

achieves complete givenness in the process that we have described previously, namely, that of the transition from the lowest species of similar elements to the corresponding higher species. In this disclosive process, the universal of mere similarity is given as a higher species, as a *species-universal*.

If we carry out a determinative attitude, a *fundamentally new mode of determination* is given *after the constitution of the universal*. The object that is the subject²¹⁷ *a* is not determined in a manner uniform to *b*, but as an *a*. The thematic grasping of the universal requires moving through the open manifold of any singularities whatsoever lying in the circle of interest concerning content. *Positionality*, where it occurs, is *not carried out* for these singularities, *the mode of being is irrelevant* and can also be a phantasy mode of being from the very outset.²¹⁸ If we focus thematically on such singularities, they will have a *unique relationship to the universal*, precisely *that of the species to its particularizations*. What exists as actual, as what is actually posited is then determined as the actual particularization of the *eidōs*, what is possible, a possible particularization. The new judgment that arises is "*This is an a*," which is to say, it is a particular of the species *a*.

There are other essentially different forms, and not only *the forms* that arise from the previous ones, by, so to speak, *dressing them with concepts*. Up to now, we had placed determined constituted objects in relation [to one another], and had determined relations between determined objects. Each object can be grasped conceptually. If we have judged that *S* is a part of *S_i*, and in this way relating them, then "*S* and *S_i*" can now absorb conceptual determinations by attribution, and this can take place in all cases.

Überhauf-Wefele
<c. As Such-Judgments²¹⁹>

But thinking in general takes on still different and more significant forms. *Thinking, in the form of the function of the "as such,"* governs the entire judicative thinking of the higher level. The universal is constituted, we said, in relation to a field of openness, and with this we have already unleashed *the function of the "whatsoever."* Yet, in a certain way, it is actually already prepared from the very start for judging as a thematic activity: If we have objects pre-given, we can choose any "this" or "that" whatsoever as the determinative theme, we can relate it to this or that other object whatsoever. But the whatsoever, the choosing, and correlatively the indifference also enters as a thematically *formative* activity into the judging itself; it also constitutes, it fashions new forms of objectlike formations, new forms of state-of-affairs and of judgment. Not only do species emerge as objects, but correlative to the species, new thematic formations are constituted. They are *As Such-objects* and *As Such-relations*, i.e., *universal and particular judgments*. The concept of the *objectlike theme* certainly also takes on with this *an essential modification*. For it is fundamentally different <to> have this table here before us thematically and <to> determine it—even if it be determined conceptually as a table—and <to> make a judgment about a table as such. It is, I say, something completely different: instead of making a judgment about this table, even if it stand before us and stand in the illuminated field of interest as a thematic focal point, to make a judgment about any table whatsoever, regardless of which one, to make a judgment about a table as such, whereby the "whatsoever," the "as such," belongs to the thematic center. Now this table is characterized here as example, this whatsoever attaches to it, it is given to consciousness here as this table, but indifferently. It is only a "*representative*," and the theme—and in a *modified way, the subject-theme—is a table as such*. Thus, here the *judging is fundamentally modified*, it is a *positional* activity that operates on an entirely different level, on an altered and complex thematic substratum.

²¹⁷ *Subjektgegenstand*

²¹⁸ For pure universals! For pure *eidē!*

²¹⁹ *Überhaupt-Urteile*

If we have a multiplicity given in the manner of experiencing positionality, and by moving through it, a universal comes to the fore, we will have the determinative attitude, "This is an A," "This is an A, etc." But also: *anything whatsoever that has been extracted, anything whatsoever to be extracted, is an A*; in moving through it, I have the consciousness of the "A again and again," each and every time an A, but also the consciousness of anything whatsoever to be extracted, of "every whatsoever." Likewise with two universals occurring together: *An A as such is B, each one.*

But, *on the other hand* (e.g., when at first a B occurs now and then), the thematic interest can also be directed toward the occurrence of a B as such. Even here the function of the whatsoever plays a role, but in a second form. It is immaterial that *this here is B*, but that *one there is B*. Obviously here again is the particular, "an A," and likewise the indeterminate universal, "some A's," that stand in the subject-position, not an object in the genuine sense, to which object (like a determined table) one would attribute a predicate; and yet it is a theme, a theme being constituted by the higher functions of activity; the entire judgment, and all functions of judgment as relating functions take on a new shape in the consciousness of the "as such," and by assuming the "as such" into a theme. It is evident that the function of the "as such," to which the specification is bound, is a conceptualizing function, that of universal and particular conceptual grasping.

If we sever the *tie to <a> realm of experience*, to a pre-given sphere of constituted objects, if we operate in a scope of pure concepts, in a manifold of possibility in which possible actualities remain indifferent according to their positionality, we gain *pure "as such"-judgments*, judgments that have the character of *judgments of laws*, like, "A triangle has as such three angles"; "An extended object is as such qualified [in some way]"; "A red object as such is colored." The *particular* judgments are expressed as *judgments of possibilities*: "A triangle can have a right angle."

All such judgments thus operate on the ground of pure possibility and say nothing about actuality. If I imagine an extended object in pure possibility, I will find it colored or qualified in some other way. But by modifying in free variation and by holding firm to the extended object, in the free transition

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from the one fiction to any other one whatsoever, and where it is a matter of indifference to me which other it is, I find both the conceptual determinations united, I see them in the transitional consciousness as united as such in lawful regularity. With this, the realm of universal judging is opened up, the realm of law-giving, the knowledge of law-giving for itself and for all judgments as such, and therefore for all possible objectlike formations.

<Supplementary Texts>

<Section 1.

FIRST VERSION OF MAIN TEXT PART 2 (1920/21)>¹

5 <1. The Misunderstanding of Modalities of Being by Logicians [225]
 and Epistemological Psychologists>

10 Thanks to the phenomenological analyses that we have
 undertaken, we now understand the origin of modalizations arising
 in the sphere of perception. We find modal distinctions purely
 with respect to the objective sense of every perception, and the
15 same perceptual object can potentially present itself one time in
 this modality, another time in that modality, or in variable
 modalities, now as existing in pure and simple certainty, now as
 problematically possible in conflict with other problematic
 possibilities, and then as not existing or as existing in fact. On the
20 other hand, the perceptual object is inconceivable without one of
 the modalities we just mentioned, just as it is inconceivable
 without open possibilities, since the perceptual object moves into
 an open future. If we go from the noematic attitude to the noetic
 one, the perceptual lived-experience will likewise be
25 inconceivable without what makes up the modalizing
 accomplishment in the perceptual lived-experience; and this is
 completely clear to us.

¹ Translator: The difference between this first version of Part 2 and the one published above under the heading of "Main Text" concerns §12 through §40. The italicized sections of this text are repetitions of the former. Like the editor of the German edition, I include them here for the sake of coherence.

The following pagination to the German text corresponds to Husserliana XI.

We are therefore in the position to be able to comprehend the bad mistakes into which philosophical logicians and epistemological psychologists have fallen by having believed it necessary to distinguish between the so-called mere presentation and judgment for every perception (and correspondingly for every other consciousness of an object), thus, in this case, to distinguish between the perceptual presentation and the perceptual judgment; here, under the rubric of judgment, one would distinguish between active acceptance and rejection as more specific differentiations.

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They obviously carried over the quite evident distinction between the perceptual object and its modal modes of givenness to the perceptual lived-experience and—since the sense of constitutive analyses were still completely hidden, and since they were even lacking the fundamental distinction between noema and noesis—they made a real distinction in a lived-experiential consciousness out of an irreal distinction; indeed, they even divided a lived-experiential consciousness into separable elements of lived-experience. If an object appears in the flesh in the perceptual lived-experience, and is thereby characterized in this or that mode of being, this does not mean that perception consists of two elements or layers of which the one constitutes the object in its presentation in the flesh and the other, building upon it, apportions to the object “being” or “non-being,” etc. According to Brentano and his school, with which Meinong was also affiliated, there is supposed to be one unique perceptual presentation that presents² the object in the flesh, and in addition to this a judgment that now actively accepts, now rejects, affirming or denying what is presented. In principle, however, those judgments do not have to be supplemented, and in this case we would have a mere presentation.

But according to our analyses, it is clear that there is not anything, and there cannot be anything, on the order of mere perceptual presentations, neither as particular lived-experiences nor only as sublayers in lived-experiences that are self-contained in an intimately inherent manner. A perceptual presentation would certainly be a consciousness, a consciousness that gives an object

originaliter. But such a consciousness would not be anything other than that system of intentions of the structure described, and it would be entirely inconceivable if it were anything but that. Such a system, however, is necessarily a system in which the intentions run their course either in original concordance and are unbroken, and if this is the case then this mode is called nothing other than perceptual faith, and the object, existent. Or a rupture ensues and then we have the other possibilities that have been prefigured; the intentions themselves undergo a thorough internal recasting of their concordance, even though the systematic structure may be the same as the systematic structure that constitutes its presentation in the flesh. Belief and the modification of belief is not something added to intentions. The fact of being non-inhibited and of being inhibited by parallel and partially coinciding intentions is not something that is juxtaposed to intentions; it is not a new supervening lived-experience called belief, judgment, but precisely a recasting of concordance, a modification that makes possible the nature of consciousness as consciousness, and in fact, as we will hear, makes possible every consciousness. Thus, belief as being certain, as negation, as affirmation, etc., is to the so-called perceptual presentation as the timbre is to the tone or as the tonal intensity is to the tone. One cannot separate the tone and then add the tonal intensity to it, although the analogy is naturally precarious and to be taken *cum grano salis*. One should not treat the perceptual object as such and the object as such presented in a different manner, that is, one should not treat what we termed either the objective sense or the noema, as a piece in consciousness, as generally happens in the traditional literature that is still unaffected by phenomenology. One must not ignore all the multifaceted and actually demonstrable structures of lived-experience in which sense is constituted in the process of perceiving as an intentional unity, and inseparably from this, the being-modality of sense. And one must consequently not pass off the mode of being as something that the judicative ego adds to the sense which would, as it were, already reach the ego in advance as ready-made.

But if one pursues a deeper analysis, it will be clear that corresponding to the unitary element of the object in the noema is

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² *vorstellig macht*

a manifold of intentions in the course of the lived-experience; these intentions in all of their elements are a consciousness through and through, and as a consciousness they have those uninhibited concordances or inhibitions and conflict; and it will become clear that this modalizing process that recasts the hue of the whole of consciousness is what necessarily constitutes the mode of being in relation to sense. Accordingly, in the case of the modality of problematic [possibility], one will also not interpret, as does happen, indecisiveness as a cessation of the putative perceptual judgment, and will not altogether reduce this merely to positive and negative believing or even only to active acceptance and rejection. Positive belief designates: (1) the primordial mode of consciousness, consciousness that is unbroken, but that is also still unaffected by any breaks. (2) Active acceptance, confirmation is that consciousness of unbroken concordance that is restored after undergoing a break; it is a concordance after overcoming the inner bifurcation. This overcoming is carried out in the original form in the perceptual progression of concordant fulfillment as the resolution of inhibition from the side of the one party of the conflicting intentions, whereby the other simultaneously gets annulled in the form of being crossed out, in the form of negation. Every affirmation also entails a negation.

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The one thing that we have not taken into consideration and that will yet play its role is the participation of the activity of the ego. If the ego executes an act of affirmation (of active acceptance), it activates, it lives through those particular intentions, those of concordance, while the annulment of the opposing intentions, as suppressed, takes place precisely in the implicit form of emptiness, as a modalization in subconsciousness. On the other hand: Negation as an act is the activation of this crossing out in the transition from the activation of the opposing intentions to the living through of concordance or vice versa. There isn't the slightest reason to exclude the mode of being undecided, the mode of question, or what amounts to the same thing, the mode of the consciousness of enticement and of probability from this set in which the latter consciousness always plays a part as an intermediate stage with a corresponding accomplishment of sense, questionable, problematically possible sense. Even here we have

different forms of execution on the part of the ego. None of this excludes the fact that decisions have a priority over the indecisive uncertainties for logic as a normative science. But one must first bring it to light, and then also do justice to the modes of indecisiveness and to their norms.

<2. Non-Prominence and the Prominence of Sense and Modes of Being for Consciousness>

Before we advance beyond the realm of perception in which our analyses were carried out, let us develop the results of our analyses a little bit. The distinction between the perceptual sense and its modes of being did not imply a separation for either perceptual lived-experience or the perceived object. In this respect we have to consider the following. There is no rupture in the origin of perception where naive perception is concerned; it is simply a consciousness of the perceptual object. If the ego is active, that is, if it grasps [objects] in an attentive manner, it will grasp the object *simpliciter*, and here mere objective sense and mode of being are not distinguished at all for consciousness, and the objective sense and the mode of originality are distinguished just as little; and in general they are distinguished just as little as the results of our reflective analyses and our scientific conceptualizations of perception would themselves become an object [of perception]. In the normal attitude of the act, of the "I perceive," the grasping bears on the unity that is constituted in a continuous coinciding as this object becoming there. In this case, [we call] the objective sense in the original mode of being that which is in a continual coincidence, that which is, so to speak, continually identified in the process of constitution; it is the correlate of the unbroken concordance of original intentions. It is only in a transition to discordance and therefore to modalizing transformations that sense and modality of being are first set apart from each other in a relation of contrast; we recognize this when we look back at the perceptual object as it was given prior to the break, and when we also look at the objects that were then given together with this and as conflicting. Seen more precisely, under the rubric of "mere" object-sense, something takes on the

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character of an object that previously did not have this character; it was itself not there like an object in the simplicity of perceptual consciousness. A coinciding and an identification take place that had not existed before; a consciousness of an object is established that had not previously existed: If the pure and simple external This-Here, the external perceptual object, has already been constituted, then the sense of this object and its mode of being will now be constituted, and this constitution is not itself an external perception, but rather a consciousness founded in external perception. It is likewise an originally giving consciousness if it has arisen in the way that we are taking it here, namely, fashioned from the reflective attitude on the perceptual object as such. But even though it is a consciousness that fashions its object in its full originality, it is not a perceiving, not a grasping *originaliter* of an individual object or even of a thing. To be sure, senses are not things. We will have something to say about this consciousness later, for its objects are also the principle themes of interest for us logicians. If the disruptive discordance has been overcome, a contrast between sense and modality arises, "being" gets the new character, "it is actually so"; but then in the active perceiving that now once more devotes itself to the object and to its acquisition of knowledge, the object will once again be given as an object in a straightforward manner; that is, as we continue to perceive, a constant sameness is given in an original mode of being, but without the distinction between sense and mode of being. Once again, we have the same object in a straightforward manner, just as if a break had never occurred.

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One can still sense a remnant of unclarity. We have an original shape of continuous perception as a system of concordance. Perception has its perceptual object, the existing object, the unity of just this concordant ratification of the self, which proceeds in an unbroken manner.

If a break occurs, [through] doubt, [or through] crossing out, we will have a "revaluing," a cancellation of this concordant nexus that no longer proceeds in an unbroken manner; rather [we will have a nexus that] becomes modified through the break itself. What is crossed out there is nothing other than the object *simpliciter* as "being." And we see that the spared, remaining

object does not consist of two components, "sense" or content and "being," but rather is precisely existing object or object *simpliciter*. A perception and a crossed out perception having the same "content" now have something in common, and that is precisely the content of the perceptual lived-experience and of the negation of perception. But this is not something general that is differentiated; it is not a part that gets a supplementary part through the "quality of belief." The noetic content of the negation of perception also "contains" the perceptual belief, but as crossed out, or rather, "being," but as crossed out. Can more still be said about this?

In the case of other modalizations, like negation for example, we do not have an object *simpliciter* from the very beginning without inner differentiations of sense and the mode of being, but rather the negated object, or in problematic consciousness, the problematic object. It seems that a bifurcation is essentially situated here in the dyad of sense and modality corresponding to the fact that in general the consciousness of such modal transformations is indeed more intricate than pure and simple perceiving.

<3. The Modalization of Immanent Objects>

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Let us get first get clear about what can be used from our results vis-à-vis immanent perception. We see without further ado that the discourse of the being of an immanent object and the characterization of immanent perceiving as a certainty of being essentially leads back to the same sources as the discourse of the being of the external object and perceptual belief. Even the immanent object is constituted in internal consciousness and is constituted through the systems of intentionality, the systems of primordial impression, retentions, protentions, which pass over into each other in steady concordance. Correlative to the unbrokenness of these original intentions is again "being" situated in the consciousness of the object. We are conscious of every one of our lived-experiences as being; we are certain of them in a straightforward manner, and this certainty means the same thing as the certainty of the external object in unbroken external

perception. But now we understand the difference and the reason why we could not profitably link the doctrine of modalities to immanent perceptions. An immanent object can in principle only be given with certainty. Original constitution, which lets it arise as an *esse in percipi*, does not in principle admit of any modalization, of any dual apprehension in conflict. There is not an apperceptive apprehension here in the same sense as there is in external perception; apperceptive apprehension already presupposes immanent constitution as its foundation. But this is, by its very nature, a steady, passive process of intentional concordance in the succession of primordial impression and retentions.

Still, we must be more careful: On the one hand, seen more precisely, modalization is indeed possible for immanent objects. The extent to which they are already constituted in the flux of their becoming (and they are certainly objects of immanent perception only as becoming), is the extent to which there is no way of speaking of modalization. The lived-experience, which has already been constituted as present and together with it as just past, cannot be subject to doubt and therefore cannot be negated, either. How should an overlapping doubling and a reciprocal inhibition of intentions arise here? A primordial impression can only fade away in a single sense, can only sink back into retention in a single sense. It is inconceivable that it become doubled. The necessity is absolutely unequivocal. But the constancy of protention also belongs to the constitutive process; what is already constituted motivates an indication of something that is to come through its own content; it prefigures an empty horizon of the future, but one equipped with an indeterminately general sense. For example, the thought brewing in me (coming to me without my aid) has a prefiguring horizon of expectation through its style, and that issues in something like open possibilities that are being determined more closely. But also an interruption of the thought or a turning against the expectation, that is, possibilities for the consciousness of the thought's non-being. This becomes even more clear when we take a tone or a tonal formation purely as an immanent datum, as a pure sense-datum, without any transcendent apperception. It becomes questionable which tonal phrases will occur there now, how the tonal figure will be pictured—questionable insofar as an

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ambiguity of protention develops. There are also, therefore, modalities here in this protentional direction. Thus, our results in relation to the latter also hold *mutatis mutandis* for immanent perception, whose indubitability, that is, whose inability to be modalized is only valid to the extent that it actually accomplishes an original constitution. That concerns the immanent lived-experience that is in the process of becoming to the extent that it moves into the process of becoming in every moment and that it has been given to consciousness as a duration that has just become by virtue of the retentional continuity. No disappointment of the anticipation can summon changes of sense in the backward direction and bedazzle what is actually constituted.

<4. "Types of Lived-Experience" are not Empirical Facts, but Formal Structures of Consciousness as Such>

Going beyond the perceptual sphere, let us now turn to other, non-original lived-experiences. We will be able to expand upon our insights here in an important way. I would like to mention a general observation at the outset. If an external, naturalistic psychology and transcendental philosophy approach the life of consciousness, they will be presented with perceptions, memories, expectations, imaginings, and then further, with judgments, feelings, desires, volitions as special names for types of experiences, and they will appear here as factual types in the realm of human and animal consciousness, similar to biological, psychological occurrences as empirical facts of organic nature. [233]

But if one has learned to see phenomenologically and has learned to grasp the sense of intentional analysis, if one has—expressed in the form of the Goethian myth—found the way to the mother of knowledge, to its realm of pure consciousness in which all being arises constitutively and from which all knowledge as knowledge of beings has to fashion its ultimate comprehensible clarification, then one will initially make the quite astounding discovery that those types of lived-experience are not a matter of arbitrary special features of an accidental life of consciousness, but rather that terms like "perception," "memory," "expectation," etc., express universal, essential structures, that is, strictly

necessary structures of every conceivable stream of consciousness, thus, so to speak, formal structures of a life of consciousness as such whose profound study and exact conceptual circumscription, whose systematic graduated levels of foundation and genetic development is the first great task of a transcendental phenomenology. It is precisely nothing other than the science of the essential shapes of consciousness as such, as the science of maternal origins.

Thus, the knowledge that perception is an absolutely universal essential structure of consciousness as such has already come to the fore with our analyses of the original constitution of temporal objectlike formations the moment we had distinguished between immanent and transcendent objects: There is no lived-experience conceivable, and there is no nexus of consciousness for lived-experience conceivable, without them being subjected to the law of time-constitution; that is, it is only insofar as it is constituted in the steadily prefigured lawful nexus of primordially impressional, retentional, and protentional intentions. Lived-experience is not only given to consciousness, it is also given as being *originaliter* and as being in the process of becoming and having-just-become. External perception has a certain universality, but one that is noticeably completely different from that of immanent perception. That external perceptions arise in the stream of lived-experience of which we are conscious immanently as perceptually given is a universal fact insofar as an external world of perception is constantly there for us, namely, in the form of some kind of perceptually given external surroundings of a continually constituted lived-body. But the necessity that external perceptions must arise in the immanent stream and must arise from this continually integrally cohesive accomplishment is obviously not a necessity in the same sense: as if consciousness would not be conceivable at all without the like. On the contrary, our intentional analysis here leads us to understand all external perception and all organization of external perceptions; these constitute an infinitely open spatio-temporal-causal world as a developmental whole, and this leads back to a consciousness "before" this development, for which no external being-in-itself can be given at all. Moreover, we see that this development is tied to conditions that signify

facticities for every empirical ego and its individually determinate stream of lived-experience which is examined in pure possibility. Without determinate courses of hyletic data spatial objectlike formations cannot be constituted.

5 <5. Presentifications as Necessary Components of Perceptual Lived-Experience>

Yet we prefer to pursue the path of absolute necessities which takes its point of departure from the necessity of perception as a title of shapes of consciousness, without which no consciousness itself can be. The structure of immanent objects in immanent originality highlights for us the curious fact that we are lead back to elementary, but non-independent components, non-independent as mere phases that present the headwaters of a most pure originality under the rubric of primordial impression. The original consciousness of immanent perception and of every perception is only a most purely original consciousness with respect to a phase; next to that we have components that are not original, no longer originally giving, and here we encounter two types, both presentifications—if this term characterizes precisely a consciousness of something that is not present in the original. On the one hand, we have the character of "still being conscious of," on the other, "not yet conscious of." The one, the retentional, becomes immediately empty, non-intuitable, but it maintains the primordially instituting knowledge, it maintains the sense in its full determination and mode of being. The other expects, anticipates the acquisition of knowledge and has leeways of indeterminacy. In this shape, presentification thus belongs to the original stock of every concrete perceptual lived-experience, and therefore to every lived-experience in general with respect to its immanent constitution; it belongs as a type of function that is non-independent and that makes possible concrete perception.

<6. Presentifications as Independent (Concrete) Lived-Experiences. Concrete Retention and its Modalization>

But we also certainly have concrete lived-experiences of presentification; we have memories and concrete expectations, and we have here under this rubric intuitive and empty consciousness. Further, we also have concrete empty retentions and not merely non-independent retentional components and continua in the nexus of a perception that is in the process of unfolding.

Let us first consider this kind of concrete presentification. It necessarily attaches to each perception; namely, we no longer speak of a perception after the last phase of the originality of perception has flowed-off, e.g., the moment when the resounding tone ceases, and when this has also become transformed in the retentional phase; we have a momentary continuum of retentions that reproduce in the Now the entire course of the preceding perception in all their phases, and this entire continuum undergoes further transformation at one and the same pace; and as it continually coincides, we become conscious of it as something that has just flowed-off and as something that is simply being pushed back further and further.

Naturally, such a retention, too, has a universal necessity for consciousness insofar as it must be regarded as a continual, immanent perceiving. Necessarily linking up to each lived-experience that has flowed-off is a concrete retention of that very lived-experience. This takes place incidentally in pure passivity in the same manner that original time-consciousness in general (to which this retention belongs), runs its course in steady passivity. The original accomplishment of retention consists solely in helping the emergent consciousness of the temporal objectlike formation to advance, even though with respect to the appearance it does permit this accomplishment to shrivel up ever so quickly and to pass over into an empty, undifferentiated distance. Just as in the change of orientation of spatial distance an outermost distant horizon always presents a "vanishing point"³ in which all phenomenal differentiations of proximity and distance (like all

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other phenomenal differentiations) fade away and disappear, so too [does this occur] in the process of sinking back into the past. All differentiations of succession and the differentiations that are formed in them with respect to content—differentiations that shrivel up more and more—fade away into a temporal distance that has finally effaced all phenomenal differentiations. And yet they are intentionally contained in it in a concealed manner. Out of the distant horizon that is given to us in a non-intuitive manner (and unlike the distant horizon in the consciousness of space that is still intuitively given), this or that can exercise a special allure from something implicit, affecting the ego, steering the ego's interest in a certain direction; and now what is distant emerges once more in the form of a remembering that brings what is distant closer in the form of "re-" or "again."

This can certainly occur without the [active] participation of the ego; a clear remembering can suddenly break through. As we shall soon see, this is certainly something essentially new. But we must say phenomenologically that what presents itself to consciousness in remembering within intentionality and in explicit intuitability gives itself as the same thing that is found *implicit* in retention by virtue of an identifying coinciding of sense with the corresponding accentuated components of retention. The emptiness that seems to be entirely undifferentiated only discloses its hidden sense-manifold in this way: through the transformations that occur when intentional, special moments surface in their particularity from the abiding emptiness, and then through the transition to presentifications that explicitly bring something to intuition. But all such transformations and transitions are in their very sense connected through syntheses of coinciding.

If after this structural analysis we inquire into what happens in the retentional sphere with respect to the belief of being and its modalizations, it will be clear that what holds for the modalization of concrete perceptions must also hold for the modalization of concrete retentions. The intentionality that is put into play does indeed become modified in the retentional transformation, and if perception ceases, then we will have a pure retention and ongoing change. But this change is not an inhibition of the intentions that are put into play; they continue to run their course in the

concordance of coinciding; the objective sense has the mode of [237] straightforward being, but in accordance with the retentional transformation, [it has] the altered mode of being-past. A becoming-discordant is likewise impossible for the immanent objectlike formation in concrete retention, just as in concrete perception. That is, doubt and negation are essentially precluded. On both accounts we will find that a theory which would limit the so-called "evidence" of the givenness of individual being only to inner perception, and would deny evidence for concrete retention, indeed, a theory that would go so far as to allow actual evidence to hold only for the punctual Now of the primordial impression is pure non-sense. Where doubt is essentially precluded, and negation too, the evidence of being is included.

Let us now continue to consider concrete retentions that follow transcendent perceptions. What about modalization with respect to them? We see that doubt, that is, a bifurcation in sense-giving, can occur in the perceptual sphere by an immanent lived-experience; a concrete lived-experience within immanent time carrying out within itself a transcendent sense-giving, i.e., "points" beyond itself in an anticipatory manner, and is therefore dependent upon possible fulfillments in the progression to new such lived-experiences. These immanent data can undergo doubled perceptions that are motivated from different sides, and these can be mutually inhibiting. In this case, we also speak of a radiating back of an inhibition occurring in the course of perception, a radiating back into the intentions that were previously uninhibited; put more precisely, we speak of its radiating back into the retentions and therefore into the past of consciousness that is concealed in them. Of course, this holds for the concrete retention that endures after perception ceases. Accordingly, such a retention can have all modalities insofar as it harbors a transcendent intentionality. Indeed, even if it emerges from an unbroken perception in unbroken concordance, it can subsequently pass over into the mode of doubt and therefore into all affiliated modes of being. In order to make this clear, let us point out, for example, that an external perception of a thing is not something isolated, that it does not constitute existence in an isolated manner for itself, but does so in the universal, [238]

transcendental nexus of constituting being—initially in the nexus that does not only constitute this one thing in an intuitive manner, but intuitively constitutes a far reaching spatio-material surrounding. Thus, a discordance can occur in the enviroing-worldly apprehension of the enviroing-world at the place of this or that thing, and this, then, will motivate reinterpretations of meaning or doubt beyond this place and with respect to givennesses of a past that is still retained in consciousness. For example, during a break we hear several piano pieces and have the apperception that someone in the next room is playing the piano. Suddenly we wonder whether it is not really coming from a mechanical apparatus (of a baby grand piano). Doubt is immediately carried over into the retentional sphere, namely, to the pieces that were previously heard.

15 <7. Empty, Concrete Expectation. Its Modalizations>

We can also gain insight into empty concrete expectations in a manner that is quite similar to concrete retentions, both as to the necessary universality of their function in consciousness as well as in relation to the way in which so-called anticipatory belief (as consciousness constituting existence) is to be understood and how the corresponding modalizations are to be understood in them.

We distinguish the intentions of expectation that belong immediately to the constitution of every perceptual givenness, the non-independent protentions, from the concrete expectations that present the futur concrete nexuses to consciousness in an empty manner—to be sure, always referring conjointly to other perceptual spheres. The former naturally belong to each moment of consciousness, since every lived-experience is co-constituted in inner consciousness by protentions. Even concrete expectations, as empty, have their latent intentionality that is made explicit in intuitive presentifications, parallel to remembering of something past; even here we see that the intuitive, explicit presentification, the intuitively pictured expectation, is a secondary form: The picturing already presupposes empty-consciousness.

Where the modalities of being are concerned, obviously nothing else can be said to hold for concrete expectations than what is said

to hold for expectations which, as protentions, link up to the perceptions themselves. The essentially possible reproductions [239]

5 through diremptions and overlappings of sense in a way that is entirely similar to what we have studied with respect to perceptions, only that [in the former case] this transition arises precisely in a reproductive form. We observed here as well the difference between [a] the implicit and, as it were, the inauthentic constitution of sense and being regarding empty expectation, and 10 [b] the authentic and explicit sense-constitution of the corresponding expectations that are intuitive and that picture: That we attribute the same sense to the corresponding acts, that we do this takes place by virtue of the synthesis through coinciding in 15 which emptiness is fulfilled. What is intuitable arises here as the intuitive expectation with the character of anticipatory fulfillment. This is obviously a different kind of fulfillment than the fulfillment occurring with the process of bringing empty retentions to intuition; here it is not anticipating but again presenting. We 20 will certainly have to treat this in a more precise manner.

<8. Concrete, Empty Presentifications of What is (Temporally)
Present. Its Modalization>

We must finally point to the fact that there is still another type of empty presentification, namely, the presentification of 25 something present, temporally speaking, but not of something present in the sense of original intuitability. We are familiar with such presentifications as components of all external perceptions; they are connected to the latter as empty horizons. But they also arise in an independent, concrete form, namely, as empty 30 presentifications of concrete things surrounding us. For example, if we glance around this room, the view of the windows and doors will awaken in us, immediately, images of the street or of the foyers, but generally in a shape that remains empty. It also belongs to the essence of such empty presentifications that they can pass over 35 into intuitive presentifications. Thus, we can at any time make intuitively present the back side of the thing of which we are

emptily conscious, as well as the concrete spatio-material surroundings of which we are emptily conscious; we can do this by imagining that we are walking around the thing or passing through the door to the foyer and then that we are walking out into 5 the street, and now that we are allowing the co-connected series of appearances of all these non-visible sides of the object and of all these objects [themselves] to run their course, namely, the sides and objects in which the present actuality of the thing is exhibited. The series of appearances, which conform to every path of 10 kinaesthetic systems that are given to consciousness as freely at our disposal, can in this case be motivated in an unambiguous or ambiguous manner, that is, the corresponding intentional nexuses can run their course concordantly and in an uninhibited way; or 15 the series of appearances disturbing one another can overlap, thus allowing conflicts to set in; and in this way modalizations are possible. This is intelligible because all of the intentions that are at issue here are reproductions of anticipatory intentions [linked] to reproduced perceptions; these are connected to hypothetical kinaesthetic courses as demanded successions. What is disclosed 20 by bringing something to intuition in a reproductive manner is found *implicit* in the empty presentifications of something present, and this "*implicit*" has its sense precisely in the mode of essentially possible explication.

We could still point to a shape of presentifying something present, and a quite curious shape indeed. I mean empathy as the 25 consciousness through which an alien psychic life can be given to an ego in its life of consciousness. Empathy necessarily arises in its original form in connection with transcendent perception. It is based on the perception of the alien lived-corporeality as a physical thing-like body, by this thing being apprehended through 30 its similarity to my own lived-body as lived-body. In a manner similar to the way in which I become co-conscious of the non-visible aspects of a thing through the empty intentions of perception, through "empathy" I become co-conscious of the alien psychic life, an alien psychic life that is inaccessible to direct 35 perception as such, and for the most part in an empty manner. Thus, empathy means here a level of founded presentation that is connected to the perception of the lived-body-thing, a presentation

which, when brought to intuition, has its own mode of bringing to intuition and its own mode of fulfillment. It is an empty making co-present, a presentification of a consciousness that is made co-present and that belongs to the lived-body, a consciousness, however, whose process of bringing to intuition certainly has to embark upon quite different paths than those peculiar to the non-visible aspects of the thing-like body. Even here it can result in modalizations by means of doubt. The lived-experiences of consciousness that are indicated through the medium of lived-corporeality and of expression that is conveyed in a lived-bodily manner emerge in an ambiguous and discordant way. We will not go into this here; our only concern is to give examples of the empty presentifications of something present. [241]

<9. Even the Presentifications of Something Present are Universal Occurrences of Consciousness>

They are nevertheless examples from the sphere of transcendence, and so it appears that we are not dealing with completely universal occurrences here. In fact, one might like to maintain that if every conceivable consciousness should contain the shapes of empty-presentifications of something present, this would also have to be manifest if we were to bracket all transcendent world constitution from the immanent realm. But an immanent present is indeed *eo ipso* given in the flesh, constituted in inner consciousness, that is, not merely in a presentified present. However, this is not a conclusive argument. Immanent perception and the presentification of something perceived are perhaps compatible in a certain way. I mean in this way: Everything that we designate by the term association is characterized phenomenologically as a connection of consciousness concerning the process of one thing recalling another, a connection that exists between the so-called associates. It is not a mere objective fact that the thought of "Vesuvius" reminds me of the thought of "Naples"; and when given to consciousness, both thoughts are not merely juxtaposed or in succession; rather, one of them refers to the other: within the consciousness of one of them, there is a pointing to the consciousness of the other. But "pointings" do not

merely occur within the consciousness of transcendence, but also within immanence, and among them even those that go from one simultaneous thing to another, and from one present thing to another. For example, if color data occur together with olfactory data once or even often, these colors and these smells will not only be there together again in the new case, but will have their integral togetherness given to consciousness: Connected to immanent data are indicators⁴ of something simultaneously given, and the givenness is not an obstacle to an indicating consciousness connected to another [datum]. But if the indicated data do not emerge along with the others, they will be "lacking" for consciousness; the indications are then empty and at the same time, inhibited. I mean, in other words, that even this kind of presentification of something present has its universal significance and is a matter of concern for us here. [242]

<10. Fundamental Types of "Presentations">

We have spoken of several types of empty modes of consciousness of something individual, each one of which referred us back to intuitions; for we could only genuinely speak of their intentional content and their modalization through the explication of the corresponding intuition. We will have to reflect upon these now. Let us first review the general typicality of the presentations of something individual, that is, the typicality of all the shapes of the passive consciousness of something individual, just as we have already come to see them. All activity of the ego and its special accomplishments, above all those of theoretical thought, of identifying, of differentiating, of predicating, etc., were outside of our thematic interest in our previous considerations. The following fundamental types can be distinguished:

(1) The radical distinction between intuitive or full presenting and the non-intuitive, empty presenting. Empty presenting is an implicit, inauthentic presenting; it only contains within itself sense and modes of being *implicite*, and further it contains precisely everything that can actually and genuinely be found only within

⁴ *Vorstellungen*

explicit consciousness. "Actually finding" is precisely the intuition-of-the-self and taking something constituted in a living manner from the vivacity of a process of intuitive constitution. What empty consciousness harbors within itself *implicite* is not actually constituted in a process of manifold intentions that carry out within themselves a unity of sense-giving accomplishment. One can therefore also designate the opposition [between intuitive and non-intuitive, full and empty] as the opposition between genuine and non-genuine consciousness or between explicit and implicit consciousness. But as we know, the mode of the non-genuine, of empty intentions, is indeed essentially fundamental for making every explicit and concrete consciousness possible. No concrete object can be constituted for consciousness without the co-functioning of empty horizons; what is required is a constant intertwining of fullness and emptiness.

(2) If we consider empty consciousness, we can distinguish, in [243]

general, between empty retentions and empty protentions. From now on, we use the latter term in general for any type of consciousness that is not only an expectation in the customary sense, but also for everything that is essentially related to it. Although we had distinguished between expectations and presentifications of something present, there is a unitary character of the term, protention. This unitary character of protention, and its radical distinction to the type, retention, will be attested to by its features which are in principle distinctive—distinctive features with respect to the corresponding processes of bringing to intuition and fulfillments, as well as modalizations.

(3) Therefore, when we consider intuitive consciousness, which in its very typicality corresponds in a certain way to empty presentations to which intuitive consciousness can refer, we encounter the radical difference between perception and reproduction. Perception is a giving consciousness *originaliter* of something individual. The object is constituted and, if you will, produced in its very sense and mode of being in the primordial mode, in originality. But reproduction reproduces, reconstitutes; it carries out constitution in a peculiar modification, in the mode of "after a fashion," whereby it gives itself in itself as modification,

and refers back to original consciousness according to all its components and accomplishments.

But that is also possible in a different way: One peculiarly characteristic way is the mode of remembering that we analyzed earlier in detail and in relation to which we clarified what is peculiar to a reproduction in general. It is a reproduction in the narrow sense; its peculiar nature is to refer to something that was previously perceived in the same immanent stream. Its object is characterized as an object that has been, an object of a perception that has been in the same stream of consciousness. The more general character of reproduction as a modification of perception and something perceived in the mode of "after a fashion" however also occurs in another form, which, as we will see is essentially different: in the form of anticipatory, intuitive presentification of something future and in the form of the intuitive presentification of something present. One usually understands by the term "rememberings" intuitive reproductions in the narrow sense, that is, more or less clear reproductions of the past, memories of the past. One could be tempted to use this term broadly to refer to all reproductions, and to speak of memories of the future and memories of the present. In any case, we lack an unequivocal, generally encompassing term, unless we use the term presentification. Or the term, phantasy. The latter, however, is dangerously ambiguous; but the former term is also the only useful term at our disposal if we should deal with all modes of consciousness of individual being, modes of consciousness, that is, that stand in contrast to perception: the intuitable as well the non-intuitable lived-experiences. All of them "presentify" insofar as they make something present to consciousness, but not in an original conscious-having.

One must become quite familiar with their essential differences, and one must initially guard against taking empty presentifications for merely obscure reproductions, as if, in the gradation of the clarity of reproduction, emptiness would only signify the lowest level of clarity and even within this level of clarity, e.g., intuitive phantasy would be nuanced. The object in question is actually constituted there if the "phantasy" is cloudy, as long as the phantasy is, in general, an intuition in a precise mirroring of the

intentional process of perception. The object is structured, as it were, before the reproductive eye as an intentional unity of its manifold. If the phantasy is intermittent, then the constitutive processes will cease, and an empty consciousness will step in in order for it then to be transformed once more into an actual reproductive constitution. Nothing happens in empty consciousness; it does not contain any constitutive structure; there is nothing to look for in it. What can be said about it can only be said by reason of its process of bringing to intuition. If we clearly recognize, essentially and universally, that every empty presentation has its process of bringing to intuition and does not at all accord with just any intuition, and if we clearly recognize what this accord means, then we will realize that an empty presentation in general is only the potentiality of what lies in the corresponding intuition as actuality. The process of bringing to intuition itself (disclosure), the transition from empty presentation in its corresponding intuition is the actualization of the potentiality of constitution which lay in the empty presentation precisely as mere potency. In the latter, sense was not a given sense, not an appearing sense.

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The phenomenon of transition is characterized as a synthesis through coinciding of the empty presentation and intuition, of the potency of a constitution and of the corresponding actual constitution; thus, with respect to sense, it is the agreement between potential and actual sense, or again, object. The presented object in its sense and being is not a doubled one, but rather a single object that, on the one hand, is now merely and empty presented, empty meant and, on the other, completely intuitive. Because there is in this way a possible empty presentation corresponding to each intuition, a possible intuiting corresponding to each empty presentation, and with this essential kind of synthesis, we witness not only an essential characteristic of the realm of presentation, but generally, of the realm of consciousness as such with respect to all levels, no matter how high they may be (as will be demonstrated). Here, where presentations are concerned, one must initially become completely clear about what is peculiar to this "emptiness," to this implicit sense-giving, or better yet, to this potentiality and its disclosure in actuality. This

will turn out to be a point of decisive significance for logic. For (privileging only the theoretical sphere of thought) linguistic thinking in the mode of emptiness plays a constant and entirely essential role. And the logical central questions, the normative ones, those concerning verificatory grounding are related to this linguistic empty thought in a special way. But here I am getting way ahead of myself. First and foremost, what has not at all come to light (but it must now be shown) is the fact that not every adaptation to an intuition shares the same fundamental character, not all of them are giving in the strict and genuine sense.

<11. Fulfilling and Merely Disclosive Intuitions>

Let us consider the mode of remembering. Rememberings are intuitions that are classed among empty presentations belonging to the type, retention. Here, the synthesis is one of disclosive, clarificatory bringing to intuition. We can contrast it with the potential reproductions that, on first glance, appear to be completely equivalent to the reproductions that turn backward, distinguished only by the fact that they are directed ahead to a coexistent present or to a future. But here we will recognize the curious feature that empty protentions as corresponding to intuitive protentions have a dual mode of bringing to intuition, on the one hand, as a fulfilling process of bringing to intuition, and on the other, as non-fulfilling, merely clarificatory. And the expression, bringing to intuition, is appropriate only here. For example, an expectation of the future is intuitively fulfilled if what is expected transpires in perception; but even without that it can be brought to intuition. The intuition is then a mere anticipation of a future perception. Inversely, an empty retention or, if you will, an emptily emerging memory is brought to intuition only in one way. That is, an intuitive remembering will occur if an appropriate intuition is affixed to the empty retention in general.

This distinction between fulfillment and the merely disclosive process of bringing to intuition gives us something to consider. Actually, we are already familiar with this difference from our analyses of perception with respect to their empty horizons. There

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is a difference between merely presentifying in intuition the non-visible side of a perceptual thing in a suitable reproduction, and bringing it to an actually giving perception by walking around it, which is to say, bringing to fulfillment the empty intentions of expectation as perception progresses. In both cases, in both the disclosive process of bringing to intuition and fulfillment, the synthesis is carried out in unbroken concordance. At least, this is the normal case. That something else is also possible, that the disclosure of the empty intention, that the explicating actualization can also bring to light hidden discordances, certainly remains to be seen. But if we stay with the normal case, we will then have in both cases—in both the process of bringing to intuition and fulfillment—precisely an unbroken consciousness of being. Then this means here as well: Where there is no break, there is a thoroughgoing consciousness of being.

But on the other hand we have the great difference that the empty presentation (as an empty intending into the future, so to speak) is “verified,” ratified in the fulfillment, while in the other case, this intending has only been clarified, made intuitive. [In the latter case,] standing here before our eyes is only what was “genuinely” intended [in the intending]. The discourse of the mere disclosure of sense is the most suitable way of speaking here. At all events, intending still remains merely intending. In our way of speaking, the term “intending” often serves to characterize any type of consciousness that is in need of fulfillment, regardless of whether it is an empty or intuitive consciousness. In this concept of intending there is the idea of a claim, demanding precisely fulfillment. Thus, even intuitions can have this indigence; in this case they make mere “claims.” What that means is also at issue here. We grasp an aspect of it now, initially with the statement that not all intuitions can assume the function of entering into a synthesis of fulfillment, that is, of filling it in a verifying manner in their coinciding with empty presentations. Intuitions that have the character of “intendings” cannot fulfill in a verifying manner, and on the other hand, there are indeed intuitions that do not have this character. But insofar as one and the same intuition has a double faceted structure, which is a universal possibility, on the one hand, mere intending, on the other, the opposite, the statement

is naturally valid, namely, that in the former instance the intuition cannot serve to fulfill if it itself requires fulfillment, while in the latter, it very well can.

This characterizes an essential distinction peculiar to intuition (and potentially to the components of intuition, too), and it is a distinction that becomes evident precisely in the dual syntheses of bringing to intuition, now as the fulfilling process of bringing to intuition, now as a mere disclosive process of bringing to intuition, and in the respectively distinctive accomplishments of these processes of bringing to intuition. In order to elucidate this let us first advance the following: Perceptions, but rememberings, too, can fulfill, can serve actual verifications, but never (even if very clear) intuitively pictured expectations, a memory of the future, or even an intuitive presentification of something present, a memory of the present. What is intuitively seen is given in the first group of intuitions, in the other group, it is not given. What does this distinction mean? Naturally it concerns the essentially distinctive way in which the objective sense is constituted in the respective cases, and accordingly the way in which the objective sense is characterized noematically. It is in perception that the object, the object itself, is given, and perception constitutes the object in the mode “itself,” itself in a primary and most original sense, in the sense of being presented in the flesh. In contrast to this, the intuitively pictured expectation does not give the object “itself,” or as we can say in a straightforward but less clear manner, it does not bring the object to givenness. And this is just what we also alluded to when we said that “it anticipates,” it anticipates a self, but it does not give it. A synthesis of fulfillment can take place between an expectation and a perception: What is expected happens. The relationship is one-sided. It is not the perception that is fulfilled in the expectation, but rather, the expectation [that is fulfilled] in the perception. Furthermore, with respect to something expected, an expectation cannot, in principle, be fulfilled in another expectation: The new cannot give anything because it does not itself have anything. What is delivered over in a fulfillment to a consciousness in need of fulfillment, as what should be given appropriately to it, is precisely the self of the object. It thus requires a consciousness that possesses this self. But

it does not only possess it in the form of an original acquisition, namely, in the form of perception, but also in the form of remembering. Even remembering is an intuition that gives. Standing before our eyes in remembering is the object itself, to be sure, in the temporal mode of being-past, and this mode is originally given here. But would it make any sense to deny the possession of the self of the object of remembering because it lacks within itself the privilege of being present in the flesh? Does not this self belong to remembering's own most phenomenological character? How then would evident identification be possible—through which the object is recognizable as identical, recognizable as one and the same subject of its predicates—if not on the basis of repetitive memories? The individual self is thus *a priori* the title for the connectedness of primordially instituting perceptions and the chains of rememberings belonging to them, connectedness through the commonality of the self that is given in all of them as accessible.

<12. Further Clarification of the Difference Between Fulfillment and Disclosure>

20 There are problems that arise here now. We have worked out a clear distinction in intuitions between self-giving and non-self-giving (but merely intuitively presentifying) ones. And at the same time we distinguished within empty presentations (which as such have this in common with the reproductive intuitions, namely, that what they make present to consciousness is not present *originaliter*) those that are disclosed in self-giving reproductions, and those that are disclosed in non-self-giving ones. Empty anticipations are disclosed in intuitive expectations, and both of them can obtain, through suitable perceptions, an entirely different adaptation to a corresponding intuition, that of fulfilling verification, that of an adaptation to a self-giving consciousness. Where empty retentions are concerned, there is only a disclosive process of bringing to intuition, there is only the adaptation that provides a fullness, namely, the adaptation to a remembering, to a self-giving presentation.

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But we must pose a question here. Is not the empty retention fulfilled insofar as it really does take on the fullness of intuition in remembering? Certainly. But according to what has become apparent to us in the meantime it has become clear that we must take hold of a more precise concept of fulfillment. Should fulfillment mean a synthetic consciousness only because one consciousness leads into a corresponding self-giving consciousness and coincides with it, then the disclosure of a retention would naturally also be a fulfillment. On the other hand, if we think of our explication of the concept of intending and the fact that "intending" characterizes a consciousness, which as it were raises a claim that is to be verified in the fulfillment; or, in other words, if we think that the fulfillment of intendings means verification—if we think of the like, then we may not say that retentions find their fulfillment, namely, their verification in the corresponding remembering. Are retentions as such really "intendings" in the sense we have indicated, in the sense of being capable and in need of verification? Certainly, they can also be intendings. But are they not so, then, merely because perceptions, which had been sedimented in them, were already not mere self-givings, but encumbered with anticipations? And is this not shown precisely by the fact that even disclosive remembering is indeed self-giving but at the same time also intending? Thus, this would mean that if a retention can be an intending, then it is also a remembering that discloses the retention, as was the case with the preceding perception. Insofar as this remembering merely discloses, however, it in no way fulfills the empty retention; rather, the fulfillment would have to take place now more than ever; the remembering would have to bring to fulfillment its intending, it would have to bring to fulfillment what, in the intending, is not actually self-giving, but instead [only] points beyond, above all, to new self-giving presentations. The decisive test cases are the purely immanent, fresh retentions that are naturally free from all components of co-intending and their disclosive rememberings that we want to think of as immediately connected to them. An immanent tone that I hear right now breaks off; if I actualize the fresh retention immediately it will become disclosed, but it does not get verified, the intended meaning was

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lacking. And the remembering is likewise free from the intended meaning, hence its renewed repetition does not carry out any further accomplishment of verification either.⁵ We also recall the fact that immediate retention can never be encumbered with doubt and therefore is incapable of modalization; and at the same time we recall that in the case of verification, and not without reason, we think of the opposite, namely, of a possible rejection; we recall that opposing the corroboration occurring through the self that fulfills the intending is also the possibility of the abrogation of the intending through a self that contests it. We keep in mind that the great theme of a fulfilling verification and thus also, so to speak, of a disappointing, abrogating crossing out stands in an essential relation to our theme of modalizations with which we began.

In any case, we have now attained a deeper insight into disclosure and genuine fulfillment. We see that only what we called protention construed in an extremely broadened manner, regardless whether it is intuitive or not, is an intending intention, that is, corresponds to the concept of a consciousness that admits of fulfillment in the sense of verification. Let us not get confused by the fact that even self-giving presentations of any kind (while precisely as self-givings, they are not intendings), can still be intendings, and we understand this by virtue of the fact that self-giving can be imbued with components of intending. Then the presentation will be precisely in need of fulfillment, or if you prefer, open to verification according to facets of its intendings; on the other hand, however, this does not apply with respect to the facets of its actual self-giving. In relation to this latter facet, as we have already recently remarked, it can itself exercise a verificatory accomplishment for the other intendings to which the self-giving can be suited. [251]

30 can be suited.

With respect to the empty intention we must accordingly establish that while it is not a self-giving consciousness, it is still a consciousness that has the self *implicit* within itself. The disclosure discloses what we already find here in empty

⁵ Thus, it was incorrect to speak in the *Ideas* of memories of the future and memories of the present. We must distinguish between memories and expectations, in the broadest sense, retentions and protentions with their intuitions.

potentially, and here the self is already potentially in it. But where there is already precisely an "intending" in the form of *potentia* in the empty presentation, precisely this intending is disclosed and is now intending in the disclosed form: It is then a reproductive intuition, but an intending, protentionally anticipating intuition.

Having clarified the distinction between disclosure and fulfillment we also see the essential ambiguity in speaking of potentiality and actuality. In the disclosure, or as we also put it, clarification, the intentional content hidden in emptiness gets "effectively realized"; it is laid bare, clarified. An intending is effectively realized in the fulfillment, and that is an entirely different sense of effective realization; it is an entirely different accomplishment. The self that was anticipatorily meant, but that was not contained at all in the intending, neither in a concealed nor in an unconcealed form—exactly this self emerges in fulfilling intuition. The fulfilling self lies in the direction of intending, like the target lies in the direction of the arrow. But the intending must first approach what is meant; the arrow must first make its way toward the target, and that takes place in the synthesis of fulfillment. Therefore, the self-giving intuition follows the protention as a new one, while the self-giving intuition follows the retention as a familiar one, as a mere resumption of the self-giving perception from which the retention has arisen.

Intention, directed toward a retentional past, is "fulfilled" in a certain way, too, while an intention into the future, a protention, is not fulfilled. Even here we must be able to distinguish in a protention between what in it is empty consciousness, and what in it is intention. It is intention through kinaesthetic motivation. [252]

<13. The Passive Processes of Experience>

30 These observations have enabled us to gain an understanding for a most universal structure of consciousness in general. All life of consciousness is constantly carried out, in a dual life-form irrespective of all intervention of egoic activity; it is constantly consciousness of something in a dual mode, now self-giving, and to be sure actually and potentially self-giving, and, on the other hand, it is anticipatory, expectant. In the first respect, it is in part

continually perceptual, and together with this it is in part held retentionally, and with regard to the latter, now disclosive retentionally of this, now of that. In another respect (where everything functions within passivity according to the essential laws of passivity), the life of consciousness develops protention together with self-givings, constitutes relative self-givings of a higher level in the connection of self-givings and intendings, as we came to understand with respect to external perceptions, and in this case lives through the passive processes of fulfillment, but also in processes of disappointment whose universal possibilities we will still have to trace out in some detail. We can characterize all these processes of the passivity of cognition as processes of passive experience, on the one hand, as processes of expanding, verifying experience, but also as processes of experience that determine more closely, and on the other hand, processes of bracketing intendings of experience that are unfitting, processes of rectifying experience. In passing through a schism, through modalization, consciousness achieves unanimity once more by means of a negating crossing out. The divergent possibilities, the privileged probabilities, get resolved through positive decisions, etc. We come to understand newer and newer portions of this and reach a deeper and deeper understanding. But we must pursue this even further in order to be able to get at least a rough overview of the main structures of pure consciousness, where consciousness is to be understood throughout as a stream that constitutes objects and that is subject to pure essential laws; and we must understand that this still takes place on the founding level of passivity. For that is the soil upon which the free activity of the ego moves and without the knowledge of which the higher accomplishments of this activity must remain for us completely unintelligible. For otherwise, what would remain unintelligible above all would be the sense and extent of the logical norm, which is nothing other than the universal legislative norm according to which all free accomplishment (like all consciousness, again unfolding along the lines of the essential distinctions between self-giving and merely intending consciousness) can be brought down the path of concordant fulfillment.

<14. Transcendental Logic (Comprehensive Reiteration)>

After this lengthy Christmas Break⁶ let us go back to where we left off in our lectures. Our method was essentially Socratic-Platonic. Guided by vague, completely indeterminate and general thoughts about the sense of logic as the science of *logos*, and drawing on the meanings of this word, we took up concrete analyses and organized them in such a way that we could simultaneously get from them, along with the concrete understanding of the particularities, the general, but now quite determinate thoughts and set goals, and in such a way that progressing further these could be developed in ever new, appropriately ordered and materially relevant analyses. Logic points us from *logos* as linguistic expression to thinking, to the multifarious consciousness that is capable of expression.⁷ And along with this, it points us to the intelligible sense that is intrinsic to thinking, to something meant in thinking and something that is posited in different forms of positing. By harboring sense, consciousness refers in and of itself to objectlike formations, that is, it refers to the identical element in diversely varying sense. This reference to the objectlike formation, which occurs within consciousness, however, can be a reasonable or a non-reasonable one: Logic should be the general science of reason. What is meant in consciousness, the sense and proposition, can be true or false, correct or incorrect, the meant object is actually existent or truly existent, or in truth non-existent.

What characterizes consciousness (and what characterizes the sense immanent to it), respectively, as something that bears within itself truth and true being? How is this to be understood? In the beginning we engaged in concrete investigations, though in this regard still in a completely unclear manner: investigations into passive and active, slumbering and wakeful consciousness and egot-consciousness, and then further into original time-consciousness, into immanent and transcendent perception, memory, and expectation, into the differences between

⁶ Editor: Christmas Break. 1920.

⁷ Translator: See Main Text, Part I, especially §§1-2.

intuitability and non-intuitability, into the way in which the concordance of sense-giving, i.e., the constitution of an objectlike formation is carried out initially on the founding level of passivity, and on the other hand, into the way in which this concordance is ruptured through modalizations—all these organized, particular investigations contained and awakened ever new general insights. What became clear to us was the distinguished feature of the transcendental formulation of questions and research, and of the special attitude peculiar to them. While natural-naïve knowledge and research bears on pre-given objects and regions of objects that are taken for granted in their existence: knowledge and research that bears on self-evidently existing nature, on the human world, on the self-evident givenness of the series of numbers, self-evident givenness of geometrical constructive formations and the like, we realized the possibility of a wholly different and extremely necessary knowledge and research that holds in abeyance every naïve pre-givenness in order to make such pre-givenness problematic in the most universal generality. And we recognized this as the mode of research that every philosophical logic invariably requires, every one that makes thinking and thought, reason, reality, truth, and at the apex, scientific truth—that makes all this scientifically intelligible in a radical manner.

It became clear to us that consciousness within itself (and that means, by its very nature) carries out sense-giving and thereby the legitimate as well as the illegitimate relation to an object; and [it became clear to us] that if naïve-dogmatic knowledge and science accept objects as pre-given realities, it is already a consciousness, and a highly multiform consciousness through which those objects have been constituted for the knower, and have been constituted in a distinctive way as evidently given. A study of consciousness must be possible with respect to its pure immanence through which we are able to comprehend how consciousness, within itself and according to all its fundamental kinds and fundamental forms, carries out the sense-giving of objects, and how consciousness itself structures its world and its true world and true theories, theories that methodically explicate this world in its truth. It must be understood step by step, and in this pure immanence, how manifold lived-experiences of consciousness form a synthetic

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unity, how such a unity essentially and intelligibly maintains the identity of sense, and then further how an identical object as the substratum of varying determinations in and through manifold sense can be given to consciousness, and thus can be given to consciousness as the same, but determined differently. And further, how consciousness within itself can, on the one hand, undergo transformations of concordance and discordance and, on the other, can produce that special concordance with special essential necessities that are called here norm-giving truths, and how, correlatively, the essential features of those discordances are characterized, discordances that “in themselves” must count as falsities with respect to the norm. From there one must understand the orders of foundation concerning the accomplishments of reason, the structure of the methodological ascension from truths to theories.

The phenomenological reduction gave us the evident method for our purely and necessary immanent research, and really determined the genuine sense of this research for the first time. It availed us of pure consciousness and the pure ego of this consciousness, and the method of pure and universal research into essence had to be linked to it, an investigation into essence that does not bear on consciousness that is reduced to something that is momentarily arbitrary, as a single fact, but rather that bears on the general essential types of consciousness and the essential necessities proper to them, for example, under the noetic heading, perception as such, or transcendent perception as such, under the correlative heading, perceptual sense as such, the present in the flesh as such, etc. Thus, transcendental logic does not want to be a dogmatic science juxtaposed to other sciences, not a science in the customary sense; it does not want to be, like the dogmatic sciences, directed toward a pre-given realm of objects, naïvely taking them for granted as pre-given. It wants to be the ultimate science that goes back to ultimate givennesses, namely, to those givennesses that are already presupposed in all other givennesses, in all naïve givennesses. That is, it wants to be the science of consciousness, the science of consciousness as pre-giving in general, and specifically, the science of consciousness that pre-gives meant reality, and grounded upon this the ultimate

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elucidating science of theoretical accomplishments and of all accomplishments under the ideas of reason. Indeed, it wants to be the universal and pure science of *logos*, the science of the essence of *logos* as *logos*, that is, of knowledge as knowledge, of the known objectlike formation as objectlike formation, of truth as truth; accordingly of science as science, too, and of all scientific types that the idea of science includes. But [it wants to be] this according to the corresponding essential correlations of scientifically cognizing consciousness, science as the theoretical system of true propositions, and the realm of science as the realm of truly existing objects and of objects determined within the theories, objects that are investigated in scientific thinking.

Thus, pure logic must yield essential insight into how consciousness as such contains sense, in which structures, in which noetic and noematic modes, how within itself it makes objects present to consciousness as its intentional accomplishment, and then how it necessarily makes [them] present to consciousness as the objectlike formation of this and that sense-content and of these and those modes of appearance. It must inquire into the essential typicality of consciousness as such, and for each one of those types, disclose the modes of accomplishment that give sense and constitute objects. And it especially aims, finally, at those essential typicalities that make intelligible the constitution of truly existing and not merely meant objectlike formations, and likewise makes intelligible for us true theory, true theoretical science and the true life of reason of every kind as a certain methodological accomplishment, with norms, whose original source is to be illuminated in every last detail. But for this we require extremely encompassing investigations that initially investigate, prior to all inquiries into truth, the general types of transcendentially pure consciousness with the types of their sense-giving, their relations to objects in noetic and noematic regard—still more primitively, investigations that distinguish consciousness with respect to the difference between passivity and activity, and initially pursue the intentional accomplishments that are carried out within passivity, accomplishments that are already presupposed as the constant foundation of all egoic activity.

Our last considerations were still carried out within the framework of passivity; these considerations dealt with the modalities of belief and following this, the considerations that dealt with disclosure and genuine fulfillment, the latter representing confirmation on the level of passivity. At issue in all of this are the eidetic descriptions of the nexuses of the consciousness of concordance and discordance, and of the modal occurrences of the "problematically possible," of the "dubitable," of the "null" which occur along with the latter with regard to their sense; then at issue are the distinguished cases of concordant or discordant annexes of consciousness to consciousness in which (like in the fulfillment or the disappointment of an expectation or of a protention in the sphere of memory), the intending is verified or annulled through a decision making process, [and this was seen] in contrast to the cases of mere disclosure in which an intending into the future is merely clarified, like, for instance, in the mere picturing of an expectation prior to its fulfillment through perception.

<15.> Corroboration and Verification

Before we proceed, we must first supplement what we have said. We distinguished intuitive presentations from empty presentations, and within the intuitive ones we distinguished between self-giving presentations, as those which are alone capable of verificatory accomplishments, and those that are not self-giving, like, for example, those merely intuitively pictured expectations. They only refer, as it were, beyond themselves, to a self that is not given in them, to a presenting against which they are measured, a presenting in which the self, verifying the intending into the future, would be given. Or they are also intuitions, but merely as anticipating other intuitions. It now becomes clear that belonging to the essential character of all individual presentations, even the self-giving ones, is the fact that they are, at the very least, encumbered with components of protention, with components of intending into the future, yielding in this case possible nexuses of corroboration that we will distinguish from verification. If we consider connected

presentations, regardless whether they are intuitive or empty, and specifically ones that do not undergo a rupture, that is, are in themselves concordant, then they are *eo ipso* of the mode of belief, namely, with respect to their protentional side. They anticipate in belief, be it according to certain components, like in the perceptual course of a process with respect to expectations that are directed ahead, be it thoroughly, like when they thoroughly have the feature of anticipations, for example, when we expect a thunderstorm on the basis of various indices. Now, where these several intendings into the future are connected in the unity of a coinciding of sense, and where they harmonize with respect to what is intended into the future, this harmony does not provide any verification, but essentially the consciousness of corroboration. Every intending into the future is motivated; we have already alluded to this when we closely examined the structure of perceptions and memories (that is, the structure of the fundamental kinds of self-giving presentations). On the side of primordial impressions and retentions we find the original constitution that has resulted in an institution, a constitution of a self and of its original acquisition of knowledge, and it essentially motivates an anticipatory belief that is directed ahead—the further path of events is expected according to the respective constellation of knowledge in more or less determinate sense-giving. This does not only hold here, but everywhere: The course of experiential knowledge also motivates a course of intending into the future, and in this way all intending into the future is motivated belief. Now where intendings into the future of the same sense arise from several motivational sources and result in a coinciding, they corroborate each other, or the new one corroborates the current one. In a certain respect there is, by the way, also something like corroboration for the acquisition of knowledge, namely, for knowledge fashioned out of repetitive acquisitions of knowledge that have the same sense. It has a dimension of intensity, knowledge is deepened, fortified. Now, where the corroboration of belief in the sense of an intending into the future is concerned (of “belief” in the strict sense), this corroboration is not to be confused with verification, and is never to be equated with it. And this holds likewise for the opposing occurrences. An intending

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into the future can undergo a rupture and therefore modalization by a motivation radiating from the realm of acquired knowledge—a motivated experiential belief that, by virtue of a partial harmony, coincides with the belief already given, but on the other hand, partially conflicts with it.⁸

<16. The Question Concerning the Verifiability of Experiential Belief> [259]

But when we articulate and think through such principles, we notice first of all that we have not yet acquired concepts like truth and falsity here in the full sense, and that speaking of the norm, of a norm of correctness and incorrectness had an incomplete sense. In immanent time-consciousness we have the stream of givennesses in lived-experience, givennesses that are strung together temporally with their anticipations which have the character of an anticipatory believing that is directed-ahead. A spatio-temporal world is given in the stream that is contained in immanent time-consciousness, in the stream of transcendent experiences, the intuitive and non-intuitive. And constantly referring to this spatio-temporal world are manifold lived-experiences of a transcendent believing that is in need of fulfillment. In both respects, belief is not only directed toward the present, but also toward the anticipated future and toward the memorial past; manifold memory-beliefs and expectant-beliefs emerge that can be verified or rejected.

What happens now with the verifiability or refutability of experiential belief in all these respects? What is to be meant by the axiom we tested that every such belief is either positively or negatively verifiable? To be sure, it does not just mean that the mere possibility of one or the other belongs to the essence of such a believing, and that when the one possibility is taken up as realized, the other would thereby be annulled. It is certainly evident from the principle of contradiction that positive and negative verification, fulfillment and disappointment, are mutually exclusive. But if we want to say that every belief is verifiable in the

⁸ Editor: There is a gap in the text here.

sense that it is valid or invalid in the usual sense, as it is in the view of the traditional principle of the excluded middle, then quite a bit more is being said here.

Let us get clear about this by drawing a parallel to mathematical judgment, to a judicative believing that bears on what is mathematical. Either it is valid, it is verifiable, or it is not valid, it is verifiable in a negative manner. This certainly implies that whether we ever will or are even able to carry out a verification or not, even without thinking about whether it may ever become a decision of the positive or negative sort, it is surely decided in itself whether the judgment is verifiable or whether it is refutable, already in advance and thus for all actual and possible consciousness in the future. Only we do not know in advance how it is decided; we only first know this in the actual, intuitive verification as the current decision. It is determined in advance, as it were, how the die is cast, whether on the positive or the negative side. If we actually and positively confirm the judgment, then we will know that it was already established beforehand that only a positive confirmation could take place and that the opposite was excluded (and for every conceivable ego).

Let us now turn to the spheres of our external experience as they had been constituted in passivity, and so far as we are able to understand them from there up to this point. We ask with respect to these spheres: Is it an actually intuitible, essential law to be drawn from the structure of the intentionality of experience that every belief, no matter how it arises in the stream of consciousness and its motivations, is decided in advance according to the possibilities of verification and refutation? How can this "in advance" be understood? Certainly, if a fulfillment occurs, then belief is decided as valid; a prehension of the self has emerged from mere anticipating, the anticipation has been ratified. But as long as the verification has not taken place, both of the open possibilities do exist. Must it be determined in itself and in advance what alone can occur there, if it is ever to be decided at all and regardless of whether a decision takes place or not? To elucidate the structure of truth or validity is to elucidate this "in itself," and perhaps there are fundamental differences there. In fact, truths of the mathematical kind and other essential truths are

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fundamentally different from truths like experiential truths. This in-itself is divided according to the correlations: As correctness in itself it belongs to believing, as truth in itself, truth in the strict sense of the word, it belongs to sense or rather to a proposition. The object in itself corresponds to the truth in itself. Now the in-itself belongs to the object.

Thus, we have brought the problem of the empirical in-itself clearly into relief by drawing a parallel to the mathematical in-itself where it is easiest to detect the peculiar trait of validity in itself. And we were able to understand that we are in no way in the position of fashioning in an original manner the axioms of the sort that we previously tested relating to the empirical in-itself. This concerns no less the immanent sphere despite its privilege through the evidence of the ego. In fact, if we conceive of a consciousness that has sounds, colors, and similar hyletic data given in passivity in immanent time-consciousness, and these data are being constituted in the process of becoming, then it is not clear in the least how it should be decided in itself, in advance, whether precisely this new tone, or whether a new tone at all should follow a previous tone. And even if an anticipatory belief in a new determinate tone were motivated by the preceding immanent experience, we cannot tell in advance that it should be decided in itself, whether it will actually occur, or instead will fail to appear, or will take place in an entirely arbitrary and altered manner.

What happens with respect to transcendence, that is, the spatio-material world, at least when we conceive of it constituted purely passively in a consciousness? Naturally, proper to the constitution of a spatio-material enviroing-world is not only a superabundance of prefigurings of inner horizons for every thing that is actually experienced, but also of outer horizons—which are reciprocally interwoven with one another, and ultimately all things of experience are connected in the unity of an enviroing-world with a unitary outer horizon—and thus a superabundance of prefigurings for the path of further possible experiences. But there are precisely prefigurings, there is motivated experiential belief, superabundantly corroborated and ratified through innumerable accordances; but in the final analysis is it not possible for the further experience with its ever new self-givings to

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continue as it will? Contrary to each and every expectation, contrary to all the overwhelming preconceptions and probabilities? Can it not continue such that everything becomes a confused muddle, such that the entire perceptual world-order is destroyed, such that this world as the unity of experience is no longer even maintained, such that it becomes unstable for consciousness, such that all sense-data lose their apprehensive apprehensions, which themselves only actually grasp appearances in concordant believing? But we have held that there would be the world in itself, and every experiential belief would be valid in itself, would be in itself true and false.

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In the last lecture⁹ we made plain the peculiar virtue of the verification of the self as opposed to mere corroborations, of the verification arising through self-giving acts of belief. This was the view where corroborations are concerned: A belief that does not arise as such, that resides in a self-giving unbroken presentation, can be connected with another one whose very sense is similarly directed; it can undergo a fortification and thus in a broader sense, verification, like the expectation of a coming event through a new *indizium*, through a new similarly directed protention. But no matter how rich this intensification may be, as long as the expectation is unfulfilled, it has, aside from all emotional interests, a deficiency; a mere ratification does not occur in fulfillment in the manner of an intensification of force; rather, the event itself is there now—for consciousness, of course. And this consciousness accomplishes a verification in the transition to fulfillment, a verification that gives itself as definitive, so to speak: And so it is: I have the existing thing itself, I do not only mean it; the being of the sense-content in question is not only a meant being, but “actual.” Just as sense thus has a new and superior mode in self-giving belief, so too does being, the correlate of the unbroken character of the presentation. Further, in the transitional synthesis, belief has the character of a belief being demonstrated as correct, and its noematic correlate, the character of actual and true being as opposed to merely intended being. Correspondingly, decisions made concerning questions, doubts, or problematic possibilities

are also diverse according to whether they take place through self-giving unbroken presentations, or through non-self-giving ones. The self-giving decision is so to speak the one through the *terminus ad quem*. And the expression is also fitting insofar as the life of consciousness in its entire scope is permeated with continuously connected tendencies toward universal concordance, not only toward concordance in general, however, but toward one suited to self-givennesses, one resolved with respect to the self-givennesses.

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In this way we had obtained preliminary concepts of truth, correctness, norm, and with respect to being, of “true being.” We can immediately add: We had obtained a preliminary and original concept of evidence as the consciousness of verification and decision about something self-given; but here we had already presupposed working out the radical difference between an arbitrary belief and its modalities as opposed to belief in the mode of a self-giving and concordant presentation.

I paused there in order to make clear to you that the concepts of truth, correctness, etc., that we obtained in the context of our studies up to this point are not yet those concepts that guide us in customary and scientific discourse and that we also ascribe to the traditional logical law of contradiction.

There is a moment here for which we can find no model, namely, being resolved, as it were, being prejudicial concerning what is true and what is false, in advance of [or] prior to all actual experience; what is true is true in itself, and that is to say, it is not open whether positive or negative confirmation is possible.

If it is a matter of the future, for example, then it is decided, even where I lack a decision. To our mind, every belief directed toward the future has its truth or its falsity prefigured in advance, once and for all.

However, if we remain in the framework of pure consciousness and consider the immanent and transcendent given matters that are constituted within it in passivity, then as I said, what we have shown has not yet accounted for the clarification of the idea of that in-itself. Where the immanent given matters are concerned, and especially the sense-data, every Now brings with it new ones. But in spite of all aroused anticipations, it cannot be foreseen why

⁹ Editor: Beginning of a new lecture.

it must necessarily be decided which data will occur in the future. And this also holds no differently where the transcendently constituted spatio-temporal world is concerned.

Perhaps some clarification is still required here. This world is given to us originally through external perceptions. Generally speaking, they cohere with one another in continual concordance, and they are likewise intertwined concordantly with self-giving rememberings that potentially span gaps like those of sleep. To be sure, occasionally discordances do also occur. We speak of illusions, experiential belief being ruptured, passing over into doubt; but in the progression of experience, which never undergoes breaks in each and every respect, a thoroughgoing concordance is indeed restored through the changes in meaning and the crossings out just described; that is, running through our consciousness is a sustained unity of world-certainty that is produced again and again over against the disturbances. "The" one world is constantly there, only it is determined more closely and occasionally determined somewhat differently.

The first problem arises here, however: Must it then remain just as it was up to this point, according to the testimonies of our memory? Must an external experience be continually adjoined to another external experience in this way? Can it not be that an external experience is the last one, while consciousness endures? An external experience is assuredly a complex structure of consciousness that emerges in the nexus of consciousness as naturally motivated. Still, must the motivations proceed in such a way that a perception has to be connected up with another perception? We have kinaesthetic courses with which the appearances of things are connected in accordance with associative motivation: thus, certain exhibiting sense-data (in the case of the visual appearance, that is, visual data) along with their apprehensions. By motivation we mean that certain data and their protentional horizons are demanded as co-emerging along with the emergence of other data in our lived-experience. But such associative demands can be annulled in the course of present experiencing. The series of sensation must actually arrive in a certain way in order for the apprehension of a thing to be experienced according to the kinaesthetically aroused pre-

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demands, and in order for the consciousness of an existing thing to be maintained. If the sense-data were suddenly to begin appearing in a muddle, if our visual field were suddenly to be filled with a confused muddle of colors, the kinaesthetic motivations would lose their force. What was formerly linked up to the kinaesthetic courses in an expectant manner would no longer be able to occur in the otherwise firmly regulated manner in anticipatory believing, and it would therefore be an end to the play of external perceptions. Their emergence means precisely a regulated functioning and a continuous further development of cultivated motivations, and this essentially depends upon the actual course of sensations. Yet this is always conceivable as an entirely different course, and as a completely unregulated one. That it is not an unregulated course, but is such a course that makes a continual perceptual flow possible, that is simply a fact. However, if we inquire into the truth of this fact and more precisely, if we ask why what was previously so must still be or will be so, this truth will obviously not be such that it could be decided by recourse to one of those passive confirmations of which we were alone able to speak.

Secondly, even if we do presuppose the truth of this fact, and thus assume that for us, that for the particular experiencing pure ego, external experiences will continually be adjoined in its stream of consciousness and will also issue in concordance every time, this would only be to say that for this ego the unity of a true world will be continually maintained in ratifying judicative intendings. But this is not to say that this world, beyond our present experience of it, is a world determined in advance, determined in itself, such that the decision of true or false would be univocally prefigured for every believing that is directed toward any temporal situation, or for a corresponding believing that is produced hypothetically.

This is illustrated most simply by referring to the difference between the world-view of that part of humanity that is influenced by modern natural science, and alternately, the world-view of the rest of humanity. This world is constantly and self-evidently there for all human beings, and they believe that it will also continue to endure. In their conscious lives they live into a world-future. But

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by far most human beings do believe that what will come depends to a large extent upon accidents that cannot be ascertained, or that gods decide the world's course according to a momentary whim. Only roughly is there an order that can be foreseen, according to which one can be practically directed, but only roughly. A conviction was indeed forged quite late in a causality that lawfully and absolutely determines each and every thing occurring in the world; and the sense of this conviction is none other than precisely this: that each and every temporal being (and in the natural attitude this means all beings in the world) is determined in itself, determined as truths in themselves. From the very beginning, nothing is open in order to have to wait and see first how the Fates of destiny will decide.

Our question rested in this consideration, namely, whether we already attain definitiveness (in the mode of experiential ratification) should an intending into the future actually be ratified by experience. Here, then, the other, last mentioned difficulty comes into play, and in a way that is very touchy where external experience is concerned. Does not external experience evidently lead *eo ipso* into infinity? Each experience is still itself an open intention; it has dimensions that are unfulfilled. Must, indeed, can a synthetically progressing acquisition of knowledge come to an end?

Let us turn back to the immanent sphere.

25 <17> The Problem of the In-Itself of One's Own Past. Evidence
in Remembering

One's own past of consciousness with its noetic and noematic components is for us a field of possible remembering, and furthermore is a field of at least *idealtier* possible, complete memory, true and valid. Extremely large stretches [of the past] may be forgotten; they may never re-emerge involuntarily in a current memory or be at our disposal in a deliberate memory: Yet we are sure of the fact that there was actually a past of consciousness and that it can be restored unequivocally in the form of rememberings—both are obviously equivalent. Belonging to the empty horizon of the past, which brings every present of

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consciousness to a close, is a belief of the past that is essentially fulfillable through chains of rememberings and nothing else. Put more precisely, belonging to the essence of this empty belief of the past is the fact that as a positive belief it cannot in principle be annulled; to measure this empty belief of the past against a self-giving intuition can never lead to nothing. As the horizon of belief, it holds up [and] is always and necessarily there in an unbroken manner. A horizon of belief that is adequate to any self-giving intuition is a remembering, and yields a portion of it, that is, it yields a portion of one's own past going back indeterminately. It can indeed be the case that the remembering in question does not hold up; it can be that it winds up as a memorial illusion. But this very thing is only possible because a memory is pitted against other memories, that is, because something past endures as self-giving, and this past served as the regulating measure for the memorial belief that was dismissed. It is inconceivable that there would be nothing behind my present of consciousness, that every one of my rememberings would be null, since this nullity can *a priori* only be demonstrated again through other rememberings. I might be convinced on occasion that my actual rememberings here were null; the new authoritative rememberings may also assume the character of nullity once more; but what is evident is that every remembering is either already complete, which is to say that it is purely self-giving with respect to that section of my past that

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revives it in a clear and intuitive manner, or that a purely self-giving remembering of this completeness is possible; and it is clear that this possibility is not a mere possibility of phantasy, and that it is not a problematic possibility either, but rather a possibility that characterizes an ideal limit to be intuitively discerned in evidence for all incomplete and deceptive rememberings, a limit that thus always prescribes an in-itself to rememberings. The intuited idea guides us, even in our futile attempts to bring a remembering to perfect clarity and concordance, even when, with respect to the repeated object, we become cognizant of the fact that remembering has taken up moments in a deceptive way, moments that did not exist and that could not have existed in this way—we still firmly maintain that the past lived-experience is to be regarded as determinate in itself

and that the disclosure of a true memory is to be regarded as a goal that is to be sought in practice. This true remembering, as a purely self-giving consciousness of the past, is thus an idea that is necessary and [is something] to be discerned intuitively; experiential belief is decided in advance here; every empty protention is actually verifiable in a predetermined sense. It may be dubious to me as to how it actually was, I may now be obliged to leave it open. But in itself, it was how it was, something determined in itself.

10 <18. Consciousness of the Memorial Illusion>

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If we pursue a deeper clarification of this situation, we would initially have to view more precisely how a remembering, even though it is a self-giving consciousness, can nevertheless turn out to be a deception for consciousness, that is, how it can split into a conflict and then pass over into unbelief, into negation. The order is prefigured, the beginning can essentially only be such that a remembering in the primordial mode of belief emerges from the obscurity of memory as the retentive distant horizon. Likewise, it is clear *a priori* that doubt and negation are not possible in just any fashion, but are possible only in a certain way such that the memory that was at first unbroken comes into conflict with other memories. Memories can be more or less vivacious, more or less unclear; by being intermittent they can transmit expanses of intuitability through empty expanses of non-intuitability. At the same time (and these are essential possibilities that can be drawn purely from examples), empty intentions can arise anew in conflict with intentional moments that were first established in the initial memory, be they intuitive or already non-intuitive; but there is no doubt that they are still memorial intentions that can only pass over into clear self-giving rememberings in a fulfilling manner. In this way a consciousness of a memorial illusion can arise, one that is in itself evident and clear, and we can recognize how it must necessarily look here. Every such consciousness, every evident annulment of a remembering (which is precisely the evident consciousness: "it was only an illusion") has the typicality of disclosing a muddle of diverse rememberings, and this disclosure

has the form of a certain transition of the initial memory into a multiplicity of discrete, completely clear memories that, phenomenologically [understood], are related to one another, and in this relation, are completely concordant.

5 We now describe this transitional phenomenon in the following way—a phenomenon that can also contain in its intermediate stages an empty phenomenon of doubt and of negation, in order then to ground the evidence of negation, of deception with bifurcation: Our point of departure is the remembering that is initially unruptured. With the transition to a sufficient level of clarity, the originally unitary memorial image falls apart into several images, and finally into several clear rememberings, [that are] in themselves unbroken [and] that belong to different temporal loci. For example, the memory of Sils-Maria surfaces, and I see a young author before me, and we are engaged in a lively conversation. It concerned Gundolf's "Shakespeare."¹⁰ But now a doubt is "stirring," and if I give into it, a second image will appear; I am now with the same young man in his apartment in a small room in the country in Fextal; he is reading to me from Gundolf's "Shakespeare," and we are speaking about it there. If I go still deeper now into the image that I first remembered, I will note that a piece of its memorial continuity remains purely self-giving and unruptured. But there was a small break in continuity, a break that was previously inconspicuous where I listened to the young man speaking and intuitively honed in on what we spoke about; the reproduction changed there, unnoticed, into the other image which as it were remained concealed visually through the first situation, falsely imputing the second conversation to the first. And seen precisely, the same person in the one situation along with his external modes of appearance was at the same time, or was actually already falsely imputed to the one in the other situation. It is evident that this duality in fact, just not noticed, already lay in the initial image giving itself in a unitary manner, an image that was then subject to a divergent duplication by virtue of

¹⁰ Translator: The reference here is to Friedrich Gundolf, author of *Shakespeare und der deutsche Geist* (Berlin: Georg Bondi, 1914), and translator of Shakespeare into German.

a peculiar overlapping in which parts of the one memorial image covered over parts of the other.

The divergence into two discrete memories is not a theory, but rather a situation that is intelligible in its intentionality. The discrete rememberings arising in this process are not two arbitrary memories, but memories that are characterized in a certain way. What is evident above all is that they do not arise anew, but were already there for consciousness, and that they have assumed only an altered mode of intuition and an altered nexus of relations.

There is a justification in speaking of a splintering of a combined memorial image into its combining elements. We find both of the memorial situations in this combined memorial image, though certainly not both of them developed in a completely intuitive manner; rather, only a part of each one is represented by intuitive parts in the entire intuitive image; but the supplementary portions of the situations are also there *implicite*; they are only "suppressed," "eclipsed." It is entirely analogous to the overlapping of two perceptual apprehensions that stand in conflict, where they are likewise grounded in a commonality and where, when the one perceptual apprehension (e.g. of a mannequin) prevails and the other, the apprehension of a person with its own peculiar perceptual moments, is suppressed, but is however grasped in a peculiar manner, only non-intuitively, only hidden.

<19. Remembering and Association>

That which makes overlapping and fusion possible, and on the other hand, that which makes the dehiscence or the divergence of memories possible is also intelligible to us phenomenologically. If we consider the pair of discrete memories [just discussed], we will recognize that they are essentially not two arbitrary memories, but two memories that are related to one another in a certain way, and that this reciprocal relatedness, or rather, the connection of consciousness did not first accrue to them in clarity. Both of them are "associated"; the one situation recalls the other, and this is not an expression of some kind of objective psychological fact, but a purely phenomenological matter concerning essential structures. It is also contained in the fusion that forms a unitary image, only that

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here it has assumed just this special shape. It is not for nothing that I say in my example that the reproduction of the conversation in Sils was the first; it recalled the conversation in Fexal, and both became conflated in a partially intermingled image for me. In separating them out, we can describe what is peculiar to association. Generally, we can say that every event of recalling something (to conduct our description noematically) is essentially a noematic nexus of synthetically united memorial givennesses under the rubric of association. This noematic nexus entails two moments: an immediate and a mediate recalling something. In every association we necessarily find a pair of immediately complementary elements: An element of the one situation immediately reminds us of a similar element of the other.¹¹ If we call the one situation associative or awakening, and the other the associated or awakened, then in the former instance what is primarily awakening is a prominent moment, even if not yet noticed, a moment that awakens something similar. This pair of similarity is situated in a special unification that we will discuss shortly. It fashions a bridge between both pasts or even between a perceptual present and a past. The similar moment that is immediately awakened awakens something coexisting with it, and then this has the character of being associated mediately. An *a* recalls an *a'* and thereby a coexisting *b*. Yet seen more precisely, we must say: The awakening spreads out from the complementary element of similarity to the entire realm of something that is coexistent with it, and from there further to the continuous temporal sequence. In other words, what is awakened through the similar moment is not only the individuated similar moment in the sphere of memory, but with regard to the inseparable empty horizons of the past stream of consciousness, the entire present of consciousness to which the similar moment belonged. It <spreads out> through it, but then further to the continuous, subsequent, concrete streaming course. Yet this awakening does not imply an explicit process of bringing to intuition; what is awakened can be

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¹¹ The general theory of association, by the way, is expounded upon here. Something recalling something else that is similar? The synthesis of coinciding can also be the coinciding that forms identity—i.e., also something recalling something else that is identical.

entirely or partially obscure, and there are still special motives for the special reproduction of images. Thus, contained in every association as a primary and founding association is an association of similarity, but it is contained as a non-independent element, and then further association through contiguity, namely, at first the association according to coexistence, and then according to succession.

But there are still supplementary principles of association that come into view as phenomenologically demonstrable, namely, insofar as everything that produces a special unity (that is, produces a prominence of constituted objects) in an original consciousness of the present according to coexistence and succession, thus everything that constitutes passive multiplicities is reawakened in the reproduction that was already awakened elsewhere through similarity, and can give rise to special associative connections between present and past prominent elements. In fact, one would have to expand the concept of association phenomenologically and not only speak of association as the association involving the connection of the present consciousness and a memorially submerged consciousness, but also speak of analogous connections within a consciousness of the present. Uniformity, contrast, for example, belong here, together with everything that, in general, renders a prominent multiplicity given to consciousness as a unity within passivity.

What should be constituted as a unity in the present for itself, as present in the flesh, is a for-itself as a unity of prominence for the ego, understood as a unity of the affecting allure. Where several prominent elements are connected into the unity of a group, of a passively constituted multiplicity, there is the unity of an allure as a whole, of an affection as a whole that distinguishes it as a for-itself. In this case, either the particular affections flow into the unity of the affection as a whole such that they only function as a moment of the affection as a whole, or this or that exercises yet another special affection, its voice especially comes through the chorus. It is a special problem to investigate what creates multiplicities, what organizes multiplicities themselves into multiplicities, how uniformity and similarity everywhere play a role there in different directions, how rhythmatizations arise

whereby something uniform in relation to something else that is uniform, something relatively the most similar in relation to something else that is most similar, shows an especially awakening force, and in the awakening, an affectively binding force for consciousness. In this way, a special unity is fashioned through affective force, especially in succession for instance; it does this in such a way that a tone as affectively unitary appears for itself, and in such a way that a new tone and then another new one do not merely appear in the same way, but rather forthwith takes hold of what has just past, as bestowing an affective salience on an object uniform to it or similar to it, imparting to the pair an affection as a whole; and special fusions occur with this and summon for themselves a unity of prominence of several of them. But then, for instance, after *a b c* have flowed-off in a unitary manner, another *a* occurs once more and then *b*, and then *c*; here the uniform *a* awakens the uniform *a*, and the course, a repeated course, a rhythmatization arises as the unity of a cyclical multiplicity. But this implies that the second *a b c* does not allow the retentionally submerged element to sink down placidly into its retentional grave, but lifts it up and holds on to it (in spite of its submersion) in its particularity and ties it to life. On the other hand, the uniform element that is running-off awakens an expectation of something uniform to it, a cycle running-off, the anticipation of the continuation of a cyclical becoming. In my view, these are primordial forms of association, originary impressional associations, so to speak, and they become efficacious once more in remembering. What was connected in original (we also say, impressional) consciousness through principles of original association, those that <unite> the discrete unities into connected coexistent or successive multiplicities, is also efficacious in reproduction; this is not only to say that it evidently has a corresponding connection in the reproduction that is already intuitive—but that before the unity of the reproduced intuition is produced, it induces the awakening to become an intuition.

If we now examine the primary association of similarity more closely, we unmistakably recognize that it is its nature to produce a certain coinciding. Two pasts can be brought to a complete

intuitive memory, one after the other, but never in the shape of an ensemble, never in a consciousness that lets both images run-off together in a intuitive manner. If we have a memorial situation and it remains vivacious, then another memorial situation awaked by it cannot be there completely and intuitively in a similar manner. But a consciousness of both pasts being there together is, nevertheless, carried out with the awakening, and this obviously occurs in the mode of repression under partial coinciding. What are coinciding are the similar members, namely, the associating member covers over the associated, the awakening member of the first intuitive situation [covers over] the awakened. The coinciding is intimate according to the degree of similarity, and where what is awakened is an object that is constituted as the same identically, the coinciding is also a coinciding of sense according to identity. What is connected with these terms of similarity or identity, then, exists in a tension, in a kind of struggle. One could speak here of positive and negative coinciding. If the first situation is completely vivacious, the associated situation that is radiating out from the awakened term will remain repressed. Yet the force of the single partial awakening can become stronger, and then two things become possible here: Either the rupture on the part of an association of contiguity makes the entire past come to life and, radiating back, tears the term of similarity loose from the awakening term. Then the entire associative situation, the entire image of it, becomes repressed and we live entirely in a new past. Or the images are interspersed with each other, resistant elements of the first reproductive past are combined with elements of the other past to form a unity of one image; here however the interspersing must also consist in the fact that what has not [explicitly] appeared in the image is still there in the mode of a repressed consciousness. It is like what happens in the "rivalry of the visual fields," in the stereoscopic combination of pictures that do not fit together: Elements of both are connected, but they can potentially alternate such that the consciousness of one of them remains continually repressed. The unity of the image is produced through a unity of the apperceptive interpretation with a unity of the constituted sense; this is analogous to similar cases where similar components were constituted as an unbroken unity. But, in

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their succession, as soon as the two situations diverge from one another intuitively by the affective force of the suppressed one winning out and the development of the image progressing—after this, as soon as each of the two situations flows-off successively in an uninhibited manner in its discrete unity and concordance, the dual stratification of the combined image and the connection of its conflicting parts becomes evident. It becomes clear that only the discrete reproductions were actually self-givennesses and that they belong together in intentionality with respect to all their parts and with respect to all the combinations of their parts. It belongs essentially to every memory that it admits of being brought to progressive clarity, to the clarity of the process of the presentified present running-off again, and to the clarity of unraveling the interlacings [that have occurred] through overlappings with other memories, and to the clarity of the elimination of apperceptive superimpositions. And however much that belongs together with the accomplishment of the ego that is active and purposively occupied here, the ground of the evidence of a true past being will consist in the evidence that every memorial deception can be elucidated only by means of memory, and that elements of a genuine past sense can necessarily play a part in every such deception only in the mixtures, and that the pure fulfillment of sense and pure explication of the concordant lines of memory is an idea lying in the finite¹². Note that when we speak about an idea, we are speaking about a *limit*, about a limit that lies in the finite, and also about a limit that is to be discerned in evidence and yet not seen in the customary sense—there where we do not suspect a memory of any alloy. The sensible qualities and the entire clarity of memory already wavers, and the true qualities of the true memory are ideal limits.

We have gained quite a lot with this, notably and above all, a deep look into the origin of deceptions, of "errors" in passivity, and particularly in the field of memory as a field of the in-itself.

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¹² *im Endlichen*

<20. Kant's Doctrine of the Synthesis of Productive Imagination>

Our problem is the clarification of the idea of the in-itself to the extent that passivity can account for it. In the full sense of the term, we [can] only speak of validity, correctness, and truth, and of evidence in which it first comes to original givenness in consciousness, in the sphere of judicative cognition, that is, in the sphere of the free rational activity of the ego. But we already have pre-levels of evidence and their correlates in the sphere of passivity as that which fashions the founding soil for all activity. Thus, fundamental investigations must begin here.

It is of historical interest to recall here Kant's brilliant insights that are expressed in his profound but obscure doctrine of the synthesis of productive imagination, above all in his transcendental deduction from the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. When Kant in his great work speaks of an analytic synthesis, he means cognition deployed there in explicit forms of concepts and judgments, and this points back, for him, to a productive synthesis.

But, in our view, that is nothing other than what we call passive constitution, nothing other than the team-work (disclosable by our phenomenological method) of the constantly higher developing intentionalities of passive consciousness in which an extremely multiform process of immanent and transcendent sense-giving is carried out passively and is organized into encompassing formations of sense and formations of being, as is the immanent unity of the stream of lived-experience, and with respect to transcendence, the unity of the world with its universal forms. Since Kant was not in the position to recognize the essence of passive production as intentional constitution, and could not yet see the actual task of making systematically intelligible the essential necessities of the constitution of all objectlike formations and the path of their order of foundation, he also understandably missed the problem of evidence. Of course, this is likewise lacking in its genuine phenomenological shape for those who followed, and for the same reasons.

<21. Development of the Problem of the In-Itself for the Immanent Sphere>

Let us limit the problem of truth in itself, or rather, of evidence to the immanent sphere, and naturally for good reasons, because it must first be clarified there. Every self-giving presentation carries out a certain accomplishment in relation to a non-self-giving one [and] with which it reaches a synthetic coinciding, an accomplishment that the term fulfillment intimates: It brings the fullness of the "self" to the non-self-giving presentation *qua* mere intending. The meant being is now there as true being, as the object as actually there. But now it happens (as we have already said earlier) that a self-giving presentation in general can become dubious and can be annulled through negation; protections are intertwined with it. Even where we distinguish between genuine and non-genuine self-giving, like with external perception, we see that disappointment is possible, also allowing for something that is actually appearing to be crossed out.

Let us directly pose the question with respect to immanence whether self-giveness here cannot be something that is entirely relative, that does not contain any definitive self at all or that does not have this definitive self supporting it as a persistent norm. Can it not be that every self-giving is to be rendered invalid through a conflict with other self-givings, and these again in conflict with others, and so on in infinitum? More explicitly, can it not be the case, when any kind of presentation is verified by a corresponding self-giving, that the latter is forthwith annulled through negation, whereby now what is presented would also be given as not actual; that then, however, the self-giving functioning as norm is also negated once again, and so the actual and the non-actual are always only something momentary, something belonging arbitrarily to the process of fulfillment? Or when we take any kind of presentation, is it decided in itself that corresponding to its meant being, to what is given in it in the mode of belief-certainty, is a definitive being of the self as true and as incapable of being crossed out for all time?

To be sure, at first we see that immanently constituted being in its living present is not only self-giving as being, but that this

being is essentially incapable of being crossed out. The moment we assert that it is not, like we can do at any time, we see that apodictically this assertion is annulled with respect to what is given. Here the indubitable, the indefeasible validity is clear. But what good is it, since its validity is only momentary? What is imminent flows off and is gone. But where we speak of a true self and of a presentation that is verified definitively, there we reach beyond the momentary consciousness through rememberings in which we repeatedly come back to the same presentation and to its same meant object; and in which, on the other hand, we can repeatedly secure for ourselves and potentially do secure for ourselves the verified self as an identical self, and one that is not capable of being crossed out. Surely, we do have the momentary lived-experiencing (e.g., of an imminent sense-datum that we see in its present becoming) in a certainty that is not capable of being crossed out. But the being that we grasp there is only meant as being in itself when we not only take it as a momentary datum in the mode of the present, but also as the identical *dablie* that could be given in arbitrarily iterated rememberings—that is, when we take it as a temporal datum, for instance, as the tonal datum in its temporality, a temporality that is identically one as opposed to possible orientations like those that are given through variable rememberings.¹³

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We see that the temporal form is the form of objects which, as objects, pretend to have their in-itself. All talk of objects thus leads back to remembering. Thus, this does not only hold for immanent objects. Even when we consider a noema, even when we consider that which is momentarily present as sense in the mode of the present and make an objective assertion about it, we grasp it as such a [noema or present object] that can be presented to us and identified in iterated memories, namely, with this reproductively presented character, "momentary present." We learn from this consideration that the question concerning how an objectlike formation, an objectlike formation in itself, is

¹³ I am not entirely satisfied with this. The object is surely constituted from the very beginning as something temporal, and the momentary phase is an abstraction that we must first construct. The incapability of being crossed out peculiar to the moment is thus not primary.

constituted, how it can show itself as such originally, leads overall and from the very start initially to the problem of the constitution of an in-itself of remembering, thus, to the question concerning how remembering can be justified and to what extent it can become a source for definitiveness. We must first of all become clear about it.

Indeed, seen more precisely, we are still lacking an intermediate term for a completely systematic exposition. The living present which is structured immanently is as we said not capable of being crossed out so long as it unfolds in constitution; doubt is not possible here. This also concerns, therefore, the span of the living retention proper to it. To make ourselves explicitly clear: Every progressing retention that continues to exist in a living fading-away cannot be modalized. But once again we must add that we still cannot identify an in-itself here. I can keep a hold on a sound fading away attentively, yes even hold onto it more tightly. Here is something of the most primitive activity. But it can also be the case that I am not even attentively aware of it, that I do not actively turn toward it and toward the series of sounds, and yet it exercises a special allure. By virtue of an associative awakening, it gets the character of an intention. In both cases, and in an entirely spontaneous fashion this provocation (this affection) is possibly discharged in a remembering that not only arises in general, but arises as the fulfillment of the intention.

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Note that this remembering is something essentially different from a retention, and is not for instance a mere reanimation of it in the sense of an increase in the level of clarity. A clear retention whose essence we grasp in the retentional levels lying most closely to the primordial impression always remains a retention. Every retention is what it is and has its intentional mode only at the place of the streaming perceiving at which it stands. But remembering is a kind of re-perception, that is, it is not a perception to be sure, but a being constituted anew, a beginning anew with the primordial-Now, and a retentional fading-away; but precisely in the mode of reproduction. Thus, in remembering all retentional levels emerge "once again," reproductively modified. If such a remembering now occurs in connection with a retention harboring an allure that is just past, it necessarily occurs in a

coinciding of sense and in a coinciding of being with the retention. The same sound that has just sunk back and just faded away appears once more on the scene, and I live through its being once more. This can be repeated; I either deliberately or involuntarily reproduce the tone or an entire tonal phrase once more, even an entire melody. What happens here to the incapability of being crossed out peculiar to remembering? Is it to be rejected out of hand? Are we speaking in epistemology from time immemorial about the general possibility of deception in remembering? And does this not hold as well for the immanent sphere?

<§22. Rememberings as the Source for an In-Itself of Objects>

We will obviously have to make distinctions here between close memories and distant memories, (1) between rememberings that are awakened through the retention that is still primordially living, still articulated in itself and found in constitutive flux, and (2) between rememberings that reach into the distant horizon of retention, like with those of an entire piece of music.

1) Rememberings as Arisen from the Awakening of Primordially Living Retention [280]

Where the first are concerned we will say: For what has just past and is still sinking back, which remembering intuitively grasps once again, we have what is absolutely incapable of being crossed out—and we have this even if remembering is repeated, whereby the second now creates its evidence from the first and no longer from the retention that has, in the meantime, completely faded away. In spite of all that, we certainly do not grasp the self and the identity of the self in such a repeated coinciding of the self without incompleteness and degrees of completeness. For we know indeed that remembering can essentially waver in its clarity, and can even be intermittent. The different moments of content are more or less veiled, as it were, as if by a fog of unclarity. And yet, it is not one of those concealments in the usual sense, namely, of objects by other objects. The fog of unclarity does not blacken out objects, it is not a real fog. And yet it does conceal, renders the

self-giving incomplete. And yet, what is just past as past is absolutely secure, it is incapable of being crossed out, indubitable, and it is absolutely secure with respect to everything that is given from it according to quality, intensity, timbre. It is itself there passing through the fog of unclarity, in all relative unclarity, but just not in an entirely obvious manner, just not as realized ultimately. Accordingly, something is lacking with respect to this incapability of being crossed out. Essentially belonging to this situation is the necessary coinciding that forms identity, the coinciding of given matters throughout the alteration of different levels of clarity, and a certain enhancement in the direction toward an ultimate, most genuine self, the self that is completely evident in its appearance but which is only an idea to be discerned intuitively, an ideal lines.

But what is peculiar here is that it does not first require something like approaching this ideal limit in order first of all to confirm a less clear reproduction. In this connection with the living present, it has its original justification in itself, continually. And "original justification" means that it contains a self that is inviolable, although it only stands in a gradation of degrees against a lines which in its very nature would alone completely exhibit the "self." The less clear remembering is less saturated, the clearer one is more saturated, it is a "more intensive" self-giveness, but if it is an intuitive remembering at all, it will give just one self and not give any other self, or any of its moments.¹⁴ However, empty remembering is not actually a remembering, but an awakening or an affective allure of a retentional sedimentation that is emerging as prominent from the immersion of memory. In a certain sense there are also gradual differences of proximity and distance here.

One must say then that we still have another gradation, namely, with respect to reproductions that reach into the outermost

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¹⁴ During the course of our lectures the following was added: The justification of close memory does not yield any elucidation of the possibility of an immanent object as being in itself. For we are still bound here to the chain of rememberings, rememberings which adhere to a living retention, which had a departure from it, and were carried by its self-giving evidence. Only when we have first justified the distant memory do we have the possibility of recognizing at any time an immanent temporal object as existing.

horizon of immersion, even with respect to those reproductions that draw near to it. Namely: Self-givensness arise here that are indeed actual self-givensnesses and are incontestable in this connection, while it is left gradually undetermined how far the actual self-givensness reaches, and what can yet actually be ascribed to it with respect to determinate moments.

2) <Rememberings of a Submerged Past of Consciousness>

The systematic path leads then further to rememberings that do not have their retentional connection to the immediate realm of the present, but rather, that revive a distant, long submerged past of consciousness. We speak here of distant memories as opposed to close memories. Even here, for distant memories, I hold that every remembering has its original justification, and this means that we are to understand essentially that corresponding to every remembering, even to this group, is a necessary idea, the idea of a self that is incapable of being crossed out. My guiding thought here is the following: An intuitive distant memory, when it is not one that fleetingly flashes forth, but is a steady one and is synthetically iterable and identifiable, has with respect to its objectlike formation essentially only one possible way of passing over into doubt and then turning out to be null, namely, as a confused muddle of rememberings. Thus, becoming discordant, inhibition, and annulment of the belief that is initially unbroken in the self-given past, necessarily leads to the phenomena of bifurcation in which the distant memory in question splits into several distant memories. And it does so in such a way that the unitary objectlike formation of an undivided memory is disclosed as the fusion of single objects, single features and events that belong to the separated memories and are self-given there with partially different objectlike determinations. In the same way it could now happen that every one of the splintered memories lose their character of unbroken concordance, and undergo a crossing out by splitting into yet other memories that are in themselves concordant.

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But on the one hand it is still the case that the content of every memory that is characterized as false is only false with respect to

the unity of the combined whole, but it remains correct with respect to its parts. What is crossed out is always the whole that has arisen through a comingling, but the elements that issued in the comingling remain self-given, only they belong to different nexuses. On the other hand, however, this process of splitting cannot continue in infinitum; it is a muddling up of discrete matters, and thus it must come to an end. Indeed, it suffices that what appears in a memory, essentially, cannot as remembered be completely empty, that its self-giving cannot be an empty title, but rather that it has its source in actual self-givings such that we are necessarily referred back to the idea of a chain of pure self-givensnesses that are no longer capable of being crossed out, but are only identifiable with respect to their content and repeatable in complete identity and concordance. Naturally, even here we have degrees of clarity for every portion of genuine self-givensness, and in this respect the idea of the most complete self-givensness as lines. Thus even this type of saturation <has> differences of evidence. In both relations we are certainly referred to the active ego and its free activity in which it is guided, precisely, by the experience that memory can turn out to be deceptive, and that, in particular, clouds of unclarity can conceal the cominglings. Accordingly, the ego strives to check its memories thoroughly, to clarify them deliberately, to investigate the intentional nexuses with respect to memories' parts, to disclose the illusion by analyzing, and thus to advance to the true self.

But still necessary for our further understanding is the elucidation of the origins of error in passivity, and in particular of error in its most original shape of comingling. This problem leads us to a radical portion of the analysis of passive consciousness, namely, as genetic analysis: to the phenomenology of association.

<23. Immediate and Mediate Awakening>

The rubric "association" characterizes for us a form and a lawful regularity of imminent genesis that constantly belongs to consciousness in general; but it does not characterize, as it does for psychologists, a form of objective, psychophysical causality; it

does not characterize a regulated manner in which the emergence of reproductions, of rememberings, is causally determined in human and animal psychic life. For we are working within the framework of the phenomenological reduction in which all objective reality and objective causality is "bracketed." What is there for us is not the world taken as reality with its psychophysical beings and its causalities, but only the phenomena of them, thing-phenomena, human-phenomena, etc., in their intentionality. In this framework of pure consciousness, we find the streaming present of consciousness, we find constituted in every case a perceptual reality constituted as in the flesh. But pasts can also enter into present consciousness through remembering. Put more precisely, in the unity of a consciousness that is streaming in the present, we find concrete perceptions with their retentional components, as well as concrete retentions—all of that in the flow of retention fading away into the distant horizon of retention. But in addition to this, emergent rememberings as well. Between the noematic components of something present and something remembered we find a phenomenologically peculiar connective trait that can be expressed in the following way: Something present recalls something past. Likewise, a second remembering can occur while a remembering runs-off; the second remembering can occur along with the first one in a nexus that is characterized noematically by the fact that the first recalled event recalls the second recalled event. A perceptual consciousness, that is, a consciousness that is constituted originally can accordingly be characterized as a consciousness that awakens, awakening a reproductive consciousness, and this consciousness can function as awakening in its turn as fetching a past of consciousness, as it were.

Let us consider this nexus in broad strokes. If an *a* that is given to consciousness reminds us of a *b*, then the associative awakening is either immediate or mediate, and immediate and mediate associations are always intertwined with one another, even if it is only the mediate one that is able to obtrude for itself upon us. For example, in a conversation we are having, a thought is expressed that reminds us of a friend. The thought belongs to the unity of the present conversation; the conversation reminds us immediately of

a previous conversation with the friend in which the same thought was expressed. The association between *a* and *b*, thought and friend, is a mediate one. What is immediately connected is *a* with *a'* and *a'* with *b*, i.e., the immediate awakening goes from something that is identical, uniform, or especially similar to something that is similar to it; that is, the bridging member, we say, connects the present consciousness with the previous one. Something uniform, and something quite especially strong, something identical in the sense, the identical thought, awakens a memory of something uniform, and the awakening goes further from here to the other previous content of consciousness. Then the awakening goes still further in the steady series of memories or pasts that advance forward in the direction of the present, but also discretely toward the previous pasts or even discretely toward the future. Still, several questions arise here when we examine this more closely.

<24. Association in the Impressional Sphere. Its Significance for Remembering and Analogizing Protention>

The multiplicity is in relief for itself, it exercises an affection as a multiplicity and, at the same time, it affects a term with a special force, one that throws out opposing terms. It is a special problem, and surely also an important one, to investigate what the general and essential conditions are for terms of a multiplicity to be capable of reaching a phenomenological union, to investigate what then allows multiplicities to connect with multiplicities and thus in general what produces unities for consciousness, unities that are not original singularities. "Original singularities" are objects that must first come into relief essentially as a whole, and then require analysis in order for parts or moments of the object to come into relief on or in them, while a multifaceted object is precisely a multiplicity that is essentially preceded by prominent singularities. The general conditions of singularity and of multiplicity lead us to certain essential relationships of uniformity and similarity, and integrally related to it, of contrast and the like. But all of this concerns, I contend, conditions of the possibility of intention and affection that are carried over in an intensified form from

something that is prominently uniform to something that is uniform to it, from something that is relatively most similar to something that is most similar to it, and together with the one-sided or mutual transference or awakening for consciousness, they have a connective force that links the special affections.

"Recalling something" is an evident nexus: thus, for example, in the constitution of successions forming multiplicities as connected unities, for instance, in a connected sequence of tones. A tone initially arises for itself; that is, the tonal phases that are continually melded together through an internal continual similarity form an enduring unity for itself by virtue of their contrast in the point of departure and in the terminal point to the tonal series, to the phase; they are affective as one. Then a new tone arises, and then another new one. But each new one that arises here does not arise in the same way as the first one does, as if no tone had arisen prior to it. The new one enters forthwith into the unitary relation with the one that has just past, with the one that has sunken back retentionally. By virtue of the similarity of intentional objects, the affection of each one is connected in a unity as the affection on the same ego. But there is still more. The object sinking back retentionally, and which as such loses something of its affective force, obtains through this connection an increase of force, and so forth with every new tone.

Not only do similarities and relations of similarities of qualities, intensities, in short, of moments with respect to content contribute to unification and to the efficacy that reawakens the sinking force, but also temporal and spatial relations contribute to them. Rhythmizations and cycles are especially instructive examples. Let us take a simple repetition: *a b c* and again *a' b' c'* with the same content and the same temporal relations. The new *a'* reaches back to *a*, likewise *b'* to *b*, *c'* to *c*, and in addition to this also the connection *a' b' c'* to *a b c*. In this affective coinciding what has already sunken back in the first group undergoes a new intensification and unification; every new repetition is of benefit to the previous ones; what has retentionally grown old and fallen in the grave is, so to speak, still tied to life with the creation of a unity of a higher order, [i.e., with the creation] of a cyclical unity of succession. These are all processes of phenomenal formations

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of unity that seen from within are processes of affective connection, and affective connection is at the same time the awakening peculiar to affective force. This is why I am obligated to see primordial forms of association here, so to speak, originary association, association within the impressional sphere.

For in other cases as well (that is, also in the series formed out of reproductive associations at a distance), it seems to me that the most essential feature of this process consists in affective interconnections.

But first we must point to the fact that the same principles that institute a connection, principles that are originally efficacious in the impression, get a hearing again in remembering. I mean it in this way: It is evident that when a remembering is developed in a completely intuitive manner, all the single prominent elements and multifarious connections are there once again reproductively, which connections were constituted in the corresponding original perception. But in the case of a remembering that is revived associatively by a present, this revival is a process there; accordingly, what is similar in the present initially provokes a reproduction of something similar in the past, and the path of the awakening of an ever broadening intuition now follows the connections between which the bridging term is tested. If a present thought recalls a past one, there is a tendency toward awakening the series of thoughts. If the thought exists in an apperceptive unity with the person who expressed it, and the person stands in a multiple relation with other persons forming a society, then all such unities are unfolded in intuition, or there is a tendency toward this unfolding. So much for the question we are treating here.

It is a primordial law that one similar thing is originally connected to another similar thing through a "fusion," and in addition to this, there is the further essential law that every awakening of a member, every augmentation of the force of affection that proceeds from it, also augments the affective force of all members connected to it. Moments in the present that have their special prominence in consciousness and thus their current force of affection on the ego not only awaken something similar to the past, but in accordance with a further law, also awaken

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something that is continuously connected with them in the temporal nexus according to coexistence and succession (this is the law of association). And in addition to this, there is for us the law of analogizing protention whereby an analogue of the associatively awakened past is projected into the present, and an analogue of the becoming that is past, that is, of the past "having-become" (of the past processes)—which were in the process of becoming in the corresponding situation of consciousness—are projected into the present as those that are quasi-becoming. And in this way a consciousness of an analogue of a becoming arises in the present that is however not a memorial consciousness, but rather an analogue of a memorial consciousness; and on the other hand, just as the memory of a becoming that is past is directed ahead into a familiar future—familiar because it has already become an epistemic acquisition—so too is the analogue directed ahead into the future, which is not familiar to be sure, but is analogous to one that is familiar. [288]

<25. The Lawful Regularity of Retention>

But if one asks (and this would be our other question) how we are to understand the fact that the present retrieves the distant, submerged past through similarity, and that the past, which is certainly no longer anything, can determine the path of reproductive awakening in the past's affective nexuses (nexuses that only had significance once for the past ego) the answer would run as follows: The present turns into the past as the past that is constituted for the ego through the lawful regularity of retention; and finally, everything that is retentional turns into the undifferentiated unity of the distant retention of the one distant horizon, which extinguishes all differentiations. However, this extinguishing is to be understood in the following way: The affective force is necessarily decreased with the submersion, which is to say, it decreases the force that makes possible the special prominent elements, the unities for themselves even within the non-intuitability of retention, be they singularities or multiplicities or even multiplicities of a higher level, for instance, cyclical multiplicities. What is given there broadly in near-

retention as something extended and as a unity of continuously connected affections, and likewise, what exists there as a multiplicity of elements given together or that follow one after the other, but as largely diverse—[all of this] moves closer together; I would say that corresponding to the temporal perspective, to the phenomenal moving-closer-together of those matters that have just been, is an affective perspective; flowing is a flowing together of affections. All of this holds, we must add, as long as the opposing forces, retroactive affective animations, do not originate from the living impression that issues forth. These are present in the form of repetition, of cycles and the like. What would have otherwise already flowed-off and become unnoticeable will continue to be retained by virtue of a fortifying awakening, of an increase in the force of affection that radiates back. But not to infinity. Finally, the awakening force becomes powerless, and the undifferentiated horizon assimilates everything that is on the verge of sinking back into a steady retention. In addition to this there is the supplementary law that this distant horizon, the horizon of the distant retention that is already dead, can be reawakened from the current present in such a way that a stimulating force issuing from the present can go into the horizon in a discontinuous fashion and can effect a prominence in it. This prominence is then propagated further according to the awakening force itself that issues from the awakened element, for example, from the force of the awakened obscure memory of a lecture in a series of similar lectures. This retentional awakening, then, functions in such a way that it brings with it a tendency toward remembering that could then be realized in an actually occurring remembering. [289]

This certainly creates new problems that pressingly await further work. It requires a phenomenology of tendencies and the demonstration of laws that govern the realization of tendencies, the fulfillment of tendentious intentions. Lacking is the association of mere simultaneity and succession as pure temporal association, which serves as the framework for all association taking place through fusion.

<26.> Expectation and Association

We have touched upon the phenomenology of association from the perspective of remembering and in my view it must be tackled from there and not by drawing on just any kind of reproductive phenomena, like the phenomena of intuitive expectation and, especially, the phenomena of free phantasy. We have already repeatedly employed and touched upon what concerns the lawful regularities of expectation. They will also be enriched and clarified through our present genetic analyses. We called protention a shadow that is projected ahead, an inverted memory. Let us now say with more clarity that as the most original protention, namely, as that of the impressional sphere, it is initially a modification of retention motivated by the near-retention, and the same holds further for distant-retentions as well. When a tendency to bring something to intuition attaches to the expectation just like it does with respect to a retention, and when this process of bringing to intuition occurs with the appropriate awakening force, then the awakened intuitive element is indeed not a pure and simple remembering, but a peculiar and original modification of a remembering. When, for example, a tonal sequence, which is running-off at a sufficiently slow pace, is repeated and we become precipitate, so to speak, during its repetition; and instead of the empty anticipatory intention, an image of what is to come appears that illustrates it, then this is evidently the remembering of the corresponding element of the tonal sequence, but in a new mode, with a new function; what is given in memory gives a picture of what is to come; what is to come is not what has past, but what is expected, which has its prototype in the past. We do not have a consciousness of the past in the expectation, although the past appears here with it; it is transformed into an anticipation, and one can read that in it.

Let us examine the situation in the sphere of the living present more closely. The occurrence of something future is expected through its similarity to what has occurred in the past, like already happens in the most primitive case of a steady protention.

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<Section 2:
APPENDICES>

<A.
APPENDICES TO PART 2>¹⁵

5 Appendix 1: (To §§6-8) Descriptions of the Phenomenon of [346]
Conflict without Regard to Position-Taking¹⁶

Wax figure—human-being. The human-being wins out: And the wax figure is presented in its determinate spatial orientation and not, for instance, in any random orientation. But it is a curious way of being presented. It is similar to the way in which I see an object and an object “repressed” by it, namely, visually eclipsed by it, an object that I had just seen, an object that is there for me in an “empty” manner, in its determinate orientation, in its determinate mode of appearance, and yet not appearing in “actual” colors, etc. [They are] not given, but rather, presented in an empty manner. Or like when, having familiar objects in my surroundings before me in the dark, I reach for them, go toward them, but only in exceptional circumstances [do I] have presentifying intuitions. And even when these do occur, they presentify the empty presented object and the empty perceived object which is identified with them (for presentification is not perception). These are similar cases. The similarity consists in the mode [of givenness] that we designate as “empty-appearance” in contrast to full-appearance. There is some basis here in saying that what is empty continually passes over into the full, and vice versa, namely, insofar as the distinctness and clarity of the full

¹⁵ Translator: The following pagination to the German text corresponds to Husserliana

XI.
¹⁶ Editor: Between 1920 and 1925.

apprehension underlies graduated differences, but the full apprehension here can have a strong surplus of something apprehended in an empty manner, and in this case as something apprehended in an entirely determinate and perceptive manner. It actually stands there, just that I do not see it, or I only see a little bit of it, only a vague glimmer, like when I still have a glimmer in the dark, and what I can make out of the completely appearing thing that is barely discernible in this vagueness here is the wholly determinate and quite familiar desk.

But viewed precisely, is it really a matter of a gradual tapering off in the genuine sense? The fullness of the thing seen gradually tapers off; the quantity of the thing that is completely perceived gradually increases, so to speak, as opposed to the thing that is empty perceived. But can one say that the full perception itself has a limit in the empty perception, that this is a limit of something less and less full? This is true in a certain respect, false in another. In such cases the appearance is always a mixture of two components of a full appearance and of an empty appearance. But the full is not itself a gradation of the empty, and likewise, the empty is not a gradation of the full. The empty is in itself something that is at the same time a limit insofar as the gradual loss of fullness, while maintaining the sense (we can suppose that at first it does not contain emptiness at all), also brings about emptiness along with the indistinctness, until the only thing remaining is sheer emptiness. This will certainly have to be rethought. The question is whether the empty appearance is only a very dark appearance, and whether it is not rather a different appearance. It is a further question whether the full appearance, insofar as it contains a pure sense, has an empty appearance in it, an empty appearance that only assumes the fullness of clarity.

But it seems to me that it is precisely conflict that shows [the following]: Two full appearances (and not only relatively, but absolutely, independently of the clarity of fullness) cannot be maintained simultaneously in a coinciding; they can only be in succession. But a full appearance can be united through overlapping with an empty appearance, and that necessarily belongs even to the consciousness of conflict. While we are conscious of the full appearance, we are also constantly conscious

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of the empty appearance, precisely as what it is, emptyly meant. If it becomes full, then the opposing appearance must be transformed into emptiness.

To say that the full appearance would contain an empty appearance (and that this would then be the pure sense), does not seem to me to be tenable either. For the empty appearance has its empty fullness, it is the appearance of this and that side and has its "back side" which is an emptiness in another sense (one should not confuse the emptiness of something concealed with the emptiness of something apprehended); and so it appears to me untenable to say that the fullness of a full appearance would cover over an empty one, but rather, where emptiness passes over into fullness, the full replaces the empty. In place of the empty presentation, I have an "actual" giving presentation.

But a conflict can also occur in a different way in the unity of a perceptual consciousness. A perceptual appearance runs-off, and the way it runs-off can be concordant. In running-off, concordance is something different from concordance in a phase, or in a duration, as continual concordance that is not continually discordant (overlapping of the full and the empty). Admittedly, both concordances are closely related and will clarify one another in their uniqueness.

Thus, we speak of concordance running its course and of discordance running its course. Sense is constantly altered in the progression of appearances, the thing shows itself from different sides and is also qualitatively modified, e.g., through movement, etc. But this series of change is concordant; what occurred previously is not betrayed, annulled by anything occurring later; nothing occurring later clashes with the previous occurrence.

However, the series of change can also be discordant. I see the thing in a continuous fashion; it gives itself as unchanged, in rest, with such and such features. I see it from one side, I walk around it, and now I see that it is different than I had apprehended it. I remain in the apprehension, "resting, unchanged thing." In this respect, there is a stream of concordance, but resisting it is what I see now; it does not fit into it. The thing is indeed the same, unchanged, but it is different. "It is different" also means: It was different. The previous perceptual phases are no longer current,

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but they have not become nil; they survive in retention, and retention holds fast to the apprehension as α ; the retention, according to its very sense, makes a necessary contribution of unification to the constant consciousness of an enduring thing (identically, but temporally pushed back), and this retention reaches its verdict the moment I see α' . The perception of α' and of the entire appearance, particularly, the "Now-appearance" to which α' belongs, coincides with the retention of the α -appearance, but it coincides in conflict, while in the case of a concordant consciousness, the coinciding would have been a coinciding of concordance.

Thus, in passing through a thing, as perception continues to progress (and not, for instance, only insofar as it "comes back to the same aspect of the thing"), we find coincidings of Now-phases of perception (the originary ones) with retentions as originary presentifications of previous perceptual phases—and [we find] coincidings of concordance if the entire perceptual consciousness is to be concordant, but on the other hand, [we find] coincidings of discordance where this is not the case. These are obviously completely different occurrences, although they are closely related to the previous ones.

If, in perceiving, I move through the series of givennesses of the thing, then the coinciding will not at all merely take place on a particular occasion, one time; rather, the coinciding is continual, that is, as long as I have a steady consciousness of unity, as long as I see one and the same thing, I will have a continuity of phenomena coinciding with each other: Coinciding is indeed a consciousness of unity. Here, consciousness flows in such a way that a new Now, an ever new originary phenomenon is always given to consciousness as a phase, and something new is continuously transformed, again and again, into something that is not new: the primordial perception is transformed into retention, which in turn is pushed back through an expanded chain of retentions of the same [primordial perception]. Certainly, after everything has run-off, the whole is itself pushed back in relation to the new Now-actualities: from this it follows that the pushing back is a moment of the retentions themselves, retentions that could not be ordered successively if there were not anything

present in them as the ground of order. With every current Now, we have an "ensemble" of retentions in their succession (in "coexistence"), and this entire sequence is in "coinciding." Not merely the ones that are immediately contiguous, but even the phases that are mediately connected interpenetrate and have an integrally cohesive unity. And vice versa. If some new "discordant" thing arises, then the discordance can potentially be propagated throughout the whole continuity, or in any case through whole sections of this continuity. But how is that? Only in such a way that every "closer determination," which a moment of indeterminacy of sense has undergone, is preserved in the sequence in each phase, naturally even if only in the form of "being-co-meant." Thus, actually, each phase only coincides directly with the one next to it, but the conflict with it is propagated to the extent that, in the continuous succession, the moment of sense in question, as determined sense, is maintained in the sense. But such general descriptions probably do not suffice. We have different cases:

A temporary concordance suddenly becomes a discordance, that is, the continual unity no longer holds out: A phase emerges where the retention of something that has just past coincides in conflict with something that is new. The consciousness of "different" arises, for example, on the very same surface, the constant white suddenly changes into black. Coinciding with conflict. The black eclipses, as it were, the white of retention.

But now we have to say: It can be that discordance arises at one place, and at the same time, it issues in a commutation of the whole apprehension; this happens in such a way that the entire series that is running-off is subject to the same commutation by virtue of which the entire series including what is new (which the explosion has called forth), is transformed into a [different] concordant series and now continues to flow on once more in a concordant manner. Then I have the current retentional series up to the Now and I have it in a conflictual coinciding with a "presumed" retentional series that has not in fact run-off. I can potentially carry out a remembering and generate through it a presentification with an altered apprehension; this is not actually a remembering, since I had grasped it differently. I had taken the

mannequin with its mechanical movements for a moving woman, and now the commutation ensues. I then recall the earlier event, I rehearse the movements in memory, but I grasp them now as movements of a mannequin. Now we have here a coinciding of the entire series, coinciding in conflict, and at the same time, the altered series is transformed into a concordant series all the way up to the Now.

It is an entirely different case when the object "changes," when its color "suddenly" changes. The discordance concerns a moment, but the object remains concordant throughout, and the sudden transition does not demand (even where the moment of sense in question is concerned) that a new apprehension should occur in what has already run-off. Thus, here we see how the discordant unity at one place does not have to exercise a retroactive efficacy on the concordance of the previous series.

But certainly, what kind of efficacy is that? Why do I say: "It was not a human being, but a mannequin"—and why not: "The human being suddenly changed into a figure made out of wood, etc.?" Now, that which is new, and each and every thing, is motivated according to the way in which I alter the apprehension, and when I do not, I have an unmotivated transition, and what is "lacking" is the motivated. The switch of color is a discordance, but it can be motivated, it is the result of turning on the light, etc.

Discordances can occur continually by maintaining a thoroughgoing unity; then we have a continual process of becoming other, a continual transformation.

What role now do the position-takings play? Now, when we were speaking of motivation, it was certainly a matter of position-takings. The moment we do not consider them, we only have the occurrences of coinciding in concordance and in contra-cordance, of coinciding in a continual non-change, coinciding in expanses of continual non-change, and suddenly places of discordance and coinciding in a continual deviation of pure concordance (of non-change), thus we have occurrences as they take place in continuous change. And further, [we have] expanses of the first and second type commingling with each other.

These are possible occurrences of appearances without regard to position-takings. If we do not regard position-takings and their

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"motivations," their "demands," we cannot distinguish free phantasy from actuality. In free phantasy I have an appearance of the thing, it begins to flow, it begins to take on shapes randomly, to change suddenly in its sense-moments; it is pure chaos.

Position-takings can accord or conflict with other position-takings. This "accord" is not the coinciding of appearances, i.e., the coinciding of their senses in "concordance" or in "conflict."

But I am not at all satisfied with this. And I think that we were already further along previously. Appearances are nothing without position-takings; appearances are merely *abstracta*. Position-takings are abstract modes of appearances; these modes as variable under the rubric of appearance, allowing something to be maintained.

Appendix 2: (To §§ 8-11) <Sense and Modality of Being in Perception and Remembering>¹⁷

Let us take one step further. We spoke of the fact that a perception can turn out later to be a deceptive perception. Let us now imagine such a case, namely, the case where a perception, regarded according to its content of appearance, maintains the character of perception in a certain respect, and yet takes on the essential modification that we all have probably experienced: the consciousness of illusion. Let me draw on an experience from my student years in Berlin. While I was viewing an exhibit in a museum I saw next to me among the other attendants, a young woman with a catalogue in her hand, intently viewing the same piece that I was. I became suspicious of this young woman after a while. I recognized that it was a mere figure, a mechanical mannequin designed to trick us. What happens interiorly in such a case? Now, we are at first wavering: two perceptual apprehensions are in conflict with each other: in this example, a human being made of flesh and blood, and the mechanically moving figure made of wood and wax. Although we are sure, we can still deliberately pass from the one apprehension to the other, and we can thus "see" what is before us, now as the human being, now as

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¹⁷ Editor: 1920/21.

the wooden and wax figure. But in contrast to the preceding perception of the young woman and the present way of regarding the same young woman, there now arises an essential difference—even though not only is the object the same and appears in the mode of being presented in the flesh, but also the succession of perceptual appearances, the successive aspects in which it is given, are essentially the same. Shortly before this the young woman was still standing there before us, existing with certainty, and now [she is standing there] with the character of illusion, with the character of nullity. The intentional object, the perceptual sense, is exactly the same in a certain respect, but it has a different “mode of being” for consciousness: one time as in straightforward existence, another as null, as non-existent. Viewed precisely, the earlier character is still maintained in a certain respect in the second one, the “existent” is in the “non-existent,” as the expression correctly suggests: still in it, but annulled, as it were, crossed out.

We encounter the same contrast here if we give into the tendency to alternate attitudes between the young woman and the mannequin, and successively bring into view thematically the appearing objects standing in a conflictual relation to one another other. The intentional objects are different here, but not only this: The qualification of their being is also evidently different: The one object, namely, the “young woman,” qualified precisely as null, the other intentional object, the mannequin, as actual, as existing in a straightforward manner. If, in addition to this, we pay attention to the intermediate phase of our wavering in doubt, that is, if we pay attention to the mode of consciousness of doubt that concerned both objects, then inhering in both of them is a third kind of qualifying character, and for both in the same way: the character of “dubitable,” or what often means the same thing, “questionable.” This character, too, is in itself characterized as a modification of the primordial mode, “being”: Dubitable is existing dubitarily—at the same time there is a modification of a crossing out in it, a modification that issues from the opposing member, though it does not make it to a decisive break-through.

Let us now also pay attention to the tendency of the ego belonging to the consciousness of dubitability or questionability as it attributes being to the one thing in the thematic directedness

toward it, and then alternatively takes this one rather as existent in the thematic directedness toward the other; and let us pay attention to the fact that when we put ourselves into the one tendency, the one thing entices us as being, but the other as clashing with it and null, and vice versa. It can be that these penchants of the ego have not arisen from an actual rivalry. In any case, the consciousness of two problematic possibilities does arise here, and something speaks in favor of each one. But a consciousness can potentially arise in which more speaks in favor of one possibility and in which the ego gives a preference to it without being able to pass over to a decisive belief. Then we have the new qualifications, [on the one hand,] those of one possibility among [other] possibilities, and on the other hand, those of probability, related to possibilities. Further, we have possibility and probability themselves in their essential character as a modality of “being”: possibly existing, probably existing. It is easy to see that the number of mutually related members belonging to the unity of consciousness can be greater than two, and is ideally unlimited.

By showing these matters phenomenologically, we have taken an important epistemological step forward. Each one of the intentional lived-experiences that we call external perception, and thus all perceptions in general immanently, contain their objective sense. We see that this is to be understood in two ways; two concepts of sense are to be distinguished: (1) Sense can mean the full What of perception, which is to say, the intentional object with its mode of being (*positum*). (2) But “sense” can also mean the mere intentional object which is something that can be identified from and throughout the modalities of being that are potentially variable; the same tree, namely, as believed with certainty is then doubted whether it is, etc. (the material of the *positum*), the mere unqualitative objective sense. Thus, every perception has its intentional object as such, but always and necessarily qualifies this sense, and, as we say in our terminology, is conscious of it in some mode of being. The mode of “being” is characterized as a primordial mode; by contrast the other qualifications are modal modifications: being dubitable, being possible, being probable, etc. It should be emphasized that these modes of being belong to the objective sense, and not for instance to the contents of

appearance, to the thematic regard, etc. For where we reflect upon these, for instance, where we make them a theme of reflective perceptions, we do not have the character of dubitability with respect to them, for example, in the case of doubt. What is dubitable is the external object that is meant with respect to its being, but not the appearance in the reflection that exists in an entirely certain manner, [i.e.,] that exists in a straightforward manner: Reflection teaches us that for all lived-experiences, the contents of appearance in general can never harbor such modalities.

We notice here that with memory, as with perception, we can in fact show that an immanent sense is something identical in manifold lived-experiences, and can show it in an evident manner. If we carry out manifold memories of the same event that were given to us *originallier* in an earlier perception, then what is given to consciousness in all memories and is potentially meant is the same in an evident manner; it comes to the fore again and again in a synthesis through coinciding as the same, as the same objective sense. It is the past event as the event meant in each of the memories. Necessarily belonging to this sense is a modality of being, and it belongs to it in precisely the same manner as it belongs to the sense of perception, either in the primordial mode of having-been, the "it was actually so," or as a modality of it. For memorial certainty can also be modalized. We can doubt whether that actually existed (or existed in some respect) in the way it is given in the presentification, whether the events in question really ran-off in such a way. We can decide negatively or we can have the remembered event in the mode of probability, etc. This concerns everything, not only the direct memorial objects, but all contents that can be extracted from the presentification-content of memory through immersion and reflection, that is, [it concerns] even the presentified ego, its egoic lived-experiences, its acts. In every direction we find the memorial sense and its inherent modes of being, just like in perception.

As I stated at the outset, however, the senses and modes of being about which we are now speaking in the context of memory are not, for instance, the presentified senses and modes of being that lie in memory by virtue of their peculiar intentional self-

contained structure, namely, by the fact that it is a piece of present experience in which a concrete piece is presentified from the stream of the former lived-experience of the same subject, from the stream of a lived-experiencing that naturally becomes presentified with its senses and modes of being. This reproduced lived-experiencing of the past ego is however there for me who I am now and who presently experiences the reproduction, since I can thematically apprehend [something] from the standpoint of the Now, [that is,] can grasp the event of yesterday's perception as remembered now and presently as my past event. This present thematic intending has its current sense precisely in this past event as meant, as past. And I am actually and presently certain of it, or I am unsure of it, I suppose it, etc. That is, the modes of being actually belong to my current memorial object.

Accordingly, we distinguish here: (1) the reproduced past perception and its sense—I grasp both by transposing myself into my past "I perceive"—; (2) the current memory and its sense. Both of them can coincide to a certain degree, but they need not do so. Thus, it can be that by immersing myself in memory I find that I had such and such perceptions, and that from the standpoint of the Now I am certain that I, as the ego of yesterday, perceived in this way—but I am now of the mind that this perception was a deceptive one. In my present motivational situation, what I saw yesterday as a human being is for me today a wooden figure. It is quite usual for us "to take over" the modes of being of the reproduced perceptions that make up, not the intimately inherent, but the intentional content of our memories; the remembered perceptual belief, the remembered doubt, the remembered supposition, etc., are not only taken up as reproduction, but without further ado we believe along with it, we doubt along with it, etc. Frequently, however, we do not take over positions, but take up a new position. To be sure, we can only speak of a memory as long as a ground of certainty is there at all, a general past that is being given with certainty from the Now, that is related to my past ego with past lived-experiences, intendings, etc.; and this present general certainty has such a character that it actualizes the certainties presentified in it from the Now, that is, it takes them over. On this basis, particular deviations, non-appropriations can

ensue. – That's enough where the modalities of being in memory are concerned and with respect to how they belong both to an immanent sense peculiar to each memory and to each perception.

Appendix 3: (To §11) <Evidence of Possibilities as Such and Modal Modification in *infinitum*>¹⁸

If we take several anticipations clashing with one another in an ambiguous situation: A future must arrive, but several anticipatory intentions mutually inhibit one another in their certainties, giving to these certainties the character of "perhaps." Different problematic possibilities are such that they have different motives speaking in favor of them, different motives grounded in experience that allow the rays of expectation, as it were, to come to some good for these possibilities. But several possibilities can be given as incompatible with each other, as impossible with each other, such that there are "motives grounded in experience" speaking in favor of each one, but in such a way that they have a different "weight," and finally, in comparing these weights, one of the possibilities can be characterized as the probable one, having at the same time the preponderance of weight over all the other ones.

But in a good sense all of these are, once more, occurrences of the object; namely, [they are] real possibilities as supposed possibilities, and like other occurrences of the object, probabilities can be meant but not self-given, not grasped in evidence; they can be falsely meant, they can turn up as null in the transition to self-giving evidence, or alternately, the meant objects can prove to be truly existing.

We have a special liking for speaking here of occurrences of expectation. But if we consider that anticipations are contained in every transcendent perception, we will see that this entire region belongs here. All anticipations in external perception are either actual anticipatory intentions or intentional horizons, which, as it were, are on the threshold of passing over into expectation; [they are] intentional horizons that exhibit quite enveloped potentialities

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of expectation. But that is much too large of a theme. In any event, we must designate the mode of empirical certainty here.

These are all occurrences that already take place prior to all (in our sense) philosophically oriented interests; these occurrences play their role in customary experiential and scientific life, and they leave their mark in the modal forms of judgment that have been very incompletely demonstrated by traditional logic. For us, however, they are shapes that can be exposed in the egological sphere. If we seek to turn up what can be shown apodictically in this sphere, we need not merely train ourselves on the individual facts that can be shown with apodictic certainty, on apodictically straightforward being. We must recognize that where we have a possible being in mind, or where inductive possibilities and probabilities are presented to us with respect to a futural event or to a past being in the pure lived-experiential sphere of the ego, we cannot assert anything apodictically for its straightforward reality, for the absolutely certain being and being-thus in the past or future; but on the other hand we can gain apodictic evidence for the respective possibilities themselves having an actual existence as possibilities, as suppositions, and probabilities. We can potentially have them in their self-sameness, grasping these possibilities themselves in a wholly original manner. And precisely the same holds for generalities and for particularities of generalities—all of these are objects.

For example, if I have the phenomenon of a thing that is extended, the probability that I will have these and those aspects of it given perceptually in a specific succession is of course not apodictically certain. If I make judgments here purely about the aspects and not about the real existence of the thing, I cannot make any pronouncement about the arrival of the object. On the other hand, however, I do have absolute evidence for the fact that the present change in aspects, of which I have the unannullable certainty of the present, makes its progression probable, and in the form of such and such new aspects belonging to it. The being-probable of something to come is given apodictically, and not the thing itself that is to come. An aspect itself is given as existing apodictically (or again to justify) only in perception. The probability of the coming aspect is apodictically given for its part

in this motivational framework that we have described. The probability is experienced, is itself perceived in it, so to speak, as this probability itself. The probability of an *A* is an object different from *A*, the being-actual, the actual existence of the being-probable of *A* is a being-actual that is different from that of the *A simpliciter*. The main point is to show that all things like possibilities, probabilities, generalities, state-of-affairs, etc., are "objects" and have their own ways of being given originally, and potentially, apodictically.

In addition, we should also note the following here: In relation to each object that is given as actual, i.e., certain as being, we can speak of its possibility, that it could be, or of its probability, dubitability, etc., and this can even take place in certainty and in truth. Now, if possibilities, probabilities, etc., are themselves objects and potentially truly existing actualities, then there will also be, in turn, possibilities, probabilities, etc., of them. Thus, the modal modifications yield precisely such objects *in infinitum*, if not always in truth, then at least with a meaningful portion of it. If *A* probably is, then the probability that *A* is can also be probable, and so forth, in continuous iteration. The being-actual of such an object is given in a certainty, and is given originally in an evident certainty, that is, in a demonstrative certainty that places it before us in its ipseity.

I would like to add just a couple supplementary remarks here. These modalities are meant or given in particular lived-experiences. Thus, we have lived-experiences that on the one hand themselves "are," and in the best case scenario are grasped in absolute certainty according to existence and components of being-thus; and on the other hand they are lived-experiences that harbor an intentionality, lived-experiences that within themselves intend something, and potentially intend with apodictic certainty, but in such a way that what is given in them there in apodictic certainty are not lived-experiences *simpliciter*, not concrete individual data *simpliciter*; rather, they are possibilities, probabilities of such data, or relations, state-of-affairs, generalities, or some kind of anticipatory being, like something that is arriving through original motivation, etc. Corresponding to the intertwining of intentionalities are also the intertwining of

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these evidences and therefore intertwining of these modal objects. They condition their non-independence, which for their part occasion similar evident demonstrations.

We must especially take note of the following: If we are directed purely to the change of the coming aspects as we regard a thing, then we will progressively have an evidence of what is to come; it has the character of a presumptive evidence and not of an evidence of pure and simple futural being. However, this evidence of the supposed being of what is to come is not something isolated; it stands in the context that gives to its supposition the character of a conditioned supposition. And this being-conditioned is a self-giving being-conditioned, and itself belongs as a very important type to the framework of our demonstrations.

Appendix 4: (To §§ 14 and 15) <Levels of Decision. Receptivity [357]
and Spontaneity>¹⁹

Conversely, however, if one of these problematic possibilities that I had rejected, for instance, *B*, is altered in the actuality of experience, then my rejection of it comes to naught, my declaration of *B* as invalid is not justified, is "false," "amiss"; precisely this possibility is shown as a reality, is the one that I let be valid, the one to which I must apportion an acceptance of validity. But correlatively, because my judgment that I passed earlier, the positive decision for the previously preferred possibility *A*, is "untenable" due to its conflict with the actuality of experience, I must withdraw my accedence to *A* and transform the declaration of validity into a declaration of invalidity.

Such occurrences are disagreeable for persons passing judgments on these possibilities; they fall into doubts of legitimacy and questions of legitimacy. Concerning its most general essential structure, we gather from this that a question always remains a question—a practical intention toward an answer.

An answer always means: the transformation of the respective problematic disjunction of problematic possibilities speaking

¹⁹ Editor: 1923

against one another into an unproblematic conjunction of actualities that accord with one another and speak in favor of one another, running parallel to this in the sphere of egoic comportment: the transformation of doubt, which is disagreeable and frustrating practically, into the comportment of the ego, which is uninhibited and satisfied, at ease, into a judicative decision for one of the possibilities; connected to this, at least *implicite*, is a negative rejecting judicative decision against the other possibilities.

10 In general, this is essential to question and answer. On the other hand, however, there are essentially also questions on different levels, and questions concerning legitimacy form the most significant higher level of questions. First is the question whether something behaves in such and such a way, and the question bears 15 on the corresponding judgment or on a conjunctive connection of judgment as an answer. Then a higher question concerns the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the judgment that is already passed, or the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the earlier standing conviction. Legitimacy or, as we can also put it initially, tenability, the ability 20 to substantiate the judicative position-taking, or untenability—this is now what is problematic. Thus, without the formal essential structure of the question as such being altered, the problematic content has altered it.

Naturally, logical judgments in the specific sense are not merely 25 decisions in general, decisions that can always be seen in an intelligible manner as answers to questions, but are also judicative decisions that at the same time respond in a satisfying manner to the corresponding questions of legitimacy, that is, they have followed from the substantiations as decisions of legitimacy.

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30 What we learn from the latter considerations is that [a] occurrences within the sphere of the passive, merely apperceptive substratum and [b] such occurrences as the ego's modes of comportment and position-takings, go hand in hand in a curious way; and original equivocations accordingly arise that are now 35 intelligible in one stroke.

Let us take something that is purely "aesthetic," [i.e.,] that is purely a matter of perception, only let us put into play, at most, the ego as perceptively aware, and thus the ego as opening a latent

apperceptive intentionality. We could say that the genuine concept of receptivity has its seat here. The ego that behaves in a merely perceptively aware and observant manner comports itself in a merely receptive fashion. Indeed, it is a wakeful ego and lives as such in the form of "*ego cogito*"; but this form itself encompasses a mere passivity and activity. This receptivity is the founding presupposition for the possibility of the specific "spontaneity" of the ego, that is, for making possible the position-takings of the ego and what is [specifically] in question here, [namely,] judicative 10 position-takings.

Within the sphere of receptivity, the modalities of being are modes of apperceptive intentions, modes of their uninhibited intentions, that is, here, a course proceeding in concordant fulfillment, or modes of inhibition, modes of a break, of the 15 "negative" synthesis of intentions inhibiting one another and connected to one another in the form of conflictual "opposition"—with the corresponding break up and modalization of their intentional sense-correlates. Sheer annulment of an objective sense by another sense or a relative annulment, namely, like a problematic possibility, is "contested" by opposing possibilities, and conversely (just as it is subsequently restituted by a two-fold crossing out)—these are purely apperceptive occurrences, that is, occurrences in the perceptual noema. And [this is] likewise [the case] with respect to other intuitions, like rememberings.

25 We can't help using the same words that we use in the sphere of spontaneity here: We speak of negation, potentially even of affirmation, of certainty of being, of deciding a problematic disjunction, namely, by a passive restitution of the concordance of an unbroken experience. But what goes on in the egoic sphere, what is carried out on the part of the ego in free or inhibited position-takings as deciding with certainty, judging in certainty, affirming, denying, or as doubting, potentially then as questioning and answering—these are in no way the same kind of occurrences as those in the receptively constituted sphere, and the fact that they 35 bear the same names with corresponding concepts in no way means that they are of the same mettle. The mutual suitability of decisions, their so-called concordance, and likewise uncontestedly holding to a genuine conviction for itself as holding to a position-

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taking, is something completely different from a concordance in passive apperception; likewise, the annulment of convictions that is carried out by the ego itself as a rejection, as a taking-a-position-against, and likewise, the rivalry among convictions—these are something completely different from the similarly named rivalry belong to apperceptive intentions: Indeed, just as the expression “intention” already means something totally different from an ego-intention taking a position (on the basis of an apperceptive intention) and as a mere apperceptive intention. To be sure, for us the main point, which we must see here with full precision, is that apperceptive intentions [either] pass into each other synthetically, concordantly, and become unified, or they diverge from one another and separate; they become separate for themselves, and this takes place with respect to the apperceptive intuitions themselves. But decisions are not lived-experiences that are passively affected. Unlike apperceptions, they do not have concordance and contra-cordance as features that are, so to speak, produced in a materially relevant manner, thereby constituting objects of experience, perduring or besetting and repressing one another; rather, *I* make a decision. If I do it for a problematic possibility, then I “must” decide against the competing possibilities, rejecting them. What does this “must” and this negation mean here? The “must” does not mean that it takes place of its own accord, like everything happening of its own accord in the apperceptive sphere. Rather, for the sake of “consistency,” I must carry out a rejection corresponding to the accepting, affirming decision that I carried out vis-à-vis the one side, and this “must” means: “I can do nothing else” in this motivation.

And when decisions conflict with one another, like when the ego finds itself in a condition of doubt, this conflict means that I must relinquish my concession to the one position because of the motivational force of the other, and then conversely. But that is an entirely different motivational force and an entirely different motivational efficacy than the motivational force of apperceptions that stand in competition with one another and that repress and eclipse one another passively; and the latter is quite analogous to the well-known phenomenon of rivalry occurring in the visual field. I am motivated in the decision, I am motivated to make a

decision, and if the passive motivation has some analog, although only an analog, to mechanical force and causality, it in no way exists for egoic motivation. And so too it is likewise the case in the broader, most broad sphere of judgment that we have not yet taken into consideration: like when I suddenly notice that a judgment that I have made by deciding a question concerns some previous convictions [which now] inhibit them and conflict with them. Convictions as convictions, judgments as judgments do not stand together in the unity of an apperceptive framework; rather, the unity here is in the ego as ego, as the unity constituted in the egoic center of motivation; it is the unity of the ego as the unity of the spontaneous ego, affectively motivated from the apperceptive sphere that now decides this way or that, and hitting upon ever new decisions, is now also motivated to abandon judicative decisions once more. It is then further motivated to shape and to build up its system of judgment in such a way that it only contains judgments that are safeguarded from being abandoned; that is, the ego is protected from having to decide any differently. In this way it, as ego, remains concordant, concordant with “itself,” consistent as ego. What I have said is what I have said, what I have decided remains decided. In this way, I am always the same, namely, the identical subject of concordant spontaneity.

One should doubtless note here that every judicative resoluteness (and thus no less every valuing and willing) is in no way merely a momentary act of the ego; rather, every act is either primordially instituting or a merely repeated act. As primordially instituting, it institutes an abiding resoluteness of the ego with the decision. The ego that has decided in this way is from now on a different ego. Something is sedimented in it as its abiding characteristic, and when the ego now repeats the judgment, it “actualizes,” it effectively realizes only the decision that was in it from the previous time as its abiding resoluteness. The new explicit judgment is then given not merely as a remembering of the previous decision, but rather as the previous, but enduringly valid one, as the effective realization of the earlier resoluteness that still belongs to the ego.

In a certain respect, we had already addressed this repeatedly in our previous lectures, though now we see more clearly that the

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habituality belonging to the general nature of subjectivity is precisely of a different mettle in passivity and in activity, or better, in receptivity and in spontaneity. In passivity, it is the transition to retention and through it, to that seemingly dead forgetfulness that can be reawakened passively by what is generally called a reproduction, namely, remembering. This concerns each and every lived-experience.

But in egoic activity, habituality does not mean the same thing. For the ego is not a lived-experience; a lived-experience occurs first with the "*cogito*," and the ego accrues to it only insofar as it is a point of acts radiating outward, an ego-pole of lived-experiences. The polarized lived-experience having the form "*cogito*" has its possible reproductions that reproduce it in the doxic modality and normally in concordant certainty. But if I repeat my decision I made for the first time yesterday—this is not a mere remembering, but it is precisely an actualization of my judicative resoluteness. As a lived-experience, a crossing out can occur in the form of a deception of remembering. But as the resoluteness of the ego, there is an entirely different kind of crossing out. This implies that it can be annulled by the ego making a different decision according to new motives. The memory of it remains, but *I* have become different in the judgment. We could say that the ego as ego progressively develops through its original decisions and is respectively a pole of manifold current decisions that have been made, a pole of a habitual system of rays of actualizable potencies for positive and negative position-takings, and corresponding to them, it bears its entire history, to be sure, by means of remembering, which can be unfurled again.

Accordingly, we see that if we have gained clarity in this way about the levels pertaining to the life of the ego with respect to receptivity (or even the passivity prior to receptivity), and on the other hand, with respect to spontaneity, and if now we form the concept of judgment as the concept of a fundamental species of spontaneous position-takings, then naturally all descriptions and considerations of essential laws that belong under the rubric of judgment (judgment as position-taking) fall outside of the framework of a transcendental aesthetic. For this transcendental doctrine of sense wants to investigate, constitutively, precisely all

the occurrences of aesthetic, perceptual apperception, and intuitive apperception in general. If it is expanded to the transcendental doctrine of receptivity as such, then standing above it is the transcendental doctrine of spontaneity. Naturally, then, this will not only include judgment. Already with questioning, a wishing and a practical striving intervenes. There are also spontaneities of the heart and of volition, of a spontaneous valuing and of a spontaneous practical comportment of the ego, valuing and volitional resoluteness, each one with different modalities of spontaneity.

Appendix 5: (To §16) <Intuitive Presentations and Empty Presentations>²⁰

We are in the habit of contrasting intuitive presentations and empty presentations. Belonging to both are horizons. Empty horizons lack an appearing content; they are potentialities of appearances. But what is the case with determinately oriented empty presentations? They have their differentiated, more or less richly formed objective sense. We can do nothing else than also ascribe to them a certain "content" as opposed to their "horizon."²⁰ If we compare intuitions and empty presentations in a more precise manner we will say: The same thing that is presented in an empty manner on one side appears in and through intuitions. But intuitions (their "outer horizons" notwithstanding) are not pure, saturated intuitions. <They have> inner horizons, but also contents which, [when] determined with respect to content, are empty: empty contents. We will have to say: empty presentations and intuitions are "presentations" in the broadest sense.

Where its sense-content is concerned, every presentation is differentiated into a genuine presentational content and into a horizontal content. The latter is differentiated into outer horizon and inner horizon. The genuine presentational content has gradations with respect to fullness; it is intuitive if it has fullness, and depending upon the gradation of fullness, is more or less intuitively complete. The presentational content in the intuitive

²⁰ Editor: August 27, 1926

fullness makes up the appearance. The empty appearance, the empty pictorial presentation²¹, designates the case of the nil of intuitibility. But one wonders whether these expressions are advisable. Appearance means intuition in the sense of intuitive pictorial presentation²², that is, presentational content in fullness. [362]

The same presentational content can be emptied. Corresponding intuitive and empty presentations present the same thing with the same genuine presentational content; while they are quite different as lived-experiences, they coincide according to this content, according to the entire objective sense, which is actually contained in every presentation and is an analytically explicable sense (explication without further change in the presenting lived-experience as a special way of regarding the self-contained element in sense in an intimately inherent manner). The same analytic (or genuinely presentative) presentational sense has now more or less intuitive fullness, and another time the nil of fullness—this however does not harm the concreteness of the presentation; in some ways, this is analogous to the way in which colorfulness as the emptying of color does not lead to a zero-degree of intensity in which the phenomenon disappears.

Let us note further that our talk of presentation and intuition here naturally shifts such that now it includes the empty horizon, another time it does not. Indeed, the presentation of a thing is not concrete without the empty horizon.

A presentation can be called confused insofar as it has not availed itself to the form of an analytically explicit presentation, and insofar as its presentational content (thus, straightforwardly expressed, [is] always understood as the genuine presentational content) is not identified and fixed in the possible shape of explicative syntheses. In this shape, the identically presented object as the substratum of determinations is distinguished from the determinations, and in such a way that the form of unity arises: [Object] is α , β , ... — and this is prior to all conceptual predicates. The production of such an analytically explicated shape yields the analytic clarity of the presentation. — One cannot say that an

appearance (intuitive pictorial presentation) of a sensible object is of the same mettle as the phantom, which is the object itself becoming intuitive.

By tracing out the occurrences that belong to the specific appearances and to the empty presentation, there is here in the “transcendental aesthetic” a relatively cohesive set of investigations: initially, how continual perceiving, continual intuiting of other intuitive modalities, continual presenting, reach a synthetic unity, and by means of this how specific appearances and presentational contents in general become unified, constituting unitary appearances, unitary presentational contents. Belonging to every perceptual phase in the continuity of a perception is, for example, a momentary appearance. This can be completely uniform in every new phase; but this is only a limit case. In this case, the perception of the same perceptual object is such that the latter appears in a continually enduring and completely unaltered unity of appearance. The normal case however is that every momentary phase offers another appearance, whereby these appearances coalesce to form the unity of an appearance and not, for instance, merely through summation, but rather in a synthetically constitutive manner. Etc. Belonging here then is the doctrine of near and far pictorial presentations, etc. In considerations like these, we operate with a thematic abstraction insofar as kinaesthesia is intrinsically involved everywhere, though initially it is left unthematic. [363]

Appendix 6: (To §16) <Sense and Intuition>²³

In the case of adequation, like everywhere, we have to distinguish between perception and other modes of intuition. In perception, the object is given in the original, and on this assumption, it is adequately given; in the other modes of intuition it is not given originally, but it is (adequately) presented, adequately given in a pictorial presentification, etc. = it is adequately intuitive.

²¹ *Bild*

²² *Anschauungsbild*

²³ Editor: Most likely between 1918 and 1921

The sense in which the object as such is given to consciousness is completely determined in adequate perception; it does not leave anything open for the object, it is the sense of the object itself and completely so.

5 But the sense is not an empty sense, albeit fully determinate; rather, it is a "full" sense through and through, a sense replete, as it were, filled with the fullness of intuition. We cannot juxtapose, e.g., two components—sense and fullness—in the intuitive object as such. Only by comparing empty and full sense can we gain the difference between them, that is, through the synthesis of intuition and empty consciousness. Perhaps we could say: The abstractly identical element, which we call sense with respect to the different acts of consciousness, is an essence²⁴ (sense-essence) that is differentiated in a peculiar way, and according to two basic modes: in the mode of intuitability (and in the perceptual sphere of originary intuitability) and in the mode of non-intuitability, in the mode of emptiness. There are still other modes in addition to these, modes about which we do not say, for instance, that they are specific differentiations of the same type like those, e.g., of color, etc. At all events, we must distinguish the intuitive (here originally intuitive) content of the object in the mode of adequate perception (and even in adequate perception) from the sense that lies in it, insofar as something identical belonging to the essence remains with the non-intuitive acts, whose object can be the same and, ideally speaking, can be fully determinate. The fulfilled sense, which in the case of perception is obviously the object itself (and when we allow the thesis of existence to become codeterminative), harbors what makes the object specific, that is, the essence that is understood individually, and on the other hand, the individualizing spatio-temporal situation (whereby the "spatial" should only be a term for what is potentially individualizing with respect to coexistence beyond the successive temporal situation). Both come to originary givenness in adequate perception. (Naturally, we do not say that every object is adequately perceivable; we know that transcendental objects, according to their nature, exclude such a perception.) [364]

In the case of inadequate perception there is an ineluctable expanse between sense and fulfilled sense. The object is the idea of the fulfilled sense (as fulfilled completely). This also holds, of course, for an expanse between completely determinate and indeterminate sense; and the fully determinate sense is an idea that is contained in the idea of the object itself or of the originally given, fully fulfilled sense.

We have to emphasize important distinctions, however, in the case of non-original intuitions. In these intuitions, sense and object, everything that perception offers noematically and that perception harbors as a telos as something ideal, is given to consciousness in a modified way, and this modification brings with it new noematic components.

Appendix 7: (To §20) <Belief and Intention>²⁵

15 When we speak of belief, of a consciousness of being, we indeed have in mind within the lived-experience in question, a directedness, an intending directedness toward the object. *Doxa* is intending. Intending can mean: *I* intend, *I* am directed toward something in a believing manner. But already within passivity we find an intention, as belonging to the structure of intentional lived-experiences as such without the ego coming into play as a subject who is [actively] directed, as a cognitively striving subject potentially making a decision. It is what in truth transforms a concrete lived-experience, perhaps like a remembering or an expectation already stirring in the background, into an intentional lived-experience. If, from the ego, this same lived-experience later becomes patent, the intention takes on the act-mode of the "*ego cogito*." Intending, understood in its current sense, signifies something wholly determinate, something we obtain in a completely clear manner when we think of our analyses of experience; it is that intending that is ultimately an intending constituting a unitary objective sense, and that makes up the formal fundamental structure of a consciousness as a consciousness directed toward an object.

²⁴ *Wesen*

²⁵ Editor: 1923

In the broader sense, belief is nevertheless the form of the concordant consciousness of the object in general; but consciousness is directed toward an object only by the fact that an intention as a whole, unified in and through harmonizing intentional rays, is actualized, while the other consciousness of the object remains a milieu that can take on the form of a specifically directed intentionality at any time under motivating circumstances. This determines belief as a living belief, and all modalization takes place in relation to it. What is occasionally inhibited is the *intentio*, what clashes is an intention with an intention, belief with belief, whereby belief, in the mode of rivaling and, being contested, is however already modalized. Likewise, it is the belief-intention occurring in the process of synthesis that is ratified or annulled, shattered with respect to the unbroken, purdoring counter-intention as a whole. It is a special case, then, when the synthesis is a synthesis of confirmation, when an empty belief-intention that terminates in a self-giving is ratified in the form of confirmation, and in being self-given takes on here the character of a legitimate validity of something attained as the final attainment.

Thus, we have advanced to the primordial sources of objectivating consciousness and thus to a genuine theory of judgement and of cognition.

To be sure, only now would this undertaking have to begin in all the higher levels; and, on the other hand, we would have to make the great distinction, a distinction that runs through all consciousness and that Hume had brought to a head under the ambiguous rubric of impression and idea. It is the distinction between pure phantasy and positionality. All our analyses operated within the positional sphere. In the pure life of phantasy there is no belief, but only quasi-belief, belief-imagination, just as there is no volition, no valuing there, but only a phantasizing into something of the kind.

I have presented what I wanted to offer in my lectures: a basic feature of the work elucidating and leading to an ultimate understanding; in this work alone is [disclosed] the sense and the accomplishment of that life of consciousness that is completely hidden from us *because* it is our living life. Ultimate self-

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knowledge that we gain here, however, is not a specialized subject matter, but the source of all true and ultimate understanding of the world. After we make intelligible the most general How of constitution of objectivity in consciousness, we must, ascending from here, clarify the constitution of all special regions of objects: the distinctive constitution of "nature," lived-corporeality, sociality, culture.

Appendix 8: (To §§ 24 and 25) <The Apodicticity of Remembering>²⁶

<1. The Consequences of Assuming that Remembering is Dubious>

Indeed, a specter of skepticism appears and grows ever more threatening, namely, the specter of the dubiousness of memory. I have spoken of my stream of consciousness without hesitation, and I have hastily used not only memory as a phenomenon in the present, but also as the gateway into my transcendental past lived-experience. But if memory is no longer a source of apodictic certainty for my past *cogitationes*, then I may no longer speak of my unending stream of life. I may no longer speak of my past ego and my past intentional lived-experiences; in this regard, I must also allow the phenomenological reduction to reign. I have only the momentary present "*ego cogito*," and only while I am reflectively directed toward it; and while it is elapsing, if I make a statement about the "*ego cogito*" that would adequately suit what is experienced phenomenologically, I can never repeat the statement. Thus, I have neither the particular "*ego cogito*" in question in the actual sense as a fact, nor do I have the corresponding proposition, "*ego cogito*" as a truth in the normal sense of an iterable truth that can be verified again and again. If the "*ego cogito*" has past away (if I can even assert this much apodictically), I can recall it, to be sure; but even if I am also absolutely sure of the current memory as I am of the present lived-experience, I am not absolutely sure of the remembered lived-

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experience. Thus, I cannot be absolutely sure whether that lived-experience that I have in mind as a past lived-experience was actual. Accordingly to my guiding principle, if I cannot be absolutely certain, then I may not make any claim about it—and just as little may I make a claim about the statement concerning it, the statement that was formed when it was still present. If I repeat the statement, I have a new statement that I could only verify by recourse to the remembering that is unfortunately of no use.

For this reason I may not speak of my unending stream of life, of my life spanning an endless past and extending into an endless future; I may no longer speak of phenomenological time as an actual form of actual life, etc. Thus, I am arrested, so it seems, at the absolutely sterile "I am": I perceive—now while I perceive, I think, namely, while I think now, I feel, and only while I am feeling, etc. During all of this, I can by reflecting make observations and can make completely useless assertions, none of which have even the slightest tinge of enduring truth; they only have the barren, fleeting relevance bearing on the fleeting life of the present. Yes, actually barren, for fecundity is precisely something of abiding value and not something merely existing in a moment of growth.

<2. Two Types of Transcendental Reduction with Respect to Remembering>

I am given to myself apodictically as a transcendental ego and *ego cogito*, so it seems, only in the transcendental self-perception as the ego that is perceiving now or remembering now or feeling now, willing, and perhaps I must even look for limits here. But I am also given to myself through reproductive acts, e.g., through rememberings as the past ego and with my past perceiving, remembering, feeling, hoping, etc., and not only as the past empirical ego, as the past human being in the past time of the world.

It is necessary for us to clarify the following issues, and they will easily become clear to us after we have gained a little practice in the phenomenological way of seeing. There are two phenomenological, or better, transcendental reductions for a

remembering, and the same holds for all presentifications. Let us assume that we have a remembering of a song. Then we have (1) a phenomenological reduction of the actual remembering that is evident now as lived-experience, the remembering that has the past song of this or that singer as an intentional object. The point of departure in this case is natural reflection: "I now have this remembering." (2) But curiously, there is not only a reflection on the present remembering, but also a reflection within the remembering. For belonging to the essence of remembering, as we ourselves have observed earlier, is the fact that it not only brings a past to intuitive givenness in general, but that it presentifies it as something perceived earlier by me. The song is not only the temporally previous song, but (in accordance with the very sense of remembering) the song heard by me; and that this is the case, this I myself find in a reflection, a reflection that I carry out by delving into remembering, into its intentional content.

Now, if I take as my point of departure this reflection that remains completely unphenomenological, this "I have heard the song," I can now, as phenomenologist, carry out the reduction on it, bracketing the spatio-temporal mundane actuality of song and singer. Then I will gain the transcendental phenomenon, namely, the past transcendental phenomenon of my—of the ego's—earlier acoustical perception of the song, whereby the real song itself is only the intentional object of the hearing.

In this way I can gain the entire realm of my memories as phenomenologically reduced, thus the realm of all memories of objectively mundane things and processes, and then of all memories in general, e.g., memories of mathematical proofs that I have carried out; and I gain them not only as present facts, but according to their remembered intentional content. And what finally results from this is my (i.e., the Ego's) past transcendental life with all of its past poles which, insofar as they are object poles, are bracketed, while the ego that is everywhere identical is the transcendental ego, and should not be bracketed, just as little as the past transcendental lived-experiences.

One can also put it in this way: In the case of rememberings and with all other presentifications that we will take up later, we deviate from our earlier principle of putting out of play all

postings that are carried out in the lived-experience itself. I only put out of play the posing, the memorial belief in the past objectivity, but not the belief implied in it, namely, the belief in my past ego and my past lived-experiencing, and my past perceiving in which my past life was given perceptually. We emphasize this because the transcendental subjective element that is past is also precisely transcendently subjective, and because we initially want to appropriate transcendental subjectivity as a whole in one stroke as far as the unity of the ego and its lived-experiences can reach (regardless of whether they be present or past). In doing this we follow the evidence that itself lies, in part, in the phenomenological reflection on the present, in part, in the phenomenological reflection on the past (that is, in the reflection penetrating into the intentional content of memories). But we do not ask whether or not this evidence is apodictic, whether or not it is better than the evidence, e.g., of external perception (that we had to put out of play to begin philosophically).

We can treat memories of the future, expectations, in the same way as memories of the past. The expectation of a future course of a natural occurrence that I await while perceiving becomes, through the phenomenological reduction, an expecting of the futural transcendental egoic life. All in all, the transcendental or phenomenological stream of lived-experience and the concrete transcendental subjectivity that I gain in this way, accordingly, has its mobile phase of the present and, in addition, the endless stream of the past and future. Only by letting the presentifications be valid does the transcendental ego have an endless life with an endless immanent temporal form on both sides.

<3. Evidences within the Flux of Perception and the Evidence of Expression Belonging to It>

(1) An immanent perception is apodictically evident with respect to the object's enduring individual present, thus, in our example, the phenomenologically reduced tone toward which we are directed as if going along with it, the tone as the current tone and as the tone continuing to endure. This "going along with" is at the same time a "swimming toward"; the grasping bears on

something lighting up now and constantly toward something that is newly being lit up, toward the new Now, and it receives it with open arms: a constant grasping that grasps something constantly new and in the constant grasping, grasps something enduring as such. This is the enduring tone *qua* the tone that is enduring and that continues to endure. The apprehending intention is an intention that is being constantly fulfilled to the point of saturation, and in the fulfillment it is an intention that is continually repeated, namely, as continually directed toward something new, once again being fulfilled, and so on perpetually. It is precisely in this process that the being of the tone is given adequately as enduringly present, as original being in the enduring. We must say here that the incapability of being crossed out is the result of adequation in the sense of a self-giving that is fulfilled, actually complete. It is a constantly fulfilled intention, as we just said.

(2) We also have a different kind of evidence of the enduring tone, and it becomes apparent that the duration and the evidence of duration have two senses. For this reason we distinguish between

(a) something continually enduring, the enduring tone itself,

(b) the tonal expanse, the past one and the one culminating in the "enduring" present. And in this expanse, every phase is given retentionally in a different, and thereby constantly varying mode of "just past."

We also have here the incapability of being crossed out, but no longer adequation in the genuine sense. Here we do not have full, namely, fulfilled self-giveness, but precisely only still-having-a-hold-of, still-having-in-consciousness in the mode of certainty, a certainty, however, that is still incapable of being crossed out to a certain extent.

Just like the tone itself that is given to consciousness as enduring has the mode of certainty, so too do we see here, generally, the necessity of the tone that is given to consciousness as just past having the mode of certainty. The mode of certainty extends unchangeably throughout the entire continuum of intentionality. But it will also be good to consider the content, what is certain there, and the evidence of the description that is suited to the phenomenon here. The perception of the tone

simpliciter is the prehension of the continually enduring tone, and this is given in its entire fullness precisely as constantly fulfilling. If we call it the "violin tone," or still more generally, the "tone," then the meaning of the term fits the corresponding moment that is found adequately in the given tone itself and that coincides with itself continually throughout its endurance. The extent to which we have such a constant, stable moment in the en-"durance," a moment that finds a steady coinciding in and through this; the extent to which we have a term that fits <it> exactly with its meaning, to this extent we have evidence of the statement, to be sure, only in the endurance itself. But at least the universal "tone" as such is necessary here; the unity of the perceptual givenness of something enduring is inconceivable as the unity of a continual synthesis were the entire unity not supported by the existence of a thoroughgoing coinciding, that is, by a universality of essence that all phases must have in common. In this way, we can speak of "tone," or more specifically, of "violin tone," of a sharp tone, a loud tone, etc., with absolute adequation. This original self-coinciding in endurance occurs in the intuitive realm of original presence. This realm of the living, intuitible present is not a mathematical point, but already has a thoroughgoing, intuitively fulfilled extension whose apex is the absolute Now. In this realm we also grasp continuity and alteration, modification of intensity, leaps in quality, etc., in their most original forms. Even an alteration can continually persist in the endurance of the tone, and can generally be stated with fulfilled evidence.

Therefore, if we glance at the empty parts of the concrete present, then all such descriptions of them can have an evident content despite the emptiness, namely, by a kind of transference occurring in each instance where, in the current present of the genuine perception (in which the fulfilled intuition takes place with respect to all that is stated) something is given that can coincide with something else of the same sort in the retentional sphere. For example, the empty retention of the tone is a continuum of coinciding that terminates in the intuitive givenness of the tone; and in this way I can speak precisely of a tone that has just been; the general term is fitting for the entire continuum, even if I only use it now for the first time. What has just been given in

an intuitive manner is the tone; the past, as coinciding with the intuitible element according to its empty intention, is also a tone. Thus, the evidence of the description would be derived in a certain respect from the intuitive sphere of perception.

Remembering need play no role in those cases where contents, which are drawn from the enduring perception itself, give a "transferred" evidence so to speak and give an evident interpretation to retention by coinciding with the empty retention. The evidence of the description, then, rests on and presupposes the fact that the retentional objectlike formation in question is grasped for itself in clarity, even if in an empty manner; and it is interpreted by a comparative coinciding in the sense originally drawn from the original intuition. Where such an original "fitting" of the expression to something given originally in the present follows the thing given, holding on to it (for example, when it concerns a momentary scratching tone and while this scratching sinks into the past), there is no doubt that the expression sinks along with it and necessarily maintains its belief of expression. Repeating the expression would already be a matter of remembering.

All of these modes of evidence that we have described up to now only have a momentary certainty, a certainty that, as attached to the flux of perception and retention, is incapable of being crossed out; but with them we do not have the same apodictic certainty of the unending past and future of life; we do not have such an apodictic certainty of the identical ego that is subject of this unending life and is subject of certainties, certainties that the subject can verify again and again, even after the original living certainty (arising from the original perception) has passed away with it. The "again and again" is only possible because of remembering, and only from it does there stem the possibility of facts that are in themselves and that can be originally experienced in perception, but also that can be experienced again as often as we please, re-identified as the same, and accordingly can be re-described in an identical manner and re-described with identical truth as often as we please. Thus, this is to say that there is an abiding truth in contrast to the momentary truth. But the question

will concern how this can be clarified and the manner of its relationship with apodicticity and adequation.

Retention is a certainty that is incapable of being crossed out, a certainty of what has just past; but the apprehending ego that strives to seize retention's object as just this object is itself, the ego that strives to know it by delving into it, reaches into emptiness. The intention directed toward it has its form of fulfillment in remembering. It gives the past itself as being fulfilled. [371]

10 The fact that remembering can be deceptive is the unanimous teaching of the philosophers, and who in fact would want to deny the possibility of deception here? This also holds for transcendental remembering; that remembering belonging to the transcendentially reduced sphere. Every transcendental reduction of a naive-natural remembering that turns out to be a deception yields, as one can easily see, a transcendentially reduced remembering that is shown up as deceptive.

Yet, I must also depart from the tradition here; I must deny the unqualified rejection of all apodictic evidence in the sphere of remembering, and must clarify this rejection by showing what is lacking in the [tradition's] analysis.

<4. Remembering as Reproduction and its Relation to Retention>

The fundamental character of remembering is "reproduction"; this implies two things, and its sense is two-fold. Reproduction can signify presentification. This is a general characteristic that is peculiar to remembering like to other modes of presentification; each phantasy, emerging haphazardly or freely generated, is a presentification, but for this reason it is not a remembering. An intuitive presentification is essentially given as a modification of perception. To present something in phantasy, but also to present something in a remembering, is "to perceive after a fashion," but precisely only "after a fashion." The tone that is perceived after a fashion begins and endures, and the entire constitutive shapes belonging to perception, the entire play of retentions and intentions of expectation that are directed ahead, together with the transitional sphere of the primordial impression—all of this also

belongs to the stock of presentification. But all of this occurs in the mode of "after a fashion." Corresponding to the perceptual certainty as certainty in the present individual being of the tone is the memorial certainty. But the memorial Now that thus has the mode of the "after a fashion" is not believed, is not certain as Now *simpliciter*; rather, this memorial Now, like the entire content of something remembered, has the characteristic of the Now that is re-presentified, the Now that is presentified in the form of renewal, of re-perception, of perception being played out once again "after a fashion." The most original consciousness of the past is the retentional consciousness belonging to every perception like a comet's tail. Should the remembering that has such an essentially different character also be called the consciousness of the past, then it must have an essential relation to retention, namely, it must be in relation to it in a synthesis of coinciding that forms identity, or it must essentially be able to take on such a synthesis. [372]

Where is such a synthesis produced? Now initially, while a retention is still running-off, a fresh past can become prominent, even if empty given to consciousness; a corresponding remembering can emerge or can possibly be generated deliberately as a remembering of the same thing. A tonal phrase has sunken back, the same thing is heard "after a fashion" once again, it takes place once again after a fashion from beginning to end in the mode of reproduction. "The same tonal phrase"—that is given to consciousness here, that is, the empty retention, which of course continues to do its own thing, namely, letting the past appear as further and further past, but in itself as the same, this empty retention, I say, is synthetically one with the tonal phrase which is, as it were, sounding anew; and in the coinciding, the emptiness of the retention is fulfilled with the fullness that is reestablished in the renewal. The intuitive element is given as the fulfilling or true self of what in the retention is presented in an empty manner. In the fullness of intuition, in complete remembering, the entire fullness of the latter's inner moments and articulations comes to the fore, which moments and articulations had become indeterminate and blurred in the retention.

<5. Levels of Clarity of Remembering>

Certainly, we must still take into account here a peculiar feature of remembering shared by all modes of making present. Remembering can be a presentification with many different levels of clarity; while it is running-off it can vacillate with respect to clarity. Once it has elapsed, it will become empty analogous to the way in which a perception becomes empty after it has elapsed; but then it is not an empty retention *simpliciter*, but an empty remembering that in its very emptiness has the peculiar feature of being the remembering of an empty retention. But at the same time it is the actual retention of the lived-experience of the intuitive remembering that has just elapsed.

Yet we also come to know the gradation of clarity with respect to the peculiar feature of rememberings, namely, that rememberings are "iterable" as repetitions of the same past, and in our case, as the repetitions of the same retentional past, as well. This is disclosed, so to speak, through the first remembering, but also through this, it remains held onto, and it is by means of a new remembering that it remains held on to now more than ever, and is disclosed once again. For after the course of the first remembering an empty consciousness was indeed there again. From this we see that from the perspective of the object the different rememberings do indeed coincide in the transition from one to the other, yet they must not be entirely uniform; we see that the one discloses more of the object, the other, less; the one greater richness with respect to prominent and intuitive traits, the other, less. Thus, in accordance with its essence, there is a gradation of inner fullness and emptiness in remembering *qua* presentification, a gradation that has an upper *limes* that we call complete memory; the latter reproduces the perceptual objectlike formation and implicitly the perceiving itself in a complete manner, and it provides the most complete explication of something that is emptily retended, and reawakens everything that has become unclear and blurred in retention.

Concerning the question how we know whether this is not just a constructed fairy-tale, we can respond by referring to a series of repetition (possible series of repetition) of rememberings of the

same thing in which we can deliberately arrive at higher levels of clarity. In the transition we see that the same thing reaches intuitive givenness more and more completely—the same thing that was intended before, though still partially given to consciousness in an empty manner—and we see that we even gain the evidence of a *limes* lying in the direction of this progression, a *limes* of saturated fulfillment, of complete fulfillment. <We gain> the knowledge that there certainly has to be a *limes* since every possible remembering, if it is fulfilled at all, is fulfilled univocally, precisely as the identity of the object.

<6. Deception and Apodicticity in Remembering>

But we also recognize the possibilities of deception within remembering, initially the possibilities of "retouching." The remembered object is the object intended originally in an empty manner; it is to find its fulfillment in the content of the renewed intuition, in the perception that is modified "after a fashion." The image that is being generated and formed intuitively coincides with the image that is intended in an empty manner. But a clear image can arise which, while being on the whole an actually fulfilled presentation of the thing intended, nevertheless has other features painted in that do not belong there, i.e., those that are not the fulfillment of the corresponding features of the intended meaning. One often notices this interiorly. The empty intention is enriched with the process of bringing to intuition; when the new features of the empty intention are awakened, it is possible to become conscious of the fact that intuitive features have intruded, features that conflict with such newly awakened components of the intention; they are not its fulfillments, but false retouchings. Indeed, it can turn out that a fusion has come about, a fusion in the unity of a memorial image of something that has stemmed from different pasts, and that was not initially noticed <as such>, since the empty retention is quite indifferent, and the anticipatory process of bringing to intuition through "association" had strayed into a different sphere of the past. When one enters into a profound consideration in this way, it is quite understandable that remembering can be deceptive.

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But, to stay at first in the present sphere of the disclosure of retentions, it is equally doubtless that remembering, too, has apodictic contents. It is absolutely evident that I have just heard a tonal formation, that I have just seen a countryside, and that I do not erroneously posit the tonal formation that I have <in> remembering instead of a perception of the countryside that has elapsed, etc.; and it is absolutely evident here that I have a past object, an individual object, a temporal object, having a certain general character of countryside, and the like. Of course, insofar as we conceived remembering as being in a fulfilling coincidence with a retention, belonging to remembering is the inviolable certainty of the latter; and precisely with this certainty, we have apodictic certainty that there is a true self in the memorial image, a true self that can be approached in the *limes* and <that> can possibly be reached in the consciousness of fulfillment. But it should also be noted here that the "having just been" of retention is disclosed as a represented Now, and in every repeated remembering this Now is given as identically the same represented object by virtue of the synthesis that encompasses the repetitions; accordingly, this Now is at the same time that which is "just" past. Remembering essentially characterizes the memorial object as the perceived object after a fashion and as the re-perceived element, that is, as the enduring present after a fashion. Since it is fulfillment, the "just past" of retention is disclosed in it.

25 By the object that is given in the original Now in perception passing over to the "just past" of retention, and then again appearing renewed in the "now after a fashion" of remembering and possibly in new rememberings to be repeated as one will, we have, with evidence, the given object as the same object in manifold modes by virtue of synthetic identification, namely, as the same individual object, as the same temporal object with the same temporal locus and temporal duration. The perceptual or original present, the memorial present or the "re"-present are modes of givenness, modes of appearance of the same individual whose original being as an enduring that is constantly being formed (unity of a duration that is constantly being generated) is reproducible and re-cognizable (that is, "re"-experientiable) precisely as absolutely the same again and again.

<7. The Modes of the Past of Something Repeatedly Remembered>

Every new remembering as lived-experience is itself a new present in repetition; and although each one reproduces the same thing, and each one has a uniform content with respect to uniform levels of clarity, there is still an essential difference of irrevocable necessity. The element that is repeated in the repetition in a completely uniform manner—the same enduring tone—necessarily has a new mode of the past in each remembering.

10 By bringing the same non-Now to consciousness in a new Now, in which a new present is developed in the original "enduring," every remembering gives a new mode to the memorial object that stands in relation to this present itself. But it does this insofar as each remembering harbors an intentionality as yet undeveloped, an intentionality that is modified for every new remembering.

15 Naturally, one only sees what kind of an intentionality it is and what the changing past ultimately means as the development that fulfills.

More precisely: In every remembering as such there is an intentional tendency pointing beyond its own remembered content. Its fulfillment leads steadily into a continuum of progressive rememberings so that a continuum of presentified presents, a continually fulfilled time is represented again. This continually unfolding remembering finally terminates in the continually enduring perceptual present. For example, I just remembered a conversation I had in my office. I let it play out; remembering it, I follow the tendency in the direction of the rememberings that connect up and that are continually fulfilling. Then I recall the stroke of the clock, the awareness "it is time to go to my lecture," then walking over there, and finally, I am here and now, in this current perceptual present in which I am now actually holding my lecture.

<8. Remembering and its Horizon of Expectation>

We must expound upon the following in broad strokes: Every original self-giving, every perception harbors, as we know, a

constant protentional tendency. It has a horizon of expectation that points into the future. Every current primordial present occurs as the fulfillment of protention that continually precedes it; analogously every remembering harbors a protentional tendency (which remembering is characterized in itself as a modal modification of perception, as the perception in the mode of "again" and of "after a fashion"); and in the same way every phase of the present occurring in the mode of "again" and "after a fashion," that is, the past Now, occurs as fulfillment. But the situation is not so simple here, already because remembering is at the same time a present lived-experience, that is, itself occurs as a perceptual present, and at the same time by virtue of its intentionality; it is a presentification of a past. In the final analysis, it reproduces the continual fulfillment of the intention of expectation.

But more than that. While in perception what is arriving is new, and only in the arriving is it determined with respect to content, (and is possibly determined in contrast to an all too determined expectation); while here something completely different than what had been presupposed can arrive (insofar as the unity of the object temporally breaks off, and now some entirely new objectlike formation is perceived), in remembering, on the other hand, what arrives there in certainty is not at all new, but is rather already familiar. Indeed, it has already been there, and is only remembered. This implies that the remembered object is in itself the expected object as determined with respect to content, and in the unity of a certain and clear memorial sequence, it has the character of being thoroughly in accordance with expectation and of necessarily-having-to-arrive-in-this-way with respect to content. The memory is confirmed in the necessity of the sequence according to the determinate content, since when it is complete, it of its essence offers nothing new, but only what is long familiar.

On the other hand, where remembering as the phenomenon of the present is concerned, a tendency that is directed ahead, a tendency of the associative expectation toward the rememberings in the sequence of the course, also belongs to remembering. Both nexuses, that of the necessary sequence of pasts and that of associations, terminate in the final perception—the former in the

object's present, the latter in the present of the perceptual lived-experience constituting this object's present.

<9.> Remembering Distant Pasts

Up to now we have considered <the> necessary features of remembering being established in the sphere of fresh retention. If we now pass over to the peculiar features of rememberings as such and now consider rememberings of distant pasts, we will then obviously have to say that everything that was essential to the special function of this retention remains unchanged. Only now we are referred to the undifferentiated empty horizon. A closer inspection would show here that the undifferentiated, empty retentional horizon undergoes its first form of awakening by some prominent features unfolding an associative tendency within the life of the subject living in the present. In their fulfillment, these prominent features evoke a prominence of features that have already become indifferent in the empty horizon. If there is already a remembering, and if it is proceeding intuitively, the present that is re-presentified in it can for its part function in an awakening manner, precisely for new moments of the empty horizon, in other words, <it can> summon new moments that were forgotten. That would be a prominence in the mode of "again," but not for instance a memorial return of the previous retentions in their original retentional flux—such a retention is something abstract that can only be in the concrete flux—; rather, it is the concrete albeit empty intention that is awakened and that now bears its own affective force, for its part it now takes on fulfillment through a process of remembering that develops the fulfillment. In this way, the empty content is brought to the fullness of self-giveness. The remembering itself, then, brings with it its intentions that point ahead, thus, demanding new fulfillment, and in this way the series of remembering is reproduced up to the current present. This emergent, older intention gives itself as emerging from the empty horizon as emerging from the night of forgetfulness (and therefore precisely as something undifferentiated becoming differentiated, namely,

something undifferentiated into which differentiated retentions passed over).

Every repetition of original remembering, and the running-off of it, yields identically the same objectlike formations, i.e., the same events with identically the same particular temporal points and temporal durations, and all in all, entirely the same expanse of the past. But yet not entirely the same. For the present that is in the process of becoming has progressed, and although the repetition of the process of remembering of the same point of departure leads once more to the current present, this present is precisely a new one, and the previous present has become a past, that is, it now forms the final element of time elapsing in remembering. Accordingly, it is clear that every remembering, even where it does not get developed with respect to its protentions, does indeed intrinsically imply that it bears intentionally the temporal series up to the present, albeit in an undeveloped manner: remembering itself belongs to this as lived-experience, and it does this in the mode of elapse, as a "development that fulfills." Several rememberings of the same object necessarily bring this same thing to consciousness in different ways, characterizing it as something past with different distances of the past, as the past that is always in relation to the living present [understood] as the final goal of the mobile temporal expanse; the mobile end presses forward, and accordingly, the same past becomes a more distant past with each new remembering. Here, the entire content of the previous remembering and of the series of remembering is necessarily maintained in the content of each subsequent one; and insofar as they coincide, the temporal series is identically the same; it is the same series of individual, enduring objects, i.e., events.

30 <10. The Immortality of the Transcendental Ego—The
Impossibility of the Transcendental Ego Being Born>

Let us take an important new step. Let us consider, in addition, the necessity of the endurance of the present, which will already give a portion of a critique of expectation. The present is necessarily the fulfilled present. Even if the presently "enduring" unitary object or event can cease, the process of the "enduring"

itself cannot come to a halt. The enduring is "immortal." When the tone ceases, precisely something else is there in its stead as the enduring present. It could be the case that the world does not exist—this is a possibility as we have shown. In contrast, it is absurd [to say] that immanent being (the present being that is being constituted in the enduring) would cease: It is inconceivable that everything would come to a halt and that then there would be nothing. As soon as one conceives of the "then-not-being," one presupposes a "then-being," which conflicts with the non-being. [378]

One imputes the possible cessation of every conceivable particular being to a putative cessation of the stream of life. The cessation itself as the cessation of the object presupposes a non-cessation, namely, consciousness to which the cessation is given.

Thus, the determinate expectation may turn out to be deceptive, the structure of the progressing time-consciousness and the structure of the constitution of new presents is certainly a fixed necessity. This implies that the process of living on, and the ego that lives on, are immortal—*notabene*, the pure transcendental ego, and not the empirical world-ego that can very well die. We do not at all deny the latter's death, its corporeal decomposition, and thus the fact that it cannot be found in the objective, spatio-temporal world, its non-existence. To be sure, an unending furural time is not yet posited with the immortality of the ego as immortality is now given, namely, as the incapability of crossing out the present that is being ever newly fulfilled. This is something that still has to be established. But we have not at all established unending time in the direction of the past, and we are still in the process of doing this.

But if we now consider the present by looking back rather than looking forward, we see that every present arises as the fulfillment of a past with absolute necessity. Namely, every present, every "enduring" being does not only have in itself, on the one hand, a potential form that is incapable of being crossed out: "A new Now must arrive"; it also has, on the other hand, a retentional form that is incapable of being crossed out. And not only that every Now leaves a trail of retentions; we cannot conceive of a Now that does not already have retentions. The new tone that arises, which is beginning anew, surely does not yet have a milieu

of its own retentions, but there is necessarily a preceding just-
 having-been, a preceding perception. Just as the cessation is
 conceivable only insofar as it is in process, though the cessation of
 the process itself is inconceivable, so too is the beginning only
 conceivable in process, though not conceivable as the beginning of
 the process. The nothing prior to the beginning already
 presupposes a something with which it could conflict. There can
 be an emptiness prior to the beginning, an undifferentiated,
 monotone, mute stupefaction, but even this is something past, and
 10 has the essential structure of something temporal.

Corresponding to this is the fact that every remembering
 necessarily has an intentional horizon belonging to the beginning,
 to the commencement of the remembered "enduring," a horizon,
 so it seems, that can be reawakened, and in this way we arrive in
 15 *infinium* at new possible rememberings. Yet, that would be too
 precipitous. We have not yet come to know the essential
 conditions of possible reawakening, that is, of remembering. Upon
 closer inspection (which is beyond our scope), we see, that
 remembering is a modification of perception as an act, that is,
 20 presupposes a wakeful ego. Even the awakening of backgrounds
 through association presupposes prominence, which implies the
 affection on the ego. Accordingly, the ego is also awakened.
 Association is not the least bit possible where there is no
 prominence, where the ego is completely asleep. But that has not
 25 been stated correctly, and time-constitution cannot be grounded
 without further ado in the possibility of reawakening remembering
 in *infinium*. Is this any different in the case of intersubjectivity?

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After what has been said about the possibility of iterative
 remembering of the same object, we arrive at an identical
 30 unending time in the necessary mode of the unending past, at a
 necessary variable mode, since all past times must be given in
 incessantly varying, and of necessity, constantly varying
 modalities of the past. Time is only possible as the original present
 or as the past and as the oncoming future. But the original present
 is the enduring present, that is, a constant change of the present
 35 pressing toward the future. And accordingly, every past is an
 enduring past that varies with the present to which it belongs. But
 with the change of these modes, there is the one unending time to

the extent that it is already past, and every position, every expanse
 of this time, is absolutely fixed and identical, namely, identifiable
 again and again with complete certainty as the same.
 Consequently, transcendental life and the transcendental ego
 5 cannot be born; only the human being in the world can be born.
 The ego as transcendental ego was eternal; I am now, and
 belonging to this Now is a horizon of the past that can be
 unraveled into infinity. And this means precisely, the ego was
 eternal.

10 Finally, we can easily see that the future signifies unending
 time. Remembering teaches us that what is expected in every past
 present occurs again and again and necessarily as the new present
 and has become the past; and we must now see the necessity that
 the protentional horizon attaching itself to every present has
 15 possibilities of fulfillment, but only in the form of an expected
 present, and consequently, of an expected past. What is futural,
 what will be, is something identical that is initially identifiable in
 repeated rememberings of the future, rememberings that have the
 character of anticipation of perceptions, i.e., of presents, and
 20 which can only find their fulfillment through the occurrence of
 these very perceptions and through the identifying [process of]
 remembering after the perceptions have occurred. Thus, what will
 be must become present and past, must become identifiable time.

Following from this is the necessity of an unending immanent
 time, which is to say (I would not know how one can escape this
 absolute evidence), the infinity of past transcendental life. But this
 in no way means that transcendental life is always a background of
 different acts and lived-experiences that can be disclosed, which is
 to say, the transcendental ego [has] always [passed] a wakeful life,
 30 a life in which all sorts of different things took place. Rather, a
 mute and empty life, so to speak, a dreamless, empty sleep, is
 conceivable as a life that also had this necessary structure and that
 appeared in perception in a passive and interior manner, but
 without any prominence, and therefore without any apprehension
 35 [of it] by the ego, without any play of single affections and acts
 such that the ego did not come on the scene, so to speak, and the
 slumbering ego was mere potentiality for the *ego cogito*. There is

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always a possibility that prominences will occur through the modification of life, and this entails the possibility of awakening.

Let us forego <a> deeper discussion of empirical experience within the sphere of remembering (perhaps it could be shown that every remembering reproduces its remembered content with some apodicticity such that even a negated and false remembering has a necessary content of truth); and let us turn to the sphere of expectation. Here we content ourselves with the determination, which can be easily clarified, that every Now has its futural horizon, or as we can also put it, necessarily passes over into a new Now. The cessation of the tone means a rupture in the intentional unity being constituted, but a new fulfilled Now is necessarily there and is changed again; or rather, it is an abiding form whose intentional sense, which is primordially instituted, immediately passes over into retention, while a new primordial institution ensues in the Now-form. Expectation is never apodictic—and yet with respect to its form, it is apodictic. The ego lives on; it always and necessarily has its transcendental future before it; the expected element having this or that content need not occur, but a different content is there in its stead; something always takes place. And there is a forward directed “always” for me as the ego. But this future has temporal form and is the same as that of the past, though it is constituted in quite a different manner. What is arriving has its intuitive presentification in the form of a presentification of the future, in the form of an expectant image that anticipates a Now and therefore the entire flux and its streaming-off into retentions, that is, a past belonging to it—which however is anticipated as the arriving past. What is futural will be past after it was present, and it will coalesce with the current Now that will correspondingly be a past lying further back, joining everything that is now past. Even the latter past will have correspondingly been pushed back.

This structure of the future thus fashions the futural bent of subjectively oriented time, oriented toward the mobile zero-point of the temporal orientation, toward the Now, in relation to which I stand as a perceiving ego, as the ego of the present. Again, it is inconceivable that the transcendental ego ceases. You will easily see that we do not mean by this that the human being has lived and

will live for eternity, and that birth and death, the emergence of human beings in nature and their disappearance from nature, say, through creation or destruction, is quite compatible with the transcendental infinity of life. Strictly speaking, the soul of the body is not immortal, i.e., it is not necessarily conceivable as immortal, and it actually perishes since it is a part of everyday experience. But in a certain respect every human-ego harbors its transcendental ego, and this does not die and does not arise; it is an eternal being in the process of becoming. [381]

10 <11. Apodicticity of Remembering on the One Hand, Expectation on the Other>

We have seen necessities in all of this, necessities that no one can alter willy-nilly. And while a remembering may be incomplete, while it may be deceptive, it still has a share in these necessities; it is remembering, and this means that it cannot simply be without something apodictically evident. My absolute life with the necessary form of immanent time in the mode of the past lies at the basis of remembering. The deception peculiar to remembering means: “The intended past can be retouched,” but behind this lie the past and identical time and identical individual life-contents of time in the necessary mode of the changing past.

Where the future is concerned: Expectation is directed toward the future; it is merely anticipatory, and like all anticipation, it can be deceptive. But life is a living on, and the law of time also attributes an apodictic content to expectation.

But we could still advance further in the same direction. A lawful regularity of expectation under the rubric of associative or inductive expectation, which allows certain contents to be inserted into the empty temporal form, also belongs to transcendental empirical experience. Just think of the transcendental turn from natural perceptual belief to the certainty of the course of those transcendental phenomena in which the same experiential object, the same physical, natural object is presented. This can yield an extremely vast class of examples, just like the transcendental turn from the natural, naive certainty of empathy, i.e., of the certainty of the objective existence of animals and human beings.

Obviously, the possibility of the non-occurrence of something expected belongs to the essence of expectation; accordingly, no such inductive empirical experience can have apodictic validity. Even here there are apodictic contents that surely lead into modalities of belief, e.g., into real possibility and probability; and this holds everywhere when the certainty of expectation plays its role.

<12.> Recapitulation

At the close of our investigation, we can characterize our results in the following manner: The universal phenomenological reduction had <disclosed> to us our ego, the ego unique to each one, with its stream of lived-experience as the center of an egoic totality with the streams of life belonging to it. The apodictic reduction yielded the mere ego as the realm of possible apodictic experience; and practically the entire investigation was actually devoted to circumscribing the scope of the *ego cogito* with its apodictic contents. I am. As soon as I reflect upon myself, I cannot posit myself as not-being, and not only with respect to the living, streaming present. And not only is the streaming *cogito* itself incapable of being negated here. I exist with an unending temporal field in its variable and firmly formed mode of appearance; I exist with an unending sphere of the past and with an open infinity of an approaching future. [382]

Certainly, I must bracket a tremendous stock of my unending temporal life for the apodictic reduction, however much this infinity itself is apodictically certain. Hence, I must bracket every determinate being-thus of the future (beyond the temporal form and the form of its variable mode of givenness). The past, the realm of what is finished and done with, already offers very much more to me. On the basis of the peculiar feature of remembering and of my evident faculty to retain something, to strive for clarity, to repeat a remembering of the same object, etc., I can gain the evidence of the identity of something experienced, even with respect to its being-thus; and therefore in the realm of immanence, specifically, past immanence, I can carry out "objective" experience, so to speak, by observation, fixation, and intuitive

determination, assuring myself of what possesses temporal existence and [determinate] being-thus. But we only have apodictic evidence for the rememberings of the retentional near-sphere with some degree of completeness with respect to the concrete content of something remembered, namely, security against overlapping and confusion. And even here is the *lines* of absolute clarity that allows the full individual self of the past to emerge—a limit-case that is not entirely free from doubt; and yet it is not such that it can be arbitrarily generated just anywhere. For example, should we want to repeat an unclear flowing phantasy or even an unclear flowing remembering as such as this lived-experience that it is, and now a second unclear reproduction occurs, how should we become certain that both of the flowing unclaritys each have absolutely identical contents of unclarity?

In general, we will accordingly say that while immanent experience is in no small way objective and apodictic with respect to what is experienced, what is experienced with respect to the determinative content is only determined typically, and moreover, is referred to the idea of a completely determinate individual past datum that is not to be characterized merely in a typical, general manner. This is similarly the case where the distant past is concerned, but here the typical generality is such that it even leaves open the possibility of confusions, deceptions with respect to the special features in which the typical generality is given as differentiated. The method that possibly confirms this typical generality again points to the idea of a true being and gives the apodictic security for the being of something true and of what can be disclosed *ideally*. But every actual remembering will have its element of insecurity, although it will also always and necessarily have a certain general content that is incapable of being crossed out. [383]

Appendix 9: (To §25) Both Variations <of Modes of Givenness:>

(1) of Proximity and Distance within Clarity
(2) of Obscurity as Veiledness, Nebulousness²⁷

Nebulous givenness, the unclarity of intuitive givenness. A memory, an expectation, a possible experience: The memorial object is before me "unclearly," nebulously, but it appears as if in obscurity, as if "drowned out" by obscurity. Likewise in perception, which is external perception in obscurity, in the obscurity of twilight, in the fog or like when my view is befuddled, and yet I still make things out.

Here is a distinction peculiar to phenomenology concerning the modes of givenness between (1) the normal, clear givenness with its distinctions of proximity and distance or of approaching and moving away from; these are distinctions of a gradation that is not a gradation of relative clarity, but rather is a gradation of a greater or lesser fulfillment and filling concerning the seen content with regard to every identical seen moment of such a series—within clarity. It is a gradation that concerns the possession of the self [of the object], the appearance of the self, which is pure possession of the self within the framework of clarity (of pure clarity), but without regard to purity in the gradations of completeness. We can say that appearances are purely self-given, but that as reduced to the genuinely appearing thing, the appearing thing itself is transparent, [since it] itself appears through the appearances; and this self of the object, or the self of the moment in question, appears all the more complete the more of it (the more a greater fullness of it) that appears through the appearances. The optimal appearance, that of absolute proximity, is the absolute maximum in which the transparency ceases and the appearance no longer points through to something new, but is itself the *terminus ad quem*.

(2) In contrast, where the nebulous givennesses are concerned, the appearances are themselves nebulous, "unclear." Here we find ourselves in a different gradation that in general is not—yet in a different way is—subject to our free variation.

²⁷ Editor: Between 1920 and 1926.

The particular reduced appearance, reduced to the genuine appearing, is not a self-presentation without further ado, [it is not a] pure self-presentation of the object; it is precisely obscured, concealed by a haze. To be sure, the object does reappear through the haze or fog, but precisely because its genuine, clear self-appearings appear through it, and in and through this, the object. [384]

Appendix 10: (To §25) <Possession of the Self and Concealment in Remembering. Reproduction and Retention>²⁸

When we said in our conclusion to the previous lecture that in near remembering the self of the memorial object is given with all moments in the mode of being that is incapable of being crossed out, this holds with the constant limitation that is implied by the gradation of concealment that is called relative unclarity. Fundamental here is the insight that we cannot emphasize strongly enough, namely, that this concealment is not a masking by or an overlay with moments that are alien with respect to content, or even by or with moments of the object. The fog of unclarity within the deeper levels of its penumbra is not on the order of an object, it is not an objectlike blackening. That would only make sense for optical data. When tones become unclear, the unclarity is not a tonal confusion; an obscurely reproduced loud tone is not a soft tone, nor is it, in place of *c* a mixture of another tonal quality or timbre. It is a concealment of an entirely unique sort: The self [of the object] is given to consciousness such that it is incapable of being crossed out, but it is pushed back into a peculiar dimension that is distant, and this "distance" and "proximity" have a two-fold *lines*: absolute clarity and absolute obscurity—the latter is a *lines* analogous to the zero-point of intensity; and just as this is excluded in principle, because an absolutely obscure remembering would no longer be a remembering, so too, a tone sensed or heard in absolute silence is no longer there in a manner conforming to sensation; the sensation of an absolute zero-point of intensity is no longer a sensing.

²⁸ Editor: 1920

One should also not confuse genuine remembering (consciousness's process of reproductively re-constituting something being renewed in becoming), and what we call empty memory. Or better, we distinguish between empty near retention and empty distant retention, and we no longer even call this distant retention a memory. If a musical motif dominates the further musical movement, and in this case continues to be held on to, if it exercises an affection on the ego again and again, with the ego also possibly coming back to it with its own rays of attentiveness without it actually reproducing it, then this can serve to make the contrast clear. In actual reproduction, the motif is steadily played out from beginning to end, or at least in sections. And this is also the case in all higher spheres of consciousness. If I conduct a proof and carry out the first premise step by step: positing the subject, the predicate, etc., then the further premises, then the mode of conclusion demands that I return to these premises. Then I say: it follows from it. But not as if we had to carry them out once again in the steps through which they were constructed. The judgment is concluded; and the retrospective examination goes back to the unity that is ready-made and only retentionally given to consciousness in the conclusion, [i.e.,] the unity that is in no way intuitive, the unity that likewise bears here its self in such a way that it is incapable of being crossed out. In this way, a retention relating to a past that reaches way back (I mean, a retention that we cannot apprehend otherwise than as the continuous duration that is indissoluble from the corresponding near retention) can also achieve a special prominence; that is, its objectlike content of the past can, in one stroke, exercise an affection for itself and possibly determine the ego to turn and glance at it without inaugurating an actual remembering. A remote past suddenly dawns on me, the thought that just came to me comes into relief from the so-called unconscious in which the object given to consciousness, in the specific sense of a special prominence, is merely an island. Every present flows once more into this undifferentiated subsoil of the distant retention. The subsoil itself is without any prominence—though once and awhile something does come into relief. It comes into relief: That is, a completely non-intuitive affection is there in entirely the same way that a chord that has just faded away [385]

emerges in a non-intuitive manner, possibly drawing my attention to it—albeit a chord that I (perhaps entirely in vain) want to make intuitive again. It can also be that a remembering flashes forth momentarily as an intuition, but that it immediately, that is, after a minimal expanse of intuitive constitution, breaks off again precisely by disappearing in obscurity. But in this obscurity it does not continue, for instance, as if the constitutive process would run on unnoticed. To assume this would be a completely empty hypothesis. Rather, remembering then, takes on once more the mode of the corresponding distant retention; and the constancy of the connection (despite the fundamentally different phenomenological mode) is evidently understood as the coinciding that takes place according to the identity of sense and according to the general law that every intuition can take on a diminution of clarity to the point of having no intensity at all, and it does so in such a way that there is a sudden change in the empty retention that has an identity of sense within the zero-point itself.—But can we really assume this so easily?

Appendix 11: (To §26) <The Concept of Associative Causality>²⁹

Lawful regularities of reproduction, of memory (expectation) of “free” phantasy and apperception: We ask: What is essentially necessary, and accordingly, what is intelligible in this? How far can one “explain” development here, the formation of memories, of expectations, of the playful course of phantasy and then understanding the development, formation of transcending apperceptions in accordance with their motives, from “motives” and according to rules of “motivation”? And of course the concept of motive here is an entirely inauthentic one since the genuine concept of motive refers to egoic acts. It is a kind of “causality,” but it operates within immanent time-consciousness, and already in its lowest levels (even already within inner consciousness), and <it is> of course nothing less than causality in the sense of [386]

²⁹ Editor: Between 1920 and 1926.

"category," which requires its own expression: substantial (or natural) causality.³⁰

Now, what should we call this causality of the sub-personal psychic dimension? Should we say: sub-personal causality? But that is misleading because one could also think of psycho-physical causality with this expression, while it should be a matter of a causality that runs purely in psychological "interiority." Or should we speak of associative causality (no matter how inadequate this expression is)? Let us use this term. This associative causality dominates in the framework of original time-consciousness, but also in a certain way in the framework of constituted immanent time and temporal objectlike formations of sub-personal interiority. But seen more precisely, the sense of causality and the sense of the regulations proper to it are different in each case here. And it is also evident here that regulations as well, necessary interconnections, must reign between [a] the constituted unities and [b] the streaming that constitutes them and [c] the multiple modes of temporal lived-experiencing that are originally constitutive. When we speak of "association," we usually have in mind unities of different levels that are already constituted. Sensual data recall other sensual data, but even objects of external experience recall other objects of experience (as appearing in this or that way, yes, even as emptily presented in this or that way). This is a relationship that is not meant as "natural," and is not to be understood in this way.

All objects being constituted from original passivity (without any participation by the active ego) arise "associatively" (that is, according to the rules of this sub-personal, purely immanent causality); arising "associatively" are all the objects pregiven to the personal ego (possibly already on its lowest level of personality), above all, objects alien to the ego, thus first and foremost all those objects that do not refer back to an "intervention" on the part of the ego in structuring their intentional constitution. Living egoic acts arise precisely from the ego,

according to a personal regulation, and do not arise associatively. But is not the ego, the person itself, an apperceptively constituted unity? And does not this apperception, like all apperceptions, refer back to "association"?

5 Appendix 12: (To § 27) Note on the Fundamental Founding of the [387] Doctrine of Original Time-Consciousness³¹

A completely homogeneous, completely unchanged tone—this is a tone that is prominent, but it is a limit-case. How can something become prominent here in the past and the future? But we must interpret this phenomenon as a limit-case according to the other cases, and in cognition, the evidence that the past and the future are extended and filled out with uniform fullness arises synthetically. So too are complete rest, an absolutely fixed thing-body, etc., limit-concepts. And in this way, the entire doctrine of time-consciousness is a product of conceptual idealization! Even this idealization would have to be described constitutively, and the point of departure would thus be the realm of concrete and discrete phenomena—and in fact, taken as primordial phenomena. Hence, begin by describing the types of primordial phenomena.—Method of interpreting phenomena through primordial phenomena.

20 Appendix 13: (To § 27) <Primordial Present and Retentions>³²

The sphere of the present as the sphere of constituted data, living streaming identification through multiplicities of appearances.—The "absolute" sphere of the present = the unities in their multiplicities. The multiplicities themselves "impressionally"—as momentary multiplicities in primordial coexistence. Strictly ordered. Two-fold concept of impression. The new sensible datum, the new sensible "point"; the coexistence of retentions with the sensible point as momentary primordial coexistence. But many sensible points with <retentions> possibly belonging to them.

³⁰ If one takes the standpoint of psychophysical parallelism, one could say with Schopenhauer that motivation = causality, viewed from within. But we do not recommend this point of view.

³¹ Editor: Between 1920 and 1926

³² Editor: Between 1920 and 1926

Within the primordial present this concerns the ensemble of sensible points and the derivations of different sensible points [that occurred] previously. Several retentions of one and the same sensible point cannot be there in a single primordial present.

5 Organization: (1) Connected unity of all of the continually constant retentions that belong cohesively to one punctual-linear temporal object. A point of color enduring, becoming altered. Without such a tail in a primordial present, [we have] only the points of departure of new temporal objects in original streaming, living transition of this structure into a new one. New points, constitutive beginning points for paths, thus, the streaming becoming of new retentional transversal series. On the other hand, vanishing – ceasing: Retentional transversal series without a head, finally, the becoming nil of the retentional transversal series.

15 Living primordial present – the fusion of series functioning in a synthetically, identifying manner in the [sphere of] vivacity.

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(2) But also, on the other hand, fusion in the same primordial present according to continuity of the non-identical (coexistence) within the local ordering, as well. The “affection” = vivacity <as> the condition of unity. – In the streaming, both orderings are one identical form that can only be occupied once. Thus, every primordial present is repressed by a new one, and the longitudinal series of retentions that belong together arise in this way.

25 The law of retention holds again in this streaming. I do not merely have primordial constancy in a primordial present, but also the retentions belonging to the primordial presents that have just past. But I believed to be able to show that it only requires a change in attitude in order to see this, and that this does not lead to any infinite regress. The streaming itself is a primordial phenomenon and must be presupposed.

30 Now, when a synthesis of identification progresses, the paths and canals of identity run together into a zero by virtue of the progressing diminution of clarity. The displacement that takes place through coinciding is the coinciding of elements that are continually similar, i.e., fusion in which the similar element is continually fused with what has preceded and yet is extended, since the repression is a modification. It is not a concealment—it was absurd to say that. It is a continual modification in a fixed

system that is always ready there, and such a modification that is always what is in the form of the Now overlaps in the form of the just-past, etc. The form of the just-past again cannot be occupied a second time, etc.

5 We can say with respect to the primordial present that “unconsciousness” is consciousness in the primordial present; the sensible object of which we are unconscious along with all the other sensible objects of which we are unconscious are “given to consciousness” in an undifferentiated manner in a zero-consciousness. All the retentions that were previously still differentiated in the primordial present flow together and do this in such a way that the paths of identity are no longer differentiated, to say nothing of offering an internally differentiated object-sense. The only thing now remaining is a horizon-consciousness, a consciousness of an indeterminate, undifferentiated, completely obscure past as a whole. Thus, it still remains consciousness, empty consciousness, whose object is without affection, and it embraces each and every thing in an undifferentiated manner that was there in the undifferentiated form of the one endless past as well. Affection and association concern the constituted objectlike formations.

20 The awakening of the horizon: Within the living present we have the final sections of the retentional paths in which clarity has already been lost, and there is only enough affective force for the empty “Something,” as what is still held onto in this instant with certainty.

25 An affective fortification from elsewhere can rouse this empty consciousness, can awaken it; it is clarified as a more or less clear remembering, or as a remembering that is quickly becoming clear.

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30 “Re-self-giving.” – How, in the original temporal flux, do all modes of appearance of everything that appears merge together into an undifferentiated zero, into an emptiness in which everything that appears, like the appearances themselves, remains without differentiation? Is that actually a zero, or a mere “point,” a “datum,” a “content” that is actually in itself empty of content, indivisible, undifferentiated?

Appendix 14: (To § 27) <The Accomplishment of the Association of Simultaneity>³³

Non-integrally cohesive intuitions, initially perceptions, and integrally cohesive intuitions in *one* stream of consciousness; thus for example, the integrally cohesive unity of perceptions of a sense-field = an optical perception – among several such unitary perceptions that are not connected to one another; that is, they do not give one perception that would have <its> correlate in *one* perceptual object, in one continual (affective and possibly thematic) unity of a multiplicity that is continually flowing-off (in general, a unity of one continual multiplicity). But within one continual unity, special unities can come into relief, i.e., they can exercise special affections, and they can do this because within the overarching unity, that is, within an overarching continuity, discontinuities are possible, the discontinuities of intensity, etc. Thus, this yields unitary “wholes” with prominent “parts.” The parts have an essential unity in the whole, and in other connections, a non-essential unity. Uniformity, similarity are not unities of connection; for this reason, they do not come into consideration. Wholes are homogeneous connections. “Mere” manifolds of individuals are manifolds that do not have any essential connection, they are manifolds that are heterogeneous. What is heterogeneous is not connected temporally by the individual beings that have a temporal form.

But where continuous unities that are constituted for themselves are not conveyed by continuity, like in the case of prominences of different sense-spheres, where the intuitions are not integrally cohesive, they are indeed ultimately “connected” in a certain way. The separated intuitions are unified in inner consciousness as time-consciousness, they are associated “in the current Now,” i.e., every intuition necessarily belongs to a continuity, to the continuity of consciousness that originally constitutes time and temporal objectlike formations. But two such separated continuities are uni-vocally associated with one another. Put more precisely: Every momentary present with its primordially

impressional Now and with its tail is “connected” to a parallel present, to the other series of retentional modification. This connection is that of association of simultaneity. It is association that produces within passivity a unity of a higher order between separated consciousnesses of unity, more precisely, it produces a connection between the separated consciousnesses of unity; this unity or connection as the consciousness of the intentional objects constitutes a unity of an object, of the simultaneity of separated objects. One can also say that primordial association is the connection of a non-essential sort, a connection that is not grounded in essential structures.

The simultaneous separated objects possibly exercise an affection in a unitary manner, or can exercise an affection in a unitary manner, because they are connected; and they are not connected because they exercise an affection communally. We also have simultaneity constituted within a unitary intuition. But intuitions that are not integrally cohesive, even perceptions constitute simultaneity, just like those that are in themselves integrally cohesive; and they must constitute it because they are synthetically connected, and in a broader sense, because they are interconnected. An original association connects everything that is not integrally cohesive and that arises in the mode of the Now, and this primordial connection of elements that are not integrally cohesive makes out of the whole momentary consciousness precisely a wholeness, a unity; as such this unity is unitarily one perception and originally constitutes one temporal series, and thus constitutes one connection for the Now of each separated object; it constitutes a Now of separated Nows such that the Now is constituted as connected, thus [it constitutes] their simultaneity; and with this, too, [it constitutes] temporal relationships in general, relationships from things [that were] constituted separately.

If we have a non-integrally cohesive perception and a remembering, then the remembering as a lived-experience of inner consciousness is “connected,” associated with the perception as the lived-experience forming an originary unity of lived-experience, that is, inner consciousness is the unity of a “perception” (“inner” perception). The present and the memorial

³³ Editor: Probably 1920/21

object are constituted simultaneously as such through association, but the memorial object is itself not originally given as now and therefore is also not given to consciousness as simultaneously now. The most original connection of non-integrally cohesive intuitions is thus the connection in inner consciousness as inner perception that institutes an original nexus among the intentional objectlike formations of the intuitions in question—insofar as we take the intuitions as inner perceptions and take them with respect to this intentionality; but this is not the case if the intuitions are presentifications insofar as we take them with respect to their presenting intentionality. Thus, just as the memorial object is not given originally, so too is the connection between the memorial object and the present object—the temporal connection—not given originally. But neither is it reproduced, it is not self-given in a reproductive manner. The present *A* and the remembered *A* is given as such simultaneously, but the present object and the remembered past object are not pure and simply given in a simultaneous manner. An intentional interconnection is produced between present and past through the association of intentional lived-experiences in inner consciousness. [391]

Association = every connecting consciousness that is founded in separated consciousnesses and that connects them to a consciousness of a higher order. Correlatively: An interconnection on the “object side” of intentionality between objects that are either constituted materially without coherence or, if they are constituted coherently, have constituted an overarching immediate nexus as an extra-material nexus of separate prominent features.

What role does the unitary movement through such continua play (continua such as fields) through an entire life?

And further: The fields are heterogeneous to one another. What fashions the homogeneity for the reciprocal connection and awakening of heterogeneous fields? The unity of time-constitution fashions a formal unity of phenomenal continuity. Fashions? Indeed, through “original time-association.” But does it not already presuppose homogeneity? Is everything that is “Now,” everything that is heterogeneous in the form of the Now, formally homogeneous precisely through this form? But what does the opposition of form and content mean here? It can certainly mean

nothing other than this, [namely,] that consciousness is connected in the most general way to another consciousness by a commonality that is correlatively noetic and noematic; and all connection is connection through “commonality,” through uniformity and similarity. This most general uniformity and similarity is not the similarity composed piecemeal; rather, it is a similarity that makes all other commonalities possible in a unique way, and on the other hand, co-determines them. With regard to everything that is otherwise given as content, similarity provides the basis for saying that content is necessarily given in a temporal form, in a different mode, in a continually varying mode of givenness, etc.

Thus, it provides a universal connection that connects the lived-experiences to one consciousness: all of them have the unity of a single stream of consciousness. All lived-experiences of immanent time are constituted in an immanent time as temporal unities and are constituted as unities of sense in the modes of givenness in the modality of time, but not in such a way that each one is constituted for itself and that each one stands under the same law of time-constitution; rather, the mode of the Now of every primordial impression occurrence is certainly its Now in each one of the lived-experiences, but it is at the same time *a single* Now, *a single* mode that connects all of these lived-experiences. Indeed, the concrete primordial phenomenon is that of the unitary “flux” with the unitary primordially impression occurrence arising ever anew as Now and with the modification being retentionally altered again and again in a unity, in the continua that we described which form a unitary phase (even a punctual unity) according to each cross-section. It is an original unity, or better, an original form of unity. The content is what can change; namely, when we compare the concrete unity in the living flux to the memorial fluxes, or when we imagine something, this unity can be variable; but this form of unity peculiar to constituting time-consciousness is necessary, and its continuation is necessarily and continually attached to a living unity according to the law that governs the sinking into an empty retention; this empty retention can be awakened by rememberings, whereby every living present, <every> current actuality of the impression flux is attached to an

implicit series of possible true rememberings in which a unitary past is disclosed as the past stream. It belongs to [the essence of] the living present that it is freely possible for the ego to carry out a continuity of remembering that is livingly present and true.

5 Ultimate descriptions and analyses are still lacking here. The fixed form of the living present (of the full "present") and what flows through this form: a timelessness of form in which time is constituted.

Appendix 15: (To §27) <Unitary Consciousness and its Correlate:
the Identical Object>³⁴

We now direct our attention to a new universal theme, to what is alluded to under the obscure Kantian rubric of "synthesis." Let us link this to our previous considerations by reflecting on how we had actually won our last series of results. Thus, we hold firmly to an object, for instance, a perceptual object and allow varying perceptions to be referred to it, but then also another, a different kind of consciousness to be referred to it, a consciousness that at the same time stands in contrast to the other one. Thus, the same object is perceived, perceived differently again and again, namely, according to its different sides, aspects, etc., it is then remembered and, for instance, remembered in changing rememberings as well, then presented pictorially, etc.

But now we must not overlook the fact that when we speak of "the same" object that is given to consciousness in different *modis cogitationis* (and speaking within the framework of the phenomenological reduction), a varying continuity or discretion of multiple consciousnesses does not merely run-off; rather, we must not overlook the fact that this multiplicity is also a unified multiplicity of consciousnesses, indeed, the manifold of consciousnesses in its unity is also a single consciousness. With this, we come across the fundamental fact of consciousness as unity and identity, whose correlate is the one and identical intentional object.

Every single perception and every phase in the continuity of a progressing perception (regarded for itself and *in abstracto*) has its intentional object. The entire continuity of multiple and varying perceptions is however *a single* perception and has *a single* intentional object. And if the perception passes over into a so-called fresh memory, or better, into a retention, and if a clear remembering then arises (a remembering relating to the previous temporal phase of the object), then the single and identical intentional object runs throughout all these modes of consciousness in their unification. – Or as we then also say in

10 comparing the different phases of unitary consciousness: Each one of these phases in itself has its intentional object, but at the same time the object is the same in all of them, and it is the same in the entire unitary consciousness. Unity, ipseity, is given to consciousness through a higher consciousness founded in multiple consciousnesses, precisely in "synthetic" unitary consciousness.

Thus, this can connect quite differently shaped consciousnesses, phenomenologically very different consciousnesses, and it connects them in such a way that what was given to consciousness in other and very different consciousnesses, is given to consciousness overall as one and the same. Naturally, not just any consciousness can be synthetically connected to just any random consciousness to form a unitary consciousness. But, on the other hand, no consciousness is isolated. Moreover, there is no consciousness that would not in <itself> already be a continuity and that would not already allow the distinction of phases and parts which themselves are already consciousnesses, and which intentionally constitute the unity of the object in the mode of synthetic unity. The phases, and likewise the different concrete intentional lived-experiences as we can also say, fuse by "coinciding" in the same lived-experience. Already here, where we consider the most simple shapes of intentional lived-experiences, like the simple perceptions of the object, presentations of the object of every kind in their functions as unity, we encounter a marvelous feature of consciousness in its progressing stream that we will call polarization. Let us consider once again: Whatever can be examined for itself as a "*cogito*," as an intentional lived-experience, has for itself its intentional object.

³⁴ Editor: 1922/23

But as we look into a consciousness being synthetically unified with another consciousness that in turn has its intentional object, either one of the consciousnesses can, in a truly striking manner, claim the same object.

5 I say: in a truly striking manner. For the stream of lived-experience to be sure exists in the form of a temporal juxtaposition. What is sequential <is> separated in all of its elements; what belongs to every phase in parts and moments, belongs exclusively to it. And yet the intentional object of one lived-experience that is intertwined with another lived-experience in a unitary consciousness must be identical with the intentional object of this other lived-experience; and this identity is even³⁵ in many cases an absolutely evident one, like, for example, in the unity of a continual perception and retention. We see here that a curious difference comes clearly to the fore, namely, between [a] what inhabits the lived-experiences "in an intimately inherent manner," what is contained in them as an intimately inherent moment, and [b] what inhabits them in a manner that is not intimately inherent.

20 At first, it is necessary to pay attention to the essential form of phenomenological time belonging to the *ego cogito* and to its flux. Objective time (which, like space, is the form of nature) is bracketed for us. But the intentional lived-experiences themselves have their temporality which remains for them even if we have put out of play every posing of the world with its objective time. A lived-experience, as a lived-experience in this "immanent" time (as we also say) expanding, beginning, and ending, has its individuation in its temporal locus; if it is now, it cannot be later; each one of its phases has its individual temporal locus. Thus generally: Everything that is a part of the lived-experience is firmly and individually bound by means of the temporal locus. For this reason, temporally different lived-experiences cannot have just any individual part in common. In the broadest sense, the individual non-independent determinations also belong to the parts. Let us call everything that is bound in a phenomenologically

temporal manner to a lived-experience an intimately inherent moment of the lived-experience. Then intentional lived-experiences will however not only have intimately inherent moments, but also moments that are not intimately inherent, thus, their intentional objects and everything that falls under the rubric of "sense."

10 In a certain way, the intentional object is also given in a phenomenologically temporal manner, to be sure. If I see a house, the intentional object "house" is the appearing object during the temporal expanse of the perceiving lived-experience from phase to phase. The phenomenological temporal expanse of perception also conditions a certain phenomenological temporal expanse of the perceived object, while the objective temporal duration of the object always belongs to the intentional object itself. But the phenomenological temporal locus binds only the intentional lived-experience and not the intentional object. The latter is not individuated through time. If we take several intuitions of the same object, for instance, several rememberings of the same object, they are indeed completely external to one another temporally; they do not have anything at all in common in an intimately inherent manner, but they are rememberings of the same intentional object; they do not have anything in it that is identical in an intimately inherent manner, but something that is ideally identical. We can say forthwith that the relation to the intentional objectlike formation means a certain polarization of lived-experiences that can be disclosed phenomenologically. Every lived-experience is an intentional lived-experience insofar as it intrinsically has a pole as the consciousness of something, that is, can enter into syntheses of identification with certain other lived-experiences and with an ideally infinite number of lived-experiences, whereby this ideal pole (as identical, not however as identical in an intimately inherent manner, but rather as the identical pole of the intended meaning, of the sense) achieves a unity of coinciding in the unitary consciousness, i.e., identity consciousness.

35 However, the coinciding in the same unitary consciousness can be a very different coinciding, and can give a very different sense to the ipseity [i.e., the identity consciousness]. The intentional

³⁵ Translator: Reading *sogar* for *sage* *ich*. This reading is based on a correction by the Husserl Archives in Leuven of a transcription error.

object can be a concrete object, and thus the identity can be the identity of this same concrete object. We then have complete identity. But the intention can also be directed toward a property of the object or toward a relative feature in the relation to a different object. In the transition from the consciousness of the concrete to the consciousness of the property or the consciousness of relation, however, the complete consciousness of the concrete object coincides in a certain way with the special consciousness of the part or of the relative feature, and in this way we have disclosed new modes of identifying syntheses. Such syntheses come to expression later linguistically in predicative propositions, propositions that certainly always already contain, as enveloped in themselves, quite intricate syntheses of identity. Every "is" points in an indeterminately general way to a synthesis of identity, and this holds for every position, every inflexion that is to be explicitly expressed by an "is."

We also distinguish here: (1) the simple synthetic unitary consciousness that lies in every simple enduring, concrete perception for itself, or in such a remembering for itself, whereby a self-coinciding takes place continually, that is, in an interiorly undifferentiated manner; (2) syntheses that are precisely genuine, where concrete, independent, and separate perceptions or rememberings, and lived-experiences of any other kind, enter into a coinciding that forms identity, and where the articulated identity consciousness, "this or that is the same" arises. We distinguish here between continual unity and discrete syntheses of identity.

Only in the latter case are we accustomed to speaking in the strict sense of the synthesis of identification or, more simply, of an identity consciousness. But every intentional object is genuinely an object *simpliciter* only as an intentional object of a concretely finished act, and such an intentional object already has its phenomenal-temporal expanse, and thus already has a continual coinciding of the self in this expanse. Only through a distinction that we make by abstraction or through an extraction of single expanses of continuity that are made prominent do we become attentive to the moment of continual coinciding in the same intentional object, a moment that is found in each consciousness.

All specific accomplishments, participations, affections, position-takings of the ego, then, relate to the "intentional objects," to these ideal poles of unity and poles of the identity of varying syntheses of consciousness; they relate to these poles that are not intimately inherent, to these poles that are already of particular intentional lived-experiences. Unfortunately, we do not have a name for what is specifically egoic. But in particular instances we can point to the fact that the ego is being affected by what is given to it, that is, affected by the object given to it appearing each time in such a manner, in these or those modes of consciousness; then we can point to the fact that [the ego] turns toward it in an attentive manner, and with different modifications of attentiveness; likewise we can point to position-takings, like those of believing, of valuing, again in differing modes; to modalities of striving like regretting, desiring, willing, driving at; to explicating, relating activities, colligating, grasping two things together in a single plurality, one referring to the other.

Appendix 16: (To §28) <On the Connection of Similarity>³⁶ [396]

The greater the similarity, the closer the data stand to one another, the stronger is the coinciding, the more that unanimity outweighs difference. Two data that do not differ, that are without distance and yet become united through synthesis, fuse. If we conceive of a multiplicity <of> data that form a unity by means of a thoroughgoing, constant mediation of similar elements, all of them will fuse to form an internally unbroken unity, a unity without discontinuity.

This is the case either in coexistence or in succession, as well. For example, a steady tone—[a tone that is] steady in itself, qualitatively uniform and, at the same time, steadily modified in its intensity—, if a coinciding that is constantly without distance is produced in the continual successive synthesis, but where the increase of intensity becomes salient as the tone continually streams on and on. If we take away an intermediary element, the increase becomes a distance and therefore a contrast. We lack the

³⁶ Editor: Between 1920 and 1926

phenomenon of increase in pure uniformity, and steady coinciding does not lead to the steady increase of an implicit difference.

Now, what makes up the unity of an object for consciousness, how does the object become prominent as one among others in coexistence and succession? How is it that there can in turn still be a singular object of a higher level—a closed group, a configuration, a whole composed of many elements—arising from several elements that are prominent in a singular fashion, that is, from several particular features? How can it be given to consciousness as the singular object? And in the other direction: What produces the unarticulated singularity that is not given to consciousness as plurality, although it does indeed imply something plural, even something continually plural, and is able to lend itself to such a plurality by a division that is ideally possible at each time? Obviously such questions are to be posed initially and originally for the immanent sphere.

It is clear that unity, homogenous and non-homogeneous unity, and plurality as unity, are governed by essential conditions, and that with such questions we will initially be led back to the syntheses of similarity and contrast, those that, within the form of time, connect-up with respect to content and separate with respect to content. The prominent feature contrasts with its temporal surroundings; the extent to which there is fusion is the extent to which there is no prominence. Something prominent can then again enter into a special unity through uniformity or great similarity, synthetically producing a connection in the unity of consciousness, be it in coexistence or in a sequence. From here on, however, the multiplicity of directions in uniformity and all relationships of a higher level would have to be studied further.

Awakening and the connection of similarity in an impressional present—the impressional present does not need to be constituted in one blow as a multiplicity of objects—a first object is privileged for instance and gets apperceived in a certain way because as the first it is the quickest one to fulfill the conditions of apperception. But meanwhile, similar features can also become prominent at the same time, similar features that invite apperceptions similar to them and that favor them in their very transformation during the impression (coming on the scene involuntarily in the central

[397]

sphere of the visual field). The latter must first be “dismantled.” Return to the primitive limit-cases. A manifold of sensible data in a synthesis of similarity. A pair. An affective interest—do we have to consider this at once? Here we immediately have the problem of the relationship between prominence and intention and affection. If the pair is such that it is completely uniform, it can arouse an affective interest only in a unitary fashion, provided that we rule out apperceptive moments. Can one then say that such an affective whole necessarily motivates a passing through them and a cultivation of overlapping? In the case of mere similarity (and uniformity) there can also be moments here and there that arouse different affective interests, but that are held in balance.

The unitary connection of similarity can be given to consciousness as the connection of uniformity or as the mere connection of similarity. In the latter case, one can disclose the incongruence of single moments that are coming into relief with overlapping by passing through them. Generally speaking, the connection of similarity has two forms:

(1) the primordial form of overlapping in pure passive coexistence;

(2) the form of “fixation” carried out from the side of the subject, the “fixation” of one and then the other, whereby the overlapping with respect to content comes on the scene—the focus of the ego does not only concern the first, but <also> the second (can one say: as something given to consciousness at once both impressionally and retentionally?). The second is still held with an egoic grasp, and here congruence and incongruence come to the fore in terms of parts and moments.

But this action does not fashion agreement and non-agreement. In the primordial form, unity is already constituted as the unity of affinity (unity of fusion) and difference, prominence, separation as the *negativum* of fusion, but is constituted as a form of unity. In addition to this we have, to be sure, the accomplishment of explication and thus of a comparison attained after explication whereby the special uniformities, special congruences and special differences “come to the fore.”