

Heidegger's Critique of Husserl's (and Searle's) Account of Intentionality

Hubert L. Dreyfus

I. Introduction

Everyone knows that in *Being and Time* Heidegger seeks to undermine the Cartesian tradition of the priority of knowledge over practice. Indeed, at first it looks as though Heidegger seeks simply to invert this tradition by arguing that detached contemplation is parasitical on everyday involvement. More specifically, he seems to be saying that the detached, meaning-giving, *knowing* subject, still at the center of Husserlian phenomenology, must be replaced by an involved, meaning-giving, *doing* subject. But if one simply inverts the tradition, one risks being misunderstood and reappropriated, and, indeed, Dagfinn Follesdal, the best interpreter of Husserl's phenomenology, has been led to underestimate Heidegger's originality on just this point. In an article on the role of action in Husserl and Heidegger, Follesdal interprets Heidegger as holding that Husserl and the tradition overemphasized detached contemplation, and he agrees with what he takes to be Heidegger's claim that practical activity is the basic way subjects give meaning to objects.

It has commonly been held that practical activity presupposes theoretical understanding of the world ... Heidegger rejects this. He regards our practical ways of dealing with the world as more basic than the theoretical. ... Heidegger's idea that ... human activity plays a role in our constitution of the world, and his analyses of how this happens, I regard ... as Heidegger's main contribution to philosophy.¹

A similar trivializing reduction of Heidegger's work to a practical variation on Husserl's, is worked out in lucid and brilliant detail in Mark Okrent *Heidegger's Pragmatism*. Okrent states bluntly: "[A]s soon as one realizes that, for Heidegger, intentionality is always practical rather than cognitive and that the primary form of intending is doing something for a purpose rather than being conscious of something, the structural analogies between the argument strategies of Husserl and Heidegger become apparent."²

Follesdal reports that "after Husserl came to Freiburg in 1916 ... he clearly became more and more aware that our practical activity is an important part of our relation to the world."³ He then tries to determine who deserves credit for this new interest in the phenomenology of practical activity. "It is possible that Husserl influenced Heidegger in this 'practical' direction," he notes. "However, it is also possible", he admits, "that it was

Husserl who was influenced in this direction through his discussion with the younger Heidegger."⁴

But once one sees the depth of Heidegger's difference from Husserl on this issue, one sees that the question of influence is irrelevant. Much more is at stake than the relation of practice to theory. The real issue concerns two opposed accounts of intentionality. As used by Franz Brentano and then Husserl, "intentionality" names the fact that mental states like perceiving, believing, desiring, fearing, doubting, etc. are always *about* something, i.e. directed towards something under some description, whether the extra-mental object exists or not. The mental property that makes this directedness possible is called the representational or intentional content of the mental state. By focusing his discussion on the relative importance of the intentional content of action over the intentional content of thought, Follesdal misses Heidegger's three radical claims: (1) that an account of intentionality in terms of mental content presupposes but overlooks a more fundamental sort of intentionality -- a kind of intentionality that does not involve mental intentional content at all. (2) That the basic way human beings are in the world does not involve intentionality at all. (3) That this non-intentional being in is the condition of the possible of both kinds of intentionality. Thus Heidegger does not want to make practical activity primary; he wants to show that *neither* practical activity *nor* contemplative knowing can be understood as a relation between a self-sufficient subject with its intentional content and an independent object.

What Follesdal assumes and Heidegger opposes is the traditional representationalist account of practice. To this day philosophers such as John Searle and Donald Davidson, who do not agree on much else, agree that action must be explained in terms of mental states with intentional content. Heidegger's attempt to break out of the philosophical tradition is focused in his attempt to get beyond the subject/object distinction that these views presuppose. In a lecture in 1929 he says, "My essential intention is to first pose the problem [of the subject/object relation] and work it out in such a way that the essentials of the entire Western tradition will be concentrated in the simplicity of a basic problem."⁵ The basic problem is not which kind of intentionality -- theoretical or practical -- is more basic, but how to get beneath the traditional understanding of intentionality to a more basic kind of experience.

Husserl defined phenomenology as the study of the intentional content remaining in the mind after the bracketing of the world, i.e. after the phenomenological reduction. Heidegger opposes the claim underlying this method -- the claim that a person's relation to the world and the things in it must always be mediated by intentional content, so that one can perform a reduction that separates the mind from the world. As he puts it:

The usual conception of intentionality ... misconstrues the structure of the self-directedness-toward, the intention. This misinterpretation lies in *an erroneous subjectivizing* of intentionality. ... The idea of a subject which has intentional experiences ... encapsulated within itself is an absurdity which misconstrues the basic ontological structure of the being that we ourselves are.⁶

This makes Heidegger sound like what would now be called an externalist. It is as if he were claiming that mental states get their intentional content by way of some connection with the external world. But as we shall see, Heidegger's view is more radical. He wants to introduce a kind of intentionality that avoids the notion of mental content altogether.

Before we can fully appreciate Heidegger's project and decide whether he succeeds, we have to sharpen as much as possible the intentionalistic theory of mind he opposes. Just how is the subject/object distinction supposed to be built into all ways of relating to the world whether they be knowing or acting? Since Heidegger focuses on action as the area in which it is easiest to see that our experience need not involve a mind/world split, I too will concentrate on action. But since Husserl never worked out a theory of action, I will turn to the work of John Searle who defends a detailed version of the intentionalist account of action Heidegger opposes. I will therefore first spell out Searle's formulation of the way the mind/world split is supposedly built into the experience of acting, and then present Heidegger's phenomenological critique.

In the terminology suggested by Searle the intentional content of an intentional state is a representation of its conditions of satisfaction. Searle formulates both a logical and phenomenological requirement for something to be an intentional state. The *logical* condition is that an intentional state must have *conditions of satisfaction*. My intentional state is satisfied if what I believe is true, what I remember happened, what I perceived is in front of me causing my visual experience, what I expect occurs, my action succeeds rather than fails. The *phenomenological* condition is that these conditions of satisfaction must be *represented in the mind*, i.e., that they must be structures of a conscious subject separate from, and standing over-against an object.

The logical condition is not in dispute between Husserl (Searle) and Heidegger, but the phenomenological requirement is. The question is whether *all* intentional content must be *mental* content? If so, and if one can describe the conditions of satisfaction of all mental intentional states apart from the question whether those conditions are satisfied, one can study the intentional content of the mind apart from the existence of the world. This subjective content, as the condition of the possibility of intentionality, would be the condition of the possibility of objective experience in general, so Husserl would be justified

in his claim that, by a detailed description of the intentional structures of consciousness, he could develop a transcendental phenomenology. Heidegger wants to undermine this project by denying the phenomenological condition on intentionality.

Now back to Searle's intentionalist account of action. Searle argues that an action is a bodily movement which has been caused in the right way by a mental state. Two conditions must be met for a bodily motion to qualify as an action. *First*, a representation of the goal of the action must exist throughout the motion and must play a continuing causal role in shaping the action. Searle calls this continuing representation of the goal the "intention in action," thus differentiating it from the "prior intention" which corresponds to the initial representation of the goal of the action prior to the initiation of motion.⁷ *Second*, Searle maintains that the subject must experience the causal connection between the intention in action and the bodily movement. Indeed, according to Searle, the experience of acting just is the experience of the bodily movement being caused by the intention in action.

Thus in his account of action, as elsewhere in his account of intentionality, Searle, like Husserl, attempts an integration of logical conditions and phenomenological description. The standard analysis of action is "bodily motion caused by a reason." Searle incorporates a phenomenological analog of this analysis into his account of action by maintaining that the experience of an action must include a direct experience of the causal relation between the intention in action and the bodily motion. Searle argues that both the prior intention and the intention in action are causally self-referential. They both include in their conditions of satisfaction the requirement that my intention to bring about a goal cause my goal-directed action.

In his attempt to overthrow the subject/object account, Heidegger seeks to show (1) that intentionality without the experience of intentional content is characteristic of the unimpeded mode of everyday activity, whereas mentalistic intentionality is a derivative mode that occurs only when there is some disturbance, and (2) that both these modes of intentionality presuppose being-in-the-world, which Heidegger calls originary transcendence, and which he claims is not a kind of intentionality at all but the condition of the possibility of both active and contemplative intentionality. In his lecture course the year *Being and Time* was published, he speaks of "the twofold task, intrinsically one, of interpreting more radically the phenomena of intentionality and transcendence."⁸ He adds:

With this task ... we run up against a central problem that has remained unknown to all previous philosophy. It will turn out that intentionality is founded in Dasein's transcendence and is possible solely for this reason [and] that transcendence cannot conversely be explained in terms of intentionality.⁹

II. Heidegger's Account of Primordial Intentionality

In using Searle's account as a stand-in for Husserl's, I will highlight two aspects of Searle's view that Husserl presumably would have shared, both of which Heidegger rejects.¹⁰ First, that there must be a separable conscious component of perception and of action, and second, that this experience represents its conditions of satisfaction. Searle points out that the experience of acting is phenomenologically distinguishable from the experience of being acted upon. I can have the experience of acting even if I am deluded -- for example, paralyzed -- and the bodily movement I take it I am causing is in fact not taking place. Conversely, if electrodes are applied to my brain, my body can be caused to move without my having an experience of acting. Searle concludes from the above considerations that the experience of acting and the bodily movement it causes belong to two totally separate domains. Thus, according to Searle, the distinction between mind and world, what Husserl and Heidegger would call the distinction between subject and object, is built directly into the logic of acting.

[J]ust as the case of seeing the table involves two related components, an Intentional component (the visual experience) and the conditions of satisfaction of that component (the presence and features of the table), so the act of raising my arm involves two components, and Intentional component (the experience of acting) and the conditions of satisfaction of that component (the movement of my arm).¹¹

According to Searle, what is represented as conditions of satisfaction are first that the experience in question is either being caused by an object in the world (in the case of perception) or it is causing a bodily movement (in the case of action), and, second, there is an object with the relevant features causing the perception, or the intention in action is causing a bodily movement that achieves the actor's goal.

Heidegger questions both the necessity of these experiences and the content allegedly represented as their conditions of satisfaction. He denies *first*, that the experience of acting must be an experience of my *causing* the bodily movement, and *second*, that the experience of acting must *represent the goal* of the action. (He also claims that perception does not involve an awareness of one's private visual experience, but rather is experienced as a direct openness to the world, but I won't go into that here.)

Searle begins his account of intentions in action by pointing out that we always seem to know during an action that we are acting -- at least in the sense that we do not experience ourselves as being passively pushed around. Heidegger would agree, but he would point out that in his analysis of the experience Searle has taken a derived form of activity to be basic. Heidegger claims that only in *deliberate* action (what Husserl called

trying) is the experience of acting an experience of one's intention causing one's movement. Everyday ongoing coping is experienced differently.

Heidegger's account of the phenomenology of everyday involved coping is rather sketchy but we can draw on Merleau-Ponty for a fuller description. According to Merleau-Ponty, in everyday absorbed coping, there is no experience of my causing my body to move. Rather acting is experienced as a steady flow of skillful activity in response to one's sense of the environment. Part of that experience is a sense that when one's situation deviates from some optimal body-environment relationship, one's motion takes one closer to that optimal form and thereby relieves the "tension" of the deviation. One's body is solicited by the situation to get into the right relation to it. When everyday coping is going well we experience something like what athletes call flow, or playing out of their heads. One's activity is completely geared into the demands of the situation. That is, one is absorbed in one's activity, and therefore one has no self-referential experience of oneself as causing that activity.

Aron Gurwitsch, a student of Husserl's, yet a perceptive reader of Heidegger, gives, in his interpretation of *Being & Time*, an excellent description of this non-mental, i.e., non-self-referential, awareness:

[W]hat is imposed on us to do is not determined by us as someone standing outside the situation simply looking on at it; what occurs and is imposed are rather prescribed by the situation and its own structure; and we do more and greater justice to it the more we let ourselves be guided by it, i.e., the less reserved we are in immersing ourselves in it and subordinating ourselves to it. We find ourselves in a situation and are interwoven with it, encompassed by it, indeed just "absorbed" into it.¹²

Since Merleau-Ponty attended Gurwitsch's lectures explaining Heidegger's account of comportment in terms of gestalt perception, there may well be a direct line of influence here. To get the phenomenon in focus we can consider a Merleau-Pontyan example such as a tennis swing. If one is a beginner or is off one's form one might find oneself making an effort to keep one's eye on the ball, keep the racket perpendicular to the court, hit the ball squarely, etc. But if one is expert at the game and things are going well, what is experienced is more like one's arm going up and its being drawn to the appropriate position, the racket forming the optimal angle with the court -- an angle we need not even be aware of -- all this so as to complete the gestalt made up of the court, one's running opponent, and the oncoming ball. One feels that one's motion was caused by the perceived conditions in such a way as to reduce a sense of deviation from some satisfactory gestalt.

Heidegger's second point comes to a rejection of Searle's claim that the intentional content of the experience of action is a representation of my bringing about the state of affairs I am trying to achieve. Phenomenological examination shows that in a wide variety of situations human beings relate to the world in an organized purposive manner without the constant accompaniment of a representational state which specifies what the action is aimed at accomplishing. Examples are skillful activity, like playing tennis; habitual activity, like driving to the office or brushing one's teeth; casual unthinking activity, like rolling over in bed or making gestures while one is speaking; and spontaneous activity, such as fidgeting and drumming one's fingers during a dull lecture. In all these cases of action it is possible to be without any representation of what one is trying to do as one performs the action. Indeed, at times one is actually surprised when the action is accomplished, as when one's thoughts are interrupted by one's arrival at one's office.

A huge amount of our lives -- working, getting around, talking, eating, driving, etc. -- is spent in this state, while only a small part is spent in the deliberate, purposeful, subject/object mode, but this is, of course, the mode we tend to notice, and which has therefore been studied in detail by philosophers. Thus, from Aristotle's discussion of the practical syllogism¹³, to Husserl and recent accounts of action such as Searle's and Davidson's, philosophers have held that we must explain action as caused by the attempt to achieve some goal. According to Searle, even when there is no prior setting of a goal, as when I jump up and pace about the room, I must have in mind what I am trying to do.

According to Heidegger, however, skillful coping does not require a mental representation of its goal at all. It can be *purposive* without the agent entertaining a *purpose*. Heidegger would like basketball player Larry Bird's description of the experience of the complex purposive act of passing the ball in the midst of a game:

[A lot of the] things I do on the court are just reactions to situations ... A lot of times, I've passed the basketball and not realized I've passed it until a moment or so later.¹⁴

We can return to Merleau-Ponty's account of action to understand this experience. Remember the gestalt account of the experience of an expert tennis stroke. If one is expert at tennis and things are going well, what is experienced is one's arm going up and its being drawn to the appropriate position so as to complete the gestalt made up of the court, one's running opponent, and the oncoming ball. We not only feel that our motion was caused by the perceived conditions, but also that it was caused in such a way that it is constrained to reduce a sense of deviation from some satisfactory gestalt. Now we can add that *the nature of that satisfactory gestalt is in no way represented*.

Indeed, I cannot represent how I should turn my racket since I do not know what I do when I return the ball. I may once have been told to hold my racket perpendicular to the court, and I may have succeeded in doing so, but now experience has sculpted my swing to the situation in a far more subtle and appropriate way than I could have achieved as a beginner following this rule.

An even more striking case, where the goal the body is to achieve is not available to the actor as something to aim at, will make the point clear. Instructor pilots teach beginning pilots a rule determining the order in which they are to scan their instruments. The instructor pilots teach the rule for instrument scanning that they themselves were taught and, as far as they know, still use. At one point, however, Air Force psychologists studied the eye movements of the instructors during simulated flight and found, to everyone's surprise, that the instructor pilots were not following the rule they were teaching; in fact the eye movements varied from situation to situation and did not seem to follow any rule at all. The instructor pilots had no idea of the way they were scanning their instruments and so could not represent the order they were following as their goal.

Searle's response to such objections is that only the broader action of winning a tennis point or finding out how everything is going by scanning the instruments is represented in the intentional content of the intention in action. Searle points out is that an expert skier does not have to form a separate intention to shift his weight from one ski to the other or to execute each turn. He just intends to ski down the mountain. Searle says to determine the intention in action just ask the agent. He argues that there must be goal-awareness in action, since, if one is stopped and questioned even while acting in a non-deliberate way, one can say what one is doing. This, Searle concludes, shows that even in non-deliberate activity our movements are being guided by a self-referential intention in action which represents our goal.

But if asked the agent in our tennis example might just say he was playing tennis. We could then restate our question insisting that he tells us what he was doing *right then*. But then he might answer he was trying to win a point, or he might equally well say that he was rushing the net, or, like Larry Bird, he might say he was so absorbed he did not know what he was doing. The point is that if we are to trust what the agent says he is doing, as Searle says we should, what the agent is doing need not be the same as the conscious intention that initiated the flow of activity. So, again, we find units of activity that count as what the agent is doing but whose conditions of satisfaction are not represented by the agent.

Heidegger has an alternative account of our ability to say what we are doing, not based on the inspection of an internal mental state. Comportment is not simply an

undifferentiated flow. One can make sense of it as having a direction and recognizable chunks. "Towards-which" is Heidegger's non-intentionalistic term for the end-points we use in making sense of a flow of directed activity. For example, I leave home, drive to work, park, enter my office building, open my office door, enter my office, sit down at my desk and begin working -- each stage has its towards-which. We thus make sense of our own comportment, and the comportment of others in terms of a directedness towards the sort of long-range and proximal ends that are, indeed, sometimes our explicit goals, but needn't always be. Thanks to the shared, social, segmentation of normal action, if asked what we or others are in the process of doing, we always have an answer. But this fact should not mislead us into postulating mental intentions in action. There is no evidence that our shared social segmentation of flows of activity into intelligible sub-units is in the mind of the person who is unreflectively absorbed in the activity. Heidegger is clear that it is a mistake to think of the toward-which as the *goal* of the activity, i.e. as the conditions of satisfaction the actor has in mind. He tells us:

The awaiting of the "towards-which" is neither a considering of the 'goal' nor an expectation of the impending finishing of the work to be produced.¹⁵

The phenomena of purposive actions without a purpose is not limited to bodily activity. It occurs in all areas of skillful coping, including intellectual coping. Many instances of apparently complex problem solving which seem to implement a long-range strategy, as, for example, a masterful move in chess, may be best understood as direct responses to familiar perceptual gestalts. After years of seeing chess games unfold, a chess grandmaster can, simply by responding to the patterns on the chess board, play master level chess while his deliberate, analytic mind is absorbed in something else.¹⁶ Such play, based as it is on previous attention to thousands of actual and book games, incorporates a tradition which determines the appropriate response to a situation, which sets up the next etc., and thereby makes possible long range, strategic, purposive play, without the player needing to have in mind any plan or purpose at all.

Notice that in trying to explain Heidegger I have had to speak of *activity* rather than *action*. Heidegger might well grant Husserl that his intentionalistic account reflects our commonsense concept of *action*. He is not, however, trying to explicate our commonsense concept of action, but to make a place for a sort of activity that has been overlooked both by commonsense and *a fortiori* by the philosophical tradition. Heidegger holds that the commonsense concept of action covers up our most basic mode of involvement in the world. Heidegger therefore introduces his own term, *Verhalten*, translated 'comportment', for the way human beings normally cope. Heidegger uses "comportment" to refer to our

directed activity, precisely because the term has no mentalistic overtones. But he claims that comportment, nonetheless, exhibits the logical structure of intentionality.

Comportments have the structure of directing-oneself-toward, of being-directed-toward. ... [P]henomenology calls this structure *intentionality*.¹⁷

But, as we have seen, for Heidegger "comportment" denotes not only conscious, deliberate actions, but non-conscious, involved activity. Thus, intentionality is attributed not to consciousness but to *Dasein*. To cite Heidegger:

Because the usual separation between a subject with its immanent sphere and an object with its transcendent sphere -- because, in general, the distinction between an inner and an outer is constructive and continually gives occasion for further constructions, we shall in the future no longer speak of a subject, of a subjective sphere, but shall understand the being to whom intentional comportments belong as *Dasein*, and indeed in such a way that it is precisely with the aid of *intentional comportment*, properly understood, that we attempt to characterize suitably the being of *Dasein*.¹⁸

III. Being-in-the-world as Originary Transcendence

Next heidegger moves to the non-intentional conditions of the possibility of all intentionality:

Underneath the entire earlier problem of the "relation" of "subject" to "object" is the undiscussed problem of *transcendence*... The problem of transcendence as such is not at all identical with the problem of intentionality. As ontic transcendence, the latter is itself only possible on the basis of originary transcendence, on the basis of being-in-the-world. This primordial transcendence makes possible every intentional relation to beings.¹⁹

Having argued so far that much of our everyday activity does not involve mental intentional content that represents its conditions of satisfaction, but rather involves an absorbed responsiveness to a situation, Heidegger next argues that all human activity, whether absorbed or deliberate, requires a background orienting that makes directed activity possible.

So far we have seen that in non-deliberate activities we experience ourselves only as an absorbed responsiveness to what solicits our activity. Heidegger now adds that such unthinking activity provides the non-salient *background*, both for ongoing coping and for deliberately focusing on what is unusual or difficult. The basic idea is that for a particular person to be directed toward a particular piece of equipment, whether using it, perceiving it,

or whatever, there must be a correlation between that person's general skillful coping and the interconnected equipmental whole in which the thing has a place. For example, when I enter the room I normally cope with whatever is there. What enables me to do this is not a set of beliefs, nor do I have the goal of coping with the room. I simply have a sense of how rooms normally behave, a skill for dealing with them, that I have developed by crawling and walking around many rooms. Such familiarity involves not only acting but also not acting. In dealing with rooms I am skilled at not coping with the dust, unless I am a janitor, and not paying attention to whether the windows are opened or closed, unless it is hot, in which case I know how to do what is appropriate. My competence for dealing with rooms determines both what I will cope with by using it, and what I will cope with by ignoring it, while being ready to use it should the appropriate occasion arise.

Here Heidegger's account sounds deceptively similar to the appeal to the Background introduced by Searle in his account of intentionality,²⁰ but in fact it is quite different. Searle, like Heidegger, holds that the background of intentionality involves non-intentional "abilities," "capacities" and "practices," that function by being taken up into intentional activity. But for Heidegger, the sort of background familiarity that functions when I take in a room full of furniture as a whole and deal with it, is neither a set of specific goal-directed actions, nor is it merely a capacity that must be activated by a self-referential intentional state. Rather for Heidegger the background familiarity, consists in a continual non-intentional activity that he calls *ontological transcendence*.

In an early lecture, Heidegger describes this transcendence as "the background of ... primary familiarity, which itself is not conscious and intended but is rather present in [an] unprominent way."²¹ In *Being & Time* he speaks of "[T]hat familiarity in accordance with which Dasein ... 'knows its way about' [sich "auskennt"] in its public environment."²² In *Basic Problems* he calls it the "sight of practical *circumspection* ..., our practical everyday orientation". This familiarity has a crucial function: it provides the conditions that make action possible.

Circumspection oriented to the presence of what is of concern provides each setting-to-work, procuring, and performing with the way to work it out, the means to carry it out, the right occasion, and the appropriate time.²³

But our sense of familiarity, although it can break down and leave us disoriented, does not have specific conditions of satisfaction. Rather, in response to Husserl and Searle, Heidegger points out that whenever we are directed towards entities by using or contemplating them, we must simultaneously be exercising a general skilled grasp of our circumstances, that opens the space that makes directed coping possible.

For Heidegger, just as Dasein is ordinarily absorbed in its activity in such a way that it does not have any mental intentional content, so, in general, Dasein is absorbed in the background coping that discloses the world as familiar in such a way that there is no intentional content at all-- no separation between Dasein's disclosing comportment and the world disclosed. Heidegger tells us: "[W]e define [concerned being-in-the-world] as *absorption* in the world, being drawn in by it. ..."24.

Self and world belong together in the single entity, Dasein. Self and world are not two entities, like subject and object ... but self and world are the basic determination of Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-world.²⁵

Or, even more directly, "Dasein ... is nothing but ... concerned absorption in the world."²⁶

Our general background coping, our familiarity with the world, what Heidegger calls originary transcendence, turns out to be what Heidegger means by our understanding of being.

That wherein Dasein already understands itself ... is always something with which it is primordially familiar. This familiarity with the world ... goes to make up Dasein's understanding of being.²⁷

And Heidegger is explicit that this understanding of being is more basic than either practice or theory.

In whatever way we conceive of knowing, it is ... a comportment toward beings. ... But all practical-technical commerce with beings is also a comportment toward beings. ... In all comportment toward beings -- whether it is specifically cognitive, which is most frequently called theoretical, or whether it is practical-technical -- an understanding of being is already involved. For a being can be encountered by us *as* a being only in the light of the understanding of being.²⁸

It is the discovery of the primacy of this non-intentional understanding of being, not of the primacy of practical intentionality over the theoretical intentionality, that Heidegger holds to be his unique contribution to Western philosophy.

¹ Dagfinn Føllesdal, "Husserl and Heidegger on the Role of Actions in the Constitution of the World," *Essays in Honour of Jaakko Hintikka*, E. Saarinen et al, eds., D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland, 1979, p. 371.

² Mark Okrent, *Heidegger's Pragmatism*, University of Cornell Press, 1988, p. 10.

³ Ibid., p. 372.

⁴ Ibid., p. 376.

⁵ Martin Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic*, Indiana University Press, 1984, p. 132.

⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Indiana University Press, 1982, pp. 63-64.

⁷ Again we find a parallel in Husserl. According to Kevin Mulligan in "Perception," The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, footnote 54, Husserl "rejects the view that trying simply initiates and precedes

movement. Rather, trying coexists with and causes movement, an achievement which is made possible by the fact that perception and volition accompany and steer one another; cf. Hua XXVIII,A §§13-16.”

⁸ Martin Heidegger, *Basic Problem of Phenomenology*, p. 162.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ This is not to say that Searle was influenced by Husserl, nor that their accounts of the intentionality of perception and action are identical. Searle's account of the logical role of causality and thus of the necessary self-referentiality of the intentional content of the experience of perception and action is not found in Husserl.

¹¹ John Searle, *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 88.

¹² Aron Gurwitsch, *Human Encounters in the Social World*, Duquesne University Press, 1979, p. 67.

¹³ Aristotle should have stuck with his account of practical wisdom and of skill. In discussing skill he says that the expert “straightway” does what is appropriate.

¹⁴ Quoted in L.D. Levine, *Bird: The Making of an American Sports Legend*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1988.

¹⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Harper & Row, 1962, p. 405.

¹⁶ For a full discussion of the chess example, see H. Dreyfus and S. Dreyfus, *Mind Over Machine*, New York: The Free Press, 1988.

¹⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Basic Problem of Phenomenology*, p. 59.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 64.

¹⁹ Martin Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic*, p. 135.

²⁰ See Searle, *Intentionality*, Chapter 5.

²¹ Martin Heidegger, *The History of the Concept of Time*, Indiana University Press, 1985, p. 189.

²² Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 405.

²³ Martin Heidegger, *The History of the Concept of Time*, p. 274.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 196.

²⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 297.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 197.

²⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 119.

²⁸ Martin Heidegger, *Basic Problem of Phenomenology*, p. 275.