

itself. Thus, we must consider the possibility whether all the fusions and separations, through which objectlike unities become in the field of the present, do not require an affective vivacity in order to become at all, and that perhaps they could not become if the materially relevant conditions of forming unities were indeed fulfilled, but the affective force were nil. Only a radical theory that does justice in the same way to the concrete structure of the living present and to the structure of the particular concretions themselves arising from constitutive elements can solve the enigma of association, and with this all enigmas of the "unconscious" and of varying modes of "becoming conscious."

On the other hand, all motives of a theory arise from the evidences of the first level, from those that are for us necessarily the first: the evidences found in the phenomena of the living present which is, so to speak, structured as ready-made.

Being already familiar with the form and content of its concrete object-structure, let us then begin with this living present in a systematic fashion. But let us now consider its affective formation.

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<§35. The Gradation of Affection in the Living Present and in the Retentional Process>¹³²

We must make an initial distinction here under the rubric of affection between: (1) affection as that varying vivacity of a lived-experience, of a datum of consciousness; whether the datum is salient in the special sense and then perhaps actually noticed and grasped depends upon the datum's relative intensity; and (2) this salience itself. Here affection has the special sense of a specific affection on the ego, and in doing so meets the ego, excites it, calls it to action, so to speak, awakens and possibly actually rouses it.

For example, a soft noise becoming louder and louder takes on a growing affectivity in this materially relevant transformation; the vivacity of it in consciousness increases. This means that it exercises a growing pull on the ego. The ego finally turns toward it. However, examining this more precisely, the modal

transformation of affection has already occurred prior to the turning toward. Along with a certain strength that is at work under the given affective circumstances, the pull proceeding from the noise has so genuinely struck the ego that it has come into relief¹³³ for the ego, even if only in the antechamber of the ego. The ego already detects it now in its particularity even though it does not yet pay attention to it by grasping it in an attentive manner. This "already detecting" means that in the ego a positive tendency is awakened to turn toward the object, its "interest" is aroused—it

becomes an acutely active interest in and through the turning toward in which this positive tendency, which goes from the ego-pole toward the noise, is fulfilled in the striving-toward. Now we understand the essential modal transformation that has occurred here. First an increasing affection; but the affective pull is not yet, from the standpoint of the ego, a counter-pull, not yet a responsive tendency toward the allure issuing from the object, a tendency that for its part can assume the new mode of an attentively grasping tendency. There are further distinctions that can be made here, but they do not concern us at this time.

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Significant for us is the peculiarity of the varying vivacity itself, irrespective of the significance it has for the ego. In every living present that is looked upon universally, there is naturally a certain relief of salience, a relief of noticeability, and a relief that can get my attention¹³⁴. In this case, we accordingly distinguish between background and foreground. The foreground is what is thematic in the broadest sense. The nil of salience is found in a potentially considerable vivacity of a conscious having that does not, however, arouse any special responsive tendency in the ego, does not make it to the ego-pole.

Therefore, if we ignore the comportment of the ego-pole, then we will still have the difference of vivacity, which is not to be confused with a materially relevant intensity, like the intensity of sound, the intensity of smell, etc. Independent of the character of the data of consciousness (and if we include any kind of object of consciousness, then precisely these kinds of data) there is a

¹³² Editor: See Appendix 22: <The Empty Horizon and Knowledge of It> pp. 524ff., and Appendix 23: <On Questioning the Potentiality of the Empty Horizon> p. 530f.

¹³³ *ist ... zur Geltung gekommen*

¹³⁴ *Aufmerksamkeit*

gradation of vivacity, and this difference is still maintained in the ray of attentiveness.

This gradation is also what determines a certain concept of consciousness and degrees of consciousness and the opposition to the unconscious in the appropriate sense. The latter designates the nil of this vivacity of consciousness and, as will be shown, is in no way a nothing: A nothing only with respect to affective force and therefore with respect to those accomplishments that presuppose precisely a positively valued affectivity (above the zero-point). It is thus not a matter of a "zero" like a nil in the intensity of qualitative moments, e.g., in intensity of sound, since by this we mean that the sound has ceased altogether.

Every concrete datum of the sphere of the living present is submerged, as we know, in the phenomenal past, succumbs to retentional transformation and thereby necessarily leads into the region of affective nullity into which it is incorporated and in which it is not nothing. Thus, we must reckon within the living present in general an affective zero-horizon that is constantly varying with the living present itself. Before we treat the affective zero-horizon more closely, we want to characterize the entire affective peculiarity of the living present: Viewed as a whole, the latter is an affective unity, has accordingly a unitary vivacity into which all special affections that belong to the affective unity are integrated as moments, as moments that are unified synthetically within it.

I have already employed the quite suitable expression, affective relief.¹³⁵ On the one hand, this alludes to a unity, on the other hand, to a difference of "peaks" for the different particular moments, finally, too, the possibility of entire augmentations or entire diminutions insofar as the affective relief can arch out more prominently or become more flattened depending upon the alterations of the living present. I am alluding here to the differences of freshness in which all present objects, possibly through a sudden transition, but altogether, gain (or in the opposing case, lose) something of the vivacity of consciousness, of affective force. But at the same time within every present there

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are relative differences of vivacity, differences of more or less affectively efficacious data. Hence the discourse of affective relief.—The affective relief has as a materially relevant support the structural nexuses of the present: by affection proceeding from a point and being distributed in an awakening manner along these lines, the entire relief is accentuated along these lines.

Further, according to what has been said, a background or subsoil of non-vivacity, of affective ineffectiveness (nil) belongs to every present. Within the positive vivacity then, an ever newly affective awakening and transference of affective forces takes place, and precisely along with this, relative alterations in the uniform level of relative freshness as a whole.

The primordial source of all affection lies and can only lie in the primordial impression and its own greater or lesser affectivity. The lines of affective awakening, or again, the lines of the maintenance or propagation of affectivity proceed from there.

Retention links up to the primordial impression. The retentional process is, as we have learned, the process of a peculiar, continuous modification of the primordial impression. What is given in the mode of original intuitability, of having a self in the flesh, givenness in the flesh, undergoes the modal transformation of the "more and more past." The constitutive process of this being modified in consciousness is a continual synthesis of identification. What is given to consciousness is continuously the same, but it is pushed back further and further into the past. In the primordial phenomenal process in which the concrete temporal objectlike formations become, the emergence of a new primordial impression goes hand in hand, inseparably, with the retentional transformation; the emergence of the new primordial impression is continuously linked up with the impression that has immediately passed and is modified into the form of the just-past. Within this entire process we have in each phase a primordial lived-experiencing of something, i.e., something that is primordially impressional: During the latter's continuous retentional modification, the affective force of the datum that is constituted as identical is preserved, but it does not go undiminished. We have also described the retentional process as the process of clouding over. What had been constituted concretely with these particular

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¹³⁵ Translator: See p. 212, and the related expression "affective prominence," p. 204.

internal differences and external prominences, initially in a unity of the primordial impression, becomes more and more unclear; it loses its distinguishing traits and prominences. It is clear that the affective force accruing to them and to the whole is constantly diminished in the process.

We can divide up this process. The primordial impression initially passes over continuously into a retentional expanse that we can describe as the expanse of the fresh retention. One will certainly have to concede that a concrete perceptual object, here the respective enduring, concrete sensible datum, is actually perceived for a stretch as temporally extended (I have doubted this at times, but it seems to me, unjustly). If we reduce a long, protracted sound to what is actually given in intuition, we will find not its entire length, but rather a small and extensive portion remaining constantly the same in an actual intuition, even if the momentary and primordially impressional element is distinguished in it again as the peak, so to speak, of the most intensive intuitability. On the other hand, the intuitability loses more and more richness as it approaches the past, to the point of the nil of intuitability. Let us say with respect to the affective height that in the steady sounding of a tone every new primordially impressional moment of the Now brings a new primordial vivacity, which in spite of the diminution in this expanse of fresh retention is nonetheless sustained on a level of intense force such that the expression "fresh" also refers to something affective. The affective force is therefore not nil when the intuitability becomes nil.

The expanse of fresh retention, then, continuously passes over into an expanse of empty retention. One can characterize this as the genetic primordial form of empty presentations. The empty retention remains a sphere of maintaining the objectlike formation that has its original sphere of institution in the primordial impression. What is the same in its very sense is still given to consciousness, this is still given to consciousness in the special sense, namely, as affective. But this affective force goes back inexorably, the objective sense becomes inexorably poorer with respect to internal differentiations, thus emptying itself in a certain way. The end is an empty presentation that presents its presented object in a completely undifferentiated manner; its presented

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object has lost the entire wealth of internally prominent features that the primordial impression had instituted. What is left over? This empty presentation is still a presentation, this portion, this end is still an end of the continuous retentional procession that has streamed out from the primordial impression and that is being constantly fed anew by the primordial impression that is ever new and synthetically attached.

Thus the end is a consciousness of a completely empty bygone "That" which only has the one determination, to be that which is "the identical" of this identifying procession. For this very reason it is the past given to consciousness as empty of content, a part of something that is still in the process of the constitutive becoming in its ever new present. If several objects have been constituted simultaneously and are potentially still running their course, then proper to each one for itself is its own empty expanse of the past and an empty end, that is still maintained, that is, is still affective and not yet blurred with its like. I say, not yet. For the process continues, ineluctably losing the remainder of differentiation and affective force that had been retentionally derived from the point of origin. Thus that separation, which has arisen by belonging to several retentional processions, and which keeps these processions differentiated even in the final segments, cannot at all be maintained. Accordingly, the end is completely undifferentiated; its lack of differentiation arises from complete powerlessness of affection. By every retentional procession losing its affective force in the process of change it itself becomes dead, it can no longer progress by fusing under prominence; for positive affective force is the fundamental condition of all life in dynamic connection and differentiation; if it is decreased to zero, its life ceases, precisely in its vivacity.

We must now supplement our description for the sake of clarifying this principle interpretation. On the one hand, we said that the retentional process is a process of identifying synthesis—the sameness of the objective sense runs clean through it. For example, the tone that sounds, and in this sounding has reached its completion, is the same through the entire process of the retentional still-being-retained-in-consciousness. The same holds for every phase and expanse of the piece that has respectively

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5 faded away during a tone that is still resounding. Thus the differences, which belong to the sense itself, remain with it in its identity through the continuity of the retentive fading away. The sense's [temporal] mode of the past is altered, but it itself is not altered.

10 On the other hand, we do speak of a loss of internal differences in the progressive "clouding over" of the retention. In the fading away, the tone itself thus does not lose anything that it originally was; if it is given at the end as completely empty of differences with respect to content, then this concerns its mode of givenness, not it itself.¹³⁶

15 At all events, it is a matter of an affective phenomenon, so we say now. The altered mode of consciousness persistently belongs in connection to the synthesis of identification, but the sense that lies in it is little affective, less and less affective in its particularity. And finally, everything runs together as one, all retentive ebbs and flows form one unity in which a multifaceted sense is lodged *implicite*, for it has flowed into it through multifarious particular lines of unity, but in such a way that no affective pull proceeds from this unity. This pull would allow any one of the past objectlike formations (contained within the unity *implicite*) and their peculiar features to have a voice, which could make them efficacious for themselves. One may well say that within the zero-stage, all special affections have passed over into a general undifferentiated affection; all special consciousnesses have passed over into the one, general, persistently available background-consciousness of our past, the consciousness of the completely unarticulated, completely indistinct horizon of the past, which brings to a close the living, moving retentive past.

30 This explains the phenomenon of perspectives coalescing as they move away from the diversely articulated impressionist present and into the flowing past that is less and less articulated and that coalesces more and more closely. It is especially a matter here of the perspectival phenomenon proper to the living present and to its retentive streaming itself. We understand it not as a

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phenomenon of an actual loss of differentiations within the object, but in the first place, affectively: The perspective is an affective perspective. Regarded noetically, the retentive modification is a transformation of consciousness itself, a transformation that is so peculiar that for all syntheses of identification it ultimately leads to the inability to be differentiated. But insofar as it contains the objective sense, precisely by having been integrated into the different lines of the synthetic coinciding that forms identity, we can say from the standpoint of the object: Less and less becomes affective from it. And when there is no affection coming from the diverse objects, then these diverse objects have slipped into sheer nightfall, in a special sense, they have slipped into the unconscious.

<Chapter 3:

15 THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF AFFECTIVE AWAKENING
AND REPRODUCTIVE ASSOCIATION>

<§36. The Function of Awakening in the Living Present>

20 But essentially belonging to this [scil. slipping into the unconscious] or to the implication of a concealed sense is the primordial phenomenon of awakening. By awakening we understand and distinguish two things: awakening something that is already given to consciousness as for itself, and the awakening of something that is concealed. Every living present brings an ever new original constitution of the object, ever new perceptual data in extensive articulations, as ordered particular data, as a kind of ordered world; that is, an ever new source of a new affective force that can spread over the nexuses in an awakening manner, spread over the unities constituted in retention, and that can make possible syntheses of fusion, of connection, of contrast in every coexistence. An actual connection, an actual formation of unity always and necessarily presupposes affective force or affective differentiation.

¹³⁶ Translator: For this discussion and the one that follows, see "Consciousness and Sense—Sense and Noema", pp. 591-623.

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On the other hand: The affective accomplishment is not merely carried out in the form of the distribution of an affective force on something that is already differentiated, that is, on something that is *affectively at work*. Rather, we already encounter an entirely peculiar affective accomplishment within the living present, namely, the accomplishment of awakening the concealed element, the accomplishment of awakening the element shrouded in implicit intentionality. An influx of affective force, which naturally has its primordial source in the impressional sphere, can enable a retention (which is poor in or completely empty of particular affective content) to restore what is concealed in it concerning an overcast content of sense. A retention cannot be analyzed, disassembled like a fixed thing. It is not something fixed, and it cannot be reified, the retentional process cannot be halted in the steady necessity of its course. But if the object constituted in the flux has taken on a special affective force, then the process of the retentional transformation may continue to progress, the process of *affective* clouding over going hand in hand with it is halted. So long as the new force lasts, the objectlike moments that have attained a special affection are affectively preserved in the empty form of the presentation, thus, sustained longer than without this new force. But an essential tendency is also given with such a radiating back of affective force into the empty consciousness, a tendency toward an eruption of a more or less clear reproduction that is more or less rich with respect to content, and with this a tendency toward the identifying transition of the empty presentation into a self-giving, which re-news "after a fashion" the constitutive process in the mode of remembering, and therefore "re"-covers the identical objective sense in its explicit differentiation.

In the previous lecture¹³⁷ we began to sketch out a theoretical idea that is called upon to clarify for us how an awakening of objectlike formations, which are in the process of becoming ineluctably concealed and which are finally already completely veiled, comes about in the living present, in the streaming life of the original constitution of an object. The multiplicity of objects,

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connected and ordered in this way and that, the multiplicity that is manifest in a constantly uniform structural typicality, manifest in every Now in original experience, and manifest precisely out of living constitution, manifests itself in multiple manners of modes of givenness. This style of givenness is designated under the headings of primordial impression, retention, the empty horizon of something submerged; it is preserved like a rigid form in streaming transition, designated noematically from the side of the object as the system of forms of the Now, of the graduated just-now, right to zero, to the lack of differentiation. Because new content constantly runs through this form in the direction of its flow along the lines of the synthesis of identification, we have the phenomenon of objects continually reaching the living impression, of objects, however, that are intuited, pass away, and ultimately disappear.

The retentional process is already a process of steady impoverishment in its expanse of intuitiveness, despite the continual identity of sense; sense has less and less intuitive fullness. By this we actually mean to say that the intuition is less and less a pure intuition, and is more and more a mixture of intuition and empty presentation. A progressive diminution of affective force is given with this which, when the retention has become a completely empty presentation, ultimately no longer has any of its own hold on what is intuitive; and it can actually only bring into relief its sustained sense in accordance with these or those partial moments by virtue of a retroactive affective force that is already at work, an affective force proceeding from the intuition, in the final analysis, from the primordial impression. But this ultimately dries up, the retentional modification leads to an empty identity that has lost its particular differentiation, and even that identity cannot last; the retentional synthetic line loses itself in the nil that is common to them all, namely, the lack of differentiation. And yet, in the continuity of this process, the sense remains identical, it has only become veiled, it has shifted from an explicit sense to an implicit one.

What else can awakening mean here than this: What is implicit becomes explicit once more. And initially no other way is prefigured here than the way of transforming an empty retention

¹³⁷ Editor: The beginning of a new lecture.

(in which little or nothing is affective with respect to the objective sense) into another empty retention in which more is affective now, that is, more "emerges" from out of the "fog," potentially in an especially salient manner, and is grasped. In fact, that is the first form of a disclosive awakening. [175]

If we inquire into how such awakening takes place, the answer will run: Just as within coexistence an intuition becomes unified with an intuition, and initially within primordially impressional coexistence, an impression becomes unified with an impression, becomes unified not only in a continuous local juxtaposition, but also through a synthesis of coinciding in distance that takes place essentially, and just as in this case coinciding and affective communicating are inseparably bound together, so too when we pass over to succession; in this case, what has finally become non-imitable achieves a synthesis with what is actually intuitive, and especially with what emerges in the new impressional vivacity. Affective communication would mean that every contribution of affective force by any "member" of something connected in distance through homogeneity and prominence augments the force of all its "conrades." Moreover, according to our principle interpretation this means further: Only by virtue of affective force does connection come about at all, and the affective force is *eo ipso* there so long as intuition takes place. Within the streaming living sphere of the present there cannot be individualized intuitions. The extent to which the conditions of near-connection and distant-connection proper to the intuitions' "content," to their objective sense, are fulfilled is the extent to which the interconnection comes about: only that depending upon the affective relief, there will exist differences of salience, differences of affective intensity of the prominence of these or those particular objects and of these or those particular interconnections.

Let us now turn to succession. We naturally assume, and it is indeed actually quite evident in a certain way, that distant syntheses as well as near syntheses can also take place in succession. Without this there would not be a world for us, and above all, as the basic feature of a possible world of experience, there would be no world given originally in experience, not only with respect to coexistence, but also with respect to the successive

order. However, in original experience one thing constantly follows another, there are processes, and not only those that continually stretch back, but also those in which temporally distant objects and processes are involved in a unitary manner, e.g., the successions of hammer blows or the sequence of tones as in melodies, etc.

But would the like be possible if these syntheses were bound to the extraordinarily narrow sphere of successive and actual intuition? It is clear that the awakening of a concealed element

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already plays its role here in order to make possible any expanse of successive syntheses, even if not exactly an arbitrarily large expanse. When the second hammer blow rings out, how does the synthesis come about between it and the first one which has in the meantime become intuitively empty or even completely empty?

How can the synthesis be the synthesis of the succession of uniform blows, how can it arise before us in a unified manner as a uniform pair? The contents that are genuinely imitable there are not uniform. But as the retention changes, precisely the identical objective sense has been maintained, and the uniform sense-content, only once in the mode of the impression and the other time in the mode of emptiness, grounds the synthesis. But the emptiness is "clouded over," has more or less lost the efficacy of the distinguishing feature with respect to content. So, how then can we become conscious of uniformity? The answer naturally runs: No matter how incompletely affective the one objective sense is, it is still there as the first, obscured hammer blow, and can thus still enter in a community of sense with the new hammer blow. From the affective force of this hammer blow and as a consequence of this community, an affective awakening now goes back into senses that are uniform. The affective awakening does not bring the uniform sense to intuition for instance, but does indeed effect an un-covering. That is to say, now it has its own affective force—the reanimated past hammer blow, just like the new hammer blow. The condition is thus fulfilled so that uniformity as such can now actually be produced synthetically. That is, as a unique, as an affectively prominent synthesis of uniformity.

Let us now imagine hammer blows progressing even further. We experience the chain of hammer blows extending relatively far back, given in consciousness in an actually living manner, and actually constituted in a synthetic manner; we experience it as a chain only by virtue of an awakening running back. Finally, however, the chain is lost in the zero-horizon, the efficacious concatenation presupposes an affective awakening that still has an ample positive force. The force of intuition is limited, and the diminished forces of the derived intuitions are limited, and it finally becomes nil in the radiating back. —The concatenation that is already formed, the pair, the triplet, etc., are new objects and sink back as objects of a higher order, etc. Thus retroactive awakening concerns them as such. [177]

15 <§37. Retroactive Awakening of the Empty Presentations in the Distant Sphere>¹³⁸

20 If the final remainder of affectivity is lost as the retention becomes obscure, and if the process itself has lost the final remainder of vivacity of the streaming process, what is essential is of course preserved. Earlier I thought that this retentional streaming and the constitution of the past would continue to go on incessantly even within complete obscurity.¹³⁹ But now it seems to me that one can dispense with this hypothesis. The process itself ceases. Thus we have the following, never ending typicality: The primordially instituting process of ever new sense-objects goes on and on ineluctably at the head of the living present; it is bound to the lawful form of the entire objective structure; the primordially instituting process begins again and again with impressional momentary data that immediately crystallize as coexistent objectlike formations and are systematically articulated; these formations are continually modified in retention while ordered articulations of succession are simultaneously constituted. But this retentional modification leads further and further into the one nil.

What does this nil mean? It is the constant reservoir of objects that have achieved living institution in the process of the living present. In it, they are tucked away from the ego, but quite at its disposal. Heretofore their being consisted in nothing other than the process of their being experienced originally, that is, in their being-given-to-consciousness *originellier* and remaining-held-in-consciousness in this process of a streaming, synthetic coinciding that forms identity. Where the retentional line of identity is concerned, this being and even this remaining-held-in-consciousness does not cease when the process has reached its end in the zero-point. The constituted object, the identical element, is no longer constitutively vivacious; thus, it is also no longer affectively vivacious, but the sense is still implicitly there in a "dead" shape; it is only without streaming life. It is not efficacious for new constituting—*notabene* for new, originally experiential constituting. How it can become efficacious and even constitutively efficacious in a new shape is the problem of association. Initially, however, we want to say that every accomplishment of the living present, that is, every accomplishment of sense or of the object becomes sedimented in the realm of the dead, or rather, dormant horizontal sphere, precisely in the manner of a fixed order of sedimentation: While at the head, the living process receives new, original life, at the feet, everything that is, as it were, in the final acquisition of the retentional synthesis, becomes steadily sedimented.

One is only acquainted with sleep by waking up; so too here, and in an entirely original manner. Waking up sedimented sense can initially mean that it will become affective once more. And we do not need to rehearse how this is possible. As we have already mentioned, it is all the same whether we conceive empty presentations (empty intentions) that are still living as being awakened or ones that are already fast asleep. The motives must lie in the living present where perhaps the most efficacious of such motives (which we were not in a position to take into consideration) are "interests" in the broad, customary sense.

¹³⁸ Editor: See Appendix 24: <Effect and Cause of Awakening> pp. 531ff.
¹³⁹ Editor: See "Consciousness and Sense—Sense and Noema," pp. 591ff.

original or already acquired valuations of the heart¹⁴⁰, instinctive or even higher drives, etc.

Certainly, there is an unmistakable distinction between the awakening of the entirely submerged sphere, the distant sphere, and the awakening of empty intentions (or of their contents) that are still in wakeful life or that are standing on the edge of life. In the latter case the thing awakened is once again integrated into the originally living constitutive nexus—as has become clear with the example of the expansion of the near sphere through repetitive affection (the hammer blows). But the distant sphere, with its sedimentations of all previous accomplishments of previous living presents, yields an awakened sense by rousing any empty presentation that is related to what is in the distance; it yields a sense that stands outside of continual, living connection with the sense being constituted and coming to life in the moment of awakening. This is very significant. All intuitions and presentations, which are originally at home in the framework of the living present, that is, which belong to the continual unity of its syntheses and its downward directed movement of identity, are integrally related in the unity of this continuity. We speak without further ado of integrally cohesive intuitions and of other kinds of presentations. The awakening of the submerged past, however, yields presentations that are not integrally cohesive with those of the living present. Accordingly, these syntheses in which these presentations can enter, by virtue of their affective force, together with the presentations that have arisen originally and that are capable of being constituted originally, stand in contrast to those syntheses of presentations that have arisen originally with each other. These syntheses have a fundamentally different character. We will have to pursue this further.

But first: Awakening is possible because the constituted sense is actually implied in background-consciousness, in the non-living form that is called here unconsciousness. Here awakening is also the production of an affective communication and therefore the production of a relevant synthesis, of an objectlike connection which, as connection, is actually produced like a simple object,

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affective for itself. Once something is constituted in the manner of an object, it can connect with anything else that is already constituted as an object; in this instance, precisely two kinds of conditions are to be fulfilled, on the one hand, the conditions of content, of both senses of the objects, on the other hand, the conditions belonging to the consciousness of them. Only something that is grasped explicitly, that is, something that exercises an affection, can become connected in consciousness. Certainly, should the connection of both objects itself be given as a connection, that is, be given intuitively, so too must these objects be self-given. There is a further, important special case where the connection of objects should yield a unity of objects in the special sense of a connected whole understood most broadly. For this, the intuitive modes of consciousness of these objects must be integrally cohesive, fit together into the universal unity of a constitution encompassing them.

Awakening the obscure distance is initially an empty awakening. Where the content is concerned, the awakening is made possible in accordance with the principle that makes a unification with respect to content and affective communication possible in every present: The fundamental condition is namely the "similarity" of contrasting discrete matters, and everything belonging to it. One color can awaken a concealed color, a pronounced sound, a sound that has become masked. A rhythm can also awaken another rhythm, e.g., the rhythm of knocking blows can awaken a similar rhythm of signal lights. (Insofar as this is the case, awakening can certainly transcend the sense-fields.) Through our analyses of the necessary structure of a living present, the vague principle of association of similarity and of contrast takes on a unequaled richer and deeper sense. In this structure lie all associative preconditions of content. The first synthesis, which is made possible through the affective communication gained by the transference of affective force, is of course precisely the synthesis of the similarity that has become currently given to consciousness, a similarity between the awakening and something presented in an empty manner, the awakened, this similarity in the essential noematic mode of the "recalling another."

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If the matter rested here, precious little would be accomplished. Although the awakened element obviously lies in the direction prefigured by the course of the constituted past that has come to life as the past-directedness and, as it were, as the objectlike formation in the most distant past, what we naturally count as the past would still be quite far from being constituted. A genuine object to be grasped and disclosed as identically the same again and again is first constituted with the help of remembering, as we have already ascertained long ago. Even the past and the synthesis in the course of pasts, which are carried out in the small circle of the living present, does not yet yield the genuine constitution of the object, but rather, only a fundamental portion of its constitution.¹⁴¹

15 <§38. The Transition of Awakened Empty Presentations in Rememberings>

In the last lecture,¹⁴² we stood before a new level and accomplishment of association. The first level, which we addressed under the rubric of primordial association, was that systematic or systematizing affective awakening that makes possible the objectlike structure of the living present, all kinds of original syntheses proper to the formation of unity of manifolds.

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The second level, the one we just treated, was the awakening that radiates back, which illuminates once more the darkened empty presentations, bringing the contents of sense implicit in them affectively into relief. Belonging here is the especially important case of awakening the presentations of the zero-sphere.

The third level is the level of the transition of such awakened empty presentations in reproductive intuitions, and that means here, rememberings.

30 One may well promulgate the principle with certainty that belonging in general to empty presentations that have undergone

an awakening is the tendency to transmute them into self-giving intuitions, which at any rate goes by way of rememberings.

In any case, the law holds that rememberings can only arise through the awakening of empty presentations. Accordingly, they can only appear as consequences of empty presentations, which for their part have arisen from an awakening in order to enter into the living present; rememberings that have arisen in the most immediate way only appear through the awakening of those empty presentations that arise in a fixed necessity of the structural elapse of a living present in itself. Thanks to the establishment of this origin the entire, essential lawful regularity of reproductive association is prefigured. It becomes entirely dependent upon the fulfillment of those lawful systems that make possible the association on the previous level, that is, make possible the awakening of empty presentations, whereby we already come back then, naturally, to the sense-structure of a living present and to the affective conditions proper to it generally. I hardly need to say that through this, the traditional laws of the association of similarity, of contiguity, of contrast in their obvious, but vague and entirely incomprehensible truth obtain an intelligible and precise sense through essential insight. However, the precision lies in the systematic analyses and affiliated laws.

Let us now examine the situation according to what is most essential. Let us take a distant awakening leading back in one blow from the present into a deeply lying layer of sediment in the zero-sphere, that is, into a submerged, distant past. There is now an empty presentation that makes us conscious of a past singular datum or of a singular connected nexus. Naturally, it is awakened by a uniform or a very similar nexus in our present. Thus, a similar synthesis is necessarily given with it, a synthesis comparable to what must have been formed in the original present itself in a primordially associative manner, and therefore also with the noematic character of all association. The awakened element has itself the noematic character of something-to-be-awakened through the awakening element (the character of recalling something).

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¹⁴¹ Translator: In the last two instances, I have rendered *Ergebnisse ihrer* as object. See "Translator's Introduction," Section 3.

¹⁴² Editor: Beginning of a new lecture.

Further: just like, awakening and connection progress¹⁴³ in accordance with the standard of affective force within the primordial sphere of all associations, and are determined ever anew in it through the influxes of affective forces, so too [do they progress] with the arrival of the awakened distance. A firmly constituted objectlike nexus, only having fallen asleep, is awakened at a location, at the location of a present that has passed by. Note well that it is a matter here precisely of the objectlike formations, of the inner connections and prominences, the connections and orders that had actually just been constituted and are now forever enclosed in the zero-sphere. Naturally, the awakening can now progress, living on the affective force of what was first-awakened, potentially augmented through the stimulation of affective interests¹⁴⁴ etc. that arise in the progression. When awakening progresses, only individualized, especially strong sense-moments of the distant present in question will come into relief in the emptiness, just like rough contours in a dimly illuminated fog. An even more favorable case is when awakening passes over into remembering. Of course, this transition is carried out as the synthesis of identity; the synthesis of identity is the accomplishment of intuitive remembering, the accomplishment of the re-constitution of the objectlike formation, but in the mode of coming-back-again to something familiar, in the mode of being-presentified-again, not genuinely experiencing, but rather as if one would experience. Now the past present is reproduced in the vivacity of the noetic-noematic flux with all accomplishments—with all accomplishments of remembering, which in the ideal case, are completely intuitive, while in truth remembering wavers in clarity and distinctness, thus, mixed with empty moments, a middle stage between pure, complete intuition and empty presentation.

<§39. The Difference Between Continuous and Discontinuous Awakening> [183]

The greater richness of affective efficacy is advantageous to the progression of awakening. But it is clear that awakening is not tied to only one reproductive present; rather, it can pass over continuously or in leaps into the other layers of sedimentation.

The direction toward higher situated layers, that is, the direction forward into the relative future is prefigured in a regulative manner and *a priori* for the possible continuous progression, while only the progression of awakening that takes place in leaps is possible for the transition to the underlying layers. This is to be understood in the following manner: The reproductive tendency is a tendency toward the re-constitution of the objectlike formation under consideration. Thus, just as the original constitution as such is now a process directed forward into the future, so too is the re-constitution. The object is not in the present as something fixed and dead; rather, it becomes in the living constitutive nexus in which, moreover, it is not isolated; instead, in the intertwining of the becoming and being-transformed, it is a term in the process of becoming, the term of an objectlike-whole being shaped progressively.

The moment the tendency toward re-constitution starts to be realized, we stand in the process of becoming which is just what the tendentious memory strives to re-produce. Accordingly, here is the field of continual awakening. On the other hand, every awakening radiating back is naturally discontinuous, whether it goes near-by or into the distance. If the reproductive process goes tendentiously forward, then the impoverishment and submersion into the old zero-sphere is repeated in the process reproductively; the discrete awakening that radiates back can acquire something once again from the zero-sphere in repeated reproductive tendencies. The awakening can jump from one sedimented layer to another, which can be now higher, now deeper; it can jump in leaps and without any determinate order. In this way, manifold possibilities develop for rememberings that follow upon one another and that are entirely and immediately disjointed. Each one is characterized as a beginning expanse of streaming re-

¹⁴³ Translator: reading *fortschreiten* for *fortschreiten*.

¹⁴⁴ *Gemütsinteressen*

constitution, but one that is sinking once more into powerlessness. All these rememberings are nevertheless referred back to the continuously integrally cohesive system of sediments existing in concealment—a coherent nexus that would however only be reproducibly realized if we would continuously reproduce, if we *could* continuously reproduce our entire life from the very beginning and in one stroke. [184]

The emergence of rememberings yields a peculiar enrichment of that living, originally constituting present that we conceived heretofore in a necessary abstraction, purely as a process of immanent hyletic experience—of original experience. Now joining the particular intuitions of this living experience, which are connected in thoroughgoing internal continuity, that is, particular intuitions that cannot be isolated at all, are rememberings like tattered rags, rememberings arising from an entire previous experience that is reanimated. United in a certain way with the current present through association, they do not have any direct experiential connection with it, they arise in a narrow sense, disjointed. Different rememberings are also without an internal coherence between each other, where they emerge in leaps through discontinuous awakening. This difference between the interconnections arising from a constitutive continuity and the interconnections arising through a mere distant-awakening is highly significant. On the one hand, we understand from this that in the continuity of original experience the phenomenon of modalization cannot emerge—original experience is a nexus of thoroughgoing concordance in absolute necessity. Only first with remembering, in more general terms, with the phenomenon of reproduction does there arise the possibility of connecting discordances, the possibility of modalizations. Before we examine this more closely, we want to bring the principle contours of the theory of association quickly to a close.

<Chapter 4: THE PHENOMENON OF EXPECTATION>

<§40. Motivational Causality Peculiar to Expectations>

We now turn our attention toward a new fundamental direction concerning the lawful regularity of association. It will already have occurred to you that I have, so to speak, kept dead silent about the long familiar phenomenon of protention and of expectation in general—so essential to the structure of every original experience, and thus, to the sphere of the living present. All formation of unity and every nexus in experience is rooted in homogeneity, formal and material. Or, as we can also say, in uniformity or similarity. Homogeneity effects the institution of the unity of experience only in impression and retention, specifically, in the temporal form of the present and past in the constitutional form: enduring coexistence and the sequence of something enduring. The future, however, which as a more or less prefigured horizon belongs to the constituted objectlike formation, arises from the continuous and discrete protention according to the laws of the formation of expectation. The future does not fashion the unities of experience in the original sense, it presupposes them. [185]

Yet viewed more precisely, we must recognize that even already in the hyletic primordial sphere of immanence, expectation is not only possible as the expectation of something future. We have already alluded to the fact on various occasions that there is also an expectation within the impressional present, as is evidently the case with respect to the phenomenon of lacking a term which is otherwise part of configurations that exist in the synthesis of similarity. Something similar recalls something else that is similar, but it also allows something similar to be expected in coexistence, as in succession.

Obviously, all the analyses that we have undertaken are already presupposed for the elucidation of the phenomena of expectation, be they tied to the synthetic formations of coexistences or successions. The structural formation of a living hyletic sphere of the present occurs in the process of impressions and retentions under the essential conditions of fusion and segregation.

connection at a distance proper to this process. This structural formation is presupposed in order for expectation to be able to make its own marks in this structure, and then in order for a fulfilled or annulled expectation to be able to occur as a future phenomenon.¹⁴⁵ It is quite evident that with expectation we simultaneously move into the most original headwaters of modalization where genesis is concerned.

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Memory—taken in the broadest sense, thus initially the most original retention—already precedes protention in what is elementary. If any kind of *a*, a sound for instance, is in the steady process of melting down new impressional phases, if it is, in other words, a course of continual connection corresponding to certain essential conditions in this original process of becoming, then a futural horizon, that is, an expectational horizon is immediately there along with it; a progressive process of becoming analogous to the previous becoming is expected according to the previous becoming, expected according to the same continual style of the course: If the invariability is of this or that qualitative and shaped content, then it is the invariability of a uniform content, and if it is variable, then the variability will likewise be prefigured, but according to the same style of variability as before. Thus, it is a matter of a necessary motivation: In accordance with what is given to consciousness retentionally, there is "to be expected" something new on its way having a uniform style. Obviously, the expectational presentation is characterized as a presentation of a new kind, specifically, as a presentation of a second level, as the replica of the more original presentation of the past. With respect to the object, what is expected is naturally not like what is perceived, that is, characterized as being in the flesh and as present; likewise, it is not characterized as what is remembered, as *just-now*, and in the subsequent expectation, what has previously been: but rather, it is characterized as in accordance with what has been, with its primordial image, as what is anticipated or as a projected image or model of being prior to its actual being.

If we go beyond the momentary singularities that are immediately at work, existing at the head of the constitutive process, over to the successive nexuses constituted in an articulated manner, then every past constituted in a unified manner, that is, every succession flowing-off in a unitary manner, is projected into the future as an expectation, even if it has already become empty presented. Accordingly, we have in the progression of experience on the one hand an ever new coexistence formed out of original experience itself, and on the other hand we have it interwoven with a structure of expectation, with a layer of anticipation, which is partly fulfilled by the experiencing, partly in conflict with the experiencing and annulled. Naturally, we likewise have a progressive structure of expectation in the temporal series, anticipating the futural experiences on the basis of the coexistence that is already given, and anticipating the futural sequences of coexistences on the basis of the entire expanding sequence of coexistences that has heretofore run-off.

Let us examine the situation in the sphere of the living present more closely. The occurrence of something futural is expected through its similarity to what has occurred in the past, like already happens in the most primitive case of a steady protention. We must take as a basis unified data connected through community. If *p* is connected to *q* in the order of succession and *p'* uniform with *p* immediately occurs in the sequence, in other words, as a repetition, then (in accordance with what we said earlier) it recalls the *p* that is submerged in retention. The latter gets a shot of affective force and is passed on further to *q*. In this connection, the *q'* following the *p'* that has just occurred will also be expected in original essential necessity. This associative expectation obviously presupposes association as an awakening reference-back of "memory." Let us now advance one step further.

This also holds for the distant sphere provided that it has been awakened precisely in an associative manner. The distant *p* can be complex in any manner, an enduring complex, a coexistence that is potentially constituted successively by the approach of new terms to form a self-contained and then enduring connection, such that after it has become a self-contained configuration given to

¹⁴⁵ The abstraction of a purely passive world of sensation must still be circumscribed more precisely. To be considered are kinaestheses as originally "free," "subjective" courses. Editor: See Appendix 25: <Kinaestheses and Potential Expectations>.

consciousness, q then ensues. We then say, under the enduring "Circumstances" $C=q$ joined with p . If we assume that the Circumstances C would be constituted in a unitary manner in a previous situation of consciousness of the distant past and then a q had ensued; and if we assume in addition to this that now in the currently present new situation of consciousness, the similar Circumstances C' would have been (implicitly) repeated, then in the event that the previous C and their q have been awakened, the occurrence of q' will now also be necessarily motivated as arriving. If the awakening has become a distinct, clear remembering, then the occurrence of q' will be given in original evidence as something to be expected, and in particular, motivated by the memorial q in the previous situation C . Here we can directly see motivational causality as a necessity; we can say in evidence: I expect q' here because I have experienced q under similar circumstances, and this "because-thus" is given in evidence.¹⁴⁶ Correlatively: I infer "inductively" in complete evidence the present, similar arrival from what has arrived under previous, similar circumstances. Like every inference, this too has necessity and yields in essential generalization an evident law of inference. Only that here the open possibility that something else will indeed occur belongs to the evidence of the motivation of something arriving as something to be expected.

<§41. Strengthening and Inhibiting Expectational Belief. The Function of Expectation for the Formation of Configurations>

It is further evident that the anticipatory belief of expectation has a differentiation of force, that is, a gradation, and that this force grows with the number of inductive "instances," that is, with the frequency of what has occurred under similar circumstances. It is likewise clear in the alternate direction that when under the Circumstances C , now q , now r , now s has occurred, exclusively, the motivated tendencies of expectation will be inhibited. It is likewise clear that the increase and the inhibition of intensity do

not merely emerge in a contingent and arbitrary manner, but rather can be motivated in a necessary and evident manner.

If for example earlier in the circumstantial situation C , a b c have occurred, and in the current similar situation C' , a' has occurred, then according to what we already said, b' and then c' are naturally motivated as arriving. If now, however, b' has actually occurred, then obviously c' is doubly motivated, since here the law gets applied once more. Thus, the occurrence of the expected b' does not only ratify the expectation, which was already awakened by the occurrence of a' and was also mediately awakened for the arrival of c' ; it also strengthens this expectation.¹⁴⁷ If the motivational situation is clear, that is to say, if the awakened, previous situation of consciousness and what has occurred in it has resulted in a clear remembering, then the motivations and their augmentation are also given in evidence, that is, the confirmations and the corroborations in their gradation are also given in evidence along with every actual occurrence of a term of the series concerned.

Let us note, moreover, that when in the place of an expected a only a part, α occurs, the supplementary part β is now "missing," it is "lacking." Indeed, proper to expectation is a certain coinciding between the present and the associatively awakened remembered past, the retentional past and potentially the past that is distant from us; and the surplus of fulfillment as the surplus of a coinciding, the surplus of too much and too little, becomes prominent within the coinciding; what has not occurred stands there in the consciousness of "lack."

Likewise, with the other types. If a has repeatedly emerged under certain circumstances or as a final term in a regular sequence, and if the corresponding expectation is there through associative awakening, then the absence, the non-occurrence becomes salient, the expectation is disappointed; the present temporal field, that is, the sense-field is filled out, but filled out "otherwise." And it does so of course in conflict with the content

¹⁴⁶ Translator: The "because-thus" structure of motivation was also treated in *Ideas II*, especially, 238 ff., 241 ff., 244 f.

¹⁴⁷

a	b	c
a'	b'	c'
b'	c'	

of the current sense-field that is actually realized. In the further progression of the genesis of consciousness such an absence acts as a diminution of the force of expectation that has been gathered through repetition. In the clear reproduction and reference-back of the present situation to the previous situations, the positively and negatively motivating instances become evident, each newly emergent having-been motivates with uniform force, each one speaks with uniform force in favor of a reoccurrence, each absence likewise speaks against it, and this "speaking in favor of" and "speaking against" is given here in evidence. But in the empty sphere of retention the forces—and with them also the forces of expectation, blind like any drive—are [either] compounded [or] inhibited; in any event, the typicality and lawful regularity of expectation is, we see, thoroughly dependent upon the typicality and lawful regularity of reproductive association and thereby is also mediated by the typically and lawful regularity of original association in the livingly streaming sphere of the present.

If one configuration has formed a prominent, specially bound unity through the affective forces governing in it, then the force will radiate out from it to accentuate objects that will fulfill the conditions for forming a uniform configuration—initially within the same living present. The part "demands" the whole—something uniform awakens something else that is uniform, which is not yet at all constituted as a unity explicitly for itself; and it does not demand the whole by a pure and simple awakening, but rather by a co-connected "expectation," by the demand as coexisting as co-belonging to the unity. Even the force of this apperceptive expectation increases with the number of "instances"—or with habit, which amounts to the same thing. At the same time, a more forceful formation of unity occurs here—a habitual one—as the regularity of the expectation being ratified; on the other hand, [we experience] the disappointment that accompanies becoming conscious of the lack of the habitual [connection], and [we experience] the disappointment that accompanies becoming conscious of something other than the habitual [object expected].

With the number of instances, I said. Reflecting on it more precisely, what does that mean? If a plurality of data emerge in the

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same present as it continues to develop, data that can go together with the configuration in question, then the entire configurations in question will be awakened by the awakening that reaches back and that issues from the particularities. And these configurations radiating ahead in a protentional-expectational manner will awaken the projected image or model of this configuration, allowing it to be expected, and through this the coalescence of the configuration will simultaneously be favored once more as fulfillment. In this way, the anticipation is at work

10 "apperceptively," it is co-productive in the configuration of the coexisting objects.

Naturally it is exactly the same with respect to the apperceptive efficacy of the distant pasts with respect to the influence that they exert upon the formation of new configurations by awakening their already configured unities: here continually according to "uniformity," which can be "great" similarity. The past configurations that have been awakened overlap with the present, and are capable of being generated as similar in this present, in this way they become generated and are then coincident with the old ones, they are "familiar"—not individually, but rather according to their type.

The unity of apperception that has become, the configuration in this motivation, is surrounded by configurations that are awakened and that are similar to it, coinciding with it in obscurity. At the same time, the nexus of the terms of the configuration is not merely a nexus with respect to content, like when the nexus has become a fusion, forming a special unity beyond the particularities by virtue of the affective circumstances, but rather apart from affective motivation, which governs selectively in the configuration. (Various figures could have been formed out of the chaos, and could still be formed, but the path of awakening that was privileged favored the path of special unifications of a lower and higher level up to the entire configuration in question.) A unity of integral togetherness has become a unity in which the terms, the connections of subordinate levels (the parts), refer to one another as to be expected reciprocally in being together, as being demanded reciprocally and fulfilling this demand. The integral togetherness—the unity formed from habitual

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connectedness (and by virtue of diverse experience)—the force of unity, increases with the frequency. Finally, the unity is surrounded by an open and clear horizon of something long familiar and of something that has been experienced this way time and again, and will also be found this way at once in the new instance with “empirical certainty,” and it presents itself as such a whole without further ado.¹⁴⁸

<DIVISION 4:

[192]

THE IN-ITSELF OF THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS>

<Chapter I:

ILLUSION IN THE REALM OF REMEMBERING>

5 <§42. Overlapping, Fusion, and Conflict of Rememberings of
Different Pasts>

10 The question concerning the intensification and inhibition of
associative awakenings naturally demands a fundamental
investigation. The living force of awakening, which radiates out
from the impressional present, flows over into the retentional
sedimentations of memory in accordance with the principle of
similarity: The prominent intentional objects, the singularities and
connected complexes of the intuitive present, link up with similar
objectlike formations that are implicitly constituted in memorial
15 sedimentations; they radiate toward them *via* the awakening force.
But actual prominence and then further, awakening, reproductive
renewal, is only of benefit to few. The awakening forces can
reciprocally combine with one another, but can also inhibit one
another, and it remains a question upon what the actual revival and
20 reproduction can depend when the departing force has a uniform
level of intensity. A uniform object with a uniform force of
prominence necessarily has behind itself another consciousness
that has run-off, that is, another horizon to be revived, and
something that gets remembered at one time through the
25 associative force of the respective object, and at another time, that
does not get remembered, depends upon its formation. It remains a
question how far essential insight reaches into this dark sphere of
retention. It is otherwise in the realm of already reproductively
developed memories and of the expectations that are awakened
30 through them. There are obviously many kinds of clear essential

¹⁴⁸ The formation of a type.

laws here whose systematic delineation would be an important task.

I would now like to say something that relates to the problem I posed earlier and not yet solved: how memories can become discordant, how a muddle of different pasts is possible, and how the appearance¹⁴⁹ of a unitary past, which later turns up through splitting as illusion, as mixture [is possible].

Remembering—more or less empty, or again, more or less intuitive, right to the *lines* of ideal reproduction—is according to our presentation nothing other than the phenomenon of awakening the past objectlike formation that was constituted in the original living present and has sunken back into retention, and has finally become completely void of force. Thus, just as this process of wakeful consciousness, of the wakeful constitution of consciousness and of the sinking into quiescent sleep is a process that never breaks off, and therefore the sediments of the unconscious element are continuously layered upon one another, so too is the potentiality of awakening one that continues to infinity. And it is evident then that belonging ideally to every remembering is a possible continuity of awakening, a continuity of possible rememberings that will lead to the living present in which we stand right now. Every single remembering and every such continuous series must, it seems, be concordant. How should an "error," an "illusion" have sense here? Certainly, it is merely a reproduction of something already there in the unconscious, and this is itself something that has arisen from original constitution. Since this original constitution fashions sense originally, it certainly cannot falsify its sense. What is that supposed to mean? But remembering as mere reproduction is not in a position to do that either. Remembering would then indeed be productive in a peculiar sense, in a way that is incomprehensible at first glance.

If we have not demonstrated a source of sense at all for such concepts as illusion, error, nullity in the sphere we have considered up to now, this would seem to be a fault in the theory. For we already know that remembering can be deceptive even in the immanent sphere. Accordingly, we must first discover the

source of this deception and therefore the origin of this concept of deception.

If we ask how discordance is possible, if we thereby ask how an overlapping and interpenetration of memories, which belong to diverse pasts, is possible genetically, then we must point to the following: Memories emerge as awakenings of components of the subsoil of memory. The latter contains ordered sedimentations—layered in a fixed order—of all particular retentions, of all presents that have been constituted. If now several retentions occupying diverse positions in this order are awakened together by virtue of what they have in common, awakened from an awakening present or from an already reproduced memory, then these retentions will never be able to be remembered at the same time in a completely intuitive manner. It is an essential law in general that the original temporal field can only be filled out once in a completely intuitive manner. That is to say that even the perceptual present does not allow one remembering to become completely intuitive at the same time as and as long as it, the perception, is actually completely intuitive. The moment we put ourselves back into the past and in this way actually see intuitively, we are removed from the perceptual present, or we experience a peculiar competition. At one time we have the full intuitive present, then a clear memorial image breaks forth, then the one shines through the other, which however is damaging with respect to the intuitibility of both. The same holds to a still higher degree where two reproductions are in question from the very beginning. Each one constitutes a fulfilled temporal field in the stable, steady formal system of the living. Now and of what has just-been, and this formal system can only function constitutively once, can only be filled out one time, namely, in completely intuitive, i.e., actual constitution. What is given in the unity of a full intuition is given as a present with a fresh past belonging to it. In general, the living present as a formal system of original constitution is only given originally once in a lived-experiential manner.

Now, if both memories have a uniform affective force from the very beginning, a contest will ensue. The least fortification of affection, then, will give a preference to one of the reproductions, and depending upon the circumstances, will lead *mutatis mutandis*

¹⁴⁹ *Anzeichen*

to its reanimation and then to the break through of its continued development and to a transition to the other reproduction. If there is a bridging term of similarity between both reproductions, that is, an association, then both intuitions that undergo a transition from one to the other coincide in a congruent manner according to this term; they are gradually fused through this term in the transition, and fused without distance if they are completely uniform. Let us take the case of reproductive association in genesis, which indeed implies an order in the emergence. If a reproduction brings into play another reproduction through its bridging term *a*, then the awakening *a* must coincide with the awakened *a'*; and in such a manner that initially the awakening one covers over the awakened one by virtue of the force of the completely intuitive memorial situation which forms the point of departure; that is, it does not allow it to push through properly to an intuition. For the increase of force that is apportioned to it will, reaching back, also become advantageous to the force of the awakening *a*. But where the similarity is very great, in particular, where an identity of sense is constituted (which the similar terms carry within themselves, for instance, as appearances of the same [sense]), there exists a tendency toward complete fusion. Through the similar terms that are coinciding with one another and becoming fused with one another, both reproductions stand in a relation of overlapping with respect to their temporal fields. What extends beyond the coinciding similar terms, coinciding in the sense of a congruence, also exists in a certain negative coinciding, in a relation of conflict, but in a certain relation of correspondence—namely, corresponding to the generally uniform structure of both temporal fields and the fields of coexistence proper to them, like the sense-fields.

Every¹⁵⁰ remembering constitutes in an intuitive manner a fulfilled temporal field as a reproductive "present" that is in the process of becoming constituted; it is a "present" of a fixed formal system to which all alteration with respect to content is bound; inalterably a Now and a continuum of just-having-beens. While a remembering seizes hold, so to speak, of this formal system and

fills it intuitively, no other remembering can be there, namely, as an actually intuitive remembering. But it can be awakened, and only through the victory of the other remembering that is taking place intuitively, [can it be] suppressed. Two intuitions find themselves in competition such that each one has approximately the same overpowering force, and in contrast to all the other affective stirrings. Then the least priority of reproductive force, which will be of benefit to the one, or rather, to its preliminary stage (the awakened retention), will allow it to break through to an actual intuition whereby the opposing intuition becomes forestalled and suppressed. This can lead to a change, a transition from the one intuition to the other. A certain coinciding of the sense-contents can already occur here. A coinciding according to commonalities takes place essentially with each transition of consciousness; and, after all, there can never be a lack of such commonalities; for at least the temporal form is something held in common, even possibly where something spatial is remembered, something extended in a local field, the local shape.

But in general, that is a mere overlapping of images, a concealment that in itself does not produce any fusing, any unifying synthesis that is tied to the conditions of content. However, the matter is otherwise if an associative connection exists between both reproductions, noematically speaking, if the one thing reproduced reminds us of the other. The similar bridging terms form precisely a bridge that allows the one reproduction not only to flow over to the other in the transition, and proceeding from the awakened bridging term of the other side, to the contiguous bridging terms. For in this case the common bridging terms coincide in a special way. They fuse, each one with a different intimacy according to its similarity; they are congruent most intimately when they are uniform or even when they reach a congruence of identity through an identity of sense constituted in them.

Let us consider this case of reproductive association in its genetic development; an order of becoming is sketched out here. The one reproduction *R*, the associating one, arouses the other reproduction *R'* through its bridging term *a*. The bridging term *a* initially awakens the other term *a'*, and in such a way that *a*, being

¹⁵⁰ Editor: Beginning of a new lecture.

congruent with a' , not only covers it, but fuses with it by virtue of the materially relevant similarity; and the covering over in question here only means that the a' does not achieve its own intuition, that in its own being it is in the mode of repression, and yet according to a common sense in which a is maintained, it has entered into this common sense.

The awakening that spreads out from the a' now tends to bring the R' progressively to intuition (tracing the connective lines of contiguity), and intuition can set in gradually, in sections or as a whole: But it does this in conflict with the intuition R . [197]

We note here that even the non-congruent regions of R and R' stand in a certain coinciding. We could well characterize the incongruence of the fields of R and R' extending beyond a or a' as a negative coinciding or as a covering over. In a certain, systematic way they correspondingly refer to one another: such that the one correspondent is in conflict with the other, such that the intuition of the one suppresses that of the other. Thus for both especially, the forms held in common correspond to one another: The temporal form, "original present" of R , is in a relationship of correspondence with the temporal form of R' according to this or that Now, and according to every level of what has been, such that through the common form the correspondents cover over each other in an incompatible manner; in the form, Now, the reproduced element can be given only once, and the other reproduction awakened in this form must meanwhile remain repressed. This also holds for the forms of coexistence that run through the stream of lived-experience under constant formal coinciding; for the realms of sensation, the forms of sense-fields proper to them, the analogy of the spatial form as the form of the optical field with its localities and of the spatial form of the tactile field. But also, on the other hand, with respect to the constantly constituted transcendent thing-world, the spatial form, and specifically in its constant mode of orientation. These forms produce a connection insofar as, when R is intuited, the R' that is awakened through it is not only awakened in general with its sense-content. Rather, the original form of temporal orientation belonging invariably to the sense-content of R , the field-forms belonging to the realms of sensation of the R' —all the like has a

necessary and original affinity to the corresponding forms in the R that has become intuited, coinciding intentionally with it. But what is formed in the concretion of the R excludes what is formed in the concretion R' . They can only become intuited one after the other.¹⁵¹

<§43. The Possibilities of a Repressed Memory Breaking through to Intuition. The Disclosure of Illusion through the Transition to Higher Levels of Clarity> [198]

If, now, the affective force of R and the affective force of its inner affective connections is depleted to such an extent that the corresponding forces of R' become preponderate, then various possibilities are given.

1) Either (and this is the most obvious one) the terms in the connection emerge out of the dark: the reproduction spreads out from here, moving along the connections, and is raised to increasing clarity, and finally, the entire past present comes completely to life. (Every element that becomes vivacious represents the corresponding element of R , corresponding to the formal systems of succession and coexistence.) This implies that the entire affiliated temporal field stands there concretely filled out, but also that as the process of bringing to intuition progresses, as it radiates back to the bridging term, the latter breaks away from its coinciding and fusion with its complementary term. Now it comes to an intuition for itself for the first time. We then completely live, as it were, a portion of the past present. The associating situation, the current present or the first memorial situation R from which the awakening departed, is entirely submerged.

2) But there is also another possibility. By virtue of their own affective force, the interrelated elements of the stimulating intuition R stand their ground. On the other hand, by breaking through, the elements of the associative situation triumph. Both

¹⁵¹ *Note:* Earlier, I introduced protection as the title for anticipatory intentions. In this case I should strongly emphasize that the empty intentions which are found in memories are not anticipatory protections; this also follows from what was said earlier. They are not anticipations of perceptions, but rather of memories. This requires more consideration.

can prevail without linking up, whereby each one of these *disiecta membra* bears its own protentional horizon of the repressed supplementary elements for consciousness. The fixed forms as frameworks are then spotlily filled out with the contents of *R* and *R'*. This is similar and in fact essentially related to what happens in the competition within the visual fields—and for good reasons. Here we have parallel phenomena: the alternating victory of an optical image that is in itself unitary and concordant. Then the phenomenon of the piebald muddle, which also gives itself as a muddle. And finally, the phenomenon that we now find with reproductions as well, the phenomenon of a combined image. In fact, remembrings can link up to form a connected remembering that has joined the elements of different memories into an intuitively concordant image. What makes the fusion into an illusory image is the force of apperception: If the components *a* and *b* have frequently been connected in a present and have been connected to form the unity of an objectlike formation, like they occur together here in an intuitive manner in the irruption of memories overlapping with one another (and in the irruption of the forms of temporal fields becoming momentarily fused through overlapping), then the components *a* and *b* will here, too, be taken as connected in the form of the unity of such an objectlike formation. But this unitary perception and the unitary intuitive image is an illusion. That is to say, to put it at first in a suggestively rough and provisional manner: The components *a* and *b* are, now as before, elements of intentional wholes, they have repressed supplementary elements that protest from the subsoil against the demands directed in the illusory image from *a* to *b* and vice versa, and they protest above all against their reciprocal fulfillments, although the protests are too weak, not loud enough to lead to a clear doubt and to a negation. But the illusion will be disclosed as illusion as soon as the affective force of the suppressed one becomes livelier and even now wins out, as soon as it leads to a reproductive development and to an unfolding, and now both the situations and their segregated temporal fields diverge intuitively, and each one developed to completeness and clarity. The illusory image will show itself in these transitions precisely as a conglomeration and fusion of

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different memorial images that are concordant in themselves, and the suppressed element within the fusion and its force of belief will come to life behind the fusion.

Let us expound upon these thoughts in a more precise manner and bring them to a conclusion so that what is essential will come to the fore. We spoke of protests that would be too weak to be able to break through and become "audible"; we spoke of the suppressed protests possibly coming-to-life—what is implied in this line of speaking? How are we to understand the unity of a memorial image and the corresponding concordance of the deceptive memorial belief that must abandon its unitariness in the alterations of such affective transformations and that must let itself be discredited as illusion? How do we understand this discrediting itself, this claim to legitimacy and rejection of it? Obviously the gradation of clarity plays a great role here. We pose the question: Would it be conceivable that a memory, a unity of reproductive intuition in which a unitary objectlike formation is intuited according to coexistence and succession, would ever become dubious and negated if it were to remain presented in constant graduating clarity as identically the same immutable givenness? Would it be conceivable that a reproductive intuition of ideally complete clarity could become negated by just any affective transformation, by just any synthesis with other remembrings? To pose such a question means to answer in the negative. A remembering that offers an "illusory image," an image that is to be parceled out to different remembrings, cannot be a completely clear one. All mixtures take place in the mode of unclarity. Only in unclarity can motivations, can expectations, potential coherent nexuses, their reciprocal fortifications and inhibitions, lose their efficacy, entire layers of the like can become, as it were, dimmed down; they lose their affective relief, fade away into the background. Every disclosure of an illusion is carried out in the transition to higher levels of clarity, just as every disclosure of a reproduced intuition through continual confirmation takes place in the progressive clarification of what is less clear.

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<Chapter 2:

THE TRUE BEING OF THE SYSTEM OF THE IMMANENT
PAST >

- 5 <§44. Confirmation of Self-Givemnesses by Expanding into the
Outer Horizon, on the One hand, and by Approximating the Idea
of Absolute Clarity, on the Other>

In¹⁵² our summary of the previous lecture with respect to the
disclosure of a deception or an illusion in the sphere of [201]

- 10 principle only in the transition to higher levels of clarity. The
illusion that is not disclosed is only possible in a self-giving
consciousness of a relatively lower level of clarity—principles
which by the way hold quite generally for deceptions and for the
disclosure of deceptions—something that we will expound upon
15 further here. Every confirmation is a process of bringing
something concealed to light, a process of bringing it to the clarity
of self-giving. If for their part self-givings admit of further
confirmations and the free ego actively demands them and aspires
toward them, then as we know this implies that a self-giving also
20 has, generally, its concealments, and that what remains within it in
an empty or veiled manner can be brought to the light of clarity.
namely, in the form of new self-givings. We know further that
verification can take place positively and negatively, essentially,
in two mutually related types, the concordantly confirming and the
25 disconfirming. Even these processes can take place in a medium of
uncertainty, of potential emptiness, of mere intending. For their part,
these processes are self-givings for the true and the not-true, that
is, for verified being or invalidated being, the nullity, only insofar
as the self-givings take place "in the clear light of day" for the
30 moments of the object as their self-givings related to the moments
of the object in an accomplishing manner—thus, insofar as the
synthesis of fulfillment actually imparts the fullness of the self to
the emptiness; and likewise for the negation, insofar as the
conglomeration [having arisen] through overlapping, the

suppression of the suppressed (i.e., of one party struggling for the
intuitable validity) has become visible. Therefore, a progression to
newer and newer, richer and richer clarity, namely, to the clarity
of self-giving belongs to the essence of all processes of
5 confirmation, processes that in this way confirm in an evident
manner. But in this case not only does the progression to further
clarity play a role in general, that is, the mere progression of self-
giving to self-giving; also playing a role is the progression to
higher levels of clarity. This is especially essential, we believe, for
10 the disclosure of an illusion.

Let us take this up more clearly. Confirmations of empty
presentations lead to self-giving presentations which themselves
demand confirmation once more. But now, two things belong to
the confirmation of a self-giving: First, the synthetic apposition of
15 new self-giving intuitions with respect to those components of
self-giving that are merely presentational and not really
presentational, that is, not actually already self-giving for the
objectlike formation in question. Elements or sides of an object, of
an object that is self-given in an intuition, can remain outside of
20 genuine self-giving (for instance, with each external perception,
say, of a house, the non-visible sides and parts of the house), we
distinguish something that is genuinely perceived, genuinely
presented, from something that is merely co-perceived, but
genuinely speaking which is as yet only intended in an empty
25 manner. We also speak of an empty outer horizon. And precisely
with respect to remembering. A situation or a process extending
further on in time, like a symphony, appears intuitively, but upon
closer inspection only elements of the situation, small segments of
the symphony, are genuinely self-given, even though we do
30 "mean" or "intend" the whole. Thus even here we have a merely
appresented outer horizon.

Secondly, like external perception remembering, too, has an
"inner horizon," namely, with respect to the element already
presented, with respect to the element that has already achieved
self-giving. Even this genuine self-giving makes still another
confirmation possible. Hence, required for the confirmation of the
concrete, full self-giving is not only the foray into the outer
horizon and its fulfillment through appropriate genuine self-

¹⁵² Editor: Beginning of a new lecture.

givings, but all these self-givings demand confirmation once again, namely, progressive clarification. "Progressing": Here is the place of the gradations of clarity. All self-giving, specifically, all self-giving that is already limited to actual presentation, stands under laws of the gradation of "clarity" by which we understand in the most general sense a gradation of self-giving whose ideal *limes* is an absolute or "pure" self-giving: absolute clarity is only another word for this. This "pure" is to be understood, for instance, like the "pure red" in the series of entirely different gradations, those of the nuances of red. In both, there is a consciousness of gradation that is continually progressing in the process of self-givings, a consciousness in which the idea in question is self-given as an evidently motivated anticipation, as a degree that is never self-given, and yet is self-given in evidence as an anticipatorily motivated *limes*, self-given precisely as "idea." [203]

The further this graduating process goes on, the clearer and purer the self-giving is with respect to the *limes*. All self-givings are full of such gradations, and, I said, all self-givings are potentially operative in such gradations; and by this we also mean that it concerns a universal law of consciousness in general. For consciousness not only exists, but consciousness exists in the form of the self-giving, in the form of a constant original self-giving *qua* perception, and in the form of a self-giving in the form of reproductive memory.

Examining this more closely, we will see however that immanent perception is only a perceptual self-giving with reference to possible immanent rememberings. Certainly, it originally constitutes a self [of the object], but a self that is identical and identifiable for the ego only by virtue of the manifold possible rememberings, which for their part are thoroughly subject to the law of gradation of all self-giving. A self, an object, we already said earlier, is only there with reference to the active ego, "available" for it as something that remains at its disposal, something identifiable again and again. And precisely for this reason, we already speak of a constituted self in the passive sphere because the conditions for something being freely at our disposal are already prefigured there. They are prefigured there for the immanent constitution of inner perception through corresponding

rememberings, which, even if to a restricted extent, are a realm of freedom, of free generation, of the free gradation of clarity, like the realm of free expansion in the form of the fulfillment of the empty intentions in a persistent continuation in the series of newer and newer rememberings. An immanent self that has been primordially instituted is a constant possible telos for the active ego on the basis of possible rememberings; or rather it is a member of a realm of being in itself that is a universally possible telos for this ego. The path to it however is the path of attaining it, the path that is called confirmation, positive and negative. According to what has been presented, it is a dual path: the path of expanding self-giving through the broadening of rememberings, and the path of the self-givings that have already been won, self-givings approaching their *limes*, approaching the idea of absolute clarity.

<§45. The Primordial Transcendence of the Past of Consciousness and the Idea of its Complete Self-Giving>¹⁵³ [204]

Consider this significant point: All self-givings that are called upon to bring out the self of the object (here in the sphere of memory, but likewise in all spheres) as a true and identifiable self that is available, are in a certain sense "transcendently" giving intentional lived-experiences; this concerns all self-givings that enter into a possible active identification. Lived-experiences of remembering arise in the immanence of the primordial present, but what they presently once again, the past, is transcendent to the lived-experience and to the entire stock of things constituted originally in the present. In this way, our own entire past of consciousness is given to us in a transcendent manner in the respective present, an entire past of consciousness that can be expanded any way one likes through new rememberings. Thus, every self-giving here has its own transcendent [self], and every

¹⁵³ Editor: See Appendix 26: <Repetition and Essential Identity of Rememberings> pp. 536ff., and Appendix 27: <Two Fundamental Concepts of Evidence: Self-Giving as Such and Pure Self-Giving> pp. 538ff.

self is transcendent in an original and a good sense—this certainly presents us with a curious paradox.

The stream of consciousness and its immanent time is the first transcendent in the manner of a primordial source, namely, it is the transcendent self, which in the immanence of the originally streaming present is primordially instituted, and then through rememberings issues in a self-giving and a verification of the self that are freely at our disposal in just this present. The stream of consciousness lives with streaming, and simultaneously becomes objectlike, objective for its ego; the stream of consciousness becomes an object as the transcendent self that comes to incomplete and approximate self-giving in rememberings and in syntheses of remembering of a particular present. For the ego it corresponds to the idea of a true self, to the idea of the true past of consciousness, as the idea of complete self-giving. According to what we said previously in a general manner, this idea is two-fold: The one concerns the orientation toward clarity and its *times*, the other toward expansion, insofar as the entire self of the stream of consciousness is in question. Obviously, and in a curious way, this idea is itself essentially a streaming one because here the object, namely consciousness, is precisely a stream that carries out within itself ever new primordial institutions. In just a bit we will want to address what holds for the primordial transcendence of remembering, that is, what holds for the primordial self, for the primordial objectlike formation that is constituted in the streaming of the living present as the existing stream of consciousness in the universal form of immanent time—that this also holds for transcendence in the customary sense, for the objective world, and correlatively for the realm of external perceptions. This transcendence of the spatial world is a transcendence of a second order; in relation to it, the stream of consciousness is called an immanent object.

But before I go further in this direction, let us complete our analysis that we have undertaken with good reason in the primordial sphere of remembering, and in particular with respect to the gradations of clarity. At the basis of every remembering is a retention that was prominent from the very beginning or has come into relief through a subsequent associative awakening. Its

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awakening entails being singled out from the memorial background. Through remembering it has become a revived self-giving, which as a reconstitution essentially runs continually toward the present at least for a time, but then for self-evident reasons is able to follow in both directions in leaps. Essentially, every portion of self-giving is more or less clear, and this gradation of clarity is *eo ipso* the gradation of the fulfillment of the underlying corresponding moments of the empty retention, the gradation of bringing the self of retention's empty sense to intuition. We also call this gradation a gradation of disclosure because essentially the intuitability not only has an awakening force in general, but an increasing awakening force; it increases according to the level of clarity. Correspondingly, along with the increase of clarity there are more and more differentiations of sense that become distinguished and that come to the fore in self-giveness. Thus, the inner horizon is disclosed more and more when we ascend through repeated rememberings of the same [inner horizon] from an unclear self-giving to clear ones. And even where no new differences are discernible, there is, in the gradation, a more intense fulfillment and approximation to the true self, to the anticipatory ideal *times* of complete clarity, to the *times* of the idea of absolute fulfillment. Naturally, running through every such series of gradation, which is carried out in the unity of a consciousness, is a synthesis of coinciding that forms identities, namely, through coinciding according to the same sense and according to the same graduating self, or rather, a gradation according to the content of the self, according to the content of truth. We can also say: We are conscious of what appears in the mode of the self as something determined closer and closer, determined ever more completely (here we do not mean it is determined predicatively).

Accordingly, the degree of concealment is also to be characterized as a degree of relative indeterminacy, of relative poverty, emptiness, which runs through every self-giving. Self-giving is always an incomplete fullness, that is, fullness that is attenuated by emptiness. It has an inner horizon of emptiness in the form of attenuation. In those syntheses of the gradation of clarity we are also conscious of a deficiency that occurs in the

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transition because of the coinciding that overlaps. In the *limes* we would thus have the idea of an attenuated self, of a self that could no longer be satiated any further, and this is the norm of all approximation, the norm of the true having-been; it is the true self of every having-been that is intended.

But in place of pure series of gradation, through which runs the concordance of ratifying belief, there can also be syntheses of discordance; it can happen that in the gradation of clarity, a part of what is self-given gets progressively fulfilled and continues to progress in the sense of an approximation, but that the accompanying process of the expansion of self-giving, which radiates out from this place, will lead, with the clarification, to clear and clearer and clearer supplementary elements that clash with the corresponding elements of the entire image given originally in relative unclarity. The image splits into two images, remembering into two rememberings referring to different pasts; each one maintains itself in increasing clarity. In the condition of complete inner clarity, only one remembering can be concordant, and all other completely clear rememberings are either mere repetitions of it or they harmonize in a system of integral togetherness. That is to say that if one follows through with every such remembering, completing it, to the point of fulfilling its empty outer horizons, and if one does so again and again, then this operation will yield one and the same complete self for every clear remembering: The completion of every clear remembering leads to the same temporal nexus, to a single filled temporal nexus of immanent having-beens.

On the other hand, conflict also belongs in a certain way to the sphere of ideally clear remembering; that is to say, with the corresponding conditions of the community of sense, overlapping and a partial coinciding, partial repression can be generated, and the synthesis of conflict can be produced. But if a mixed image is also to be possible in ideal clarity then it is indeed necessarily crossed out here. The easiest way for you to see how something like this is possible is to imagine "in phantasy," as we say, that a house which is presented in memory is displaced onto another street, and to do this in full clarity, but yet in a way that has been crossed out in evidence.

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However, if we take normal rememberings, then the gradation of clarity and the reference back to an ideal self belong to their essence, but such that both cases of determining more closely and of determining otherwise, of verifying approximation to the self or of negation are essentially open. But necessarily belonging to the latter case is the fact that parts of self-giving are confirmed through verification, [whereas] crossing out concerns lumping together things that do not belong together.¹⁵⁴

What we expounded upon earlier did not merely present us with special features for a theory of remembering and for the theory of a norm of true being that essentially rules over the manifold of possible rememberings of an ego. Essentially, and understood from *a priori* laws of genesis, living, streaming consciousness contains a realm of true being that gets continually richer. But in accordance with the primordial institution in constant identity with itself, it becomes an abiding realm of true being, a realm of objectlike formations in themselves that are pre-given, available for the active ego and its active apprehension, identification, verification, and invalidation: But not only available in a current experience, but rather as a lasting and an enduring in-itself; in a certain respect, the actual process of experience is incidental to this in-itself. To be sure, this in-itself of the stream of consciousness is on another level of being by virtue of the fact that its future is not likewise in itself.

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We must make the marvelous feature of this situation abundantly clear. Consciousness is not only a streaming original present in which rememberings occasionally show up, and lived-experiences do not merely follow upon one another in the process of streaming through the steady form of this primordial present, and not only are there lived-experiences in an ordered sequence, in a fixed temporal form, lived-experiences that make up a unity of a past stream terminating in an ever new present. Rather, that this is the case is a fact that is available for the ego. It is a truth that it can ascertain as an active ego. The stream of consciousness up to the Now is a true being and it is for the ego, whether it notices <it> or

¹⁵⁴ The important supplementary exposition belongs here (pp. 260ff.).

not.¹⁵⁵ Every past lived-experience has been: in itself. And yet [it is there] for the ego, namely, in such a way that it is something available, something truly existing, something recognizable for the ego. If that were not the case, then we would not be able to speak about a stream of consciousness at all, and we can easily see that if it were not its nature to bear within itself an "in-itself," a true being of consciousness itself (according to the primordial conditions of passivity that make active cognition possible), then in a world that is already constituted objectively-externally, no empirical ego could attribute to another ego a stream of consciousness and everything else we reckon with it. It is therefore the most radical problem of a transcendental logic to understand how—in the streaming egoic life that is the life of consciousness—this life itself can be constituted as a true being; as a true being, I say, that is, as the ideal correlate of possible verification, as an ideal norm which, according to essential laws, lies in consciousness, and more precisely, in the self-givings belonging to it. And this ideal norm is implicitly contained within consciousness, so that later in its freedom the ego can seize hold of it and can make it manifest. In this case, the true self that is to be disclosed in the processes of concordant clarification is essentially not something fortuitous and fleeting, belonging only to this process as its momentary *limes*. Indeed, two self-givings, two rememberings, which emerge in a synthesis of identity as rememberings of the same past, can essentially turn up as rememberings of something different. But for essential reasons, the connecting consciousness of identity cannot be annulled if both terms are verified in a continual identity with themselves as they continuously approach the *limes*. The synthetic consciousness "A is identical to B" is essentially transformed if A and B approach their *limes* in a parallel manner and are verified as true, both of them in a pure self-giving of identity; then the identity is also given as a true self. Accordingly, belonging to every true being, once manifest, is the ideal possibility of repeating a pure self-

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giving, and all iterations are capable of being integrated into a synthesis of identification and only of identification, according to which the true is thus the identical and unique, like the corresponding identity itself. Certainly, all that would remain hidden, that is, the ego would be intellectually¹⁵⁶ blind to it if it were only to live in passivity. On the other hand, if it lives in an active manner, it does not have to exercise a cognitive activity; but in this case it is blind to everything "in-itself," to everything that it has not brought to self-active cognition, that it has not brought to a verifying appropriation which is actually carried out in free acts. But in each case, everything that makes the accomplishment of the active ego possible is already prepared in passivity, and it stands under stable essential laws according to which the possibility of this accomplishment can be comprehended.

Thus, the ego has a first, absolutely and necessarily constituted sphere of the in-itself, a first sphere of absolutely secure, true objectivity¹⁵⁷ without which it is altogether inconceivable as ego. We distinguish between [a] the current living ego along with the living present of consciousness with the primordial impression, retentional modifications and the [retentional] horizon's end, and [b] objectivated consciousness, the objectively temporal system of lived-experiences that presents itself in the primordial immanence of that present of consciousness partially, incompletely, unclearly, and potentially demonstrable as false in the orientations; noetically in rememberings, in the momentarily fresh retentions with the limit of the primordial impression.

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In originally living consciousness, however, other objectivities¹⁵⁸ also present themselves, namely, through the medium of the current, living lived-experiences of consciousness. These contain then not only the intentionality that leads to the constitution of immanent time and of objectivated immanence, but also a second intentionality in which different and other individual objectivities are constituted. Thus external perceptions, external memories, etc., are lived-experiences that have their objective

¹⁵⁵ In the lecture: Objectivated consciousness as a first universe, as a totality of objects.

But I forgot to say that this totality does not only have a mobile endpoint in the Now, but also a beginning—as a problem. I made an allusion to the parallel between the universe as object and its reference back to the universe of consciousness.

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geistig

¹⁵⁷ *Gegenständlichkeit*

¹⁵⁸ *Objektivitäten*

being in the first sense, insofar as they get their place in immanent time in the form of objectivated subjectivity for itself. On the other hand, they are presentations of things, of animals, of human beings, etc., and what they present in them is something objective in space existing in itself and in objective time existing in itself.

Thus, we have come to understand how consciousness prior to all activity of the ego manages to objectify itself, or how it manages, according to the essential laws of original genesis, not only to have its own past in general, but to be able to gain knowledge of it. Belonging essentially to the genesis of consciousness are the possibilities for series of rememberings to be able to be continually awakened in the form of series of fulfillment for every remembering in which the true past being is constituted as an absolute *limes* of clarity such that it cannot be crossed out. Consciousness not only is and not only becomes; an absolute norm is also inborn in it, so to speak, an absolute norm for each of its rememberings and for the closed universe of rememberings. Certainly, this norm would remain hidden and the ego would be, so to speak, intellectually blind to the true being of this sphere if it were only to live in passivity. But if proper to the essence of an ego and of an egoic life is also the possibility of a free activity, and if the possibility of a free activity extends essentially to rememberings, and if further, proper to it is the fact that it seeks fulfillment for such self-givings and strives after true being, then an attainable truth with respect to the ego's sphere of the past is prefigured for the ego by virtue of the essential structure of the underlying basis of passive life. What is prefigured for the ego is the true being of its own past life as a necessarily valid idea; it lies ready, even though higher thought processes are required to realize them as already prepared and necessarily valid. All of this holds, as we said, for the past of consciousness.

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<Chapter 3: THE PROBLEM OF A TRUE BEING FOR THE FUTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS>

<§46. Disappointment as an Essential Moment of Expectation>

Our considerations did not have any bearing on the direction of the future. While streaming consciousness constantly projects a protentional horizon ahead of itself, it is not clear that this prefiguring should be so determined and so compelling that we are able to say that a norm of true being as a binding one is secured for the future. What I have experienced¹⁵⁹ actually was, even if I have momentarily forgotten it, and it remains for me a true reality; progressing from rememberings to rememberings, I am able to awaken it once more and to legitimate it in pure immanence: Here, the norm is contained securely within me. But how about for the future?

Expectations can really only be fulfilled through perceptions. Thus, they are also essentially susceptible to disappointment in all circumstances. Perception brings something new; that is its nature. To be sure, it may have a prefiguring that stems from the past of consciousness, something new arrives in accordance with something already familiar, something already constituted as past for me. Potentially, the motivation can be evident to me and it can be of a force that outweighs all counter forces; it may even happen that no counter forces are at work, and further, that none of them can be exhibited in the past. But it is certainly clear that it is perception that first decides, and that something new can be a slap in the face to all expectation. Think only of prefigured sequences of sensations like melodies. The "must" that expectation harbors is not an absolute necessity of being, but rather the necessity of an anticipated being. It seems that we must say: In its life, the ego has a more or less determinately anticipated future ahead of it. Moreover, it may have the freedom to picture intuitive possibilities that in the framework of this prefiguring project a fulfilled future according to the pattern of the past. But in this

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¹⁵⁹ *erlebe*

case, only the form of a possible future and the fact that something in general will undoubtedly arrive is *a priori* incapable of being crossed out. The ego living toward the future also naturally experiences what arrives right at the moment when it has become present and when the ego actually perceives it. From this point on the in-itself of the objectlike formation in question is secured; but it is first of all here, in the actual perception, that it is instituted as a reality which is freely identifiable and demonstrable in its self at any time. The unfamiliar is then transformed into something familiar, and in a certain respect every object is a familiar object when it is an existing, true object for the ego, and in its true being, knowable for the ego.

The future is the realm of the unfamiliar, and insofar as this is the case, it is initially not a realm of the in-itself, not a realm of true objectlike formations that are pre-given to the ego in their truth, but rather a realm of indeterminacy that the ego occupies with objectlike formations only insofar as it is sure that determining fulfillment will later constitute an objectlike formation. This is what we must say, so it would seem. And yet an expectation can also constitute an objectlike formation and make the future determinate.

<§47. The Constitution of the Objective World in Its Significance for the Determinate Prefiguring of Futural Consciousness>¹⁶⁰

How does the immanent stream of consciousness accomplish this? In fact, our inner life actually does accomplish this. Naturally, in the phenomenological reduction we grasp an essential type of consciousness through our factual consciousness, an essential type of a streaming lived-experience in which an objective future is constituted, at least to a large extent, and according to the belief of contemporary science, universally. Thus, not an indeterminate future that must first wait until we actually experience it in order for it to take on the character of a [determinate] object for us, that is, in order for it to be able to [213]

become demonstrable in the manner of an in-itself, in the manner of a true being along prefigured paths of verification, and to be able to become determinable again and again as the same according to a norm. But rather, precisely a determinate future which is determinable in this way, in advance and prior to actual experiencing. I do not ask now whether it belongs to the essence of a consciousness in general, according to immanent necessity, to have to be so shaped, that is, that it must correspond to such an essential type of consciousness. I assert that our given consciousness and its essential type has this marvelous feature, not only to constitute objectively (in the sense of demonstrated absolute necessity) its own temporal being with respect to the past up to the present, but also its future. If we ask, however, how our streaming consciousness brings that about, our answer runs: through the fact that it constitutes within itself an objective world in a transcendent intentionality. A stream of lived-experiences of spatio-material experience runs throughout the stream of the lived-experiences such that all things experienced in the course of the steady sequence of perception are referred to one's own lived-body with which everything else that emerges in the course of lived-experience under the rubric of psychical lived-experiences is then constituted as intertwined in a regulated manner, psychical lived-experiences that are bound to the lived-body are regulated as psycho-physical lived-experiences.

Yet, first of all we have to attend to the main point: Things are constituted in immanent lived-experiences, but are not themselves [constituted] as a lived-experience, neither as a past lived-experience, nor as a futural one. They are essentially constituted as intentional unities, as identifiable unities of actual and possible perception, so that they, extending beyond the current perceptions, are unities only appearing in them. And they are thereby constituted as enduring unities reaching *via* the experienced past and present into a non-experienced past and present, but also *via* the experienced past and present into the future, and reaching into it objectively. The thing is constituted from one side, but it is more than what I see of it; it has sides that are presently non-visible, but that in themselves befit it. Likewise, the thing has, in itself, a future, it is in itself not only with respect to the past and present,

¹⁶⁰ Editor: See Appendix 28: <The Problems of the Determinate Determinability of the World> pp. 541ff.

regardless of whether the past and present have been genuinely experienced or are now genuinely being experienced; the thing is also what it will be, in itself, no matter how little I may be familiar with it. In my lived-experiences of so-called external perception, such an external existence is constituted with such a sense-giving of the in-itself. Much is indeterminate here, partly in the current perceptual thing or the thing-complex, partly with respect to its surroundings, which are constantly co-constituted as a horizon—and yet everything here is constituted as objective, as in itself; everything is constituted as determinable indeterminacy. A being that can be legitimated, a true being in itself, lies at the basis of all of this; all error, all illusion has its norm in a hidden truth, but a truth that is to be attained.

If we accept this claim as belonging to the sense of nature as the objectivity of actual and possible external perception, then we will now have to consider that this nature is constituted precisely in the immanent sense-giving of these perceptions, that is, of consciousness. The following is accordingly clear: In the natural objective attitude, nature presents itself as a universal nexus of thing-like objects in which the objective past, present, and future is determined in itself. According to this claim, the future course of nature can be legitimated from the standpoint of every experienced present, ultimately, logically knowable and predictable—it is thus in the objective attitude.

But it is now clear, I say, that by virtue of the constitution of nature as a nature, which universal time fills out objectively, a rule of lived-experiencing and initially of perceiving—a rule encompassing the whole of consciousness and therefore also its future—is prefigured. There are norms of verification, there are originally prefigured ways of possible verification that the active ego in its freedom can discover and survey. That genuine verification is possible at anytime—this is intrinsic to the sense of every objectivity being experienced, whether we understand this objectivity in a constitutive manner or not. Every genuine verification prescribes a determining rule for the course of perceptions, of past and future ones. Just because a thing existed does not mean that we would have to carry out a perception and a progressive legitimation relating to it; but given that it existed,

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what is prefigured along with it is something that I could have seen or must have seen at some time by appropriately running through my kinaesthetic data; as it is also prefigured that I could see it and the manner in which I could see it in the future, and the manner in which I could continue to legitimate it as that existing-being by the appropriate position or movement of my lived-body. Naturally, this yields the regulation of my perceptual appearances and therefore the regulation of my current or possible perceptual lived-experiences. Certainly, this concerns a narrower sphere at first, a sphere that we first instinctively prefer; it is a sphere in which we do not pay attention to the abnormal functioning of our lived-corporality (which of course is itself only taken into account as constituted from a phenomenological perspective). However, every abnormality that belongs here as well—a blow to the eyes that modifies our visual images, a burnt hand whereby the tactile appearances break the rule of normality, and the like—even such abnormalities I say only indicate new rules for the interconnections between lived-experiences; they, too, belong in a grand reshaped constitutive nexus; set down in this nexus is transcendent objectivity, the universal objectivity of a world constituted as existing in itself, and therefore a universal regularity encompassing the course of lived-experiences, a regularity that prefigures a firm determination for future consciousness from past consciousness. The objective existence of the world has its correlate in the unity of experiences that are concordant and continually verifying, experiences that can now only run their course in such a way that they continually verify precisely this existence. The possibilities of experience are freely at the disposal of the ego as paths of possible verification; it orchestrates their flow through its kinaesthetics.

Thus, we see that the stream of consciousness, in which a nature is constituted in a thoroughgoing manner, has a marvelous inner organization. This lies in the fact that we not only always have external experiences, but that a steady rule is prescribed for all possible experiences, those that are actually transpiring and those that are freely possible. This prefiguring is not a blind and fundamentally senseless prefiguring coming from the outside; rather it is one that is accessible to ego-consciousness in the form

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of knowledge: just like the objective reality of nature is not a fact that exists for itself and without any relation to the ego, but rather is a fact for the ego, namely, through actual and possible experiences and verifications that are prefigured in it—verifications which in their self-giving of a transcendent world are referred to determinate paths of verifying legitimation of true being and of bringing out its true being. In other words, the spatio-temporal world and the correlative regulation of the stream of consciousness not only exists, but exists precisely for the ego, it is for the ego as a pregivenness, an availability, as a readiness for possibilities of cognitive activity that are to follow. A consciousness that would be entirely without organization is completely inconceivable. For try as we might to imagine a consciousness without regularity, and try as we will to conceive of each new present bringing new data in an entirely unorganized manner, the general structure of consciousness in general would still prefigure certain binding relationships; and in this respect it also prefigures a steady regulated order as we have come to understand, namely, that everything that has emerged in a primordially impressional manner must be held in retention and that the ego's own secure past must thereby be constituted for it.

Yet, an infinitely much richer organization, and an organization that encompasses consciousness as a whole and in advance for the future means, as we now see, the constitution of an objective world. At first, the constitution of a physical nature. But this is only a lower level, only a constitutive sublayer of the entire world pregiven to us. This world is also a psychophysical world. In it we find animals and human-beings given objectively, we find consciousness objectively tied to their objectively experienced natural lived-bodies, objectivated consciousness, so-called psychical lived-experiences that maintain through it an integration into objective space and objective time. Other kinds of consciousness also participate in objectivation, kinds of consciousness that we previously only mentioned in passing and did not consider in more detail: the kinds of consciousness like emotion and willing; and not only functions of passivity, which we have alone pursued up until now, participate in the formation of sense, but also creative activity peculiar to the functions of

reason. The world that lies in front of us is not merely psychophysical nature, but also a personal, communal world, and a cultural world with manifold special types of objectivities that are there for the ego who experiences them, constituted in the ego, in the immanence of its stream of consciousness, objectivities that are indices in the ego for regulations of consciousness of higher and higher levels. For every kind of objectivity that is there for us there are kinds of self-giving, and then obviously corresponding to them, affiliated ways of legitimating the corresponding true being which as transcendent being, is always given perspectively. Thus, ever new rules of a possible course of consciousness are indicated, and modes of preparedness are developed in consciousness itself; but this regulation encompasses each and every consciousness, even emotional-consciousness and willing-consciousness, since this, too, participates in constitutive functions.

<Transitional Methodological Considerations>¹⁶¹ [218]

<§48. Consciousness as a Storied Structure of Constitutive Accomplishments. The Disciplines of a Systematic Investigation>

Naturally, all of this is of the greatest interest not only from the standpoint that we utilized as a leading clue, according to which the constitution of transcendence is a means of prefiguring futural consciousness and of giving to it as well the steadiness of identifiable elements, objectivity. The great theme of transcendental philosophy is consciousness in general as a storied structure of constitutive accomplishments in which ever new objectivities, objectivities of ever new types, are constituted in ever new levels or layers, in which ever novel self-givings are developed, and belonging to them, ever novel prepared ways of possible legitimation, of possible ideas of true being. All other levels are thereby taken up into the higher ones, but are not lost in

¹⁶¹ Translator: Section heading modified. With the inclusion of the "Active Synthesis" Material as Part 3 of the Main Text, this section can no longer be function as a "concluding consideration" as it did in Husserl XL, namely, as the end of the Main Text.

them; rather they are themselves ready at any time for corresponding orientations of interest and demonstrations.

It is necessary to make all of that intelligible through the phenomenological method, that is, in pure consciousness and in a systematic order. The leading thought is this: Nothing can be grasped in a stream of consciousness, or rather, in its ego, without this consciousness having accomplished the corresponding intentional genesis from its material of hyletic components and according to essential laws, that is, according to laws that are purely and simply irrevocable. This is an intentional genesis whose emanation is the respective consciousness of the object, and whose sedimentation is the respective retentional system in which we find the preconditions for the in-itself of this type of intentional objectivity and for its normative regulation. Consciousness is an incessant process of becoming. But it is not a mere succession of lived-experiences, a flux, as one fancies an objective river. Consciousness is an incessant process of becoming as an incessant process of constituting objectivities in an incessant *progressus* of graduated levels. It is a never ending history. And history is a graduating process of constituting higher and higher formations of sense through which prevails an immanent teleology. And belonging to all sense is a truth and a norm of truth. History in the usual sense of its relation to human culture is only a highest level, and even this we see has its in-itself prefigured.

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The path of radical phenomenological investigation must trace the storied structure of constitution, and it must itself seek out and bring this structure to light. Of course, it can do nothing else but take its departure from the objective world as it presents itself immediately and naively; and in it mere physical nature—dead, spiritless nature—becomes distinct as a lower level that is relatively easy to tease apart insofar as all creative accomplishments of the free ego remain out of play with respect to the constitution of nature and insofar as one abstracts from all such accomplishments in this consideration of the world. An obvious task here, one that is both encompassing and in itself already very difficult, is the study of ready-made intentionality within the self-giving of nature in multifarious modes of external perception. Many of our expositions were developed in this direction before

the Christmas break. Offered to us in these expositions is, so to speak, a static understanding of the noematic contents of external perception and thus of the ready-made phenomena of external nature, or rather, an understanding of the variety of phenomena that integrally cohere in a regulated manner and that are able to coalesce noematically, and while running their course, bring into view the phenomenal unity of a spatio-temporal infinity and a nature interwoven with causal dependencies. Precisely such analyses open to a multifaceted phenomenology of lived-corporeality and of psychophysical animality.

But the further course of our considerations showed that this is only a beginning. The general theory of belief points us further down the path. The preferred consideration of concordant nexuses of experience must be superseded by a consideration of possible occurrences of modalization, of bifurcation, of negation and then the occurrences of verification. What is to be accomplished in this regard for every kind of objectivation only first became and becomes clear to us in the self-objectivation of consciousness with respect to its past; and at the same time we also became sensitive in this most fundamental and most primitive sphere to the problem of genesis, a problem that we had also tackled there. The same would now have to be accomplished as well for the constitution of nature. This entire network of possible concordant and discordant modes of givenness of nature, of possible verifications and invalidations, must be integrated into the history of constituting consciousness, and it must be made intelligible genetically how, and according to which essential laws, something can be prepared in consciousness, how the latter can arise in consciousness and can make possible these kinds of constitutive nexuses and the normative regulation according to ideas of truth.

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It must suffice for us to have at least brought the problematic to light, and at those places where we have carried out our analysis, especially where we have undertaken the work for the most universal and at the same time the most primitive constitution of immanent temporality, to have gained a clear understanding of the style of such investigations. By virtue of the tremendous variety of problems that belong here, these investigations lead to an entire range of transcendental disciplines, to a transcendental science of

5 nature, or rather, to a science of a possible nature in general, we
 could say to a science of a transcendental physics; taken in its full
 sense, this would encompass a transcendental science of space and
 a transcendental science of time; in the same sense they will lead
 10 to a transcendental psychophysics and psychology, to a
 transcendental science of personalities, of individual personalities
 and personalities of a higher level, thus to a transcendental
 sociology related to possible personal communities in general.
 Likewise [they will lead] to a transcendental science of culture as
 15 a transcendental science of possible accomplishments of
 communities in general. They all treat, statically and genetically,
 the corresponding constitutive problems.

These [constitutive] disciplines stand in an intimate relationship
 to the *a priori* sciences which (only in part developed in a pure
 manner) explicate the *a priori* of the pure "essence" of the
 20 respective regions of objectivity or their affiliated existential
 forms. We also call such sciences, ontologies. The essence of a
 nature in general, its pure idea, naively develops so to speak the
 ontology of nature, especially the essence of space, pure geometry,
 that of time, the pure doctrine of time, that of specific *physis*, of
 25 physical materiality, pure mechanics, a pure science of the
 possible causal formations of physical being. The fundamental
 concepts of empirical physics, fundamental concepts in the most
 strict sense of concepts of principle, are not any different than the
 30 leading concepts of the ontology of nature or of rational physics.

These concepts and the axioms that are grounding in them
 constantly serve the physicist as norms for all possible physical
 being and for the empirical truths to be established for it. They
 serve the transcendental philosopher if we assume that ontologies
 35 that are developed naively and dogmatically exist as leading clues
 to transcendental analyses.¹⁶² In theorizing, the physicist places
 himself on the soil of a nature that is given in experience; he wants
 to determine it theoretically according to its true being. The
 rational physicist, generally speaking, the pure geometer and
 mechanic, the ontologist of nature, places himself on the soil of

the givenness of essences of the pure idea of space, of time, of a
 possible nature in general.

But the transcendental phenomenologist takes nature and a
 possible nature in general purely as the correlate of the
 5 consciousness of it. "Material object" designates for him a type of
 meant and potentially self-given object that he regards purely in
 this correlation and in the phenomenological reduction. The
 ontological fundamental concepts, which in principle explicate the
 essence of a space, of an objective time, of a materiality, serve him
 10 as indices for certain systems of verification; the systematic series
 of self-giving, which terminate in the true self, contain this self as
 a *terminus ad quem* that is distinguished noematically. The general
 knowledge that all true being is constituted noematically as an
 ideal *terminus* in the processes of self-giving, and that it must
 15 essentially be constituted in this way, and that unique lines must
 correspond to every essential moment in true being in the
 constitutive nexuses of self-giving, leads to the fact that one will
 begin the phenomenological investigation into an object-type like
 20 physical nature precisely with the [following] consideration: What
 belongs essentially to something like physical nature?—in order
 then to see how something of this sort gives itself to consciousness
 and how it gets legitimated in consciousness in a verifying manner
 with respect to all its essential aspects, i.e., how these nexuses of
 25 legitimation must be shaped according to noesis and noema. This
 task, which is in no way a trifling one, of the systematic
 explication of a highest concept for a region of being, for example,
 of the concept material nature, is however already accomplished in
 the corresponding ontology or would be accomplished in it were it
 30 to be established in a completely scientific manner. Thus,
 phenomenology and ontology exist in a kind of alliance. The
 principle difference of method, not merely, but already with
 respect to the basis of their work consists in the fact that the
 ontologist takes the idea of nature as a kind of ideal reality, that he
 35 situates himself on the soil of this idea in order to investigate it
 according to its properties; for example, as geometer the ontologist
 takes the idea of space as given and inquires into which essential
 properties and ideal shapes belong to it; while the transcendental
 phenomenologist does not have as his theme an existing ideal

¹⁶² *transzendente Leitfaden*

space, but rather, the idea of a consciousness in general in which an objectlike formation in the form of spatiality can be given. He does not pass a geometrical judgment, but judgments about all the transcendental possibilities, upon which rest even the possibility of geometrical judgments and geometrically true judgments.

<PART 3:
ANALYSES CONCERNING ACTIVE SYNTHESIS: TOWARD
A TRANSCENDENTAL, GENETIC LOGIC>¹⁶³

5 <INTRODUCTION. CIRCUMSCRIBING THE
INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIVE EGO>

<§49. The Relation between Activity and Passivity>

Let us now turn, then, to the transcendental consideration of the accomplishments of activity. We said repeatedly that a consciousness of the object is actually and genuinely carried out only first in egoic acts; an object—an object as object—is only first there for the active ego. All of the concepts that refer back to the concept of the object: “identical sense,” “being” and “modalities of being,” “true being” and “verification”—all of these get their genuine character only first within the framework of activity. We must now elucidate what this means, and therefore we must first of all completely elucidate what is actually accomplished on the lower level of passivity as well. It is endemic to the nature of the situation that we can only speak of these lower levels if we already have before us something constituted in activity, ready-made; and if we abstract from activity, then the lower level is at first unavoidably and essentially still indeterminate, so that we can also have the purity of understanding the accomplishment of <the> lower level only with the successive investigation into the higher level. In addition, every accomplishment of activity itself in turn sinks in a regulated manner into passivity, and is sedimented in the accomplishments

¹⁶³ Translator: The following pagination to the German text corresponds to Husserliana XXXI.

of original passivity, which once more demands successive processes of purification.

Passivity is what is in itself first because all activity essentially presupposes a foundation of passivity as well as an objectlike formation that is already pre-constituted in it. Thus, this also holds for the spontaneous accomplishments of genuine *logos*. In general, we can say: The investigation into the active accomplishments of the ego, through which the formations of the genuine *logos* come about, operate in the medium of an attentive turning toward and its derivatives. Turning our attention toward is, as it were, the bridge to activity, or the bridge is the beginning or *mis en scène* of activity, and it is the constant way in which consciousness is carried out for activity to progress: All genuine activity is carried out in the scope of attentiveness.

We are familiar with the fact that there are differences in the mode of attentiveness and that what we call negative attentiveness, or the counter mode of all attentiveness within passivity is called affection. Something can be noticed in a primary fashion; if this is the case, then the ego is attentive <in> a distinctive sense, the ego has turned toward it in a primary sense; but something can also be noticed in a secondary fashion; a single thing or several things in the unity of a single grasping can be called to our attention in a primary fashion or can be noticed in a secondary fashion and, for instance, can still be held onto in a secondary manner after it was primary. The affections proceed to the ego from out of the passivity of the background; they are what are presupposed [for the ego] to turn toward. Carrying out this turning toward, the ego complies with the affection; it directs itself toward what is exercising the affection. Now, before we enter this sphere, we must make the limits of our entire previous transcendental investigations clear. Naturally, we will keep these investigations in mind as we proceed in order to facilitate our task.

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<§50. The Constitutive Accomplishments of Affect-Consciousness¹⁶⁴. Affection of Feeling and Turning Toward in Feeling, Will and Desire>

Up to now we have left out of consideration *affect-consciousness* and its constitutive accomplishments, even though it also already plays its constant role in the passivity of the life of consciousness. At this time we want to say a few words about it so that we can reach a better understanding of the sphere with which we are occupied. It was the *sphere of presentation*¹⁶⁵, a term that is unfortunately extremely ambiguous, a term taken in a certain sense that is now determinative, *the sphere of objectivating consciousness in the specific sense*.

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We had in the back of our mind some kind of consciousness as the consciousness of something, as the consciousness of an object,¹⁶⁶ and this *something* was the same thing given to consciousness running through varying and possibly very diverse lived-experiences, namely, by virtue of those peculiar syntheses that have a continual or a discrete coinciding of sense. As long as the concordance of this coinciding sufficed, the One, the objective sense, was characterized in the mode of *being*. As this thoroughgoing unity, every constituted thing for itself in the background of consciousness exercises an affection on the ego precisely as one. If a turning toward ensues, this One and this being with its objective sense has emerged from the obscurity of passivity; it has become something grasped; the ego has turned toward it and is possibly occupied with it in manifold ways. By following the affection, a theme is made out of the identical object; I sidle up to it, as it were, in order to get to know it better, to determine it, to know it in its true being.

¹⁶⁴ *Gemütsbewußtsein*
¹⁶⁵ *Vorstellungssphäre*.

Why sphere of presentation? Sensuous sphere would be better.

¹⁶⁶ Yet that can only mean that sensuous consciousness underlies all valuing, consciousness that constitutes matter, and in a higher level, consciousness that constitutes nature. Or, initially, relative objectivating.

But now what is constituted within passivity as identical, as an *object*, can lead to a *feeling*¹⁶⁷ already within this passivity; it can be characterized as pleasurable or unpleasurable, as agreeable or disagreeable, varying according to the context in which the respective consciousness of the object occurs, thus, correlatively, according to the noematic horizon in which the object in question noematically occurs. That is to say, the consciousness of the object founds a *novel* consciousness: a layer of consciousness of the intentionality of feeling¹⁶⁸, which exhibits a novel intentionality. Certainly, even this new layer yields an accomplishment with respect to the object, the object that was already constituted in the lower level as the object of such and such sense. Sedimented in it, or rather, in the noema, is a new moment precisely as the character of feeling, for instance, as "pleasurable," or in the case of frustration, as "painfully lacking," and the like. The same thing occurs noematically with respect to what is given to consciousness as being or what is given to consciousness in the corresponding modality of being. It is something that is already there and discovered with a turning toward directed [to it] in a fitting manner, in its own way, constituted once more in the manner of an object, like consciousness as a whole and all its noematic contents.

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But if we hold firmly to the directedness toward the underlying object in relation to the self-contained objectivation through which it is given to consciousness—toward the object to which feelings relate—then it is evident that its objective sense does not undergo any enrichment through the process of objectivation, that nothing at all enters into the objective sense, that it is not determined more closely, like what happens precisely through the fulfillment of its empty horizons or by virtue of its connection to other objects by means of relative predicates.

The object is constituted in and through the objectivating that underlies the intentionality of feeling, and is progressively constituted in a distinctive path of identifications, a path that is trodden by means of this objectivating and that is prefigured according to further possibilities. The intentionality of feeling as

such has nothing to seek down this path. On the other hand, the entire life of consciousness is certainly a progressive objectivating, too, precisely in this sense: Not only is every consciousness itself constituted as an object, but each one has its accomplishment which is, so to speak, seized by the objectivating, and which is interlaced with further objectivating accomplishments by the objectivating. Objectivating consciousness is irrevocably bound to every consciousness; what it itself brings to consciousness as non-objectivating is at the same time given to consciousness with an objectlike character; in this way, a path of possible identification is instituted. If an objectivating consciousness is already at hand, if an object is, so to speak, already instituted, a feeling consciousness can be built upon it and can enter into a peculiar relation with it, into a relation that only a consciousness relating to another consciousness can enter: namely, in such a way that neither are juxtaposed to one another, but rather in such a way that the one consciousness, the founded one, has its object in that which the other consciousness has instituted as object, and that now this object gets a new character: this new character itself becomes an identifiable one by virtue of this essential feature of every founded consciousness: only to be able to relate to an object through [the relation of] foundation by accomplishing something for it, by precipitating something on its noema, and simultaneously by objectivating the latter as sense.

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Owing to this, the sense contents that have arisen from non-objectivating lived-experiences can be intertwined with them in higher objectivations; objectlike formations like objective values, like, e.g., works of art, economic goods and so forth that are given to consciousness as matters that are laden with objective value predicates. The latter are predicates that obviously arise from the intentionality of feeling. These value determinations are not the arbitrarily varying characters of feeling; they are predicates, that is, elements that are identifiable; but the sources from which the objectivation for these predicates are drawn are the feelings and the contents of them accruing to the matters in question. But in the final analysis, one must distinguish here between the intentionality of feeling itself, and the objectivating—be it passive or, in higher levels, active—the objectivating that objectivates the contents

arising in the intentionality of feeling and that makes use of them in order to constitute new predicate layers with respect to matters that are constituted in other ways.

If we go back to the genetically most primitive series of development, what is carried out in a manner entirely independent from all accomplishments of feeling is a graduated objectivating, beginning with the hyletic data coming into relief, up to things of the senses like visual things, then to intuitive material things, whereby the varying feelings do not even enter into the unity of identity of the respective constituted objects. In this way, nature is constituted as mere physical nature in manifold of a pure objectivation without the objectivating interlacing of the accomplishments of feeling. A concept of presentation, precisely as mere, pure presentation, is characterized through this kind of pure objectivation (presentation—feeling—will).

One can also point to the following for the purpose of drawing a contrast. Each time we spoke of affection, we had in mind a mode of consciousness being carried out as the consciousness of an objectlike formation, that is, each consciousness was treated here to the extent that each one is either purely objectivating or founded, and then also according to its higher accomplishments seen from the perspective of objectivating, of following the series of intentional identification. Affection was a mode of carrying out objectivation, the constituted object exercises an affection, exercises an allure of gradually varying intensity on the ego as the ego of possible knowledge. On the side of the ego, it is a tendency to turn toward and to pass over into active objectivation, into the system of determining and verifying accomplishments in paths of coinciding that form identity. Thus, already within passivity, affection is a specific modality of objectivation for the ego. The ego is aroused in a special way here, although it does not yet orient itself actively. We must judge *dynamis* according to entelechy, and for this reason we called the ego here the cognizing ego.

If we pass over now to *feeling*, we also find here a *different mode of execution*, that of *passivity*, which means here the mode of intentionality of feeling without active egoic participation and the corresponding active mode. Again, we have different degrees of affection, different degrees of the tendency toward the

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corresponding turning toward, of the *turning toward in feeling*. But now when the feeling emerges out of its latency, what is new is *not attentiveness* in the usual sense, but rather a *mode parallel to attentiveness*. And the progression is not an objectivating process, but rather an *intentionality of feeling*, an unfolding of feeling, albeit a feeling that is *active* now, an intentionality of feeling on the part of the ego that is actively referred to the corresponding matter at hand.

The active intentionality of feeling has become *pleasurable or displeasurable activity*, the ego regards the object, namely, the underlying object whose consciousness of it has itself taken on the active form of execution. *The object lies in the scope of attentiveness*. But the role of this objectivating is to serve, the *ego lives in pleasure*, for instance, it regards the object with pleasure. But in this case neither the pleasure nor the character of feeling with respect to the object has for its part become actualized as object, that is, it has not become a theme of identity. Instead, what is required for this is *a new attitude*, that is, a *new active objectivation* that directs precisely *the thematic gaze toward the "pleasurable" and identifies it and determines it as object*. While the ego is a cognizing ego when it is attentive and when it is engaged in other *active objectivating* behavior, it is the *feeling ego* when it is *turning toward in feeling*. Feeling, while not a theme, is not a passive feeling at this time, but rather an intentionality of feeling radiating out from the ego. Accordingly, we also distinguish the *objectivating* affection from the *affection of feeling*.

Further, just as objectivating consciousness has its own syntheses, which on the active level are the specific cognitive syntheses, judgments, so too does the consciousness that carries out the intentionality of feeling have its own syntheses and likewise its own modes of modalization as well, modes that accord with modalities of being through the relation of foundation. Belonging here, to give just one example, is the sense of lack that is founded in the modality of non-being; the lack of what would be given to consciousness as gratifying for the feeling ego in the modality of being.¹⁶⁹

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¹⁶⁹ Not given in the lecture and probably written in a moment's haste.

Striving, desiring, and shunning are so tightly connected to the intentionality of feeling (which can have manifold possible qualities that always move within the general typicality of positivity and negativity) that one might be tempted to see in them¹⁷⁰ only the modalities of feeling. Desire is related to those affections—of which we have spoken as tendencies of a turning toward, be the tendency of turning toward an objectivating or a feeling one—by the fact that it likewise is tendentious, but yet with an entirely different character. It is a tendency that occurs in the way that both passivity as well as activity are carried out, everywhere an intentionality of feeling in the mode of striving that, unlike the tendency of turning toward, is striving after, or driving away from, shunning; that is, it has its positivity and negativity, like feeling in general. Its fulfillment is a relaxation that results from realizing [the striving, etc.], in the change into the corresponding joy of fulfillment. At root, joy lies in the arrival of what was lacking. On the other hand, the tendency to turn toward is relaxed precisely in the turning toward, in the activation of passive consciousness, of objectivating, feeling, possibly desiring consciousness.

Realizing a desiring is a synthetic consciousness that can still run its course in a special sense actively and passively: namely, voluntarily and involuntarily. Volition is not a mere desire; it belongs in the more general sphere of pure activity. Should one say that there is no originally latent volition? Should one say, it is effective in passivity only as habitual resolve, that is, only through the fact that formerly it was precisely a current, firm resolve? The concept, "will," has been taken so broadly sometimes that every egoic activity, that is, every active presenting, intentionality of feeling, etc., has been apprehended under its name, i.e., attentiveness has been taken as the activity of the will. The strict and genuine concept of will, however, designates only a special mode of activity which spreads over all other regions of consciousness insofar as all activity can occur in the form of voluntary activity. It seems to me more and more that the will is not a separate mode of consciousness, but rather a special and

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higher form of activity that can appear everywhere under certain essential conditions that lie in presupposed objectivations and intentionality of feelings.¹⁷¹

<§51. Playful and Positional Consciousness>

In the last lecture, we contrasted objectivating consciousness and feeling-consciousness only to circumscribe our own direction of investigation. We did not want to go into the special feature of the intentionality of feeling, and in connection with the latter, into the functions of the heart¹⁷² in general and the functions of willing, and we also did not want to go into the way in which the contents arising in these spheres of consciousness undergo that exceedingly significant objectivation through which a spiritual environment-world, a world of culture is constituted over and above mere nature. If such an objectivation has come about, then it has at all events the general feature of such an objectivation, [namely,] we have paths of possible identification, possibilities of determination. We want to get to know what holds in an entirely general manner for an objectivating activity, and what kinds of forms of unique structures generally arise from it.

Certainly, the realm of activity is *eo ipso* a realm of free volitional activity; here the ego—be it fleeing, be it steady—directs its activities toward cognitive goals that are as such naturally of value to it. Insofar as this is the case, feelings, strivings, volitions, play a constant role here. Yet to a large extent we can circumscribe the accomplishments of cognitive activity and make them intelligible without entering into a systematic investigation of all kinds of consciousness, which, to be sure, would be required for a universal, transcendental elucidation of the eidetic interconnections between subjectivity and objectivity.

If we limit the scope of our analyses in such a way, we must, on the other hand, also expand <it> and still take into account the *constitutive accomplishments of phantasy*. These accomplishments

¹⁷¹ All of this is very obscure, and remains behind what was previously said. Much is lacking to make it definitive. In any case, what I have said here is completely unsatisfactory.

¹⁷² *Geist*

are a great field of free activity for the objectivating ego, but they already play a role in passivity that is very much in need of clarification. When the term "phantasy" is understood in the way we understand it here, the accomplishments of phantasy have the significance of a curious general modification that encompasses all types of consciousness with all of their noematic structures, a modification that I want to circumscribe in broad strokes in order only later to provide some descriptions of the manner in which phantasy provides the basis for its own formation; and I want to do this by considering the forms of judgment and the categorical concepts proper to them.

We all know the difference between an actual perceiving, that is, having an object given to consciousness in ordinary givenness, in the consciousness of actual existence, and on the other hand a quasi-perceiving, like we have for example when viewing a painted phantasy-landscape, with phantasy-houses, trees, and the like. The latter are there with the character of originarity, and we also speak freely here of perception, and yet [this] consciousness is something else entirely: The things are there not as an actuality *simpliciter*, rather, they are there as a quasi-actuality, as a phantasy-figurement. We also say: as an aesthetic "illusion"¹⁷³. But this is unlike the case of a bifurcated consciousness and the resolution of it, where it is a matter of a consciousness of a deceptive illusion, where two intuitions as it were struggle with belief: [where] the one that inserts itself into the concordant belief-unity of the encompassing experience of the environing-world is the true one, [and stands] in contrast to the one that is crossed out and is not inserted into it. In our example there is no conflict, there is also no resolution on the basis of a conflict, no negation and no affirmation here. The perceptively exhibited phantasy-world is a world for itself and yet not an actual world. [It is a] mere "image." On the side of consciousness we must say here that it is an analogue, a counterpart of a perceiving, experiencing consciousness, but it is not itself a perceiving, an experiencing; it is an experiencing-as-if. But in this case it is not a reproduction. Since the objects are given as being presented in the flesh,

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consciousness does not have the character of a presentification in the mode of a memory. But even though they do this, we do not take that existence seriously; constituting consciousness is a playful-consciousness; being, in which the objective sense is characterized, is a playful being.¹⁷⁴

This is similarly the case in the comparison of a remembering as an experience to a reproductive phantasy which, by the way, could appear completely uniform to a memory where the intuitive content is concerned. Reproductive phantasy is illusory¹⁷⁵, but not illusory the way a deception is, like in the conflict of rememberings that interpenetrate one another; rather, a "phantasy-image" stands before us as mere "image," as play, and the reproductively given image in this case can be imagined as present, or also as past, or also as future: But all that is play, and being as present-being, etc., is itself playful being. This can be seen in the fact that we do not speak here "seriously" of an attestation, but only of a phantasy-play of an attestation. An experience is binding precisely as a serious act that actually constitutes a being, an act that has actual retentions and protentions at work admitting actual fulfillment, or in the opposite case, then, of a necessarily actual rejection. A phantasy-experience is the play of an experience, and in play the progression of concordant verification can be added onto it, but the opposite [can occur] in play as well. In play, everything is possible, so to speak, one thing like the other. In fact, phantasy is a realm of freedom and that means arbitrariness. We can continue to play this way or that¹⁷⁶. Consciousness is continually a consciousness of the "as if" and as such has the character of this modification through and through, a modification that we call here precisely play: phantasy. But the same can be said now of each and every [mode of] consciousness. We can contapse a playful analogue to each one of these [modes of] consciousness. Thus, phantasy signifies a general modification that in itself points back to an unmodified consciousness. We call unmodified consciousness positional

¹⁷³ Is this equivalence of image consciousness and phantasy tenable then? That is certainly not my view at all.

¹⁷⁵ *vorwunderlicher Schein*

¹⁷⁶ *das Spiel ... weiter spielen*

consciousness; being and modalities of being, which are apportioned to the object in positional consciousness, are serious ones, are posings. Thus, a phantasy-experiencing does not only *correspond to experiencing as positional, intuitive consciousness* of individual objects, but also, in play, to actual wishing, a phantasy-wishing, a phantasizing into a wishing. A phantasy-desiring [corresponds] to an actual desiring and willing, etc. The correlates of phantasy are fictions, "phantasy images," the correlates of positionality are actualities, meant or true actualities: actual object, actual deception, actual probabilities, etc. In phantasy, all of this is meant with the term play, non-being and being alike.

On the other hand, even phantasy has its constitutive accomplishment. Namely, the counter-image of a thing, which is being attested to seriously in experience in the corresponding nexuses of concordant fulfillment, is a fiction, a fiction that in play, being concordantly maintained, yields precisely the image of a concordant being, the image of a true existing thing. And thus corresponding to each type of truly existing objectivity is an image typical of it, a concordant, fictitious objectivity. A fictitious objectivity as *fictum*, an image as image, yields a kind of objectivity, an ideal, noematic one insofar as what the ego has formed in this manner in play can be identified in the repetition of play and in maintaining the constituted sense, and can then be explicated in cognitive acts. Every such formation, which nevertheless first crystallizes into a firm unity in free activity, is called a free possibility, a possibility of phantasy.

Up to now we spoke of phantasies purely in themselves, free phantasies with their playful actualities, and we conceived of them without any tie to the current actuality of the respective ego. But it is also a common occurrence, and an extremely important type of connection between positional and phantasy consciousness, that a positional actuality is refabricated, that, for example, a red house that is given to us in positional experience is reconceived, fabricated as green in conflict with the red that was experienced.

The synthesis is carried out in the form of the on set or the assumption of a unique modalization of original consciousness of being, a modalization that presupposes phantasy. The actual

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positing of the house forms the basis [of this modalization] and remains in effect, but it is transformed in the following way: "assuming that this house were green." In this case, the new positional accomplishment of assumption is an accomplishment of spontaneous activity. Still, a non-spontaneous phantasy-play can also allow formations to arise that insert themselves into our world of experience and obfuscate it—not of course without repressing matters given in experience. In this insertion, they have a tie to actuality and a piece of solid ground of actuality underlying them, and in tolerating them, we also already have in them a kind of beginning, only that we have not generated them in synthetic acts and have not formed hypotheses. We certainly do not have to go into this. What we have presented suffices to contrast playful and positional consciousness, and to distinguish pure phantasy and phantasy that is imbued with positional consciousness.

<Chapter 1:

ACTIVE OBJECTIVATION>

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<§52. Cognitive Interest and Striving for Knowledge>¹⁷⁷

If we now delve into our investigation of active objectivation, the latter, as we know, necessarily refers us back to realms of objects¹⁷⁸ that are already pre-constituted, realms of objects that are contained in the potentiality of the background. They will be, in part, well-known objects that we got to know little by little in previous acts. They have sunken into the background with their structure constituted in activity, and if we are able to take note of them again, we then encounter them with the character of familiarity <in order> to be reconfirmed in the mere renewal of activity as the ones with which we are familiar. In part, they will be objects that are strange to us, objects that nevertheless can have the apperceptive mint of actively constituted objects insofar as the apperception already followed in the background, so to speak, the

¹⁷⁷ Editor: See Appendix 29: <Theme and Theoretical Interest> pp. 548ff.

¹⁷⁸ *Objektivitäten*

model of the previous activity. No object can be given to developed consciousness without such a prefiguring. An object that exercises an affection from the background, but that does not yet bear any traits that stem from active accomplishments, is actually a limit-concept for us, an abstraction, but a necessary one, since we see necessarily that whatever exercises an affection must already be a unity of constitutive manifolds, and that where a unity is constituted in this blind way, many kinds of occurrences of disruptive inhibition, and hence preliminary stages of modalization, must already occur as well. But certainly, despite all of its ties through [passive] positionality, so long as the ego has not actively formed its world, we cannot expect the firm path of knowledge given by a teleological relation to guiding ideas, and even the constitution of firm unities of identity, which unities, as genuine objectivities, give to the ego an environing-world and a rule for its further activities. And the ego must continually intervene with ever new formations; it must not allow the objectivities that are already formed to be abandoned in the passive background and, so to speak, allow decay to rule. The organization of the realms of being, the realms of truth for the ego, especially of an objective world as the environing-world of the ego, is an accomplishment acquired only through its activity and in higher formations through its fully conscious positing of goals and goal oriented activity. What concerns us is understanding the levels of this accomplishment, the originally prefigured system of their typical strides forward, and in this typicality, their necessary strides forward.

Pre-given are not only positional actualities, naturally, meant actualities, but also the play of phantasy, emergent fictions, however they may have arisen, pure or alloyed. We do not consider them initially even though they do play quite an encompassing role in the path of knowledge, for all eidetic knowledge rests on them.

Let us take as a natural point of departure positional pre-givens, [i.e.] any kind of individual objects. We assume that they are given in perception, that they are unfamiliar, or more clearly, unrecognized; the active objectivation, which we call cognition in the broadest sense, is not yet exercised with respect to

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them, the memory of them is not attached to them in the manner of a re-cognizing. And still more restrictively: Such an object emerges, we follow the affection, *we turn toward it, we grasp it*. In a special way, we now live through the continual unity of the objective sense, that is, the continuity of the streaming and varying consciousness, a continuity in which the continually unitary self is constituted. We are continually directed to this self, to the object of experience; we actively carry out the continual consciousness of the experiencing: The consciousness of existence is hereby a *living awareness, a living belief*. But in this firm directedness toward the object, in the continuity of its experiencing, there is an intention that intends beyond what is given and beyond its momentary mode of givenness toward a progressing *plus ultra*. It is not only a progressive conscious-having in general, but a *striving onward* to a new consciousness. This striving is founded in an interest in the enrichment of the self [of the object] that is *eo ipso* being augmented with the grasping, according to its content streaming toward the ego. Interest is a feeling and a positive feeling, but only apparently is this feeling a sense of well-being with respect to the object.¹⁷⁹

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It can be that the object itself also stirs our feeling, that it is of value to us and that we therefore turn to it and dwell upon it. Indeed, it can just as well be that it is not of value to us, and that it awakens our interest precisely by its repugnance. The interest of which we are speaking here is a feeling, but one that is directed in a very peculiar manner. Namely, even if an object motivates our turning toward it through a value that we feel in it, the sense-content of the object is necessarily enriched as soon as we grasp it, in part, by its merely intuitive persistence in perception, in part, by the ensuing awakening of its obscure horizons: for instance through our involuntary eye movements and head movements, and through which ever new appearances of the object make ever new sides of it intuitive. Here, the object given to consciousness is the same, but its sense is enriched in the varying mode of the manner of givenness, and at the same time this process now bears with it a

¹⁷⁹ Theoretical interest. Cf. the more precise exposition on content and object of theoretical interest - see below p. 548f. >

constant open horizon, related to possibilities and expectations for ever new enrichments of this sort. Connected to this is a distinctive feeling, the joy in this enrichment, and in relation to this horizon of expanding and increasing enrichment, a striving to get "closer and closer" to the object, to appropriate the self [of the object] ever more completely. This striving can of course also take on the form, then, of a genuine volition that becomes the will to knowledge in higher, and then intelligible levels. The interest that we have described is the motive of active objectivation, of "knowledge or cognition" and is therefore called "*cognitive interest*." And accordingly the striving toward knowledge that is also usually meant under the concept of cognitive interest is also a peculiarly directed striving that is not to be confused with a "desiring-the-known-object."

15 Cognitive interest can be fleeting and secondary insofar as it is obscured by other interests, and where it reigns, <it can> also have from the very beginning the character of a transference of feeling. But the extent to which it is at work as being directed toward knowledge, it fashions pre-conditions for levels of newer and newer cognitive accomplishments that have different forms.

<§53. Explicative Acquisition of Knowledge>

For the sake of simplicity, we want to leave all other kinds of interest entirely out of consideration and operate with the idea of a pure and unbroken cognitive interest by which the ego (which is conceived of as the subject of the acts to be described) is guided and, as it were, is guided as long as we attribute [this] to the ego. We also determine the concept of *theme* now. It designates the *object* as the substrate and center of a *unitary interest*, more precisely, the entire object toward which the ego is constantly directed in the mode of attentiveness, while its cognitive interest is satiated by its richer and richer givenness, but which also strives onward toward newer and newer givenness.

Let us now turn back to the formation of knowledge in perception. We have just thematically grasped a perceptual object and have pursued it for a time through the unity of intuition with interest and in active grasping. As long as nothing else takes place,

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the object is indeed only "the indeterminate object of empirical intuition," to speak with Kant. But the matter cannot rest here very long. The "examination," as the fitting German word suggests,¹⁸⁰ goes immediately onward, and when we use this word, we immediately think of a "more" as well. The continuity of examining necessarily falls into discrete, distinct steps. The examining that would continually stream forth in a serial fashion would become a mere staring at it if it would not take shape in distinct shapes and pass over into a chain of single graspings, of single acts, acts that would form an internally connected unity, a poly-thetic unity that binds the single theses together. Examining the object, the first thing to strike my eyes especially, for instance, is its luster, then its surface color, then its shape, then a portion of the object, for instance, the roof of the house, then for instance the special features of this portion, the color, the shape, etc. (In this case we take the object as a world for itself and do not let the attentiveness spread to the rest of the world, to its neighbors. What would happen here will occupy us later.) Thus, single acts follow one after another. The object, every object, has properties—so runs the self-evident ontological talk. The object is given to consciousness—at least on the level of higher developed consciousness—in such a way that it has (or will immediately gain) its inner prominence, its inner affections, and the examination follows them. In this way it comes to the progressing acquisition of the knowledge of its inner determinations. More precisely: If the object, the house, is called *S*, and these so-called inner determinations, α , β , γ , then the process generated by the cognitive interest in *S* does not simply issue in the sequence: grasping *S*, grasping α , grasping β , etc., as if the graspings, the first one and [then] the other ones, would have nothing to do with one another, as if a change of *thematata* were to occur: like when cognitive interest in an object has grown weary, or has been overcome by the interest in a second object, and then again by a third one, where, in these instances, attentiveness is provoked by the corresponding powerful affection. Rather, in the entire process

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¹⁸⁰ Translator: "*Betrachtung*." Husserl is referring here to the antiquated sense of the term as "trachten nach etwas": endeavoring or striving after something.

of single acts, which lead from the grasping of *S* to the graspings of α, β, \dots we get to know *S*. The process is an unfolding examination, a unity of articulated examination. Throughout the entire process the *S* keeps the character of the theme, and by gradually getting a hold of it, moment by moment, part by part, it is precisely "moment," "part," generally speaking, property, determination. In this way it is nothing for itself, but rather, it is something of object *S*, something from it and in it. We get to know it by grasping the properties. In the developmental process, the indeterminate theme *S* becomes the substrate of the emergent properties and they are themselves constituted here as its determinations.

But how is it that the ego, in grasping α , is aware of recognizing *S* in it? Why is the α given to consciousness in a manner that is different from the *S* or from any other *S'* toward which the ego turns right after having turned toward the *S*? What we will think about initially does not suffice: The *S* must be held onto in the transition to the other one rather than simply relinquishing the hold on it, and that means that the cognitive interest in *S'* represses that of *S*, not in the sense that it simultaneously annuls it, destroys it. It only pushes it out of the central place, out of the place of primary attentiveness and examination: it becomes something noticed in a secondary fashion. It is still held onto actively, only that it has the shape of what has retreated due to the pressing nature of the *S'*; it has the shape of what has retreated but is still maintained.

All of this designates significant noematic modifications, but they are just as possible for the cases in which the grasping and examination of a concrete-unitary object passes over to another object as when it passes over from an object to its properties.

Certainly, the designated modifications essentially belong to the process of the explicative acquisition of knowledge, and with this we have thus accomplished the beginning of our description. But what is required now are more differentiated, further descriptions, as is evident from the cases that run counter to these. We realize here that the consciousness of something like a determination of the object and correlatively of the substrate—the subject of determinations in such processes, whose description we now

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attempt—only now arise at all; we notice that in the articulated activity and in the unity of the encompassing synthesis, which synthesis connects the succession of the acts grasping *S*, α, β, \dots an original formation of sense is constituted with respect to the objective sense of *S* and the emergent α, β, \dots a formation of sense by virtue of which the terms "subject" and "determination" originally gain their significance. The corresponding concepts have their foundation of abstraction in these sense-forms. In other words, we are standing at the place where the first of the so-called logical categories originate; and proceeding from here the primordial sources of all other categories will be opened in a similar way. We will fully clarify what this means.

<§54. The Active Synthesis of Identification. The Most Strict Sense of Objectivation>¹⁸¹

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Now back to our description, and <we> are guided back to it by the following questions: How is it that the *unity of the theme S does not get left behind*, indeed, that *S* remains the dominating theme and not merely the theme that is held onto, namely, when we pass over to the graspings of α, β, \dots ? How is it, when the latter are grasped in their turn and therefore have become *themata* in a certain respect—how is it that they do not have the same "weight" as *S*, that they are merely *themata* in which the dominating theme *S* is efficacious and the thematic interest in *S* is not decreased in them, but is increasingly fulfilled? How is it that we speak of an explication as the unfolding of *S* in its determinations? How, on the other hand, is it that the *S* is determined as α, β , etc.? If a thing is initially grasped in undifferentiated generality, and further in its specificity according to shape, color, according to any kind of element coming into relief, then this way of grasping is different from the way in which a thing, then a sound, then a smell, are grasped synthetically in succession. In the first case, the synthesis with respect to the objective senses is a synthesis of continual coinciding that runs

¹⁸¹ Editor: See Appendix 30: <Determining as Cognitive Act> pp. 549ff.

clear through it, running clear through the sharply differentiated steps of the act. But in the other case the coinciding is lacking. In both cases, and in all possible cases taken together—in which the ego progresses from grasping to grasping in a synthetic operation, in the combining unity of one cognitive interest—in both cases, I say, is a certain intellectual¹⁸² overlapping of all things grasped. An overlapping is carried out with each synthesis, even if entirely different objects are observed in a unitary fashion. The ego functions as continually active in and through the sequence of steps; it is still directed toward the object of the first step with the second step, and in spite of the privileged place that the new one occupies as being something that is grasped in a primary manner, it is now directed toward both together with the new one and through the new one toward the previous one. Both together are actively taken up in the ego, the indivisible ego is in both. The succession of the rays of attentiveness and rays of grasping has become a double ray.

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But now there is an essential difference whether a synthesis of coinciding takes place in accord with sense in this synthetic activity, and especially a synthesis of identity for instance, or whether this does not take place. If we pass from a color over to a sound, this is not the case. If we pass from a color over to another color, always in a synthetic manner, we will already have syntheses of coinciding that coincide by overlapping in the manner of uniformity or similarity. But even if we take our case of the thing and the property of the thing, and generally, the case of the object and the property of the object, then an entirely peculiar synthesis of coinciding that forms identity arises. It is not a total identity, like when we pass over synthetically from one presentation to other presentations in the consciousness of the same object, and actively identify it with itself. Instead, it is precisely a peculiar identification, precisely that identification in which an object and its determination coincide, in which the consciousness of the substrate of sense and <of the> determination (property) originally arises.

Yet we must add that a modification of the corresponding coinciding must also already ensue passively, already when the passive affection of *S* and the passive affection of α meet in the passive ego, or, even in the case of the wakeful ego, when the *S* is abandoned while the interest falls to one of its properties, so that the latter becomes a unique theme and *S* has relinquished its thematic character. The living *S* that is still fresh, still exercising an affection, coincides with the property that has been drawn from it. But then we do not have a unity of knowledge, then the *S* is not characterized as the substrate of determination for the ego, and the determination itself is not characterized as a determination. Should this be the case, then the identification must be one that is actively carried out, it must be an act running through the thematic unity of both terms, an act that we can describe in the following way: The *S* as theme initially undergoes a general examination that is lacking any determination. An affecting moment α , which is passively "enclosed in *S*," now penetrates to the active ego. But this ego is abidingly interested in *S*; as such it "concentrates" its interest, that is, its *S*-interest in α . The fullness of givenness of the *S* is enriched in the grasping; but this takes place because it itself is given to consciousness as *S* only in its particularity. The concentration on the particularity therefore fulfills and enriches the interest in *S*.

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In this discursive activity, however, an active synthesis of identification is carried out between *S* and α , and it finds the active fulfillment of the thematic intention. The *S* in this case has passed from the beginning mode of undetermined generality over to the noematically new form of a *S*, a *S* that in the explicit identification with α and in the concentration on α has become the determinate *S*, has become the subject of the determination, α .

If the cognitive movement passes over <from> α to β , then the regard that is concentrated on α is expanded in order to be deepened in the concentration on β . But the acquisition of the first partial knowledge has precisely not been lost. After it is carried out, *S* is from now on the *S* determined as α for all further cognitive steps. With this it has a new mode again. The moment when the active two-fold synthesis *S*- α has come about, we have the *S* in the mode of the original acquisition of its determination

by α . But afterwards the acquisition remains as the acquisition in retentional modification. The S held onto goes with the new sense formation S_α into the new determinations. The S_α is determined further as β , the $S_{\alpha\beta}$ as γ , etc.

5 After the current processes of knowledge acquisition, processes of explication, the object is constituted abidingly as the object determined by the respective determinations, even if it has sunk into passivity. It has internally taken up, as *habitual knowledge*, the sense formations constituted originally in the described acts. In 10 the initial view of a later new perception, this view is given to consciousness of course with the empty horizon of acquired knowledge, and every new explication has the character of a repetition and of a reactivation of the association of the "knowledge" that was already acquired. *Even similar objects* are 15 now apprehended according to familiar laws in an analogous sense, and the apprehension has to be verified in the actualization of its cognitive intentions by the corresponding explicative syntheses actually coming to light. The developed consciousness, the consciousness of the subject that has already operated with 20 respect to all types of objects as explicating consciousness, will hardly be able to have objects given that are not already apprehended in such a "logical structure," that is, that are not already apprehended at least in the empty form of determinability, as the substrates of properties that are prefigured in protentional indeterminacy as chains of properties that can be explicated.

25 Every object now harbors, in apprehension, an implicit horizon of properties, of familiar and unfamiliar ones. But this implication is entirely different from that of objects that we must conceive as found in a still undeveloped consciousness, as entering into the 30 first original determinations. An essential difference is alluded to by our use of symbols: Whether an S already arises in the shape of apprehension, $S_{\alpha\beta\gamma}$, whereby this shape, however, only lies as the empty prefiguring in the protentional horizon, or whether the S arises without such a horizon. In the latter case, the activity of explicating S yields a first, fully original chain of determination 35 for S , in the former case, however, it also yields an original chain, but as filling-out in this entirely different sense as determining more closely an already prefigured horizon and possibly as

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bringing-to-giveness-once-again a horizon that is already familiar. What is familiar here is the S as it is shaped by property-like determinations.

5 But it is precisely here that we must begin. Let us once again clearly draw our attention to the fact that the determination of S through its gradual emergent properties, a determination that is carried out in the continuity of thematic interest within the activity of the ego, is an accomplishment that is in the process of being brought about, being built up here in the mode of originality, that 10 it, then, like everything that is constituted in consciousness, passes over into corresponding non-original modes, since precisely consciousness itself can take on the mode of retentional modification, finally, the mode of property sedimented in the horizon of memory, and from there can take on the mode of the re-emergence.

15 Let us add that rememberings are of course also possible, namely, those rememberings that give back all such modes reproductively; in this case, however, there is also the possibility that an object S is remembered, in relation to which <we> now 20 first grasp certain properties in a determinative manner that we had not grasped before, that is, that are not remembered as determinations of the previous determining processes. But whether we operate now on the basis of perception or reproduction, the difference remains that determinative explications of a S have their 25 basic shape of originality in a manner that is entirely analogous to how we speak in a modified way in another context of originality in perception or, in other modes of self-giving. And, in fact, we see that original activity, so far as its unity reaches, possesses the character of the unity of self-giving. What comes about in 30 synthetic activity is once more noetically speaking a consciousness that, as a consciousness, has its What, its objectlike formation, and in the progressive intermeshing, even has an ever newly formed objectlike formation. It is a progressive creation of sense, a progressive constitution of the object, specifically, an 35 original and self-giving one, precisely in the course of actually creative activity. But in the unity that is being constituted in manifold ways, there are several constitutive accomplishments. The one that is for us initially the most important accomplishment

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- we designate as *objectivation in the most strict sense*. "Object" in the complete and genuine sense is identical with itself and is originally constituted as the thematic object for an ego in identifying activity. There are as many fundamental formations of identification that we have for a theme as there are modes and, as it were, sides of objectivation. (But we will soon see that all these modes of objectivation are necessarily related, and are found there ready as possibilities, even if only one of them is carried out.)

<Chapter 2:

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10 THE FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURES AND FUNDAMENTAL FORMS OF JUDGMENT>

<§55. The Possible Objectivation of Judgment and of its Components, Syntactic Matter, Syntactic Form, and Syntagma>¹⁸³

- 15 We have chosen as our point of departure the explication of a *S*. *S* is determined by partial self-identification as α , β , γ , and thereby it remains the one and the same *S* in the unity of this multiform activity, in the progression to newer and newer concentrations under mediating distinctions. Initially [this unfolds] in a continual fashion. But we will soon be able to take a further step whereby even this ipseity can be brought to a higher objectivating form in a synthetic activity.

- 25 Just as the *S* can only be given in this process as object, namely, in the form of a substrate, so too can the determination, the *property as property (namely, of a S)*, only be given in this process. And further: The *S*, constituted in this form of substrate, is non-independent, as α , constituted in the form of determination, is non-independent; both are constituted in relation to one another. And in fact not only subject and determination (or a plurality of determinations) are constituted, but both together constitute a connecting, harmonizing unity. We have already said previously, and we say it now in a still more precise manner: With every self-contained step that is carried out, the entire synthetic deed of the

- ego makes up a consciousness, a self-contained intentionality; corresponding to the entire synthetic deed of the ego is a self-contained noema, a self-contained objective sense with a mode of being. But precisely the constitutive whole as whole—this is what we have not yet observed more closely.

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- 5 If we call the *objectivating process a process of judging*, here, a process of a unitarily determinative judging, and [if we call] every self-contained determinative process that has the character of an act, a *judicative act*, then corresponding to it correlatively as its act, a *judicative act*, then corresponding to it correlatively as its proposition. "Judgment" is ambiguous, since it designates judicative lived-experience, evident in the predilections of contemporary psychological and logical discourse, but not proposition. But apart from the grammatical resonances, we also use the term for more general cases. Thus where we require complete clarity, we say judicative proposition (*propositio*). We will also have to distinguish the objective sense contained in it and its mode of being: We speak of *propositional sense* and *propositional mode of being*.¹⁸⁴ But do these ascertainties not come into conflict with our understanding, since we did say that constituted as an "object" is something that is actively identified as theme, and in determinative judgment this is the *S*, the subject of determination, and no longer the constituted property (no matter the degree to which it is constituted in a differentiated manner in the form of the property accruing to the constituted property), and even to a lesser extent is it the judicative proposition (no matter the degree to which it is found noematically as a self-contained and articulated unity)?

- 30 How the conflict is remedied is clear. What "is found" in this way, what is in this way co-contained in the framework of our active constitution of an object is an index for essential possibilities for new active objectivations whose theme is thus the property and, on the other hand, the judgment itself. In determinative judging, the *S* is objectlike: in the progression of the determination it is altered noematically, in a certain respect it also

¹⁸³ Editor: See Appendix 31: Syntactic Formation, pp. 551ff.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. <§32 ff.> concerning proposition distinguished from state-of-affairs. Editor: See §14: The Distinction between State-of-affairs and Judicative Proposition.

takes on sense-structures that are being annexed, sense-structures that are also transformed in the mode of givenness. It is subject in a newer and newer way, and subject in the judgement, "S is α , β , γ , ...". Or actually, the chain of judgements "S is α ," "S is β ," "S is γ ," etc. But the respective judgment itself is not given to consciousness as an object in the judging, it is not itself constituted as an object, but in the appropriate change in attitude it can at all events become a theme and subject of determination in a new judging, and this is likewise the case where the determinations are concerned. What is there for itself can exercise an affection for itself, but it must first be "there." The primary judgement "S is α " must first be constituted where S is objectlike, then the judgement can itself become objectlike, like when for instance it becomes a subject in the following way: when it contains the "S" as subject and the α as predicate. This path of objectivation is prefigured *a priori*. Likewise a determination that is constituted originally in our judging, but is not objectlike in the active sense, as for example the bodily shape, can become a theme in its own right. In grasping it, the S does not determine itself now, [rather,] this very S gets determined, and now has taken on the form of the subject. And now its previous form of determination does not belong to the sense. We have yet to treat the cases in which even here the path is prefigured.

Let us note that S as the subject of judgement has the form of the subject, but during the judicative process, S is the object, and not S in this [subject] form. For this we need quite another step that grasps its component, the subject of judgement, in a determinative manner on the basis of judging that produces objects.

Now, one could still raise the following objection. There is certainly much that is ready for possible objectivation; but not everything is equal, and especially in judging, to be sure, the subject may be distinguished as the theme of the determination; but the determinative predicate is also distinguished, and in a manner similar to S. By the S being determined by it, by α , α itself does indeed belong to the theme and is itself in a thematic hold, albeit in service of the S. In a certain, general way, it is thus also "objective," and if it is made independent as subject, it has only

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changed the form of objectivity; it has assumed the distinguished form of subjectivity, the form of substratum.

This is completely correct. Everything that lies in the thematic regard when we judge has in a broadened sense the distinguishing trait of something given to consciousness as an object, in contrast to what does not lie in the thematic hold. And we already recognize that everything given to consciousness as an object in this sense can be given to consciousness in this way in a varying mode, and within this in a possible mode of substrate as well. In this way, in the judgement, "This tree is green" (leaving out of consideration the general conceptual and the verbal expressions), "green" is there "objectively" as predicate; in the judgement, "This green is brighter than that other green of the object over there," "green" is an independent subject, but abstracting from the forms, it is objectively the same, and can also be identified as the same.

We have gained important knowledge from this: we encounter fundamental distinctions now that must be carried over from determinative judgement to all types of judgement. They are distinctions that we gain of course in reflective attitudes, all of which refer back to a normal attitude, that of the execution of judgement itself.

If we judge that S is α , is β , is γ , then we now distinguish: (1) the identical S, the α , the β , etc., in their objective ipseity, just as they are found and are maintained in the thematic regard (2) from the S in the form of the subject, from the α in the form of determination, etc., just as they belong to the content of the judicative proposition. The S itself, α , β themselves can be given in different shapes of this type.

If we pass over to other forms of judgement, we will distinguish the form of the subject and that of the object, for example, the tree as subject, and the tree as object, whereby the thematic content of different forms can be the same. And we previously saw the same thing already with respect to the α , β , ... as well. Accordingly, two <or rather three> concepts are determined:

(1) The form as the component of the form of judgement or as the form that makes the content adaptable to a judgement, we call the *syntactic form*.

(2) Its content, what is thematic and maintained identically in different syntactic forms, we call the *syntactic matter*¹⁸⁵ or *judicative core*.

(3) What is formed syntactically as the unity of matter and form we call the *syntagma*. The judgment is a *syntactic unity* that is completely self-contained; it has in itself syntactically formed matters, and it can only have syntactically formed matters; and the matters that are formed in this way in particular divisions have their encompassing syntactic unity that contains still further "forms" of judgment: To be sure, for them, the talk of form is less suitable: for the correlate of identification, what is expressed in the "is" and many in other forms proper to it, *do not form* the matters, S, α , β etc. in a similar fashion.

Traditional logic always spoke of the *termini* of a judgment, without ever bringing it to phenomenological clarity, for example, "Socrates is tall." Seen precisely, these *termini* are not, for instance, subjects, predicates, and the like, but the syntactic cores in the subjects, in the predicates. We indicate here general structures of judgment, but now it is necessary above all to ascertain the general ideality of judgment and <to determine> its relationship to time.

<§56. The Ideality of the Judicative Proposition in the Sense of Omni-Temporality>

In the progressive process of determining, judging essentially builds upon judging; it is not only added on externally, but builds the unity of a new judging, and it correlatively builds a judgment as a constitutive accomplishment out of the already constituted judgment. Just as judging is a process of becoming, so too what is originally pre-constituted as objective—what we call judgment—is a unity of becoming; the becoming is a becoming created on the part of the subject from materials of passivity, of course. The original core of judgment's being, that of constitution, is a being in the mode of created being, that is, a being in the form of temporality.

Certainly, this temporal being is nothing less than the being of an *individuum* or of the individual event. A judgment is not an *individuum*. The difference that arises between the two signifies *fundamental types in the mode of temporality as the form of the objectlike formation*. Now, when we arrive at vindicating the *a-temporality* of judgments and of the entire realm of cognitive structures that are built out of them or are contained in them, this *a-temporality will itself be brought to light as a distinctive shape of temporality*, a shape that a-temporality fundamentally distinguishes from individual objectlike formations. If we rest provisionally with our presently delimited sphere of determinative judging, and even continue holding firm to intuitive individuals as the point of departure, the difference already appears to us here in a certain way. If the object is an intuitive one, for instance, given in its duration as red, then the judgment that brings this fact to light through the explication of the object, as the judgment carried out now, is constituted in the process of becoming and is referred to the Now, that is, to a certain stretch of time belonging to the judgment itself, a stretch of time that is different from the duration of the object.

If we repeatedly carry out the same judgment in arbitrary remembrings that yield the unitary consciousness of the same object in their concatenation, then each time it will have its new constitutive becoming of self, its new duration, and possibly even the judicative tempo will be a very different one. And yet the judgment as the judicative proposition is one and the same. This is to say that all such judging actions essentially enter into the unity of an encompassing complete identification; there are manifold acts, but identically one propositional sentence in all of them. It achieves original givenness only in a temporal act that has its determinate temporal locus, possibly in several [or] in any number of temporal acts with many [or] even any number of temporal loci. But the proposition itself does not have any binding temporal position; and its process of becoming built up that belongs inseparably to it does not have the individuality of the arbitrary act. The ideality of the proposition as the idea of a synthetic unity of becoming is the identity of something that can emerge in individual acts at each temporal position; at each temporal position in which it emerges, it

emerges necessarily in a temporal manner [as] becoming in a temporal manner, and yet is the same "omni-temporally." Thus, running through the temporal manifold is a supra-temporal unity found in it. *Supra-temporality signifies this omni-temporality*.
 5 Found in each of these manifolds is the same unitary structure, and in this way it is found in time, and of course as given to consciousness. If I make a judgment now, then the What of the judging, the judicative proposition, is given to consciousness in the mode of the Now, and yet it is not bound to any temporal position, it is not bound to any judicative action found there, and it is not represented in any action by an individual moment, by an individual particularization. It is itself at each position and becomes itself at the position where a corresponding judicative act is unfolding. But while the individual element has "its" temporal position and its
 15 temporal duration, beginning at a position and passing away at a position, and is past, such an ideality has the temporal being of supra-temporality (it is contained in individual acts, in individual temporalities that can emerge at any position, and nevertheless [remains] identically the same in all of them); it has the being of omni-temporality, which is however a mode of temporality. We will
 20 hear later that this holds similarly in a certain way for all ideal objectlike formations. But only similarly. We will hear later that the ideality of the objectlike formations of sense and the objectlike formations of the proposition is not the ideality of the species that is particularized as the *eidōs* in individual moments.¹⁸⁶

<§57. The Forms of Judgment Issuing from Determinative and Complete Identifications>

Given this, we can proceed in two directions. The nearest direction is the one in which we systematically pursue the shapes of judgment that are opened by our point of departure: We will go
 30 down this path. But I would like to point out from the very start that all of our discussions are burdened with a limitation that can

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still essentially influence the concept of judgment itself. We had an experiencing as our point of departure and, at all events, a positional consciousness. But it is clear from the very start that even phantasy, multiform play-consciousness, <can> bring to us
 5 objectlike formations [in their] pregiveness, and that we can freely and actively exercise entirely similar processes of an attentive turning toward, of grasping, of explicating a substrate in terms of its properties in relation to a world of phantasy that is already constituted in the background. But we will have to pose
 10 the fundamental question concerning which character these judgments have, judgments that operate on the basis of play, on the basis of the "as if," more precisely, not phantasmized judgments, but judgments about phantasy objectlike formations and, in contrast to these, which character the judgments have that operate
 15 on the basis of positing, judgments not about actualities posited [in the modality of] "as if," but about actualities posited in all seriousness. We will have to ask to what extent the difference between founding positionality and quasi-positionality, between seriousness and play, approaches the conception of a concept of judgment in the strict sense. By this we have in mind, of course,
 20 the concept of judgment that lies at the basis of traditional logic, which is completely in the dark concerning its phenomenological origins. I would not like to delve into this problem here so that we can initially shake our thirst on the shape, on the systematic
 25 development of the forms of judgment, and therefore on the development of the forms of active objectivation. But first I had to point to the problem so that you will keep in mind that our concept of judgment that relates to the ground of positing has its limits precisely with this distinction, and must obtain its final
 30 demarcation only by drawing the necessary contrasts.

Let us make one more observation. We started with explicative determinations, with individually intuitive objects. But the idea of the objectlike formation was expanded in and of itself. For we saw that after something has been judged, the judgment itself, this
 35 ideal objectlike formation, can just as well become the subject of determination, and then in like fashion its ideal components, etc.

We explicitly recall that no matter what and no matter <how> something is there as ready-made and exercises an affection—that

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¹⁸⁶ The judicative proposition has no restriction? See accompanying page, Appendix 32: <The Ideality of the Objectlike Formations of Sense and the Ideality of the Species> pp. 553f.

is, even every objectlike formation that arises as the constitutive accomplishment of egoic activity—this “something” can be the subject of determination and can deliver up features in the form of a property; this in turn, then, occasions judgments that themselves can in turn become substrates from which we can in turn draw judgments: an ideal-unending process.

Let us first observe the forms of judgment that are immediately contained in the framework of the determination. The conceptually most simple form of the determinative judgment is “*S* is *p*.” Its most universal significance is certain. According to what we have previously said, whatever *S* stands for, no matter what exercises an affection on the cognitive ego, whatever is in the position of being noticed, can become the subject of determination, and the process of determining can obviously be concluded for itself with its first step. If the determinative movement goes on in this direction—which is another possibility—then the form “*S* is *p*, *q*, *r*,” etc., arises, and depending upon the particular conclusions, [we will have] the particular forms “*S* is *p*, *q*,” “*S* is *p*, *q*, *r*,” *S* is etc.

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Indeed, there are different things to be noted here: In the most simple determinative judging, *S* goes throughout the entire movement of judgment in the unity of a firm thematic hold. It is that which lies at the basis, the substratum, which runs throughout and without regard to the determinations set off in relief.

Where the *p*, *q* is concerned, the *p* is grasped, then *q*, while *p* becomes something secondary, but remains firmly held onto. Let us note now that in this case *q* enters into a special synthetic unity with *p*. By *S* being a theme that is held onto throughout, a determination is continuously being prehended; now the new one is not only prehended for itself, but at the same time grasped along with it. The intellectually prehending hand that already possesses *p*, grasps *q* next and holds onto it along with the other, etc. With this, a separate form occurs for the unification of what is held onto singly, forming an encompassing hold, the collective form, which is linguistically expressed by the “and.” For this reason, we must express “*S* is *p* and *q*,” etc., in a more precise manner. In this case belonging to every term is a separate synthesis of identity with the *S*, identifying rays, as it were, run from one *S* to *p*, *q*, etc. They are not however only connected in the *S*, but have the collective

relation on the side that is determined. The one thematic interest grasps them together in their successive ordering that however is ideal, since the ideality of the proposition does not harbor any individual temporal loci. Only the ordering is constituted.

But still another form occurs to us. If we take the judicative process in the middle of its movement and we allow it to be interrupted, two things are possible according to the kind of thematic interest [in play]. It can be limited to the *p* or to the *p* and *q*; it is not a limitless interest in *S* or it does not maintain it as such. It limits itself. Or the determinative movement breaks off, but the thematic interest, the cognitive intention, is maintained in its limitlessness. In one case, we have the forms, “*S* is α ,” “*S* is α and β ,” and further similar forms that get richer with respect to its terms; in the other case, [we have] the forms “*S* is α , etc.,” “*S* is α and β , etc.”

The curious “etc.” appears here [as] a fundamental form in the sphere of judgment. It can be and will be pre-constituted in general, even with limited judgments, but not as taken into the form of judgment itself. Namely, an open horizon for the new properties to be expected will have arisen as the determining process progresses according to the protentional laws, naturally, beyond the succession of the currently constituted determinations. Every articulated¹⁸⁷ intellectual movement progressing in a uniform style brings with it such an open horizon: an open one; *for it is not the next term as a single one that is prefigured, but the progression of the process*, one term and then another, etc. But it is precisely a matter of fixing this style of an open process and the peculiarity of a consciousness constituting it: what is expressed in the “etc.,” in the “and more of the like.” Obviously, however, this “etc.” may or may not enter into the shape of judgment depending upon the thematic interest; thus, it creates differences in the forms of the judgment itself.¹⁸⁸

We have therefore designated, at root, an infinity of forms. The term “infinity” itself means as much as the “etc.,” only that it says more, namely, it continues to give the further *plus ultra*. When we

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¹⁸⁷ *gegliederte*¹⁸⁸ This should have already been said in the context of protentional laws.

use the concepts of number here for the purpose of a characterization, we can say: The forms cultivated with and without the coda, "etc.," can have one, two, three terms, and so forth. But certainly, we cannot therefore say *a priori* that any kind of determinate object will yield or can yield infinitely many property-like determinations, or even, in the sense of objective truth (of which we have not yet spoken here), that every object must have infinitely many properties.¹⁸⁹

New forms arise if we conceive of the determination carried out in such a way that the *S*, after the determination by *p* is carried out, shifts in turn into the primary grasping and then issues in a new determination, but in a thematically coherent manner—this is something that is possible *a priori* at any time. Thus, not merely in the form "*S* is *p*," and "*S* is *q*," Naturally, neither of these judgments have any unity in themselves, and let alone a unity of judgment, even if they be carried out by the same ego, which could indeed also ensue at different times and without any interconnections.

If both are carried out in a present, possibly even by means of remembering one of them, the *S* that is given to consciousness twice in different modes arrives at a passive coinciding without further ado, even if there is a division between them due to an interruption of interest. But if the unity of theoretical interest remains unbroken, then not only will the succession of both judgments, "*S* is *p*," "*S* is *q*," be bridged through a passive coinciding of *S*, but the thematic activity will run throughout this bridging in the *S*, and then we will have a judgment that is built up out of two judgments. Thus, if the identification of the *S* with itself reaches into the unity of thematic activity, we will have two identifying activities with the one identifying activity running though them. "*S* is *p*" and "the same *S* is *q*."

We get contrasting forms when we allow the identifying connection to be carried out on the side of the determination. We judge, "*S* is *p*." We imagine that now a thematically determinative interest in *p* is awakened, and this is determined as α , while the

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interest in *S* remains the secured and overriding interest. We will then have a new formation of form. Above all, the transformation of the form of the determination *p* into a substrate of determination, is for itself already a principle of the formation of forms in judgment. In this regard, lacking a fitting expression, I spoke of nominalization in my *Logical Investigations*, but only in relation to non-independent features. Here I want to use the more general expression, "becoming independent."¹⁹⁰ The *p* becomes independent in becoming the substrate. This is accordingly already a universal formation of form; for we can distinguish forms of judgment in general where there is a determination that has become independent and, in another case, where it has not.

Let us observe an important, special group of forms of judgment that belong here. Granted that we judge "*S* is *p*" and if the becoming independent of *p* leads to the judgment "*p* is α ," then, if a unity of thematic interest encompasses both, an identifying synthesis ensues that produces a unity of judgment. Initially, one will begin: "*S* is *p*, and this, namely, this *p* is α ." For example, "This thing is red, this red is saturated." But this second proposition must assume the form of a subordinate clause, since the interest belonging to the second judgment is subordinated to that of the first; in other words, since the dominating interest is the determination of *S*, the second proposition in turn gets the form of the attribution. This thing is saturated-red, it is saturated existing red. The closer determination of red co-determines the *S*. The form of a determination arises that is now determinate and as determinate is determinative.

In the present context we have seen different identifications function in connection with determinative, that is, with partial identifications. They were obviously complete identifications. But complete identifications can also determine forms of judgment in a different way, initially, in an entirely independent manner. If this is the case, they will yield peculiar judgments that are on a par with determinative ones. Finally, we could have begun with completely identifying judgments instead of with determinative

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¹⁸⁹ Editor: See Appendix 33: <Main and Subordinate Determination and the Division into Main and Subordinate Clauses>.

¹⁹⁰ *Verselbstständigung*.

ones. Indeed, the determinative ones seem to me to merit a priority genetically.

What is identified will normally already be determined to some extent, even if minimally. In this case we must distinguish: the continual fusion formative of identity—*S* is recognized and immediately explicated in a progressive manner, for instance, by reappropriating the interest and the previous "conviction"—or distinctions are made and actively identified. We never speak of acquired convictions, of their reanimation, reappropriation, etc. It is nevertheless quite conceivable that a thematically grasped *S*, still prior to being explicated, reaches a unity of identity with an *S'* that is given in another mode of givenness. We would then have the identifying judgment, "*S* is identical to *S'*." The form becomes fruitful through its tie to determinations. And here all emergent forms of syntactic terms, in the framework of determinative objectifications, give to us many (ideally prefigured) possibilities to shape more richly the identifying judgment: thus, for example, "*S*, which is α , is identical to *S'*", which is β ," or "*S_G* is identical to *S_B*", or "*S_G*, which is β , is identical to *S'*", which is β and γ ," and so on, in many regulated combinations that can easily be derived from it. Further, we can once again bring to the unity of judgment several identity-judgments through overarching identifications, for example, "*S* is identical to *S'*", and the latter is identical to *S*" as well," etc.

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<Chapter 3: THE SYNTACTIC AND THE OBJECT-THEORETICAL DIRECTIONS OF EXAMINATION>

5 <§58. Sensible and Intellectual Objects, Substrate-Objects and Determination-Objects. Independent and Non-Independent Objects>¹⁹¹

10 In the formations of form that we have carried out up to now,
we are thoroughly concerned <with> those things that are ideally
iterable; that is, the principle of each particular formation of form
can repeatedly be in operation. In this way, the series of property-
like determinations, which can be connected to a subject
collectively in the form "*S* is α and β and γ ," is ideally infinite;
likewise the series of subordinate clauses connected attributively
to a subject is ideally infinite. This is likewise the case with the
15 principle of the formation of forms; [this principle says] that a
determination can be made into a subject of determination for a
new determination. Etc. I refer to this because it can be seen in a
like fashion where the futural formations of forms are
concerned.¹⁹²

20 Let us note further that our point of departure from a single
concrete individual object as the main substrate was merely an
exemplary one, or can be taken as such in retrospect. For no
matter what exercises a unitary affection, no matter what enters
into the attentive regard, we can make it a substrate, then
25 conceptualize the idea of a substrate as such and now intuitively
see the possibility of all such iterable forms of the total and
determinative identification that we also called forms of judgment.
Accordingly, in the generality of this mode of observation, the
concept of substrate can leave open whether or not it is a matter
30 here of substrates that have arisen from the thematic becoming
independent of a determination. This having arisen in no way

¹⁹¹ Editor: See Appendix 34: <Absolute Substrates and Substrates as Determinations that have Become Independent> pp. 556ff.

¹⁹² Cf. <314> concerning what we will treat subsequently. The distinctions of the *termini* of judgment according to the origin in the sphere of judgment itself, etc. Etienne's generalization of the distinctions that have been won.

needs <10> mean something that is merely arbitrary and relative, as we will immediately see.

This holds likewise for the distinction between the substrates that stem from passivity and those that stem from activity. There is nothing prejudiced in the generality of our forms of judgment even for this distinction, and even this distinction has behind it an absolute distinction. Let us now elucidate this distinction here. If the ego pursues an affection, it grasps it and makes what was already constituted passively an explicit object. It exercises receptivity, an actively self-giving intuition, and if it exercises further determination, if it carries out total and partial identifications with respect to the received object, and thus [carries out] other activities that interconnect, then arising now in the sphere of synthetic activity itself will be new objectlike formations, the judicative objectlike formations, states-of-affairs, which themselves can then in turn become substrates of identity and of determination.

But everything that is actively constituted sinks into the background and is transformed into a passivity; emerging from memory, it can similarly exercise an affection like other types of passivity. And yet it continually bears within itself the stamp of its origin and its essential peculiarity. It can actually be received only in the explicit execution of the same multiform activity from which it has arisen. Only then is a *grasping of the self* [of the object] possible. The self-giving constitution of such objectlike formations is essentially a synthetic activity. Thus, this must have already taken place so that what was constituted in a multiform fashion can be grasped in a grasping of the self and so that it can become a theme. By contrast, there is an *original passivity*, an *originally passive constitution* of objects, whose activation is *sheer reception*: the sensible objects. All objectlike formations that have arisen from activity—which can only become passive after they themselves, or ones similar to them, had been actively “engendered”—point back for their part to founding objects that were originally constituted in a passive manner. The *intellect* is a name for constitutive accomplishments of objects that the ego has given to itself through the activities of identification. The self-giving is a creative self-giving. *Sensibility* is the contrary, <it is a

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name> for constitutive accomplishments without the participation of the active ego; the grasping of such objects is indeed an activity, but it is a mere receiving of a pre-constituted sense, and further explicating, judging already presupposes this sense.

The difference is not a mere relative one, although even intellectual objects, as ideas, can exercise an affection from [the sphere of] passivity and can then be received. Precisely this receptivity is fundamentally different for both; in order to be an actual grasping of the self it needs to be an active-synthetic accomplishment where intellectual objectlike formations are concerned, and where sensible objectlike formations are concerned, this is not the case.

Also belonging here is the distinction between *original substrates* and *original determinations*. What has emerged in the judgment as a determination can become independent thematically, it can become a substrate. Thus, the same substrate can appear now in this form, now in that form. And yet there is an absolute difference even here in the background. There are objects that can occur in original self-giveness in the form of substrate only by having occurred previously as *determinations*. And, on the other hand, there are objects for which this is not the case. Functioning as determinations is not essential for the latter; we call them *original substrate-objects*. For the other ones, the form of determination is essential, namely, their *a priori* original form; we call these objects *original determination-objects*. A shape, a color, is to be given originally only as the determination of a concrete object. A shape cannot become prominent without the shaped object becoming prominent, and the object is grasped first, even if the interest immediately passes over it, and then the object's color is grasped, which may perhaps immediately usurp the main thematic interest.

So it is with respect to all non-independent moments: Their *concreteness* is grasped earlier than they are themselves, and prior to this they occur in the form of determination, in that of the “on something” before they become the substrate. This is otherwise when we have a pile of stones that are strewn about, given in an intuition that brings it into relief, or when we have an articulated whole like a series of markedly different houses: The particular

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affections of the members here are contained in the unity of the whole affection. But from the very beginning the plurality or the whole (the unity of the street) can be grasped and become the substrate, and any particular thing can become the substrate just as well.

These distinctions about which we have just spoken, the distinctions in judicative objectlike formations of course also signify universal distinctions in judgments that we can also meaningfully characterize as formal distinctions of judgment. But those universal forms of judgment that we have enumerated up to now have a universality and so encompass all such distinctions of judicative objectlike formations, and are insensitive to all such distinctions.

We can also characterize this *dual differentiation of forms of judgment* in the following way: If we imagine objectlike formations as objective sense, as they are always constituted and ready to occupy our thematic interest, then judicative activity can come into play from different directions, and these objectlike formations, together with those that are formed out of them or together with them, become the *termini*, the syntactic matters for syntactic forms whose possible system of forms is prefigured *a priori*, irrespective of the particularity of the *termini*. The judicative activity creates newer and newer objectlike formations through these syntaxes themselves that are constituted in them. As objectlike formations in general, they can also become the *termini* of syntactic forms, and these forms belong again and again to the same system of forms. *Accordingly, the difference between the syntactic matter and the syntactic form is relativized.* The theoretical-logical interest can (1) *go purely to the syntactic formation of forms.* Without concerning ourselves with this relativity, by leaving the *termini* indeterminate, one can ask: Which forms of judgments are possible for objects as such, grasped as thematic substrates no matter how they are constituted? The extent to which the objects remain indeterminate, and with them all *termini* in the forms, which is evident in the mere statement of the letters *S S', p, p'* etc., is the extent to which the judgment, as objectivation, itself leads to particular formations of *termini*, like to the form of the determination in contrast to that of

the substrate; but this form belongs here in the very form of judgment. It forms something that abides in an indeterminate manner.

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(2) On the other hand, then, one can (and one must even necessarily), however, pass over to another direction of observation, namely, *posing questions concerning the syntactic matters*, particularly of such a kind that can be posed with regard to all matter in general, and which are therefore formal characteristics as well. One arrives, then, at the *general questions of the origin of the judicative objectlike formations*, at relativities of the type just mentioned, and at the absolute lying *a priori* behind them. That designates a *system of forms that is prefigured a priori for the indeterminate "objects" of possible judgments*; after the exclusion of the relativizing syntaxes that could be included in the *termini*, there remains a general typicality of the absolute syntactic matters to which all judgments in their *termini* point back as relative matters, in other words, *a typicality of the ultimate object-senses* that contain nothing more stemming from intelligibility. They are *types of the most original objects* that can be *thought* as objects of possible judgments, *as objects of possible knowledge.*

Guiding distinctions for this are the distinctions that we made previously between sensible objects and intellectual objects, or, as they are also called, *categorical objects*; further, between original substrate-objects and original determination-objects, likewise the distinctions in concert with them between the *independent objects* and *non-independent objects*, between concrete and abstract objects, etc.

We call *concepts* that grasp scientifically the *elements of determination that belong to the form of possible judgments, logical categories*. Accordingly, *distinguished* for us, and corresponding to the two directions of examination, are *syntactic categories* and *core-categories or object categories*—like, then, the one logical direction of investigation that is specifically syntactic, and the other that is object-theoretical. In transcendental logic, even the examination that is directed toward the *a priori* of the objectlike formation is naturally transcendental; it treats all of the essential distinctions and laws proper to this direction in

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essential connection with judgment, in connection with constituting consciousness.

<§59. Whole and Part. Sets as Special Cases of Wholes>¹⁹³

At the conclusion of the last lecture, we were right at the point of continuing the development of judicative forms a bit farther in a purely syntactic direction. We had won the first group of forms from a single center of objectivation. An affection [stemming from] an objectlike formation led to the grasping of an object 5; the thematic interest belonging to it led to explication and was satisfied in certain partial identifications>, i.e., with respect to the properties that were won. This yielded different modes of identifying interconnections here. To this we added the total identification and the syntactic forms arising through the connection of both functions. Let us expand our horizon. *Instead of one thing exercising an affection, we will take a multiplicity.*

Of course, there are many things that will exercise their affective force, partly originating from a living present, partly arising from memory. We are considering only a plurality in which the special affections are combined to form the unity of an entire affection. Such a combination is already based—in the realm of passive pre-constitution—on commonalities of pre-constituted single senses. With this, pathways are prefigured for thematic interest, as well as for courses of interest and courses of judicative syntheses that are connected in the unity of an encompassing interest. Indeed, we see a constant variation here already within passivity to the extent that the intensities of the affective forces can change: something new can push to the fore, something else can weaken and can become submerged; and likewise, when a thematic interest is activated for an object, we see a constant variation in the thematic horizon. But such a horizon will always be there; and what is alien to the theme will always separate off from what belongs together with the theme when an object breaks through to attentiveness. The former has nothing to do with our present thematic substrate, it is alien to it;

the latter, which is grasped thematically, does not alienate us from the previous theme, but rather, by fulfilling its new thematic interest it also enriches our previous interest, fulfills it along with it. This is just a correlate of saying that in the process of grasping and explicating the one theme, a common element comes to light along with what is self-contained in the other theme and along with what gets explicated from the standpoint of it. Active operation and fulfillment of objectivating interests bring commonalities to light, which is to say, it consists in continuously interrelating syntheses of identity. That which is common, and in the broadest sense, that which is identical, is disclosed in judicative syntheses, and in very different forms.

Yet certainly judging as an objectivating process is an unending one, and one that is infinitely enriched because not only is an ever new objectlike formation pre-constituted within passivity (and everything that is pre-constituted can be combined precisely with such a pre-constituted objectlike formation [leading] to new reconstituting accomplishments), but because even the process of activity does not only "make manifest," but at the same time accomplishes constitution and thus fashions ever new themes in which it does justice to the previous determinative ones.

We can also make the following general statements. If thematic interest is realized, that is, fulfilled, it necessarily branches out into a manifold of thematic interests that are, however, organized in the unity of one interest. The corresponding judicative activity proceeds in judicative steps, each step is a judgment, but it is connected with the other judgments that are already carried out, forming a unity of judgment. It does not matter here whether we take as a guiding theme a single substrate, at least in fictive isolation, or whether we have a manifold of substrates. If we look at this more closely, we will recognize—precisely as an essential peculiarity of a thematic-unity process—that no matter how many objects may thematically exercise an affection and coalesce in the unity of a theme, a satisfaction of interest is however only possible through concentrations [of interest] in which an object becomes a substrate each time and with this a subject of determination.

¹⁹³ Editor: See Appendix 35: Multiplicity and Judgments of Multiplicity, pp. 559ff.

Every judgment, out of which the thematically unitary movement of judgment is built, has the necessary bipartite structure: subject and determination. If, in the reorganization of the form, the determination (as we see in the case of relative clauses) is adjunctive to the subject, if likewise a determination itself in turn gets a similar annex through its own determination, a central caesura remains in the whole advancement of the determinative process in every judgment, namely, what separates the subject of determination from its determination.

If several objects that cohere thematically are there from the very beginning or enter into the thematic unity successively, then each one will demand becoming the thematic main subject successively, that is, a concentration of interest that pushes its companions back into the provisionally secondary position. To be sure, we have to consider the two possibilities here: Namely, the one possibility is that in a movement of judgment several thematic objects are necessarily equally valid in the thematic interest; the other possibility is that one of them or particular ones hold, so to speak, the royal interest, so that only they should become the subjects of determination, while the interest in the other objects only leads to determining the subjects or the dominant subject through them.

And this is the way it is already in the explication of a single subject. The singularity that we presupposed in our first considerations was obviously this singularity of domination from the very outset. The subject cannot remain the singular object, the subject develops; that is, precisely new objects, the subject's properties come to the fore. But these objects are interesting in this connection only as determinations; their function is to serve. But they could also have an interest coordinated in their previous substrate, or they could gain it after they have arisen. And now we would have not only the path of its explication through <which> the *S* would also be determined mediately, but also <the path> of a new mode of determination that we have not yet considered, not where *S* is determined by *p* as we previously considered, but where *p* is determined by *S*.

This will become immediately intelligible if, in a formal and general manner, we call the property-like determination a *part*,

and say that an object—*speaking in the formally most broad sense*—is a *whole* that has its properties within it. The whole is determined in that grasping that grasps each part. We had alluded to the originally unitary mode of determination with the terms “*S* is *p*”; we could just as well have said “*S* has *p*.” Conversely, however, the part is also determined through the whole. The *p*, taken as substrate (and perhaps already grasped as substrate before the *S* was grasped), leads to an identification in the transition to *S*, but naturally not to a complete one. *P* is contained in *S*, the interest in *p* is also enriched with this. Every identification determines its subject. It determines it here not in a property-like manner or, as we also say, through an *inner determination*, but through an *outer* one. Already by virtue of the *constitutive community* with its *whole* prior to the judgment something has, so to speak, made an impression on the part due to the fact that it is precisely not for itself, but rather is constituted in an affective coinciding with *S*. This coinciding is unfolded in the thematic activity in the form of a peculiar identification. Thus, we have counterparts here. Let us alter our characterization in order to remove the priority of the place of the predicate, a priority alluded to by the letter *p*. If we have two objects, *S* and *S*₁, they can stand in a relationship of parts, and depending upon which one is the main substrate, we will have on the side of the determination the “has *S*₁” or the “contains *S*.” And in both cases here, the object on the side of the determination has the *correlative form of determination*, that of the *inner* or the *outer*.

If we call the *substrate-object*, *subject*, and the *determination-object*, *object*,¹⁹⁴ the former will always have the same form of function as subject; that is, being such a form of function, it is not differentiated. Only other annexes, like attributions, can provide the subject with further forms without altering it as such. On the side of the determination, however, we have different modes of determination within the general form of function, determination, and then also supplementing this are possible attributive annexes. Every new form of determination *eo ipso* fashions new forms of attributes, for example, “*S* which contains *S*.” These forms of

¹⁹⁴ den Bestimmungsgegenstand Objekt.

determination, however, are not the only ones, and even not the only ones looked at from the standpoint of the community of parts.

In accord with a self-evident ontological consideration, two objects can stand not only in the *relationship of the containing and the contained*, but can also stand in the relationship of *intersection*. Even this develops in a peculiar form of identification. In [the relationship of] intersection, *S* is identical with *S'* (according to a common part *S''*), which is explicated differently: "*S* contains *S''*," and "*S'* contains the same *S''*." Or in the new, plural form: "*S* and *S'* contain *S''*," in which the determinative object *S''* only appears once, and diverging from it are two rays of identity, the one to *S* and the other to *S'*.

We can and we must understand these forms of judgment here in the most universal and syntactic generality, and this means that we leave it open whether the respective objects themselves are unitary or multiple. Surely, the concepts that appear here, concepts like *the containing* and *the contained*, *whole* and *part* are like *cat<egories>*. No object is conceivable that is not part or whole, and the universality of our formation of these concepts allows us <to call "wholes"> even the loosest of sets, [including] all the multiple unities that we call, following a more restrictive concept of whole, "mere sets" and do not want to call a "whole."

We do not yet have such restrictive concepts here, but we do have the "having-within-itself" and the "being-contained." It suffices that we have in mind several objects in indeterminate generality, objects that stand in the corresponding community of parts, and then the active judicative activity yields judgments of new elementary forms we characterized, elementary forms that obviously make possible ever new forms. On the one hand, this takes place through iteration, since we conceive the objects functioning as the point of departure in turn as parts of objects that lie further back, and we can continually imagine their splitting into parts. On the other hand, the thematic synopsis requires the conjunctive connection of particular judgments, and besides this, the reconfiguration of determinations into attributions is always possible.

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Let us add here at once the discussion of the differences between the unity of sets and the whole in the special sense.

Objects that do not stand in a community of parts are not therefore devoid of community. Their affective and active community can be given to consciousness in an original manner; they can possess their affective and active community from entirely different means, and can accordingly constitute a judicative community. If we call such objects *separate*, *disjunctive*, it is clear that such objects are also given in separate intuitions and that in the transition from one to the other, an entirely different consciousness comes about, like when the identifying coinciding that we described here would become manifest.¹⁹⁶

Now, it can be that disjunctive objects, regardless of the affective force that each one exercises, coalesce to form the unity of one affection, and that initially this unity awakens the activating interest. Then the disjunctive multiplicity as unity, a set, is grasped, and it is explicated by going through the particular members and in the conjunctive collection of them: set *T* is *m[ember]₁*, and *m₂*, ... *m_n*. Every single step is an identification of "the containing." If the series of the steps is finished and if every contained member is manifest, then a complete identification occurs.

The entire set enters member by member into an identification with itself, and every member is given to consciousness in a twofold manner, in implicit and explicit form. The set as the subject of determination is resolved into the sum of its members. The set that is grasped in a single ray of attention as the subject of determination is completely identical with <the> collection that is constituted in multiple rays of attention, with the entire totality of individually grasped members, each one of which has the form of determination, "the contained." Noteworthy is that in this collective form of sets, "*m₁*, and *m₂*, ... *m_n*," the "and" as a summary "and" carries the sense of separation, the sense of the connection of disjunctive objects. Yet, on the other hand, we have the indirect

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¹⁹⁵ The following presentation was not immediately successful. See the appendices that contain improvements; and see the next lecture.

Editor: See Appendix 36, Set and Whole, pp. 562ff.

¹⁹⁶ Does this suffice?

construction when we say that it would consist in the members not standing in a community of parts. There is no talk here of negation. The set is given as objectivated accordingly in a completely identifying judgment of the structure indicated, in a plural judgment if we understand under this general rubric, every <judgment> in which many rays of identity coalesce into one member and are thereby connected—be the judgment on the side of the object or the side of the determination. [50]

A set, explicitly objectivated, that is, completely determined, is a collective combination of disjunctive objects: Yet the objects can themselves be sets once more, only that they must be disjunctive sets. Ultimately, every intuitively pre-constituted set leads to final members, to particularities that are no longer sets. For belonging to the idea of such a set is that in the first givenness of the substrate, the set <as> an already pre-given manifold of special affections is there that we only activate. But certainly this does not rule out that “in bringing something closer,” the intuition brings new affections into play, affections that were not already there, and that resolve the unities once more into multiplicities; so that the concept of the unity of sets becomes relative. It¹⁹⁷ hardly needs to be said that within the unity of a set different part-sets are to be delimited through affective special connections, that overlapping sets are possible here and that in this general way, sets in relation to other sets can offer all the possible relations of containment. Naturally, the concepts of set and unity of sets are also logical categories.

Sets are special cases of wholes. Now, what distinguishes a set and a whole in the restrictive sense, and in an original way? We carry out all of our considerations in such a way that we appropriate the cat<egorial> forms, forms in which objectivity is constituted on an intellectual order, to t<he> acts that give in an original manner.

In order to have a set “intuitively,” in order to have the unity that unfolds its sense in a collection through total identification, the mere unity of an affection of separate elements must come first. How this unity comes about otherwise, what lends to the [51]

¹⁹⁷ Insufficient.

particularities their community—this remains fully open. If, for example, a memory reminds me of several other melodies that I had heard in an entirely different context, their similarity suffices to produce a connection. They can be of interest unitarily as a combination and can yield a set; we say here that they do not have any “real” tie; they do not form any real, general whole, no whole bound in a materially relevant manner, like what holds for tones and figures of a melody, or for houses and streets, but also for the parts of a proposition, for the propositions of a judicative framework, etc. If we compare the *self-givenness* of a set with that of a whole in the narrower sense, it is clear that the *whole* is constituted in the *unity of a continually harmonizing intuition* and as correlate.

15 <§60. Non-Independent Members of Judgment, Independent Judgments and Interconnections of Judgments>

At the end of our last lecture, I began to clarify the categorical concepts of whole and set, concepts that arise around the judgments of containment, and initially the concept of set. I should not dwell upon this any longer, and for this reason I will not pursue my treatment of it further *in extenso*; rather, I only want to say briefly that our point of departure from pure passivity and from the described multiplicity of affections that coalesce to form the unity of an affection, should not mean that like the sensible objectlike formations, the set-objectlike formations are also already actually pre-constituted in passivity and are objectivated only in categorical activity for the intellect.

A closer investigation shows that a set as such only arises at all in categorical action, put more precisely, in colligating, in the “and-synthesis” of thematically grasped, separated objects. Wherever, and no matter from what motives, the thematic interest passes over from one object to other disjunctive ones, and leads to an encompassing “and-synthesis,” a new objectlike formation is thereby constituted (namely, purely by virtue of this synthetic activity); because this object has arisen from such a synthetic accomplishment, it is called an intellectual object, a categorical object. Every objectlike formation that is generated from the ego [52]

synthetically, that is, with many members, has two constitutive stages. The categorial synthesis, in our case, the S_1 and S_2 and S_3 , is noetically a unity of consciousness, to be sure, but not yet a unity of one object in the genuine sense, which is to say, a theme. Thematically, the S_1 is found in it, and again, S_2 , S_3 , but not yet the *collectivum*. Likewise in the case of all categorial synthetic actions: The thematic element is what every self-contained step has given to consciousness as a thematic object. Synthetic consciousness encompasses several objects in a unity, but it does not have a single object having many members. However, a new object—precisely the object having many terms—is essentially pre-constituted through every synthetic, unitary consciousness, and this requires only one thematic grasping that is possible at any time in order to render this pre-constituted [objectlike formation] a thematic object, and thus to become an object¹⁹⁸ in the full sense.

In particular: Colligating is a synthetic accomplishment through which a *collectivum* is essentially pre-constituted. It becomes a thematic object through a reverting grasp that takes place after the completion of the colligating process; this grasping is possible at any time and it is only with it that the set is first given as object, as an identifiable object for the ego itself. Afterward, it is an object like any other; it can not only become completely identified as the identical object of many modes of givenness, it can also become the subject of a judgment in a different way, for example, in relations of containment. It is not necessary to explain that sets colligate, in turn, with other disjunctive sets; thus, sets of a higher order can be pre-constituted and then thematically objectivated, etc. Standing in contrast to pre-constituting sensibility is pre-constituting intellect, which, by unifying thematic objects synthetically in different ways, brings about through this a pre-constituting accomplishment, a categorial pre-constituting one; an accomplishment that brings with it *a priori* the possibility of making, through a “reverting grasp,” the pre-constituted [objectlike formation] into a new theme, a new object that in itself has many terms and points back to the preceding categorial action with every member and with the form. And only because this is

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the case, can one speak of synthetic categorial objectlike formations as such. Yet we have to add that we will also get to know non-synthetic categorial objectlike formations that carry out an accomplishment that is executed in several steps, not as tying them together. But otherwise, what we have said holds, namely, that a pre-constituting activity precedes an objectivating grasp.

Where the concept of the *whole* is concerned, it also has a categorial character and is very closely related to the concept of set. The restrictive concept of the whole is the concept of an object—*no matter how* it has arisen, whether sensibly or categorically—an object that can be *completely*¹⁹⁹ explicated in a multiplicity of *disjunctive* parts, as in the form of a set. Part means here that which is merely contained. Corresponding to every whole is the set of its parts, but it is not itself this set. We need not belabor this point here.

More important for us now is to take the *doctrine of categorial objectlike formations* somewhat further here. They are named after “predicative statement” (cat<egoria>²⁰⁰), which is the expression of judgment. What this term should actually mean is “judicative objectlike formations.” It is to be understood as the objectlike formations, which, through judicative activity, that is, through objectivating activity, first arise in the shape of an accomplishment that prefigures activity in contrast to the merely receptive objectlike formations stemming from prefiguring sensibility. Every categorial objectlike formation is either that of the full judicative category, or it is an objectlike formation occurring in the judicative context as an element, being actively pre-constituted in it. This requires some explanation.

Once a thematic interest is put into play—be it by one or several objects exercising an affection in a thematic solidarity and being grasped—then an open infinity of thematic interconnections is unfolded from there, interconnections that are all connected thematically in the form of an open, unending unity of a thematic interconnection. From the ever new objects that break through to

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¹⁹⁹ The “completely” would have to be clarified. The parts taken together make up the “whole,” etc.

²⁰⁰ Translator: *Avantage*. Husserl is referring to the Greek sense of *κατηγορία*, namely, its accusation or form of predication.

attentiveness, only those objects in their thematic acts, their judgments, are connected to the thematic feature that is already put into play, expanding its unity—only those objects that have something in common with the previous ones and that have something to do with them. This already shows up in the affection in the form of combinations of affection, and something is developed in the judgments that produce judicative interconnections between the individually grasped objects. The thematic objects are juxtaposed to one another and, at the same time, they are internally determined; they are explicated individually whereby the explicated objects themselves in turn have a direct or indirect thematic connection to all the previous substrates.

Thematic action is intensive and extensive, or what is also said in place of the latter, discursive (likewise we could also say, analytic and synthetic, if these terms were not so philosophically burdened). It belongs to the essence of thematic activity that it begins again and again with acts of a single ray of attention that we call grasplings, with straightforward objectivatings, or rather it begins with one of them; and further that it demands such objectivations in particular "concentrations" again and again, but that straightforward objectivation cannot be thematically independent, although it can stand alone for itself. It stands alone if the thematic movement breaks off, but breaks off before it has accomplished something. Then the thematic interest is left completely unsatisfied. The first satisfaction is carried out in the form of a determination of a completed judgment, and it is carried out in ever new judgments, which for their part are thematically interconnected with those that have preceded. Every judgment is an accomplishment contained within itself, that is, thematically a self-contained satisfaction. However, the fact that ever new thematic interests are aroused in this [thematic] interconnection and are then satisfied in new judgments does not speak against this. In any case, every judgment has a thematic completion, is something thematically complete. And yet it is an element²⁰¹ of an open interconnection, and according to an ideal possibility, a

constantly expanding thematic interconnection, and is thus not self-contained. This interconnection is built completely out of judgments, and with every new judicative step, fashions a unity of accomplishment out of particular accomplishments, a unity of satisfaction from satisfactions that have already been gained. [55]

Accordingly, in each relative completeness, that is, with a final judgment conceived of as relatively self-contained, a thematic interconnection has divisions in a very different sense. First is the division from the standpoint of thematic independence. It leads back to judgments as elements. And where judgments in turn contain judgments, the final elements are in turn judgments. They are the final cells of the thematic system, cells which, however, <are> also functional elements of terms²⁰² of a higher level, relative cells for higher judgments or judicative combinations.

If, secondly, we now go back to judgments in which each thematic interconnection is divided according to the current standpoint, they themselves will have a division; they will have a subject-side and an determination-side, they will have a caesura: This new division has an entirely different character; it provides thematically non-independent elements: be there already a combination on each side, for example, through collection or attribution (which always rests on previous accomplishments that has further implications). Thus, every judicative element (every judicative element that is to be divided up through the immediate partition of a judgment) is in any case thematically non-independent. For good reasons, a house may be called an independent object, something real existing independently for itself; but in thematic activity through which such an object is first constituted for us, namely, as an independent one, the house as a judicative object, as a thematic substrate, is non-independent. Only a judgment in which the object occurs as a thematic element, for instance, as a subject-element, is independent. In concert with this, naturally, is the fact that a mere name, like this house, does not yield a complete proposition. A complete proposition is the expression of something thematically complete, the expression of a complete judgment.

²⁰¹ *Glieder*²⁰² *Glieder*

If judgments are inserted into an interconnection of judgments, after they are constituted in independent self-containment, they themselves in turn certainly take on the form of the interconnection and lose their independence. Independent unities arise again and again only as judgments of a higher level, which judgments are founded in founding judgments. In this way, every theoretical judicative unity is to be disclosed as a unique judgment of a higher order, which judgment is quite inextricably founded in judgments, which are themselves founded in judgments, etc.

Where judgments become connections that do not fashion a judgment of a higher order, like for example, "A is B, and C is D," the connection has the same thematic non-independence as the connection of two simple substrates, A, B forming the *collectivum* A and B. On the other hand, belonging to the essence of the thematic variation, which inserts a judgment into the syntaxes and makes it thereby non-independent, is the fact that the originally independent judgment can be reproduced at any time as a thematic independence in itself. Looking ahead, we can use an example whose sense is sufficiently familiar to you: If we have the connection "Because A is B, then C is D," we can gain from it in turn the independent judgments that are precisely complete unto themselves: "A is B," "C is D."

<§61. Logical Senses>

But now we want to supplement this with a fundamental distinction. We wanted to speak about categorial objectlike formations and we spoke about judgments, their elements and their interconnections. Surely, all categorial objectlike formations are contained in them. But are, or in what sense are, judgments themselves categorial objectlike formations? And the elements of judgments?

Here the *concept of categorial objectlike formations* is in need of an *essential delimitation*. If we give the name of categorial objectlike formations to all objectlike formations *simpliter* that are constituted through judicative activity (excluding, of course, judicative lived-experiences themselves as objects of the inner sense), then naturally judgments are to be characterized as

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categorial objectlike formations. But if we look more closely we come up against a *radical distinction*: Not only <is> the judgment constituted in the activity of judging, or rather, not only [is it] there as a pre-constituted unity (and not only an even more encompassing noema, a variable mode of givenness of the one and the same judgment), but a *still quite different objectlike formation is pre-constituted*, a categorial objectlike formation found in the judgment, and yet not the judgment itself.

The objectivating activity as a unitary consciousness, which we called judging in the most general sense, has a "What", specifically, in different noematic modes, it has something identical, a unitary sense, the judgment as something judged, as we would say even more clearly, the judicative proposition. For example, judging on the basis of the perception: this (the roof) is contained in the house, is a part of the house.

Thus, on the basis of a repeated perception through which our standpoints vary, the modes of appearance can be different; or retroactively on the basis of multiple memories, the judgment can be absolutely, identically the same despite the differences of the modes of givenness; it is identical despite the noematic differences. Imagine now how the subject of the judgment executed at the outset is determined in a newer and newer way through progressive judicative activities, and through this, takes on ever new attributive contents. Let us compare, for instance, the judgments "S is a part of S₁," "S_a is a part of S₁," "S_{b+y} is a part of S₁." Here it is a matter, we say, of the same S; this is to say that in these transitions to new judgments, and in going back to the previous subjects as thematic substrates, we say and we judge "the same" S, we may also say, the same subject. Yet, the judgments are indeed different; in the first element, the *subject-element*, the judgments now have the S without attribution, then S_a, then S_{b+y} etc. The same interplay can also take place with respect to the object-position: the same object on the side of the determination, but with different attributions, whereby different, new syntactic matters occur which we however do not take into account when we say that it is the same object. Subject and object, even the self-determining subject and its determination itself is accordingly *ambiguous*.

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The distinction is an ultimate one, at the heart of the essence of objectivating activity. Belonging to its essence is the fact that every taking notice and grasping bears on a grasped Something, a Something which, in the alteration of the progressive objectivating activity and in the synthetically identifying return to the same something, can show up precisely as *the same theme* despite the manifold changing logical shapes that have been appropriated to the theme through the accomplishments of judgment. A finished judicative structure is a system of *thematic poles*, each one entwined with shapes of significance, and all of this is connected by syntactic forms. Judging means posing *themes*, determining themes, connecting themes with themes, *giving to them ever new shapes of significance through this process* and, as it were, *guiding themselves with the significances already made*: *The themes remain the same* and yet they have varied according to the judgment; they have *taken on a varying thematic sense* of predicative significance.

The identity of the theme does not mean the identity of the *thematic sense*. For instance, thanks to the judicative activity relating to the theme, a theme can be laden with products of the accomplishment of this activity, products that signify for the sense a new, that is, a specifically *logical sense-giving*; a variation of sense, which, I say, *does not alter anything with respect to its thematic identity*. Like, for example: this, this red, this house, this red house, etc., continually the same, but with a varying *logical sense*. In a certain way, a sense is self-evidently and necessarily there wherever something is a theme, and already when something becomes a theme for a judging for the first time. Already within pure sensibility, we have distinctions of objective sense in the alteration of appearances under continual or discrete coinciding in "the same."

If this variation of sensibility takes on the mode of attentiveness, then "the same" is what remains singularly One through the variation, the thematic object; thus it already has its variable objective sense even before the determinative activity with the theme carries out logical accomplishments. But the objective sense is *not a logical sense*, that is, is not a product of intellectual activity. What arises through it under the rubric of

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altering logical sense, logical significance, is something essentially new. It is something that does not at all take up into itself the alteration in the passively constituted sense. Both of them have the following in common: when an object is the theme, the sense in which the object is given as the pole of identity is not the theme. But sense as logical significance means something new and not something connected to and intermeshed with that sensible sense. If the intellect has appropriated from sensibility something constituted as the continual unity of manifolds of passive sense-giving and worked on it, then this One is a theme in the starting point, to be sure, but a logically undetermined theme. In the progression, and already by the first step, it is determined logically; it becomes the subject of judgment and perhaps later the object of judgment; that is, in the first judgment "S is p," the S is the One that is still logically undetermined in the subject-position—but the undetermined that gets determined in these judgments and has its determination on the side of the predicate. However, by the attributive activity adjuncting to the subject the determination carried out in the first predication, holding on to the S as being p in the following predications and subjecting them to further determinations in new activities, we no longer have an undetermined logical substrate, but rather a substrate encumbered with a logical significance.

Thanks to logical activity, every substrate takes on logical encumbrments, ever new contents of logical significance in an ideally infinite number of ways. One can say that every judging concerning a thematic object alters the consciousness of this object itself and habitually imparts to it an ever new sense as well. The ever new determinations do something to it on the order of consciousness; but, on the other hand, the fact that the predicate, which has been made manifest as the sense acquired for the subject, is added to the sense attributively, and possibly joining this, even a habitual volition to want to conceive the S persistently as determined only in this way, as the S of this sense (like in the case of the *definition*)—this is something specific, it is something to be accomplished first of all in a specifically active procedure. Here, the S is not given to consciousness in the manner of mere sensibility with varying content; *through conceptual processes*,

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that is, thematic activity, it has taken on not merely expansions of its passive content of sense; but in the full light of the intellect, in the creative activity of the ego which abandons itself to the *themata* and to the work for them, the creation of logical structures is carried out, the creation of judgments as a whole or in particular, and thus everything that we call the alteration of logical significances as well.

But how is it that we come to speak of an alteration of logical significances in a way that is similar to speaking of an alteration of objective sense within sensibility, pre-logically of course, with respect to the same object? And how will the concept of logical significance (= logical thought) itself be determined? We say that logical significances: "this," "this red," "this red house," "this school building," etc.—are different, and that the subject is the same. The subject is the subject of judgment or a theme functioning in one way or another in the judicative context. It is completely beyond the scope of our investigation [to consider] through which objective sense the subject is given from case to case in an extra-logical manner. The identity of the judgment is not oriented according to the objective sense.

In order to speak more clearly and to avoid entirely using the term "sense" for something extra-logical, let us now say "*presentational content*"²⁰³ for that objective sense. Thus, differences of the presentational content are now irrelevant. Only the theme, the presentational object, the sensible One, the house, is consciously meant in the judgment. But when the house is the thoroughgoing theme, it is the identical object in the context of thematic actions, no longer as the unity of its sensible manifolds and of its changing presentational contents, but as the identical element precisely of these thematic actions and of the accomplishments arising through them for the theme itself. It is the identical element in the manifold of active identifications that manifest the theme as a point of intersection of manifold judgments and then as the point of identity of corresponding attributions, as the same again and again. No matter which of the attributive structures we take: "this," "this house," "this red," etc.,

each one of these structures is a thematic judicative element. Each one (no matter how different its content may be), has, as the judicative element, its theme and each one evidently has the same theme. We take the "this," so to speak, as the What of attribution in this series.

<§62. The Distinction between State-of-affairs and Judicative Proposition>

In general we say that all judgments necessarily have in themselves a thematic division, every element has its theme. Wherever <there is> a manifold of different judicative elements and wherever <the latter> are identical according to their thematic content, we say that they deal with the same theme in different logical significances, or that in them the same object is conceived in different logical significances, or is also conceived in different logical thoughts. Yet, we are not to think immediately of an individual object when speaking of the same object, and if the realm of generality, the realm of "as such"—*themata*²⁰⁴ had already come into view for us, then all of this would be transferred to them, as well. The term *themata* is the most correct expression for this: the object as object, that which is judged in the judgment, does not mean the presentational object, but rather, the conceptual object, that is, what functions in the judgments as theme, no matter what shape or what level the judgments have, and therefore that which is the content of a judicative element. For a theme is nothing for itself; it is the judicative element just like, conversely, every judicative element is self-contained as an element by virtue of it possessing its unitary theme.

One could now say: A judgment is a thematic structure through and through, it is a structure made up of syntactic matters and united by syntactic forms, like we ourselves have already shown. If, in judging, I speak of a house that is roofed with shingles, the house is my theme, but the shingles are too, etc. Yet, one must not overlook what is decisive here, what necessitates precisely the distinction between logical object and logical significance, and

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²⁰³ *Vorstellungsinhalt*

²⁰⁴ *"überhaupt"-Themata*

then further, the difference between the *state-of-affairs of the judgment and the judgment itself* (the judicative proposition).

Let us treat the matter at hand noetically. In every judging we have our themes, for example, an "S is partially identified with S₁"; "S has S₁" or "S is in S₁." Judging means carrying out this identification. But now an integration of acquisitions of judicative activities that were previously current (judicative activities that refer to the same themes) into the thematic consciousness of the judicative elements can be intertwined with the current judging to form a thematic unity. The annexes are no longer actual judgments, actually executed identifications, but modifications of them given to consciousness. The predicate that is added on attributively is no longer the actual theme (the theme as actually functioning) in the current judgment, but rather a modification of it—a theme that points back to a previous judging that we can also restore at any time, but which now is no longer carried out. The theme that is given to consciousness in the modified manner, the annexed theme, does stand in our regard to be sure, it is indeed also something that is grasped, it also has a thematic character in a broader sense. But there is an obvious difference, a tremendous one, between a functioning theme, the theme of the determination that is actually carried out in the present judgment (with the current object-theme on the side of the determination itself), and the themes that are no longer functioning and that are only drawn into the unity of the judicative consciousness, i.e., of the consciousness of the respective element [of the judgment].

If we have attributively packed into the subject and into the predicate of a simple judgment however many objects and predicates from other judgments (newly carrying out the judgment of the previous form, under the co-execution of all of these thoughts that are packed into it) this does not at all change the fact that we carry out the same determinative identification, and only carry it out presently; whereas we do not carry out with the attributions any predications indicated by them. What we do carry out are precisely attributions, mere modifications in the form of supplements. What we actually judge again and again is "S has P," the one substrate contains the other, however many other contents of thought from earlier judicative accomplishments S may be

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conceived as having. *What we have described noetically* has its *correlate* in the judicative proposition, in the identical judgment, that is, in the object being constituted in the thematic activity. We see here that it belongs to the essence of judicative action to constitute two types of objectlike formations in an integrated unity. Judging as a thematic action is intending, thinking, positing something in the present as theme, drawing new themes from it through the process of explication, and positing them in a unity with the main theme, drawing in an external theme and relating one to the other, etc. Every conceptual intending has its intended object, every synthetically relating and connecting [act of] intending has its synthetic intended meaning.

The objectlike formation constituted in this way, which makes up the primordial essence of the judging as present judging, is the *state-of-affairs*.²⁰⁵ It is the pure synthetic unity of the themes and the theme here is everything that is currently grasped thematically in the corresponding execution of judgment, and currently posited in each and every relation to precisely such an execution. If the themes are individual things, they go into the *state-of-affairs*, they are the *termini* that "relate" themselves within it. When we speak of relationships, relationships of part, relationships of similarity, relationships of elements, etc., here relationship is only another word for state-of-affairs. The points of relation of the relationship are single objects that have an objective unity in a certain syntactic form. States-of-affairs, relationships, are objective correlates of judgments, that is, they are originally constituted only in judgments.

Every state-of-affairs is a complete categorial objectlike formation, and all elements of the state-of-affairs or *termini* that are not simple *termini*, thus, are not thematically simple, are themselves categorial objectlike formations in their turn. Thus, when we take a plural judgment, "S₁ and S₂ are P," or even "S is P₁ and P₂ ..." a collectivity is contained in the state-of-affairs; at least we can form sets by easily reconstructing single themes, and distributive predicates relating to them would then have as a

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²⁰⁵ Editor: <See pp. 298f.>

thematic element a categorial objectlike formation that contains within itself single themes of a second order.

We make the following distinction: [1] *a first sense of the word "Meinung"* in which these categorial objectlike formations and above all, the complete *states-of-affairs* make up the "*intended meaning*" in a judgment, and [2] *the second sense of the word "Meinung"* as the judgment itself [understood] "*as the intending of the one judging*." The intended meaning, *which the one judging intends or means*, is now the *judicative proposition* as the complete *unity of significance* that harbors all logical significances of the corresponding judging.

I do not need to explain in much detail how this is to be understood. In the transformation that takes place by drawing the conclusions of manifold judicative activities in relation to the momentary, present determination-themes into the new judgment that is being carried out, the state-of-affairs, the intended meaning in the first sense, remains untouched.

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Every current theme can become the substrate not only for the current judicative accomplishments, but at the same time can become the substrate for the modified connection of previous acquisitions of accomplishment. This does not alter the state-of-affairs, which is constituted thematically, but it does alter the mode in which it is conceived. In this "mode" it is the thematic product, not only of the present judgment, but also of the implicit judgments. Or the current thematic product has an embellishment of formations that point back intentionally to the intermeshed judgments. Every such formation can be extricated, the explication of the judgment according to all of its significances leads to a connected system of primitive judgments that no longer contain anything of the intermeshings, that is nothing of the like, like attributions. This unraveling is not the resolution of complex judgments into simple judgments; for a judgment is not genuinely complex by having appropriated an attribute in a thematic element. The expanded judgment is not a judgment that contains two current judgments as parts, as intimately inherent components. Yet in a certain sense it is certainly true that the expansion is the same thing as a complex composition, for if the predication after being transformed into an attribute is also no longer currently a

predication, then it is certainly found analytically in the attribution. This points toward a special form of identification and belongs to the theory of analytical deductions.

Let us now consider the limit-case of judgments that, in this direction, are analytically simple insofar as their thematic elements do not contain any co-intended meanings that exhibit sedimentations of an earlier actuality. *In the case of such judgments* it is clear that *we do not distinguish between the state-of-affairs and the judgment itself*. In the case of judgments, the state-of-affairs is the unity of significance itself. Nevertheless, we even have to speak of these judgments in two ways, taking into account the fact that they are mere limit-cases and that unending manifolds of judgments accord with every such limit-judgment in the state-of-affairs. The concept of state-of-affairs characterizes from the very beginning the identical thematic framework that precisely all judgments have in common, judgments that have identically the same current themes and that connect these themes in the same categorial forms (i.e., the synthetic forms of function). The limit-proposition is the pure proposition proper to such a group, and is a correlate of the pure determinative actuality. The objective element in judging, the state-of-affairs, which itself should be a judgment and in particular a limit-case, loses its paradoxical status if we remind ourselves that we are speaking here of objects in quotation marks and thus of states-of-affairs in quotation marks, as well.

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<Chapter 4:

THE GRADATION OF OBJECTIVATION>

<§63. Two Dimensions of the First Level of Objectivation: Mere Intuition and the Dimension of Explicative Examination>²⁰⁶

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The insights that we have gained into the structure of judgments are important in many respects. They are insights into the internal

²⁰⁶ Editor: See Appendix 29: Theme and Theoretical Interest, pp. 548f., and Appendix 37: <Object and Content of Interest> pp. 556ff.

construction, into the structure of judgments as ready-made formations of determinative action, and insights into the *a priori* genesis according to which every ideal possible continued construction of judgments and intertwining of judgments of higher and higher complexity is carried out systematically and according to fixed laws. Accordingly, all judgments ultimately lead back to fundamental shapes of primitive judgments and to principles of syntactic reconstruction and intertwining. What strikes us here is the variation in thematic consciousness, thus, the different way in which the *termini* in the state-of-affairs, that is, in the logical main clause, and the *termini* in the subordinate clauses are given to consciousness, and accordingly are even characterized in a categorially different way, and moreover, even the difference of thematic form of the subject of determination from the object determining it. And it strikes us that the wholly other distinction in thematic consciousness, which consists in the fact that in a certain way the entire judicative accomplishment, the entire state-of-affairs in its syntactic shape, stands in the brightest light of thematic interest, while only the *termini* are thematic objects.

20 Required is a new attitude, which is a change in thematization so that, for example, the state-of-affairs or the judgment becomes a theme in its complex shape of significance, namely, becomes something grasped thematically and even becomes the subject-theme.

25 We recall here our doctrine of interest³⁰⁷ that we have placed at the beginning of everything having to do with the theory of judgment; already prior to all determinative judging we have the following distinction: the object of interest—the One within the objective sense that varies in manifold ways, what gets grasped, what is thematic *simpliciter*, which we more clearly also call the thematic object—and the content of interest, that is, the varying objective sense of the What-content of the object in its persistence or even in its variation, which lies necessarily in the field of interest, but is not the thematic object. If a simple, unchanged tone becomes the object of interest, if it is perceived in a simple manner, then the interested regard rests in each moment on the

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tonal phase that is sounding right now, and what has just sounded is also still held onto in a modified way; in these relations we have something different from moment to moment. But running through it is the perceiving of the one tone. It is the object of intuition, and it does this only by the interested examination running throughout all tonal phases and tonal components, throughout the intuitive content. *This difference between object and content is repeated on all levels of thematic activity and takes on newer and newer shapes.*

10 *Our chief aim, which is to understand objectivation as a genetic gradation of thematic accomplishments, must be carried out consistently to the very end, and the exposition that we have presented up to now already makes intelligible for us a gradation of objectivation and the sense of such a gradation. The doctrine of the genesis of logical significance with respect to the substrates of determination is especially illuminating. It even shines back to our beginnings, with respect to which, as we now see, we would have to introduce the distinction between the activity of mere intuition and of the merely synthetic examination, and the genuine determination as a unique genetic distinction of levels. Let us survey the gradation of objectivation, and let us append the supplementation to which we alluded.*

25 The example of the tone illustrates for us the *first* conceivably most primitive level. It is the level of the intuition that examines prior to all explication. [Examined here is] the thematic object, the one *enduring tone*, thematic content, the flowing What-content of the tone. *The second level* is that of the examination that delves into and the examination that extends beyond, two types of examination that do not have any essentially prefigured order. The former thus concerns delving into the content of a thematic object 5; it is explicated. The progressive objectivation consists only in the fact that what was previously merely a thematic content now becomes a thematic object in a particular way, whereby what has become the special theme enters step by step into partial unity of identity with the S still being held onto, and precisely through this connection remains firmly held onto in the progression. The interest in the object running through this is fulfilled in this way in concentrated form in every partial theme.

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³⁰⁷ Editor: <See above 288f>.

Upon closer inspection we distinguish here: that which is the matter <of> activity, namely, the process of making the object thematic, which will be explicated afterward, then the process of making the components of its content thematic; and on the other hand that which is the matter of passivity, namely, the occurrence of partial coinciding and the occurrence of the enrichment of sense which is carried out with respect to the beginning thematic object.

We will have to say that the determinative identification, the activity of judgment is not yet carried out. It demands a new step in order to transform what passivity has prepared into an activity, into a judging in which the state-of-affairs is first constituted.

Before we make this clear, let us point to the second form of examination, the one that extends beyond, the examination that is not constricted by delving into the content, but rather expands by passing over to different objects. Commonalities are constituted here in passivity through connecting syntheses that can guide interest and can expand it into the unity of an overarching interest. By passing from object to object, passive synthetic unities are thus produced again; in this are found excitations for possible determinations, but that is still not the activity of determinative synthesis, not judging. Thus, for example, not first when an object has become a theme and after it, a whole encompassing it. The inverse partial identification is constituted passively. Likewise, where syntheses of uniformity and similarity are concerned.

<§64. The Second Level of Objectivation: Active Relating and Determining. The Task of a Universal Theory>²⁰⁸

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Up to this point we had considered two levels of the lower activity of objectivation under the general rubric of an examining intuition. In contrast to this, we posit as the *second main heading*, "the level of judgment." By this we mean now the *determining process found prior to conceptualization*, that is, prior to the function that constitutes the universal for us; we mean the activity of relating one theme to another theme, and then further all the

activities that give a higher synthetic unity to such determinative accomplishments. The level of *conceptualizing thinking* is then a *fundamentally new and higher level*.

The distinction of the relating process of objectivating, of actively determinative objectivating, in contrast to mere examination, e.g., to explicating, becomes clear if we describe clearly the actions that lead upward: If in the transition from one object *S* to a moment of its content, *m*, the coinciding that forms identity has occurred passively, then with this, as we had said, something is done to the object, it has an increase of sense in this synthesis. If this enters into the circle of the content of interest, that is, if the *S* (which is different at the end of this process than it was at the beginning, the *S* that has receded and is only being held onto, yet no longer in the focal point)—if this *S* [now] enters into the focal point of interest as the *S* that is expanded in sense, then this is only possible in such a way that *S* again becomes the primary object of the grasping in a new grasp; and now an active intention, in the active transition to *m*, is concerned with originally and actively generating what is accruing to the *S*. Only now do we have a subject-theme as *terminus a quo* and a counter *terminus* as the *ad quem* at which the activity is striving; only now [do we have] the consciousness actually constituted only in the synthetic activity, the consciousness that the *S* undergoes determination through *m* in the mode of "*S* contains *m*."

Likewise in the inverse case: "*m* is a part of *S*." If the interest in the object passes over from the part to the whole—precisely by virtue of the inner commonality and of the coinciding that forms identity, which sets in passively—then remaining in the second element is the first that is still held in the interest's grasp. But what is new is the active intention toward determination, the activity that directs its aim at *m* to determine it with respect to *S*, thus, the activity with an eye to *m* and electing it as the subject-theme driving at the *S* and, in carrying out the process of identification, determines *m* as a part of *S*.

The progress of objectivation of this higher level consists in the accomplishment of determining and is seen in the active formation of new thematic forms: subject-theme and determination-theme. We no longer have thematic objects like [we had] on the first level

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²⁰⁸ Editor: See Appendix 37: <Object and Content of Interests> pp. 556ff., and Appendix 38: <Categorical and Non-Categorical Connections and Relations> pp. 573ff.

where the thematic shape is the same everywhere; rather, we have new thematic shapes harmonizing with one another that have arisen from new activity. Each one has a syntactic formation, and they are connected to a syntactic unity, a unity of an state-of-affairs.

This is likewise the case (to hint at new judicative shapes), if we have wholes that are pre-constituted in passivity, if we have unified combinations in the broadest sense or in some more narrow sense, unities in which different particular objects are divided off from each other, now being elements that intersect, now being elements that are disjunctive. Every two elements of such a unity can enter into a determinative relation. But the active grasping of them in passing from one to the other is still not an active process of relating, although the transition can yield a passive product that points the way to active determination.

If we have an intuitive configuration before us, for example, in the most simple scenario, a pair of balls in a sensible unity of position, then lying in the possible horizon of examination is the concrete unity, the pair of balls in its position; initially unexplicated. Then grasping the single balls individually and then grasping them together. Then the form of connection as a non-independent moment. This is not a third part that is on a par with the others; rather, the grasping presupposes the explicit grasping of the balls, and in this respect it is essentially a mediate, non-independent moment.

All of this provides the foundation for different possible determinative judgments, the relationships between the whole and immediate parts, between the whole and the form of connection of parts, between the combination of parts and their form of connection, finally: relationships between the elements as connected in these forms. In this relation of connection, the elements participate in the same whole and have a commonality in it. If we pass over from the one to the other, (if each one is given to consciousness with the direction of interest toward the connection), then a coinciding takes place in the elements that share something in common, and therefore an enrichment of sense that can give occasion in turn to activities of determining which form relations. Determinations arise in this way, like "a" is in a

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particular position to b." Relations of a higher order can also arise in this way, like relationships of positions between positions, etc.

You see here that one may not confuse the connection of parts to a whole and the relation of a part in relation to another part. The relation is an state-of-affairs and originally has two elements. (A relation having several elements is a connection of several relations taking place in judgment.) But a whole is, in general, not a state-of-affairs, although every state-of-affairs, every judgment, is a whole insofar as it can be divided up.

Let us note further that relationships between whole and part, between parts of a whole, thus, in principle all types of relation that belong most generally to the idea of a possible objectlike formation as such, does not only concern sensible objects and wholes that are connected sensibly, but also categorial objects. Judicative action fashions wholes that are structured by being generated from elements. But that they are given as elements, that they are given as parts of the whole, and that the relationships of every other kind are given among them as parts of this whole—this presupposes that the constituted judgment is first made into the subject-theme by a reverting grasp, that from here its parts are brought into relief by dividing them up; these parts are being related to one another in determinative actions, actions that are entirely different from those in which the judicative whole in question would be constituted.

In accordance with the general path that we have sketched out, a systematic theory of relation would have to outline, at first in formal generality, the types of relation (types of state-of-affairs on the level of pre-conceptual judging) proper to the most general idea of the objectlike formation as such. The development of all forms of judgment and forms of judicative interconnections yielded by the intertwining of significance leads in this case to an infinity of types of wholes, which examined under the formal idea of the objectlike formation, are special forms of objects with special forms of elements and connections, with special forms of relations. They are forms of objects called categorial objects that relate back to all objects as such, that is, even to themselves. The universal investigation into the categorial realm, according to its forms, and the pure laws determined by these forms, laws of true

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existence of states-of-affairs, make up a self-contained discipline, "formal logic."

Let us note here that when one treats as objects states-of-affairs, and the formations of the states-of-affairs themselves, the relations proper to them are not only those that can also occur with other objects, with objects of all types in general. Rather, it belongs to the essence of states-of-affairs and of categorial objectlike formations in general to ground relations of this kind as well. Thus, the relations are divided into specifically categorial relations, into relations belonging specifically to the essence of categorial formations, and into non-categorial relations. In this way, the relationship between a relation and its inversion is a categorial relation; the relationship "a is a part of b" is, as one says, included in the relationship "b is the whole of a," and vice versa. And this holds for every relation and its inversion, and for every instance of a judgment being contained "analytically" in another judgment, for every instance of an state-of-affairs being contained "analytically" in another state-of-affairs.

In the formal logic of the second level of objectivation, the level that relates to the *states-of-affairs*, the relations, *inhabiting* the judgments of all possible forms, the main theme is the systematic disclosure of the radically different genera of relations that are possible for objectlike formations as such, in formal generality, that is, forms of states-of-affairs—forms, since the *termini* here are conceived in an undetermined, general manner. Accordingly, it is a matter here of a *formal classification of relations*, while a *logical theory of relation as such* makes differentiations even where the *idea of the objectlike formation* is concerned, and gives an account of all differences of this idea, i.e., the *fundamental types of objectlike formations* that are sketched out precisely through the essence of the objectlike formation itself. The difference between *individuum* and *eidos*, between *categorial* and *non-categorial objectlike formations*, is sketched out in this way.

We have already suggested that categorial objectlike formations have their peculiar forms of relations, and that not all objectlike formations can enter into them; they, the objectlike formations, only have sense for these forms of relations. Likewise, *individuals* have their *peculiar individual-relations*; these relations have their

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foundation in so-called *individuating determinations* and in the forms of connection that are rooted in them: thus, the *relations of temporal position* related to the absolute temporal loci, and likewise, the spatial position for external objects. Genera and species in turn have their specific relations. The said *types of objects are logical ones*, because every such type refers to every other one, and there is no *objectlike formation conceivable* that is not related back to all of these types. Even the *topic*, "consciousness," belongs here, for not every object is consciousness, to be sure, but each one is an object of a possible consciousness and, constitutively, has a relation to the interconnections of consciousness. *Consciousness, further, has specific, peculiar relations*. Considered here are relations that have their foundation in *essential connections* that *intertwine* with one another the objectlike formations of these types of objectlike formation, which are prefigured "a priori", that is, the intentional relations between object and consciousness, ultimately between *individuum* and consciousness, the relation between *individuum* and *eidos* as the genus-universal, between *individuum* and the non-categorial object and the categorial object as such, etc.

Thus, the great task of a universal theory of relation consists in *establishing all fundamental shapes of relations*, taking the *fundamental shapes of objectlike formations as objectlike formations*. The result is a theory of the forms of relations. The establishment of the affiliated fundamental laws of relational truths like, for example: that the true subsistence of "a temporally after b" and "b after c" contains the true existence of "a after c"—all of this is yielded by the so-called *axioms* of relations that are assigned to every radical type of objectlike formation for itself and in an intertwining, for example, axioms of individuality, axioms for genus and species, etc.

But preceding all of this is a theory of the forms of those relations, a theory that has a formal universality in a still higher sense. We have precisely relations into which the objectlike formations as such can enter, be they individuals or genera, etc., so that in the disclosure of these forms of relations, the *termini* remain fully undetermined and thus indicate nothing concerning

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whether the objects belong to this or that radical object-type or, as one also says, to this or that category of objectlike formation.

As you see, the universal *relationship of part and whole* and *vice versa* (or better, the universal relationship of containment and of what is contained, of part to part, and much else) naturally belongs in this realm of the *most general, formal universality*, a realm contained in itself.²⁰⁹

<§65. The Third Level of Objectivation. Conceptualizing Judgment on the Basis of the Consciousness of the Universal>

10 <a. *Relations of Comparison. Association of Similarity as its Foundation, and Direction of Interest toward the Universal*>

Of interest to us now, however, is a new topic, the topic of relations of comparison, as we call them, the relations of uniformity and similarity, which serve us as the transition to the third level of objectivation, that is, to the higher judicative level, that of the logically conceptualizing judgment.

The peculiar place of these relations shows up in the following exposition: We have directed our whole undertaking up to now to the sphere of positionality, even in the realm of self-giveness. We conceived of various objects as being self-given, and posited them in a relation which, in turn, was also self-given. The opposite of positionality is quasi-positionality, phantasy, be it perceptual or reproductive. If we transfer an objectlike formation (so to speak) into the sphere of phantasy, we will also have the states-of-affairs belonging to it in the mode of the "as if"; thus, it appears that we can dispense with the consideration of phantasy, since corresponding to each type of positional giveness is a quasi-type of phantasy giveness; both share the same essential content.

However, phantasy is Janus-like, so to speak. Leaving the ground of actuality, we can situate ourselves completely in phantasy, and as subjects immersed in phantasy, live in the "as if"; thus, we can have a phantastised actuality given as if it were an

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actuality. But, secondly, we can keep our footing on the positional ground as actual subjects, as the subjects of actual, current experience peering into the world of phantasy, and then comport ourselves positionally to it in a unique way. In other words, now the phantasy formations are for us something given as existing, namely, precisely phantasies, fictions, characterized as modifications of actuality and insofar as this is the case, as non-actualities. But not non-actualities in the sense of actualities that are crossed out, like in the case of an illusion as a negated illusory appearance. From certain perspectives, then, we also characterize these objectlike formations that are constituted by phantasy, these "phantasy images" (whose essence it is "to imagine" objects together with their mode of being in a phantasical manner), as possibilities, possibilities of objects.

15 I now need merely to point to the fact that relations, like those between whole and part, part and part, cannot exist in principle between actualities and such possibilities, that is, that they cannot be constituted in self-giveness, where the one *relatum* is given to consciousness as actual and the other as a fictum. If a whole is actual, then the part is too, and a fictum cannot be connected to something actual to form a whole. However, actualities and fictions can obviously be compared with one another; they can stand in a relationship of similarity and uniformity to one another.²¹⁰ Closely related to this is the following distinction which likewise characterizes the essential division of both fundamental types of relations. Even if they do occur in the unity of one consciousness and in a living present and achieve an overarching unity, every intuition that gives an actuality, and every phantasy-intuition *do not, as intuitions, form a cohesive connection*. The very *same thing* holds for a perception and for a remembering and for several remembering that do not make up a continual unity of remembering from the very start. *A memory*

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²⁰⁹ <See the parallel exposition, Appendix 39: <The Task of a Theory of Relations> pp. 575f.

²¹⁰ We distinguish: Relations of materially relevant ties (relations of connection) and relations of comparison. Relations of comparison can not only place actualities in relation to actualities, but also actualities in relation to possibilities. Or alternatively: What they place in relation does, not need <to> be constituted as connected in a continually cohesive intuition.

interrupts into the perceptual present without any connection, or [we can have] a different memory rupturing a memory.

An objectlike formation is constituted in the continual unity of an intuition as the unity of a giving consciousness. What is constituted in several intuitions, intuitions that do not form a cohesive connection, is constituted as not forming a cohesive connection in a materially relevant manner. But there is a kind of connection that can even connect what is given without a connection. Association can unite each and every thing that is given to consciousness together in a present of consciousness, whether connected or unconnected in materially relevant ties. A whole as whole of its parts, the connection of parts as parts of a whole, can only be given in the unity of a cohesively connecting intuition of the whole, of the connection. However, this does not effect uniformity or similarity at all. And they are unaffected precisely because uniformity or similarity have their original source purely in the connection that is pre-constituted by the unity of the so-called association. No matter how much efficacy the association may have for the formation of unitary intuitions, and no matter how constantly it is efficacious for them, like for the constitution of unitarity, cohesively connected objects, it also has efficacy where objects, so to speak, are floating down into the present of consciousness without a cohesive connection; they fashion a tie between them, and specifically as an association of similarity.²¹¹

This connection entering into thematic view is the *fundamentum relatum* for the active constitution of a relation, of the relation of similarity and of uniformity. Now, if I say, further, that this connection is at once the source even of the consciousness of the universal, and therefore of conceptualizing judgment, of judgment in the full sense, then I mean by this that a primordial form of association is this source, which is to say, it functions as a specific *a priori* of passive pre-constitution upon which a new level of activity can build, which level of activity not

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only yields the universal as object, but lends to all judgments (in the sense given to them up to now) a new, a specifically logical shape.

The universality of the accomplishment of comparison and formation of concepts rests on the fact that everything, no matter how it is constituted as an object in actuality or possibility, can emerge precisely in an *a priori* fashion as the *terminus* in relations of comparison, and can be grasped conceptually by the activity of eidetic identification and by the activity of assuming it under the universal.

An excellent form of the relation of comparison is uniformity; a multiplicity of objects that are merely repetitions of one another precedes and is internal to the unity of the consciousness of a present, and this means an associative form of unity of a peculiar type, already constituted prior to the active process of relating. A coinciding that forms uniformity enters into the particular grasping of a *terminus*, with the transition to a second *terminus* that is grasped individually, and in the active relating, the one *terminus* is determined in the form of the subject as uniform to the other: *a = b*. And *vice versa*, as well.

The peculiar feature of this synthesis of two uniform objects consists in the fact that it indeed seems quite similar to a synthesis of identity, and yet is not one. It is so similar to it that, in passing from one uniform object to the next, we are virtually inclined to say that it is indeed the same thing. The uniform objects, however, are two separate objects and not one and the same. And yet, in every such duality and in every manifold of uniform elements whatsoever, there actually is a unity and ipseity in the strongest sense. It arises originally in the synthesis of the coinciding that forms uniformity; it is constituted through it originally as object. Naturally, this original constitution means pre-constitution. An *ἐν ἑνὶ τοῦ ἀλλοῦ*, the unity of a universal, can only first be given to consciousness for the ego *a priori*, can only first be ready for possible thematic grasping by carrying out the activity of grasping uniform objects separately in the synthetic transition [from one to the next]. A relating judgment of comparison is not required; this occurs in a different attitude. The direction of interest toward the universal, toward the unity as opposed to the

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²¹¹ Accordingly, sensible uniformity and similarity are thus also an original association and a unity of affection. Does the affection of one element pass over to the other, or conversely, does the coinciding in a unity give an increased force of affection?

manifold, is not that of determining the one uniform object in relation to the other as being uniform to it; rather, what awakens interest is the One being actively constituted in the coinciding of individually grasped uniform objects; the One is the same, and is the same over and over, no matter what direction we may pursue in passing from one to the next. Obviously, what we carried out here is not anything like an explication of uniform objects where the One is not found as part, as something partially identical in the uniform objects; otherwise the One would only be something that is everywhere uniform, and the uniform elements would be in the relationship of intersection. The One does not repeat itself in something uniform; it only occurs one time, but is given in the many.

The original grasping of this One has a different field of interest, a different "content" that the interest must move through, different from the case of a sensible object, an object on the level of the individual. For now the interest, the ray of attentiveness must pass clear through the individual objects that are already constituted, and by traveling along the path of uniformity and carrying out the coinciding, the One that is constituted becomes thematic.

<b. The Universal as a Novel Intellectual Object>²¹²

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It may initially seem that it does not require the open infinity with the form of the "etc."²¹³ Two repetitions already suffice to grasp the unity. But we note that with the pure directedness toward the unity, the existence of the objects that are elements [of the unity] is immaterial, that the potential postings of existence do not play a founding role, and that as long as we do not have the particular objects in the consciousness of the whatsoever,²¹⁴ in the consciousness of the exemplary, we do not have pure self-giving.

We achieve the highest grade of self-giving in the free passing from the given manifold into the realm of free possibilities and in

going through an open manifold in consciousness, a manifold of any possibilities whatsoever as any example whatsoever in the form of the "etc." We encounter the universal as a novel objectlike formation, as an intellectual objectlike formation, an objectlike formation from the original well-spring of activity: although, of course, on the basis of sensibility, insofar as the activity of "going through," of grasping the individual, of bringing into a coinciding, is necessary so that the universal as such can be pre-constituted, and then later can become a thematic object. If we take independent, concrete objects as our point of departure, this *universal of repetition* (with open unending scope) is the *concrete eidōs*, from the Latin, the *concrete species* or the concrete essence.

Where the *non-independent moments* of the concrete object are concerned, the lowest non-independent species are given, the lowest abstract species: if "abstract" only serves as a counter term to "concrete." Now different species among these abstract and concrete species can themselves be compared; like all objects, they can also have their associative unity in consciousness; in it we grasp, in a still higher intellectual activity, a specific-universal as the unity of manifolds that are already species, a universal of a higher order. We arrive at species and genera.²¹⁵

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In going from uniformity to similarity, we would have to expound upon related matters. *Similarity is a fundamental shape of association*, and the transition yields <here> an analogue of partial identity, a coinciding and yet not a complete coinciding. The elements of the similarity that overlap (which, by the way, need not be separate) have a *distance*; different similarities can have different distances, in fact, they themselves can be compared. Thus, *similarity has a gradation*, and the *lines is uniformity* without any distance in the coinciding of elements merely being repeated. Nevertheless, something in common also comes to light here in the *coinciding at a distance*, or, as we could put it perhaps in a better way, it shines through originally as a universal.²¹⁶ If

²¹² Editor: See Appendix 35: Multiplicity and Judgments of Multiplicity, pp. 559ff.

²¹³ Yes, for pure universals.

²¹⁴ *Beliebigkeit*

²¹⁵ All of this would have to be given more thoroughly; above all, the pure *eidōs*, what is purely exemplary, etc., would have to be grounded more thoroughly and be set in contrast to the empirical universal.

²¹⁶ Thus, it is apparent that by virtue of the *lines*-relation, the universal of similarity is the universal of uniformity.

achieves complete givenness in the process that we have described previously, namely, that of the transition from the lowest species of similar elements to the corresponding higher species. In this disclosive process, the universal of mere similarity is given as a higher species, as a *species-universal*.

If we carry out a determinative attitude, a *fundamentally new mode of determination* is given *after the constitution of the universal*. The object that is the subject²¹⁷ *a* is not determined in a manner uniform to *b*, but as an *a*. The thematic grasping of the universal requires moving through the open manifold of any singularities whatsoever lying in the circle of interest concerning content. *Positionality*, where it occurs, is *not carried out* for these singularities, *the mode of being is irrelevant* and can also be a phantasy mode of being from the very outset.²¹⁸ If we focus thematically on such singularities, they will have a *unique relationship to the universal*, precisely *that of the species to its particularizations*. What exists as actual, as what is actually posited is then determined as the actual particularization of the *eidos*, what is possible, a possible particularization. The new judgment that arises is "*This is an a*," which is to say, it is a particular of the species *a*.

There are other essentially different forms, and not only the forms that arise from the previous ones, by, so to speak, *dressing them with concepts*. Up to now, we had placed determined constituted objects in relation [to one another], and had determined relations between determined objects. Each object can be grasped conceptually. If we have judged that *S* is a part of *S*₁, and in this way relating them, then "*S* and *S*₁" can now absorb conceptual determinations by attribution, and this can take place in all cases.

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Überhauf - Urfelle
 <c. As Such-Judgments²¹⁹>

But thinking in general takes on still different and more significant forms. *Thinking, in the form of the function of the "as such,"* governs the entire judicative thinking of the higher level. The universal is constituted, we said, in relation to a field of openness, and with this we have already unleashed *the function of the "whatsoever."* Yet, in a certain way, it is actually already prepared from the very start for judging as a thematic activity: If we have objects pre-given, we can choose any "this" or "that" whatsoever as the determinative theme, we can relate it to this or that other object whatsoever. But the whatsoever, the choosing, and correlatively the indifference also enters as a thematically *formative* activity into the judging itself; it also constitutes, it fashions new forms of objectlike formations, new forms of state-of-affairs and of judgment. Not only do species emerge as objects, but correlative to the species, new thematic formations are constituted. They are As Such-objects and As Such-relations, i.e., *universal and particular judgments*. The concept of the *objectlike theme* certainly also takes on with this *an essential modification*. For it is fundamentally different <to> have this table here before us thematically and <to> determine it—even if it be determined conceptually as a table—and <to> make a judgment about a table as such. It is, I say, something completely different: instead of making a judgment about this table, even if it stand before us and stand in the illuminated field of interest as a thematic focal point, to make a judgment about any table whatsoever, regardless of which one, to make a judgment about a table as such, whereby the "whatsoever," the "as such," belongs to the thematic center. Now this table is characterized here as example, this whatsoever attaches to it, it is given to consciousness here as this table, but indifferently. It is only a "*representative*," and the theme—and in a modified way, *the subject-theme—is a table as such*. Thus, here the judging is *fundamentally modified*, it is a *positional* activity that operates on an entirely different level, on an altered and complex thematic substratum.

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²¹⁷ *Subjektgegenstand*

²¹⁸ For pure universals! For pure *eidos*!

²¹⁹ *Überhauf-Urfelle*

If we have a multiplicity given in the manner of experiencing positionality, and by moving through it, a universal comes to the fore, we will have the determinative attitude, "This is an A," "This is an A, etc." But also: *anything whatsoever that has been extracted, anything whatsoever to be extracted, is an A*; in moving through it, I have the consciousness of the "A again and again," each and every time an A, but also the consciousness of anything whatsoever to be extracted, of "every whatsoever." Likewise with two universals occurring together: *An A as such is B, each one.*

But, *on the other hand* (e.g., when at first a B occurs now and then), the thematic interest can also be directed toward the occurrence of a B as such. Even here the function of the whatsoever plays a role, but in a second form. It is immaterial that *this here is B*, but that *one there is B*. Obviously here again is the particular, "an A," and likewise the indeterminate universal, "some A's," that stand in the subject-position, not an object in the genuine sense, to which object (like a determined table) one would attribute a predicate; and yet it is a theme, a theme being constituted by the higher functions of activity; the entire judgment, and all functions of judgment as relating functions take on a new shape in the consciousness of the "as such," and by assuming the "as such" into a theme. It is evident that the function of the "as such," to which the specification is bound, is a conceptualizing function, that of universal and particular conceptual grasping.

If we sever the *tie to <a> realm of experience*, to a pre-given sphere of constituted objects, if we operate in a scope of pure concepts, in a manifold of possibility in which possible actualities remain indifferent according to their positionality, we gain *pure "as such"-judgments*, judgments that have the character of *judgments of laws*, like, "A triangle has as such three angles"; "An extended object is as such qualified [in some way]"; "A red object as such is colored." The *particular* judgments are expressed as *judgments of possibilities*: "A triangle can have a right angle."

All such judgments thus operate on the ground of pure possibility and say nothing about actuality. If I imagine an extended object in pure possibility, I will find it colored or qualified in some other way. But by modifying in free variation and by holding firm to the extended object, in the free transition

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from the one fiction to any other one whatsoever, and where it is a matter of indifference to me which other it is, I find both the conceptual determinations united. I see them in the transitional consciousness as united as such in lawful regularity. With this, the realm of universal judging is opened up, the realm of law-giving, the knowledge of law-giving for itself and for all judgments as such, and therefore for all possible objective formations.

<Supplementary Texts>

<Section 1.

FIRST VERSION OF MAIN TEXT PART 2 (1920/21)>¹

5 <1. The Misunderstanding of Modalities of Being by Logicians and Epistemological Psychologists> [225]

10 Thanks to the phenomenological analyses that we have undertaken, we now understand the origin of modalizations arising in the sphere of perception. We find modal distinctions purely with respect to the objective sense of every perception, and the same perceptual object can potentially present itself one time in this modality, another time in that modality, or in variable modalities, now as existing in pure and simple certainty, now as problematically possible in conflict with other problematic possibilities, and then as not existing or as existing in fact. On the other hand, the perceptual object is inconceivable without one of the modalities we just mentioned, just as it is inconceivable without open possibilities, since the perceptual object moves into an open future. If we go from the noematic attitude to the noetic one, the perceptual lived-experience will likewise be inconceivable without what makes up the modalizing accomplishment in the perceptual lived-experience; and this is completely clear to us.

¹ Translator: The difference between this first version of Part 2 and the one published above under the heading of "Main Text" concerns §12 through §40. The italicized sections of this text are repetitions of the former. Like the editor of the German edition, I include them here for the sake of coherence.

The following pagination to the German text corresponds to Husserliana XI.

We are therefore in the position to be able to comprehend the bad mistakes into which philosophical logicians and epistemological psychologists have fallen by having believed it necessary to distinguish between the so-called mere presentation and judgment for every perception (and correspondingly for every other consciousness of an object), thus, in this case, to distinguish between the perceptual presentation and the perceptual judgment; here, under the rubric of judgment, one would distinguish between active acceptance and rejection as more specific differentiations.

10 They obviously carried over the quite evident distinction between the perceptual object and its modal modes of givenness to the perceptual lived-experience and—since the sense of constitutive analyses were still completely hidden, and since they were even lacking the fundamental distinction between noema and noesis—

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15 they made a real distinction in a lived-experiential consciousness out of an unreal distinction; indeed, they even divided a lived-experiential consciousness into separable elements of lived-experience. If an object appears in the flesh in the perceptual lived-experience, and is thereby characterized in this or that mode of being, this does not mean that perception consists of two elements or layers of which the one constitutes the object in its presentation in the flesh and the other, building upon it, apports to the object “being” or “non-being,” etc. According to Brentano and his school, with which Meinong was also affiliated, there is supposed to be one unique perceptual presentation that presents² the object in the flesh, and in addition to this a judgment that now actively accepts, now rejects, affirming or denying what is presented. In principle, however, those judgments do not have to be supplemented, and in this case we would have a mere presentation.

30 But according to our analyses, it is clear that there is not anything, and there cannot be anything, on the order of mere perceptual presentations, neither as particular lived-experiences nor only as sublayers in lived-experiences that are self-contained in an intimately inherent manner. A perceptual presentation would certainly be a consciousness, a consciousness that gives an object

originaliter. But such a consciousness would not be anything other than that system of intentions of the structure described, and it would be entirely inconceivable if it were anything but that. Such a system, however, is necessarily a system in which the intentions run their course either in original concordance and are unbroken, and if this is the case then this mode is called nothing other than perceptual faith, and the object, existent. Or a rupture ensues and then we have the other possibilities that have been prefigured: the intentions themselves undergo a thorough internal recasting of their concordance, even though the systematic structure may be the same as the systematic structure that constitutes its presentation in the flesh. Belief and the modification of belief is not something added to intentions. The fact of being non-inhibited and of being inhibited by parallel and partially coinciding intentions is not something that is juxtaposed to intentions; it is not a new supervening lived-experience called belief, judgment, but precisely a recasting of concordance, a modification that makes possible the nature of consciousness as consciousness, and in fact, as we will hear, makes possible every consciousness. Thus, belief as being certain, as negation, as affirmation, etc., is to the so-called perceptual presentation as the timbre is to the tone or as the tonal intensity is to the tone. One cannot separate the tone and then add the tonal intensity to it, although the analogy is naturally precarious and to be taken *cum grano salis*. One should not treat the perceptual object as such and the object as such presented in a different manner, that is, one should not treat what we termed either the objective sense or the noema, as a piece in consciousness, as generally happens in the traditional literature that is still unaffected by phenomenology. One must not ignore all the multifaceted and actually demonstrable structures of lived-experience in which sense is constituted in the process of perceiving as an intentional unity, and inseparably from this, the being-modality of sense. And one must consequently not pass off the mode of being as something that the judicative ego adds to the sense which would, as it were, already reach the ego in advance as ready-made.

35 But if one pursues a deeper analysis, it will be clear that corresponding to the unitary element of the object in the noema is

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a manifold of intentions in the course of the lived-experience; these intentions in all of their elements are a consciousness through and through, and as a consciousness they have those uninhibited concordances or inhibitions and conflict; and it will become clear that this modalizing process that recasts the hue of the whole of consciousness is what necessarily constitutes the mode of being in relation to sense. Accordingly, in the case of the modality of problematic [possibility], one will also not interpret, as does happen, indecisiveness as a cessation of the putative perceptual judgment, and will not altogether reduce this merely to positive and negative believing or even only to active acceptance and rejection. Positive belief designates: (1) the primordial mode of consciousness, consciousness that is unbroken, but that is also still unaffected by any breaks. (2) Active acceptance, confirmation is that consciousness of unbroken concordance that is restored after undergoing a break; it is a concordance after overcoming the inner bifurcation. This overcoming is carried out in the original form in the perceptual progression of concordant fulfillment as the resolution of inhibition from the side of the one party of the conflicting intentions, whereby the other simultaneously gets annulled in the form of being crossed out, in the form of negation. Every affirmation also entails a negation.

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The one thing that we have not taken into consideration and that will yet play its role is the participation of the activity of the ego. If the ego executes an act of affirmation (of active acceptance), it activates, it lives through those particular intentions, those of concordance, while the annulment of the opposing intentions, as suppressed, takes place precisely in the implicit form of emptiness, as a modalization in subconsciousness. On the other hand: Negation as an act is the activation of this crossing out in the transition from the activation of the opposing intentions to the living through of concordance or vice versa. There isn't the slightest reason to exclude the mode of being undecided, the mode of question, or what amounts to the same thing, the mode of the consciousness of enticement and of probability from this set in which the latter consciousness always plays a part as an intermediate stage with a corresponding accomplishment of sense, questionable, problematically possible sense. Even here we have

different forms of execution on the part of the ego. None of this excludes the fact that decisions have a priority over the indecisive uncertainties for logic as a normative science. But one must first bring it to light, and then also do justice to the modes of indecisiveness and to their norms.

¶2. Non-Prominence and the Prominence of Sense and Modes of Being for Consciousness>

Before we advance beyond the realm of perception in which our analyses were carried out, let us develop the results of our analyses a little bit. The distinction between the perceptual sense and its modes of being did not imply a separation for either perceptual lived-experience or the perceived object. In this respect we have to consider the following. There is no rupture in the origin of perception where naive perception is concerned; it is simply a consciousness of the perceptual object. If the ego is active, that is, if it grasps [objects] in an attentive manner, it will grasp the object *simpliciter*, and here mere objective sense and mode of being are not distinguished at all for consciousness, and the objective sense and the mode of originality are distinguished just as little; and in general they are distinguished just as little as the results of our reflective analyses and our scientific conceptualizations of perception would themselves become an object [of perception]. In the normal attitude of the act, of the "I perceive," the grasping bears on the unity that is constituted in a continuous coinciding as this object becoming there. In this case, [we call] the objective sense in the original mode of being that which is in a continual coincidence, that which is, so to speak, continually identified in the process of constitution; it is the correlate of the unbroken concordance of original intentions. It is only in a transition to discordance and therefore to modalizing transformations that sense and modality of being are first set apart from each other in a relation of contrast; we recognize this when we look back at the perceptual object as it was given prior to the break, and when we also look at the objects that were then given together with this and as conflicting. Seen more precisely, under the rubric of "mere" object-sense, something takes on the

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character of an object that previously did not have this character; it was itself not there like an object in the simplicity of perceptual consciousness. A coinciding and an identification take place that had not existed before; a consciousness of an object is established that had not previously existed. If the pure and simple external This-Here, the external perceptual object, has already been constituted, then the sense of this object and its mode of being will now be constituted, and this constitution is not itself an external perception, but rather a consciousness founded in external perception. It is likewise an originally giving consciousness if it has arisen in the way that we are taking it here, namely, fashioned from the reflective attitude on the perceptual object as such. But even though it is a consciousness that fashions its object in its full originality, it is not a perceiving; not a grasping *originaliter* of an individual object or even of a thing. To be sure, senses are not things. We will have something to say about this consciousness later, for its objects are also the principle themes of interest for us logicians. If the disruptive discordance has been overcome, a contrast between sense and modality arises, "being" gets the new character, "it is actually so", but then in the active perceiving that now once more devotes itself to the object and to its acquisition of knowledge, the object will once again be given as an object in a straightforward manner; that is, as we continue to perceive, a constant sameness is given in an original mode of being, but without the distinction between sense and mode of being. Once again, we have the same object in a straightforward manner, just as if a break had never occurred.

One can still sense a remnant of unclarity. We have an original shape of continuous perception as a system of concordance. Perception has its perceptual object, the existing object, the unity of just this concordant ratification of the self, which proceeds in an unbroken manner.

If a break occurs, [through] doubt, [or through] crossing out, we will have a "revealing," a cancellation of this concordant nexus that no longer proceeds in an unbroken manner; rather [we will have a nexus that] becomes modified through the break itself. What is crossed out there is nothing other than the object *simpliciter* as "being." And we see that the spared, remaining

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object does not consist of two components, "sense" or content and "being," but rather is precisely existing object or object *simpliciter*. A perception and a crossed out perception having the same "content" now have something in common, and that is precisely the content of the perceptual lived-experience and of the negation of perception. But this is not something general that is differentiated; it is not a part that gets a supplementary part through the "quality of belief." The noetic content of the negation of perception also "contains" the perceptual belief, but as crossed out, or rather, "being," but as crossed out. Can more still be said about this?

In the case of other modalizations, like negation for example, we do not have an object *simpliciter* from the very beginning without inner differentiations of sense and the mode of being, but rather the negated object, or in problematic consciousness, the problematic object. It seems that a bifurcation is essentially situated here in the dyad of sense and modality corresponding to the fact that in general the consciousness of such modal transformations is indeed more intricate than pure and simple perceiving.

<3. The Modalization of Immanent Objects>

Let us get first get clear about what can be used from our results vis-à-vis immanent perception. We see without further ado that the discourse of the being of an immanent object and the characterization of immanent perceiving as a certainty of being essentially leads back to the same sources as the discourse of the being of the external object and perceptual belief. Even the immanent object is constituted in internal consciousness and is constituted through the systems of intentionality, the systems of primordial impression, retentions, protentions, which pass over into each other in steady concordance. Correlative to the unbrokenness of these original intentions is again "being" situated in the consciousness of the object. We are conscious of every one of our lived-experiences as being; we are certain of them in a straightforward manner, and this certainty means the same thing as the certainty of the external object in unbroken external

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perception. But now we understand the difference and the reason why we could not profitably link the doctrine of modalities to immanent perceptions. An immanent object can in principle only be given with certainty. Original constitution, which lets it arise as an *esse in percipi*, does not in principle admit of any modalization, of any dual apprehension in conflict. There is not an apperceptive apprehension here in the same sense as there is in external perception: apperceptive apprehension already presupposes immanent constitution as its foundation. But this is, by its very nature, a steady, passive process of intentional concordance in the succession of primordial impression and retentions.

Still, we must be more careful: On the one hand, seen more precisely, modalization is indeed possible for immanent objects. The extent to which they are already constituted in the flux of their becoming (and they are certainly objects of immanent perception only as becoming), is the extent to which there is no way of speaking of modalization. The lived-experience, which has already been constituted as present and together with it as just past, cannot be subject to doubt and therefore cannot be negated, either. How should an overlapping doubling and a reciprocal inhibition of intentions arise here? A primordial impression can only fade away in a single sense, can only sink back into retention in a single sense. It is inconceivable that it become doubled. The necessity is absolutely unequivocal. But the constancy of protention also belongs to the constitutive process; what is already constituted motivates an indication of something that is to come through its own content; it prefigures an empty horizon of the future, but one equipped with an indeterminately general sense. For example, the thought brewing in me (coming to me without my aid) has a prefiguring horizon of expectation through its style, and that issues in something like open possibilities that are being determined more closely. But also an interruption of the thought or a turning against the expectation, that is, possibilities for the consciousness of the thought's non-being. This becomes even more clear when

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we take a tone or a tonal formation purely as an immanent datum, as a pure sense-datum, without any transcendent apperception. It becomes questionable which tonal phrases will occur there now, how the tonal figure will be pictured—questionable insofar as an

ambiguity of protention develops. There are also, therefore, modalities here in this protentional direction. Thus, our results in relation to the latter also hold *mutatis mutandis* for immanent perception, whose indubitability, that is, whose inability to be modalized is only valid to the extent that it actually accomplishes an original constitution. That concerns the immanent lived-experience that is in the process of becoming to the extent that it moves into the process of becoming in every moment and that it has been given to consciousness as a duration that has just become by virtue of the retentional continuity. No disappointment of the anticipation can summon changes of sense in the backward direction and bedazzle what is actually constituted.

<4. "Types of Lived-Experience" are not Empirical Facts, but Formal Structures of Consciousness as Such>

Going beyond the perceptual sphere, let us now turn to other, non-original lived-experiences. We will be able to expand upon our insights here in an important way. I would like to mention a general observation at the outset. If an external, naturalistic psychology and transcendental philosophy approach the life of consciousness, they will be presented with perceptions, memories, expectations, imaginings, and then further, with judgments, feelings, desires, volitions as special names for types of experiences, and they will appear here as factual types in the realm of human and animal consciousness, similar to biological, psychological occurrences as empirical facts of organic nature.

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But if one has learned to see phenomenologically and has learned to grasp the sense of intentional analysis, if one has—expressed in the form of the Goethian myth—found the way to the mother of knowledge, to its realm of pure consciousness in which all being arises constitutively and from which all knowledge as knowledge of beings has to fashion its ultimate comprehensible clarification, then one will initially make the quite astounding discovery that those types of lived-experience are not a matter of arbitrary special features of an accidental life of consciousness, but rather that terms like "perception," "memory," "expectation," etc., express universal, essential structures, that is, strictly

necessary structures of every conceivable stream of consciousness, thus, so to speak, formal structures of a life of consciousness as such whose profound study and exact conceptual circumscription, whose systematic graduated levels of foundation and genetic development is the first great task of a transcendental phenomenology. It is precisely nothing other than the science of the essential shapes of consciousness as such, as the science of maternal origins.

Thus, the knowledge that perception is an absolutely universal essential structure of consciousness as such has already come to the fore with our analyses of the original constitution of temporal objectlike formations the moment we had distinguished between immanent and transcendent objects: There is no lived-experience conceivable, and there is no nexus of consciousness for lived-experience conceivable, without them being subjected to the law of time-constitution; that is, it is only insofar as it is constituted in the steadily prefigured lawful nexus of primordially impressional, retentional, and protentional intentions. Lived-experience is not only given to consciousness, it is also given as being *originaliter* and as being in the process of becoming and having-just-become. External perception has a certain universality, but one that is noticeably completely different from that of immanent perception. That external perceptions arise in the stream of lived-experience of which we are conscious immanently as perceptually given is a universal fact insofar as an external world of perception is constantly there for us, namely, in the form of some kind of perceptually given external surroundings of a continually constituted lived-body. But the necessity that external perceptions must arise in the immanent stream and must arise from this continually integrally cohesive accomplishment is obviously not a necessity in the same sense: as if consciousness would not be conceivable at all without the like. On the contrary, our intentional analysis here leads us to understand all external perception and all organization of external perceptions; these constitute an infinitely open spatio-temporal-causal world as a developmental whole, and this leads back to a consciousness "before" this development, for which no external being-in-itself can be given at all. Moreover, we see that this development is tied to conditions that signify

facticities for every empirical ego and its individually determinate stream of lived-experience which is examined in pure possibility. Without determinate courses of hyletic data spatial objectlike formations cannot be constituted.

5 <5. Presentifications as Necessary Components of Perceptual Lived-Experience>

Yet we prefer to pursue the path of absolute necessities which takes its point of departure from the necessity of perception as a title of shapes of consciousness, without which no consciousness itself can be. The structure of immanent objects in immanent originality highlights for us the curious fact that we are lead back to elementary, but non-independent components, non-independent as mere phases that present the headwaters of a most pure originality under the rubric of primordial impression. The original consciousness of immanent perception and of every perception is only a most purely original consciousness with respect to a phase; next to that we have components that are not original, no longer originally giving, and here we encounter two types, both presentifications—if this term characterizes precisely a consciousness of something that is not present in the original. On the one hand, we have the character of "still being conscious of," on the other, "not yet conscious of." The one, the retentional, becomes immediately empty, non-intuitable, but it maintains the primordially instituting knowledge, it maintains the sense in its full determination and mode of being. The other expects, anticipates the acquisition of knowledge and has leeways of indeterminacy. In this shape, presentification thus belongs to the original stock of every concrete perceptual lived-experience, and therefore to every lived-experience in general with respect to its immanent constitution; it belongs as a type of function that is non-independent and that makes possible concrete perception.

<6. Presentifications as Independent (Concrete) Lived-Experiences. Concrete Retention and its Modalizations>

But we also certainly have concrete lived-experiences of presentification; we have memories and concrete expectations, and we have here under this rubric intuitive and empty consciousness. Further, we also have concrete empty retentions and not merely non-independent retentional components and continua in the nexus of a perception that is in the process of unfolding.

Let us first consider this kind of concrete presentification. It necessarily attaches to each perception; namely, we no longer speak of a perception after the last phase of the originality of perception has flowed-off, e.g., the moment when the resounding tone ceases, and when this has also become transformed in the retentional phase; we have a momentary continuum of retentions that reproduce in the Now the entire course of the preceding perception in all their phases, and this entire continuum undergoes further transformation at one and the same pace; and as it continually coincides, we become conscious of it as something that has just flowed-off and as something that is simply being pushed back further and further.

Naturally, such a retention, too, has a universal necessity for consciousness insofar as it must be regarded as a continual, immanent perceiving. Necessarily linking up to each lived-experience that has flowed-off is a concrete retention of that very lived-experience. This takes place incidentally in pure passivity in the same manner that original time-consciousness in general (to which this retention belongs), runs its course in steady passivity. The original accomplishment of retention consists solely in helping the emergent consciousness of the temporal objectlike formation to advance, even though with respect to the appearance it does permit this accomplishment to shrivel up ever so quickly and to pass over into an empty, undifferentiated distance. Just as in the change of orientation of spatial distance an outermost distant horizon always presents a "vanishing point"³ in which all phenomenal differentiations of proximity and distance (like all

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other phenomenal differentiations) fade away and disappear, so too [does this occur] in the process of sinking back into the past. All differentiations of succession and the differentiations that are formed in them with respect to content—differentiations that shrivel up more and more—fade away into a temporal distance that has finally effaced all phenomenal differentiations. And yet they are intentionally contained in it in a concealed manner. Out of the distant horizon that is given to us in a non-intuitive manner (and unlike the distant horizon in the consciousness of space that is still intuitively given), this or that can exercise a special allure from something implicit, affecting the ego, steering the ego's interest in a certain direction, and now what is distant emerges once more in the form of a remembering that brings what is distant closer in the form of "re-" or "again."

This can certainly occur without the [active] participation of the ego; a clear remembering can suddenly break through. As we shall soon see, this is certainly something essentially new. But we must say phenomenologically that what presents itself to consciousness in remembering within intentionality and in explicit intuitability gives itself as the same thing that is found *implicit* in retention by virtue of an identifying coinciding of sense with the corresponding accentuated components of retention. The emptiness that seems to be entirely undifferentiated only discloses its hidden sense-manifold in this way: through the transformations that occur when intentional, special moments surface in their particularity from the abiding emptiness, and then through the transition to presentifications that explicitly bring something to intuition. But all such transformations and transitions are in their very sense connected through syntheses of coinciding.

If after this structural analysis we inquire into what happens in the retentional sphere with respect to the belief of being and its modalizations, it will be clear that what holds for the modalization of concrete perceptions must also hold for the modalization of concrete retentions. The intentionality that is put into play does indeed become modified in the retentional transformation, and if perception ceases, then we will have a pure retention and ongoing change. But this change is not an inhibition of the intentions that are put into play; they continue to run their course in the

³ *Abschluß*

concordance of coinciding; the objective sense has the mode of [237]
 straightforward being, but in accordance with the retentional
 transformation, [it has] the altered mode of being-past. A
 becoming-discordant is likewise impossible for the immanent
 objectlike formation in concrete retention, just as in concrete
 perception. That is, doubt and negation are essentially precluded.
 On both accounts we will find that a theory which would limit the
 so-called "evidence" of the givenness of individual being only to
 inner perception, and would deny evidence for concrete retention,
 indeed, a theory that would go so far as to allow actual evidence to
 hold only for the punctual Now of the primordial impression is
 pure non-sense. Where doubt is essentially precluded, and
 negation too, the evidence of being is included.

Let us now continue to consider concrete retentions that follow
 transcendent perceptions. What about modalization with respect to
 them? We see that doubt, that is, a bifurcation in sense-giving, can
 occur in the perceptual sphere by an immanent lived-experience; a
 concrete lived-experience within immanent time carrying out
 within itself a transcendent sense-giving, i.e., "points" beyond
 itself in an anticipatory manner, and is therefore dependent upon
 possible fulfillments in the progression to new such lived-
 experiences. These immanent data can undergo doubled
 apperceptions that are motivated from different sides, and these
 can be mutually inhibiting. In this case, we also speak of a
 radiating back of an inhibition occurring in the course of
 perception, a radiating back into the intentions that were
 previously uninhibited; put more precisely, we speak of its
 radiating back into the retentions and therefore into the past of
 consciousness that is concealed in them. Of course, this holds for
 the concrete retention that endures after perception ceases.
 Accordingly, such a retention can have all modalities insofar as it
 harbors a transcendent intentionality. Indeed, even if it emerges
 from an unbroken perception in unbroken concordance, it can
 subsequently pass over into the mode of doubt and therefore into
 all affiliated modes of being. In order to make this clear, let us
 point out, for example, that an external perception of a thing is not
 something isolated, that it does not constitute existence in an
 isolated manner for itself, but does so in the universal, [238]

transcendental nexus of constituting being—initially in the nexus
 that does not only constitute this one thing in an intuitive manner,
 but intuitively constitutes a far reaching spatio-material
 surrounding. Thus, a discordance can occur in the environing-
 worldly apprehension of the environing-world at the place of this
 or that thing, and this, then, will motivate reinterpretations of
 meaning or doubt beyond this place and with respect to
 givennesses of a past that is still retained in consciousness. For
 example, during a break we hear several piano pieces and have the
 apperception that someone in the next room is playing the piano.
 Suddenly we wonder whether it is not really coming from a
 mechanical apparatus (of a baby grand piano). Doubt is
 immediately carried over into the retentional sphere, namely, to
 the pieces that were previously heard.

15 <7. Empty, Concrete Expectation, Its Modalizations>

We can also gain insight into empty concrete expectations in a
 manner that is quite similar to concrete retentions, both as to the
 necessary universality of their function in consciousness as well as
 in relation to the way in which so-called anticipatory belief (as
 consciousness constituting existence) is to be understood and how
 the corresponding modalizations are to be understood in them.

We distinguish the intentions of expectation that belong
 immediately to the constitution of every perceptual givenness, the
 non-independent protentions, from the concrete expectations that
 present the future concrete nexuses to consciousness in an empty
 manner—to be sure, always referring conjointly to other
 perceptual spheres. The former naturally belong to each moment
 of consciousness, since every lived-experience is co-constituted in
 inner consciousness by protentions. Even concrete expectations, as
 empty, have their latent intentionality that is made explicit in
 intuitive presentifications, parallel to remembering of something
 past; even here we see that the intuitive, explicit presentification,
 the intuitively pictured expectation, is a secondary form: The
 picturing already presupposes empty-consciousness.

Where the modalities of being are concerned, obviously nothing
 else can be said to hold for concrete expectations than what is said

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to hold for expectations which, as protentions, link up to the perceptions themselves. The essentially possible reproductions that are intuitively presentified verify the fact that a transition to negation and to problematic possibilities can only take place through disruptions and overlappings of sense in a way that is entirely similar to what we have studied with respect to perceptions, only that [in the former case] this transition arises precisely in a reproductive form. We observed here as well the difference between [a] the implicit and, as it were, the inauthentic constitution of sense and being regarding empty expectation, and [b] the authentic and explicit sense-constitution of the corresponding expectations that are intuitive and that picture: That we attribute the same sense to the corresponding acts, that we do this takes place by virtue of the synthesis through coinciding in which emptiness is fulfilled. What is intuitable arises here as the intuitive expectation with the character of anticipatory fulfillment. This is obviously a different kind of fulfillment than the fulfillment occurring with the process of bringing empty retentions to intuition; here it is not anticipating but again presentifying. We will certainly have to treat this in a more precise manner.

<8. Concrete, Empty Presentifications of What is (Temporally) Present. Its Modalization>

We must finally point to the fact that there is still another type of empty presentification, namely, the presentification of something present, temporally speaking, but not of something present in the sense of original intuitability. We are familiar with such presentifications as components of all external perceptions; they are connected to the latter as empty horizons. But they also arise in an independent, concrete form, namely, as empty presentations of concrete things surrounding us. For example, if we glance around this room, the view of the windows and doors will awaken in us, immediately, images of the street or of the foyers, but generally in a shape that remains empty. It also belongs to the essence of such empty presentations that they can pass over into intuitive presentifications. Thus, we can at any time make intuitively present the back side of the thing of which we are

emptily conscious, as well as the concrete spatio-material surroundings of which we are emptily conscious; we can do this by imagining that we are walking around the thing or passing through the door to the foyer and then that we are walking out into the street, and now that we are allowing the co-connected series of appearances of all these non-visible sides of the object and of all these objects [themselves] to run their course, namely, the sides and objects in which the present actuality of the thing is exhibited. The series of appearances, which conform to every path of kinaesthetic systems that are given to consciousness as freely at our disposal, can in this case be motivated in an unambiguous or ambiguous manner, that is, the corresponding intentional nexuses can run their course concordantly and in an uninhibited way; or the series of appearances disturbing one another can overlap, thus allowing conflicts to set in; and in this way modalizations are possible. This is intelligible because all of the intentions that are at issue here are reproductions of anticipatory intentions [linked] to reproduced perceptions; these are connected to hypothetical kinaesthetic courses as demanded successions. What is disclosed by bringing something to intuition in a reproductive manner is found *implicit* in the empty presentifications of something present, and this "*implicit*" has its sense precisely in the mode of essentially possible explication.

We could still point to a shape of presentifying something present, and a quite curious shape indeed. I mean empathy as the consciousness through which an alien psychic life can be given to an ego in its life of consciousness. Empathy necessarily arises in its original form in connection with transcendent perception. It is based on the perception of the alien lived-corporeality as a physical thing-like body, by this thing being apprehended through its similarity to my own lived-body as lived-body. In a manner similar to the way in which I become co-conscious of the non-visible aspects of a thing through the empty intentions of perception, through "empathy" I become co-conscious of the alien psychic life, an alien psychic life that is inaccessible to direct perception as such, and for the most part in an empty manner. Thus, empathy means here a level of founded presentation that is connected to the perception of the lived-body-thing, a presentation