and analytic philosophy, in spite of all the very considerable divergences between the two currents, this is presumably no historical accident. Both are reactions, if not identical reactions, to the scientific and ideological crisis of the time, the very crisis which Husserl explicitly addresses in his 1937 text.

Our own situation, at the beginning of the 21st century, is a rather different one. Something like forty years ago, the centre of gravity of English-speaking philosophy moved from Britain to the United States, and, what is intellectually more significant, to an academic world dominated by a so-called scientific – some call it scientistic – approach to philosophy, its tasks and its method. Leading roles were played in this connexion, as you know, by W. V. O. Quine, Donald Davidson, Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, Paul Churchland and many others. But present-day scientism, in an era of the information and cognitive sciences, of artificial intelligence and genetic theories of behaviour etc., presents a new challenge to any critical philosophy. These questions are however matter for other papers than the present one – some of which are indeed being presented to this Congress.

*Queens College, Oxford*

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> By John Passmore in his *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 442.

<sup>2</sup> Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London: Hutchinson, 1975).

<sup>3</sup> See Austin, *Philosophical Papers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 184.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Ricoeur, “From Existentialism to the Philosophy of Language”, in *The Rule of Metaphor: Multidisciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1975), pp. 315–22.



<sup>5</sup> Jesús Conill, "Fernando Montero's Linguistic Phenomenology", in (ed.) Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *Phenomenology World-Wide* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002).

<sup>6</sup> Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; especially p. 164ff.

<sup>7</sup> The psychologist Liam Hudson, who read philosophy at Oxford in the 1950s, recalls that "the philosophy practised in Oxford in the 1950s seemed to us at the time to embody all that was incisive and sane. Its most skilled practitioners we placed at the very pinnacle of the intellectual pyramid: Austin, Strawson, Ryle."

<sup>8</sup> Edited by Rush Rhees; trans. Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975).

<sup>9</sup> A piece by Denis Paul (co-translator with Elizabeth Anscombe of *On Certainty*), entitled "Wittgenstein's Second Half in Forty Five Minutes", available on internet at <http://www.wittgenstein.internet-today.co.uk> (including contact information for the author), argues the following regarding the *Nachlass* in respect to the remarks on phenomenology:

"In Cambridge, dating his first notes 2.2.29, [Wittgenstein] proceeded to write in a new set of large notebooks, investigating a 'phenomenological language'. ... After eight months of hard work ... he abandoned the attempt ...

There are two interesting passages which show that Wittgenstein was feeling uneasy about his quest for a phenomenological language before he expressly abandoned it."

These passages read as follows:

"With the phenomenological language it is as if I came into a swamp with a magic spell on it where everything that can be grasped vanishes."

And:

"The kind of consideration that leads us down as if into a Devil's Punchbowl is considering the present as the only real thing. This present, conceived as being in constant flow or rather in constant change, will not let itself be grasped. It vanishes before we can even think of grasping it. We stay bewitched in this punchbowl in a swirl of thoughts."

Later, Paul adds, Wittgenstein lets us know "that renouncing his phenomenological language did not mean abandoning what we should call phenomenism or idealism ...

Back in England in April 1930 [after a Vienna vacation], Wittgenstein left his typescript with Russell and took the carbon copy back to Cambridge, where he cut it up into paragraphs and pasted a selection from them into the blank pages of a further manuscript book, cunningly reordering them to give the impression that the phenomenological language quest had been given up before the resulting text was written, instead of, merely, before it was pasted together. The trustees' nickname for this quite substantial collection of pastings was the Moore Volume. Wittgenstein's name, on the identical title pages of both, was *Philosophische Bemerkungen* ...

This printed volume, later translated as *Philosophical Remarks*, disguised the part played by the phenomenological language ...

[But] 1929 and its struggles with the phenomenological language continued to reverberate with Wittgenstein until the end of his life. ..."

<sup>10</sup> In *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 5, 1968; reprinted in Stuart Shanker (ed.), *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments*, vol. 1 (London: Croom Helm, 1986).

<sup>11</sup> Wuchterl, "Phänomenologie beim 'mittleren' Wittgenstein", in R. Haller & W. Grassl (eds.), *Language, Logic, and Philosophy*. Proceedings of the 4th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, 1979; Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1980.

- <sup>12</sup> Hintikka, in Keith Lehrer and Johann Christian Marek (eds.), *Austrian Philosophy Past and Present* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997).
- <sup>13</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 108–9, 120.
- <sup>14</sup> Rival Moravian and Austrian physicists of the 19th-early 20th centuries.
- <sup>15</sup> Hintikka, *op. cit.*, p. 106.
- <sup>16</sup> William Barrett, *Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1962), p. 190.
- <sup>17</sup> Pears, *The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
- <sup>18</sup> Pears, *op. cit.*, pp. 97–8.
- <sup>19</sup> Both passages quoted by Hintikka, *op. cit.*, p. 114.
- <sup>20</sup> Norman Malcolm, “Moore and Ordinary Language”, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, The Library of Living Philosophers, Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University, 1952; quoted by Roderick Chisholm, “Philosophers and Ordinary Language”, in Richard Rorty (ed.), *The Linguistic Turn* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 175.
- <sup>21</sup> *Philosophical Remarks*, § 1.
- <sup>22</sup> See Grahame Lock, *Wittgenstein: Philosophie, Logique, Thérapeutique* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992), p. 110.
- <sup>23</sup> *Philosophical Remarks*, § 4.
- <sup>24</sup> Hintikka, *op. cit.*, p. 120.
- <sup>25</sup> Hintikka, *op. cit.*, p. 121.
- <sup>26</sup> Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958).
- <sup>27</sup> Albany: State University of New York, 1981, p. 95.
- <sup>28</sup> Marsh, “The Triumph of Ambiguity”, in *Philosophy Today*, no. 19, 1975, p. 251; quoted in Gier, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
- <sup>29</sup> John Hems, “Husserl and/or Wittgenstein”, in *International Philosophical Quarterly*, no. 8, 1968; quoted in Gier, *op. cit.*, p. 104.
- <sup>30</sup> Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).
- <sup>31</sup> Gier, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
- <sup>32</sup> Gellner, *op. cit.*, pp. 46, 68, 72.
- <sup>33</sup> Husserl. London: Routledge, 1990, p. 203.
- <sup>34</sup> Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 228.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 231.
- <sup>36</sup> Gier, *op. cit.*, p. 119.
- <sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 32.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119.
- <sup>39</sup> On the various possible meanings of Wittgenstein's form of life, see e.g. J. F. M. Hunter, “‘Forms of life’ in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*”, in Stuart Shanker (ed.), *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical Assessments*, vol. 2 (London: Croom Helm, 1986).
- <sup>40</sup> Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1970; see the discussion on this and related passages in G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, *Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity. An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations*, vol. 2 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p. 247ff.


<sup>41</sup> Baker and Hacker, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 241.

<sup>43</sup> *Big Typescript*, p. 521; quoted by Gier, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

<sup>44</sup> Johansson, "Perception as the Bridge Between Nature and Life-World", in C. Bengt Pedersen and N. Thomassen (eds.) *Nature and Life-World* (Odense: Odense University Press, 1998); and available on internet at <http://hem.passagen.se/ijohansson/intentionality1.htm>.

<sup>45</sup> Ryle, *op. cit.*, p. 11.



Graham Lock, lecturing; Angela Ales Bello, presiding.

## LESSONS FROM SARTRE FOR THE ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

### § 1. USING SARTRE

According to a well known account, phenomenology and analytic philosophy have a common origin in the attempt to find and defend the objectivity of logic and philosophy against psychologism, a tradition of anti-psychologism going back ultimately to Bolzano. The respective founding fathers (Edmund Husserl and Gottlob Frege) differ in their methods and points of departure, so that – so the story is told (cf. Dummett 1988) – at last analytic philosophy was more successful in that language as intersubjectively shared turned out to be the better foundation of objectivity than the realm of pure phenomenology, where phenomenologists disagree and cannot establish an intersubjectively valid method of *eidetic reduction*. Analytic philosophy of mind also shares with phenomenology the fundamental interest in intentionality. Accounting for intentionality – in terms of propositional attitudes – turned out not only to be successful, but became (in the guise of functionalism) the very paradigm of the philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. What is missing in that philosophy of mind – as its main proponents like Jerry Fodor readily admit (cf. Fodor 1995) – is an account of consciousness *as experienced* by someone. Others in the analytic camp have offered theories of consciousness focusing on phenomenality and so called qualia (cf. Chalmers 1996). What is mostly and strikingly missing in these theories are (sub-)theories or models of the egological structures of consciousness (i.e. a theory of the subjectively experienced or theoretically to be assumed agents/egos in consciousness). There are mostly reflections on the use of the personal pronoun “I” and a undifferentiated notion of a/the “self”. It is here, I think, that the analytic philosophy of mind should revisit phenomenology again. The egological structures of consciousness have been a – or even *the* main – topic of Kantian, Idealistic and phenomenological theories of consciousness.

I have chosen Jean-Paul Sartre as my point of departure, since I believe that he has an advanced theory of these structures, and that some of his insights are congenial to theses in the analytic philosophy of mind. Sartre develops this theory in *The Transcendence of the Ego* (Sartre 1937), the

introduction to *Being and Nothingness* (Sartre 1943) and his talk “*Self-Awareness and Self-Knowledge*” (Sartre 1948).

There are positive and negative lessons from Sartre:

- Taking up some of his ideas one may arrive at a better model of consciousness in the analytic philosophy of mind; representing some of his ideas within the language and the models of a functionalist theory of mind makes them more accessible and integrates them into the wider picture.
- Sartre, as any philosopher, errs at some points, I believe; but these errors may be instructive, especially in as much as they mirror some errors in some current theories of consciousness.

This paper, therefore, is not a piece of Sartre scholarship, but an attempt of a “friendly takeover” of some ideas I ascribe to Sartre into current models in the philosophy of mind.

## § 2. ORDINARY LANGUAGE AND THE SELF

Talking of the self or an ego is often ridiculed by analytic philosophers by pointing out that sentences like

(1\*) I came around and I brought (with me) my Self.

(2\*) She visited Frank and my I was there, too.

are ungrammatical. They are ungrammatical, if they are, in the sense of running against the meaning of the expression involved, i.e. their common usage. This is, however, a very weak argument. The strangeness of (1\*) might be accounted for by a proponent of a Self in noting the inseparability of person and self, so that it is no more strange than

(3?) I came around and I brought (with me) my body.

This may not work for all constructions, (2\*) may be an example of real deviance. Such deviance, nevertheless, does not show much. Starting from ordinary usage sentences like

(4) Near heavy bodies space is curved.

(5) All full explanation has to consider the colour of the quarks.

are nonsensical as well, since there is nothing, according to our pre-scientific understanding of space and before redefining the notion, against which is can be curved; and subatomic particles simply have no colours. Once it is conceded that scientific language may deviate from ordinary

and pre-scientific usage there is no exception with the philosophy of mind. Maybe “the I”, different sorts of “Egos” and “the Self” are theoretical posits. Given a background theory sentences like

(6) The I unites experiences to present the Self to us

may not sound strange any longer.

The deviance from ordinary usage may be considered a special problem for philosophy in as much as it is assumed to merely work with our intuitive understanding of ourselves and the world. Although this is partially right, this poses no real problem. On the one hand this complaint cannot be brought forward by analytic philosophers, who – especially in the cognitive sciences – stress the continuity of scientific and philosophical methods. On the other hand the problem may be due to the intricate character of the distinctions involved. There are enough other concepts and distinctions introduced by philosophers to re-construct our ordinary understanding of ourselves and our access to reality (e.g. the terminology of “possible world” semantics, the vocabulary of epistemic appraisal and confirmation, like “falsifiable”, “simplicity”, keeping “indirect” and “direct” duties apart – and so on).

### § 3. SELF DENIAL IN THE ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND IN SARTRE

Another criticism has focused on “the” Self as a supposed *object* we encounter in self-awareness. The deeper – even if philosophically somewhat shallow – reason that self-awareness is neglected as a topic by many analytic philosophers may just be that it is understood as being the awareness of an self as an object. If it is excluded that self-awareness might be more, and given the dubious character of “the Self” as an object, self-awareness drops out of consideration as being a mere by-product (a secondary construction) of more interesting and fundamental mental events.

Nevertheless there is something to this criticism. Marvin Minsky (1985) sees the self as a construct: Thoughts are outputs of the cognitive systems, where several agencies, each of which doing only its job, work in the background being involved in perception, association, memory access and where several information states compete for the access to consciousness; some of the information states model control states that work on lower states; from these states a *self-image* of the system is built up; this construct is the self, seen as the agent who has the thoughts in question

and who is responsible for the actions of the system; the self is not some *additional agent* inside you looking at the performance of the other agencies; the self is a *representation*; the self is ascribed properties that are essential to give the system's self-representation unity; so the self develops as a *narrative* in which language is used to describe an entity with coherent properties.<sup>1</sup>

Interestingly this opinion is not far off from Sartre's. The *me* is a for Sartre a posited transcendent object (cf. Sartre 1937, pp. 70, 76). The self – called “ego” by Sartre here – is something brought *before* consciousness, is an object and not that which is intentionally directed at this object. The self is “an object”, not something active. The self is posited *as* the origin of acts and *as* their principle of unification:

[C]onsciousness projects its own spontaneity into the ego-object in order to confer on the ego the creative power which is absolutely necessary to it. But this spontaneity, *represented* and *hypostatized* in an object, becomes a degraded and bastard spontaneity, [...] (Sartre 1937, p. 81)

So we may understand the Self<sup>2</sup> as representing the whole “society of mind” (with all its processes and agencies) as a single agent. With the concept of “the Self” we represent the whole system/architecture. This is not wrong in as much as that system is us, and is acting. It is misleading in as much as we might start a search for that *agent* Self that is not among the agents of the mind. The Self is nevertheless *phenomenally real* and can be described in its features. The self represents the unification process within the cognitive system, including the occurrence of deliberate (verbal) control states. Other features of the Self may correspond to hidden cognitive agents, and so again the Self as construct is not inadequate. It is, therefore, misleading to say that by positing the Self we are victims of an illusion.<sup>3</sup> The decisive point is to see the Self not as the agent in control but as a (narrative) construct.

Having thus downsized the Self one has to avoid overdoing the deconstruction. Overdoing the rejection of supposed entities in the vicinity of self-awareness loses the phenomenon itself. The crucial distinction that is often overlooked, and which is at the centre of my paper, is that between the Self and – at least one – I, which both have to be kept apart from the person that I am. Sartre clearly sees that there is a question of the *Ego* to be considered after having kept apart the *Me*. Several questions are put to us either as a phenomenologist or a cognitive scientist by the phenomena.

## § 4. A SHORT PHENOMENOLOGY OF SOME DISTINCTIONS

There are a couple of basic observations concerning my knowledge and experience of myself.

*Phenomenon I*

“I” is a singular term. Singular terms are used in statements to refer to objects which are said to have some property, which is referred to by the predicate (the general term):

- (1) The table in lecture hall 3F is white.

Statement (1) is true if one has identified by the description (or its meaning) an object and discerns (by the meaning of “is white”) that it has the corresponding property. Singular terms serve to identify objects. Identification need not be successful. “The headless rider” is a singular term, but refers to nothing.

The meaning of “I” is usually given as “the one speaking”. That seems reasonable: If some body uses the term “I” we (the hearers) know that she is talking of herself. Can “I”, however, be employed to characterize self-awareness? – It seems not. Self-awareness cannot have the structure of the following statement:

- (2) I see a white table in lecture hall 3F.

The question of identifying the referent (i.e. the question generally associated with singular terms) does not arise: I need not identify myself for myself. I am immediately present to myself.

Furthermore there is no chance of misidentification here. I am present in my consciousness and no one else whom I could mistake for the referent of “I” or whom I could mistake for myself. Further on I have to know myself as the one who does the identification in every act of identifying – even if I am not doing this in inner speech (i.e. I am not using the pronoun “I”) I have to be aware of the act of identifying. And to identify *myself* I have to know myself already!<sup>4</sup>

These phenomena throw a bad light on a propositionalist theory (employing the pronoun “I” to account for the structure of self-awareness).

*Phenomenon II*

I am a person. I can refer to that person for example by the description “the one who is lecturing on December, 18th, in lecture hall 3F at 4 p.m.”.



The description refers to me and I know that. I can describe myself in several ways, but not all ways of referring to myself as a person are dependent on a description. Some famous anecdotes highlighting my peculiar knowledge of myself make this clear: Jon Perry follows with his trolley a sugar line in the supermarket to draw the responsible customer's attention to his defect sugar bag. After a while he recognizes that he himself has laid the sugar line with a defect sugar bag in his trolley (cf. Perry 1979). – How can one describe this case?

Jon Perry had at some time *t* (when he started his search) an opinion with respect to the customer looked for. At this time *t* Perry is *de facto*, although he does not know it, this very customer. Perry has at this time *de facto* a belief about himself, only he does not recognize this. At a later time *t\** Perry recognizes that he himself is the customer looked for. Now he still has *de facto* a belief about the customer, but additionally he now has a belief *de se* with respect to *himself* (in an emphatic sense of “himself” which points to the self-access to be explained here).

This phenomenon shows that there is a difference between beliefs/attitudes in which I am referred to by a description and such in which I know about *myself*.

### *Phenomenon III*

“The I/the *Ego*” sounds peculiar, echoing philosophical traditions out of fashion. With the first phenomenon, however, we have already seen that to know about some objects involves knowing in some way about myself as the one who knows the objects. There is obviously in any conscious mental event – if we stick to individual mental acts for the moment – something that attributes that very act to itself as the thinking “thing”. And this I is not a modification that sometimes occurs, as the anecdotes in the third phenomenon may make you believe, but is present in *every* conscious episode. (The anecdote is telling by being an instance of mis-describing myself using a description although I am immediately given to myself without using a description.) Even if I am not engaged in inner speech (processing thoughts in public language), but looking absent minded out of the window – nevertheless I know that it is *me* who is looking out. I do not have to use the pronoun “I” for this, I am just having my thoughts. There is no question as to who is having these thoughts. I am immediately given to myself (I am “at”/“by” myself). There are mental events (e.g. in phonetic decoding) which are not conscious, but if some act is conscious I am present. In *this* sense human

consciousness is self-awareness (knowing oneself as thinking) – whatever forms of consciousness there might be in the animal kingdom (cf. Bremer 2004). It is not the case that we first have consciousness and then – in some additional act? – there comes self-awareness. Whatever I know of consciously I know as known by me. Whatever content I am thinking I know about me. Mental content is content for somebody. This somebody (the I) is (phenomenologically) the same whereas the content changes. Although the content or the scene before my eyes changes I am still there. We experience a continuous agent of thinking while the content varies. The I does not fall on the side of mental content (in the sense of the observed scene, the sentence thought etc.). The I might be the agent I experience within my mental acts as the one who does the thinking (the supposed actor of the acts of thinking). Is it not the case that I am thinking – and not that thinking happens to me?<sup>5</sup>

#### *Phenomenon IV*

There is, however, a further distinction to be made with respect to the just mentioned role of the *Ego*. Sometimes, although the question does not arise whose acts are these, I am absorbed in whatever I am doing. I am only looking at the cat as playing with the cork, I am reading being absorbed in the matter. Then – without any effort – immediately I can become aware that I am looking at the cat, that I am reading. Now I am *explicit* about the subject of the act, no longer is only the content I was absorbed in presented.<sup>6</sup> This shift is almost imperceptible. It is not that I consciously *intend* now to focus on myself or set out to see who is doing the thinking. It just happens that from one moment to the next I realize my *Ego* as being the subject of my acts. If there is some reflection involved here, it does not take place as explicit reflecting by some of my *acts* on *another* of my *acts*. If this shift towards the I is a reflection it has to be modelled in some other fashion.

#### *Phenomenon V*

We have to add a phenomenological remark on (some) representations: Suppose you hear a bee humming. By the humming we refer to the bee as its source. We represent the bee *as* humming. The humming sound represents the bee in some fashion (including pitch, frequency, etc.). The humming *itself*, however, by pain of a vicious regress, is not represented

“as” itself. To hear the humming is nothing besides or above the fact of having some representation. Expressed as a general observation:

- (F) There are representations with respect to which it is the case that their being tokened is accompanied by a phenomenal quality.

By tokening such a representation some quality is given in consciousness. Several distinctions have to be made in the light of these phenomena:

1. “The Self” is that vague complex of biography and biographical knowledge, discussed in § 3, that together with some body defines an individual person; names and descriptions refer to that person as known by me and others; the Self falls on the side of *content* of conscious states.
2. “The I/the *Ego*” is my I that, although in fact related to an individual Self, contains the structural functions which are shared by conscious beings (e.g. in the acts of perception mentioned above); let us call it the *Ego* or the *functional I*; in the light of phenomenon IV we will have to distinguish two components here, depending on whether (2a) the focus is on the I itself or (2b) on the objects that I am aware of.
3. “The implicit I” is the functional correlate of the functional I within the realm of tacit knowledge or mental events that are *not* conscious, but nevertheless are processed (e.g. in memory or pre-conscious association) as being self-attributed states.
4. The set of conditions necessary for consciousness to be possible at all, to arise in the first place are not present in consciousness itself in correlation to the talk of the *Ego* as present in consciousness one might talk of a “transcendental *Ego*” here, but this analogy to an agent as we know it from consciousness may be simply mistaken.<sup>7</sup>

A theory of the logical structure of my knowledge of myself (including the *de se*-theory of self-awareness introduced in the next but one paragraph) deals mainly with the functional I and secondarily with its relations to the other two instances. It does not deal primarily with biographies or the Self. The talk of a transcendental unity of consciousness has been transformed within cognitive science into the talk about the architecture of a cognitive system that may give rise to consciousness. Keep in mind the fact (F) about representations.

Sartre’s theory also distinguishes between the Self/Me as a biographical construct and the functions of self-awareness. His distinction between a

pre-reflexive and a reflexive *cogito* may mirror the distinction between (2b) and (2a).

#### § 5. SARTRE'S CONCEPTION OF THE PRE-REFLEXIVE *COGITO*

Sartre in his way defends the thesis that consciousness cannot be separated from self-consciousness, as was alluded to phenomenologically in the preceding paragraph. It is in this context that his introduction of a pre-reflexive *cogito* is crucial. It is a necessary condition for being conscious of some object to be conscious of being conscious, since an unnoticed consciousness is an absurdity (cf. Sartre 1943, p. 18). Consciousness presents itself (to itself). This cannot be another intentional act on pains of a regress of presupposed or required acts of consciousness. Thus the accompanying consciousness of oneself is no additional act besides the intentional act, and it is not a reflexive act having the intentional act as object:

[T]his consciousness of consciousness ... is not *positional*, which is to say that consciousness is not for itself its own object. Its object is by nature outside of it, and that is why consciousness posits and *grasps* the object in the same act. (Sartre 1937, pp. 40–41)

This pre-reflexive *cogito* is within one and the same act that is a conscious act presenting some intentional object. Neither does it come *after* there being some intentional act already, nor is it vacuously present to be filled then with content. There is only the one (unified) conscious state representing an object in which I am also (non-positionally) aware of myself (cf. Sartre 1943, p. 21). My being conscious of myself falls *not* on the side of the content of my conscious acts. It is responsible both for the content being conscious for me, although I do not focus on me, and is the precondition for the reflexive *cogito*. In having then a reflexive *cogito* I once again have a pre-reflexive *cogito* for the act of reflection being a conscious act.

Note for the following paragraph that that I which we call pre-reflexive *cogito* is not an *object* of thought as long as it is active in accompanying other content. It is related to but not phenomenally identical to the I brought into focus by reflection. The latter, in addition, has to be kept apart from the Self. The pre-reflexive *cogito* does not have itself as an object, so we may model it along the line of fact (F) as some peculiar representation that with its mere occurrence has its crucial features. Since the pre-reflexive *cogito* is no act, it cannot be phenomenologically brought

into focus itself, although the immediacy of any conscious act may be claimed as evidence *for it*. Its characteristic is only given negatively, in terms of what it isn't. For a theory of self-awareness we need a working model. Here we turn to some help from theories developed within the analytic philosophy of mind.

#### § 6. *DE SE* THEORIES OF SELF-AWARENESS

In the analytic philosophy of mind *de se* theories of self-awareness have been proposed by Roderick Chisholm (1981) and David Lewis (1979). Within the philosophy of mind we can distinguish between phenomenological and psychological theories. A psychological account, say functionalism, refers to the role the state has with respect to other states or the system's behaviour. Within such an explanation it might be important that it "is like something" to be in that state, but not all psychological accounts of some states require that it feels like something to be in such a state. A psychological theory need not account for (all) phenomenological features of mental states. Therefore one and the same psychological theory is compatible with different phenomenological descriptions. A complete functionalist theory of self-awareness comprises:

1. The identification of self-awareness by giving criteria for it being ascribed and by explaining its causal role.
2. The specification of the format of representation of mental content, which explains its inferential structure and its causal efficacy.

One and the same answer to (i) can be coupled with different answers to (ii). The non-propositionalist account of self-awareness discussed here (a *de se*-theory) is an answer to (ii). The *de se*-theory, therefore, is at least in part a phenomenological theory. The basic alternative is a propositionalist account in which all states of self-awareness (including the states/aspects enabling self-awareness) have to be propositional if not also sentential.

*De se*-theories (in short: DST) were developed by Roderick Chisholm (1981) and David Lewis (1979). I will not explain their theories, but take a few of Chisholm's considerations as a starting point for some systematic explorations. Both theories are embedded in peculiar ontologies that need not concern us here.

Roderick Chisholm puts the basic theses of a *de se*-theory as follows (cf. 1981, p. 1):

- (A1) There are attitudes which are not propositional but self-attributions of properties.

The objects of these attitudes does not belong to their content, as § 4 said, so that the content consists just of the properties the supposed object is considered to have:

- (A1') (i) Some contents of attitudes are properties.

Instead of *propositional attitudes* DST speaks of attitudes in a more general way. Propositional attitudes are secondary with respect to the basic non-propositional self-attributions. (A1) is the fundamental structural axiom of DST. It uses the two *relata* properties and I (see (A1')(ii) below). The fundamental relation is the relation of self-attribution which involves direct self-reference. (A1') contradicts the thesis of the propositionalist who claims that the content of an attitude can be given only by a proposition or a sentence. In a proposition or sentence properties are ascribed, but the referent (or its description) is part of the content. According to (A1) the object of some attitudes is descriptionless and, therefore, contentless. This object is, according to Chisholm, the I:

- (A1') (ii) The I does not belong in/to the content of some attitudes.

To be justified is the following thesis:

- (T1) The primary form of reference is direct self-reference.

This thesis should be justified by defining the ordinary ways of referring (usage of statements, singular terms, beliefs, perceptions ...) with the use of the concept of direct self-reference.<sup>8</sup> It has to be shown, so, that the following generalizations are true:

- (T2) The primary form of belief is the self-attribution of properties.  
(T3) The I is the primary object of my attitudes.

These basic ideas are taken up here. Of course it has to be made clear *which* I is the one relate of conscious acts, considering Sartre's distinction between a pre-reflexive and a reflexive *cogito*. Sartre and the DST seem to agree that the subject of consciousness does not belong to the side of the content. Whether the reflexive *cogito* has to be taken as propositional, as one may take it in Sartre, is not that clear. The pre-reflexive *cogito* certainly cannot be on pains of the well known regresses – here Sartre and the DST agree. Further on the talk of “object” in the DST, say in (T3) should either not be taken in the sense in which Sartre denies that the pre-reflexive *cogito* is the object of a conscious act, in which case (T3)

would be false for it, or the talk of “object” should be taken as in Sartre and then there will be a distinction between the reflexive I, for which something like (T3) holds, and the pre-reflexive *cogito*.

§ 7. A SYNTHESIS OF THE PRE-REFLEXIVE *COGITO* WITH A  
DE SE THEORY OF SELF-AWARENESS

*De se* theories and Sartre’s conception share the crucial axiom that the I responsible for being also aware of myself in being aware of something else is not part of the content of my thought proper. Self-awareness – and thus any consciousness, since the two phenomena cannot be brought apart – has two components: my knowledge of myself (not to be understood as a second act) and my attitude (believing, wishing, seeing ...) to some content.

In this paragraph I try to build a synthesis of Sartre’s idea of a pre-reflexive *cogito*, the distinction to reflexive consciousness, and a *de se* model of representation. As a means of presentation I use symbols like “☺”, “☹”, “☹” and others, alluding to the *Language of Thought* hypothesis (Fodor 1975).<sup>9</sup>

Suppose there is a *Language of Thought*, then also to thoughts not rendered in inner speech there is a chain of corresponding LOT-symbols. Taking some pictograms and capitalization as representation of LOT-symbols we may have, for example,

(1) ☎ RED

as the representation that a (specific) telephone is red.

The structures of the *Language of Thought* are the structures of intentionality. We refer to some property by using or tokening the corresponding LOT-symbol (or some symbol of ordinary language). Someone tokens a LOT-Symbol if he produces a token of it (in his brain or “belief box”). To refer to some property is nothing else than tokening the LOT-symbol. Using the LOT-model we can try to make the representational structure of non-propositional consciousness plausible. If self-awareness was propositional it would have to have the structure:

(2) A believes that p.

Believing would be a relation to a sentence or proposition p. Put thus the difficulty is that with the believer a subject seems to be presupposed with respect to which we can ask whether it is aware of itself (cf. § 4). If

it is self-aware the propositional structure adds nothing. If it is not self-aware self-awareness had to arise by believing some special sentences/propositions, taking believing as such as not involving self-awareness. Which sentence/proposition should be able to achieve that? Take a sentence like:

(3) I am F.

The meaning “the one who is speaking” secures by the use of the pronoun “I” self-reference which is pragmatically immediate with the tokening of (3). This self-reference can as well have a special functional role. The processing of “I” can be explanatory for behaviour. The combination of (3) and (2) in third person reports like

(4) A believes “I am F”.

could be explanatory for A’s self-directed behaviour. What this functional role, however, has to do with *phenomenal* self-awareness is not clear. It seems to be an addition to (3). In case of the first person one would say

(5) I believe I am F.

If (5) is the *relatum* of my belief it seems that I am (as the agent of the thought) opposite or besides (5). If (5) was the structure of my self-ascriptions it had to be made certain that “I” refers to me, and that both uses of “I” refer to the *same* entity. The relate of my believing, if (5) was the structure of my thought, would be (3) again. The pronoun “I” can secure infallible self-reference, but phenomenal self-awareness might not *arise* thus.

If we have to presuppose phenomenal self-awareness the processing of “I” is not necessary, even if “I” has a special causal role. I am given to myself and directly attribute myself (without a further act of self-reference) to have property *F*. The content of such an ascription is the property only, as (A1) of the DST in § 6 says.

Now it seems that even in such self-attribution I *refer* to myself, however immediately. I know myself. The representation of this self-reference cannot be a symbol of a natural language, which by its meaning allows to identify a referent, since the meaning of the symbol looked for cannot be intersubjective, the supposed meaning being my self-apprehension of myself. Subjective meaning are a *contradictio in adjecto*. Even claiming that to the public expression “I” there correspond different subjective contents does not help, since this content, because of it being content *for me*, had to be my self-apprehension, but this whole self-apprehension we



were trying to explain by postulating the *processing* of the (meaning of the) pro-noun “I”. So we had a second self-representation as the content of a part of the first self-representation (by using “I”) leading us into a vicious regress. The representation of my self-reference can, therefore, have no meaning (as meaning is usually understood). Let us suppose instead that “☺” is the LOT-symbol of immediate self-reference (the I-symbol). Self-attributions have then the structure:

(6) ☺ F

where “F” either is a general term of a natural language or the LOT-representation of a property. “F” stands within the scope of “☺”. (6) models an act of consciousness the content of which is *F*. So “☺” is not part of the content, it is the awareness of oneself that accompanies the awareness of some content. It is Sartre’s pre-reflexive *cogito*. The pre-reflexive *cogito* has the same role in Sartre’s theory as my unmediated knowledge of myself has in a *de se*-theory of awareness. The self-access given with Sartre’s pre-reflexive *cogito* and that given with tokening of “☺” is *part* of the one conscious state, not a further positional reflexive act.

Thinking (6) as a whole has a propositional structure, but this should not be confused with the claim that the content of the thought would be propositional. “☺” is not part of the content of my thought. If my self-apprehension consisted in representing “☺” to myself there would be a difference between my processing of “☺” (analogous to hearing a word) and my understanding the content of “☺” (analogous to understanding the word). So we would have two processes taking place. There are not these two acts in my consciousness, neither do I *meet* a self-symbol or the like. Therefore my self-apprehension *is nothing else* than tokening “☺”. Remember the fact (F). As content of my belief I only experience “F” or the property referred to by “F”. Between me and my self-reference intervenes no symbol. The symbol is not for me, I am it. In § 4.III we said the I is not within the content. The I-symbol is not for me, but I am self-aware in virtue of tokening the I-symbol. “☺” is not perceived or apprehended from some point of view within me. The pre-reflexive *cogito* is not apprehended itself. “☺” does not “stand for” something, but with its tokening self-awareness is presented.<sup>10</sup>

So we have a correspondence of our awareness with a LOT-sentence like

(7) ☺ SEE                      ☎ RED  
       ↓ — mode of the act ← (percept of) a red telephone  
       such that I am conscious of it

What this modelling does for Sartre's theory is giving it a working theory background cashing in in terms of a semi-formal model the talk of a non-propositional pre-reflexive *cogito*. The LOT-hypothesis – and the funny looking symbols like “☺” – provide a model of mechanisms connecting the workings of a cognitive system with the occurrence of consciousness. What the appeal to Sartre's pre-reflexive *cogito* does for the DST is giving further backing that one has to comprehend the being aware of oneself as distinct from the contents of consciousness, as something not be thought of as in the (propositionalist) higher order model of self-awareness.

#### § 8. UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND REFLEXIVE ASSENT

Given the basic features of DST this paragraph takes up related problems:

- (a) Accounting for the assent from pre-reflexive *cogito* to *presenting* an I to myself.
- (b) Accounting for the *unity* of consciousness on its different levels.

(ad a)

Sartre goes wrong, I believe, in identifying the object given in a self-presentation with the Me (and so finally rejecting the *epoché*).<sup>11</sup> Even though what we experience in our self-awareness is ourselves as the individual we are, there is the distinction between the Self/Me and the self-representation of the agent of consciousness, since the assent to this self-representation is functionally distinct from object centred consciousness, and the operation of assent can be characterised generally without paying attention to any involvement of biographic knowledge (as would be distinctive of an involvement of the Self).

The reflexive assent should not be modelled simply in the traditional way as one act having as object another act, as Sartre himself mostly does.<sup>12</sup> The LOT-hypothesis gives as the means to model the assent as the relation and modification of I-symbols.

“☺” I works as an operator and has to be distinguished from a further LOT-symbol for me, say “☺” which can occur within the scope of “☺”. Consider, for example, a reflexive thought

having me not only as the agent of the thought, but also as an object; this objectification could be done by something like “☺” “☺” in fact is the reflected *cogito*. “☺” stands for the *Ego*, that arises with the almost imperceptible shift of focus mentioned in phenomenon IV in § 4. With

the tokening of “☺” we have the presentation of an I to ourselves. The thought has a structure like

(1) ☺ THINK ☺ SEE ☎ RED

being the thought that it is me who sees that the telephone is red. We can model the shift from being absorbed into seeing the red telephone to being aware that it is me who sees the red telephone as the shift from

(2) ☺ SEE ☎ RED

to (1). The operation that is responsible for the shift can be described as a rule:

(R1) Whenever “☺” is put into the scope of another “☺”, then the left most “☺” within the scope is changed into “☺”.

That only the left most “☺” is changed is necessary, since there is just *one Ego* and not a nesting of *Egos* in consciousness, even if there are higher order thoughts like

(3) I believe that I want that I believe that dogs are green, but they just aren’t.

As mentioned already we need another self-representation for mere self-representation, i.e. not as tokening either the pre-reflexive or the reflexive *cogito*. This self-representation is needed for such nested occurrences like in (3) and at the level of sub-doxastic processing in the cognitive system. We take “☹” as the corresponding symbol of the LOT. The LOT-rendering of (3) then becomes something like

(3) ☺ BELIEVE  
 (☺ WANT ☹ BELIEVE ALL:[☹ GREEN])  
 & NOT(ALL:[☹ → GREEN])

where I have an explicit thought about me.<sup>13</sup>

“☺” is not the Self (as biographical construct), but the *Ego* experienced, although posited as a representation in the scope of “☺”, as the agent of the acts, giving them unity. This objectification “☺” of “☺” has the function as *presenting* to me myself *focussed* as the subject of my acts. This function is independent from the biographical narrative surrounding the Self needed e.g. in claims of responsibility and understanding ourselves as *persons*.

“☺” and “☹” are *not the same*; thus, like Sartre says (1937, p. 44), the occurrence of the *Ego* is not due to the fact that one and the same entity

– beneath the level of the whole cognitive system – is reflected *in itself* as some Neo-Kantians claim.

(ad b)

The question of the unity of consciousness appears either as the question what unites some content into a consciousness of something or the question what unites several acts into a unified consciousness. The first question is the topic of Kant's theory of the transcendental unity of apperception or a theory of the conditions for consciousness to arise. The second question is closer to the role of the *Ego* within the conscious acts. Sartre denies that we need the *Ego* to unite consciousness, since the temporal structure of consciousness (including retention and protention) and the holism of mental content would suffice for that (cf. Priest 2000, pp. 36–42); but this may seem questionable, since temporal or intentional unification seems to pre suppose that there *are* several acts within *something* waiting to be unified. Given the DST, however, we can formulate a simple rule of unification of content:

(R2) ☺ F & ☺ G ↔ ☺ (F & G)

This means that on some level of information processing a conjunction principle within the scope of “☺” applies. A similar rule may apply for “☹” and “☹”. The rule is no deep explanation of the unity of consciousness, but merely a description of an architectural constraint.

On the other hand there is nothing in it that commits us to conclude from the fact that some *cogito* (respectively the fact that some content occurs within the scope of some I-symbol) is responsible for unification that it is not the pre-reflexive *cogito* that is central for self-awareness.

#### § 9. WHERE DO HIGHER ORDER THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS GO WRONG?

The DST model is not a higher order theory of consciousness (HOT) as they are widely held in the analytic philosophy of mind (cf. Carruthers 1996, Rosenkranz 1995), but it has some of its features. The *Ego* only appears after a modification of awareness that resembles reflection (see § 8). This bringing the *Ego* into focus, nevertheless, was not modelled as involving propositions or even sentences of a natural language, as a HOT would have it.

Is Sartre's conception of self-awareness compatible with a propositionalist rejoinder to the DST?

There is one obvious point of reply for a HOT, which is also the most fundamental: A theory of the logical structure of knowing oneself has to keep – for the sake of the unity of a functionalist account of the mental – the connection between the functional I of awareness with the implicit I of mental processing. A propositionalist theory can do this more systematically than a *de se*-theory, since in the propositionalist theory both levels have the same logical format. The basic claim of the propositionalist is:

- (P) Any propositional attitude, any information processing explicit or tacit, but cognitively penetrable,<sup>14</sup> has the form: I (ATTITUDE) SENTENCE.

For example,

- (1) I believe that it is Monday.
- (2) I see that the audience is falling asleep. etc.<sup>15</sup>

The “I” as LOT-symbol “☺” or as a symbol of a natural language has, according to the propositionalist, the meaning “that which is tokening this very sentence” and, therefore, is immune from failure of reference. It refers to the thinking person. This “I”, still the propositionalist speaking, does *not* yield phenomenal awareness immediately. “☺” is not the representation for this. Fact (F) does *not* apply to “☺”. Phenomenal self-awareness – even if it does not occur as explicit (inner) speaking – occurs only if *in the scope* (that is in the sentence within the structure defined by (P) an I-symbol is tokened (be it one of a natural language or an according symbol of LOT like “☺”), like we had in (R1). For the propositionalist the unity of the levels of mental processing requires that mental events on different levels (i.e. some of which are conscious, some of which are *not*) be within the scope of an I-symbol, whereas only those yield self-awareness where an I-symbol gets into the scope of an I-operator. What happens by bringing “☺” into the scope of “☺” is the *decisive* step from tacit processing to phenomenal self-awareness. This differs from the DST, where the mere presense of the pre-reflexive *cogito* (alias ☺) gave rise to awareness. Whereas DST is a “first order” theory (self-awareness arising by tokening a special symbol) the propositionalist account is a higher order theory (only by some representation being represented or being brought into the scope of another does self-awareness arise). The corresponding cognitive architectures or models of inferential roles might vary accordingly. Nevertheless the general idea of accounting for self-awareness by a process of tokening some LOT-symbol is kept

also in the propositionalist theory. A radical version of a propositionalist theory could even claim that the I-symbol that matters is the pronoun “I” of a natural language. It helped building up the structures that matter for a functional architecture with consciousness.<sup>16</sup> A less radical version could admit the secondary role of the pronoun “I”, and might agree to denying a speaker meaning to “I”, but would still see the structure (P) as the defining structure of self-awareness.

Furthermore, the fundamental role which attitudes *de se* have according to Chisholm need not be denied, the propositionalist just sees this fundamental role for *de se* propositions. The only thing left over from DST then will be claim of direct attribution of properties. This claim was motivated by phenomenological considerations how we know of ourselves within our states and as *not* being part of *the content* of the states which we experience. Can this phenomenology be undermined? Can the arguments given in §§ 4–7 be circumvented? In fact the justification given there depends on the analysis of the sentences

(3) I am F,

and

(4) I believe I am F.

It was claimed that these sentences cannot express the phenomenal content of self-awareness, since the agent believing these sentences would occur “on the other side” of this content. If these sentences are the content of my thoughts where am I? It seems that I am the one thinking the content, i.e. being related to the content and therefore distinguished from it. The analysis operates with a principle which could be expressed thus:

(E) That which is experiencing is not itself an experienced object in that act.

Now *suppose* it is the defining and peculiar characteristic of the I that it knows itself and *at the same time* is presented as part of the content of consciousness. The I-symbol then would instantiate my knowledge of myself and at the same time be part of the represented sentence. Why should it be impossible that I know myself as the continuous agent representing content and at the same time represent *that very agent* (not only myself in the manner of *another* representation like “☺”) as that object to which some properties are attributed? This would have to be done by a *single* representation to avoid the problem of identifying the referents of the symbols.<sup>17</sup>

Phenomenologically it is not that clear as § 4 made us believe whether self-awareness is non-propositional: Since I always am aware of myself when I am attributing myself – directly, since I do not have to identify myself – a property (like “☺ LOOKOUTOFTHETHEWINDOW”), this very knowledge has to be part of the content of what I am thinking. Where else should it be? What I know – even if it is knowledge of myself – seems to be mental content. If we put this knowledge into the processing of the I-symbol we are back at the prepositional structure of (3) in § 7! But putting it there is more than dubious for the reasons given in § 7 and merely saying that (E) might be false, as in the beginning of the preceding paragraph, does not give us a model of how this might be. For Sartre giving up (E) and thus going back to a propositionalist account in which the *cogito* in every case is part of the content is unacceptable; the pre-reflexive *cogito* is *defined* as being non-positional. It is thought of as a non-thetic consciousness, and thus cannot be modelled in the propositionalist fashion. Further on what would become to the shift between being absorbed in the content, although being conscious, and being aware that I am thinking these contents? This focussing on oneself simply does not seem to have a that higher order reflexive structure the propositionalist assigns to it. Thus Sartre’s theory of consciousness appears to be congenial to a DST account.

#### § 10. CONCLUSION

One major short coming of the analytic philosophy of mind seems to be keeping insufficiently apart the Self as constructed biographical object from the *Ego* as the subject of our conscious acts. Even if the *Ego* is an aspect/is tied to a Self its functions and its phenomenology require a theory of its own. Narrowing the attention to the Self downsizes self-awareness to an awareness of an object “Self”. A motivation to avoid a theory of the *Ego* may have been the fear of being committed to extravagant metaphysics. Keeping Self and *Ego* apart, however, allows to substantiate the thesis that all awareness of something is at the same time awareness of oneself. Sartre’s version of this thesis, using the pre-reflexive *cogito*, helps here. It can be synthesised with a *de se* account of self-awareness. Both parts may shed light on each other and come closer to saving the phenomena.

*Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf*

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Similar accounts of the self as (narrative) construction one can find in (Dennett 1991) and (Metzinger 1995).

<sup>2</sup> I used capitalisation of the Self, the Me, the Ego to highlight that we are dealing with philosophically reconstructed/defined (concepts of) entities here.

<sup>3</sup> Sartre may come close to this (see also Priest 2000, pp. 124–26), Metzinger (1995) really claims that; but the mere fact that the Self is a representation does not make it a misrepresentation. If the Self is a representation of the whole cognitive system its referent really does what it is described as doing. Even our narrative of the Self re-enters memory and so influences our further acts. For the phenomenology and structural modelling of self-awareness it is indeed important to see that the Self as representation is not the agent of the act. *Here* a hypostatization would block the view on the pre-reflexive structures of consciousness and the *Ego*. This does not come, however, as sensational revelation.

<sup>4</sup> This is a variant of “Fichte’s original insight” that self-awareness cannot *come into existence* by reflection or higher order thought, because a vicious regress ensues (cf. Pothast 1971). The phenomenology is systematically developed here, but the phenomena have been recognised, of course, in the mentalist tradition – otherwise these could not be basic phenomena. Fichte writes in the *Nachgelassenen Schriften*: “Das Ich setzt sich *schlechthin*, d.h. ohne alle Vermittlung. Es ist zugleich Subjekt und Objekt. Nur durch das sich selbst Setzen wird das Ich – es ist nicht vorher schon Substanz – sondern sich selbst setzen als setzend ist sein Wesen, es ist eins und ebendasselbe; folglich ist es *sich seiner unmittelbar selbst bewusst*.” (Vol. 2, p. 352).

<sup>5</sup> That self-awareness is no *addition* to consciousness is expressed by Hegel as follows: “Ich bin beim Sehen, Hören einfach bei mir selbst, und es ist nur eine Form meiner reinen Durchsichtigkeit und Klarheit in mir selbst.” (*Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, § 350). The fact that the I cannot be taken to be part of the *content* is expressed by (the Neo-Kantian) Paul Natorp in his *Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode*: “Ich-Sein heißt nicht Gegenstand, sondern allem anderen gegenüber dasjenige sein, dem etwas Gegenstand ist”. (Natorp 1912, § 4).

<sup>6</sup> Sartre himself (1937, pp. 46–49) uses the example of reading or looking at a picture. (Sartre 1948, pp. 42–45) expresses the phenomenon as being at the same time at myself (because of the prereflexive *cogito*) and detached from myself (since it is *only* a pre-reflexive *cogito*, reflecting breaking the immediacy to the object).

<sup>7</sup> One might – as Kant did – also speak of the transcendental synthesis or unity of apperception. I will not discuss this topic here. In Sartre it is clear that one should not confuse such conditions with the *Ego* as experienced by me. Sartre (1937) may be taken as accusing Husserl of confusing his talk of a transcendental *Ego* with Kant’s talk of a transcendental *Ego*. I will neither discuss whether this interpretation of (Sartre 1937) is right nor whether Sartre himself represents Husserl’s theory appropriately. Husserl (1913) is in his distinction between the empirical Me as a transcendent object and the *Ego*, which remains after the *epoché*, closer to the model advanced here. Husserl, however, takes that *Ego* as not being part of the content of acts, since he neither endorses a pre-reflexive *cogito* nor is he explicit as Sartre about the distinction between being absorbed in the intentional objects and focussing on oneself as having these intentional objects; cf. § 8.

<sup>8</sup> A topic that does not concern us here, see Chisholm (1981) belabouring the point.

<sup>9</sup> The thesis (short: LOT) will only be used in a vague or general sense, since so it will be easier to understand the psychological reality of the fundamental relation of self-attribution



used in DST. Not much is said about the inferential role of such an I-symbol within a LOT-model of self-awareness. That these symbols look funny should not be confused with the serious intent of their presentation. The use of these symbols circumvents some problems with keeping the different *Egos* apart linguistically, and avoids using expressions that carry heavy connotations in the history of philosophy (like, “transcendental *Ego*”, etc.).

<sup>10</sup> That “☺” is not part of mental content does not mean that “☺” does not contribute to the inferential role that representation like (6) have. (6) taken entirely has sentential structure. A full-fledged LOT-theory should be able to specify inferential roles accordingly. Even if “☺” was an atomic symbol this does not exclude its having a central role in processing – according to Fodor quite a lot LOT-symbols are atomic. The characterization of *de se* attributions given is compatible with a functionalist account of the peculiar way I am to myself (i.e. of “☺”). “☺” has by its syntax a causal role, as all LOT-symbols do. The DST tries to explain the structure of acts in which “☺” occurs and their relation to the other attitudes and attitude reports in natural language using *inter alia* the pronoun “I”; something I go not into here, see (Chisholm 1981) for details. The fact (F) for ordinary representations – that the appearance does not appear itself again, as Husserl said – can now be reduced to “☺” possessing this crucial feature; other representation behave according to fact (F) in as much as they are the content of some state introduced by the symbol “☺”.

<sup>11</sup> See Sartre’s way of equating “I” and “Me” in (Sartre 1937). If there is an *Ego* apart from the Self/Me then after the *epoché* not all egological structures are gone in favour of Sartre’s “pure field of consciousness”. A problem of the *epochs* is that by cutting of the objects as real one turns from being at the objects to focussing on *act content* thus getting into a reflexive state easily. But then – in virtue of being in a reflexive state – there is this persisting I, its ubiquity being due to the *epoché*.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. for example Sartre 1937, p. 45; but maybe in contrast to Sartre 1948, pp. 42, 85.

<sup>13</sup> This account of the phenomenality of myself experiencing myself is not that of the original DST in Chisholm (1981). Chisholm’s theory works by a kind of “self-representing” properties. What these properties are and how they work seems to me to be part of Chisholm’s arabesque ontology. The appeal to “self-representation” in properties either is only a title to the problem or has to appeal to something like (F). Since there are different *Egos* to be co-ordinated, however, (see § 4), we need also an account of their relation. An appeal to something like (F) is not enough at this crucial point of the theory. Chisholm also uses a relation of “considering” that one has such a property. This brings his account dangerously close to a higher order theory of self-awareness (see § 9).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. for this notion (Pylyshyn 1989, pp. 130–45). Pylyshyn and Fodor are two of the main proponents of a propositionalist theory.

<sup>15</sup> The thesis that all conscious events are prepositional is compatible with the claim that some contents of conscious acts are non-propositional representations (example: “I see this: ➤”, in which a picture is following after the colon). Perceptual scenes can be embedded in sentential frames.

<sup>16</sup> Carruthers (1996) is a proponent of such a strong version of propositionalism.

<sup>17</sup> Remember Fichte’s “original insight” which was mentioned in § 4. Self-awareness cannot arise by one I reflecting on *another*. The second I-symbol in (4) must not be a mere *objectivation* of the I, however that might be possible. The traditional opinion that subject and object are “one” or “united” here is a mere re-description of the problem. The traditional thesis (in Schelling or Natortp) that the acting I cannot be completely objectified leaves open to account for the mechanism of incompletely objectifying that very agent.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bremer, Manuel. "Animal Consciousness as a Test Case of Cognitive Science. Some Theses." In *Bewusstsein*. München: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven, 2004.
- Carruthers, Peter. *Language, Thought and Consciousness*. Cambridge: 1996.
- Chalmers, David. *The Conscious Mind*. New York/Oxford: 1996.
- Chisholm, Roderick. *The First Person*. An Essay on Reference and Intentionality. Minneapolis: 1981.
- Dennett, Daniel. *Consciousness Explained*. London: 1991.
- Dummett, Michael. *Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie*. Frankfurt a.M.: 1975.
- Fodor, Jerry. *The Language of Thought*. Cambridge/MA: 1975.
- . "Jerry Fodor." In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), *Companion to the Philosophy of Mind*. Oxford: 1994.
- Husserl, Edmund. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*. Tübingen: 1913.
- Kenevan, Phyllis. "Self-Consciousness and the Ego in the Philosophy of Sartre." In P. A. Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre*. La Salle: 1981.
- Lewis, David. "Attitudes *De Dicto* and *De Se*." *Philosophical Review*, 88 (1979): 513–43.
- McCulloch, Gergory. *Using Sartre*. An Analytical Introduction to Early Sartrean Themes. London: 1994.
- Merek, Prayoon. *Sartre's Existentialism and Early Buddhism*. Bangkok: 1988.
- Metzinger, Thomas. "Faster Than Thought: Holism, Homogeneity and Temporal Coding." In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), *Conscious Experience*. Lawrence: 1995.
- Minsky, Marvin. *The Society of Mind*. New York: 1985.
- Natorp, Paul. *Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode*. Tübingen: 1912.
- Perry, Jon. "The Problem of the Essential Indexical." *Nous* XIII (1979): 3–21.
- Pothast, Ulrich. *Über einige Fragen der Selbstbeziehung*. Frankfurt a.M.: 1971.
- Priest, Stephen. *The Subject in Question*. Sartre's Critique of Husserl in *The Transcendence of the Ego*. London: 2000.
- Pylyshyn, Zenon. *Computation and Cognition*. 5th edition. Cambridge: 1989.
- Rosenthal, David. "Multiple Drafts and Facts of the Matter." In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), *Conscious Experience*. Lawrence: 1995.
- Sartre, Jean Paul. "La Transcendence de L'Ego: Esquisse d'une description phénoménologique." *Recherches Philosophiques*, VI; quoted by the English edition *The Transcendence of the Ego*. New York: 1960 (1937).
- . *L'être et le néant*. Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique. Paris: 1943.
- . (1948). "Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi", *Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie*, XLII; quoted by the German edition *Bewußtsein und Selbsterkenntnis*. Hamburg: 1973.

A NEW COPERNICAN REVOLUTION:  
MOVING BEYOND THE HUSSERLIAN *EPOCHE* TO A  
NEW CRITIQUE OF REASON: TYMIENIECKA AND  
THE ROLE OF THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION

TYMIENIECKA AND THE HUSSERLIAN *EPOCHE*

To discuss the notion of the *epoche* is to enquire into the heart of phenomenological critique of cognition. For the methods and practices of phenomenological philosophy rise and fall on this question: how does the phenomenologist think about thinking? From Descartes through Hume and Kant through to Husserl, we have been enjoined, in examining the nature of the world, to begin at the beginning by examining the nature of consciousness.

This quest came to grief almost immediately between the Scylla and Charybdis of objectivity and verifiability. Is it possible to measure consciousness from within? And if consciousness can be measured at all (for example, as patterns and commonalities), what relation does this internal 'reality' have to the external reality of extra-mental phenomena? What is the relation of the essence of consciousness to the facts of consciousness?

In his attempt to reclaim the contents of consciousness from the transcendental trappings of 19th century German Idealism, Husserl insisted on re-thinking the nature of consciousness as a faithful and *essential* reflection of external phenomena, and further, one which could not be studied or known without reference to the subject. Husserl's study of consciousness bypasses the problem of objectivity by incorporating the subject (as a thematizing and contextualizing structure) rather than seeking vainly to extract or abstract it. This is the task of the *epoche*: to uncover the essences of the phenomena of consciousness without being distracted into considerations of actual existence. For Husserl's interest lay in the examination and analysis not of facts, but of essences. He was careful to distinguish between essential being and actual existence/existents, in much the same way as Heidegger would later delineate the distinction between *das Sein* and *das Seiende*. The subject of phenomenological inquiry is pure, essential consciousness itself, not its real experiences, facts, and contents. Its interest is with the non-real, the essential which encapsulates, structures, and thematizes the real.

Following Kant, Husserl examined the role of cognition in this analysis, cognition informed by *a priori* intuitions regarding the nature of existence. And according to Husserl, there are at least two types of intuition: empirical (facts or realities regarding objective data) and essential, which refers to the essences of the things themselves. (Both types of intuition, however, are objective). In fact, Husserl placed such great emphasis on the role of the intuition in providing the essential data for the subjective analysis of consciousness that he described his philosophy as the intuitive study of essences. Through applying the lens and filter of the *epoche*, the subject is able to avoid a slide into the analysis of empirical data, in order to maintain a singular focus on the essential. Only in this way can subjectivity be overcome, with the subject no longer seeing the object in terms of its relation to itself, but rather as an essence. By relying solely on the essential intuition, Husserl displaces the subject from the equation from the outset.

The *epoche*, as Husserl intended it, is a procedure of mind which is meant to guarantee the reliability of cognitive results. It has been called a method, but in fact, with Husserl's emphasis upon the crucial role of intuition, no application of procedures could really yield intuition as such. The term 'method' seems somewhat misleading, for in spite of the precise analysis that Husserl gave of this procedure (e.g., the bracketing in successive stages of non-essential elements), the special gift of intuition has to be assumed *a priori* in order for the *epoche* to yield the expected experience.

This amounts to saying that the phenomenological *epoche* is much less a method (the results of which could not necessarily be verified) than a legitimation of the results really obtained by the intuition. In light of this unfolding, Tymieniecka's emphasis on intuition – the direct intuition of the given objective – should be seen as upholding Husserl's essential approach. However, there are several points of difference which Tymieniecka brought to her engagement with the cognitive material.

- 1) First, she states that there are numerous levels of intuition; they legitimize themselves within and by means of the context of cognition in which they reside.
- 2) Further, she recognizes specific types of intuition according to the constitutive levels of reality already distinguished by Husserl: the eidetic intuition, the transcendental intuition of the nature of consciousness, the

constitutive intuition of the genesis of objectivity. All of this, of course, manifests with numerous interminglings of the various intuitive realms.

Let us emphasize that the respective legitimations of these distinct intuitions are to be accepted from each of their specific contexts, and in terms of their concordance with other available contexts. (That is, the eidetic intuitions should find their corroboration and concordance with a corresponding constitutive and genetic context). For instance, the eidetic insight of an orange gives shape, color, fullness which corresponds to its genetic context; should it be flat, your constitutive context would not accept it – neither would its own genetic context. The specific object of cognition is compared with all other possible objects of its type within its own specific context (genetic, eidetic, constitutive).<sup>1</sup>

It is again a new type of intuition, of a higher order, (e.g., intuition of intellectual interconnectedness and concordance) that enters the game here. This legitimation of a singular intuition of a certain type by several contexts, legitimation which is also the fruit of a special type of intuition, reaches ultimately the intuitive complex of the world in which it resides. Thus, the Husserlian *epoche* is here understood in its own pristine way – and yet is taken a giant leap further! (That is, she says, only the beginning of the story.)

3) According to Tymieniecka, this intuition-legitimation of the cognitive content and the three above-mentioned levels takes an ultimate grounding in the fourth level: the intuition of interconnectedness. It goes without saying that all the work of cognition is done by the intentional work of consciousness. However, this clearing of intuition from its discursive calcification allows us to recognize in its workings an essential factor of human creativity.

Tymieniecka has, as a matter of fact, displaced the dominant role assigned by Husserl to intentional cognition in consciousness with a primogenital role for *creative* imagination in the origination and progress of sense-giving. With the human creative act, the barrier between mind and nature is lifted and we enter into the ultimate phase of grounding reality in the self-individualization of life. The unveiling of the onto-poetic sphere of life offers a new apparatus by which to thematize this process, along with a host of new originary intuitions and the means to thematize them.

4) This level, that of the self-individualization of life, is the field upon which beingness and the human cognizing-thematizing function originate

in their mutuality. (One does not exist without the other). It is on this level that the primogenital sense-giving, ciphering, occurs.

It is at this point that Tymieniecka makes a decisive leap beyond Husserl's understanding of the *epoche*. The theory of intuition that is thus founded is key to understanding Tymieniecka's philosophy as a whole, both in terms of epistemology and in the larger sense of thinking about reality and the place of human being within reality. For it is through the creative activity of ciphering that the human inscribes itself onto the world which forms its context. As a demonstration of intentionality, will, and agency, the bracketing off of experience in the service of the analysis of the pure phenomena of consciousness serves both to construct and to constitute the self.

The creative agency which for Tymieniecka is the defining characteristic of human beings accomplishes two essential tasks. First, it distinguishes the subject from the object, establishing the self as not merely part of the 'given', but as self-projective into the realm of the given. Through the creative agency, meaning is created, and the essence of human being is inscribed, as it were, on the essence of being. One such task would be enough, but its second task is much more central to Tymieniecka's project as a whole, for with the second task, Tymieniecka brings in the question of intersubjectivity. The second task for the creative agency is to establish the subject by means not of the pure consciousness of the subject, but rather by means of another consciousness. In developing what Tymieniecka has termed the cipher, the creative self comes into being. In developing the means to examine the phenomena of consciousness, the creative self also creates the other. Thus Tymieniecka's understanding of the *epoche* is far more radical than Husserl's: it facilitates not only the analysis of the phenomena of consciousness, but also the analysis of meaning – thus the *epoche* appears to be not only in the service of epistemology, but of axiology and ontology as well.

Remember that Husserl's interest is not in the real, but in the essential aspects of being. When we suspend judgment in the *epoche*, placing in brackets whatever facts belong to essential Being, we bring ourselves closer to understanding the essence of human being and its place in Being as a whole. We isolate essential insights from their empirical counterparts, and so clear the analytic field for consciousness to be understood on essential terms.

In Tymieniecka's perspective, it is vain and futile to try to identify one single privileged access to the foundation of reality, or to the ultimate questions, or to the great mystery of life. The history of philosophy has

made clear the fact that reality and human being's place in it are intertwined in numerous ways. In order to find the 'final' reasons (either of reality or of the great mysteries) we have to try to find access into the various knots between reality and human being. Each philosopher has attempted to solve this puzzle, but the complexity of the human condition does not admit of one single, all-encompassing answer. By bringing together the various threads of the discussion, Tymieniecka's use of the *epoche* provides one useful point of access into this mystery.

#### IMAGINATION, SIGNIFICANCE AND WILL

Several important questions are raised by Tymieniecka's theories regarding the nature of the creative imagination. What does freedom mean in the context of the creation of significance? Is the will free? What place does passion have in the creative activity of reason? What is the relationship between reason and passion in this conceptual framework?

First and foremost, for Tymieniecka it must be understood that in order to be meaning-giving, the creative action of consciousness must be utterly free. That is, while events or objects in the circumambient world may influence or prompt responses from an individual, the processing of those events by the perceptual activity of reason is always free to choose what meaning to assign to those objects. The will is constrained neither by *a priori* intuitions nor by any externally imposed signifier. Rather, the complex activity of perception, cognition, intellection and judgment propels the creation of the subject's unique and meaningful knowledge of the object. To think otherwise is to rupture the understanding of the parallel action of human creativity and the ontopoetic *imaginatio creatrix* of life. If the will is constrained in any way, how could it be said to mirror the free generative power of the life-force which strives for ever fuller and more meaningful expression of its creative telos?

Tymieniecka understands the will to be the uniquely human prerogative that transforms natural passions into projects that create new moments of meaning within the organic movements of life's constructive progress. The will is free, but not arbitrary. Rather, it has four aspects, each of which serves to direct and correct its course: "first, the primordial moves of the human spirit; second, the thrust towards the other; third, the will to undertake; and lastly, the deliberately inventive quest."<sup>2</sup> Each aspect keeps the others in balance, and ensures that together these 'means of propulsion' move forward both the life of the individual and the larger dynamic of life.

These functions are not performed alone ... on the contrary, they may be activated only within valuative schema that install the human creative condition, within the aesthetic, moral, and intellectual perspectives that introduce the specifically human valuation of life. Furthermore, these factors of human dynamics informing human action operate within the bounds that the world of life projects in structures and rules.<sup>3</sup>

These four functions inform the will and guide its freedom. The tension between them provides a synergy which links individuals to others, and all back into the unity-of-everything-that-is-alive (Tymieniecka's term for *das Sein*). This activity Tymieniecka calls the moral sense – "a factor of sense among the virtualities of the human condition and now playing an active role in the advance of life."<sup>4</sup> Self-consciousness informs consciousness of the other, of the other's projects, and the overall project of life. "Human life is engendered in the freedom of this self-awareness with others. ... The very root significance of my freedom lies in my recognition of the equivalence of the rights of other[s]."<sup>5</sup>

Passion, in this schema, must be understood in two aspects: first, as the reflection of the Dionysian character of the Logos of life, and second, as the elementally individual character of each subject. Let us take this second aspect first. Far from marginalizing passion as a force that wrestles against reason, Tymieniecka values passion as one of the natural engines of human creativity. Without passion, the individual does not exist. Its drive to individualize, to invent new meaning, is grounded in the natural passion to establish a point of contact within the world of objects, a locus from which to move out into action.

Inasmuch as the human being is a center from which its individual and personal concerns spread, establishing it within the unity-of-everything-that-is-alive, it is also a center into which lines from innumerable other centralizing life-processing agencies gather, maintaining it in existence and allowing it to advance.<sup>6</sup>

This center of our lived, experienced universe is constructed and maintained by the passion that drives the subject to self-individualization through the interpretation of unique significance.

It is through a revaluation of passion that Tymieniecka finds a way to resolve the dualism between the mind and the body. In the creative context, "a new alliance is struck between the opaque, mute, 'bodily' functions ... and the highest specialization of man's tendencies to organize his world: intellectual intuitions, ideas, reasoning and speculative powers".<sup>7</sup> Working together, the passive (or involuntary) and constitutive activities of perception, discernment and judgment cooperate with the active (or voluntary) and creative processes of value-seeking, meaning-



giving and questioning the nature and significance of what is given in the unity-of-everything-that-is-alive. Since

the creative impulse reject[s] the pre-established patterns and cut[s] ... the ties among the functional agencies – the rules and points of reference of the organizing sovereign reason – it is upon the inarticulate movements of passions, impulses, moods, and strivings that the emphasis falls. The creative function solicits their dynamism by projecting a double quest: firstly, it seeks after the interpretative points of reference for this natural striving operating within us, mute, and yet most significant for the human being; secondly, it attempts to discover or invent the significance which this dynamic upsurge of elemental passions may have for the reinterpretation of reality it is originally asking for.<sup>8</sup>

Thus the passions work, as reason does, in the service of the creative function. They are, Tymieniecka says, “at the extreme edge of our psyche”, at the threshold between human nature and Nature itself, between what is given and what is experienced. The passions point towards that which we can only dimly discern with the senses. Their indicative nature is also part and parcel of their creative function, and leads us to a second aspect of the passions which must not be overlooked. For in addition to pointing to what lies hidden in our nature, the passions also point to an aspect of life that might be otherwise hidden from reason alone: the Dionysian character of the Logos of Life. In Tymieniecka’s *Weltanschauung*, the dynamic principle of life is informed by a spirit whose vitality and spontaneity cannot be trammled. Human consciousness is “the middle zone between cosmic nature, nature-life, and the emerging human universe of the spirit.” This spirit can only be called Dionysian, as it blurs traditional distinctions between natural and human, self and other.

What in traditional philosophies was assumed to be an abrupt hiatus calling for a bridge between “external nature” and the “human mind” (vainly sought after), or, in modern times, between “subjectivity” and “objectivity,” a bridge to explain the marvelously differentiated and discrete and yet strict continuity of life’s progress, phenomenology of life has revealed to be a series of transformation phases within the play of forces of nature itself, in which transformations the Logos of Life in its unfolding comes to reveal its further potentialities.<sup>9</sup>

The liminal space occupied by the Dionysian spirit reveals the vital, essential aspect of passion, its role in the Logoic system. Here Tymieniecka undertakes to bring to resolution once and for all the traditional dichotomy between human and ‘natural’. For consciousness makes the drama of the Logos of Life intelligible in human terms. In the encounter between human being and its surroundings, we can observe the movement of the processes of the Logos of Life. These processes go on within and around us, as life drives onward. Reason alone might not make this connection.

At its most elemental level, the Logos of Life triggers the *imaginatio creatrix* into action, enabling humans to respond to objects and events imaginatively in reaching first for survival, and secondarily for meaning, challenging “the human being to respond with his entire endowment and ingeniousness.”<sup>10</sup> In this way too, human activity reflects and reveals the activity of the dynamic principle of life. “Man shares only in an imaginatively sentient way in the growth and unfolding of the individualizing life (taking part in its inner workings yet remaining enclosed within his/her vital autonomy).”<sup>11</sup> Yet

the surging of *imaginatio creatrix* in the bowels of Nature without and within the human being, face to face with the Elements which stir it into action, places the drama of Nature at the heart of man’s creative endeavor. Simultaneously, it places this creative endeavor at the heart of man’s *self-interpretation in existence* by delineating its course through the struggle for life.<sup>12</sup>

In the struggle against the obstacles to our projects that are presented by nature, we are stimulated to create new identities in response. We also reflect back and act upon them, and so create new moments in the life of life itself – there is here an “*existential interplay between them being inventively initiated within their common framework: the Human Condition.*”<sup>13</sup> This interplay, Tymieniecka asserts, occurs at what she calls ‘the twilight of human consciousness,’ by which I understand her to mean that level of pre-conscious awareness at which perception begins, the self emerges from the world, and creativity is born. This, indeed, is the defining threshold of the Human Condition, in Tymieniecka’s terminology, the point at which Becoming and Being intersect:

... by “Human Condition” we do not mean any kind of situation of the human individual with respect to his freedom and destiny. In radical contrast to such a summary view upon man, which makes the nature of the Human Condition controversial and relative to biases, we are concerned with the virtualities of the universal life schema, within which, at a certain level of complexity reached by the individualizing progress, the living being may from his constructive life resources release an entirely unprecedented set of virtualities and initiate a new constructive phase of the specifically human significance of life. Thus ... the Human Condition constitutes an integral segment of the *unity-of-everything-that-is-alive*.<sup>14</sup>

The Human Condition is itself the source of new becoming, of new creation within the Logos of life. At this liminal level, natural and human life are integrated in a new synthesis.

## IMAGINATION AND PASSION

Passion plays into this dynamic at every level, even the most fundamental. What Tymieniecka calls “the primeval dialectic of life” includes the interplay between light and darkness (“the primal fruits of *imaginatio creatrix*”). As human being enters the world,

the elements of light and darkness in their dialectics transmit into the human significance of life the basic existential operations of **life itself**. In their dialectical game, light and darkness bring together *physis* and *psyche*, natural growth and *techné* ... *bios* and *ethos* ... in an infinitely nuanced varying rainbow whose glimmering rays fulgurate, sparkle, expand in an ever new play.<sup>15</sup>

Tymieniecka redefines human passion in terms of the elemental movement of the Logos of Life, as a motive force that complements reason. In combination with reason, and under the operational guidance of the *imaginatio creatrix*, passion is responsible for all creativity. Experience is thus by no means limited (as it may be by Husserl) to a rational foundation. Rather, the principle of being is itself understood as Dionysian: wild, spontaneous, vital. The Dionysian impulse of the Logos of Life is balanced by the purposeful, telic movement towards self-actualization in the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive. How this balance is manifested in human life will be the focus of the next section.

## TYMIENIECKA'S 'COPERNICAN REVOLUTION' AND THE CREATION OF THE WORLD

Kant understood *Einbildungskraft* as a threshold between the given and the experienced (or between *physis* and *techné*). Kant understood the crucial role of imagination in the constitution of the perceiving, cognizing subject. And he surely understood the role of the imagination in the constitution of aesthetic and moral responses to the world. But in Tymieniecka's view, Kant did not go far enough. Tymieniecka places the imagination itself in a creative, sovereign role. For imagination, she claims, is not merely mimetic, reproductive, or a matter of remembering the world. It does not simply function as the ongoing interpretation of the world, continually modified to integrate new circumstances and constitute a new constitutive understanding. (This, she says, is closer to Husserl's interpretation of Kant than to her own.)

Tymieniecka's conception of the role and nature of *Einbildungskraft* is the first, since Kant, to argue for its vital significance as a creative agent,

and her entire lifelong project has been aimed at this goal. For Tymieniecka, the primary significance of the imagination is its ontological import as the bearer of meaning. This is not a metaphorical understanding, but a metaphysical one. Imagination brings about actual creation of new networks within human consciousness to support new intuitions and ideas about the world. Imagination is a spider, spinning new webs of comprehension, positing new connections, forging new alliances. Again, it must be emphasized that hers is not a metaphorical understanding. For Tymieniecka, the significance of the *imaginatio creatrix* is its ability not merely to give birth to a subject, but to create something new within the phenomena, to originate something independent of the given.

With this notion, Tymieniecka challenges the central notion of transcendental idealism, arguing that the constitutive activity of consciousness is only one of the functions of consciousness, and that a corrective analysis of the workings of consciousness in fact reveals that the true nature of human freedom is found in its orchestration of human potentialities (what she calls 'virtualities') into the creative function of consciousness. She thus uncovers "the creative imagination as the agency of the *a priori* in the creative freedom as well as ... the plurifunctionality of human consciousness as the source of possible worlds."<sup>16</sup> That is, she offers a new phenomenological answer to Leibniz' metaphysical query. The real answer, she avers, may be implied from the question itself.

To explore her answer, we must pose a series of fundamental questions. First, once and for all, what is the origin of human reality? Second, is human being free or determined? Finally, what is the relation of the *a priori* to human freedom?

We have already outlined the creative role Tymieniecka assigns to the imagination, but let us look a little more closely into the creative process. In her understanding, cognition is, from its outset in perception, active rather than passive in the constitution of the world. Perception supplies the foundation for the construction of human reality. Even reception is explained as active, since as soon as a perception is received, it is immediately acted upon by the other faculties. The imagination immediately seizes upon the object and begins to synthesize its meaning for itself, acting to create meaning and achieve unity among its perceptions.

The so-called 'passivity', which means the pre-installed inevitability of its progress, is, in fact, the expression of its way of organization. Its 'spontaneous' unrolling, far from being a blind outburst, is on the contrary, pre-established by rules, principles, blueprints preparing progressively appropriate means as the vehicles of their accomplishment.<sup>17</sup>

Yet Tymieniecka would have us understand that Husserl's model, which calls for a rigidly rational structurization of the given world, lacks the essential characteristic which she seeks to re-introduce at the originary source: freedom. Without freedom, she argues, the project of the Logos of Life would be stifled in its cradle. The project of self-individualization in manifestation would be impossible and absurd. There would be no hope of establishing meaning.

Rather, Tymieniecka argues, we need to correctly understand the centrality of the creative impulse, and its dynamic relation to the constitutive process. Like consciousness itself, the creative impulse is found at the threshold of the constituted world. But the creative impulse is never still: as it stands on the threshold, it is always already turning and moving on. Its nature is to look beyond itself towards something new, and thereby to create a new vision of the possible.

[The creative process] situates itself between the two different temporal phases of the constituted world by stemming from it and breaking off, then, breaking back into it in order to transform it.<sup>18</sup>

*Imaginatio creatrix* begins its work in the process of creative perception of

the already constituted lifeworld of the creative agent. Preceded by unaccountable *subjective dealings* of the creator-to-be with the constituted reality, it actually triggers the creative activity by producing a new opening of sight within the fixated reality ... [in this process] the inherited and passively constructed forms and affective contents of experience become repudiated. All our operational virtualities partly extracted from their chains in the constitutive system, become galvanized and set off in an effort towards reconstruction of the Real.<sup>19</sup>

But wait – reconstruction? Is the work of the *imaginatio creatrix* merely to reconstitute the Real in a unique individualized perspective? Not at all. Its first task is to create a self, its second, to cut a window into the new, its third, to develop cables between the given and the experienced, and its fourth ... its fourth and subsequent tasks cannot be delineated, as they are free and may take any number of forms. What we can know about them, however, is that creativity has a specific function: to orchestrate “anew all the productive operative virtualities of man into a framework of the creative context, [which may well terminate in] an aimed at, concrete, and intersubjectively accessible ‘product’.”<sup>20</sup>

The origin of human reality on an individual level, then, is the creative perception that initiates the re-invention of the world as uniquely meaningful and significant. How does this work? Tymieniecka likens the role

of the creative context to “a weaving loom, upon which the novel reality is going to be woven.” (IC, 11)

The yet undetermined creative impulse finding the appropriate response in our functional virtualities, establishes itself searchingly in its own mode of operation; simultaneously it calls into active commitment a network of particular functional operations. In their consistent and purposeful orientation as they bring together the major operational arteries of man, these sub-sets of functional dynamics constitute the framework of creative operations: the creative context.<sup>21</sup>

This is the origin of human reality on a social or intersubjective level. Moreover, the creative function reaches even deeper into the ontological structure of the world. Remember, Tymieniecka locates this impulse not only on the level of the human, but also on the level of the elemental structure of life. The orchestration of functioning provided by the creative impulse of human striving for meaning informs the lifeworld with its intentionality. The interplay between human and world is a two-way street: the elemental passions are released by the action of the creative agent, and give them themselves over to be reinterpreted in significance.

In the first movement, Elemental Nature lends itself to the meaning-giving reason and is worked to raise from its anonymous impersonal status to become ‘interiorized’ in reflection; in the second, inverse movement, it is intellectual intuition, which interrogating, goes into Nature present in man, being molded through its whole range down to the most elementary operations.<sup>22</sup>

The new orchestration arises in response to this double quest. Imagination thus permeates the lifeworld through its creative action. Tymieniecka wants us to clearly understand that the action of the *imaginatio creatrix* does not, as Husserl thought, take place merely on the level of representation. It does not ‘float’ between being and non-being, as, say, the objective content of a work of art. Rather, the action of the *imaginatio creatrix* takes place and grounds itself in the temporal actuality of the given, effecting its radical transformation into meaning. This is a matter, as Kant implied in his valuation of *Einbildungskraft* as both reproductive and mediating, of reaching through the object into the world of nature and so creating it anew, not merely as an object with properties, but also as a locus of meaning. The difference, for Tymieniecka, between her notion of *imaginatio creatrix* and Kant’s valuation of *Einbildung* is this. For Kant, the activity of the subject on the sensuous manifold provides a synthetic structural link between the human being and its world. For Tymieniecka, in contrast, the creative interactivity of subject and object

provides an operational function which allows for both to continue to progress towards fuller actualization. For Tymieniecka, the soul is never 'blind': it is always informed by the creative impulse, and so objects are never merely passively encountered, rather, they are posited within and by the synthesizing organization of the manifold *of which the subject is also a part*. However, without the guiding force of the orchestrating creative function, the associative synthesis of the empirical given would not cohere towards any telos. The creative agent provides a synthesizing locus for what is given from/in nature into the creative process: the human soul.

Tymieniecka does not follow Kant's division of the faculties. She clearly prioritizes the imagination as the motivator of perception, reflection and judgment. All the faculties find their roles and rules in the orchestrating function of imagination. In this respect, imagination functions as the creative elemental force of nature.

Imagination is the factor of originality on its own: instead of entering into the schematism of ... pure reason, it surges within the subject 'free' from the constraints of the constitutive system and its mechanisms, as the powerful streamlet of the Elemental Nature having the intellect as its sole partner and its sole regulative instance to bring the forces of the soul into effervescence: wakening them to a new life and releasing their spontaneities, imagination becomes '*belebendes Prinzip im Gemüt*.'<sup>23</sup> (i.e., the animating principle of nature.)

In order to fulfill this task, imagination must be understood as unfettered by any *a priori* principles. The creative process, to be sure, "works within the framework of the constituted world and it is with respect to this world that the balance between the old and the new has to be estimated, in each work of creation anew" (IC, 36). But it is possible, Tymieniecka suggests, for the creative process to fulfill its telos as the animating principle of nature by emerging as fully and freely operative, as a *special integration of all the functions*, [by which the creative process] can *trigger, from the operations of their novel configuration, an original invention*.<sup>24</sup>

For Tymieniecka, *imaginatio creatrix* is "the decisive factor within the creative context." In its simultaneous emergence into consciousness and the lifeworld, it "brings together the mechanisms and forces of the constitutive apparatus with those of the complex realm of passions." Correctly understood, imagination can integrate the dualities which have plagued philosophical discourse for so long: soul/body, reason/passion, nature/culture. "Imagination appears as mediating between two producing levels, the one of the generative forces of passions and the other, scrutinizing and selecting power of reason at all their strata."<sup>25</sup> In this regard, it can

be understood as both the process and the result of the positing of an object.

One question remains to be resolved at this preliminary level: the place of the *a priori* in this schema. If, as Tymieniecka insists, “the structurizing agency in its decision is neither bound by any pre-established *a priori* delineating structural regulations or principles”,<sup>26</sup> then how are we to understand the nature and role of the *a priori*? Tymieniecka frames this question as one of “*capital metaphysical scope*: ‘What are the ultimate structurizing principles the *creative function* follows in its operations in the selection of the construction elements and their moulding to be concretized into an object?’”

In Tymieniecka’s analysis, ideas must precede the pluriform creativity of perception and imagination, not as structural regulations, but as a referential, contextualizing framework which provides continuity, categories for identity and intentionality, and an entelechial exoskeleton.

Their existence is neither constitutive nor prescriptive. Rather, ideas are transcendent to the constitutive system, providing standards of definition and categories of judgment. (In this way, they function in a manner perhaps more reminiscent of Plato than of Kant.) They are indispensable to the operation of the creative process of life itself. “Could we, in fact,” asks Tymieniecka, “without having such unchangeable, unavoidable, universal regulative principles for establishment of the organization promoting life, maintain the continuity of life and a homogeneous universe?”<sup>27</sup> The ideas precede creativity, and provide the context for the creative function, its canvas and its raw materials. The rest is the purview of the art of life.

*Saint Joseph College*  
*West Hartford, Connecticut*

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> I am deeply indebted to Tymieniecka for this insightful explication of her theory. Personal communication, July 22, 2004.

<sup>2</sup> *Logos and Life*, p. 504.

<sup>3</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 532.

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 533.

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 411.

<sup>7</sup> *Imaginatio Creatrix*, p. 15ff.

<sup>8</sup> *Loc. cit.*



- <sup>9</sup> *Logos and Life*, p. 572ff.
- <sup>10</sup> "Aesthetics of Nature", p. 15.
- <sup>11</sup> "Aesthetics of Nature", p. 13.
- <sup>12</sup> *Loc. cit.*
- <sup>13</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 18.
- <sup>14</sup> *Loc. cit.*
- <sup>15</sup> *Analecta Husserliana*, vol. 38, p. viiff.
- <sup>16</sup> *Imaginatio Creatrix*, p. 5.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- <sup>19</sup> *Loc. cit.*
- <sup>20</sup> *Loc. cit.*
- <sup>21</sup> *Imaginatio Creatrix*, p. 11.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36.
- <sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 38.
- <sup>26</sup> *Imaginatio Creatrix*, p. 40.
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anna Teresa Tymieniecka. "Aesthetics of Nature." In *Life, Differentiation, and Harmony*, *Analecta Husserliana*, vol. 58. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998.
- . "Imaginatio Creatrix: The 'Creative' versus the 'Constitutive' Function of Man, and the 'Possible Worlds', *Analecta Husserliana*, vol. 11. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1974.
- . *Logos and Life: Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason*. *Analecta Husserliana*, vol. 24. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988.

SECTION II

ONTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES OF CLASSIC  
PHENOMENOLOGY IN THEIR PRESENT DAY  
INTERPRETATION

## ONTOLOGICAL INTENTIONS OF TWENTIETH- CENTURY TRANSCENDENTALISM

Transcendentalism in its classical, Kantian version, was, undoubtedly, one of the most important inventions in the history of European philosophy in the time of its existence – and in terms of the difference between history and evolution (development). At this stage *a radical turn* occurred, and a new world opened up before philosophers' eyes – namely, the world of "subjectivity", radically different from what they were concerned with and what they treated as their own private domain.

One could say that Kant, from his contemporaries' point of view, and as they interpreted his "Critique of Pure Reason", appeared both as a thinker who discovered "the New World" of subjectivity and as a philosopher who closed up "the Old World" – the objective world of the transcendent, or essential. And, probably, for many people (including Kant himself) this other side seemed to be the main one. It is *later*, in the eyes of the following generations of philosophers Kant becomes Columbus! At first he looked like a sort of English landlord of the time of the Enclosure, who drove peasants away from the lands they traditionally treated as their own. It is evident even from the common title of the series of his epoch-making works, to begin from the "Critique of Pure Reason". These works had been proposed by the author, and also interpreted by their readers as a program of the *destruction* of excessive claims of human reason, as a call for what may be called a philosophical modesty. But it should be remembered that Kant himself treated his own works as *prolegomena* to the future, more important and, furthermore, native philosophical work: critical self-analysis would have cleared the field for a positive work of a metaphysician, and so it was necessary to the question, namely, what we, human beings, can know with evidence at all? What we should know in order not to recognize our own illusions as a reality, independent of our consciousness, not to recognize that a thing seems to be as its entity, what a thing is on its own. Only after this preliminary work one can *hope* to find a right, though not much reliable way to a true reality. That's why after the first Kantian question, "what can we know?" another question arises, "what we should believe in?", and the next one, "what we should hope to?". Even if an attempt to

answer two last questions would fail – for *faith* has no ground, and every *hope* is illusive – but still “hope dies latter”.

“Clearing a place for a faith” was, for Kant, a kind of making a building site: for there was no place for a faith in a joyous culture of the Enlightenment, it was of no use where was a belief that true knowledge is reachable and human reason is omnipotent! A human who has knowledge at his disposal is not in need of a faith (if not to treat the belief in the boundless opportunities of the reason as a kind of faith; and that’s a subject of psychology, not philosophy), like Laplace, who was not “in need” of the idea of God while making up his “System of the World”.

“Critics of his critics”, followed by the publication of Kant’s works (and a wide distribution of such expressions in a philosophical language of the future is a significant thing by itself) proceeded in different directions, often interacted with each other. One of these critical directions is an epistemological one: Kant says “world by itself” is beyond the reach of human reason! But it’s very likely that if we properly inquire into mechanisms and instruments of cognitive activity, which are inherent and also developed by ourselves, we’ll probably find out some reliable ways of cognition because we’ll not only get rid of mistakes, but we’ll eliminate their reasons. And at the same time we’ll prove the groundlessness of Kant’s pessimism and criticism. From what does cognition begin – from sensations? So let’s begin to analyze sensations in their own right! What are the natural processes to be found in the structure and functioning of the receptors? Evidently energetical, chemical, mechanical and physiological ones! From here goes one of the working definitions of sensation: “sensation is a transformation of an energy of the exogenous irritant into a fact of consciousness ...”

Such a program is just an aim, a tendency, because there was no *common* program, though during the progress of work some convincing results had been obtained concerning modelling of the organs of sense, and also in their correction and enhancement. Although the empirical critics (also “critiques”!), turning themselves towards the experimental psychology, had resorted to an ambiguous hypothesis of the “continuity of experience”, because of which a forthcoming result could be expected, and so defined an idea as a “general notion”. The fuzzy movement of the “Energeticians” proceeded in a close way – they asserted that “cognitive process” for professional philosophers is nothing else than a form of natural transformations of energy (thought, for instance, is nothing but an “electric fluid”; for electricity is not exactly a matter because it has no mass but, at the same time, it is perceptible!). Besides other “positive

philosophers", being enemies of metaphysics and going the same direction, finally drove themselves to a conclusion that, unfortunately, Kant in fact was right, because experiments in physiology did prove the existence of a "specific energy of the organs of senses". And it means that receptors not only link ourselves with an actual world, but also isolate us from it "on its own". But, perhaps, Kant is still not right in some place, and his point can be corrected by the definition of cognition as a one-one match making between different "energies" (see here H. Helmholtz and a branch of psychology known as "a physiology of the higher nervous activity").

The other tendency is a program of Hegel. From its followers' point of view Kant deserves praise as an "analyst", but actually he treats the result of his analysis of the subject matter, which is in fact integral, as an evidence of its ruggedness! And there are no two Universes, as Kant thought, but it is not a massive one, and it more closely resembles a constitutional monarchy: it has many regions, but it functions and it is ruled as a single organism; autonomy and integrity are quite compatible. But if so, philosophers do not need any theory of knowledge. Marxism lies within the same tendency, though it borrowed a lot from epistemological programs: "unity of the world" is treated in Marxism as its major characteristic, and it is not in its being, but in its materiality, which is proved by the "long and hard way of the development of natural science". If one dislikes this variant, so, from Marxist's point of view, the unity of the *world of culture* is grounded in practice, where can be found both subjective and objective, ideal and material, universal and individual, in other words, antithetical dialectics. To this one can add "epistemological expectancies": of the physiology of the organs of senses and of the studies in the *physiology* of the higher *nervous* activity (for nervous processes include a good deal of the "electrical"). History therefore is treated as a "practical movement", and, after all, the contradiction between material and ideal does exist, but it is not of an absolute character and makes no sense, unless within the framework of the theory of knowledge – not in the bounds of knowledge itself, but in the bounds of the theory of this objective process. As a matter of fact, these are, of course, different variations of the same theme, and the main motive of this theme is posed by Hegel's ontology and is set forth in his "Phenomenology of the Spirit".

Finally, there's another direction of the philosophical thought which made "transcendental" as a priority human world his main subject. It is represented by various forms of the "anthropological project", including C. Levi-Strauss' "Structural Anthropology" and the mutations of post-structuralism in continental European philosophy of the twentieth cen-

tury. Among them the most notable is the history of Husserl's classical phenomenology, because in this history, which took place during the lifetime of a *single person*, in his mind and works the whole drama of the European philosophy after Kant is displayed. One might say, that Husserl's phenomenology is nothing more nor less than phenomenology of the idea of transcendentalism.

For known reasons I cannot give concrete expression to two "pre-phenomenological" stages in the intellectual biography of this thinker, namely, the stage of "almost childish" (by his own words) *idealism* in his treatment of numbers and the following stage of *psychologism*. But, to say incidentally, if one would turn to English philosophy of the "common sense", where G. Moore and B. Russell had discovered "the pluralistic universe", where, taken together, numbers and ideas, mind and body are settled comfortably, there's no need for "philosophical sufferings" or even to overcome psychologism. Continental philosophy is a horse of a different colour: here psychologism in logic was a serious rival to the idealism; it was a sort of an empiricist ground of mathematics, opposed both to idealism and transcendentalism (if we treat logic as an a priori structure of consciousness). Besides when "the earliest" Husserl draws a distinction between "true" numbers and those which are constructed by our mind as technical tools for the counting process and so appear in the mind of a mathematician as "substitutes" for "true" numbers, which are beyond the reach of the direct knowing, Husserl is forced to treat the relationship between these two sorts of numbers in terms of classical transcendentalism. But when he made the process of the formation of these objects, "secondary", regarding to "numbers by themselves", a subject of his special attention, the horizons were broadened for him. It would be possible to try, remaining within the framework of the studies of mathematical thought, turning to the history of mathematics and using something like a "method of similarity", to uncover "a priori schemes" which mind uses for constituting mathematical objects. In that way apriorism would be "betrothed" with empiricism, and 'a priori' would become a "historical" one; moreover, the mechanics of constituting would appear as a taken for granted and so would be driven out of the bounds of metaphysics. But Husserl has come in another way: in spite of trying to find new paths to the ideal world of "numbers by themselves" he transmitted his attention to the mechanism of the formation of the numbers used in counting procedures – and thus not only rid himself of tedious work with the texts on history of mathematics (God knows what would be the result of such a work, and a number of these texts is great ... ), but also

discovered another field, which became “a vein of gold” for him and his disciples: a field of subject constituting in general! As a result, Husserl no longer was an ordinary “philosopher at the service” of mathematics, or even of logic, and so no more played a supporting role in the intellectual life of that time. For in that time both mathematicians and logicians had become divided in opinion, cleft into “formalists” and “empiricists” (“psychologists”); afterwards Russian mathematicians – “constructivists” made their contribution on this cleavage; but they haven’t created their own alternative program. But Husserl found his own subject, namely, the constituting of the world of objects (*des Gegenstandswelt*) and a study of the constitution of different objective worlds, treated as special regions of culture! And even now, when the mathematicians’ discussions of those times are almost forgotten, phenomenology is still not passed from the scene, and congresses on phenomenology are assembling time and again.

However, the changing of philosophers’ interests and purposes is an ordinary thing. Even the objective character of human thought is not an innovation: Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and “late” Marx all paid attention to this side of the cognitive process. Both Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard had seen the importance of the “subjective purpose of consciousness” straight away, and so they treated Kant’s transcendentalism, seemingly a passed stage in the history of philosophy, with great respect. At the same time, exploring the etymology of the term “interest”, which they introduced into a philosophical use, and perceiving its roots in Latin ‘inter-esse’, they had paved a way for the transition from transcendentalism (as an aspect of epistemology) to *ontology* – at first, *the ontology of human existence*.

But again Husserl reproduces, in his own intellectual biography, this trajectory of European thought. He not only pays attention to this new tendency in philosophy, being a subtle observer of another’s intellectual life, but, *from his own experience*, drives to an understanding of an important part of the human being’s ability not only to “become interested”, but to change his own field of interests, *and so to change an appearance of his objective world*. That’s why the concept of “interest” is replaced by the concept of *intentionality*, which is principal, if not central, for *his own phenomenology*. This concept, supplemented with an “instrumental” concept of the *intentional act*, although somewhat tacitly, had transformed *phenomenology* into *phenomenotechnics*. “Transcendental subject” now became a designer of both personal and cultural worlds. Accordingly the world of culture, the objective world now appears as a human surrounding, but not by the way of “environment”. Afterwards

the main concepts of the former “physicalist” ontology had changed: the everyday language had become understandable – the language in which there are *close* relatives, who live in Australia, and *distant* ones, who live on the neighbourhood, or even in our own house. And the *objective surrounding* is nearly identified with a “field of interests”. It is obvious here that the subject as a generator of intentional acts is nothing else than a Kantian “transcendental subject”, because the subjectivity of the objective world is not the same as the subjective character of the “world-for-us” in his teaching. As a matter of fact, Kantian transcendentalism was actually fraught with either agnosticism or subjective idealism, and reproaches for it did take place frequently. But it is not applicable to Husserl’s transcendentalism, for it investigates the culture-building activity. But, perhaps, it is even more important that this transcendentalism clears the way to further explorations of the place and characteristics of the human *as a part of culture*.

Conformably the former principal discerning, namely, the subject-object relationship, which had once acquired a status of the “general question of philosophy” at first transformed into a shade of ontology, and afterwards became merely a philosophic archaism.

But if, in the beginning of the twentieth century, the leading tendency of the European philosophy looked like a “return from Hegel to Kant”, so nowadays, as I think, Hegel gains his revenge: almost all the subsequent history of the phenomenological movement, from the ideas of “late” Husserl, represents, to my mind, a return to Hegel’s ideas, although with some considerable corrections. The subject-object relationship now transforms from dialectical correlation into an interchange; the boundary between the components this relationship binds is being marked depending on conditions (if being marked at all). Now subject is like Proteus: now it is cognizing, now it is practical; sometimes thinking, sometimes willing; first sentient, then acting; at one moment reflexing, at another an object of reflexion; or even a mixture of these components. The same happens with an object, when the M. Foucault’s and G. Deleuze’s idea of the “field of discourse” takes the place of the former concept of the “real world”. All “diffuses” and everything “flows”; accordingly changes a concept of cognition, and also all its dialectic components (theoretical and empirical, sensual and empirical etc.).

Perhaps it would be better, for the present moment, to talk about a *tendency*. If it would come to its end, any dialogue, any “discourse” with the Other or the Others would not be possible – as it was in the case of a “thinking Ocean” in S. Lem’s novel “Solaris”. For a naïve self-evidence



of the personal experience of the human individual is still survived, as well as a mirror of self-reflexion, a distinction of Ego as a content of thought and as an object. But for how long? For the process of the universal ontological decentration is not only a Jacques Derrida's fiction (who, it seems, has decided to give a dare to Lem in constructing fantastic situations). That's why when I talk about something like a "renaissance of Hegelianism", it is not the same as the "rebirth of Hegel", and Deleuze's "Logic of Sense" is not an exposition of Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit": first of all, there's no Hegel's spiritual substance, which self-reflexion is at the same time a creation of the world.

Looking back on the history of phenomenology, I would like you to pay attention, from this standpoint, to the specific character of the development of *Italian philosophical thought*, which showed itself in works of the prominent XX century thinker, *Benedetto Croce*. Surely I have no pretensions of contributing my own share into all that Russians know about this philosopher from his translated works, as well as from the works of those who set forth, systematized or sold his ideas. "Casus Croce" is interesting because it can be taken as an argument for the general thesis, that there is a strong case (and, moreover, it is necessity) for an attempt to observe history of philosophy "from the point of difference", from the *point of individual*, i.e. one shall not confine himself by the claims to discover only "general patterns", by the *point of general*. The whole process of European cultural development is indeed the *history*, the way of human spirit's existence, but not a type of "applied logic" or an incarnation of the Thought of the Absolute.

But it happened quite often when some specific historical phenomenon, i.e. an *individual* of history and culture, had been recognized by the researchers (and, following them, by the whole cultural community), knowingly or subconsciously, as a *standard*, or at least as a *model*; and so *the single historical* (cultural and contextual) formation had gained overall ontological priority among the other formations, and so had endowed with perfection and had taken if not the position of "Logic in the flesh", the Absolute embodied, but at least of its plenipotentiary. "Listen not to Me, but to the Word of Mine ..."

Is it because of this the philosophy of Croce didn't attract any attention from the specialists in the history of philosophy for a long time, and not only in Russia (for it is quite clear why), but also in the West? In courses and dictionaries, Croce, if mentioned, was usually characterized as an out-of-date Hegelian, who had taken some contribution into aesthetics,

and also as a popularizer of liberal political ideas. Thus he looked like a typical European intellectual “from the province”, though well-educated.

To my mind, such a characteristic of Croce was determined, first of all, by the specific development of the Central European philosophical thought, and particularly by the German one. By now it's a commonplace that the Hegel's philosophy was a compromise, and that it's claims for an “absolute” character, that Hegel's concept of the Absolute Spirit “lifts”, dissolves the contradiction of two universal elements, namely material and ideal, – is nothing more than simply claims; for in Hegel's system the “metaphysical” component is still preserved: his Absolute still remains a Spirit, even though nature, declared to be an “other-being (*das Anderssein*) of the Spirit”, thus gains signs of spirituality! The struggle against Hegelianism as against the “recurrence of obsolete metaphysics” for a long time was the aim which united nearly all German philosophers “after Hegel”, even when they criticized each other. But they, though hesitatingly and with major reservations, had finally accepted, that there was a rational particle in Hegelianism – namely *the method*, but *not the philosophical program, focused on the escape from dualisms*. In addition the Hegel's philosophy was “official”, for it was taught in state universities under the state control. That's why the appraisal of this or that *philosophical system* as “Hegelian” first looked like a stain, and firstly meant a direct accusation of its *reactionary character*. And is it the very reason the Central European philosophy has experienced a period of a radical positivist denial of all previous philosophy as “metaphysics”, after which followed a stage of deliverance from the excessive positivism – in empirical criticism and other epistemological conceptions, in neo-Kantian methodology, in the “Philosophy of Life” and, later, in Husserl's phenomenology, existentialism and structuralism? And later, in the course of the development of these conceptions, now re-oriented towards the escape from such Positivist excesses, ontological problems gradually reappeared – now free from the “dualisms” of Classical philosophy: it was Husserl who made his famous turn towards the philosophy of the “living world”; in Heidegger's “fundamental ontology” language becomes “a home of being”; in structuralism, groundlessness of substantialism's opposition of the material and ideal had been shown, though, for a start, with reference to language. And, finalizing this historical process, the concept of discourse in Foucault's philosophy, and Deleuze's “Logic of Sense” both turn out to be worldviews, in which not only the opposition of material and ideal in the human world (i.e. the world of culture) is denounced, but also the opposition of ontology and epistemology!?

Little by little the “kindred” of these worldviews with a Hegelian philosophy gradually becomes recognized both by philosophers and historians of philosophy. That’s why, just as at the end of 19th – beginning of 20th century in European philosophy Kant had been “resurrected”, resurrected not only as a discoverer of a specific “subjective world” (i.e. “transcendental” world as an opposition to “transcendent”), but also as the one who had proclaimed its ontological priority, in the same way at the very end of 20th century in France and Germany Hegel has “arisen” and has become “modern philosopher”.

Italian philosophy, which nowadays also includes powerful current of phenomenology, didn’t follow that multi-step, roundabout way. It didn’t follow because in the time of B. Croce the “metaphysical component” of Hegelianism was not, to philosophers’ sight, so suspect (or even awful) to make a new attempt to create *absolute* picture of the world impossible *a priori*. As a result, *logical continuity*, once *broken* (and, one could say, *broken wittingly!*) in the history of philosophical thought in the central and northern parts of Europe (we can remember here the “radical overturn”, which Feuerbach and Marx perceived in their teachings, as well as Kierkegaard’s and Schopenhauer’s seizure of Hegelianism), appeared to be *preserved* in Italy, and Croce’s works demonstrate it well. Or, to put it more gingerly, it was more easy to *repair* this link here, for Croce himself was familiar with the course of the “struggle of ideas” in Germany in the second half of 19th century, and so he took it into consideration in a certain degree, even if he didn’t treat as valuable ideas of those who tried to do all their best in order to get rid of any “metaphysics”. However, Croce’s attitude to Hegel’s philosophy was also critical. But for German philosophers of the second half of the 19th century criticism of classical philosophical systems of the past was, first of all, an *instrument* for tearing this past away; and for Croce, on the contrary, it became a form of “soft”, and even *friendly dialogue* between the past and the present; a dialogue free of serious troubles, taking place in a *continuous “space”* of the logical development of philosophical thought – and it corresponded to the *continual historical time of the development of Italian philosophy*. Moreover, it was to a great extent because of this – Crocean! – dialogue, historical time of the development of philosophy *did become continuous*, while for German thinkers and, subsequently, for the historians of German philosophy, it was *discontinuous*!

That’s why, particularly, the dialogue which Croce carried on with his philosophical past is not a dialogue with Hegel only, although he declared himself his continuer. It was also a dialogue with Schelling, and also with

Fichte, Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard; and (perhaps, first of all) with “Historical School” principal concepts of which were, as Croce believed, founded by Vico, not by Dilthey! All these thinkers now live in harmony in a *continuous common space of discourse*. In Croce’s works it doesn’t look strange – instead of the fact that relationships of these thinkers were far from being friendly not only in the field of revolutionary post-Hegelian philosophy (which, it seems, engaged itself mainly in struggle with its own past and with internecine fights, resulted in numerous “epistemological obstacles”, partitioning off the whole space of its own discourse), but, according to their biographers, in a “real” past either. It is the fact, that Shelling and Hegel had no special sympathy of each other, Kierkegaard mocked at Hegel’s adherence to a “system”, and Schopenhauer once had called Hegel Caliban!

So how could Croce bring them together around a *table d’hôte*? And, trying to find an answer, we find out the same *historical* factor, discover the same thing we can call Croce’s invention, his novelty in philosophy. Organizing of such a “round table” was Croce’s *personal merit*. Such a discourse has become possible due to Croce’s concept of *aesthetics*, which he treated as *the first moment of theoretical Spirit’s activity*. It is important here not to fail to take into consideration the fact, that Crocean sense of this term, “aesthetics”, doesn’t concur with what it’s usually meant by specialists in this discipline. *Aesthetics*, according to Croce, is a *basic philosophical concept*, which agrees closely with its Kantian interpretation (and also with the etymology of the word, which would be very important from the point of view of the structuralism). But, there are important, key points in this interpretation that differ from those of Kant. *Aesthetical* means here, first of all, “expressive” or even “adjusted”. For Kant, synthesis a priori is a forming activity routine of the *transcendental subject*, but, according to Croce, this synthesis is a *creative act of many-sided human spirit*. And, at the same time, it is also its result, existence of which is inseparable from a creative act, even *after* it took place. However, by and large, saying anything of this kind about expression as form of human spiritual activity is hardly correct. At any rate, it is not more correct than the statement that, according to Hegel’s treatment, phenomenon, once “engendered” by essence, continues to exist autonomously; and so, the relationship between essence and phenomenon can be compared to that of the cuckoo and its nestling: once laid it’s egg to other bird’s nest, and all the rest is not his business! That the relationship of essence and phenomenon in aesthetics is not of this kind can be easily demonstrated by the example of any work of art: the artist’s painting beyond the world

of culture, considered as a part of the "material Universe" (for instance, a thing which requires space on the picture-gallery's wall) is not *a work of art* – it's *a part of nature, a product natural factors' activity*. According to this view, its creation is not a creative act of a human being, i.e. an ideal act, but a case of the "material and energy process transformation of natural substance", a result of natural powers' play.

For Croce, after this accent changing, became in sight a prospect, at first, to deliver Hegelian picture of world both from "meta-physics" (for there's no opposition of "physics" and "metaphysics") and from its coldness and senseless, so reproached by Kierkegaard; and to find in it a place not only for sense and reason, but also for *will* (as Schopenhauer and "Philosophy of Life" put it). Secondly, Croce transformed the matter of meaning of *history* itself, meaning of historical process in Hegel's sight. *Freedom* became its essential characteristic; and meant not as "deliberate necessity", when the direction of human activity is determined by the cruel power of historical law. According to Croce, *real history dislikes necessity* – meaning under "necessity" an irresistible "rational" motion by the high road of human life. It knows passion and creativity, historical faults and windfalls, performances, ups and downs, unity and variety; sometimes mighty people's will, sometimes its weakness. That's why the science of history should also appreciate historical merits and faults made by people and political parties, and the distinctive characteristic of historical human existence is not only *freedom*, but also *responsibility*, its persistent companion. It means that the final product of *the theory of history* is not a "straightened" chronology, but a set of events concerned with a "essential basis". The result of historian's work, in the long run, should be *a conceptual idea of human activity, human work and practice*.

Hence it's clear why, for Croce, the true place of historical discipline lies between art and philosophy. The thesis that history as a science is originated in Hegel's *philosophy of history* was a commonplace in Croce's time, and also for those who didn't turn themselves to the "phenomenology of historical consciousness" in the time when historical school came into being. But, even there, Croce found his own standpoint, *analyzing the main questions concerning the subject of historical science just in his "Aesthetics"*, and at the same time adverting to G. Vico, who lived two centuries before and who was known not at all by his researches in aesthetics. And now, in his main work, "Origins of the New Science Concerning the Nature of Nations" Croce finds something like a "total philosophy of Spirit", which is also valid for both history and "empirical social science". It seems that in forming of Croce's philosophical concept

Vico played the same part as Kant did in forming of neo-Kantian epistemology. Specialist in the history of philosophy, who got accustomed to hold literal contents of original texts, would perhaps found Crocean interpretation of Vico too free or even simply incorrect. But Croce is a *self-dependent*, creative philosopher! To tell more, if one accepts his concept of history and applies it to the history of philosophy, he would find out that his interpretation of Vico is also a moment of life of the philosophical thought. Croce didn't try to systematize or to schematize Vico's philosophy by selecting quotations as fiducial points of *his own* reconstruction of *his* philosophy: but he, solving his own problems, adverted to Vico's texts; he construed his theses "in a course of business"; and he uses quotations from his texts as "nuclei of center" for his own ideas. Here we see, perhaps, the most important characteristic of the *history* of philosophy and the *history* of culture in general.

And the last thing. On the grounds of all above saying we may draw a conclusion that the philosophical thought in Italy developed in another way than German philosophy did. Because of specific historical conditions it passed through the shorter way from the last classical ontology, Hegel's "absolute idealism", – towards modern, "non-classical" ontologies; it was not the way German and other European philosophies developed, and it's *just a historical fact!*

But this historical fact is another argument in favour of my opinion that *history* in general (and history of culture in particular) doesn't imply "the only right way", which every nation, every culture should pass sooner or later. Moreover, it is hardly correct to consider differences in different cultures' development from the point of view of their proximity to above said ideal way, as different stages of approximation. In that case, can any single country, or culture, claim to *an absolute and objective cultural leadership* and so to serve an example for imitation for other cultures, treated therefore as less progressive ones? In our case, can we contend that the historical development of Italian philosophical thought has finally turned out to be closer to the "true" way of the development of philosophy, when Logical means Ontological, and history appears to be realization of Logic?

It's difficult for me to agree with such a thesis, if ever it is settled in a less radical form. The reason is that the most "simple" the most "direct" and so, from later generations of philosophers' point of view, the most "natural" way of cultural development (as well as the development of arts and philosophy, of science and, possibly, all other fields of human activity) is not the most productive. It is not difficult to show that, for example,

progress in such an applied science as “earthly” technical mechanics would be absolutely impossible if this development would have begun directly from the generalization of practical experience, but not from the *heavenly* mechanics, which principles had been formulated under the great influence of Platonism and Pythagoreans, i.e. under the influence of *metaphysical* systems, which basic principles theoretical mechanics later rejected. From the other side, what would be the fortune of geometry if it would have still followed the principles of Euclid’s plane geometry? And, at last, what would be with all the idea wealth which Husserl’s heritage contains, if he would have begun his way to philosophy from formulating the concept of “living world”? Certainly there were some research programs in philosophy which developed according to what is called “problem’s own logic”. But even so, the transition from one of such programs to another, in the context of the same problem, doesn’t generally follow the logic of the “basic” program. These transitions are like crossroads, and here we may rather call about some *transients*, when *mutations of rational thought* occur. Some of them (and sometimes a number of them) result in a rise of new cultural worlds, including philosophical concepts, and history keeps names of those with whom these mutations are associated.

*Moscow State University*

*Department of the History of Foreign Philosophy*

THE FORMAL THEORY OF EVERYTHING:  
EXPLORATION OF HUSSERL'S THEORY  
OF MANIFOLDS

“Kant verstehen, heißt über ihn hinausgehen.”

Wilhelm Windelband<sup>1</sup>

1. Opening

Husserl's theory of manifolds was developed for the first time in a very short form in the *Prolegomena* to his *Logical Investigations*, §§ 69–70 (pp. 248–53), then repeatedly discussed in *Ideas I*, §§ 71–2 (pp. 148–53), in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, §§ 51–4 (pp. 142–54) and finally in the *Crisis*, § 9 (pp. 20–60). Husserl never lost sight of it: it was his *idée fixe*. He discussed this theme over forty years, expressing the same, in principle, ideas on it in different terms and versions. His discussions of it, however, were always cut short and inconclusive, so that he never developed his theory of manifolds in detail. Apparently, the reason for this was that he had not a clear idea about it; “it seems to serve [only] as a regulative ideal for future philosophical-mathematical work” (Smith 2002, p. 106).

Not only did Husserl himself fail to conclusively elaborate his theory of manifolds; it also remained a neglected theme in Husserl's studies. Only recently has it been discussed in a number of essays (see Scanlon 1991, Hill 2000, Smith 2002, Gauthier 2004). This can be partially explained with the fact that Husserl's most instructive writings on this theme were only recently published. Here I mean *Logik und allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie*, Chapter 2, first published in 1996, and *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie*, §§ 18–19, available since 1984.

Our task in this paper will be to fill this gap in Husserl studies. The importance of this task results from the fact that the theory of manifolds plays a central role in Husserl's phenomenology. In fact, phenomenology and theory of manifolds are two alternative branches of a single discipline: the science of essences (*Wesenslehre*). The difference between them is that while phenomenology is the content science of essences, the theory of



manifolds is the formal one (see Husserl 1913, pp. 149 f.). A consequence of this divergence is that whereas phenomenology is descriptive, the theory of manifolds is not. As we are going to see in the lines to come, the latter supplies primitive law-essences (*Wesensgesetze*), like axioms, and is therefore deductive.

The main claim in this essay is that Husserl's theory of manifolds is twofold. It is (1) a theory of theories, advanced in the good German tradition of *Wissenschaftslehre*, launched first by Fichte and Bernard Bolzano. The latter, in turn, is an offspring of the ancient tradition of *mathesis universalis*, explored in the modernity by Descartes and Leibniz. Further, (2) the theory of manifolds is also a formal theory of everything. Its objective is to provide a systematic account of how the things in the world (its parts) hang together in wholes of quite different kind. It is to be noted that Husserl explicitly speaks about (1) and only implicitly about (2). In this paper we shall also show that the theory of everything is intrinsically connected with the theory of theories.

We shall accomplish the tasks we took on in this investigation in two steps. The first step, made in Part One, will be to find out what Husserl's theory of manifolds is. In Part Two we shall try to develop this theory further, following its authentic spirit. In this sense we shall paraphrase the words of Wilhelm Windelband articulated in the motto to this essay thus: "To understand Husserl means to go beyond him."

## I

### 2. *Levels of Husserl's Logic*

(a) *Three Kinds of Logical Atoms*. Husserl's logic claims that there are three kinds of logical atoms: *expression*, *meaning* and *object*. Logic analyses not only forms of expression (sentences) but also forms of meaning (propositions and thoughts) and forms of objects (states of affairs). The basic forms of meaning are: concepts, propositions, truths, connectives, etc.; the basic forms of objects are: object, state of affairs, unity, plurality, number, relation, connection, etc.

(b) *Pure and Transcendental Logic*. Husserl's logic has two sides: (i) It turns towards what is subjective; (ii) it turns towards the objective order of the ideal objects (concepts) including. (i) is developed by the transcendental logic; (ii) by what he called *pure logic*. Husserl insisted that (ii) has primacy over (i). What pertains to the purely logical is something

ideal and has nothing to do with the subjects. Nevertheless, (ii) finds by him a necessary completion in (i).

(c) *Three Levels of Logic*. Husserl accepts that there are three levels (*Stufen*) of pure logic:

- Traditional Aristotelian apophantic logic of truth.
- The logic of second level deals with objects of indeterminate, general kind. We find here the theory of cardinal numbers, the theory of ordinals, set theory, etc. This logic treats “forms of judgments, and forms of their constituents, forms of deduction, forms of demonstration, sets and relationships between sets, combinations, orders, quantities, objects in general, etc.” (Hill 2000a, p. 168).
- Abstracting further, we reach a third level of logic, the level of the *theory of possible theories*, or the science of theory-forms. “This is a science which tracks down and investigates the legitimate relations between the essential types of possible theories (or realms). All real theories are particularization of relevant theory-forms” (Husserl 1900, p. 251).

The theory of theories is a completely new discipline. It is such in both a historical sense, in the sense that nobody spoke about it before Husserl, as well as in a theoretical sense, in the sense that it is a new level of logic. Indeed, whereas on the second level we deal with forms of propositions, forms of demonstrations, etc., on this level logic deals with forms of systems of propositions.

This is the level of pure forms in which we can modify the shape of the real theoretical systems *ad libitum*. This means that we can construct an infinite number of forms of possible disciplines. “Any individual theory is a particular instance of the theory form corresponding to it” (Hill 2000a, p. 170).

(d) *Apophantic Logic and Formal Ontology*. Pure logic can be also considered as consisting of just two layers. The lower level, the level of apophantic logic, investigates what can be said *a priori*. Its main categories are the proposition (predication) and the state of affairs. It is a logic of truth; it deals with forms of propositions and states of affairs.

The higher level of logic treats absolutely determined formal object-structures: sets, numbers, quantity, ordinals, multitudes, etc. (Husserl 1906/7, p. 78). This layer of logic is called *formal ontology*; it is a *a priori* science of objects as such.

What is the relation between apophantic logic and formal ontology? On the one side, Husserl’s formal logic depends on formal ontology. In

the same time, however, formal ontology follows the laws of apophantic logic. The point is that formal ontology follows principles which are those of apophantic logic. Indeed, “we cannot think without thinking” (p. 94). This is the case since the stem of the pure logic is the apophantic logic. It is true that formal ontology is its highest level; nevertheless it is based on the stem of pure logic – the apophantic logic (p. 77).

### 3. Husserl's Theory of Forms

(a) *Disciplinal Forms*. Husserl claimed further that different realms of investigation define different forms: physical form, mathematical form, logical form, ontological form, phenomenological form. “A rich ontology, then, will distinguish different types of form: in the domains of linguistic, conceptual, and mathematical, as well as physical and mental entities” (Smith 2002, p. 104). In his *Logical Investigations* Husserl studied all these different forms. This means that the book examines rather different disciplines: pure logic, speech act theory (act, sense, reference), ontology (universals, parts/whole, ideal meanings), phenomenology (intentionality, structure of consciousness), epistemology (evidence, intuition).

(b) *Objectival Forms*. Different objects of cognition have also different forms. In this sense Husserl discriminated between:

- propositional form;
- forms of states of affairs;
- number forms (*Zahlenformen*);
- form of entailment (*Schlusselldform*);
- categorical form;
- axiomatic form;
- theory form;
- disciplinal form;
- manifold form.

(c) *Pure Forms*. Husserl, however, did not only study these disciplinal and objectival forms. He also investigated the pure form. In particular, Husserl's idea of a pure form was a product of his efforts to abstract the ideal forms in mathematics, logic, ontology and phenomenology.<sup>2</sup> It is to be investigated by the discipline *mathesis universalis*. This is “a philosophical theory of the types of form that shape or situate entities of various types or categories” (p. 105). As we are going to see in the next section, Husserl connected it with his theory of manifolds.

#### 4. *The Idea of Husserl's Theory of Manifolds*

Husserl used to call his theory of theories also a theory of manifolds. Some authors define his manifolds as “pure forms of possible theories which, like moulds, remain totally undetermined as to their content, but to which the thought must necessarily conform in order to be thought and known in a theoretical manner” (Hill 2000a, p. 169).

Husserl started to examine the manifolds at the beginning of the 1890s. In his first works “On the Concept of Number” (1887) and *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891), however, he rarely employed the term “manifold”. Instead, he spoke about “quantity”, “plurality”, “totality”, “aggregate”, “collection”, “set”, “multiplicity [*Menge*]”.

Now, multiplicity (*Menge*) was the concept Georg Cantor used to denote what we today call “set”. In this connection it is instructive to remind the reader that at the time Husserl taught at the same German University (at Halle a.d. Saale) in which Cantor was a professor. More than this: Cantor was a member of the committee that approved Husserl's Habilitation Dissertation “On the Concept of Number” in 1887. In the same time we must point to the fact that except for their Platonism, Husserl's manifolds differ significantly from Cantor's multiplicity; the latter pertains to the second level of Husserl's logic (as described in § 2, (c)), whereas the former to the third level.

But what exactly did the term *manifolds* mean? Husserl was explicit that he borrowed his concept of manifolds from the him contemporary geometry; in particular, from the  $n$ -dimensional manifolds as set up in the works of H. Grassmann, W. R. Hamilton, Sophus Lie and Georg Cantor (Husserl 1900, p. 252). In this sense he called the theory of manifolds “a fine flower of modern mathematics” (p. 250). This means that this new discipline, the theory of manifolds, was not only Husserl's vision. It turn reality in the last years of the nineteenth-century mathematics. Husserl's dream was to extrapolate this discipline to the whole categorical realm of human knowledge.

This claim of Husserl was interpreted in three different ways. (a) His manifolds were seen as being close to Riemann's theory of varieties. (b) Most often Husserl's concept of manifold was explained referring to the manifold of three dimensions in Euclidean geometry. By the way, this interpretation can be straightforwardly supported with citations from Husserl 1917/18, p. 265. (c) Yvon Gauthier, by contrast, believes that on this point Husserl followed the general theory of forms or polynomials of Leopold Kroneker's work *Foundations of an Arithmetical Theory of Algebraic Quantities* (see Gauthier 2004, p. 122).

Despite this dissension in interpretation, we can easily outline unambiguous examples of the manifolds. One such an example: The conventional mathematician speaks of space. Instead, we can simply accept that space is the just mentioned Euclidean manifold of three dimensions, so that every object in space is subject to the laws of this particular manifold (Husserl 1917/18, p. 265). In this way we avoid to talk in terms of space altogether. We speak of axiomatic forms instead, from which we can make inferences as to particular objects. Every object of such a manifold is subject to the laws of the manifold. At a next level of abstraction, we do not speak even of three dimensions but of  $n$  dimensions instead which have different particular manifolds. Not only do we not speak of space; we do not speak even of geometry (p. 267).

In the light of the analysis made so far, it turns out that in the theory of manifolds the numbers are only number forms (*Zahlenformen*). Further, what is conventionally called arithmetic and algebra turns out to be nothing but hypothetical theories of particular manifolds (p. 271). The signs 0, 1, etc., as well as  $+$ ,  $\times$ ,  $=$ , were introduced in them only in order to make evident particular formal analogies.

It is time now to say something more about the pure manifolds. Husserl defines them as “endlessly opened sets of thought-of objectnesses [*Gegenständlichkeit*] which are defined through axiomatic forms” (p. 274). This means that the objects in a pure manifold are absolutely undetermined.<sup>3</sup> Further, Husserl calls mathematical manifolds *definite manifolds* (Husserl 1913, p. 152).<sup>4</sup> These are systems of axioms, defined in purely analytic way, and so are completely and unambiguously determined – there are no places for contingencies in them.

Let us now chart the scheme of different types of manifolds in Husserl’s theory of manifolds:

- Euclidean manifolds;
- other particular manifolds;
- pure manifolds;
- definite (mathematical) manifolds.

### 5. *The Essence of Husserl’s Theory of Manifolds*

In an earlier exposition of his logic (from 1906/07), Husserl defined the theory of manifolds as the third, higher level of logic.<sup>5</sup> Later it was also called axiomatic mathematics. However – and we already have mentioned this – Husserl’s theory of manifolds was also called *mathesis universalis*.

Conventionally, mathematics is understood as treating numbers and magnitudes. Instead, Husserl's *mathesis universalis* claims that "what is important in mathematics is to be found out not in its objects, but in the type of its method" (Husserl 1906/07, p. 80). Pure mathematics produces "calculation truths", of any kind. In geometry, for example, we calculate with constructions (*Gebilden*). But "we can [also] calculate with concepts and propositions, exactly as with lines, powers or surfaces" (p. 81).

In other words, instead of numbers, powers, energies, light-beams, Husserl claims that it is better to think of letters and of rules of calculating. If we accept this, then the problems in mathematics will be resolved in the higher possible completeness and generality. (Actually, we can consider the numbers, letters, etc. only as chips (*Spielmarken*) with the help of which we play the game of calculating.) In this way we shall forget that we have to compute with numbers. What matters here is the "tissue of entailments" (*Gewebe von Schlüssen*).

This is the realm of pure logic which can be also called super-mathematics (*Übermathematik*),<sup>6</sup> or mathematics of higher degree. It can be seen as nothing but an interconnection (*Verkettung*) of entailments. As just mentioned, this is not a mathematics of numbers or magnitudes. Rather, it is a "mathematics" (logic) of an indefinitely general realm of thinking. The only thing that is determined in it is the form. Contemporary mathematics calls such undefined realms *manifolds*; the particular theoretical systems in mathematics are its consequences.

We can construct manifolds through contingent definitions, after which we can mathematically deduce theoretical systems which follow from them. Such a construction is a product of the creative mathematical imagination (pp. 86–7).

A pure manifold is a class of objects; it is a construction of purely logical concept of possible objectnesses (*Gegenständlichkeiten*). The latter can be characterized through the forms of propositions which are valid for it. Actually, this is not a manifold of objects but of things which are thought of as objects. To put it in other words: A pure manifold consists of objects-senses, or of substrata-senses which are suitable to function in a system of judgments as substrata of predications (Husserl 1929, p. 148) Or: In the theory of manifolds we operate with pure logical, principal concepts (*Grundbegriffe*).

These characteristics of the theory of manifolds allow some authors to call it "a formal theory of everything" and to see it as nothing but "a philosophical theory of the types of form that shape or situate entities of various types or categories" (Smith 2002, p. 105).

### 6. *Additional Notes on Husserl's Theory of Theories. Disciplinary Form*

Husserl's theory of theories is part of his more comprehensive philosophy of science. The latter distinguishes between normative and practical disciplines, on the one hand, and theoretical sciences, on the other. Theoretical sciences are nomological disciplines and are analytical. They are the *formal mathesis*. As already noted in § 3, Husserl's declared aim is to advance "a new and higher form of formal mathesis – a science of the possible forms of theories – *mathesis universalis*" (Husserl 1917/18, p. 257). Husserl's *mathesis universalis* addresses the disciplinary form (another name for theory-form). Its aim is to gain a general concept of many formal, mutually independent axioms (p. 272).

We can analyze this way many existing theories, for example, we can look for the pure form of the Euclidean geometry, in particular, for the proofs in it. The result of such kind of analysis is a number of axioms from which the whole theory can be deduced.<sup>7</sup> (In the real Euclidean geometry not all axioms are made explicit.)

There are different possible relations between disciplinary forms. Usually, several theoretical disciplines have one group of axioms as a form. In other situations, a disciplinary form can be a part of another disciplinary form. Another case: the system of axioms of one disciplinary form can be a formal restriction of another one. Etc. (pp. 262–3).

A disciplinary form can be widened up. We can explore different ways of its expansion. We can also modify its axioms. In both cases we simply play with the forms of the possible theories (with the disciplinary forms). The only condition by these experiments is not to change the system of this particular discipline. At the end, we contemplate the infinity of possible disciplinary forms in one vision (p. 268). We, more precisely, try to see the regularities which rule in the contexts and modifications (*Zusammenhänge und Abwandlungen*) of the system. The further our theoretical illumination reaches, the more perfect our deductive work in this particular theory is. Indeed, with the enlargement of the disciplinary form grows the power of the mathematical (high logical) thinking.

When an expert confronts such a possible theory, she can assess its applicability in her discipline. In other words: Husserl's new science constructs *a priori* forms of possible theories and possible sentences, and these theory-forms can be used when actual theoretical contents are discussed (Husserl 1906/07, p. 89). Here are meant, however, only the deductive disciplines. We can thus define Husserl's *mathesis universalis* as a science about the possible forms of the deductive disciplines.

### 7. *The Connection Between the Theory of Manifolds and the Theory of Theories*

The connection between the pure theory of manifolds and the theory of possible theories is that the first determines the second and this in such a way that Husserl considered them identical. The reason for this is that Husserl saw the manifold of a given deductive theory as the ontological form of the highly complex state of affairs presented by it (Smith 2002, p. 110). As a matter of fact, the formal structure of any elementary state of affairs [*Rab*] can be seen as a simple type of manifold in Husserl's sense (p. 115). On the other hand, any manifold can be seen as the form of a possible world.

This all means that Husserl's theory of manifolds, or his theory of everything, is nothing but formal ontology. This interpretation can be supported with Husserl's definition of the manifolds as "compossible totalities of objects in general" (Husserl 1936, § 9 (f), p. 45). It also conforms Husserl's claim, discussed in § 2, (d), that formal ontology is the higher level of logic.

In order to make this conception more convincing, Husserl's formal ontology posits complex forms of states of affairs which mirror the logical connectives and quantifiers. Husserl claims further that there are conjunctive, disjunctive, negative and hypothetical states of affairs.<sup>8</sup> He, for example, recognizes connectional states of affairs like [*Rab & Qcd*]. "This exceedingly complex state of affairs is, as it were, the "world" of the theory *T*, or rather that part of the actual world characterized by *T*"<sup>9</sup> (Smith 2002, p. 118).

## II

In Part Two of this essay we shall advance our own conception of the theory of manifolds which goes, in many points, beyond Husserl's conception, despite the fact that we follow in this effort its true spirit. We shall make this in concert with the motto of this paper as paraphrased at the end of § 1.

### 8. *Husserl's Project and His Contemporaries*

Different aspects of Husserl's theory of manifolds were developed by some contemporary philosophers, in the first place, by Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. We shall pass them in review here with the hope



that this will help us to discover new perspectives in Husserl's theory of manifolds. We shall see, at that, that while Russell developed something like a Husserlian theory of theories, Wittgenstein advanced a theory of manifolds which *prima facie* was quite different from that of Husserl. In truth, however, it disclosed important new aspects of it.

(a) *Husserl and Russell*. In his book *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914) Russell developed – independently from Husserl – the idea of theory of theories in most clear form. In particular, he connected the theory of theories with the new symbolic logic. The latter “suggest[s to science] fruitful hypotheses which otherwise could hardly be thought of” (Russell 1914, p. 51). Scientists must decide later which theory fits the facts they now know and which do not fit them.

This makes out the difference between the new and the old logic. Whereas the old logic is normative, the new (symbolic) logic is liberal: it assumes that there are many possible solutions to the problem under consideration. Its task is not to criticize such solutions but, quite the reverse, to promote them. It has the effect of “providing an infinite number of possible hypotheses to be applied in the analysis of any complex fact” (p. 68). In more concrete terms, Russell claimed that the new scientific philosophy, enriched by the ideas of the new symbolic logic, can supply to physics new hypotheses. Later we can choose the hypothesis which is most appropriate to the empirical data now available.

In this way (symbolic) logic supplies the method of research in philosophy. At the centre of this conception lie two claims of Russell: (i) The proper subject of philosophy is philosophical logic. (ii) The philosophical logician advances hypotheses build up on the analogy of symbolic logic in regions of science which are still not susceptible to systematic scientific analysis. This is a true marriage between philosophy and science.

The difference between Husserl and Russell on this point was that while Russell believed that the theory of theories is suggested by the new symbolic (mathematical) logic, Husserl claimed that his theory of manifolds was a result (“a flower”) of mathematics. That difference, however, is scarcely a big one since to Russell logic is so good as identical with “pure” mathematics: the former is the essence of the latter.

(b) *Husserl and Wittgenstein*. The concept of manifold (multiplicity) played a central role also in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. At least *prima facie*, however, Wittgenstein used this concept in quite different sense from that of Husserl. In particular, he claimed that in a proposition there are exactly as many distinguishable parts as in the situation it represents. To Wittgenstein this means that they have the same logical (mathematical)

manifold. The very picturing of reality is possible only because of this common manifold.

Wittgenstein was convinced that this way of connecting matter and mind (language) is much more promising than the old idealistic conception of “spatial spectacles”: he termed so (in Wittgenstein 1922, 4.0412) Kant’s claim that we see the matter through the “spectacles” of our aesthetic intuition. Wittgenstein set out that the two elements, fact and proposition, touch one another; this touch is realized through the manifold which is common to the two formations; it is something of an intersection of these two. It is the element on which the two quasi “hinge” (see Milkov 2001a, p. 408). Wittgenstein saw the manifold – the common element between matter and mind (language) – as an *indefinable*.<sup>10</sup> Being a such, it, “of course, cannot itself be the subject of depiction. One cannot get away from it when depicting” (Wittgenstein 1922, 4.041). We can only show it.

In his works between 1929 and 1933 Wittgenstein continued to use the concept of manifold, with an important addendum, though. Now he connected it with the conception of copying actions. Similarly to pictures, the action we now make, following an exemplary action, has the same manifold as the action which we copy (see Wittgenstein 1979, p. 112).

So far so good. The question now is what is the relatedness, and what is the difference, between Wittgenstein’s conception of manifolds and that of Husserl. In an effort to answer this question we can remind ourselves that Max Black has called the analogy between Husserl’s pure theory of forms and Wittgenstein’s conception of perfect, perspicuous language “striking” (Black 1964, p. 137). What is even more striking, however, is that the two conceptions were based on the idea of manifold. How is this?

This is the case because, as we already have noted in § 7, Husserl’s conception of manifolds can be seen as a kind of formal ontology. In this formal ontology, every state of affairs has its own manifold. The same with the complex states of affairs, including such macro-complexes as those presented in the theories of science. Further, states of affairs, of all kinds, can be seen as possible worlds. This is exactly how the things were conceived in the formal ontology of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*.

In another place (Milkov 2001a) we have reconstructed Wittgenstein’s Tractarian ontology as claiming that states of affairs are combinative compositions out of many aspects (forms) of objects and of states of affairs. In the world of pure possibility, there are many such compositions: in Husserl’s idiom, we can interpret the forms of states of affairs (the manifolds) as “compossible totalities” out of forms of objects (pp. 405 f.). Further, exactly like in Husserl’s formal ontology, the scientific theories

in the Tractarian ontology state possible worlds. The facts of the real world can make these possible worlds true or false.<sup>11</sup>

Finally, Husserl embraced a “robust *formal realism* holding that these types of form [the pure manifolds] are part of the world. Forms are abstract or ideal entities, along with numbers, universals, concepts, etc.” (Smith 2002, p. 120). This means that forms do not reside in another world but are rather features of particulars in this world – they are something of *universalia in rebus*. The same with Wittgenstein. As David Pears have correctly noticed, the Tractarian ontology is approximately Aristotelian. In it “the forms revealed by logic are embedded in one and only one world of facts” (Pears 1987, i, p. 23).

### 9. Pure Manifolds, Really Pure Forms

In this section we are going to develop a theory of pure manifolds, adding some new elements to Husserl’s theory of manifolds. This is a logic of fourth level advanced in an effort to further develop his scheme of more and more abstract logics as described in § 3, (c).

In particular, we shall eschew Husserl’s claim that pure forms are only of mathematical or formal-logical type. In contrast, we shall accept that they can be of quite different types. The difference with Husserl’s pure forms is that our pure forms are not analytic *a priori* but synthetic *a priori*. We can call them *really pure forms*, and the discipline that investigates them *theory of pure manifolds*.

Such really pure forms present (express) all courses of values (their ups and downs) of the elements in this particular manifold of elements. They exhibit an order of development, of priority and dependence, etc. The elements themselves can be of quite different kind: they are not only mathematical ones but also colours, shapes, etc., and further: pieces of music, types of animals, etc.<sup>12</sup> The manifolds of such systems supply coordinate system for discriminating of their elements.

The task of this variant of the theory of manifolds is to describe something of a conceptual scheme,<sup>13</sup> with this important addition that it is not really a scheme of *concepts*, i.e. it is not “conceptual” proper. It is merely an ontological-logical scheme of objects; or merely of object-like formations (called by Husserl *objectnesses*). It is similar to a conceptual scheme in that it lays down the epistemological and logical conditions of thinking and perceiving in its terms. Every item of a scheme of this kind has a unique place on the cognitive map set out with its help. This means that such an item is identifiable as an unique thing in it.

In the lines bellow we shall give two examples of our theory of pure manifolds.

(a) *Logical Chromathology (Logic of Colours)*. Programmatic for developing such a theory of pure manifolds are Wittgenstein's *Remarks on Colour* (Wittgenstein 1977). In a word, they advance a systematic study of the colour circle. Such a study is worth doing since the relations between colours constitute a system which makes possible all discourses about them. The listing of the relations between the colours describes the manifolds of colours. Its family resemblance with the mathematical manifolds explains why Wittgenstein has called the discipline that he was engaged with in *Remarks on Colour* "geometry of colour", or "mathematics of colour". Indeed, colours have their manifold, exactly like mathematical objects, or the objects of geometry have their manifolds. The task of the mathematics of colour is not to "record anything that lies in the unknown nature of colour, nor do they record phenomenological laws, but rather they state or describe the structural relations within the system of colour conceptions that is defined by means of the colour circle" (McGinn 1991, p. 444).

The trouble here arises from our tendency to think of colour in terms of two-dimensional, monochrome patches of determinate colour. From here we make the conclusion that there must be a single, absolutely precise chromatic description of the world. This, however, is an illusion. In fact, the objects have a variety of textures and different degree of transparency, opacity and cloudiness. Our colour concepts interrelate with concepts like transparency and reflection, which require the notion of three-dimensionality or depth. Besides, the colour of an object is affected by its surroundings.

(b) *Logical Biology*. It (described e.g. in Milkov 2002) studies the forms of animals and other biological objects, both as species and as individuals. In particular, it "pass transformations of animal shapes in review" and describes them (Wittgenstein 1956, III, § 13)

This is a formal, strict and *a priori*, descriptive discipline.<sup>14</sup> Its possibility is based on the fact that biological individuals can be seen as mosaic of forms which actually makes out their manifold. Not only this. Every individual biological specie has its idiosyncratic manifold.

The study of biological manifolds is made through a comparison of different forms of biological individuals (in the same way in which we compare different colours), tracking down different analogies between them. An illuminating example of this method is given by Wittgenstein: "But might it not be that plants had been described in full detail, and

then for the first time someone realized the analogies in their structure, analogies which had never been seen before? And so that he establishes a new order among the descriptions” (Wittgenstein 1980, § 950). Wittgenstein apparently hoped that this kind of analysis will help us to chart the manifold(s) of plants in a new way.

We can call the theory of really pure forms (or the theory of pure manifolds) a theory of natural forms, which is to be distinguished from the theory of natural kinds of Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam. We call them “natural forms” because they are *a priori*. Here we speak of “natural forms” since these, similar to colours, are given to us and so are synthetic. They are neither invented, nor deduced by us. Rather, they pertain to the world “as we find it”. They are among those *a priori* elements of human knowledge, through the rearrangement of which we receive new knowledge.<sup>15</sup>

We can see the natural forms as shapes. Metaphysics, on this understanding, investigates the transformations of such shapes. This study is a type of morphology; not a morphology of Goethe’s type, however. The later is complementary in the sense that it strives to arrive at new knowledge, to make discoveries. This is not the case with the theory of natural forms which is analytic. Its aim is only to analyze *a priori* forms. Making this, however, it achieves a synthesis – by way of *drawing their map*. Still, it adds nothing to the forms themselves and so is not speculative.

In a sense, this discipline is a successor of the *philosophia teutonica* (the German mainstream philosophy of the 17–19th century) which has as its objective to see something as something, to discover *a* as *b*; it so follows the *principle of concept*. In the same time, however, our theory of pure manifolds is not speculative – and the *philosophia teutonica* was speculative *par excellence* – but analytic. Because of this, we can see it as an intersection point between analytic and continental philosophy.

### 10. Theory of Manifolds in the Humanities

We have already noted that Husserl accepted that his theory of manifolds is valid only in the theoretical disciplines. He claimed that when we try to formulate a pure form in the humanities, we reach “nothing more than the empty general truth that there is an infinite number of propositions connected in objective ways which are compatible with one another in that they do not contradict each other analytically.”<sup>16</sup> (Hill 2002a, p. 171)

Now we shall mention by way of two illustration (no more!) that this is not the case with the theory of pure manifolds.

(a) *Logical Geography*. Its aim is to see new aspects in geographic world; for instance, to see the Appenine peninsula as a boot, or France as a hexagon. These are most elementary examples but the method they illustrate can be quite helpful when we try to orient ourselves in a new geographical environment.

(b) *Logical History*. Similarly, the task of logical history is to make *conceptual shifts*: to discover new correlations between the facts already known – more precisely, between their forms. On the basis of these new logical determinations, we can advance new historical theories.

What is common to logical geography and logical history is that the conceptual shifts they make produce *a priori* models of the posteriori facts in the subject under scrutiny – and exactly these models are cases of manifolds in the humanities. Of course, their cognitive value is not as high as that achieved by systematic scientific pursuit. Nevertheless, they can help to gain new aspects of the geographic, resp. historical facts, which can bring important fruits in this very scientific discourse.

*University of Bielefeld*

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Windelband 1924, i, p. iv.

<sup>2</sup> In the same way in which Cantor claimed that we can obtain the concept of set by abstracting the elements both from properties, as well as from the order in which they are given. On the similarities between Husserl and Cantor see Hill 2000b.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. with Wittgenstein's Tractarian objects which are also absolutely undefined. On Wittgenstein and Husserl see § 8 (b).

<sup>4</sup> See on them Scanlon 1991.

<sup>5</sup> We have already seen, however, that the third level of logic is preserved for the theory of theories. This is not a contradiction since we have previously declared (at the beginning of § 4) that Husserl used to call his theory of theories theory of manifolds. On the connection between theory of theories and theory of manifolds see § 7.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. with the conception of Frege-Wittgenstein for "perfect (ideal) logic".

<sup>7</sup> Here it is clear to see how similar Husserl's theory of manifolds is to Frege's logic. The difference between them is that while Frege analyses arithmetic to logic, Husserl analyses all deductive science to logic.

<sup>8</sup> Which, here is to be remembered, Wittgenstein rejects in the *Tractatus*.

<sup>9</sup> We developed a similar conception in our paper "Tractarian Scaffoldings": In science a formation (a theory) represents another formation (a part of the world) (see Milkov 2001a, p. 407).

<sup>10</sup> “Indefinables” are intuitively knowable simples. (see on them Milkov 2003, p. 95) Some authors have rightly noted that the discovery of the indefinable by Moore and Russell signalled the beginning of analytic philosophy (see Quinn 1977, pp. 209 ff.).

<sup>11</sup> Here we concern the problem of truth-making. On its history see Milkov 2001b.

<sup>12</sup> A similar theory was developed by the so-called “realist” phenomenologists, and above all by Alexander Pfänder, Max Scheler and Adolf Reinach. Cf. Smith, 1996, pp. 186f.

<sup>13</sup> Similar to that set out in Strawson 1959.

<sup>14</sup> This is an important distinction between the conventional (Husserlian) theory of manifolds and our radical theory of manifolds. As already noted, the former is deductive, whereas the latter is descriptive. This difference is a consequence of the fact that while the forms of the conventional theory of manifolds are analytic, the forms of the theory of pure manifolds are synthetic. Otherwise, both are *a priori*.

<sup>15</sup> As if in accordance with Russell’s Theory of Descriptions which discriminates between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. The latter describes the world with pieces (elements) that we know by acquaintance.

<sup>16</sup> Incidentally, this claim of Husserl reminds closely Wittgenstein’s general propositional form which states: “This is how things stand.” (Wittgenstein 1922, 4.5) In contrast to Husserl, however, Wittgenstein didn’t believe that the general propositional form is an “empty truth”. This point of difference between the two philosophers signals their dissent as to are there synthetic *a priori* forms.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Black, Max. *A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971 (1st ed. 1964).
- Gauthier, Yvon. “Husserl and the Theory of Multiplicities ‘*Mannigfaltigkeitslehre*’.” In *Husserl and the Sciences: Selected Perspectives*, Richard Feist (ed.). Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2004.
- Hill, Claire Ortiz. “Husserl’s *Mannigfaltigkeitslehre*.” In Hill and Rosado 2000 [2000a].
- Hill, Claire Ortiz. “Did Georg Cantor Influenced Edmund Husserl?” In Hill and Rosado 2000 [2000b].
- Hill, C. O. and Rosado Haddock, G. E. *Husserl or Frege?: Meaning, Objectivity, and Mathematics*. Chicago and La Salle (Ill.): Open Court, 2000.
- Husserl, Edmund. *Logische Untersuchungen*. vol. 1, *Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*, Hamburg: Meiner, 1992 (1st ed. 1900/01).
- Husserl, Edmund. *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/1907*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1984 (*Husserliana* vol. 24).
- Husserl, Edmund. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phenomenology*. Hamburg: Meiner 1992 (1st ed. 1913).
- Husserl, Edmund. *Logik und allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie. Vorlesungen 1917/1918*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996 (*Husserliana* vol. 30).
- Husserl, Edmund. *Formale und transzendente Logik*. Halle a.d. Salle: Mohr, 1929.
- Husserl, Edmund. *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*, Walter Biemel (Hg.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1954 (1st ed. in *Philosophia* 1, pp. 77–176, Belgrad, 1936).
- McGinn, Marie. “Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Colour.” *Philosophy* 66 (1991): 435–53.

- Milkov, Nikolay. "Tractarian Scaffoldings." *Prima philosophia* 14:4 (2001) [2001a], pp. 399–414.
- Milkov, Nikolay. "Verifikation II." In J. Ritter, K. Gründer und G. Gabriel (Hrsg.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Band 11, Basel: Schwabe & Co., 2001 [2001b].
- Milkov, Nikolay. "The Logical Form of Biological Objects." In *Analecta Husserliana* 77 (2002).
- Milkov, Nikolay. *A Hundred Years of English Philosophy*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.
- Pears, David. *The False Prison*, 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.
- Quinn, Arthur. *The Confidence of British Philosophy*. Leiden: Brill, 1977.
- Russell, Bertrand. *Our Knowledge of the External World*. London: Routledge, 1993 (1st ed. 1914).
- Scanlon, John. "'Tertium non datur:' Husserl's Conception of a Definite Multiplicity," in T. M. Seeböhm et al. (eds.), *Phenomenology and the Formal Sciences*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.
- Smith, Barry. "In Defense of Extreme (Fallibilistic) Apriorism." *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 12 (1996), pp. 179–91.
- Smith, David Woodruff. "Mathematical Form in the World." *Philosophia mathematica*, 3d ser., 10 (2002), pp. 102–29.
- Strawson, Peter. *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*. London: Methuen, 1959.
- Windelband, Wilhelm. *Präludien*, 2 vols., 9th edn. Tübingen: Mohr, 1924 (1st ed. 1884).
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*. London: Routledge, 1922.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik*, G. H. von Wright et al. (eds.). Oxford: Blackwell, 1956.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Remarks on Colour*, G. E. M. Anscombe (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell, 1977.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Wittgenstein's Lectures. Cambridge 1932–35*, Alice Ambrose (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell, 1979.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Bemerkungen über der Philosophie der Psychologie*, vol. 1, G. E. M. Anscombe et al. (eds.). Oxford: Blackwell, 1980.



## ON THE MODE OF EXISTENCE OF THE REAL NUMBERS

### INTRODUCTION

#### *Roman Ingarden's Ontology*

In *The Stanford's Encyclopedia of Philosophy* the entry *Properties* reads: "There are interesting philosophical issues about fictional characters, individuals like Holmes and Pegasus and the bride of Frankenstein, and there may be similarly interesting questions about fictional properties. Aside from Zalta (1983), however, little work has been done on this topic." (Swoyer 2000) As a matter of fact a great deal of work concerning fictional characters was done by a Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden in his 1931 work *Das literarische Kunstwerk*.

Roman Ingarden (1893–1970) was a phenomenologist, ontologist and aesthetician. He was one of the prominent students of Edmund Husserl, and his ontological system developed in *The Controversy over the Existence of the World* belongs to the heritage of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*.

Ingarden's ontology is an ontology of an object. An object, as conceived by Ingarden, is, first of all, something which is a unity of matter (referred to by Ingarden as material endowment), form (formal structure) and existence (mode of existence). As examples of objects in this meaning one may offer: a physical object, a process, an event, a Platonic idea, a property of a thing, a negative state of affairs. Yet, not everything is an object. Non-objects are: matter, form and mode of existence as such. *The Controversy over the Existence of the World* was divided by Ingarden into *Existential Ontology* and *Formal Ontology* in order to deal with existential and formal aspects of objects.

The realm of objects is divided into domains with respect to the mode of existence of objects. And there are four such domains: absolute being (God), real objects (psychical and physical), ideal objects (ideas and individual ideal objects) and (purely) intentional objects (works of art).

Intentional objects were for the first time analysed by Ingarden in *Das literarische Kunstwerk*. In this work Ingarden provided an ontology of a literary work of art that has been accepted by aestheticians as a conclusive argument against psychologism in the theory of literature. According to

Ingarden a literary work of art is composed of four strata: (1) word sounds and phonetic formations of higher order, (2) meaning units, (3) schematised aspects, (4) represented entities (characters, objects, plot). It is a literary character that forms a model example of an intentional object.

Subsequently, an intentional object gained a detailed ontological characteristics in *The Controversy over the Existence of the World* and analyses presented in the present paper are based on *The Controversy*.

In my opinion Ingarden's conception of an intentional object could be successfully applied to the ontology of informatics, economy, mathematics. In this paper I shall show how it could be applied to the ontology of mathematics.

Ingarden himself offered no analysis concerning the mode of existence of mathematical objects, since, according to him, there was no controversy there: mathematical objects are ideal individual objects, and plane geometric figures are model examples of these kinds of objects. It was Danuta Gierulanka, Ingarden's distinguished pupil, who in her *Habilitationschrift* from 1962, was first to apply Ingarden's ontology to the question of existential status of mathematical objects. According to Gierulanka, the structuralists' approach to mathematics developed by Bourbaki group, implies that a mathematical objects determined by an axiomatic theory has to be an intentional object. However, she suggests that a mathematical reality should be something more than a mere intentional being and she provides certain sketch analyses, which are aimed at showing that an algebraic group is as an idea in Ingarden's sense (Gierulanka 1962).

The next attempt to apply Ingarden's ontology to the ontology of mathematics has been undertaken by Barry Smith. Smith tries to develop an ontology of "all-inclusive universe of mathematical objects", in which ontology some mathematical objects are ideal objects (natural numbers, figures of Euclidean geometry), and others are intentional objects (Hamilton's quaternions) (Smith 1975, 1976).

The detailed analyses of Gierulanka's and Smith's works mentioned above shall be presented elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> At present, I will only say that the main objection concerns their interpretation of an intentional object, especially their understanding of spots of indeterminacy of an intentional object. For this reason, a bit more detailed discussion of a spot of indeterminacy of an intentional object will be given in point 4. below.

### *Mathematical Objects*

Within the framework of philosophy of mathematics, the issue of mathematical objects gives rise to numerous questions, such as the following:

What *is* a mathematical object? Do mathematical objects exist and, if they do, what is their mode of existence? Are they created or discovered? Are they dependent on or independent of human cognition?

Realists in philosophy of mathematics maintain that mathematical objects exist outside of space and time and do not enter causal relations. They claim that mathematical objects exist objectively, independently of whether or not they are being cognized, and independently of our definitions and constructions. They maintain that mathematical cognition consists in discovering these objects or their properties. Generally speaking, mathematical objects are “Platonic beings”, and therefore they are neither physical nor mental objects (Barker 1969).

In Ingarden’s ontology the domain of the non-physical and the non-mental is diverse; it embraces ideas, individual ideal objects and intentional objects. All these objects are intersubjective, they exist out of space and time and do not enter causal relations.

The tension connected with the questions whether a mathematical object is discovered or created, and whether or not it is dependent on man, in this ontology is shifted onto the ideal-intentional opposition. An ideal object is independent of man and apprehending it may be called discovering, whereas it may be maintained that an intentional object is created by man and to this extent it is dependent – but, let us repeat, at the same time it is an intersubjective object.

In what follows I shall present arguments intended to prove that a mathematical object is an intentional object. I shall not consider mathematical objects in general but, in order to stick to the concrete, I shall focus instead on one of the most crucial sort of mathematical object, the real numbers. The real numbers will be treated here as they are treated in mathematics, i.e. as a complete ordered field –  $(R, +, ;, <)$ .

The plan of the reasoning is as follows: first, in order to introduce the intuitive meaning of an intentional object, I shall present a classic example of such an object. Next, I shall specify its ontological characteristics. And finally, starting from point 5. below, I shall attend directly to the real numbers.

#### INTENTIONAL OBJECTS

1. The classic example of an intentional object is a literary character. Let it be Lolita, a protagonist of Vladimir Nabokov’s novel *Lolita*.

The descriptions of Lolita are numerous and diverse, and all of them come from Humbert Humbert, a man admiring her girlish beauty. Along

with her physical measurements – height, weight, size of thigh and calf, neck circumference, etc. – one may find details of medical nature; for example, that her vermiform appendix was still present, or that she had a tiny dark-brown mole on her side and a little scar on the lower part of her shapely calf, a couple of inches above her rough white sock, or that her arm bore the figure-eight scar of vaccination. While the majority of the descriptions are quite personal, this does not diminish their specific character. So Lolita has pale-grey vacant eyes with soot-black lashes. Her face is covered with freckles, five of which are asymmetrically placed on her bobbed nose. Her lips are as red as licked red candy, the lower one prettily plump; her front teeth are big, her voice strident, her hair a rich brown, with bangs in front, a swirl at the sides and natural curls in back. Moreover, Humbert several times notices a silky shimmer above her temple that blends into the bright brown of her hair. Her complexion and tan are subtly tinted. Her shoulders are honey-hued, and after a good cry her complexion assumes a tinge of Botticellian pink. To this description is added a detailed psychological portrait reflecting the process of Lolita's development and maturing. This is the picture of Lolita aged twelve to fourteen. The fact that she was growing and changing is recorded in the novel with great precision. After three years during which he had not seen Lolita, Humbert Humbert finds her considerably transformed. She is a couple of inches taller, has a new hairdo and new ears, her head looks smaller, her cheeks hollowed and freckles paled (Nabokov 1995). Such is the description of Lolita.

These descriptions display something that has the structure of a real object. As opposed to a real object in the literal sense of the word, this something does not have an autonomous existence, but exists merely as specified by the text. To this object refer all the descriptions listed above. Simultaneously, to this object one may ascribe certain characteristics, which by no means can be considered to be characteristics of Lolita – for example, the fact that this something was entirely invented by Nabokov, that later on it was preserved in a written form, that in some way it is reconstructed by each reader. The entity to which these two groups of characteristics refer is what Ingarden calls an intentional object. With the whole set of descriptions she acquired from Nabokov, Lolita is therefore merely a part of an intentional object, a part which is called a content.

Thus, there are three principal elements here: the author, the text and the intentional object – the entity in which the character of Lolita forms

the content. In the following presentation of the characteristics of the intentional object I shall be referring to this model situation.

#### THE MODE OF EXISTENCE OF AN INTENTIONAL OBJECT

2. The ontological characteristics of an intentional object are of a dual nature. I shall first characterise its mode of existence,<sup>2</sup> and then its formal structure.

The description of the mode of existence consists in juxtaposing various aspects of existence, which Ingarden calls existential moments. The mode of existence of an intentional object is characterised by the following moments: derivation, separateness, dependence,<sup>3</sup> heteronomy and nonactuality.

2.1. Derivation means that an object “can exist only when it is produced by another object”.<sup>4</sup> In the case of our example it means that the source of the intentional object’s existence lies in the respective acts of Nabokov’s consciousness, and that the intentional object comes into being through the agency of the author.

2.2. Separateness means that an intentional object does not have to coexist with another object “within the compass of one and the same whole”.<sup>5</sup> In other words, that it is a separate object, not an aspect, a part or a property of some other object. In our case it means that the intentional object is not a part of either Nabokov’s or the reader’s psychological experience, and that it is not a part or a property of the book understood as a concrete real object, or as a copy of the text.

2.3. Dependence. In the introduction ‘dependence’ was already mentioned in a quite general sense of this term. What we have in mind now is a purely technical sense. Dependence means that an intentional object is a separate entity “which requires for its own existence that of some other existentially separate object”.<sup>6</sup> While derivation conveys that to remain in existence an intentional object requires some other object, that to continue existing an intentional object has to be supported by something else. What supports the existence of an intentional object is called an existential foundation. The existential foundation of an intentional object can consist of a complex of entities, which, in turn, can be real, ideal or intentional.

What does this mean? A work of literature emerges through the writer's acts of creation but its further existence is possible only due to the fact that it was recorded. What makes possible the continuity of existence of a work of literature is a book, understood as an actual physical object. On the other hand, the existential foundation of a work of literature is its language, its words and sentences, which in themselves are also intentional entities. The senses of words and the meanings of sentences are intersubjective, and equally intersubjective is the material foundation of the intentional object, the actual physical copies of the book. This whole situation results in the fact that the intentional object, as opposed to the writer's acts and the reader's acts, is an intersubjective object.

2.4. Heteronomy is related to the fact that an intentional object is not "immanently determined in itself".<sup>7</sup> This technical language hides a relatively straightforward intuition: *Lolita* has just these and no other features ascribed to her in the text. Ingarden expresses it in the following way: "immanent qualifications do not make an appearance in the contents of purely intentional objects. All their material determination, formal moments, and even their existential moments, which appear in their contents, are in some way only *ascribed* to purely intentional objects".<sup>8</sup>

2.5. Nonactuality. It is hardly possible to characterise this existential moment in a concise way but, on the other hand, it will not be referred to in the subsequent considerations and, for this reason, we will restrict our remarks to indicating three significant moments linked to it. Nonactuality is related to the fact that there are no causal relations between an intentional object and real objects, which means that producing an intentional object is not causal in its character. Nonactuality is associated with the unchangeability of an intentional object. And finally, nonactuality is connected with the atemporality of an intentional object.<sup>9</sup>

It has to be admitted, however, that what we have in mind here are the strictly defined notions of change and time that were developed in Ingarden's ontology for a real object. Nonetheless, it is a fact that in a certain sense intentional objects are subject to change. To some extent, this change is manifested in, for example, the history of the language and the historical variability in interpretation of a work of literature. The question of the ontological significance of such change lies beyond the scope of the present study and demands a separate treatment.

## THE FORM OF AN INTENTIONAL OBJECT

3. Structural aspects or, as Ingarden puts it, formal-ontological characteristics of an intentional object are determined by two moments: two-sidedness and schematism (including the occurrence of spots of indeterminacy).

3.1. Two-sidedness. An intentional object displays a certain two-sided nature: it is composed of the intentional structure (the intentional object as such) and the content. This is connected with the fact that there are two subjects: the subject of the intentional object as such and the subject appearing in the content of the object. The former of these two is the proper and the more important subject; it bears the historicity of the intentional object, the defining characteristics involved in its genesis.

3.2. The content of our intentional object, that is to say Lolita, has the form of a real thing. It is her – in a certain simplification – who is the second subject of the intentional object. Lolita possesses these and no other determinate characteristics that were ascribed to her by Nabokov and were recorded in the text of the novel. According to Ingarden, the “ontic character”, namely the mode of existence of the subject appearing in the content, ascribed directly or merely presumptively, also belongs to the content of an intentional object. It is not an existence in the literary sense of this term, therefore Ingarden puts the word ‘exists’ in inverted commas and uses the term “ontic character”: “For the content of an intentional object has exactly those determinate characteristics which have been *ascribed* to it and ‘exists’ in the mode ascribed to it in the act that produced it”.<sup>10</sup> It is so since, even if the text does not explicitly say that Lolita is a real thing, that reality is presumed because of the fact that she is an element of the world which, in turn, is presumed to be real.

3.3. Schematism. It has been mentioned that Lolita has only these and no other determinate characteristics than the ones ascribed to her in the text. If we take into account the fact that she is presumed to be a real object, then, as such an object, she should have more determinate characteristics than the ones ascribed to her. These gaps in the description of Lolita are called spots of indeterminacy.

Examples. (1) No helpful information is given concerning Lolita’s ears when Humbert Humbert, meeting Lolita years later, notes: “New, heaped-up hairdo, new ears” (Nabokov 1995, p. 269). But a person’s ears

do not usually become significantly larger or change their shape within a period of three years. Lolita's face changed, and with her new countenance her ears, while basically the same as three years earlier, became more distinct. But what are they actually like? Small? Large? Protruding? Flat? Narrow? Rounded? What are their lobes like, and do they have any lobes at all? The novel contains no information about this. (2) We know that Lolita has freckles, but no word is spoken about their colour – we may only deduce that it is a tint of brown.

#### SOME OTHER RESULTS

4. Now, we shall go beyond Ingarden's existential and formal ontology and list some other important ontological characteristics of an intentional object.

4.1. An intentional object does not satisfy the ontological law of excluded middle in the form: for every object  $P$  and every property  $w$  it is the case that  $w$  pertains to  $P$  or  $w$  does not pertain to  $P$ , where  $w$  does not pertain to  $P$  refers to a negative state of affair.

As we remember, an intentional object is of a two-sided nature, with which fact the division of its properties in two groups is connected, namely, the properties characterising the intentional object as such and the properties ascribed to the object occurring in the content. So, Ingarden's assertion is this: an intentional object in its intentional structure satisfies the ontological law of excluded middle, whereas the object occurring in the content of the intentional object does not satisfy this law.

This assertion is related to Ingarden's conception of a negative state of affairs. The necessary condition for a negative state of affair to occur is that a certain positive state of affair occurs from which the negative one could *reflect*. Let us consider a negative state of affair "Lolita's ears are not narrow". If this negative state were to occur, it would have to *reflect* from a positive state of affair relating to the shape of Lolita's ears. Therefore Lolita's ears would have to be somehow described as long as their shape is concerned, which means that the text would have to actually state that they are of some particular character. But the text fails to do so, and for this reason the negative state of affair "Lolita's ears are not narrow" does not occur (Błaszczuk 2003).

4.2. Ingarden's assertion that spots of indeterminacy occur in the content of every intentional object depends on the assertion that "ontic character"



belongs to the content of an intentional object. The ontic character, in turn, marks out the *places*, in which an object of a given mode of existence should be determined. Accordingly, taking into account just the choice of features ascribed to Lolita, as yet we are in no position to determine any spots of indeterminacy whatsoever. Only when Lolita's *claim* to being a real object is taken into account may we accept the incompleteness of her determination. The ears of some real Lolita must be determined in every respect. Let us put it clearly: the ears of any real Lolita are *ex definitione* determined in every respect. In Ingarden's ontology a real object is understood in such a way that it is determined in every respect, although it is necessary to add: in every respect which is possible for this kind of object, i.e. a real object.

In summary, spots of indeterminacy may be discussed only when the ontic character of an object occurring in the content of an intentional object is taken into account (Błaszczyk 2003).

4.3. As a consequence of Ingarden's conception of negative states of affairs, every intentional object satisfies the ontological law of contradiction.<sup>11</sup>

4.4. It is the content of an intentional object that guaranties an identity of the intentional object, or to put it in a negative way: different intentional objects have different contents.

## THE REAL NUMBERS

5. We shall now proceed to the real numbers. In this case the basic triad author-text-object established by the text consists of: Richard Dedekind – his 1872 work *Steitigkeit und irrationale Zahlen* – the intentional object determined by this work. To demonstrate that we are indeed faced with an intentional object we shall analyse two moments: the twosidedness of the formal structure and schematism.

5.1. Regarding two-sidedness. The content of the intentional object forms the real numbers created by the method now known as Dedekind cuts. According to the definition,  $R$  is the set of all such cuts of the ordered set of the rational numbers  $(Q, <)$ –

$$R = \{(A, B): A \neq \emptyset \wedge B \neq \emptyset \wedge (A \cup B = Q) \wedge \forall x \in A \forall y \in B [x < y]\}.$$

In this set arithmetic operations are defined in such a way that an

algebraic field is given. Moreover, an order is introduced which, as proved by Dedekind, is continuous in the sense of the definition of continuity presented in this work, i.e., an order in which no cut yields a gap. (Nowadays we say that a linear order is Dedekind continuous when it is dense and no cut yields a gap.) And, what is most important, this structure provides “a purely arithmetical and perfectly rigorous foundation to the principles” of the calculus, as Dedekind says. Nonetheless, apart from characteristics that belong to the real numbers, there is also a class of characteristics belonging to the whole constituted by the text of the dissertation which by no means can refer to the real numbers. The fact of being defined by Dedekind on November 24, 1858 (the date given by Dedekind in his *Preface*) is not, indeed, a feature of the continuous order, no more than the fact of being *modeled* by Dedekind after the continuity of the geometric line, as Dedekind admits in his dissertation. These characteristics belong to the intentional object as such, not to its content.

In the Introduction I said that a mathematical object is an intentional object. Now, having become acquainted with the structure of an intentional object, we may state our principal assertion more precisely: a mathematical object is the content of an intentional object. As with Lolita, the field of the real numbers is not itself an intentional object but instead forms the content of an intentional object.

5.2. Regarding derivation. Let us recall that derivation is connected with the fact that an intentional object comes into being; this relates to the whole object, including its content. Consequently, it should be accepted that because the dissertation of Dedekind did not exist before 1872, what is now known in mathematics as the real numbers did not exist before this date either; the object to which we refer in a more or less direct way (e.g. *via* axiomatic approach) whenever we have the real numbers in mind did not exist.

An obvious question arises here: if the real numbers did not exist, what were the wide variety of mathematicians who created and developed differential and integral calculus dealing with? Yet it is possible that the suggested description will seem less paradoxical if we recall that in the 18th century the fundamental definition of calculus, the definition of the limit (in today's meaning), was not yet available. Differential and integral calculus was developed as a technique of solving problems of physics and geometry: finding velocity, minimal and maximal values, tangents, calculating the lengths of curves, surface areas and volumes. The range of problems was widening with time. Mathematicians applied derivatives

and integrals, employed series, solved differential equations, they were aware of the correlation between differentiation and integration. The effectiveness of these techniques was not yet accompanied by any explication. The infinitesimals, fluxions, and differentials they referred to hid geometrical and dynamical intuitions and were at that time subjected to severe criticism. It was only Cauchy who formulated the definition of limit devoid of geometrical references, according to which definition the limit is a number. Therefore, in order to make use of the notion of limit it was necessary to have the notion of number ready for use. This is why in the second half of the 19th century numerous mathematicians sought the definition of number – of irrational number. The efforts of most of these mathematicians were directed by Cauchy's definition, which stated that irrational numbers are the limits of sequences of rational numbers. Reasoning in a similar way, Heine, Meray and Cantor reached the conclusion that what should be considered as the number which is a sequence's limit is simply the sequence itself. This type of reasoning culminated in Cantor's construction. On the other hand, Dedekind arrived at the notion of a real number by reflecting on the "nature of continuity". Although these facts are well-known,<sup>12</sup> I would like to stress one more aspect of these events.

What was so special about the achievements of Dedekind and Cantor that they were the ones singled out by following generations? In the historical events that reached their peak in these works there was something more important at stake than the mere working out of a definition of real number. The real goal was to create a numerical system in which the techniques of differential calculus might be substantiated. Cantor and Dedekind not only proposed a definition of the field of real numbers but, first and foremost, they offered methods of completing the field of rational numbers to the field in which it becomes possible to develop the calculus. I do not, therefore, perceive the constructions of Cantor and Dedekind as the "discovery" of some object. What I see are distinct methods of solving the same problem: the method of building a numerical system (extending the field of the rational numbers) which would serve as the foundation of the already existing edifice of mathematical analysis.

In the sixties of the 20th century Abraham Robinson developed an alternative solution to this problem. Within the framework of nonstandard analysis one may show that, instead of basing analysis on the notion of the limit, this problem – the problem of arithmetical foundations of calculus – may be solved by grounding analysis on the notion of an infinitesimal, and the suitable numerical system for this approach is the

field of hyperreal numbers, which is not isomorphic with that of the real numbers.<sup>13</sup>

5.3. Regarding schematism. The mathematical object appearing in the content of an intentional object does not possess a presumptive mode of existence, i.e., no “ontic character” is ascribed to it. For this reason it is necessary to answer the following question: how should a property of a mathematical object be understood? Unable to find grounds for any arbitrary restrictions, I have chosen to take the most liberal stand: everything that is stated in mathematical theories may be stated also about a mathematical object. Several examples of properties of the real numbers: the set of algebraic numbers is countable, the field of the real numbers is not algebraically closed, intervals are the only connected subsets of  $R$  (in the order topology), there exist discontinuous real functions,<sup>14</sup> or, more generally speaking, the very notion of the limit reveal the variety of properties that distinguish the real numbers from fields in which it is possible to develop differential calculus – for example, there are differentiable real functions that do not have the second derivative, whereas complex functions that have the first derivative (in an appropriately defined region) have (in this region) derivatives of all orders.

Generally speaking, each property is a property within a certain theory and no property exists outside a theory, whereas an object itself – the real numbers – remains beyond particular theories. To put it metaphorically, the real numbers are planted in various mathematical theories like a certain substance in test-tubes containing different reagents, and as a result we come to know their various properties.

The above considerations ought to be supplemented with the following condition: it is assumed that a mathematical theory incorporates research instruments – that is to say, for example, the fact that the only definitions a certain theory admits are the predicative ones (*vide* Herman Weyl’s mathematical analysis of *Das Kontinuum*), or that it adopts first- or second-order logic.<sup>15</sup>

Among theories there are also formalised theories. I shall present two examples of properties associated with formalised theories.

(1) In ZF (Zermello-Fraenkel set theory) + AC (the axiom of choice) there are subsets of  $R$  which are not Lebesgue-measurable. (1’) the theory ZF + AD (the axiom of determinateness) each subset of  $R$  is Lebesgue-measurable (Mycielski, Świerczkowski 1964).

(2) In ZF + AC the Cauchy continuity of a function (CC) is equivalent to the Heine continuity (HC). (2’) in ZF these conditions are not equivalent.

lent: the implication  $HC \rightarrow CC$  cannot be proved to be true (Jeagerman 1962).

Adopting the above understanding of a property and recalling that a property always reveals itself within the framework of a certain theory, it is possible to indicate the spots of indeterminacy of the ordered field of real numbers: these spots of indeterminacy are connected with independent statements. Examples.

(1) Assuming that the set  $R$  is considered within  $ZF + AC$  set theory (with first-order logic), we may ask about its cardinality's location in the aleph hierarchy (i.e. the hierarchy of well-ordered cardinal numbers), or in other words, how great the continuum is. And here we come across the place of indeterminacy. By the independence of the continuum hypothesis, within this theory there is no positive answer to this question; that is to say, it is not possible to show to which of the alephs the cardinal number  $2^{\aleph_0}$  is equal.

(2) Considering the ordered set  $(R, <)$ , we may ask whether this set possesses the following property:  $(R, <)$  is isomorphic with every ordered set  $X$  which is continuously ordered (i.e. is dense-ordered and none of its cuts gives a gap), does not contain either the first or the last element, in which every family of pairwise disjoint intervals is at most countable. The positive answer to this question is known as Suslin's hypothesis. Suslin's hypothesis is an independent statement of  $ZF + AC$  set theory, from which it follows that within the framework of this theory it is impossible to prove that real numbers have this property, and it is not possible to show that they do not have this property.

#### DEDEKIND'S VERSUS CANTOR'S CONSTRUCTION

6. Arguments analogous to these presented in 5.1 can be given with regard to construction of the real numbers presented by Georg Cantor (Cantor 1872, 1883).

What is known nowadays as Cantor's construction of the real numbers is the one in which the set  $R$  is defined as the quotient set  $C/\approx$ , where  $C$  is the set of all sequences of rational numbers satisfying the Cauchy condition, whereas  $\approx$  is the relation:

$$(a_n) \approx (b_n) \quad \text{iff} \quad \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} (a_n - b_n) = 0.$$

In this set addition, multiplication and order are defined in such a way that an ordered field is created. It is a complete field inasmuch as every

sequence of real numbers satisfying the Cauchy condition is convergent to some real number.

The following question naturally arises: what is the relation between the constructions of Cantor and Dedekind?

From the point of view of Ingarden's ontology, *Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen* and Cantor's works establish two different intentional objects. But different intentional objects have first of all different contents. As we remember, these are the constructions that make the contents of the intentional objects. So, by what do these constructions differ? I shall point out three differences.

(1) The fields constructed by Cantor and Dedekind are, obviously, isomorphic, but this isomorphism disregards the *nature* of the elements of the fields, the fact *of what* and *how* they were constructed, and this belongs to the contents of the respective intentional objects. In Dedekind's construction a real number is a pair of subsets of the set of the rational numbers, in Cantor's construction it is a set of sequences (the equivalence class determined by a certain sequence).

(2) The property that plays the decisive role in Dedekind's construction is continuity, whereas in Cantor's construction it is Cauchy completeness. These properties considered as properties of an ordered field are not equivalent. The field of the hyperreal numbers is an (non-Archimedean) ordered field that is Cauchy complete but not Dedekind continuous.

(3) And most importantly: these constructions differ in the methods employed. On the one hand there is the method of Dedekind cuts which is at present referred to as completion of linear to continuous order. On the other hand Cantor's method is seen as a completion of metric space to the complete metric space.<sup>16</sup>

#### THE AXIOMATIC APPROACH TO THE REAL NUMBERS

7.1. It is well known fact that the real numbers could be characterised in an axiomatic way. For the first time it was done by David Hilbert in 1900. Hilbert characterised the real numbers as an Archimedean field which admits no proper extension to an Archimedean ordered field (Hilbert 1900). Since that time a number of other sets of axioms have been presented. All of them follow the pattern: axioms of an ordered field  $(A, +, \cdot, <)$  plus some statements referring to the order. Let us list five of them.

- (1)  $A$  is an Archimedean field, and is Cauchy complete, i.e. every Cauchy sequence in  $A$  has a limit in  $A$ .
- (2)  $A$  is Dedekind complete, i.e. there are no gaps in  $(A, <)$ .
- (3) Every non-empty subset of  $A$  which is bounded above has a least upper bound in  $A$ .
- (4) Every bounded infinite subset of  $A$  has an accumulation point in  $A$ .
- (5)  $A$  is an Archimedean field, and for every sequence of closed intervals  $X_n$ , if

$$X_{n+1} \subset X_n, \quad \text{then} \quad \bigcap_{n \in \mathbb{N}} X_n \neq \emptyset.$$

It can be proved that these axioms are equivalent (Cohen, Ehrlich 1963, ch. 5).

The axiomatic approach to the real numbers suggests that Dedekind's construction of the reals is of minor importance.<sup>17</sup> The subsequent analysis will show that it is just the opposite.

7.2. In the axiomatic approach the key role is played by the theorem of categoricity, which states that there exists the unique, up to isomorphism, Dedekind complete ordered field.

The axiomatic approach is dependent on Dedekind's, or Cantor's, construction in two ways.

(1) The proof of the theorem of categoricity is usually conducted as follows: there are two fields  $F$  and  $F_1$  given, which satisfy the fixed axioms; they include isomorphic fields of fractions,  $Q$  and  $Q_1$ , respectively; the natural isomorphism between  $Q$  and  $Q_1$  is extended to the isomorphism between  $F$  and  $F_1$ , and this extension is modeled on the procedure of completing the field of the rational numbers by either the method of Dedekind cuts, or Cantor's method, with the aid of Cauchy sequences (Birkhoff, MacLane 1954, ch. IV; Cohen, Ehrlich 1963, ch. 5).

(2) The axiomatic approach frames the real numbers as an ordered field, which approach is characteristic of both Dedekind's and Cantor's constructions. It is not, however, the only possible framing of the real numbers. Lew Pontriagin in his well-known theorem offered a topological-algebraical characterisation: the real numbers constitute a topological field, which is connected, locally compact and one-dimensional (Pontriagin 1949, ch. IV).

7.3. As has been mentioned before, the problem that Cantor and Dedekind confronted concerned the *direction* – if I am allowed to put it this way – of the completion, that is to say, adding new elements to the field of rational numbers. However, what Cantor and Dedekind actually

did was not merely to extend the field of rational numbers – they also verified that a further implementation of their methods to the new, i.e. completed, field does not *create* new numbers: the structure *created* by Dedekind turned out to be continuous, the structure *created* by Cantor turned out to be complete, and this was enough to commence developing calculus. In this sense, setting arithmetical foundations of calculus determines both the *direction* of extending the field of the rational numbers and the phase at which the extension procedure may be stopped.

If we remove the point of reference in the form of setting the arithmetical foundations of calculus, then we may miss the *direction* of the completion process, as well as the justification of the fact that this process may be stopped at one particular phase. And yet, it is not impossible to extend the field of the rational numbers in some other *direction*, nor is it impossible to extend the real numbers further. One may assume an algebraical point of view and aim at the algebraic closedness of the initial field, i.e. the field of the rational numbers. Then Cantor's or Dedekind's completion process is not sufficient and the real numbers have to be extended further, as is well known, to the field of the complex numbers. And even if the process of extending the field of the rational numbers is aimed at setting the fundamentals of calculus, and, simultaneously, instead of the notion of the limit the infinitesimals are adopted, then the real numbers ought to be extended further – to the field of the hyperreal numbers. This field may also be described axiomatically, nevertheless this axiomatics, as well as the one of the real numbers, is dependent on the already existing construction.<sup>18</sup>

While extending the field of the rational numbers, it is necessary to know what is the purpose of extending it. A purely axiomatic approach does not itself generate the direction of such an extension process. Dedekind and Cantor were aware of the aim of their *creation* of the real numbers. Abraham Robinson knew what reason stood behind his *creation* of the hyperreal numbers. The differential and integral calculus is what furnishes these constructions with rationale.

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to thank Professor Jeff Mitscherling for his comments and linguistic remarks.

*Department of Mathematics  
Pedagogical University  
Kraków, Poland*



## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> See my "O sposobie istnienia liczb rzeczywistych".
- <sup>2</sup> "The mode of being" in Michejda's translation (Ingarden, 1964).
- <sup>3</sup> "Contingency" in Michejda's translation (Ingarden 1964).
- <sup>4</sup> Roman Ingarden. *Spór o istnienie świata. Vol. I.* Warsaw: PWN, 1987, p. 92.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 89.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49.
- <sup>9</sup> Ingarden's conception of change and time is presented in (Błaszczyk 1996, 1999). Incidentally, it is because of their atemporality and unchangeability that mathematical objects are considered to be "Platonic beings".
- <sup>10</sup> Roman Ingarden. *Spór o istnienie świata. Vol. II, part 1.* Warsaw: PWN, 1987, p. 201.
- <sup>11</sup> Compare (Smith 1975, p. 96).
- <sup>12</sup> See, for example (Boyer 1956).
- <sup>13</sup> See (Goldblatt 1998; Robinson 1966; Capiński and Cutland 1995).
- <sup>14</sup> The notion of the limit employed in intuitionistic analysis gives different results. In th intuitionistic theory of functions defined on Brouwer's continuum, a function defined on a closed interval is uniformly continuous. See (Heyting 1956, ch. III).
- <sup>15</sup> A. Grzegorczyk, particularising Weyl's ideas from *Das Kontinuum*, indicates the theorems of classical calculus which may be obtained when only elementary definitions are accepted, i.e. the definitions in which quantifiers bound variables ranging over the set of integers (Grzegorczyk 1954). Numerous other attempts to build mathematical analysis basing on restricted array of proof tools were also undertaken. See (Fraenkel et al. 1973, ch. IV, § 6).
- <sup>16</sup> The well-known Benacerraf's paradox of multiple reductions of natural numbers (Benacerraf 1964) can be developed further and carried over to the analogous problem for the real numbers (Maddy 1992, ch. 3). The argument presented in point 6 solves the problem for the real numbers.
- <sup>17</sup> See (Levy 1979, ch. IV).
- <sup>18</sup> See (Capiński and Cutland 1995, Appendix).

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barker Stephen F. "Realism as a Philosophy of Mathematics". In *Foundations of Mathematics. Symposium Papers Commemorating the Sixtieth Birthday of Kurt Gödel*, J. J. Bulloff (ed.). Berlin: Springer, 1969.
- Bartoszyński, Kazimierz. "Teoria miejsc niedookreślenia na tle ingardenowskiego systemu filozoficznego". In *Wypowiedź literacka i filozoficzna*, M. Głowiński and J. Sławiński (eds.). Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1982.
- . "Schematyczność II". In *Słownik pojęć filozoficznych Romana Ingardena*, A. J. Nowak and L. Sosnowski (eds.). Cracow: Universitas, 2003.
- Benacerraf, Paul. "What numbers could not be?". In *Philosophy of Mathematics*, P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam (eds.). New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs, 1964.
- Birkhoff, Garrett and Mac Lane Saunders. *A Survey of Modern Algebra*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954.

- Błaszczuk, Piotr. "Ingarden o czasie". In *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny* 24:3 (1996): 33–61 and 24:4 (1996): 125–51.
- . "O sposobie istnienia liczb rzeczywistych". In *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny*, to appear.
- . "Odrzucenie *Tertium non datur*". In *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny* 31:1 (2003): 17–37.
- . "Związek przyczynowy w *Sporze o istnienie świata*". In *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny* 27:2 (1999): 69–118.
- Bourbaki, Nicolas. *Elements of Mathematics. General Topology. Part I, II*. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1966.
- Boyer, Carl B. *The History of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development*. New York: Dover, 1959.
- Cantor, Georg. "Über die Ausdehnung eines Satz aus der Theorie der trigonometrische Reihen". Leipzig, 1872. In G. Cantor, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, E. Zermelo (ed.). Berlin: Springer, 1932.
- . "Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre". Leipzig, 1883. In G. Cantor. *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, E. Zermelo (ed.). Berlin: Springer, 1932.
- Capiński, Marek and John Cutland *Nonstandard Methods for Stochastic Fluid Mechanics*. Singapore: World Scientific, 1995.
- Cichoń, Jacek, Aleksander Kharazishvili, and Bogdan Węglorz. *Subsets of the Real Line*. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 1995.
- Cohen, Leon W. and Gertrude Ehrlich. *The Structure of the Real Number System*. Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1963.
- Dedekind, Richard. *Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen*. Braunschweig: Friedrich Vieweg und Son, 1960. First edition: Braunschweig, 1872.
- Fraenkel, Abraham A., Yehsoua Bar-Hillel, and Azriel Levy. *Foundations of Set Theory*. Amsterdam: NHPC, 1973.
- Gödel, Kurt. "What is Cantor's continuum problem?" In *Philosophy of Mathematics*, P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam (eds.). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964.
- Gierulanka, Danuta. *Zagadnienie swoistości poznania matematycznego*. Warsaw: PWN, 1962.
- Goldblatt, Robert. *Lectures on the Hyperreals*. New York: Springer, 1998.
- Grzegorzczak, Andrzej. "Elementarily definable analysis". *Fundamenta Mathematicae* 41 (1954): 311–338.
- Heyting A. *Intuitionism*. Amsterdam: NHPC, 1956.
- Hilbert, David. "Über den Zahlbegriff". *Jahresbericht der Deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung* 8 (1900): 180–184.
- Ingarden, Roman. *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1964/65.
- . *Time and Modes of Being*. Translated by H. Michejda (from parts of *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*). Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1964.
- . *Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft*. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1931. *O dziele literackim*, M. Turowicz (trans.). Warsaw: PWN, 1988. *The Literary Work of Arts*, G. Grabowicz (trans.). Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
- . *Spór o istnienie świata. Vol. I Ontologia Formalna. Vol. II Ontologia Egzystencjalna*, third edition. Warsaw: PWN, 1987. First edition: 1947/48.
- . *O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego*. Warsaw: PWN, 1988. First edition: 1937. *The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art*, R. A. Crowley and K. R. Olson (trans.). Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
- Jeagerman, M. "The Axiom of Choice and Two Definitions of Continuity". *Bulletin de L'Académie Polonaise des Sciences. Série des science math., astr., et phys.* 13:10 (1965): 699–704.

- Levy, Azriel. *Basic Set Theory*. Berlin: Springer, 1979.
- Maddy, Penelopa. *Realism in Mathematics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.
- Markiewicz, Henryk. "Problem miejsc niedookreślenia w dziele literackim". In H. Markiewicz, *Nowe przekroje i zbliżenia*. Warsaw: PIW, 1974.
- Mitscherling, Jeff. "Schematyczność". In *Słownik pojęć filozoficznych Romana Ingardena*, A. J. Nowak and L. Sosnowski (eds.). Cracow: Universitas, 2003.
- Mycielski, Jan and S. Świerczkowski. "On the Lebesgue measurability and the axiom of determinateness". *Fundamenta Mathematicae* 54 (1964): 67–71.
- Nabokov, Vladimir. *Lolita*. London: Penguin Books, 1995.
- Niven, van. *Irrational Numbers*. Rahway, New Jersey: The Mathematical Association of America, 1956.
- Nowak, Andrzej J. and Leszek Sosnowski (eds.), *Słownik pojęć filozoficznych Romana Ingardena*. Cracow: Universitas, 2003.
- . *Ingarden contra Ingarden*. Cracow, 1990.
- Pontriagin, L. S. *Topological Groups*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949.
- Robinson, Abraham. *Non-standard Analysis*. Amsterdam: NHPC, 1966.
- Smith, Barry. "Historicity, Value and Mathematics". In *Analecta Husserliana* 4 (1976).
- . "The Ontogenesis of Mathematical Objects". *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 6:2 (1975): 91–101.
- Strelka, Joseph P. "Roman Ingarden's 'Points of Indeterminateness': A Consideration of Their Practical Application to Literary Criticism". In *Analecta Husserliana* 30 (1990).
- Swoyer, Chris. "Properties". In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Internet: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties/>, 2000.

HERMENEUTISCHE VERSUS REFLEXIVE  
PHÄNOMENOLOGIE

*Eine kritische Revision Heideggers frühe Stellung zu Husserl ausgehend  
vom Kriegsnotsemester 1919*

Im Rahmen der hermeneutischen Philosophie hat sich die Differenz zwischen transzendentaler und hermeneutischer Phänomenologie tief eingebettet. Diese Differenz wurde bereits vom jungen Heidegger stark entfaltet und bietet den Ausgangspunkt für Gadammers spätere Interpretation der Husserlschen Phänomenologie. Der Kernpunkt Heideggers Kritik lässt sich folgenderweise zusammenfassen: Husserls phänomenologische Haltung zur Welt geht von der Wahrnehmung eines weltlosen Subjekts aus, dass die Erlebnisse durch einen reflexiven und theoretischen Vorgang auf ihren eidetischen Gehalt reduziert. Dagegen behauptet Heidegger, dass das menschliche Leben schon immer in einer verstehenden Weltbeziehung lebt, von der aus die Erlebnisse durch einer hermeneutischen und atheoretischen Haltung ereignet werden.

Die Problematik der gegenwärtigen Philosophie zentriert sich also im Phänomen des Lebens: der Lebenswille in Nietzsche, das religiöse Leben in Kierkegaard, das geschichtliche Leben in Dilthey, das soziale Leben in Weber oder das grenzsituationale Leben in Jaspers. Der junge Heidegger übernimmt und vertieft diese Problematik, in dem er sich auf das Urphänomen des Lebens konzentriert. Das Leben als Urphänomen drängt gegenüber jener Lebensphilosophie, Kulturphilosophie oder wissenschaftliche Weltanschauung. Worum es geht eigentlich? Hauptsächlich um ein originäres Erfassen des Lebens, um die Art und Weise wie das Phänomen des Lebens methodologisch aufgestellt und gelöst werden kann. In anderen Worten: Während den frühen Freiburger Vorlesungen (1919–1923) und ein großer Teil der Marburger Vorlesungen (1924–1928) beschäftigt sich Heidegger intensiv mit der Frage wie man genuin, originär, unmittelbar, direkt oder echt an das Urphänomen des Leben herangehen kann, ohne im Irrationalismus zu geraten. Gegenüber den verschiedenen logischen, ethischen, ästhetischen und religiösen Einordnungen der Lebensgestalten, soll man jetzt das Leben im Vollsinn seiner Konkretion zum Ausdruck bringen.

Dementsprechend wird ein methodologischer Zugang gesucht, um den Sinn des Lebens und deren Erlebniszusammenhänge begrifflich zu erfassen. Das Sein des Lebens als philosophisches Thema ist also wesentlich an der Methodenfrage gebunden. Deshalb ist die Methodenfrage so wichtig: »Wir stehen – wie es in einem expressionistisch eindrucksvollen Ton im Kriegsnotsemester 1919 ausgedrückt wird – an der methodischen Wegkreuzung, die über das Leben und Tod der Philosophie überhaupt entscheidet, an einem Abgrund: entweder ins Nichts, [...] oder es gelingt der Sprung [...] in die Welt«.<sup>1</sup>

Im Kontext dieser Lebensproblematik kann man Heideggers frühe phänomenologische Hermeneutik als den Versuch einer begrifflichen Artikulation der ontologischen Strukturen des faktischen Lebens verstehen.<sup>2</sup> Die Hermeneutik des faktischen Lebens liegt vor folgender methodologischen Hauptaufgabe: Wie gelangt man von der bloßen Anschauung zur Beschreibung ihres Inhaltes? Wie erreicht man einen direkten Zugang zum menschlichen Leben, zu unserem eigenen Daseinscharakter?<sup>3</sup> Die erste Aufgabe einer Hermeneutik der Faktizität enthält das Moment eines kritischen Abbaus der Tradition, d.h. fordert die in jeder Interpretation mitbeteiligten Vorurteile aufzudecken, um einen richtigen bzw. genuinen Zugang zur hermeneutischen Situation zu erreichen. Erst dann ist man in der Lage das »kategoriale« Gewebe des menschlichen Daseinsverständnisses formal-anzeigend zu untersuchen. Wir stehen also vor dem Problem der methodischen Erfassung von Erlebnissen überhaupt. Gefragt ist nach dem *Wie* der phänomenologischen Erschließung der Erlebnissphäre, nach dem *Wie* der philosophischen Wissenschaft.

Gerade Heideggers frühe phänomenologische Interpretationen der mittelalterlichen Mystik, des geschichtlichen Bewußtseins der urchristlichen Paulusgemeinschaft, der faktischen Lebenserfahrung in Augustinus oder der praktischen Philosophie des Aristoteles sind verschiedene Versuche die Spuren des Lebens in ihrer Unmittelbarkeit nachzugehen und führen den jungen Heidegger gleichzeitig zu einer philosophisch tiefeingreifenden Auseinandersetzung mit Dilthey, Rickert, Windelband, Natorp und, vor allem, mit Husserl.

In diesem Sinn strukturiert sich unser Beitrag in den folgenden drei Teilen: *Zuerst* soll gezeigt werden, wie Heideggers hermeneutische Transformation der Phänomenologie streng an einem Methodenproblem gebunden ist, nämlich das methodologische Problem eines korrekten Zugangs zur originären Lebenssphäre; *dann* betrachten wir Natorps Stellungnahme zu dieser schon in Husserls Phänomenologie dargestellten

Problematik, da sie evidenterweise Heidegger beeinflusst hat; und *zuletzt* wollen wir – ausgehend vom Kriegsnotsemester 1919 – die Hauptzüge Heideggers Kritik an Husserl skizzieren, denn gerade hier erweisen sich klar und deutlich die methodologische Unterschiede zwischen einer hermeneutischen und einer reflexiven Phänomenologie.

#### I. DAS METHODOLOGISCHE PROBLEM EINES KORREKTEN ZUGANGS ZUR ORIGINÄREN LEBENSSPHÄRE

Ab 1919 konzentrieren sich Heideggers philosophische Interesse auf eine neue Bestimmung der Philosophie. Die durch die akademische Tradition überlieferte Philosophie bewegt sich hauptsächlich im Bereich des erkenntnistheoretischen Paradigma. Aber das Phänomen des unmittelbaren Lebens gehört zu einer anderen Sphäre, nämlich der Sphäre des Vortheoretischen. Wenn die Philosophie dieses Leben urwissenschaftlich erfassen will, dann muss sie von der Faktizität ausgehen. Der Ursprung der philosophischen Urwissenschaft ist nicht das bloß objektivierbare Faktum der Erkenntnis, sondern das Urfaktum eines Lebens, das sich welt-, bedeutungs- und vollzugsmäßig erstreckt. Der neue Ausgangspunkt einer hermeneutisch transformierten Phänomenologie sind jetzt die unmittelbar bedeutungsbeladene Umwelterlebnisse und seine Aufgabe ist »das Leben im Vollsinn seiner Konkretion zur Erfassung bringen«.<sup>4</sup>

Die Geschichte der Philosophie bietet unterschiedliche Beispiele einer solchen Phänomenologie des Lebens, die Heidegger natürlich untersucht. Zuerst in seiner Habilitationsschrift (1915), wo er einen großen Wert auf den Scotusbegriff der *haeccitas*, der Individualität des hier und jetzt Existierens in Scotus legt.<sup>5</sup> Dieses Aufbrechen und Verfolgen der Lebenssphäre intensiviert sich anfangs der zwanziger Jahren in den Vorlesungen *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens* anhand der Exegesen der Paulusbriefe, Augustinus *Confessiones*, Luthers Kreuzestheologie oder Eckharts Mystik.<sup>6</sup> Aber ohne Zweifel erreicht der Programm einer hermeneutisch-phänomenologischen orientierten Daseinsanalytik sein Zenit in den umfangreichen Interpretationen der praktischen Philosophie des Aristoteles, wo der Akzent eher auf den daseinsmäßigen aktiven Umgang mit den Dingen und den anderen Menschen als auf das kontemplative und passive Existieren gelegt wird.<sup>7</sup>

In allen diesen Fällen erscheint immer die selbe Frage: Wie ist es denn möglich, das Leben echtmethodisch zu erfassen, ohne theoretische Perspektiven einzuführen? Wie können wir das Leben in genuiner Weise erfassen? Wie kann man die ontologisch konstitutiven Strukturen des

menschlichen Daseins begrifflich zum Ausdruck bringen? Man muß als aller erstes den richtigen Ausgangspunkt finden. Welcher Horizont liegt dem Menschen phänomenologisch am nächsten? Eine wichtige Entscheidung, denn alles liegt daran, dass der »Gegenstand« nicht im ersten Ansetzen der hermeneutischen Explikation verfehlt wird. Nur so kann die urwissenschaftliche Philosophie einen genuinen Zugang zur hermeneutischen Situation erreichen und ihre Aufdeckungsfunktion erfüllen. Heidegger wählt als Ausgangspunkt die Situation, in der wir schon immer *de facto* sind, nämlich das alltägliche Leben.

Die Sachen und Umstände des alltäglichen Lebens erscheinen – wie es schon Aristoteles zeigte – zuerst und primär im Kontext unserer routinären und praktischen Begegnung mit der Umwelt, jenseits jeglicher theoretischen Vormeinung oder Weltanschauung. In den ersten Freiburger Vorlesung von 1919, *Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem*, illustriert Heidegger seine methodologisch suggestive Vorgehensweise anhand einer phänomenologisch dichten Beschreibung eines banalen Umwelterlebnisses wie das Kathedersehen: »Ich trete in den Hörsaal, ich sehe das Katheder. [...] Was sehe ich?« Braune Flächen, die sich rechtwinklig schneiden? Nein, ich sehe etwas anderes: Eine Kiste, und zwar eine größere, mit einer kleineren daraufgebaut? Keineswegs. [...] All das sind schlecht, mißdeutete Interpretationen, Abbiegung vom reinen Hineinschauen in das Erlebnis. Ich sehe das Katheder gleichsam in einem Schlag; ich sehe es nicht nur isoliert, [...] ich sehe das Katheder in einer Orientierung, Beleuchtung, einem Hintergrund.«<sup>8</sup>

Später, in den Vorlesungen 1925 *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffes*, nennt Heidegger die Anwendung dieses optischen Interpretationsmodells »phänomenologische Grundttäuschung«, sofern sie das spezifisch theoretische und reflexive Dingerfassen ansetzt, statt sich in den Zugangszusammenhang des alltäglichen Umgangs mit den Dingen zu versetzen. Die spontane und häufig akritische Annahme dieser theoretischen Blickrichtung ist für die Derformierung des Lebens verantwortlich und setzt einen Entlebensprozess in Gang.

In der theoretischen Haltung konzentriert sich man einseitig auf die analytische und objektive Beschreibung der Eigenschaften. Im Rahmen dieser reflexiven und vergegenständlichen Haltung würde man das Kathedererlebnis folgenderweise charakterisieren: »Es ist braun; braun ist eine Farbe; Farbe ist echtes Empfindungsdatum; Empfindungsdatum ist Resultat von physischen und physiologischen Prozessen; die physischen sind die primäre Ursache; diese Ursache, das Objektive, ist eine bestimmte Anzahl von Ätherschwingungen; die Ätherkerne zerfallen in einfache

Elemente; zwischen ihnen als einfachen Elementen bestehen einfache Gesetzlichkeiten; die Elemente sind das letzte; *die Elemente sind etwas überhaupt*«. <sup>9</sup> Wir stehen hier vor einem klaren Objektivationsbeispiel, vor einem reflexiven Akt des erkennenden Subjekts, dass im vorhinein das komplexe Bedeutungsnetz der Welt ausschaltet.

Aber Heidegger erwidert energisch, dass wir nicht primär Farbe, Schwere oder Größe eines Gegenstandes wahrnehmen, um im nachhinein zu dessen Weltbedeutung zu gelangen. Nein, wir sind schon immer bei den Dingen und den Menschen in unserem bedeutungsverleihenden Verhalten zur Welt. »In dem Erlebnis des Kathedersehens gibt sich *mir* etwas aus einer unmittelbaren Umwelt. Dieses Umweltliche Katheder, oder Buch, Tafel usf. sind nicht Sachen mit einem bestimmten Bedeutungscharakter, Gegenstände, und dazu noch aufgefaßt als das und das bestimmte, sondern das Bedeutsame ist das Primäre, gibt sich mir unmittelbar, ohne jeden gedanklichen Umweg über ein Sacherfassen. In einer Umwelt lebend, bedeutet es mir überall und immer, es ist alles welthaft, ›es weltet‹«. <sup>10</sup>

Genau dasselbe geschieht in einem anderen alltäglichen Erlebnis wie das "Tee trinken": »Teetrinkend nehme ich meine Tasse in die Hand; im Gespräch habe ich meine Tasse vor mir stehen. Es ist nicht so, dass ich etwas Farbiges oder gar Empfindungsdaten in mir als Ding auffasse und dieses Ding als Tasse, die in Raum und Zeit bestimmt ist, etwas, was in Wahrnehmungssukzessionen sich gibt, eventuell auch nicht existieren könnte. "Meine Tasse aus der ich trinke" – in der Bedeutsamkeit erfüllt sich ihre Wirklichkeit, sie ist sie selbst«. <sup>11</sup> Ein weiteres Beispiel Heideggers hermeneutischen Transformation der Phänomenologie, d.h. die Einsetzung des Verstehensmodell des hermeneutischen Paradigma an Stelle des Wahrnehmungsmodell des traditionellen Bewußtseinsparadigma. Die Erlebnisse gehen also nicht von einer Sachspäre aus, die das Ich vor sich hat und wahrnimmt, sondern von einer Zeugganzheit, die das Leben benutzt und versteht.

Diese Umwelterlebnisse des "Katheders" oder des "Tee trinken" zeigen wie sich die Sachen selbst aus der konstitutiven Zirkelhaftigkeit des Lebens geben. Deshalb wählt sie Heidegger als unmittelbarer Ausgangspunkt der Philosophie. Die Phänome werden immer schon im Horizont eines vorgängigen Weltverständnisses interpretiert. In der sogenannten theoretischen Haltung löst sich diese primäre Bedeutsamkeit der Umwelt auf. Die Husserlsche Ausklammerung der natürlichen Einstellung bewegt sich in der weltlosen bzw. weltfremden Ebene des puren Subjekts, dass alle Erlebnisse objektmäßig reduziert. »Die tief eingefressene



Verranntheit ins Theoretische ist allerdings noch ein großes Hindernis, den Herrschaftsbereich des umweltlichen Erlebens echt zu überschauen.<sup>12</sup> Das hartnäckige Festhalten an dem Subjekt-Objekt-Schema kann nur in einen Entlebungsprozess münden, den Heidegger auf alle Fälle vermeiden will. Das Erlebnis ist eine spezifische Erfahrung, die irreduzibel zum Objektivierungsvorgang des Bewußtseins ist und die sich vollständig im Ereignis offenbart. Die Urgegebenheit des Lebens besteht für Heidegger in seiner Weltbezogenheit und nicht in der Selbstbezogenheit auf das Ich.<sup>13</sup> Die Idee der Phänomenologie bestimmt Heidegger jetzt als »absolute Ursprungswissenschaft vom Leben an und für sich«,<sup>14</sup> so dass das Leben als solches nie Objekt einer neutralen und egozentrischen Betrachtung werden kann. Die Richtung der methodischen Fragestellung blickt jetzt auf den faktischen Lebensvollzug.

In diesem Kontext findet Heidegger in Dilthey und Natorp wichtige Ansatzpunkte für seine Kritik der Husserlschen Konzeption des transzendentalen Subjekts. Die ausdrückliche Entwicklung von Grundkategorien des faktischen Lebens ist nämlich auch ein vorrangiges Ziel in einigen Arbeiten Diltheys. Die Verschiedenartigkeit der Wirklichkeit kann nur mit Hilfe einer lebendigen Sprache gewürdigt werden. Das Organon der Philosophie ist die in der Geschichtlichkeit ausgedehnte Sprache. Die theoretische Haltung verkörpert nur eine mögliche Erkenntnisweise, die natürlich nicht andere ausschließt. Der lebendige Geist ist nur zu begreifen, wenn die ganze Fülle seiner Leistungen, d.h. seiner Geschichte, in ihm aufgehoben wird.

Anders gesagt: Die philosophischen Aussagen über das Leben können nicht allein nach formal-logischer Kohärenz und letztgültiger Evidenz streben, denn das Leben bewegt sich in einem immer schon offenen Spielraum von Bedeutsamkeiten innerhalb deren wir uns die Sachen der Umwelt, Mitwelt und Selbstwelt verstehend aneignen können. Wir leben »faktisch immer *bedeutsamkeitsgefangen*. [...] Ich lebe im Faktischen als einem ganz besonderen *Zusammenhang* von Bedeutsamkeiten, die sich ständig durchdringen«,<sup>15</sup> wie es Heidegger graphisch im Wintersemester 1919/1920 *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* äußert. Dieser Perspektivenwechsel bereitet schon im Kriegsnotsemester den mehrmals erwähnten Weg zu einer Phänomenologie als Urwissenschaft des Lebens vor, die in den nächsten Jahren verschiedene Physiogonomen zeigt: im *Natorp Bericht* von 1922 spricht man von einer Ontologie des Lebens, im Sommersemester 1923 stoßen wir mit einer Hermeneutik der Faktizität und in den Marburger Vorlesungen 1925 stehen wir vor der existenzialen

Analytik, die zwei Jahre später wieder in *Sein und Zeit* aufgenommen und erweitert wird.

## II. NATORPS KRITIK AN HUSSERL

Natorps Einwände an Husserls Phänomenologiemodells, besonders nach der Veröffentlichung von *Ideen*, werden von Heidegger teilweise aufgenommen. Natorp gibt zu, dass Husserl und er selbst im Prinzip von den gleichen Voraussetzungen ausgehen. Beide wollen eine Darstellung der Erlebniszusammenhänge des Bewusstseins bieten, beide stimmen in der Forderung einer reinen Bewußtstseinslehre überein. Die Husserlsche Phänomenologie fordert dazu eine völlig neue Einstellung. Diese beruht auf einer doppelten Reduktion: zuerst vom singulären und räumlich-zeitlich erfahrenen Faktum zum notwendig-allgemeinen Eidos und dann von der realen Welt zum Vor – oder Überrealen, nämlich zum reinen Bewußtsein. Natorps allgemeine Psychologie stellt folgende doppelte Aufgabe: eine allgemeine (in Husserls Terminologie: eidetische) Beschreibung des Bewusstseinsbestandes und eine Distinktion der Erlebnisheiten in genetischer Perspektive, die von der ursprünglichen Kontinuität des Bewußtseins ausgeht.<sup>16</sup>

Doch wo liegt der Unterschied zwischen Husserl und Natorp? Husserls Wesenserkenntnis und die Grundlage ihrer Gewißheit wird erstens und hauptsächlich durch Intuition, durch ein unmittelbares Sehen oder Anschauen begründet. Alles, was die Phänomenologie aufstellt, tritt mit dem Anspruch auf, zuletzt in Anschauung direkt gegeben zu sein. Das »Prinzip aller Prinzipien« besagt, dass »jede originärgebende Anschauung eine Rechtsquelle der Erkenntnis« ist<sup>17</sup> (oder, noch näher an Descartes Ausdrucksweise, dass »vollkommene Klarheit das Maß aller Wahrheit«<sup>18</sup> ist). Natorp erinnert, dass »der Ausdruck "Anschauung", "Intuition" ja mit Fingern auf Plato zurückweist, der, wie nach ihm das ganze Heer der Rationalisten, von einer "Schau", einem Erschauen des rein "Seiendes" spricht. Im "Eidos", in der "Idee" liegt auch der Hinweis auf eine "Art Sehen"«,<sup>19</sup> dass sich später in Descartes in sinnliches Greifen (*perceptio*) und begriffliches Erfassen (*conceptus*) entzweigt.

Aber was charakterisiert dieses reine Anschauen der gebenden Intuition? Wie erhält sie die Evidenz eines apodiktischen Beweises? Streng nach Descartes und in einer platonisch ähnlichen Manöver, beugt sich Husserl vor dem starren Vorbild der Mathematik.<sup>20</sup> Die akritische Assimilation des statischen Naturwissenschaftsmodells ergibt, dass die Begründung der isolierten Einzelsetzung des Denkens die Kontinuität

des Denkens nicht genügend in den Blick nimmt. Dazu äussert sich Natorp ganz klar und deutlich: »Denken ist *Bewegung*, nicht Stillstellung; die Stillstände dürfen nur Durchgänge sein, gleichwie der Punkt nur im Zuge der Linie, nicht ihr voraus für sich und durch sich selbst bestimmt sein kann. [...] Die vermeinten Festpunkte des Denkens müssen aufgelöst, verflüssigt werden in die Kontinuität des *Denkprozesses*. So ist nichts, sondern wird nur etwas "gegeben". Jede diskrete, im schlechten Sinn "rationale" Setzung muss zurückgehen in das Irrationale, d.h. Vor – und Überrationale einer logischen Kontinuität. [...] *Der Prozeß selbst ist das "Gebende"* für die "Prinzipien"; nur so "gibt" es, "gibt sich" Gegebenes«. <sup>21</sup>

Das setzende und tetische Denken entsteht erst aus der ursprünglichen Kontinuität, aus der schließlich allbefassende Unendlichkeit der Wechselbeziehungen. Gerade hier liegt eine der tiefsten Entdeckungen Platons: der der Bewegung (*kinesis*) der Ideen. Eine Entdeckung, die die traditionelle Übernahme des platonischen Rationalismus verfehlt. »Vielleicht, dass Husserl in der weiteren Durchführung seines Gedankens eben dieser Einsicht näherkommt, ja schon nähergekommen ist; vorerst aber, so wie die Sätze dastehen, scheint es, dass er zwar bis zum Eidos Platons vorgedrungen, aber auf der *ersten Stufe* des Platonismus, der der starren, unbeweglich "im Sein dastehenden" Eide stehen geblieben ist, den letzten Schritt Platons, der erst der größte und eigenste war: die Eide in *Bewegung* zu bringen, sie in die letzte *Kontinuität* des Denkprozesses zu verflüssigen, nicht mitgemacht hat«. <sup>22</sup>

Das reine Bewußtsein soll dargestellt werden in strenger Entgegensetzung zur erfahrbaren Wirklichkeit, aber zugleich doch im Ausgang von dieser. Wie erhält man nun die reine Phänome? Sie werden, nach Husserl, durch Ausschaltung oder Einklammerung des Realitätscharakter erreicht. Diese Epoche (genauso wie im Descartschen Zweifel) erstreckt sich auf die ganze Welt. Dann bleibt als phänomenologisches Residuum das Bewußtsein in sich selbst, das reine oder transzendente Bewußtsein. <sup>23</sup> Dagegen meint Natorp, dass das reine Bewußtsein nicht durch eine einfache Reduktion als selbstverständliches Residuum herauszustellen ist; diese Aufgabe bedarf eher einer schweren und komplexen Rekonstruktion, die die Unmittelbarkeit des Bewußtseinsstroms in Betracht nimmt. Husserls Problem liegt in der ständigen Notwendigkeit einer Vermittlung, besonders einer reflexiven Vermittlung des kontinuierlichen Stroms des Erlebniszusammenhangs. Die Erkenntnis, um diesen Zusammenhang in bestimmten Momenten festhalten zu können, muß aber den Strom gleichsam aufhalten. Und das bringt mit sich eine reflexive Modifikation des strömenden Stroms, eine Charakterveränderung des

Stromerlebnis. Löst sich damit nicht die Konkretion des Bewußtseins in eine Summe von Abstraktionen? Wird nicht der flutende Strom des Bewußtsein, gegen seine Natur, stillgestellt? »Der Strom im Strömen«, betont Natorp, »ist etwas anderes, als was von ihm in der Reflexion erfasst und festgehalten wird.«<sup>24</sup> Insofern das Bewußtsein in jeder Richtung unendlich und grenzlos ist, kann es keine endliche und absolute Erkenntnis von ihm geben. Und es leuchtet noch weniger ein, dass ein bloßes Ausschalten der Welt der Gegenständlichkeit, d.h. ein einfach negatives Verhalten, das Bewußtsein in seiner Reinheit herausstellt.

Der schraffe Dualismus ist aufzulösen und beweglich zu machen in der reinen Korrelation von Bewußtsein und Gegenstand. Man muß von der untersten Potenz des Lebens, vom letzten und bestimmungslosen Untergrund des Erlebbaren ausgehen.<sup>25</sup>

Heidegger legt auch einen besonderen Nachdruck auf den prozessualen, dynamischen oder kinetischen Charakter der Erlebnisse, wenn er die Notwendigkeit einer Verflüssigung der Kategorien unterstreicht. Damit soll ein originär umwelterlebendes Mitschwingen, ein spontanes Hineinschauen in das Bedeutungshafte (wie im Fall des Kathederumwelterlebnisses) erreicht werden.<sup>26</sup> Gerade in diesem Punkt erweisen sich die Unterschiede zwischen Heideggers und Husserls Phänomenologiebegriffes.

### III. HERMENEUTISCHE PHÄNOMENOLOGIE VERSUS REFLEXIVE PHÄNOMENOLOGIE

Wir stehen hier vor zwei verschiedenen Begriffen der Phänomenologie, die sich hauptsächlich in der Bestimmung der phänomenologischen Intuition unterscheiden: Husserls fasst diese Intuition als ein reflexives Schauen, Heidegger kennzeichnet sie als ein hermeneutisches Verstehen. Bereits in den jungen Heidegger kann man die verschiedenen Stationen seiner hermeneutischen Transformation der Phänomenologie klar und deutlich verfolgen, besonders anhand des Kriegsnotsemesters 1919 *Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem* und der Marburger Vorlesung vom WS 1923/24 *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*.<sup>27</sup> Die hermeneutisch-phänomenologische Erschließung des vorher analysierten Kathederumwelterlebnisses ist ein gutes Beispiel, um Husserls reflexive und theoretische Zugangsweise und Heideggers nicht-reflexive und vor-theoretische Zugangsweise zum Leben und Erleben zu vergegenwärtigen. Heidegger behauptet, dass das unmittelbare Umwelterlebnis primär von einer jeweils verstandenen Zeuganzheit aus-

geht und nicht von einer wahrgenommenen Sachspähre. In der vergegenständlichen Reflexion läuft das Umwelterlebnis gegenständlich vor dem reflektierenden Akt als ein Vorgang ab. Dagegen verbleibt das hermeneutische Verstehen innerhalb des auszulegenden Umwelterlebnisses. Dadurch kann das Umwelterlebnis nicht zum Reflexionsgegenstand objektiviert werden. Es schwingt mit dem Vollzugssinn des geschehenden Erlebens. Es ist aber nicht das Geschehen eines reflexiv vorgestellten Vorgangs, sondern ein Erlebensgeschehen, mit dem ich mitgehe, wenn ich es hermeneutisch verstehe. Dieser eigenste Geschehenscharakter ist ein Ereignis.<sup>28</sup> Das a-theoretische, hermeneutische Verstehen ist eine ganz neue Zugangsweise zu den Erlebnissen, die ihrem Wesen nach Ereignisse sind insofern sie aus dem Eigenen des Lebens selbst entstammen; d.h. sie sind nicht mein Eigentum, sondern sie gehören zur ursprünglichen, anfänglichen, genuinen, echten oder authentischen Lebensspähre.<sup>29</sup>

Die Erkenntnistheorie sucht den Zugang zu das Unmittelbar und Primäre durch die Theorie (Betrachtung) und die Reflexion (Überlegung). Für die hermeneutische Phänomenologie ist aber dadurch das eigentliche Unmittelbare und Primäre verdeckt und unsichtbar geworden. Gerade diese Verranntheit in das Theoretische, wie wir schon erwähnt haben, hindert die Einsicht in den Herrschaftsbereich des umweltlichen Erlebens. Die Theoretisierung kann also als »Prozeß der fortschreitenden zerstörenden theoretischen Infizierung des Umweltlichen«,<sup>30</sup> als Entzug der Lebendigkeit des Erlebens, als Prozeß der Ent-deutung, der Ent-lebung und der Ent-geschichtlichung interpretiert werden.<sup>31</sup> Letzten Endes stehen wir vor dem Problem einer methodischen korrekten Erfassung bzw. Erschließung der Erlebnisse überhaupt.

Heidegger meint, daß Husserls reflexive Phänomenologie sich im Bereich einer theoretischen Fassung der Subjektivität bewegt. Ihre primäre Zugangsweise zur Welt ist durch die sinnliche Wahrnehmung vermittelt, so daß die intentionale Objekte sich hauptsächlich in einer sachsetzenden Betrachtung der Welt geben. Diese Vorgehensweise funktioniert wie ein Mechanismus der reflexiven Vergegenwärtigung der Erlebnisse, die Heidegger als Vorgang beschreibt. Dagegen geht Heideggers hermeneutische Phänomenologie von dem faktischen Leben aus, welches sich schon immer in einer bedeutungsgeladenen Welt mit dem Phänomen begegnet. Der Mechanismus, der den Bedeutungsstrom der Umwelterlebnisse verstehend wiederholt und uns die ursprüngliche Lebens und Erlebnisspähre öffnet, nennt Heidegger Ereignis.

Schematisch könnten wir den Kontrast zwischen Husserls reflexivem und Heideggers hermeneutischem Phänomenologiebegriff folgenderweise schildern:

## HUSSERLS REFLEXIVE PHÄNOMENOLOGIE

### SUBJEKTIVITÄT

Ausgangspunkt der reflexiven Phänomenologie ist ein von dem lebendigen Substrat entwurzeltes Subjekt und künstlich vor einem Objekt gestellt.

### GEGEBENHEIT

Der Bereich der intentionalen Objekte gibt sich hauptsächlich in einer sachsetzenden Betrachtung der Welt, die die Erlebnisse im Rückgang auf erklärende Aufbauelemente zerstückelt.

### WAHRNEHMUNG

Die primäre und alle anderer tragende Zugangsweise zur Umwelt sind die sinnlichen Wahrnehmungen, so dass die umweltlichen Dinge als räumlich ausgebreitete Empfindungsdaten bewußt sind. Die Umwelt ist zuunterst eine sinnliche Erfahrungswelt, deren objektiven Eigenschaften mit Hilfe des naturwissenschaftlichen Beschreibungsmodell vor Augen gestellt wird.

### WAS

Die naturwissenschaftlich orientierte Phänomenologie stellt die objektiven Bestimmungen fest, d.h. sie determiniert den Wasgehalt der Sachen (Farbe, Figur, Gewicht, Geschwindigkeit usw.).

### VORGANG

Mechanismus der reflexiven Vergegenwärtigung der Umwelterlebnisse, wo die Sachen theoretisch objektiviert und aus der Umwelt entzogen werden. Demzufolge verliert das Erlebnis sein ursprüngliches Erlebenscharakter und reduziert sich auf einen ichbezogenen

## HEIDEGGERS HERMENEUTISCHE PHÄNOMENOLOGIE

### FAKTISCHES LEBEN

Ausgangspunkt der hermeneutischen Phänomenologie ist ein schon immer in einer hermeneutischen Situation eingebettetes Leben.

### BEGEGNUNG

Die unmittelbare Umwelterlebnisse geben sich nicht in oder vor dem Bewußtsein, sondern begegnen uns jeweils im vertrauten Horizont einer symbolisch strukturierten Lebenswelt.

### BEDEUTUNG

Die sinnliche Wahrnehmung behält ihre Gültigkeit, aber sie verliert ihren primären Fundierungscharakter. Die Erlebnisse erscheinen unmittelbar nicht als wahrgenommene Objekte, sondern als bedeutungsgeladene Phänomene. Die Umwelt ist zunächst eine begegnende Bedeutungswelt, die dank der hermeneutische Intuition schon immer irgendwie verstanden wird.

### WIE

Die urwissenschaftliche Haltung der Philosophie beschäftigt sich mit der Weise, mit dem Wie man verstehend mit der direkten Lebenswelt umgeht (Sorge, Fürsorge, Verfallen, Man usw.).

### EREIGNIS

Mechanismus der verstehenden Wiederholung der Umwelterlebnisse ausgehend von dem Bedeutungsstrom des Erlebens, wo die Dingen, Personen oder Situationen schlicht und direkt begegnen. Diese nicht reflexiv vergegenständlichen Erlebnisse behalten

Vorgang, der ein Entlebensprozeß verursacht.

ihren ursprünglichen Ereignischarakter, in denen mein historisches Ich voll dabei ist.

### WISSENSCHAFT

Husserl bleibt im Rahmen einer naturwissenschaftlichen Konzeption der Phänomenologie, wo jene Beziehung zum faktischen Leben künstlich ausgeschaltet wird zugunsten eines idealen Zugangs zu den puren Ich-erlebnissen. Diese Wissenschaft benutzt noch die Kategorien in ihrem Versuch eine objektive Welterfassung zu erreichen. Die eidetische Deskription bewegt sich hauptsächlich in der Sphäre der Bewußtseinsakte der reinen Subjektivität.

### URWISSENSCHAFT

Heideggers Hermeneutik konzentriert sich auf die vorthoretische oder urwissenschaftliche Sphäre, d.h. auf die praktische Beziehung des Lebens zur Welt, um von da aus die ontologischen Hauptstrukturen des menschlichen Daseins abzuleiten. Jetzt spricht man von formaler Anzeige, d.h. von den Begriffen, die das Leben direkt aus dem Weltkontext entnimmt, um sich selbst zu interpretieren. Der Schwerpunkt liegt hier in den Vollzugs- bzw. Verhaltensweisen des Daseins.

### INTENTIONALITÄT

Die phänomenologische Beschreibung geht hauptsächlich vom Ich-pol aus, d.h. sie setzt den Schwerpunkt auf der noetisch weltentzogenen Tätigkeit des reinen Bewußtseins.

### SORGE

Die Philosophie als Urwissenschaft ist eher noematisch orientiert, d.h. sie verrückt den Akzent auf die Umwelterlebnisse, um denen sich das Leben jeweils schon besorgt.

### REDUKTION

Der Zugang zur puren Subjektivität als letztes Fundament (oder phänomenologisches Residuum) und die dementprechende Ausschaltung der natürlichen Welt gelingt durch einen expliziten Reflexionsakt, d.h. beruht auf einer objektiv reflexiven Haltung, die das *ego* in jedem Moment willkürlich einsetzen kann. Die Angst dagegen versetzt oder entwirft uns die nackte Welt hinein.

### ANGST

Die originäre Welterschließung des Daseins geschieht eher durch eine Grundstimmung wie die Angst. Die Angst ist von ausgezeichneter Bedeutung für die methodischen Absichten der Hermeneutik der Faktizität, weil sie passiv (d.h. ohne eine explizite Reduktion) genau die Selbstdurchsichtigkeit erbringt, die Husserl seinen drei Reduktionen zuschreibt.

---

Doch stehen wir nicht vor einem teilweise künstlichen, partiellen, reduzierten und interessierten Gegensatz zwischen reflexiver und hermeneutischer Phänomenologie, der über Heidegger und besonders durch Gadammers Urbanisierung der Heideggerschen Provinz einen wichtigen Teil der Sekundärliteratur beherrscht? Heideggers philosophisch großer Beitrag ist -nach Gadammers Meinung- die radikale Kritik eines hypostasierten

Bewußtseins, die Verführung das Bewußtsein als eine »Sphäre« mit einem »Außen« zu denken.<sup>32</sup> Husserl hat im Aufweis der intentionalen Struktur des Bewußtseins (und später mit dem graduellen Vorrang der Lebenswelt) diese Implikation zu klarer Evidenz gebracht. Aber erst Heideggers begriffsgeschichtliche Destruktion der neuzeitlichen Subjektivität hat die ontologische Unangemessenheit dieses Subjekt- bzw. Bewußtseinsbegriff zur letzten Klarheit gebracht. Heideggers und Gadammers Interpretation von Husserl ist vielleicht etwas einseitig, denn bereits Husserls frühe Untersuchungen zur konstitutiven inneren Zeitlichkeit des Bewußtseins in *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins* (1905), zur Intersubjektivität in der *Problemvorlesung* (1910) und zum Lebenshorizont in den Vorlesungen *Erste Philosophie* (1923/24) sind klare Zeugnisse einer langsam genetisch orientierten Phänomenologie, die Heidegger natürlich direkt und persönlich kannte und die uns zu einer Revision des Gegensatzes zwischen reflexiver und hermeneutischer Phänomenologie führen sollte.

*Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona*

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> GA 56/57, S. 62. Wir zitieren nach Heideggers *Gesamtausgabe*. (Other authors mentioned in the text: Aristotle, Dilthey, Gadamer, Husserl, Jaspers, Kierkegaard, Lask, Levinas, Natorp, Nietzsche, Rickert, Weber, Windelband).

<sup>2</sup> Der Lebenslauf, den Heidegger 1922 verfasste und zusammen mit dem *Natorp-Bericht* nach Marburg schickte, bietet uns einen wertvollen Zeugnis der ontologisch steigenden Färbung seiner hermeneutischen Phänomenologie des Daseins: »Die Untersuchungen, auf denen die vollständig ausgearbeiteten Vorlesungen gründen, haben das Ziel einer systematischen phänomenologisch-ontologischen Interpretation der Grundphänomene des faktischen Lebens, das seinem Seinssinn nach als »historisches« Leben verstanden und nach seinen Grundverhaltensweisen des Umgehens mit und in einer Welt (Umwelt, Mitwelt, Selbstwelt) zur kategorialen Bestimmung gebracht wird« (GA 16, S. 44).

<sup>3</sup> Vgl. GA 63, 15.

<sup>4</sup> GA 58, S. 97.

<sup>5</sup> Vgl. GA 1, S. 185ff. Hier sollte man auch die Wichtigkeit der Analyse der impersonalen Aussagen und deren zuvor vorgegebene Hintergrundwissen erwähnen. Im letzten Kapitel der Dissertation *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus* (1913) spürt man ein steigendes Interesse an den faktisch schon immer vorausgesetzten Bedeutungshorizont jeder Urteilstätigkeit. Für weitere Information zu diesem Thema und Heideggers produktive Assimilation von Lasks Prinzip der Materialbestimmtheit der Form, siehe Adrián (2001), S. 61–72.

<sup>6</sup> Vgl. dazu GA 60. Hinsichtlich der später in *Sein und Zeit* entfalteten existenzialen Analytik des Daseins, werden hier schon einige der Hauptstrukturen und fundamentalen Tendenzen des faktischen Leben klar und deutlich skizziert (wie z.B. das Verfallen, die



Verdeckungstendenz, das Gewissen, das Man, die Sorge oder die kairologische Erfahrung der Zeit).

<sup>7</sup> Der *Natorp Bericht* und die Vorlesungen von 1921/22 *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles* (GA 61), so wie die ontologisierenden Interpretationen der aristotelischen *Rhetorik* und *Nikomachischen Ethik* der Sommersemestervorlesungen 1924 *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie* (GA 18) und der Wintersemestervorlesung 1924/25 *Plato: Sophistes* (GA 19) geben uns einen reich dokumentierten Überblick. Zu diesem Thema gibt es umfangreiche Literatur. Siehe u.a. Adrián (2000), Sadler (1996), Taminiaux (1989) und vor allem Volpi (1992) u. (1994).

<sup>8</sup> GA 56/57, 71f. Husserl Begriff der Horizontintentionalität funktioniert ähnlicher Weise. Die Intentionalität ist hier nicht auf einzelne Gegenstände gerichtet, sondern projiziert sich in einem Horizont. Wenn ich meine Aufmerksamkeit auf einen bestimmten Gegenstand richte, etwa auf dem Tisch, der gegenüber mir steht, so sind für mich gleichzeitig alle andere Gegenstände des ganzen Saal mit da. Doch dieser Horizont von Intentionalitäten ist nicht mehr Gegenstand eine subjektiven Meinens. Deswegen nennt Husserl solche Intentionalität anonym.

<sup>9</sup> Vgl. GA 20, S. 254f.

<sup>10</sup> Vgl. GA 56/57, S. 91.

<sup>11</sup> GA 56/57, S. 113.

<sup>12</sup> GA 56/57, S. 72f.

<sup>13</sup> GA 58, S. 104.

<sup>14</sup> GA 56/57, S. 88. Die ganze Argumentation muß man natürlich in den korrekten Texthintergrund Husserls *Ideen* situieren, von dem Heidegger in diesen Vorlesungen spricht. Die wichtigsten Textpassagen zum Thema der theoretischen Haltung zur Umwelt und der phänomenologischen Reflexion findet man in »Der Welt der natürlichen Einstellung: Ich und meine Umwelt« (vgl. *Ideen* § 27) bzw. »Die phänomenologische Fundamentalbetrachtung« und »Zur Methodik und Problematik der reinen Phänomenologie« (vgl. *Ideen* §§ 38, 45 u. 77–78).

<sup>15</sup> Vgl. GA 58, S. 36.

<sup>16</sup> GA 58, S. 171.

<sup>17</sup> GA 58, 104.

<sup>18</sup> Vgl. Natorp (1971/18), S. 225.

<sup>19</sup> Husserl, *Ideen* § 24.

<sup>20</sup> Husserl, *Ideen* § 78.

<sup>21</sup> Natorp (1917/18), S. 228.

<sup>22</sup> Genau an diesem Punkt knüpft auch Heideggers Kritik an Husserls. Siehe dazu die interessanten und ausführlichen Analysen von den Vorlesungen 1923/24 *Einleitung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, besonders die Textstellen in denen gezeigt wird, wie Husserls Idee der Wissenschaft das Prototyp der mathematischen Naturerkenntnis problemlos übernimmt (GA 17, §§ 11, 15 u. 47–48).

<sup>23</sup> Natorp (1917/18), S. 230.

<sup>24</sup> Natorp (1917/18), S. 231.

<sup>25</sup> Vgl. Husserl, *Ideen* § 33. Husserls Postulat der Idealität der Bedeutungen versucht gerade den Relativismus und die Kontingenz der kontextabhängigen und empirisch modifizierenden Umständen zu neutralisieren. Im Namen des wissenschaftlichen Anspruchs der Phänomenologie wird die Geschichte eingeklammert, um jeden Historismus und Relativismus zu vermeiden. Doch damit bleibt Husserl an den transzendentalen Idealismus gefesselt (in der Form des Platonismus oder sogar Neucartesianismus). Erst anfangs der

zwanziger Jahren wird Husserl allmählich die Lebenswelt und die Geschichte in seine genetische Phänomenologie in Betracht nehmen.

<sup>26</sup> Natorp (1917/18), S. 237.

<sup>27</sup> Vgl. Heideggers ausführliche Interpretation Natorps *Psychologie in den Sommersemestervorlesungen 1920 Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks* (GA 59, §§ 12–15).:

<sup>28</sup> Vgl. GA 56/57, § 15.

<sup>29</sup> Wie es schon bekannt ist, diese erste Kritik an Husserls Phänomenologie wird später in der Vorlesung 1925 *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* ausführlich durchgeführt. Innerhalb der umfangreichen Literatur zu diesem Thema, siehe u.a. Adrián (2004), Gander (2001), Grondin (1991), Held (1988), Kalariparambil (1999), Merker (1988), Riedel (1989), Rodriguez (1997) und besonders Herrmann (1981) und (2000).

<sup>30</sup> Vgl. GA 56/57, 73ff.

<sup>31</sup> Daher ist es ein grober Interpretationsfehler diesen Ereignischarakter des Lebens und Erlebens aus der späteren seinsgeschichtlichen Perspektive zu deuten, wie im Fall von Gadamer.

<sup>32</sup> GA 56/57, S. 89.

<sup>33</sup> Vgl. GA 56/57, S. 89.

<sup>34</sup> Vgl. Gadamer (1987), S. 83ff.

## LITERATURVERZEICHNIS

### 1. Schriften Heideggers:

Heidegger, M. (1978), *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus. Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik* (1913), in *Frühe Schriften*, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, S. 59–188 (GA 1).

——. (1978), *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus* (1916), in *Frühe Schriften*, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, S. 189–411 (GA 1).

——. (1987), *Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem* (1919), in *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, S. 3–117 (GA 56/57).

——. (1993), *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (1919/20), Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann (GA 58).

——. (1993), *Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks* (1920), Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann (GA 59).

——. (1976), »Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers »Psychologie der Weltanschauungen« (1919–1921), in *Wegmarken*, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, S. 1–44 (GA 9).

——. (1995), *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens* (1920/21 und 1921), Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann (GA 60).

——. (1985), *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (1921/22), Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann (GA 61).

——. (1989), »Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation (Natorp-Bericht 1922)«, *Dilthey-Jahrbuch* 6, S. 237–274.

——. (1988), *Ontologie. Hermeneutik der Faktizität* (1923), Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann (GA 63).

——. (1994), *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (1923/24), Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann (GA 17).

- . (1992), *Platon: Sophistes* (1924/25), Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann (GA 19).
- . (21988), *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffes* (1925), Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann (GA 20).
- . (161987), *Sein und Zeit* (1927), Tübingen, Max Niemeyer.
- . (2000), *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges*, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann (GA 16).

## 2. Sekundärliteratur

- Adrián, J. (2000), »De la Ética de Nicómaco a la ontología de la vida humana«, *Taula* 33–34, S. 91–106.
- Adrián, J. (2001), »Der junge Heidegger und der Horizont der Seinsfrage«, *Heidegger Studien* 17, S. 93–116.
- Adrián, J. (2004), »Heidegger y la indicación formal. Hacia una articulación categorial de la vida humana«, *Dianoia* XLIX/59, S. 1–22.
- Buren, J. (1992) »The Young Heidegger, Aristotle and Phenomenology«, in Dallery u. Scott (Hgg.), *Ethics and Danher. Essays on Heidegger ant the Continental Thought*, State University Press, New York, S. 169–185.
- Courtine, J.-F. (1990), »Réduction phénoménologique-transcendentale et différence ontico-ontologique«, in *Heidegger et la phénoménologie*. Paris, J.Vrin, S. 207–247.
- Courtine, J.-F. (Hrg.) (1996), *Heidegger 1919–1928: De l'herméneutique de la facticité à la métaphysique du Dasein*, Paris, J. Vrin.
- Dahlstrom, D. (1994), »Heidegger's Method: Philosophical Concepts as Formal Indications«, *Review of Metaphysics* 47, S. 775–797.
- Espósito, C. (1997), »Il periodo de Marburgo (1923–1928) ed *Essere e tempo*: dalla fenomenologia all'ontologia fondamentale«, in Volpi, F. (Hrg.): *Heidegger*, Roma, Laterza, S. 107–157.
- Fabris, A. (1997), »L'ermeneutica della fatticità nei corsi friburghesi del 1919 al 1923«, in Volpi, F. (Hrg.), *Heidegger*, Roma, Laterza, S. 57–106.
- Gadamer, H.G. (1987), *Gesammelte Werke (Band III: Hegel-Husserl-Heidegger)*, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr.
- Gander, H.-G (2001), *Selbstverständnis und Lebenswelt. Grundzüge einer phänomenologischen Hermeneutik im Ausgang von Husserl und Heidegger*, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.
- Grondin, J. (1991), *Einführung in die philosophische Hermeneutik*. Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Herrmann, F.-W (1981), *Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Husserl und Heidegger*, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann.
- Herrmann, F.-W. (2000), *Hermeneutik und Reflexion*, Frankfurt am Main. Vittorio Klostermann.
- Husserl, E. (1975), *Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*, Den Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.
- Husserl, E. (1976), *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Den Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.
- Imdahl, G. (1997), *Das Leben verstehen. Heideggers formal anzeigende Hermeneutik in den frühen Freiburger Vorlesungen*, Würzburg, Königshausen & Neumann.

- Kalariparambal, T. (1999), *Das befindliche Verstehen und die Seinsfrage*, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot.
- Kisiel, Th. und Buren, J. (Hrg.) (1994), *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought*, Albany, State University of New York Press.
- Lazzari, R. (2002), *Ontologia della fatticità. Prospettive sul giovane Heidegger (Husserl, Dilthey, Natorp, Lask)*, Milano, Franco Angeli.
- Merker, B. (1988), *Selbsttäuschung und Selbsterkenntnis. Zu Heideggers Transformation der Phänomenologie Husserls*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp.
- Natorp, P. (1917/18), »Husserls "Ideen einer reinen Phänomenologie"«, *Logos* 7, S. 215–240.
- Riedel, M. (1989), »Urstiftung der phänomenologischen Hermeneutik. Heideggers frühe Auseinandersetzung mit Husserl«, in Jamme, Ch. und Pöggeler, O. (Hgg.), *Phänomenologie im Widerstreit*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, S. 215–233.
- Rodríguez, R. (1997), *La transformación hermenéutica de la fenomenología. Una interpretación de la obra temprana de Heidegger*, Madrid, Tecnos.
- Sadler, T (1996), *Heidegger and Aristotle. The Question of Being*, London, Athlone.
- Taminiaux, J. (1989), »La réappropriation de l'*Ethique à Nicomaque*: poïesis et praxis dans l'articulation de l'ontologie fondamentale«, in *Lectures de l'ontologie fondamentale. Essais sur Heidegger*, Grenoble, Jerome Millon, S. 149–189.
- Volpi, F. (1992), »Dasein as praxis. The Heideggerian Assimilation and the Radicalization of the practical philosophy of Aristotle«, in Macann, Ch. (Hrg.), *Martin Heidegger. Critical Assessments II*. London and New York, Routledge, 91–129.
- Volpi, F. (1994), »*Being and Time*: A Translation of the *Nichomachean Ethics*?«, in Kisiel, Th. und Buren, J. (Hgg.), *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought*, Albany, State University of New York Press, S. 195–212.

# ON THE ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF HUSSERL'S PERCEPTUAL NOEMA AND THE OBJECT OF PERCEPTION

Husserl's noema, particularly the perceptual noema, is one of the most important concepts of his phenomenology. Nevertheless, Husserl has not provided a satisfactory description of this notion. Indeed, among others, Dagfinn Føllesdal remarks that "[w]e might like to know in much greater detail what noemata are. Like Frege [regarding his *Sinn*] Husserl is not very helpful."<sup>1</sup> Many of Husserl's commentators who have pointed out that this concept is still seriously in need of further clarification have attempted to interpret it in various ways. For example, Hubert, L. Dreyfus states that "... there is a fundamental disagreement as to what Husserl has in mind when he speaks of the perceptual noema."<sup>2</sup> Again David Bell mentions that "[a] very great deal has been written recently in an effort to establish exactly what a Husserlian noema is. And wide variety of options have been canvassed; amongst them that noemata are intentional objects, linguistic meanings, essences, Fregean senses, and either the appearances, or the perspectival aspects, or even the parts, of physical objects."<sup>3</sup> Bell instead maintains that "... we should resist the temptation to think that a noema is some particular sort of object or that the concept of a noema is a genuine sortal concept."<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, the nature of the object of perception is even a more disputed point than that of the perceptual noema. Especially the problem of whether non-veridical perceptions have an object is in need of clarification.

In this paper we shall engage in an analysis of the ontological structure of Husserl's perceptual noema and the object of perception, viz., to find out what kind of entities, if any, perceptual noemata and objects are. We restrict our attention to outer perception, i.e., perception of physical things in the external world, using thus the term "perception" as short for "outer perception".

## 1. NATURAL VS. PHENOMENOLOGICAL STANDPOINT

Husserl's phenomenology starts with the natural attitude involving three categories of objects, viz., physical as well as psychical real individuals, essences, and essence-instances which are moments of individuals. For

example, given a perceived physical individual, say, a red flower, we distinguish between the essence Redness on the one hand, and two of its instances, viz., the shade of red as an objective moment of the flower itself and the sensation of red as a subjective moment of the flower's perception on the other hand. Within the natural standpoint, physical things and psychical occurrences, as well as their moments, are called *real* objects, whereas essences are called *ideal* objects.

In the phenomenological attitude, all *real* and *ideal* objects are *excluded* (*aussgehaltet*), i.e., bracketed, via phenomenological (transcendental and eidetic) reduction, viz., ἐποχή. The transcendental reduction applies to *real* whereas eidetic reduction to *ideal* objects resulting with the suspension of judgments (especially existential ones) about both kinds of objects. What survives the ἐποχή, viz., the unbracketed *residuum*, consists of the *experiences* (*Erlebnisse*) within pure consciousness. Some experiences are experiences *of* some object, and some are not. The former are called *intentional* and the latter *non-intentional*. An intentional experience is said to be directed to what it is of. Intentional experiences are called *acts* whereas non-intentional ones *non-acts*. Typical examples of acts are perceptions, memory and phantasy images, judgments, beliefs, etc., and of non-acts sensory data and mere feelings. Experiences and their moments are called *reell* objects.

The phenomenological attitude is characterized by a fundamental operation by means of which a counterpart of every *real* or *ideal* object is constituted as an object depending only on pure consciousness. This operation is called *constitution*. Although the constituted objects depend only on pure consciousness, they themselves are not experiences or moments thereof. Therefore, they are not *reell* objects; indeed they are said to be *irreell*. The ontology underlying the phenomenological attitude consists of both the *reell* and *irreell* objects. These objects are *immanent* in the sense that they are in, or depend only on, consciousness in contradistinction to the *real* or *ideal* objects which are called *transcendent* in the sense of depending not only on pure consciousness.<sup>5</sup> In general, the constituted (*irreell*) counterparts of *ideal* objects, i.e., of transcendent essences, are called *ideell*. The constituted counterpart of a given transcendent object is expressed by enclosing the name of this object within a pair of inverted commas. For example, the constituted counterpart of the transcendent essence Redness is "Redness", that of a red flower I pointed to is "this red flower", and that of the color moment of this red flower is "the particular shade of red of this flower". On the other hand, there are two different kinds of counterparts of a psychic experience *e* concerning

a given person. One is the constituted (*irell*) counterpart "*e*". The other one consists in the (*reell*) experience corresponding to *e* as a result of the person's application of a transcendental reduction. We denote this experience as *e*\* and call it the *reell* counterpart, or phenomenological *reduct*, of *e*.<sup>6</sup> For example, let *e* be the perception of a red flower by a person *P* in a given situation, and suppose that *P* performs a transcendental reduction. Then, the experience in the pure consciousness of the person *P* *qua* pure ego consisting in the perceptual act directed to "the red flower" is the *reell* counterpart of the psychic experience of *P*'s perceiving the red flower. In general, *e* being a psychological experience, *e*\* is the act – in the same mode as *e* – directed to "*e*".

## 2. PERCEPTION

From the natural standpoint, the structure of a *perceptual* process, or *perception* for short, can be described in the following way. Consider a physical thing *A*, say a red flower, which is perceived by a person in a given situation. Let *B* be one of the perceived determinations (or objective moments), say, the shade of color red of *A*. *B* is an instance of a transcendent essence *B'*, viz., Redness. Given that *C* is the perception of an aspect of *A*, *C* contains, among others, a sensory datum *D*, viz., a sensation of red, caused by the objective moment *B*, i.e., the shade of color of object *A*.

On the other hand, from the phenomenological standpoint, the structure of the *reell* counterpart *C*\* of the above-mentioned perception *C* can be described as follows. The matter or stuff of *C*\* consists of *reell* sensory data, called the *hyletic moments* of *C*\*. The totality of these moments is said to be the *hyle* of *C*\*. In particular, *D*\*, i.e., the *reell* counterpart of the sensation of red, is a hyletic moment of *C*\*. In order that a hyletic moment be the sensation of a corresponding objective moment, for example that *D*\* be a sensation of "*B*", viz., "the shade of color red", it must be *animated* by a *construing* or *apprehension* (*Auffassung*), say, *E*\*. The *construings* are also considered to be *reell* components of the perception *C*\* which do not belong to its matter; they rather make up the form (intentional *morphe*) of *C*\* and they are called *noetic moments*. The hyletic moments of *C*\*, in so far as they are animated by the corresponding noetic moments, are said to be *appearances* or *adumbrations* (*Abschattungen*) of objective moments of the objects of perception. For example, the hyletic moment *D*\* (the sensation of red) animated by the *construing* *E*\* is an appearance or adumbration of the determination "*B*" ("the shade of color red"). "*B*" is an instance of the immanent essence

Redness, “B’”. The essence-instance “B” is an “objective moment” of the constituted object “A”. On the other hand, both the hyletic datum  $D^*$  and the construing  $E^*$  are subjective moments of the perception  $C^*$ . The totality of the noetic moments of the perception  $C^*$ , or *noesis* for short, is a meaning-endowing component of this perception.  $C^*$ , by virtue of its noesis, is a perception of the immanent counterpart  $A$ , viz., “A”. We shall later describe how the immanent object is constituted starting from sensory data such as  $D^*$ .<sup>7</sup>

Let us take as a paradigmatic case of perception visual perception, i.e., *seeing*. Seeing is characterized by the fact that the seen objects take place in a visual space and that these objects are identified by their position in this space. In general, perceived objects take place in a perceptual space and they are recognized by their location in this space.<sup>8</sup> An object is never perceived without referring to its kind, properties, and relations with other things in the same perceptual space. A person’s perceptual space consists of his sensory data and these data have always a geometrical structure, i.e., they are in spatial relations to each other. As mentioned above, only by virtue of a construing is each sensory datum a sensation of some determinate property, viz., essence, such as color, shape sound and so forth, or in other words it is an appearance of such an essence. Thus, without the construing the experience consisting *merely* of the sensory data is nothing but a meaningless chaotic aggregate.

As Kevin Mulligan rightly states, Husserl only indicates the *role*, but does not explain the *nature* of interpretation (*Deutung*) in his *Logical Investigations*.<sup>9</sup> This remark seems to hold also for his later works – in particular for his *Ideas* – where *Auffassung* (construing, apprehension) replaces *Deutung*. Hence, we shall later attempt to elucidate the nature of the notion of construing. We cannot perceive a bare object devoid of any feature, i.e., a *substratum*, if any. Indeed perceiving something requires the separation of that which is perceived and its environment, and this in turn depends on being aware of some characteristic features of the perceived thing, as well as of its position in the percipient’s space-time. This is called the *individuation* of the perceived thing, i.e., it’s being considered as a distinct individual. On the other hand, in any given perception of a physical thing some of the thing’s features are not actually perceived, and some of them are even unperceivable. The perceived features are objective moments of the thing, viz., instances of properties, relations, and kinds located in the percipient’s space-time. All these features are essence-instances.



In general, philosophical views of perception must cope with the problems arising from illusions, hallucinations (as well as afterimages and holograms) and dreams. Let us, therefore, shortly examine the nature of these phenomena. The perception *C* of an existing physical object *A* depends not only on *A* and the perceiver, but also on the conditions of the perception. *A* is perceived *as it is* in the sense of being recognized as belonging to a particular kind and bearing certain intrinsic properties only under normal conditions. In fact, there are no perfectly normal conditions but rather approximately so. That is to say that a physical object can be perceived as it is only approximately. We shall use, then, "normal" in the sense of "approximately normal" hereafter. Thus, the following types of perception can be distinguished.

1. *Perception under normal conditions.* *A* is perceived as it appears to the sense organs, i.e., approximately as it is, but also in another sense as a result of non-inferential knowledge just as it is. For example, under normal conditions when looked horizontally a round or square table appears oblong – as it ought to – but simultaneously it is apprehended with its real shape (i.e., round or square). Given that the perception under normal conditions has an object present to the perceiver which is just as it is perceived, such a perception is called *veridical*.

2. *Perception under non-normal conditions.*

2.1. The perceiver knows that the conditions are non-normal but he has an inferential knowledge of the object as it is, without perceiving it as such. For example, an experienced perceiver sees a stick half immersed in water as broken but knows inferentially that it is straight without apprehending it as such.

2.2. The perceiver thinks that the conditions are normal and, therefore, he falsely believes that the object is really as it appears. For example, an ignorant perceiver may believe that the stick half immersed in water is really broken. This is what is called illusive perception or *illusion* for short.

2.3. The object *A* of the perception *C* does not really exist but the perceiver believes that what he perceives (i.e., *A*) really does exist. Such a perception is either isolated, i.e., it happens in conjunction with several other perceptions each having a real object, or else the perceiver has at a given time no perception of a real object. The first is called a *hallucination*, and the second a *dream*. Such perceptions are called *non-veridical*.

Any satisfactory theory of perception has to explain not only veridical but also non-veridical cases. Let us state in outline some of the main alternative philosophical views of perception, especially with respect to

the problem of non-veridical perceptions. We shall later compare these views with the results of Husserl's phenomenology of perception.

(i) *Phenomenalism*. According to this view the perception *C* of the red flower *A* consists in a complex of sense-data including, say, the sensation of red *D*, whereas the object *A* (the red flower) itself is supposed to be constructed out of a bundle of actually or possibly perceived sense-data. Therefore, the sense-data are components of perception as well as of the perceived object. A perceived determination, say, of the shade of red flower, i.e., *B*, is identified with the sensation of red *D*. Regarding non-veridical perceptions, since what is perceived is again a sense-datum, phenomenalism, at least in principle, can deal with such cases. The main commonsensical objections raised against this view, however, is first, that we do not perceive sense-data such as a sensation of red, but rather red things, such as a red flower, and second, the thing that we perceive is not reducible to sense-data.

(ii) *Physicalist theory of perception*. In this view, talks about perception is confined to so-called folk psychology, and should be taken as short for statements about neurophysiologic states about the perceiver. Suppose that a person has a perception *C* under normal conditions in the presence of red flower *A* so that the body of the perceiver must be in a characteristic neurophysiologic state. But since the same state may occur also under non-normal conditions, that is, when the person's brain get stimulated in the absence of the red flower, non-veridical perception can in principle be explained. Again, however, this view is incompatible with the entrenched belief that we do really have *irreducible* conscious sense-experiences, especially perceptions.

(iii) *Representative realism*. In this view we do not directly perceive physical things but only sense-data or signs which are representations thereof. The represented things are said to be *indirectly* perceived by means of the directly perceived sense-data or signs which are caused by the physical things. It is plausible to admit that the causal relation between the represented and its representation is through the intermediary of the perceiver's brain state. Since the brain state caused by the presence of a red flower can occur also in the absence thereof, non-veridical perception can be explained. This view is confronted, first, with the same objection associated with phenomenalism, because what is directly perceived is a sense-datum. Second, the causal relation between the represented physical thing and the representation in the perceiver's mind is in need of explanation rooted in the mind-body problem.

(iv) *Naïve realism* (or *direct realism*). According to this view first, we *directly* perceive a physical thing, or a real aspect thereof, and not a sense-datum. As it is unanimously agreed, such a view cannot explain non-veridical perceptions such as illusions, hallucinations, and dreams.

The existence or even the possibility of non-veridical cases of perception gives rise to the following skeptical argument. We formulate the version for the case of dream which is due to Russell:

- (1) There are cases in which what is seen in dream is indistinguishable from the supposed external object seen awake.
- (2) It may be that there is no external object seen when awake.
- (3) Therefore, there is no conclusive evidence for the existence of the external object.<sup>10</sup>

Surprisingly, with appropriate modifications, this skeptical argument can be turned into a logically equivalent one, which brings about the acceptance of a new category of object common to both veridical and non-veridical perceptions. This argument, call it (A), is as follows:

- (1) For any perception *C* under normal condition there may be perceptions *C*<sub>1</sub>, *C*<sub>2</sub>, and *C*<sub>3</sub> (i.e., illusion, hallucination, and dream) such that what is perceived in case of each of the latter is indistinguishable from what is perceived in case of the former.
- (2) What is perceived in case of *C* (i.e., under normal conditions) is an ordinary thing in a (possibly private) space-time.

It follows from (1) and (2):

- (3) What is perceived in case of *C*<sub>1</sub>, *C*<sub>2</sub>, and *C*<sub>3</sub> is (also) an ordinary thing in a (possibly private) space-time.

The justification of premise (1) can be stated on the basis of the following points. First, (1) is simply a commonsensical and even a trivial fact of perception. Second, given the neurophysiologic structure of a human being, a thing perceived under normal conditions can be perceived also in the absence of such a thing as a result of an appropriate stimulation of the person's neural system. Third, skeptical arguments such as Descartes' evil demon or Hilary Putnam's brain-in-the-vat leads to (1) in the sense that anything perceived under the so-called normal condition may be just a dream.

On the other hand, premise (2), first of all, is defended by naïve (direct) realism,<sup>11</sup> which is also in accord with commonsense and, second, by Husserlian phenomenology where perception under normal conditions is

perception of an ordinary object in inverted commas, which “prevents any judgment about perceived actuality ... [b]ut it does not prevent the judgment about the fact that perception is consciousness *of* an actuality ...”<sup>12</sup>

If we turn to the conclusion (3), it seems that it can be accepted only within a certain interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology, the truth of which commits us to a category of objects common to normal perceptions and to illusions, hallucinations and dreams. Following Husserl we may call this category “*object-in-the-broader-sense*”.<sup>13</sup> Indeed Husserl writes:

The question is ... how ... all the concatenations of consciousness are to be described which makes necessary, precisely in its actuality, an object simpliciter (which, in the sense of ordinary speech, always signifies an *actual* object). In the *broader* sense, however, the object is ‘constituted’ – ‘whether or not it is actual’ – in certain concatenations of consciousness which in themselves bear a discernible unity ...

As a matter of fact, what has been worked out does not concern just actualities in some pregnant sense or other. Questions about actuality enter into *all* cognitions as cognitions, even in our phenomenological cognitions bearing upon the possible constitution of objects: they all have, indeed, their correlates in “objects” which are meant as “actually existing.”<sup>14</sup>

We restrict objects-in-the-broader-sense to thing-like objects in Husserl’s sense, i.e., to veridically or non-veridically perceivable ordinary objects in the public or in any private space-time, which are thus not intentional. David Woodruff Smith and Ronald McIntyre give three characteristics of intentional objects: (i) they are essentially different from ordinary objects, (ii) they are conception-dependent, and (iii) they are “incompletely determined” in the sense that they have no other properties than the intended ones.<sup>15</sup> For example, an appearance of a perceived ordinary object, say the red flower, is an intentional object. First, such an appearance is not an ordinary object, since the appearance is by no means identical to the flower itself. Second, the appearance depends on the way of perceiving (or conceiving) of the flower. Finally, the appearance has no other properties different from those which appear, since none of the unperceived properties of the flower can belong to the appearance. The above-mentioned objects (in-the-broader-sense), on the other hand, satisfy none of the three characteristics of the intentional objects. Indeed, the former objects are ordinary things, they are not depended on the way they are perceived, and their properties are not restricted by the perception in the sense that they possess unperceived properties.

Every object is located in some space-time, though not in a unique one. Thus, objects in different dreams are in different space-time manifolds;

each dream having its own. On the other hand, all actual objects are in one and the same space-time, called therefore the *actual* space-time. In fact, the *actuality of objects* is defined by their taking place in a unique space-time obeying the laws of nature, which is common to all persons and, therefore, inter-subjective. By contrast, the space-time manifolds of *non-actual objects* are private in the sense that they belong to just one person (say, the dreamer). Such a manifold may be called a *quasi-objective* space-time in the sense of the space-time of the totality of a particular system of quasi-objects.

A globally coherent system of objects in the same space-time may be called a *world* (in the broader sense). The world consisting of actual objects is the unique *actual world*. On the other hand, a world consisting of quasi-objects is a *quasi-world*.<sup>16</sup> The *existence* (*quasi-existence*) of an object within a world means that the object takes place in a harmonious sequence of perceptions. On the other hand, the *nonexistence* (*quasi-nonexistence*) of an object within a world means that it does not occur in such a sequence, and ultimately undergoes cancellation.<sup>17</sup> For example, in case of a perception of a red flower under normal conditions, what is perceived is an actual and existing object. In case an artificial flower is misperceived as a genuine flower, what is perceived is actual (in the actual world) but nonexistent in that it is not genuine. On the other hand, if one sees in dream a red flower, it is a quasi-existent quasi-actual object. Finally, misperception can happen even in a dream so that what is dreamt as a genuine flower may ultimately (within the same dream) turn into an artificial one. Then, what is seen in the dream is a quasi-nonexistent quasi-actual object.

We turn now to argument (A) introduced above in order to compare Husserlian phenomenology *cum* object-in-the-broader-sense with the alternative views, regarding its soundness. Clearly argument (A), which is no doubt valid, is sound only in Husserlian phenomenology *cum* object-in-the-broader-sense. Indeed, in such a view, both the premises and the conclusion are true as we have seen above. On the other hand, for the naïve realist the first premise and the conclusion, whereas for the phenomenalist, the representative realist, and the physicalist, the second premise and the conclusion are false.

#### 4. INTENTIONALITY AND THE OBJECT OF PERCEPTION

The phenomenological description of the perception *C* of an existing actual object *A* requires the bracketing of the object *A*, denoted then as

"A". Let us compare such a perception with the perception  $C_3$  of the dreamt quasi-object " $A_3$ ", which is indistinguishable from the former. Then " $A_3$ " is quasi-existent quasi-actual. Although from the natural standpoint the descriptions of these two perceptions are drastically different, from the phenomenological standpoint they coincide, since phenomenological descriptions of an experience must be independent of the actuality of its object.

The problem of whether *every* intentional experience (act), especially a perception, has an object, as well as the very nature of intentionality, is controversial among Husserl's commentators. Smith and McIntyre distinguish between what may be called *intentional-object theories* and *non-relational theories* of intentionality.<sup>18</sup> According to the former view every perception has an object which is intentional (as characterized with three features above) and intentionality is a relation between the perception and its intentional object. On the other hand, according to the second view, only normal perceptions have an object, viz., an ordinary thing, while the intentionality of any perception (whether normal or not) is a non-relational ("existence-independent" in Smith and McIntyre's terminology) feature of that perception. In this way non-normal perceptions (illusions, hallucinations and dreams) are endowed with intentionality despite of their lacking an object. By saying that the intentionality of a perception is non-relational, we mean that it is not a relation between the perception and its object or, for that matter, with any other entity, but it is an intrinsic property of the perception, or more precisely of the perceptual noesis.

We think that perceptual experience is essentially different from other kinds of experiences such as thinking and believing. The basic insight behind our argument is that it is the object of perception that brings out the act of perception (which was just the opposite in case of non-perceptual acts like thinking). If one thinks of an object, say, of an actual object such as a red flower, but also of a non-actual one such as centaur, it is assumed by no way that the object of thought is present to the thinking subject. Therefore, the structure of a thought (or for that matter of an imagination) can be analyzed alternatively by one or the other above-mentioned types of theories of intentionality. Indeed it is quite plausible to construe an object of thought, whether actual or not, as an intentional object. This construing has been adopted, for example, by Meinong. Notice also that G. E. M. Anscombe distinguishes the intentional object, if any, from the material object.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, the act can be described in a non-relational way by construing the object of the act

simply as a particular characterization of the act. Thus, to think of a red flower or a centaur means nothing else than to think in a particular way, viz., in a red-flower-intending way or a centaur-intending way. This is an adverbial modification of the act of thinking which gets rid of the necessity of referring to an object. It may thus appropriately be called an adverbial theory of thinking.

Although both of the two views are plausible for the explication of non-perceptual acts such as thinking and imagination, we contend that both of them are utterly inadequate for the case of (outer) perception. From the point of view of common sense and usage of ordinary language we do not say that one sees images or in general mental entities, but just ordinary objects, and this is not the case only under the normal conditions, but also in cases of illusions, hallucinations, and dreams. Turning to the non-relational view, we see for the same reason that perception, both under normal and non-normal conditions, presupposes an object.

It is unanimously agreed that, any (outer) perception, at least under normal conditions, has an object, and furthermore such an object is an ordinary one. Since the objects of perceptions are ordinary rather than intentional, under these assumptions, the intentional-object view does not work. Turning to the non-relational view it seems to work for non-intuitional acts such as thinking of something. For it is quite possible to think of something that is fictive, say, of Pegasus. But thinking of a real object and thinking of a fictive one are structurally indistinguishable. In both cases it is the act of thinking that elicits its object and not the other way around. Therefore, thinking cannot be a relation between the act and its object. More precisely, since thinking of a fictive object cannot be such a relation, thinking of a real object cannot be either. On the other hand, if an act of thinking is of a real thing, then this thing is an ordinary object rather than an idea or a thought. For example, thinking of Mount Everest is thinking about a certain mountain rather than about the thought or idea of that mountain.

It is plausible to assume that the rationale lying behind the non-relational view could consist in the following facts. First, there are perceptions, such as hallucinations and dreams, which have no existent objects. Second, and more importantly, as a result of transcendental phenomenological reduction, the object of normal perceptions is bracketed, i.e., its real existence is excluded. But then the intentionality of perception cannot be construed as a relation between the act and its object, which is excluded *qua* transcendent thing. Instead the immanent counterpart of the transcendent object is taken by the proponents of the non-relational view as an

intrinsic characteristic functioning as the sense of an object independently of whether this object exists or not. In case of the perception of an actual transcendent object, this object is prescribed by the sense; otherwise the sense functions *as if* there were an object. Thus if one dreams of a red flower, the sense of the perceptual dream prescribes the red flower as if there were such a thing.

We shall, however, argue in favor of an interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology according to which *every perception* has an immanent object, viz., an object in-the-broader-sense, and its intentionality consists in a genuine relation between the act and its object. For this purpose we refer to Husserl's pregnant description of perception:

- (P) ... the ... experience [*Erfahrung*] that is presentive [object-giving]<sup>20</sup> of something *originarily* is *perception*, the word being understood in the ordinary sense,<sup>21</sup>

We propose to interpret proposition (P), together with what is said about the object-in-the-broader-sense where we referred to Husserl's relevant passage quoted above at length, as follows: (i) It applies to illusions, hallucinations, and dreams, as well as normal perceptions. (ii) The object of perception is directly or immediately given "in person" to consciousness; therefore it is immanent (rather than transcendent) to the perceptual act.<sup>22</sup> (iii) But it is not a complex of *reell* moments of the perception, or for that matter, not a complex of sense-data. (iv) That perception gives its object means that the given object is *constituted* by the perception.

Husserl states that in the transcendental phenomenological attitude "... there is no question to be raised of the sort whether or not something corresponds to [perception] in 'the' actuality."<sup>23</sup> Therefore, the very distinction between veridical and non-veridical perception disappears at this stage. This seems to justify (i), which also establishes the soundness of the argument in section 3. It seems to us that (ii) is justified by our ordinary reflection on our outer perception. Husserl writes:

The spatial physical thing which we see is, with all its transcendence, still something perceived, given "in person" in the manner peculiar to consciousness. It is not the case that, in its stead, a picture or a sign is given. A picture-consciousness or a sign-consciousness must not be substituted for perception.<sup>24</sup>

We mean by "immanent object of perception" a non-mental object that is given "in person" to the perceiver independently of whether it is a picture or a sign of some other thing. It seems plausible to interpret the second sentence of the above quote as meaning that what is given "in



person" is itself a genuine thing rather than a *mere* sign or picture of some other thing which is the only genuine entity. Notice that Husserl does not exclude the possibility that the direct object of perception be a sign of something determined symbolically by the currently accepted physical theory.<sup>25</sup> Thus, (ii) is justified.

Furthermore, the views to the contrary, viz., phenomenism, representationalism, physicalist view of perception, and naïve realism all conflict with the soundness of the argument in section 3, and thus, by elimination, (ii) is vindicated. Note that naïve realism, though seeming to conform to (ii), diverges from the second part, i.e., that the object of perception in naïve realism is transcendent, rather than immanent. If the object is given immediately, it cannot be transcendent. This shows that naïve realism cannot explain even the perception of (transcendent) ordinary objects. As a matter of fact, from the natural standpoint, outer perceiving is caused by the presence of a physical object via highly complex physical and neurophysiologic processes so that it is exceedingly improbable that the (immanent) immediate object of perception is similar, let alone identical, with the (transcendent) real physical object from which, here, it is understood that it is the physical object to which the laws of nature apply. Besides, naïve realism is independently found untenable because of well-known reasons, among which is that it fails to explain non-normal perceptions. (iii) amounts to saying that what is perceived is not a part of the act of perception (something that is difficult to deny) from which it follows that it is not *reell*. Husserl writes:

a physical thing cannot be given in any possible perception, in any possible consciousness, as something really [*als reell*] inherently immanent.<sup>26</sup>

It is important to note that what has to be underlined is that the object of perception cannot be *reell* rather than immanent. For whatever *reell* is immanent but not vice versa. To ascertain (iv) we need to elucidate Husserl's notion of the constitution of object. But constitution of the object of a perception is mediated by the noema of the perception. So we shall elaborate our view concerning noemata.

#### 4. PERCEPTUAL NOEMA AND THE OBJECT OF PERCEPTION

As mentioned in the Introduction, there are problems concerning as to what exactly noema is. According to one view the main characteristic of the perceptual noema is to determine or, in the terminology of Smith and

McIntyre, *prescribe* the object of perception. Such a view is committed to a solution of the problem of objectless perception. This problem, as already mentioned above, results from first in case of illusions, hallucinations, and dreams. Second and more importantly, it comes out from bracketing or excluding the transcendent object of normal perception. In the latter case we are confronted with the problem of establishing the status of the immanent counterpart (phenomenological reduct) of the bracketed transcendent object. For example, given the perception of the red flower *A*, we should ask what kind of object, if any, the immanent counterpart "*A*" is. In our view the answer is obviously that "*A*" is an object-in-the-broader sense. But this is a much disputed point which we discuss below in some detail.

Concerning the first problem, we see that the case of illusion is explained away by virtue of the very nature of perception resulting from the laws of nature. For example, that the stick half immersed in water is seen broken is an aspect of the real stick due to certain optical laws. The case of hallucination is often evaded as exceptional or pathological. Finally, the case of dreams, which is most difficult to deal with, is often ignored or at least not explicitly mentioned. Russell and Merleau-Ponty are among the few exceptions.

The second problem is more complicated. Husserl seems to identify the immanent counterpart of a transcendent object with the noema, or more precisely noematic *Sinn*, i.e., the *perceived as perceived*.<sup>27</sup> Based on this statement, Aaron Gurwitsch also construes the immanent counterpart of the perceived transcendent object as the perceptual noema, but this time as an aspect or part of the perceived object. Furthermore, he considers the object of perception as consisting of a system of noemata.<sup>28</sup> On the other hand, for Smith and McIntyre the only object of perception, if any, is the transcendent object, and what remain as a result of the transcendental reduction are the *reell* perceptual act and its noema. Husserl himself introduces the notion of (perceptual) noema within the phenomenological attitude as follows:

Here, in the case of perception ... there is no question to be raised of the sort whether or not something corresponds to it in "the" actuality. This ... actuality is indeed not there for us in consequence of judging. And yet, so to speak, everything remains as of old. Even the phenomenologically reduced perceptual mental process [*Erlebnis*] is a perceiving of "this blossoming apple tree, in this garden," etc. ... The tree has not lost the least nuance of all these moments, qualities, characteristics *with which it was appearing in this perception* ...

In our <transcendental> phenomenological attitude we can and must raise the eidetic question: *what the "perceived as perceived" is, which eidetic moments it includes in itself as*

*this perception-noema.* We receive the answer in the pure directedness to *something given* in its essence, and we can faithfully describe the "appearing as appearing" in complete evidence. It is only another experience for this to say that we "describe perception in its noematic respect."<sup>29</sup>

The notion of noema we defend is a Fregean conception according to which the noema is the sense, and the object is the referent of the perception, where the sense itself is what determines the object. We have already remarked that any view admitting objectless perception is in difficulty in explaining the nature of the perceptual noema. Our view is of course exempted from this difficulty, since every perception has an object, viz., a thing in-the broader-sense. The constitution of the object of any perception is mediated by the prior constitution of the noema of the perception, which we describe below.

Using again the example of the perception *C* of a red flower *A* having, among its determinations (or objective moments), a particular shade of red *B*, we shall describe the process of perceiving with the purpose of disclosing the structure of the noema "*N*" of *C*. From the phenomenological standpoint this process involves three main elements: First, the intentional experience or act *C*\*, second, the noema "*N*" of *C*\*, and third, the immanent object "*A*" of *C*\*. The structure of the act, as already stated above, can shortly be restated as follows. *C*\* consists of hyletic data such as *D*\*, i.e., a sensation of red, and hyletic moments such as *E*\* which animates *D*\* in such a way that *D*\* becomes an appearance or adumbration of the determination (objective moment) *B*\*, viz., the shade of red of object "*A*". In case the determination under consideration is an instance of the kind of the perceived object, such an instance is the perceived aspect of the object. In our example, the perceived aspect of the red flower is an instance of its kind, viz., the kind Flower. Then, it is the perception as a whole (rather than any of its sensory data) which is the appearance of such a determination.

We propose to explicate how a noetic datum animates a hyletic datum in such a way that the latter turns into an appearance of a determination of the (immanent) object of perception, say a red flower. In this respect it is important to notice that a perceiver cannot take a given sensation as being an appearance of some objective determination, say, the shade of color red, or the perceived aspect of the flower, unless he already possesses a concept of, or is acquainted with, the respective essences,<sup>30</sup> viz., the attribute Redness and the kind Flower, instantiated by the determinations in question. We can say then the perceiver re-cognizes in this sensation the shade of red and, in the whole perception, the aspect

of the flower. Of course re-cognition of an essence (an attribute or a kind) presupposes an antecedent cognition of the same essence. This is tantamount to saying that the perceiver has at the time of perception a conceptual scheme including all those concerning the essences instantiated by the *perceived* determinations of the object. It seems that the re-cognition of an essence in a sense-datum (sensation) is a case of essence-seeing (*Wesensschauung*). Remember that the animation of a sense-datum by a noetic datum is called a construing (*Auffassung*). Therefore the latter notion can be identified with re-cognition based on essence-seeing. In this respect we remark that Husserl himself stated that "... no intuition of something individual is possible without ... directing one's regard to the corresponding essence exemplified in what is individually sighted ..."<sup>31</sup>

In general it is only essences pertaining to an antecedently available conceptual scheme that are re-cognized in the hyletic data of the perception of a physical thing. Nevertheless, there are exceptional cases in which the perceiver is endowed with creative imagination in such a way that he may be induced to renovate his conceptual scheme and interpret the hyletic data on the basis of the new conceptual scheme. In the latter case, perception is *creative* in contradistinction to the merely constitutive (or better *re-constitutive*) perception in the former. In this regard A.-T. Tymieniecka writes the following:

... we find a striking resemblance between the creative process itself and the process of constitutive perception. We can, indeed, consider the creative process to be a type of perception, a "CREATIVE PERCEPTION." How, then, could creation renovate forms when constitution obviously follows preestablished patterns?<sup>32</sup>

It seems that our distinction between creative and constitutive perception conforms to Tymieniecka's highly elaborated answer to the question raised in the above-quoted passage.<sup>33</sup>

We can now describe the structure of noema as follows. As stated above, each hyletic moment of a perception, as well as the perception itself, is an appearance of an objective perceived determination, which corresponds to a particular concept. Such a concept can be called the *sense* of the perceived determination. Thus, given the perceived determination "*B*", we shall use "*B<sup>S</sup>*" for denoting the sense of "*B*". A sense such as "*B<sup>S</sup>*" is called by Husserl a *predicate-noema* of the object "*A*".<sup>34</sup> A predicate-noema "*B<sup>S</sup>*" is said to be the *noematic correlate* of the noetic datum *E*\* animating the hyletic datum *D*\*, which adumbrates the determination "*B*". The *Sinn* of a perception is described by Husserl by the phrase "perceived as perceived." It is, therefore, plausible to interpret it as a description of the meaning of the perception, rather than of the perceived

thing. On the other hand, the qualification "as perceived" seems to indicate that the *Sinn* contains as components all and only the senses of the perceived determinations of the object. Thus, the predicate-noemata are elements of the *Sinn*. In order to indicate that the predicate noemata concern the same object, Husserl introduces within the structure of the *Sinn* the notion "the empty X"<sup>35</sup> or "the determinable X."<sup>36</sup> Note that "X" is a "sense-bearer"<sup>37</sup> of the predicate-noemata, and thus belongs to the *Sinn*, and not the object of perception. The *Sinn* of a perception consists, then, of the senses (predicate-noemata) of the perceived determinations corresponding to the hyletic moments of the perception, and the common bearer "X" of these senses.

The *Sinn* is the main part of the whole noema. Indeed the noema contains a second component, called *the manner of givenness* [*Gegebenheitsweise*] or *thetic character* of the perception. The most basic sub-components of the thetic character of the perception are the *intuitional fullness*<sup>38</sup> and the *being-characteristics*. The former can be described as follows. Given that a noetic datum E\* animates the hyletic datum D\*, D\* is said to (intuitionally) *fill* E\* (i.e., the matter fills the form). Then, the same hyletic datum E\* is also said to fill the noematic correlate (i.e., the predicate-noema) "B<sup>S</sup>". Clearly not all the determinations of the object "A" are perceived at any given time, whereas those which are perceived are divided into "genuinely" and "ungenuinely" perceived determinations. The genuinely perceived determinations are those whose respective senses are filled by hyletic data, and, therefore, belong to the *Sinn*. On the other hand, an ungenerally perceived determination is one whose sense is not filled by a hyletic datum, but which belongs to a so-called *object-horizon* consisting of further determinations of the object. Furthermore, an *act-horizon* of the perception of a given object consists of possible perceptions *co-directed* to that object which would fill further determinations of the object.<sup>39</sup> Regarding the second sub-component of the thetic character, viz., being-characteristics, we only take into consideration the noematic correlate for the appearing object, viz., "being-characteristic: *actual* [*wirklich*]",<sup>40</sup> since this is the one which plays an important role in the explanation of the actuality, or quasi-actuality, of the object-in-the-broader-sense.

On the basis of the noema we can constitute, as the final step, the immanent object of the perception, which we called the object-in-the-broader-sense. As already stated, the *Sinn* within the noema is that which prescribes the immanent object of perception. We think that such a prescription has a form of a singular description whose variable is pre-

cisely “the determinable X.” Indeed, Husserl himself, as stated earlier, calls this X also “the empty form” or “the substrate” whose function is to bear the predicate-noemata contained in the *Sinn*. If X were itself a sense-component of the *Sinn*, then it would be by itself the sense of the object so that the predicate-noemata would be devoid of any function. But since this is inadmissible, it seems to be quite plausible that the X is nothing but a variable whose value is the object of perception, provided that this value satisfies the predicate-noemata. It is important to remark that among the predicate-noemata fixing the value of X there must be also location-predicates such as “at the center of the visual field”, “to the left of this center”, etc. We take it for granted that the perceiver’s conceptual scheme contains such predicates referring to a private perceptual field.

Different kinds of acts, such as remembering and imagining, can have the same noema as the one perception has. Perception is characterized among these acts by positing the “actuality” of its appearing object. Thus, non-normal perceptions, viz., illusions, hallucinations and dreams, are indeed perceptions, since they all posit the actuality of their respective objects. It is only retrospectively as a result of new perceptions that one becomes aware of the fact that the above-mentioned perceptions are nothing but delusions. Such awareness depends on emptying, i.e., annulling, the previous fullness of a delusive perception on the basis of conflicting senses of new perceptions. In general, a perception *C* is confirmed or disconfirmed by means of a concatenation of co-directed perceptions prescribed by the horizon of *C*. In case the senses of these perceptions agree with that of *C*, or in other words if the concatenation of perceptions is *harmonious*, *C* is established to be actual. On the other hand, if the senses of the members of the concatenation disagree with that of *C*, i.e., if the concatenation is disharmonious, *C* turns to be quasi-actual. In the latter case, it is also said that the noema of *C* is *exploded*.<sup>41</sup> On the other hand, in the former case, when the object-in-the-broader-sense to which *C* is directed is established to be actual, then this object’s intrinsic nature does not change and the object, as well as the perceptual field in which it is located, is incorporated into a unique inter-subjective space-time. This space, however, cannot be identified with the space-time of physics which can be described only by a mathematical symbolism.<sup>42</sup>

#### 6. CONCLUSION: THE STRUCTURE OF PERCEPTION AND THE IMMANENT ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORIES

By way of conclusion we shall recapitulate in a concise way the structure of perception, emphasizing the relationships obtained among the imma-

nent ontological categories that make up the structure. As stated above a perceptual process has three phases: the perceptual act  $C^*$ , the noema " $N$ ", and the object " $A$ ".  $C^*$  and its pairs of hyletic and noetic data ( $D_i^*$ ,  $E_i^*$ ) are *reell* particulars, but whereas  $C^*$  is a concrete *individuum*, each of the ( $D_i^*$ ,  $E_i^*$ ) is an abstract moment of  $C^*$ .

The noema " $N$ " is a complex *ideell* entity, composed of a *Sinn* and several thetic characters, among others, the being-characteristic "actual". The *Sinn* is also a complex *ideell* entity consisting of several predicate-noemata " $B_j^s$ " borne by one and the same determinable  $X$ , which is an empty form, i.e., a variable. Each of " $B_j^s$ " is a *concept* of the essence " $B_j$ ", which is instantiated by the determination " $B_j$ ". " $B_j^s$ " is a signitive *ideell* entity which is called the *sense* of " $B_j$ ".

Finally the object " $A$ " belongs to a new ontological category of entities which are neither *reell* nor *ideell*. Indeed object " $A$ " is not *reell*, since it is not an experience, or a moment thereof, and thus is not *in* consciousness. Again " $A$ " is not *ideell* because it is spatio-temporal, and hence a *concrete* particular.

To illustrate all these, let us turn to our example used throughout the paper, where " $A$ " is the immanent counterpart of a red flower  $A$ , and " $B$ " is the shade of color red of " $A$ ". Then " $B$ " is the immanent essence Redness instantiated by the shade of color red. " $B^s$ " is the *concept* Being-red, viz., the concept of Redness " $B$ ". Being-red is the *sense* of the determination "the shade of red" of the object; and  $D^*$  is the sensation (appearance) of this shade of red.  $E^*$  is the *construing* or re-cognition in the sensation  $D^*$  of the essence Redness. Finally,  $C^*$  is the perception of "the red flower".

Middle East Technical University  
Ankara

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> D. Føllesdal, "Husserl's Theory of Perception", in *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, ed. H. L. Dreyfus (Cambridge: The MIT Press), p. 79.

<sup>2</sup> H. L. Dreyfus, "Husserl's Perceptual Noema", in *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, p. 97.

<sup>3</sup> D. Bell, *Husserl* (London and New York: Routledge), p. 179.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 179–180.

<sup>5</sup> Notice that psychical occurrences concerning a given person are transcendent (i.e., non-immanent) since they depend to a certain degree on the person's brain, as well as his environment.

<sup>6</sup> Only psychic occurrences have also a *reell* counterpart; all the other objects have only a constituted one.

<sup>7</sup> For the notions involved in the structure of perception see E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book*, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), § 41 and § 97.

<sup>8</sup> See J. Hintikka, *The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975), pp. 47, 52, 63–64, 66–67, and 71.

<sup>9</sup> K. Mulligan, “Perception”, in *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, eds. B. Smith and D. W. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 183–84.

<sup>10</sup> B. Russell, *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948), p. 181.

<sup>11</sup> Note, however, that the first premise of the argument is denied by naïve realism, and this was the reason why it is commonly agreed that it is an inadequate theory of perception.

<sup>12</sup> *Ideas*, § 90, p. 220. See also *ibid.*, p. 219.

<sup>13</sup> See *ibid.*, § 135, p. 325.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, § 135, p. 325. The original German phrase of the end of the quoted passage is “*die als ‘wirklich-sein-de’ gemeint sind.*” Thus, W. R. Boyce Gibson translates it rather as: “are meant to possess ‘real Being.’” (E. Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), § 135, p. 349).

<sup>15</sup> D. W. Smith and R. McIntyre, *Husserl and Intentionality* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1982), pp. 42–44.

<sup>16</sup> See E. Husserl, *Experience and Judgment* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973) who calls the objects of a dream “quasi-actual” (p. 381), and the corresponding world “quasi-world” (p. 344).

<sup>17</sup> See *ibid.*, § 74b, pp. 299–301.

<sup>18</sup> See Smith and McIntyre, pp. 47–61 (for the former kind of theories) and Ch. III ff. (for the latter kind). The authors call the former kind simply “object-theories of intentionality” where here “object” means “intentional object”. On the other hand, they hold that the latter kind is the view that Husserl endorses.

<sup>19</sup> G. E. M. Anscombe, “The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature”, in *Analytical Philosophy*, ed. R. J. Butler (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965), pp. 158–180.

<sup>20</sup> See *Ideas*, trans. Gibson, § 1, p. 45. For the notion of “object-givenness” (*Dinggegebenheit*) see also E. Husserl, *Husserliana*, Band IV (*Ideen II*), pp. 34–35.

<sup>21</sup> *Ideas*, trans. Kersten, § 1, pp. 5–6. “Ordinary sense” means “when one speaks of showing legitimacy without theoretical experience.” (*Ibid.*, n. 3, p. 6).

<sup>22</sup> In Hintikka’s terms the object given in perception “will ... at the same time be part of the mind-independent reality and an element of my consciousness. There has to be an actual interface or overlap of my consciousness and reality.” See J. Hintikka, “The Phenomenological Dimension”, in *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, eds. B. Smith and D. W. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 82.

<sup>23</sup> *Ideas*, trans. Kersten, § 88, p. 215.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, § 43, pp. 92–93.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, § 40, pp. 84–85.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, § 42, p. 89.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, § 88, p. 214.

<sup>28</sup> See A. Gurwitsch, “Husserl’s Theory of the Intentionality of Consciousness”, in *Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science*, pp. 59–71.

<sup>29</sup> *Ideas*, trans. Kersten, § 88, pp. 215–216.

<sup>30</sup> The concept of an essence (and thus noema) should not be confused with the essence itself. Indeed a concept is a signification, whereas an essence is instantiated by objective



determinations of things. (See *ibid.*, §§ 22–23.) Cf. also E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Phenomenology and the Foundations of Sciences, Third Book (Ideas III)*, trans. Ted. E. Klein and William E. Pohl (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), § 16, p. 73.

<sup>31</sup> *Ideas*, trans. Kersten, § 3, p. 10.

<sup>32</sup> A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Analecta Husserliana*, XXIV (1988): 124.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 125ff.

<sup>34</sup> *Ideas*, trans. Kersten, § 131, p. 313.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, § 40, p. 85.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, § 131, pp. 313–316, esp. p. 316.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 315.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, § 131, pp. 315, 318.

<sup>39</sup> For a detailed discussion of this issue see Smith and McIntyre, Ch. 5, esp. pp. 227–233.

<sup>40</sup> See, *Ideas*, trans. Kersten, § 103, p. 250.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, § 138, p. 332.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, § 40, p. 85.

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH  
TO ONTOLOGY IN THE ARGUMENT  
OF ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA:  
DIFFERENTIATION AND UNITY AS DYNAMISM  
OF LOGOS AND LIFE

INTRODUCTION

The problem of ontology has been one of the greatest enigmas of Philosophical researchers down through the ages in the history of Philosophy. For the rationalists, it is purely a mental conjecture and postulation that forms the basic foundation of all that is and can be. The Idealists see it in a purely transcendental way, a way beyond the physical but responsible for all that can be said to exist. Both groups could be said to conceive of reality as an a-priori destination. But they fail to realise that: "There are limits to what we can conceive of, or make intelligible to ourselves, as a possible general structure of experience."<sup>1</sup> Others like the Empiricists and Logical positivists see it in a systematic logical way. Hence, "they try to provide a systematic account of the basic concepts which we use when we are thinking about the world ..."<sup>2</sup> therefore, the issue of being is looked at in its existential and conceptual realness only. Nevertheless, philosophical experiences have shown that this disposition can no longer be sustained in the present age. Kenny's suggestion is a testimony to this. "There are certain things which philosophers of the present day understand which even the greatest philosophers of earlier generations failed to understand."<sup>3</sup> Therefore, a better disposition is demanded of philosophers today.

Furthermore, some consider it in its Empiric-phenomenological way, studying being in its "manifest" state. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka is one of those who have looked at being in its phenomenological perspective, not only just in the traditional phenomenological method of "Eidetic" suspension, but in a scientific and philosophical analytical way. She is also one of the few thinkers who have through the phenomenological way demonstrated the restoration of ontology. In her dynamism of the logos and the life experience, she has been able to distinguish the different levels of participation in being and structural unity and the subjectivity that characterise the life force.

## MOTIVATION

The choice of this project is motivated by my interest in the study of philosophy and the general apathy towards the transcendence. Though this is a difficult task, it also forms an incontrovertible part of our life, particularly the human experience. It should therefore be given attention. The argument of Tymieniecka is found to be good material for this philosophical reflection.

## AIM

This research is aimed at discussing the phenomenological approach to the problem of ontology. The argument of Tymieniecka – *Differentiation and Unity* – will be the basis of this endeavour, demonstrating its foundation for Metaphysics, particularly in her thoughts and phenomenology in general.

## METHOD

The method is analytic and synthetic. It is also historical and critical. This is a phenomenological work and in its history it has adopted this manner of approach to investigate the Ultimate, which unfortunately has been relegated to the meanest ridicule by modern sciences and researchers in some quarters, particularly within the last few centuries.

In the tradition of Edmund Husserl: a mathematician, psycho-logician and eventually philosopher, who attempted to in a new yet rigorous manner revolutionalised and restored philosophy to its central place in human endeavour; phenomenology has consistently, but dynamically provided a bridge for the search not just into the epistemological ambient, but almost all aspect of human research. Since it is impossible in this presentation to take these issues one after the other, it is important to note that the work looks at phenomenology in its historical context alongside the problem of ontology, and brings out its uniqueness in approach and results as demonstrated by Tymieniecka. No wonder then that Kevin Mulligan claims:

Many of the philosophers who adopted Husserl's framework applied it in the philosophies of mind, language, and society to problems that neither to the philosophy of logic nor formal ontology – the nature of perception, emotions, sentiments, the will, collective intentionality, and communication.<sup>4</sup>

In keeping with this tradition, phenomenology has consistently addressed itself among other issues to the problem of being, man's place in the universe, and his abilities in almost all fields of life. These and others are the issues of this research. The plan is as follows:

The basic general background of phenomenology, its development, uniqueness and internal diversity will be looked into. Then, a panoramic and selective historical view of the problem of ontology follows. The choice of a historical consideration in this work is to highlight in a particular way, how the neglect or the negative approach to the issue of ontology has affected philosophy. Thirdly, the phenomenological exploration of Tymieniecka and how she is able through her *Logos* and *Life*, pave the way for the reinvigoration of *Metaphysics* as we now retain the name, in her phenomenology of life. These will be followed by a general observation that leads to a conclusion.

#### THE GENERAL BACKGROUND OF PHENOMENOLOGY

In the philosophical panorama of the contemporary time, phenomenology occupies a place of great relevance and in fact one of the most renowned of all philosophical movements, particularly in the eighties. The uniqueness of phenomenology, a brainchild of Husserl, has in this period demonstrated not only a veritable method of study, but it has also formed a good foundation for scientific researches.<sup>5</sup> This citation gives a lead to the issues of the first part of this research. It also goes a long way to authenticate the achievement of phenomenology though it is a unique discipline in the whole gamut of philosophical activities.

Edmund Husserl, the father of phenomenology, did not begin his carrier life as a philosopher. As a result of the fact that for him philosophy is a "vocation", many, including his followers, see the uniqueness of his method. Here Ales Bello notes: "Indeed we are here concerned with a thinker for whom philosophy constituted a true vocation."<sup>6</sup> A true vocation in the sense that he did not see philosophy as an abstract discipline, that only concerns the school-men; but a way of life that is necessary by choice for all who seek the completeness of knowledge. Therefore, "his frequent reference to the profession of a philosopher."<sup>7</sup>

What are the generative principles of Husserl's philosophy? How was he able to co-ordinate these principles? What are the possible influences that helped the development of his philosophy? What impact has his method had on the history of philosophy? Does the present time have any positive benefit from this method? These and more are the issues this section will look into.

The general background of phenomenology, its development, uniqueness and internal diversity, are issues of major importance. For instance, the different divergent view is an obvious fact in its historical development. However, there is something that is basic which underlies the unity despite its historical divergences. The facts of rigor, analysis and openness to the life-world, have been very consistent in phenomenological dynamism in history. Thus, Tymieniecka at the 1969 international conference points out that "phenomenology as inaugurated by Edmund Husserl and undertaken by his immediate disciples has raised a vast claim. As we well know, it was meant not only as a *philosophia prima* but also as a *universal science*."<sup>8</sup> The original dream of Husserl for the "science" of sciences, just like Aristotle about philosophy, is the intention of Tymieniecka today. This stands out clearly as she opines:

It is a very vast project of universal, fundamental inquiry to be carried on by scholars, each in his own sector, that phenomenology has been conceived, has received the basic formulation of its task, field of research, and methods and has been taken up by philosophers and scholars. However, as it is well known, the very enthusiasm which made it radiate led to such a diversification of tasks, differentiation of approaches, ways of procedure, points of view and conclusions ...<sup>9</sup>

The same has been the character of phenomenology in the course of history, from Ingarden, Conrad Martius, Edith Stein and the present day phenomenologists like Tymieniecka.

In Husserlian tradition, two things are very important – the 'eidetic' reduction and the 'transcendental reduction'. With these two ideas at background, Husserl was able in his peculiar manner to create a new awareness to the issues that were before him neglected. Husserl was able to raise new issues that advocated a return to the things as they are both in the phenomenological form and in the transcendental dimension. Phenomenology for Husserl is an 'a priori' 'eidetic' science that makes possible a treatment [centered] on essences and the science of essences and assures the legitimacy of essential knowledge, with the rigors of disinterestedness as compared to naturalism and psychologism.<sup>10</sup> Put in a different way it is "an attempt to reach reality in a way that neither subsumes it within general concepts nor reduces it to elements"<sup>11</sup> The whole essence of Husserlian eidetic method is summarised in the above citations. Phenomenology becomes the universal science. This is a task that cannot be limited by any form of system or tradition. It is a project, which, "emerge in a certain cultural area in which such foundations appeared to him to be of paramount significance."<sup>12</sup> Yet he repudiated

the parochial claim of psychology and the naturalistic method of the logical positivists, to accept a process – that ‘*Mathesis Universalis*’ of Leibniz and the Aristotelian ‘*Philosophia Prima*’, which is the basis of all discipline and all the sector of philosophical investigation.<sup>13</sup> This is the project of phenomenology.

Husserl was originally a mathematician; he “received Ph.D. in mathematics while working with Weierstrass, and then turned to philosophy under the influence of Franz Brentano.”<sup>14</sup> The effort to combine his previous mathematical studies with psychology which he studied under Brentano, yielded a positive result in his development of a mathematical psychology that led him to the invention of numbers<sup>15</sup> These two disciplines could not adequately respond to his desire for the ultimate,<sup>16</sup> but he used the psychology of Brentano: a qualitative science to determine or know what arithmetic was all about.<sup>17</sup>

In an attempt to get to the ultimate of all disciplines and the inability to find it neither in mathematics, psychology nor in the newfound logic, Husserl rejected the position of the logical positivists, which was on at the Vienna Circle. Thus “... in his initial mathematical investigations and proceeding to his challenge to the psychologism, neo-positivism, and materialism that then dominated thought”,<sup>18</sup> he did not realise his quest. He eventually, opened up to the discipline of disciplines in his phenomenology. Ales Bello brings out the clarity of this when she elucidates:

The last two works, published during his lifetime, preserve all their importance as significant stages of approach that was at first characterized by departure from psychologist positions, then by a move towards an analysis of the theme of logic, and eventually by the conquest of the phenomenological terrain<sup>19</sup>

Husserl arrived at the terrain of phenomenology, as a result of the search for the method that guarantees knowledge without bias.

In his philosophy like Descartes, Husserl believes that in order to attain true and certain knowledge, the philosopher should start from a ‘zero’ point – a point devoid of presuppositions. The past must be resolutely put aside, and the investigator must beam his attention on the essence or the essentials of the object as it exactly reveals itself to experience pure and simple. This is possible by a kind of intuitive seeing by which the mind grasps the essence exactly as it reveals itself to the investigator. In strong terms Heidegger asserts that:

the term phenomenology expresses a maxim which can be formulated as ‘To the things in themselves!’ It is opposed to the all free-floating constructions and accidental findings; it is

opposed to taking over any conceptions which only seem to have been demonstrated; it is opposed to those pseudo-questions which parade themselves as 'problems' often for generations at a time<sup>20</sup>

So phenomenology then follows in the footsteps of Descartes in his methodic doubt. This in fact is Husserl, as he tells us that Descartes is "the great patron of phenomenology".<sup>21</sup> Husserl himself in one of his lectures in Paris made it obvious when he elucidates thus:

No philosopher of the past has affected the sense of phenomenology as decisively as Rene Descartes ... Phenomenology must honour him as its genuine patriarch. It must be said explicitly that the study of Descartes' *Meditations* has influenced directly the formation of the developing phenomenology and given it its present form, to such an extent that phenomenology might almost be called a new twentieth century Cartesianism<sup>22</sup>

Husserl rejected the distinction Kant made between things as they are and things as they appear to us. He maintains that things appear to consciousness exactly as they are, so that what consciousness perceives are things in themselves. Nevertheless, he was also influenced by the transcendental philosophy of Kant. Kant claimed a philosophical revolution in the manner of the Copernicus with his transcendental Idealism, in the epistemological field and the priority of subjectivity over objectivity. This became an instrument very useful for Husserl who sees the subjectivity as the most authentic way to arrive at the knowledge of things in the world.

In its later stage, i.e., the stage of transcendental phenomenology, the great influence is, of course, Kant's. By his 'Copernican revolution' – Kant had elevated subjectivity over and above objectivity, and he attributed to it the role of restructuring and constituting the objective world. It is the subject which gives the objective world its structure and turns it into what we now know it to be.<sup>23</sup>

However, Husserl did not accept the distinction made by Kant between the noumena world and the phenomena world, but for him the subjectivity and objectivity are basically inseparable yet independent, to hold that objects simply agree with our categories was too much for Husserl to accept as he sees everything as independent but related in an internal manner. This relationship with Kantian philosophy sometimes becomes the basis of the accusation levelled against Husserl of ending up a transcendental Idealist. Besides these major influences on Husserl it cannot really be said that there is a part of the history of philosophy that he did not go through as it has been pointed out earlier<sup>24</sup> Philosophers like Plato and Aristotle also have some influence on Husserl.

# ONTOLOGY IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Having seen some of the background issues leading to Husserl's philosophical revolution, it is pertinent to have a panoramic view of the historical problem of ontology (Being), and its nuances. Here the truism of a new metaphysical pursuit becomes pertinent and urgent. From Parmenides to the present day philosophical quests have shown that the essential and central point has been finding a structure and rhythm for the entire reality. The approach has been from different points of view from Parmenides to the present moment in the phenomenological way. For the phenomenologists, it is simply analysing and describing experience exactly as it occurs without the prejudice of any prior assumption.<sup>25</sup>

Plato, in the *Republic* had claimed the relation in the notion of the hierarchy of ideas. In his proposal, he sustained that, there is a supremely important form, the idea of goodness that brings order in the intelligible world of forms and also determines its contents. The problem that arises is that, the dualism of Plato's ontology, the separation of the pure ideas—the archetypes, from their copies, poses a lot of issues that need some clarifications in the understanding of the harmony of the ideas and the reality that can be seen. In reaction to this, Yarza has observed that:

Plato describes the relation of the Idea of Good with regard to the other Ideas, but does not explain the basis of this relation and its exact nature. He does not clarify how the Ideas are related with one another and how they depend on a single principle.<sup>26</sup>

A typical example of this is the considerable harmonious working of the human capacity to know. The fact of the relationship between these two categorically separated worlds of realities and their imitations cannot be sustained without a corresponding link that holds them in unity. The difficulty of these conflicts are resolved at least on a practical level with the capacity of an integral dynamism and manifestation of the Logos in Life and the oneness of this basic principle in all that exists and beyond the concrete world. Aristotle got to this extent, but the problem was that he could neither connect properly the reality of this duality as he reacted to another opposing extreme to Plato's position. The problem here can be seen as earlier observed and more so in the assessment of Edith Stein in her book *Finite and Eternal Being*, that: "Aristotle's doctrine of form and matter can be properly understood if we remember that he developed it on the basis of observation of animate nature."<sup>27</sup> To emphasise the importance of this observation she states further— "The attempt to see in this doctrine a fundamental law of everything material carried with it the



danger of misjudging the specific nature of purely material elements and of obliterating the boundary line between these two realms of being form and matter.”<sup>28</sup> This has been one of the major predicaments of philosophy.

The perennial problems of coherence and clarity have led to addressing issues that will hardly bring the desired result in research. “Aquinas’ remarks on the identity of existence and essence in God are not easy to understand. Commentators have worked to bring clarity and coherence to this account but not with complete success”<sup>29</sup> On the whole a more solid foundation can be laid if the Aquinian analogical passage is reread in the phenomenological manner. In fact doing it in a way that a common factor, that is transcendental and immanently connected is sought. The right approach will most likely lead to the right answers, as the ability to open up the horizon makes the difference. The response of Ales Bello to the question posed in her recent book *Sul femminile. Scritti di antropologia e religione*, edited by Michele D’Ambra, is very important when it is phenomenology and mental openness. She stressed the importance of openness to every event and reality, particularly when they touch on culture and human being.<sup>30</sup> This new approach to ontology must take seriously the fact of casting as wide as possible the philosophical net of research. “If philosophy has any business in the world it is the clarification of our thinking and the clearing away of ideas that cloud the mind.”<sup>31</sup> This is the position of Putnam and I share his view entirely though the process might be different.

Having discussed phenomenology so far it is pertinent to consider its approach to the issue of ontology. Phenomenology as a philosophical research method is popularly associated with Edmund Husserl, who is regarded as the father of phenomenology. Before Husserl, the term “phenomenology” has been used by philosophers. Of all who have used it, Husserl’s use of phenomenology is unique and particular. Husserl used it as a method of philosophising which deals with essences. “Its aim is simply to analyze and describe experience exactly as it occurs without the prejudice of any prior assumption or presupposition.”<sup>32</sup> This process is carried out within a system known as eidetic reduction on the object of experience.

First, the “reduction”, a moment that characterizes the whole of the analysis, the very heart of phenomenological inquiry; second, the question of valuation of sciences, which personally involved the mathematician Husserl and the positivistic environment surrounding him, with its regression to the pre-categorical dimension of the life world; third, the development of the phenomenological philosophy in accordance with the schema set out in Ideas II; and

last, the completion of the anthropology by means of ethics, religion and theology, understood as rational discourse about God<sup>33</sup>

Husserl also distinguished two types of ontologies as formal and material. When it is formal it deals with the essences or the domain of meanings. These are purely conceptual matters. Material ontology, on the other hand, deals with the structure essences of physical things. For Husserl, essences in both cases, because it is not restricted to the physical realm as much as it is not to the conceptual, must be broadly viewed.

Husserl distinguished two types of ontologies: formal ontologies, which are the domain of meaning, or essences, such as "one", "many", "whole" or "part", that are articulated by formal logic and which Husserl referred to as empty; and material ontologies, which discover and map the meaning and structure of sensory experience through transcendental investigation<sup>34</sup>

The issue of ontology has been seen from its historical point of view and very importantly from a phenomenological perspective as well. It is now pertinent to look into the argument of Tymieniecka in her effort to develop a transcendental investigation using the principle of differentiation and unity.

In previous considerations, a general study of Phenomenology and Ontology has been respectively examined. Now, attempt will be made to synthesize them. That is, applying phenomenological perspective in a particular and unique way in the analysis of the various processes of establishing a more comprehensive and scientific ontology, with the view of drawing a metaphysical possibility from using the phenomenological method of research. This in a way is one of the highlights of the main themes of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's philosophy and her contribution to phenomenology.

Now, these two points, the need to philosophically appreciate creative experience, on the one hand, and the need to revamp phenomenological formulations to vindicate real existence, on the other, underlay the greening of my own philosophical thought, even before the writing of my doctoral dissertation<sup>35</sup>

Here is the main thrust of our presentation, or the kernel of the argument of the phenomenological exploration of Tymieniecka. Here it is also clear how she is able, through her *Logos and Life*, to pave the way for the reinvigoration of metaphysics as we now retain the name, in her phenomenology of life. What is unique about Tymieniecka? The uniqueness of her philosophy and her contribution, to the wealth of human

endeavour, is that she has been able to keep the pace with tradition in a critical, but tolerant philosophy. This not only revives metaphysics, but it can also be a veritable help to Theology. The verity of this proposal can be seen if explored to be an instrument for a new orientation in issues of Religion and approach to Theological matters. Since theology is not exempt from the crisis of our time, a new approach that will accommodate the various fragments and guarantee a dialogue based on the most basic and all-pervading dynamism of life, can make things better. This is the heart of the phenomenology of life Tymieniecka is offering to history.

In a radical contrast, in order to reach the unifying source of the innumerable rationalities that life itself prompts through its constructive advance, we have to delve into the *conditions of life itself*. Not the givenness of the already man-projected life-world but the *human condition* which holds the virtualities that enable the human being to unfold himself together with his life-world lies the source of the proliferation.”<sup>36</sup>

Hence, the task of philosophy today should necessarily and urgently above every other thing, re-establish the metaphysical sphere so as to build on the foundation of the tradition of philosophy with new insights and diversified ability. If this is seriously heeded, many of the unnecessary problems that science and philosophy and even theology are faced with today, will be reduced to the essentials that are naturally part of human terrestrial experience.

Tymieniecka's thoughts in DIFFERENTIATION and UNITY are as important as talking about her goal in the philosophical ambient. Even before her teenage period she was already philosophising about what will culminate eventually in these principles of all principles – the principles of unity and differentiation. “My interest was awoken when I was very young, before [I] even knew the meaning of the word “philosophy” ... And as I pondered the verses of Horace and wondered what philosophy might be in them ...”<sup>37</sup> Then her interest in and confrontation with Ingarden on deeper lectures about being.<sup>38</sup> Through Logos and Life she has been able to a large extent to bridge the sea of separation between the schools of philosophy that existed before her. As shown in earlier chapters, the task of unifying the work of philosophers particularly in the modern period was the pre-occupation of many like Descartes, Kant and even Husserl. It is a historical fact that they almost all lack this kind of synthesis that is characteristic of Tymieniecka's philosophy made possible by the marriage between Logos, the pure dynamism and Life, which is both dynamic and immanent. Therefore, the unity of all that exists, that which is an important part of the philosophy of Tymieniecka, was already

foreseen by Stein when she opined that she finds it "impossible indeed to characterize to its full extent any one of the great fundamental genera of being without relations to others, ..." <sup>39</sup> The wealth of differentiation and unity, as far as the philosophy of our century is concerned, lies in this new approach to the problem of ontology and more metaphysical issues.

In phenomenology, ontology is as crucial as metaphysics is to the modern classical philosophy. With her study under and along side many of the phenomenological philosophers, Tymieniecka became so engrossed in the issue of ontology that she always wanted to know more of that from her teachers. Once, in her public expression of this intent, she confronted Ingarden and "asked him why he did not talk more about ontology". <sup>40</sup> Having had her formation, our author decided to expand the frontiers of phenomenology. In the process of doing that, she also contributes, and will certainly do more to enrich the legacy of philosophy in this new millennium. The prospect is readable, viewing her background project alongside the recent movement towards the restoration of metaphysics to philosophy, after the long period of neglect and discrimination it suffered. This idea is best expressed in the observation of Ryba when he elaborated:

As points of entry into Tymieniecka's thought, four concerns have particular significance to this survey both because they are internal themes running through her thought and because they are the chief way phenomenology has been thematized in the 20th century <sup>41</sup>

What are these four ways? "They are: (1) phenomenology as a methodology, (2) phenomenology as epistemology, (3) phenomenology as anthropology and (4) phenomenology as metaphysics." <sup>42</sup> In retrospect, this in summary is the work of philosophy right from its genesis. The unity of all things, without undermining the reality of the differences there are. She also adds the aesthetical aspect. <sup>43</sup> In the words of Raeymaeker, one sees clearly the importance of Tymieniecka's approach bringing disciplinary re-organisation in the field of philosophical research:

Since philosophy seeks above all for a solution to the problem of the one and the many, which is presented moreover under the various forms, it ought to determine accurately the nature of the unities which it studies. And just as there are unities of very different species, it must avoid confounding them, and it must [endeavor] to distinguish them. <sup>44</sup>

With such a foundational programme of inquiry, as in the above, Tymieniecka's work is a move towards a kind of re-invigoration and expansion of the phenomenological way and clarion call on philosophers

of all categories to re-direct the needed attention from the hitherto constitutive to the creative framework.<sup>45</sup> The new approach will help to achieve these two things, among other benefits to philosophy. Descartes had tried, followed by Husserl who improved on this method, but their approach could not recognise the vital part of the issue. On the part of Descartes, in an attempt to be free of prejudice, fragmented man and had no foundation for his structure as a result of reducing man essentially to a mere thought machine. Husserl went further by recognising this being of man, but in his structural and essential form, leaving out his quidity in terms of the inner dynamism which goes beyond just phenomenological manifestation, thereby not succeeding in reconciling both his composition in terms of matter and form. "Epistemologically, this reorientation is a new critique of rationality. Because it puts *ontopoiesis* (the making of being) at the centre of meaning, a refocusing of philosophy results that dissolves the artificial dichotomizations between matter and mind ..." <sup>46</sup>

This *ontopoiesis* is part of a larger activity of the *logos* that is responsible for dynamism in every being and among beings. This will be treated in detail in the course of this chapter. In considering this new attitude to philosophy and its issues at this most critical time of science and technology, man will be rescued from an impending doom. "On the one hand, Tymieniecka provides a fresh relationship with science, but in a way that helps to lead it out of its deficiencies."<sup>47</sup> While on the other, "The articulation of *logos* and life, then, is a new vision that, Verducci argues, is capable of leading us out of the contemporary crisis"<sup>48</sup> Life forms the basic element of every other possible reasonable discussion be it in general as regards everything that is in its unity and diversity and at the level of the human person seen as the crown of this *logoic* manifestation in immanence.

How do we approach this *Logos* as principle of life? The life principle from its very most basic epiphany to its most sophisticated manifestation is the task of this chapter as expressed in the philosophy of Tymieniecka. In effect therefore, life is seen as a dynamism that cannot be restricted to a particular sector of being(s), but a fluid that flows in its dynamic way all over living beings and beyond their concreteness. In this case the suggestion of Mardas will be most auspicious and enlightening. "Thus, the *Logos* cannot be thematized. The question of "where it all began" makes no sense. In this system there is no unmoved mover, only the eternal dynamic principle of motion unfolding in temporality."<sup>49</sup>

Mardas' opinion can be said to be inspired by the all-encompassing movement of the *Logos* in nature, and its unlimited possibility and

permeation. The impetus the Logos brings to life, in terms of its energy and the response it also carries from this interaction in the process, become a double-edged activity that goes on in an eternal way. "The nature of both impetus and equipoise is dynamic, a dynamism in action striving to effectuate its tendencies and a dynamism in repose, completing and marking its effects."<sup>50</sup> The effects of the dynamism of the logos, is not only a constant activity, but also a concrete realisation in immanence. Consequently, it is necessary to look at some of the different moments of its manifestations.

#### DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN TYPES

Man, beast and every other thing that exists, is by all means connected one to the other, at least in the bond of the ECOLOGICAL tie, they are all related and individual classes are naturally tied up to one another in this eco-system. "Throughout his existence, the human being as a living individual is carried by the cyclic life of everything alive."<sup>51</sup> So in this dynamism these classes all have a common link that brings them under the same umbrella. Yet the major problem that has plagued studies in this project of unity is the fragmentation and lack of communication that has continually been held in history. Therefore, "as there is no communication among them, so there is no opportunity for today's man to make a synthesis: to reach a holistic view of his own existence within the world and of life."<sup>52</sup> The solution that could be proffered to this problem is also very clear in the words of Tymieniecka when she posits that, "we have to delve into the *conditions of life itself*"<sup>53</sup>

In the whole process of the dynamism of the logos, that realises itself in its self-expression in the beings that are concretely manifested, is an evident unity on the one hand and of obvious differences on the other. These unity and differences are not just among the different types of creatures or beings, they also involve even the dynamism among the so-called same type. So the need arises to start the construction of the entire edifice of understanding by looking into the most basic reality among these *Beings* we have with and in us always. "Its modality is multiple, consisting of innumerable types of operations. Yet each functional operation points out a closer or further relation with an overall partly fluctuating, partly perdurable schema."<sup>54</sup>

The dynamism involved here is both a means of unity and at the same time a principle of differences. It is like the scientist's catalyst that goes through the process of dissolution bringing about changes and its

content(s) endures. The unity and individuation as observed before, has been plagued by a kind of consistent discordance both in terms of method and choice of study themes. Harmony will be the most viable way out of this historical quagmire.

The first most rudimental idea is the differentiation and unity among all that are. Here, the unity of all is that they all are, that is they exist. This simply indicates that they live.

In short we will follow along the spontaneous run of life's intuition in pursuit of the meanders and [relevances] of all-there-is-alive, seeking ultimately the differentiating as well as uniting articulations of life's origination and becoming at the cross section of various perspectives<sup>55</sup>

Tymieniecka further puts it thus: "Life is understood by us to be at the [center] and also to be the ultimate point of reference ..." <sup>56</sup> The immediate issue that logically follows will be that since the fact of their living will be too general to understand them completely, as they appear and as they are different from one another, there is need to look at them in their different classes.

The classing of or the differentiation of these beings is principally based on their course of development, referred to as their *ontogenetic* nature. This in itself suggests a constructive functioning.

#### DIFFERENTIATION AMONG TYPES

Here as well, there is a form of unity and differentiation which needs to be made in the sense that even among types of the same class, there are very glaring differences, sometimes in structure and more specifically in their inner dynamism. A very typical example of this is the human person. Every human being is both as a living being and as a type part of the 'genera', yet there are also some radical differences in particular groups of human beings.

Principally, the human specie is divided into two sexes – male and female. This is a very big differentiating principle and even among a particular sex there can be striking differences that certainly will call for individual attention. Some of these differences vary from mental composition to psychosomatic particularity. Not just in the human family only does there exist this togetherness and separation, it is the characteristic of all that exist. Tymieniecka further puts it thus:

As I have voiced it before elsewhere, this life-individualizing progress consists in processing forces, energies, synergies with their germinal affinities, floating, in wait, around a seminal

profile, which falls together like a dynamic jigsaw puzzle having at any moment in its emerging – unfolding a reservoir of support to draw from, the support of the already accomplished stages – phases with their inherited and acquired proficiencies<sup>57</sup>

In the mist of this dynamism lies the force of life that manifests itself in the union and becomes also the principle of separation in the ontogenetic reality. Hence, one talks about unity and diversity among a class of beings in the project of logos and life. This is tying the nodal points, to use the words of Tymieniecka. The fact of differentiation and unity go beyond the phenomenological ontology to the ontoipoiesis in the sense that it seeks to go to the most elementary level and dig deeper to its pristine state. This can best be understood in the following:

The ontoipoietic unfolding of the logos of life manifests itself in the spectacle of all, cosmos, world, nature, life, the works of human spirit ... We live within its network and speculate without noticing it. Yet the philosophical query dives below the spectacle to find its genesis and underpinnings.<sup>58</sup>

#### THE PROJECT OF LOGOS AND LIFE (THE ONTOPOIESIS)

In the brief summary above, the different types of dynamism in terms of the activities of the logos have been presented. The other issue and very important one that has to be addressed now is the system follow-up of Tymieniecka's way of the realization of this project. In Ryba's view, the expansive development of logos and life is the peak of the realization of this philosophical project. "In her massive, four volume work, *Logos and Life*, A.-T. Tymieniecka's philosophical project reaches a stage approximating its ultimate completion".<sup>59</sup> This is a higher level of development in the dynamism of the logos as a life force. Here the individual is capable of self-regeneration and replenishment. In their constitution they are imbued with the capacity of self-multiplicity. Here also is the strictly botanical and biological differences that are very difficult to make which however, exists. "The difference consists foremost, in a dynamic locus of relative freedom which is the basis for animal's deliberative and discriminative functioning in its life-promoting and conserving activities."<sup>60</sup> In fact it is in this ex-current task within and beyond the phenomenological ambient, that one sees a newness of ingenuousness in what may be referred to as the return to the basis. A return to the beginning of history in organised philosophising-the earliest attitude that signifies a search for the common grounds of all. Philosophy dealt with life, both in its concrete and speculative forms:



That is to say, it is an issue as much about the progress of life itself as it is of the experience constitutive of reality for the human being (as Husserl treats it), as it is of logic's struggles with it as works from the base of Aristotle's metaphysically rooted conception of the individual.<sup>61</sup>

The whole idea under consideration is not just the human person, though the centre of the drama, all that exist become part of this web, but in the dynamics of its analysis, purpose and meaning single man out of the group. As sophisticated as the level of animal dynamism may be, it still consists of some differences and relatedness, but in the major part more restricted in the full-blown movements of the logos. "At the actual peak seem to be human beings, whose representational and conceptualising communication seems to set them apart from the rest of life."<sup>62</sup>

#### LOGOS AND LIFE – A PROJECT OF RESTORATION AND EXPANSION

In a time as bewildering as ours, filled with continuous and unrestricted rationalities, trivialization and relativism, it takes a decisive and profound anti-dote to re-enact the reign of values and reasonability. This restoration can only be achieved by an effort that is equally as definite and desperate to transmit an ingenuity based on conviction, insistence on sophistication and the advocate for dignity that leads to a new orientation and commitment. Logos and Life as the critique of reason that is phenomenologically based, is what this paper calls for.

This is the theme of Tymieniecka's research as a philosopher and restorer of some philosophical legacy, through and beyond the phenomenological bound. The concept logos and life runs through four books in which she analyses the movement of the logos both in history and in transcendence – History, because of its becoming, and transcendence, because it goes beyond becoming as it pre-dates it in an eternal dynamics. The precedence of the logos has previously been attested to by Tymieniecka in the following comment: "The vision which I present here shows the human subject not as the root-source of the life-world and of the universal order, but merely cooperating in the genesis of life, nature and the life-world: the life-order."<sup>63</sup> In the Heideggerian manner she sees Dasein as the most sophisticated ground through which this eternal flux of the logos is concretised and therefore can most appropriately be studied.

The Logos, for Tymieniecka, is governed by a single dynamic principle that of the constantly shifting balance between impetus and equipoise. This principle of becoming is also a principle

of measuring – not Schopenhauer's blind will-to-live, but rather a constructive, unifying principle more akin, perhaps, to Heidegger's concept of *Dasein*.<sup>64</sup>

However, the view goes beyond this ciphering to an inner dynamism that non of the actors in this drama of life, not even the human being can contain in themselves in an absolute manner this principle of principles. "The unity-of-everything-there-is-alive is grounded in the intrinsic existentially and vitally significant linkage among the entire system of beingness that are mutually indispensable for each other's existence"<sup>65</sup> The importance of this is the observation made by Ryba when he proposed thus: "Here, Tymieniecka's main concern, again, is to review the inadequacies of previous phenomenological approaches, particularly Husserlian phenomenology, in order to demonstrate how her own approach provides the required supplement."<sup>66</sup> The great advantage here is not just for the benefit of phenomenology alone, but put in a more comprehensive manner, that of philosophy in general. To further elaborate and lay credence to the fact of what may be referred as "a philosophy of totality" Tymieniecka once again goes back to the root, the starting point of philosophy, as she puts it in a very clear manner.

Philosophical discourse by nature follows the temporal flow of the human reflective mind in its exposition. Still out of concern for continuity, it strives to smooth out the route the mind takes in its work of presenting reality, so that its becoming and its features are presented in a sequence of arguments and so that there is continuity among the descriptive fragments.<sup>67</sup>

Besides philosophers by profession, the above position is true of all the branches of research in the human world. A particular attention should be recommended to scientists here, be they physical or social, that the posture of fragmentation which is obvious in the approach man assumes in his effort at understanding reality, is only a reminder and a call to humility. Hence Tymieniecka spurns the natural scientific method as the only paradigm of knowledge and points out its inadequacies in many of its branches.<sup>68</sup> One can further substantiate this position by an appeal to methodological disposition.

That is to say, faithful to our logoic principle that each significant move of life simultaneously stem from a radius of conjoined operating forces and by its emergence circumscribes the new radius of constructive conjoined operational schema, with each radius drawing on a circumambient respectively selective play of forces, ... This radius of forces is at the same time a constructive coming together toward an achievement and a rebound that throws out lines of operations imbued already by a significant factor making it operate.<sup>69</sup>

From the above, tradition is taken care of, and at the same time innovation has occurred. This is the uniqueness in this philosophy. The reason for this is that the role of man, as the peak of all the manifestation in the dynamism of the logos in life is retained, yet his finiteness is also highly emphasised. Tymieniecka, unlike many of the philosophers of the modern time, the critique of reason involves the realization of the limits of the human reason as one of the many manifestations of REASON. She sees her philosophy addressing this fact among many issues.

Actually, the phenomenology of life that I have developed is at the same time a critique of reason, a critique of reason in the sense that I am radically counteracting the current and always represented idea that there is one reason, the reason of the human mind. The reason of the human mind is held up as the measure of whatever happens in nature. I say to the contrary that the human mind is only one among an infinite number of rationalities.<sup>70</sup>

However, Tymieniecka accepts the Heideggerian principle of Dasein as the most appropriate place of understanding BEING. So the logos can best be studied in human being as the endowment of the human being with the dynamism of the logos is much more advanced than any other contingent being.

#### MAN AS AT THE CENTRE OF THE DRAMA

In a radical contrast, in order to reach the unifying source of the innumerable rationalities that life itself prompts through its constructive advance, we have to delve into the *conditions of life itself*. Not the givenness of the already man-projected life-world but the *human condition* which holds the virtualities that enable the human being to unfold himself together with his life-world lies the source of this proliferation.<sup>71</sup>

Man radically differs from all the other participators in the life force of the logos. However, his privileged position does not extend to absolute independence, but that of first among many. "And yet, he not appear as just one of the segments within some or other subordinate sequence: he surges from the entanglements of all the networks as the VORTEX in which all the networks of life's orderings meet; ..." <sup>72</sup> The reality of this difference starts from the simple physiological to the psychosomatic difference. Man as a cultural being and as intuitive self-conscious being. The differences that make each individual unique, and the harmony that abound, linking all individuals in one and the same cyclical dynamism, is something of particular interest. "Here we cannot help but share Aristotelian intuition of the vital forces which carry with themselves the

constructive propensities lying-there-in wait to be unfolded ...”<sup>73</sup> It is this unfolding that brings us to the realm of the transcendence, with a fluidity of passages in the human condition that the new critique of reason which the philosophy of Tymieniecka proposes. It is not the critique of rationality that is the aim, rather, the critique of: “The whole realm of life through its phases beginning with pre-life, then the organic life, then the zooidal realm each phase and each moment of life advances through rational articulations that belong to the nature of life itself.”<sup>74</sup>

Furthermore, the ensuing “poetics of the elements” brings forth the “creative forge” active within the human soul in the most elementary passion states, as a result of the power of imagination. This power of imagination as highlighted, seeks the pristine responses of the imagination, with its three virtual sense-giving factors, in the aesthetic, moral and intellective spheres, to the challenges of the force of life, both in the cosmic stream and the human condition. Here the vitally significant forces that constitute the dynamic elements become the common denominator in the whole process. This denominator is seen as the Logos that permeates all, gives meaning and force to all.

The possibility that Tymieniecka found in her philosophy as a result of the new critique of reason is something that has been hitherto impossible for both science and philosophy. “She finds the common weakness of all contemporary approaches in their reliance on an enlightenment rationalism that dictates which phenomena are to be legitimate objects of scientific investigation.”<sup>75</sup> The question is no longer a particular reason or rationality plays the role of foundation, but it is a matter of the life dynamic itself that flows along all that can be seen and felt. This according to Tymieniecka is the phenomenology of life.

The above position leads to a more complex and dynamic level, this she makes clear when she asserts that:

To strike the right chord, which echoes and resounds from the human universe-in-the-making, we have to begin at the [center] of all differentiation. We have to begin by evincing the human creative experience, in which all the forces which carry the meaningfulness of natural life play upon the strings of the [passional] soul and are gathered and transmuted, filtered, and united and tied again into new networks, bringing new, unprecedented, and unique *specifically human significance* to life.<sup>76</sup>

The human significance points to some creative role that man plays that is unique to him only among all the realities of this life brought about by the logos. The emphasis here is that possibility of digging into the realities that though not apparent, but are very obviously recognised in

man. These are the possibilities of spirituality and consequently speculative reflection on religion. All these are evident in the life of man and must be attended to. She is really Husserlian in the sense that for Husserl every form of intuition and consciousness must be considered in its own terms and class. Here, this power brings about in the concrete sense a triple avenue of response to imagination in its pristine level. These are shown in-aesthetic, moral and intellective manners. The three levels in this sense according to Ryba, possesses a triadic structure akin to the three transcendental concepts – of Truth, Goodness and Beauty.<sup>77</sup> Furthermore, “This thesis is worked out in a three-part circuit, beginning first, with her metaphysics, second, with her aesthetics and third, with her moral theory of literature.”<sup>78</sup> For Tymieniecka, the basis of all these is WONDER – man tries to respond to the marvels around and within him and to find reasons for existence as well. One can conveniently hold therefore, that Tymieniecka advocates the return to the model of philosophy of the earliest time, and what in the concept of Aristotle is *Philosophia Prima*.

The whole experience of wonder is contingent and a consequence of a vital point, which must be given a voice in this section of our work. It zeros into the dynamism and balance in the formation of life as a result of the activities of the Logos. Tymieniecka refers to this as the law of primogenital Logos: it is the indivisible complementary dynamism of impetus and equipoise. The return to the most basic, the crust of the whole project of the Logos and Life in the final book in the series of this great topic is an indication that, at the end of the analysis and the diversifications of its application, the root of the matter is very important and the subject (man the crown and subject of this research), becomes the first and last focus in the gigantic project of life. The complex and encompassing project of Tymieniecka, shows that the dynamism of the Logos in the pursuit of reason peaks in exfoliating the self-motivated instrument carrying the gigantic game of life. This phenomenology/ ontopoiesis of life, integral and scientific, thus unfolds in a concrete analytic fashion in an overt and implicit dialogue with history, science, arts, literature and social life. It brings out numerous inspiring views, ideas and insights, to think of classical philosophical issues, and in a phenomenological manner, but different in disposition even from the classical phenomenologists.<sup>79</sup>

At the end of it all it is worthy of note that:

Although life on this earth undergoes transformations and we are terrified by the possible developments that future generations may face, nevertheless as far back as humanity can

remember the basic cycles of development, the essential modalities of its progress and continuity amid contingent fluctuation have remained well in place.<sup>80</sup>

In fact, Impetus and Equipose form the indivisible complementary dynamism of the law of primogenital logos. "Since construction is its spring, the logos goes over "onward"; it implies the necessity of discrete continuity (disruption recurrence), and its spacing and scanning implies the necessity of a measure ultimately, *the impetus of becoming implies the necessity of equipose*."<sup>81</sup> This in its most complex form is found in the human condition. The valley of difference created as a result of the fragmentation and illicit separations made in history, have been overcome with the philosophy of logos and life.

I have proposed this question for reflection and if there is an immediate solution I will be glad to note it for further research: Will philosophy grow more with an attitude of openness, or when the issue particularly of metaphysics, whatever method of approach is closed?

#### OBSERVATIONS

The end of such a research as this, is normally the beginning of it. In his book, *Un passo oltre la Scienza filosofia e transcendenza in Karl Jaspers*, Messinese points out that philosophy has had right from the onset the issue of being.<sup>82</sup> The majority of philosophers will agree with the above citation, but the problem normally is that of the direction of study of this being. What is the point of departure to take? Do we start from the phenomenological manifestation, or from idea?

Messinese sees the two points of departure as contributing greatly to the study of being. The core of Tymieniecka's proposal is an approach that recognises this movement, but in a new way. The difference is that we need to go even deeper than the phenomenological manifestation, though necessarily passing through the way of phenomenology to the dynamism the Logos and Life entail in the presentation of the search about being. In addition to the above, wonder or response to the marvels around man becomes the discourse known as philosophy.

In human history the attempts to express this acts of wonder in man, that is language in its totality has been an indispensable ingredient. This is related to the sociological and the transcendental nature of the human person. Man needs to relate within his community into which he is born in order to realise himself. This is the reason why Karl Jaspers says: "There my being lies in freedom and communication and is aimed at

other free being. ... It is not only together with other free beings; it refers in itself to a being that is not Existenz but its transcendence."<sup>83</sup> Man goes beyond himself so as to be able to seek a more comprehensive meaning about the life he lives in the physical world, the totality of which he cannot situate here in the empirical world of reality. Hence, the open-ended form of communication: of both with the physical and the meta-physical, or horizontal and vertical. Man however, transcends both the self and the institutions within which he operates. He is always in a constant thrust towards realities beyond him, the community and the society in which he lives.

No matter how difficult it may be, man needs to keep relating, he must continue to be in communication. The most adequate means of doing that is language, though at times very cumbersome and paradoxical. In Tymieniecka, we see these paradoxes. Ryba observes of Tymieniecka's philosophy thus: "Anyone who has made a careful study of her philosophy knows how difficult it is to understand, classify or convey."<sup>84</sup> This is another of the major issues that may call for attention in subsequent works of Tymieniecka. Therefore some clumsiness in language that can be noticed in the process of analyses is expected, but efforts should be made not to allow that in any way to impede the beauty of her presentation and explanation. It is the right time for philosophers to open wider their horizon just like their "earliest colleagues"<sup>85</sup> to accommodate the entire possibility of all human endeavours. Nevertheless, these issues should be treated as distinctively as possible

### CONCLUSION

The task of writing a conclusion to a work of this nature is as demanding as posing and resolving a philosophical problem. The inability to completely answer a philosophical query therefore makes my task more complex. However, conscious of the comment of Karl Jaspers about human nature as a being in the world and his position, powers, weaknesses in confrontation with his destiny, yet his dynamism among all other creatures; the task all the same is an obligation. It is the view of Jaspers that:

Indeed, we have a better knowledge of all those things that we ourselves are not-what man is, is perhaps less clear to him than anything else he encounters. He becomes for himself the greatest of all mysteries when he senses that despite his finite nature, his possibilities seem to extend into the infinite.<sup>86</sup>

Tymieniecka has been able to provide a yardstick for literary criticism in the academic arena. Her all-embracing and un-discriminative approach has gone a long way in this project to enlighten some obscured areas of researches. Nevertheless, there is still so much to be done in developing further this new approach. If Tymieniecka's call for a new approach to philosophy is heeded by many, the realization of the dream of philosophy that has been relegated to the background, our millennium has to seek the real question that led to the act of philosophising. "In our day, the practice of philosophy is in great decadence because the majority of the present-day philosophers who occupy the attention of the world are relativists."<sup>87</sup> Furthermore:

The vocation of philosophy in the West from the time of the ancient Greeks has been that of answering the questions that no other branch of knowledge can answer. ... Now philosophy today is giving up this quest. ... I am audacious enough ... to maintain the real vocation of philosophy. Why are things as they are? Why is life as it is? Why do human beings strive in such a way and no other? Answering these questions is the vocation of philosophy.<sup>88</sup>

Finally, philosophy is about research. Research is a living dynamism. Dynamism is the principle of life. Life is all about all. Therefore, about life when we finish then we are beginning.

*Lateran University*  
*Rome*

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense: An essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 15.

<sup>2</sup> G. H. R. Parkinson (ed.), *An Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 252.

<sup>3</sup> A. Kenny, *Aquinas on Mind* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> K. Mulligan, "Searle, Derrida, and the Ends of Phenomenology," in *John Searle: Contemporary Philosophy in Focus*, B. Smith (ed.) (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 261–286.

<sup>5</sup> A. Ales Bello, "I Contributi più significativi della Fenomenologia," in *Scuola e Cultura*, Nuova secondaria n.3, 1987 21. Nel panorama della filosofia contemporanea la fenomenologia occupa un posto di grande rilevanza, rappresentando uno dei momenti fondamentali della sensibilità filosofica attuale. Ed è soprattutto nel clima culturale degli anni ottanta che il movimento filosofico, che ha avuto origine nel pensiero di E. Husserl, ha dimostrato sempre più la sua efficacia in quanto metodo di indagine conoscitiva nell'ambito delle scienze umane.

<sup>6</sup> A. Ales Bello, "The Generative Principles of Phenomenology, Their Genesis, Development and Early Expansion," in *Phenomenology World Wide*, op. cit., p. 29–61.

<sup>7</sup> A. Ales Bello, *ibid.*



- <sup>8</sup> A.-T. Tymieniecka, "The latter Husserl and the Idea of Phenomenology," in *Analecta Husserliana* vol. II (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel Publishing Company, 1969), p. 1.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>10</sup> Cf. *ibid.*
- <sup>11</sup> A.-T. Tymieniecka, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>13</sup> Cf. *ibid.*
- <sup>14</sup> F. Dagfinn, "Husserl Edmund," in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 369–370.
- <sup>15</sup> A. Ales Bello, *Class note*, Lateran, 2003.
- <sup>16</sup> A. Ales Bello. Scuola e Cultura *op. cit.* 23. tuttavia l'insufficienza dello strumento fornito dalla psicologia per la comprensione di tutte le operazioni matematiche e quindi della struttura di questa disciplina, lo orienta verso un esame della logica, come è testimoniato dalle Ricerche logiche.
- <sup>17</sup> Cf. A. A. Bello, *Class note*, Lateran, *op. cit.*
- <sup>18</sup> A.-T. Tymieniecka, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
- <sup>19</sup> A. Ales Bello, *Phenomenology World Wide*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
- <sup>20</sup> M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, John Macquarrie et.al. (trans.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), p. 50.
- <sup>21</sup> J. Omoregbe, *A Simple History of Western Philosophy*, Vol. 3 (Lagos, 1991), p. 30.
- <sup>22</sup> H. Edmund, *The Paris Lectures*, translated with an introduction by Peter Koestenbaum (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), p. 3, *ibid.*
- <sup>23</sup> J. Omoregbe, *op. cit.*, p. 34.
- <sup>24</sup> Cf. Footnote already cited, no. 6.
- <sup>25</sup> Cf. J. Omoregbe, *A Simplified History of Western Philosophy*, Vol. 3: *Contemporary Philosophy* (Lagos, 1991), p. 29.
- <sup>26</sup> I. Yarza, *History of Ancient Philosophy*. Sinag-tala, 1994, p. 91.
- <sup>27</sup> E. Stein, *Finite and Eternal Being*, K. F. Reinhardt (trans.) (Washington, D.C., 2002), p. 269.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>29</sup> C. Diane', "Aquinas," in *Fifty Major Philosophers: A Reference Guide*. Bristol, 1987, p. 34.
- <sup>30</sup> A. Ales Bello, *Sul femminile Scritti di antropologia e religione*, a cura di Michele D'Ambra, Città Edizioni, 2004, p. 68 "... la riflessione filosofica ci aiuta a riconoscere la comune struttura antropologica universale e duale che caratterizza tutti gli esseri umani, in secondo luogo a saper riconoscere la comune umanità al di sotto delle diversità culturali che sono presenti nei gruppi umani."
- <sup>31</sup> H. Putnam, *The Collapse of the Fact and Value Dichotomy and other Essays*. Harvard College USA, 2002, cover page.
- <sup>32</sup> J. Omoregbe, *History of Western Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
- <sup>33</sup> A. Ales Bello, *Phenomenology World Wide*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
- <sup>34</sup> Encyclopedia Britannica, *Metaphysics* vol. 12, 1981, pp. 10–36.
- <sup>35</sup> I. Rainova, "Interview with Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka in Moscow 1993," in *The World Phenomenology Institute – World Institute for Advance Phenomenology*, file://C: old %20Documents, 01-Dec. 1999, p. 4.
- <sup>36</sup> A.-T. Tymieniecka, "The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condition," in *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. XXI (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1986), p. 7.
- <sup>37</sup> I. Rainova, "Interview with Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka in Moscow 1993," in *The World Phenomenology Institute – World Institute for Advance Phenomenology*, file://C: old %20Documents, 01-Dec., 1999, p. 1.

- 38 *Ibid.*, p. 16.
- 39 *Ibid.*, p. 267.
- 40 I. Rainova, *Interview*, *op. cit.*, p. 2.
- 41 T. Ryba, *op. cit.*, p. 432.
- 42 *Ibid.*
- 43 *Ibid.*
- 44 L. De Raeymaeker, *The Philosophy of Being*, E. H. Ziegelmeyer (trans.) Herder Book Co, U.S.A., 1966, p. 62.
- 45 A.-T. Tymieniecka, "Logos and Life: Creative Experience and Critique of Reason," in *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. xxiv (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), p. xxiv.
- 46 T. Ryba, *op. cit.*, p. 432.
- 47 G. Backhaus (ed.), "Introduction," in *Phenomenological Inquiry*, Vol. 27 (New Hampshire: Hanover, 2003), pp. 5–19. 10.
- 48 *Ibid.*, p. 14.
- 49 N. Mardas, "Following the Golden Thread: A Journey Through Labyrinth of Tymieniecka's Logos and Life," in: *Phenomenological Inquiry*, Vol. XXVII, 2003, pp. 34–62, 36.
- 50 A.-T. Tymieniecka, "Logos and Life, Book Four," in *Analecta Husserliana*, LXX (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 45.
- 51 A.-T. Tymieniecka, "The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condition," in *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. XXI, p. 16.
- 52 *Ibid.*, p. 7.
- 53 *Ibid.*
- 54 A.-T. Tymieniecka, "Differentiation and Unity: The self-individualizing life process," in *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. LVII, pp. 3–36, 9.
- 55 *Ibid.*
- 56 *Ibid.*
- 57 *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- 58 A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Logos and Life* book 4, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
- 59 T. Ryba, "Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's Phenomenology of Life", *op. cit.*, p. 448.
- 60 *Ibid.*, p. 25.
- 61 A.-T. Tymieniecka, "Differentiation and Unity", *op. cit.*, p. 10.
- 62 *Ibid.*
- 63 A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Logos and Life*, Vol. 4, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
- 64 N. Mardas, *Phenomenological Inquiry*, *op. cit.*, pp. 35–36.
- 65 A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Logos and Life*, Vol.4, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
- 66 T. Rybba, *op. cit.*, p. 448.
- 67 A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Logos and Life*, book 4, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
- 68 T. Ryba, *op. cit.*, p. 448
- 69 A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Logos and Life*, *op. cit.*, pp. 7–8
- 70 Rainova Ivanka. Interview with Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–14.
- 71 A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. XXI *op. cit.*, p. 7.
- 72 *Ibid.*, p. 11.
- 73 *Ibid.*
- 74 Ivanka, R, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
- 75 T. Ryba, "Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's Phenomenology of Life", *op. cit.*, p. 448.
- 76 A.-T. Tymieniecka, "Logos and Life, Book II: The Three Movement of The Soul," in *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. XXV, p. 10.

<sup>77</sup> T. Ryba, *op. cit.*, p. 454.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 455.

<sup>79</sup> A.-T. Tymieniecka, *Personal dialogue on phenomenology and philosophy*, Rome, March, 2004.

<sup>80</sup> A.-T. Tymieniecka, "Logos and Life", Book 4, Vol. XXXV.

<sup>81</sup> A.-T. Tymieniecka, "Logos and Life", Book 4., *Analecta Husserliana*, Vol. LXX, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, p. 38.

<sup>82</sup> L. Messinese, *Un passo oltre la Scienza. Filosofia e trascendenza in Karl Jaspers* Città Nuova, Roma, 2002, p. 20.

<sup>83</sup> Karl Jaspers, *Philosophy*, Vol. III, E. B. Ashton (trans.). Chicago & London, 1971, p. 3, "L'oggetto proprio della filosofia, dalla nascita, è la totalità dell'essere, quindi essa è scienza dell'ente in quanto essere e, per questo, del suo fondamento cioè dell'essere assoluto.

<sup>84</sup> T. Ryba, "Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's Phenomenology of Life," in *Phenomenology World Wide – A Guide for Research and Study* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 431.

<sup>85</sup> It is important and possible to carry along the earliest attempts in the tradition of even from the pre-Socratic times in order to be able to see and always leave behind a complete picture of the enterprise of philosophy. In this way it will be in consonance with the proposal of Tymieniecka. This is necessary because for philosophy to continue to retain its prime position it must live above the danger of specializing in a particular field like other sciences, since philosophy is the 'science of all sciences'.

<sup>86</sup> Karl Jaspers, *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy*, R. Manheim (trans.). Archon USA., 1968, pp. 48–49.

<sup>87</sup> I. Rainova, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

<sup>88</sup> I. Rainova, *Ibid.*

## SECTION III

### CRITERIA OF VALIDITY IN TRANSFORMATION: EVIDENCE, CERTAINTY

DESCARTES AND ORTEGA ON THE FATE OF  
INDUBITABLE KNOWLEDGE\*

My intent here is to carry out an examination of the role that consciousness played for Descartes, the putative father of modern Western philosophy, and to do so in view of a particular thematic nexus, namely, the problem of the possibility of indubitable knowledge. However, before proceeding to discharge such a task, two disclaimers are, in my opinion, appropriate.

On the one hand, it is clear from the historical record that my choice of focus is neither whimsical nor accidental. Descartes himself framed the questions concerning science and reality that he was living so intensely precisely in such terms. Without great fear of distortion, one could even say that subsequent philosophical developments and difficulties may be traced to the problem of whether absolutely certain cognition is at all possible.

On the other hand, I do not propose to be guided in this investigation merely by a historical interest in establishing the logic of thought unfolding on the basis of adopting Descartes's point of departure and leading therefrom to the present. No matter how meritorious and attractive such a procedure may be in itself, I believe it would not be self-sufficiently or ultimately rewarding. After all, real questions cannot be raised out of sheer curiosity,<sup>1</sup> or on the grounds of simple erudition; on the contrary, they must be born of actually pressing preoccupations, which we think genuinely exist for us and that could be characterized, in a way, as Husserl himself did in presenting the situation prevailing in his time, for, as he put it,

[t]he splintering of present-day philosophy ... sets us thinking ... The comparative unity that it had in previous ages, in its aims, its problems and methods, has been lost. When, with the beginning of modern times, religious belief was becoming more and more externalized as a lifeless convention, men of intellect were lifted by a new belief, their great belief in an autonomous philosophy and science ...

But meanwhile this belief too has begun to languish not without reason. ... Instead of a serious discussion among conflicting theories that, in their very conflict, demonstrate the intimacy with which they belong together, the commonness of their underlying convictions, and an unswerving belief in a true philosophy, we have a pseudo-reporting and a pseudo-criticizing. ... The philosophers meet but, unfortunately, not the philosophies. The philosophies lack the unity of a mental space in which they might exist and act on one another. ...<sup>2</sup>

Indeed, it seems highly paradoxical that thought – the aim of which is the attainment of clarity about and insight into reality – and particularly philosophical thought (which is systematically directed toward that goal) find themselves in such a predicament, a situation of crisis that, to avail ourselves of Husserl's own assessment of it, appears to be “similar to the one encountered by Descartes in his youth. ...”<sup>3</sup> This is especially confusing when one encounters so many philosophical schools, which, in their incommunicant and dysfunctional glossolalia, make a mockery of their essential vocation. If nothing else, philosophy, when practiced with the “radicalness of self-responsibility”,<sup>4</sup> consists in searching after ultimate foundations, for no questionable or grounded view can satisfy the philosopher's quest, and yet one sees that today, more than ever, the confusion is so vast and profound that, again, many so-called philosophers – knowingly or unknowingly – take historically-rooted ideas or socio-politically determined notions as means to articulate what they take as valid answers to age-old difficulties. No wonder did Husserl consider our crisis as betraying not simply a difference of opinion or just a passing befuddlement concerning principles; rather, he understood it *radically*, if one employs this word etymologically, for he conceived it as affecting reason precisely as the modern principle of principles. All theories, schools of thought, and theoretical or scientific propositions are fundamentally one, for they are all attempts to live, formulate, and recast the workings and products of reason, taken as the power and endeavor to grasp reality as it is. But now it is this ultimate source and sustenance of radical thought which is being cast in doubt, obscured, and even disregarded in view of the chaotic multiplicity of opinion<sup>5</sup> identifiable as the issue of present-day philosophical thinking.

To follow Descartes's and Husserl's injunction and example does not mean, however, to interpret their advice and attendant practice as if they impelled us – to say it once more – to carry out a mere literary or historical examination that would determine the components and qualities of what the latter described as the “medley of [the] great traditions ...” of the “immense philosophical literature ...”.<sup>6</sup> On the contrary, the path to be trodden and charted in order to overcome our predicament must be genuinely philosophical; that is to say, the ultimateness of the end pursued thereby must be consistent with, and supported by, the radicalness of the procedure chosen to follow after it. Now, I suggest that the sort of path to be traversed is already indicated by some of the expressions Husserl himself employed, to wit: the “comparative unity” of philosophy “in previous ages”<sup>7</sup> and the “commonness of ... [the] underlying convic-

tions” of the presently “conflicting theories”.<sup>8</sup> Following Descartes’s example, Husserl had thus insisted in going down to the universal root of all such products and the activities in which they originate, as indeed one must, for unless one understands reason as their final human source, one cannot come to terms with, let alone do justice to, its articulations and derivatives.

Accordingly, what I endeavor to do here is to clarify the notion of reason by attempting to establish some of its boundaries, a task I would characterize as transcendental-historical, i.e., transcendental inasmuch as it seeks to determine the conditions rendering its exercise possible, and historical to the extent that it seeks to identify such conditions in the midst of the historical nexuses that motivate their emergence and conformation.<sup>9</sup> In this light, the Cartesian question, “is indubitable knowledge possible?” becomes, “is reason a valid way of access to reality, and why?” Now then, in order to appreciate the meaning and consequences of the problem understood in such terms, it is first necessary to trace it back to its original formulation. Descartes’s sense of the internal connections among consciousness, reason, and reality will therefore serve as our guide and constitute our point of departure in that inquiry. However, this is not – to say it once more – a mere empirical or historical search, for, as part and parcel of the proposed examination of Descartes’s sense, one must certainly consider the possibility that his understanding of such matters was flawed in some of its essential aspects, taken precisely as he did, for it may very well be that one of the components of an account of the present crisis is found not so much in a mere disbelief in reason as it is in a particularly modern form thereof, namely, physico-mathematical reason.<sup>10</sup> In other words, the task I have set myself will take the form of an attempt to understand some of the limits of this particular sort of reason, so as to see whether or not it is in principle possible to engage in a new style of rational behavior resulting from a radicalization of the notion of reason. My contention is that, unless the overcoming of the historically constituted boundaries of reason is possible, no final resolution of our crisis of value and thought will ever be achieved. However, one thing is to be underscored, namely, that a permanent state of crisis is, if I am not mistaken, a self-contradictory state of affairs (or at least it seems to be so to the human animal, insofar as he is a *conatus* to perdure *meaningfully* in existence). What is at stake, then, is no mere concern with some intellectual view or controversy, but the very possibility of the survival of Western civilization, rooted as it is in scientific reason and laden as it has become by its fruits. An effort to come to terms with it,

no matter how circumscribed in scope or groping in character it may be, is thus not only permissible but necessary. Let me now take a few steps in that direction.

# I

Descartes was one of the early and distinguished practitioners of modern mathematics and the mathematical science of Nature. This statement of fact must be approached with care, for it can easily be misunderstood. One may certainly mean thereby that Descartes was one of the originators of modern mathematics, especially insofar as the latter has a bearing on physics.<sup>11</sup> In line with this interpretation, we would have to see Descartes as one among several theoreticians of great importance, for we are no doubt entitled to see him as worthy of the company of Galileo, Leibniz and Newton. But that view soon proves to be insufficient to do him justice, and, in fact, if left unqualified, it becomes a source of error, since Descartes's deliberate and efficacious efforts were directed beyond work in the new sciences. His paramount interest lay not so much in doing mathematical physics (or any other particular science) as it did in justifying the new, radical, and paradoxical practices identifiable therein. He was not content with advancing theorems in a given science or even with establishing their truth; he wanted to determine whether or not the novel scientific activities were possible and justifiable in principle, especially insofar as such theorems can be seen as answers to questions about the nature of reality.

Now, how did Descartes approach the problem of the validation of the modern scientific enterprise? One could say that he attempted to do so by placing it in a wider context, namely, that of the possibility of human knowledge in general. In other words, he saw that establishing the possibility of scientific knowledge was a particular case of the effort to decide whether or not human knowledge – and its claim of being able to grasp reality for what it is with a modicum of certainty – was possible at all.

At the intuitive level, one may say that there is a striking difference between scientific knowledge – understood as a special but paradigmatic exemplar of cognitive activity – and everyday or practical knowledge. And the difference seems to be that the latter is tentative and somewhat confused, while the former is categorical and absolute. Viewed in such terms, the difference under consideration can induce us to restate the



question raised by Descartes as to the possibility of scientific knowledge in other terms. Let me try to give expression to that reformulation.

One cannot deny that the knowledge found to be useful by us in our everyday, mundane transactions is neither well-defined nor conclusive. A great number of obscurities and dubious aspects are part and parcel thereof, as evinced by our uncertainties and hesitations in decision-making and deliberation and our difficulties in finding (or in communicating to others) a practical understanding of mundane affairs and events and the right path to be followed in doing and making. By contrast with this familiar background of our lives, one would have to say that scientific knowledge either is a *rara avis* or at least constitutes a paradoxical specimen of human achievement. That it is rare – in the sense of being out of the ordinary and unlike what is usual about the notions concerning self and world – one need not elaborate. That it is paradoxical, one can perhaps appreciate by pointing to the strange fact that, should a scientific account be proposed for a given sort of worldly event or phenomenon, it would be so considered on the grounds of needs and conflicts which cannot be met with a significant degree of success in terms of our *usual* conceptions of such events or phenomena. Scientific knowledge, then, is rooted – both as an activity and a product of the mind – in our everyday dealings with reality, for it is precisely in such dealings that one finds the motivations to raise scientific questions and form scientific ideas. Once this is realized, one is able to recast the difference between scientific and everyday, practical knowledge by saying that the definite and categorical (as proper to the former) is to be seen as deriving from – and as “applicable” to – the tentative and confused (as characteristic of the latter) by means of some procedure that remains to be identified. But this is undoubtedly a paradox, seemingly involving as it does a *metábasis eîs állo génos*, and not just a difference in degree.

If I am not mistaken, Descartes had access to that paradoxical but constitutive dimension of scientific knowledge, as can be seen by taking a look at the context in which his attempt to justify the scientific enterprise took place. As has already been pointed out, he was confronted with the need to account for science in the modern style by way of endeavoring to establish the possibility of knowledge in general, a task which he viewed specifically in light of the question of whether indubitable knowledge is possible. Accordingly, one would then have to show how he came to bring about such a correlation and what, in essence, the solution derivable therefrom was. Let me now try to do so.

## II

Within the space available here, it is next to impossible to present, in its particularity, the historical situation in which Descartes found himself, and in the light of which he was motivated to propound his ultimate theoretical formulations. And yet, if one wishes rightly to appreciate the Cartesian project, one has to face the “substance” of his times, at least in summary form. To this end, and as suggested by the picture drawn for us by Husserl, one must say that there are two things helping to determine the Cartesian point of departure:

1. The influence that Descartes’s historical situation exerted on his theorizing cannot be reduced to the trivial understanding according to which any thinker’s views and blind spots are traceable *simpliciter* to the tenor of the times in which he or she lived. And the reason why this would be illegitimate in his case, as is manifest in his own *Discourse on Method* and *Meditations on First Philosophy*, is that his express intent therein was to examine the meaning of his own mental confusion as a man of his times in order to establish whether or not such a state was permanent or *de iure*.

2. But not only did Descartes make his state of mind an explicit topic of consideration, insofar as it contained a multiplicity of heterogeneous thoughts and beliefs, deriving as they did from sensation, tradition, and other sources of questionable validity; he also wished to subject it to scrutiny in terms of one and only one goal, namely, the resolution, once and for all, of the question as to whether such thoughts and beliefs could involve, in themselves, the possibility of thinking something about anything with absolute certitude. In light of this formulation, one would have to say that Descartes was neither a mere man of his age (that is to say, one who would have lived, acted, suffered, produced, and even theorized on the basis of the more or less explicit “prejudices” prevailing in his times)<sup>12</sup> nor a historian or even a moralist, whose aim would have been to present the actual states of affairs proper to his times and to reflect upon their conditions and would-be consequences. On the contrary, Descartes was primarily a philosopher, that is to say, a man whose objective was to be able to see clear through the sense of his times, a man who wanted to examine – for the purposes of evaluation – the “premises” embedded in his own situation as clues which could serve to betray their own foundations and claims to validity. If one may legitimately assert that Descartes’s youth elapsed in an era characterized by moral relativism and intellectual skepticism,<sup>13</sup> then his work would have

to be taken as a deliberate attempt on his part to find the grounds which could explain such relativism and skepticism. As it turned out, the identification of the grounds in question allowed, at once, for an explanation of the situation of crisis in which he lived and for the possibility of its being overcome.

It would of course be misleading to leave at that the characterization of Descartes's self-appraisal as a man of his times, as someone both undergoing its critical effects and endeavoring to supersede them. Another essential aspect of his life, to which I have already referred, must be borne in mind as well, for he was a distinguished man of science, more specifically, a mathematician and physicist of note. As such, he was aware that not everything was beyond the reach of man's mental powers: others had been responsible for advances in those disciplines in their recent past, and he himself had made considerable, even revolutionary contributions to science – his recasting of geometrical analysis in algebraic terms and his attempt to formulate the physical principle of conservation, for example, were consequential scientific accomplishments. He was thus confronted by, and aware of, two conflicting components of his situation: on the one hand, men were no longer sure of much – this was the trivial expression of the relativism and skepticism characteristic of his times; on the other hand, some men (i.e., those devoted to the pursuit of science in the modern style) had made some significant discoveries.

Now then, how did Descartes interpret this duality? How did he reconcile those conflicting aspects of his historical situation? In order to see his solution clearly, it is necessary to understand the meaning of the discoveries of the new mathematical sciences. Husserl very aptly referred to the basic "theses" which made life possible prior to Descartes's times as being now no more than "lifeless convention[s]".<sup>14</sup> The reason for that transformation seemingly was that all such "notions" – religious, moral, political, and even scientific – were significantly based on authority: the authority of the Church and her world-view, the authority of the established socio-political institutions and usages and of the beliefs embedded in them, and the authority of the learned. But it was precisely authority (and the issues deriving therefrom) which was collapsing. No doubt, Descartes was still a man living in a characteristically transitional period, finding himself as he did in the "interregnum" between the Middle Ages and the Modern Era.<sup>15</sup> Modernity had not yet consolidated itself; in point of fact, Descartes, as it turned out, was to become one of the agents working towards that settlement. Accordingly, it was impossible to overcome the relativism and skepticism of the times by any appeal to

authority, whatever its sort might have been, for the prevailing crisis was precisely one over authority. If a grave and intolerable situation<sup>16</sup> – such as Descartes's own – was to be superseded, then other grounds had to become available. Again Husserl's formulation is incisive and to the point: the recasting of life was to take place on the basis of a new belief, a belief opposite to that which was characteristic of the ancients and medievals. If the ancients and medievals had ultimately lived on the grounds of authority, now the moderns were to live off "their great belief in an autonomous philosophy and science"<sup>17</sup> and have recourse primarily to the tribunal of reason as its origin. This would have led Descartes to make an important theoretical point, one which would at once correspond to the prevailing crisis by explaining it and serve to guide him to a new era by disclosing the foundation of the crisis. In his *Discourse*, he spoke of the new principle, of the source of independence and autonomy in thought and possibly in action. He called it reason or good sense, and he defined it as the "power of forming a good judgment and distinguishing the true from the false".<sup>18</sup> But concerning a power of this sort, one may differentiate between two dimensions:

1. One can speak of reason as a human power, namely, as one's ability to judge correctly, which is common to all men,<sup>19</sup> as Descartes himself did. Viewed in this fashion, reason, as long as there are normal human beings, is not subject to considerations of existence or nonexistence, or to qualifications belonging to the domain of the more or less.<sup>20</sup> The nature of man necessarily involves reason: error, doubt, confusion, and the like cannot be accounted for by saying that some men are endowed with a greater measure of reason than others; to the extent that reason is inherent in human beings, such attempts at explication are not only factually wrong-headed; they are patently absurd or even categorially mistaken.

2. But one can also speak of reason as an activity, i.e., as an active way of proceeding from A to B. Understood in this fashion, reason is not "by nature equal in all men",<sup>21</sup> for it is possible to try to go from A to B along different paths. Moreover, the difference between the conceivable paths may be such as to allow us to introduce a *qualitative* distinction between them, some being good (i.e., leading to the goal desired) and others bad (when not),<sup>22</sup> a distinction irreducible to one of mere convenience (which may also apply but which would be *quantitative* in nature, as long as "quantitative" is taken in the sense of "degree"). This, I think, is what Descartes expressed when he said:

For to be possessed of good mental powers is not sufficient; the principal matter is to apply them well. The greatest minds are capable of the greatest vices as well as of the greatest virtues, and those who proceed very slowly may, provided they always follow the straight road, really advance much faster than those who, though they run, forsake it.<sup>23</sup>

Accordingly, the difference among human beings which would be at the root of error, and which would explain the critical historical situation of universal relativism and skepticism prevailing in Descartes's times, is not one concerning the power of reason as such, but one that would pertain to its use. A human being in error and another holding to the truth are one and the same insofar as the power to discriminate between the true and the false is concerned, for they both possess the power of reason to the same degree.<sup>24</sup> But they are qualitatively different to the extent that they have employed reason differently. Only a human being holds to the truth who has followed the right path or straight road in order to arrive at its possession, and has done so "slowly" or carefully, i.e., while abiding by the rules serving to chart his way. It would then be necessary to identify such rules or conditions under which it can be followed, and followed slowly or carefully, if indeed one wishes always to proceed unerringly. That was Descartes's purpose in his *Méditations*, a purpose extensively articulated in his *Regulae*<sup>25</sup> and, more succinctly, in his *Discours*. It is certainly no literary accident that the full title of the latter work was *Discours de la méthode* for *méthode* signifies "straight" or "right" path.

Let me now turn my attention to Descartes's own attempt to discover the right way of employing reason. One finds it expounded in Parts I, II, and IV of his *Discourse* and in his first and second *Meditations*. So that we may be assured that we are proceeding correctly or in the proper direction, allow me briefly to state the sense, as I understand it, which ultimately animated his effort. One could say that he was engaged in examining such things as skepticism and relativism in order to see whether or not they embodied meaningful life-forms or types, that is to say, consistent ways of leading one's life. Now, it seems reasonable for me to propose two things in this regard. First of all, and according to normal usage, I would suggest that skepticism is the position according to which no view can ever be held as true or a would-be fact known to be the case beyond a doubt. Secondly, I would add, on the same basis, that relativism (as the practical side of skepticism) is the name for the attitude in keeping with which one would be forbidden to consider and practice any moral or political form of conduct, as if one were more legitimate or permissible

than another, for none would be so privileged, inasmuch as all of them would be objectionable in principle and thus revocable, since any norm or maxim that could be advanced as one's guide in action would only be a function of the time and place in which one is living.<sup>26</sup>

In light of these nominal definitions, one could say that Descartes's predicament was something like this: if he was to succeed in his attempt, he would have had to come to terms with the ever-changing multiplicity of experiences, opinions, and mores that his contemporaries and immediate predecessors were so keenly aware of, and which some of the first minds of the day had raised to the level of theoretical and normative formulation. But a mere refutation of this or that version of skepticism or relativism would not have done for this purpose, and a simple rhapsodic presentation of various skeptical arguments and relativistic contexts would have hardly sufficed to carry out the task. On the contrary, Descartes would have had to show that, *in principle*, any such views and attitudes were self-contradictory. Now, this is equivalent to saying that his inquiry into the sense of skepticism and relativism should have been guided, as in fact it was, by one interest and one interest only, namely, to find, if possible, some experiential ground incapable of being assailed or brought down by any objection. Otherwise, his contentions would have been open to possible or renewed skeptical or relativistic attacks. Accordingly, the definitive refutation of such theses or valuations would have required of Descartes that he established the nature and existence of indubitable knowledge.

In search of such an impregnable ground of belief, Descartes consequently proceeded to review his own mental stock and prepare an inventory of the essentially different sorts of opinion which he – and like him, any other man – had grown into in the course of his life. As he himself argued: “All that up to the present time I have accepted as most true and certain I have learned either from the senses or through the senses. ...”<sup>27</sup> To which he added that, as “it is sometimes proved to me that these senses are deceptive ..., it is wiser not to trust entirely to anything by which we have once been deceived.”<sup>28</sup> Now, even if taking sense-perceptual deception as our only criterion of disbelief may seem too extreme and the example of the insane “so extravagant”,<sup>29</sup> it would not be ill-advised, however, to take into account the possibility that, when one comes to experience bodies so shaped and so colored through one's senses, one may in fact be dreaming.<sup>30</sup> The painter of pictures, the one who confects stories, the dreamer of dreams, and anyone who perceives bodies as being thus and so can conceivably be taken, without exception,

as belonging in the same family, for the eyes, heads, and other composite wholes they produce or “experience” need not be real; they may very well all be imaginary.<sup>31</sup> That notwithstanding, Descartes did not mean to say that he was convinced that every such thing was in fact imaginary. His contention was just that, since it is possible for them all to be products of one’s imagination, one is not bound to espouse or advance another thesis which would indeed be more complex, to wit: that they are real. The reality of such items is, then, questionable or open to doubt, and our belief in them problematic. Accordingly, one should not accept the view that, as a matter of fact, sensations (or their derivatives) present us with reality, and, hence, that sense-perceptual evidence – whether direct or not – can be used as a reliable ground to refute skepticism or the attendant relativism. Moreover, any science dealing with such composite things as become accessible to us in sensation, disciplines such as physics and astronomy, cannot be deemed to be intrinsically trustworthy<sup>32</sup> (and for the same reasons).<sup>33</sup> By contrast, perhaps the royal road to the truth is one which leads us to simple natures or entities, such as corporeal nature in general, spatial extension, and the magnitude, shape, number, location, and duration of extended things, which certain other sciences such as geometry and arithmetic treat of, but, in such a fashion, that their conclusions, which do not establish whether or not such things exist,

contain some measure of certainty and an element of the indubitable. For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three together always form five, and the square can never have more than four sides ...<sup>34</sup>

The situation in which Descartes found himself at this point is certainly odd, as he himself recognized, for he argued that opinions may be divided into two groups:

1. the trustworthy, such as the truths of arithmetic and geometry, which are ultimately about simple natures or entities and cannot be derived from sensation, and
2. the untrustworthy, such as the truths of physics and astronomy, which are about composites and can be derived from sensation (whether directly or indirectly).

Now, even though this finding was merely presented by Descartes as a matter of fact, one is nonetheless entitled to ask for the warrant permitting him – or anyone else, for that matter – to contend that one is not deceived when things are considered in light of simple natures or entities. To that

end, it would seem reasonable to advance, as some do, the following hypothesis:

But possibly God has not desired that I should be thus deceived, for He is said to be supremely good. If, however, it is contrary to His goodness to have made me such that I constantly deceive myself [as it would be the case if both a claim to know a simple nature and a claim to know a composite were dubitable], it would also appear contrary to His goodness to be sometimes deceived [as is often true with a claim to know a composite], and nevertheless I cannot doubt that He does permit this.<sup>35</sup>

However, it would seem unjustified to introduce, at this point, the view that a creator and all-providential God exists, for that step would simply be the equivalent of advancing an *ad hoc* (and thus arbitrary) contention or it would serve to bring about the paradoxical effect of explaining away part of one's experience. Furthermore, the logical status of the said contention is just that of a hypothesis, as may be gathered from the fact that its introduction *in this manner* can be denied and in fact has been denied by some.<sup>36</sup> Hence, one may not have recourse to it in one's attempt to refute either skepticism or relativism, since it itself seems to be dissolved by skeptical objections.

On the basis of all of these analyses, Descartes arrived at the following conclusion:

I feel constrained to confess that there is nothing in all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than that to which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty ...<sup>37</sup>

The scope of the untrustworthy has thus been clarified inasmuch as it is now seen to contain two different sorts of items, which fail nevertheless to be identical: in the first place, any view that is patently false (whether factually, as, for example, in the case of "I am now singing at the Opera House", or because it is a *contradictio in adiecto*, as, say, in the case of "this rose is both red and not red simultaneously"); secondly, any thesis that may or may not be true (e.g., factually so, as in the case of "I am now looking into my wife's eyes", or in that of a conclusion "which does not depend on demonstrative but on dialectical reasoning. ...")<sup>38</sup> It was precisely in those terms that, in his *Discours*, Descartes was able to formulate the negative criterion by means of which to identify that which deserves to be regarded as true, namely, "to esteem ... as well-nigh false [*presque pour faux*] all that only went as far as being probable



[*vraisemblable*]"<sup>39</sup> or "to reject as absolutely false everything as to which I could imagine the least ground of doubt. ..."<sup>40</sup>

Let me here emphasize again that Descartes was not saying that any dubitable belief or contention is necessarily false by virtue of its dubitability; he was simply asserting that the fact that it may be doubted casts a shadow on it which makes it impermissible for us to employ it for the specific purpose of determining whether or not absolutely certain knowledge is possible, if indeed a final refutation of the theses of universal skepticism and relativism is ever to be achieved. This point was most aptly formulated by Descartes when he stated:

But inasmuch as reason persuades me that I ought no less carefully to withhold my assent from matters which are not entirely certain and indubitable than from those which appear to be manifestly to be false, if I am able to find in each one some reason to doubt, this will suffice to justify my rejecting the whole.<sup>41</sup>

It was at this juncture that Descartes introduced what was to become his celebrated hypothesis of the *malin génie* or evil spirit, the purpose of the employment of which hypothesis was to ensure that no human being would be deceived about anything he or she may experience.<sup>42</sup> Let me underscore the fact that this is a purely *methodological* recourse, rather than an ontological one, for it is clear that Descartes was not suggesting that there was any such entity, as if it were a possible, let alone an actual, existent; instead, he was simply proposing it as a heuristic means that would allow anyone to examine the worst conceivable situation in which one could find oneself in attempting to know something. Now then, if Descartes, in availing himself of the said hypothesis so understood, came to discover that something could nonetheless be known for certain, then he would have finally and conclusively refuted, at least, the thesis of universal skepticism. In other words, by transforming the skeptical doubt into an all-comprehensive methodological procedure under the aegis of a would-be evil spirit, Descartes's intent had been to establish whether or not one could gain access to some indubitable experience.

Let me now proceed under the methodological assumption in question. In consequence, it would seem that no matter what sort of thing one would experience, encounter, or consider, it would of necessity be the result of the deceptive action of the evil spirit on oneself. In terms of both this assumption and the previously formulated criterion of evaluation (to the effect that anything doubtful is to be rejected as if it were false), one would be bound to refuse as untrue many of the views one would have long abided by – for example, all manner of external things the existence

of which had been taken for granted (such as bodies so shaped or colored), or the “fact” that I see or hear or that one has hands or a body, and so on.<sup>43</sup> Or as expressed in Descartes’s own words:

Thus, because our senses sometimes deceive us, I *wished to suppose* that nothing is just as they cause us to imagine it to be; and because there are men who deceive themselves in their reasoning and fall into parallogisms, even concerning the simple matters of geometry, and judging that I was as subject to error as was any other, I rejected as false all the reasons formerly accepted by me as demonstrations. And since all the same thoughts and conceptions which we have while awake *may* also come to us in sleep, without any of them being at that time true, I *resolved to assume* [*feindre*] that everything that ever entered into my mind was no more true than the illusions of my dreams.<sup>44</sup>

Now then, not only does it therefore seem that the sense of the universal and methodic doubt as presented by Descartes is entirely destructive, but also that it led him, in consequence, to achieve his purported aim, to wit: that nothing is worth believing for everything is dubitable in principle. This assessment of his intent, however, would be quite erroneous, for, as he himself asserted,

I shall ever follow in this road until I have met with something which is certain, or at least, if I can do nothing else, until I have learned for certain that there is nothing in the world that is certain.<sup>45</sup>

In any case, then, skepticism (and possibly the relativistic stance of which it is the ground) will be finally refuted, for either some thing or event would come to be known with absolute certainty, or else, if it is concluded that nothing can be known for certain, then that much would be known for certain (which would accordingly dissolve skepticism by resolving it into a contradiction).

The question thus arises as to whether anything remains which would be grasped as certain after the thoroughgoing application of the universal, methodic doubt. One’s body, the senses, the world or any of its contents, God, etc. would have fallen by the wayside as a result, and the evil spirit’s “endeavors” would have apparently met with complete success. But is this really so? Let me examine the situation more carefully. For the sake of argument, I will grant that the evil spirit’s “effort” would have triumphed without qualification, and that, therefore, he would have deceived me about everything I think or experience (this being, of course, the outcome as well for anyone else engaged in the same quest). What was, then, the conclusion drawn by Descartes on that basis?:

But I was persuaded that there was nothing in all the world, that there was no heaven, no earth, that there were no minds, nor any bodies: was I not then likewise persuaded that I did not exist? Not at all; of a surety I myself did exist since I persuaded myself of something. ... But there is some deceiver or other, very powerful and very cunning, who ever employs his ingenuity in deceiving me. Then without doubt I exist also if he deceives me, and let him deceive me as much as he will, he could never cause me to be nothing so long as I think that I am something. So that after having reflected well and carefully examined all things, we must come to the definite conclusion that this proposition: I am, I exist [*ego sum, ego existo*], is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it.<sup>46</sup>

In other words, there must needs be a residue left after the doubting process has been completed, a residue which “very evidently and certainly”<sup>47</sup> could not be removed by the doubt. And such a residue, as has been seen, is one’s own existence, for, as Descartes himself pointed out,

I noticed that whilst I thus wished to think all things false, it was absolutely essential [*il fallut nécessairement*] that the “I” who thought this should be somewhat [*quelque chose*], and remarking that this truth “*I think, therefore I am*” was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the skeptics were incapable of shaking it, I came to the conclusion [*je jugeai*] that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of the Philosophy for which I was seeking.<sup>48</sup>

To the extent that Descartes was engaged in a search for indubitable knowledge, he was constrained to abide only by what is “most simple and easy to understand”<sup>49</sup> about any object, including (and most especially) the one for which he claimed that it successfully resisted the application of the method of universal doubt he was practicing, namely, the existence of his own self. In his view, only the “thoughts which of themselves [*sponte*] spring up in ... [his] mind”<sup>50</sup> would satisfy that condition; and, among them, if he was to keep exclusively to those which are most immediate, he would have to exclude, as well, those inspired by “anything beyond ... [his] nature alone”,<sup>51</sup> such as the ones having to do with his having arms or a body, or with the “fact” that he was walking or being nourished.<sup>52</sup> And he must have done so because, in fact, there is no assurance that such thoughts presented him with any reality, since they could be accounted for as the outcome of sensing and dreaming, and thus as subject to the evil spirit’s would-be action on me.<sup>53</sup>

The question now arises as to whether or not there is something left in the stock of my thoughts or ideas after such a process of elimination is completed. To that Descartes replied as follows:

What of thinking? I find here that thought is an attribute that belongs to me; it alone cannot be separated from me. I am, I exist, that is certain. But how often? Just when I

think; for it might possibly be the case if I ceased entirely to think, that I should likewise cease altogether to exist. I do not now admit anything which is not *necessarily* true: to speak accurately I am not more than a thing which thinks, that is to say a mind or soul, or an understanding, or a reason, which are terms whose significance was formerly unknown to me. I am, however, a real thing and really exist; but what thing? I have answered: a thing which thinks.<sup>54</sup>

According to Descartes, then, the residue left after everything dubitable has been eliminated from the sphere of my thought is not just the proposition "I exist", but rather the truth "I think, therefore I am," which is an incontestable one if it signifies, as it does according to the text, that I exist insofar as I think and as long as I think. It is therefore Descartes's contention that he has established, in one stroke, not only his existence, but also that dimension of his nature which is implicated therein, or co-given with it, namely, his thinking being. Now then, thought, as understood and experienced by the one exercising it, is universal in scope, that is to say, it involves not just a singular, solitary event, but, rather, points to a domain of acts, for, obviously, the one whose existence has thereby been proven is one that "doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels."<sup>55</sup> In other words, what has been demonstrated to exist beyond a doubt belongs to a sphere of events encompassing from the cognitive through the volitive to the affective. If one now refers to such a domain by means of the name "consciousness", one can then say that what has been proven to Descartes's satisfaction is that a polymorphous sort of consciousness undoubtedly exists in the universe. Perhaps there is nothing else in reality which is known to exist with certitude, but at least there is no doubt about the existence of such a consciousness.<sup>56</sup>

It would be misleading, however, to say that Descartes, having reached this point in his meditative effort, had essentially completed his examination of conscious experience, to the extent that such an examination is relevant to the establishment of the possibility and actuality of indubitable knowledge. He had determined, to be sure, that he existed, and that he did insofar as he was a thinking being.<sup>57</sup> And yet the ascertainment, on his part, of the incontrovertibility of his findings was hardly sufficient to do justice to the full sense thereof. On reflection, one soon realizes that what he had obtained out of his inquiry was simply the result of having abided by an empty or purely formal criterion concerning absolute validity, to wit: that anything is indubitable if it proves to be the residue left after the methodical application of the universal doubt. Now, had Descartes stopped his investigation at that point, its results would have

turned out to be merely factual and negative in character, unless, of course, one could have discovered – as evinced by the nature of the very particular item of indubitable knowledge in question – what the reasons were for its indubitability.<sup>58</sup> Indeed, he himself acknowledged that, in order to bring his analysis to completion, he had still to discharge a specific task, one which, nonetheless, essentially belonged to the self-same endeavor in which he was already engaged. This is how he put it:

After this I considered generally what in a proposition is requisite to be true and certain; for since I had just discovered one which I knew to be such [i.e., “I think, therefore I am”], I thought I ought also to know in what this certainty consisted. And having remarked that there was nothing at all in the statement “*I think, therefore I am*” which assures me of having made a true assertion, excepting that I see very clearly that to think it is necessary to be, I came to the conclusion that I might assume, as a general rule, that the things which we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true. ...<sup>59</sup>

As I see it, several points must be made if one is, in principle, to come to terms accurately with this rich and decisive text. First of all, let me say that the expression “After this” (i.e., *Après cela*) with which Descartes opens his paragraph refers to a particular transition, namely, that which proceeded from his original discovery (i.e., that of the “I think, therefore I am” as an indubitable piece of knowledge) to his full ascertainment of its logical status. This much is obvious, as I hinted above by means of the phrase “On reflection”; what may not be evident, however, is what the said transition involved. In my opinion, it is a passage from one phase of thinking to another, in which the elapsing of time is underscored. It is thus a noetic event that does not however correspond to going from one level of thought to another, as perhaps could be suspected if one were hastily to read Descartes’s statement to the effect that he “considered generally what in a proposition is requisite to be true and certain” by placing one’s emphasis on the adverb “generally”. That would lead one into mistakenly believing that in the transition in question one would have moved from the particular to the universal.

This interpretive difficulty had already been envisaged in the seventeenth century when Daniel Huet argued, in É. Gilson’s words, that it would go “against good sense to claim [that one is] seeking after a truth in order to derive therefrom the rule of truth, instead of first seeking after the rule in order, thereby, to discover a truth. ...”<sup>60</sup> But such a problem may arise only on the basis of a false distinction between a truth and the rule or criterion governing the truth,<sup>61</sup> since, as Descartes himself had pointed out, the “rule of truth is itself a truth”.<sup>62</sup> In other words, in his

project aiming at the construction of the “edifice of philosophy”, which is the discipline whose objective is the discovery of the truth self-sufficient and well-founded, Descartes would have had just to find a “truth known without mediation [*par elle-même*], one which [would] serve ... as a rule by means of which to measure all the other unknown truths.”<sup>63</sup> And that was the *cogito*, as Descartes had demonstrated to his satisfaction.

Accordingly, Descartes would have had to observe only one requirement in order to complete his examination of the indubitability of the piece of knowledge he had obtained, namely, the determination of that in which the “certainty [of the *cogito*] consisted”. To that end, he would have had merely to engage in an act of simple inspection, as opposed to any form of mediation, such as generalization or deduction. By so proceeding, he came to note, on reflection, that “there was nothing at all” therein which “assure[d him] ... of having thereby made a true assertion, excepting that ... [he saw] very clearly that to think it is necessary to be ...”, where the expression “very clearly” is immediately thereafter explained by him to mean “very clearly and distinctly”. In light of this, one may say that Descartes was of the well-founded conviction that, as embodied in the singular propositional formulation of the *cogito*, he had come face to face with the *general* rule of clarity and distinctness which governs the truth *par excellence* and which would consequently provide him, or anyone else for that matter, with the absolutely sound criterion to be employed in the evaluation of any other truth. But this is the equivalent of affirming that he had found the means to determine whether or not any other truth would be a suitable component of the “edifice of philosophy”, for only the indubitable has rights of full citizenship therein.

In view of the preceding, one may conclude, as Descartes no doubt did, that the legitimate result of his analysis of cognitive experience was not merely the establishment of some particular truth as indubitably known; it was also, and by the same token, the determination of the criterion that any truth would have to conform itself with if in fact it was to be known indubitably. In other words, to know that “I exist as a thinking being” means that one and the same conscious act I perform reveals to me, without mediation, (a) that something about the universe is absolutely true, and (b) that something about the logical status of such a truth is known therein as well, namely, that the propositional expression of my existence as a thinking being is necessary (for as long as I think). But to know this dimension of the *cogito* is tantamount to knowing the criterion of indubitability by which to evaluate all claimants to the same

title, a criterion identified by Descartes as being twofold, viz., clarity and distinctness. And this criterion he spelled as follows:

I term that clear which is present and apparent to the attentive mind, in the same way as we assert that we see objects clearly when, being present to the regarding eye, they operate upon it with sufficient strength. But the distinct is that which is so precise and different from all other objects that it contains within itself nothing but what is clear.<sup>64</sup>

Now, according to Descartes, the mark characterizing a clear cognition (namely, the presence therein of an object which acts upon the mind with sufficient strength) seems undoubtedly to be *subjective* in character. And yet one could speak in the same terms of a distinct cognition, insofar as it is said to contain “nothing but what is clear”, although, in this case, the emphasis is placed on the *objective* side of the perception. This distinction is given expression by Beck, for example, as the difference obtaining between the “psychological result of an [intellectual] intuition upon the subject”<sup>65</sup> and the “logical cause” of the “act of perceiving a clear and distinct idea”.<sup>66</sup> Despite such a distinction, it is obvious that “these two aspects of the same whole”<sup>67</sup> are intimately connected, inasmuch as they “depend on one and the same principle”;<sup>68</sup> therefore, they “cannot be divorced”<sup>69</sup> from one another, to the extent that one is the “psychological result of an intuition upon the subject” and the other the “logical ground [thereof], which is the clearness and distinctness of the perceptual *content*.”<sup>70</sup>

This entitles us, I believe, to translate the noetic language adopted by Descartes, in the passage just quoted from the *Principles*, into the objective idiom chosen by Leibniz.<sup>71</sup> Let me reformulate the Cartesian distinction by saying that an idea is *clear* if one can differentiate it – and the object for which it stands – from the rest, whether sense-perceptually or rationally, and that it – and the object for which it stands – is *distinct*, if one can articulate the reasons why it is other than the rest. To illustrate this point, I would like to avail myself of an example chosen by Descartes himself, namely, the judgment “ $2 + 3 = 5$ ”.<sup>72</sup> In the given case, it must be said that I would have a clear perception of 3 as soon as I grasp it as being different from the numbers constituting its immediate natural-numerical context, namely, 3 and 4, and I would add that, likewise, I would have a clear perception of 2 as soon as I grasp it as different from 3 and 1.<sup>73</sup> This is apparently applicable throughout the scale of the counting or natural numbers, in ascending order.<sup>74</sup> However, I would not have a distinct perception of 2, 3, 4, and so on, unless and until I come to know exactly why 3 is different from 2 and 4 (and 2 from 1 and 3),

etc.<sup>75</sup> Accordingly, only when I know that  $2 = 1 + 1$  and  $4 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1$  would I grasp exactly the difference between 3 and 4 and between 2 and 3 (namely, 1) and thus obtain the distinct knowledge thereof. One could then say that distinct knowledge is acquired on the basis of the clear knowledge of the elements of the composite in question, a knowledge that can be secured only by an analysis of the latter, except, of course, when the idea in question is primitive or absolutely simple (and, consequently, incapable of definition and thus irrational, in this sense).<sup>76</sup> In the latter case, one would have a clear and distinct grasp of the item only by way of intuition.<sup>77</sup> Or as Couturat put it, a “distinct primitive notion cannot be conceived except intuitively.”<sup>78</sup>

Now, if I were to apply this measure to what is given expression by the proposition “I think, therefore I am”, I would have to say the following:

First, that I grasp myself thereby as the only reality existing indubitably for me (a case that is therefore made about me by myself by contrast with the rest of the would-be claimants to the title), and thus as a reality I know *clearly*.

Second, that I grasp myself therein as one who consists in thinking in the broad sense of the term (a case that is therefore made on the basis of my intuitive and consequently indubitable experience of myself as thinking, as long as I am engaged in thinking), and thus as a reality I know *distinctly*.

It seems, then, that Descartes was in possession of one piece of necessary or indubitable knowledge, namely, “I think, therefore I am”, which is precisely the propositional expression of the intuitive grasp of myself as a fundamental or primitive notion.<sup>79</sup>

### III

Once Descartes's conclusion has been attained, it is appropriate to turn one's attention to his claim that the proposition “I think, therefore I am” gives expression to an *indubitable* cognition. His claim seems to be grounded in the kind of reality proper to thinking. In contradistinction to ancient and medieval philosophy, modern philosophy, or idealism, does not take the being of Nature as the originary reality, or adopt it as its basis or point of departure. Rather, modern philosophy had apparently made the discovery, with Descartes, that the being of Nature (and of the elements and events contained therein) is *intrinsically* problematic, for it exists and is what it is only insofar as there is our thinking of it, or is



mediated by ‘thinking’.<sup>80</sup> Upon discovering the existence of thinking as the first indubitable datum for the cognitive construction of the universe, Descartes presented it, consequently, as the one thing to which one has immediate access in experience. Accordingly, thinking or consciousness thus became one’s first datum and, as such, one’s medium of access to everything. But, if this is so, only the being of consciousness is given to us with certitude, while the being of Nature or the world, as mediated by consciousness,<sup>81</sup> is subject to doubt.

Furthermore, the being of things in Nature and the being of consciousness stood opposed to one another, for the former – as seen in ancient and medieval philosophy – was taken ultimately to be static or immobile,<sup>82</sup> while the latter appeared restless, consisting as it does in being for itself, in becoming aware of itself, in “seeming to itself to be.”<sup>83</sup> But then one is confronted with a surprising turn in the history of philosophy, indeed a reversal, for, with Descartes (and, with him, modern philosophy), the outer, static domain of being came to be regarded no longer as primary, but as relative to and mediated by consciousness, while the latter – as the inner realm of the ever-moving and self-related – came to be considered as primordial.

In light of this, one may say that, in modern philosophy, thinking or consciousness is taken as co-extensive with existence, and thinking as consisting in self-reflection. But an act of thinking is an event different in kind from a cosmic occurrence, since the scope of its possible relationships is not limited to that which is other than itself, be it another act of thinking or something external to thought; on the contrary, an act of thinking is such that, when it takes place, one thereby becomes aware – at once – of the act and of something other than the act. For an act of thinking or consciousness it is impossible to be aware of an other without being aware of itself as conscious of an other. In other words, two of the dimensions *intrinsic* to consciousness are the presentation of an other and the presentation of itself to itself,<sup>84</sup> both aspects being necessarily mine in reciprocity.<sup>85</sup> Now, it is precisely the dimension of self-presentation which I have called self-reflection, a dimension by virtue of which consciousness is concomitantly aware of itself as existing (i.e., as occurring), without however requiring mediation of any sort. This obviously does not mean that consciousness must needs therefore understand anything with certainty beyond its existence, whether about itself<sup>86</sup> or about that which may lie outside of the domain of thought, if anything. As Descartes clearly saw, consciousness discovers itself indubitably existing as the means by which everything is accessible or discoverable.<sup>87</sup>

Now then, Descartes did not content himself with this contention. He took one step further, for he did not merely present the *cogito* as an indubitable fact; he added to it the thesis, “I am”. One may wonder quite rightly about the meaning of this addition, and Ortega did devote his attention to it, though not simply as a matter of historical interest, but as an element the examination of which could be crucial to the overcoming of modern philosophy or idealism. In his effort to do that he did not just part company with Descartes, for, had he limited himself to doing that, he would have merely left modern philosophy (and our present mental situation as its consequence) intact. Ortega saw that what was required was to think the Cartesian position from within, if one wished to understand it fully and thus to do it justice. He believed that, if he endeavored to do that, he would be able, as a result, to incorporate it consciously to contemporary thought and thereby become capable of transcending it. The first step to be taken in that direction had to be, of course, the underscoring of the abiding insight lived by Descartes, namely, that in order to be able to build a universal philosophical science worthy of the name, the point of departure adopted had to be established in such a fashion – as Descartes himself had realized and acknowledged – that it would function as the unshakeable foundation of everything else in such an edifice. In other words, the first datum for the construction thereof had to be a necessary truth. Or, as Ortega put it,

[t]he first thing we must do is to find what reality, among whatever there may be, is really, undoubtedly existent, that is to say, what in the Universe is given to us.<sup>88</sup>

This Cartesian position Ortega obviously stressed and accepted. A difficulty arose for him, however, when he considered whether or not Descartes’s claim that the proposition “I think, therefore I am”, as understood by its proponent, could play the role of the necessary truth needed as the *fundamentum inconcussum* upon which to build the edifice of philosophy.

The sentence “I think, therefore I am” has been employed to render Descartes’s formula, *cogito [ergo] sum* into English. Now, the word *cogito* is the first person singular of the present indicative of the verb *cogitare*, to think. Accordingly, the translation “I think”, for the first part of the Cartesian sentence, seems to be correct. Moreover, Descartes apparently let himself be guided, at least in part, by the linguistic clues contained in the expression *cogito*, for he took it to convey an act performed by someone, specifically by an ego or self-conscious entity. Hence, the transla-

tion “I think” seems to be justified again. In view of this, an act of thinking is to be understood as a manifestation, state, or performance of the self, as a modification of something which is thus discovered only as underlying it, just as “white”, for example, is taken to be a given modification of a table (or, more exactly, of some underlying stuff which had already been organized in certain stable ways, i.e., those corresponding to what one calls, and thinks under the rubric, “table”), except that the *cogito*, by contrast, exhibits a pronounced actional lability.<sup>89</sup> If this position is correct, then the Cartesian philosopher would have established, as indubitable, not only the existence of acts of thinking but, as well, that of the ego (as engaged in the performance of such acts). But is this actually so? This is the very question which Ortega raises at this point.

In order to give expression to Descartes’s discovery with total precision, Ortega employed two different but related terms, namely, *cogito* and *cogitatio*, meaning, respectively, “I think” and “an act of thinking”. Availing himself of this terminological distinction, which had been made in his writings by Descartes himself,<sup>90</sup> Ortega attempted to extract the legitimate sense of the Cartesian formula, “I think, therefore I am”. According to him, Descartes’s examination of conscious experience led just to one indubitable conclusion, namely, *cogitatio est*, or an act of thinking exists (i.e., is taking place or is occurring.)<sup>91</sup> If so, then Descartes had succeeded in establishing absolutely that thinking exists and that my ego is this (thinking) existence.<sup>92</sup> But is this really what Descartes thought he had shown to be indubitable? Let me return for a moment to his own words to verify whether or not this is the case.

In his *Discourse* he proceeded to interpret his own conclusion as follows:

I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place nor does it depend on any material thing ...<sup>93</sup>

In his *Meditations* he both reasserted this view and expanded it, for there he said that

I am a thing that thinks, that is to say, that doubts, affirms, denies, that knows a few things, that is ignorant of many [that loves, that hates], that wills, that desires, that also imagines and perceives ...<sup>94</sup>

In other words, Descartes contended that two things had been demonstrated to be indubitable by means of his reflective analysis:

1. That there is thinking, an activity the name of which was taken by him to denote occurrences such as doubtings, affirmings, denyings, lovings, hatings, willings, desirings, imaginings, perceivings, etc.

2. That there is an ego that exists as the performer of acts of thinking, which are other than and manifestations of that underlying mental entity.<sup>95</sup> This, it seems to me, is clearly suggested by the opposition between thinking and thing expressed by Descartes's formula, "I am a thing that thinks", and by his employment of the word "substance" (which literally means "that which underlies" something else) in order to refer to the thinking ego.

But was Descartes entitled to both these conclusions? At first glance, he seems to have been, for, as Ortega himself recognized, "there is no thought which does not contain as one of its elements a subject who thinks, just as it includes an object which is thought."<sup>96</sup> Indeed, this thesis is in agreement with Descartes's position, as explicitly stated by him in his reply to one of Hobbes's objections, to wit:

*We cannot conceive any ... [act without] its subject, e.g., thought apart from that which thinks, since ... [the thing] which thinks is not nothing.*<sup>97</sup>

This serves to give expression to what I called self-reflection, as one of the constitutive dimensions of consciousness.<sup>98</sup> This Ortega did not contest; in fact, he accepted that thesis, and he did so precisely as the abiding legacy of modern philosophy. Indeed, according to him, not only was Descartes right in advancing it; one must also preserve the thesis in question, which reads, in Ortega's formulation, as follows: "I am and exist insofar as and because I think that I am, and such as I think that I am."<sup>99</sup>

Descartes, however, did not content himself with such a result, as issuing from his reflective analysis. He took a further step and proceeded to interpret the essence and reality of the indubitably existing ego in light of the distinction between substance and accident, or of thing and attribute. Accordingly, he came to view the ego as the substratum underlying the activity of thinking, which was thus taken as its manifestation or modification. Before he had advanced this interpretation, the ego seemed to him to be the same as thinking, and thinking was understood by him to be a self-aware or self-appearing reality.<sup>100</sup> If, *at the level of the indubitable*, reality is identical with thinking, and the ego or thinking is self-appearance or self-reflection, then there is no essential difference between reality and appearance. Yet, at that point in his meditative effort, Descartes came to recast his notion of appearance or phenomenon; reality

was no longer to signify for him the “appearance of what appears as self-appearing”, but rather that which appears through the appearance, namely, the *ego as the underlying, static stuff*. Now then, what was the import of this step as taken by Descartes? It did not merely amount to a simple change, however small, of the sense of phenomenon or appearance, or even to an addition, no matter how consequential, thereto; rather, it meant the *cancellation* or *annulment* of his original identification of ego and thinking. Therefore, the ego was no longer to be considered the same as the event or occurrence of thinking, and the domain of the indubitably real was no more to be seen as coextensive with the realm of the *cogitationes* or acts of thinking. Instead, it was to be understood as that which works itself through the acts of thinking and becomes manifest for what it is thereby.

Clearly, this is Descartes’s own interpretation of the sense of “ego” as a “thing that thinks”, but, as Ortega has pointed out, it is also the factor which renders the Cartesian understanding of consciousness flawed. If such an understanding was the result of subjecting everything presenting itself conjointly with the claim “real” to the universal, methodic doubt (with the consequent elimination of anything the least dubitable as possibly false), then one would have to hold Descartes liable to the charge of inconsistency. If the aim was to gain access to indubitable reality, then the notion of ego as substance must be set aside as doubtful. That much is obvious, for, while the fact that thinking occurs is immediately and incontestably ascertained, the thesis that the realm of thinking is a domain of acts that are manifestations or modifications of a deeper, underlying reality called ego is far from evident. With that additional step, Descartes moved away from the sphere of the indubitable to advance the hypothesis of the existence of the substance “ego”, a hypothesis which, like any other, is certainly not immediately grasped as true or apprehended to be the case. The Cartesian interpretation of the status and nature of the ego may very well be true; in fact, there may be good reasons for proposing it, but, nonetheless, it is, at this point, a construction about what is immediately and incontestably experienced, namely, the existence of the ego as the event of being self-awarely conscious of something,<sup>101</sup> and as such it is in need of demonstration, which, if possible, would have to be carried out on the basis of what has been established already as indubitable, thus presupposing it necessarily. The opinions to the effect that the “ego is substance” and that the “acts of thinking are manifestations or modifications of the underlying ego” are to be set aside, a decision that is justified on the grounds that the said opinions are not means by which

to present experience in its own terms and thus as indubitably grasped. The Cartesian theory of evidence requires that one exclude any construction as dubitable, and the inquirer is to abide by this obligation for as long as he or she is moving on the plane of truths graspable as absolutely certain and as long as grasping them as such continues to be his or her goal. Ortega's objection was precisely raised against Descartes in keeping with the latter's own requirements and stipulations.<sup>102</sup> Ortega did not say, therefore, that the ego and the acts of thinking cannot be correctly understood as Descartes had proposed, for that may very well be the case. Ortega only contended that Descartes's views on these matters were unnecessary at this stage of the inquiry, and thus inadmissible in view of his intended goal, namely, to establish indubitable reality in order to avail himself of it as the unshakeable foundation upon which to build the edifice of philosophy and a sound understanding of the universe.

Descartes was in pursuit of the real, as any philosopher would be, regardless of eventual or possible success. But what deserves the qualification of "real", at least to begin with? Only that which indubitably exists, according to Descartes. Now, how is one to determine that something exists indubitably? By showing, I would argue, that it is something experienced in such a fashion that, were it to be absent, everything else would dissolve or be beyond reach, making it impossible to begin coming to terms with the universe on a sound basis. And that something is the incontrovertible fact that consciousness occurs, or that it exists precisely as the indispensable, universal medium of access (first to itself and, then, should that be actually available, to everything else in the universe.) As we have seen, Descartes had established the thesis that one exists insofar and as long as one thinks, which is the lived condition for one's being conscious of everything else.<sup>103</sup> Here he had found, therefore, the first indubitable ground of knowledge, for, in order to qualify as such a foundation, the proposed ground would have had to meet the requirement of being free of any hypothetical admixture, which, in fact, it did, as we have had the occasion to appreciate. But when Descartes proposed to interpret the relationship between ego and thinking in terms of the conceptual pair "substance and accident", he failed precisely to live up to his own requirement, for, as Ortega remarked, "no one ever has had the intuition of a substance."<sup>104</sup>

At first glance, it had appeared as if Descartes's addition of "I am" to the proposition "I think" had not affected its meaning, or altered in any way the claim of indubitability attached thereto. It seemed, in fact, as though the formula "I am" were another way of expressing the same

indubitable finding, to wit: that I am or exist insofar and as long as I think. Yet in light of Ortega's analysis of Descartes's arguments, it is impossible to be in agreement with that contention, for not only has the meaning of the proposition changed, but the claim of indubitability attached to it would also have had to yield, since it is not possible to say: (1) that "I think" is equivalent to "I exist as a substance, the modifications or states of which are the acts of thinking I perform", or (2) that the resulting proposition may be legitimately taken as necessarily or absolutely true. Moreover, in my opinion, Ortega's examination did establish something else too. Since Descartes was led to state the original proposition as the result of his employment of the universal, methodic doubt, it is reasonable to suspect that the change of meaning involved in coming to the new proposition (and, accordingly, to the loss of its indubitability status) must have been due to the introduction therein of a notion that had not been subjected to the application of the universal, methodic doubt and that, consequently, could have been eliminated as doubtful. In light of this, the addition of the formula "I am" indicates to me that the newly and dogmatically advanced element must be an unexamined thesis concerning being or existence. And that is precisely the case, for what Descartes did was to take substance as the privileged manner of being or existence. Descartes thus re-adopted the classical, i.e., Greek-medieval notion of reality, apparently unable to endure the thought that anything may occur – and indeed occurs – which does not require the support of an abiding substrate. To put it in Ortega's own words: in Descartes's opinion, "thought is the only thing which indubitably exists because in order to ... [exist] it needs only to appear ..." <sup>105</sup> to itself. But this is just what would be cancelled or contradicted by the introduction of the notion of being *qua* substance. It would then seem that Descartes was oblivious to the fact that the event he had encountered and underscored need not be – and coherently could not have been – interpreted in that fashion.

The reason for this difficulty lies, in my judgment, in the fact that Descartes was inadvertently employing two different and mutually inconsistent senses of the term "substance". In the *Discourse* and the *Meditations*, the word refers to that level of reality that abides in concealment and manifests itself by way of its effects (which, in the case of the ego *qua* substance, would be the *cogitationes*); hence, the contrast between the ego and an act of thinking is interpreted as that which obtains between substance and accident. But in his *Principles* he availed himself of a different meaning of the locution, for there he took it to signify that "which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist." <sup>106</sup> In

other words, “substance”, understood in this manner, is identified not with one sort of thing or layer of reality, but only with anything that exemplifies the empty or formal trait of self-sufficiency or *autárkheia* (understand, of course, in an epistemological, not in an ontological, sense). Now, in accordance with this sense of the term, one may say – without changing the meaning or altering in any way the claim attached to the original proposition – that the *cogito* or “I think” is substance. In view of this interpretation, one could assert that the ego is no longer taken as if it were other than one’s thinking activity *lato sensu*, or as though the former were the support or cause of the latter and capable of existing apart from any one of its particular manifestations or modifications. It is then *cogitatio*, now understood as the self-aware grasping of an other, which may be declared to be substantive (in the sense of self-sufficient) in the order of appearance. Paradoxically, one must then contend that, in the domain of thinking, substance is appearance, a thesis that would give precise expression to the justification of Descartes’s claim – when rightly conceived – to have identified the unshakeable cornerstone of the edifice of philosophy and science.

From a modern standpoint, one can fully appreciate the significance of Descartes’s rejection of the fundamental stance of Greek and medieval philosophy. No longer would it be possible again to assign priority in being to cosmic substance, for it is not characterized by the mark of self-sufficiency, contingent as it is on one’s consciousness of it. Post-Cartesian philosophy, then, could not possibly accept the independent existence of the world, since philosophy, in its attempt to build knowledge on a sound basis, had henceforth to do so exclusively by adopting the indubitable or unmediated as its point of departure.<sup>107</sup>

The development of post-Cartesian philosophy hinges on this fundamental opposition between consciousness and external reality. On the one hand, one cannot reduce consciousness to the world; on the other hand, one cannot go beyond consciousness, into the non-ego or external reality, since the domain of thinking and that of extension (with which the Cartesians primarily identify the substance of the world)<sup>108</sup> have no trait in common.<sup>109</sup> Consequently, I am unable to assert, with certainty, the existence of the world beyond my thought. Accordingly, “there is no alternative”, as Ortega pointed out, “but to recognize its existence as a mental content within myself.”<sup>110</sup> The world is thus absorbed into the ego or realm consisting of acts of thinking, and, as a result, it would be, at best, the “system” of my modifications or representations. As a result, the theory of consciousness would become identified with first philosophy,



metaphysics, or the ultimate account of the universe, and modern philosophy would ultimately be reducible to idealism.<sup>111</sup>

At this point one must proceed with extreme caution. The view that external reality forms no part of consciousness should not be misunderstood, for it does not signify that the world has nothing to do with consciousness, or vice versa. If they did not, the fact that one knows something about the world would be truly miraculous. The still valid discovery ascribable to modern philosophy is that the world has no ascertainable being apart from consciousness, but such a dependence of the world on consciousness no longer should be taken to mean – as it did for many post-Cartesians – that external reality is absorbed by one's ego, or reduced at best to the "system" of one's representations of it. Such an eventuality would come to pass if and only if the notion of mental content, aside from the difficulties it gives rise to,<sup>112</sup> were the contradictory of external reality. But such an understanding, prevalent as it was during the last, subjectivistic phase of modern philosophy, is neither necessary nor cogent. In fact, it was possible for Ortega to reject both the classical (or Greek-medieval) view of reality and the subjectivistic solution (to its perceived difficulties) that was proposed by the moderns, for he wanted to accomplish two things at once: on the one hand, to take consciousness and the world precisely as they are actually and immediately given to us, namely, as irreducible to each other; and, on the other hand, to account for the fact that consciousness is one's only way of access to the world. In the same sense in which one asserts, say, that there is no notion of a left hand without the concept of a right hand, and vice versa, Ortega affirmed that there is no ego without a world and no world without an ego. In logical parlance, this means that the ego and the world are correlatives, although the correlation obtaining between them is neither merely logical nor causal in character; rather, what appears to be the case is that the ego and its world are constituted for what they are in actional reciprocity or mutuality. I shall return to this point.

Ortega agreed with the idealist followers of Descartes concerning their position that the world is what it appears to be for me or anyone. As Ortega put it,

the world is not a reality subsisting in itself and independent of me – [rather,] it is what it is for me, and for the moment it is nothing more. ... Up to this point we march step by step with idealism.<sup>113</sup>

But, as Ortega continued in the furtherance of this argument, the great error of idealism, as the philosophical stance growing out of Cartesianism,

was to have become subjectivistic.<sup>114</sup> No doubt is it true that there are no objects except those which appear before a subjectivity or conscious subject, but it is no less true that “[w]ithout objects there is no subject[ivity].”<sup>115</sup> If one wishes to construct a sound theoretical account of the universe as experienced, the indubitable point of departure cannot be the *cogito* as understood by Descartes and his disciples. On the contrary, the notion in question must be radically reformed. Accordingly, to that end one would have to say that the “basic datum of the Universe”<sup>116</sup> should not be the one expressed by the thesis “I exist insofar and as long as I think”, since it is *not* true that the only components necessarily involved in the event of consciousness are, on the one hand, the act of thinking and, on the other, the self-awareness of the act of thinking as it occurs, even if those two dimensions were, as indeed they are, co-existent for the sake of one another. The truth of the matter is that an analysis of consciousness the results of which are as stated is *incomplete*. In fact, the primordial datum of the universe as experienced is a threefold but indivisible *concretum*, to wit: the world, or aspect thereof, of which I am conscious at any given time (and which is irreducible and external to my ego or consciousness); my being-conscious of the world; and my being-aware of my being-conscious of the world. And that articulated manifold is what Ortega gave expression to by saying that

if thought exists, *ipso facto*, I who think and the world about which I think also exist; the one exists with the other, having no possible separation between them.<sup>117</sup>

Even self-consciousness (or what I have described as my being-aware of the fact that I am conscious of the world, or a part thereof, as I am actually conscious of it) is impossible, or so it seems, without my consciousness of the world, or even without the existence of some world. I cannot think (and that includes the possibility of explicit or even systematic self-reflection) if I do not think (of) things, or as Ortega bluntly put it:

I exist for the world, and the world exists for me. If there were no things to be seen, thought about, and imagined, I would not see, think, or imagine; that is to say, I would not exist.<sup>118</sup>

Now, according to this newly formulated thesis about conscious experience, the ego or consciousness would still remain an inner domain, but it would no longer be “my hermetic conscious self”,<sup>119</sup> or a worldless subject. On the contrary, one would then be confronted with the indissoluble interactional unity which my self and the world would constitute at every turn, and this – and not the occurrence of a self-aware act of

thinking – would have to be taken as the basic datum of the universe or as the fundamental and irrevocable phenomenon, whatever else it may be found to be. This, and not the Cartesian *cogito*, would thus be the first indubitable truth on the basis of which to construct the philosophical theory of the universe.

This first given is, however, no abstraction. It is a lived event, the ongoing, self-aware, practical interaction between self and world. And such an experience is no other, contended Ortega, than my own individual life. Or expressed in his own words:

... that which is given to me is ... “my life” – not myself alone, not my hermetic conscious-  
[ness] ...; these things are [already] interpretations, the idealist interpretations. “My life”  
is given to me, and my life is primarily a finding of myself in the world; nor is there  
vagueness in this. I am in this very world, the world of now; here in this theatre [or hall]  
which is a bit of my vital world, here at this instant, doing what I am doing in it ... [which  
at this point is] philosophizing.<sup>120</sup>

This life of mine, as the ultimate or radical reality in the order of appearance, is then neither a mere string of conscious events, even self-conscious ones, nor the structure binding them together. Rather, it is my ongoing structuring, or activity of making sense, of my permanent counterpart, namely, this particular world of here and now, and of my self (by complication). My life thus involves and embodies the world, the ego, and the structures of the world and the ego (and the relations thereof). Taken in this manner, one’s own life becomes, if I do not misunderstand Ortega, the indubitable point of departure of philosophy.

This is the result to which Ortega was led by examining the basic foundations of Descartes’s philosophical stance and analyses (and of modern philosophy in their wake) and by pursuing them to the limits of their meaning. Ortega’s critique of the Cartesian strain of modern philosophy represents both an attempt at overcoming it and at justifying and motivating contemporary philosophical inquiry. Ortega’s views and conclusions are basically in agreement with Husserl’s phenomenological reformulation of the Cartesian understanding of the absolute point of departure required of philosophy; as Husserl himself, Ortega saw that the *cogito* or “I think”, if devoid of an object taken precisely as it appears or as I think of it,<sup>121</sup> is impossible. But Ortega did not rest his case there. Since 1914 he had been in possession of an insight which was to be placed by him at the origin of his sustained endeavor to supersede the modern style of thinking,<sup>122</sup> and which can be formulated by means of his celebrated apothegm, to wit: “I am myself ... [and] my circum[-]stance, and

if I do not save it, I cannot save myself.”<sup>123</sup> Yet, at face value, this maxim does not appear to help us go much further than the points made by Descartes in the analyses he conducted in the *Discourse* and the *Meditations*, at least so far as they had been radicalized by Husserl himself. To claim otherwise would seem to be simply misleading or a matter of plain hyperbole. Nonetheless, a nominal understanding of Ortega’s thesis may well prove insufficient to clear up the matter, for certainly its rich content is deserving of a closer look and scrutiny.

Ortega contended that, by means of his view that one’s life is the primordial reality, he had been totally faithful to the nature and texture of conscious experience, while Descartes, despite himself, had not. This no doubt is a claim both venturous and most consequential; hence, I believe that it would not be inappropriate, but indeed necessary, to raise a few questions about it.

First of all, how did Ortega come to make his discovery? According to him, he did so

by insisting on and purifying the idealist thesis whose decisive affirmation consists in noting that the only thing which indubitably exists is what appears to me to exist.<sup>124</sup>

But this means, obviously, that he did not only identify certain aspects of idealism as foundational, but, as well, that he accepted them, and only them, as *valid* and true. Secondly, what did serve him as a guide when he purportedly carried out the examination and evaluation of idealism? It was the *methodological* principle, reclaimed by him in various contexts, that “all surpassing is conserving”.<sup>125</sup> Now, this could be differently formulated by saying that no one can *radically* criticize any contention unless he or she is already placed beyond the position in question, at least inchoately; otherwise, the critique developed would be just an exercise in negativity, and the endeavor it would represent a mere attempt at refutation. Accordingly, there must be a *positive* side to which it would inherently point, one which would offer us, at a minimum, a glimpse of the possible reality transcending that which is already given expression by the fundamental thesis under scrutiny. But this was precisely what Ortega, in so many words, argued that he had done, for he had identified one’s individual life as the novel experiential level of reality. Moreover, he demanded that it be recognized as the “primordial reality, the fact of all facts, the [first] datum ... [for the philosophical construction or account] of the Universe. ...”<sup>126</sup> Thus, if Ortega was right, what would be given to me – without mediation and thus indubitably – is the reality

of my own life, that is to say, “not myself alone, not my hermetic conscious self; these things are interpretations, the idealist interpretations”,<sup>127</sup> of what is given primordially, but myself and my circum-stance in actional reciprocity, as has already been stated.<sup>128</sup> In light of this, the first or metaphysical task of philosophy would be to

define that datum, to define [“my life”]. ... [To live or living is thus the radical manner of being.] Every other thing, every other manner of being I find within my own life, both as a detail of it and with reference to it. In it is all the rest, and all the rest is what it is with regard to that life [and, at least to begin with, as it is non-mediatly lived in my life].<sup>129</sup>

Now then, Ortega found that his claim was justified on the following grounds. First of all, just as idealism had effected the overcoming of realism by showing, through an essential-descriptive analysis of conscious experience, that the “world is not a reality subsisting in itself and independent of me”, since “it is what it is for me and for the moment it is nothing more ...”,<sup>130</sup> he himself was faced with an equivalent task in respect of idealism, one that would consist in completing the analysis of conscious experience initiated by it. And this Ortega attempted to do by pointing out that

as the world is only what it seems to me that it is, it will be only an apparent being, and there is no reason that obliges me to seek for it a substance which is beyond that appearance. ...<sup>131</sup>

In other words, what was needed, in order to accomplish the task Ortega had set himself, was to do, for the sake of modern philosophy, what the latter had done for ancient and medieval philosophy, namely, to eliminate the notion of substance as a prejudice inconsistent with consciousness (as the indubitable reality) and as unnecessary for an account thereof.<sup>132</sup> The outcome of Ortega’s perfected analysis of conscious experience was, to use his own words, that

there is one primary and fundamental fact which [posits itself and] carries its own assurance. This fact is the joint existence of a self ... [or] subjectivity, and of its world. The one does not exist without the other. I acquire no ... [awareness] of myself except as I ... [become aware] of objects, of the surroundings. I do not think unless I think of things. ...<sup>133</sup>

Or again:

The conscious self goes on being ... [a realm of intimateness]. But now ... [it turns out to be] close and intimate not only with my subjectivity, but also with my objectivity, with the world which is ... [manifest to] me.<sup>134</sup>

However, for the purposes of overcoming the prejudice of substance and of surpassing the defining vantage-point of modern philosophy,<sup>135</sup> is it sufficient merely to assert, no matter how warrantedly, that the “[radical] and undeniable fact is not my existence, ... but my *coexistence* with the world”?<sup>136</sup> In my opinion, something more would be demanded, for, otherwise, one would be hard pressed to tell the difference between Ortega’s thesis and the idealist’s, especially when the latter is recast in terms of Husserl’s most refined version of it,<sup>137</sup> namely, the concept and reality of consciousness as a noético-noematic duality.<sup>138</sup> Yet it is clear that Ortega distinguished his position from that of idealism when he claimed that

this fundamental reality that is one’s life consists not in “consciousness”, in *Bewusstsein*, but in a fundamental unitary duality ... [which] is a dynamic dialogue between ... “[me] and my circum[-]stances” ...,<sup>139</sup>

that is to say, the “pure event of [a] man’s dialogue with his circum[-]stances. ...”<sup>140</sup> This discovery is no other than that of the absolute occurrence “which is, according to ... [Ortega], the *first category of human life* ... [i.e.,] the fact of encountering myself living and striving in a world of ‘things’. ...”<sup>141</sup> Though, at first blush, his move may have appeared to be a re-statement of the idealist thesis, in fact it was no such thing, however more precise such a would-be reformulation might have seemed; rather, it was his substitution of a radical, unmediated level of experience for a derivative or grounded one, namely, that of my life for pure consciousness or *Bewusstsein von*.

Ortega’s justification for having taken that step was that the latter simply amounted to the fact that the ego, though aware of itself, primarily consists in being the “aware[ness] of everything else”,<sup>142</sup> i.e., to the fact that, for example, the ego “does not want, [but] ... is only aware of wanting and of what is wanted, [that] it does not feel, but only sees its feeling and the values felt.”<sup>143</sup> In other words, pure consciousness “does not think in the sense of *believing* what it thinks, but is reduced to noticing that it thinks and *what* it thinks.”<sup>144</sup> But it is precisely here that lies the difference between the concept “consciousness of” and Ortega’s notion of life, to wit: that the former is merely *contemplative* in character, and its correlate is *not* reality but the *spectacle* thereof, deriving as it does from an act of reflecting<sup>145</sup> on our immediate access to reality, while the latter is the self-aware, unmediated believing contact with the real.<sup>146</sup> In light of this, one may now appreciate that the “consciousness of” the world would transform it into “mere sense”,<sup>147</sup> and, as a consequence,

that the straightforward feel of reality would vanish and reality be reduced to “pure *intelligibility*”,<sup>148</sup> which, even if of the perceptual order, would be no less contemplative or “spectacular” in nature. Accordingly, the essence of my individual life, as the *primary, unreflective, naïve* form of “consciousness”, is “that nothing is only an object for it, but rather everything is reality”,<sup>149</sup> therefore, my life, strictly speaking, is not consciousness at all.<sup>150</sup>

This conclusion notwithstanding, one cannot construe it as if it signified that blindness to itself and mere other-directedness were the defining condition of life. To be sure, life is – at the primordial level – unreflective, consciousness being a *derivative* thereof which results from an act of reflection *proper* having it as an object. Accordingly, one would have to say that, “while an act of [living anything or act of] ‘primary consciousness’ is taking place, it is unaware of itself.”<sup>151</sup> In other words, “it does not exist for itself”,<sup>152</sup> in the sense of being an object to itself. On the contrary, my life – and everything therein, whether as part of the objectivating ego or of the thing lived and capable of being objectivated – is “an object to the extent that thought ... thinks it as being a non-object for me, as being, instead, that which is for itself.”<sup>153</sup> My life – and everything therein, *sua sponte* – is a “presence of being before me which is not of an objective sort, but rather of a straightforwardly entitative kind.”<sup>154</sup> In the sense indicated, blindness would be the permanent character of living – and self-consciousness an inexplicable or sheer fact of experience – only if objectivation were a pre-condition of awareness, *but it is nothing of the kind*. As Ortega did point out, “no act is capable of being its own object”,<sup>155</sup> and yet an act may nonetheless be aware of itself otherwise and more fundamentally, to wit: when it does not take itself as an object (for which purpose it would have to be regarded from *without*, i.e., from the vantage point of another act), but as a performance being carried out (which is the ongoing, ordinary manner in which one’s self-consciousness is lived). Consider Ortega’s own example. An “act of seeing ... is not an act for itself [as long as it is being performed]; it is not cognizant of that because it is not engaged in reflecting upon itself”,<sup>156</sup> and, despite that, it is aware of itself as it occurs. It would be my coming upon myself (without however distancing myself from myself in reflection) as seemingly busied with, or living, this or that thing, situation, person, or event, as contextually given. Now, if one were to generalize on the basis of the example, one would have to say that living, as my ongoing, pre-reflective encounter<sup>157</sup> with things, consists in being – at every turn and ordinarily – the performative or non-objectivating but nonetheless

self-aware manner of presence of myself and things in actional reciprocity. Therefore, performativeness (*ejecutividad*),<sup>158</sup> as the defining character of living or of life as activity,

presupposes that an act [of living, say, my seeing this book, to keep with Ortega's example] *is for itself* and yet, at the same time, that this *being for me* does not signify the same as objectivation, or the consciousness properly so called that the act would have of itself.<sup>159</sup>

Hence, one is spontaneously in possession of a non-objective presence of being which would be, according to Ortega's trenchant formula, of a "straightforwardly entitative kind".<sup>160</sup> Now, this is in fact a *sui generis* manner of "reflection", inasmuch as it "originarily constitutes"<sup>161</sup> reality itself and is thus no mere *possibility* of thought, as reflection or self-consciousness – requiring as it does an act of explicit constitution – was for idealism,<sup>162</sup> but both an actuality and a necessary constituent of living at the most radical of levels, "something inseparable from the real, an indefeasible dimension of it, one that does not come to be superadded to it by my *cogitatio*."<sup>163</sup>

If I am not mistaken, we are at this point in the position of grasping the fundamental sense of Ortega's 1914 apothegm, i.e., "I am myself and my circum-stance".<sup>164</sup> Negatively speaking, the terms "myself" and "my circum-stance"<sup>165</sup> in that formula are not to be construed as if they meant, respectively, the objectivating self and the object which the latter would constitute by its activity, but, positively, as just the subjective and objective polarities or aspects of an ongoingly spontaneous and self-aware encounter.<sup>166</sup> The first "I" of Ortega's principle would thus refer to what Ortega called "my life", which is that reciprocal duality about which one must say: "I am present to myself without having to perceive myself."<sup>167</sup> Ultimately, then, life is neither "self" nor "thing", not even the external, mutual relationship between them; rather, life, which is always "mine",<sup>168</sup> is the "strange and unavoidable presence"<sup>169</sup> of self and world to each other. Or as Ortega gave it expression, when he said that

[t]he reality called *life* is the realm of reflection in itself, wherein everything is "engaged-in-being-for-itself" absolutely. *I* [as expressed by the term "myself" in the English version of Ortega's principle] am not the locus in which reflection occurs; rather, I find myself, as a matter of course, immersed therein, as it were, in a medium of light [which is given expression by the opening "I" of Ortega's principle]. Life is self-illuminating, and everything in it [whether self or world or any of their actually lived components] is possessed of self-illumination, or self-luminosity.<sup>170</sup>



Now, if Ortega's analysis is well-founded and essentially complete, then one would be entitled to draw certain final inferences from it. For one thing, Hamelin's contention that Descartes was the "genuine founder of idealism"<sup>171</sup> would be validated, since he held to the thesis fundamental to it, namely, that the manner of being involved in the *cogito* is that of thought, insofar as one does not know oneself to be except as engaged in thought.<sup>172</sup> For another, and despite that acknowledgment, Hamelin was wrong too, for he was of the opinion, as well, that "Descartes's logic was unassailable",<sup>173</sup> this assessment having been derived by Hamelin on the basis of the consequence just mentioned, which would be true only if its given Cartesian presupposition were the case, namely, that the *cogito* necessarily is an act of reflection or objectivation. But that is precisely what Ortega's essential-descriptive examination of life as "conscious" experience has shown not to be true: the *cogito*, as understood by Descartes, cannot play, as he claimed, the role of *fundamentum inconcussum* upon which to build and develop metaphysics or the first, absolute philosophical science of the universe, since objectivation, a would-be requirement for that purpose in the Cartesian scheme of things, has been proven by Ortega to be neither the primary manner of one's own self-aware experience of the world nor the necessary means to realize the intended goal, inasmuch as objectivation is derivable from a more basic strain or style of experience (and is thus dependent on it). Obviously, I have here in mind my own life, as the pre-reflective though self-aware actional dialogue between myself and the world. Therefore, the Cartesian identification of the requirement to be met by such a constructive enterprise would have to be rejected, as Ortega certainly did after the most careful of considerations, having found it capable of being overthrown by the application of the universal, methodic doubt, Descartes's own analytic procedure of choice. One would have to say, if this point is well taken, that Ortega's position should serve as well to dissolve the decisive objection that was classically raised against Descartes's stance (and, in its wake, against idealism), to wit: that one is not entitled to hold, on the grounds of the idealist thesis, to a spiritual form of realism,<sup>174</sup> for the transition to be effected in accomplishing that – a transition rightly characterized by Hamelin as a *saltus mortalitatis*<sup>175</sup> – is definitely foreclosed, such grounds having rendered impossible, as they did, anyone's attempt legitimately to leave the domain of pure thought and enter that of external reality.<sup>176</sup> At this juncture, it must be clear that the obviation of the said objection is well founded, but not because Ortega had been a proponent of idealism or a subscriber to the prejudice of substance; on the contrary,

as we have seen, he had rejected both for good reasons, which may now be reformulated as follows: there is no leap involved in the logic of Ortega's analysis of conscious experience, let alone a fatal one, for it is the notion of *solus ipse*, proper and fundamental to idealism, which had been overcome and left behind by Ortega. On the basis of his analysis, one must say not only that self and world are different from and opposite to one another, but, as well, that they are essentially correlative and open or disposed to each other, for there is no self (or act thereof) without something being disclosed to it, and vice versa, since the actional mutuality characteristic of the situation in which one finds oneself at every turn, being ongoingly effective and constitutive of my life *sua sponte*,<sup>177</sup> is in need of no reflection or objectivation to occur. But, if this view is correct, it would imply a revolutionary transformation of philosophy and its history.<sup>178</sup> If one may say that the notion of metaphysics proper to modern philosophy is definable as egology, the self being grasped therein as the all-encompassing and fundamental reality and activity, then what Ortega proposed instead was to substitute for it the categorical analysis of life, conceived as the actional encounter of myself and the world in spontaneous reciprocity. According to him, this is the radical task with which philosophy is confronted today, and, to use the title of his 1923 work, it constitutes the metaphysical "theme of our times".<sup>179</sup> In fact, he believed that therein lay the future of philosophy at its most fundamental level. It was, then, to the development and critical presentation of his novel conception of first philosophy, understood as the categorical analysis of life, that Ortega devoted some of his greatest reflective efforts, basing them on what Antonio Rodríguez Huéscar has rightly called his "metaphysical innovation",<sup>180</sup> namely, the discovery of the reality of my life as the *fundamentum inconcussum* upon which philosophically to construct the universe. But such an analysis could only prove feasible in principle if my life were given to me, as Ortega claimed,<sup>181</sup> intuitively and self-articulatedly. Only then would the notion of first philosophy or metaphysics be validated as a system of concepts necessarily verifiable always and everywhere.<sup>182</sup>

*Long Island University*

#### NOTES

\* Based on a lecture delivered to the Faculty and student body of Goucher College (Baltimore, MD, U.S.A.) on April 24, 1973 at the invitación of Prof. Adrián García-Hernández Montoro.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. José Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es conocimiento?*, in *Obras de José Ortega y Gasset*, ed. P. Garagorri (Madrid: Revista de Occidente en Alianza Editorial, 1984), pp. 25–26, 67, and 77–78. (*What is Knowledge?*, trans. and ed. J. García-Gómez [Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2002], pp. 43–44, 78, and 86–87); see also p. 17 of my introduction to the English version of this book.

<sup>2</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*, in *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, 2nd. ed., § 2, ed. S. Strasser, in *Gesammelte Werke*, Husserliana (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), I, p. 46. (*Cartesian Meditations*, trans. D. Cairns [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960], pp. 4–5). Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, *En torno a Galileo*, in *Obras Completas* (Madrid: Revista de Occidente/Alianza Editorial, 1983), V, chapters viii–xii. (*Man and Crisis*, trans. M. Adams [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1958], pp. 119ff.)

<sup>3</sup> E. Husserl, *op. cit.*, p. 47 (trans., p. 5).

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* (trans., p. 6).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Agrippa's first argument, on the basis of the discrepancy of opinion, against the possibility of certain knowledge (*ton apò tês diaphonias ton doxon*). Vide Sextus Empiricus, *Purrrhoneion hupotupóseon*, i, chapter xv, 164 ff. (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, Greek-English ed. in *Sextus Empiricus*, trans. R. G. Bury [Cambridge, Mass.: The Loeb Classical Library/Harvard University Press, 1961], I, pp. 95 ff.) and J. Ortega y Gasset, *Investigaciones psicológicas*, in *Obras Completas*, XII, chapters 10 and 11. (*Psychological Investigations*, trans. J. García-Gómez [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1987], pp. 142 ff.)

<sup>6</sup> E. Husserl, *op. cit.*, p. 47 (trans., p. 5).

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46 (trans., p. 4).

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47 (trans., p. 5).

<sup>9</sup> Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, "Guillermo Dilthey y la Idea de la Vida", in *Obras Completas*, VI, p. 190. ("A Chapter from the History of Ideas – Wilhelm Dilthey and the Idea of Life" in J. Ortega y Gasset, *Concord and Liberty*, trans. H. Weyl [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1946], pp. 158–159).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, *En torno a Galileo*, pp. 11 ff. (trans., pp. 9 ff.) and *El tema de nuestro tiempo*, in *Obras Completas*, III, pp. 141 ff. (*The Modern Theme*, trans. J. Cleugh [New York: Harper & Row, 1933]).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Ernst Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*, 2nd. rev. ed. (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1911), I, iii, chapter 1, pp. 442 ff. and *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff. Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik*, 2nd. ed. (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1923). (*Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity*, trans. W. C. Swabey et al. [Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1923], pp. 70 ff.)

<sup>12</sup> Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, "Historia como sistema", in *Obras Completas*, VI, pp. 11 ff. (*History as a System and Other Essays Toward a Philosophy of History*, trans. J. W. Miller [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1941], pp. 165 ff.) and "Ideas y creencias", in *Obras Completas*, V, pp. 381 ff. ("Ideas and Beliefs", Appendix to *What is Knowledge?*, pp. 175 ff.)

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Paul Hazard, *La crise de la conscience européenne. 1680–1715* (Paris: Fayard, 1961), particularly Parts I and II.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 225 and n. 2.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, *En torno a Galileo*, chapters 6, 8, 11, and 12.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, "Ideas y creencias", chapter 1, iii.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 225 and n. 2.

<sup>18</sup> René Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, text and "Commentary" by É. Gilson (Paris: J. Vrin, 1962), p. 2, ll. 5–6. (*Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason and*

*Seeking for Truth in the Sciences*, Part i, in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. E. S. Haldane et al., rev. ed. 1933 [New York: Dover, 1955], I, p. 81.) Henceforth, this work shall be referred to as *Discours*; moreover after a work by Descartes has been mentioned for the first time, the name of the author (Descartes) shall be omitted in connection with it.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 1, ll. 17–18.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, 5, 2 b 27.

<sup>21</sup> *Discours*, p. 2, ll. 7–8 (trans., p. 81).

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Plato, *Phaedo*, 100 a and 101 d.

<sup>23</sup> *Discours*, p. 2, ll. 12–19 (trans., p. 82). The expression “straight road” (*le droit chemin*) is the quasi-literal or etymologically-based translation of the Greek *mēt'hódos* (from *metá* [after] and *hódos* [road or journey]), which is thus taken in the sense of inquiry or following after knowledge.

<sup>24</sup> It seems to me that this is the sense of Descartes's assertion that “[g]ood sense is of all things in the world [of human beings] the most equally distributed” (*ibid.*, p. 1, ll. 17–18; trans., p. 81), or, more clearly, the meaning of his proposition that reason is “by nature equal in all men” (*ibid.*, p. 2, ll. 7–8; trans., p. 81).

<sup>25</sup> Cf. R. Descartes, *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*, in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, ed. Ch. Adam et P. Tannery, new ed. (Paris: J. Vrin), X (1966), pp. 349 ff. (*Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, I, pp. 1 ff.) For the connection between the Cartesian method and metaphysics, cf. Jean-Luc Marion, “Cartesian Metaphysics and the Role of Simple Natures”, trans. J. Cottingham, in *The Cambridge Companion to Descartes*, ed. J. Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 115 ff.

<sup>26</sup> This position had been classically expressed in its most extreme form by the Greek sophist Protagoras of Abdera in the 5th century B.C., as reported by Plato in his *Theaetetus* (trans., F. M. Cornford), 167 d: “For I hold that whatever practices seem right and laudable to any particular state are so, for that state, so long as it holds by them.” (*The Complete Dialogues of Plato*, ed. E. Hamilton et al. [New York: Pantheon Books/Random House, Bollingen Series LXXI, 1961], p. 873.) See *ibid.*, 166 d, p. 87 for Protagoras' parallel formulation of skepticism: “Each one of us is a measure of what is and what is not, but there is all the difference in the world between one man and another just in the very fact that what is and appears to one is different from what is and appears to the other.” Shortly before Descartes was born, such or related views had been discussed, among others, by Francisco Sánchez in his *Quod nihil scitur* (*That Nothing Is Known*), Latin-Spanish ed., trans. and ed. S. Rábade et al. (Madrid: Instituto de Filosofía “Luis Vives”/Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1984), where matters are examined primarily from a cognitive standpoint, and by Michel de Montaigne, *Les essais*, ed. P. Villey (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965), a book more concerned with human action and practice; *vide*, e.g., Book I, chapter 1, i [A], p. 9: “Surely man is a wonderful, vain ..., divers[e], and wavering subject ...” (*The Essayes*, trans. by J. Florio [London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1935], I, p. 19.) Among Descartes's contemporaries defending some important skeptical theses, one would find, for example, Pierre Gassendi in his *Exercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos*, in *Opera*, Books I (1624) and II (1658), (*Dissertations en forme de paradoxes contre les aristotéliens*, ed. and trans. B. Rochot, 1959, 192b and 203b.) At the beginning of the 18th century, one encounters in Montesquieu a notable representative of relativism by way of satire. (Cf. his *Lettres persanes*, in *Lettres persanes suivies de Le temple de Gnide*, ed. J. Varloot [Paris: Bordes/“Les grands maitres”, 1949].) Cf. E. Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem*, I, i, chapter 3.

<sup>27</sup> R. Descartes, *Méditations* i, in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, IX-1 (1964), p. 14, 9[18]; *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, in *op. cit.*, VII (1964), p. 18, ll. 15–16. Henceforth I shall

refer to this work as *Meditationes*. (*Meditations on the First Philosophy*, in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, I, p. 145.)

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, ll. 16–18.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *Méditations*, 9[19]; *Meditationes*, p. 19, l. 11.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *Méditations*, pp. 14–15; *Meditationes*, pp. 19–20 (trans., pp. 145–146).

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *Méditations*, p. 20; *Meditationes*, p. 15, 20[11] (trans., p. 146).

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *Méditations*, p. 16, 20[12]; *Meditationes*, p. 20, 12[11], ll. 20 ff. (trans., p. 147).

<sup>33</sup> Cf. *Méditations*, p. 15, 20[12]; *Meditationes*, [11], ll. 12–19 (trans., p. 146).

<sup>34</sup> *Méditations*, p. 16, 20[12]; *Meditationes*, ll. 26–30 (trans., p. 147).

<sup>35</sup> *Méditations* p. 16, 21[13]; *Meditationes*, p. 21, ll. 11–16 (trans., p. 147).

<sup>36</sup> Cf. *Méditations*, p. 16, 21[13]; *Meditationes*, ll. 15 ff. See “Meditation”, iii for the appropriate introduction of the thesis of the existence of God.

<sup>37</sup> *Méditations*, p. 17[21–22]; *Meditationes*, pp. 21, II. 14–31 and 22, ll. 1–2 (trans., pp. 147–148).

<sup>38</sup> É. Gilson, “Commentary”, p. 138.

<sup>39</sup> *Discours*, i, p. 8, ll. 28–29 (trans., p. 86). Vide É. Gilson, “Commentary” on “presque pour faux” (pp. 137–138) and “que vraisemblable” (pp. 138–139).

<sup>40</sup> *Discours*, iv, p. 31, ll. 27–28 (trans., p. 101). Here this criterion is explicitly advanced by Descartes as being relevant to the area of knowledge (and therefore as pertinent to the refutation of skepticism) and thus in contrast to the sphere of “les moeurs” [mores], where the criterion to be abided by is that of “follow[ing] opinions which one knows to be most uncertain, exactly as though they were indispensable” (ll. 21–23; trans., p. 100). (Cf. R. Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*, I, 2 and 3 in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, VIII-1 [1964], p. 5, ll. 5–14. [*The Principles of Philosophy*, in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, I, pp. 219–220]). This suggests that a refutation of relativism is *de iure* impossible, for in the area of “les moeurs” the only available and prudent counsel is the one which advises us to conform to well-established though theoretically uncertain or disputable opinion.

<sup>41</sup> *Méditations*, i, p. 14, 18[8–9]; *Meditationes*, p. 18, ll. 6–10 (trans., p. 145). The phrase “the whole” seems to refer to all other opinions of the same kind and all putative forms of knowledge, scientific or not, which are based on that kind of opinion. Cf. *Principia philosophiae*, I, 6, in *op. cit.*, p. 6 (trans., p. 221).

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Octave Hamelin, *Le système de Descartes*, 2nd. rev. ed. (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1921), p. 118: “Le malin génie n’est pas autre chose qu’une personnification de la violence que fait peut-être subir à l’esprit par la nature peut-être irrationnelle de l’univers.” I take the sense of “violence” here as consistent with Aristotle’s distinction between violent and natural motion. (Cf. *De caelo* I, 8, 276 a 22 f.) Accordingly, the natural tendency of reason toward the truth could be obstructed by the external constraint that would be exerted on it by the possibly irrational “nature” of the universe; as a consequence, reason could move against itself (= violently), that is, toward error.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. *Méditations*, i, p. 18, 23[16]; *Meditationes*, pp. 22–23 (trans., p. 148).

<sup>44</sup> *Discours*, iv, pp. 31 (l. 30)–(l. 32) 15; trans., p. 101. The emphasis is mine.

<sup>45</sup> *Méditations*, ii, p. 19, 24[18]; *Meditationes*, p. 24, ll. 8–9 (trans., p. 149).

<sup>46</sup> *Méditations*, ii, p. 19, 25[19]; *Meditationes*, p. 25, ll. 2–13 (trans., p. 150). In my opinion, the sense of the phrase “there is” in “But there is some deceiver ...” is not really categorical but only hypothetical, as may be grasped when Descartes added, almost immediately, “if he deceives me ...” (emphasis added), whether “if” is taken here to refer to both its existence and action or only to its action.

<sup>47</sup> *Discours*, iv, p. 32, l. 30 (trans., p. 101).

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, ll. 15–23. Cf. *Principia philosophiae*, I, 7, pp. 6–7. Descartes, however, did not rest his case here, for, having achieved certainty about the fact of his existence, he did “not yet know clearly enough *what*” he was. (*Méditations*, ii, p. 19, 25[19]; *Meditationes*, p. 25, l. 14; trans., p. 150.) He was thus bound to inquire into the nature of his own being, and he endeavored to do so in a fashion that he thought would be consistent with his quest for indubitable findings. Accordingly, he proceeded, as he had done before, by examining at that point all the views or opinions he had at any time held about himself, in order to determine whether there was anything indubitable among the things he had thought, or was thinking, about his nature. *Vide*, for example, *Méditations*, ii, p. 20, 25[20]; *Meditationes*, p. 25, 17, ll. 25–29.

<sup>49</sup> To determine first the “objects that were most simple and easy to understand” is in keeping with Descartes’s *third* rule of method, to wit: “to carry on my reflections in due order, commencing with objects that were the most simple and easy to understand, in order to rise little by little, or by degrees, to knowledge of the most complex, assuming an order, even if a fictitious one, among those which do not follow a natural sequence relative to one another ...” (*Discours*, ii, p. 18 [ll. 27–31] – 19 l. [1. 2]; trans., p. 92. *Vide* É. Gilson, “Commentary”, pp. 207–213. Cf. *Regulae*, iii, v–viii, and xi, pp. 366 ff., 379 ff., and 407 ff. [trans., pp. 5 ff., 14 ff., and 33 ff.]

<sup>50</sup> *Méditations*, ii, p. 20, 25[20]; *Meditationes*, pp. 25 (17[19], l. 31) – 26 (17[19], l. 1); trans., p. 150.

<sup>51</sup> *Méditations*, ii, p. 20, 26[20]; *Meditationes*, p. 26, l. 1 (trans., p. 151).

<sup>52</sup> Cf. *Méditations*, ii, p. 21, 26[21] and 27[21–22]; *Meditationes*, pp. 26 (l. 28) – 27 (l. 1) and 27, ll. 3–4 (trans., p. 151).

<sup>53</sup> Cf. *Méditations*, p. 21, 27[22]; *Meditationes*, p. 27, ll. 5–7; (trans., p. 151), and *supra*, p. 235 and n. 44.

<sup>54</sup> *Méditations*, ii, p. 21, 27[22]; *Meditationes*, p. 27, ll. 7–17; trans., pp. 151–152. (The emphasis is mine.) In my judgment, three remarks are in order at this point:

First, Descartes particularly stressed here the temporality of the *cogito*, for, as he said, he was certain of his existence as *often as he thought* and at such junctures only. To use Jacques Chevalier’s formulation, the *cogito* “est une acte de pensée indivisible, quoique non instantané.” (*Descartes*, rev. and enl. ed. [Paris: Librairie Plon, 1957], p. 219; cf. *ibid.*, p. 223). *Vide* Descartes, “Manuscript de Göttingen”, v, 148, *apud* J. Chevalier, *op. cit.*, p. 219, n. 1: “Quod cogitatio etiam fit in instanti, falsum est, cum omnis actio mea fiat in tempore. ... Sed non tamen est extensa et divisibilis quoad suam naturam.”

Second, where the translation says “What of thinking? I find here that thought is an attribute that belongs to me; it alone cannot be separated from me ...” the translator is following the French version, while the original Latin reads much more simply: “Cogitare? Hic invenio: cogitatio est; haec sola a me divelli nequit ...,” where the ruling phrase is “cogitatio est”.

Third, this expression is to be contrasted with the phrase *res cogitans*, or just *cogitans*, which is found in the Latin original too, and is translated here as a “thing that thinks” and into French as “une chose qui pense”. I shall return to this point. Cf. *infra*, pp. 246 ff.

<sup>55</sup> *Méditations*, ii, p. 22, 28[24]; *Meditationes*, p. 28, 20[23], ll. 21–22. (*Vide Méditations*, iii, 27[34], ll. 29–32; *Meditationes*, 34[27], ll. 18–21; trans., p. 157.) Cf. Baruch Spinoza, *Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy*, i, “Prolegomenon”, in *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, ed. and trans. E. Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), I, p. 234 (*Spinoza opera*, ed. C. Gebhardt [Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925], I, 145, ll. 14–16) and Definition 1, p. 238 (*ibid.*, I, 149, ll. 18 ff.)

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *Principia philosophiae*, I, vii and viii.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *Méditations*, ii, 21 [27], l. 27; *Meditationes*, 27, 18, ll. 9–10.

<sup>58</sup> As opposed to what Kant would later argue (cf. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 405 and especially B 423, note; vide O. Hamelin, *op. cit.*, pp. 131 ff.), one would have to say that Descartes took the *cogito* not just as a condition rendering thought possible but as an actuality, namely, his own, which was given to him intuitively for as long as he was engaged in thinking. To put it otherwise: “Par le *cogito* nous touchons pied dans la réalité: nous passons de la logique à la métaphysique ...” (J. Chevalier, *op. cit.*, p. 213), an assertion in which the consequence of such a straightforward grasp of the being of the self is underscored. I shall return to this point. Cf. *infra*, pp. 256 ff.

<sup>59</sup> *Discours*, p. 33, ll. 12–22 (trans., pp. 101–102). Cf. *Méditations*, iii, p. 27[34]; *Meditationes*, p. 35[29], ll. 7–15.

<sup>60</sup> Daniel Huet, *Censura philosophiae cartesianae* (Paris: Horthemels, 1687), II, 1, p. 47, *apud* É. Gilson, “Commentary”, p. 312 (to p. 33, l. 20 of the *Discours*.)

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Pierre-Silvain Régis, *Réponse au livre qui a pour titre P. Danielis Huetii CENSURA PHILOSOPHIAE CARTESIANAE* (Paris: Jean Cusson, 1691), p. 78, *apud* É. Gilson, *loc. cit.*

<sup>62</sup> Cf. P.-S. Régis, *op. cit.*, p. 77, *apud* É. Gilson, *loc. cit.*, p. 313.

<sup>63</sup> P.-S. Régis, *op. cit.*, *apud* É. Gilson, *loc. cit.*

<sup>64</sup> *Principia philosophiae*, I, xlv, pp. 21 [16], ll. 30–31 and 22 [16–17], ll. 1–9 (trans., p. 237). Cf. xlv, p. 22[19], ll. 10–17. Vide L. J. Beck, *The Method of Descartes* (Oxford at The Clarendon Press, 1964), pp. 59 ff.

<sup>65</sup> L. J. Beck, *The Metaphysics of Descartes* (Oxford at The Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 140. Here the author refers to the psychological aspect as the “mental act involved in clear and distinct perception, which includes the elements *mentis purae et attentae* [see *Regulae*, iii, p. 368[6], l. 15 (trans., p. 7), that is to say, ‘an unclouded and attentive mind’]”. (Cf. L. J. Beck, *The Method of Descartes*, p. 60).

<sup>66</sup> L. J. Beck, *The Method of Descartes*, *ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> L. J. Beck, *The Metaphysics of Descartes*, p. 140. The emphasis is mine.

<sup>71</sup> Cf. G. W. Leibniz, *Discours de métaphysique*, § 24 in *Discours de métaphysique et correspondance avec Arnauld*, ed. and comm. G. Le Roy (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957), p. 62. By contrast with Descartes, who chose to emphasize “*l’impression subjective produite par l’idée*”, Leibniz elected to underscore “*la structure objective de l’idée elle-même, envisagée indépendamment de la pensée qui la conçoit*” (Le Roy’s n. 1 to § 24, pp. 246 and 247, respectively). To be sure, there are two different conceptions of intelligibility at work here, namely, one founded on a “feeling of presence” or psychological aspect and another grounded in “logical analysis” or contentual dimension (cf. *loc. cit.*, n. 1, p. 247). These are the bases for the approaches adopted by Descartes and Leibniz, respectively. Whatever the particular advantages or disadvantages proper to each, it cannot be said that they are incompatible, but, rather, that they complement one another and, indeed, that they are co-functional. One should not, however, make this point too strongly, as if the complementarity and co-functionality in question were necessarily implied by Descartes’s theses. To use Beck’s words, “we can either study the operation itself in its relation to the *vis cognoscens* or the objects which are specific data to its cognitive processes. They should be studied *separately* and the results *correlated*, in one synthesis” (*The Method of Descartes*, p. 52; the emphasis is mine), provided – I would

add – that the correlatedness could be established descriptively as a matter of necessity. Cf., e.g., E. Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*, § 15, in *op. cit.*, pp. 74–75.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. *Méditations*, iii, p. 28 [36]; *Meditationes*, p. 36[29], l. 2 (trans., p. 158). For my purposes, here I will disregard the important difficulties arising for Descartes in relation to the apparently well-established (or clear and distinct) knowledge belonging, say, to the mathematical sciences, namely, those which are articulated in terms of the skeptical (*le malin génie*) and atheistic hypotheses, on the basis of which he will proceed in the remainder of the third meditation.

<sup>73</sup> Cf. G. W. Leibniz, *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain*, ii, 29, in *Die philosophischen Schriften*, ed. C. J. Gerhardt (Hildesheim: G. Olms), V (1978), p. 236 (*New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, 2nd. ed., trans. A. G. Langley [Chicago: Open Court, 1916], p. 266): “an *idea* is clear when it suffices to recognize and distinguish the thing.”

<sup>74</sup> Except for one, obviously.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. G. W. Leibniz, *Nouveaux essais*, p. 237 (trans., p. 267): strictly speaking, *distinct* ideas are those which “distinguish in the object the marks which make it known, which an analysis or definition of it gives ...”.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, “Ni vitalismo ni racionalismo”, in *Obras Completas*, III, pp. 270 ff. and *La idea de principio en Leibniz y la evolución de la teoría deductiva*, in *op. cit.*, VIII, § 2.

<sup>77</sup> Cf. G. W. Leibniz, “Letter to Burnett, January 20/30, 1698”, in *Die philosophischen Schriften*, III (1960), p. 247.

<sup>78</sup> Louis Couturat, *La logique de Leibniz* (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1961), p. 197. “One” is apparently a case in point.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. J. Chevalier, *Descartes*, p. 214: “... en effet, nous avons là précisément une connaissance immédiate, c'est-à-dire intuitive, d'une nature simple (le *je* comme sujet pensant), connaissance qui répond par conséquent de la règle de l'évidence et qui, par suite, ne peut-être que vraie.” For the relevance of the notion of *simple nature* to this conclusion, cf. J.-L. Marion, “Cartesian Metaphysics and the Role of Simple Natures”, pp. 115 ff. As Marion puts it most provocatively at the opening of his study, a simple nature “is neither simple, nor a nature” (p. 115), for (a) it is not absolutely simple (*per se*), but only relatively so, i.e., as it “appears ... to the mind” (p. 116) or in the order of knowledge; and (b) it is not the equivalent of the ontological idea of *ousia* or even to that of *phúsis* (which would belong to the order of reality) but, again, to something which “corresponds to our knowledge” of things (p. 115). In this connection, cf. R. Descartes, “Responsio ad secundas objectiones”, TERTIO, in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, VII (1964), p. 140 (*The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, II, p. 38) and L. J. Beck, *The Method of Descartes*, pp. 75–76, 79, and 302–303.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es filosofía?*, in *Obras Completas*, VII, p. 393. (*What is Philosophy?*, trans. M. Adams [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1960], p. 184).

<sup>81</sup> Cf. Aron Gurwitsch, “The Phenomenological and the Psychological Approach to Consciousness” in *Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 94.

<sup>82</sup> For this contention, Ortega refers us to Plato's *Parmenides* and *Sophist* and to Book XII of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Cf. *¿Qué es filosofía?*, p. 393 (trans., p. 185).

<sup>83</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, *ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> This does not mean, however, that the two presentative aspects are of the same sort, for the aspect by which an other is made present to the self is objectivative or explicit, while the one by which the self is made present to itself is only concomitant (and in that sense implicit). Cf. A. Gurwitsch, “A Non-Egological Conception of Consciousness”, in *Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology*, pp. 287 ff. and Antonio Millán-Puelles, *La estructura de la*



*subjetividad* (Madrid: Rialp, 1967), p. 327 and *Teoría del objeto puro*, i, i, chapter 5, § 3, pp. 142 ff. (*The Theory of the Pure Object*, ed. and trans. J. García-Gómez [Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1996], pp. 173 ff.)

<sup>85</sup> Cf. O. Hamelin, *op. cit.*, p. 134: “Not only is the *cogito* an experience in the sense of a lived process [*Erlebnis*]; it is an experience as well in the sense that in it something is given [*Erfahrung*].” *Vide* Robert Sokolowski, *The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution*, PHAENOMENOLOGICA XVIII (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 4 f. (Cf. A. Gurwitsch, “On the Systematic Unity of the Sciences”, in *Phenomenology and the Theory of Science*, ed. L. Embree [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974], p. 139, n. 6 and “Perceptual Coherence as the Foundation of the Judgment of Predication”, in *ibid.*, p. 242, n. 1).

<sup>86</sup> That is to say, beyond its knowledge of itself as a thinking existent. Cf. Nicolas Malebranche, *Recherche de la vérité*, vi.ii.6 in *Oeuvres Complètes* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1963), II, p. 369 and iii.i.1 in *ibid.*, I (1962), pp. 381, 382, and 383–384. *Vide* Sara F. García-Gómez, *The Problem of Objective Knowledge in Descartes, Malebranche, and Arnauld*, unpublished doctoral dissertation (New York: The Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, New School for Social Research, 1979; University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan), pp. 90–98; “God and Descartes’ Principle of Clear and Distinct Knowledge”, *Philosophy Research Archives*, XIV (1988–1989), pp. 282 ff.; and “Arnauld’s Theory of Ideative Knowledge: A Proto-Phenomenological Account”, *The Monist*, Vol. 71, No. 4 (October, 1988: “Descartes and His Contemporaries”), pp. 542 ff.

<sup>87</sup> Cf. O. Hamelin, *op. cit.*: “[In the *cogito*], it is a question of getting to what we are to the extent that we think ...” (p. 124). “Thus the point of departure of the *cogito* is thought, and thought alone; and, correlatively, ... [the *cogito*] does not attain to being, except that [measure] thereof which is presupposed by thought, the question of knowing whether the whole of our being encompasses something more [having been] set aside” (pp. 124–125).

<sup>88</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es filosofía?*, p. 393 (trans., p. 184).

<sup>89</sup> Concerning the question as to when it is justified – in the philosopher’s reflective effort – to take up the problem of whether the said “sub-stance” is a soul or mind, *vide* R. Descartes, “Abregé”, *Méditations*, 12(2), II, 16 ff., p. 9; “Synopsis”, *Meditationes*, 2, II, 16 ff., pp. 12–13; *Discours*, iv, p. 33, l. 7; “Preface” to *Principes de la philosophie*, in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, IX-2 (1964), p. 10, l.4. Cf. O. Hamelin, *op. cit.*, pp. 124, 126–127, and 128–129.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. *supra* p. 240 and n. 54.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es filosofía?*, p. 395 (trans., pp. 187–188).

<sup>92</sup> Cf. *ibid.* The complete certainty of the Cartesian discovery is assured, as Descartes himself pointed out, only when, and as long as, I think. See *supra*, p. 240 and n. 54.

<sup>93</sup> *Discours*, iv, p. 33, ll. 4–7 (trans., p. 101).

<sup>94</sup> *Méditations* iii, p. 27(33); *Meditationes*, p. 34, 27, ll. 18–21 (trans., p. 157).

<sup>95</sup> Or to use Hamelin’s trenchant formula: “L’être de la pensée va se trouver conçu conformément au type de la substance et de la chose.” (*op. cit.*, p. 128; cf. p. 130). *Vide* R. Descartes, “Rationes Dei existentiam & animae a corpore distinctionem probantes more geometrico dispositae”, Definitions v and vi, in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, VII (1964), p. 161, ll. 14 ff. (“Arguments Demonstrating the Existence of God, etc.”, in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, II, p. 53).

<sup>96</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es filosofía?*, p. 395 (trans., p. 189). Cf. *supra*, p. 245 and n. 85.

<sup>97</sup> R. Descartes, “Responsio” to Objection II to “Meditation” ii, “Objectiones tertiae cum responsionibus authoris”, in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, VII, p. 175, ll. 6–8 (“The Third Set of Objections with the Author’s Reply”, in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, II, p. 63). Or

as he reiterated the point and generalized it later (pp. 175 [ll. 25–27] – 176 [l. 1]; trans., p. 64): “it is certain that no thought can exist ... [without] a thing that thinks; no activity, no accident can be without a substance in which to exist.” And further (“Responsio” to Objection III, p. 177, ll. 15–16; trans., p. 65): “I do not deny that I, the thinker, am distinct from my own thought, in the way in which a thing is distinct from its mode.”

<sup>98</sup> Cf. *supra*, p. 245.

<sup>99</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es filosofía?*, p. 395 (trans., p. 188).

<sup>100</sup> I would say that, before Descartes proceeded to adopt his interpretive position with regard to the *cogito*, his view could have been reduced to the essential conjunction of these two theses: (a) *cogitatio est* (at the existential level) and (b) *ego cogitatio est* (at the level of nature).

<sup>101</sup> Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, “Sensación, construcción e intuición”, in *Obras Completas*, XII, pp. 487 ff. (“Sensation, Construction, and Intuition” in *Phenomenology and Art*, trans. Ph. W. Silver [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1975], pp. 79 ff.)

<sup>102</sup> Cf. *Discours*, i, ii, and iv; *Meditationes*, i and ii; *Regulae*, i–vi; and *supra*, pp. 233 ff.

<sup>103</sup> Saying that the *cogito* is the lived condition of everything else should not be taken to mean, or imply, that self-consciousness temporally precedes the consciousness of the other, for the two aspects of awareness are only operative simultaneously and in reciprocity. Cf. *supra*, p. 245.

<sup>104</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es filosofía?*, p. 399 (trans., p. 193).

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 398–399 (trans., p. 193).

<sup>106</sup> *Principia philosophiae* i.li, 19, ll. 21–23, p. 24: “Per substantiam nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quàm rem quae ita existit, ut nullâ aliâ re indigeat ad existendum.” (Cf. *Principes*, 35, p. 47; trans., p. 239.) Immediately thereafter, however, he proceeded to qualify the field of application of the term by saying that “in fact only one single substance can be understood which clearly needs nothing else, namely, God”, that is to say, that God alone is substance properly so called. That notwithstanding, in the discussion which follows in the text above, I shall ignore this point, not because it must of necessity be considered false but, rather, by reason of the fact that it is doubtful and not needed at this level of the discussion process, which is taking place on the plane of appearance, in the sense of that which is absolutely manifest and does not become available to us by means of any hypothesis or mediation of any sort (say, deduction on the basis of a principle, such as that of causality). Hence, in the body of the text, I am limiting this notion of substance to its epistemological, as opposed to its ontological, sense.

<sup>107</sup> Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es filosofía?*, p. 400 (trans., p. 195).

<sup>108</sup> Cf., e.g., *Principia philosophiae*, ii.xxii, 45, ll. 18–19, p. 52; *Principes*, p. 75 (80).

<sup>109</sup> Cf. Franz Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, ii.i, ed. O. Kraus, 2nd. ed. (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1924). (*Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, trans. A. C. Rancurello et al. [New York: Humanities Press, 1973], pp. 77 ff.); George H. Mead, “The Definition of the Psychical”, in *The Decennial Publications*, 111 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1903), pp. 77–112; Alloys Müller, *Psychologie. Versuch einer phänomenologischen Theorie des Psychischen* (Berlin: F. Dümmler, 1927), i.ii, pp. 52–56; and J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es filosofía?*, pp. 401–402 (trans., pp. 196–199).

<sup>110</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, *ibid.*, p. 400 (trans., p. 195). As Ortega indicated, the expression “mental content” is one “which the nineteenth century used most often in philosophy; it is not in Descartes although it could and should be there, but it germinates in Kant.” (*Ibid.* Cf. “Contenu”, [A], in André Lalande, *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie*, ed. Société Française de Philosophie, 8th rev. and enl. ed. [Paris: Presses Universitaires de

France, 1960], p. 180, right col.) The notion of mental existence and content is therefore conceived as the opposite and counterpart of external existence, the latter being accordingly resolved into the former. The followers of Descartes, however, should not have hastened to regard the matter as settled. Ortega has suggested that, before coming to a final judgment on it, they should have subjected the concept of mental content to close scrutiny. Let me attempt to do this by means of an example. Suppose I were to find myself in a given hall or theatre; indeed, imagine I were entertaining the thought, “I am in this hall or theater.” (Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es filosofía?*, pp. 401; A. Rodríguez Huéscar, *La innovación metafísica de Ortega. Crítica y superación del idealismo*, ed. J. García-Gómez, 2nd. ed. [Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2002], Part I [José Ortega y Gasset’s *Metaphysical Innovation. A Critique and Overcoming of Idealism*, trans. and ed. J. García-Gómez {Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1995}]). What would I then mean or think by means of the thought expressed by the phrase, “this hall or theater”? In everyday parlance, it would stand for a given room, i.e., one which would be characterized by the possession of particular dimensions and contain certain decorations, seats, etc. Were I then to add that this hall or theater is just one of the contents of my consciousness at this time, the contention would obviously fly in the face of our everyday understanding of the words, for could I possibly mean or say thereby that my act of thinking of this hall or theater would be endowed with the features exhibited by this hall or theater (e.g., that it would have this particular area)? Faced with this or a similar objection, the Cartesian philosophers would accordingly withdraw the notion of mental content (or its equivalent) by a process of qualification. Take, for example, Malebranche’s way of dealing with such difficulties:

Following St. Augustine, I have maintained that matter was nothing but extension, [i.e., something endowed with] length, width, and depth; but I have never thought that the *idea* of extension was long, wide, and deep, or that the intelligible body was material, [i.e., something which is] larger in a larger space than in a smaller one. (*Recueil*, ed. David [1709], I, p. 415, *apud* Martial Gueroult, *Malebranche* [Paris: Mouton, 1955], I, p. 157).

After having thus critically revised the notion in question, the Cartesian philosophers could no longer signify by “mental content” the thing thought about in the world but, rather, the image or idea thereof. (Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es filosofía?*, p. 401; trans., p. 196.) Keeping to the example, one would have to assert, therefore, that what inhabits my mind or consciousness at the given time is not the hall or theater but my idea of it. Having introduced this conceptual distinction, the idealist philosophers would have certainly succeeded in removing the difficulties in question, but they would have done so at a great price, namely, that of severing – in principle – any possible connection between consciousness and the world. Nothing foreign to me would thus remain in my thought – the hall or theater would certainly not be found in it. In consequence, *external reality would always remain outside myself*, and I would be hopelessly condemned to solipsism, even to the point of being unable to make the assertion without contradiction.

<sup>111</sup> Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es conocimiento?*, pp. 118 ff.; see also pp. 67–69 (trans., pp. 119 ff.; see also pp. 79–80).

<sup>112</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 110.

<sup>113</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es filosofía?*, p. 402 (trans., p. 198).

<sup>114</sup> Cf. *ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.* (trans., p. 199).

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 403 (trans., p. 199).

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 404 (trans., p. 202).

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>121</sup> Cf. Aron Gurwitsch, "On the Intentionality of Consciousness", iv, in *Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology*, p. 138.

<sup>122</sup> Cf. A. Rodríguez Huéscar, *op. cit.*, Part I.

<sup>123</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, "Al lector", *Meditaciones del Quijote*, in *Obras Completas*, I, p. 322 and *Meditaciones del Quijote*, with a "Commentary" by Julián Marías (Madrid: Universidad de Puerto Rico in la Revista de Occidente, 1957), pp. 43–44 ("Commentary", pp. 266–268); (*Meditations on Quixote*, trans. E. Rugg *et al.*, introduction and notes by J. Marías [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1961], p. 45. Cf. Marías's n. 8 on pp. 173–174). To "save", here as elsewhere, has a special meaning, namely, "given a fact – a man, a book, a picture, a landscape, an error, a sorrow – to carry it by the shortest route to its fullest signification. ... Everything has within it an indication of its possible plenitude." (*Meditaciones del Quijote*, in *Obras Completas*, I, p. 311; *Meditaciones ...*, with a "Commentary", pp. 14–15 ["Commentary", p. 224]; trans., pp. 31–32 [Marías's n. 1, p. 166]).

<sup>124</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es filosofía?*, p. 404 (trans., p. 201).

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.* Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, *Origen y epílogo de la filosofía*, in *Obras Completas*, IX, i, pp. 349 ff. (particularly p. 359) and iii, pp. 374 ff. (*The Origin of Philosophy*, trans. T. Talbot [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1967], pp. 13 ff. [particularly p. 26] and pp. 47 ff.)

<sup>126</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es filosofía?*, p. 404 (trans., pp. 201–202).

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.* (trans., p. 202).

<sup>128</sup> Cf. *supra*, pp. 254–255.

<sup>129</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es filosofía?*, p. 405 (trans., p. 202). Some examples of "all the rest", as given by Ortega, are mathematical equations, philosophical concepts, the Universe as such, and God Himself (*ibid.*; trans., pp. 202–203). Cf. *ibid.*, Lectures x–xi, pp. 407 ff. (trans., pp. 205 ff.); *Unas lecciones de metafísica*, in *Obras Completas*, XII, especially Lectures iv–v and xi–xiv (*Some Lessons in Metaphysics*, trans. M. Adams [New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969]); *¿Qué es conocimiento?*, Parts ii and iii (trans., pp. 75 ff.).

<sup>130</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es filosofía?*, p. 404 (trans., p. 198).

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.* Cf. R. Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*, i, Nos. 11 and 53, in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, VIII-1, pp. 8 and 125 (*Principes*, in *op. cit.*, Vol. IX-2, pp. 29 and 48); "Responsio" to "Objectio ii" of "Objectiones tertiae", in *op. cit.*, VII, p. 175 ("Réponse" to "Objection seconde" of "Troisièmes objections", in *op. cit.*, IX-1, p. 136); "Responsio ad secundas objectiones", in *op. cit.*, VIII, pp. 128–130 ("Réponses ... aux secondes objections", IX-1, pp. 102–103); "Rationes ... geometrico depositae" with "Responsio ad secundas objectiones", Definitions 5 and 6, in *op. cit.*, VII, p. 161 ("Raisons ... disposées d'une façon géométrique" with "Réponses ... aux secondes objections", in *op. cit.*, IX-1, p. 125); "Lettre à Arnauld, June 4, 1648", in *op. cit.*, V, p. 193; O. Hamelin, *op. cit.*, p. 128; and J. Chevalier, *op. cit.*, pp. 223, 224, 227, and 228.

<sup>132</sup> Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es filosofía?*, p. 404 (trans., p. 198).

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 403 (trans., p. 200).

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>135</sup> For an idealist and, more specifically, a neo-Kantian version of the attempt to overcome the prejudice of substance, cf. Ernst Cassirer, *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff. Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik*. (*Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity*). Ortega's attempt to overcome the prejudice of substance does not

necessarily imply any dogmatic commitment on his part to the rejection of the notion. It only signifies, methodologically speaking, that he would have displaced it from its originary or primary position to that of a hypothesis, which, like any other, would only be endowed, to begin with, with a derivative status and, especially if well-founded, would be in need of proof or support.

<sup>136</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es filosofía?*, p. 403 (trans., p. 200). The emphasis is mine.

<sup>137</sup> Cf. E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, I* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), in *Gesammelte Werke*, HUSSERLIANA, III-1, §§ 37, 46, 57, and 80; J. Ortega y Gasset, “Prólogo para alemanes”, in *Obras Completas*, VIII, pp. 47 ff. (“Preface for Germans”, in *Phenomenology and Art*, pp. 61 ff.) and A. Rodríguez Huéscar, *op. cit.*, I, chapter 3.

<sup>138</sup> Cf. E. Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen*, ii (§§ 14 and 17–19) and iv; *Ideen I*, i, iii, chapter 3, §§ 87 ff.; and A. Gurwitsch, “On the Intentionality of Consciousness”, pp. 138–140.

<sup>139</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, “Prólogo para alemanes”, § 4, p. 43 (trans., p. 55).

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40 (trans., p. 60).

<sup>141</sup> A. Rodríguez Huéscar, *op. cit.*, p. 126 (trans., p. 85. The emphasis is mine.) Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, “Prólogo para alemanes”, pp. 51 and 53 (trans., pp. 66–67 and 69).

<sup>142</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, *ibid.*, p. 48 (trans., p. 62).

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.* The emphasis on “believing” is mine.

<sup>145</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 49 (trans., p. 64): “... this new situation which consists in my encounter with the thing ‘consciousness’ [i.e., my life as primordial, living access to reality], and which is memory, or more generally, ‘reflection’, is not itself consciousness, but instead just as ... [naïve], primary, and unreflective as the first one.” Cf. A. Rodríguez Huéscar, *op. cit.*, pp. 110–111 (trans., p. 69): here radical “reflection”, in the sense of the mediating act of the phenomenological reduction, is seen as a more complex process, of which remembering is only the initial stage and imagining the culminating one.

<sup>146</sup> Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, “Prólogo para alemanes”, p. 48 (trans., p. 62).

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.* Cf. Xavier Zubiri, *Sobre la esencia* (Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1963), ii, chapter 3, pp. 23 ff. (*On Essence*, trans. A. R. Caponigri [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1980], pp. 57 ff.)

<sup>149</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, “Prólogo para alemanes”, p. 49 (trans., p. 63). Cf. p. 50 (trans., p. 65). For the full meaning of this contention, cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, *Unas lecciones de metafísica*, Lectures iii–vi and *¿Qué es filosofía?*, Parts ii and iii.

<sup>150</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, “Prólogo para alemanes”, p. 49 (trans., p. 63).

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>153</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, “Problemas”, § 8, in *¿Qué es conocimiento?*, p. 16 (trans., p. 35).

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, § 9, p. 19 (trans., p. 38).

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18 (trans., p. 37).

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.* (trans., p. 36).

<sup>157</sup> Cf. A. Rodríguez Huéscar, *op. cit.*, ii, chapter 4, § 2, p. 127 (trans., p. 87): “to live is to encounter or come upon myself living. But to say this means that I always and inevitably ‘encounter’ or come upon ‘myself’ in connection with one or another thing.”

<sup>158</sup> Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, “Ensayo de estética a manera de prólogo”, §§ 2–3, in *Obras Completas*, VI, pp. 250 ff. and particularly p. 252. (“An Essay in Esthetics By Way of a Preface”, in *Phenomenology and Art*, pp. 131 ff. and especially pp. 133–134.) The act of living,

or life *qua* performance, is thus the opposite of an act of *Bewusstsein*, because living consists in the reciprocal, actional duality which my encounter with myself as engaged with things is, while an act of *Bewusstsein* “severs itself from its object, whether the object in question is itself or something else.” (J. Ortega y Gasset, “Problems”, § 4, in *¿Qué es conocimiento?*, pp. 13–14 [trans., p. 33]).

<sup>159</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, *ibid.*, § 9, p. 18 (trans., p. 37).

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19 (trans., p. 38).

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20 (trans., p. 36).

<sup>162</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 19 (trans., p. 37). *Vide*, by contrast, I. Kant’s notion of the “I think” in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B 131–132.

<sup>163</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, “Problemas”, § 9, in *¿Qué es conocimiento?*, p. 20 (trans., p. 38).

<sup>164</sup> Cf. *supra*, pp. 256–257.

<sup>165</sup> Or “ego” and “non-ego” (= “world”), in idealist parlance.

<sup>166</sup> *Vide* A. Rodríguez Huéscar, *op. cit.*, Part ii, chapter 4, § 5A, pp. 134 ff. (trans., pp. 95 ff.) No doubt it is possible, by means of an *a posteriori* act of reflection, to transform such subjective and objective polarities – at a given moment and nexus of experience – into an objectivating act explicitly confronting, as its correlate, an object or objective sense (corresponding to the originally subjective or objective polarity). Cf. Julián Marías, “Existencia y persona”, *Miguel de Unamuno* (1943), chapter 3, in *Obras de Julián Marías* (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1960), V. pp. 58–59; see also his “Commentary” to p. 42, l. 23 to *Meditaciones del Quijote*, pp. 266–268 (*Meditations on Quixote*, n. 8, pp. 173–174). Accordingly, there is an originary, actional givenness of “self” and “world” in reciprocity, which functions as the foundation of all experience. To philosophize on a radical basis would then involve “a return to something indubitable, not in the sense of something resisting doubt or subsisting after doubt”, as it was with Descartes, “but in the sense of a presence precluding doubt ...” (Paul Ricoeur, “Gabriel Marcel and Phenomenology”, in *The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel*, ed. P. A. Schilpp *et al.* [La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1983], p. 477), as is the case with Ortega and his concept of life.

<sup>167</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, “Problemas”, § 9, in *¿Qué es conocimiento?*, p. 20 (trans., p. 38). Here “I” and “myself” refer to “my life” or act of living, i.e., to what is expressed by the first (or global) “I” of Ortega’s apothegm, as opposed to the second or objectivating one (which is conveyed therein, in translation, by the word “myself”).

<sup>168</sup> Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, in GESAMTAUSGABE, Vol. II (Frankfurt a. M.: V. Klostermann, 1977), §§ 9 and 25–26.

<sup>169</sup> J. Ortega y Gasset, “Problemas”, § 9, in *¿Qué es conocimiento?*, p. 20 (trans., p. 39).

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>171</sup> O. Hamelin, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

<sup>172</sup> Cf. *ibid.*

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>174</sup> Cf. J. Chevalier, *op. cit.*, p. 224.

<sup>175</sup> O. Hamelin, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

<sup>176</sup> Cf. *ibid.*; Thomas Hobbes, “Objectio tertiae”, ii and “Responsio”, in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, VII, pp. 172, ll. 12 ff. and 174, ll. 5 ff. (“Objection seconde” and “Réponse”, *op. cit.*, IX-1, pp. 134–135; *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, II, pp. 61 and 62); and I. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 349–351/B 407 ff.

<sup>177</sup> Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, *¿Qué es conocimiento?*, Parts i and ii; *Unas lecciones de metafísica*, Lectures ii–v; and my “Introduction” to *What is Knowledge?*, pp. 12 ff.

<sup>178</sup> Cf. J. Ortega y Gasset, *El tema de nuestro tiempo*, in *Obras Completas*, III, pp. 141 ff. (*The Modern Theme*, trans. J. Cleugh); “Reforma de la inteligencia”, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 493–500; and, especially, “Las dos grandes metáforas”, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 387–400 and *Meditación de nuestro tiempo. Las conferencias de Buenos Aires, 1916 y 1928*, ed. J. L. Molinuevo (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1996).

<sup>179</sup> That is to say, *El tema de nuestro tiempo*. Cf. *supra*, n. 178.

<sup>180</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 110 for this expression, which forms part of the title of A. Rodríguez Huéscar’s work, so often cited in this study.

<sup>181</sup> Cf., e.g., J. Ortega y Gasset, “Historia como sistema”, p. 32 (trans., pp. 199–200); *¿Qué es filosofía?*, p. 414 (trans., p. 216), and *Unas lecciones de metafísica*, p. 32 (trans., p. 36).

<sup>182</sup> For a critical exposition of Ortega’s categorial analysis of life, cf. A. Rodríguez Huéscar, *op. cit.*, Part ii; my “Estudio preliminar” to it (pp. 23 ff.; trans., pp. ix ff.), as well as my “José Ortega y Gasset’s Categorial Analysis of Life”, *Analecta Husserliana*, LVII (1998), pp. 135–173, and “José Ortega y Gasset”, *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology*, ed. L. Embree *et al.* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), pp. 511–512; and J. Marías, *Antropología metafísica* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1983), chapter 10.

## EVIDENCE AND STRUCTURE

### *Perspectives on the Metaphysics of Presence and Non-Presence*

#### INTRODUCTION: PRESENCE, ABSENCE AND ANOTHER PLACE

This paper discusses the concepts of evidence and structure from within a phenomenologically inspired epistemology. It situates these concepts against two metaphysical backgrounds, a metaphysics of presence versus a metaphysics of non-presence or absence. The paper contains three parts.

It starts with an introduction into Husserl's theory of knowledge, in which *evidence* functions as an ideal point that founds a corpus of knowledge and serves as a teleological anchorage in the process of knowledge. In a Derridean spirit, this viewpoint is interpreted as relying upon a metaphysics of *presence*, in which the play of structure is (ideally) stabilized by a source point of evidence.

It further presents a Derridean critique of evidence, by opposing a metaphysics of presence to a metaphysics of *non-presence* or *absence*. According to Derrida, the condition of possibility of structure is absence. The continuous play of the elements within a structure emerges from an original non-presence, and this absence is situated beyond the specific structural functioning.

Finally, this paper investigates whether a metaphysics of absence can be relevantly interpreted and actualized from within Merleau-Ponty's account, as developed in his *The Structure of Behavior* (1942). This account involves dynamic, stratified structures, which ask for a functional interpretation coming from outside the structure itself. In line with Derrida, a point of absence is required in enabling the play of the elements, and this point of absence is articulated as a point *external* to the structural functioning in focus. In the interpretation presented here, the absence is situated at *another* organizational level, i.e. a level other than the one of the structure at issue. From this *other place*, a structure can be endowed with meaning or with function. For a structure to be revealed *as* structure, *another place* is required. This is how the issue of *perspective* can be epistemologically clarified.



# 1. EVIDENCE AS THE CORNERSTONE OF HUSSERL'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

## 1.1. Evidence as a Justificatory Basis

In his quest for a firm foundation of knowledge, Husserl encounters the problem of reason (*Vernunft*), i.e. the problem of finding the conditions of *truly existent* objects. In the *Cartesian Meditations* (1931), Husserl refers to this as a Cartesian problem: "How can evidence (*clara et distincta perceptio*) claim to be more than a characteristic of consciousness within me? Aside from the (perhaps not so unimportant) exclusion of acceptance of the world as being, it is the Cartesian problem, which was supposed to be solved by divine *veracitas*" (Husserl, 1960: 82–83).<sup>1</sup>

The gap between consciousness and truth is for Descartes bridged by God's benevolence. Thanks to God, something untrue cannot be evident. Husserl, in contrast, aims at achieving an evidence theory of truth without recourse to God as a guarantee for truth. The notion of evidence shall function as a removal tool for the presence of God; in itself, it has to guarantee a secure basis for knowledge.

Husserl believes the origin of the Cartesian problem is twofold. It lies, firstly, in the fact that Descartes has not understood the real meaning of the transcendental reduction and the reduction to the pure ego. Indeed, the Cartesian ego remains a mundane ego, i.e. part of the world, which is, to Husserl, an absurdity. Secondly, Husserl believes, contra Descartes, that the *cogitatum*, and not only the *cogitato*, is part of absolute evidence. This means that the object is not totally external to the subject, and therefore it does not require, as for Descartes, a source of divinity guaranteeing its truth.<sup>2</sup>

Even if phrasing and points of focus differ, Husserl will stick to this intuition throughout from the *Logical Investigations* to the *Ideas*.<sup>3</sup> Evidence is the ultimate justificatory basis in his theory of knowledge. In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl states that without evidence, truth remains out of reach, even within an internally coherent ensemble of judgments. "We therefore conceive 'knowledge' in a wider, but not wholly loose sense: we separate it off from baseless opinion, by pointing to some 'mark' of the presumed state of affairs or for the correctness of the judgment passed by us. The most perfect 'mark' of correctness is inward evidence, it counts as an immediate intimation of truth itself" (Husserl, 2001, vol. 1: 17).<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile, Husserl also admits that the immediately evident is trivial. This is no underestimation from his side of what is immediately evident;

knowledge does not reach any further than evidence does. Yet, evidence only holds for a very limited number of cases, and therefore knowledge via evidence is not yet science. For the latter we need a systematic coherence, a structured corpus of judgments, in a theoretical sense. Thus, against the background of ultimately justifying evidence, a theory of knowledge also has to study how systematic coherence is possible, and it does so by investigating the knowledge-relations between founding evidences and inferences (*Begründung*).

### 1.2. Evidence as an Ideal Possibility

Thus, for Husserl, insight into truth is accompanied by evidence. "Inner evidence is rather nothing but the 'experience' of truth" (Husserl, 2001: 121).<sup>5</sup> The possibility of evidence is, however, *ideal*. In the case in which evidence is psychologically impossible, it may ideally be well possible. For example, evidence is *psychologically* impossible if we encounter very large numbers; *ideally*, however, it remains a possible experience. Evidence does not *only* – but in its *essence* it does – fall under ideal laws. Although evidence also resides under psychological conditions, it may in no way be reduced to a *feeling* of evidence. This implies that psychology is inapt to say something which pertains to the essence of evidence. Psychology can only account for the natural conditions of human cognition under which the occurrence or non-occurrence of the experience of evidence falls. It has, however, nothing to say about evidence as an ideal possibility, which is a possibility for pure consciousness in general.

In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl considers the experience of evidence in the case of judgment and in the case of perception as similarly structured. "The inwardly evident judgment is (...) an experience of primal givenness: the non-self-evident judgment stands to it much as the arbitrary positing of an object in imagination stands to its adequate perception. A thing adequately perceived is not a thing merely meant in some manner or other: it is a thing primarily grasped without residue" (Husserl, 2001: 121).<sup>6</sup>

So, evidence is not a *psychological* concept, but in the first place an *epistemological*, and even a *metaphysical* concept. It is the agreement between what is merely meant and that which is meant in its originary presence. In other words, it is the agreement between the meaning (*Sinn*) of the proposition and that which is meant given in *primal fashion* (*originär*). More generally, in evidential knowledge, the object itself (which may be real or ideal) is present to us.

In perception, for example, the ideal limit of agreement between intention and intuition is a case of evidence.<sup>7</sup> The object is present or given precisely as it is intended. No partial intention remains without intuitive fulfillment. The ideal limit is the case in which the absolute self of the object is present in perception, and this for each side and each aspect of the object. This limit is, however, ideal, and is never experienced in actual sense-perception. To each truly existent object thus corresponds the Idea of a possible consciousness, in which the object is *originarily* and *adequately* graspable.

Whether Husserl deals with judgments or with perceptions, evidence remains to him the ultimate foundation of knowledge, the ideal point which secures grip on truly existent objects, the epistemological cornerstone that provides the ideal closure for the structure of perception and scientific knowledge. It is the never-to-be-reached limit of the process of knowledge and functions as its teleological pole of attraction.

## 2. THE METAPHYSICAL GESTURE BEHIND HUSSERL'S VIEWPOINT ON EVIDENCE: A DERRIDEAN CRITIQUE

### 2.1. *The Stabilizing Presence of the Center*

Derrida (1967: 409ff)<sup>8</sup> considers Husserl's phenomenology, especially in the first *Logical Investigation*, as indicative of a metaphysical gesture that is characteristic of the Western philosophical and scientific tradition or *episteme*. It consists in neutralizing a structural play of elements by providing it with a center, a point of presence or a fixed origin. It is with regard to that metaphysical gesture that Derrida wishes to make a difference, or at least wants to indicate a potential "event".

It is true that in the Western episteme the concept of structure captures both the constrained functioning of elements and the dynamical interplay between the elements in function of the structural whole. Elements function differently within a structure. They are not functioning freely or randomly but instead obey principles related to the organization or structure. It is also true that the introduction of a center or a point of fixation has been naturally accompanying this classical viewpoint.<sup>9</sup> The center is the point that equilibrates, orients and organizes a structure. It brings the structure to rest by reducing or neutralizing the structurality of the structure. This happens by limiting what Derrida calls the *play* (*jeu*) of the structure.

The center itself, however, is closed off from the play of structure: if all elements in a structure are substitutable, not so for the center of the structure, which precisely indicates the limit of the play of substitution. The center both closes off and opens up or enables the play of structure (Derrida, 1967: 409). The center of a structure thus has a special status. It both installs in the structure that which commands it, and it neutralizes the structurality of the structure. In that sense, it is both *in* and *out* of the structure. Derrida refers to the concept of a centered structure as a *grounded* play, i.e. a play that is constituted by a founding immobility and a reassuring certainty that is itself excluded from the play (Derrida, 1967: 410).<sup>10</sup>

The center is named indifferently beginning and end, the unique point of presence that can reveal the historical meaning (origin and telos) of the repetitions, substitutions and transformations of the elements grabbed within the structure.

Clearly, a *metaphysics of presence*, implying a center that limits the ever-ongoing dynamics of the elements in the structure, is at work in Husserl's theory of knowledge. The point of presence is situated in his concept of evidence. In this, Husserl overtly admits his Cartesian roots and ambitions. Even if he refuses the Cartesian solution in terms of a guaranteeing God, he does look for a guaranteeing, fixating point, a point bringing the processes of knowledge, judgment and perception to rest, a point outside the structure of knowledge enabling and guaranteeing its ultimately faithful functioning. The position of the guaranteeing divine presence is taken in by the ideal limit of evidence. In line with Descartes, and with many philosophers having worked within the same metaphysical option, Husserl looks for certainty, for mastering. As Derrida correctly states, it ultimately concerns a mastering of anxiety, an anxiety related to being implied and grabbed in the play.

## 2.2. *A Metaphysics of Absence*

In opposition to a metaphysics of presence, Derrida focuses on the conditions of possibility of structure in terms of *absence*. What renders structure possible is that which escapes the structure, that which cannot be captured from within the structure. A structure has no privileged center, no privileged subject or reference. "Therefore, one has to abandon the scientific or philosophical discourse, the *episteme*, that has as an absolute requirement, that is the absolute requirement to return to the source, the center, the foundation, the principle, etc." (Derrida, 1967: 420, our translation).<sup>11</sup>

The play of structure, with its endless movement of substitution, repetition, transformation and permutation of the elements, does no longer have as its horizon the possible or impossible exhaustion of a field. In contrast, it points to the *absence* of a center that would stop and found the play of substitutions, and implies as such a radically different nature of the field itself. In this regard, Derrida believes that the metaphysical shift has become possible by the progressive reflection on the notion of structurality of structure, initiated at the end of the 19th century and culminating in the structuralist movement.

It is true that the metaphysical space that thereby opened up, involved what Derrida calls an *invasion by language* of the problematic field of universality. In the absence of a center of presence, in the absence of a point of origin or telos, everything becomes discourse, that is, a system in which the central signified (originary or transcendental), is never absolutely present outside a system of differences.

It is useful here to note that the absence of a center does not mean that at the heart of structure there is an empty place, or that the center is still there but has been emptied. Rather, structure is only made possible from a void point, i.e. from something that escapes the structure. Indeed, the solution Derrida proposes, is not so much to stop the infinite play of the structure by securing it through a point of presence or by introducing an emptiness at the heart of structure. It is to consider any answer to the absence of a fixating point of origin, not as a fulfillment (a presence), but as a floating addition, a local and temporal supplement, something that comes on top of, or in the place of, the absence. "It is impossible to determine the center and exhaust totalisation because the sign that replaces the center, that *supplies* for it, that takes its place in its absence, that sign comes in addition, on top, as a *supplement*. The movement of meaning adds something, which implies that there is always more, but that addition is floating because it substitutes, it supplies for a lack at the side of the signified" (Derrida, 1967: 423, our translation).<sup>12</sup> Since the structuralist movement, the signifier is typically what has been considered to fulfill this task. It is in itself void, indefinitely interpretable, and functions as a suppletion in the sense meant here. Therefore, from the moment the supplement enters the scene, what we call Derrida's 'metaphysics of absence', is more appropriately called a 'metaphysics of delay' or a 'metaphysics of postponement'.<sup>13</sup>

In the final part of the paper, this metaphysics of absence, involving the idea of suppletion, is given some "flesh" on the basis of an

organisational point of view, inspired by Merleau-Ponty's *The Structure of Behaviour* (1942).

### 3. MERLEAU-PONTY: STRUCTURE AND MEANING

If we go along with Derrida's idea of a metaphysics of delay or postponement, the big issue is to conceive of "the other place" as a genuine condition of possibility of structure. That must be done without recourse to a point of presence or fixation, or even without appealing to an empty place at the heart of structure. The "other place" does not point to an absence that should be completed. It points to a place from which structure *as* structure becomes possible. In other words, it is the perspective from which structure can be seen. That will be articulated in terms of a "logic of suppletion" related to a metaphysics of delay. To this end, a phenomenological account of organizational levels is presented based on Merleau-Ponty (1942). That account serves as a framework to outline the idea of perspective, from both an organizational account and a "logic of suppletion".

#### 3.1. *A Structural Approach to the Organism*

In his structural account of the organism, Merleau-Ponty criticizes vitalist or holistic, as well as atomistic or reductionist viewpoints. He considers both options of holism and atomism as two sides of the same coin. Indeed, from the point of view of vitalism, the unity of the organism is established through a principle (entelechy) that unifies otherwise separately working mechanisms. This principle not only brings about the living system as a meaningfully organized, purposive system. At its basis also lies a mechanistic image of a living being, i.e. a material mass *partes extra partes* that asks for a unifying principle. Merleau-Ponty believes that the whole of the organism is more than the sum of its parts. But he resists the vitalist solution, in as far as it invokes a mysterious unifying principle. What exactly will then be his solution?

Firstly, he acknowledges that in describing the behavior of living systems, it is impossible to set out the relation between stimulus and response in a linear way. There is no linear, causal relation between what sensitively or otherwise comes in and the patterns of response the organism produces.

Secondly, in accounting for this impossibility, Merleau-Ponty will make the structural assumption in relation to the organism.<sup>14</sup> It is because of

the structured nature of the organism that stimulus and response are not coupled linearly.

Thirdly, the assumption of structure goes hand in hand with a *functional* account. As the stimulus in itself does not dictate the ways in which it is to be taken into account, an explication of the *perspective* out of which a stimulus acquires a meaning, is unavoidable. The issue of perspective is the big issue in relation to living systems, and stands in close connection with the issue of functionality.

This issue has two aspects. On the one hand, it refers to the actively interpreting, dynamically structured organism itself. On the other hand, it refers to an interpreting instance, a perceiving subject that cannot but acknowledge the intrinsically purposive, meaningful nature of living systems.

To Merleau-Ponty, it is beyond doubt that the behavior of the organism involves meaningful relations. The object of biology is unthinkable without acknowledgment of the meaningful unities that it unfolds and that are encountered by a perceiving subject. Merleau-Ponty is clear about the fact that this does not lead to a new form of vitalism. "There is no question – as we have said often enough – of returning to any form whatsoever of vitalism or animism, but simply of recognizing that the object of biology cannot be grasped without the unities of signification which a consciousness finds and sees unfolding in it" (Merleau-Ponty, 1998: 161).<sup>15</sup>

What, however, will secure the fact that it is not a vitalist solution? In this regard, it is necessary to be more precise about Merleau-Ponty's ideas of structure and function. To this end, we return to the idea of perspective.

Firstly, we have seen that stimulus and response are *intrinsically, not linearly*, related because a living, actively interpreting structure is involved. The implication of structure makes stimulus and response two moments of a *circular process*, by which the behavior of the organism cannot be understood as a simple function of the physical surroundings. The organism *contributes* to the constitution of the 'stimulus'; it creates or even is the *perspective* out of which the stimulus can have a specific impact and can stand in a specific relation to the response. Meaning therefore arises from the dialectic mutual exchange between organism and environment. It is neither passively present in an external order and as such assimilated (cf. realism), nor *de novo* constructed by a creative mind (cf. idealism). So, circular causality is at work in the organism, but also in the relation between organism and its milieu.

Secondly, those phenomena of structure stand in relation to *human experience*, which is experience of a multitude of structures or meaningful wholes. In this regard, Merleau-Ponty states that the structure of behavior is articulated in terms of the correlation between perception and form. "The structure of behavior as it presents itself to perceptual experience is neither thing nor consciousness; and it is this which renders it opaque to the mind. (...) behavior is not a thing, but neither is it an idea. It is not the envelope of a pure consciousness and, as the witness of behavior, I am not a pure consciousness. It is precisely this which we wanted to say in stating that behavior is a form" (Merleau-Ponty, 1998: 127).<sup>16</sup> In other passages, Merleau-Ponty uses the terminology of 'meaning' and 'consciousness', instead of 'form' and 'perception'. "Vital acts *have* a meaning; they are not defined, even in science, as a sum of processes external to each other, but as the spatial and temporal unfolding of certain ideal unities. (...) it is only to say that it is a whole which is significant for a consciousness which knows it, not a thing which rests in-itself (*en soi*)" (Merleau-Ponty, 1998: 159).<sup>17</sup> The organism is perceived and known as a unity of meaning; its unity is no appearance, but a phenomenon. A phenomenon, however, is only visible from a certain perspective, in this case the perspective of human perception.

### 3.2. *Function and Perspective Within a Stratified Viewpoint*

Merleau-Ponty's ideas about structure and perspective are to be situated within a stratified point of view. Its core can be formulated as follows.

Firstly, to conceive of the behavior of an organism in structural terms, implies the idea of a dialectics between something functioning at a certain level of organization, and something situated externally to it, at another level of organization. More specifically, it is always the organizational level *situated above* the structural level in focus that does the interpreting. Or in other words, to interpret always requires a level *from which* something is seen as meaningful. It is impossible to acknowledge meaning from within the level of focus, as a level above is required to realize meaningful interpretation. In this way, Merleau-Ponty states that anatomy borrows from physiology, and that physiology borrows from biology. A physiology that merely talks and explains from its own level is impossible. A physiology that borrows from biology is instead an informed, interpreting physiology able to recognize the meaningfulness of physiological processes. This stratified organizational viewpoint therefore quite



naturally expresses the idea of *another place*, i.e. the place external to the organizational level in focus from which interpretation is initiated.

Secondly, the stratified account inevitably involves a *functionalist* viewpoint. Something on the physiological level can only have a function if it is related to the biological level situated above it. In the same vein, function takes precedence over anatomy, and organization over juxtaposition. Therefore, it is the interpretive impact of the organizational level situated above the structural level in focus that renders the function visible or conceivable. Moreover, such a functionalist point of view on the organism correlates with the biological *values* of the organism.

Thirdly, Merleau-Ponty suggests a *hierarchical* picture in which human consciousness or human perception functions as the ultimate interpretive instance, the ultimate organizational layer from which the meaningfulness of the other layers can be revealed.

Those three points show that a structural account involves the idea of *stratification*, implying the idea of a dialectics between something functioning at a certain level of organization, and something situated externally of it. It is at the organizational layer situated externally to the level in focus, that eventually the epistemological perspective enters the scene. That perspective is intrinsically interpretative and functionalist.

### 3.3. *The Interpretative Perspective: Presence or Suppletion?*

As Merleau-Ponty suggests a hierarchical picture in which the final interpretative instance is human consciousness or perception, it is important to be as precise as possible about the place of that instance. Does consciousness or perception function within a metaphysical context of presence, as in Husserl's evidence theory of knowledge? Or is it instead an instance that precisely *supplies* for a lack or an absence of a central signified?

In this regard, the first thing to be stressed is that consciousness is not the *central* issue for Merleau-Ponty, but *perception*. *Perception* is the irreducible element in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, and correlatively, structure is equally irreducible. The field of perception and the phenomenal givens are first, and they cannot be explained on a physiological basis. "The living physiology of the nervous system can only be understood by starting from phenomenal givens" (Merleau-Ponty, 1998: 88).<sup>18</sup>

The second important thing, and tightly connected with the first, is that Merleau-Ponty's basic issue is not *meaning*, but *structure*. A structure

is an organized form, and a form is a whole which has a *sense*. Structure is the contingent way in which matter shows itself to us in order to have a meaning. It is due to that connection with (material) existence that Merleau-Ponty escapes idealism. Meaning or signification belong merely to the order of consciousness, whereas structure is inseparable from its material incorporation. Structure is the way in which matter has a meaning for us. It is not dissolvable into the idea of a pure spirit. Structure is therefore the limit of critical thinking. Because it is not reducible to meaning, the real enters transcendental thinking. "What is profound in the notion of 'Gestalt' from which we started is not the idea of signification but that of *structure*, the joining of an idea and an existence which are indiscernible, the contingent arrangement by which materials begin to have meaning in our presence, intelligibility in the nascent state" (Merleau-Ponty, 1998: 206–207).<sup>19</sup>

Merleau-Ponty thus recognizes the rights of both transcendentalism and realism. On the one hand, he refuses the idealist and intellectualist aspects of transcendentalism. Realism shows that reality is not open for a constitutive consciousness, but on the contrary resists it. On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty rejects the realist idea that everything in the outside world is pre-constituted. The notion of structure precisely expresses the crossroads between transcendentalism and realism: it is the way matter has meaning for the perceiver.

As a consequence, consciousness or perception does not only have to deal with pure meaning (cf. Husserl and the issue of fulfillment in intuition), but also with the resistance of the perceived world. Such a resistance disturbs the presence of a point of evidence. The world is no longer transparent for consciousness, but, as perceived, a matter of continuous interpretation from a certain perspective. That happens in the way of a continuous suppletion for the absence of pure meaning or a central signified. Structure and perception can only be considered as provisory, or as delayed and postponed in reference to what has been supplied for.

### 3.4. *Consequences for Transcendental Conditions of Possibility*

Merleau-Ponty, through his structural account, realizes a radical change in the status of transcendentalism and hence contributes to a change in metaphysical "gesture" in the way Derrida conceives of it. The transcendental is rooted in the empirical, without, however, collapsing into an empirical issue. For Husserl, this change in status of the transcendental would have appeared an oxymoron. It is not only because of his evidence

theory of knowledge that his phenomenology is indicative of a metaphysics of presence. It is also based on a metaphysics of presence to the extent that it involves a space in which conditions of possibility are clearly set apart as untouchable and untouched products of a conscious or transcendental ego that is ultimately present to itself (cf. Derrida, 1967).

Merleau-Ponty aims at avoiding an unwarranted intellectualism or idealism that he sees implied in that view on transcendentalism. In that, he relies more on Husserl's transcendental-genetic work, where the body and the issue of intersubjectivity become the main sources of conspiracy between the transcendental and the empirical. In this regard, the term 'transcendental empiricism' (N. Depraz, 2001) has been introduced, referring to a form of transcendentalism that ruins any kind of *pure* transcendentalism. For Depraz, the idea of a transcendental empiricism is very Derridean, it is the place where the pureness of the transcendental analysis is confronted with the impurities (stemming from the other, time, the empirical world) by which the transcendental analysis is precisely fed. In that sense, it is the last word of Husserlian phenomenology, and it is the starting point of Merleau-Ponty's analysis. A structural point of view can no longer claim the pureness of transcendental conditions the way Husserl has. From the moment structure enters the scene, the conditions of possibility of the perspective are mixed up with the empirical and with the resistance of the perceived world. That resistance is especially clear in the case of living beings, which resist an approach in terms of pure meaning or signification, and require a point of view that takes into account the intrinsic values of the organism itself. The functionalist perspective cannot fixate the determinations of the organism on an exclusively extrinsic basis.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

The core difference between presence and suppletion can be formulated as follows. In the case of presence, there is an *absolute, fixed* stabilizing anchorage of the structure, whereas in the case of suppletion, something comes on top as a floating element *partially* and *temporarily* stabilizing the dynamics. The assessment of the difference between the two metaphysics therefore involves two things.

Firstly, the distinction relies upon a difference in stabilizing potential. The stabilizing function of a suppletion is temporary and local, whereas the stabilizing function of a point of presence is absolute and universal. The most important issue therefore becomes the issue of stability and

stabilization. The aspect of more or less stabilization renders the distinction between both metaphysics *gradual*. There is, however, also a second aspect.

Secondly, whether or not that which comes to cover the absence is a suppletion, basically depends upon whether it is recognized as such, i.e. whether it is recognized as resulting from a perspective. Therefore, there also remains an *essential*, decisive difference between both kinds of metaphysics in that a metaphysics of presence does not require an articulation of the issue of the perspective, whereas a metaphysics of delay or postponement intrinsically does. In other words, a metaphysics of non-presence awakens the issue of the perspective. It thereby includes the knowing (stabilizing-destabilizing) subject itself into the dynamical process. The latter has methodological as well as ethical consequences.

A metaphysics of presence closes off from the very start the potential destabilization involved in any interactive process, of which the knowledge process is a part. In this way, Husserl's notion of evidence clearly aims at excluding the observer's or knower's perspective at the heart of structure. Evidence functions at the heart of the structure of perception and knowledge, both as origin and as teleological point of attraction. In evidence it is the thing itself which comes into grip.

A metaphysics of non-presence, on the other hand, opens up the issue of the interpretative perspective. In as far as a structure is only possible if there is a point external to the structure that interprets the structure at issue, a functionalist space is opened up wherein the points of interpretation need to be specially argued for. It is here that the interests, purposes and anxieties of the human subject, alongside those of living beings in general, are revealed as potentially destabilizing or stabilizing factors. In that way, a metaphysics of delay or postponement creates a richer space in which stabilizing and non-stabilizing effects of living systems, at various organizational levels, have to be taken into account.

*Ghent University – Department of Philosophy*

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> "Wie kann die Evidenz (die *clara et distincta perceptio*) mehr beanspruchen, als ein Bewußtseinscharakter in mir zu sein? Es ist (unter Beiseitelegung der vielleicht nicht so gleichgültigen Ausschaltung der Seinsgeltung der Welt) das Cartesianische Problem, das durch die göttliche *veracitas* gelöst werden sollte" (Husserl, 1931: 116).

<sup>2</sup> "Or cette découverte a le sens d'un dépassement du cartésianisme, car Husserl a eu alors la révélation que le *cogitatum*, et non seulement la *cogitatio*, fait partie de la sphère de

l'évidence absolue. Cela signifie que l'objet n'est pas totalement étranger au sujet, qu'il ne lui est pas absolument extérieur et qu'il ne requiert donc pas, comme c'est le cas chez Descartes, la garantie de la véracité divine" (F. Dastur, 1995: 42–43).

<sup>3</sup> Independently from whether or not the transcendental reduction is explicitly operational.

<sup>4</sup> The German original speaks in the first version of some 'mark' for the *truth* of the presumed state of affairs, and in the second version of the *existence* of the presumed state of affairs. "So fassen wir überhaupt den Begriff des Wissens in einem weiteren, aber doch nicht ganz laxen Sinne; wir scheiden ihn ab von dem grundlosen Meinen und beziehen uns hierbei auf irgendwelche 'Kennzeichen' für das Bestehen des angenommenen Sachverhalts, bzw. für die Richtigkeit des gefällten Urteils. Das vollkommenste Kennzeichen der Richtigkeit ist die Evidenz, es gilt uns als unmittelbares Innwerden der Wahrheit selbst" (Husserl, 1975: 29).

<sup>5</sup> "Evidenz ist vielmehr nicht anderes als das 'Erlebnis' der Wahrheit" (Husserl, 1975: 193).

<sup>6</sup> "Das evidente Urteil (...) ist ein Bewußtsein originärer Gegebenheit. Zu ihm verhält sich das nicht-evidente Urteil analog, wie sich die beliebige vorstellende Setzung eines Gegenstandes zu seiner adäquaten Wahrnehmung verhält. Das adäquat Wahrgenommene ist nicht bloß ein irgendwie Gemeintes, sondern, als was es gemeint ist, auch im Akte originär gegeben, d.i. als selbst gegenwärtig und restlos erfaßt" (Husserl, 1975: 193). The German quotes are again from Husserl's revised edition.

<sup>7</sup> We may also say that evidence is the *experience* of the agreement between intention and fulfilment, and thus the experience of truth. Husserl's account involves an intimate connection between truth and the experience of truth. The intimate connection between truth (as universal) and the experience of truth (as particular) is, however, problematic, as the instantiation of a universal is not necessarily also the experience of that instantiation. (Cf. G. Patzig, 1977)

<sup>8</sup> Unless explicitly mentioned, all references to Derrida's 1967 are to 'La structure, le signe et le jeu dans le discours des sciences humaines', pp. 409–428 in *L'écriture et la différence*. Derrida's interpretation is neither a correct account nor a refutation of Husserl's point of view, it is an inspiring reading of Husserl. The reason why we do not consider it to be a correct representation, has to do with the fact that Derrida pushes retention to the side of representation, in order to arrive at a purified source-point in the now-moment.

<sup>9</sup> Recognizable, for instance, as *eidōs*, *archē*, *telos*, *energeia*, *ousia*, *aletheia*, ...

<sup>10</sup> "Le concept de structure centrée est en effet le concept d'un jeu *fondé*, constitué depuis une immobilité fondatrice et une certitude rassurante, elle-même soustraite au jeu" (Derrida, 1967: 410).

<sup>11</sup> "Il faut donc renoncer ici au discours scientifique ou philosophique, à l'*épistémè* qui a pour exigence absolue, qui est l'exigence absolue de remonter à la source, au centre, au fondement, au principe, etc." (Derrida, 1967: 420).

<sup>12</sup> "On ne peut déterminer le centre et épuiser la totalisation parce que le signe qui remplace le centre, qui le *supplée*, qui en tient lieu en son absence, ce signe s'ajoute, vient en sus, en *supplément*. Le mouvement de la signification ajoute quelque chose, ce qui fait qu'il y a toujours plus, mais cette addition est flottante parce qu'elle vient vicarier, suppléer un manque du côté du signifié" (Derrida, 1967: 423).

<sup>13</sup> We are grateful to E. Evink for this suggestion. Cf. his *Transcendence en inscriptie – Jacques Derrida en de hubris van de metafysica* (2002).

<sup>14</sup> This is in fact the move Kant had already made in his third Critique, and indeed, it could be argued that *The Structure of Behavior* is in many ways comparable to the second part of Kant's third Critique. For a more detailed description of Kant's solution, cf. G. Van de Vijver, 2004, G. Van de Vijver et al., 2003, G. Van de Vijver, 1999.

<sup>15</sup> “Il n'est pas question, nous l'avons assez dit, de revenir à une forme quelconque de vitalisme ou d'animisme, mais simplement de reconnaître que l'objet de la biologie est impensable sans les unités de signification qu'une conscience y trouve et voit s'y déployer” (Merleau-Ponty, 1942: 174–175).

<sup>16</sup> “La structure du comportement telle qu'elle s'offre à l'expérience perceptive, n'est ni chose ni conscience et c'est ce qui la rend opaque pour l'intelligence. (...) le comportement n'est pas une chose, mais il n'est pas davantage une idée, il n'est pas l'enveloppe d'une pure conscience et, comme témoin d'un comportement, je ne suis pas une pure conscience. C'est justement ce que nous voulions dire en disant qu'il est une forme” (Merleau-Ponty, 1942: 138).

<sup>17</sup> “Les actes vitaux *ont* un sens, ils ne se définissent pas, dans la science même, comme une somme de processus extérieurs les uns aux autres, mais comme le déploiement temporel et spatial de certaines unités idéales. (...) c'est dire seulement qu'il est un ensemble significatif pour une conscience qui le connaît, non une chose qui repose en soi” (Merleau-Ponty, 1942: 172).

<sup>18</sup> “On ne peut connaître la physiologie vivant du système nerveux qu'en partant des données phénoménales” (Merleau-Ponty, 1942: 97).

<sup>19</sup> “Ce qu'il y a de profond dans la ‘Gestalt’ d'où nous sommes partis, ce n'est pas l'idée de signification, mais celle de *structure*, la jonction d'une idée et d'une existence indiscernables, l'arrangement contingent par lequel les matériaux se mettent devant nous à avoir un sens, l'intelligibilité à l'état naissant” (Merleau-Ponty, 1942: 223).

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Dastur, F. *Husserl, Des mathématiques à l'histoire*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995.
- Depraz, N. *Lucidité du corps* (Phaenomenologica 160). Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.
- Derrida, J. *La voix et le phénomène*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967.
- . “‘Genèse et Structure’ et la phénoménologie.” In *L'écriture et la différence*. Paris: Seuil, 1967.
- . “La structure, le signe et le jeu dans le discours des sciences humaines.” In *L'écriture et la différence*. Paris: Seuil, 1967.
- Evink E. *Transcendentie en inscriptie – Jacques Derrida en de hubris van de metafysica*. Delft: Eburon, 2000.
- Husserl, E. *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973 (1931).
- . *Cartesian Meditations – An Introduction to Phenomenology*, D. Cairns (trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960.
- . *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950 (1913).
- . *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952.

- . *Logische Untersuchungen, Erster Band Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*, herausgegeben von Elisabeth Ströker, Text nach Husserliana XVIII. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1975 (1900).
- . *Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*, I. Teil (Untersuchung I-V), herausgegeben von Elisabeth Ströker, Text nach Husserliana XIX/1. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1975 (1900).
- . *Logische Untersuchungen, Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis*, II. Teil (Untersuchung VI), herausgegeben von Elisabeth Ströker, Text nach Husserliana XIX/2. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1984 (1901).
- . *Logical Investigations*, Vol. 1, J. N. Findlay (trans.). London and New York: Routledge, 2001.
- . *Logical Investigations*, Vol. 2, J. N. Findlay (trans.). London and New York: Routledge, 2001.
- Merleau-Ponty, M. *La Structure du Comportement*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002 (1942).
- . *The Structure of Behavior*, A. L. Fisher (trans.). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998.
- Patzig, G. "Husserl on Truth and Evidence." In *Readings on Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations*, J. N. Mohanty (ed.). The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977, pp. 179–196.
- Van de Vijver, G. "Kant et les intuitions de l'auto-organisation." In *Auto-organisation et émergence dans les sciences de la vie*, B. Feltz, M. Crommelinck and Ph. Goujon (eds.). Brussels: Ousia, 1999.
- Van de Vijver, G., L. Van Speybroeck, and W. Vandevyvere. Reflecting on Complexity of Biological Systems. Kant and Beyond? *Acta Biotheoretica*, 51(2) (2003): 101–140.
- Van de Vijver, G. Auto-organisation, autonomie, identité: figures kantiennes. *Auto-organisation, Autonomie, Identité, Numéro spécial de Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 228(2) (2004): 95–117.

THE RESISTANCE OF THE QUESTION TO  
PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION:  
HUSSERL, FINK AND THE ADEQUACY OF THE  
*SIXTH CARTESIAN MEDITATION*  
AS A RESPONSE TO HEIDEGGER

It is no exaggeration to say that before it is anything else phenomenology is questioning, and that there would be no phenomenological reduction without the question. Perhaps we could go further and say that to question is phenomenological in principle. But can we say that Husserl knows what a question is for phenomenology? Husserl seems to be caught in a double bind, for at the same time he is committed to the thought that with the phenomenological reduction even questioning can be suspended, 'put into question', and that methodologically this is necessary for the attainment of transcendental questioning, which is why he affirms that what transcendental questioning is cannot be said. Then in what sense can a transcendental question be put at all? But perhaps this double bind, if it is a double bind, is necessary for phenomenology, or at least for a phenomenology carried out responsibly in the name of questioning.

To my knowledge Husserl nowhere reflects on what exactly a question is, despite his arguing that transcendental phenomenology is a radically new way of questioning. However, with the comparatively recent (1986/1995) publication of Fink's *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* (1932) we are provided with Husserl's thoughts, in the form of his annotations and amendments to Fink's text and appendices attached to it a little more than a year later, on precisely in what sense the phenomenological reduction can lead to a new way of questioning, that is on the relation between the phenomenologist as questioner and the questioning that phenomenology is.<sup>1</sup> To this extent Fink's text and Husserl's additions and alterations to it can be seen as a response to and rebuttal of Heidegger's existential analytic, published five years earlier, which famously begins by distinguishing Dasein as the being for whom above all its being is an issue in the form of a question, the question of being.<sup>2</sup> It can be argued that Fink's text is a response to the way in which Heidegger unfolds the question of being, perhaps even an answer to the questions Heidegger raises. But in this paper I shall want to say that if the question is necessary



for phenomenology, if it is, then it is necessary because it resists phenomenology. The question resists the phenomenological reduction, and Husserl's and Fink's understanding of what a question is, more particularly a reflective self-questioning, is inadequate to the task of phenomenologically understanding the question of human being in the world and in no way moves beyond Heidegger's account of the question in his existential analytic and other of his texts prior to Fink's (and Husserl's) *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*.

What Fink and Husserl are after is a 'transcendental questioning', a prejudice-free, ultimately grounded science "radicalised to the *transcendental* questioning of the presuppositions of the worldly idea of knowing and science", one which is "different in principle: motivated by transcendental insight, [putting] <theoretically> into question what can never be put into question at all in the natural attitude" [SCM 32–3]. "In the breakthrough of the phenomenological reduction all natural questioning, as questioning that moves into the world-horizon, is inhibited ... is put out of play" [SCM 39]. There is a great deal of emphasis here placed on the question, on what it is to question, putting into question 'natural' ways of questioning in a favour of a 'transcendental' questioning. More than once Husserl and Fink appear to locate the primary question at the very place of questioning. But on each occasion they step back from where their questioning leads them, back from a conception of questioning which is not theoretical or metaphysical or one that is premised on an autonomous subjectivity.

Most importantly Fink and Husserl believe that the question of being being a question is relevant only within what they term the 'natural attitude', and it is this of course that is suspended by the phenomenological reduction. For Husserl real questions about our being are consequent of a decision to make the question a theoretical one. It is as if for Husserl we are not in fact questioning or subject to a question when in the world, and being in the world can only properly become a question, that is a question for phenomenology, when it is posed from without the natural attitude. If nowhere in the text with which we are concerned do Fink and Husserl 'abstain from belief' in the value of the question or the power of the interrogative [SCM 41], it is because of the way in which they detach questioning from our being always already questioning and questionable.

For Heidegger on the other hand we cannot not be concerned with the question that our being is precisely because of our being in the world, and we would not be motivated to carry out a phenomenological questioning were we not already subject to a question about our being, and

explicit (phenomenological) questions about being have somehow to take account of this. To ask phenomenologically the question of being is to assume responsibility for a question *anyway* performed by the self in its existing at all. Moreover, it is a requirement of any explicit question that phenomenology may wish to carry out about being in the world that its asking be a repetition of what is anyway latent in existing at all, to the extent that nothing *external* to the question decides whether it has been asked. One's response to the question of being both sets up and satisfies, at *the same time*, the criteria for deciding what, ontologically, the question of being is. For Husserl, on the other hand, to ask the radical and new philosophical question is to perform the phenomenological reduction with a view to achieving autonomy, as a subject in the world, for only then can one be self-responsible towards it. Responsibility for Fink and Husserl supervenes on our ability to achieve autonomy methodologically.

For Heidegger we attain responsibility only if we take account of our being always already responsive to the question of being in such a way as to embrace in our questioning how that responsiveness makes autonomy impossible. Against Husserl then, Heidegger seeks to put the notion of the subject into question – that is, a subject defined in terms of a consciousness identical, transparent and adequate to itself – and with it the idea that the self is autonomous, and that the self has an unmediated access to itself in the form of intact representational content (intentionality), in a present moment (the here and now). *But*, it is not as if this 'putting into question', for Heidegger, can occur simply from without. Nor is it that the self can simply decide to put itself into question. Rather, it is the question of being which puts one into question by maintaining the self in an irreducible 'proximity' to itself in that one is called upon to respond to the being that one is. But at the same time one is not the being one is until one has responded. Thus the question both divides *and* unites one's presence to oneself. One is both divided from and united with oneself by the doubly genitival way one is subject to and of the question of being. Phenomenology lacks this doubly genitival 'of', which is why it is so preoccupied with the question of motivation, the very beginning of phenomenology being the question of the motivation of the phenomenological reduction: How does phenomenology come about as the performance of the reduction? asks Fink, Why does it take place at all? For Fink the answer lies, rather as it does for Heidegger, in a covered-over questionableness: "The motivation for the action of reduction is the awakening of a questionableness that indeed enters the scene in the natural attitude, but which in principle 'transcends' the horizon of all

questions that are possible with the natural attitude" [SCM 37]. For Heidegger, not to accept the full implications of the question of being being a question is to lose the motivation for carrying out the phenomenological reduction at all.

For Heidegger the 'ability' to carry out the reduction is rooted in and given by one's having always already responded to the question that is being. There is no discrete subject position from where to begin, and that to which one is always already responding is a question. To be a questioning being is Dasein's mode of being [*Seinsmodus*].<sup>3</sup> To understand this involves a transformation of what is understood by *question*. Husserl too accepts this; but *contra* Husserl it is open whether and to what extent the question in 'question of being' can be understood to be a question in the conventional sense at all, since the question of being is prior to – in the sense that it calls for – particular question forms; thus questions in the particular can be considered to be *responses* to the questioning that is being.

Fink and Husserl also seem to accept that a phenomenological questioning puts into question what a question is, after all as a 'phenomenologizing I' "I deny myself the actions of inquiry" [SCM 163], but they do not seem able to conceive of a question as being anything other than interrogative. Whilst what the question is to which the phenomenological reduction leads cannot be specified, at least not yet – "that is something we are not in a position to do ..." [SCM 39] – *that* it be an inquiry, interrogative, seems not to be in question: "All we shall do here is indicate the fundamental distinction between mundane pregivenness ... and the *entirely different* disclosure found in the phenomenological foreknowledge of transcendental subjectivity in *transcendentally* self-radicalizing inquiry" [SCM 39]. "This self-consciousness develops in that the onlooker that comes to himself in the epoche reduces "bracketed" human immanence by explicit inquiry back behind the acceptednesses in self-apperception that hold regarding humanness ..." [SCM 40]; "... what it [the phenomenological reduction] does is *interrogate* [*italics in original*] them and make them the theme of a *transcendental clarification*" [SCM 48]. There is an 'entirely different' disclosure implied and sought by phenomenology; phenomenology achieves this by making it "possible to pose the radical questions – in a new sense of 'radical'" [SCM 36]; but that inquiry, no matter how radical it is, is an interrogation, and therefore not a new sense of 'pose', its newness can in no way stretch to the *way* in which the question is to be posed.

The difference here between Husserl and Heidegger is not just that for Heidegger the question of being puts into question the very possibility of questioning, but that the way in which what a question is is put into question by the question of being is performatively allowed for by Heidegger in his questioning. If to ascertain the meaning of the question of being is to question fundamentally then such questioning runs up against its own possibility *as* a question. In its being Dasein is essentially questioning, in that it cannot but put itself into question, *whether or not* its questions do pose the question of being questioningly, and the trick is to come into this questioning in the right way. Fink and Husserl on the other hand argue that in the natural attitude we are questioning, but insufficiently radically, and that we must perform a phenomenological reduction to put ourselves in a position to ask the question which is simply impossible in the natural attitude of one's participation in the world. We thus make a decision to question, and to do so theoretically, but this question seems for them nowhere to be anything other than an interrogative one.

But if ultimately what is of interest in both Husserl [cf. SCM 41] and Heidegger is how questioning might keep open a relation to being, including to oneself, then it is necessary to ask whether phenomenology is justified in maintaining that questioning in the interrogative sense is the means by which this possibility is best preserved. Indeed, perhaps what we call 'questions' are *inappropriate* responses to or expressions of the question of being, both because of and in spite of the fact that, in an important way, they repeat something essential about one's being brought into question by being at all.

What is most remarkable about being, for Heidegger, is that it gives rise to a question about itself, not just that being can be questioned but that it comes to the fore *as* a question. It is a question which, importantly, is performed by Dasein in its existing *as a requirement of the question itself*. So when speaking about the question of being, it is important not to collapse what is meant by question here with what is ordinarily understood by 'to question' (in the interrogative) – that is, not to collapse the ontological back into the ontic. Experiencing oneself as a uniquely questioning being does not consist simply in an ability to formulate explicit questions. The question of being is not reducible to questions that may be asked about being. There is a complicity between Dasein's ability to question (the analytic), and its being from the start concerned about the meaning of being (the existential). On the one hand Dasein generates the question as a question, it is Dasein's question. On the other

Dasein is the object of the question, the being interrogated as to its being. So Dasein begets the question, it is both the subject questioning (subjective genitive) and subject to the question of being (genitive objective). In this way is Dasein essentially questioning in its being, and its being equiprimordially questionable. The question *of* being, then, has to be seen in terms of the grammar of this double genitive, as the being of Dasein.

For Husserl, though, we have to *make* man questionable: "... the epoche risks *more* than all philosophical beginnings made with the questionable-ness and insecurity of human existence. It puts into question what all 'existential' philosophies of this kind presuppose, that upon which they rest assured: *human being itself* (the natural attitude) ... the whole natural acceptedness of the world with all its distinctions of truths certain and uncertain, original and non-original, are what it puts into question. Not only does it not reassure itself with mundane knowledge, but it precisely makes the world *questionable* in a way in which this is never possible on the basis of the world – despite all existential perturbation and agitation" [SCM 46–7]. The problem here is the point of view, the place from where the 'human being itself' can be put into question. We can only get out of the natural attitude by putting it into question, but this putting into question is nonetheless an interrogative. But in what sense can a question be interrogative and yet not natural? Is not Husserl presupposing in his questioning the very thing he wishes to put into question by it?

In Heideggerian terms nothing external to the question decides whether it has been asked. This can be put another way: the criteria for judging whether a question has been asked well coincide with the criteria for ascertaining what, ontologically, questions *are* – this is what Heidegger means in the later work by saying that man is his own measure. Dasein both sets up the question as a question, and acts as a response to it *at the same time*. That is to say, simultaneously Dasein both sets up and satisfies the criteria of what a question *is*; *and* of what a proper response to the question is – 'proper' in the sense of one's own answer rather than a correct one. The peculiar [*eigentlich*: '*eigen*' conferring ownness<sup>4</sup>] structure of the being-question [*Seinsfrage*] is such that Dasein poses questions about being, questions as to what the meaning of being might be, precisely because being poses itself as a question to Dasein. But the problem is in establishing the temporal priority between the two. And part of the methodological difficulty of this is that it goes for questioning in general, inasmuch as all questioning, from the start, is already a response to what Heidegger sees as the fundamental question, the question of being. Whereas what a question is for Husserl is either defined from

without and in advance, that is a natural question, defined and definable phenomenologically as something to be suspended, or unknown as something that as yet cannot be said.

In any explicit question about being, for Heidegger, being has been already determined in and by the question put to it, determined as to the extent of the conclusions to be drawn about it. In which case such a question cannot strictly be called a question at all, because it contains its end latent within itself 'End' in two senses: the extent or the limit of possible responses; and its own dissolution. If all questioning is, from the start, already a response to a question (the question of being), then the freedom to question is limited, and not a reserve and in principle limitless capacity simply to question. What a question is then for Heidegger is open, I mean the philosophical question of being, both because of and despite its being covered over by being-in-the-world, and can in no way be detached from the questioning being that Dasein is always already. Heidegger's difference from Husserl is that he seeks here a return back to where we already are; whereas Husserl always presupposes the possibility of reaching somewhere other than where we are, a position of questioning 'external' to what is questioned: philosophy as science, the myth of progress, a pure presuppositionless theoretical questioning the possibility of which, whilst not being able to say what it is, Husserl never seems to doubt. It is the 'coming back' that is the problem for Heidegger, and it is the getting elsewhere than where one is that is the problem for Husserl. Both seem attuned to the question of how to question without simply repeating what is in question. And whilst Husserl sees this as a problem in need of surmounting Heidegger views it as a virtuous circle. Dasein's experience of the questionableness of being [*Seinsfraglichkeit*] is so fundamental that it gives rise to the task of seizing that questionability, of "driving one's own Dasein ... into a fruitful questionableness" [*in eine fruchtbare Fraglichkeit hineinzutreiben*].<sup>5</sup> What is important is not to get out of the circle, as it is for Husserl, who contends that the circle is basic "only as long as one remains in the natural attitude" [SCM 38], but to come into it the right way [*nach der rechten Weise hineinzukommen*].<sup>6</sup>

For Heidegger, if one can question it is because one is subject to a question. If there is a self, then it is not as if it is ever not brought into question in its being there as a self. Thus to 'put' oneself into question is to bring out what is already questioning, and hence what is questionworthy, such that it becomes questionable – that is, able to be questioned: "to raise it in a way which will put in question our own being so that it

becomes questionable [*fragwürdig*] in its relatedness [*Bezug*] to being, and thereby open to being".<sup>7</sup> The self cannot simply be brought into question from without; instead, it is the structure of the self itself which makes questioning, any questioning, possible. But, and this is the important point, if Dasein is structured as something like a subject it is through its being subject to something like a question. So rather than presume either the possibility of bringing the subject into question through philosophical or theoretical questioning, or that Dasein is able to question itself, what must be asked is *what is it* about subjectivity that is announced in the way in which the philosophical task of questioning it is formulated? This is a reversal of the Husserlian way of questioning.

The significance of Dasein being the opening of the question is that the self presupposed is brought into question largely as a consequence of the sort of questioning being Dasein is. The subject cannot simply be brought into question from without. Dasein's concern with its being is not to be understood as theoretical or self-reflective; rather, Heidegger seeks to reveal how Dasein's being *cannot fail* to be a concern for it, for this concern is in its existing at all. That Dasein is necessarily concerned with its being Heidegger calls its defining characteristic [*Auszeichnende*],<sup>8</sup> and hence Dasein cannot be 'characterised' as such outside of this, which is to say defined from without. Dasein is not autonomous with respect to questions concerning its existing or how its being is an issue for it. If Dasein's being is an issue for it, then it is disenabled from believing that theoretical or self-questioning is not itself an action participating in the problematic at issue.

The subject cannot simply be brought into question from without: there persists a proximity to oneself such that one is brought into question as a self – in two senses: one is brought into question in being a self, and one is asked to respond as a self. Without this self-proximity responsibility would lose its sense. Responsibility is presupposed in any self-questioning, in that one must be able to respond. But one's being able is itself in question in one's responding, precisely because one's response is a repetition. To put oneself into question is to repeat what is questionable about oneself as a self, that is, it is to respond to one's being always already questionable by appropriating that questionableness.

Part of Heidegger's project generally is to question the extent to which human beings can think themselves outside a problem such that they can pose a question *to* it. In *Identity & Difference*, for example, with explicit reference to the genitive structure within which ontological difference is articulated, the 'genitive of the difference' [*Genitiv der Differenz*] as he

puts it, Heidegger states: "The question is more properly: what do you make [*was haltet ihr*] of the difference if being as well as beings appear *by virtue of the difference*, each in its own way? To do justice to this question, we must first assume a proper position face to face with the difference [*müssen wir uns erst zur Differenz in ein sachgemäßes Gegenüber bringen*]"<sup>9</sup> – not outside of it. Ontological difference makes its intervention at the very site at which phenomenology located intentionality: the *of*. For Brentano and Husserl consciousness is always consciousness *of* something. Whereas Heidegger allows for the recoil of the directional movement of intentionality, thereby bringing into question the very distinction inside/outside upon which the intentionality thesis ultimately rests. The 'of', for Heidegger, is always *doubly* genitival. The double genitive always involves an articulation, a *movement* back and forth, one which displaces Dasein from itself and brings it back to itself by demanding that one account for one's response despite and because of this displacement – the 'I' presupposed in and by its responding, whether conscious and intentional or otherwise. And the important point to grasp is that we cannot say which of these occurs first: the displacement or the bringing back. This is the ineluctable sense of responsibility we all bear. I cannot not be me, I cannot not say 'I'. But in saying 'I', in affirming it, I am required to answer for my right to say it. I cannot not respond, but I am not the I that I am until I have responded. Whereas for Husserl the movement of questioning is always to a self which whilst not one's worldly self is a self 'concealed within' the 'human I' [SCM 42], a transcendental I within oneself into which one passes only when one has brought oneself "out into the open" [SCM 40], an I presupposed in the requirement of the phenomenological reduction itself that I suspend what is particular and worldly in me.

Heidegger seeks the sense of Dasein's own ineluctable *involvement* in the questions it asks; this is for Heidegger the metaphysical specificity of Dasein's questions. As a questioning which inquires into the whole, metaphysics is a questioning in which in the questioning itself the questioner is included in the question, and thereby placed into question.<sup>10</sup> Understanding the totality needs must include this pre-understanding of the question. But then Dasein's answers cannot be construed as conclusive; rather, they are responses, and as such disenable a grasp of the totality *as a totality*, for that would presuppose one's being able to grasp – as part of the totality – the response which decides what that totality is. The type of thinking which would maintain that human beings receive from the outside the matter of thinking, that they bring themselves to



questions, that they can be 'above' or 'external' to the matter of questioning in the traditional metaphysical sense, is disavowed. But it is precisely this metaphysical sense that Husserl and Fink seek, and a grasp of the totality from without is presupposed.<sup>1</sup> They accept that any question we might raise about our being in the world implicates the questioner, but that nonetheless the metaphysical question of what the world is can be asked such as to suspend the self from it. In other words the metaphysical question is the exception: "*Every question about the world is a question already in the world that is existent for me*; pervading all experience and unintuitive belief in and having of being with respect to the mundane as these are motivated by experience is the flowing-steady certainty of the world, which *as the constant basis for all questions cannot become a theme for questions*, except for this one: to ask *what the world is*, what is in it as steady existent and [something] to be known, [and which] thereby determines it itself at any given time in its what" [SCM 35, mg n95]. This question of the 'what', essentially a metaphysical and epistemological question, is what, for Husserl and Fink, allows us to undercut all questions in the worldly sense. Fink too is concerned with the questioner's involvement in his questions; he asks Can the questioner place his own self and thus his own inquiry in question? He feels that the question sounds counter-sensual, but only in the natural attitude. It becomes "at once 'full of sense' if we – at least in an implicit knowing – are already capable of *distinguishing* between ourselves (as a unity of self-acceptednesses, of self-apperceptions) and a deeper self in whose life these concealing self-acceptednesses have their origin" [SCM 37]. Once we have made this distinction we can learn to suspend what it is to be an I, we can learn how to question phenomenologically. But it is surely this 'deeper sense' which is made impossible by the way in which the reduction puts into question distinctions implied by it, such as original/non-original: "... the epoche risks *more* than all philosophical beginnings made with the questionableness and insecurity of human existence. It puts into question what all 'existential' philosophies of this kind presuppose, that upon which they rest assured: *human being itself* (the natural attitude) ... the whole natural acceptedness of the world with all its distinctions of truths certain and uncertain, original and non-original, are what it puts into question" [SCM 46–7].

We cannot learn to do metaphysics, or rather we cannot learn to make the metaphysical question of the 'what' the exception to our ineluctable involvement in our questions. Whilst Heidegger speaks of a right way of questioning<sup>11</sup> and of learning to think and to listen,<sup>12</sup> this does not mean

that human beings can learn how to question as if it were a theoretical practice, or that there is a way of questioning rule-governed in its application; instead, through a modification of one's given questioning attitude, one can hope only to come into or to re-enter the structure of one's being a questioning being in a way that makes sense to oneself as human being. Rather than the metaphysical question of what a human being is it becomes a question of how to be human. The 'right way' cannot be decided in advance, only by going along with it [*Ob er der einzige oder überhaupt der rechte ist, das kann erst nach dem Gang entschieden werden*].<sup>13</sup> Questions are always *responses* to the question of being. Indeed, metaphysics in general, for Heidegger, cannot hope to do anything more than aspire to put the question in an appropriately responsive way, in a way which seeks to take into account that an answer has already been begun. But Husserl and Fink think we can begin again with what they contend is an entirely new way of questioning, but it is new only in the sense that it is a more metaphysically rigorous metaphysical way of questioning, which is why they continue to hold to the possibility of answers, fixed and final answers: the phenomenological reduction produces, they say, "for the first time ... an adequate understanding that ... has the appropriate answer ready for all objections and misgivings" [SCM 48].

The problem is to understand how the task of questioning emerges, and whether, and if so how, it can be taken over *in the course of questioning*. Contra Husserl, Heidegger would not want to suggest that human beings can ever 'know' precisely what it is to be a questioning being: they cannot transcend the being of their questioning, they cannot attain to a place outside the temporal structure of the question that they are, beyond the question that they pose in their being, but – and Heidegger always believed this possible – human beings can inhabit that structure in a way proper to them, a way that is indeed offered by being structured as questioning beings, and in a way which reveals something of what it is to be a human being. Heidegger makes this 'return' or 'retrieval' a condition of being able to speak of holding oneself responsible, of earning the right to say 'I', of disclosing the 'I' presupposed in what one says and does, of seeking not to get elsewhere than where one is, but of seeing how one got to be where one already is. This temporal structure, of how it is to be a questioning being, is that which puts into question a notion of responsibility premised on an autonomous subject, but it brings with it the important problem of showing how responsibility is in no way *exterior* even if it is not at one's disposal.

'Question' might not be the appropriate term for what we are describing here, for the interrogative form may not question fundamentally at all. To ask after this would be to do something more or other than simply ask questions, it would be to question what it is that gives rise to the question, what it is to be a questioning being, via a route *other* than that promised by the interrogative form. It would be in some way to suspend what is implied by 'to question'. It seems that in questioning the question something more than just a reflective capacity to question is needed, something which exceeds being able to question again theoretically in the Husserlian sense. Heidegger sought a non-theoretical sense of questioning, one which did not pretend to 'escape' metaphysics but to take account of it; perhaps he even dreamt of a non-questioning question. After all the later Heidegger struck out the question mark. But even when the question marks are struck out and questioning becomes non-interrogative this can still be seen to be part of the movement of questioning. The later Heidegger states "to let ourselves be told something and not to ask questions, we must strike the question mark out again when a thinking experience is at stake".<sup>14</sup> And he insists that the *Kehre*, the reversal his thinking undergoes late in his career, is "above all not an operation of *interrogative* thought".<sup>15</sup> However, we are not outside the movement of questioning thereby, for in crossing out the question mark it is not as if we return to the 'original' form of that which had been in question. The removal of the question mark, not to ask questions, is a moment in the questioning, it does not bear the status or the content of a conclusion. The removal itself, as an act of erasure or suspension, is itself born of a questioning attitude.

To question means suspending what is meant by 'question' in the interrogative. But if what we are saying here is that the question is phenomenological in principle, and that if it is carried out to the extreme degree which Heidegger and in their own way Fink and Husserl too [SCM 37] seek, then it is suspensive of itself as a question. It is this which makes self-presence, the premise of a self-responsible autonomous self, impossible to prove, for only an answer to a question uniting questioner to questioned could do that. It would seem that the questioner is not at one with his questions, but in his being. His being at all is what properly poses the question, a question which it is his responsibility not to assume responsibility for. Yet he must assume responsibility for his being already questioning. Phenomenology is before it is anything else a questioning, but one which if carried out according to its stated intentions suspends the question in its very asking, requiring of the phenomenologist

that he *invent* the question with which he puts himself and his place in the world into question. This is why we find Fink ending the section of the *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* with which we have been solely concerned, on questioning and the phenomenological reduction, with the rather elusive remark, one for which we have not been prepared by his account of the 'relation' between questioner and the question (although the emphasis is Fink's), that the phenomenological reduction makes possible a "literary presentation" of it [SCM 48].

University of Southampton  
Great Britain

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Eugen Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation: The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method* (1932), with textual annotations by Edmund Husserl (1933–4), Ronald Bruzina (trans.). (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995). Hereafter SCM. I occasionally inset Husserl's annotations in < >. The section to which I shall be referring is § 5, "Phenomenologizing as the act of reduction", pp 29–48.

<sup>2</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being & Time* (1927), seventh edn, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (trans.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962 (1988)).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.

<sup>5</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude* (1929–30), William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (trans.) (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 20.

<sup>6</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being & Time*, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

<sup>7</sup> Martin Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?* (1954), J. Glenn Gray (trans.) (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 78.

<sup>8</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (1928), Michael Heim (trans.) (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 186.

<sup>9</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Identity & Difference* (1957), bilingual edn, Joan Stambaugh (trans.) (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pp. 129–31.

<sup>10</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>11</sup> For example at *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, *op. cit.*, p. 10, and at *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected 'Problems' of 'Logic'* (1937–8), Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (trans.) (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 21; cf. *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935, rev 1953), Ralph Mannheim (trans.) (Newhaven & London: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 83.

<sup>12</sup> See for example *What is Called Thinking?*, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

<sup>13</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being & Time*, *op. cit.*, p. 487.

<sup>14</sup> Martin Heidegger, "The nature of language" (1957–8), in *On the Way to Language*, Peter D. Hertz and Joan Stambaugh (trans.) (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 76.

<sup>15</sup> Martin Heidegger, "Letter to Father Richardson" (1962), bilingual printing, Preface to William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, 2nd edn 1967), p. xviii, my emphasis.

# AN INTERPRETATION OF HUSSERL'S CONCEPT OF CONSTITUTION IN TERMS OF SYMMETRY

## INTRODUCTION

In declaring that his or our era is characterized by a crisis of the sciences,<sup>1</sup> Husserl does not mean that the sciences are on the wrong track or that they have reached an impasse (and, of course, he is far from calling into question the validity of their knowledge). The sciences evolve, precisely corresponding their telos, towards increasingly higher degrees of objectivity. The crisis of which he speaks, consists of the alienation of this objectivity from the lifeworld: the lifeworld in which objectivity is rooted, and by which it is motivated. In order for knowledge to regain human meaning, the 'horizontal' sphere of objectivity should be accompanied by a 'vertical' deepening. For Husserl, this is the task of transcendental phenomenology.

A transcendental philosopher's account of objectivity starts from the view that every objectivity is a *constituted* objectivity. By phenomenological analysis, one can obtain insight in this process of constitution. In order to restore the science's affinity with the lifeworld, the constituted objectivity has to be supplied with a phenomenological account of constitution. Although the theme of the 'lifeworld' is only elaborated in full depth in his later works, it is completely in line with the central concerns which, since his early writings, motivated Husserl's philosophy. When Husserl, following Brentano, writes about intentionality,<sup>2</sup> he is concerned about how the structures of consciousness are involved in what this consciousness is conscious of. He tries to understand how the subject pole of the intentionality relation is constitutive of the object pole, without reducing the latter to the former. His aim to render an account of the importance of constitution is always accompanied by the aim to avoid any form of psychologism. The objects of consciousness are constituted, but they are not psychic constructions. Throughout his work, Husserl never ceased trying to steer clear of various forms of these two rocks: maximally appreciating constitution – and thus avoiding dogmatic realism – without reducing it to mere construction – and thus avoiding scepticism. In *The Origin of Geometry*,<sup>3</sup> for example, the subject matter is no longer the intentionality of consciousness, but the general structure of

his concern has remained. In *The Origin*, by describing a transcendental history of geometry, Husserl analyses how a tradition, which is a tradition of mathematics and mathematicians in their lifeworld, is involved in the constitution of ideal objects.<sup>4</sup> But this involvement of a tradition in the genesis of mathematical objects does not mean that these objects are mere historical constructions. Just as he in the *Logical Investigations* criticizes every psychologicistic attempt to understand intentionality, Husserl, in *The Origin*, opposes himself to the contingency of historicism. Historicism is unable to comprehend the historicity which is the necessary condition of possibility of the a-historicity of geometry. The truth about the ideal objects of geometry is constituted in history, in a tradition of successive mathematicians, but at the same time, this truth is eternal and universal. Somewhat paradoxically, one could, as Jean Petitot indeed does, speak of a *transcendental platonism*.<sup>5</sup> Mathematics is neither, as in classical platonism, *discovered* in a historical process, nor is it *created* in this process. Mathematical truth has a – as it were – a-historical platonistic status,<sup>6</sup> but its a-historicity has historicity as its necessary condition of possibility. In other words, geometry is constituted in a historical process, but at the same time it transcends this historicity (just as the object of consciousness is constituted by, but at the same time transcends the immanence of consciousness). Only the transcendental concept of constitution is able to catch this very peculiar marriage of historicity and a-historicity, of immanence and transcendence. With the development of the concept of transcendental constitution, Husserl restores the involvement of the subject in its lifeworld with constituted objectivity, without reducing this objectivity to mere contingent – and thus relativistic – construction.

#### TRANSCENDENTAL CONSTITUTION: A MATTER OF SYMMETRY

In this paper Husserl's concept of constitution is explained in terms of the mathematical concept of symmetry.<sup>7</sup> It can be argued that our specific interpretation of the symmetry concept covers both the 'static', 'structural' eidetics of Husserl's *Ideas*<sup>8</sup> and his more dynamic concept of constitution, which he elaborates in his later works. In this paper we will concentrate on the very specific constitution process which plays a central role in *The Origin of Geometry* and therefore is of crucial importance for a good understanding of Husserl's *Crisis*-book.

The symmetry-view on constitution is inspired by the success of the use of mathematical symmetries in modern physics. On the level of

theoretical physics, the importance of symmetries cannot be overestimated. Contemporary theoretical particle physics, for example, is completely built up with group theory, the mathematical theory of symmetries. The elegance of symmetry principles is usually seen as an indication for the ultimate objectivity of the theories built around them. In our interpretation, however, the use of symmetries not so much illustrates the objectivity of these theories, as that they show what it is to be objective. Together with an objective explanation of the world, these theories uncover the meaning of objectivity itself. In other words, beyond being objective, they illustrate the *constitution* of the theories' objectivity.

The introduction of the symmetry concept, however, leads to a modified perspective on the concept of constitution in its globality. In Husserl's phenomenology, objectivity is constituted by an absolute pole of subjectivity, i.e. the subject pole of the constitution process rests unaffected during the process. In our symmetry view, however, objectivity and subjectivity are *correlatively* constituted. In this manner, the operation of giving vertical depth to the horizontal sphere of objectivity by phenomenological analyses gains a supplementary dimension and meaning. Following the symmetry interpretation, objectivity is not constituted from an engagement of the subject (be it the transcendental ego or an intersubjective community of mathematicians), but objectivity and engagement emerge together in the process of constitution. By constituting objectivity the subject (con)firms itself *as* an objectifying subject.

Before we apply the symmetry view to Husserl's *The Origin of Geometry*, let us explain its idea in general. Following the transcendental account, objectivity has its constitutive conditions of possibility. Objectivity can be reached in the realm of the phenomenal, not in that of the noumenal. An objective account of the world is never *absolutely* objective. At most, it is objective *relative* to the access to the world, to the *perspective* which is, as necessary condition of possibility, constitutive of the objectivity. Our symmetry view corresponds very well with this general transcendental idea. Symmetries are defined as invariants under transformations of coordinates. We can identify these invariants with the objectivities which have to be constituted. And, very well in accordance with what the transcendental idea prescribes, nothing can be *absolutely* invariant. The definition of the symmetry concept tells us that something only can be invariant *relative* to a set of operations, *relative* to transformations of co-ordinates. But this relativity doesn't imply a radical scepticism. Philosophy is often a matter of choosing your poison: absolute dogmatism or relativistic scepticism. But transcendental constitution is able to conceptualize rela-

tivity without falling back in a meaningless scepticism. But there is more: as the application of symmetry-principles in theoretical physics shows, objectivity is possible, not *despite* this relativity, but *thanks to* it. Instead of being deconstructive for objectivity, relativity is settled as the constructive motor in the heart of the constitution process itself.

How can we interpret this relativity? Symmetries are invariants under transformations of coordinates. These coordinates can be seen as the expression of a perspective, and *transformations* of coordinates are then *changes* of perspectives. From the viewpoint of the Heracleitian flux, nothing is invariant under changes of perspective. Everything flows. In order to arrive at something invariant under the transformation, in order to get the flux sedimentated in objective stabilities, the subject has to neglect some aspects of the flux. Only due to the subject's activity of neglecting, a world of invariants rises from the otherwise ever changing flux. To neglect aspects of the flux means then to consider certain changes of perspective as irrelevant. The neglecting activity of the subject can thus be seen as the taking up of an engagement. The subject commits itself to install a certain indifference with respect to its actual perspective. Actually, it is only when the subject takes up this engagement, that it institutes itself *as* subject. Objectivity and subjectivity are co-constituted at once, and they stay in a correlative unity. Subjectivity is formed when an engagement is taken up, and objectivity is the sedimentated counterpart of this engagement. Whereas in traditional accounts perspectives are a constant challenge for objectivity, in the symmetry view the perspective is really constitutive, and not only the necessary entrance gate to the world. The objective world is constituted through the subject's engagement to 'allow' changes of perspective, *not* by the subject's exceeding of its perspective.

It is clear that Husserl's basic insights about eidetics<sup>9</sup> can be straightforwardly translated in the vocabulary of the symmetry view. To see the essence of something, one has to subject the whole scene to free variation in phantasy. The essence is then identified with the invariants of this variation. An essence is indeed a symmetry, an invariant under transformations of coordinates. Maybe the symmetry view can shed new light upon the discussions about the status of eidetics: 'Seeing essences', is that *finding* already existing essences, or is it *creating* essences? Following the symmetry view, it is none of them. These essences are the result of a constituting engagement, but they also transcend this engagement. Indeed, the free variation is limited. Not every transformation is allowed. When I see a bike, I can imagine it in another colour without affecting its



essence, but I cannot imagine it without wheels and still see a functioning bike. In English, I even cannot think of it with three wheels, because then it is a trike. However, this need not be the case in other languages. In Dutch, for example, a 'fiets' with three wheels can still be seen as a 'fiets'. So, the intrinsic engagements of the two languages are different. But that does not mean that the bike essence is something completely contingent, something bound to a certain perspective. On the contrary, an essence is the result of a process of varying and relativizing perspectives.

Before returning to Husserl's transcendental history of geometry, we will explain the symmetry view a bit further by applying it to the special theory of relativity of Einstein. The whole special theory of relativity springs from the demand that every law of physics has to be the same for every observer connected with an inertial frame of reference. This is the very explicit expression of an engagement, and the corresponding theory turns out to be nothing more than the objective counterpart of this engagement. And the concept which unites engagement and objectivity is symmetry. If the demand of Einstein is translated in mathematics, it reads: every law of physics has to be invariant under Lorentz transformations. The symmetry structure can be immediately recognized. The theory is nothing more – nothing has to be added – than the analysis of these invariants. The engagement is without rest and without surplus sedimentated in objectivity and this objectivity is a universal testimony of that engagement. This perfect and manifest correlation between objectivity and engagement makes the special theory of relativity paradigmatic for our symmetry view of constitution.

#### THE SYMMETRY INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTION APPLIED TO HUSSERL'S 'THE ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY'

Let us now confront the symmetry view of constitution with Husserl's analyses in his *The Origin of Geometry*. Actually, Husserl's book reveals little or nothing about mathematics. Husserl only argues how the ideality of mathematical objects and insights is rooted in history. That is all, but it is quite a lot. He shows how the historicity of our lifeworld is the transcendental condition of the a-historicity of the platonic world of ideas, *without* simply incorporating the latter in the former. The platonic world keeps its status of ideality, universality and absolute transcendence.<sup>10</sup> Ideality is not reduced to mere fiction. For example: numbers have their being completely outside history and untouchable by history, but without history, they would have not.

Let us now turn to the constitution process in question. The question is, in Husserl's words: "But how does the intrapsychically constituted structure arrive at an intersubjective being of its own as an ideal object which, as 'geometrical,' is anything but a real psychic object, even though it has arisen psychically?"<sup>11</sup> Husserl's answer to this question can be organised in five stages.

The *first* stage is that of the original being-itself-there of a first production by a first geometer. A certain man, which we retrospectively can call the first geometer, has produced some thoughts that are immediately present to his consciousness. This means that his thoughts are 'evident' because they are indubitable there, but they are of course far from objective since they miss every kind of stability or invariance. The evident content is 'real' in the sense that it is lived through, but it is not in another sense since it lacks any form of stability. The first production is absolutely tied to the concrete particular psychological act of the first geometer.

The *second* stage is that of *passive recollection*, passive memory. The production is first present as a vivid evidence of a primal impression, but it turns over in the retention, the presence of what-has-just-now-been. The content of the production is recognized as the same, flowing from primal impression to retention and slowly fading away. But strictly speaking, as concrete moments of the stream of consciousness, they are *not* the same. The recognition of these two moments as 'the same' is the first step towards ideal objectivity. Let us have a look at this step from the perspective of the symmetry view. The first evidence of the first geometer when it is present as primal impression and that evidence when it has reached the stage of retention correspond to two different concrete psychic acts. In order to identify the contents of these acts as the same, the content has to be partly disconnected from the act. The structure of time consciousness embodies the inherent engagement to allow this transformation between acts without altering the content. The structure itself introduces a first symmetry, the first stabilization of the passing flux of experience.

After some time, the retention disappears, but the content can accidentally return in consciousness. In recognizing the disappeared and the returned content as identical, the involved subject, increases the symmetry. The set of transformations of concrete psychic acts that leave the content unchanged is enlarged. The invariance of the content is raised to a higher level.

The *third* stage is that of *active recollection*. "To the passivity of what is at first obscurely awakened and what perhaps emerges with greater and greater clarity there belongs the possible activity of a recollection in

which the past experiencing is lived through in a quasi-new and quasi-active way."<sup>12</sup> In the stage of passive recollection, the subject was at the mercy of a trigger from outside to awaken the evidence of the first production. In the next stage, this factual contingency is overcome. When the first geometer is able to recall the evidence actively, then, in principle, the possibility arises of doing that again and again, at every moment in the future. The content is on its way to ideality. This stage is that of the transition of a factual, i.e. contingent, given into a possible, i.e. essential, one. "Yet even with this, we have still not gone beyond the subject and his subjective, evident capacities; that is, we still have no 'objectivity' given."<sup>13</sup> During this stage, the symmetry has remarkably increased. The content has become invariant under an infinite set of transformations and is, as *possible* experience freed from the *facticity* of psychic events. But that content is still tied to the person which we have called the first geometer. The content still doesn't exist outside this person.

The *fourth* stage is the stage of what we could call *intersubjective recollection*. In this stage the possibility to make the evidence present again is extended to a community of mathematicians. "In the contact of reciprocal linguistic understanding, the original production and the product of one subject can be *actively* understood by others."<sup>14</sup> Whereas in the third stage, the *time* of reactivation had become irrelevant, here the *individuality* of the reactivator becomes of no importance. Again, the symmetry is increased, but the content is still dependent on a subject, the subject of mathematical research community.

In the *fifth* and last stage, the content is completely detached from subjective activity, i.e. it is completely idealized. It is the stage of *written or material recollection*. "The important function of written, documenting linguistic expression is that it makes communications possible without immediate or mediate personal address; it is, so to speak, communication become virtual."<sup>15</sup> The sedimentation in linguistic expression is not the fixation of a content, but the fixation of a possibility. The content itself is freed entirely from any factual existence. The set of transformations that leave the content invariant, and thus the symmetry, is maximalized. The content has reached the realm of ideality, and transcends its conditions of possibility, which is the historicity of the lifeworld. Although there stays a tension, the ideal status of the content guarantees both, quite contradictorily, the possibility of lived through experience and untouchable stability.

After these five stages of constitution, the ideal objectivity of mathematics is reached. The symmetry interpretation of constitution shows how

the process of objectification at each stage is accompanied by a process of subjectification. Indeed, the activity which introduces symmetry by considering certain changes of perspective as irrelevant can be interpreted as the taking up of an engagement, and thus as a process of subjectification. The strength of the symmetry concept is that it elegantly unites the objective and subjective poles of the constitution relation, without simply reducing the one to the other. Objectivity and subjectivity stand in a correlative unity as each other's constitutive conditions of possibility.

### CONCLUSION

The crisis of the sciences of which Husserl wrote can be formulated as a dichotomy: scientific objectivity alienated from life or the relativity of subjective engagement. The symmetry view on objectivity overcomes this dichotomy and shows how objectivity and engagement are two sides of the same coin. The symmetry view argues for an objectivity with a human face without handing it over to a radical scepticism or relativism. Every objectivity is the transcendent, sedimentated testimony of an immanent engagement.

*Ghent University*

### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (Northwestern University Press, 1970).

<sup>2</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations, Volume 1 and Volume 2* (New Ed edition, Routledge, 2001).

<sup>3</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction*, John Leavey (trans.) (Reprint edition, University of Nebraska Press, 1989). Husserl's text *The Origin of Geometry* (translated by David Carr) is included as appendix.

<sup>4</sup> It can be argued that in *The Origin of Geometry*, the concept of constitution doesn't play a major role anymore. In this paper, however, we wish to put the stress more on the continuity than on the discontinuity in Husserl's works. Following our symmetry interpretation, the concept of constitution is broadened in such a way that the historical genesis of geometry can be seen as a problem of constitution. It is the strength of the symmetry view of constitution that it is at the same time a more determinate and a more general elaboration of Husserl's original concept.

<sup>5</sup> Jean Petitot, "Pour un platonisme transcendantal", *L'objectivité mathématique. Platonisme et structures formelles*, M. Panza and J.-M. Salanskis (eds.) (Paris: Masson, 1995), pp. 147–178.

<sup>6</sup> From a transcendental viewpoint, there cannot be made sense of a traditional platonistic world of ideas, of course. In transcendental phenomenology, objectivity is completely

detached from ontology (interpreted as independent reality). Objectivity is not a matter of correspondence with an independent reality. So, the ideal objects of mathematics don't belong to the platonistic heaven in an *ontological* sense. They are rooted in history and have historicity as their necessary conditions of possibility. But in the historical process of doing mathematics, these objects transcend the immanence of history and reach the status of platonistic ideality in *juridical* sense (according to *rules* of constitution).

<sup>7</sup> For a general account of the mathematical concept of symmetry, we like to refer to the most inspiring writings of H. Weyl: *The classical groups, their invariants and representations*, Princeton University Press, 1946. *Symmetry*, reprint edition: Princeton University Press, 1983.

<sup>8</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Studies in Phenomenology of the Constitution*, R. Rojcewics and A. Schuwer (eds.) (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990).

<sup>9</sup> Eidetic methods are used and explained at various places in the works of Husserl. Especially in his *Ideas* – see 7 – they play a prominent role.

<sup>10</sup> See note 6.

<sup>11</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction*, John Leavey (trans.) (Reprint edition, University of Nebraska Press, 1989), p. 163.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 163.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 164.



Dinner in the Wadham refectory. In front at right: Leo Sonneveld and Tze wan Kwan.

## HEGELIAN AND HEIDEGGERIAN TAUTOLOGIES

## I. TAUTOLOGY IN A NEW KEY

Ever since the start of the phenomenological movement, the nature and definition of phenomenology itself has been very much in dispute. It is commonplace that nearly all leading phenomenologists define the term “phenomenology” in their own way. But the most precarious and perplexing thing about phenomenology is that this very term is often understood and defined differently by one and the same phenomenologist in different theoretical contexts or in different phases of his/her career. It is well-known that Husserl himself coined a chain of adjectives to qualify what he called phenomenology – descriptive, eidetic, transcendental, static, genetic, etc. Heidegger is lukewarm in employing the term; but generally speaking, Heidegger’s earlier thought is often described as some kind of “hermeneutical phenomenology” or “existential phenomenology”. But taking the subsequent development of Heidegger’s thought into account, we see that “hermeneutical” or “existential” are no longer suitable for characterizing the later Heidegger. It is at this juncture that the term “tautological” comes into consideration.

In *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger used the term “tautology” or “tautological” a number of times. But there the word is used rather casually and still in the mild pejorative sense of “redundancy.”<sup>1</sup> In *Kants These über das Sein* of 1961, however, Heidegger changed his tone. Toward the end of this book, Heidegger compared Kant’s famous thesis of Being as “positing” (*Position*) to his own notion of “enduring presencing” (*des währenden Anwesens*).<sup>2</sup> Summing up his discussion, he depicts this approach to Being in the following manner: “Is being [...], τὸ αὐτό (the same), here said καθ’ αὐτό, with reference to itself? Does a tautology speak here? Indeed. However, it is a tautology in that highest sense, which says not nothing but everything: that which originally was and throughout the future will be decisive for thought.”<sup>3</sup> Finally, in a seminar held in Zähringen in 1973, Heidegger called up this term again when he embarked upon the verses of Parmenides’ famous fragment nr. 8, which he related again to his own teaching of *Anwesen*. On that occasion, he made the following remark: “I name the thinking here in question tautological thinking. It is the primordial sense of phenomenology.”<sup>4</sup> Looking closer at these statements,

there are two things we can feel certain about. Firstly, the notion of “tautology” now appears in a new key, i.e. in an unambiguously positive sense. Secondly, Heidegger is making his point with the strongest emphasis imaginable. Although Heidegger probably just uttered the word “tautological thinking” once or twice, the weight he put in there and the fact that it was expressed as late as just three years prior to his death makes it rather safe for us to maintain that “tautological phenomenology”, “tautological thinking” or some sense of tautology should best represent Heidegger’s latest position.

## II. HEIDEGGER CONTRA HEGEL

Regarding Hegel and tautology, the situation is quite different. Unlike Heidegger, who puts so much weight on the notion of tautology, to the extent that he resorted to using this notion to label his later position, we don’t find any indication that Hegel is giving “tautology” the same emphasis. Of course, if we browse through Hegel’s *Werke*, we discover in the *Phänomenologie*, in the *Wissenschaft der Logik*, in the *Enzyklopädie*, in the various *Vorlesungen* as well as other smaller works dozens of occurrences of this key term. Generally speaking, Hegel is using the term “tautology” *prima facie* in a neutral to skeptical, if not pejorative sense.<sup>5</sup> But in some occasions, the terms tautological or tautology deviate from this traditional usage and do suggest some positive intent.

Therefore, in posing the theme of the current paper, we have to be very careful that we are not simply putting words into Hegel’s mouth in making our comparison. When we talk about “Hegelian tautology”, we must first clarify that this word is not explicitly used by Hegel in the way we intended it to be, namely as a characterizing label of his philosophy. If Hegel would need one such label, he probably will choose the word “absolute” ... Then the next thing we need to do is to show, in the light of interpretation, whether Hegel’s own positional statements (like those related to the Absolute, Self-knowledge, Selfsameness etc.) are in line with “tautology” in some sense, so that a comparison between Hegel and Heidegger in this very regard is meaningful.

As pointed out by many scholars, the later Heidegger’s work has been mainly preoccupied with entering into dialogue with major philosophical figures of the past. Among modern masters, Kant and Hegel are the two major “discussants” of Heidegger. But on the whole Heidegger’s relationships with the two masters are very different; whereas his tie to Kant seems to be more or less one of agreement,<sup>6</sup> his attitude towards Hegel



is a markedly unfriendly one. In this regard, Max Müller remarked with full insight that Hegel is in fact Heidegger's "eternal antagonistic interlocutor" (*eigentlicher immerwährender 'gegnerischer' Gesprächspartner*).<sup>7</sup>

But why is Heidegger so hostile to Hegel? One most important reason is that the later Heidegger and Hegel have a lot of features in common, so that Heidegger finds in Hegel the greatest competitor who very easily would divert the attention of his readership away from his own philosophical intention. In nearly every phase of his work, Heidegger is addressing Hegel in order to render his own point clearer.<sup>8</sup> It is therefore not by chance that Heidegger puts the two superficially unrelated essays together to make up the book *Identität und Differenz*. While the first essay on "*Der Satz der Identität*" represents one of many positive accounts of Heidegger's tautological thinking, it is in the second essay "*Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik*" that Heidegger turns to a negative account of his thought through an immanent comparison and critique of Hegel.

Thinking along this path, we can argue that, the later Heidegger himself must have found in Hegel's and his own system certain similarities which are matters of the greatest concern. Of course, for a similarity to become a challenge, there must be serious discrepancies behind what appears to be similar, so that head-on collisions between the two parties being compared become inevitable. Now given the great emphasis Heidegger puts on the notion of tautology, would it be possible that "tautology" is in fact this very crucial point, around which all similarities and discrepancies between Hegel and Heidegger revolve? In the answering of this question, Hegel left us no direct indication, but Gadamer gave us his testimony!

In his book *Hegels Dialektik*, Gadamer hinted directly or indirectly that Hegel's approach to logic and indeed his whole style of writing is "tautological". In the essay "Hegel und die antike Dialektik", Gadamer maintains that a philosophical statement is very different from ordinary empirical statements. In the empirical statements, the predicate always leads us to "something new or different", but in a philosophical statement, the predicate always leads us back to a deeper reflection of the subject itself, such that "to ordinary 'representative' thinking a philosophical statement is always something like a tautology; the philosophical statement expresses an identity".<sup>9</sup> Then in the essay on "Die Idee der Hegelschen Logik", Gadamer focused more directly on Hegel's speculative statement and suggested that the speculative dimension "demands a retreat of thought into itself" and the speculative statement has to "maintain the mean between the extremes of tautology on the one hand and

self-cancellation of the infinite determination of its meaning on the other".<sup>10</sup> Finally, in the essay "Hegel – Die verkehrte Welt", while summarizing his own experience of reading Hegel's *Phänomenologie*, Gadamer suggested that from chapter to chapter Hegel seems to be talking "always about the same thing", and that on different levels of the explication it is the "proper and single (*das einzige*) object or the content of the Same" that is being revealed.<sup>11</sup>

With the above remarks, it becomes quite clear that tautology pertains in one way or other to the very heart of both Hegel's and Heidegger's thought. With such remarks, our whole comparative approach appears not just possible, but instructive and worthwhile. In the following two sections, we will go into more details to see in what concrete sense Hegel's and Heidegger's systems are describable as "tautologies" (be they tautologies each in their own way). Since it was Heidegger who "instigated" the whole issue, we will reverse the timeline by starting with him.

### III. PROBLEMS AND FEATURES OF A HEIDEGGERIAN TAUTOLOGY

In the following, I will try to show from various angles in what sense this very notion of tautology can help elucidate some well-known concepts, standpoints, or issues concerning the later Heidegger.

- a. **General backgrounds and motives:** The thought of the later Heidegger is well known to be the consequence of his dissatisfaction with traditional metaphysics in general and the modern theory of subjectivity in particular. For Heidegger, this modern position is reproachable mainly because it falls prey to anthropocentrism, which is the source of what we now call the "modernity crisis". To put it in another way, Heidegger found it lamentable that modern man gradually overexerted the importance of humankind to the extent that Being is marginalized and forgotten, as is also Man's original unity with Being. As a term used in traditional logic and philosophy, the stem of the word tautology derives its origin from the Greek word τὸ αὐτό, which means "the identical", "self" or "the Same".<sup>12</sup> When two distinct elements are said to be the same, they are ascribed some sort of "belonging together". Now by employing the term tautological thinking, Heidegger is reminding the world of the original self-sameness and mutual belonging of Man with Being. Tautological thinking is in this regard an antidote to the modernity crisis, which has haunted Heidegger since the beginning of his intellectual career.

- b. **Method: The Step Back – Thinking Being without beings:** For the later Heidegger, the problem with traditional metaphysics lies in its presumption that Being can be adequately understood through the understanding of beings. In the course of modern philosophy, this attempt adopts the formula of singling out from the realm of beings a highest entity, which supposedly will provide the key to the solution of ontology. This formula Heidegger characterizes as onto-theo-logy. Being totally disillusioned with this attempt, the later Heidegger suggested another approach, namely the “step back” (*Schritt zurück*), which is a meditative scrutiny of the very nature of Being itself as presencing (*Anwesen*) to which man is only “assigned” (*überreignet*) and inevitably involved. For Heidegger, the step back is not a total negation or uprooting of traditional metaphysics;<sup>13</sup> rather, in scrutinizing Being itself, the very source and nature of traditional metaphysics as rooted in Man’s original relation with Being should be exposed.<sup>14</sup> It is for this reason that Heidegger also describes this “step back” as “the step back from metaphysics into the essence (*Wesen*) of metaphysics.”<sup>15</sup> In this “step back”, according to Heidegger, it is the presencing of Being which should be rescued from its state of oblivion. Man, although always being involved, is not the center of attention. In order to direct us to this very central insight and not otherwise distracted, Heidegger further suggested the attitude of “thinking Being without beings” (*Sein ohne das Seiende denken*).<sup>16</sup> Of course, this motto can easily be misunderstood as if beings should be left aside or totally expelled from our consideration.<sup>17</sup> What Heidegger tries to say is actually the following: Being has long been forgotten. Now in order to regain insight into Being, we first have to put beings aside so that we will not be blinded by traditional metaphysics. Once we reclaimed Being (in the sense of appropriation) as our source, the whole realm of beings including man and world will all return and appear in a new light.
- c. **Convergence of Neologisms:** If the later Heidegger can still be called a phenomenologist, then he would be one whose interest is focused on one single phenomenon, the primal event of Being. In order to differentiate this Being from Being as understood in traditional metaphysics, as is well-known, Heidegger either adopts the old spelling of Being (*Seyn*) or introduces a cross on top of the word to signify what he called four-fold. Another thing is that, having said goodbye to the traditional metaphysical language of ontology, the later Heidegger employs more and more neologisms to circumscribe from different angles what he now thinks Being should cover: *Ereignis*, *Lichtung*,

*Geviert*, *Ge-stell*, *Austrag*, *Zwiefalt*, *Geschick*, *Spiegel-Spiel*, *Sach-Verhalt*, *Ver-sammlung* and many more, a full account of which would require a book!<sup>18</sup> Yet if one goes along with all these new terms, one will eventually discover that despite having different *connotations*, these neologisms all *denote* in the final analysis the same holistic state of affairs, or the same all-encompassing primal event – Being. No matter where one starts, with some patience one finally will arrive at the same context of “thinking”. In a word, no matter how disparate the later Heidegger’s neologisms might appear, they all are about the same thing. This probably is one of the main reasons why the later Heidegger characterizes his thinking as “tautological.”

- d. **Reinterpretation of Parmenides:** Among works of the later Heidegger, the small but important book *Identität und Differenz* offers us the most vivid picture of what “tautological thinking” might look like.<sup>19</sup> Heidegger lingered upon Parmenides’ famous Fragment 8 “τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι” and drew our attention to the keyword “τὸ αὐτό”. While traditional scholarship took this dictum as maintaining the identity of Being (εἶναι) with Thought (νοεῖν), Heidegger innovatively rendered εἶναι and νοεῖν, respectively, as presencing (*Anwesen*) and apprehending (*Ver-nehmen*), a pair of cardinal concepts of his tautological thinking. Here presencing refers to the ongoing (*an-*) primal event of Being as Appropriation (*Ereignis*), which covers, brings about and nurtures the *universum* in its entirety. As with “apprehending”, this otherwise common word is used by Heidegger in stark contrast to “representing” (*Vor-stellen*), which is a key concept of modern epistemology. While representing denotes an invasive taking-over of objects by man as the knowing “subject”, apprehending alludes to a modest hearing and receiving of Being (presencing) by man. Given this modest stance of apprehending, the later Heidegger still admits of man having a certain “distinctive feature” (*das Auszeichnende des Menschen*) among all beings, namely, man’s being bestowed with “thinking” (νοεῖν).<sup>20</sup> Being as appropriation (*Ereignis*) unfolds itself in such a manner that Being assigns itself (*überreignet*) to man and leaves things (*überlassen*)<sup>21</sup> to him. On the other hand, man is put inside Being’s order (*eingeeordnet in das Sein*),<sup>22</sup> and is destined to apprehend Being’s presencing in the sense that man is given the responsibility to take good care of what is assigned to him. Therefore, the traditional abstract equation (τὸ αὐτό) of Being and Thinking is totally transformed into this all inclusive “belonging-together” (*Zusammengehören*)<sup>23</sup> of *presencing* and *apprehending*, i.e., of Being and Man,<sup>24</sup> which in a

sense are “assigned to each other” (*einander übereignet*)<sup>25</sup> so that they belong together as one single primal event. This brings us to the next important feature of Heidegger’s tautological thinking – singularity.

- e. **The “Simple Oneness”, the “Singular” and the “Only”:** In order to safeguard the integrity of his holistic doctrine and prevent this holism from being dispersed or confused by the multiplicity of his neologisms (*Denkmittel!*), Heidegger consistently uses the notions of “simple oneness” and “singularity” to depict the all-inclusive phenomenon of Being he has in mind. If “singularity” is not strong enough to offset multiplicity, he sometimes even employs the word “only” (*einzig*) to underline the exclusiveness of this very singularity,<sup>26</sup> which is the Same (τὸ αὐτό) and the only thing being talked about. “Simple Oneness” is *Einfalt* in German. Heidegger uses this notion to consummate his accounts on the two-fold (*Zweifalt*)<sup>27</sup> and the four-fold (*Geviert*)<sup>28</sup> so that the literally simple unity of the entire discourse is maintained. Likewise, when Heidegger talks about the *Sach-Verhalt* or about *Ereignis*, he refers to them (or better put, it) as “absolutely singular” (*das schlechthin Singuläre*),<sup>29</sup> or as *singulare tantum*,<sup>30</sup> which is a Latin word which already entails the notion of “only”. Of course Heidegger does not mind repeatedly using the German word *einzig* to make his intention as clear as possible. In the following citation, we see how all these work together when the cardinal concept of *Ereignis* is being discussed: “The word appropriation (*Ereignis*) here no longer means what we would otherwise call a happening, an occurrence. It now is used as a *Singulare tantum*. What it indicates appropriates only in the singular (*Einzahl*), nay, not even in terms of a number any longer, but the only (*einzig*).”<sup>31</sup> In his account of the other cardinal term *Geviert*, the same concerted effort appears, “*Die Vier gehören, von sich her einig, zusammen. Sie sind, allem Anwesenden zuvorkommen, in ein einziges Geviert eingefaltet.*”<sup>32</sup> Heidegger’s preference for the one, the singular and the only reminds us of Parmenides’ characterization of Being (εἶναι) as τὸ ἓν (the One), and the Parmenidean dictum τὸ αὐτό acquires in Heidegger a completely new presence.
- f. **Heraclitean elements:** For readers of the later Heidegger, the relevance and importance of Heraclitus are unmistakable. Regarding Heraclitus’ legacy, the concepts “One is All” (ἐν πάντα) and “homologein” (ὁμολογεῖν) are most relevant to the “tautological” *motif* of the later Heidegger. And both of these concepts show their strong presence in Heraclitus’ Fragment 50: οὐκ ἑμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφὸν ἔστιν ἐν πάντα εἶναι,<sup>33</sup> which was analysed many

times by Heidegger. In his lecture course of 1944, Heidegger maintains that “logic” or ἐπιστήμη λογική has to include knowledge of *physis* (ἐπιστήμη φυσική) as well as of *ethos* (ἐπιστήμη ἠθική).<sup>34</sup> These two arms of “logic” remind us of the ordered pair *An-wesen* and *Vernehmen*<sup>35</sup> as ascribed by Heidegger to Parmenides’ Fragment 8. For in both contexts, the central issue lies in the mutual relation between Being and Man. *Homologein* is in fact a guiding precept for the *ethos* (or man’s dwelling). In Fragment 50, Heraclitus advocated *homologein* as an alternative to the attitude adopted by common people, who suffered from selfishness and bigotry because they are accustomed to view things only from their own angles. What Heraclitus teaches us is that: Man can liberate himself from his own cravings by adopting the alternative attitude of *homologein*, i.e., by elevating one’s own standpoint to that of *Physis* or *Logos*, and in so doing feels to be one with it. In other words, *homologein* reveals the truth of ἐν πάντα, of the “One is All”. In contrast to anthropocentrism, which puts man in the center of all relations (*Bezugsmittle*), *homologein* places man in an “eccentric” position.<sup>36</sup> This marginalization of the self, this direction of the self towards Logos, and this sense of “belonging together” with the One is the true spirit of Heidegger’s tautological thinking.

- g. **Repetition Model – the Basic Tautological Formula:** In traditional logic, a common understanding of tautology is the repetition of the subject term in the predicate. Generally speaking, a tautology in this sense of redundancy of terms is charged with poverty in meaning or with incapability to extend knowledge. But for the later Heidegger, redundancy or repetition of terms has become a standard model of his linguistic expression. Many key statements of the later Heidegger are expressed according to the following repetition formula:  $a X_n X_v(t)$ , where  $a$  is usually a definite article,  $X_n$  and  $X_v$  represent the substantive and the verbal form of a certain term  $X$ , and  $(t)$  the grammatical suffix of the third person singular present tense verb in German. When dealing with the concept of *Ereignis*, for example, Heidegger time and time again says “*Das Ereignis ereignet*.” In his lecture on *Zeit und Sein* in 1961, he added an “explanation” to this classical dictum: “What remains to be said? Only this: Appropriation appropriates. Saying this, we say it from [the point of view of] the Same in terms of the Same about the Same.”<sup>37</sup> Here, by explaining the word *Ereignis*, Heidegger also shows us the structure of his basic tautological formula, which was applied extensively to other key themes of his later thoughts. So we have structures like: *Das Ding dingt; die Welt weltet; die Sprache*

*spricht; Der Raum räumt ein; das Seyn west ...* etc. This scenario is certainly a further reason why Heidegger depicts his programme as tautological thinking.

- h. **Finitude of Being:** One central *motif* of Heidegger's tautological thinking is his insistence upon the finitude of Being itself. In Western philosophy, finitude is usually considered just as a human condition – thus the locution “human finitude.” But on top of human finitude, Heidegger speaks of the finitude of Being, or even “finitude of *Ereignis*”.<sup>38</sup> Heidegger's discourse on “finitude of Being” can best be shown with his dictum “without why” (*ohne Warum*). In *Der Satz vom Grund* of the year 1955/56, Heidegger undertook some completely new reflections on Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason. The most interesting thing is that, while fully aware of the importance of the principle for modern science and technology,<sup>39</sup> Heidegger deliberately interpreted the principle from a completely different angle which led to the opposite result. The sentence “**Nichts** ist **ohne** Grund” was read by Heidegger with a different intonation as “Nichts **ist** ohne **Grund**”. For Heidegger, only beings can be provided with grounds and reasons. Being or *Ereignis* as such, however, is already the source of everything, for which no further reason can be given. For Heidegger, Being is ground in the sense of “abysmal ground”, which is not rationally explainable. In face of Being, we should not keep on asking for reasons but should only apprehend its presencing and accept and take it as is. In the book *Der Satz vom Grund* there are two passages I find most instructive: In one instance Heidegger cited a poem written by the German baroque poet Angelus Silesius “Die Ros ist ohn Warum; sie blühet, weil sie blühet ...”<sup>40</sup> In another instance, Heidegger quoted Goethe's verse “Wie? Wann? Wo? Die Götter bleiben stumm! Du halte dich ans Weil und frage nicht Warum?”<sup>41</sup> If we compare the two poems, we realize that Goethe was in fact alluding to the two words “*ohne warum*” and “*weil*” in Angelus Silesius' poem. Here Heidegger gives his explanation as follows: Man is accustomed to ask for reasons for beings, but if this asking is kept on and on (*Und-so-weiter*), man will eventually fail to give reasonable answers. For man will then be running into the limit of reasons, because Being as presencing or endurance (*weil* in the sense of *weilen*), taken holistically, is finite or “abysmal” in the sense that it escapes all reason and can only be pointed out. Silesius' verse “sie blühet, weil sie blühet ...” is reminiscent of the “tautological formula” as discussed above, namely the simple naming of a key phenomenon and let it “speaks” for itself by repeating

its own name. This plain apprehension of Being by tautologically **repeating** its name or by simply **pointing** it out without resorting to further reasons is what Heidegger would depict as “topology of being” (*Erörterung*).<sup>42</sup>

The above observations should give us a general picture of what “tautological thinking” would mean by Heidegger. All in all, Heidegger’s tautological thinking prescribes for us a new way of focusing on the long forgotten abyss of Being itself, together with a new way of relating to it.

#### IV. TO WHAT EXTENT CAN HEGEL’S SYSTEM BE DESCRIBED AS A “TAUTOLOGY”?

As we have clarified, the theme of a “Hegelian tautology” is not on Hegel’s official agenda, but a supposedly underlying but important *motif* imputed upon him by the Heideggerian line of thought. In the following, we will go through a few central notions of Hegel, and will try to show that this “tautological” interpretation is indeed not doing injustice to Hegel.

- a. **The Absolute:** In the historiography of Western philosophy, Hegel’s philosophy is often referred to as “absolute idealism”. As indicated above, “absolute” is indeed the first keyword of Hegel. He speaks of “*absolute Idee*”, “*absoluter Geist*”, “*absolutes Wissen*” or simply “*das Absolute*,” depending on the level of discourse he is undertaking. The Latin word “*absolutum*” was first introduced by Nicholas of Cusa into philosophy. The word “absolute”, which means literally “loosened from,” acquired the derived meaning of **self-sufficiency** (*Selbstgenügsamkeit*). It refers originally to God in view of His independence from anything than Himself. Thus Spinoza, trying to free himself from traditional religious creeds, depicts “God” as *causa sui*, or self-cause. With the element of “**self**” highlighted, the “tautological” overtone of the concept “absolute” is immediately visible. Unlike earlier doctrines of the absolute, the mature Hegel advocates an “absolute idealism” which is nothing but the identity of an all-embracing reality with the working of the universal mind, which Hegel calls the absolute Spirit. Hegel’s Absolute is therefore substance as much as subject, being as much as thinking, idea as much as real process, or One as much as All. In the eyes of Heidegger and many others, Hegel’s system represents the most ambitious programme Western philosophy has ever undertaken. By synthesizing Substance and Subject, Hegel



thought he had brought Being and Thinking to a complete unity. It is for this reason that Heidegger once regarded Hegel as “the most radical Greek.”<sup>43</sup> In achieving this task, Hegel has also brought the theory of modern subjectivity to its true submit. In Heidegger’s eyes, Hegel’s metaphysics is not only *onto-theo-logic*, but further than that, it is “*onto-theo-ego-logik*”<sup>44</sup> pure and simple. In a word, by finding a path that leads from the human mind to the universal mind, Hegel deified or absolutized the subject, which, in its embodiment as substance, encompasses everything exhaustively and systematically in one single tautology, making it difficult, if not impossible, for any member of the system to escape or surpass.

- b. **Self-Knowledge:** In Hegel’s system, self-knowledge is another key term that allows us to grasp the main tenets of his absolute idealistic doctrine. Under self-knowledge, Hegel always means the knowledge of the underlying absolute Spirit of its own self, which comes bit by bit to the foreground. This explains why towards the end of the *Phänomenologie* we witness an abundance of the term “self-knowing Spirit” (*sich selbst wissende[r] Geist*), which is obviously a tautological construct. To unfold his system, Hegel adopts Plotinus’s doctrine of emanation and depicts his Absolute as a self-initiated process of self-knowing through self-alienation and self-rediscovery, all these being predestined according to an absolute idea. And for Hegel, a complete process of self-knowledge can only be achieved when the absolute spirit lays aside all one-sidedness of knowledge and comes back to a “transparent” vision of the self-induced process of the absolute spirit itself in its entirety.<sup>45</sup> In the *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Hegel formulates this his “method” in the following wording, which duly reveals his tautological position: “From this course the method has emerged as the self-knowing Notion that has itself, as the absolute, both subjective and objective, for its subject matter ...”<sup>46</sup> Taking this self-knowing nature of absolute Spirit into account, this complete process can arguably be described with Hegel’s own term as a “tautological movement” (*tautologische Bewegung*).<sup>47</sup>
- c. **Self-sameness (*Sichselbstgleichheit*):** The root meaning of τὸ αὐτό is “self” or “same”. In Hegel, selfsameness (*Sichselbstgleichheit*) is an often neglected, but definitely important operational concept, which permeates nearly all levels of his philosophical system, from the top down to the very bottom. Selfsameness or self-identity<sup>48</sup> can be regarded as a “tautological operator” through which things that appear to be disparate when seen in an “abstract” fashion are brought under

the same higher “concrete” context: such as the being-in-itself and being-for-itself (in general); or Law and duty,<sup>49</sup> substance and mind,<sup>50</sup> absolute freedom and universal will,<sup>51</sup> etc. As Hegel puts it, reflection of this sort allows us to “preserve the self-sameness and truth of the Thing, its being a One”.<sup>52</sup> This reflective and often speculative unity of the seemingly disparate can be formally described as “selfsameness of the asunderness” (*Sichselbstgleichheit des Aussereinanderseins*)<sup>53</sup> or “selfsameness in otherness” (*Sichselbstgleichheit im Anderssein*).<sup>54</sup> In Hegel’s text, one most interesting thing is that the concept of selfsameness sometimes concurs with the concept of “tautology”,<sup>55</sup> and these are instances where the term tautology is used with a positive intent, as we have mentioned earlier. All in all, it seems that this little word “selfsame” is so important that if it is truncated from Hegel’s text, his whole systematic edifice will collapse.

- d. **Aufhebung and Speculation:** *Aufhebung* and Speculation are also key concepts of Hegelian dialectics in the broadest sense, and are both targets of Heidegger’s critique. Both of these concepts have to be understood with reference to the process of self-knowledge of the absolute Spirit as mentioned above. As is well-known, Hegel defines *Aufhebung* in the *Phänomenologie* as “at once a negating and a preserving”,<sup>56</sup> which means in fact the removal of one-sidedness in our account of a certain state of affairs, while preserving the content of that same affairs in a less biased form. It is for this reason that Max Müller suggests that the third element of “*elevare*” should be added to negating and preserving, thus bringing home the crucial meaning of *Aufhebung* as “uplifting”. Regarding speculation, although the term was used already by the early Hegel, it seems that it is only in the *Enzyklopädie* that this concept of speculation reaches maturity. Basically, speculation counts as the third “moment” of the “Three moments of the Logical”.<sup>57</sup> Whereas the first moment of the “Abstract” (or the “Understanding”) refers to that stage of thought which “sticks to fixity of characters and their distinctness from one another”<sup>58</sup> and the second moment of the “Dialectical” (or “negative Reason”) is a “subjective seesaw of arguments pros and cons” of the skeptically enquiring mind,<sup>59</sup> it is the third moment of “Speculation” (or “positive Reason”), which represents the summit of knowledge, which in turn is nothing but the complete transparency (*Durchsichtigkeit*) of the absolute Spirit of its own self. Speculation in this sense is therefore the hallmark of absolute knowledge or self-knowledge of the Hegelian system, and is in this way also the hallmark of Hegelian tautology. In a joint-seminar with Eugen

Fink on Heraclitus, Heidegger singled out the cardinal importance of the speculative element as characteristic of Hegel.<sup>60</sup>

- e. **Part/Whole Relationship:** In view of the speculative moment of Hegel's system and the overwhelming nature of the system itself, it has been a perennial question whether in the Hegelian system the parts are not totally engulfed by the whole. Regarding this issue, Hegel knows clearly that although the parts and the whole are in one way or the other one "same tautology" (*diesselbe Tautologie*), they each relate to the tautology in a different manner, one on the level of "unity" and the other precisely on the level of "otherness".<sup>61</sup> But since Hegel always equates unity with concreteness and wisdom and otherness with abstraction and one-sidedness, the tension between parts and whole, according to Hegel, can to the last analysis be resolved only from the standpoint of the whole. It is in this way that the parts in Hegel's system can never enjoy the dignity and integrity they presume to possess. In many circumstances, Hegel speaks of the "absolute Power" (*absolute Macht*)<sup>62</sup> of the absolute substance/subject, which again favours the whole, under which all parts are inevitably subsumed as one same tautology.

With these few remarks, I think we should be able to show that the key word tautology is not only compatible with Hegel's philosophical terminologies, but can even bring out the true holistic nature of the Hegelian system.

## V. CONCLUSION: SOME FINAL COMPARISONS

1. **Finitude versus Infinitude:** The most striking similarity between Hegel and Heidegger lies in their strong holistic flavour, and this similarity is by far not a superficial one. In a way, both Heidegger's *Sein (als Ereignis)* and Hegel's *Geist* are all-encompassing phenomena; and both *Ereignis* and *Geist* involve some kind of self-engendered process in or under which all entities are tautologically conjoined, including man and world. But given this basic similarity, the two tautologies part their ways uncompromisingly in two directions – finitude versus infinitude. Regarding finitude and infinitude, the four major German philosophers since modernity seem dividable into two camps, with Kant and Heidegger on the one side and Hegel and Husserl on the other.<sup>63</sup> The more interesting thing is that from each of the two camps we find a tautologist in place – namely Heidegger and Hegel; and it is due to

this additional relation that conflicts between the two camps are sharpened (the relation between Kant and Husserl alone, for example, is a much milder one). The reason why the antagonism between Hegel and Heidegger is so intense lies in the fact that they are no longer arguing the question concerning finitude or infinitude on the level of human reason or subjectivity, but on the most sublime level of Absolute Spirit or Being itself. It is war between the Hegelian tautology of infinitude and the Heideggerian tautology of finitude, or between speculative transparency of Absolute Spirit on the one hand and the unfathomable Abyss of Being on the other.

2. **Stringency versus Leniency:** Tautological thinking is not new to philosophy. Although Heidegger is the first one to coin this term, traces and variants of “tautological thinking” can in one way or the other be found in the philosophical vocation, now and then, in the West as well as in the East. In fact, tautological thinking could trigger deep philosophical reflections and could in turn bear fruits of genuine wisdom. But an over-exertion of the tautological principle could turn out to be problematic, or indeed dangerous. In the cases of Hegel and Heidegger, we witness precisely such fateful consequences. While the Hegelian tautology is unmistakably too stringent, the Heideggerian tautology turns out to be too *lenient*. As a result of this, both Hegel and Heidegger, without detriment to their genuine insights and their contributions to philosophy, do put philosophy under some kind of threat. Unlike other phenomenological theories, which are rich in distinctions, the later Heidegger is gradually giving up making distinctions in favour of the One, the Singular and the Only phenomenon – Being.<sup>64</sup> Though rich in neologisms, Heidegger’s tautological thinking is for this reason extremely poor in its ability to build up concrete references to worldly affairs and phenomena .... It is in this regard that Hegel’s tautology proves to be much more enriching for posterity. For even though we can accuse Hegel’s system of being too rigid and overwhelming, one can at least benefit from his partial analysis and distinctions on the various levels of “otherness” (on culture, religion, music, family, politics ...) while keeping his tautological rigidity at arm’s length. In a word, while we can benefit at least partially from Hegel, the later Heidegger is “wisdom in a lump sum” which leaves his posterity no such choices. Reading the later Heidegger can be an enlightening experience (provided that one understands him), but at some point it might become boring, and reading Heidegger alone is for a learner of philosophy by all means seriously inadequate.

3. **The Challenge of the End of Philosophy:** Curiously enough, another similarity between Hegel and Heidegger is that they both have challenged or threatened the very discipline of philosophy by advocating the notion of "End of Philosophy". But under this same banner, Hegel and Heidegger provide different reasons why philosophy should or has come to an end: For Hegel, because philosophy, having reached absolute knowledge, has accomplished its task already; for Heidegger, because philosophy, driven by the metaphysical formula of onto-theology, has never been able to find the right approach to Being, leaving the mystery of Being unthought. Due to its oblivion of Being, so says Heidegger, philosophy should be replaced by the new era of thinking. In the face of such challenges posed by Hegel and Heidegger, some reaction is necessary. Regarding Hegel, a short dialogue between Gadamer and Ricoeur seems to be of much interest. Gadamer once said, let me quote: "About Hegel, I have my reservations, but in my contribution here I tried to find a way of overcoming the Hegelian end-point [...]"<sup>65</sup> Ricoeur later replied: "I am entirely on the side of Prof. Gadamer when he says that we have to do without a philosophy of absolute knowledge. This is in fact the lament of modern philosophy, that we have to raise Hegelian problems without the Hegelian solution ..."<sup>66</sup> In this connection I agree with Gadamer and Ricoeur. And I ask myself the question: Why is it not possible for us to become "partial Hegelians"? For as soon as we put the "speculative moment" of Hegel's system into bracket or have it at least essentially tuned down, we will be able to enjoy the true spirit of dialectics which makes allowance for indeterminacy regarding "end-points". And in such a way, the Hegelian system might still have much contemporary relevance. Regarding Heidegger, the scenario is no less serious. Heidegger's abysmal thinking, after his suggested destruction of philosophy, reduces man's intellectual activities on a very narrow domain of tautological wisdom, which is precious but not in a position to cope with the multiplicities of problems lying ahead of mankind. One of the gravest consequences of Heidegger's legacy was that out of a totally biased and one-sided attitude towards the notion of subjectivity, Heidegger deprives man of his most precious intellectual instrument to make reasonable judgment about our own affairs, about our society and our world.<sup>67</sup> Cassirer, following Albert Schweitzer, criticizes Heidegger with the following remark: "As soon as philosophy no longer trusts its own power, as soon as it gives way to a merely passive attitude, it can no longer fulfill its most important educational task."<sup>68</sup>

Most ironically, Heidegger himself seemed to have fallen prey tragically to his own legacy. In this regard I think Heidegger should at least be accused of some kind of “political *sensu latiori*”<sup>69</sup> for his wrong political judgments related to Nazism. In *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Hegel alluded to Schelling’s concept of Absolute as being too broad and vague that it is comparable to the “night in which [...] all cows are black”; for Hegel this is simply “naiveness in the sense of emptiness in knowledge” (*Naivität der Leere an Erkenntnis*).<sup>70</sup> To me, this criticism of Hegel seems unfortunately to be applicable to some extent to Heidegger as well.

4. **Is some middle ground possible?** Given the inherent crisis embedded in both the Hegelian and Heideggerian tautologies, our critique of them should not be overstated. For both the Hegelian and Heideggerian tautologies, taken separately, each have their own insights, which are too precious to be obliterated because of their weaknesses. Hegel’s dynamic (dialectical) view of life and history and his very idea of reconciliation on the one hand, and Heidegger’s vision of the finitude of Being on the other are doubtless intellectual jewels (*Gedankengut*) for all humanity. And most interestingly, the wisdoms of the two tautologies seem to be complimentary, each being in a position to offset the danger of the other. If Hegel’s rational system is supposed to be too overwhelming and dominating, the eccentricity of Heidegger’s thought provides an antidote. If Heidegger’s tautological thinking turns out to be too relaxed to do anything about our concrete world, then Hegel’s dialectical movement through all levels of worldliness comes to his aid. Instead of obliging ourselves to choose between being Hegelians or Heideggerians, why can we not stand in the middle? Why can we not benefit from both, or even from beyond both? In comparison to Heidegger’s humble and sparing (*zurückhaltend*) attitude of stepping back, the aggressiveness of Hegel’s philosophical position stands out in stark contrast.<sup>71</sup> Regarding the notion of “stepping back”, Heidegger’s stance is in fact very close to that of Kant, who once characterizes his *Transzendentalphilosophie* as “going back”.<sup>72</sup> Now, whereas Kant’s “going back” allows us to view the conditions of possibility (*Möglichkeitsbedingungen*) of the fruitful *Bathos* of human experience,<sup>73</sup> the “stepping back” of Heidegger prevents us from so doing, because in Heidegger worldly wisdom has been compromised for the sake of tautological wisdom. Above, we criticized the two types of tautologies for being either too stringent or too lenient. Against this backdrop, I cannot help but reckon: Given that Kant does share

Heidegger's modesty concerning human finitude but does not fall prey to "emptiness in knowledge", and given that one can choose to benefit from Hegel's dialectical insight while underplaying Hegel's speculative motif, is Kant's system not situated on some middle ground between Hegel and Heidegger, where the spell of both tautologies can be undone, so that Western philosophy can be rejuvenated and further developed? Or, alternatively, between the two extreme types of tautologies, could we find in some middle ground tautological wisdoms in philosophies of other cultures, which would not lead us to such impasses, so that philosophy on the whole could be enriched and continue being a blessing for humanity?

*The Chinese University of Hong Kong*

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*. 12. unveränderte Auflage (Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1972), pp. 35, 193, 318.

<sup>2</sup> Heidegger, *Kants These über das Sein* (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1962), p. 33.

<sup>3</sup> *Kants These über das Sein*, p. 36.

<sup>4</sup> Heidegger, *Vier Seminare* (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1977), p. 137. "... das Denken, dem hier nachgedacht wird, nenne ich das tautologische Denken. Das ist der ursprüngliche Sinn der Phänomenologie."

<sup>5</sup> For example, the occurrence of the word *Tautologie* in Hegel is often related to the word *leere* (empty). See *Phänomenologie* III-137; *Wissenschaft der Logik* II-40, 97, 412; *Enzyklopädie* VIII-269. [All works of Hegel are cited from *Werke in zwanzig Bänden* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1970)].

<sup>6</sup> Besides the attitude of "common quest" with Kant as expressed in *Kants These über das Sein* as quoted above, Heidegger has in the preface to the 4th edition of the *Kant-Buch* admitted that Kant was for him a kind of "refuge" (*Zuflucht*) when the programme of *Sein und Zeit* ran into impasse. See Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 4. Auflage (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1973). For a general account of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, see Hansgeorg Hoppe, "Wandlungen in der Kant-Auffassung Heideggers", *Durchblicke: Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag* (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1970), pp. 284–317.

<sup>7</sup> Max Müller, *Sinn-Deutungen der Geschichte. Drei philosophische Betrachtungen zur Situation*. (Zürich: Edition Interfrom AG, 1976), p. 109.

<sup>8</sup> For an account of Heidegger's criticism of Hegel, see David Kolb, *The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger and After* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 213–222.

<sup>9</sup> Gadamer, "Hegel and the Dialectic of the Ancient Philosophers", *Hegel's Dialectic*, transl. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 18.

<sup>10</sup> Gadamer, "The Idea of Hegel's Logic", *Hegel's Dialectic, ibid.*, p. 95.

<sup>11</sup> Gadamer, "Hegel's 'Inverted World'", *Hegel's Dialectic, ibid.*, p. 36. English modified to fit text.

- <sup>12</sup> See Liddell and Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*. 9th edition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966), pp. 281–282. See also Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), p. 14.
- <sup>13</sup> See Heidegger, *Zur Seinsfrage*, p. 36.
- <sup>14</sup> In his much earlier *Kant-Buch* Heidegger already conceived the notion of a metaphysic of Dasein, which he depicts as “the metaphysic which necessarily is realized as Dasein (*notwendig als Dasein geschehende Metaphysik*), which is nothing but a “fundamental event” (*Grundgeschehen*). See *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, p. 235.
- <sup>15</sup> *Identität und Differenz*, *ibid.*, pp. 47–48.
- <sup>16</sup> Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976), p. 25.
- <sup>17</sup> *Zur Sache des Denkens*, *ibid.*, pp. 35–36.
- <sup>18</sup> See Tze-wan Kwan, *Die hermeneutische Phänomenologie und das tautologische Denken Heideggers*, (Bonn: Bouvier-Verlag, 1982).
- <sup>19</sup> For in-depth discussion of Heidegger’s *Identität und Differenz*, see Otto Pöggeler’s review of Heidegger’s book in *Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger*, Band 11 (1958), pp. 294–298; and also Pöggeler’s, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, 3. erweiterte Auflage, Chapter 7 (Pfullingen: Neske, 1990), p. 143ff.
- <sup>20</sup> *Identität und Differenz*, p. 22.
- <sup>21</sup> For a related use of the term *überlassen*, see *Zur Sache des Denkens*, p. 25.
- <sup>22</sup> *Identität und Differenz*, p. 22.
- <sup>23</sup> *Identität und Differenz*, p. 20.
- <sup>24</sup> *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, 104ff.
- <sup>25</sup> *Identität und Differenz*, p. 23.
- <sup>26</sup> See Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie*. Here Heidegger speaks of “the uniqueness of Seyn” (*Einzigkeit des Seyns*), *Gesamtausgabe*, Band 65, p. 73.
- <sup>27</sup> Heidegger applies the concept of *Zwiefalt* to various “ordered pairs”, such as *Anwesen* and *Anwesendes* (Usp 122–126); *Sein* and *Seiendes* (WhD 134–136), *Sein* and *Mensch* etc.
- <sup>28</sup> Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954), p. 150
- <sup>29</sup> Heidegger, “Der Spruch des Anaximanders”, *Holzwege* (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1972), p. 318. Young and Haynes have translated the term as “singular as such”, which is also fine.
- <sup>30</sup> *Identität und Differenz*, p. 29, 54.
- <sup>31</sup> *Identität und Differenz*, p. 29. “Das Wort Ereignis meint hier nicht mehr das, was wir sonst irgendein Geschehnis, ein Vorkommnis nennen. Das Wort ist jetzt als Singulare tantum gebraucht. Was es nennt, ereignet sich nur in der Einzahl, nein, nicht einmal mehr in einer Zahl, sondern einzig.”
- <sup>32</sup> *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, p. 172.
- <sup>33</sup> Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker I*, 18. Auflage (Zürich: Weidmann, 1989), p. 161. English translation by Freeman: “When you have listened, not to me but to the Law (Logos), it is wise to agree that all things are one.”
- <sup>34</sup> Heidegger, *Heraklit-Vorlesungen (1943/44)*, *Gesamtausgabe*, Band 55 (Frankfurt/main: Klostermann, 1979), p. 204.
- <sup>35</sup> For a correlation of homologuein with *Ver-nehmen*, see Heidegger, *Heraklit-Vorlesungen*, p. 260.
- <sup>36</sup> The term *ekzentrisch* appears again the *Heraklit-Vorlesungen*, p. 206.
- <sup>37</sup> *Zur Sache des Denkens*, p. 24. “Was bleibt zu sagen? Nur dies: Das Ereignis ereignet. Damit sagen wir vom Selben her auf das Selbe zu das Selbe.” English translation by Joan Stambaugh, but modified by the author.
- <sup>38</sup> *Zur Sache des Denkens*, p. 58.



- <sup>39</sup> See Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957, 1971), p. 200.
- <sup>40</sup> *Der Satz vom Grund*, p. 68. An English translation would be: "The rose is without why; it blossoms, because it blossoms ..."
- <sup>41</sup> *Der Satz vom Grund*, p. 200.
- <sup>42</sup> *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 121. For the topic of *Seinserörterung* or "topology of Being", see Otto Pöggeler, "Metaphysik und Seinstopik bei Heidegger", *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, Band 70, 1962–63, pp. 118–137.
- <sup>43</sup> This was reported by Gadamer, see *Hegels Dialektik*, *op. cit.* p. 89. Noteworthy is the fact that for the later Heidegger, "being Greek" is an increasingly pejorative predicate. Among others, see Otto Pöggeler, *Heidegger in seiner Zeit* (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1999), p. 240; English translation by Henry Pickford, "Does the Saving Power also grow? Heidegger's Last Paths", *Martin Heidegger. Critical Assessments*, edited by Christopher Macann, Vol. IV (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 414.
- <sup>44</sup> The term "onto-theo-ego-logisch", tailor-made for Hegel, was used, as far as I know, only once by Heidegger. I take the liberty to change it to the substantial form. See Heidegger, *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Gesamtausgabe, Band 32 (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1980), p. 183.
- <sup>45</sup> Heidegger describes Hegel's *Phänomenologie* as "Sichanderswerden und Zusichselbstkommen des Bewusstseins". See Heidegger, *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
- <sup>46</sup> *Wissenschaft der Logik II*, p. 551. This passage being so important, I am quoting the original in its entirety: "Die Methode ist daraus als der sich selbst wissende, sich als das Absolute, sowohl Subjektive als Objektive, zum Gegenstande habende Begriff, somit als das reine Entsprechen des Begriffs und seiner Realität, als eine Existenz, die er selbst ist, hervorgegangen."
- <sup>47</sup> *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 126. Although this term appears as early as in the third chapter, its general meaning is applicable to the "self-knowing Spirit". See also *Wissenschaft der Logik II*, p. 122.
- <sup>48</sup> *Sichselbstgleichheit* ist often translated as "self-identity."
- <sup>49</sup> *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 469.
- <sup>50</sup> *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 324.
- <sup>51</sup> *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 438.
- <sup>52</sup> *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 100.
- <sup>53</sup> *Wissenschaft der Logik I*, p. 212.
- <sup>54</sup> *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 53.
- <sup>55</sup> See, for examples, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 132, 316.
- <sup>56</sup> *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 94.
- <sup>57</sup> *Enzyklopädie-I*, § 25, § 79.
- <sup>58</sup> *Enzyklopädie-I*, § 80.
- <sup>59</sup> *Enzyklopädie-I*, § 81.
- <sup>60</sup> Heidegger/Fink, *Heraklit-Seminar*, Wintersemester 1966/67 (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1970), pp. 184–185.
- <sup>61</sup> *Wissenschaft der Logik II*, p. 169.
- <sup>62</sup> *Wissenschaft der Logik II*, p. 246, 282.
- <sup>63</sup> It is for this reason understandable why Heidegger puts Hegel and Husserl in one basket and has them criticized together. See "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens", *Zur Sache des Denkens*, p. 68ff. Fink, on the other hand, also used the contrast between infinitude and finitude as the main line of distinction between Husserl and

Heidegger. See Dorion Cairns, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976), p. 25.

<sup>64</sup> On this issue, see Tze-wan Kwan, "Phenomenological Distinctions and the Buddhist Doctrine of Two Truths", paper presented at the Conference on Phenomenology & Buddhist Philosophy, organized by the Research Centre for Phenomenology & the Human Sciences, RIH, CUHK, in collaboration with Chilin Nunnery, Hong Kong. Held February 13–14, 2004, in Hong Kong. Pending for publication.

<sup>65</sup> *Phenomenology: Dialogues and Bridges*, (ed.) by Ronald Bruzina and Bruce Wilshire (Albany: SUNY Press, 1982), p. 314

<sup>66</sup> *Phenomenology: Dialogues and Bridges*, *ibid.*, p. 319

<sup>67</sup> In an earlier paper presented at the first O-P-O conference held in Prague, I have criticized Heidegger's critique of subjectivity from a cross cultural point of view. See Tze-wan Kwan, "Subject and Person as Two Self-Images of Modern Man – Some Cross-Cultural Perspectives", now available at the URL: <http://www.o-p-o.net/essays/KwanArticle.pdf>

<sup>68</sup> Ernst Cassirer, "Philosophy and Politics", *Symbols, Myth, and Culture. Essays and Lectures of Ernst Cassirer 1935–1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 230.

<sup>69</sup> This expression is formulated by Thomas Sheehan; see his review of Wolin's and Rockmore's books, *Ethics*, Vol. 103/1, October 1992, pp. 178–181. Regarding Heidegger's involvement with Nazism, I can not help but agree with Rockmore, that Heidegger must have undermined the freedom of man under Nazism since he "offered the main role to Being." See Tom Rockmore, *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy* (London: Harvester, 1992), p. 290.

<sup>70</sup> *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, p. 22.

<sup>71</sup> In fact, Heidegger was consciously speaking against the Hegelian method of *Aufhebung* when he proposed "stepping back" as a key to his era of Thinking. See *Identität und Differenz*, p. 45.

<sup>72</sup> Kant, *Kants Gesammelte Schriften*, Band XVIII (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1928), p. 80. Refl. 5075: "In der transzendentalen Wissenschaft ist nicht mehr darum zu thun, vorwärts, sondern zurück zu gehen."

<sup>73</sup> See Kant's *Prolegomena ...*, *Kants Gesammelte Schriften*, Band IV (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1903), p. 373.

SECTION IV

EPOCHE AND REDUCTION TODAY

THE PROBLEM OF THE 'IDEA' IN DERRIDA'S  
*THE PROBLEM OF GENESIS*

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to approach *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy* – that is, Jacques Derrida's (1930) master's thesis, later published as one of his writings in 1990 – from the viewpoint of “the problem of the idea”, which I consider to be one of the most important points of Derrida's interpretation of Husserl. Before approaching the main subject, I would like to present my view on the position of *The Problem of Genesis* in Derrida's thought.

The starting point of Derrida's philosophical career is, as we know, his philosophical research on Husserl, and it seems to me that the confrontation with Husserl's phenomenology occupies an important position in the formational process of his thought. I believe that the development of Derrida's interpretation of Husserl, from the master's thesis to *Speech and Phenomena*, can be classified into three stages:

1. *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy* was written in 1953–54 and successfully defended in 1956. In this study, Derrida attempted an overview of the whole history of Husserl's thought, from the earliest to the latest, and he pursued “the problem of genesis” throughout this history. I consider this work to be the first stage of Derrida's interpretation of Husserl. (Incidentally, the long preface, or “Avant Propos,” was, strictly speaking, written after the completion of the main body of the thesis (cf. PG 1(1)/182 note 1)).
2. Derrida studied abroad in the U.S. for one year in 1956. There he studied microfilms of Husserl's manuscripts and began work on his translation of “Origin of Geometry” at the same time.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, in 1957, after returning to France, he registered “The Ideality of the Literary Object” as the title of a doctoral dissertation that he did not submit after all. This dissertation was planned as an attempt to bend “more or less violently, the techniques of transcendental phenomenology to the needs of elaborating a new theory of literature.”<sup>2</sup> After that, in 1959, “‘Genesis and Structure’ and Phenomenology” – a summary of *The Problem of Genesis* that also introduced a new viewpoint – was presented at a colloquium on “Genesis and Structure” in Paris, and

*The Introduction of Origin of Geometry* (the French translation of Husserl's "Origin of Geometry" with an introduction by Derrida) – the book that would be Derrida's debut work – was published in 1962. The above could be called the second stage. The remarkable feature in this stage is the strong interest in Husserl's posthumously published "Origin of Geometry," and the comprehensive examination of Husserl's later theory of history.

3. Henceforth, Derrida commenced a wide range of writing activities far exceeding the limits of phenomenology. With regard to Husserl, in "Violence and Metaphysics" (1964), he called Husserl's phenomenology a "metaphysics of presence" in contrast to Levinas and Heidegger (although this word does not appear in the 1964 edition). Although he presented various essays on Husserl, such as "Phenomenology and Closure of Metaphysics" (this was published in Greek in 1966 and later in a French version in 2000), "Form and Signification" (1967), and *Speech and Phenomena* (1967), the basic position of these later essays were different from before. The whole of Derrida's thought is still at the "early stage" at this time, but it can be seen as the third stage of his interpretation of Husserl. (Derrida also wrote eight reviews of phenomenology-related books for *Philosophical Research* during this period.)

According to this view, *The Problem of Genesis* is the first step of Derrida's interpretation of Husserl and posits the fundamental premise for his subsequent reading of Husserl. Now, in the main discussion, I will undertake a general view of *The Problem of Genesis* which has not yet been sufficiently considered (I), and next, I will focus on "the problem of the idea" (II).

# I. COMPOSITION OF *THE PROBLEM OF GENESIS* – TIME AND REDUCTION

## (a) Overview

I will begin by considering the title "The Problem of Genesis." This title shows that Derrida regards "genesis" as a "problem" in Husserl. Although "genesis" is of course a great "problem" both for Husserl and for phenomenologists in general, what is important here is how the "problem" is formulated, since this will decide the fundamental structure of the interpretation that follows. The basis of Derrida's interpretation of Husserl is in the way he posits the problem. The following quotation from the

beginning of *The Problem of Genesis* clearly expresses Derrida's perception of the issue.

"The problem of genesis is at the same time the essential motivation of his thought and the locus of a dilemma that Husserl seems to have put off or dissimulated endlessly. The unity of this problem has never wavered; it is only differentiated in its development into several themes or loci that we will be content here to announce in schematic fashion" (PG 1).

That is, according to Derrida, the problem of genesis is a problem that haunted Husserl from the start to the end. In other words, it is the problem through which we can interpret the history of Husserl's thought consistently and systematically, just as Derrida did.

The word "genesis" in the context of Husserl's phenomenology immediately brings to mind his "genetic phenomenology." The results of research on Husserl's posthumous manuscripts over many years has shown us that Husserl's phenomenology developed towards a genetic phenomenology and this has changed the general perception of his phenomenology. However, we cannot say that Husserl's genetic phenomenology was popular in France during the 1950s, when Derrida wrote his paper. Merleau-Ponty had already introduced the term "genesis of sense (Sinngenesis)" in his arguments, and it was probably Tran-Duc-Thao's *Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism* (1951) that introduced Derrida to the appeal of Husserl's later thought. However, we may say that the attempt of Derrida to focus on "genesis" and to pursue this concept throughout the whole development of Husserl's thought was very unique at that time. Briefly said, Derrida posits "genesis" as the "aporia" of Husserlian phenomenology. That is to say, was a difficulty that had already existed at the starting point of phenomenology, and although the difficulty was deferred at the stage of static phenomenology, it inevitably forced the shift to genetic phenomenology and later to a philosophy of history, but phenomenology could not overcome the difficulty after all. – This is the storyline drawn by Derrida.

Before examining specific texts, let us review Derrida's sketch of the development of Husserl's thought in order to better clarify Derrida's own viewpoint. Derrida classified Husserl's thought into four periods, and *The Problem of Genesis* is composed of four parts that roughly correspond to this classification. Let me describe each period briefly and mention the main texts of Husserl treated by Derrida for that period. (The years in parentheses indicate when the writing was first made public, in one form or another.)

The first period can be called the time of the “formation of phenomenology.” According to Derrida, phenomenology started primarily as an attempt to overcome the conflict between logicism and psychologism concerning the origin of knowledge. Derrida considers that phenomenology first appeared in *Logical Investigations vol. II*, after the psychologism of *Philosophy of Arithmetic* and the logicism of *Logical Investigations vol. I*. Part I of Derrida’s thesis, “The dilemma of psychological genesis: psychologism and logicism,” discusses this period. *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891) is discussed in chapter 2, and *Logical Investigations* (mainly the first volume) (1900) is treated in Chapter 3.

The second period is the time of “static phenomenology.” Derrida also regards the period of static phenomenology to be the period when genesis was reduced and treated only in a static way. “It [the appearance of genetic research] had been prepared, called forth by a long period when the genetic theme is ‘neutralized,’ kept absent from phenomenological description. In fact, it seems to us that it is the difficulty of this ‘neutralization’ that animates the whole movement of Husserl’s thought from 1901 to 1919–20” (PG 107/53). This period is described in part II: “The ‘neutralization’ of genesis.” *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* (1928) is discussed in Chapter 1, and *Ideas I* (1913) is discussed in Chapter 2 (*Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* was published in 1928, edited in fact from various texts from around 1904 to the 1910s, but Derrida treats it fundamentally as “a lecture from the years 1904–05” (cf. PG 37(4)/184 note 4).

The third period is the period of “genetic phenomenology.” According to Derrida, Husserl comes to thematize “genesis” in the lectures of 1919–20, which are the origin of *Experience and Judgment*. After that, the problem of genesis continued to be a central theme of Husserl’s. This period is discussed in part III “The phenomenological theme of genesis: transcendental genesis and ‘worldly’ genesis.” Chapter 1 takes up *Experience and Judgment* (1938, although it is based on lectures from 1919–20), and *Cartesian Meditations* (1931, based on the Paris lecture of 1929) is treated in Chapter 2. Genetic phenomenology is treated as a theme for the first time in *Experience and Judgment*, and is developed in the *Cartesian Meditations*, which Derrida calls “the most systematic expression of Husserl’s thought” (PG 215/130).

The fourth period is the “philosophy of history.” Derrida says that, in his last work *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Husserl planned a “philosophy of history” (PG 282/178). In Part IV, entitled “Teleology, the sense of history and the history of

sense," the main subject of Chapter 1 is "The Crisis of European Humanity" (1950; however it is based on the Vienna lecture of 1935), Chapter 2 discusses "Origin of Geometry" (1939, but written in 1936) and Chapter 3 discusses *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1936).

In this way, Derrida follows the whole of Husserl's thought by making an axis of "the problem of genesis," following Husserl's texts in chronological order, along with the movement of Husserl's thought.

(b) *The Theory of Time – "Genesis" as "Originary Synthesis"*

In order to examine more concretely the contents of *The Problem of Genesis*, with a special focus on parts II and III, I would like to introduce two focal points of the argument: the theory of time and the problem of reduction. This is because the problem of "genesis" that propels Derrida's whole argument is construed as a conflict between the problem of time and the problem of reduction as a method. Thus, the first thing we should focus on is Derrida's interpretation of Husserl's time theory as the first place where "genesis" causes difficulties for phenomenology.

In *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, Husserl analyzes time consciousness as the constitution of the time object through originary impression, retention and protention. I will omit a lengthy discussion about Husserl's time theory here and go directly on to Derrida's interpretation.

Through a reading of Husserl's analysis of the consciousness of melody, Derrida focuses on the problem of what can be called the duality of the now and the present, i.e., "a cyclic definition of the relation between an originary impression and now,"<sup>3</sup> and analyzes the situation in his distinctive way. This is also a description of the first locus of "the problem of genesis." The center of Derrida's point of argument here is the "originary impression."

First, Derrida confirms that "the temporal object is constituted out of the 'originary impression' of the pure hyletic given; a retention and a protention unite the series of originary impressions in order to make an object out of them" (PG 119/61–62). However, "in order for a melody to be perceived, it is necessary that I retain the past sounds and anticipate the sounds to come" (PG 119/62). That is, in order for the consciousness of a time object to be possible, a width of time (the present), composed of retention, originary impression and protention, is required. Then, Derrida considers that "what is true of a melody is true of a sound on



its own" (PG 120/62), and says, "I cannot reduce an originary impression to the purity of a real point, and that is a matter of essence" (PG 120/62). That is, the width of time is required for all consciousness, and Derrida thinks that it is also the same for the now-point. Then, he says as follows:

"It is an *a priori* necessity of the perception of the time and of the time of perception that an originary impression has some temporal density. As a result, absolute originarity is *already a synthesis* since it implies *a priori* a 'retentional modification'" (PG 120/62).

That is, Derrida points out that the originary impression, which Husserl regards as originary, is not absolute in itself, but requires retention, and thus he calls it a "synthesis."

Now, what is the retention that precedes the originarity of an originary impression? First, Derrida confirms that a retained sound is not a "naturalistic" and real sound but a "phenomenological" and "real" (the German *reel*) one. A retained sound is no longer a real sound. However, Derrida thinks that the "non-reality" of this retained sound can constitute a real sound together with an originary impression, because the sound as a unity precedes it *a priori* and is its basis. Thus Derrida asks, "is not the *a priori* phenomenological synthesis possible through an *a priori* synthesis that is ontological, fundamental, and more originary than the noematic lived experience?" (PG 120f./62). As pointed out previously, an "*a priori* phenomenological synthesis" is considered to be a "synthesis" of the originary impression and retention. This is a synthesis that takes place within the constituting time consciousness, but Derrida thinks that a unity of existence (as sound) precedes and conditions this synthesis in time consciousness, in advance of this synthesis.

Based on the above argument, Derrida describes the problem as follows: "In a certain sense, it is because there is a constituting consciousness of time that the 'real' sound is constituted in an objective unity. This unity is in this way a production of consciousness; but it is also because it appears as already constituted in its very being, prior to any noematic synthesis, that consciousness can experience originary constitution according to an attitude that could be called intuitive. Here, the ambiguity of any intentional movement appears; production and receptivity, creation and intuition, activity and passivity" (PG 121/62–63).

Derrida interprets the perception of the time object in time consciousness as above, and discovers in its structure what he calls "originary synthesis [*synthèse originaire*]":

"The originary and constituting present is thus absolute only in its continuity with a 'non-present' that is at once constituted before it, through it, and in it. The originary synthesis is precisely one of constituted and constituting, of the present and the non-present, of originary temporality and objective temporality" (PG 123/64).

What Derrida is saying is that the originary impression as a point of origin is always preceded by something (retention), that without it originary impression is not possible, and that time consciousness constitutes the time object because what becomes an object had already existed. While Husserl refers to the "originary impression" as the origin-point (now), Derrida says that the "originary synthesis" is *more originary than* Husserl's "origin" (originary impression), that the "present" is possible only in relation to a "non-present" and that both are "originarily synthetic."

The "originary synthesis" is the synthesis of the "constituted" and the "constituting", which are clearly distinguished in the method of reduction in Husserl: Derrida says "this ambiguity will stamp all Husserl's thought with a dialectic mark" (PG 121/63). That is, the "originary synthesis" is expressed as a "dialectic". Derrida asks if this is not "the theme of passive genesis, taken up fifteen years later by Husserl, already announced?" (PG 121/63).

(c) *Reduction – "Essence" and "Genesis"*

Next, let us turn to Derrida's interpretation of the reduction as Husserl's fundamental method, which is the other crucial issue of *The Problem of Genesis*. The main point of Derrida's interpretation is that he places the eidetic reduction at the center of the reduction. Although Husserl speaks of an eidetic reduction and a transcendental reduction, Derrida says, "in a sense, transcendental reduction is eidetic reduction,"<sup>4</sup> and regards eidetic reduction as being the fundamental characteristic of reduction.

Husserl describes the eidetic reduction in *Ideas I*. According to him, phenomenology must be "a science which exclusively seeks to ascertain 'cognitions of essences' and no 'matter of fact' whatever." That is, it must be "a science of essence," and, correspondingly, "the relevant reduction which leads over from the psychological phenomena to the pure 'essence' or, in the case of judgmental thinking, from matter-of-fact ('empirical') universality to 'eidetic' universality is the eidetic reduction" (Hua III/1 6/XX). We can say that the eidetic reduction is the operation that shifts to essence from fact, or that removes all contingent elements and extracts only the element of essential necessity.

We must understand what is meant here by “essence.” According to Husserl, “it belongs to the sense of anything contingent to have an essence and therefore an Eidos which can be apprehended purely” (Hua III/1 12/7). The essence is “what is to be found in the very own being of an individuum as the What of an individuum” (Hua III/1 13/8), and “the essence (Eidos) is a new sort of object. Just as the datum of individual or experiencing intuition is an individual object, so the datum of eidetic intuition is a pure essence” (Hua III/1 14/9). That is to say, an essence is not something individual, factual and experiencing, but of essential necessity, and at the same time, something which can be treated as one object by itself, separated from the individual.

Derrida’s assertions about reduction in *The Problem of Genesis* focus on two points. The first is that although essence is indeed *a priori* in relation to the fact, this essence is obtained from the fact by the act of subjectivity. Husserl does not discuss the concrete method of eidetic reduction in *Ideas I*, and then no longer uses the term “eidetic reduction,” calling instead on the method of imaginary variation as the means of arriving at essence in *Experience and Judgment*. Put simply, the method of imaginary variation is the method of varying arbitrary facts by acts of free imagination, and by doing so to sift out inessentials and to intuit what remains as a non-variant. As Derrida emphasized in response to a question posed to him at the colloquium, this means that “I have an eidetic intuition only starting from the fact (...).”<sup>5</sup> That is to say, the “genesis” of the essence is at issue here. “These [eidetic structures that are *a priori* and universal], in fact, in spite of a pretension to originarity, are *always already* constituted and post-genetic” (PG 39/3).

The second point is that essence is a non-temporal – Husserl would call it “omni-temporal” – object. That is to say, what is obtained by eidetic reduction is a static essence. Time itself, i.e. the genesis itself, cannot be obtained. Eidetic reduction always leaves the genesis of essence as an “irreducible.”

This is where “a reduction that is no longer eidetic but phenomenological” (PG 134/72), i.e., transcendental reduction, makes its appearance. Here, transcendental reduction refers to the reduction intended to approach the originary experience of the transcendental subjectivity that constitutes objects. Derrida considers the center of this reduction to be the first eidetic reduction, which was “expanded” to the transcendental reduction – “the method of reduction, eidetic reduction and transcendental reduction, its scope made wider and wider” (PG 37/2) – in order to catch the irreducible that the eidetic reduction had left behind.

Derrida's reading of Husserl follows this interpretation of reduction. For example, the question of the "a priori" of time in *Internal Time Consciousness* is interpreted as the eidetic reduction of time. Regarding *Ideas I*, Derrida asserts that the transcendental subjectivity found there is consciousness as an "eidetic domain" and "an 'already constituted' structure" (PG 144/79), and that "the sphere of originary constitution is not yet unveiled" (PG 138/75). In *Cartesian Meditations*, he says that what is pursued there is the essence of genesis, and that reduction does not reach the originary passive genesis.

Genetic phenomenology can achieve its purpose only by reaching the genesis itself. However, since the main method of genetic phenomenology is the eidetic reduction, even if it can catch the "essence of genesis," the genesis of that essence still remains uncaught, and the reduction ultimately cannot catch the genesis itself. From Derrida's point of view, Husserl's method always misses "the actual genesis [*la genèse effective*]" (PG 203/121).

## II. THE PROBLEM OF THE IDEA

### (a) *Overview of the problem*

We focus from here on "the problem of the idea." First, let us examine the connection between the problem of the idea and the arguments on time theory and reduction summarized above.

Derrida shows us how "all the depth of Husserl's fidelity to the absolute necessity of the eidetic reduction" (PG 226/138) is evident in his exhaustive efforts to arrive at essence. The principle that directed Husserl in his effort to intuit essence is none other than the "principle of intuition" – "the principle of principles" advocated in *Ideas I*. The figure of Husserl drawn by Derrida is a Husserl who was strictly faithful to the "principle of intuition."

On the other hand, Derrida detects "a profound malaise" (PG 216/130) in Husserl's sequence of analyses. It is a malaise that arises from the fear that something "irreducible" will always remain, and that reduction will go on endlessly. Derrida equates "all the dilemmas and the impasses" to "the impossibility of the philosophy of genesis faithful to the pure principles of phenomenology" (PG 215/130). Derrida thinks that Husserl's phenomenology is driven by this "malaise." In this sense, the problem of "genesis" is indeed the "motivation" of phenomenology.

However, according to Derrida, “Husserl is interested only in the *a priori* and ideal form of the constituted product of genesis” (PG 236/145), and did not truly recognize the difficulty that he himself faced. This is where the “idea” becomes significant. That is, Derrida concludes that Husserl held to the “idea” of phenomenology to the last, instead of squarely facing up to the “malaise” of phenomenology. Derrida has described Husserl’s idea in the following note:

“It is strange that criticism in general omits the absolutely essential role of the idea of infinite in Husserl. This role is all the more interesting and important in that it is always played *sottovoce* [*en sourdine*]. It is the idea of the infinite that always comes, at the last moment, to straighten out a difficulty or to swallow it. Now [and] we will have occasion to come back to this, the phenomenological or transcendental status of this ‘idea’ is, if not inconceivable, at least absolutely exceptional. It seems that in coming to save phenomenology, it will at the same time convert all its sense.” (PG 99f. (73)/196 note 73)

Thus, Derrida thinks that the “idea” occupies an “absolutely exceptional” place for Husserl. Moreover, Derrida states also as follows: “So the very idea of *a priori* intuition of essences, guiding principle of every phenomenology, must be profoundly transformed in the light of the dialectic whose necessity we are verifying at each step” (PG 237). Finally Derrida connects the “idea” to the dialectic.

First, based on Derrida’s text, let us reconstruct “the problem of the idea.” The problem of the idea is made up of four arguments, as Derrida himself outlines several times (PG 39(12), 216, etc./187 note 12, 131, etc.). In other words, “the problem of the idea” is made apparent by connecting several arguments by Husserl concerning ideas – arguments that are normally not discussed in conjunction to each other – as a single consistent “problem.” That is to say:

1. “the idea of the infinite becoming of logic” in *Logical Investigations*,
2. “the idea of the infinite totality of temporal experience” in *Ideas I*,
3. “the idea of the world as a horizon of infinite possibilities of experience” in *Experience and Judgment*, and
4. “the infinite idea” which gives an intentional sense again to passive genesis in the form of “teleology” (PG 216).

Here, we will examine 2 and 4, in which the features of Derrida’s argument appears most clearly.

#### (b) *The “idea in the Kantian sense” in Ideas I*

In 2, Derrida discusses the matter of Section 83 of *Ideas I*: that is, “the unitary stream of mental processes is grasped as an ‘idea’” (title of

Section 83). When I turn my gaze to reflect upon experience, because of the *a priori* possibility that I can turn the gaze to the other experiences which the experience possesses as a horizon, Husserl says there is a “‘limitlessness in the progression’ of immanent intuitions that grasp experience endlessly,” and further, that “in the continuous progression from grasp to grasp, we can, in a certain way, now seize upon the *stream of mental processes as a unity*.” And he adds further: “We do not grasp it as we do a single mental process but rather in the manner of an *idea in the Kantian sense*” (Hua III/1 186/197).

As we know, an “idea in the Kantian sense” means the regulative idea that defines the limit of experiential recognition in *Critics of a Pure Reason*. For example, Kant thinks that although the infinite totality of the world cannot be experienced, it is given as an “idea” by the “regulative use of reason.” That is, the “idea” is necessary to grasp what cannot be recognized directly by experience. For Husserl, although the stream of mental processes is open to the past and the future so that the totality cannot be grasped directly in the present, it is possible to grasp it as an idea.

Here, Husserl says that we grasp “one infinite union” of a “stream of mental processes” as an “idea in the Kantian sense”, but this contains the problem that the intuition theoretically cannot achieve perfect evidence, since the whole of the stream of mental processes cannot be given at once to the intuition.

According to Husserl, it is possible to seize upon the totality of “one infinite stream of mental processes” as a Kantian idea, but Derrida raises the question: “how is an intuition of what is not yet there possible?” (PG 170/98). He says that “Husserl believes in an ‘intuition’ of this possible infinity of connections,” (PG 169/97) but adds that “there is no actual intuition of the infinite totality of chains of connections, but an intuition of the very indefiniteness of this totality of the chains of connections” (PG 169/98).

What Derrida emphasizes here is that the infinite totality of experience is seized upon not as itself but as an idea. The point at issue is whether to accept the right of the “infinite [infini]” to be grasped as an idea based on the “indefinite [indéfini]”, or, whether by emphasizing the difference between the “indefinite” and the “infinite,” to question the right of the intuition that grasps “infinity” as an idea. The difference between “infinite totality itself” and the “idea of infinite totality” is at issue. Although Husserl presupposes that an idea is grasped and given intuitively, Derrida poses the following question about intuiting such an idea:

"Must not the transformation of the infinite into the indefinite, introducing negation into originary lived experience, force us to use conceptual mediations or other kinds of mediations to attain a totality that is not 'given' to us? This totality remains formal and the intuition that claims to aim at it cannot be 'fulfilled' by an originary presence" (PG 170/98).

Derrida says further in a note, "The intuition of the indefinite is intuition of the possible infinite" (PG 169(89)/203 note 89), so it is possible to consider the distinction between the infinite and the indefinite to correspond to a distinction between an actual infinity and a possible infinity (since Aristotle). The difference between an actual infinity and a possible infinity consists in whether we accept infinity as a substance, or only as a possibility. Husserl emphasizes the difference between "an infinite idea" and "infiniteness" itself in another part of *Ideas I* (Hua III/1 331), and this difference seems to support the difference between a possible infinity and an actual infinity. If we follow Derrida's context, Husserl's intuition intuits indefiniteness, which is a possible infinity, and not an actual infinity.

Thus, Derrida raises the suspicion that in Husserl "ideas in the Kantian sense" cannot be presented by the intuition as the ultimate principles of phenomenology.

(c) *The "idea of science" in the Cartesian Meditations*

We will progress to the above-mentioned problem 4 from here. Husserl mentions ideas not only in talking about the grasping of the infinite totality of a stream of mental processes. In fact, for Husserl, science itself is characterized as an "idea." Thus, the "teleological idea" is introduced as "a new 'idea'" (PG 2 18/132), as the practical version of the infinite idea, like something to strive for, or like an infinite task. This is the problem 4 mentioned earlier. This problem is discussed in a paragraph entitled: "The infinite idea of 'theory' and the repetition of the difficulties" (PG 215–223/130–136) in Chapter 2 of part III, and the subject of discussion is the "idea of genuine science" in the first meditation of *Cartesian Meditations*. Let us follow Derrida's argument.

In the first meditation of *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl speaks of the idea that guides his meditation. It is described as "a science that shall be established as radically genuine, ultimately an all embracing science" (Hua I 9/7), and "a science (ultimately an all embracing science) grounded on an absolute foundation, and absolutely justified" (Hua I 13/11). However, someone who begins philosophy does not necessarily have such an idea from the beginning. According to Husserl, we draw out the idea

"from the sciences that are factually given." Let me quote the following long passage from Husserl.

"Naturally we get the general idea of science from the sciences that are factually given. If they have become for us, in our radical critical attitude, merely alleged sciences, then, according to what has already been said, their general final idea has become, in a like sense, a mere supposition. Thus we do not yet know whether that idea is at all capable of becoming actualized. Nevertheless we do have it in this form, and in a state of indeterminate fluid generality; accordingly we have also the idea of philosophy: as an idea about which we do not know whether or how it can be actualized" (Hua I 10/8).

Here what concerns Derrida is that the idea of genuine science has not been given as itself. We can arrive at the idea of genuine science only "by the phenomenological reduction" (PG 220/133), and by finding "a pure scientific intention (...) in which no moment constituted as a scientific fact would be comprehended" (PG 221/134). However, since "any grasping of the pure teleological intention is essentially part and parcel of a constituted moment of real science," (PG 221/134) achieving such a pure intention is impossible *de facto* and possible only as an idea. Thus, Derrida states as follows: "This teleological idea of an absolute science, this experience of a limitless theoretic intention, where the whole fate of phenomenology is played out in this way, hence only brings back the difficulties and the dilemmas encountered earlier" (PG 222/135).

In this way, Husserl's "idea of science" is a teleological idea, envisioned as a *telos*, and Derrida questions the presence of such an idea, just as he does with the idea in the Kantian sense. In this way, Derrida shows how the idea is "absolutely exceptional" and also an "aporia" for phenomenology.

#### CONCLUSION

I have tried to approach *The Problem of Genesis* from the viewpoint of "the problem of the idea." If, as mentioned at the beginning, we suppose this thesis to be the first step in Derrida's interpretation of Husserl, how was the problem developed in Derrida's subsequent work on Husserl? I would like to finish this presentation by touching on this matter.

The subject of this presentation was 1/ "the problem of the idea" in *The Problem of Genesis*. Behind the choice of this subject is my belief that "the problem of the idea" occupies a central position in the entire series of writings on Husserl by Derrida. Namely, 2/ in *The Introduction of*



*Origin of Geometry* (where the problem of the history discussed in *The Problem of Genesis* part IV is greatly developed and updated, although we were not able to discuss it here), the “infinite idea” as a feature of Husserl’s theory of history in the period when *Crisis* was written (and also the “Origin of Geometry”) and the historicity of the idea are brought into question. 3/ The problem of ideality discussed in *Speech and Phenomena* deals directly with the *Logical Investigations*, but as Derrida states in its preface, the problem in question is that of the “idea” as the condition for the possibility of the infinite repetition that establishes ideality, and it is upon this argument that Derrida’s argument concerning Husserl’s “metaphysics of the presence” is developed. One of Derrida’s main and consistent concerns was no doubt the “idea” (we could suggest also “‘Genesis and Structure’ and Phenomenology” and “Violence and Metaphysics” as supportive texts), though of course there were changes in interpretation over the course of ten years and more.

Based on the above viewpoint, to borrow the words of Derrida “the presence of the idea” (la présence de l’Idée), which are impressively used in the *Introduction*, I believe that Derrida’s whole interpretation of Husserl can be understood as *a questioning of the presence of the idea*. This presentation is only a small part of the possible inquiry that should be carried out on the basis of this questioning, which was begun in the earliest stages of Derrida’s thought.

*University of Ritsumeikan*  
*Kyoto*

#### ABBREVIATIONS

- PG – Jacques Derrida, *Le problème de la genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl*, Paris: PUF, 1990./*The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy*, Marian Hobson (trans.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003.
- Hua I – Edmund Husserl, *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, Hrsg. und eingeleitet von Stephan Strasser. Nachdruck der 2. verb. Auflage, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973./*Cartesian Meditations*, Dorion Cairns (trans.). Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 9th impression, 1993.
- Hua III/1 – Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch*, Hrsg. von Karl Schuhmann, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976./*Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy First Book*, F. Kersten (trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Dominique Janicaud, *Heidegger en France, II, Entretiens* (Paris: Bibliothèque Albin Michel Idées, 2001), p. 93.

<sup>2</sup> Jacques Derrida, "The time of a thesis: punctuations", in *Philosophy in France Today*, Alan Montefiore (ed.), Kathleen McLaughlin (trans.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 37.

<sup>3</sup> Rudolf Bernet, "Die ungegenwärtige Gegenwart. Anwesenheit und Abwesenheit in Husserls Analyse des Zeitbewußtseins", in *Phänomenologische Forschungen* 14 (Freiburg i.B.: Alber, 1983), S. 45.

<sup>4</sup> Jacques Derrida, "La phénoménologie et la clôture de la métaphysique", in *Alter*, no. 8, *Derrida et la phénoménologie* (Paris: Éditions Alter, 2000), p. 79.

<sup>5</sup> *Entretiens sur les notions de GENÈSE et de STRUCTURE* (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1965), p. 265.

BODY OR FLESH? THE PROBLEM OF  
PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION IN  
MERLEAU-PONTY'S  
PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT

The attention devoted by Merleau-Ponty to the problem of a definition of the phenomenological reduction is at the same time very restricted and yet very acute. We cannot hope to find, in Merleau-Ponty's writings, anything comparable to the extension and the meticulousness with which Husserl carefully distinguishes and compares, defines and undoes the various ways to perform the reduction, and progressively clarifies its purpose and value. Yet in a certain sense Merleau-Ponty's whole conception of phenomenology is an answer to Husserl's position and its implications. This alone should suffice to reject the common place according to which Merleau-Ponty criticises the reduction in order to declare it unnecessary. We will have to dwell at a certain length on Merleau-Ponty's famous dictum, according to which "reduction can never be complete", but a thing is certain from the beginning: to say that the reduction can never be completed means that, at the same time, reduction is always to be performed anew. Contrary to what is commonly held, then, Merleau-Ponty assigns a great importance to this notion.

As Merleau-Ponty's style of thought refrains from the care for the exact definition which characterises Husserl, an investigation on his conception of the reduction must face a further problem: how to extract, from his charming but often a-systematic analyses, a clear-cut enough definition. A certain degree of arbitrariness will always be unavoidable when dealing with Merleau-Ponty's working concepts. At the same time, however, when digging deep enough into this rich terrain, a more regular profile can be ascertained, and the researcher is then gratified with important discoveries.

In order to bring to the fore the elusive notion of reduction worked out by Merleau-Ponty, then, I will in the first place schematically set out what he could consider Husserl's concept to consist in. We will see that Merleau-Ponty was aware that Husserl's position is more complex than what appears in the texts then published, as he was one of the very first to avail his acquaintance of Husserl's works with a fair knowledge of the

unpublished manuscripts. Accordingly I will distinguish between different, although related, definitions of the reduction in Husserl's writings. My main questions will be: what does Husserl mean by reduction; what the reasons are to perform it; what kind of subject is implied in it; what the achievement of its performance are; what concept of phenomenology does emerge from Husserl's research. The very same questions then will be posed to Merleau-Ponty's works. But in this case it will be necessary to distinguish between two periods of his production, which also correspond to two different although related conceptions of the reduction. The first is focused around his main work, *Phenomenology of perception*. The second is what comes after the revision of this work, and culminates in the unfinished, posthumously published manuscript known as *The visible and the invisible*. Needless to say, my presentation of Husserl's very articulated conception of the reduction will be quite sketchy but hopefully not incorrect, the attention of this paper being devoted to Merleau-Ponty's position.

#### 1. HUSSERL'S CONCEPTION OF THE REDUCTION

In order to find a way to deal with this enormous topic that can be both effective and limited in extension, I will concentrate the investigation on what can help to understand Merleau-Ponty's own position better. Husserl declares in many places that the reduction is a *method* that allows the phenomenologist to reach the domain of pure subjectivity, which represents the field proper to phenomenology as the fundamental science of philosophy.<sup>1</sup> It is then clear that the reduction plays a crucial role for phenomenology. Given the plurality of treatments, both theoretical and historical, available in Husserl's texts, I will in the first place set up the meaning of reduction as the *fundamental operation* devised to open an access to the sphere proper to phenomenology.<sup>2</sup>

The main shift, which determines the final definition of the field of the reduction in terms of «the pure theme of subjectivity»,<sup>3</sup> occurs between the *Logical Investigations* and the later works. Without entering into details, we can see that, in the early phase of his work, Husserl considers the reduction as a means to delimit, in a methodologically pure way, the field of research concretely worked out in the LU. This means that the reduction is meant to secure the pure givenness of the data pertaining to descriptive psychology, that is, phenomenology in its first formulation. The accent is on the concrete lived experiences of the flux of consciousness, but not yet on consciousness as a field in itself, accessible only through

a peculiar *apperception* which, in turn, must be phenomenologically acceptable. In the fifth Logical investigation yet, according to his own subsequent self-criticism, Husserl is still trying to understand consciousness itself by means of an empirical-natural apperception.

As a matter of fact, the problem of the exact interpretation of the meaning of this criticism, and of the implications derivable from it, is not limited to the question of understanding Husserl's position, but invests the interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's own solution, and I would say it is of the utmost importance for phenomenology as a whole. For what does it mean to understand consciousness in a transcendental, rather than empirical, way? Where do we land when the reduction is properly performed? What we can say is that Husserl, once arrived at a clear definition of the outcome of the reduction as the field of pure subjectivity, conceives of this as something distinguished *both* from the object understood according to the natural attitude, and consciousness as it is conceptualised by empirical sciences such as psychology. It is this "third" nature of pure consciousness that is taken up by Merleau-Ponty and developed into a personal, original even if not completely orthodox, conception.

We have at any rate a first scheme of the function of the reduction. This is a methodological procedure that allows the phenomenologist to reach the field of science, the latter being defined in terms of evidence. The most important difficulty, seen by Husserl in performing this task, is that of remaining at the level of the *unnatural reflection* free from contaminations coming from the empirical understanding of consciousness. I insist on this aspect for it is crucial in order to understand both the criticism *and* the positive solution offered by Merleau-Ponty. It is my suggestion that, the many differences notwithstanding, both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty have something common in sight when repeatedly insisting on the need to distinguish the field of pure consciousness, in Husserl's terminology, *both* from the world of objects and the universe of mental events, understood according to the worldly sciences such as psychology.

The question is, in fact, the following: once the reduction is performed, in what terms is the realm of pure subjectivity, that is then arrived at, to be accounted for? We will see that it is Husserl, and not Merleau-Ponty, the first to acknowledge a number of features whose detection is usually ascribed to the French phenomenologist, such as the relationship with the body and the intersubjective character of transcendental subjectivity. It is possible to state this now, when the three volumes devoted to the phenomenology of intersubjectivity are published, but then Merleau-

Ponty must be regarded as having looked at the right direction at a time when only very few manuscripts were available.

The nature of subjectivity that is reached once the reduction is performed, furthermore, interacts with the performance of reduction itself. It is not indifferent, in fact, what kind of subject is to arrive at its own truth, and by what means. The interaction between reducing and reduced subject is a topic that Husserl has progressively recognised as crucial. In his endless fight against the naturalisation or reification of consciousness, Husserl has often kept together something that Merleau-Ponty distinguishes: it is one thing to suspend the presuppositions coming from the natural attitude, and quite another thing to remain blind in front of phenomena which on the contrary pertain precisely to the very definition of that which is to be achieved by the reduction. In other words, if the co-implication between immanence and transcendence, the proper and the extraneous, and phenomena of the like, is what emerges from a correct actuation of the reduction, then there is no reason to reject such achievements. In the end, as it emerges from the manuscripts especially of the last period, Husserl seems to have accepted this conclusion. A clear assessment of this situation comes from a consideration of the motivation and the paths to be taken in order to perform the reduction.

As it is well known, the overall reason guiding Husserl's philosophical endeavour is that of gaining the ground of science. In a progressively clearer understanding of the meaning of this aim, Husserl constantly makes clear that the philosophical enterprise does not consist in competing with empirical sciences, which in their domain are fully valid, but rather in investigating and clarifying the essential possibilities pertaining to the constitution of science. Thus phenomenology has to do with the foundation of knowledge, and the motivation to perform the reduction is accordingly related to this project. In order to correctly grasp the meaning of this otherwise rather old-fashioned conception of philosophy, it must be kept in sight that the term of comparison and the antagonist is scepticism. Husserl's conception of truth, and this is also very important in order to grasp Merleau-Ponty's contribution, is not simply opposed to the sceptical claim that there is no truth, but consists in a constant effort to interiorise the reasons of scepticism. This is especially relevant in connection with the way Husserl understands the procedure of the epoché, or suspension, which is one of the most important aspects of reduction. While Husserl's epoché is not to be confused with the sceptical term, at the same time it is fruitfully related to it. The real triumph of scepticism, in fact, would be the acceptance of the claim that the only

truth is the empirical truth reached by empirical sciences, for in this case the very possibility of error would be ruled out, and this would render the researcher blind to the fact that truth is an infinite process. In other words, scepticism can be effectively contrasted only when its possibility is constantly confronted with, and not naively forgotten. In his *Critical History of Ideas* Husserl declares that the deepest although hidden meaning of modern philosophy consists in a constant effort to render the subjectivism proper to the sceptical tradition really true. This can be done only through a form of transcendental subjectivism founded on the reduction.<sup>4</sup>

The challenge of scepticism thus is, both historically and theoretically, the real motivation that led Husserl to his "transcendental turn". The meaning of this turn can be synthetically stated as follows: to set the conditions for understanding that objectivity is subjectively founded. To dismiss naive objectivism cannot simply lead to sheer subjectivism. Husserl's perennial philosophical acquisition is the statement that the theme of phenomenology as transcendental philosophy is the *relationship* between objectivity and subjectivity. This relationship precedes both subjectivity and objectivity, and constitutes their common ground. If this is not so clear when performing the reduction according to the so-called "Cartesian" way, it is because, as Husserl recognised, there is a jump in that case.<sup>5</sup> The Cartesian way is the one that allows to pose the exact question, namely, how is it possible, for immanent knowledge, to grasp something that is not immanent.<sup>6</sup> The examination of this possibility does not consist, as in Descartes, in a deduction or a demonstration of the existence of transcendence, but in a pure clarification of the essential possibilities of consciousness which brings the structures of pure consciousness itself to light. Thus the main acquisition of the Cartesian way is the production of the visibility of that which is usually invisible, and remains invisible to the empirical sciences of mind as well, for they reduce consciousness to a piece of the world, a "thing", although a different sort of thing.

This is another way to say that what characterises transcendental consciousness is intentionality. And intentionality is the name for the relationship between noesis and noema, that is, something not reducible to either term. This alone, in itself, should suffice to see why the hypothesis of the annihilation of the world in the famous § 49 of *Ideas* is only a mental experiment. The real problem of the Cartesian way depends on the fact that it concentrates on the *actual* structure of consciousness, and in this doing it fails to account for the subjective clarification of the world

as an *intersubjective unity*, which entails the ability to account for the realm of possibility. According to the Cartesian way, at least in its earlier formulations, solipsism seems to be unavoidable. In the *Cartesian Meditations*, accordingly, Husserl shows how the constitution of an *Alter Ego* is possible, in order to produce the conditions of possibility of the transcendental community. But the question of the other egos brings with it the problem of the lower strata of intentional activity, and in particular the problem of passivity. Husserl devotes many efforts to a clarification of this problem. In particular, he sees the opportunity to adopt a genetic approach which can supplement the static or structural approach. This genetic approach opens the possibility for a different way to the reduction, the so-called ontological way. Despite its name, however, even in this case Husserl insists on the subjective side: against Kant, he defends the need to distinguish transcendental subjectivity from the *constructive* concept of a subject which after all is a piece of world. Again it is the naturalisation of transcendental subjectivity that constitutes the real mortal risk for philosophy. Against this risk Husserl develops a third approach to the reduction, the so-called way through intentional psychology.

Thus we can see that the three ways to the reduction are in fact three different modes to reach the same result: the life of consciousness in terms of intentionality. Intentionality is a complex concept: it means that the world is to be seen as "world-for-consciousness", the object of *possible experience*. But it also means that consciousness is nothing without its object, for the intentional definition of consciousness is in terms of *consciousness-of*. The achievement of the reduction is then the awareness that consciousness and world are to be seen as poles of a relation which, as such, becomes the real theme of phenomenology. To distinguish the sphere of transcendental subjectivity from the empirical realms of matter and mind means therefore two things: to account for the peculiar sense of being of consciousness thus defined, and to explain the relations between the transcendental and the mundane spheres. In the *Cartesian Meditations* as well as in the *Krisis*, and in many of Eugen Fink's works as the assistant of Husserl in his last years, the theme of mundanisation becomes prominent, and it plays an important role in Merleau-Ponty's reflection too, in particular in the last phase.

In order to properly grasp Merleau-Ponty's own contribution to the conception of the reduction, one important difference must at this point be stressed. Husserl sees the correlation between subjectivity and objectivity as the transcendental theme of phenomenology. Yet he does not arrive,



or at least not fully and undisputedly, at conceiving of this correlation as another mode of being. He tends to distinguish consciousness and world even when he clearly states that their relationship is in a certain sense more original than the two poles. But with Merleau-Ponty we have an important shift, due to his interest for the “incarnation” of thought. Once one accepts that consciousness does not exist except as intimately connected to a body, then the correlation itself between body and mind becomes more stringent. Thus, as we will see in a moment, it becomes inevitable to inquire into the peculiar ontological status of this middle, or third, term between consciousness and world. This inquiry is done by Merleau-Ponty in his last writings in more details, but is originated by his investigations on the phenomenology of perception.

## 2. MERLEAU-PONTY'S CONCEPTION OF REDUCTION IN *PhP*

His conception of the body proper or lived body is perhaps Merleau-Ponty's most renowned idea. We can provisionally say that the incarnated subject, the subject as body proper, is what appears after the performance of the reduction according to the perspective disclosed in the early works, the *Phenomenology of Perception* in particular. Yet there are many aspects of this conception that need to be clarified. I will schematically analyse them by following the order above indicated for Husserl's case.

I have already mentioned Merleau-Ponty's statement about the impossibility to bring the reduction to a close. But what exactly is the reduction according to *PhP*? In the Preface one can find perhaps the most accomplished analysis of it. There Merleau-Ponty wants to distinguish two Husserls: the one which can be found in the published works, and the other, which emerges from the unpublished texts. But most of all Merleau-Ponty wants to show that these two Husserls are in fact one, and accordingly that Husserl's phenomenology is a complex perspective, not reducible to transcendental idealism. The first lesson of this reading then teaches us that Merleau-Ponty's version of phenomenology is intended as a development of this complex perspective irreducible to the official Husserl which circulated then, but perhaps also later.

In his effort to separate Husserl's phenomenology from its neo-Kantian reading, Merleau-Ponty states that «the best formulation of the reduction is probably that given by Eugen Fink [...], when he spoke of 'wonder' in the face of the world.»<sup>7</sup> The uncompleted and interminable character of the reduction is thus depending on the fact that, precisely because it aims at an effective grasp of “what there is”, which usually is covered up by

unnoticed conceptual masks, the reduction produces the effect of an awakening which can be a shock. By suspending the usual attitudes with which one relates him- or herself – to the world in general, the reduction in fact opens to the awareness of the perceptual world, which in itself is *indeterminate*, where this expressions possesses a positive connotation. Hence the inseparability of essence and existence, which is one of Husserl's merits to have insisted upon; hence the peculiarity of perception in terms of a *logos* of the aesthetic world, different from the *logos* of non-contradictory rationality.

The effect produced by the reduction then cannot but be of wonder, for the perceptual world not only is based on a logic which is other than that of rationality, but is a world with respect to which the subject “belongs to”, is not separated from, and is guided by, almost ruled by. Here emerges the awareness of the fact that such a world, far from being the quiet effect of a *Sinnggebung* performed by a sovereign subjectivity, is what affects the subject from the inside. The subject is thus *subjected* to the world, which guides its sight and its touch, which imposes itself upon it and discloses itself as that which is unmotivated, groundless, endlessly elusive. Rationality then becomes a means to give a structure to what is structureless and yet not chaotic. It is indeed very remarkable that many descriptions usually ascribed to VI are actually to be found already in PhP.

If Merleau-Ponty rejects the idea that the reduction lead to an absolute transparency, this is less in order to abandon Husserl's position than to bring it to its own truth. The whole strategy set up in PhP is to proceed along the lines already indicated by Husserl in his later works and in the unpublished texts. An effect of this reading is the awareness that the reduction poses a methodological problem: if the subject that is to perform it is accounted for in terms of incarnated subjectivity, of the same stuff of which the world is made, then it is difficult to see how this kind of subject can emerge and dominate this world through a disembodied gaze. It is rather as if the world itself is performing a reduction through that particular being which the human being is, according to a reversal of the usual perspective which, however, is not meant to negate experience, but certain philosophical accounts of it.

The clearest way to understand this analysis is to consider Merleau-Ponty's use of a case of illness, that of the patient Schneider. Schneider embodies in a certain sense the subject proper to rationalism and idealism, that is, the one which must bring everything to the clarity of reason in order to understand it and even to *live* it. Schneider suffers from a loss

of those vital bonds which allow human beings to lead a normal life. And Schneider seems to be cut off from most of the experiences which characterise human existence, sexuality and affectivity included. Thus the analysis of this case is a true form of reduction, insofar as it brings to light what usually remains hidden, namely, the bodily attachments which link subjectivity and world. Clearly we are here quite far from Husserl's way of conceiving of the reduction. And yet Merleau-Ponty claims that this is Husserl's real intention of accounting for subjectivity. When he emphasises the embodiment of the Cogito, Merleau-Ponty is not preaching a return to the empirical mind, but on the contrary is claiming that this the only adequate way to account for a subject which is situated, affected by finitude, exposed to the other subject's gaze, in other words characterised by an exteriority which is not due to chance for it is not the contrary of interiority.

All this being said, it must also be remarked that the overwhelming power of the world and its structures does not prevent the subject from playing a crucial role. The world is, in the PhP, the perceived world. As the subtitle of the second section of PhP, devoted to the perceived world, says, «the theory of the body is already a theory of perception»,<sup>8</sup> which means that the world is seen from the bodily subject's perspective. The reduction of the world of separated objects to the coherent systematic totality which is given in perception is possible thanks to the reduction of the soaring-over transcendental subjectivity to the incarnated subject which is born, feels pain and sorrow, is sexually marked, and is bound to die.

It is then as if the notion of incarnated subjectivity is not deepened enough. Once the relationship between subjectivity and world is recognised, and once the world itself is acknowledged as consisting most of all in the relations instituted by subjects in their bodily exchanges, a possibility is thus open to a different perspective, one which sees this middle realm between subjectivity and world as more primordial than the two poles. But to reach such a realm poses peculiar problems to phenomenology and in particular to the reduction. In order to understand their nature we must turn to VI.

### 3. THE PECULIARITY OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION ACCORDING TO VI

One could be tempted to say that in VI Merleau-Ponty accomplishes a double or meta-reduction. If the body proper is the result of a reduction

of the natural attitude, where this concept in Merleau-Ponty means the tendency to separate the body in the empirical sense from the soul in the idealist sense, then the result of the meta-reduction is the flesh. The flesh is this enigmatic concept that receives an ontological status in Merleau-Ponty's later writings. The expression "meta-reduction" can be used insofar as it is a further reduction of the subjectivity proper to the level of the body proper. And it is a further reduction insofar as it deepens that link or relationship between world and subject which is delineated but still insufficiently thought of by means of the concept of body proper. But this is a suggestive way to describe Merleau-Ponty's ontological move which, however, possesses no textual evidence. Yet there are some reasons to suggest such an interpretation, which I would like to put together.

The flesh is a concept meant to explain the power, characterising the body proper, to explore the world without possessing a conceptual representation of it. Merleau-Ponty explicitly adopts this expression by borrowing it from Husserl's posthumously published works, *Ideas II* in particular.<sup>9</sup> How can the body possess such a power, asks Merleau-Ponty, if not because it is "of it", that is, is part of the world? Only by reason of the common belonging to an exteriority which however, in the case of the body, can fold onto itself, and carve out an interiority, can the bodily subject and the perceptual world be communicating. The term "flesh" thus is a common term which is then distinguished into "flesh of the world" and bodily flesh. With respect to PhP, the adoption of this term marks the acquisition of the awareness that this realm is even more primordial than that of the incarnated subjectivity.

At the same time, the world that is in communication with this sort of subjectivity is what Merleau-Ponty calls the "vertical world", that is, something not yet subjected to the laws of the representative consciousness, which tends to institute plans, perspectives, and to separate things and individuals. The vertical world, on the contrary, is the world of co-implications, overlappings, mutual transgressions, absence of linear succession both in space and in time. The primordial subject represented by the flesh thus is part of this vertical world, but is also instituting a first form of difference, because it is able to feel and be felt at the same time, that is, it possesses two sides, as Husserl shows with the famous example of the two hands. For Merleau-Ponty this example in fact holds for every sense, not only touch but also vision and hear, and in general marks the inter-sensory structure of subjectivity and allows a primordial form of communication between subjects which is called intercorporeity. Borrowing another Husserlian expression, Merleau-Ponty speaks of the

space itself which “becomes flesh”: «Es wird Leib».<sup>10</sup> It accomplishes an “Erinnerung”, an Hegelian expression which is here used in the almost literal sense of “going inside”, er-innern. The flesh is then not subjectivity if this means a form of identity, an ego. There is no “I” at work here, the I is a later accomplishment, the outcome of a process of institutions and sedimentations which Merleau-Ponty tends to see as not teleologically preordained, but exposed to chance and in any case to discontinuities.

This interrelation and this reciprocal mirroring between things and bodies is according to Merleau-Ponty a specific kind of Being, one which was not previously recognised by ontology, but which possesses a crucial role for it is, as it were, the matrix of any other being, the irrelative of every relation, as he writes in “The philosopher and its shadow”. To speak of relations means to stick to the idea that the vertical world is a phenomenal world, to be accounted for in terms of intentionality, while at the same time intentionality itself is deeply revised along the lines suggested by Husserl’s conception of working latent intentionality (*fungierende Intentionalität*). The intentional relationships occurring between lived bodies do not express a possession of the world but rather a being dispossessed by the world on the part of the subject. The world is made up of egoless bodily subjectivities which interact with one another anonymously.

Merleau-Ponty thus accomplishes a reversal of the Heideggerian perspective concerning the reduction: for Heidegger the reduction is what unexpectedly occurs to Dasein when its own being-for-the-death imposes itself upon him, and thus singularises him. For Merleau-Ponty, on the contrary, the loss of naïve identity corresponds to the awareness of the carnal roots of subjectivity, to its belonging to a community of bodies which is not yet intersubjectivity, but intercorporeity.<sup>11</sup> As he writes, «the reduction to “egology”, or to the sphere of the proper, like every reduction, is but a proof of the primordial attachments, a way to follow them up to their final prolongations.»<sup>12</sup> The reduction thus is a process of de-singularisation.

This last consideration entails a challenge for phenomenology: when exceeding the limits of egology, phenomenology must become able to bring into its realm that which escapes it, what Merleau-Ponty calls, with an expression coming from Schelling, the “barbaric principle”, the “shadow” of philosophy. In other words, phenomenology must reinvent itself in order to overcome the traditional limits to rationality. Many commentators have seen in this position an implicit rejection of phenomenology. I rather tend to see, in this attempt, the effort to deepen the very

inspiring motives of the phenomenological inquiry, to remain faithful to the will to go the “the things themselves” even when these things are no longer things at all, when they become oneiric entities. In a certain sense, Merleau-Ponty’s version of phenomenology should be seen as an opening to psychoanalysis. One of the last teachings of the ontology of VI is the effort to reach the world of simultaneity,<sup>13</sup> the world of the *omou en panta*, where everything communicates with everything else, and this very structure of relations is the ultimate irrelative, raw Being.

*University of Pavia*  
*Italy*

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> See for example Hua VIII (*Erste Philosophie*, vol. II), pp. 78–80.

<sup>2</sup> In doing this I will mainly follow E. Marbach’s account, in turn influenced by I. Kern’s influential analysis. But other sources will be taken into consideration as well.

<sup>3</sup> Hua XIII, p. 203.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Hua VII, p. 61.

<sup>5</sup> The term is employed by Husserl in the *Krisis*. Cf. Hua VI, p. 158.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Hua II, p. 7. See also Hua VII, p. 64.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Phenomenology of Perception*, Colin Smith (trans.) (London and New York: Routledge, 2002) (Routledge Classics), p. xv. Hereafter referred to as PhP.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. PhP vi and 235.

<sup>9</sup> See for example Merleau-Ponty’s exemplary reading of Husserl in his “The Philosopher and its Shadow”, now published in *Signs*.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Hua, V, p. 145.

<sup>11</sup> See for example the working note dated February, 1959. Cf. *The Visible and the Invisible*, A. Lingis (trans.) (Evanston Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968), pp. 171–172.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. “Le philosophe et son ombre”, *Signes*, Gallimard, Paris 1960, p. 221; my translation.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. many of the last working notes of VI. For example the one dated April, 1960, and entitled “Indestructible past, and intentional analytic – and ontology”.

## CONCEPTIONS OF TIME IN HUSSERL'S SOCIAL WORLDS – MODERN PERSPECTIVE OF *METAXY*

The Husserlian theory of time, showed in *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* (Husserl 1928), is the example of the peculiar breaking up within homogeneous time. According to Husserl, the flow of time is represented by a row of consecutive and *successive* points of time. There the future is later than the past, the past is earlier than 'now', in his theory of time. The past, 'now', and the future do not possess the same nature. These three are not the same in a stream of consciousness, this distinction is the basic condition of the existence of the internal (immanent) time. This time is never-until-the-end constituted, it is the fundamental feature of such time. The time loses the un-constitution, it becomes something total. The past and the future does not come into being in time but they come into being in the consciousness of time. The consciousness seems as blown up by only – momental – 'now', in Husserlian construction. The stream of time, according to Husserl, is divided into consecutive 'now' in a retentional-protentional perspective. That is to say, Husserl had to create very sophisticated constructions. Unfortunately, these constructions go beyond immanent world.

Husserl writes: "Die Urimpression ist das absolut Unmodifizierte, die Urquelle für alles weitere Bewußtsein und Sein. Urimpression hat zum Inhalt das, was Wort jetzt besagt, wofern es im strengsten Sinne genommen wird" (Husserl 1966: 57) and "Die Urimpression ist der absolute Anfang dieser Erzeugung, der Urquell, das, woraus alles andere stetig sich erzeugt" (Husserl 1966: 85).

There are some conclusions from the quotation in the context of what I wrote above.

Firstly, monads are eternal. One of the most important assumption of Husserl's theory of consciousness of time is the idea of a monad without the beginning and the end. The Husserlian schema of retention – 'now' – protention assumes an internal motivation, which displays in the form of internal consciousness of time. There is no reason to assume that in analysis of the stream of the consciousness and in analysis of the internal consciousness of time one may recognize satisfactory instrument and term which are the basis for metaphysical conclusion. In later works, Husserl uses a term of the absolute and eternal monad. An existence of the monad

is the existence in – oneself and for – oneself. This condition consists on a self-constitution that is, without the first and the final ‘now’. Let’s trace the internal time of monad without this metaphysical assumption of the non-temporal-limits-monad.

Secondly, a motivation in the actual consciousness of time and in the primordial consciousness of time does not accompany a subject from the beginning of his or her consciousness life, that is, an interpretation is done on the basis of previous experiences. Does it mean that the consciousness-in-a-pure-‘now’ can not interpret and can not be the complete consciousness? The reference to the *Nullpunkt* is the basis of our interpretation, in the foregoing question, however, the existence of consciousness-in-the-pre-point is “only” pure and full depiction of reality. We are coming to the conclusion (is it right?) that, previous experiences as resources of at-hand-knowledge – are schema with respect to the constitution of internal time. This historical-ness is given because we can make reference to the past of every individual in concrete ‘now’ (cf. Schütz 1962, *The Phenomenology and the Social Science*: 133–134).

I will call to question these two preliminary assumptions concerning a consciousness of time, and I will make an attempt showing limited usefulness of such constructions.

# 1.

Let’s imagine a birth of individual consciousness (supposing the individual is not the eternal monad). According to Heidegger, more primordial than the man himself is the finiteness of *Dasein* in him; *Dasein* is the most primordial in his consciousness. I am not interested in time as constituting of my universal sense of the world, at the moment, that is, the sense which appeals to my retention and protention, appeals to my consciousness of the flowing time, as well to the socialised and the intersubjective time. I am only interested in a feeling of time in his specific ‘now’. I reduce my individual feeling of time as deeply as I do not reach retention and protention.

Well, I can go on to a situation of subject (for example, on to situation of a baby, who consciousness is just being born). Husserl writes on such latent monad in the following way:

‘Der Urhorizont, die Erbmasse ist in ihrem Ursinn Leerhorizont. Die erste Hyle, das erst Affizierende wird zum erst Erfassten, in erster Zuwendung ist es erstes Thema als erst Erfüllendes. (...) Das Urkind – wie ist es als Ich, polar auf erste Daten gerichtet, worin



besteht seine "instinktive" Habitualität? Das mutterleibliche Kind hat schon Kinästhesen und kinästhetisch beweglich seine 'Dinge' – schon eine Primordialität in Urstufe sich ausbildend' (Husserl 1973: 604–605).

There is such *Nullpunkt* of his or her consciousness in which appears *Einfühlung* connected with the self-consciousness. There is no retention that's why there is no protention because the first one determines the second one – the three-dimensional perspective from 'point-instants' (retention-'now'-protention) requires "longer"-than-the-first-'now' experience of time. We must take into consideration that experience of time accompanies always, too. It is a transcendental mental life-process in the natural attitude, because there is no attitude with the exception of natural one.

In phenomenology, which goes after Husserl, we can not point at consideration beside internal or immanent time. Thus consideration of the birth of the consciousness of time creates some difficulties. Namely, we deal with two different conditions of the consciousness of time. (1.) The consciousness of the first 'now' – the-being-the-form-of-the-pure-'now', and (2.) the consciousness of 'now' in retentional-protentional time – the-being-the-form-of-the-'now'-between-before-and-after.

The atemporal existence is the absolute existence. Also, there is no contradiction between the consciousness of the first 'now' and the consciousness of a retentional-protentional time. In that case we deal with two qualitative different conditions. (1.) The condition of the consciousness outside the retentional-protentional time of the first 'now' (a simultaneously lack of the consciousness of my consciousness outside time), and (2.) the condition of the consciousness of my consciousness outside retentional-protentional time. In the first case, the existence in the *Nullpunkt* is "only" the pure and unconditional reception of reality, in the second one, we deal with a reference to the *Nullpunkt* as a basis of the interpretation. On the one hand, the consciousness is blind because it does not know retentional-protentional perspective, on the second hand, the consciousness outside retentional-protentional time is the intentional correlate for the consciousness of time. The objectivisation of the first level takes place outside the time, the objectivisation of the second one takes place above the time. The second kind of the objectivisation exceeds the monolinear pattern of a sheer succession in 'now' of the acts since each "reference to" primordial temporality supposes a continuity of an action. The action is deprived of a limited perspective of retention-'now'-proten-

tion and is potentially referred to 'future' by 'now', an action does not take place in 'now' noticed in the prism of 'before'.

In the first case (in the-being-the-form-of-the-pure-'now'), the consciousness is anonymous and it is not non-individual (only an individual consciousness can enter the reality). The creation of the consciousness of internal time is a derivative process to the consciousness, which is, inherently, atemporal that is, the first 'now' is recognised only into perspective of 'before'. An experience of the first 'now' is *temporal unconscious*. We can say it because the consciousness was not experienced in internal time in the retentional-protentional perspective, the consciousness was not motioned in "objective" time. Also an experience of the first 'now' is *conscious* because the consciousness in the pure way participates in reality; this process takes place without participation in the temporal character any 'now'. The consciousness (in *post factum* interpretation the being-the-form-of-the-pure-'now') as the pure *Einfühlung* of reality wins the memory of reality and it wins internal and temporal perspective of social communication. Simultaneously, the consciousness "loses" a part of its nature (namely, it loses the atemporal character – as a result of the transcendental reduction, the pure consciousness appears as absolute). Husserlian *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* are based on the radical uncontinuity between re-presenting appearance and symbolical representing. According to Husserl:

'intuition (and empty representation as well) is simple, immediate representation of the object; a symbolic representation is a founded representation – empty – mediated through a simple representation. An intuitive representation brings the object to appearance; and empty representations does not' (Husserl 1991, *Appendix II*: 107).

Die erste Form des (Zeitbewußtseins) ist eine 'gemeinsame Form des Jetzt' (Diemer 1965: 131).

In the second case (in the being-the-form-of-the-'now'-between-before-and-after), there is an existential tension, which appears at the moment when the consciousness recognises 'now' in the context of the future. There is the existential tension between a-temporality in pre-cognition and a cognition into perspective of retention-'now'-protention, between 'before' and 'after'. The "now" every time exists and the 'before' and the 'after' fix its borders.

But existential tension is not our main problem. The first 'now' is neither dispersive nor collective (cf. Casey). The first 'now' does not create the retentional-'now'-protentional scheme of time, it does not possess memory, it is not monolinear. Only the consciousness of the first-'now'-

is-being-been-in-the-past (only the consciousness of the past of the first 'now') creates monolinear view of time and monolinear pattern of sheer succession – an assumption has been used by Husserl, and earlier, by Aristotle, Augustine and Kant, alike. An atomization of time on the momentaneous 'now' has been the cause of representation of time by what was 'before' and what was or will be 'after'. In this way, the 'now' has been the main term in the theory of consciousness of time. The 'now', like an atom, has been stopped conceivable and, according to Aristotle, it is the border between the past and the future. The 'now' is a peculiar *templum* of various theories of time, it is a place into which we can only walk, and from which we can never manumit. Such consciousness of time has got problems with a recognition of monosubjectivity and intersubjectivity, and it creates a monolinear time-grid. This time is not exactly formed by the consciousness of the stream of time but the time is a subject of dispersiveness of the static 'now'.

Let's use some example. Suppose that the suffering is a memory of pain. We have only access to pain, in our case. While the pain finishes, the dispersal of time covers its activity tracks. Thus the extent is very biological – the objectivisation takes place on very ground level.

'Time may be felt *by* the body (...) but it is not felt as such *in* it' (1987: 182),

writes Casey. Well, we admit the pain, but we are not capable of recognising the suffering, subjectively too. The feeling of pain is, in this schema, an idle stimulus – the nature of the generated time does not admit to creation of the consciousness of pain consciousness. In this case, the pure 'now' is only a term, it is not the condition (or state) of consciousness. There is no passive constituted co-present or *empfindende Vergegenwärtigung*. We can not agree with Husserl who inserts in his system the conception of teleological progress of thinking and being (*Ur-Ich*) which precedes *ego* and *alter-ego*. Only an abstraction which realies on impressions and the impressions areas causes that *Zeitigung* – in way of *Anschauung* – can be expressed as taking place and can be expressed as occuring of something what senses informs about, *only*. The constitution of consciousness involves *Zeitigung*, strictly. According to Husserl:

'jedes Ich, das ich als anderes in originaler Vergegenwärtigung erfahre, hat seine Einheit und sein strömendes Leben, seinen immanent-zeitlichen Strom sachlicher Zeitigung, seine primordiale Natur' (Husserl 1973).

On the one hand, the limitation of a space perspective can be important for cognition – for example, the narrowing of space to the space between two columns of a cloister can provide new elements of an architectural style and can separate part of space. On the second hand, a narrowing of stream of time to something what is between ‘before’ and ‘after’ does not permit taking a sense of the whole. The monosubjectivity of the consciousness of time is based not on a resignation from a position halfway between ‘before’ and ‘after’ but it means that the monosubjective time is measured by the manner of lapse, that is, a mono-dimensional grid of the time (a row of consecutive columns) is replaced with the continuity of time duration. There is no ‘now’ which can be separated as a moment, no ‘now’ which can be represented as a pure point-ness. Nevertheless, the internal consciousness of time possesses a centre – a point-ness (a lack of extent) of the actual ‘now’.

When I say: “something happened”, it means that something happened for every another subject, potentially. This rule is in force even if something did not happen subjectively for the Other. The Other treats his experience of the past regardless he is capable of understanding of an event or not (cf. Husserl 1965: *passim*). *Periechon* (container) is off significance, borders. The consciousness of the flowing of time stream that is, the statement of the fact that was such ‘now’, which is the past, that there is a difference between that ‘now’ and actual ‘now’, that there is a relation *between* them.

And what follows, the metaphysics of presence as self-consciousness (cf. Derrida) does not fit the scholastic distinction in which ‘now’ is the opposition to non-‘now’ (‘before’ and ‘after’). This presence for oneself and for the Another is created in an absolute unity in *Anschauung* of time –

there is no distinction between hidden and unhidden, shadows and real things, light and dark (Heidegger 2002: 22).

However, Kersten interprets Husserl’s theory of retentive-protentive time in this way.

(1.) Any mental life-process, is immediately presented in full concreteness as protentive and retentive. (2.) The only noematic objects protended to and retended to are immanent once consisting of other intensive extens or phases of mental life-process. Husserl exercises a reduction of the really inherent hyletic datum to the status of a noematic objective sense of the flowing consciousness-of “the tone” in its manners of appearance of actually now and just past (Kersten 1989: 269).

We may therefore also say that 'now' is the "product" of its own intentiveness to time, that it is essentially and necessarily an identifying and differentiating synthesis having gone on and yet to come. But this can only be because the retentive-protentive structure constituting time in the proper sense, and mental living as inherently temporal, is objectivated as the identical time at each intermediary level of constitution. According to Kersten (cf. 1989: 273), the process of "self-temporalisation", the process of "self-constituting" of transcendental mental living as past, present, and future in the manner described, does not, however, "reconstitute" itself or "multiply" itself. That is to say, at the level of oriented constitution peculiar to time, transcendental mental life is transcendently temporalized, with the identical structure of transcendental intentiveness to time. Given schema of a transcendental mental life-process with respect to process as a whole is objectivated as "unflowing" frame consisting of future, present, and past. The current extent flows through this frame such that the relation of any portion of the extent to each part of the frame changes continuously. The "tense" of the posited characteristic of each portion changes continuously from "will be later" to "will be soon" to "is" to "was recently" to "was earlier" to "was still earlier". The change in "tense" of the positioned characteristics of the extents is a consequence of the flow out of the future, through the present into the past. If it is not the case, mental life-processes would be nothing but continuous recurrence, hence would provide no basis for building up the real, the objective world within which mental life-processes find themselves. It is the "condition" for my transcendental life. But the change in "tense" is only a necessary, not a sufficient, "condition" for being in the world. It is true, but the mental construction of time, in other words, transcendental mental living, which constitutes 'now', disappoints when we can define pure 'now'. This Husserlian construction does not take into consideration a pure concept of flowing time. The unity of an enduring extent of any mental life-process is possible only in so far as it presents itself in correlation with something identical presented in and through a multiplicity of different temporal extents continually changing in orientation and "tense". On the one hand, consciousness of internal time relates to the present (the consciousness of time and its reference to the wider, retentive-protentive context is built by the sense of 'now') on the other hand, the social time is built by the reference to the past, to an experience. The centre of gravity of immanent temporality moves into the past.

Aristotle is right when he claims that now constitutes a border between the past and the future, but the 'now' does not determine the border in relation to *only* the past and to *only* the future. Real objects exist in time in relation to monosubjectivity and intersubjectivity of an individual. This horizon of individual 'now' expresses in an action that is, in the horizon of individual relation to 'before' and to 'after', simultaneously. Ontological sense of primordial temporality – Aristotelian *καίρως* – is the time of subject action. Consciousness contains time itself, but it is two-dimensional time. I would not like to trivialize time but to make it into a dimension of space through the active influence of place. On the other hand, time is trivialized when it is reduced to monolinear pattern of sheer succession and monolinear time-grid. This is reasoning which leads us to wrong problems, for example, two simple 'now' can not exist at the same time.

## 2.

How does a motivation create internal consciousness of time? It is the consciousness of being-something-distinct. It seems that *μεταξύ* (in-between) makes a shift that uncovers a difference between things and the stream of the consciousness. The fundamental and primordial condition of the sense of time is the discovery of the difference between things and the stream of the consciousness (cf. Husserl 1963: *Med. II*). Psychology confirms it. According to psychology, the first days of the mental development of babyhood proceed as learning of own autonomy and recognising new and more and more subtle external stimuli, mainly. An individual in the very early babyhood is too weak to learn to escape from external danger. He or she is strong enough to learn own autonomy, and then, to use this ability in order to defend himself or herself. Even though the consciousness of time does not accompany the subject from this first 'now', but from the first 'now' it is accompanied by the sense of change created by the consciousness of autonomy. If there is no consciousness of autonomy there is no consciousness of time. If there is no consciousness of autonomy the internal time would be identical with the natural time in that sense the consciousness of time would consist in uniform retention-'now'-protention schema of all subjects. It means: the present could not relive *and*, of course, the present could never be given again. Let's notice:

'we shall never again experience the previous (...) period in time in its aboriginal form whereas I might well return to a perduring place. We are particularly prone to alienation-

effect when we become aware of profound temporal gulf existing between the self who is presently remembering and the self being remembered. The time in which the latter self existed has elapsed definitively and forever; it is a *temps mort*

as claims Casey (1987: 75).

There are two kinds of 'now'. Firstly, the 'now' as the only 'now', as 'now' identical with itself, which contains whole time of consciousness. Secondly, the 'now' as the relation-of-before-and-after-ness. In the first case, the 'now' is absolute in relation to the consciousness. In the second case, the 'now' is an reflection on the first one, but the nature of the second 'now' is essentially dissimilar because it is accompanied with temporal location between 'before' and 'after' – between the 'now' which was and the 'now' which will be. Does it mean that the nature of consciousness of time is variable? The consciousness is not based on time, but it is perfect and whole not in time, but in every moment, in every 'now'. The 'now' can not be abstract from the stream of time consciousness.

### 3.

Primordial consciousness of time does not build a picture of the world in *epoché*. The rejecting of the world could not allow primordial consciousness to build the monosubjective or the intersubjective consciousness of time. In another words, it could not allow to create a consciousness of real world in "time" of the first 'now' in which takes place the creating of the retentional-protentional consciousness of time. We can assume that the transcendental reduction can not be made when the consciousness of time is non-retentional-protentional, in other words, the natural attitude and *epoché* are out-intentionally identical (in ontological sense).

Why does subject fall in ruts the natural attitude and does not call into question the reality? It seems that the time is responsible for it. The first pure 'now' enables the subject to enter reality by total acceptance of it, only. The pure 'now' is not a retentional-protentional 'now' – being-the-form-of-the-pure-'now' is not being-the-form-of-the-'now'-between-before-and-after. Pure 'now' is identical for each subject thus the way of the beginning of expressing of own time is identical. We deal with later, different impressions, depictions etc. belonging to subjects but they are placed in the same context of 'now'.

Between what we know and what is new for us appears platonic *pathos* – astonishment. Being-the-form-of-the-pure-'now' and being-the-form-of-the-'now'-between-before-and-after, there are two orders of time, indepen-

dent of each other. The pure 'now' is a kind of contemplation of reality, similarly the retentional-protentional 'now' constitutes the monolinear time.

In what way does the time of intersubjectivity constitute? In the first place, there is nothing made which ontologically and objectively exists outside the monad. The pure (in the temporal sense) *ego* takes place of absolute 'now'. Non-retentional-protentional position of *nunc stans* is in universal reference to *nunc fluens*, which is defined by the first one. This primordial position of pure *ego* is, according to Husserl, a source and a basis of temporal modifications, it is a foundation of unity (homogeneous-ness) of time stream. *Nunc stans* changes into *nunc fluens* in time of the life of the *ego*. But, is there a difference between the first one and the second one? The difference between the 'now'-consciousness and the consciousness of the retentional-protentional modification shows the fundamental condition of the difference between non-directional contemplation of the pure being and two-directional – towards the 'before' and towards the 'after' (τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον) – reference to the being marked by a stamp of the consciousness in the temporal flow. In time, the "life of the *ego*" temporalizes itself. The primal 'now' (*Ur-Jetzt*) of non-directional-in-time of the consciousness is the initial "point" of the inner time-flow in relation to the pretemporal position of the pure *ego* (*nunc stans*). The primal 'now' and the being are a unity for lack of temporal horizon and temporal duration – the consciousness is dropped in being.

We can say that "the absolute temporal flow is to be interpreted as the *horizon* of the *ego* itself, i.e., of the *ego* objectifying itself in its reflective pursuit of itself" (Chernyakov 2002: 196).

Husserl insists that the self-recognition of the *ego* in its "life" or primal being (*Ur-sein*) does not require temporal duration.

Husserl writes (1952: 252): "the *ego* does not arise originally out of experience – in the sense of the associative apperception, in which the unities of the manifold of the nexus constitute themselves – but rather out of its own life (it is, what it is, not *for* the *ego* but, rather, it is itself the *ego*)".

The trait of the unity is visible in retentional-protentional consciousness, too. The consciousness of the "internal horizon" of the intentional object preserves its bond with the point-like 'now'; it is either the retained



or the anticipated content of the primal impression. However the former unity of the being and primordial 'now' is changed into the unity of temporal flow. This new flow marks the being as duration. Thus the beyond-monadical time is strange. Monad is related to own grid of time, only. All that beyond-monad uses a category "in-between" in horizon of the past.

We come to the conclusion that the first experience of time encounters with non-temporal consciousness. The pure 'now' is invariable and, in a sense, is eternal because it is not subjected to qualification by the retentional-protentional consciousness of time. Such consciousness has not access to the temporality of another consciousness – it is static. This mechanics is very well visible in constitution of common 'now', in Husserlian *Paarung*. Husserl (1973: 343) writes as follows:

'Im aktuellen Vollzug einer Einfühlung "deckt" sich so meine urmodale strömende Gegenwart, mein urmodales Ich-bin, dessen Jetzt-Gegenwärtigsein Sein aus der urpräsentierenden Zeitigung ist (das im engsten und eigentlichsten Sinne präsent- (jetzt-) seiende Ich), mit der urmodalen Gegenwart des Anderen, die aber für mich nicht urmodale, sondern appräsentierte ist; und von da aus ergreift die Deckung die beiderseitigen Horizonte. Es decken sich dabei mein urmodales urimpressionales Jetzt, der absolute Quellpunkt der urmodalen Ursprünglichkeit, mit dem einfühlungsmässig vergegenwärtigten urimpressionalen Quellpunkt-Jetzt, das in dieser Deckung zugleich ist mit dem meinen nach Form und Inhalt. Die Abwandlungsform der Soeben wiederholt sich in der Vergegenwärtigung und deckt sich Phase für Phase mit der urmodal verlaufenden Abwandlung, und zwar konkret nach Form und Inhalt, und so wiederholt sich auch die in der lebending strömenden Gegenwart konstituierte Identität der strömend in immer weitere frische Vergangenheit Versinkenden und damit die identisch verharrende erfüllte Zeit Phase für Phase, und das Wiederholte steht Phase für Phase nach Form und Gehalt in Deckung, und so konstituiert sich ein zeitliches Zugleich der übermonadischen oder intermonadischen Zeit höherer Stufe.'

As we can see, the basic constitution of time consciousness is an intersubjectively identity of what becomes the past. According to Husserl, only temporal simultaneousness is *conditio sine qua non* of the constitution. No one can say on socialisation of individuality in very early babyhood, which separates himself or herself from the world. The most primary identity is not a close identity, it is the lack of any individual unconveters and it is a consequence of initial-primordial irreversibility of thought (cf. Piaget 1972, *passim*). The primordial consciousness of time is born because of reversibility and it is born because definition of the individual retentional-protentional horizon of time. If the pure 'now' had virtue of individual identity (which allows the consciousness to free from retentional-protentional schema of 'now') surely the consciousness would

develop on the internal and non-temporal level. The close consciousness arises *simultaneously* with the retentional-protentional consciousness of time. *Ursprünglichkeit* as well as *Quellpunkt-Jetzt* assume “what just passed”, thus inter-mond time is not exactly the common time of the streams of the consciousness that overlap time horizons of two identities.

What is invariable and what is retentional-protentional merges with one another. There is no contradiction between the initial-primordial unity and the retentional-protentional multitude. In the first case, we know only the ideal felling of ‘now’, in the second one, we have the full context of time in the *simple* consciousness of time. Thus, in the horizon of this world pure “now” flies, retentional-protentional “now” goes on as stream of time.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

##### Sources:

- Husserl, Edmund. *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, Martin Heidegger (Hrsg.), *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Band IX, 1928, s. 367–490.
- . *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, Den Haag, 1963.
- . *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy: Philosophy as Rigorous Science and Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man*, translation with notes and an introduction by Quentin Lauer, New York: Harper and Row, 1965.
- . *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins* (1893–1917), R. Boehm (Hrsg.), Den Haag, 1966.
- . *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Dritter Teil, 1929–1935*. Den Haag, 1973.
- . *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, translated from German by John Barnett Brough, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991.

##### Resources:

- Casey, Edward S. *Remembering. A Phenomenological Study*. Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987.
- Chernyakov, Alexei. *The Ontology of Time. Being and Time in the Philosophies of Aristotle, Husserl and Heidegger*, *Phaenomenologica*, vol. 163, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.
- Diemer, Alwin. *Edmund Husserl, Versuch einer systematischen Darstellung seiner Phänomenologie, 2. verbesserte Auflage*, Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung begründet von Georgi Schischkoff, Band 15, Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain KG, 1965.
- Heidegger, Martin. *The Essence of Truth, On Plato's Cave Allegory and Theaetetus*, translated from German by Ted Sadler. London/New York: Continuum, 2002.

- Kersten, Fred. *Phenomenological Method: Theory and Practice*. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.
- Piaget, Jean. *Psychology and Epistemology: Towards a Theory of Knowledge*, P. A. Wells (trans.). Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972.
- Schütz, Alfred. *Collected Papers*, vol. 1: *The Problem of Social Reality*, edited and introduced by M. Natanson with a preface by H. L. van Breda. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.

## ALFRED SCHUTZ'S CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF HUSSERL'S TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY

Alfred Schutz applied Husserlian phenomenology to the study of the social world. And although many applied studies appeared in Husserl's *Jahrbuch*, the journal for phenomenological research, Schutz engaged in a sustained and exhaustive study that pioneered social phenomenology. Husserl highly approved of Schutz's application, and Schutz looked to Husserl to continue developing phenomenology at deeper levels concerning which Schutz did not plan to venture. Schutz's phenomenological application to interpretive sociology relies on Husserlian transcendental phenomenology in fundamental ways and so Husserl's successes and failures would have direct consequences for the founded level of Schutz's work. It is the purpose of this paper to exhibit the changing relationship involving the two phenomenologies as Schutz presents it and the developments in his interpretation concerning Husserl's attempt to ground intersubjectivity through the transcendental reduction. It is not necessary to articulate every component of Schutz's arguments; I only choose passages that are pivotal in Schutz's continual attention to the problem of intersubjectivity. In addition, I assess Schutz's redevelopment of the problem concerning the foundation for social phenomenology, and I shall be critical of his solution to the problems posed by transcendental phenomenology. Finally I make suggestions concerning the direction that can be taken in light of Schutz's later orientation.

In his first important phenomenological work, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt* (1932), Schutz is concerned with providing a phenomenological clarification of Max Weber's interpretive sociology. Schutz maintains that without a phenomenological understanding of consciousness, sociology cannot adequately distinguish and account for various fundamental aspects of *verstehen*, such as the point of view of the actor versus the point of view of the observer and the nature of human action. In his preface to the work Schutz writes, "In this work I have attempted to trace the roots of the problem of the social sciences directly back to the fundamental facts of conscious life."<sup>1</sup> And then in the first chapter: "Whoever, then, wishes to analyze the basic concepts of the social sciences must be willing to embark on a laborious journey, for the meaning-structure of the social world can only be deduced from the most primitive

and general characteristics of consciousness.”<sup>2</sup> He follows with discussion of Henri Bergson and Edmund Husserl concerning their investigations of inner time. Schutz also extols the merits of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. The foundation that these thinkers have laid “have at last made possible the solution to the riddles of meaning-establishment and meaning-interpretation.”<sup>3</sup>

Schutz not only seeks a clarification for the fundamental terms and structures of interpretive sociology, but also a foundation upon which the clarification is grounded. Schutz declares his own attempt, the work, *Lebensformen und Sinnstruktur*, unsuccessful, for he builds life forms upon Bergson’s *durée*, about which he recognizes an insoluble epistemological problem of positing an ego-less structure from the standpoint of ego-thought. And so he turns to the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. According to Schutz, interpretive sociology is to be grounded through a thorough investigation of the structures of consciousness. But, also, in turn, the structures of the social world (e.g., world of predecessors, they-relation) require transcendental phenomenology as their foundation, for it is through transcendental subjectivity that all meanings, including social meanings, are constituted. Schutz’s sociology, which consists of analysis of the constitutive acts of consciousness concerning Others and the eidetic description of the structures of the social world, is not a transcendental phenomenology. Schutz explains, “The purpose of this work, which is to analyze the phenomenon of meaning in ordinary (*mundanen*) social life, does not require the achievement of a transcendental knowledge that goes beyond that sphere or a further sojourn within the area of the transcendental reduction.”<sup>4</sup> Schutz’s phenomenology remains with the phenomena of meaning that appear within the natural attitude. “We shall ... be carrying on ‘as constitutive phenomenology of the natural standpoint’ that phenomenological psychology which, according to Husserl, is ... nothing other than a psychology of pure intersubjectivity.”<sup>5</sup> “Pure” in this passage means eidetic; it does not mean transcendental. Constitutive phenomenology accounts for the structures of meaning as they are built up in consciousness and Schutz takes an eidetic approach, which is to seek the invariant structures of “a society composed of living minds.”<sup>6</sup>

Schutz’s phenomenology is not transcendental phenomenology, but it is understood to depend on its foundational level of constitution to further clarify the meaning structures of mundane life and to provide them with a transcendental foundation. Even though Schutz’s constitutive phenomenology does not make a reduction to the pure life of the transcendental ego, it still carries out a phenomenological reduction that opens the field

of meaning constitution concerning the subjective experience of the social world. The natural attitude is bracketed, in order to clarify the constitutive process that the mundane ego naively lives, but about which the mundane ego is unaware. "It is only after I 'bracket' the natural world and attend only to my conscious experiences within the phenomenological reduction, it is only after I have done these things that I become aware of this process of constitution."<sup>7</sup> To the person remaining in the natural attitude, the problem of objective versus subjective meaning, for example, remains unknown or inadequately clarified and this is why it takes a phenomenologist of the social world to open the field of constitutivity. By distinguishing subjective and objective meanings, ambiguities that haunt the Weberian project are brought to clarity.

On the other hand, certain problems, which are not found at the level of "mundane" phenomenology, emerge at the deeper reduction of transcendental phenomenology. Schutz states that his phenomenology leaves aside "all problems of transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity, which in fact emerge only after the phenomenological reduction."<sup>8</sup> Yet, Schutz recognizes that the problems arising at the transcendental level have not been adequately addressed. "The problem of how the intersubjectivity of all knowledge and thought can be transcendently deduced is something beyond the scope of the present study, even though its analysis would completely clarify the concept of objective meaning. This most difficult and basic problem of every phenomenology of knowledge was stated in Husserl's *Formal and Transcendental Logic* but by no means solved."<sup>9</sup> Husserl raises the problems in that work, but had not embarked in finding solutions to them. The "*Logic*" was the latest publication at that time that Schutz had studied during the writing of the "*der sozialen Welt*."

Thus, Schutz is aware that the transcendental foundation upon which he expects to found his constitutive phenomenology of the natural standpoint is fraught with problems and thus the grounding of social phenomenology remains for him only a promise. The problem that both Schutz and Husserl acknowledge, which is most germane to interpretive sociology, is the problem of intersubjectivity. In a footnote to his 1932 publication, Schutz writes, "Husserl's *Méditations cartésiennes* (Paris 1931) became available to me only after I had completed the present work, and I could not therefore rely upon it in my presentation of Husserl's views."<sup>10</sup> Schutz understands that the attempt to find the solution to the problem of intersubjectivity at the level of transcendental phenomenology occurs in the "meditations," and that the fate of the foundation for his social phenomenology may rest on its success or failure.

I now want to draw attention to a paper written ten years later in 1942, "Scheler's Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego." Here Schutz plainly states that "the problem of the alter ego is the real crux of any transcendental philosophy."<sup>11</sup> He recognizes that Husserl is aware that the specter of solipsism follows from the transcendental reduction and that Husserl offers a solution to the problem of the alter ego in the fifth Cartesian meditation. Husserl had already made the reduction to the transcendental field in the previous meditations and he succeeded to demonstrate genetic phenomenology to be the building up of sense from the standpoint of transcendental subjectivity as a monadology. But from this already reduced transcendental realm, Husserl abstracts the *Eigensphäre*, "my own peculiar sphere." Subsequently all meanings that immediately or mediately involve the subjectivity of Others are eliminated. Schutz explicates that the consequence of this abstraction is that the surrounding world of Nature is rendered to be no longer common to everyone, because in "my own peculiar sphere" it now becomes my private world, losing the character of intersubjectivity. Having removed intersubjectivity Husserl looks for that structure in this sphere that will admit the Other, and this structure would have to be found within the most primitive level of consciousness, passive synthesis. This structure is "pairing" whereby objects emerge as analogous to my own body "and are therefore apperceived as other people's bodies."<sup>12</sup> Concerning these bodies, "I" interpret their movements as an expression of their psychical life, for I know this is the relation that I have to my own embodiment. And so "the Other is constituted within my monad as an Ego that is not 'I myself but a second, an *alter ego*.'"<sup>13</sup> And so an alter ego is paired with my own even in the very structure of "my own peculiar sphere."

After explicating Husserl's discussion in the fifth meditation, Schutz turns to a critical evaluation of its claims. His first criticism is that in order to abstract from all meanings concerning Others, the non-reference to Others is the principle of demarcation for what is to remain within "my own peculiar sphere" and what is to be eliminated. But, that means the principle of non-reference to Others, the criterion, must still subsist within the peculiar sphere of the transcendental monad. Consequently, this meaning, "nonrelation to Others," remains as a datum, that is, a meaning that is not constituted from within the *Eigensphäre* of transcendental subjectivity. The fact that an extrinsic principle is constitutive of the main functionality of "my peculiar sphere" proves its abstractive nature. But what needs to be accounted for is how an abstraction to "my own peculiar sphere" is possible without presuming such a principle of

non-Other orientation in order to distinguish it from the moment of monadic life that only includes acts of Other-orientation. By assuming the analytic principle, the abstraction to "my own peculiar sphere" is foiled for all of its contents must assume the principle of Other-orientation in order to be distinguished from it as non-Other orientation.

Secondly, when the transcendental reduction is made, nothing remains except my own unified stream of consciousness. This stream is closed: it exhibits the property of a windowless monad. This stream of consciousness now is understood to be intentionally related to its life-world with the full content of the life-world left intact. In the natural attitude, the life-world is experienced as intersubjective and so its intersubjective character is not lost on the basis of the reduction. "The fact that Husserl feels induced to apply within the reduced sphere the device of abstracting from the meaning of 'Others' proves this statement rather than refutes it."<sup>14</sup> We may ask that, if intersubjectivity is a fundamental moment of the life-world, then why does Husserl abstract from intersubjectivity? All content has to be phenomenologically clarified after the reduction but it is only this one aspect, intersubjectivity, for which Husserl forms this special strategy of abstraction. The reason for this move is that Husserl must ground transcendental intersubjectivity and he can only do so by constituting intersubjectivity at the transcendental level. But according to Schutz, all Husserl has succeeded in doing is to show that within the transcendental sphere Others also are revealed as windowless monads. And thus the fifth meditation leaves us with a "cosmos of monads."<sup>15</sup> In other words, what is constituted is the Other from within my reduced sphere, and presumably the Other like me does the same within his windowless monad, which does not bring us to a transcendental intersubjective relation.

In his 1948 article, "Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego," Schutz agrees with Sartre that "Husserl has not succeeded [sic] in explaining the problem of intersubjectivity in terms of a relationship between transcendental subjectivities."<sup>16</sup> Sartre's position is that the ego only emerges as a construction, that is, an empirical object. Schutz does not go so far as only admitting an empirical ego but nevertheless maintains that the appresenting function in the coupling (pairing in the fifth meditation) does not present the Other's transcendental ego, but the psychophysical I as it had been reduced in the transcendental sphere. This is obviously so because the appresented Other is first grasped in the passive synthesis of perception, which presents the body of an Other as an object in the outer world. And so what the other I pairs with, is also an object in the outer world,



which is the body of my psychophysical I. An Other's body is taken as a body like mine, a psychophysical unity. And so, that body indicates the mental life of the Other just as my own body expresses my mental life. Through this genetic phenomenology, Husserl traces the emergence of the Other in the consciousness of the mundane ego. "Yet he has not shown the possibility of a coexisting transcendental Alter Ego constituted within and by the activities of the transcendental ego. This, however, would be necessary in order to overcome the solipsistic argument in the transcendental sphere."<sup>17</sup> So, Schutz maintains that Husserl has only transcendentially clarified the emergence of the Other on the basis of the natural standpoint and has not succeeded in the intuitive apprehension of another transcendental ego, which would be the first move in establishing intersubjectivity at the transcendental level.

In 1957, Schutz presented his article, "Transcendental Intersubjectivity." Here Schutz takes a different approach. For sake of argument, he entertains the hypothesis that Husserl had been able to constitute the Other's transcendental ego and not merely the Other's mundane ego within the transcendentially reduced sphere. Still an insurmountable problem remains, which is to constitute a transcendental community, a transcendental we-relationship. "On the contrary, each transcendental ego has now constituted for himself, as to its being and sense, his world, and in it all other subjects, including myself *but* he has constituted them *just for himself and not for all other transcendental egos as well.*"<sup>18</sup> Communication presupposes intersubjective sharing and this would mean that the egos that are constituents of this community would recognize this community, a shared world. But, the other transcendental egos are constituted within the primal ego of the phenomenologist in the transcendental attitude where no communication can take place.

Schutz concludes that Husserl's attempts have not succeeded in securing transcendental intersubjectivity on the basis of the transcendental ego. There is intersubjectivity at the mundane level, which remains within the reduced transcendental sphere as pure appearance, but there is no transcendental correlate to mundane intersubjectivity as there is a correlate of mundane ego and transcendental ego. Thus, transcendental phenomenology cannot ground intersubjectivity as a constitutive agency, but only as a constituted object within its field. From this Schutz surmises "that intersubjectivity is not a problem of constitution which can be solved within the transcendental sphere, but is rather a datum (*Gegebenheit*) of the life-world. It is a fundamental ontological category of human existence in the world and therefore of all philosophical anthropology."<sup>19</sup> Schutz

comes to the conclusion that "only an ontology of the life-world, not a transcendental constitutional analysis, can clarify that essential relationship of intersubjectivity which is the basis of all social science."<sup>20</sup>

At this juncture, it is appropriate to raise questions concerning Schutzian social phenomenology. In his 1932 book-length study, Schutz depends on Husserl's transcendental phenomenology to ground his phenomenology of the natural attitude. This is an important grounding, for he opts for a sociology of *verstehen*, which allows him to clarify social structures and human action on the basis of constitution. Constitution is recognized as the foundation of sense and is viewed as the activity of consciousness, sense-bestowal; consciousness is understood to be the only sense-constituting agency. It is the case that the constitutivity naively lived by the mundane ego can be clarified through transcendental phenomenology, because the transcendental ego accompanies the mundane ego, but is privy to the constitutive activities of which the mundane ego is unaware. The activities of the transcendental ego are laid bare by the reduction, but each individual gains its access privately. And, in fact, Schutz cites private accessibility as an egregious difficulty for the case for transcendental intersubjectivity. The failure to establish the grounding of an alter, transcendental ego, and the community of transcendental egos, is particularly problematic for the establishment of this sociological science.

It is established that the reduction to transcendental subjectivity opens up the field by which the constitutive acts of the transcendental ego come under the purview of the phenomenologist. The social phenomenology of the natural attitude establishes that acts of Other-orientation – face-to-face interaction and the We-relationship most specifically are constituted as transcending the individual's own sphere of consciousness as two streams of consciousness interlock. Yet, Schutz has shown that Husserl has failed to grasp a transcendental constituting activity that corresponds to this mundane intersubjectivity of interlocking streams of consciousness in the natural attitude. And so the very transcendental foundation of the social world for the sociology of *verstehen*, or interpretive sociology, is then not social – there is no transcendental we-relation that accompanies the mundane we-relation. No transcendental field of sense founds social structures through an intersubjective transcendental constitutive agency.

Scientia is understood to be a realm of public knowledge and as such is presented in such a way that its claims are open to verifiability by other members of a scientific community. As public, scientific knowledge takes the form of, "researchers say," or "other researchers say," or fellow

researchers say.” Public knowledge is constituted within the they-relationship. The they-relationship, in these more concrete cases, is convertible into we-relationships. Even when reading an article, a quasi-we-relationship is formed with the author. The public nature of the contents of the research allows it to be subject to constitutive activities within the we-relation – it can be debated, reinterpreted, definitively acknowledged, etc. But, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology fails to establish the epistemological grounding that would allow it to achieve this publicness necessary for scientific status – a consequence of not overcoming the problem of solipsism. The transcendental reduction puts each researcher into their own private realm and the only way that the results of transcendental phenomenology become public in the sense explicated above is at the mundane level. We can just report our private transcendently-reduced experiences without the capability of achieving transcendental intersubjectivity. Now, obviously the mundane sciences could not care less whether their practices are epistemologically grounded. But, Husserl’s claims of providing a foundational science, a first philosophy, requires the most radical rigor of self-responsibility. Transcendental solipsism means that what is constituted by consciousness at the deepest levels remain at the level of “personal experiences,” regardless of the fact that the transcendental is the deepest level of constitution. And so the ultimate foundation for social phenomenology leads to private worlds, the pure experience of many single unified streams of consciousness. All the clarifications that phenomenology is able to achieve concerning a sociology of *verstehen* seem paradoxically founded on separate transcendental egos. In order to enter into a we-relationship, the social scientists themselves are linked only as mundane egos. The “transcendental report” allows for other transcendental phenomenologists to test the results in their own “private transcendental laboratories.” Publicness is achieved, but it is mundane publicness, which is inadequate for grounding a foundational science. And so verification of the transcendental phenomenology, which is supposedly foundational, takes place at the non-foundational level of the mundane we-relationship. This contradiction is not avoidable.

But since the phenomenological work at the mundane level is sound, it seems then that it must rest on another foundation. The foundation that Schutz advocates is the transcendental clarification of life-world ontology – the life-world accepted as a primary datum.

The structures of the ontology of the life-world can be grasped by a non-transcendental phenomenology. Since the life-world phenomenologist does not work from the reduced sphere of transcendental conscious-

ness, a scientific community can be established and through communication, is able to share in establishing the legitimacy of its claims. In other words, intersubjectivity at the mundane level is acceptable in grounding the structures of the life-world. Since the ontology of the life-world is an eidetic science, it is possible, through employing the techniques of imaginative variation, to test whether supposed eidetic apprehensions hold up to further scrutiny. Transcendental phenomenology can clarify the constitutive process and in this case the genesis of sense as constituted through the accumulative work of eidetic social scientists. And so transcendental phenomenology does not establish the foundation for the social world in terms of intersubjective constitution. Rather, transcendental constitution clarifies the genesis of the articulation of the structures of the life-world that are apprehended by eidetic scientists.

However, I think this solution begs the question. What can Schutz possibly mean by 'datum'? It seems that this word is appropriately used for meaningless sensory contents or hyle, which by the time of genetic phenomenology, no longer is a legitimate realm. And so the datum is meaningful. And, if meaningful, then the datum has been constituted. The new function of transcendental phenomenology is only to clarify these meanings, that are "given" to it. Its constitutivity is not foundational. And so, either we give up the idea of foundation and become post-modern, or constitution must come from somewhere else.

Schutz critiques and abandons Husserl's "Cartesian way into phenomenology" and promotes a phenomenology of the life-world, which is one of the other "ways" that Husserl explored. Schutz, however, is unable to conceive of constitutivity, except on the Cartesian egological model. Thus, his ontology of the life-world is quite sound in its description of structures, but lacks a deeper analysis that would be foundational. Schutz died (1959) prior to the publication of his two-volume work, *The Structures of the Life-World*. I can only conjecture whether Schutz would have returned to the question of constitutivity at foundational levels. But following his pattern it seems that he would have raised the issue of foundation after the re-working of his social phenomenology on the ontological model. But it is necessary to keep in mind that Schutz's project requires not only a phenomenology of the structures of the life-world and a deeper foundational phenomenology, but also the articulation of the founded-founding relationship between them. The first key is to recognize that whatever appears as a "datum" irreducible to transcendental subjectivity must itself be investigated as to whether it indeed entails constitutive agency.

Such an analysis leads not to the inefficacy of transcendental subjectivity, but rather to the recognition of co-constitutivity. Along these lines Husserl himself had rejected the egology of the "Meditations" and developed a transcendental-social intersubjectivity that entails the notion of world horizon. Donn Welton explains:

The asymmetry of ego and other is preserved, but they belong not to two different spheres of being, as the first formulations of the Cartesian way demanded, but to a single field linked through the notion of horizon. These changes in the notion of the Cartesian way are what finally enable Husserl to secure the equioriginality of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and world, a notion required by his later thought.<sup>21</sup>

Equioriginality means that none function as a datum, for both intersubjectivity and the world horizon exhibit constitutive agency at the same foundational depth as transcendental subjectivity.

Bracketing belief in the world does not lead to a reduction to transcendental subjectivity, because the world never appears to consciousness as does intentional objects. The world is the horizon of relations that allows for the appearance of things that are the subject to the reduction. It is not that first things appear and then they make up the world. Rather the pre-given world-horizon allows things to appear. The world cannot be "annihilated" as claimed in Section 49 of the first book of *Ideas*. This is because the world's constitutivity is the agency that does not itself appear but, because of its horizontality phenomena do appear. Schutz only had reached the sense that the world is irreducible to transcendental subjectivity, and thus the world is interpreted as a "datum," because he had yet to realize its constitutivity. The world is the prehorizon of possibilities, the matrix by which contexts of relations arise. We say the worlds of this or of that as contexts (e.g., the world of boxing, the world of filmmaking) from which things appear, yet the world is the matrix (the context of contexts or horizon of horizons) from which such worlds emerge. The apprehension of this constitutive function of world horizontality and its relation to transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity would be the founding level of constitution that would ground Schutz's social structures of the life-world ontology.

Transcendental subjectivity is co-constitutive, which means it appears in relation to the co-constitutive world horizon. A special field arises, intersubjectivity, by which meanings are socially/culturally constituted. Transcendental subjects share in this field with other transcendental subjects and this field is at once intersubjective. This field involves the nexus of transcendental egos related empathically so that a transcendental

social temporality is formed. And thus the inner time consciousness of egological phenomenology is no longer any more foundational than social temporality as the constitutive empathic horizon.

But the Schutzian project would then have to show how social phenomenology rests upon this tri-partite foundational system of co-constitutivity. Both of these tasks, articulating the relations within the tri-partite system and then articulating the founding/founded relation with social phenomenology, are of monumental proportions.

*Morgan State University*

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Alfred Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (trans.) (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. xxxii.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 12–13.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43.

<sup>11</sup> Alfred Schutz, "Scheler's Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego," in *Collected Papers 1: The Problem of Social Reality* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1962), p. 165.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 166.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 167.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Alfred Schutz, "Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego," in *Collected Papers 1: The Problem of Social Reality* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1962), p. 197.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> Alfred Schutz, "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl," in *Collected Papers III: Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*, I. Schutz (ed.) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), p. 76.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> Donn Welton, *The Other Husserl: The Horizons of Transcendental Phenomenology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), p. 155.

## THE JOYS OF DISCLOSURE: SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR AND THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL TRADITION

Simone de Beauvoir is best known to the general public as the author of the feminist classic, *The Second Sex*, first published in 1949. But she also wrote a number of philosophical essays in the 1940s. In them she defended and further developed the philosophy of what came to be known as existentialism. Her existentialism is similar to that of Jean-Paul Sartre, which he presented in his 1943 work *Being and Nothingness*, but it departs from it in interesting ways as well. The culmination of her work from this period is *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, published in 1947. In this work she brings her distinctive philosophical concept of disclosure into the foreground. ("Disclosure" is the English word that her translator chose to render the French word she uses, "*dévoilement*." ) In this paper I will explore the philosophical origins and ramifications of this important concept.

In *The Ethics of Ambiguity* Beauvoir writes:

By uprooting himself from the world, man makes himself present to the world and makes the world present to him. I should like to be this landscape which I am contemplating. I should like this sky, this quiet water to think themselves within me, that it might be I whom they express in flesh and bone, and I remain at a distance. But it is also by this distance that the sky and water exist before me. My contemplation is an excruciation only because it is also a joy.<sup>1</sup>

In this passage Beauvoir describes directly the process by which consciousness discloses the world. By the time *The Ethics of Ambiguity* appeared Beauvoir had been developing her concept of disclosure for some time, as I will show in a moment. But first I want to meditate on this passage itself in order to explore the background and deeper meaning of what she says here.

First, Beauvoir speaks of a human being "uprooting" himself (or herself) from the world. This idea refers back to a central concept of *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, what Beauvoir designates as humans' ambiguity. Ambiguity is usually considered a linguistic phenomenon: a word or phrase is ambiguous in that it can have more than one meaning. This sense of the word lingers in the background in Beauvoir's usage of it. For instance, her ethics is an ethics of ambiguity in that she recognizes that

moral principles can be ambiguous and it is often difficult to figure out what the right thing to do is. But foremost for her ambiguity is a metaphysical concept: human existence is ambiguous because each of us exists both as a consciousness and as a material reality. For this reason there are several paradoxical aspects to human life. And try as we might we cannot escape from these paradoxes. One way that she puts it is to say that a human being “escapes from his natural condition without, however, freeing himself from it. He is still part of this world of which he is a consciousness.”<sup>2</sup> So for Beauvoir a human being is rooted in the material world. But in order to disclose the world, to make it present, she says in the above passage, one must try to uproot oneself from it. Yet, although consciousness continually transcends its material origins, it never leaves them behind. Disclosure is a paradoxical operation in that one is always uprooting oneself from the world one remains rooted in.

To uproot oneself from the world in disclosing it goes against a desire that Beauvoir herself confesses to – to merge with material reality. She would like to *be* the landscape and for the sky and the water to exist within her and to themselves *be* conscious. In *The Second Sex* Beauvoir gives a psychological explanation for this desire: it comes from being separated from the “nourishing body” of the mother as an infant.<sup>3</sup> In *The Ethics of Ambiguity* the implication is that this desire is metaphysical in origin, springing from humans’ ambiguous existence.

In order for one to disclose the world one must remain at a distance from it, Beauvoir says. By remaining at a distance from them one makes the sky and the water exist. What does she mean when she says that it makes them *exist*? Beauvoir does not mean that the sky and water are products of consciousness. Consciousness discloses the world; it does not create it. She says elsewhere in *The Ethics of Ambiguity* that “man does not create the world. He succeeds in disclosing it only through the resistance which the world opposes to him.”<sup>4</sup> After all, if consciousness created the world what sense would make to talk of uprooting oneself from it or remaining at a distance. The resistance that the world offers testifies to how human existence is ambiguous. As a material thing, a human being can be “a thing crushed by the dark weight of other things.”<sup>5</sup>

Beauvoir addresses this possible misconception – that disclosure implies that the existence of the world depends on consciousness – in another forum entirely, the opening pages of her first published novel, *L'invitée*, published in 1943. Beauvoir used this novel to get across some important metaphysical ideas, as she argued in her essay “Literature and Metaphysics” a metaphysical novel is well-equipped to do. Here Beauvoir



first begins to formulate her concept of disclosure, although the technical philosophical term is not used, of course. The part of the narrative that directly concerns Beauvoir's philosophical concept of disclosure comes in the opening pages when Françoise leaves the room where she is working with her colleague Gerbert to walk through the empty theater and across a deserted square. Françoise reflects:

When she was not there, the smell of dust, the half-light, the forlorn solitude, all this did not exist for anyone; it did not exist at all. Now that she was there the red of the carpet gleamed through the darkness like a timid night light. She exercised this power: her presence revived things from their inanimateness; she gave them their color, their smell. She went down one floor and pushed open the door into the auditorium. It was as if she had been entrusted with a mission: she had to bring to life this forsaken theater filled with darkness. ... She alone released the meaning of these abandoned places, of these slumbering things. She was there and they belonged to her. The world belonged to her.<sup>6</sup>

Françoise does not believe that the existence of objects *depends* on someone perceiving them. This is the philosophical position of subjective idealism, which was expounded in its most straightforward form by George Berkeley. Beauvoir does play with this idea in this passage. But Françoise herself realizes that she could not fulfill this function: she would have to be everywhere at once. Later in this opening chapter, reflecting in the midst of a very philosophical conversation with Gerbert, Françoise explicitly concludes: "the corridors, the auditorium, the stage, none of the things vanished when she closed the door on them, but they existed only behind the door at a distance."<sup>7</sup>

The question as to whether the relation between the world and consciousness involved in disclosure implies that consciousness creates the world also surfaces very briefly in the novel that Beauvoir published after *L'invitée*, her novel about the French Resistance, *The Blood of Others*. When the main character in it, Blomart, expresses his feeling of being somehow implicated in the developments leading up to World War II, his lover Hélène reproaches him: "It's as though you imagined that you created the world."<sup>8</sup> Blomart replies that he has always felt that "my eyes are sufficient for this boulevard to exist; my voice is sufficient for the world to have a voice. When it is silent, it's my fault." Blomart concludes, though, that this doesn't mean that the existence of the world depends on consciousness: "I didn't create the world, but I create it again by my presence every moment," he says.<sup>9</sup>

This way of putting it, that consciousness recreates the world every moment by making it present, is one way to retain the connection between

disclosure of the world and the creation of a world, at least, without falling into the absurd position of subjective idealism. The connection between disclosure and creation becomes important when one considers disclosure in the realm of aesthetics.

Another place where Beauvoir utilized her concept of disclosure in her writing leading up to *The Ethics of Ambiguity* was in her philosophical essay, *Pyrrhus et Cinéas*. The concept of disclosure actually appears in only one sentence, but it is worthwhile to note because the wording of this sentence raises another philosophical issue. She says there: "there is being only due to the presence of a subjectivity that discloses it."<sup>10</sup> In *The Ethics of Ambiguity* Beauvoir also commonly writes of the human being disclosing *being*. These statements only make sense once one realizes that Beauvoir uses the term "being" in a very loose sense in her philosophical works. It is important to keep this fact in mind when comparing Beauvoir to Husserl and Heidegger, as I will do later.

The best way to see the attenuated sense in which Beauvoir uses the term "being" is by connecting her philosophical perspective to the metaphysics that Sartre lays out in *Being and Nothingness*. She herself alludes at the beginning of *The Ethics of Ambiguity* to Sartre's claim that man is "a being who *makes himself* a lack of being *in order that there might be being*."<sup>11</sup> What makes itself a lack of being is what Sartre calls the for-itself. But the for-itself or consciousness is always conscious of something. (This insight lies at the basis of Husserl's concept of intentionality.) In Beauvoir's terms it always discloses being. So in this sense being exists because consciousness is a lack of being. However, the level of being that exists because of and through the activity of the for-itself or consciousness is not what Sartre calls being-in-itself. Rather it is what Sartre calls the "phenomenon of being" in the opening pages of *Being and Nothingness*, or what is present to consciousness. So what consciousness discloses for Beauvoir is not being in the sense of being-in-itself or being in Heidegger's sense, but rather what I have been calling and will continue to call "the world."

But if disclosing the world goes against this deep desire Beauvoir identifies to merge back into material reality, how can it bring joy? Beauvoir gives one clue, again when she connects up her concept of disclosure to remarks made by Sartre in *Being and Nothingness*. Beauvoir disputes Sartre's assertion there that man is a useless passion. She says it is up to human beings themselves to determine what is useful and useless. There is no truly external standpoint from which one can condemn any human effort. Beauvoir agrees with Sartre that humans all yearn to

escape their lack of being by achieving the status of being. That is what drives them to engage in bad faith. They must necessarily fail in this quest. But if their goal becomes instead to disclose the world they can succeed. Beauvoir says, "It is not in vain that man nullifies being. Thanks to him, being is disclosed and he desires this disclosure. There is an original attachment to being which is not the relationship 'wanting to be' but rather 'wanting to disclose being'. Now here there is not failure, but rather success."<sup>12</sup>

So Beauvoir postulates another desire besides the desire to become being: a desire to disclose being. What concrete forms does this desire take? Beauvoir does not specify. Presumably it is a desire to see, to hear, to taste, to feel – to experience the world. Fulfilling this desire would lead to joy. And of these two desires, only this second one can be fulfilled. Humans cannot fulfill their desire to sink back into being, except in death, and death ends all desires, rather than fulfilling them. Humans are conscious beings not just material ones. That is what Beauvoir calls their ambiguity. Because we can fulfill this second desire that Beauvoir posits, human existence is not a useless passion. As Beauvoir writes: "man also will himself to be a disclosure of being, and if he coincides with this wish, he wins, for the fact is that the world becomes present by his presence in it."<sup>13</sup>

It is fruitful to compare Beauvoir's concept of disclosure to Heidegger's concept of *Erschlossenheit* in *Being and Time*. One scholar claims that there are close connections between the two.<sup>14</sup> Heidegger's work was translated into French in the 1930s.<sup>15</sup> And there is evidence that Beauvoir read Heidegger even before that in the original German.<sup>16</sup> So it is possible that Beauvoir derived her concept of disclosure from him. It is the case that "*Erschlossenheit*" is translated as "disclosure" or "disclosedness" in English translations of *Being and Time* just as "*dévoilement*" is translated as "disclosure" in English translations of Beauvoir. And it is true that Beauvoir was deeply influenced by Heidegger, as was Sartre. But it turns out that Beauvoir's concept of disclosure is quite different from Heidegger's concept of *Erschlossenheit*, and in revealing ways.

For Beauvoir disclosure involves a relationship between two terms. In the opening passages of *L'invitée* the relation is between Françoise and the objects that she surveys in the empty theater. In *Pyrrhus et Cinéas* and *The Ethics of Ambiguity* Beauvoir speaks more abstractly of subjectivity or man disclosing being or the world. The term "subjectivity" is anathema to Heidegger. Nor does he speak of man. The term he uses to refer to the human being in *Being and Time* is "*Dasein*." "*Da*" in German

means there. “*Sein*” means being. So for Heidegger what surrounds the human being, its “there,” is not disclosed by him or her. It does not have to be. Dasein is its there. Heidegger is adamant that *Erschlossenheit* does not involve a relation between a subject and the world. Indeed he says even to use the term “between” is misleading.<sup>17</sup> Heidegger criticizes existentialism in his “Letter on Humanism” published in 1947 for retaining the conventional model of subject/object relations that he rejects in *Being and Time*.<sup>18</sup>

Heidegger says in one important passage that “*Dasein ist sein Erschlossenheit*.”<sup>19</sup> This sentence is rendered in one translation as “Dasein is its disclosedness.”<sup>20</sup> This translation of *Erschlossenheit* as “disclosedness” is apt because it conveys an important feature of *Erschlossenheit* for Heidegger. For him the there that Dasein is has always already been disclosed. By contrast, Beauvoirian disclosure is an ongoing process oriented to the future, as I will discuss. *Dévoilement* is essentially different from *Erschlossenheit* in this way.

Heidegger stresses that Being-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon. “What is decisive for ontology is to avoid splitting the phenomenon,” he says.<sup>21</sup> But in *The Ethics of Ambiguity* Beauvoir sees disclosure to involve a person “uprooting himself from the world.”<sup>22</sup> If Heidegger is right and Dasein is its there, is what is disclosed, then in one sense I am the landscape that stretches out before me, and the quiet water and the sky. Contrary to Heidegger, Beauvoir suggests that the world only becomes present if I who am disclosing it put some distance between it and me: “disclosure implies a perpetual tension to keep being at a certain distance, to tear oneself away for the world and to assert oneself as a freedom.”<sup>23</sup> In Beauvoir’s and Sartre’s existentialism the desire to achieve the status of being is the mark of inauthenticity. In Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology human beings are part of being from the start.

I think that Beauvoir’s concept of disclosure is actually closer to Edmund Husserl’s concept of constitution or *Sinngebung* than to Heidegger’s notion of *Erschlossenheit*. Beauvoir was exposed to Husserl’s thought as well as Heidegger’s. She also read him in the original German and discussed him with Sartre, who went to Germany in 1934–1935 to study his thought.<sup>24</sup> In Husserl’s phenomenology the meaning constituting operations of consciousness are revealed by what he calls the transcendental epoche. To perform the epoche one must abstract from the question of whether the objects of consciousness actually exist. Whether these objects really exist or not, they exist for us. They have certain definite meanings. Furthermore, these meanings are bestowed on them by our

consciousness. Whether they exist or not, the objects of consciousness are mind-dependent in this sense. The objects in the world revealed in what Beauvoir calls disclosure are mind-dependent in the same sense. Beauvoir sees disclosure as giving meaning to the world, not as creating or producing it.

Still, there are important differences between Beauvoir and Husserl. For Husserl the ultimate source of these human meanings, of all meanings and significations, is something that he calls the transcendental ego. Beauvoir does not take this further step into philosophical abstraction. She stays within the "human world in which each object is penetrated by human meanings," the world of what Husserl calls the natural attitude.<sup>25</sup> For her human beings are the source of human meanings.

Comparing Beauvoir to Husserl and Heidegger in this way allows us to arrive at a deeper understanding of what Beauvoir means by disclosure. I see Beauvoir as taking over Husserl's concept of constitution and interpreting it in more naturalistic, not strictly phenomenological way. Beauvoir does speak of disclosure in terms of meaning. Meaning, she says, "surges up only by the disclosure which a free subject effects in his project."<sup>26</sup> And the act of disclosing meaning can be a source of joy:

Every man casts himself into the world by making himself a lack of being; he thereby contributes to reinvesting it with human signification. He discloses it. And in this movement even the most outcast sometimes feel the joy of existing. They then manifest existence as a happiness and the world as a source of joy.<sup>27</sup>

However, it turns out that there are two important factors that influence how joyful one's disclosure of the world is.

First there is the choice that one makes of oneself in the world – one's attitudes, one's character, one's sensibilities. Beauvoir continues the passage quoted just above:

What is called vitality, sensitivity and intelligence are not ready-made qualities, but a way of casting oneself into the world and of disclosing being. ... There is vitality only by means of free generosity. Intelligence supposes good will ... and sensitivity is nothing else but the presence which is attentive to the world and to itself. The reward for these spontaneous qualities issues from the fact that they make significances and goals appear in the world. They discover reasons for existing.<sup>28</sup>

The characteristics one cultivates in oneself can greatly influence the extent to which the disclosure of the world brings joy. Of course Beauvoir lived before the days of antidepressant drugs. Present day research on the brain suggests that mood is affected by biochemical factors. But I

think that Beauvoir would still insist while brain biochemistry affects behavior, it does not determine it. The physical structure of the brain is an aspect of material reality. Its effect on our lives testifies to the ambiguity of human existence. In this same passage she says: "Doubtless, every one casts himself into it [the world] on the basis of his physiological possibilities, but the body itself is not a brute fact."

So to a certain extent the stance one chooses to take toward the world determines the joy one finds, or does not find in disclosing it. Beauvoir gives some examples of how this is so. In the middle section of *The Ethics of Ambiguity* she presents a hierarchy of personality types, five basic attitudes people can take toward the world and their lives, with each one representing a higher level of morality and freedom. On the lowest rung of the ladder is what she calls the sub-man and on the highest, the one closest to a fully free and ethical existence, is the passionate man.

The sub-man finds absolutely no joy in existence. Indeed he feels almost nothing at all. The world that he discloses through his subjectivity arouses no reaction: "He discovers around him only an insignificant and dull world. How could this naked world arouse within him any desire to feel, to understand, to live?"<sup>29</sup> The world has no meaning because he gives it no meaning. It is a "bare and incoherent" place where "nothing ever happens; nothing merits desire or effort."<sup>30</sup>

The passionate man, on the other hand, is someone who invests the world with great but very particular significance. It is home to the object of his passion. The object of this passion can be another person, or it can be an object, a "rare treasure," or a country, or something more nebulous. Unlike another personality type that Beauvoir describes, the serious man, the passionate man recognizes that it is his passion that gives value to this object; it does not have it in itself. He recognizes it "as a thing disclosed by his subjectivity."<sup>31</sup> Such passion can bring joy because it "helps populate the world with desirable objects, with excited meanings." But he does not represent the highest stage of ethical development because his passion is too exclusive and isolating. Passion can even lead to violence. The world he discloses is distorted: "Only the object of his passion appears real and full to him. All the rest are insignificant."<sup>32</sup>

There is, however, another factor that affects how much joy one takes in disclosing the world. For an existentialist like Beauvoir one can always choose what attitude to take toward the world. But there are many aspects of the particular situation one finds oneself in that one does not choose. The existentialist term for these aspects of the world is facticity, which includes a person's physical make-up, physical environment, social

and historical circumstances, etc. For Beauvoir we are free in disclosing the world, but the world also always pushes back, so to speak. The world opposes our efforts at disclosure with resistance.

Since humans are conscious beings, not just material ones, they always disclose a world. As Beauvoir puts it: "men are always disclosing being in Buchenwald as well as in the blue isles of the Pacific, in hovels as well as in palaces."<sup>33</sup> But she in no way regards these situations as equivalent. Some situations are what she calls "privileged situations" for disclosure. They are those in which disclosure is realized as an "indefinite movement."<sup>34</sup> Human consciousness always strains to break through the limits it experiences – to disclose more and more. Of course certain factors always limit the way that we disclose the world, for instance, material or conceptual factors. But there are other limits imposed by the forms of social organization that humans adopt and these limits can be changed through human effort.

For this reason, Beauvoir pays a great deal of attention to the political dimension of life in *The Ethics of Ambiguity*. Living under tyranny and/or being reduced through poverty to the barest level of physical existence severely restricts one's possibilities for disclosure. Beauvoir deploys a complex argument, which I cannot go into here, to show that my ability to disclose the world in new and creative ways – my realizing my freedom – depends on others having the ability to do so as well.<sup>35</sup> Thus in order to live in the best possible situation, one that enables me to find joy in the disclosure of the world, I need to try to guarantee that others can enjoy this privileged situation as well. Beauvoir says: "To will that there be being is also to will that there be men by and for whom the world is endowed with human significations. One can reveal the world only on the basis revealed by other men."<sup>36</sup>

It would be hard to delineate exactly what conditions need to exist for one to bring about this privileged situation for oneself and others. For Beauvoir perhaps the most important issue is whether one "preserves the disposal of his future."<sup>37</sup> Another way that she puts it is that in some situations the future is open and in others it is closed off. The privileged situation for disclosure is where it is open; then disclosure can be realized as an "indefinite movement." There are many factors that might close off a person's future. Being terminally ill is one. But oppressive social institutions and practices can rob people of a future as well. Beauvoir gives the example of a prisoner being made to empty and then fill a ditch over and over again. Being put in this situation keeps a person from engaging constructively with the world.

The upshot of Beauvoir's argument is that in order to will the disclosure of the world oneself, so that one's life is not a useless passion, one needs to have others around who are able to will the disclosure of the world as an indefinite movement toward the future as well: "To want existence, to want to disclose the world, and to want men to be free are one and the same will."<sup>38</sup> That commits one, according to her, to a particular political stance, one which supports liberation struggles and combats oppression. Beauvoir's utopia would be a place where "men will know no other use of their freedom than this free unfurling of itself; constructive activity would be possible for all; each one would be able to aim positively through his projects at his own future."<sup>39</sup> Writing in 1946 in the aftermath of World War II Beauvoir recognizes that such a utopia is just a "dream." It certainly is not a reality today. But Beauvoir also realized that even in the imperfect circumstances that human beings have always found themselves in, and perhaps always will find themselves in, some people can choose to will the disclosure of the world in joy. In what remains of this paper I am going to look at some of the different ways she suggests people do choose to.

For instance, Beauvoir points to science as an example of how humans actively will the disclosure of being. "Being" might even seem to be the right term in this case, given the claims that modern science makes to be able to reveal the world as it really is. Beauvoir, true to her phenomenological origins, criticizes these metaphysical aspirations of science:

Science condemns itself to failure when, yielding to the infatuation of the serious, it aspires to attain being, to contain it, and to possess it; but it finds its truth if it considers itself as a free engagement of thought in the given, aiming, at each discovery, not at fusion with the thing, but at the possibility of new discoveries; what the mind then projects is the concrete accomplishment of its freedom.<sup>40</sup>

There are many other intellectual activities that might be considered "a free engagement of thought in the given," and would also be a disclosure of the world.

The material improvements of life that come from the practical application of scientific results often serve as a social justification of science, Beauvoir remarks. But "pure" science, as a disclosure of the world, needs no such justification. Besides the development of technology is not an end in itself. It too is in need of justification. The time that all our time-saving devices save us cannot be stored up in a warehouse, she points out. Time "exists only by being spent."<sup>41</sup> What is important is how we spend it. Further development of technology can be justified if it "aims



at an indefinite disclosure of being by the transformation of the thing into an instrument and at the opening of ever new possibilities for man."<sup>42</sup>

If the privileged situation for disclosure of the world is one in which it can realize itself as an indefinite movement toward the future, what attitude should one take toward the past? Of course our only access to the past is by means of "the disclosure of being realized by our ancestors": the writings, the buildings, the artworks and other artifacts. The times during which they were created and used do not exist any more. Beauvoir criticizes what she calls a contemplative aesthetic attitude toward the past in which one "faces history, which he thinks he does not belong to, like a pure beholding."<sup>43</sup> This disengaged mode of disclosing the world is "a way of fleeing the truth of the present."<sup>44</sup> But it is also wrong to ignore the past completely in order to focus on the present, she says: "To abandon the past to the night of facticity is a way of depopulating the world ... if the disclosure of being achieved by our ancestors does not at all move us, why be interested in that which is taking place today; why wish so ardently for future realizations?"<sup>45</sup> To disclose a world without a past is to disclose an impoverished world. From these statements I infer that Beauvoir would also recognize the historian as effecting a disclosure of the world – not a world of facts, but a world shaped by past human activities.<sup>46</sup>

Beauvoir definitely sees both the visual and literary artist to be engaged in the disclosure of the world. (Perhaps in regard to the individual art or literary work it might be better to say the disclosure of *a* world.) The artist does not take the detached contemplative attitude toward the world that the aesthete does. An artist does not just behold the world. His or her art is a project, a way of intervening in the world. In this project the artist interacts with the material world and transforms some small portion of it. Like every human being, the artist encounters the limits posed by facticity, but in a special way. They become "the limits the artist gives himself in choosing himself."<sup>47</sup> The individual artwork is in a way an absolute – a finite absolute – for Beauvoir. But art is also a continuing cultural activity. And the disclosure of the world as an indefinite movement is realized through it: "painting is not given completely either in Giotto or Titian or Cezanne: it is sought through the centuries and never finished."<sup>48</sup>

In *The Ethics of Ambiguity* Beauvoir mentions writing but discusses disclosure mainly in terms of the visual arts. In a previous work, however, she explicitly identifies literature as a disclosure of the world. Her essay "Literature and Metaphysics" published in *Les Temps modernes* in 1946

is about the metaphysical novel, the type of novel she intended *L'invitée* to be. In it she says, "A metaphysical novel that is honestly read, and honestly written, brings a disclosure (*dévoilement*) of existence which no other mode of expression supplies."<sup>49</sup> Some novels create their own world. What is called escape fiction and science fiction and fantasy fall into this category. (Where is it after all that one escapes *to* by reading escape fiction?) Beauvoir implies in this essay that the metaphysical novel, or more serious novels generally, disclose something important about our world.

It turns out that Beauvoir's conception of literature as a disclosure of the world, and her general concept of disclosure, had a strong influence on Sartre, at least on his essay on aesthetics, "What is Literature?" published in *Les Temps modernes* starting in 1947 (in the same issue the last installment of *The Ethics of Ambiguity* was published). Sartre announces in this essay that "human reality is a 'disclosing' (*dévoilante*), that is, it is through human reality that 'there is' being."<sup>50</sup> He goes on:

It is our presence in the world which multiplies relations. It is we who set up a relationship between this tree and that bit of sky. Thanks to us, that star which has been dead for millennia, that dark river are disclosed (*se dévoile*) in the unity of a landscape. It is the speed of our car and our aeroplane which organizes the great masses of the earth.

Sartre makes these remarks in order to introduce his thesis that literature is a type of disclosure as well. But Sartre goes beyond Beauvoir in insisting that it not just the writer of literature who discloses a world: the reader needs to disclose it as well in order for it to exist at all. For instance, Sartre says, referring to the protagonist of Fyodor Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment*: "the literary object has no other substance than the reader's subjectivity. Raskolnikov's waiting is *my* waiting which I lend him. Without this impatience of the reader he would remain only a collection of signs."<sup>51</sup>

These examples that Beauvoir gives of free active disclosure of the world are not meant to be exhaustive. Many other human activities could be explained in these terms as well. There are many ways to do as Beauvoir prescribes and "will the disclosure of being in the joy of existence."<sup>52</sup> Beauvoir does not scorn even the most trifling occupations of someone's time – a child playing, a man sitting on a bench or drinking a glass of wine – if they bring real joy, if even for the moment. If we cannot take joy in these casual moments, she points out, then all the efforts we make to improve our lives and others' lives or to justify them

through philosophizing would be pointless: "If we do not love life on our account and through others, it is futile to seek to justify it in any way."<sup>53</sup>

*Long Island University*  
*Brooklyn*

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, Bernard Frechtman (trans.) (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1991), p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Simone de Beauvoir, *Le Deuxième Sexe*, Vol. II (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), p. 14. My translation.

<sup>4</sup> Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, Bernard Frechtman (trans.) (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1991), p. 28.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>6</sup> Simone de Beauvoir, *L'invitée* (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), p. 8. My translation.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>8</sup> Simone de Beauvoir, *The Blood of Others*, Roger Senhouse and Yvonne Moyse (trans.) (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), p. 145.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 146.

<sup>10</sup> Simone de Beauvoir, *Pyrrhus et Cinéas* (Paris: Gallimard, 1944), p. 111.

<sup>11</sup> Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, Bernard Frechtman (trans.) (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1991), p. 11.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>14</sup> See Eva Gothlin, "Reading Simone de Beauvoir with Martin Heidegger," in *The Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir*, Claudia Card (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 47.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>16</sup> See Simone de Beauvoir, *Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre*, Patrick O'Brian (trans.) (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 172.

<sup>17</sup> See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (trans.) (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 170.

<sup>18</sup> See Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, David Farrell Krell (ed.) (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 252. Heidegger wrote this essay in response to Sartre's essay "Existentialism is a Humanism."

<sup>19</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Hiemayer, 1986), p. 133.

<sup>20</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (trans.) (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 171.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.

<sup>22</sup> Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, Bernard Frechtman (trans.) (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1991), p. 12.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 23–24.

<sup>24</sup> See Simone de Beauvoir, *The Prime of Life*, Peter Green (trans.) (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1962), p. 162.

<sup>25</sup> Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, Bernard Frechtman (trans.) (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1991), p. 74.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 41–42.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 43.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 44–45.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 65–66.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 74.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 32.

<sup>35</sup> See Kristana Arp, *The Bonds of Freedom: Simone de Beauvoir's Existentialist Ethics* (Chicago: Open Court, 2001).

<sup>36</sup> Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, Bernard Frechtman (trans.) (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1991), p. 71.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 86–87.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 81.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 76.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 92.

<sup>46</sup> “If the past concerns us, it does so not as a brute fact, but insofar as it has human signification,” she says. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 129.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> Simone de Beauvoir, “Littérature et métaphysique,” in *L'existentialisme et la sagesse des nations* (Paris: Les Éditions Nagel, 1986), p. 104). My translation.

<sup>50</sup> Jean-Paul Sartre, “What is Literature?” and *Other Essays* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 48. Translation altered.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>52</sup> Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, Bernard Frechtman (trans.) (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1991), p. 135.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 135–136.

SECTION V

THE SENSIBLE AND THE IDEA

MERLEAU-PONTY AND THE RELATION BETWEEN  
THE *LOGOS PROPHORIKOS* AND  
THE *LOGOS ENDIATHETOS*

By the end of his *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty succeeded in problematizing the very vantage point that served, in effect, as a point of departure in that work. The work demonstrated that the position from which Merleau-Ponty had described the dynamic of perception is a position that is generated, in fact, by means of that dynamic itself. In this way, Merleau-Ponty's work accentuated a core element of phenomenology, namely, a certain priority of appearance. In fact, this priority turned out to be radical in so far as the sense of a subjective grounding had, in effect, undermined itself as Merleau-Ponty's analyses proceeded. The result was to re-open the ontological question that Merleau-Ponty would address in later work, and all of this made for a certain affinity between Merleau-Ponty's work and Heidegger's. To my mind, it was precisely because the *Phenomenology of Perception* effected a "de-struction" of the traditional sense of perception, which is specified by Heidegger in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, as the model, in effect, for the traditional ontology, that *Phenomenology of Perception* went somewhat further in the direction of a radical priority of appearance than did Heidegger's *Being and Time*. According to Heidegger's own assessment, elements of the standard sense of subjectivity as ground, as *hypokeimenon*, can still be found in *Being and Time*, although to be sure, this would not be the case in Heidegger's later work. The radical priority of appearance is affirmed when in the course of *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty writes that "the problem with the world, and to begin with, my body, is that everything already resides there." The "already" is crucial to the priority of appearance. Appearance has, in effect, already occurred, always.

Merleau-Ponty closes *Phenomenology of Perception* by citing Saint-Exupéry to the effect that the human being is but a network of relations and that these alone matter to the human being, to which Merleau-Ponty adds that what is demanded here is silence in that it is only the hero who lives out his or her relations to the world and to the others. The significance here of the word "silence" is that it will turn out to be an indication

that it is by way of the problematic of language that Merleau-Ponty will find the means to proceed after *Phenomenology of Perception*. In *The Visible and the Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty wrote the following:

The philosopher speaks but this is a weakness in him, and an inexplicable weakness: he should keep silent, coincide in silence, and rejoin in Being a philosophy that is there ready-made. But yet everything comes to pass as though he wished to put into words a certain silence he hearkens to within himself. His entire "work" is this absurd effort. He wrote in order to state his contact with Being; he did not state it, and could not state it, since it is silence. Then he recommences. ...<sup>1</sup>

Merleau-Ponty found that a shortcoming in *Phenomenology of Perception* lay in the analysis there of "the tacit cogito." He observed that the chapter devoted, in that work, to the Cogito should have been related directly to the chapter specifically on language, "The Body as Gesture, and Speech." Here is what he says about this issue in a Working Note for *The Visible and The Invisible*:

Therefore very important, from the introduction on, to introduce the problem of the tacit cogito and the language cogito Naivete of Descartes who does not see a tacit cogito under the cogito of *Wesen*, of significations – But naivete also of a silent cogito that would deem itself to be an adequation with the silent consciousness, whereas its very description of silence rests entirely on the virtues of language. The taking possession of the world of silence, such as the description of the human body effects it, is no longer this world of silence, it is the world articulated, elevated to the *Wesen*, spoken – the description of the perceptual *logos* is a usage of *logos prophorikos*. Can this rendering characteristic of reflection (which, wishing to return to itself, *leaves itself*) come to an end? There would be needed a silence that envelops the speech anew, after one has come to recognize that speech enveloped the alleged silence of the psychological coincidence. What will this silence be? As the reduction finally is not for Husserl a transcendental immanence, but the disclosing of the *Weltthesis*, this silence will *not be the contrary* of language.<sup>2</sup>

The determination that "the description of the perceptual *logos* is a usage of *logos prophorikos*" marks the sense in which the description, in *Phenomenology of Perception*, of the perceptual dynamic, is carried out from a position generated by that dynamic. In effect, this Working Note specifies the entirety of Merleau-Ponty's itinerary.

Merleau-Ponty reformulates, in *The Visible and the Invisible*, the problematic situation at the close of *Phenomenology of Perception*, where it became evident that the position from which the dynamic of perception is described there is, in fact, generated by the dynamic itself. In *The Visible and the Invisible*, we find the acknowledgment that while perception is our access to the things, at the same time, perception removes us

to a margin of the world. In effect, it is the priority of appearance that removes us to a margin of the world. In everyday perception, Merleau-Ponty observes, we manage to make access to the world go together with removal to a margin of the world. However, when philosophy comes to explain how that is done, it finds itself trapped in various contradictions. The paradox here is that we do first that which subsequently eludes explanation.

In *The Visible and the Invisible* Merleau-Ponty addresses this issue by way of the dynamic of reversibility that had been described earlier by Husserl in the second volume of *Ideen* and that Merleau-Ponty, after *Phenomenology of Perception*, had found at work in the overlap between the field of vision and that of motor projects operative in the art of painting. My vision is as it is by virtue of the fact that I am of the visible. This is illustrated easily in terms of the way that I see the side of a building, except under rare circumstances, not as a free-standing wall but rather as the side of a building and this by virtue of my own location in the visible. Here we have what Merleau-Ponty describes as two overlapping circles. One is the circle of vision, and the other is the circle of visibility. The two are dependent upon one another. Vision depends on my position in the field of visibility and my position in the field of visibility depends on vision. Although in the course of everyday perception, we make the two circles go together, as soon as we begin to reflect about this, we find them displaced one with respect to the other. If, by virtue of the dependency of vision on the visible, I see myself seeing, this is an invisible that is *of* the visible, an invisible in principle, not an invisible that could be seen from elsewhere.

The relation between the *logos prophorikos* and the *logos endiathetos*, the spoken word and the word *in* the speaking, displays a displacement of two circles in this manner, each with respect to the other. In speaking, the words and turns of phrases I use must first take up a place in the field of the nameable and the sayable. The *logos endiathetos* is dependent upon the *logos prophorikos*. The character of these words as nameable and sayable marks their dependence upon naming and saying. The *logos prophorikos* is dependent upon the *logos endiathetos*. Each of the circles is dependent upon the other. Merleau-Ponty writes:

... as the visible takes hold of the look which has unveiled it and which forms a part of it, the signification rebounds upon its own means, it annexes to itself the speech that becomes an object of science, it antedates itself by a retrograde movement which is never completely belied – because already, in opening the horizon of the nameable and of the sayable, the speech acknowledge that it has its place in that horizon. ...<sup>3</sup>



This “retrograde movement” is never completely belied in the same way as my seeing myself seeing remains an invisible of the visible. The *unsaid* is of the said. This intimacy between the *logos prophorikos* and the *logos endiathetos* was also detected by Heidegger in his later thought, and on this basis, he rejected the earlier characterization of “the assertion,” in *Being and Time*, as a derivative mode of language.

Merleau-Ponty determined that the chapter of *Phenomenology of Perception* devoted to the *cogito* should have been related to the chapter on language because he realized that the chapter on language had already provided a clue as to how we are to understand that the *unsaid* is of the said. In that chapter, Merleau-Ponty approached language by way of gesture, and gesture names both the self-movement of speaking and its belonging to the nameable and the sayable. The relation between the *logos prophorikos* and the *logos endiathetos* pertains to a *self-movement* that Merleau-Ponty first detected in the chapter of *Phenomenology of Perception* on “The spatiality of One’s Own Body and Motility.” A Working Note for *The Visible and the Invisible* now specifies the matter as follows:

... I cannot see myself in movement, witness my own movement. But this *de jure* invisible signifies in reality that *Wahrnehmen* and *Sich bewegen* are synonymous: it is for this reason that the *Wahrnehmen* never rejoins the *Sich bewegen* it wishes to apprehend: it is another of the same. But, this failure, this invisible, precisely attests that *Wahrnehmen* is *Sich bewegen*, there is here a success in the failure. *Wahrnehmen* fails to apprehend *Sich bewegen* (and I am for myself a zero of movement even during movement, *I do not move away from myself*) precisely because they are homogeneous, and this failure is the proof of this homogeneity: *Wahrnehmen* and *Sich bewegen* emerge from one another. A sort of reflection by Ec-stasy, they are the same tuft.<sup>4</sup>

Along these lines, the *logos prophorikos* emerges from the *logos endiathetos*, but in so far as the *logos prophorikos* manifests the *logos endiathetos*, there is also a sense in which it may be said that *logos prophorikos* marks an emergence of the *logos endiathetos*. The *logos prophorikos* fails to apprehend the *logos endiathetos*. But the silence here tells us the *unsaid* is of the said. In the last paragraph of the last chapter that Merleau-Ponty wrote in the unfinished *The Visible and the Invisible*, we find:

We shall have to follow more closely this transition from the mute world to the speaking world. For the moment we want only to suggest that one can speak neither of a destruction nor of a conservation of silence (and still less of a destruction that conserves or of a realization that destroys – which is not to solve but to pose the problem).<sup>5</sup>

This is why the demand for silence at the close of *Phenomenology of Perception* would not hold.

The emergence of the *logos prophorikos* and the *logos enditathetos* from one another is a mark of that displacement noted when it is found that the descriptions of the perceptual dynamic in *Phenomenology of Perception* are carried out from a position generated by that dynamic, a mark of the displacement found in the way that perception removes us to a margin of the world at the same time that it gives us access to the world, a mark of the displacement found in the circling around each other of the perceived and the perceiving, each dependent upon the other. It is the mark of an ec-stasis pertaining to that anonymity that Merleau-Ponty identifies with *la chair*, the flesh. He characterizes the ec-stasis as “a true negative, i.e. an *Unverborgenheit* of the *Verborgenheit*, an *Urpräsentation* of the *Nichturpräsentierbar*, in other words, an original of the *elsewhere*, a *Selbst* that is an Other, a Hollow [...] *Offenheit* of a corporeity to ... World or Being. ...”<sup>6</sup>

The problematic of language brought Merleau-Ponty from the “lived body” of *Phenomenology of Perception* to the ec-stasis of the self and the anonymity of “the flesh.” If we dream of a coincidence, we find that language is a “power for error, since it cuts the continuous tissue that joins us vitally to the things and to the past and is installed between ourselves and that tissue like a screen.”<sup>7</sup> But the reversibility of the *logos prophorikos* and the *logos enditathetos*, their mutual circling, their emergence one from the other, capable, Merleau-Ponty observes, of “weaving relations between bodies that will pass definitively beyond the circle of the visible”,<sup>8</sup> is a non-coincidence whereby what we find is precisely the inextricability of our involvement with the world. If one thinks that the non-coincidence is eliminated by the silence that tells us that the *unsaid* is of the said, everything here gets misunderstood immediately. The reversibility is always imminent, but it does not get realized in fact.

The *unsaid of the said* points us in the direction of the status and role of ideas, and with this, what Merleau-Ponty characterizes as the hardest point, namely, the bond between the ideas and “the flesh.” The issue is ideality. The final chapter that we have of *The Visible and the Invisible* provides indications of Merleau-Ponty’s approach to the issue and helpful illustrations. I will address four of these passages. First, “the idea of light or the musical idea doubles up the lights and sounds from beneath, is their other side or their depth.”<sup>9</sup> Again, a question of reversibility, and the ideas are of the sensibles in the manner that the *unsaid* is the *unsaid of the said*. The ideas are the “other side” and always remain the “other side” in that with any attempt to get our hands on them, they recede in the same measure as we approach. The ideas are, in effect, occasions of

possibility of the sensibles, not in the standard sense of established conditions of possibility, but rather in the sense of the interior possibility of the sensibles, their intrinsic possibility. This point reiterates the priority of the phenomenon radicalized via Merleau-Ponty's findings in *Phenomenology of Perception*. We would not find the ideas even if we were to remove ourselves to another location. This brings us to the next passage. "We do not see, do not hear the ideas, and not even with the mind's eye or with the third ear ..." <sup>10</sup> Merleau-Ponty, in his essay "Cézanne's Doubt," says this emphatically: we never see our ideas or our freedom face to face. The "screen" here, as Merleau-Ponty specifies, is carnal experience and this provides access to the ideas. Without it there would be no access to the ideas. The displacement here is again that of self-movement, marking the self that is other and the anonymity that Merleau-Ponty specifies as "the flesh."

The next passage is actually a note inserted between brackets at the point of the final chapter of *The Visible and the Invisible*, "The Intertwining – the Chiasm," where Merleau-Ponty initially broaches "the point of insertion of speaking and thinking in the world of silence," and provided by the editor, Claude Lefort. The note reads:

In what sense we have not yet introduced thinking: to be sure, we are not in the in-itself. From the moment we said *seeing, visible*, and described the dehiscence of the sensible, we were, if one likes, in the order of thought. We were not in it in the sense that the thinking we have introduced was *there is*, and not *it appears to me that ...* (appearing that would make up the whole of being, self-appearing). Our thesis is that this *there is* by inference is necessary, and our problem to show that thought, in the restrictive sense (pure signification, thought of seeing and of feeling), is comprehensible only as the accomplishment by other means of the will of the *there is*, by sublimation of the *there is* and realization of an invisible that is exactly the reverse of the visible, the power of the visible. Thus between sound and meaning, speech and what it means to say, there is still the relation of *reversibility*, and no question of priority, since the exchange of words is exactly the differentiation of which the thought is the integral. <sup>11</sup>

Between sound and meaning, speech and what it means to say, the *logos prophorikos* and the *logos endiathetos*, there is reversibility. The reversibility marks a displacement and that displacement accomplishes what Merleau-Ponty here calls the "there is." The "there is" is another locution for the openness of a corporeity upon World or Being. The invisible that is realized is the idea. It is interior to the visible in the way that the *logos endiathetos* emerges from or is interior to the *logos prophorikos*, and this is the sense in which it is the reverse of the visible. Its realization never completely surfaces just as the retrograde movement whereby speech

annexes its means to itself is never completely belied. The idea is the power of the visible in the sense that it is the possibility of the visible that is interior to it. The idea accomplishes the “there is,” that openness, our inextricable involvement with the world.

Finally, in the art of music as it figures in the work of Marcel Proust, Merleau-Ponty provides an illustration of the ideality hinted at by all of this:

At the moment one says “light,” at the moment that the musicians reach the “little phrase,” there is no lacuna in me; what I live is as “substantial,” as “explicit” as a positive thought could be – even more so: a positive thought is what it is, but, precisely, is only what it is and accordingly cannot hold us. Already the mind’s volubility takes it elsewhere. We do not possess the musical or sensible ideas, precisely because they are negativity or absence circumscribed; they possess us. The performer is no longer producing or reproducing the sonata: he feels himself, and the others feel him to be at the service of the sonata; the sonata sings through him or cries out so suddenly that he must “dash on his bow” to follow it. And these open vortexes in the sonorous world finally form one sole vortex in which the ideas fit in with one another. [Quoting Proust:] “Never was the spoken language so inflexibly necessitated, never did it know to such an extent the pertinence of the questions, the evidence of the responses.”<sup>12</sup>

The non-coincidence, the displacement, the lapse whereby the violinist must “dash on his bow” to follow the sonata that otherwise sings through the violinist, is not eliminated by the ideality of the sonata in the service of which the violinist performs, just as Merleau-Ponty had found that the silence of what remains unsaid does not eliminate the noncoincidence of the *logos prophorikos* and the *logos endiathetos*. It is more accurate to say, again, the ideality confirms this.

What prevails is the inextricability of involvement in the world. The primal unrepresentable is manifested by the inextricability. This is its primal presentation. Merleau-Ponty writes of this involvement in the world:

Before this inextricable involvement, there are two types of error; one is to deny it – under the pretext that it can be broken up by the accidents of my body, by death, or simply by my freedom. ... [T]he inverse error ... would be to treat this order of involvement as a transcendental, intemporal order, as a system of *a priori* conditions.<sup>13</sup>

At this point, Merleau-Ponty characterizes the “inextricable involvement” as an “operative imaginary.” It is imaginary in that even if one were to remove oneself elsewhere, one would not find it. But it does not break up before the philosophical consciousness. It has, Merleau-Ponty specifies, the “solidity of myth.” Here we approach, I think, the silence that “envelops the speech anew,” a silence that is not the contrary of language, and

that to which the philosopher hearkens within himself. The solidity Merleau-Ponty names here proves elusive, ever more so. Still, Merleau-Ponty had found a point of access to it in how the inextricability of our involvement in the world cannot be measured by the accidents of my body, by death, or simply by my freedom. The obverse of this is that the inextricable involvement has nothing of coincidence about it. In the note concerning the “there is,” Merleau-Ponty said as much: “our thesis is that this *there is* by inherence is necessary.” To say that it is necessary is not to say that it comes easily. As Merleau-Ponty put it in *Phenomenology of Perception*: “[o]ne day, once and for all, something was set in motion which, even during sleep, can no longer cease to see or not to see, to feel or not to feel, to suffer or be happy, to think or rest from thinking, in a word to ‘have it out’ with the world.”<sup>14</sup> In his recognition that where the “there is” is concerned, one can stand on neither metaphysical assurances, nor on methodological strictures, Merleau-Ponty’s work exemplified that of which he spoke, and pointed up a relation between the philosopher and philosophy that Merleau-Ponty, in “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” captured in that essay’s study of Husserl: “[t]he philosopher must bear his shadow, which is not simply the factual absence of future light.”<sup>15</sup>

*George Mason University*

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible (Followed by Working Notes)*, Claude Lefort (ed.), Alphonso Lingis (trans.) (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1969), hereafter *VI*, p. 125.

<sup>2</sup> *VI*, p. 179.

<sup>3</sup> *VI*, p. 154.

<sup>4</sup> *VI*, p. 255.

<sup>5</sup> *VI*, p. 154.

<sup>6</sup> *VI*, p. 254.

<sup>7</sup> *VI*, p. 125.

<sup>8</sup> *VI*, p. 144.

<sup>9</sup> *VI*, p. 150.

<sup>10</sup> *VI*, p. 151.

<sup>11</sup> *VI*, p. 145.

<sup>12</sup> *VI*, p. 151.

<sup>13</sup> *VI*, pp. 84–85.

<sup>14</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. 406–407.

<sup>15</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Philosopher and His Shadow” in *Signs*, Richard McCleary (trans.) (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 178.

# A MINISCULE HIATUS: FOUCAULT'S CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF LIVED-EXPERIENCE (*VÉCU*)

At the end of his life in 1984, Foucault revised the introduction he had written in 1978 for the English translation of Georges Canguilhem's *The Normal and the Pathological*. Foucault gave no title to the original introduction, but in 1984 he gave it the simple title: "Life: Experience and Science."<sup>1</sup> Here, Foucault tried to show that Canguilhem "wants to re-discover ... what of the concept is *in life*" (VES 773–74/475; Foucault's emphasis). For Canguilhem, but also for Foucault himself as well, we must think that the concept is immanent *in* – "dans" – life.<sup>2</sup> What is at issue in immanence is the logic of this relation between concept and life. Now, clearly, one could just as well say that phenomenology consists in the immanence of the concept in life. Yet, just as clearly, Foucault thinks that what Canguilhem was doing with the concept of life was radically different from the phenomenological concept of life. In fact, this is what Foucault says at the end of his revised introduction: "It is to this philosophy of sense, of the subject, of lived-experience [*le vécu*] that Canguilhem has opposed a philosophy of error, of the concept, of the living [*le vivant*] as another way of approaching the notion of life" (VES 776/477). Now what I intend to do here is examine this difference between "*le vécu*"<sup>3</sup> (lived-experience) and "*le vivant*" (the living), that is, I intend to examine the different logics, we might say, of immanence that each concept implies. To do this, I am going to reconstruct the "critique" that Foucault presents of the concept of *vécu* in the Ninth Chapter of *The Order of Things* (*Les Mots et les choses*): "Man and His Doubles."<sup>4</sup> Then, I am going to construct the positive logic of Foucault's relation of immanence by means of another text, which is contemporaneous with *Les Mots et les choses*: *This is not a pipe*.<sup>5</sup> As we are going to see, the critique of the concept of *vécu* is based on the fact that the relationship in *vécu* is a mixture (*un mélange*) which closes "un écart infime." Conversely, Foucault's conception of the relationship – here we must use the word "vivant" – in "*le vivant*" is one that dissociates and keeps "l'écart infime" open. Perhaps, I will give my conclusion away if I say that for Deleuze – whom we must also keep in mind here – immanence is defined by a kind of dualism, a dualism that "is a preparatory distribution within a pluralism," within, in other words, a multiplicity.<sup>6</sup>

I. LIVED-EXPERIENCE (*LE VÉCU*) IN MERLEAU-PONTY

In Chapter Nine, Foucault names no particular philosopher when he criticizes the concept of *vécu*. But, we know, from "Life: Experience and Science," that, for Foucault, the side of the subject and *le vécu* refers to phenomenology and more particularly to Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Thus, it is probable that Foucault, in Chapter Nine, is thinking of the early Merleau-Ponty, the Merleau-Ponty of the *Phenomenology of Perception*.<sup>7</sup> Foucault's use of the word "écart," to which we shall return, also makes us think of the Merleau-Ponty of *The Visible and the Invisible*. Below, I shall turn to the later Merleau-Ponty. But, here at the beginning, we are going to remain with the Merleau-Ponty of the *Phenomenology of Perception*.<sup>8</sup> On the very first page of the *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty speaks of *le vécu*, and, throughout the *Phenomenology* the word modifies the word "monde," "world." For example, in the chapter called "The Phenomenal Field," Merleau-Ponty says that "the first philosophical act therefore would be that of returning to the lived-world on this side of the objective world" (PhP 69/57).<sup>9</sup> Yet, he uses the word as a noun – "le vécu" – only twice. The first time occurs in the chapter called "Space"; here he says "lived-experience [*le vécu*] is really lived by me ..., but I can live more things that I can think of [*plus de choses que je m'en représente*]. What is only lived is ambivalent" (PhP 343/296; my emphasis). For Merleau-Ponty, ambivalence is the crucial characteristic of *vécu*. And this characteristic guides his analysis of intersubjectivity in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, which is where he uses "le vécu" for the second time, in the chapter called "Others and the Human World." Here "le vécu" is defined by self-givenness (PhP 411/358); but, this self-givenness is also given (PhP 413/360). In other words, the active is also passive. In this formula we can see the importance of the positive affirmation in the "is." This positive affirmation is the heart of ambivalence. Now, these two uses of "le vécu" in the *Phenomenology of Perception* depend of course on Merleau-Ponty's appropriation of Husserl's concept of *Fundierung*.<sup>10</sup> In the chapter called "The Cogito," Merleau-Ponty speaks of the relation between founding (*le fondant*) and founded (*le fondé*) as one that is "equivocal" (*équivoque*), since "every truth of fact is a truth of reason, every truth of reason is a truth of fact" (PhP 451/394; my emphasis).<sup>11</sup> Merleau-Ponty also says that the relation of matter and form is a relation of *Fundierung*: "The form integrates the content to the point that it appears to end up being a simple mode of the form ... but reciprocally ... the content remains as a radical contingency, as the first

establishment or the foundation of knowledge and action. ... It is this dialectic of form and content that we have to restore ..." (PhP 147–48/127). We can now summarize what we see in Merleau-Ponty's concept of "le vécu." For Merleau-Ponty, "le vécu is ambivalent or equivocal – it is, we could say, a mixture, *un mélange* – because the content of experience, "le sol," as Merleau-Ponty also says, becomes, is integrated into, the form of expression. This relation would have to be formulated as a positive affirmation; the copula indicates the sameness of the things related. We know, however, that the logic of the *Fundierung* relation in Merleau-Ponty is not yet complete. Since he calls it a dialectic, it must involve some sort of negation. We shall return to the question of negation in a moment. Now let us turn to Foucault's critique of the concept of *vécu* in *Les Mots et les choses*.<sup>12</sup>

## II. THE ANALYSIS OF LIVED-EXPERIENCE (*VÉCU*) IS A DISCOURSE WITH A MIXED NATURE

It is well-known that this chapter – Chapter Nine, "Man and His Doubles" – contains Foucault's critique of modern humanism. The chapter therefore focuses on man (and not on the human being). Foucault defines man, of course, as a double; he is at once an object of knowledge and a subject that knows (MC 323/312). Man (and again not the human being) is what occupies, as Foucault says, this "ambiguous position." The entire critique of humanism unfolds, for Foucault, from this designation of man as "ambiguous," a designation which recalls Merleau-Ponty (but perhaps not Sartre, at least not the Sartre that Merleau-Ponty portrays in *Adventures of the Dialectic*). For Foucault, the ambiguity consists in two senses of finitude. In one sense, finitude consists in the empirical positivities, the empirical contents of "work, life, and language," which tell man that he is finite (MC 326/315). "The knowledge of life" (Canguilhem), for instance, tells man that he is going to die. The other sense is that this finitude is itself fundamental. The forms of knowledge in which the very contents that tell man that he is finite are forms which are themselves finite. For instance, for man, there is no intellectual intuition. So, finitude is ambiguous between empirical content and foundational forms. For Foucault, this ambiguity of finitude results in an "obligation" to ascend "up to an analytic of finitude." Here is it necessary to hear the word "analytic" in its Kantian sense, as a "theory of the subject" (MC 330/310). For Foucault, this would be an analytic "where the being of man will be



able to found, in their positivity, all the forms that indicate to him that he is not *infinite*" (MC 326/315).

For Foucault, because the analytic of finitude consists in "bringing to light the conditions of knowledge on the basis of the empirical contents which are given in the knowledge" (MC 329/319),<sup>13</sup> two kinds of analyses arise in the Nineteenth Century. In both of these analyses, Foucault has Marxism in mind. On the one hand, there is what Foucault calls a "transcendental aesthetics," in which one discovers that "knowledge had anatomo-physiological conditions"; this transcendental aesthetics would be "a nature of human knowledge." On the other hand, there is what Foucault calls a "transcendental dialectic," in which one would study "the illusions that are more or less ancient, more or less difficult to eliminate, of humanity"; this would be "a history of human knowledge." Here we can see that the two senses of finitude have been dissociated between a "positivism" – this is the transcendental aesthetics – and an "eschatology" – this is the transcendental dialectic. This dissociation calls for, as Foucault says, "a critique," in the sense of providing the conditions for the possibility of positivism and eschatology. Without a critique, positivism and eschatology remain naïve. This critique is *a distribution of the truth*. In particular, what is required is "a truth which would allow us to have, concerning the nature or history of human knowledge, a language that would be true." In other words, what is required is a discourse which would be neither of the order of a reduction to positive truth or of the order of a promise of truth revealed. This discourse is that of phenomenology.

The discourse of phenomenology would aim at both requirements, while trying to keep the empirical and transcendental separated. It would be an analytic of man as a subject in this precise sense: man as subject, "that is, as the place of empirical knowledge but led back as close as possible to what makes empirical knowledge possible, *and* as the pure form that is immediately present to these contents." Man as subject therefore would be the third and intermediary term in which positivism and eschatology would have their roots. According to Foucault, this third and intermediary term has been designated by "le vécu." "Le vécu" responds to the "obligation" to analyze finitude, that is, to the obligation to have a theory of the subject. Here is Foucault's definition of "le vécu": "lived-experience, in fact, is at once the space where all empirical content is given to experience; it is also the originary form that makes them in general possible." We can now see the problem with "le vécu," indeed, with "man." "Le vécu" must be concrete enough in order to be able to

apply to it a descriptive language; yet it must be enough removed from positivity so that it can provide the foundations for it. The discourse of *vécu* still tries to make the empirical hold for the transcendental. A simple judgment of equivalence could express this "hold for," this kind of immanence: the empirical is the transcendental and the transcendental is the empirical, or, the content is the form and the form is the content. We have returned to Merleau-Ponty's equivocity: *le mélange*. And thus Foucault says that "the analysis of lived-experience [*vécu*] is a discourse with a mixed nature: it is addressed to a specific but ambiguous layer" (MC 332/321). This analytic "mixes" the transcendental and the empirical together in an affirmative judgment. But this affirmation brings us to the question of negation.

In Chapter Nine, Foucault does not explicitly speak of negation. But, in a second discussion of phenomenology – which never mentions "le vécu" – Foucault recognizes that phenomenology, being a reflective philosophy, transforms the old idea of thought thinking itself into thought thinking its other. This other is called "the unthought" (MC 337/326). The word "unthought" (*l'impensé*) obviously contains a negative prefix. This is what Foucault says about "the unthought": "it has never been reflected upon for itself according to an autonomous mode ... it has received the complementary form and the inverse name" (MC 337–38/327). This citation means that "the unthought" or "the unconscious," for instance, has never received its own positive and autonomous form; it has always been that which is *not* thought or that which is *not* consciousness. This negation would even mean that "the unthought" is that which is devoid of the form of thought, that which is emptiness itself, and therefore that about which one can say nothing. As early as *L'Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* in 1961, Foucault had discovered this structure of negation. Unreason (*déraison*) is the experience of madness (*la folie*) as the lack of truth, "the non-being of error," and as the lack of reason, "the empty negativity of reason." Foucault calls *déraison* "the night," "the obscure contents [tied up] with the forms of clearness." The result is that "all of what madness can say about itself is nothing but reason."<sup>14</sup> Again, nothing positive can be said about "the unthought" or "the unconscious" or "unreason." Being emptiness, the irrational is nothing, but as soon as we speak of it, we give it the form of reason, which implies that it is nothing but reason. Now, *L'Histoire de la folie* can help understand the negation in one other way. Here we move from the form to the content. Because unreason (*déraison*) is emptiness (*le vide*), it can be filled with the content of reason. Thus, for Foucault, we say that unreason is *not* reason

because reason “is taken in an aberrant face.”<sup>15</sup> This aberration is “an extreme, negative slenderness” (*une extreme minceur négative*), “a negative index,” which means that unreason is nothing but “quasi-reason.” Foucault calls this “negative index” “un écart.”<sup>16</sup> This “écart” brings us back to *Les Mots et les choses*.

For Foucault, all of the doubles in which man consists are based on “un écart infime, mais invincible”; the English translation says, a “hiatus, miniscule and yet invincible” (MC 351/340). Here we can dissociate an ambiguity in the word “infime.” This “écart” is “infime,” that is, *miniscule*; insofar as it is miniscule, the “écart” closes and relates “in the manner of “a mixed nature.” Here, the “écart” has the sense of a deviation from a norm. But, this “écart” is also “infime,” in the sense of infinitesimal, infinitely divisible, and thus a great distance that separates and keeps open. This sense of the negative word, “in-fime,” clarifies one of the most infamous things that Foucault says in Chapter Nine of *Les Mots et les choses*. In the section of Chapter Nine called “The Empirical and the Transcendental,” Foucault advises that, if one wants to “contest” both positivism and eschatology truly, in other words, if one want to construct truly a critique, one should try to imagine that man does not exist. This “paradox” means: try to imagine a theory of the subject different from the modern theory of the subject (man). This different theory of the subject would be an analytic too, but now in the literal sense of the word “analytic,” in the sense of loosening, of untying, of taking apart, even of differentiating within a *mélange*. This analytic would not “mix” the transcendental and the empirical together but would make their difference *infime*.

### III. THIS IS NOT A PIPE

In order to clarify the infinitesimal sense of this “*différence infime*,” we are now going to turn to Foucault’s analysis of a painting by Magritte called “This is Not a Pipe.” The analysis of this painting is at least analogous, if not identical, to that of “le vécu” in *Les Mots et les choses*. Just as lived-experience is a *mélange* of the empirical and the transcendental, this picture looks to be a calligram. A calligram, of course, is literally beautiful writing, words drawn in figures. Magritte’s picture consists in a drawing of a pipe floating in air above a sentence, which says “ceci n’est pas une pipe.” In other words, we have a figure and a text that names it. Foucault calls it a calligram because the picture looks to be written and the text looks to be drawn. According to Foucault, a calligram has a

triple function: "to compensate the alphabet; to repeat without the help of rhetoric; to capture things in the trap of a double cipher" (CP 20/20–21). This quote means first that a calligram makes the figure speak and the words represent. We can see here the old oppositions between "showing and naming; figuring and saying; reproducing and articulating; imitating and signifying; looking and reading" (CP 22/21). But, these oppositions are now effaced, because the text and the figure are, as Foucault says, "tautological" (CP 21/21). For Foucault, although the text and the figure are the same, this sameness does not mean that Magritte's picture is an allegory for something else, for something which is somewhere else. Instead, the calligram attempts to trap the thing itself. In order to spring this trap, the calligram makes use of a particular property of letters. "At once," letters have the value of "linear elements that we can arrange in space *and* as signs that we must unfold according to the unique chain of the sonorous substance" (CP 21–22/21, my emphasis). Thus twice the calligram tracks the thing itself. Pure discourse cannot represent the thing; pure drawing cannot say the thing. The calligram, in contrast, draws and says the thing itself at once. Here, we can see in Foucault's description of the calligram's triple function the same structure as we saw in "le vécu." We have a double between saying and figuring, or between the empirical and the transcendental, or even between life and concept, but this double is really the same, tautological (*to auto*). Even more, here we have a same that closes tightly this small infinitesimal distance between the two.

Yet, Magritte's picture is not a simple calligram. According to Foucault, here, in fact, we have a different logic of the relation between. For Foucault, Magritte has not only constituted a calligram, but has also "carefully unmade" it (*défait avec soin*) (CP 19/20). And this is why it produces in us "an indefinite uneasiness." Magritte has perverted the triple function of the calligram. First, instead of the words invading the figure and vice versa, in Magritte's picture, the words have returned to their old place at the bottom of the page; they have become a legend. Yet, because the words look to be drawn and the figure looks to be written, Magritte, according to Foucault, has distributed words and things in their traditional disposition "only in appearance" (CP 24/22). But also and second, there is no tautology here between words and things, since, on the one hand, we have a figure that is so familiar that it has no need of being named, and, on the other, at the very moment that the legend should give us the name it gives us the name by denying it: "ceci n'est pas une pipe." Here we start to see the importance of negation, of the

negative adverb in Foucault's thought. For a calligram to function, it is necessary that the viewer (*le voyeur*) look (*regarde*) and not read. Then the picture (which is made out of words) is a pipe. But, as soon as the viewer becomes a reader, then the picture is no longer a pipe but a sentence with a sense. Indeed, it is not a pipe but a sentence. According to Foucault, Magritte has understood that "the calligram never says and represents, either by ruse or impotence – *it hardly matters* – at the same moment" (CP 28/24–25). In other words, because of the way in which Magritte has distributed the space, separating the picture from the words, the picture says that "I am a thing (or a pipe or a picture of a pipe) and I am not words," while the sentence says "I am not a pipe and I am words" (CP 29/25). We no longer have a tautology here. Instead, as Foucault says, "the redundancy of the calligram is based on a relation of exclusion; the hiatus [*l'écart*] of the two elements in Magritte, the absence of letters in his drawing, the negation expressed in the text bring forward *affirmatively two positions*" (CP 29–30/25–26, my emphasis). We have two positions affirmed – and not a *mélange* – by means of the double negation. The "écart" remains here "infime," in the sense of infinitesimal or indefinite.

But, there is one more point that Foucault makes; in fact, it is the essential point. Because we still have the remnants of a calligram in Magritte's painting, "it is therefore necessary to admit that between the figure and the text there is a series of crossings between [*entrecroisements*]" (CP 30/26). Foucault calls this series of crossings "a battle" (and Deleuze, in fact, calls it "the audio-visual battle"<sup>17</sup>). For Foucault, this battle takes place through the "this," the "ceci," through the index, which is the subject of the sentence. The subject of the sentence has become the space of a battlefield. This space of the battlefield is what we find when we try to imagine that man as a subject no longer exists. In fact, for Foucault what has happened is that the subject has been reduced to the infinitive of the verb. If we recall the literal meaning of the word "verb," then we can even say that the subject has been reduced to the voice, or as Foucault would say, to the murmur. We would be able to see this reduction of the subject down to the infinitive if we had the time to examine the paradox with which Foucault opens his essay on Blanchot, *The Thought from the Outside*.<sup>18</sup> Yet, from the title of this essay alone we can see that the infinitive of the verb is how Foucault would think about thought itself, about the concept. Thinking, for Foucault, would not involve judgments but infinitives like "penser," or "surveiller et punir," verbs of becoming. But, we can say as well that the infinitive of the verb,

which precedes declensions and tenses, which precedes, in other words, subjects and times, is like the trajectory of an arrow. According to a very old paradox, the trajectory of an arrow, of course, can be infinitely divided, implying that it has no beginning and no end.<sup>19</sup> This infinite movement could also be called error, the error by means of which one could start to think about what "le vivant" means and "another way of approaching the notion of life" (VES 775/477). Approaching the notion of life would be multiplicity.

### *The University of Memphis*

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Michel Foucault, "Vie: expérience et vie," in *Dits et écrit, IV*: 763–776; The English translation is by Robert Hurley as "Life: Experience and Science," in *Essential Works of Michel Foucault: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, volume 2, James D. Faubion (ed.) (New York: The New Press, 1998), pp. 465–478. We shall refer to this text with the abbreviation: VES, with reference first to the French, then to the English translation.

<sup>2</sup> Here we must think of Deleuze too since the title of his last text in 1995 is "Immanence: une vie."

<sup>3</sup> *Le vécu*, of course, is the French translation of the German phenomenological term "Erlebnis."

<sup>4</sup> Michel Foucault, *Les Mots et les choses* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966); anonymous English translation as *The Order of Things* (New York: Random House, 1970). Hereafter referred to as MC, with reference first to the French, then to the English translation. This project could complete itself it seems, only by a reading of Merleau-Ponty's "L'Homme et l'aversité," in *Signes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), pp. 299 and 306; English translation by Richard C. McCleary as *Signs* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 235 and 241. For more on this project, see note 36 below.

<sup>5</sup> Michel Foucault, *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1973); English translation by James Hames as *This is Not a Pipe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). Hereafter cited as CP, with reference first to the French, then to the English. We can say that *Ceci n'est pas une pipe* is roughly contemporaneous with *Les Mots et les choses* because there was a first version of it in 1968. See *Dits et écrits I*, 1954–1975 (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), pp. 663–678.

<sup>6</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault* (Paris: Minuit, 1986), p. 89; English translation by Seán Hand as *Foucault* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 83. One of the unstated theses of my essay is that there is a tacit Bergsonian methodology in Foucault, a methodology that functions by dissociating or differentiating in a mixture. See Henri Bergson, "Introduction à la métaphysique," in *Œuvres* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), p. 1418; English translation by Mabelie L. Andison as "Introduction to Metaphysics," in *The Creative Mind* (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1992), p. 186.

<sup>7</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945); English translation by Colin Smith, revised by Forrest Williams as *Phenomenology of Perception* (New Jersey: The Humanities Press, 1981). Hereafter PhP, with reference first to the French, then to the English.

<sup>8</sup> See also Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *La Structure du comportement* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1942), p. 232; English translation by Alden L. Fisher as *The Structure of Behavior* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1983), p. 215. Merleau-Ponty appropriates the idea of a “mélange” from Descartes’s Sixth Meditation. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *L’Union de l’âme et du corps chez Malebranche, Biran et Bergson* (Paris: Vrin, 1978), p. 13; English translation by Paul B. Milan as *The Incarnate Subject* (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2001), p. 33; also see *L’Union*, p. 81 (p. 89 of the English translation), for the connection of “mélange” to Bergson.

<sup>9</sup> He also speaks of “une histoire vécu”; see PhP, p. 512/449.

<sup>10</sup> In a remarkable essay, Rudolf Boehm has tracked the ambiguity in the concepts of immanence and transcendence in Husserl. He says that in the *Logical Investigations*, immanence meant strictly lived-experience, without any transcendent object, and in this regard, immanence was not for Husserl ambiguous. But, then in the *Idea of Phenomenology*, Husserl (anticipating the concept of the noema) included the intentional object in immanence since he thought it is given in an adequate intuition. From 1907 on (the time of the lectures that make up *The Idea of Phenomenology*), the Husserlian concept of *Erlebnis* is ambiguous, a mixture. See Rudolf Boehm, “Les ambiguïtés des concepts husserliens d’‘immanence’ et de ‘transcendence,’” in *Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger*, vol. 84 (1959): 481–526.

<sup>11</sup> Thomas Busch also cites this passage in “Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Alterity and Dialogue” in *Circulating Being: Essays in Late Existentialism* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1999), p. 83. Busch’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of ambiguity and equivocality is based on the idea of dialogue, an idea very different from a battle.

<sup>12</sup> One finds a similar critique of the concept of *Erlebnis* in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s *Wahrheit und Methode* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1975; English translation by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd revised edition, as *Truth and Method* [New York: Continuum, 1989]). Gadamer claims that the concept of *Erlebnis* consists in the immediacy of self-consciousness and in an immediacy that yields a content (*das Erlebte*). His critique is that *Erlebnis* is unity and interiority, whereas life itself is self-diremption. Here he takes his inspiration from Hegel, “the speculative import of the concept of life” (*Wahrheit und Methode*, p. 237; *Truth and Method*, pp. 250–51). Thus, because of the idea of self-diremption, Gadamer stresses the idea of judgment, “Urteil,” in German, which literally means “original partitioning.” Nevertheless, despite Gadamer’s emphasis of *Ur-teil*, we think with Foucault that life is not expressed in a judgment, which still relies on unity or synthesis, but in the infinitive of a verb which can be infinitely divided without unity. It is the expression of the indefinite, a universal singularity. On this idea of the verb, see Gilles Deleuze, *Logique du sens* (Paris: Minuit, 1969), p. 11; English translation by Mark Lester, with Charles Stivale, edited by Constantin V. Boundas as *Logic of Sense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 3. See also Foucault’s review of Deleuze’s *Logique du sens* et *Différence et répétition*, “Theatrum Philosophicum,” in *Dits et écrits I, 1954–1975* (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), pp. 950–51; English translation in Michel Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory Practice*, edited by Donald F. Bouchard (New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 173–75. If there is a concept in Foucault, it would be an infinitive, like “représenter,” “classer,” “parler,” “échanger,” or “surveiller et punir,” or finally, “penser.” It is important to recall that Deleuze says that a statement (*un énoncé*) in Foucault – and a statement is the true equivalent to the concept in Foucault – is a “curve” (*un courbe*) (Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 87; *Foucault*, p. 80).

<sup>13</sup> All the citations in the next two paragraphs are taken from the section called “l’empirique et le transcendantale” of Chapter Nine of *Les Mots et les choses*: 329–333/318–322.

<sup>14</sup> Michel Foucault, *L'Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), p. 310. The other citations come from these final pages of the chapter called "La transcendance du délire," pp. 309–318.

<sup>15</sup> Foucault, *L'Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique*, p. 240. See also, p. 265.

<sup>16</sup> Foucault, *L'Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique*, p. 239.

<sup>17</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 119; English, p. 112. See also, Michel Foucault, "Préface à la transgression," in *Dits et écrits I, 1954–1975* (Paris: Gallimard Quarto, 2001), pp. 261–278, especially p. 266; English translation by Donald F. Bouchard as "Preface to Transgression," in *Essential Works of Foucault: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, volume 2, James D. Faubion (ed.) (New York: The New Press, 1998), pp. 69–87, especially p. 74. On this page, Foucault cites Kant's early essay on negative magnitudes; here, on the basis of how negative numbers function in relation to positive numbers, Kant stresses that real conflict occurs only between two positive forces; see Immanuel Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy 1755–1770*, David Walford (ed.) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 206–241, especially, p. 215.

<sup>18</sup> Michel Foucault, "La Pensée du dehors," in *Dits et écrits*, volume I (Paris: Gallimard Quarto, 2001), pp. 546–567; English translation by Brian Massumi as "The Thought from Outside," in *Foucault/Blanchot* (New York: Zone Books, 1997), pp. 7–60. For an excellent discussion of this text, see Kas Saghafi, "The 'Passion for the Outside': Foucault, Blanchot, and Exteriority," in *International Studies in Philosophy*, XXVIII:4, pp. 80–92. At the beginning of the third section, "Reflection, Fiction," Foucault says that the thought of the outside is not lived-experience.

<sup>19</sup> In *Foucault*, Deleuze says that "En vérité, une chose hante Foucault, et c'est la pensée, 'que signifie penser? Qu'appelle-t-on penser?', la question lancée par Heidegger, reprise par Foucault, *flèche par excellence*" (p. 124; English translation, p. 116; c'est moi qui souligne). Also in *Ceci n'est pas une pipe*, Foucault describes la bataille comme "des flèches jetées centre la cible adverse" (CP 30/26).



THE INVISIBLE AND THE UNPRESENTABLE.  
THE ROLE OF METAPHOR IN MERLEAU-PONTY'S  
LAST WRITINGS

There is little doubt that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, and in particular the last period of his production, is highly metaphorical in character. A quick glance at the key notions employed by the philosopher would easily confirm this statement: expressions such as "raw being" or "wild spirit", technical terms like "encroachment", "overlapping", "transgression", and most of all the meta-notions which pervade his whole reflection, that of chiasm in the first place, witness the style of thought of a philosophy that needs to recur to the power of metaphorical expressions in order to communicate what cannot otherwise be adequately expressed. Yet here I do not want to enter into a discussion of this aspect of Merleau-Ponty's way of thinking, which certainly deserves a careful study, but which belongs to another kind of interrogation of his thought. I rather aim at a short, and yet hopefully deep enough, investigation of Merleau-Ponty's conception of the metaphor as a peculiar mode of thought, one which possesses a dignity of its own, and perhaps even more than this.

My suggestion, in fact, is that the role of the metaphor is that of an effective door through which the access to a proper understanding of the ontology of the flesh is provided. In other words it is my intention in this paper to maintain that a comprehension of what Merleau-Ponty means by Being can be obtained only if the mode of functioning proper to the metaphor is seriously taken into consideration. Furthermore, this way of understanding the notion of metaphor should provide a clarification of what the concept of "sensible idea" means.

Thus, I will proceed as follows: after a brief recollection of the few textual places in which Merleau-Ponty mentions the concept of metaphor, meant to gather as much information as possible with respect to something which did never receive an actual analytical treatment on the part of the philosopher, I will compare some recent conceptions of the metaphor, and then will try to articulate what can be deduced from such a comparison into a reflection on the ontological function that the metaphor can perform, in particular with respect to the question of the meaning of what Merleau-Ponty calls the unrepresentable. In doing this, it is the notion

of sensible idea that is in particular called into question. But let me proceed by first quickly evoking what Merleau-Ponty says, in his unmistakable way, about this elusive concept.

#### MERLEAU-PONTY ON THE METAPHOR

There are a very few places, in *The Visible and the Invisible*, in which the concept or at least the term “metaphor” is mentioned. Merleau-Ponty unfortunately has apparently never felt the need to render his opinion about this topic more explicit than a scanty mention. His spare prose on this particular topic is all the more surprising, given the importance that the *meaning* of the metaphor can be said to receive in his speculation. I do not want to judge Merleau-Ponty by his intentions, and accordingly will simply offer a possible explanation, which springs from a reading of the most important of the passages in which the notion of metaphor is mentioned. In a working note dated November 26, 1959, Merleau-Ponty writes the following:

A “direction” of thought – This is not a *metaphor* – There is no *metaphor* between the visible and the invisible [...]: *metaphor* is too much or too little: too much if the invisible is really invisible, too little if it lends itself to transposition.<sup>1</sup>

Here Merleau-Ponty is talking, as it becomes clear in the unfolding of the note, about the fact that thought is incarnated without being flesh, or at least without being reducible to the flesh peculiar of the material bodies. Thought is, as another working note notoriously states, a subtler flesh. In other words, the invisible is not the visible but it is not unrelated to the visible either. It is possible to describe this relationship between visible and invisible by saying that the invisible cannot be reduced to the visible but at the same time cannot be completely uprooted from it. It is as if the invisible cannot be rendered totally pure, as if it cannot lose its fleshy origin. Or, to put it differently, it is as if the invisible cannot be accounted for its visible counterpart and yet it has somehow to be tied to it. Neither totally with nor totally without incarnation, the invisible leads therefore an amphibious life. This is, expressed in another form, what Merleau-Ponty says, in the note above mentioned, in what immediately follows the text quoted. He speaks of objective space and of the quasi-localisation of thought. This quasi-localisation of thought cannot be accounted for in terms of objective space, and yet thought must be somehow localisable, at least in the form of the “not there”: «one cannot

say that a mind is here, but one can say that it is *not there*».<sup>2</sup> This condition of the invisible of not coinciding with, and yet of not being separable from, its visible, is something of the utmost importance in order to understand the notion of sensible idea, and is what Merleau-Ponty's *positive* concept of the metaphor must account for. Thus let us take a step further in the analysis of this concept.

Merleau-Ponty states that it is inappropriate to call a metaphor the relationship between the visible and the invisible. What sort of meaning does he attach to the term "metaphor" in this case? Without being in a position to state anything that can claim to be the ultimate truth on the topic, one can at least say that here Merleau-Ponty seems to adopt a traditional view about the metaphor. This is not the only view to be present in VI, however. In a passage of the chapter "Interrogation and intuition", to be more extensively examined below, Merleau-Ponty seems to adopt a different perspective. There he mentions «the occult trading of the metaphor»<sup>3</sup> in order to describe the mode of language which functions autonomously, without being the simple tool of a thinker who is in direct connection with the things themselves and with his own thoughts. This occult trade of the metaphor is able to institute relations that the thinker can grasp only afterwards, "après coup", and in a certain sense despite himself. The power of the metaphors is thus a capacity to put things into relations that escape the free initiative of the philosopher. As Merleau-Ponty says,

[i]t would be a language of which he [i.e.: the philosopher] would not be the organizer, words he would not assemble, that would combine through him by virtue of a natural intertwining of their meaning [...] where what counts is no longer the manifest meaning of each word and of each image, but the lateral relations, the kinships that are implicated in their transfers and their exchanges.<sup>4</sup>

The conclusion of this discourse is then extremely important for our purpose: «we have to recognize the consequence: if language is not necessarily deceptive, truth is not coincidence, nor mute.»<sup>5</sup> Language thus, if it is to be able to let the things themselves speak, must be understood in terms different than the one-to-one relationship of coincidence which is proper to what prescribes the traditional and still most widely accepted view of truth. Language is then understood by Merleau-Ponty in terms of productivity. This has a direct effect on the notion of metaphor to be held as the good one. Basically we are confronted with a duality in Merleau-Ponty's conception of the metaphor: there is a bad notion, which is related to a bad notion of language, and which holds that the things

are there to be directly seen and directly accounted for with univocal words. And there is a good notion, connected with the idea that language is not simply an exercise in naming things that pre-exist this exercise, but is a way to *let the things be*.

The wrong account of the metaphor is thus the conception based on the assumption that there is a “proper” meaning of a word, which consists in the object named by that word, and with respect to which any other term would be but a “figure”. But then what would the right account of the metaphor be, in this perspective? In order to properly answer to this question, at least in the form of a hypothesis, it will be useful to take a very quick look at some recent philosophical developments in the debate on the nature of metaphors.

#### PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE METAPHOR<sup>6</sup>

The traditional conception of the metaphor can be traced back to Aristotle. In his *Poetics*, for example, even though with some exceptions, Aristotle characterises the metaphor as an “improper” name. This perspective has then been adopted by the rhetorical tradition, through Quintilian, up to the XVIII and XIX centuries treatises (Du Marsais, Fontanier), so as to become a canonized common place. According to this conception, the metaphor is a rhetorical figure based on the mechanism of substitution, in which an extraneous *name* is transported, on the basis of an *analogy or similitude*, in order to name an object which usually cannot be named in that way. What matters here, therefore, is that there must already be a “normal” or proper way to name an object, and only on the basis of this normality can the extraneous name be perceived as a metaphor. The comparison based on a (striking, if the metaphor is to be functioning) analogy is what grants the success of the rhetorical figure. But the object, in itself, is given in advance and constitutes the ground on which to perceive the novelty represented by the improper, unexpected name, used in that circumstance. Thus the conception of language which underlies this theory of the metaphor is founded on the metaphysical, although quite commonsensical, conviction that words are names, and the role of language is that of giving names to objects which pre-exist in themselves. Thus there is a proper name which is the one that gives the essence of the object, and there are improper names whose function can be aesthetical or rhetorical, but do not add any real knowledge.

It is well known that this is a peculiar strategy oriented toward the establishment of a theory of truth. The proper names can be linked to

predicates in order to form judgments which can give the truth about a given state of affairs. The pre-condition of this theory of truth is that the judgment is true if it puts together things that are actually together, and separates things that are actually separated, as Aristotle says in the *Analytics*. But the metaphysical horizon which constitutes the foundational ground for this whole theory is that of the substance as an individuated "this" liable of predications which reflect the attributes, or accidents, of it. Therefore the conception of the metaphor as an improper name is metaphysical as well, as it constitutes the counterpart of a linear theory of truth which is based on the possibility to relate things and words in a direct way. Thus the metaphor becomes the rhetorical expedient, meant to embellish a discourse, but unable to uncover the truth. The realm of the metaphor, accordingly, is the realm of the arts, but not that of the science. This is what the mainstream of Western philosophy, up to Hegel and still Cassirer, constantly declares.

It is legitimate to say, I believe, that when Merleau-Ponty rejects the idea that the relationship between visible and invisible is a metaphor, he is referring to this classical concept of the metaphor as a figurative sense, as opposed to the proper sense. If this claim is acceptable, then it is also possible to suggest that Merleau-Ponty is, perhaps implicitly, supporting another conception of the metaphor, which no longer separates proper and figurative senses, and therefore which grants the metaphor a function of truth. This, in turn, means that truth is no longer related to the possibility to give proper, univocal names to pre-established objects, that is, truth is no longer coincidence. Clearly, it is a whole conception of Being and of meaning which is here called into question. In order to check whether Merleau-Ponty is actually suggesting this relation between metaphors and truth, it is necessary to schematically outline the main aspects of a different notion of metaphor.

It is not possible to enter here into details, but some elements must be brought to the fore. The most important of them is clearly the idea that a good metaphor is not good because it gives an object a new, unexpected name, but because it lets something *different* become visible. Metaphors, accordingly, are instruments of vision, in the sense that they allow to see differently. They institute new relations, bring to light what was concealed. This is not simply to embellish the expression of what can otherwise be said more ordinarily. This means that what is visible depends on the relations that are instituted, and this in turn means that the institution of a new relation corresponds to the institution of a new entity. What is most striking of a good metaphor, in fact, is that it is new and yet always

already known. If the power of a successful metaphor were only based on the capacity to surprise and astonish, then any unexpected comparison whatsoever could be a metaphor. But this is clearly not the case. A good metaphor is one which was never heard before, and yet, at the moment in which it is spoken, it becomes *normal*, it institutes a norm (which is why some metaphors can become so obvious that they are no longer felt as metaphors). A good metaphor, then, is a new vision, but also a vision about something that now, thanks to the metaphor, is visible for the first time, shines forth and gives itself "as such". It is usual to say, when hearing a metaphorical expression for the first time, "well, I have never seen it this way before!". The whole problem is to understand what this "before" can mean. In other words, it is the temporality of the metaphorical event that is here implied.

Some authors have developed this aspect of the metaphor. Max Black has shown that only when a scheme or model ceased to be considered as "metaphorical", in the old sense of this term, has a new scientific concept begun to be seen as *true*. It is the case of the notion of gene in biology: Black argues that biologists have *seen* the genes, in the literal sense of this term, only when they started to reason in terms of models, which are, according to Black's interpretation, metaphorical schemes of reasoning. Black is in this case applying an intuition to be found in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical investigations* to the problem of scientific reasoning. Wittgenstein uses the expression "to see as", which possesses important elements of analogy with Merleau-Ponty's "voir selon", in order to stress the effect or a real reorganisation of vision that takes place in certain cases, and not only of a different characterisation of aspects which are in themselves already given. The same perspective can be found in P. Ricoeur's notion of the poietic power of constitution of the world pertaining to a metaphorical text, which then can be called a "mythos" in the ancient sense of this term. In his *La métaphore vive*, Ricoeur shows that what he calls the living metaphor is alive precisely insofar as it produces a world: one could say that the metaphor in this case possesses an ontological force, inasmuch as it is not limited to a rearrangement of the aspects or properties to be ascribed to a certain object, but rather of the conditions of visibility of the object itself.

We begin to see that there is a whole range of aspects that cannot be adequately accounted for in the traditional conception of the metaphor. A conception which, as Derrida shows in his *La mythologie blanche*, depends on the conception of philosophy that underlies it and in turn is supported by it. The very opposition between proper and figurative sense

is the philosophical effect of a strategy of demarcation and mutual separation between what is "in itself" and what is linguistically produced. Thus the very notion of an "in itself", prior to and independent from its linguistic account, is in turn the outcome of a linguistic, or textual to be more precise, account, and accordingly is undecidable. Yet Derrida's analysis is somewhat disappointing. It is true that the dimension of language is unsurpassable; it is true that the notion of a meaning of the metaphor independent of its linguistic expression is a myth that can take the form, as in Hegel's case, of the progressive release of the conceptual dimension from its sensible origin, or on the contrary, as in some French thinkers of the Enlightenment who influenced the young Nietzsche, can lead to the unmasking of the sensible origin of the concept as its original sin. In both cases, we are left with the impression that this is only the negative side of a phenomenon that is much deeper than that, and which possesses a great importance, for it seems to allude to an ontological question, or to be more precise and more radical, it seems to allude to a different ontology. This is precisely my thesis. Merleau-Ponty's renovated ontology has to do with this conception of the metaphor as something that does not simply *represent* previously given objects in a different way, but rather *presents* objects, brings them to the fore, uncovers them from a concealment which is not a veil but something that as such cannot be given, since is not a thing. This is what I would like to argue in the rest of this paper. In order to do it, I will quickly mention Hans Blumenberg's ideas about the metaphor, which are the most innovative available on the topic.

#### BLUMENBERG'S ABSOLUTE METAPHORS AND MERLEAU-PONTY'S SENSIBLE IDEAS

Blumenberg offers a number of important analyses devoted to the theme of the metaphor. He works at two levels: on the one hand by investigating the theoretical status of the metaphor, on the other by offering amazing readings of the history of particular metaphors, such as that of the "legibility" of the world. In his *Paradigms for a metaphorology*, Blumenberg speaks of absolute metaphors, a notion which is in my opinion precious in order to understand Merleau-Ponty's position. An absolute metaphor is one for which there is no "proper" meaning, as above defined. They work as a supplement for an absence. Thus there is no possible comparison between literal and figurative meaning of the metaphorical expression, since the latter is the only expression available.

These metaphorical expressions then work in a very peculiar way: Blumenberg compares them to the rhetorical figure of the catachresis: the absence they stand for is not a determinate absence, something that would otherwise be present; this absence is something that was never present, and in itself cannot be present. There is, in other words, no “thing in itself” of which the metaphor would be the figurative counterpart. And yet the metaphor brings to light its visibility, it makes something visible which, once recognised, cannot be ignored, for its presence is indisputable, affirms itself with the power of truth. Blumenberg explains this effect performed by the absolute metaphors by recurring to an anthropological explanation: he sees in them the answer to a need proper to man, the need to give a face to what is faceless, the exigency to cope with man’s inability to be fully integrated in the world, according to a conception of man in terms of a lacking animal which was already present in Nietzsche.

Whether the explanation given by Blumenberg of the causes for the attitude toward building up absolute metaphors is acceptable or not, what in any case seems to be absolutely decisive is the perspective that this notion opens up. An absolute metaphor is a “text”, in a very broad sense of this term, which presents an absence, and this absence is in itself never present, but its unpresentability is in turn presentable. In other words, the absolute metaphor gives a form to, produces the visibility of, something that in itself cannot be visible, but whose invisibility is somehow more compelling than anything actually visible. This fact explains why a metaphor can never be totally exact. There always is a margin of indeterminacy, in the actual metaphorical expression, with respect to what is expressed. But this indeterminacy is not a lack that could be filled or corrected. It rather represents the infinite, inexhaustible aspect of that which conceals itself below its metaphorical unconcealment.

What sort of relation can be established between this notion and Merleau-Ponty’s implicit understanding of the metaphor? I think that there are a number of aspects in Merleau-Ponty’s analyses that can be clarified if seen in this perspective. I would like to focus at least of some of them here. In the first place I would say that an absolute metaphor cannot be said to be true in the usual sense. Truth in terms of correspondence is ruled out for the simple reason that there is no element the metaphor would correspond to. This is what Merleau-Ponty seems to suggest in the passage quoted at the beginning. Yet to say that there is no correspondence does not mean to say that “anything goes”, that is, that any expression can function as an absolute metaphor, and this is the most intriguing aspect of this notion. An absolute metaphor is one that



imposes itself with the force of a revelation. It is a metaphor which institutes a paradigm, so that nothing can be the same afterwards. When the metaphor is instituted, therefore, we see according to it, and this gives us the strange feeling that something that was not visible before the advent of the metaphor is now unmistakably visible. The question immediately arises: was this "something" ever present before or not?

One could say that it was and it was not present. Let us take the example of a work of art. It would be possible to consider the true works of art in terms of absolute metaphors, and this holds for novels as well as for paintings. Following Merleau-Ponty's suggestion in *Eye and Mind*, we can say that a work of art contains more than what it is contained in it, in the sense that it is not possible to make the list of what is present in that work, since other spectators or readers might find something else, and in fact they will. Now if this can be granted to the work of art, since it is such precisely because it is artificially crafted so as to produce that effect, what about normal perception? And yet the parallel between perception and art is present in Merleau-Ponty's whole philosophy. Being is what requires from us creation in order to be. Strange conception of Being indeed! But it is what Merleau-Ponty repeatedly maintains, if we remind ourselves the content of working notes such as that in which Merleau-Ponty writes the following:<sup>7</sup>

A certain relation between the visible and the invisible, where the invisible is not only non-visible [...] but where its absence counts in the world (it is "behind" the visible, imminent or eminent visibility, it is *Urpräsentiert* precisely as *Nichturpräsentierbar*, as another dimension [...]). It is this negative that makes possible the *vertical* world

Here we have one of the clearest statements of a structure that the notion of absolute metaphor expresses perspicuously. The invisible is not only not visible *de jure*, but its invisibility is *actually presented as unpresentable*, and what counts the most, it makes possible the vertical world. It is a negativity which is not opposed to a positivity but represents its other dimension. If by positivity one understands the work of consciousness that poses what it sees, then this negativity is felt as negativity because it is not posed, but on the contrary *imposes* itself to consciousness, it passivises consciousness, so to speak, in forcing it to see along lines which were not foreseen before, but whose inescapable force imposes itself on the spectator. But if we agree in considering perception in terms of a metaphorisation of Being, two questions arise:

1. what are the “metaphorical” tools that allow perception to work in this way?
2. why is it that we usually are unaware of the metaphorical nature of perception?

Obviously these questions would require much wider a space than what remains at present. I must limit myself to mentioning very synthetically the main elements of this thesis. As far as the first question is concerned, I would like to suggest that what I have called above the metaphorical tools of perception are represented by the so-called sensible ideas. These are contrasted by Merleau-Ponty to the full positivity of the concept. Literature, music, passions, but also the experience of the visible world, as a well-known passage of “The Intertwining – The Chiasm” tells us,<sup>8</sup> «are – no less than is the science of Lavoisier and Ampère – the exploration of an invisible and the disclosure of a universe of ideas. The difference is simply that this invisible, these ideas, unlike those of that science, cannot be detached from the sensible appearance and be erected into a second positivity.» Sensible ideas accordingly can be grasped only in terms of the filigree, so to speak, of the visibles in which they appear, and at the same time cannot be detached from their incarnation, cannot become a full-fledged “other” positivity, like scientific ideas do. Sensible ideas thus are more “opaque” than concepts. But this opaqueness is not a defect, it is the only way they have to be what they are. They «owe their authority, their fascinating, indestructible power, precisely to the fact that they are in transparency behind the sensible, or in its heart.»<sup>9</sup> The manifestation of sensible ideas cannot be separated from their retreat behind the sensible. They are “there”, but as different from what appears. And yet this elusiveness is their mode of givenness. If we were to possess them completely, we would not really have them, we would rather lose them. Their power is “without concept”, and they owe it to a strange, peculiar force of cohesion, which Merleau-Ponty compares to the cohesion of the parts of my body.<sup>10</sup>

What sort of cohesion is this? Merleau-Ponty says that these sensible ideas function as a form of “initiation”, «the opening of a dimension that can never again be closed, the establishment of a level in terms of which every other experience will henceforth be situated.»<sup>11</sup> He then goes on by saying that «[t]he idea is this level, this dimension. It is therefore not a *de facto* invisible, like an object hidden behind another, and not an absolute invisible, which would have nothing to do with the visible. Rather it is the invisible *of* this world, that which inhabits this world,

sustains it, and renders it visible, its own and interior possibility, the Being of this being.»<sup>12</sup> Merleau-Ponty uses here, almost literally, the words that were above employed in order to describe the mode of functioning of absolute metaphors. It is in particular remarkable that the cohesion proper to sensible ideas is subtracted from the logic of non-contradiction: like a metaphor, the sensible idea puts together what common sense tends to disjoin and separate.<sup>13</sup> In this doing, the sensible idea performs the institution of a relationship which acts retrospectively, and makes what has just been related be felt *as if* the relation were there from the beginning, according to a movement which possesses the aspect of an *après coup*. The temporality proper to sensible ideas is neither the serial time of ordinary experience, nor the a-temporality proper to concepts, but it is a transtemporality in which past, present and future are strangely linked together and turned upside down.

Many other remarks should be made in this connection, but I must leave them for another occasion. I would like to end with the answer to an obvious objection, above evoked: why are we never aware of the metaphorical condition, in the radical or absolute sense of the term, of sensible ideas? Perhaps the answer resides in the notion, derived from Husserl, of sedimentation. Once a mode of perceiving is instituted, it is irreversible, it cannot be changed. This is true to the point that these metaphorical perceptions, if I am allowed to coin this expression, become a habit, a second nature, which is precisely what the notion of sedimentation, to be found in the *Cartesian Meditations*, the *Krisis* and in a number of manuscripts, is meant to convey. We no longer perceive the metaphorical origin of a certain mode of perceiving. But this must be understood in more radical a way than simply by explaining it by recurring to the sensible origin of the metaphors, for in this case it is sensibility itself which is metaphorical. In other words, and perhaps recovering Nietzsche's real radical intuition, metaphors do not have a proper meaning, a literal sense. Metaphors *are* the original, the literal meanings, and Being can be given only as a never present, and yet always present, unpresentable presence, whose absence is constantly metaphorised in perception.<sup>14</sup>

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> M. Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, A. Lingis (trans.) (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 1968), pp. 221–222. Hereafter referred to as VI followed by page number(s).

<sup>2</sup> VI 222.

<sup>3</sup> VI 125.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> For this account of the debate on the concept of metaphor I rely heavily on the work done by Silvana Borutti. Cf. in particular her “L’invenzione della metafora”, aut-aut 220–221, 1987, pp. 47–62.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. VI 227–228.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. VI 149.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. VI 150.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. VI 152.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. VI 151.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> There is a passage in his Lectures of 1960–61, devoted to Descartes’ Ontology and the ontology of the present, in which Merleau-Ponty writes that a sensible idea signifies in a peculiar way, insofar as it carries a meaning which is characterised as follows: «non signification qui soit “idée de ‘intelligence’”, mais signification qui est *métaphore*, mise en relation de tout ce que nos habitudes et nos contrôles séparent». Cf. *Notes de cours 1959–1961*, Gallimard, Paris 1996. p. 202.

<sup>14</sup> This conception of perception and of the absolute function of the metaphor can be developed in order to show that Lyotard’s criticism of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of Being and its allegedly still too optimistic consideration does not hold. I hope to show this further in another essay. Cf. what M. Carbone says in his “Il sensibile e il desiderlo. Merleau-Ponty, Lyotard e la pittura”, aut-aut 232–233, 1989.

## APPENDIX

### *The Third World Congress of Phenomenology*

#### PHENOMENOLOGY WORLD-WIDE

*Organized by:* The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning (1 Ivy Pointe Way, Hanover, NH 03755, United States) its centers and affiliated societies, as well as other phenomenology groups and societies.

#### *Theme*

#### LOGOS OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE LOGOS

*Historical Research; Great Phenomenological Issues;  
Present Day Developments*

---

Wadham College, University of Oxford, England  
August 15–21, 2004

The Congress begins at 4:00 p.m., Sunday, August 15, 2004, with an Opening Reception and Registration on site, in the Cloister Garden, near the Cloister, which is located behind the College Hall.

Registration on site will continue at 8:30 a.m. on Monday, August 16, in the Auditorium.

Plenary sessions will run from 9:00 a.m. until 1:00 p.m. Lunch will run from 1:00 p.m. until 2:30 p.m.. The afternoon sessions will run from 2:30 p.m. until 7:30 or 8:00 p.m. (with a coffee break in the afternoon).

Coffee may be taken in your room or in the King's Arms (a pub).

## P R O G R A M

**Monday, August 16**

**8:30 a.m. The Auditorium, Registration**

---

**9:00 a.m.**

### ***INAUGURAL LECTURE***

*Presided by:* Brian McGuinness, Siena, Italy

THE LOGOS OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND  
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE LOGOS

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, World Institute for Advanced  
Phenomenological Research and Learning, United States

### ***PLENARY SESSION I***

*Chair:* Grahame Lock, Oxford University, Great Britain

PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE HERMENEUTIC OF  
TRADITIONS

Mafalda Blanc, Center of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon,  
Portugal

ONTOLOGICAL INTENTIONS OF TRANSCENDENTALISM  
Anatoly Zotov, Russia

SCIENCE IN MIND. EXPLORING THE LANGUAGE OF THE  
LOGOS

Leo Zonneveld, Netherlands

HEIDEGGER'S TAUTOLOGICAL THINKING AND THE  
QUESTION CONCERNING THE END OF PHILOSOPHY

Tze-wan Kwan, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

---

**1:00–2:30 p.m. Lunch**

---

**Monday, August 16**

**2:30 p.m., The Auditorium**

### ***SESSION I: PHENOMENOLOGY OF HISTORY***

*Organized and Presided by:*

Mark E. Blum, University of Louisville, United States

PHENOMENOLOGICAL HISTORY AND  
PHENOMENOLOGICAL HISTORIOGRAPHY

Mark E. Blum, University of Louisville, United States

**PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE CHALLENGE OF HISTORY**

Kathleen Haney, University of Houston, United States

**PHENOMENOLOGY, HISTORY AND HISTORICITY IN KARL JASPER'S PHILOSOPHY**

Filiz Peach, University of London, Great Britain

**THE TASK OF A HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY OF HISTORY**

Osborne Wiggins, University of Louisville, United States

---

**4:00–4:30 p.m. Coffee Break**

***“PHENOMENOLOGICAL HISTORY:  
A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION”***

*With the following participants:*

Mark E. Blum, University of Louisville, United States

Kathleen Haney, University of Houston, United States

Filiz Peach, University of London, Great Britain

Osborne Wiggins, University of Louisville, United States

---

**Monday, August 16**

**2:30 p.m., Staircase 1 – Room 3**

***SESSION II:***

***FREEDOM, NECESSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION***

*Chair:* Maija Kule, University of Latvia, Latvia

**OUTLINE OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF VIOLENCE. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS**

Michael Staudigl, Institute for Human Sciences, Austria

**THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RESISTANCE**

Kadria Ismail, AIN – Shams University, Egypt

**PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE'S OPENING TO THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY – THE VIRTUE'S ISSUE** Carmen Cozma, University “Al.I.Cuza”, Romania

---

**4:30 – 5:00 p.m. Coffee Break**

**PATOCKA AND DERRIDA ON RESPONSIBILITY**

Eddo Evink, Groningen University, Netherlands

SARTRE'S METHOD, THE DIALECTIC OF FREEDOM AND  
NECESSITY

Raymond Langley, Manhattanville College, United States

"PERFECT HEALTH" AND THE DISEMBODIMENT OF THE  
SELF. AN APPROACH TO HENRYAN THINKING.

Stella Zita De Azevedo, Universidade do Porto, Portugal

---

**Monday, August 16**

**2:30 p.m., Staircase 2 – Room 2**

***SESSION III:***

***LIVING TOGETHER IN THE PSYCHIATRIC PERSPECTIVE***

*Presided by:* Simon Du Plock, Regents College, Great Britain

PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Simon Du Plock, Regents College, Great Britain

LOGOS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY: PHENOMENON OF  
ENCOUNTER AND HOPE IN THE PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC  
RELATIONSHIP

Camilo Serrano Bonitto, Latinoamerican Circle of Phenomenology,  
Colombia

THE MEANINGFULNESS OF MENTAL HEALTH AS BEING  
WITHIN A WORLD OF APPARENT MEANINGLESS BEING

Jarlath Mc Kenna, Waterford Institute of Technology, Ireland

FUNCTION AND MEANING OF DESIRE IN DEPTH-  
PSYCHOLOGY

Mina Sehdev, Italy

---

**5:00–5:30 p.m. Coffee Break**

---

ONTOPOIESIS AND UNION IN THE PRAYER OF THE HEART:  
CONTRIBUTIONS TO PSYCHOTHERAPY AND LEARNING

Olga Louchakova, Institute of Transpersonal Psychology, United States

DIE VERWANDLUNG DES SCHIZOPHRENNEN IN-DER-WELT-  
SEINS

Eva Syristova, University of Prague, Czech Republic

---



**Monday, August 16**

**2:30 p.m., Staircase 9 – Room 1**

**SESSION IV:  
PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE HUMAN AND  
SOCIAL SCIENCES**

*Organized and Presided by:*

Gary Backhaus, Morgan State University, United States

TOWARD A CULTURAL PHENOMENOLOGY

Gary Backhaus, Morgan State University, United States

A SCHUTZ'S CONCEPTION OF RELEVANCE AND ITS  
INFLUENCE ON SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Natalia Smirnova, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia

DEMONSTRATING MOBILITY

Anjana Bhattacharjee, Brunel University, Great Britain

**4:00–4:30 p.m. Coffee Break**

PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY AND THE CHOICE TO  
CHOOSE

Marianne Sawicki, United States

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SELF AS NON-LOCAL:  
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RESEARCH REPORT.

Amy Louise Miller, United States

USER-FRIENDLY MARKET AS A PROJECT OF MODERN  
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Maria Bielawka, Krakow, Poland

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

**Tuesday, August 17**

**8:30 a.m., The Auditorium, Registration**

**9:00 a.m., The Auditorium**

**PLENARY SESSION II: CROSSING BRIDGES**

*Chair:* Angela Ales Bello, Lateran University, Italy

SOME COMMENTS ON ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND  
PHENOMENOLOGY

Grahame Lock, Oxford University, Great Britain

“THE TEMPTATIONS OF PHENOMENOLOGY ARE VERY GREAT HERE”: ON THE CURIOUS (ABSENCE OF) DIALOGUE BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY

Richard Paul Hamilton, Saitama University, Japan

LESSONS FROM SARTRE FOR THE ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Manuel Bremer, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Germany

PROBLEM OF THE “IDEA” IN DERRIDA’S “THE PROBLEM OF GENESIS”

Dasuke Kamei, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan

DIE NICHT-INTERNATIONALITÄT DES LEIBES

Andreas Brenner, Universität Basel, Switzerland

**1:00–2:30 p.m. Lunch**

**Tuesday, August 17**

**2:30 p.m., The Auditorium**

***SESSION V:  
PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION***

*Presided by:*

Thomas Ryba, Notre Dame University, United States

BEFORE THE GENESIS: LEVINAS, MARION AND TYMIENIECKA ON CONSTITUTION, GIVENNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE

Thomas Ryba, St. Thomas Aquinas Center at Purdue, United States

MATER-NATALITY: AUGUSTINE, ARENDT, AND LEVINAS

Ann Astell, Purdue University, United States

LEVINAS AND THE NIGHT OF PHENOMENOLOGY

Sandor Goodhart, St. Thomas Aquinas Center at Purdue, United States

THE POTENTIALITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ISLAM

Aziz Esmail, Institute of Ismaili Studies, Great Britain

**4:30–5:00 p.m. Coffee Break**

---

AL-SUHRAWARDI'S DOCTRINE AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Salahaddin Khalilov, Azerbaijan Universiteti, Azerbaijan

RELIGION WITHOUT WHY: EDITH STEIN AND MARTIN  
HEIDEGGER ON THE OVERCOMING OF METAPHYSICS

Michael F. Andrews, Seattle University, United States

HERMENEUTICS OF THE MYSTICAL PHENOMENON IN  
EDITH STEIN

Carmen Balzer, Argentina

---

**Tuesday, August 17**

**2:30 p.m., Staircase 9 – Room 2**

***SESSION VI:***

***PHENOMENOLOGICAL ORCHESTRATION OF THE ARTS***

*Presided by:* Mao Chen, Skidmore College, United States

PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE WORK  
OF ART: R. INGARDEN, M. DUFFREN, P. RICOEUR

Elga Freiberga, University of Latvia, Latvia

NATURAL BEAUTY AND LANDSCAPE PAINTING

David Brubaker, University of New Haven, United States

TOWARDS PHENOMENOLOGY OF NATURAL –  
ARCHITECTURAL MEMORIAL

Ljudmila Molodkina, State University of Land Use Planning, Russia

PATINA – ATMOSPHERE – AROMA, TOWARDS AN  
AESTHETICS OF FINE DIFFERENCES

Madalina Diaconu, Academy of Fine Arts, Austria

---

**5:00–5:30 p.m. Coffee Break**

---

THE PERSISTENCE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL TIME:  
REFLECTIONS OF RECENT CHINESE CINEMA

Mao Chen, Skidmore College, United States

THE TRUTH OF SUFFERING (LEVINAS) AND THE TRUTH  
CRYSTALLIZED IN THE WORK OF ART (GADAMER)

Aleksandra Pawliszyn, Uniwersytet Gdanski, Poland

---

**Tuesday, August 17**

**2:30 p.m., Staircase 9 – Room 3**

**SESSION VII:**

**“THE MOST DIFFICULT POINT”: “THE BOND BETWEEN THE  
FLESH AND THE IDEA” IN MERLEAU-PONTY’S LAST  
THOUGHT**

*Organized and presided by:*

Mauro Carbone, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy

LET IT BE

Mauro Carbone, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy

THE INVISIBLE AND THE FLESH. QUESTIONING CHIASM.

Patrick Burke, Seattle University, United States

MERLEAU-PONTY ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LOGOS  
PROPHORIKOS AND LOGOS ENDIATHETOS

Wayne Froman, George Mason University, United States

**4:00–4:30 p.m. Coffee Break**

UN ECART INFIME (A MINUSCULE HIATUS): THE CRITIQUE  
OF THE CONCEPT OF LIVED-EXPERIENCE (VECU) IN  
FOUCAULT

Leonard Lawlor, University of Memphis, United States

THE INVISIBLE AND THE UNPRESENTABLE

Luca Vanzago, Università degli Studi Pavia, Italy

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

**Tuesday, August 17**

**2:30 p.m., Staircase 1 – Room 3**

**ROUNDTABLE ON A-T. TYMIENIECKA’S PHENOMENOLOGY  
OF LIFE**

*Presided by:* Gary Backhaus, Morgan State University, United States

THE LOGOS OF LIFE AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE

Agnes B. Curry, Saint Joseph College, United States

Lawrence Kimmel, Trinity University, United States

ONTOPOIESIS AS THE FIRST ONTOLOGY OF BEINGNESS-IN-BECOMING

Peter Abumhenre Egbe, Lateran University of Rome/Nigeria

---

**4:30–5:00 p.m. Coffee Break**

---

ECOLOGY

Zaiga Ikere, Daugavpils Pedagogical University, Latvia

HUMAN CONDITION-IN-THE-UNITY-OF-EVERYTHING-ALIVE  
AS A NEW CONCEPTION OF ANTHROPOLOGY

Mieczyslaw Pawel Migon, Gdansk, Poland

THE MEASURE

Carmen Cozma, University “Al.I.Cuza”, Romania

THE NEW CRITIQUE OF REASON

Nancy Mardas, Saint Joseph College, United States

***GENERAL DISCUSSION***

---

**Tuesday, August 17**

**2:30 p.m., Staircase 2 – Room 2**

***SESSION VIII:***

***DISCLOSURE AND DIFFERENTIATION:***

***THE GENESIS OF BEAUVOIR'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL VOICE***

*Presided by:*

Laura Hengehold, Case Western Reserve University, United States,  
and Shoichi Matsuba, Kobe, Japan

BEAUVOIRIAN EXISTENTIALISM: AN ETHIC OF  
INDIVIDUALISM OR INDIVIDUATION?

Laura Hengehold, Case Western Reserve University, United States

BEAUVOIR'S CONCEPT OF DISCLOSURE: ORIGINS AND  
INFLUENCES

Kristana Arp, Long Island University, United States

THE ORIGINS OF BEAUVOIR'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL  
METHOD

Edward Fullbrook, Case Western Reserve University, United States

---

**5:00 – 5:30 p.m. Coffee Break**

---

***GENERAL DISCUSSION***

---

**Wednesday, August 18**

**8:30 a.m., The Auditorium, Registration**

**9:00 a.m., The Auditorium**

***PLENARY SESSION III:  
LIFE IN NUMEROUS PERSPECTIVES***

*Presided by:* Kadria Ismail, AIN – Shams University, Egypt

**THE LANGUAGE OF OUR LIVING BODY**

Angela Ales Bello, Lateran University, Italy

**PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW EVOLUTIONISTIC  
PARADIGMS**

Roberto Verolini, Italy, *and* Fabio Petrelli, Università degli Studi de  
Camerino, Italy

**HUMAN BEING IN BEINGNESS: ANNA-TERESA  
TYMIENIECKA'S VISION**

Zaiga Ikere, Daugavpils Pedagogical University, Latvia

**WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE EMBODIED, NATURALIZING  
BODILY SELF-AWARENESS**

Peter Reynaert, Universiteit Antwerpen – UFSIA, Belgium

**SENSIBLE MODELS IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE**

Arthur Piper, University of Nottingham, Great Britain

---

**1:00–2:30 p.m. Lunch**

---

**Wednesday, August 18**

**2:30 p.m., The Auditorium**

***SYMPOSIUM***

***Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue  
Around the Perennial Issue: MICROCOSM AND MACROCOSM***

*Organized and Presided by:*

Nader El-Bizri, University of Cambridge, Great Britain

**BEING AND NECESSITY: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL**

# INVESTIGATION OF AVICENNA'S METAPHYSICS AND COSMOLOGY

Nader El-Bizri, University of Cambridge, Great Britain

# THE ILLUMINATIVE NOTION OF MAN IN PERSIAN THOUGHT: A RESPONSE TO AN ORIGINAL QUEST

Mahmoud Khatami, University of Tehran, Iran

# THE MICROCOSM/MACROCOSM ANALOGY IN IBN SINA AND HUSSERL

Marina Banchetti-Robino, Florida Atlantic University, United States

# MICROCOSM AND MACROCOSM IN LOTZE

Nikolay Milkov, Germany

## 4:00–4:30 p.m. Coffee Break

# MICROCOSM AND MACROCOSM IN MAX SCHELER IN RELATION TO ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

Mieczyslaw Pawel Migon, Gdansk, Poland

# AL-GHAZALIAN INTERPRETATION OF AN ARISTOTELIAN TEXT USED BY HEIDEGGER

Abu Yaareb Marzouki, International Islamic University of Malaysia, Malaysia

# MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND OMAR KHAYYAM ON THE QUESTION OF "THERENESS"

Mehdi Aminrazavi, Mary Washington College, United States

# CONCLUDING REMARKS

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, World Phenomenology Institute, United States

## Wednesday, August 18

## 2:30 p.m., Staircase 9 – Room 1

### *SESSION IX:*

# *CLASSIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY IN THEIR TRANSFORMATION*

*Presided by:* Carmen Cozma, University "Al.I.Cuza", Romania

# THE FORMAL THEORY OF EVERYTHING: HUSSERL'S THEORY OF MANIFOLDS

Nikolay Milkov, Universitaet Bielfeld, Germany

## ON THE MODE OF EXISTENCE OF THE REAL NUMBERS

Piotr Blaszczyk, Pedagogical University, Poland

ON THE ONTO-LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF HUSSERL'S  
PERCEPTUAL NOEMA

David Grunberg, Middle East Technical University, Turkey

**4:30–5:00 p.m. Coffee Break**HERMENEUTISCHE VERSUS TRANZENDENTALE  
PHANOMENOLOGIE

Jesus Adrian Escudero, Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain

PHENOMENOLOGIE TRANSCENDENTALE ET CRITIQUE DE  
LA REASON THEOLOGIQUE

Arion Kelkel, La Terrasse, France

**Wednesday, August 18****2:30 p.m., Staircase 9 – Room 2*****ROUNDTABLE:  
EPOCHE AND REDUCTION TODAY****Organized and Presided by:*

Michael Staudigl, Institute for Human Sciences, Austria

INTRODUCTION: EPOCHE AND REDUCTION AFTER  
HUSSERL

Michael Staudigl, Institute for Human Sciences, Austria

CONCEPTION OF TIME IN HUSSERL'S SOCIAL WORLDS –  
MODERN PERSPECTIVE OF “METAXU”

Cezary J. Olbromski, University Marii Curie-Sklodowskiej, Poland

ON SCHUTZ CONCERNING THE TRANSCENDENTAL  
REDUCTION

Gary Backhaus, Morgan State University, United States

**5:00–5:30 p.m. Coffee Break**

## BODY OR FLESH (FROM HUSSERL TO MERLEAU-PONTY)

Luca Vanzago, Italy



BEYOND THE EPOCHE: INTUITION AND CREATIVE  
IMAGINATION (ON TYMIENIECKA)

Nancy Mardas, Saint Joseph College, United States

---

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

---

Wednesday, August 18

2:30 p.m., Staircase 9 – Room 3

**SESSION X:**

**TIME, ALTERITY, AND SUBJECTIVITY: REFLECTIONS ON  
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF  
EMMANUEL LEVINAS**

*Organized and Presided by:*

Richard Sugarman, University of Vermont, United States

EMMANUEL LEVINAS AND THE DEFORMALIZATION OF  
TIME

Richard Sugarman, University of Vermont, United States

THE JUSTIFICATION AND JUSTICE OF PHENOMENOLOGY

Richard A. Cohen, University of Vermont, United States

---

**4:00–4:30 p.m. Coffee Break**

---

EMMANUEL LEVINAS: NON-INTENTIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS  
AND THE STATUS OF REPRESENTATIONAL THOUGHT

Roger Duncan, Holy Apostles College, United States

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF TIME IN PHILOSOPHY OF  
LEVINAS: TEMPORALITY AND OTHERNESS IN THE HEBRAIC  
TRADITION

Shmuel Wygoda, Israel

---

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

---

**Wednesday, August 18**

**2:30 p.m., Staircase 1 – Room 3**

***SESSION XI:***

*Chair:*

Francesco Totaro, University Degli Studi di Macerata, Italy  
and Ignacy Fiut, Krakow, Poland

LES FIGURES DE L'INTERSUBJECTIVITE

Maria Manuela Brito Martins, Universidade do Porto, Portugal

SUBJECTIVITY AND ESSENTIAL INDIVIDUALITY

Roberta de Monticelli, Universite de Geneve, Switzerland

EGO-MAKING PRINCIPLE IN CLASSICAL INDIAN  
METAPHYSICS AND COSMOLOGY

Marzenna Jakubczak, Poland

---

**4:30–5:00 p.m. Coffee Break**

---

THE EMPIRICAL EGO AND THE PROBLEM OF NARCISSISM:  
PREAMBLES TO A READING OF “IDEEN I” 27–32

Jeffrey Bloechl, College of the Holy Cross, United States

PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY OF THE BEING-WITH:  
THE NOTION OF CO-EXISTENCE IN MAURICE MERLEAU-  
PONTY AND JAN-LUC NANCY

Rinalds Zembahs, University of Latvia, Latvia

---

**Wednesday, August 18**

**2:30 p.m., Staircase 2 – Room 2**

***SESSION XII:***

***TIME, CONSCIOUSNESS AND HISTORICITY***

*Presided by:* Kathleen Haney, University of Houston, United States

THE PRINCIPLE OF HISTORICITY IN THE  
PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE

Maija Kule, University of Latvia, Latvia

TIME AND HISTORY IN P. RICOEUR'S THOUGHT

M. Avelina Cecilia Lafuente, University of Seville, Spain

## HUSSERL & BERGSON ON CONSCIOUSNESS AND TIME

Rafael Winkler, Great Britain

## THE HISTORICITY OF NATURE

Konrad Rokstad, University of Bergen, Norway

---

### 5:00 – 5:30 p.m. Coffee Break

---

## THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND EARLY ROMANTIC CONCEPTS OF NATURE AND THE SELF

Oliver W. Holmes, Wesleyan University, United States

## ANXIETY AND TIME IN THE HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY OF HEIDEGGER

Marta Figueras Badia, Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain

---

**Thursday, August 19**

**9:00 a.m., The Auditorium**

### ***PLENARY SESSION IV:***

#### ***THE LIVING SPACE***

*Presided by:* Jorge Garcia-Gomez, Southampton College, United States

## LIVING SPACES: THE LANDSCAPES OF HUMAN LIFE

W. Kim Rogers, East Tennessee State University, United States

## DISCUSSION ON THE NOTIONS OF 'LIFE' AND 'EXISTENTIA' IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTIONS OF HEIDEGGER AND MERLEAU-PONTY

Maria Golebiewska, Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland

## VARIATIONS OF THE SENSIBLE, TRUTH OF IDEAS AND IDEA OF PHILOSOPHY MOVING FROM THE LATER MERLEAU-PONTY

Mauro Carbone, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy

## THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE OF ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA IN RELATION TO HER ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONCEPTION

Mieczysław Paweł Migon, Gdańsk, Poland

## PHENOMENOLOGY AND ECOPHILOSOPHY

Ignacy Fiut, Kraków, Poland

## MEN IN FRONT OF ANIMALS

Leszek Pyra, Poland

**1:00–2:30 p.m. Lunch****Thursday, August 19****2:30 p.m., The Auditorium***Roundtable (and lectures)****GREAT CLASSICAL QUESTIONS REVISITED****Presided by:* Andreas Brenner, Universitat Basel, Switzerland

## STRUCTURE AND THE CRITIQUE OF EVIDENCE

Helena De Preester, Ghent University, Belgium, *and* Gertrudis Van de Vijver, Ghent University, Belgium

## DESCARTES AND ORTEGA ON THE FATE OF INDUBITABLE KNOWLEDGE

Jorge Garcia-Gomez, Southampton College, United States

**4:00–4:30 p.m. Coffee Break**

## THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE QUESTION IN HUSSERL AND FINK WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE “SIXTH CARTESIAN MEDITATION

Jonathan Lahey Dronsfield, University of Southampton, Great Britain

## AN INTERPRETATION OF HUSSERL'S CONCEPT OF CONSTITUTION IN TERMS OF SYMMETRY

Filip Kolen, Ghent University, Belgium

**Thursday, August 19****2:30 p.m., Staircase 1 – Room 3*****SESSION XIII:****Presided by:* Carmen Balzer, Argentina

## PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHODOLOGOS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Rimma Kurenkova, Vladimir Pedagogical Institute, Russia,  
Y. A. Plekhanov, Vladimir Pedagogical Institute, Russia,  
Elena Rogacheva, Vladimir Pedagogical Institute, Russia

HOW ARE WE STUDYING PHENOMENOLOGICAL  
PHILOSOPHY IN MONGOLIA?

Danzankhorloo Dashpurev, The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and  
Political Science, Mongolia

PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFELONG LEARNING

Klymet Selvi, Anadolu University, Turkey

---

**4:30–5:00 p.m. Coffee Break**

---

FROM THE STATION TO THE LYCEUM

Matti Itkonen, University of Jyväskylä, Finland

THE FRUITS OF THE LABOR: TYMIENIECKA'S  
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF HUMAN CREATIVITY

Nancy Mardas, St. Joseph College, United States

CREATIVITY AS A CHANCE FOR MAN

Monika Kowalczyk-Boruch, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, Poland

---

**Thursday, August 19**

**2:30 p.m., Staircase 2 – Room 2**

**SESSION XIV:  
PHENOMENOLOGY AND LITERATURE**

*Presided by:*

Jadwiga Smith, Bridgewater State College, United States

LOGOS, THE AESTHETIC IMAGINATION, AND SPONTANEITY

Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, The University of Maine, United States

AN HISTORICAL LOOK AT GENRE WITHIN

PHENOMENOLOGICAL AESTHETICS

Donald F. Castro, Mesa Community College, United States

EXPLORING AESTHETIC PERCEPTION OF THE REAL IN IRIS  
MURDOCH'S "THE BLACK PRINCE"

Calley Hornbuckle, University of South Carolina, United States

---

**5:00–5:30 p.m. Coffee Break**

---

PHENOMENOLOGY OF EMOTIONS: AUREL KOLNAI'S ON  
DISGUST AND JACOBAN DRAMA

Jadwiga Smith, Bridgewater State College, United States

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF LITERARY  
CREATIVITY: RICOEUR AND JOYCE

Raymond J. Wilson III, Loras College, United States

**Thursday, August 19**

**2:30 p.m., Staircase 9 – Room 1**

*Presentation of our "Encyclopedia of Learning":*

**PHENOMENOLOGY WORLD-WIDE**

*Foundations – Expanding dynamics – Life-engagements*

*A Guide for Research and Study*

Robert D. Sweeney, John Carroll University, United States

Jadwiga Smith, Bridgewater State College, United States

Kathleen Haney, University of Houston, United States

**4:00–4:30 p.m. Coffee Break**

**Thursday, August 19**

**2:30 p.m., Staircase 9 – Room 2**

**SESSION XV:**

*Presided by:*

Robert D. Sweeney, John Carroll University, United States

UNDERSTANDING OF CULTURE IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY  
OF LIFE

Rihards Kulis, University of Latvia, Latvia

LIFE WORLD BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL  
EXPERIENCE: ON "EUROPEAN CRISIS"

Andrina Tonkli-Komel, Slovenia

TIME, SPACE AND BEING IN THE WORLD THROUGH THE  
LIFE COURSE

Judith A. Glonek, Somerton, Australia

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL  
CONCEPTION IN THE WORKS OF A-T. TYMIENIECKA WITH

SOME ISSUES OF CONTEMPORARY GEORGIAN  
PHENOMENOLOGY

Mamuka G. Dolidze, Institute of Philosophy of Georgia, Tblisi,  
Georgia

---

**4:30–5:00 p.m. Coffee Break**

---

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SENSE IS THE MATURE SENSE –  
HUSSERL'S REFLECTION ON THE MEASURE OF  
PHILOSOPHY

Włodzimierz Pawliszyn, Uniwersytet Gdanski, Poland

LANGUAGE, TIME AND OTHERNESS

Julia Ponzio, University of Bari, Italy

VIRTUAL DECADENCE

Martin Holt, City University, Great Britain

---

**Friday, August 20**

**9:00 a.m., The Auditorium**

***PLENARY SESSION V:  
WORLD OF LIFE, CULTURE, COMMUNICATION***

*Presided by:*

Tze-wan Kwan, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

IMAGINARY WORLD AND WORLD OF LIFE. MASS  
COMMUNICATION AS NEW "IDEENKLEID" AND  
IMPLICATIONS OF SENSE

Francesco Totaro, University Degli Studi di Macerata, Italy

THE INTERFACING OF LANGUAGE AND WORLD

Erkut Sezgin, Istanbul Kultur Universitese & Istanbul Technical  
University, Turkey

LES DEPENDANCES INTER-SUBJECTIVES OU LE LANGUAGE  
ET LA COMMUNICATION JOUENT UN ROLE IMPORTANT

Jozef Sivak, Filozoficky Ustav Sav, Slovakia

LIFEWORLD: MEANING OF SIGNS AND COMMUNICATION

Ella Buceniece, University of Latvia, Latvia

PHENOMENOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS OF  
INTERMEDIACY AND THE CONSTITUTION OF  
INTERCULTURAL SENSE

Dean Komel, Slovenia

HANNAH ARENDT'S REVISION OF PRAXIS: ON PLURALITY  
AND NARRATIVE EXPERIENCE

William D. Melaney, The American University in Cairo, Egypt

---

**1:00–2:30 p.m. Lunch**

---

**Friday, August 20**

**2:30 p.m., The Auditorium**

***SESSION XVI:  
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AS A NEW EXCAVATION  
INTO THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL FIELD***

*Presided by:*

Angela Ales Bello, Lateran University, Italy

HISTORY AS THE UNVEILING OF THE *TELOS*. THE  
HUSSERLIAN CRITIQUE OF THE WELTANSCHAUUNGEN.

Nicoletta Ghigi, University of Perugia, Italy

THE PERSON AND THE OTHER IN MARIA ZAMBRANO'S  
THOUGHT

Maria Mercedes Libozzi, University La Sapienza, Italy

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO  
ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHICS

Mobeen Shahid, Pontifical Universita Laterano, Vatican State

VITOLOGY: THE AFRICAN VISION OF THE HUMAN PERSON

Martin Nkafu Nkemnkia, Pontifical Lateran University, Italy

---

**5:00–5:30 p.m. Coffee Break**

---

WHOSE LIFE IS A HUMAN LIFE?

Victor Gerald Rivas, University of Puebla, Mexico



PLATO'S TEACHING ABOUT A "LIVING CREATURE" AND  
PHENOMENOLOGY

Olena Shkubulyani, Ukraine

DISPOSITION TO PHENOMENOLOGY IN W. JAMES'S  
CONCEPTION OF PURE EXPERIENCE

Velga Vevere, University of Latvia, Latvia

**Friday, August 20**

**2:30 p.m., Staircase 9 – Room 3**

***SESSION XVII:  
THE MORAL SENSE OF LIFE***

*Presided by:*

M. Avelina Cecilia Lafuente, University of Seville, Spain

MORAL ASPECTS OF LIFE

Tadeusz Czarnik, Uniwersytet Jagiellonski, Poland

THE PRINCIPLE OF GRATEFULNESS: THE  
PHENOMENOLOGY OF GIVING AS THE CONSCIOUSNESS  
OF ONE'S OWN IDENTITY AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF  
GLOBALIZATION

Shannon Driscoll, Pontifical Georgian University, Rome, Italy

THE CREATIONISM OF LEONARDO COIMBRA AND THE  
"SAUDE"\* AS MORAL "GOOD"

Maria Teresa de Noronha, Universidade Alberta, Portugal

**4:00–4:30 p.m. Coffee Break**

FICTION AND THE GROWTH OF MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS:  
ATTENTION AND EVIL

Rebecca M. Painter, Marymount Manhattan College, United States

THE SOCIAL, AFFECTIVE AND TRANSCENDENTAL  
DIMENSIONS OF BEING IN DOSTOIEVSKY'S, PROUST'S AND  
WOOLF'S NOVELS

Michel Dion, Universite de Sherbrooke, Canada

PHENOMENOLOGY FOR WORLD RECONSTRUCTION

Chiedozie Okoro, University of Lagos, Nigeria

**Friday, August 20**

**2:30 p.m., Staircase 1 – Room 3**

***SESSION XVIII:***  
***EXPERIENCE AND LOGOS IN FINE ARTS***

*Presided by:*

Patricia Trutty-Coohill, Siena College, United States

LEONARDO DA VINCI'S WORKING METHOD, IN LIGHT OF  
A-T. TYMIENIECKA'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE

Patricia Trutty-Coohill, Siena College, United States

PRINCIPIOS DE OBJECTIVIDAD POETICA

Antonio Dominguez Rey, Universidad Nacional de Educacion  
Distancia, Spain

ESSENTIAL "POIESIS"

J.C. Couceiro-Bueno, Univ. de la Coruna, Campus Elvina s/n, Spain

PHENOMENOLOGY OF COUNTENANCE. PORTRAITING THE  
SOUL, REPRESENTING A LIVED EXPERIENCE

Piero Trupia, UPS University, Italy

---

**4:30–5:00 p.m. Coffee Break**

---

MUSICAL PROGENY: THE CASE OF MUSIC AND  
PHENOMENOLOGY

Ellen J. Burns, State University of New York, Albany, United States

ART, ALTERITY AND LOGOS: IN THE SPACES OF  
SEPARATION

Brian Grassom, Gray's School of Art, The Robert Gordon University,  
Great Britain

Topic to be Announced

Maha Salah Taha, Misr International University, Egypt

LOGOS, RATIONAL AND DESIRE IN CONVERGENT ART  
PRACTICES

James Werner, Gray's School of Art, The Robert Gordon University,  
Great Britain

---

**Friday, August 20**

**2:30 p.m., Staircase 2 – Room 2**

***SESSION XIX:***

***PHENOMENOLOGY IN THE DIALOGUE WITH THE SCIENCES***

*Presided by: Leszek Pyra, Poland*

**“OBJECTIVE SCIENCE” IN HUSSERLIAN LIFE-WORLD  
PHENOMENOLOGY**

Aria Omrani, Isfahan, Iran

**PHENOMENOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF NATURAL  
COORDINATE SYSTEM**

Nikolay Kozhevnikov, Yakut State University, Russia

**ALIENATION AND WHOLENESS: SPINOZA, HANS JONAS,  
AND THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT ON THE “PUSH AND  
SHOVE” OF MORTAL BEING**

Wendy C. Hamblet, Adelphi University, United States

**M. HEIDEGGER’S PROJECT FOR THE OPTICAL  
INTERPRETATION OF REFLEXION AND THE LOGOS**

Alexandr Kouzmin, Yaroslav Wise Novgorod State University, Russia

**5:00–5:30 p.m. Coffee Break**

**PHENOMENA” IN NEWTON’S MATHEMATICAL EXPERIENCE**

A.L. Samian, National University of Malaysia, Malaysia

**WHAT COMPUTERS COULD NEVER DO: AN EXISTENTIAL  
PHENOMENOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF THE PROGRAM OF  
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE**

Eldon C. Wait, University of Zululand, South Africa

**VERTICAL TIME: COUPERIN’S PASSACAILLE**

Jessica Wiskus, Duquesne University, Australia

**Friday, August 20**

**2:30 p.m., Staircase 9 – Room 1**

***SESSION XX:***

***HEIDEGGERIAN PHENOMENOLOGY AND CONTEMPORARY  
ISSUES IN ANGLO-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY***

*Organized and Presided by:*

Mark Wrathall, Brigham Young University, United States

## HEIDEGGER ON LANGUAGE AND ESSENCES

Mark Wrathall, Brigham Young University, United States

HEIDEGGER'S PERFECTIONIST PHILOSOPHY OF  
EDUCATION, OR: BILDUNG IN *BEING AND TIME*

Iain Thomson, University of New Mexico, United States

---

**4:00–4:30 p.m. Coffee Break**

## HEIDEGGERIAN, TAOIST AND THE BOOK OF CHANGES

Xianglong Zhang, Peking University, China

---

**7:00 p.m., Friday, August 20: Farewell dinner at Wadham College, tickets to be ordered at registration (18.50 pounds).**

*Organization Committee:*

Keith Ansell-Pearson, Gary Banham, Ullrich Haase, Matthew Landrus, Grahame Lock (Great Britain); William Smith, Chair.

*Program Director:*

Professor Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning, Hanover, NH, USA.

*Assisted by:* Gary Backhaus, Morgan State University, United States; Tadeusz Czarnik, Jagiellonian University, Poland

The Congress begins with the Opening Reception on August 15 at 4:00 p.m. and ends by a Farewell Banquet on the night of August 20.

## INDEX OF NAMES

- Ales Bello, A.: 199, 201, 204  
 Ampère: 438  
 Anscombe, G. E. M.: 184  
 Apel, K-O.: 45  
 Aquinas, T.: 204  
 Aristotle: 158–9, 200, 203, 212, 216, 350,  
     371, 374, 432–3  
 Augustine: 158, 371  
 Austin, J. L. A.: 49–50  
  
 Bachelard, G.: 43  
 Badiou, A.: 42  
 Baker, G.: 56–7  
 Barrett, W.: 52  
 Beauvoir, S. de: 393–404  
 Beck: 243  
 Bell, D.: 55, 175  
 Bergson, H.: 382  
 Berkeley, G.: 8, 395  
 Biemal, W.: viii  
 Black, M.: 129, 434  
 Blumenberg, H.: 435–6  
 Boltzmann, L.: 52  
 Bolzano, B.: 38, 63, 120  
 Brentano, F.: 4, 38, 49, 201, 301, 307  
  
 Canguilhem: 417, 419  
 Cantor, G.: 38, 123, 147, 149–52  
 Carruthers: 79  
 Casey, E.: 370–1  
 Cassirer, E.: 331, 433  
 Cauchy: 147, 150–1  
 Cezanne: 403  
 Chalmers: 63  
 Chisholm, R.: 72–3, 81  
 Chomsky, N.: 45  
 Churchland, P.: 58  
 Columbus, C.: 105  
 Copernicus: 202  
 Couturat: 244  
 Croce, B.: 111–17  
  
 D'Ambra, M.: 204  
 Davidson, D.: 58  
 Dedekind, R.: 145–7, 149–52  
 Deleuze, G.: 42, 110–2, 417, 424  
 Dennett, D.: 58  
 Depraz, N.: 288  
 Derrida, J.: 111, 277, 280–3, 287–8,  
     339–52, 372, 434–5  
 Descartes, R.: vi–ix, xi, xxv, 5–8, 14–5, 87,  
     120, 163–4, 181, 201–2, 206–8,  
     225–56, 261, 278, 281, 410  
 Dilthey, W.: 114, 157–8, 162  
 Dostoevsky, F.: 404  
 Dreyfus, H.: 175  
 Dummett: 63  
 Durand, G.: 43  
  
 Eckhart, M.: 159  
 Einstein, A.: 311  
  
 Feuerbach: 113  
 Fichte: 114  
 Fink, E.: iv, xxiii, 15, 293–305, 329, 360–1  
 Fodor, J.: 58, 63  
 Follesdal, D.: 175  
 Foucault, M.: 110, 112, 417–24  
 Frege, G.: 38, 63, 175  
  
 Gadamer, H-G.: 43–5, 55, 157, 169, 319,  
     331  
 Galileo: 228  
 Garelli, J.: 40, 42, 46  
 Gauthier, Y.: 123  
 Gellner, E.: 50, 55  
 Gier, N.: 54, 56–7  
 Gierulanka, D.: 138  
 Gilson, E.: 241  
 Giotto: 403  
 Goethe: 132  
 Grassman, H.: 123  
 Gurwitsch, A.: 188

- Habermas, J.: 45  
 Hacker, P.: 56–7  
 Hamelin: 261  
 Hamilton, H. R.: 123  
 Hegel, G.W.F.: 3, 39, 107, 110–16, 318–20, 326–33, 435  
 Heidegger, M.: xxvi, 39–40, 42–5, 49, 87, 112, 157–69, 201, 212, 293–304, 317–33, 365, 368, 396–9, 409, 412  
 Heine: 147  
 Helmholtz, H.: 107  
 Hems, J.: 54  
 Henry, M.: 41  
 Heraclitus: 323–4, 329  
 Hilbert, D.: 150  
 Hintikka, J.: 51–2, 54  
 Hobbes, T.: 248  
 Horace: 206  
 Huet, D.: 241  
 Humboldt: 43  
 Hume, D.: 6, 8, 14, 16, 87  
 Huscar, A.R.: 262  
 Husserl, E.: iii–xxvii, 3–32, 37–41, 46, 49, 50–2, 54–8, 63, 87–90, 97–8, 108–12, 117, 119–30, 132, 137, 157–9, 163–9, 175, 178, 180, 182–4, 186–8, 190–2, 198–208, 211, 216, 225–7, 230–2, 255–6, 258, 277–81, 286–9, 293–304, 307–14, 339–52, 355–65, 367–74, 376–7, 381–90, 396, 398–9, 416, 439  
 Ingarden, R.: xv, 49, 137–45, 150, 200  
 Jaspers, K.: 157, 217–18  
 Johansson, I.: 57  
 Kant, I.: iii, vi–viii, xxv, 3–20, 23, 26–8, 31–2, 43, 79, 87–8, 95, 98–9, 100, 105–9, 113–4, 116, 129, 202, 206, 317–18, 329–30, 332–3, 360, 371  
 Kersten: 372–3  
 Kierkegaard, S.: 109, 113–5, 212  
 Kripke, S.: 132  
 Kroneker, L.: 123  
 Laplace: 106  
 Lavoisier: 438  
 Lefort, C.: 414  
 Leibniz: 20, 96, 120, 201, 228  
 Lem, S.: 111  
 Levinas, E.: 41  
 Levi-Strauss, C.: 107  
 Lewis, D.: 72  
 Lie, S.: 123  
 Locke, J.: 6, 8  
 Luther: 159  
 Mach, E.: 52  
 Magritte: 422–4  
 Malcolm, N.: 53  
 Maldiney, H.: 41  
 Mardas: 208  
 Marsh, J. L.: 54  
 Martius, C.: 200  
 Marx, K.: 109, 113  
 McIntyre, R.: 182, 184, 188  
 Meinong: 184  
 Meray: 147  
 Merleau-Ponty, M.: xxv–xxvi, 41, 43, 46, 188, 277, 283–8, 341, 355–66, 409–16, 418–9, 429–31, 433–39  
 Messinese: 217  
 Minsky, M.: 65  
 Montague, R.: 45  
 Montero, F.: 50  
 Moore, G. E.: 53, 108  
 Müller, M.: 319  
 Mulligan, K.: 178, 198  
 Nabokov, V.: 139–41, 143  
 Natorp, P.: 5, 158, 162–5  
 Newton, I.: 228  
 Nietzsche, F.: 24, 157, 435, 439  
 Parmenides: 41, 203, 317, 322–4  
 Pears, D.: 52, 130  
 Perry, J.: 68  
 Petitot, J.: 41, 308  
 Piaget: 377  
 Plato: 100, 164, 203  
 Plotinus: 327  
 Proust, M.: 415  
 Putnam, H.: 132, 181, 204  
 Quine, W. V. O.: 54, 58  
 Quintillian: 432

- Raeymaeker: 207  
 Richir, M.: 41, 42, 46–7  
 Rickert: 158  
 Ricoeur, P.: xxvi, 43, 50, 331, 434  
 Riemann: 123  
 Robinson, A.: 147, 152  
 Rosenkranz: 79  
 Russell, B.: 38, 108, 127–8, 181, 188  
 Ryba: 207, 211, 213, 216, 218  
 Ryle, G.: 49–50, 53, 57–8  
  
 Saint-Exupéry: 409  
 Sartre, J-P.: 19, 63–4, 66, 70–1, 73–4, 76–7, 79, 82, 385, 393, 396–8, 404, 418–19  
 Schelling: 332, 365  
 Schlick, M.: 51  
 Schutz, A.: 381–91  
 Schweitzer, A.: 331  
 Silesius, A.: 325  
 Smith, B.: 138  
 Spinoza, B.: 326  
 Stein, E.: 200, 203, 206  
 Suslin: 149  
  
 Thao, T-D.: 341  
 Titian: 403  
 Tom, R.: 41  
 Tymieniecka, A-T.: 87, 89–100, 190, 197–200, 205–19  
  
 Verducci: 208  
 Vico, G.: 114–6  
  
 Waismann, F.: 51  
 Weber, M.: 38, 381  
 Weierstrass: 201  
 Welton, D.: 390  
 Weyl, H.: 148  
 Windelband, W.: 119–20, 158  
 Wittgenstein, L.: 45, 50–7, 127–32, 434  
 Woodruff Smith, D.: 182, 184, 187–8  
 Wuchterl, K.: 51  
  
 y Gasset, O.: 246–62  
 Yarza: 203

# Analecta Husserliana

---

## The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research

*Editor-in-Chief*

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka

*The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning,  
Belmont, Massachusetts, U.S.A.*

---

1. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *Volume 1 of Analecta Husserliana*. 1971  
ISBN 90-277-0171-7
2. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *The Later Husserl and the Idea of Phenomenology*. Idealism – Realism, Historicity and Nature. 1972  
ISBN 90-277-0223-3
3. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *The Phenomenological Realism of the Possible Worlds*. The “A Priori”, Activity and Passivity of Consciousness, Phenomenology and Nature. 1974  
ISBN 90-277-0426-0
4. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *Ingardeniana*. A Spectrum of Specialised Studies Establishing the Field of Research. 1976  
ISBN 90-277-0628-X
5. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *The Crisis of Culture*. Steps to Reopen the Phenomenological Investigation of Man. 1976  
ISBN 90-277-0632-8
6. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *The Self and the Other*. The Irreducible Element in Man, Part I. 1977  
ISBN 90-277-0759-6
7. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *The Human Being in Action*. The Irreducible Element in Man, Part II. 1978  
ISBN 90-277-0884-3
8. Nitta, Y. and Hirotaka Tatematsu (eds.), *Japanese Phenomenology*. Phenomenology as the Trans-cultural Philosophical Approach. 1979  
ISBN 90-277-0924-6
9. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *The Teleologies in Husserlian Phenomenology*. The Irreducible Element in Man, Part III. 1979  
ISBN 90-277-0981-5
10. Wojtyła, K., *The Acting Person*. Translated from Polish by A. Potocki. 1979  
ISBN Hb 90-277-0969-6; Pb 90-277-0985-8
11. Ales Bello, A. (ed.), *The Great Chain of Being and Italian Phenomenology*. 1981  
ISBN 90-277-1071-6
12. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *The Philosophical Reflection of Man in Literature*. Selected Papers from Several Conferences held by the International Society for Phenomenology and Literature in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Includes the essay by A-T. Tymieniecka, *Poetica Nova*. 1982  
ISBN 90-277-1312-X
13. Kaelin, E. F., *The Unhappy Consciousness*. The Poetic Plight of Samuel Beckett. An Inquiry at the Intersection of Phenomenology and literature. 1981  
ISBN 90-277-1313-8
14. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condition*. Individualisation of Nature and the Human Being. (Part I:) Plotting the Territory for Interdisciplinary Communication. 1983 *Part II* see below under Volume 21.  
ISBN 90-277-1447-9



# Analecta Husserliana

---

15. Tymieniecka, A-T. and Calvin O. Schrag (eds.), *Foundations of Morality, Human Rights, and the Human Sciences*. Phenomenology in a Foundational Dialogue with Human Sciences. 1983 ISBN 90-277-1453-3
16. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *Soul and Body in Husserlian Phenomenology*. Man and Nature. 1983 ISBN 90-277-1518-1
17. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *Phenomenology of Life in a Dialogue Between Chinese and Occidental Philosophy*. 1984 ISBN 90-277-1620-X
18. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *The Existential Coordinates of the Human Condition: Poetic – Epic – Tragic*. The Literary Genre. 1984 ISBN 90-277-1702-8
19. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *Poetics of the Elements in the Human Condition*. (Part 1:) The Sea. From Elemental Stirrings to Symbolic Inspiration, Language, and Life-Significance in Literary Interpretation and Theory. 1985  
For Part 2 and 3 see below under Volumes 23 and 28. ISBN 90-277-1906-3
20. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *The Moral Sense in the Communal Significance of Life*. Investigations in Phenomenological Praxeology: Psychiatric Therapeutics, Medical Ethics and Social Praxis within the Life- and Communal World. 1986 ISBN 90-277-2085-1
21. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condition*. Part II: The Meeting Point Between Occidental and Oriental Philosophies. 1986 ISBN 90-277-2185-8
22. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *Morality within the Life- and Social World*. Interdisciplinary Phenomenology of the Authentic Life in the "Moral Sense". 1987  
*Sequel to Volumes 15 and 20*. ISBN 90-277-2411-3
23. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *Poetics of the Elements in the Human Condition*. Part 2: The Airy Elements in Poetic Imagination. Breath, Breeze, Wind, Tempest, Thunder, Snow, Flame, Fire, Volcano ... 1988 ISBN 90-277-2569-1
24. Tymieniecka, A-T., *Logos and Life*. Book I: Creative Experience and the Critique of Reason. 1988 ISBN Hb 90-277-2539-X; Pb 90-277-2540-3
25. Tymieniecka, A-T., *Logos and Life*. Book II: The Three Movements of the Soul. 1988 ISBN Hb 90-277-2556-X; Pb 90-277-2557-8
26. Kaelin, E. F. and Calvin O. Schrag (eds.), *American Phenomenology*. Origins and Developments. 1989 ISBN 90-277-2690-6
27. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *Man within his Life-World*. Contributions to Phenomenology by Scholars from East-Central Europe. 1989 ISBN 90-277-2767-8
28. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *The Elemental Passions of the Soul*. Poetics of the Elements in the Human Condition, Part 3. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0180-3
29. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *Man's Self-Interpretation-in-Existence*. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Life. – Introducing the Spanish Perspective. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0324-5
30. Rudnick, H. H. (ed.), *Ingardeniana II*. New Studies in the Philosophy of Roman Ingarden. With a New International Ingarden Bibliography. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0627-9

# Analecta Husserliana

---

31. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *The Moral Sense and Its Foundational Significance: Self, Person, Historicity, Community*. Phenomenological Praxeology and Psychiatry. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0678-3
32. Kronegger, M. (ed.), *Phenomenology and Aesthetics*. Approaches to Comparative Literature and Other Arts. Homages to A-T. Tymieniecka. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-0738-0
33. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *Ingardeniana III*. Roman Ingarden's Aesthetics in a New Key and the Independent Approaches of Others: The Performing Arts, the Fine Arts, and Literature. 1991  
*Sequel to Volumes 4 and 30* ISBN 0-7923-1014-4
34. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *The Turning Points of the New Phenomenological Era*. Husserl Research – Drawing upon the Full Extent of His Development. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1134-5
35. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *Husserlian Phenomenology in a New Key*. Intersubjectivity, Ethos, the Societal Sphere, Human Encounter, Pathos. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1146-9
36. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *Husserl's Legacy in Phenomenological Philosophies*. New Approaches to Reason, Language, Hermeneutics, the Human Condition. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1178-7
37. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *New Queries in Aesthetics and Metaphysics*. Time, Historicity, Art, Culture, Metaphysics, the Transnatural. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1195-7
38. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *The Elemental Dialectic of Light and Darkness*. The Passions of the Soul in the Onto-Poiesis of Life. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1601-0
39. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *Reason, Life, Culture, Part I*. Phenomenology in the Baltics. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-1902-8
40. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *Manifestations of Reason: Life, Historicity, Culture*. Reason, Life, Culture, Part II. Phenomenology in the Adriatic Countries. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-2215-0
41. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), *Allegory Revisited*. Ideals of Mankind. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2312-2
42. Kronegger, M. and Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.), *Allegory Old and New*. In Literature, the Fine Arts, Music and Theatre, and Its Continuity in Culture. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2348-3
43. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *From the Sacred to the Divine*. A New Phenomenological Approach. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2690-3
44. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *The Elemental Passion for Place in the Ontopoiesis of Life*. Passions of the Soul in the *Imaginatio Creatrix*. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-2749-7
45. Zhai, Z.: *The Radical Choice and Moral Theory*. Through Communicative Argumentation to Phenomenological Subjectivity. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2891-4
46. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *The Logic of the Living Present*. Experience, Ordering, Onto-Poiesis of Culture. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-2930-9

# Analecta Husserliana

---

47. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Heaven, Earth, and In-Between in the Harmony of Life. Phenomenology in the Continuing Oriental/Occidental Dialogue.* 1995  
ISBN 0-7923-3373-X
48. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Life. In the Glory of its Radiating Manifestations.* 25th Anniversary Publication. Book I. 1996  
ISBN 0-7923-3825-1
49. Kronegger, M. and Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.): *Life. The Human Quest for an Ideal.* 25th Anniversary Publication. Book II. 1996  
ISBN 0-7923-3826-X
50. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Life. Phenomenology of Life as the Starting Point of Philosophy.* 25th Anniversary Publication. Book III. 1997  
ISBN 0-7923-4126-0
51. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Passion for Place. Part II. Between the Vital Spacing and the Creative Horizons of Fulfilment.* 1997  
ISBN 0-7923-4146-5
52. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition. Laying Down the Cornerstones of the Field.* Book I. 1997  
ISBN 0-7923-4445-6
53. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *The Reincarnating Mind, or the Ontopoietic Outburst in Creative Virtualities.* Harmonisations and Attunement in Cognition, the Fine Arts, Literature. Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition. Book II. 1997  
ISBN 0-7923-4461-8
54. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Ontopoietic Expansion in Human Self-Interpretation-in-Existence.* The I and the Other in their Creative Spacing of the Societal Circuits of Life. Phenomenology of Life and the Creative Condition. Book III. 1997  
ISBN 0-7923-4462-6
55. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Creative Virtualities in Human Self-Interpretation-in-Culture.* Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition. Book IV. 1997  
ISBN 0-7923-4545-2
56. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Enjoyment.* From Laughter to Delight in Philosophy, Literature, the Fine Arts and Aesthetics. 1998  
ISBN 0-7923-4677-7
57. Kronegger, M. and Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.): *Life. Differentiation and Harmony ... Vegetal, Animal, Human.* 1998  
ISBN 0-7923-4887-7
58. Tymieniecka, A-T. and Matsuba, S. (eds.): *Immersing in the Concrete.* Maurice Merleau-Ponty in the Japanese Perspective. 1998  
ISBN 0-7923-5093-6
59. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Life – Scientific Philosophy/Phenomenology of Life and the Sciences of Life.* Ontopoiesis of Life and the Human Creative Condition. 1998  
ISBN 0-7923-5141-X
60. Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.): *Life – The Outburst of Life in the Human Sphere.* Scientific Philosophy/Phenomenology of Life and the Sciences of Life. Book II. 1998  
ISBN 0-7923-5142-8
61. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *The Aesthetic Discourse of the Arts.* Breaking the Barriers. 2000  
ISBN 0-7923-6006-0
62. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Creative Mimesis of Emotion.* From Sorrow to Elation; Elegiac Virtuosity in Literature. 2000  
ISBN 0-7923-6007-9

# Analecta Husserliana

---

63. Kronegger, M. (ed.): *The Orchestration of The Arts – A Creative Symbiosis of Existential Powers*. The Vibrating Interplay of Sound, Color, Image, Gesture, Movement, Rhythm, Fragrance, Word, Touch. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6008-7
64. Tymieniecka, A-T. and Z. Zalewski (eds.): *Life – The Human Being Between Life and Death*. A Dialogue Between Medicine and Philosophy, Recurrent Issues and New Approaches. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-5962-3
65. Kronegger, M. and Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.): *The Aesthetics of Enchantment in the Fine Arts*. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6183-0
66. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *The Origins of Life, Volume I: The Primogenital Matrix of Life and Its Context*. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6246-2; Set ISBN 0-7923-6446-5
67. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *The Origins of Life, Volume II: The Origins of the Existential Sharing-in-Life*. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6276-4; Set ISBN 0-7923-6446-5
68. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *PAIDEIA*. Philosophy/Phenomenology of Life Inspiring Education of our Times. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6319-1
69. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *The Poetry of Life in Literature*. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6408-2
70. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Impetus and Equipose in the Life-Strategies of Reason*. Logos and Life, volume 4. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6731-6; HB 0-7923-6730-8
71. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Passions of the Earth in Human Existence, Creativity, and Literature*. 2001 ISBN 0-7923-6675-1
72. Tymieniecka, A-T. and E. Agazzi (eds.): *Life – Interpretation and the Sense of Illness within the Human Condition*. Medicine and Philosophy in a Dialogue. 2001 ISBN Hb 0-7923-6983-1; Pb 0-7923-6984-X
73. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Life – The Play of Life on the Stage of the World in Fine Arts, Stage-Play, and Literature*. 2001 ISBN 0-7923-7032-5
74. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Life-Energies, Forces and the Shaping of Life: Vital, Existential*. Book I. 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0627-6
75. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *The Visible and the Invisible in the Interplay between Philosophy, Literature and Reality*. 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0070-7
76. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Life – Truth in its Various Perspectives*. Cognition, Self-Knowledge, Creativity, Scientific Research, Sharing-in-Life, Economics ..... 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0071-5
77. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *The Creative Matrix of the Origins*. Dynamisms, Forces and the Shaping of Life. 2003 ISBN 1-4020-0789-2
78. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Gardens and the Passion for the Infinite*. 2003 ISBN 1-4020-0858-9
79. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Does the World exist? Plurisignificant Ciphering of Reality*. 2003 ISBN 1-4020-1517-8

# Analecta Husserliana

---

- 80. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Phenomenology World-Wide. Foundations – Expanding Dynamics – Life-engagements. A Guide for Research and Study.* 2002  
ISBN 1-4020-0066-9
- 81. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Metamorphosis. Creative Imagination in Fine Arts, Life-Projects and Human Aesthetic Aspirations.* 2004 ISBN 1-4020-1709-X
- 82. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Mystery in its Passions. Literary Explorations.* 2004  
ISBN 1-4020-1705-7
- 83. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Imaginatio Creatrix. The Pivotal Force of the Genesis/Ontopoiesis of Human Life and Reality.* 2004. ISBN 1-4020-2244-1
- 84. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Phenomenology of Life. Meeting the Challenges of the Present-Day World.* 2005. ISBN 1-4020-2463-0
- 85. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *The Enigma of Good and Evil: The Moral Sentiment in Literature.* 2005. ISBN 1-4020-3575-6
- 86. Not yet published
- 87. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Human Creation Between Reality and Illusion.* 2005.  
ISBN 1-4020-3577-2
- 88. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): *Logos of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of the Logos. Book One: Phenomenology as the Critique of Reason in Contemporary Criticism and Interpretation.* 2005. ISBN 1-4020-3678-7