

# Experience and Judgment

# *Edmund Husserl*

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*Afterword by*



Experience  
and Judgment  
*Investigations in  
a Genealogy of Logic*

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LOTHAR ELEY

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY PRESS

EVANSTON

1973

Northwestern University Press  
Evanston, Illinois 60201-2807

Originally published 1948 by Classen & Goverts, Hamburg, under the title *Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik*. New edition published 1972 by Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg. This edition published by arrangement with Classen & Goverts. Afterword published by arrangement with Felix Meiner Verlag. Translation copyright © 1973 by Northwestern University Press. First published 1973 by Northwestern University Press. All rights reserved.

Third paperback printing, 1992

Printed in the United States of America

ISBN 0-8101-0595-0

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences--Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.



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## *Translator's Introduction*

AS LUDWIG LANDGREBE tells us in his Foreword, *Experience and Judgment* was compiled from a number of separate manuscripts. Still, the book is very much a unity, with its own sweep and style, and is no mere adjunct to any other work, to *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, for example. It is a companion piece to this work, certainly, but is by no means a restatement or duplication of its principal themes. It is far less abstract than *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, and it deals extensively with subjects (e.g., the life-world) which are only touched on in the *Logic* or not discussed there at all.

*Experience and Judgment* can best be approached in terms of its guiding thesis, namely, that, even at its most abstract, logic demands an underlying theory of experience, which at the lowest level is described as prepredicative or prelinguistic. In the process of articulating this thesis, the book provides a re-examination and restatement of many of the persistent themes of Husserlian phenomenology and does so in language remarkably free from the idealistic overtones characteristic of many of Husserl's works. For example, objects are described as given "there in the flesh" (p. 19), external perception is "perception of the body" (p. 56), and so on, all of which is evocative of something on the order of Merleau-Ponty's "incarnate consciousness" rather than the transcendental ego.

It is also worth noting that the neutral and/or naturalistic language of *Experience and Judgment* often enables the reader to discover relationships between certain of Husserl's basic conceptions and those of other philosophers whose general orienta-

tion is usually held to be quite different, a discovery which could well lead to new possibilities of philosophical "dialogue." A case in point, although one which can only be mentioned here, concerns the relationship between Husserl and Whitehead, in particular their respective conceptions of an "enduring object." For Husserl, an enduring object is "constituted in the flux of an ever new becoming" (p. 383), in which every point "lights up" the fleeting present, while its duration is described as a "continuum of continua" (p. 387). For Whitehead, on the other hand, "actual occasions are the creatures that become," and an "ordinary physical object, which has temporal endurance, is a society." Further, such objects, which are usually analyzable "into many strands of 'enduring objects' . . . are the permanent entities which enjoy adventures of change through time and space."<sup>1</sup>

## II

TURNING NOW to a more systematic account of the organization and import of *Experience and Judgment*, an obvious place to begin is with the over-all structure of the book. In conformity with its purpose, an inquiry into the "genealogy of logic," it is divided into three main parts, concerned, respectively, with prepredicative experience, the structure of predicative thought as such, and the origin of general, conceptual thought.

Part I begins with an analysis of the "passive" data of experience (which always involve a constitutive synthesis of internal time-consciousness). Starting from this level, Husserl exhibits the prepredicative conditions of predication as such. As underlying every act of objective experience, these structures found the specific forms of judgment encountered on the level of formal logic.

Part II is specifically concerned with the origin of the predicative forms of judgment from prepredicative experience. At this stage of the inquiry begins that detachment from the pregiven elements of experience which culminates in the forms of general conceptual thought discussed in Part III.

1. Alfred N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1929), pp. 51 f.

In Part II, the focus is on cognition as an activity of the ego whose goal is the apprehension of the object "once and for all." On this level, the so-called "objectivities of understanding" arise from acts of categorial judgment and form the logical structures which have hitherto engaged the attention of logicians, who at the same time have neglected to reflect on the manner of their original production.

In Part III, Husserl continues the process of isolating the forms of judgment, as acts of the ego, from the data of "self-given" experience. In keeping with this development, Part III focuses on forms of judgment as concerned with general conceptual thought—in short, on the problem of universals, wherein the general classification or type under which objects are known is apprehended as such. It is this level of predicative activity which leads to true knowledge, which, detached from a given situation, is freely communicable and permanently available to everyone. It is also this type of activity which culminates in the forms of judging-in-general as representing the highest type of spontaneous activity of the ego.

Such is the over-all plan of the book. But before Husserl's ambitious project of founding logic in the prelogical and pre-predicative can be appreciated, it needs to be supplemented by an explication of the key terms, namely, those appearing in the title itself: "experience" and "judgment."

The first thing to be noted is that, on Husserl's broad interpretation, the terms in question are, in effect, coextensive. A preliminary examination of each, beginning with the first, will serve to bring out the significance of this basic equivalence.

"In the first and most pregnant sense," Husserl tells us, experience is a "direct relation to the individual" (p. 27). Further, such experience, which is typically characterized as "prepredicative," is rooted in *aisthēsis* (p. 71) or "simple sensuous awareness," although what it is, over and above this awareness, is very much in need of further explanation. In addition, prepredicative experience, as involving a direct relation to the individual, is that which "gives in advance the most original substrates" (p. 27). According to Husserl, this in turn implies that such experience is experience of "pure universal nature," the "primitive building stones" (p. 58) of subsequent cognitive activity. Otherwise expressed, this pure universal nature is the pure "life-world," before it is masked by a "garb of ideas" supplied by the idealizations of science (p. 45).

However, much as Husserl stresses the sheer givenness of the fundamental substrates, which are "objects only for me" (p. 58), he also insists that, even here, there is a minimal ego-act: an act of objectification which involves "an active believing cognizance of that of which we are aware, this something [which is] *one* and continuously the *same* . . . which is identified in distinct acts which form a synthesis" (p. 62).

It is this ego-like activity, taking place even in prepredicative experience, which constitutes the lowest level of judgment. In Husserl's words: "with every prepredicative, objectifying turning-toward an existent, it is already necessary to speak of an act of judgment in the broader sense" (p. 61). Further, even the "passive" reception of sense data also involves a bestowal of meaning on these allegedly ultimate object-substrates; or, to put it in another way, even the lowest level of experience involves "its own horizon" (p. 32), for every "novel reality" enters into consciousness "*from* the world" (p. 35), ultimately from the life-world "in which we are always already living and which furnishes the ground for all cognitive performance and all scientific determination" (p. 41).

Although Husserl's discussion of prelinguistic experience is the subject of only the first of the three parts of *Experience and Judgment*, the role of such prepredicative activity as the foundation of all subsequent levels of cognition makes his analysis of this activity of paramount importance. Certainly, an irremediable incoherence or lack of clarity here would greatly weaken the resulting superstructure of cognitive activity as such. And it certainly seems to be the case that there are in Part I, if not the "contradictions" which Lothar Eley cites in his Afterword,<sup>2</sup> at the very least elements of ambiguity which should be clarified insofar as possible. In view of its importance, then, Eley's basic charge should be examined, both to determine its significance and to uncover possible alternative interpretations which would blunt the force of his criticisms while remaining faithful to the basic theme of the book.

The fundamental "contradiction" which Eley points out in the Afterword is one involving a conflict between the over-all concept of prepredicative experience as concerned with ultimate

2. This Afterword (see below, pp. 397 ff.) was prepared by Professor Lothar Eley of Cologne for the new German edition of *Erfahrung und Urteil*, soon to be published by Felix Meiner Verlag. It has been translated for the present edition by Karl Ameriks.



substrates, i.e., with individuals as the ultimate objects-about-which, and the claim that "beyond this core of determinate quiddity, of the truly given as 'itself-there,'" such experience nevertheless "has its own horizon" (p. 32). In other words, the alleged contradiction lies in the fact that such ultimate objects as prelinguistic objects would be "barren of prescription" and at the same time have their own horizon of sense; or, as Eley states: "what is prelinguistic and objective belongs to language, but it is met only in the horizon of the linguistic" (Afterword, p. 408).

In connection with his discussion of this "circle of language" in which phenomenology is allegedly caught up, Eley also makes an illuminating reference to Martin Heidegger's approach to this same problem, which he describes as involving the assumption that language is brought to expression as language ultimately through being and not through beings. As Eley points out, such a conception of language forgets both phenomenology and criticism. "Its only possibility is onomatopoeics, and that in the form of etymology" (p. 408). (Such forgetting, one might add, leads straight to the being-mystique characteristic of so much of the later Heidegger.)

Heidegger's drastic solution of the problem of the "circle of language" is mentioned chiefly in order to contrast it with another approach, to be found in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's doctrine of *primary perception*. But before discussing this doctrine as it bears on the problem in question, it is worth noting that Merleau-Ponty was fully aware of the apparent conflict between the idea of prepredicative experience and the necessity of a world-horizon, although he did not think it to be a strictly linguistic or logical conflict. Rather, it is the result of a "double-edged" relationship between the "preobjective order" and "logical objectivity" (between what Husserl termed in *Ideen II* the "world of nature" and the "world of mind"). But neither order, Merleau-Ponty tells us, is self-sufficient: the first because it is only "fulfilled in the founding of logical objectivity," the second because it is limited to consecrating the labors of the pre-objective layer."<sup>3</sup>

It is true that, in his *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-

3. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Signes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1960). English translation by Richard C. McCleary, *Signs* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 173.

Ponty does speak of a "contradiction," but it is one whose elimination requires more than logical consistency. "We must return to the *cogito* in search of a more fundamental *Logos* than that of objective thought, one which endows the latter with its relative validity, and at the same time assigns to it its place."<sup>4</sup>

From his many references to the problem, it is clear that to Merleau-Ponty the basic circularity to which Eley refers requires a spelling-out of this "more fundamental *Logos*," something which his doctrine of primary perception is intended to supply.

What, then, is primary perception? It is a mode of cognitive behavior which is primary not only in the sense that it is the way in which we become aware of objects as such but also because it is "the basic experience of which science is the second-order expression."<sup>5</sup> It is prerational, "older than intelligence," but it is at the same time the basis for all rationality. Finally, in Husserl's broad sense of the term, it also includes judgment as a sense-bestowing act "which creates at a stroke, along with the cluster of data, the meaning which unites them—indeed which not only discovers the meaning *which they have*, but moreover *causes them to have a meaning*."<sup>6</sup>

But if Merleau-Ponty's primary perception is the counterpart of Husserl's prepredicative experience, how does it escape from the "circle of language" which Eley describes? The answer is to be found in the expansion of this concept into a general theory of linguistics wherein the element of language is considered not as a static entity but as a living whole, capable of continuous historical development.

Insofar as it bears on the circle of language, Merleau-Ponty's theory, which is itself based on Ferdinand de Saussure's general linguistics, is intended to explain how it is possible for consciousness to have a horizon, a common world of meaning, against the background of which novel experiences can be assimilated. His answer turns on the following points. First, he emphasizes that "firsthand speech," that is, original utterance as opposed to "second-order" expression, does not presuppose thought. "Thought is no 'internal' thing, and does not exist

4. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945). English translation by Colin Smith, *Phenomenology of Perception* (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. 365.

5. *Ibid.*, p. viii.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

independently of the world and of words.”<sup>7</sup> On the contrary, the word becomes “the presence of that thought in the phenomenal world.” To illustrate his point, Merleau-Ponty turns to *art*, which “confers on what it expresses an existence in itself, installs it in nature as a thing perceived and accessible to all.”<sup>8</sup> Second, Merleau-Ponty insists that ultimately the meaning of individual words is a function of the entire language and the culture from which it springs. “Available meanings, in other words former acts of expression, establish between speaking subjects a common world.”<sup>9</sup> “Strictly speaking, therefore, there are no conventional signs, standing as the simple notation of a thought pure and clear in itself; there are only words into which the history of a whole language is compressed.”<sup>10</sup>

These two points are epitomized in Merleau-Ponty's notion of indirect language (the “speech of silence”). In contrast to empirical language, “that is, the opportune recollection of a pre-established sign,”<sup>11</sup> authentic language, the speech of silence, is “more like a sort of being” than a language. It is an “open experience,” an “ever-recreated opening in the plenitude of being.”<sup>12</sup>

The gist, at least, of Merleau-Ponty's solution to the problem posed by the circle of language should now be apparent. Primary perception, whose vehicle is language, is an “originating operation,” “the principal instrument of our relations with the world.”<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, authentic language is not something apart from the world of objects; it is that apart from which there is no such world, although it is itself enlarged and enriched by the activity of perception as a mode of behavior which structures the world. In other words, there is that “double-edged relationship” between language and world noted above. Moreover, as essentially creative, such language is most fruitfully understood from an aesthetic point of view, something which Heidegger also stresses, although for him it is being as such which is

7. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

8. *Ibid.* I am indebted to E. F. Kaelin's *An Existentialist Aesthetic* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966) for its clear presentation of the aesthetic basis of Merleau-Ponty's general theory of linguistics.

9. *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 186.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 188.

11. *Signs*, p. 44.

12. *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 197.

13. *Signs*, p. 55.

ultimately responsible for aesthetic creativity, whereas for Merleau-Ponty the source is man himself.<sup>14</sup>

Essentially intersubjective, as well as the product of individual creativity, indirect language cannot literally be understood as providing "a world only for me." Rather, as Husserl himself in fact suggests, this last idea is a "methodological limitation," which is necessary "if we wish really to catch sight of the original activity in its ultimate originality" (p. 58). This methodological limitation (Husserl also speaks at times of a "thought experiment") is something to which Merleau-Ponty also refers—sometimes with approval, viewing it as a maneuver designed "to break off our familiarity with the world momentarily and to restore 'astonishment' to us before the strangeness and the paradox of a world which situates us,"<sup>15</sup> at other times with disapproval and suspicion. In his posthumous work, *The Visible and the Invisible*, he has this to say, for example:

My access to a universal mind via reflection, far from finally discovering what I always was, is motivated by the intertwining of my life with the other lives, of my body with the visible things, by the intersection of my perceptual field with that of the others, by the blending in of my duration with the other durations. If I pretend to find, through reflection, in the universal mind the premise that had always backed up my experience, I can do so only by forgetting this non-knowing of the beginning which is not nothing. . . . I was able to appeal from the world and the others to myself . . . only because first I was outside of myself, in the world, among the others, and constantly this experience feeds my reflection.<sup>16</sup>

To return to a comparison of Husserl's prepredicative experience and Merleau-Ponty's primary perception, ultimately both are constitutive of the world of objects, but with the difference that primary perception reflects Merleau-Ponty's concep-

14. The parallel between Merleau-Ponty's indirect language and Heidegger's conception of the language of poetry, "the primitive language of a historical people," as the house of being is also striking.

15. Paul Ricoeur, *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology*, translated by Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), p. 33n.

16. Merleau-Ponty, *Le Visible et l'Invisible*, ed. Claude Lefort (Paris: Gallimard, 1964). English translation by Alphonso Lingis, *The Visible and the Invisible* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 49.

tion of experience as active intersubjective behavior in which the body is inextricably involved. (Even language is gesture for Merleau-Ponty.) This is an idea which is never completely worked out in Husserl, although he certainly tended in this direction in *Experience and Judgment* and other works of his later period. In addition, because of his insistence on experience as active, Merleau-Ponty, unlike Husserl, avoids even the appearance of passivity, and he does this by emphasizing that primary perception is essentially creative; again and again he returns to the realm of aesthetics as affording the clearest examples of such perception.

In this connection, it is unfortunate that Husserl, for whom experience likewise is never really passive, did not make a similar use of aesthetics. Specific references to works of art are extremely rare in *Experience and Judgment*,<sup>17</sup> and even in his general references to art (pp. 55, 266) Husserl draws a sharp distinction between the kind of experience associated with art and prepredicative experience as such, a distinction which also occurs in *Ideen II*.

But despite this dichotomy between prepredicative experience as "pure sensuous perception" and the expression of "mental being-sense" (p. 55), there are indications in Husserl of a more inclusive concept of experience on the order of that exemplified by Merleau-Ponty's primary perception. The following passage from *Formal and Transcendental Logic* is an example:

"*Transcendental aesthetics*"—in a new sense of the phrase (which we use because of an easily apprehensible relationship to Kant's narrowly restricted transcendental aesthetics)—functions as the ground level [in a world-logic]. . . . As a level founded on the logos of the aesthetic world, there arises the logos of Objective worldly *being*, and of *science*, in the "*higher*" sense.<sup>18</sup>

However, this is at best a hint, and to this writer's knowledge one which was never elaborated by Husserl.

Does this mean, then, that the "contradictions" which Eley

17. Where such references do occur (cf. p. 266), they are limited to the consideration of art objects as "irreal objectivities."

18. Edmund Husserl, *Formale und transzendente Logik: Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1929). English translation by Dorion Cairns, *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), pp. 291 f.

discusses cannot be resolved within Husserlian phenomenology? Possibly. But, as Merleau-Ponty and others have pointed out, Husserl's thought was never static and, as it evolved in his later works, tended away from ideal structures and toward an increasing involvement with the actual world, a tendency noticeable in *Experience and Judgment* itself. Indeed, it is this impatience with fixed positions, this refusal to leave things as they are, which leads Husserlian phenomenology that evocative power that has inspired so many contemporary thinkers, not the least of whom is Merleau-Ponty himself.

### III

AS IS THE CASE with other contemporary German philosophers whose literary output has been extensive (Martin Heidegger, for example), Husserl's books have been translated into English by many different men and at widely separated intervals. Although this circumstance may have had the beneficial result that the later translators were able to profit from the work of their predecessors, this possible advantage is outweighed by the disadvantages presented by differences in technical vocabulary and style among the different translations. Indeed, one can sympathize with the student of Husserl who knows little or no German and is forced to rely on translations for access to Husserl's philosophy, for this is difficult enough when expressed in the original German without the added difficulty presented by the differences just mentioned.

Not wishing to add to the terminological confusion, the translators of the present volume have, insofar as possible, made use of the common English equivalents of Husserl's technical terms. But since we believe that it is possible to translate Husserl without departing significantly from the norms of standard English, we have consciously avoided clumsy, non-standard expressions, even if these are sanctioned by other translators. For example, we have not followed the practice of translating *Evidenz* by "evidence" because, in most contexts, it is clearly at variance with normal usage. Rather, except when another expression is clearly in order, we have translated the German as "self-evidence." Also, unlike many translators, we do not distinguish between Husserl's interchangeable use of *Gegenstand* and *Objekt* by translating the first as "object" and the

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second as "Object." Our justification for translating both terms simply as "object" is twofold: first, we know of no reasonable explanation of Husserl's practice insofar as a difference of intended meaning is concerned, and, second, we believe that distinguishing between *Gegenstand* and *Objekt* in the manner described puts a slight but still needless obstacle in the way of the reader's grasp of the content.

In general we have tried to avoid any interruption of the flow of understanding that would result from the addition of extraneous material to the English text except when such material is required by the demands of scholarship. For this reason, the reader will find a minimum of German words in square brackets. But no matter how few the distractions, no one should forget that this book, like all translations, is really a secondary source, that Husserl's original expression has invariably been altered by transposing it into another language.

Finally, a word of explanation about the preparation of the translation itself. The body of the text is the result of the joint effort of Mr. Ameriks and me. However, he is chiefly responsible for the translation of the Afterword, as I am for this Introduction.

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*May, 1972*





# Experience and Judgment



## *Editor's Foreword to the 1948 Edition*

THE FIRST PRINTING of the following work by Academia-Verlag of Prague followed soon after the death of Edmund Husserl in 1938. In the spring of 1939, immediately after this printing, the publishing house was closed in consequence of the annexation of Czechoslovakia, so that this book was no longer offered for sale. The entire edition remained in Prague and during the war was pulped—with the exception of 200 copies, which were still able to be shipped in 1939 to the publishing house of Allen & Unwin in London, which sold them in the United States and England. Thus arose the paradoxical situation that in those countries, at least to a limited extent, the book was distributed, discussed, and quoted, while at the same time it remained practically unknown to readers in continental Europe. Hence it became necessary to reprint the work in its original form by photomechanical means in order that this book, which in reality had appeared eight years before, could at last find its way to the public.

The editing and publication of *Experience and Judgment* was based on a commission by Husserl, who up to the end kept in touch with the progress of the work, although it was not given to him, as he had intended, to provide a preface, nor did he live to see the actual printing. Accordingly, the task of saying what is necessary by way of introduction must fall upon the editor.

In his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (1929) Husserl intended not only to point out the inner sense, the articulation and intimate connection, of everything which up to our day

had been treated as belonging to the sphere of "logical problems" in the broadest sense of the term, but at the same time to demonstrate the necessity of a phenomenological illumination of the entire logical problematic. An essential part of the analytic-descriptive investigations which contribute to such a phenomenological foundation of logic is presented here. *Formal and Transcendental Logic* was conceived as the general fundamental introduction to these concrete specific analyses (already sketched out at that time). However, so long a period of time has elapsed since the appearance of that work that these analyses can no longer simply be presented as its continuation and elaboration—even less so in view of the fact that the progress which Husserl later made in his systematic reflections causes many of the findings of that book to appear in a new light. The following text, then, must take the form of a work independent in itself, and with this in mind a detailed Introduction was added. On the one hand, it serves to relate the sense of the whole analysis to the last phase of development of Husserl's thought, many of the important results of which were published in his last book, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (*Philosophia*, Vol. I, 1936). On the other hand, it serves as a recapitulation of those basic concepts of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* which are essential for an understanding of the approach of the specific analyses.

It is obvious that, in the setting of an introduction, we cannot, by recapitulating some of the points of view of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, pretend to provide in a few words a conclusive answer to the questions of principle of phenomenological logic. A really penetrating introduction into the peculiar nature and sense of phenomenological logic requires the completeness of that book, whose study cannot be replaced by a brief synopsis. Rather, the parts of the Introduction relating to this book serve more as a brief reference, and like other parts of the Introduction will cause certain difficulties for the reader who is relatively unfamiliar with phenomenology. To him we recommend that in his first reading he skip over these pages and pass forthwith to the individual analyses, which are understandable in themselves. Only after study of the entire work should he come back to the Introduction and, at the same time, relate it to *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. As the realization of an essential part of the program marked out in the *Logic*, the following work will at the same time enable the reader to attain a better understand-

ing of that book; and, in turn, the deeper sense of the concrete analyses carried out here can be disclosed only by reference to the *Logic*.

In order to understand the character of the following text, a reference to the circumstances of its origin is necessary. Faced with an ever increasing number of sketches and research manuscripts, Husserl in the last two decades of his life increasingly occupied himself with the problem of finding, in cooperation with his students and coworkers, new ways of making some literary use of the results of his studies, the profusion of which he did not feel himself able to manage alone. Thus in 1928 I was delegated by Husserl, being then his assistant, to collect the manuscripts relating to the problems of transcendental logic, transcribe them from the shorthand notes, and attempt to group them in a uniform and systematic way. The basic text and ideas involved in this task were contained in a four-hour lecture on "Genetic Logic," which, beginning with the winter semester of 1919-20, Husserl had given many times at Freiburg. This lecture served as the foundation for my work. A group of older manuscripts from the years 1910-14, in addition to parts of other lectures from the twenties, supplemented this material. The resulting rough draft was to have formed the basis of a publication whose final editing Husserl had reserved to himself. But this never came about. Husserl's attempt to complete by his own hand a short essay on the sense of the problematic of transcendental logic, which I had placed before the proposed treatise as an introduction, grew into the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, which he drafted in a few months during the winter of 1928-29. The book appeared by itself, apart from the treatise of which it was supposed to form the prelude and whose introduction had formed, so to speak, its primal cell.

In my later revision of the material which I had assembled, I had to take account of the new light which had been thrown on the entire complex of logical problems, whereby not only was the purport of its individual analyses *deepened* by reference to the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, already in print, but its *content was broadened* as well. This second outline (drawn up in 1929-30) of the present work came about in the following way. The basis was the first outline (already made up before the writing of *Formal and Transcendental Logic*), which Husserl himself provided with marginal notes and addenda. These had first to be taken into account, together with further supple-

mental manuscripts—for the most part from the years 1919–20. It was my job to establish from this material a uniform, coherent text, relative to the fundamental principles laid out in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Since the bases for this text were of a very diverse nature—on the one hand, a first draft, already revised by Husserl himself, on the other, manuscripts recently introduced, from different periods and having different characteristics: some containing short and merely sketched or fragmentary analyses, some composed of studies of individual topics, complete in themselves but having no explicit reference to the overriding structure—I had not only to compare them stylistically and terminologically and, if possible, bring them to the same level of development, but also, where necessary, to supply the missing transitions, divide the material into chapters and paragraphs, and add appropriate headings. Furthermore, whenever the analyses presented in the manuscripts were only sketched out, and were quite full of gaps, I had to supply what was missing.

This was done in the following manner. Everything that I added or introduced I discussed with Husserl beforehand, so that, even where the text could not be directly supported by the letter of the manuscript, it still contained nothing which could not be supported at least by Husserl's verbal utterances and nothing which did not have his approval. This second draft (finished in 1930) of the work presented below was also annotated by Husserl himself with the intention of putting it into definitive form for the printer as soon as possible. However, other more pressing tasks intervened and finally caused him to lose sight of his plan.

It was only in 1935 that it became possible, thanks to the support of the Prague Philosophical Circle, to return to the project. Then, Husserl, having abandoned the idea of completing it himself, gave me authority to give the finishing touches to the text on my own responsibility. To this end, I had not only to take into consideration the notes which he himself had made to the second outline, but also to tighten up the structure of the whole and make it clearer. In addition, the passages were added concerning the modalities of judgment, a realm of problems which had already been treated in the above-mentioned lecture concerning genetic logic but which was absent from the preceding outlines.

Above all, however, the Introduction, with its presentation

of the general meaning of the inquiries, was sketched out for the first time. This Introduction is in part a free rendering of ideas taken from *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and from Husserl's last-published work, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, and in part it is based on verbal discussions with Husserl and on manuscripts from 1919–34. The plan of this Introduction was talked over with Husserl and was approved by him in its essential content and line of thought.

Considering the complicated history of the origin of this work and the many stages of its revision, it should be obvious that the text cannot be judged according to the usual standards of philological exactitude. Technically, it would be completely impossible to sort out what belongs literally to the original manuscripts (written, without exception, in shorthand) which form its base, what was reconstructed from Husserl's verbal statements, and what has been added by the editor (to be sure, with Husserl's approval). As to the question whether, under these circumstances, the writing is at all to be accepted as an original text of Husserl, one can only reply that it is to be viewed as a work whose carrying-out was in its *totality authorized by Husserl himself*. This means that it is the *result of a collaboration of a wholly unique kind*, which can be characterized roughly as follows. The content of the thought, the raw material, so to speak, stems from Husserl himself. There is nothing here which was simply added by the editor or which in itself involves his own interpretation of phenomenology; but the *literary form* is his responsibility.

The choice of the title *Experience and Judgment* was inspired by the heading of a manuscript from 1929 which deals with the basic problems of phenomenological logic.

The two appendixes occupy a special place. With them, it is a matter of the simple reproduction of the original manuscripts, amended only as to style. They contain observations complete in themselves, and thus they could not be built into the body of the work without sacrificing an essential part of their content. They should be taken not as mere tacked-on *appendixes* but as *essential supplements* to the relevant parts of the text. The first appendix comes from the year 1919 or 1920; the second is a section from the draft of the modification of Investigation VI of the *Logical Investigations* of 1913, a draft which was never brought to a conclusion and published.

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Finally, I express my warmest thanks to all who contributed to the realization of this publication: the Emergency Association of German Science, which, through its aid in the years 1928–30, made my participation in Husserl's work possible; the Prague Philosophical Circle; and the Rockefeller Foundation, to whose support I owe the completion of the work and the first printing; and, last of all, the publishing house of Claassen & Goverts, which undertook the present new printing of the book. I am also most indebted to Dr. Eugen Fink, Freiburg im Breisgau, for his advice in the matter of the final wording of the text, especially in regard to the form of the Introduction.

LUDWIG LANDGREBE



## INTRODUCTION

## The Sense and Delimitation of the Investigation

### § 1. *The predicative judgment as the central theme in the genealogy of logic.*

THE FOLLOWING INQUIRIES are concerned with a problem of origin. In clarifying the origin of the predicative judgment, they aim at making a contribution to the genealogy of logic in general. It is necessary first of all to discuss the possibility and necessity of such a project as well as the meaning of the questions to be asked. In this clarification of origin, which has as a theme neither a problem of the "history of logic" in the usual sense, nor one of genetic psychology, the essence of the structure whose origin is sought is to be elucidated. Our task is thus a clarification of the essence of the predicative judgment by means of an exploration of its origin.

If this exploration advances the problem of the genealogy of logic in general, the reason is that *the concept of the predicative judgment, of apophansis, stands at the center of formal logic* as it has developed historically. Its core is apophantic logic, a theory of the judgment and its "forms." Taken in its original sense, formal logic is *not only* that; for, in a fully developed formal logic, i.e., in a logic which, as formal *mathesis universalis*, includes formal mathematics, formal apophantics is the counterpart of formal ontology, the theory of something in general and of its derived forms, thus of concepts like "object," "property," "relation," "plurality," and the like. The fact

that in the traditional logical problematic these questions were always treated in both spheres can only be mentioned here, for at this point we cannot treat the difficult problems which concern the relation of formal apophantics and formal ontology, their correlation and their homogeneity, or even their inner unity, with regard to which their separation proves to be merely provisional, resting only on a difference of point of view and not of *domain*.<sup>1</sup> Only this much can be said, namely, that all the categorial forms which constitute the theme of formal ontology accrue to objects in the act of judgment. Even the empty concept "something in general," by which objects in general are thought logically, arises only in the judgment,<sup>2</sup> and the like is true of its variant forms.

Just as *property* designates a form that makes its first appearance non-selfsufficiently in the judgment and, on being "nominalized," yields the substrate-form property, so the *plural* makes its appearance in plural judging and, on being "nominalized," on being transformed into the object in the pre-eminent sense (the substrate, the "object-about-which"), yields the *set*.<sup>3</sup>

One could show the same thing for all other concepts which appear in formal ontology. Taking this into account, we can affirm that the central position of the theory of judgment in the total problematic of formal logic is due to material as well as historical grounds.

However, with this stipulation we should not anticipate a determination of the essence of what in the broadest and most comprehensive sense is to be understood under "logic" and the "logical." On the contrary, this comprehensive essential concept can be only the *end result* of the phenomenological clarification and investigation into the origin of the logical that was begun in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, wherein questions of its fundamental principles are discussed which are continued in the present inquiry. The phenomenological elucidation of the

1. Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Formale und transzendente Logik* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1929), Part I, Chaps. 4 and 5; English translation by Dorion Cairns, *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969). This work will be cited throughout as *Logic*. [In all citations of this work, page numbers of the German edition will be cited first, followed by page numbers of the English translation, designated as "ET."—Trans.]

2. *Logic*, p. 98; ET, p. 110.

3. *Logic*, p. 95; ET, p. 107.

origin of the logical reveals that its domain is far more extensive than traditional logic has dealt with hitherto. At the same time, this elucidation uncovers the concealed essential grounds of this contraction—and it does so precisely in returning above all to the origin of the “logical” in the traditional sense of the term. Thereby it discovers not only that logical activity [*Leistung*] is already present at levels in which it was not recognized by the tradition and that, accordingly, the traditional logical problematic begins at a relatively higher level, but that, above all, it is precisely in these lower levels that the concealed presuppositions are to be found, on the basis of which the meaning and legitimacy of the higher-level self-evidences of the logician are first and ultimately intelligible. Only in this way will it be possible to come to grips with logical tradition in its entirety, and—as a further, distant goal of the phenomenological elucidation of logic—to attain that comprehensive concept of logic and the *logos* of which we spoke. If the domain of the logical cannot be traced out in advance, nevertheless its phenomenological elucidation requires a *preliminary concept* which first indicates the general direction of the phenomenological inquiry. This preliminary concept cannot be chosen arbitrarily but is precisely the concept of logic and the “logical” offered by tradition.<sup>4</sup> And at its center stands the problematic of the predicative judgment.

## § 2. *The determination of the predicative judgment and its privileged position in tradition.*

### *The problems which result.*

JUDGMENT, APOPHANSIS in the traditional sense of the term, is itself only a word which includes many meanings. Thus we require, first of all, a *more exact determination of our theme* and a look at what it includes in the way of problems marked out for it by tradition (§ 2). Only then can we try to character-

4. For the explication of the sense of the logical tradition, cf. *Logic*, Introduction, § 11, and Part I, a.

ize, step by step, the method to be attempted here, a method we have already characterized as genetic (§§ 3 ff.).

Throughout the whole tradition there extend distinctions between the most varied "forms" of judgment as well as efforts to fix, by the most diverse means, what the "judgment" is in itself. However, what has been established from the beginning, from the founding of our logical tradition with Aristotle, is this: the most general characteristic of the predicative judgment is that *it has two members*: a "substrate" (*hypokeimenon*), about which something is affirmed, and that which is affirmed of it (*katēgoroumenon*); from another point of view, according to grammatical form, we can distinguish *onoma* and *rhēma*. Every declarative statement [*Aussagesatz*] must be made up from these two members.<sup>1</sup> Every judging presupposes that an object is on hand, that it is already given to us, and is that about which the statement is made. Thus tradition provides us, so to speak, with an original model of the judgment which, *qua* judgment, we must interrogate as to its origin. We must leave entirely open here whether with this we are really dealing with the most primordial logical structure. Only the elucidation of the origin of this structure, traditionally defined as judgment, can provide the answer to this question and to all further questions associated with it: to what extent is the predicative judgment the privileged and central theme of logic, so that, in its core, logic is necessarily apophantic logic, a theory of judgment? Furthermore, what is the mode of connection of these two members which are always to be distinguished in judgment? To what extent is the judgment synthesis and diaeresis (analysis) in one? This is a problem which has always created an embarrassment for the logician and for which there is no satisfactory solution to this day. What is it that is "bound together" and "separated" in the judgment? Further: which among the multiple judgment-forms which tradition distinguishes is the most primitive, i.e., that one which, as being the undermost, and founding all others, must be presupposed, and by an essential necessity conceived as underlying, in order that other forms of a "higher level" can be founded on it? Is there a single primal form, or are there several, enjoying equal rights, standing beside one another? And, if there is only one, in what way may all the others be traced back to it as the most primitive? For example,

1. Cf. Aristotle *De Interp.* 16a19 and 17a9.

are affirmative and negative judgments equally privileged, equally primitive forms, standing side by side, or does one of the two have precedence?

The traditional determination of the judgment leads to these questions. But over and above them there certainly remain others, which cannot be immediately answered if one restricts oneself to *our* method of elucidating the origin of what is traditionally alleged to be judgment. Rather, the answer would involve coming to terms with the whole tradition, something which would go beyond the framework of this discussion. Nevertheless, some of the problems in question can be indicated here. Since Aristotle, it has been held as certain that the basic schema of judgment is the *copulative* judgment, which is reducible to the basic form *S is p*. Every judgment having another composition, e.g., the form of a verbal proposition, can, according to this interpretation, be transformed without alteration of its logical sense into the form of the copulative bond; for example, "The man walks" is logically equivalent to "The man is walking." The "is" is part of the *rhēma* in which always "time is cosignified," and in this it is like the verb.<sup>2</sup> Thus, we require an exact understanding of what is involved in this copulative bond, of the nature and origin of the copulative predicative judgment, before we can take a position regarding the question of whether in fact this convertibility is justified and whether the difference between the judgments is merely one of a difference of linguistic form, which does not refer to a difference of the logical achievement of sense. However, should the latter be the case, the problem would arise of knowing how both forms, the copulative proposition on the one hand, and the verbal on the other, relate to each other. Are they equally primitive logical achievements of sense, or is one (and which one?) the more primitive? Does the copulative form *S is p*, as tradition holds, really represent the basic schema of the judgment? Further, the question about the primordially of this schema would in that case also have to be raised with regard to the fact that in it, as a matter of course, the subject is set in the form of the third person. In this, it is presupposed that, in the first and second persons, the judgment in the form "I am . . .," "You are . . ." expresses no logical achievement of sense which deviates from that expressed in the privileged fundamental schema "It

2. Cf. *De Interp.* 16a19, 17a9, and 21b9.

is. . . ." This presupposition requires testing and would again put the question of the primordially of the traditional basic schema  $S$  is  $p$  in a new light.

§ 3. *The two-sidedness of logical thematizing.  
The problem of self-evidence as the point  
of departure of subjectively oriented  
problems and its being passed over  
in the tradition.*

THE JUDGMENT, on which all these questions turn, is first given to the logician in its linguistic formulation as a declarative statement, which is to say as a kind of objective structure, as something he can examine relative to its forms and modes of relation like anything else. Cognition, with its "logical" procedures, has always already done its work whenever we reflect logically; we have already passed judgments, formed concepts, drawn conclusions, which henceforth form part of our store of knowledge and as such are at our disposal. This means that the interest which the logician has from the beginning in these structures is not merely an interest in just any formation having such and such a form but an interest in formations which claim to be the precipitate of cognitions. The judgments whose forms he examines appear as alleged cognitions. This implies that before all logical reflection we are already aware of the difference between judgments which constitute real knowledge, to which truth adheres, and those which constitute merely presumed or alleged knowledge. Before all logical reflection we are already aware of the differences between true judgments and those which at first are presumed true but which later turn out to be false, between correct and incorrect inference, and so on.

Now, if the logician really aims at a logic in the comprehensive and serious sense of the word, then his interest is directed toward the laws of formation of judgments—the principles and rules of formal logic—not toward the mere rules of a game but toward rules which the constitution of the forms must satisfy

if any knowledge whatever is to be possible.<sup>1</sup> They hold for judgments considered purely according to their form, quite apart from the material content of that which, as the object or substrate of the judgment, is inserted in the empty form. Thus they comprise, so to speak, the *merely negative conditions of the possibility of truth*; an act of judgment which violates these conditions can never result in truth or, from the subjective point of view, self-evidence; it cannot be a self-evident act of judgment. But on the other hand, even if it satisfies the requirements of these laws, it does not thereby attain its goal: truth. Accordingly, this insight compels us to ask the question of what must be added over and above these formal conditions of the possibility of truth if an activity of cognition is to reach its goal. These supplementary conditions lie on the subjective side and concern the *subjective characteristics of intuitability, of self-evidence* and the *subjective conditions of its attainment*. Due to the fact that judgments present themselves as alleged cognitions and that many which pass themselves off as yielding knowledge later prove to be illusory, and because of the resulting necessity of a critique of judgments with regard to their truth, the problematic of logic is determined from the beginning as *two-sided*, although this two-sidedness was never grasped in its deeper sense by the tradition. On the one side, we have the question of constitution of forms [of judgment] and their laws and, on the other, that of the subjective conditions of the attainment of self-evidence. Here the act of judgment *qua* subjective activity comes into question, and with it the subjective processes in which formations, as they appear, manifest themselves, sometimes as evident, sometimes as not evident. Attention is thus directed to the act of judgment as an achievement of consciousness in which the formations, with all their claim to be the expression of cognitions, originate—an area which traditional logic has never placed at the center of its concerns, as should have been required; rather, it believed that the problems lying in this area could be handed over to psychology. In consequence, it seemed prescribed by the tradition that a question concerning the origin of the act of judgment, and of the logical in general, can have no other sense than that of a regressive subjective inquiry in the manner of genetic psychology. If now we

1. Concerning the difference between the logic of truth and a mere analytic of rules of a game, cf. *Logic*, § 33.



refuse to characterize as psychological our genetic way of putting the problem, and if, indeed, we explicitly contrast it with a psychological question of origins in the usual sense of "psychological," this requires a special justification, which, at the same time, will make clear the unique nature of the analyses of origin here to be conducted.

Meanwhile, by way of anticipation, we will say only the following. A genetic psychology of judgment in the usual sense is distinct, first from our project of a phenomenological elucidation of the origin of the judgment and then from a phenomenological genealogy of logic in general; because problems of self-evidence, which supply the natural point of departure of every regressive subjective question concerning logical structures, have, in the tradition, never been seriously understood and examined at all as such. Men believed that they knew in advance what self-evidence is. They believed that they could measure every other item of cognition against ideal, absolute, apodictically certain knowledge. They did not suspect that this ideal of knowledge (and with it the cognitions of the logician, which imply a claim of apodicticity for themselves) could for its part also require a justification and originary foundation. Thus these laborious psychological analyses never applied to the *self-evidence itself*: neither to that of him who actually judges, nor to that of the logician, which is an (apodictic) self-evidence relative to the formal laws of the judgment. They did not bring into question the problem of self-evidence as such but only made allusion to the *occasioning of self-evidence*, the avoidance of error through clarity and distinctness of thought, etc.—so that in countless ways logic was stamped as a psychologically determined technology of correct thinking. It will be necessary to show that it is not simply accidental that every subjective regressive inquiry was led down such paths and, furthermore, why, for deep-seated reasons, the specific and genuine problems of self-evidence could not at all appear within the horizon of psychological problems.

Consequently, we shall try, first of all, to picture to ourselves the nature of these problems (§§ 5, 6) in order to render, in retrospect, an account of their range and the peculiarity of the method required for their solution (§§ 7–10), the difference in principle between this method and a genetic psychological one, and why the latter could not come to grips with such problems (§ 11).

§ 4. *The levels of the problem of self-evidence.  
Objective self-evidence as a preliminary  
condition of a possible self-evident  
act of judgment.*

THE ACTIVITY OF JUDGMENT is considered by our regressive subjective inquiry as an activity which is at the service of the striving for knowledge. Knowledge of what? Speaking quite generally, knowledge of what-is, of the existent [*das Seiende*]. But, if the striving for knowledge is directed toward the existent, if it is the effort to formulate in a judgment what and how the existent is, then the existent must already have been given beforehand. And since the act of judgment requires something "underlying," about which it judges, an *object-about-which*, it is necessary that the existent be so pre-given that it can become the object of a judgment. Wherever an activity of judgment, an activity of thought of any kind, explicit or not, comes into play, objects must already be present in mind, either in an empty way or as intuitively self-given; every activity of thought presupposes pre-given objects. But if thought, insofar as it is an activity of judgment, really leads to its goal—to *knowledge* (i.e., if the judgments are to be *self-evident* judgments)—then it is not sufficient that, in some way, some objects or other are given in advance and that the act of judgment is directed toward them, thereby merely satisfying rules and principles which are prescribed with respect to their *form* by logic. Rather, the success of the cognitive performance also makes demands on the modes of pre-giveness of the objects themselves, relative to their *content*. On their part, these objects must also be so pre-given that their givenness of itself makes knowledge, i.e., self-evident judgment, possible. They must themselves be self-evident, must be given as themselves.

To speak of self-evidence, of self-evident givenness, then, here signifies nothing other than *self-giveness*, the way in which an object in its givenness can be characterized relative to consciousness as "itself-there," "there in the flesh," in contrast to its mere presentification [*Vergegenwärtigung*], the empty, merely indicative idea of it. For example, an object of external

perception is given as self-evident, as "it itself," precisely in *actual* perception, in contrast to the simple presentification of it in memory or imagination, etc. As "*self-evident*," then, we designate *consciousness of any kind which is characterized relative to its object as self-giving this object in itself*, without asking whether this self-giving is adequate or not. By this, we deviate from the customary use of the term "self-evidence," which as a rule is employed in cases which, rigorously described, are those of adequate givenness, on the one hand, and of apodictic insight, on the other. This mode of givenness, too, is to be characterized as self-giving, i.e., of idealities and of general truths. But *every kind of object has its own mode of self-giving*, i.e., *self-evidence*, even though apodictic self-evidence is not possible for every kind, e.g., not for the spatiotemporal objects of external perception. Nevertheless, even they have their own kind of original self-giving and therewith their own kind of self-evidence.

In such "self-evident" givenness of an object the predicative form need not be involved in any way. An object, as the possible substrate of a judgment, can be self-evidently given without having to be judged about in a predicative judgment. On the other hand, a self-evident predicative judgment concerning this object is not possible unless the object itself is given with self-evidence. For judgments of experience, this is, to begin with, nothing astonishing; indeed, in this case we seem only to be expressing a truism with the allusion to the founding of predicative self-evidence on the prepredicative. But the return to objective, prepredicative self-evidence obtains its proper emphasis and full significance only with the stipulation that this *relation of founding concerns not only judgments grounded in experience but every self-evident predicative judgment in general, and therewith also the judgments of the logician himself*, with their apodictic self-evidence, which, after all, make the claim of being valid "in themselves," i.e., regardless of their possible application to a determinate range of substrates. It will be necessary to show that even these judgments do not have as a content any free-floating "truths in themselves," but rather that in their range of application they are based on a "world" of substrates and that, accordingly, they themselves ultimately refer back to the conditions of possible objective self-evidence in which these substrates are given (cf. § 9). This is original self-evidence, i.e., that which must already be on hand if self-evident predicative

judging is to be possible. What makes affirmative statements, once constituted, into a repository of knowledge, and what justifies their claim to knowledge, is not, therefore, to be sought in the statements themselves. What is needed is a return to the mode of givenness of the objects of the act of judgment, to their self-givenness or nonself-givenness; for this is the condition of the possibility of the successful achievement of knowledge. This condition is the condition of every act of judgment and every combination of judgments (for example, in an inference), no matter how faultless they may be in their formal and logical constitution.

Thus *two levels of inquiry* arise for problems relating to self-evidence. One concerns the *self-evidence of the pre-given objects themselves*, namely, their condition of pre-givenness; the other concerns *the act of self-evident predicative judgment* taking place on the basis of the self-evidence of the objects. Formal logic does not inquire into these differences in the mode of pre-givenness of objects. It inquires only into the conditions of self-evident judging, not into the conditions of the self-evident givenness of the objects of such judging. It does not enter into the first of the two levels of possible lines of inquiry, any more than, up to now, this level has been entered by psychology with its regressive subjective inquiries. But for the phenomenological elucidation of the genesis of the act of judgment this regressive inquiry is necessary. It alone makes evident what must be added, over and above the fulfillment of the formal and logical conditions of the possibility of self-evidence, if judgment, as an activity which, by its very nature, is directed toward knowledge, toward self-evidence, is really to attain its goal. For this phenomenological elucidation, the question which has priority is that concerning the self-evident givenness of the objects of the act of judgment, of the content of thought as the presupposition of *all* judicative self-evidence: not only of the straightforwardly judging subject but also of the logician himself, whose self-evidence concerns the formal laws of this judging. Objective self-evidence is the more original because it is what first makes judicative self-evidence possible. The elucidation of the origin of the predicative judgment must investigate the way in which the self-evident predicative act of judgment is erected on objective self-evidence, and it must do this first of all for the most primitive operations of predicative judging.

§ 5. *The retrogression from the self-evidence of judgment to objective self-evidence.*

a. Mere judging as an intentional modification of self-evident judging.

BUT THE CONTRAST between objective self-evidence—the self-evidence of the givenness of the substrates of the judgment—and the self-evidence of the judgment itself is not yet sufficient, taken in this generality, to enable us to understand where such original self-evidence is to be sought, what it is like, and what the sense of this originality really is. For this a *retrogression* [*Rückgang*]<sup>1</sup> in several stages is required in order to arrive at primal objective self-evidences, which must then form the necessary point of departure for every elucidation of the origin of the judgment.

To begin with, we are given statements, structures which lay claim to knowledge. As long as we do not go beyond the consideration of judgments with regard to their mere form, they are pre-given to us with like originality whether it is a question of real or of merely alleged knowledge, of mere judgment; and, doubtless, in most cases it is a question of the latter. Even in the first mythical beginning of knowledge, and in traditions of all kinds, the most varied forms of judgment go hand in hand with judgments really productive of knowledge and far surpass them in profusion. However, as soon as we examine this judging, pre-given to us in a number of very diverse forms with respect to the difference between self-evidence and real knowledge, on the one hand, and nonself-evidence, merely alleged knowledge, mere judgment, on the other, it is no longer enough to consider judgments thus given merely with regard to their form, re-understanding them merely as a reader, genuinely judging in accord with them. Rather, we must also re-execute them in view of the

1. [*Rückgang* has a special meaning in this text. Literally, it might be translated as a "going back," that is, a "reversal" of the ordinary course of analysis for the sake of a "return" to what is most fundamental. "Retrogression" must therefore be understood without any negative connotations but rather as implying the process of an uncovering of original and essential sources.—Trans.]

acts of cognition in which they arose as original results of cognition and can always newly arise in repetition—arise originally even in being “again” the same as they were before. If we thus seek out the phenomenological genesis of judgments in the originality of their production, it then becomes apparent that *mere judging is an intentional modification of cognitive judgment*. A judgment produced in original self-evidence, a cognition which was produced once with insight, can, to be sure, always be reproduced without such insight, and even with distinctness.<sup>2</sup> Consider, for example, the reworking of a mathematical theorem: the first time through, it is done with understanding; subsequently it becomes a “mechanical” reproduction. Thus it is true in general that in every ego of consciousness cognitions must already be present—to begin with, those of the lowest level, then those of a higher level—in order for mere judgments to be possible as their consequence. This does not mean that in every case mere judgments are memorial sedimentations [*Erinnerungsniederschläge*] of identical cognitive judgments; nonsensical ideas which, believed at the moment, appear as judgments, whatever the intentional mediation may be. Thus, immediate judgments, conceived as standing in the immediacy of a mode of production we have called cognitive, are the most original in the world of judgment—and, what is more, for each individual judging subject.

We see, already here, in what sense we shall be dealing with questions of genesis. Our concern is not a first genesis (of a history in general, or of an individual history) or a genesis of knowledge in *every* sense; rather, we shall be dealing with that mode of production through which judgment and also knowledge in their original form, that of self-givenness, arise—a mode of production which, no matter how often it is repeated, always yields the same result, the same cognition. Knowledge, like judgment, i.e., that which is judged, taken as such, is not a real [*reeles*]<sup>3</sup> moment of cognitive activity, whose repetitions of the same [judgment] could only be like one another, but an “im-

2. Concerning the self-evidence of distinctness, see *Logic*, § 16a.

3. [*Reell* has been translated as “real”; but, wherever it is used, the German has been added in brackets to warn the reader that this term (unlike *wirklich* or *real*) means, for Husserl, precisely not objective reality but rather what is sheerly phenomenal and immanent to consciousness.—Trans.]

manent" moment of *such nature* that in repetition it is self-given as the identical moment of the repetitions. In a word, it is not immanent in a real [*reell*] or individual sense but in an irreal, supertemporal sense.

b. Mediate and immediate self-evidence and the necessity of returning to absolutely immediate cognitions.

If, within the manifold of judgments pre-given to us, we have thus separated self-evident judgments capable of being carried out again in their original self-evidence from those which are not self-evident and are not capable of attaining it, this is still not enough to enable us to choose an example at random from the totality of self-evident judgments and, through this example, study the origination of predicative self-evidence from objective pre-predicative self-evidence. Rather, self-evident judgments themselves are also subject to the contrast of mediacy and immediacy. Mediate judgments, the conclusion of an inference, for example, are results obtained from grounds which themselves refer back to immediate cognition. They are really present as cognitions only if the entire connection of grounds is present as the synthetic homogeneous unity of an actual cognition. Only in this unity does what is itself mediately founded have the character of an actual cognition, but precisely in a mediate way; thus these mediate cognitions are not capable of being produced *for themselves* in their character as cognitions. A deduction can attain self-evidence (and here this means the self-evidence of truth, not the mere self-evidence of distinctness) only if the premises are also capable of attaining it and actually do so. Consequently, there is nothing arbitrary about the mode of self-evidence to which we must appeal if we wish to pursue the founding of the self-evidence of judgment in objective self-evidence. No direct way leads from the self-evidence of mediate judgments, of mediate cognitions, to the objective self-evidence which founds them, since these are still founded on other, i.e., immediate, cognitions. Therefore, before we can study the forms of mediate cognitions and their premises, we must first study the forms of immediate cognitions, that is to say, those which are the *simplest of all* in terms of cognitive activity. In the genesis of cognition, in the structure of the production of cognition,

they are the *most original*. This means they are functions which must already have been carried out if the mediate ones are to be possible. And obviously they are to be sought in judgments which, from the point of view of their form, are simple—in judgments, which, consequently, do not already by their form (for example, the form of an inference) prove to be dependent for their possible substantiation and becoming evident on other judgments.

c. Immediate “ultimate” judgments and their relation to individuals as ultimate objects-about-which (ultimate substrates).

But it is not sufficient merely to return to judgments which are formally simple and immediate; not every judgment of such simple form is equally suited to allow us to trace through it the founding of judicative self-evidence in objective self-evidence and to understand what problem is really involved in the notion of objective self-evidence. This latter concerns the mode of pre-givenness of the substrate of the judgment. But the substrate, the object-about-which, can be this or that, any something or other in general. The formal character of logical analysis consists precisely in this, that it does not inquire about the material constitution of this something, that it considers substrates only in terms of the categorial form they assume in the judgment (subject form, predicate form, and so on). In other respects they remain entirely indeterminate, designated symbolically by *S*, by *p*, which signify nothing but empty places to be filled any way at all. For example, the form of the categorial judgment, more precisely, the form in which the subject is determined by an adjective, does not say whether the subject and the predicate of the judgment do not themselves already contain categorial forms in their core. The subject *S*, understood as a form, is individualized just as well by a still undetermined object *S* as by “*S* which is *a*,” “*S* which is *b*,” or by “*S* which stands in relation to *Q*,” and so on. Thus, with the indeterminateness which is allowed to the terms by formalization, even simple forms of judgment like “*S* is *p*” leave open the question of knowing whether, in their exemplification by actual judgments, these forms are, in fact, forms which refer immediately back to the formation of ultimate substrates or whether the terms stand for objects-about-which, that is, forms



which are themselves already categorial structures and so refer to an earlier judgment in which these structures accrued to them. The concept of the object as something in general, as a possible judicative substrate in general, therefore is not sufficient, in the formal emptiness in which it is employed in formal logic, to enable us to study in it alone what it is that we call objective self-evidence in contrast to judicative self-evidence. For such categorial formations (for example, the attributive), to the extent that they can already be contained in the object of judgment, refer back (how, we will study later) to earlier judgments in which this attribute was originally predicatively stated of this object. These formations, therefore, refer to a self-evidence which on its part is already the self-evidence of a judgment. Thus, if we wish to arrive at the domain in which something on the order of objective self-evidence is possible, in contrast to the self-evidence of the judgment which, on its part, presupposes the former, then, among the possible objects of judgment, we must also distinguish among substrates of judgments those which already bear in themselves the sedimentations of earlier acts of judgment having categorial forms and those which are really original substrates, objects entering for the first time into the judgment as substrates, i.e., *ultimate substrates*. Only these can reveal what is original, objective self-evidence, in contrast to judicative self-evidence.

What does self-evident givenness signify with regard to ultimate substrates? Formal logic can state nothing more about an ultimate substrate than that it is a something still categorially completely unformed, a substrate which has not yet entered into a judgment and taken on a form in it, and which, just as it is self-evident and self-given, becomes for the first time a substrate of judgment. At the same time, however, this implies that such a substrate can only be an individual object. For all generality and plurality, even the most primitive, already refers back to an act of taking several individuals together and, therewith, to a more or less primitive logical activity, in which what is taken together already receives a categorial formation, a forming of generality. *Original substrates are therefore individuals, individual objects*, and every thinkable judgment *ultimately* refers to individual objects, no matter how mediated in a variety of ways. If general objectivities are the substrates of the judgment, these substrates themselves ultimately refer back to a grasping of generality which embraces a plurality of pre-given individuals.

Finally, this is also true of purely formal and analytic generalities, for the truths relative to them are precisely truths for an indefinitely open realm of individual objects and have their application within this realm.

§ 6. *Experience as self-evidence of individual objects. The theory of prepredicative experience as the first part of the genetic theory of judgment.*

THE QUESTION concerning the character of objective self-evidence is thus a question concerning the self-evident givenness of individuals. *And the self-evidence of individual objects makes up the concept of experience in the broadest sense.*<sup>1</sup> Experience in the first and most pregnant sense is accordingly defined as a direct relation to the individual. Hence, those judgments which are *primary in themselves* are, as judgments with individual substrates, judgments about individuals, *judgments of experience*. They are preceded by the self-evident givenness of individual objects of experience, i.e., their prepredicative givenness. The self-evidence of experience, therefore, should be that ultimately original self-evidence which we seek, and therewith the point of departure for the elucidation of the origin of the predicative judgment. *The theory of prepredicative experience*, of precisely that which gives in advance the most original substrates in objective self-evidence, *is the proper first element of the phenomenological theory of judgment*. The investigation must begin with the prepredicative consciousness of experience and, going on from there, pursue the development of self-evidences of higher levels.

Consequently, the concept of experience must be understood so broadly that it comprehends not only the giving of individual existence itself, purely and simply, that is, the giving of something itself in the certainty of being, but also the modalization of this certainty, which can change into conjecture, probability, and the like. Moreover, it also includes experience in the mode

1. *Logic*, pp. 181 ff.; ET, pp. 203 ff.

of as-if, i.e., the givenness of the individual in phantasy, which in an appropriate, always possible, free alteration of attitude turns into positional experience of a possible individual.

However, this general and still more or less empty concept of experience, such as we have attained up to now, is by no means sufficient for understanding the meaning of the required retrogression, and especially not for understanding in what respect such an elucidation of origin, which seeks out the founding of predicative self-evidences in the self-evidences of experience, is not a question of psychological genesis and, on principle, cannot be. Besides, the logician will also have in readiness a sufficient number of arguments against this retrogression. Even if he should admit the existence of a self-evidence of experience, and thereby consider our broadening of the concept of self-evidence acceptable, still, the self-evidence of the judgment would naturally seem better to him as that which first enables us to speak of knowledge and cognition in the proper sense. What can come of this retrogression from the domain of *epistēmē* to that of *doxa*, to a domain of vague experience with its "deceitful appearance"? Does not the predicative judgment alone remain the seat of knowledge, of genuine and proper self-evidence? Even if one grants a kind of self-evidence to experience and concedes that, from the point of view of genesis, it precedes predicative self-evidence, is not its self-evidence still of lesser worth? What, then, is to be accomplished by an elucidation of the origin of the judgment, an elucidation which leads back from its self-evidence to a dimension of obviously inferior rank? How can the nature of the superior be clarified by a return to the inferior?

§ 7. *The world as the universal ground of belief  
pregiven for every experience  
of individual objects.*

IN ORDER TO ANSWER all these questions, a still deeper insight into the nature and structure of prepredicative experience is required. To this end, let us return to what has already been said. The concept of experience as the self-giving of indi-

vidual objects was so broadly understood that not only did the self-giving of individual objects in the mode of simple certainty fall under it, but also modifications of this certainty, even those modifications of actual experience in the form of the as-if. Though all this is included equally in the concept of experience, yet experience which takes place in the certainty of being [*Seinsgewissheit*] has a special distinction. This is true not only because every lived experience of imagination, every modification of experience in the mode of as-if, is given precisely as a modification, as a transformation and metamorphosis, of previous experience and genetically refers back to it, but also because the modalizations of simple certainty of belief into conjecture, probability, and the like are modifications of an original simple believing consciousness, which is the medium in which all existents as objects of experience are at first simply pregiven for us—as long as the further course of experience does not provide occasion for doubt or modalization of any kind. Objects are always present for us, pregiven in simple certainty, before we engage in any act of cognition. At its beginning, every cognitive activity presupposes these objects. They are there for us in simple certainty; this means that we presume them to exist and in such a way as to be accepted by us before all cognition, and this in a variety of ways. Thus it is as simply pregiven that they stimulate and set going the activity of cognition in which they receive their form and their character of legitimacy, in which they become the permanent nucleus of cognitive functions having for a goal “the truly existing object,” the object as it is in truth. Before the movement of cognition begins, we have “presumed objects,” simply presumed in the certainty of belief. This certainty of belief continues until subsequent experience or the critical activity of cognition shakes it, modifies it to “not so, but otherwise,” or “possibly so,” or even confirms the presumed object in its certainty as “really being so” and “truly existing.” We can also say that before every movement of cognition the object of cognition is already present as a *dynamis* which is to turn into an *entelecheia*. This “preliminary presence” [*Voranliegen*] means that the object affects us as entering into the background of our field of consciousness, or even that it is already in the foreground, possibly already grasped, but only afterward awakens “the interest in cognition,” that interest which is distinguished from all other interests of practical life. But always preliminary to this grasping is affection, which is not the affecting of an iso-

lated, particular object. "To affect" means to stand out from the environment, which is always copresent, to attract interest to oneself, possibly interest in cognition. The environment is copresent as a *domain of what is pregiven*, of a *passive* pregivenness, i.e., of what is always already there without any attention of a grasping regard, without any awakening of interest. All cognitive activity, all turning-toward a particular object in order to grasp it, presupposes this domain of passive pregivenness. The object affects from within its field; it is an object, an existent among others, already pregiven in a passive *doxa*, in a field which itself represents a unity of passive *doxa*. We can also say that an actual *world* always precedes cognitive activity as its universal ground, and this means first of all a ground of universal passive belief in being which is presupposed by every particular cognitive operation. Everything which, as an existing object, is a goal of cognition is an existent on the ground of the world, which is taken as existing as a matter of course. A particular element in this world, presumed at first to exist, may turn out to be nonexistent. Cognition may bring us to correct details in opinions about existence, but this means only that, instead of being thus and so, something is otherwise—otherwise on the ground of the world existing in totality.

It is this *universal ground of belief in a world* which all praxis presupposes, not only the praxis of life but also the theoretical praxis of cognition. The being of the world in totality is that which is not first the result of an activity of judgment but which forms the presupposition of all judgment. *Consciousness of the world is consciousness in the mode of certainty of belief*; it is not acquired by a specific act which breaks into the continuity of life as an act which posits being or grasps the existent or even as an act of judgment which predicates existence. All of these acts already presuppose consciousness of the world in the certainty of belief. If I grasp in its particularity some object or other in my field of perception, for example in looking at a book resting on the table, then I grasp something which for me is an existent, something which, as already existing in advance, was already "there," "in my study," even though my attention was not yet directed toward it. In exactly the same way, this entire study, which now has entered my field of perception with all its objects which perception has thrown into relief, was already there for me, together with the side of the room which is not in view; it was already there with its familiar things, imbued

with the sense "room in my house," the latter being on the familiar street, the street in my town, and so on. Thus, all existents which affect us do so on the ground of the world; they give themselves to us as existents presumed as such, and the activity of cognition, of judgment, aims at examining whether they are truly such as they give themselves to be, as they are presumed in advance to be; whether they are truly of such and such a nature. *The world as the existent world is the universal passive pre-giveness of all judicative activity, of all engagement of theoretical interest.* And if it is also characteristic of consistently worked-out theoretical interest to be directed ultimately toward knowledge of the totality of existents, and this means here the world, this is nonetheless a later development. The world as a whole is always already pre-given in passive certitude, and the orientation of cognition toward a particular existent is genetically more primordial than that toward the world as a whole—whether the particular existent has become doubtful in its being or in its being-such and requires a critical examination by cognitive thought, or whether, without being doubtful in its being, the existent requires a more thorough study to conform to the demands of a particular praxis.

§ 8. *The horizon-structure of experience.*  
*The typical precognition [Vorbekanntheit]*  
*of every individual object of experience.*

TO SAY THAT every grasping of an individual object, and every subsequent activity of cognition, takes place against the background of the world indicates something more than the dependence of this activity on the domain of what is pre-given in passive certainty. A cognitive function bearing on individual objects of experience is never carried out as if these objects were pre-given at first as from a still completely undetermined substrate. For us the world is always a world in which cognition in the most diverse ways has already done its work. Thus it is not open to doubt that there is no experience, in the simple and primary sense of an experience of things, which, grasping a thing for the first time and bringing cognition to bear on it, does not

already "know" more about the thing than is in this cognition alone. Every act of experience, whatever it may be that is experienced in the proper sense as it comes into view, has *eo ipso*, necessarily, a knowledge and a potential knowledge [*Mitwissen*] having reference to precisely this thing, namely, to something of it which has not yet come into view. This preknowledge [*Vorwissen*] is indeterminate as to content, or not completely determined, but it is never completely empty; and were it not already manifest, the experience would not at all be experience of this one, this particular, thing. *Every experience has its own horizon*; every experience has its core of actual and determinate cognition, its own content of immediate determinations which give themselves; but beyond this core of determinate quiddity, of the truly given as "itself-there," it has its own horizon. This implies that every experience refers to the possibility—and it is a question here of the capacity [*Ver-möglichkeit*] of the ego—not only of explicating, step by step, the thing which has been given in a first view, in conformity with what is really self-given thereby, but also of obtaining, little by little as experience continues, new determinations of the same thing. Every experience can be extended in a continuous chain of explicative individual experiences, united synthetically as a single experience, open without limit, of the same. Depending on my particular goals, I may have enough of what an experience has already provided me, and then "I just break off" with an "It is enough." However, I can convince myself that no determination is the last, that what has already been experienced always still has, without limit, a horizon of possible experience of the same. And this horizon in its indeterminateness is copresent from the beginning as a realm [*Spielraum*] of possibilities, as the prescription of the path to a more precise determination, in which only experience itself decides in favor of the determinate possibility it realizes as opposed to others.

Thus every experience of a particular thing has its *internal horizon*, and by "horizon" is meant here the *induction* which belongs essentially to every experience and is inseparable from it, being in the experience itself. The term "induction" is useful because it suggests [*vordeutet*] (itself an "induction")<sup>1</sup> induc-

1. [The point is that the German word, translated here as "suggests," might be literally rendered by "pre-signifies" (*vor-deutet*), and in this sense it itself designates a process of induction, from present signs to a later fact.—Trans.]

tion in the ordinary sense of a mode of inference and also because it implies that the latter, for its elucidation to be completely intelligible, must refer back to the original, basic anticipation. It is from this, therefore, that a true "theory of induction" (on which so much effort has already been expended without success) must be established. But we mention this only in passing, for we are concerned here only with the horizon-structure of experience.

This original "induction" or anticipation turns out to be a variant mode of originally constitutive [*stiftender*] activities of cognition, of an activity and an original intention, therefore of a mode of "intentionality" which anticipatively aims beyond a core of givenness. However, this aiming-beyond [*Hinausmeinen*] is not only the anticipation of determinations which, insofar as they pertain to this object of experience, are now expected; in another respect it is also an aiming-beyond the thing itself with all its anticipated possibilities of subsequent determinations, i.e., an aiming-beyond to other objects of which we are aware at the same time, although at first they are merely in the background. This means that everything given in experience has not only an internal horizon but also an infinite, open, *external horizon of objects cogiven* (therefore, a horizon of the second level, referring to the horizon of the first level and implying it). These are objects toward which I am not now actually turned but toward which I can turn at any time and which I can anticipate as being different from what I now experience or as similar, according to some standard or other. But no matter how these objects may differ in anticipation, they always have something in common: all real things which at any given time are anticipated together or cogiven only in the background as an external horizon are known as real objects (or properties, relations, etc.) *from* the world, are known as existing within the one spatiotemporal horizon.

This is first of all immediately true for the world of simple,<sup>2</sup> sensible experience,<sup>3</sup> for pure nature. It also holds mediately for

2. [This term (*schlicht*) occurs frequently in the text. For the sake of consistency (and the contrast to complex or "founded" experience) it is almost always translated as "simple," but it can often be best understood as signifying directness or immediacy rather than simplicity.—Trans.]

3. For the difference between simple experience and founded experience, see below, § 12.



everything mundane, i.e., also for human and animal subjects as subjects in the world, for products of culture, useful things, works of art, and the like. Everything mundane participates in nature. The naturalization of spirit is not an invention of philosophers—it is a fundamental error if falsely interpreted and misused, but only under these conditions. In fact, it has its ground and its justification in this, that mediately or immediately all that is worldly has its place in the spatiotemporal sphere. Everything is here or there, and its place is determinable, as are places in general, in the same way that everything spatiotemporal is determinable, i.e., temporally determinable by means of physical instruments, whether hourglasses, pendulum clocks, or any sort of chronometer. In this way, everything non-sensible partakes of the sensible; it is an existent *from* the world, existing in the one spatiotemporal horizon.

Hence *the existence of anything real* never has any other sense than that of *existence-in* [*Inexistenz*], than that of a being in the universe, in the open horizon of spatiotemporality, the horizon of real things which are already familiar, and not only those of which we are actually aware but also of those, presently unknown, of which it is possible to have experience and subsequent knowledge. Particular apperceptions make us conscious of particular real things, but these apperceptions are inevitably provided with a stock of sense which, although it does not become thematized, extends beyond the apperceptions, beyond the total stock of the particular things perceived. In the advance from the specific stock of the particular apperceptions already carried out to a new stock there prevails a synthetic unity; the newly apperceived fills, as it were, the horizon which was previously still empty, still undetermined as to content, with anticipated sense; it fills a horizon already indicated but not yet specified and determined. Thus, a horizon of validity is continuously present, a world posited in the validity of being, an anticipation which, in the continuous movement of realization that specifies and confirms, goes beyond what is at any given time grasped in singularity and relative determinateness and accepted as such.

In this way a *transcendence of sense* clings to every particular apperception, to every complex of particular apperceptions. On the one hand, this transcendence is relative to the continuously anticipated potentiality of possible new individual realities and of groups of such realities which are to be experienced in

the realization of the process of their entering into consciousness *from* the world; on the other hand, this transcendence is the internal horizon, the complex of characteristics not yet perceived, associated with every real thing offering itself to experience. Every novel reality entering into experience does so within the horizon of the world and as such has its own internal horizon. The real thing is known in thematic perception in that, as the experience is extended (however far it may actually be prolonged), this real thing is continuously presented as being itself there, being displayed thereby in its particular characteristics, its quidditative elements. The latter, on their part, are also known as presenting themselves but as having the precise sense of elements in which the real thing reveals itself as that which it is. We must soon go into the structure of such explication in detail. Everything which reveals itself in this way, and which is already implicitly there before the explication of the perceived, essentially passes for that which, derived from this real thing, *really* attains perception in this perception. This real thing itself is more than that which at any given time attains (and has already attained) actual cognizance. It is provided with a sense which continuously confers on it its "internal horizon"; the side that is seen is a side only insofar as it has sides which are not seen, which are anticipated and as such determine the sense. We can always turn toward them thematically; we can ask for them, we can envision them; for example, after the perception has been interrupted, and after what was a process of knowing has become a piece of knowledge, something acquired and "still living" (as knowledge of this real thing, on the basis of what has really become known about it), we can represent to ourselves in advance what further perception could and must provide us as belonging to this real thing itself. But every such anticipatory envisionment of the "*a priori*" which must be ascribed to this real thing has the essential characteristic of indeterminate generality. This means: if we make such an anticipatory envisionment, e.g., with reference to the hidden side of a visible thing, we indeed obtain a presentifying intuition (somewhat like a recollection) but not a firm determinateness which binds us to it individually, as is the case with a recollection—presuming complete clarity in both cases. As soon as we really advance in the internal determination of a thing, we become aware of the arbitrariness of the color which presents itself and continues to present itself. Every anticipatory envisionment

takes place in a flowing variability which is copresent to consciousness and which allows consciousness to fix the variants, e.g., as a determinate color, but as free variants, for which we could always introduce others in place of what has been fixed.

But, on the other hand, this arbitrariness is still not without limit. In the oscillation of the anticipatory envisionment, in the transition from one temporary variant or orientation to another, we remain in the unity of the anticipation, namely, that of the color of the back side of the thing; but, as an anticipation, it is indeterminate and general; the determination is anticipated in terms of a type, an element of familiarity. In the clarification of this typical generality in the form of determinate "possibilities" open to the real being of this color, the realm [*Spielraum*] for these possibilities is given as the explicit "extension" of the indeterminate generality of anticipation. Whereas the thing entering into experience has ontic sense only as a thing having a specific internal horizon, even though only a nucleus of quiddities relative to the thing has attained actual knowledge in the true sense, every real thing whatsoever has, as an object of possible experience, its general "*a priori*," a preknowledge that is an indeterminate generality but which remains identifiable as the same, as a type belonging *a priori* to a realm of *a priori* possibilities. Obviously, this type, provided we take it in its totality, also includes properties which have already entered into actual knowledge. In the flux constituted by the bowing in and out of quiddities, the real thing is always presented to consciousness as one and the same, and it is to this unity that the total type as the total horizon of typical generality belongs. In this total horizon everything that actually becomes known is incorporated as a particular and partially fulfilling determination.

But as to the external horizon which belongs to each individual real thing and determines its sense, this is found in the consciousness of a potentiality of possible experiences of individual real things: these each have their own *a priori*, a group of types [*Typik*] in view of which they are necessarily anticipated and which, through every fulfillment by specific possibilities of this realm, remains invariant. But every particular group of types for particular real things (and constellations of such things) is encompassed by the *totality of typification* [*Totalitätstypik*] belonging to the total horizon of the world in its infinity. In the flow of world-experience, of world-consciousness in the full concretion of its specificity, the ontic sense of "world" re-

mains invariant and, with it, the construction of this ontic sense, which is structured by invariant types of individual realities.

Thus *the structure of the known and of the unknown* is a *fundamental structure of world-consciousness*, correlatively, a structure of the world as horizon of all individual real things capable of being experienced. This structure is characterized by its complete relativity and by the distinction, equally relative and complete, between indeterminate generality and determinate particularity. In the continuous validation of its being, the world, present to consciousness as horizon, has the subjective general character of trustworthiness as a horizon of existents known in general but, on that account, still not known as regards individual particularities. This indeterminate general trustworthiness is allotted to all things which attain separate validity as existent. Accordingly, each thing, as a familiar form, has its own degree of familiarity, ranging from the known to the unknown.

These rough indications must suffice for the moment to enable us to acquire a concept of the nature and manner of achievement of prepredicative experience and of all that is already involved in the experience of an object, i.e., in the apparent ultimacy and originality of a primitive grasping. It becomes evident that, although it is correct that a truly existing object is first the product of our cognitive activity, still, for all cognitive activity, wherever it is brought to bear, this production of a truly existing object does not mean that the activity brings forth the object from nothing but that, on the contrary, just as objects are already pregiven, an *objective* environment is always already given to us. From the very first, everything which affects us in the background is already present to consciousness in an "objective apprehension," and in an anticipatory way we are conscious of it as such. This takes place as follows: the field of perception which belongs to every moment of conscious life is from the first a field of "objects," which as such are grasped as unities of "possible experience" or, what amounts to the same thing, as *possible substrates of cognitive activities*. This means that what affects us from the current passively pregiven background is not a completely empty something, some datum or other (we have no really exact word for it) as yet entirely without sense, a datum absolutely unfamiliar to us. On the contrary, *unfamiliarity* is at the same time always *a mode of familiarity*. What affects us is known in advance at least insofar as it is in general

a something with determinations; we are conscious of it in the empty form of *determinability*, that is, it is equipped with an empty horizon of determinations ("certain," or undetermined, unknown). Correlatively, the apprehension [*Auffassung*] allotted to it has from the first an open, empty horizon of explications to carry out (in the "I can," "I can proceed," "get a closer look," "turn it around," and so on). These explications are naturally "undetermined," anticipated in an "empty" way. Every entering into a real explication gives this the intentional character of an explication fulfilling and realizing the horizon-intention (as an empty anticipation), realizing it in determinate steps by means of which various unknown determinations are determined and henceforth known. The apprehension "object in general"—still completely indeterminate and unknown—already entails an element of familiarity, namely, as a something that "somehow or other is," that is explicable and can be known in conformity with what it is, i.e., as something which is situated within the horizon of the world considered as the totality of existents, something which itself is already familiar *insofar as* it is a being "in the world" and, correlatively, a being which must enter into the unity of our flowing experience.

But still further: not only is a general apprehension as "object," as "explicable in general," prescribed in advance for any developed consciousness, but also a definite typification of all objects. With each new kind of object constituted for the first time (genetically speaking) a new type of object is permanently prescribed, in terms of which other objects similar to it will be apprehended in advance. Thus, our pregiven surrounding world is already "pregiven" as multiformed, formed according to its regional categories and typified in conformity with a number of different special genera, kinds, etc. This means that what affects us in the background and is seized upon for the first time in an active grasping is known in a much more extensive sense; it is already passively apprehended in this background not merely as an "object," an object of experience, something explicable, but as a thing—as a man, as a human artifact, and so on, in still more extensive particularities. What is thus apprehended has, accordingly, its own *empty horizon of familiar unfamiliarity*, which is to be described as the universal horizon "object," with particular indications or, rather, prescriptions—namely, prescriptions of a style of explications to be realized, with explicates corresponding to them. Therefore, this horizon still remains an

empty one, a horizon of indeterminates, of unknowns capable of being taken notice of and made known. Without doubt, it can happen that an affect lacks a particular typification, but at least it is still grasped as an object, and, if it is a sensible given, as a spatial object, and, as an object, as one within the absolutely necessary and most general form "object in general."

§ 9. *The world as horizon of all possible substrates of judgment. How traditional logic, qualified in this way, acquires the character of world-logic.*

THEREFORE, however much in formal logic one thinks of the "terms" in judgments, the "S" and the "p," etc., as formalized, still there are limits to the permutability of the "something" which can be inserted in the empty places, something which is arbitrarily chosen with regard to its quiddity when the judgments are viewed from the point of view of pure form. What can be inserted is still not completely arbitrary; rather, the presupposition, never made completely explicit, remains that this something which is introduced must be precisely an *existent* which fits into the unity of experience, correlatively, into the unity of the world understood as the totality of objects of experience in general: therefore, not merely into the unity of what is actually experienced, but also of all imaginable experience. Thus it is an existent which, if it does not belong to the actual world, still belongs to a possible world. Accordingly, everything which can be arbitrarily chosen as the object of an activity of judgment, as a substrate, has a homogeneity, a common structure, and it is only because of this that judgments which have sense can be made at all. The object of judgment is bound by the fact that it is a something in general, i.e., something identical in the unity of our experience, and hence such that it must be accessible to objective self-evidence within the unity of our experience.<sup>1</sup> In this way a limit is set to the free variability of the nuclei [*Kerne*], a limit which makes logic, with-

1. Cf. *Logic*, § 89b.

out this element in it ever being expressed or presented as its fundamental presupposition, precisely a *logic of the world*, of worldly entities.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, the tracing of predicative self-evidence back to the self-evidence of prepredicative experience and the demonstration of the genesis of the predicative judgment from prepredicative experience of the world do not imply any limitation which brings into question the exemplary value of this tracing-back in its generality, as if one might object that there are also predicative judgments which are not to be traced back in this way to the prepredicative self-evidence of experience. Rather, since we are inquiring about the genesis of what is traditionally classified as logical, we have in fact exhibited its genesis in a universal generality—because it is precisely the tacit presupposition of this traditional logic that everything which can enter into its judgments as a substrate is such that it is correlated in the unity of our experience and consequently is to be traced back to a fundamental type: that of existent *qua* mundane existent, as the ultimate type and invariant frame within which everything must be accommodated.

In this way, what we have maintained above (pp. 20 f.) first becomes completely intelligible, namely, that the *disclosure of the foundation of predicative self-evidence in prepredicative represents not merely the genealogy of certain kinds of predications and predicative self-evidence but the genealogy of logic itself in one of its fundamental elements*—precisely because all self-evidence, even that of the logician himself, has the foundation of its sense in the conditions to which the possible making self-evident of the ultimate substrates of the act of judgment is subject.

2. Concerning the relatedness to the world of traditional logic, and the problem of an "ultimate logic" going beyond it, cf. *Logic*, §§ 92a and 102.

§ 10. *The retrogression to the self-evidence  
of experience as retrogression to the life-world.  
Destruction of the idealizations which  
veil the life-world.*

ALL PREDICATIVE SELF-EVIDENCE must be ultimately grounded on the self-evidence of experience. The task of the elucidation of the origin of the predicative judgment, of establishing its relation to a foundation and of pursuing the origination of prepredicative self-evidence in that of experience, turns out to be, in conformity with our elucidation of the essence of experience, the task of the *retrogression to the world* as the universal ground of all particular experiences, as the *world of experience* immediately pregiven and prior to all logical functions. The retrogression to the world of experience is a *retrogression to the "life-world,"* i.e., to the world in which we are always already living and which furnishes the ground for all cognitive performance and all scientific determination. The insight which we have now acquired into the nature of experience as experience of the world will enable us to answer questions concerning the sense of this retrogression, to reply to objections which might be made against it, and to characterize the method of this genetic questioning as nonpsychological.

From what has already been said, it is apparent that in the flux of our experience of the world, as it is related to the always already pregiven world, we will not so easily find that ultimately original self-evidence of experience which we seek: that real primal establishment of prepredicative self-evidence constructed on the basis of a self-evidence of experience entirely original and originally established. For our task, it is not sufficient simply to retrace our steps from particular judgments which may present themselves to us as examples to the mode of givenness of their substrate-objects, as if without further ado the retrogression from a judgment arbitrarily chosen as an example to an ultimately original self-evidence or experience could be begun. On the contrary, in order to represent to ourselves the structure of a completely original acquisition of knowledge, we



must always keep in view the horizon of experience in which every such experiential performance inseparably stands.

The world in which we live and in which we carry out activities of cognition and judgment, out of which everything which becomes the substrate of a possible judgment affects us, is always already pregiven to us as impregnated by the precipitate [*Niederschlag*] of logical operations. The world is never given to us as other than the world in which we or others, whose store of experience we take over by communication, education, and tradition, have already been logically active, in judgment and cognition. And this refers, not only to the typically determined sense according to which every object stands before us as a familiar object within a horizon of typical familiarity, but also to the horizon-prescription [*Horizontverzeichnung*], the sense with which it is pregiven to us as the object of possible cognition, as an object determinable in general. The sense of this pre-giveness is such that everything which contemporary natural science has furnished as determinations of what exists also belongs to us, to the world, as this world is pregiven to the adults of our time. And even if we are not personally interested in natural science, and even if we know nothing of its results, still, what exists is pregiven to us in advance as determined in such a way that we at least grasp it as being in principle scientifically determinable. In other words, for this world which is pregiven to us, we accept the following idea as a matter of course on the basis of modern tradition, namely, "that the infinite totality of what is in general is intrinsically a rational all-encompassing unity that can be mastered, without anything left over, by a corresponding universal science."<sup>1</sup> This idea of the world as a universe of being, capable of being controlled by the exact methods of physicomathematical science, of a universe determined in itself [*an sich bestimmten*], whose factual

1. Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*, ed. Walter Biemel, *Husserliana*, Vol. VI (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954; 2d printing, 1962), p. 20; English translation by David Carr, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 22. [Hereafter cited as *Crisis*. This work was first published in 1936 in Belgrade in Volume I of the journal *Philosophia*. References throughout will be given to the Biemel *Husserliana* edition and to the Carr translation.—Trans.]

determinations are to be ascertained by science, is for us so much a matter of course that we understand every individual datum of our experience in its light. Even where we do not recognize the universal binding force and general applicability of the "exact" methods of natural science and its cognitive ideals, still the style of this mode of cognition has become so exemplary that from the beginning the conviction persists that objects of our experience are determined in themselves and that the activity of cognition is precisely to discover by approximation these determinations subsisting in themselves, to establish them "objectively" as they are in themselves—and here "objectively" means "once and for all" and "for everyone." This *idea of the determinability "in itself" of what exists* and hence the idea that the world of our experience is a universe of things existing in themselves and as such determined in themselves is so much a matter of course for us that, even when laymen reflect on the achievement of knowledge, this "objectivity" is from the first accepted as self-evident. Thus it is presupposed as self-evident that the space of our world and the time in which what exists is encountered and in which our own experience is situated are precisely *the* space and *the* time, which it is then the task of physicomathematical natural science to grasp exactly as they are in themselves. In the same way, it is presupposed as self-evident that the causal connection among existents as it is given in experience is precisely the same connection as that which is then exactly and objectively determined in objective science and which refers to exact causal laws.

In this way, the world of our experience is from the beginning interpreted by recourse to an "idealization"—but it is no longer seen that this idealization, which leads to the exact space of geometry, to the exact time of physics, to exact causal laws, and which makes us see the world of our experience as being thus determined in itself, is itself the result of a function of cognitive methods, a result based on the data of our immediate experience. This experience in its immediacy knows neither exact space nor objective time and causality. And even if it is true that all theoretical scientific determination of existents ultimately refers back to experience and its data, nevertheless experience does not give its objects directly in such a way that the thinking that operates on these objects as it itself experiences them is able to lead by itself—by its explicating, colligating, disjoining, relating, concept-forming, by its deductions

and inductions—immediately to objects in the sense of true theory, i.e., to objects of science. If we speak of *objects of science*, science being that which as such seeks truth valid for everyone, then these objects, which find their adequate expression in predicative propositions considered as [reflecting] the complete structure of categorial actions, are *not objects of experience*, such as are encountered purely and determined in categorial actions on the basis of pure experience. “Judgments of experience,” or, to speak more clearly, judgments which are obtained only from original operations in categorial acts purely on the basis of experience, i.e., sense experience and the experience founded on it of mental reality [*geistigen Seins*], are not judgments of definitive validity, are not judgments of science in the precise sense—that is, of science which works under the idea of definitive validity. Thus, by their nature, *the logical activities of idealization and of mathematization*, the latter presupposing the former—which might generally be called activities of geometrization—are distinguished from other categorial activities.

The mathematization of nature, prepared for by the creation of Euclidean geometry with its ideal forms and, since Galileo, become exemplary for the investigation of nature in general, has become so much a matter of course that, already in its Galilean conception, the exact world was from the first substituted for the world of our experience, and men entirely neglected to question the original sense-bestowing activities by means of which the exact space of geometry developed from the space of intuition, with its vague and fluent typification.<sup>2</sup> Such a reflection would have shown that it is not a phantasy-like simulation of intuitive spatial forms which leads to the exact forms of geometry but only a method of idealization of the intuitively given; and so also for all the determinations of natural science which are attributed to existents as determinations which they have in themselves. It was thereby overlooked that this method of idealization in the end accomplishes nothing other than an anticipation, infinitely extended, of what is to be expected in experience. And it is always overlooked that this universe of determinations in themselves, in which exact science apprehends the universe of existents, is nothing more

2. On this point, and on what follows, cf. *Crisis*, pp. 22, 48 ff.; ET, pp. 25, 48 ff.

than a garb of ideas thrown over the world of immediate intuition and experience, the life-world; for each of the results of science has its foundation of sense in this immediate experience and its corresponding world and refers back to it. "It is through the garb of ideas that we take for true Being what is actually a method,"<sup>3</sup> and this causes us to interpret the world of our experience always according to the sense of this garb of ideas thrown over it, as if it were thus "in itself." In like fashion, every return to "pure experience," and above all the current reflections of positivism in this regard, remains content with nature as already idealized, which is equally true of the logician when he inquires about the empirical foundations of knowledge; and it holds not less for the psychologist, who from the first regards life [*Erleben*] as being in correlation with the true being of things which he believes he is able to find in its objective determinateness and determinability. In the same way, the logician also always sees the meaning of cognitive functions in the attainment of this "in itself," in "objective" knowledge, and its goal in the determination of the existent "for everyone" and "once and for all." Accordingly, the logician forgets to ask whether this is really the meaning of the cognitive function, the norm relative to which *all* activity of judgment and cognition should be measured, or whether, on the contrary, this activity must not be measured relative to the purpose of original experience, the goals which it posits and which arise from it, among which *exact* knowledge is only *one* among possible goals. [The logician forgets to do this] precisely because he is not able to acquire a concept of *original* experience in consequence of the fact that he has superimposed an idealization on what is given originally, an idealization which has its source in exact science (but which is no longer understood as such).

If, therefore, we wish to return to experience in the ultimately original sense which is the object of our inquiry, then it can only be to the original experience of the life-world, an experience still unacquainted with any of these idealizations but whose necessary foundation it is. And this retrogression to the original life-world is not one which simply takes for granted the world of our experience as it is given to us but rather traces the historicity already deposited in it to its source—it is in this

3. *Crisis*, p. 52; ET, p. 51.

historicity that the sense of a world as existing "in itself" and objectively determinable first accrues to the world on the basis of original experience and intuition. Because the logician does not inquire behind this overlaying of the world of original experience with idealizations but thinks that it is always possible to restore the originality of experience without further ado, he also measures knowledge by this ideal of exactitude, of *epistēmē* as exact "objective" knowing. In opposition to this attitude, the retrogression to prepredicative experience and the insight into what is the deepest and ultimately original level of prepredicative experience signifies a *justification of doxa*, which is the realm of ultimately original self-evidence, not yet exact and physicomathematically idealized. Thereby, it is also shown that this realm of *doxa* is not a domain of self-evidence of lesser rank than that of *epistēmē*, of judicative knowledge and its sedimentations [*Niederschläge*], but precisely the domain of ultimate originality to which exact cognition returns for its sense, such cognition (it must be recognized) having the characteristic of being a mere method and not a way leading to knowledge by itself.

In all this there is implied no denigration of exact knowledge nor any denigration of the apodictic self-evidence of the logician himself. It signifies only a clarification of the path which must be taken in order to arrive at self-evidence of higher levels and at the hidden presuppositions on which this self-evidence rests, presuppositions which determine and delimit its sense. Such self-evidence itself is not brought into question with regard to its content. On the contrary, matters remain such that knowledge terminates in the self-evidence of higher levels, that essentially the path of knowledge is to ascend from *doxa* to *epistēmē*—it is simply that even concerning this ultimate goal, the origin and specific rights of the lower stages should not be forgotten.

§ 11. *The elucidation of the origin of the judgment  
and the genealogy of logic in the total  
horizon of the transcendental and  
phenomenological problematic of constitution.*

FOR SIMILAR REASONS, the necessary retrogression to the most original self-evidence of experience cannot be accomplished with the means of psychology. Psychology, even where it is pure, where it concerns pure lived experience and what is given to consciousness as such, a psychology conceived and put into practice as pure internal psychology, could at best inquire regressively from the pregiven types of logical forms to the subjective operations belonging essentially to such forms in which structures having these forms arise as self-evident. But even if psychology seriously grappled with the problem of self-evidence and pursued the founding of judicative self-evidence in pre-predicative self-evidence, it would still of necessity inquire regressively to the lived experiences of the self-evidence of subjects who are precisely as such already subjects of our world—of a world which is already overlaid by idealizations and always apperceived in accordance with the sense of this overlaying. In its reflection back to logical activity, from which all judicative self-evidence arises, it would be brought to a halt by experience which is, just as a matter of course, already conceived to refer to an idealized world. The dismantling of these idealizations, the breakthrough to the concealed foundation of their sense in the most original experience, is no longer a problem which can be handled by psychology, no matter how comprehensively and purely it may be carried out. For psychological reflection on lived experiences as they are accessible to internal perception can never lead to the origination of this garb of ideas thrown over the world from the original experience of the life-world. Psychological reflection takes lived experiences as isolated, as occurrences separated from one another within our consciousness, which it, of course, can study as particulars with regard to their origin just as the logician studies particular forms. But every such psychological reflection leads to lived experiences which, insofar as they are such, are experiences of the world, of a

world which, for this subject, is already given as complete; and this means that this world is there as that on which contemporary science has already done its work of exact determination. Thus the psychologist can perhaps establish the precedence of isolated acts of prepredicative experience in relation to those of predicative experience, but he will not be able of himself to clarify the genuine sense of this retrogression as a retrogression to something which is more original. This world *as the correlate of lived experiences* always belongs to the lived experiences which the psychologist meets with entirely as a matter of course and which he studies, but from these lived experiences he has no way of going back to the *origin of this world itself*—a world which is what it is because of the subjective operations, cognitive activities, and pursuit of scientific methods through which it stands before us as determined in such and such a way and as in principle infinitely determinable with regard to its true being.

Now these are *also* sedimentations of subjective intentional operations, but the intentionality of these operations does not lie open to the view of reflection but is only *implied* in the sedimentations which refer to it. The revealing of these intentional implications and with them the history of the world itself, in which the subject of psychology already finds himself as in one ready-made, *also* means, therefore, a retrogression to what is subjective, since it is through the intentional activity of the subject that the world has obtained this form; but it is a *retrogression to a hidden subjectivity*—hidden because it is not capable of being exhibited as present [*aktuell*] in reflection in its intentional activity but can only be indicated by the sedimentations left by this activity in the pregiven world. Thus, the regressive inquiry bearing on the most original self-evidence is also a subjective one, but it bears on a *subjectivity understood in a more radical sense than can ever be the case in psychology*. It is necessary to dismantle everything which already pre-exists in the sedimentations of sense in the world of our present experience, to interrogate these sedimentations relative to the subjective sources out of which they have developed and, consequently, relative to an effective subjectivity. This is not the subjectivity of psychological reflection, of a subject perceiving itself situated in the presence of this world as already complete. It is, on the contrary, the subjectivity whose operations of sense

have made the world which is pregiven to us what it is, namely, *our world*—no longer a pure world of original experience but a world having the sense of a world exactly determined and determinable in itself, a world within which all particular existents in advance and as a matter of course are given to us as determinable in principle, according to the methods of exact science, and, at least as a matter of principle, a world existing in itself, in a sense originally derived from the idealizations of the physicomathematical natural sciences.

Moreover, such regressive inquiry does not involve seeking the factual, historical origin of these sedimentations of sense in a determinate historical subjectivity, in the subjectivity of definite historical personalities who, in their activity, grasped this idea of mathematization for the first time.<sup>1</sup> Rather, this world which is ours is only an example through which we must study the *structure and the origin of a possible world in general* from subjective sources. We would not be able to understand this definite historical origin of productions of sense in historical subjects if we did not reaccomplish them ourselves, if we did not re-experience this origination of the operations of idealization from original life-experience—that is, if we could not accomplish in ourselves this retrogression from the concealed life-world, with its garb of ideas, to the original world-experience and the life-world. In so doing, we repeat the entire history, already consummated, of the subjective activities which formerly were concealed and which have now become patent in their reactivation and, as such, intelligible. We then understand ourselves, *not as subjectivity which finds itself in a world ready-made, as in simple psychological reflection, but as a subjectivity bearing within itself, and achieving, all of the possible operations to which this world owes its becoming*. In other words, we understand ourselves in this revelation of intentional implications, in the interrogation of the origin of the sedimentation of sense from intentional operations, *as transcendental subjectivity*, where, by “transcendental,” nothing more is to be understood than the theme, originally inaugurated by Descartes, of a regressive inquiry concerning the ultimate source of all cognitive formations, of a reflection by the knowing subject on

1. On the method of this retrogression, cf. also *Crisis*, pp. 58 ff.; ET, pp. 57 ff.



himself and on his cognitive life, the life in which all scientific formations valid for him have been purposefully produced and are preserved as available results.<sup>2</sup>

To speak more precisely, the retrogression to this transcendental subjectivity constituting the pregiven world takes place in two stages:

1. *In the retrogression from the pregiven world with all of its sedimentations of sense, with its science and scientific determination, to the original life-world.*

2. *In the regressive inquiry which goes from the life-world to the subjective operations from which it itself arises.* For the life-world indeed is nothing simply pregiven. It also is a structure which we can question regarding the modes of its constitution. Here, also, we already find logical operations of sense—not logical, to be sure, in the sense of our traditional logic, which always has as a foundation the idealization of being-in-itself and being-determined-in-itself [*Ansichseins und Ansichbestimmenseins*], but in the sense of an original logical operation which is primarily oriented on determination, i.e., on acts of cognition in the limited and relative horizons of experience in the life-world. But the logical productions of sense are only a part of that which contributes to the structure of the world of our experience. Also belonging to this structure are practical and affective experiences, the experience of willing, evaluating, and manual activity, which on its part creates its own horizon of familiarity, the familiarity involved in practical association, evaluation, etc. But belonging equally thereto are all the activities of sense experience, without which we could not arrive at the constitution of a world-time and a world-space, and of spatial things, cosubjects, and so on. If we thus follow up the lowest constitutive operations which belong, first of all, to the constitution of a possible life-world, then what follows is the constitution of objective time, of physicomathematical nature and its in-itself.

The elucidation of the whole interpenetration of the operations of consciousness which leads to the constitution of a possible world (of a *possible* world: this means that it is a question of the essential form of the world in general and not of our factual real world) is the comprehensive task of constitutive

2. On this concept of the transcendental, see *Crisis*, pp. 100 ff.; ET, pp. 97 ff.

phenomenology. Within its scope is included the clarification of the origin of the predicative judgment as the fundamental task of a genealogy of logic which, understood within this total horizon and taken in its complete and comprehensive sense, becomes *transcendental logic*. As such it has to investigate the share of logic, of the logical operations of consciousness in the broadest sense, the operations of cognitive reason, in the structure of the world. To understand the extension of this domain of the logical and of logical reason ([i.e.,] everything that in the structure of the world shares in the logical formation of sense, in logical operations) and hence to understand the extension of the concept of the *logos*—all this, to be sure, can first be established only within this total framework of the problematic of constitution. Here, to begin with, our task is a more modest one. We do not yet have this all-embracing concept of the logical at our disposal; we must proceed from the traditional concept and trace its traditional subdivisions and the share of what tradition already has in view as logic and logical activity in the construction of the world of our experience, as well as the position which this activity occupies in this construction. *Thus the task of transcendental logic, taken in the comprehensive and ideally complete sense which we have indicated, differs, on the one hand, from that of a total constitutive phenomenology and, on the other, from that of a genealogy, i.e., an analysis of the origin and subjective foundation of traditional formal logic.* Only the latter task is pursued here in one of its fundamental elements: the elucidation of the origin of the predicative judgment.<sup>3</sup>

§ 12. *The point of departure of the individual analyses. The distinction between simple and founded experiences, and the necessity of the retrogression to the simplest experiences.*

THESE INDICATIONS must suffice to make understandable the sense of the retrogression from predicative self-evidence

3. On the delimitation of this task in regard to the comprehensive constitutive systematic, see also below, § 14.

to prepredicative or objective self-evidence, a retrogression which leads to the self-evidence of the life-world. It is now time to draw the conclusions of these general insights in order to choose the correct point of departure for the concrete, particular analyses and to seek out in the total sphere of experience of the life-world that prepredicative self-evidence in which the origin of the predicative judgment can be shown. Though we have already acquired a concept of experience as objective self-evidence of individual objects, such experience is still multiform in itself, even if all the idealizations which overlie its originality have been dismantled. Our life-world in its originality, which can be brought to light only by the destruction of those layers of sense, is not only, as has already been mentioned, a world of logical operations, not only the realm of the pregivenness of objects as possible judicative substrates, as possible themes of cognitive activity, but it is also the world of experience in the wholly concrete sense which is commonly tied in with the word "experience." And this commonplace sense is in no way related purely and simply to cognitive behavior; taken in its greatest generality, it is related, rather, to a habituality [*Habitualität*]<sup>1</sup> which lends to him who is provided with it, to him who is "experienced," assurance in decision and action in the situations of life—whether these situations are definitely limited or are understood in general as comprising an attitude toward life on the whole—just as, on the other hand, by this expression we are also concerned with the individual steps of the "experience" by which this habituality is acquired. Thus this commonplace, familiar, and concrete sense of the word "experience" points much more to a mode of behavior which is practically active and evaluative than specifically to one that is cognitive and judicative.

We have disregarded so far everything which constitutes experience in this concrete sense, and in our regressive inquiry we have gone back directly from the act of predicative judgment and its self-evidence to the domain of passive belief in being as consciousness of the pregivenness of the substrates of judgment—of a ground of belief which has been shown to be that of the

1. ["Habituality" (and "habitual") in this text does not have its occasional and informal English meaning but should be understood as designating, rather, the philosophical concept (*Habitualität*, also translated as "*habitus*") of an acquired intelligent disposition.—Trans.]

world and that by which every particular experience is experience within the horizon of the world. But this horizon of the world is undoubtedly such that it is determined not only by the familiar aspects of what exists, which have their origin in cognitive praxis, but also, and above all, by those derived from the everyday praxis of life and practical activity. That, in spite of this, we have gone back beyond the broad, concrete concept of experience which has just been sketched to the narrower one is justified because *every* type of worldly conduct, practical activity as well as purely cognitive, is founded in experience in *this* same sense. Practical activity, the positing of value, the judgment of value, is, as such, dependent *on* pregiven objects, on objects which already stand before us in doxic certainty as existing and are treated as existing. Thus the realm of passive *doxa*, of passive belief in being, provides a ground of belief which is the foundation not only of every particular act of cognition and every orientation of cognition and all judgment of what exists but also of every individual judgment of value, of all practical activity bearing on what exists—therefore, it is the foundation of everything which we call “experience” and “having experience” in the concrete sense of the term. To be sure, it must not be stated that from this passive pregivenness of what exists we must always and forthwith pass over to cognitive activity; on the contrary, it may be that what affects us immediately provides a stimulus to action. Of course, some explication is always already presupposed in any primitive cognitive activity, in any grasping of an existent as determined in such and such a way. Thus this concept of experience as self-evident givenness, of the pregivenness, first of all passive, of individual objects, has its distinctive characteristic in this: that it indicates *the fundamental structure of every experience in the concrete sense*. In passive *doxa*, what exists is pregiven not only as a substrate for cognitive activities which can possibly be applied to it but also as a substrate for all valuations, all positing of goals and practical activities. For something to be given in immediate sense experience as useful, beautiful, alarming, terrifying, attractive, or whatever, it is necessary that it be something present and sensuously apprehensible, even if we do not enter further into its perception, even if we do not try to explicate it accordingly, to grasp it in a pure contemplation, to display it in its sensuous and perceptible characteristics, but if it immediately awakens a practical or affective interest on the basis of this sensuous pres-

ence, giving itself to us immediately as this useful, attractive, or repulsive thing—all this is founded precisely in the following: that it is a substrate with properties apprehensible simply as sensuous, these properties being such as to lead at any time to a possible interpretation.

When we talk about experience, then, we must distinguish between *simple and founded experiences*. The world, as it is always already pregiven entire in passive *doxa*, furnishing the ground of belief for all particular acts of judgment, is at bottom given in simple experience as a world of substrates apprehensible simply by sense. Every sensuous experience, in other words, every experience with the being-sense [*Seinssinn*] of a simple substrate, is *sensuous* experience—the existing substrate is a body, i.e., a body which confirms itself in the harmony of experience and as such has the validity of a body truly existing. Universal sensuous experience, conceived in universal harmony, has a unity of being which is a unity of a higher order; the being of this universal experience is nature in its totality, the universe of all bodies. Thus, in the world of experience, nature is the lowest level, that which founds all others. The existent in its simple, experienceable properties as nature is the substrate which lies at the basis of all other modes of experience, of all evaluation and conduct. Nature is the invariable foundation for all the changing relativity of evaluative judgments which bear on it and for all the changes in its usefulness with regard to the various ends which are set in order to produce something different from naturally given “material.” The existent is always given, at bottom, *qua* natural body, provided with natural properties accessible to simple experience—although often interest need not be directed toward them.

If this experience is given at first hand [*originär* <sup>2</sup> *gebend*],

2. [The term *originär* occurs frequently in the text and is another word for “original,” which is usually expressed in German by *ursprünglich*. The latter has a much wider range of use (and is very frequently used in this text), as it can mean any kind—genetic, logical, evaluative—of originality or priority. *Originär*, on the other hand, is used only in the context of analyses of what is given to consciousness, and it indicates the immediate, present, unique nature of an original datum as opposed to its copy or any secondary and mediated references to it. *Originär* will therefore generally be translated as “at first hand” or “firsthand,” as in “firsthand consciousness” (*Originärbewusstsein*), a term used especially in Appendix I.—Trans.]

we call it *perception*—more precisely, *external perception*. Everything worldly and external we perceive as a corporeal existent in the spatiotemporal totality of nature. Wherever we meet with animals and men and cultural objects (implements, works of art, or whatever), we no longer have mere nature but the expression of mental being-sense. Then we are carried beyond the domain of what is given in simple sensuous perception. Perception, as pure sensuous perception, is *directed toward pure corporeality*, simply and straightforwardly. In contrast to this is the perception of what is perceptible only by means of the understanding of an expression, as in the understanding of a tool which awakens the “memory” of the men who made it for a purpose or of those for whom it was supposed to be determined, or again, as the immediate expression of a living body as being that of [another] human being. Both cases presuppose a sensuous perception of the corporeal element which founds the expression and presuppose from there the transition to a reflection,<sup>3</sup> which thus, mediately or immediately, confers a final certainty to a being-with of man *qua* person (of the ego-like), or of animal subjectivity, and in this derivative [*fundierten*] way determines an existent which is not simply a corporeal existent but a subjective corporeal existent. But this subjective element is not simply and immediately experienceable, perceptible; it is experienceable only insofar as it is founded on what is simply and sensuously experienceable and only insofar as it is given in unity with what is simply “there” according to perception. Reflection, therefore, is not a perceiving in which we can be simply turned toward what is perceived; reflection occurs only on the basis of and in divergence from direct orientation. If I turn toward a man, this act of turning-toward [*Zuwendung*],<sup>4</sup> the thematic ray of activity, goes first of all simply and straight-

3. An expression which here indicates only the mediacy of this mode of lived experience. It goes without saying that a “reflection” of this kind is completely different from reflection in the ordinary sense, namely, from the turning-back of regard from objectivities which are straightforwardly apprehensible to one’s own lived experiences.

4. [“Turning-toward,” and other terms like “the interest,” “the tendency,” “the regard,” are not to be understood in this text in their literal psychological and informal English meaning—though the practical aspect of this meaning is not entirely unintended—but primarily as different ways of designating the intentionality of consciousness, its directedness toward objects.—Trans.]

forwardly to the body, as a matter of sensuous perception. But this ray does not *terminate* in the body; in the understanding of the expression, it goes beyond, to the ego-subject, therefore to his being in the doing of this or that: in turning-toward, in being-preoccupied-with, having-a-world, being mundanely affected by the latter, and so on—to the extent that all this attains expression. To this necessarily pertains a state of the ego's being related to his physical body, namely, to the one which is there for me. However, this normal process of the perceiving of a man, from the sensuous perception of his body through his expression to the ego-subject which belongs to it and expresses it, also admits of a change of focus: we can attend purely to the corporeal element, as we do when we busy ourselves with a merely corporeal thing. The expression is still understood, but the understanding no longer actually functions; the ego-subject is only background, so to speak—copresent, but nonthematically.

In order to attain the truly ultimate and original self-evidence of prepredicative experience, we must go back *from these founded experiences to the simplest, and thus leave all expression out of play*. For every experience which finds the existent determined otherwise than by its natural qualities, and identifies it as an implement or what have you, refers to an understanding of expression. Accordingly, we leave as valid only pure sensuous perception and then experience in general; we look upon the *world purely as a world of perception*, and we abstract from everything which it manifests in itself as regards familiarities and determinations which are not rooted in purely perceptive acts but in evaluative ones, ours as well as those of others. Thus, we abstract from all determinations which accrue to the existent from our own personal attitudes or from those of others. In this way, as the ground of experience, passively pregiven, we obtain *pure universal nature*, which in the natural sequence of sensuous perception is given as a closed system, as precisely the nature which I perceive and have perceived—for, from the actual field of my experience, I have excluded others [other egos] by putting all expression out of action. For the concretely existing world, this putting out of action signifies an abstraction—a word which at first is meant to express only a proximal leaving out of account of things which are there for me and continue to hold good. By this [word “abstraction”] we are not to understand an omission or the idea that nature exists for itself and sep-

arately or even that in the original formation of the "idea of the world," of a consciousness of the being of the world, there would first be required a systematic expansion of what exists for me as mere nature, which only then would receive a more extensive ontic sense. Of all this, there is no question here.

In this abstractive limitation of experience to the domain of what is valid only for me, the reflecting subject, there is already contained the exclusion of all idealization, the exclusion of the presupposition of objectivity, of the validity of our judgments "for everyone," which traditional logic, oriented on the ideal of exact determination in the sense of definitive scientific validity, has always tacitly presupposed as belonging to the essence of the act of judgment. For as soon as we disregard others, there is also no question of a validation which refers to the cognitive activity of others; there are as yet no sedimentations of sense which insure that our world, as far as it is given to us, is always already understood as a world exactly determinable and, through the achievements of science as it is historically constituted, already determined in conformity with the idea of definitive validity.

To be sure, a certain idealization is already present in judgments of experience in that we designate by general names the substrates chosen as exemplary; the objects thus designated are then assumed to be familiar to at least the linguistic community concerned, and the judgments are assumed to be valid for this community. The same thing is also involved in the objectivation of natural experience: its sense is also to be already valid for everyone—precisely for everyone belonging to the environing world and the community concerned. The objects about which one judges are pregiven with the sense "object for everyone"—for everything which is germane. This is equally true for determinations of practical intent. In order now to arrive at an original act of judgment and to track down the completely original activity which is carried out in judicative determination, we must also disregard this and act as if the operations were precisely *my own* completely original acquisitions, without any such reference to a community already there. There are, to be sure, difficulties here in the fact that the expressions of our language necessarily have a general communicative sense so that, with the use of some designation or other of objects, we already suggest at least this *first idealization*—that of being valid for a linguistic community—and we have need of an ever-renewed



effort to ward off this obtrusive sense that is characteristic of expressions. This is a difficulty attached essentially to every investigation of what is subjective in the most radical sense, insofar as in such investigation we are constrained to use expressions having a mundane sense and a communicative meaning in the world.

We therefore pursue the act of judgment as if it were an act always exclusively mine, with results only for me, and completely disregard the function of the act of judgment in communication and the fact that it always presupposes preceding communication precisely in the way in which its objects are pregiven, already provided with a prescription of sense. It is only then that we arrive at the most primitive building stones of the logical activity out of which our world is constructed. The objects which function thus as substrates are objects which at first sight are not conceived as existing for everyone, or even for everyone belonging to a limited community, but as *objects only for me*; and the world from which they are to affect us must be considered as a *world only for me*. This methodological limitation to the domain of what is proper to the subject is necessary if we wish really to catch sight of logical activity in its ultimate originality, by which it is always precisely the activity of a *single* subject.

### § 13. *The general concept of judgment and of object.* *Judging as confirmation.*

IF ONE DISREGARDS all these superstructures of the world of our experience, above all, of the experience which to each is his own [*je-eigenen*], then it appears that the act of judgment, even on this lowest level, where it rests purely on the basis of experience, and, to restrict this even further, of experience which to each is his own, has structures which coincide with those of the judgment under the idea of definitive validity. It appears not only that the domain of the logical also extends to where scientific intent does not yet exist but also that, with the expression "judgment," a *general essence is denoted which, in its basic structure, is the same at all levels of logical activity*

*in which it occurs.* Thus what is exhibited as the structure of the predicative judgment in the framework of an analysis limited to the simplest experiences has at the same time an exemplary significance for understanding the essence of the judgment, even where judgment fulfills a function of a higher level.

If, beforehand, we wish already to make precise *this most general concept of the judgment* and *the concept of the object* which belongs to it as the concept of the substrate of the judgment, then we must go back to the relation between the act of judgment and life-experience in the wholly concrete sense. All experience in this concrete sense rests at bottom on the simple pregiving *protodoxa* [*Urdoxa*] of ultimate, simply apprehensible substrates. The natural bodies pregiven in this *doxa* are the ultimate substrates for all subsequent determinations, cognitive determinations as well as those which are axiological or practical. All come into being *from* these simply apprehensible substrates. But this domain of the *protodoxa*, the ground of simple doxic consciousness [*Glaubensbewusstsein*], is a merely passive pregiving consciousness of objects as substrates. In this domain the existent is pregiven as a unity of identity. However, this domain of *doxa* is a domain of the fluid. A passively pregiven unity of identity is not yet one which is grasped as such and retained as an objective identity. On the contrary, this apprehension, e.g., the perceptive contemplation [*Betrachtung*] of the pregiven sensuous substrate, is already an activity, a cognitive performance of the lowest level. It is so in pure perception, in which we let our glance wander here and there over the pregiven object which affects us. The object then reveals itself as "the same object seen from different sides," and in reflection our regard is directed toward the fact that the object is given to us in perspectives, in gradations [*Abschattungen*], in which it reveals itself as this one and the same thing to which our attention is directed. Thus, even the purely perceptive contemplation of a pregiven substrate proves to be our *achievement*, an act, and not a mere suffering of impressions.

The naïve consciousness, which, through all the perspectives, gradations, and so on in which the object of perception appears, is directed toward this object itself, in its identity, has always in view only the result of this act: the object, which is explicated in perception as such and such. This consciousness is not at all

aware that this givenness of the object in these sensuous properties is itself already an achievement, a cognitive achievement of the lowest level. Hence, this consciousness will be inclined to view perception, contemplation, as a kind of suffering, as a passive attitude, and to contrast, with regard to activity, this passive acceptance of pregiven objects only with praxis in the narrower sense, i.e., the seizing transformation of pregiven things as well as the construction of predicative propositions, which then stand forth as objective structures, productions. Thus *the distinction between active behavior and passive acceptance or suffering does not have the same meaning for naïve consciousness, turned directly toward pregiven objects, as it does for the reflective regard*, which already finds in acceptance of the pregiven, in contemplative apprehension of it, an element of activity and, as a result, must obtain a *more radical conception of passivity* than that entertained by naïve consciousness. This [more radical] conception is that of *pure affective pre-givenness*, of *passive belief in being*, in which there is nothing yet of cognitive achievement: the mere "stimulus" which proceeds from an existent in the environing world, as, e.g., the barking of a dog which "just breaks in on our ears," without our previously having given our attention to it, without our having turned toward it as a thematic object. Wherever it is a matter of attention, such an activity of the lowest level is already present.<sup>1</sup>

Every apprehending turning-toward which arrests what is given in the flux of sensuous experience, i.e., turns toward it attentively and by way of contemplation searches into its properties, is already an achievement, a cognitive activity of the lowest level, with regard to which we can already speak of an *act of judgment*. The existent as the unity of identity is, to be sure, already passively pregiven, preconstituted; but it is only in apprehension that it is retained as this identical unity, although this need not as such involve anything in the way of predicative activity.

Under the term *judgment in the sense of traditional logic* is always understood the *predicative judgment*, which finds its linguistic expression in apophansis, in the declarative statement. Indeed, wherever a thing is designated by a name, even if only in the context of practical life, this already presupposes not a

1. Cf., on this point, the detailed analyses below, §§ 17 f.

mere prepredicative apprehension but an act of predicative judgment, an operation of sense already carried out.

But if we wish to define the *broadest* concept of the judgment as opposed to this *most limited and specific* concept of the predicative judgment, we can wholly disregard this and point out that, *with every prepredicative, objectifying turning-toward an existent, it is already necessary to speak of an act of judgment in the broader sense*. Thus, for example, a perceptive consciousness in which an object is before us as existing, intended [*vermeint*] by us as such, is an act of judgment in this broader sense. If, in addition to this, we take into account that the prepredicative consciousness has on its part its different modes of clarity and indistinctness and that, on the other hand, every act of predicative judgment also has its own differences of clarity and distinctness, then *the broadest concept of the judgment* thus includes all these modes, the predicative as well as the prepredicative. The term "judgment" taken in this sense is then the name for *the totality of objectivating* (objectifying) *ego-acts*; in the language of *Ideas*, of doxical ego-acts. We will soon concern ourselves in detail with how the act of prepredicative judgment, as a lower level of ego-activity (the level of receptivity), that of perceptive contemplation, explication, etc., is distinguished from the higher level, that of the spontaneity of the act of predicative judgment.

The act of judgment in this broadest sense of ego-activity of higher or lower levels should not be confused with that of passive *belief*,<sup>2</sup> which Hume and the positivism which follows him assume as a datum on the tablet of consciousness. Even Brentano's concept of judgment supposes such a datum—at any rate, as his theory of internal consciousness shows, it is not an activity emanating from the ego-pole. Every pregiven object which affects us from a passive background has its passive *doxa*. The way in which this object is precisely pregiven is not important, i.e., whether a glance of perceptive, objectifying apprehension is directed on this givenness, or whether it immediately becomes the theme of a practical activity. And even the passive constitution of a datum standing out of the background as a unity in immanent temporality has a passive *doxa*. This is nothing other than the certainty of belief belonging to the passive agreement of intentionalities in a synthetic unity.

2. [The word is given in English by Husserl.—Trans.]

This certainty of belief, as modified, enters into all reproduction, but always as passive certainty. Everything which is constituted as unity in an intentional harmony has this "it is in accord": the certainty of being. To this extent, we already have an existent or, subjectively speaking, a belief; and where this harmony is broken, we have discrepancy and modalization of belief. To this extent, all passive consciousness is already "constitutive of objects"—more precisely, it is *preconstitutive*. But only the activity of objectifying, of cognition, the ego-activity of lower and higher levels, which is not merely passive *doxa*, creates objects of judgment and cognition.

*Objectification* is thus always an *active achievement of the ego*, an active believing cognizance of that of which we are aware, this something being *one* and continuously the *same* through the continuous extension of consciousness in its duration. It is that which is identified in distinct acts which form a synthesis; in this synthesis we are aware of it as the same, as that which can always be recognized, or also as that which is freely repeatable in recollections or freely producible in perceptions (when we go there and take one more look). It is precisely this identity, as the correlate of an identification to be carried out in an open, boundless, and free repetition, which constitutes the *pregnant concept of an object*. Just as every other praxis has its practical goal, the that-about-which of the act, so the existing object is, as existing, the goal of the doxical, the act of cognition, the act which explicates the existent in its modes of being, which are here called determinations. To be sure, it is really only on the higher level that the *confirmation* [*Feststellung*] of the existent, of its how and what, which constitutes the objectifying function of the judgment, becomes a confirmation to which we can return again and again and, as such, a permanent possession of knowledge. This is the level of the act of predicative judgment, the sedimentation of which is found in the declarative statement. As the sedimentation of a store of knowledge, this confirmation is freely available, preservable, and communicable. Only the act of predicative judgment creates this store of knowledge and the objects of knowledge in the pregnant sense of the term, and not the act of judgment typical of merely receptive contemplation, although the latter already creates knowledge which persists as habitual. *Every act of predicative judgment is a step in which a permanent store of knowledge is produced.* It is in itself a complete step in deter-

mination (how, subsequent analyses will reveal) <sup>3</sup> and the primal cell of thematic determination.

To be sure, not all cognitive, judicative objectification is accompanied by this tendency toward confirmation "once and for all," i.e., toward "objective" confirmation, not even when it is predicative and results in declarative statements. It can also be a matter of a confirmation which serves only transient, practical ends, only for a definite situation or for a number of situations of similar type; for example, when a judgment confirms the utility of a tool for such and such purposes, this makes sense only relative to the situations in which the tool is really used. Likewise, the confirmation of the axiological and practical properties of things always has this relativity to the situation in which they are valuable and practically useful. This relativity is inherent in every act of judgment that has reference to a praxis and administers only to it. For such a judgment, therefore, the "again and again," which constitutes the sense of the judicative confirmation, must be understood with the limitation that it is relative to a situation of such and such a type. But even in this relativity, that which is the distinguishing characteristic of all cognitive intention, of all judicative objectification, remains: the fact that, beyond the *momentary* situation, we aspire to create a store of knowledge which is communicable and usable in the future; and this is no less true of our abstractive limitation to the domain of what, in each case, is one's own. To be sure, it is then a question of confirmations only for me, but, even in this case, of confirmations which lead to a store of knowledge—a store for me—and which are directed toward its acquisition.

3. Cf. below, § 50c.

§ 14. *The necessity of starting from analyses of external perception and the judgment of perception, and the delimitation of the investigation.*

IF WE HAVE SUCCEEDED in thus obtaining a view of the connection of logical activity with the flux of world-experience and of its function in this flux, it must now follow that we also see where we must begin, in order, by analytical investigation of detail, to track down the origin of predicative forms of judgment in prepredicative experience. Since we are looking for the most elementary act of judgment, that which founds all the rest, it must be that which is based on the most immediate and simplest experience. The simplest experience is that of the sensuous substrates, of the natural stratum of the whole concrete world. Thus we must orient ourselves on *the act of judgment which is based on external perception*, on the perception of bodies, in order to study in this exemplary case the structures of the predicative judgment in general and its construction on the basis of prepredicative activities.

The activity of judgment, which is based on sensuous perception, and explication, into which, for the most part, perception immediately blends, presuppose the prior satisfaction of a pure contemplative interest in the ultimate pregiven substrates which affect us: bodies. What is pursued first of all in the prepredicative sphere is thus the coherent realization of the interest inherent in perception. But this is not to say that in the context of concrete world-experience we must immediately arrive at such an interest. On the contrary, it is the passage from *aisthēsis*, from simple sensuous awareness, to acting, evaluating, and so forth, which is the rule; we apprehend things as enjoyable, useful, etc., before it can ever, for special reasons, be a matter of acceding to such a purely contemplative interest. The ego, living in its concrete environing world, given over to its practical ends, is in no way a subject which is contemplative above all. For the ego in its concrete life-world the contemplation of what exists is an attitude which can be assumed on occasion and in passing, as an attitude not having any special distinc-

tion. But subsequent philosophical reflection on the structure of the world of immediate experience, our life-world, reveals that contemplation is privileged to the extent that it reveals the structures of the world and has them as a theme. These structures also underlie all practical activity, although they do not usually become thematic. *The interest which is satisfied in contemplating and perceiving is the activation of the fundamental aisthēsis*, of the passive protodoxa, that fundamental stratum which underlies every act of experience in the concrete sense of the word. Thus external perception, and the contemplative, perceptive interest associated with it, has the privilege of grasping things in such a way that the tendency of the act of judgment toward confirmation can very quickly be fulfilled. So it is the objects of pure perception—simple, sensuously apprehensible substrates, natural things, things in their fundamental stratum as natural bodies—which as such are not relative and which, through all the relativities of our environmental dealings with the pregiven, maintain themselves as objectively stable identities and, in virtue of this, can be confirmed and judged.

Thus the act of perceiving and judging on the basis of perception is not only something invariant in all change and all relativity of environing worlds, but it is at the same time, as the coherent satisfaction of the interest of contemplation, in a modified form which includes the idealizations mentioned above, that attitude which underlies theoretical science and makes possible a confirmation with the goal of objectivity, of validity "once and for all" and "for everyone." Hence perceiving and judging on the basis of perception are the *modes of pre-predicative self-evidence on which the act of predicative judgment, as this is regarded by traditional logic*, is based. However, in its orientation on scientific determination and its tendency toward science and scientific theory, this logic has never brought into question the entwinement of cognitive behavior with the practical and the evaluative and has never investigated how a judgment is produced which does not serve purely cognitive interest in this way but rather serves the practical in the most general sense of the word; nor has it investigated how predicative self-evidence is built on *this* domain of the prepredicative, on practical evidence and the evidence of feeling. It is indisputable that these are original sources of the giving of existents themselves, of the disclosure of determinations which, by their nature, can take place only in practical activity itself and not



in mere contemplation. But it is precisely about these modes of giving a thing itself that we do not ask; we do not ask how it is possible to construct a judicative act of objectification *on them*; rather, we create the fiction that the ego, in a purely contemplative activity without any purpose or interest other than that of contemplation, turns immediately toward what exists as it is passively and affectively given to us. In other words, we create the fiction of a subject that behaves in a purely contemplative way and which is not aroused to any practical activity by the existent by which it is affected environmentally.

Nevertheless, the analysis of contemplative perception and of the predicative judgment constructed on it will also be of fundamental importance for further inquiry concerning the relation of this theoretical activity to practical and evaluative behavior. For the way in which the activity of predication in the strict sense of the term is built upon the activity of contemplative perception is entirely the same whether this contemplative, purely cognitive behavior is itself at the disposal of a practical action or whether it is a goal in itself; and it is also entirely the same whether, with respect to itself, it precedes or follows practical activity. The superposition of the predicative synthesis on the prepredicative is in both cases the same as regards its structure, except that, where it is a question of an active, practical behavior and of an act of judgment which refers to it and serves it, the structures which precede predicative activity are more complex in the prepredicative stratum, for it is no longer a matter of simple perception.

Thus the privilege accorded to perception has a further justification in its *greater simplicity*. It is indeed a methodological precept in such analyses to begin with the simpler and only then to ascend to the more complex. In this sphere of purely contemplative perception, the construction of the predicative judgment on prepredicative perceptive experience is the easiest to demonstrate; here we have objective self-evidence which, as prepredicative, can be made visible without further ado. Such is the self-evidence of contemplative perception and explication, which is founded in no other. The syntheses exhibited here attain by this the significance of *exemplary* syntheses. The complicated transition from practical behavior to the act of predication and their connection, as well as the nature of the syntheses which are then in question, will be the object of individual inquiries.

The analyses have the same motivation of greater simplicity and clarity when, in order to obtain an exemplary case of pre-predicative judicative-cognitive synthesis and the predicative synthesis based on it, they are oriented above all toward the perception of *static*, immobile objects and do not attempt to deal with either the perception of movement, which is much more difficult to analyze, or judgment concerned with moving things. The question of knowing what modifications would result if we did take account of the perception of movement, in which case a basic structure of synthesis and explication, as well as of the predicative synthesis constructed on it, could turn out to be all-pervasive, must remain unanswered here.

In the exemplary character of the investigations which follow, further justification is given for the fact that they limit themselves to the purely *categorical judgment*. It would be the task of further investigations to carry out a similar genetic derivation for the other forms of judgment as well. The theme of our investigation, accordingly, is the *categorical judgment which is based on perception*. And in this there is still another limitation: in perception, objects are given as really existing; the contrary is true in imagination. Imagination also has its own mode of givenness of objectivities; however, these are not real objects but quasi-objects in the mode of as-if. If we set reality and quasi-reality over against each other, as the domain of positionality on the one side and that of neutrality on the other, we see that, with the exclusion of the lived experiences of imagination, the limitation of our study to the sphere of positionality, i.e., to the sphere of consciousness which gives being intended as real, is also implied—at least to begin with. In later passages we must also take into consideration the lived experiences of imagination, as well as judgments based on imagination.

It hardly needs to be emphasized once more that such delimited analyses, by disregarding the copresence of others, will move in the domain of being-which-is-only-for-me and that in this domain there can be no mention of all the idealizations, of the garb of ideas which is thrown over the world of pure experience. Here we seek out the most original, the ultimately founding self-evidence, from which arises the act of predicative judgment. With this originality, however, it is in no way asserted that these investigations, set into the total structure of the phenomenological systematic of constitution, refer, in this

totality, to a completely elemental stratum. Although they may begin with the analyses of the perception of spatially individual objects, i.e., of things, the theme of these investigations is not, on that account, the constitution of perceptual things or, further, of an external world made up of spatial things. Rather, the structures of perception are taken into consideration only to the extent that it is necessary to understand how, on the basis of sensuous perceptive experience, logical operations, with their resulting logical formations, are established; how, on the basis of perception, categorial objects, circumstantial and general objectivities, are produced through logical spontaneity.

At the point at which our analyses begin, various constitutive strata and operations are therefore presupposed. In particular, it is presupposed that a *field* of spatial things is already constituted and, along with it, the entire layer of investigations which have reference to the constitution of the perception of things in all of its levels. These investigations concern the constitution of the formation of particular fields of sense, their combined action, the constitution of the particular domains of sensuality [*Sinnlichkeit*] which contribute to the perception of a fully concrete thing, the kinaesthesias, the relation to the body of the perceiving subject considered in its normal functioning, and so, by degrees, the constitution of the sensuous thing, first as static and then in its causal connection with other things. Equally presupposed with this is the constitution, already carried out, of things as temporal, as extended in time, and, from another aspect, the constitution of individual acts in which the spatiality of things is constituted in the internal consciousness of time. All these are dimensions of constitutive investigations which lie still deeper than those conducted here and which can only be alluded to at this time in order that the place which our investigations occupy in the total systematic of constitution will be clearly apparent.

## 1 / The General Structures of Receptivity

### § 15. *Transition to the analysis of external perception.*

IT IS IN THE ACTS of external perception, as the perception of individual spatial objects pertaining to the consciousness of the living present, that, in what follows, we will study as exemplary what the essence of the achievement of prepredicative experience is and how the predicative syntheses are built upon it. If in this sphere of perception, which constitutes indeed only part of the total sphere of doxic objectivating lived experiences, we are going to distinguish different structures, such as those of passive pregivenness and of the active orientation of the ego, of interest, of receptivity and spontaneity, then it is necessary to emphasize at the same time that such differences are not limited to the sphere of perception or even in general to the sphere of doxic lived experiences, but that these structures are to be found in all the other spheres of consciousness. Therefore, there is an original passivity not only of sensuous givens, of "sense data," but also of feeling and, in contrast to this passivity, there is an active, objectivating orientation, not only in perception, but also in evaluation and in pleasure. In these cases, too, there are *analogues* of self-evidence and, therefore, of perception as well, in the original giving of values, of ends, etc., in themselves.

The activity of perception, the perceptive orientation toward

particular objects, their contemplation and explication, is already an *active performance of the ego*. As such, it presupposes that something is already pregiven to us, which we can turn toward in perception. And it is not mere particular objects, isolated by themselves, which are thus pregiven but always a *field* of pregivenness, from which a particular stands out and, so to speak, "excites us" to perception and perceptive contemplation. We say that what excites us to perception is pregiven in our environing world and affects us on the basis of this world. But, in conformity with our introductory remarks, we will leave out of account here the fact that perception is always perception of objects of the world, and first of all of our environing world. For this implies that there is an objective existent that is not only something perceptible for me but also for others, for my fellow men. We only presuppose, within the limitation indicated above, that it is a field of prominences [*Abgehebenheiten*] for me, toward which my perception is oriented. The constitution of this field would itself be the theme of separate, very extensive analyses; within the framework of the present inquiry, however, a few brief indications must suffice.

#### § 16. *The field of passive data and its associative structure.*

LET US TAKE THE FIELD of passive data in its originality, which of course can be established only abstractly, i.e., by disregarding all the qualities of familiarity, of trustworthiness, according to which everything which affects us is already there for us on the basis of previous experiences. If we take this field as it is before the activity of the ego has as yet carried out any sense-giving operations whatever with regard to it, it is not as yet a field of objectivities in the true sense of the term. For, as has already been mentioned, an object is the product of an objectivating operation of the ego and, in the significant sense, of an operation of predicative judgment. But even so, this field is still not a pure chaos, a mere "swarm" of "data"; it is a field of determinate structure, one of prominences and articulated particularities. A *field of sense*—a field of sensuous data, optical, for example—is the simplest model

in which we can study this structure. Although a field of sense, an articulated unity of sensuous data—colors, for example—is not given immediately as an object in experience, for colors are always already “taken” in experience as colors of concrete things, as colored surfaces, “patches” on an object, etc., still an abstractive turning-of-regard is always possible, in which we make this apperceptive substratum itself into an object. This implies that the sensuous data brought into prominence by abstraction are themselves already unities of identity which appear in a multiform manner and which, as unities, can then themselves become thematic objects; the present sight of the color white in this particular light, etc., is not the color white itself. Thus, the sensuous data, on which we can always turn our regard as toward the abstract stratum of concrete things, are themselves also already the product of a constitutive synthesis, which, as the lowest level, presupposes the operations of the synthesis in internal time-consciousness. These operations, as belonging to the lowest level, necessarily link all others. Time-consciousness is the original seat of the constitution of the unity of identity in general. But it is a consciousness producing only a general form. The result of temporal constitution is only a universal form of order of succession and a form of co-existence of all immanent data.<sup>1</sup> But form is nothing without content. Thus the syntheses which produce the unity of a field of sense are already, so to speak, a higher level of constitutive activity.

Let us now consider a unitary field of sense as it is given in an immanent present and ask how in it, in general, consciousness of a particular thing raised into prominence is possible, and, further, what essential conditions must be fulfilled in order to bring about the consciousness of a multiplicity of like or similar things raised to prominence.

Every such field of sense is one that is unitary in itself, a *unity of homogeneity*. It stands in the relation of heterogeneity to every other field of sense. A particular element in the field is raised to prominence in such a way that it *contrasts* with something; for example, red patches against a white background. The red patches contrast with the white surface, but with one another they blend without contrast—certainly not in such a way that they flow over into one another but in a kind

1. On this, cf. below, § 38.

of blending at a distance, in which they can be made coincident with one another as being similar. To be sure, in every contrast there also remains something on the order of affinity and blending; the red patches and the white surface are originally related to each other as visual data. And this homogeneity is different from the heterogeneity of data of another kind, e.g., acoustical data. Thus *with regard to content the most general syntheses of sensuous data raised to prominence within a field*, data which at any given time are united in the living present of a consciousness, are those in conformity with *affinity (homogeneity)* and *strangeness (heterogeneity)*. To be sure, one can say that similarity between particular data establishes no real bond. But we are not speaking now of real qualities but of the way in which sense data are connected in immanence.

Affinity or similarity can have different degrees within the limits of the most perfect affinity, of likeness without difference. Wherever there is no perfect likeness, *contrast* goes hand in hand with similarity (affinity): the coming into prominence of the unlike from a basis of the common. If we pass from likeness to likeness, the new like presents itself as *repetition*. Its content comes into completely perfect coincidence with that of the first. This is what we refer to as *blending*. If we pass from the similar to the similar, a kind of coincidence also takes place, but it is only partial, being subject to the simultaneous opposition of the unlike. In this overlapping in conformity with similarity there is also something on the order of a blending, but relative only to the element which is like; there is no pure and perfect blending, as with complete likeness. What in a purely static description appears to be likeness or similarity must therefore be considered in itself as being already the product of the one or the other kind of synthesis of coincidence, which we denote by the traditional term *association*, but with a change of sense. It is the phenomenon of associative genesis which dominates this sphere of passive pre-givenness, established on the basis of syntheses of internal time-consciousness.

The term "association" denotes in this context a form belonging essentially to consciousness in general, a *form of the regularity of immanent genesis*. That association can become a general theme of phenomenological description and not merely one of objective psychology is due to the fact that the phenomenon of *indication* [Anzeige] is something which can be

exhibited from the point of view of phenomenology. (This insight, worked out as early as the *Logical Investigations*, already constitutes there the nucleus of genetic phenomenology.) Every interpretation of association and its laws which makes of it a kind of psychophysical natural law, attained by objective induction, must therefore be excluded here. Association comes into question in this context exclusively as the *purely immanent connection* of "this recalls that," "one calls attention to the other." We can catch sight of this phenomenon only in the concrete, where we have individual prominences, individual data, standing out from a field: the one recalls the other. And this relationship is itself capable of being shown phenomenologically. It presents itself in itself as a genesis; one of the elements is characterized relative to consciousness as that which evokes, the other as that which is evoked. To be sure, association is not always given at first hand in this way. There are also cases of mediate association, wherein the intermediate members are skipped over; it is thus an association in which the intermediate members and the immediate similarities which obtain among them do not explicitly come to consciousness. But *all immediate association is an association in accordance with similarity*. Such association is essentially possible only by virtue of similarities, differing in degree in each case, up to the limit of complete likeness.<sup>2</sup> Thus all original contrast also rests on association: the unlike comes to prominence on the basis of the common. Homogeneity and heterogeneity, therefore, are the result of two different and fundamental modes of associative unification. Another mode of unification, different from either of these, is the unification of the present and the not present. It is thus only by associative blending (homogeneous association) that a field of sense is a unity; likewise, its order and articulation, as well as all formation of groups and likenesses, are produced in the field by the effect of association: the similar is evoked by the similar, and it contrasts with the not similar. This can be shown, first of all, in the structure of a homogeneous field of sense, but it also holds in the same way for all data, even for the more complex. And what we designate as the perceptual field, as the field of passive givenness, toward which perceptive apprehension turns in order to grasp

2. On this point, see below, §§ 44 f.



from it a particular element as an object of perception, is already a "field"—to be sure, one having a much more complicated structure, being already constituted by a unifying synthesis and the concurrent action of several fields of sense.

§ 17. *Affection and the turning-toward of the ego.  
Receptivity as the lowest level of the  
activity of the ego.*

ALL PROMINENCES IN A FIELD, the articulation of the field according to likenesses and differences and the group-formation arising from it, the coming-to-prominence of particular members from a homogeneous background: all this is the product of associative syntheses of a manifold kind. But these are not simply passive occurrences in consciousness; rather, these syntheses of coincidence have their own affective power. We say, for example, of that which, in its nonsimilarity, stands out from a homogeneous background and comes to prominence that it "strikes" us, and this means that it displays an *affective tendency* toward the ego. The syntheses of coincidence, whether it is a matter of coincidence in undifferentiated blending or of coincidence together with the opposition of the unlike, have their own affective power; they exert a stimulus on the ego which makes it turn toward, whether it obeys the stimulus or not. If there is an apprehension of a sensuous datum in the field, this always takes place on the basis of such a prominence. Through its intensity, the datum stands out from a multiplicity of coaffecting data. This occurs, for example, when, in the sensuous sphere, there is a sound, a noise, or a color which is more or less obtrusive. These lie in the field of perception and stand out from it and, although not yet apprehended, exercise on the ego a stimulus more or less powerful or weak, as the case may be. In the same way, a thought which suddenly emerges can be obtrusive, or a wish, a desire, can get through to us from the background with insistence. The insistence is determined by the mode, more or less abrupt, of coming-to-prominence; in the sensuous sphere it is determined by contrasts, qualitative discontinuities of considerable degree, and

the like. In the domain of nonsensuous data there is, to be sure, no question of qualitative discontinuities of this kind; still, there is something analogous here also: among the different obscure movements of thought which stir us, one thought, for example, stands out from all the rest and has a sensitive effect on the ego, as it, so to speak, forces itself against the ego.

We must now distinguish those discontinuities (in the sensuous sphere, above all, qualitative or intensive discontinuities) which "give rise to" an obtrusion, as well as everything which, in an analogous way, is otherwise a *condition of the obtrusion*, from *the obtrusion itself*. There are degrees of obtrusiveness, and thus what is obtrusive comes more or less close to the ego: it obtrudes on *me*. Therefore, we distinguish between *that which obtrudes* and *the ego on which it obtrudes*. In proportion to the intensity of the obtrusiveness, what is obtrusive has greater proximity to, or remoteness from, the ego. These differences in obtrusiveness, and in the corresponding stimuli for the ego, we can very easily verify in the conscious field by a retrospective glance—these are data which phenomenology is able to exhibit—just as we are able to establish the connection of this gradation with other moments, such as the continuity of coming-into-prominence, intensity, and all other more mediate moments pertaining to the sphere of association, understood in the broadest sense.

If *the ego yields to the stimulus*, a new element enters. The stimulus exercised by the intentional object<sup>1</sup> in its directedness toward the ego attracts the latter more or less forcefully, and the ego yields to it. A graduated tendency links the phenomena, a tendency of the intentional object to pass from a position in the *background of the ego* to one *confronting the ego*. This is a transformation which, correlatively, is a transformation of the entire intentional background-experience [*Hintergrunderlebnis*] into one of the foreground: the ego turns toward the object. This turning-toward is itself first an intermediate process: the turning ends with the ego being next to the object and apprehending it by contact. With this yielding of the ego a new

1. It is once again necessary to remind ourselves that, when one speaks here of an object [*von einem Objekt, einem Gegenstand*], the term is not being used properly. For, as we have already pointed out several times, one cannot yet speak at all of objects in the true sense in the sphere of original passivity. Cf. also above, pp. 62 f.

tendency makes its appearance: a tendency coming from the ego and directed toward the object. We must, therefore, distinguish:

1. The tendency which precedes the *cogito*, the tendency as stimulus of the intentional background-experience and its differing degrees of strength. The stronger this "affection," the stronger the tendency to give way to it, to bring about the apprehension. As already mentioned, this tendency has its two sides:

a) *The obtrusion on the ego*, the attraction which the given exerts on the ego.

b) From the side of ego, the *tendency to give way*, the being-attracted, the being-affected, of the ego itself.

From these tendencies antecedent to the *cogito* can be distinguished:

2. The turning-toward as compliance with the tendency, in other words, the transformation of the character of the tendency of the intentional background-experience in which the *cogito* becomes active. The ego is now turned toward the object; it has of itself a tendency directed toward the object. Thus, generally speaking, every *cogito*, every specific ego-act, is a striving, accomplished by, and arising from, the ego and capable of being worked out in various ways. It can be impeded or not impeded, worked out completely or less completely. We will soon have to speak about all this in greater detail.

The tensional strength of this tendency also has different degrees. The ego can be already attracted more or less actively by an object which affects it, and the increase in intensity can take place at a varying tempo; a sudden heightening is also possible. Accordingly, the nature and tempo of what follows can have analogous differences without these differences being determined by the first alone. The ego need not give way entirely to a strong stimulus; it can admit it according to varying degrees of intensity. To be sure, the heightening of the affective power is necessarily determined by certain alterations of the mode of perceptive givenness of the object, as, for example, that of the whistle of a locomotive which passes in front of us; but such a mode of givenness need not by itself bring about a turning-toward of the ego. One need not pay attention to a powerful stimulus if one is engaged in conversation with an "important" person. And even where a man is momentarily overcome, this can be merely a secondary, marginal turning-toward

or only a being carried away and diverted momentarily, which does not involve "careful" attention.

The accomplishment of the turning-toward is what we call *the being-awake of the ego*. More precisely, it is necessary to distinguish being-awake as the factual accomplishment of an act from being-awake as potentiality, as the state of being-able-to-accomplish an act, a state which constitutes the presupposition of the actual accomplishment of the act. To be awake is to direct one's regard to something. To be awakened means to submit to an effective affection. A background becomes "alive"; intentional objects from this background draw more or less close to the ego; this or that attracts the ego powerfully to itself. The ego is close to an object when it turns toward it.

Insofar as in this turning-toward the ego receives what is pre-given to it through the affecting stimuli, we can speak here of the *receptivity of the ego*.

This phenomenologically necessary concept of receptivity is in no way exclusively opposed to that of the *activity of the ego*, under which all acts proceeding in a specific way from the ego-pole are to be included. On the contrary, receptivity must be regarded as the lowest level of activity. The ego consents to what is coming and takes it in. Thus under the term "perception," for example, we distinguish, on the one hand, the simple having-in-consciousness of the original appearances (those which present objects in their original embodiment), in which an entire field of perception is set before us—already in pure passivity—and, on the other hand, active perception, the active *apprehension* of objects which come to prominence within a field of perception which extends beyond them. We might have a field of recollection in the same way, and indeed can have it in pure passivity. But again, the simple appearing of a memory is not yet the active apprehension characteristic of recollection which is concerned with what appears (that which "strikes us"). Obviously, the *normal concept of experience* (perception, recollection, etc.) means *active experience*, which then operates as explicative (cf. Chapter 2).

§ 18. *Attention as a tendency of the ego.*

IN WHAT SPECIALLY CONCERNS the domain of objectivating lived experiences, of doxic lived experiences, in which "existents" are present to consciousness, if only in the background, it is, in general, the corresponding *doxic turning-toward* which psychologists usually have in mind as *attention*. However, whoever, completely abandoned to the beauty of a picture, lives in the pleasure taken in it and not in the belief in existence, in the intention directed toward what exists, and likewise, whoever, in the realization of a practical activity, lives entirely in its deliberate accomplishment, is also ordinarily called "attentive," i.e., attentive to beauty or to the activity of his work in its different stages up to the final completion. Indeed, the two pass into each other in many different ways: the apprehension of existence in belief in existence (or the explication of existence, the explication of what exists in the way it exists) and, on the other hand, evaluative activity or practical activity blend into each other. It is thus, for example, that a doxic activity founds a manual one and that a subsequent doxic ascertainment of a state of completion, or of a completed work, is bound up with the practical act of putting to one side for future use. It is also clear that every nondoxic turning-toward and continuing occupation with something leaves the possibility open for a change of attitude into a doxic one, which apprehends as existent the produced formations which result from the preceding attitude and explicates them actively as such.

In general, *attention* is a *tending of the ego toward an intentional object*, toward a unity which "appears" continually in the change of the modes of its givenness and which belongs to the essential structure of a specific act of the ego (an ego-act in the pregnant sense of the word); it is a tending-toward in realization. The realization which is brought into being with the turning-toward, the starting point of the realization of the act, is the beginning of a continuing realizing directedness of the ego toward the object. The beginning indicates the direction of a further synthetically unified process of realization (although it can perhaps be carried out in more than one way). The original tendency of the process, along with what has accrued

to it from what has been realized hitherto, is fulfilled phase by phase, and it is at the same time extended as a tendency and exhibits new stages of fulfillment. This continues, up to an "end" or breakoff point, which may have the form of "and so forth." The beginning, therefore, has an intentional horizon; it points beyond itself in an empty mode, which is filled only in subsequent realizations. It refers implicitly to a continuous synthetic process (one or another of the directions to be followed possibly remaining indeterminate in the multidimensionality of possible processes), throughout which extends a continuous uniform tendency. In its course, it has continuously modified modes of fulfillment, each with the character of mediate fulfillment, which always refer, due to the nature of horizon, to new fulfillments.

This essential difference in the mode of the tendency involved belongs to all intentional lived experiences, namely, that the ego either actively lives "in" the experience, directed in it toward the intentional objectivity and occupied with this, or it does not. In the former case, there emanates from the lived experience—in this case, from the background-experience—or from the intentional object to be found therein, an awakening attraction on the ego, a stimulus going to it (if the ego is already aroused and otherwise occupied) with a variable affective force.

§ 19. *The tendency of the ego in experience  
as "interest" in what is experienced,  
and its actualization in the "doings" of the ego.*

DOXIC ACTS, acts directed toward what exists (perhaps modalized in possible existence, supposed existence, non-existence) form a particular case of lived experiences of attention, of ego-acts in the course of realization; included in this totality are intuitive experiences in their various modes of intentional mediacy and, finally, self-evident experiences which give the existent itself (to speak with complete precision: doxic experiences, since experience and intuition can likewise be taken so generally as to include every kind of act or object).

If, in what follows, we speak of attention—in particular, of perception and remembrance—it is always doxic acts which we have in mind.

As has already been said in a general way, here also it is true that the inception of an act of turning-toward, of paying attention to what exists, puts into play an activity with a tendency, a striving. It is a striving toward realization, a doing which includes different forms of discontinuance and completion. The beginning of an act of perception with its turning-toward is, to be sure, already a consciousness of being next to the object itself—perception is certainly a consciousness of the apprehension of the object in its living, so to speak, present. But the tendency which emanates from the ego is not yet brought to its completion with the inception of the turning-toward. It is, to be sure, directed toward the object, but at first it merely has the object in view. We can say that with this tendency is awakened an *interest* in the object of perception as existent. We are continuously *directed* toward the object itself; we execute the uninterrupted consciousness of experiencing it. The consciousness of its existence is here a belief in act; by virtue of the accord in which the perceptive appearances flow off in original presentation, retention, and protention, an accord of continuous self-affirmation, belief is continuous certainty of belief, which has its certainty in this originality of the object in its living being-present. But in this firm orientation on the object, in the continuity of the experience of the object, there is an intention which goes beyond the given and its momentary mode of givenness and tends toward a progressive *plus ultra*. It is not only a progressive having-consciousness-of but a striving toward a new consciousness in the form of an interest in the enrichment of the “self” of the object which is forthcoming *eo ipso* with the prolongation of the apprehension. Thus the tendency of the turning-toward continues as a tendency toward complete fulfillment.

The affecting object first of all attracts the regard of the ego to itself in an undivided unity. But this unity at once divides into its constitutive moments; they begin to stand out; while one is at the center of regard, the others, as belonging to the object, are thematically related in the intentional unity of this object and as such exert their attraction. In the same way, with everything actually given, *horizons* are awakened; thus, if I see the front of a motionless thing-like object, I am conscious, within

the horizon, of the back of the object, which I do not see. The tendency which aims at the object then is directed toward making it equally accessible from the other side. It is only with this enrichment of the given, with the penetration into particularities and the being given "from all sides," that the tendency passes from the initial mode of aiming at something into the mode of attainment, a mode which has its own different degrees: imperfect attainments, partial, with components of unfulfilled aim.

The tendency is thus actualized in a manifold "doing" of the ego. Its aim is to convert the appearance (figuration) which the ego has of the external object into other and again other "appearances of the same object." It moves in the closed manifold of "possible appearances." It constantly strives for new alterations of appearance in order to bring the object to givenness from all sides. The tendency is thus directed toward the one identical object which "presents itself" in all of the appearances, toward the same object from that side and from this, from nearer and farther. However, the tendency also aims at transforming this something in the how of one mode of appearance to the same something in the how of other modes of appearance. It aims at the "production" of ever new modes of appearance, which we can also call "images"—a concept of image which naturally has nothing to do with illustration but one which is thoroughly customary in current speech: thus, when we speak of the image which a person has of a thing, what is meant by this is precisely the way we see it, how it presents itself to us.

In this sense, every object of external perception is given in an "image," and the object is constituted in the synthetic passage from image to image, by means of which the images, as images (appearances) of the same object, come to have synthetic coincidence. Every perception which presents the object to me in this orientation leaves open the practical transition to other appearances of the same object, specifically to certain groups of appearances. The possibilities of transition are *practical* possibilities, at least when it is a question of an object which is given as enduring without change. There is thus a freedom to run through<sup>1</sup> the appearances in such a way that I

1. ["Run through" is an inescapable, though awkward, literal rendering of the frequently used term *durchlaufen* (and its noun



move my eyes, my head, alter the posture of my body, go around the object, direct my regard toward it, and so on. We call these movements, which belong to the essence of perception and serve to bring the object of perception to givenness from all sides insofar as possible, *kinaestheses*. They are consequences of perceptive tendencies, "activities" in a certain sense, although not voluntary actions. In doing all this, I do not (in general) carry out voluntary acts. I move my eyes, etc., involuntarily, without "thinking about my eyes." The *kinaestheses* involved have the character of an *active, subjective process*; hand in hand with them and motivated by them goes a sequence of visual or tactile changing "images," which "belong" to them, while the object is still "given" to me in an inactive duration or alteration. My relation to the object is on the one hand receptive and on the other hand definitely productive. The coming-into-view of the images is "in my power"; I can also cause the series to break off, e.g., I can close my eyes. But what is not in my power, *if* I allow the *kinaestheses* to run their course, is having another image come into view. With regard to this, I am purely receptive; if I put these or those *kinaestheses* into play vis-à-vis the object, these or those images will come into view. This holds for rest as well as for movement, for alteration as well as for nonalteration.

Thus, beginning with the first turning-toward of the ego, perception is animated by *perceptive tendencies*, tendencies of the continued overflowing of apperceptions into apperceptions, tendencies to run through multiplicities of *kinaestheses* and in this way to set in motion a flow of "images." I am then always focused on what appears and presents itself in the images, particularly on this one or that of its moments, forms, etc. This play of tendencies, the process of motivating *kinaestheses* regulated by them, is part of the essential nature of external perception. These are all active processes, processes of tendencies, in the course of which the latter discharge themselves.

In the preceding description it was presupposed that the tendencies of perception are worked out after the first turning-toward and that this actualization continues further in the light of this turning-toward. But also, the objects of my visual field, for example, can exert their stimulus and develop tenden-

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form, translated as "the running-through"). What is meant is something analogous to the process of going through one's notes or memory, "running through" the details one by one.—Trans.]

cies to which I give way with eye movements but without my being turned toward them attentively. These apperceptive processes are possible as active processes without the turning-toward of the ego. On the other hand, the turning-toward, i.e., the realization of apperceptions in the turning-toward of the ego, in the form of "I perceive," first brings it about that the object is *my* object, the object of my contemplation, and that the contemplation itself, the running-through of the kinaestheses, the motivated allowing-to-flow of the appearances, is *mine*, my contemplation of the objective through its images. The ego lives in the *cogito*, and this gives to all the content of the *cogito* its distinct ego-relation. The turning-toward itself is characterized by an "I do"; and the wandering of the rays of attentive regard, of regard in the mode of turning-toward, is likewise an "I do." The following, therefore, can be distinguished:

1. A doing which is not an "I do," *a doing which precedes the turning-toward*.
2. The *I do* which, as has already been mentioned, need not also include in itself any voluntary action: I move my eyes involuntarily while I am turned attentively toward the object.

## § 20. *The narrower and the broader concept of interest.*

WE HAVE ALSO SPOKEN of an *interest* which may be awakened along with turning-toward an object. It now appears that this interest still has nothing to do with a specific act of will. It is not an interest which engenders anything on the order of plans and voluntary activities. It is merely a *moment of the striving* which belongs to the essence of normal perception. The reason that we speak of interest here is that a *feeling* goes hand in hand with this striving, indeed a positive feeling, which, however, is not to be confused with a pleasure taken in the object. To be sure, it can also be that the object itself touches our feelings, that it has value for us, and that for this reason we turn to it and linger over it. But it can just as well be that it is disvaluable and awakens our interest just because of its abhorrent qualities. Thus the feeling which belongs to interest has an entirely peculiar direction. In either case—whether the

object motivates our turning-toward by the value or by the disvalue we sense in it—as soon as we apprehend it, its sense content is necessarily enriched, partly by its simple intuitive duration in the perception, partly by the awakening of its obscure horizons which follows, horizons which are related to possibilities and expectations of ever new enrichments. Linked with this is a specific feeling of satisfaction in this enrichment and, in relation to this horizon of expanding and heightening enrichment, a striving “to come ever closer” to the object, to take possession of its “self” ever more completely. On a higher level, this striving can also take the form of a true act of will, a *will to knowledge*, with deliberate positing of goals, etc. But this is not yet in question here, where we find ourselves in the sphere of simple perception and of the searching contemplation connected with it.

Another, broader concept of interest must be distinguished from that developed here. This striving to enter into the object, and the satisfaction in the enrichment of its self, is forthcoming, not if I am merely turned toward the object in a general way, but only if I am turned toward it as a *theme*, in the specific sense of the term. *A theme in this pregnant sense and the object of the turning-toward of the ego do not always coincide.* I can be engaged thematically with something, e.g., some scientific labor, and be disturbed by a noise from the street. The noise breaks in on me, and I turn toward it for a moment. Nevertheless, my previous theme has not been abandoned because of this but only sinks into the background for this moment. It still remains my theme, to which I return immediately, as soon as the disturbance is over. With regard to this, we can form a *broadier concept of interest*, or of acts of interest. Among such acts are to be understood not only those in which I am turned thematically toward an object, perceiving it, perhaps, and then examining it thoroughly, but in general every act of turning-toward of the ego, whether transitory or continuous, every act of the ego's being-with (*inter-esse*).

§ 21. *The obstruction of tendencies and the origin of the modalizations of certainty.*

LET US RETURN NOW to the subject of interest in the primary and proper sense of the term. Concrete perception is achieved in the working-out of its progressive striving, its tendency to attain new modes of givenness of the same object. These tendencies can work out in an *obstructed or unobstructed way*.

This implies the following: the tendencies are not mere blind strivings toward ever new modes of givenness of the object but go hand in hand with *intentions of anticipation*, with pre-intentional anticipations which refer to what will attain givenness in the further course of perceptive contemplation of the object; for example, anticipations regarding the back side of the object, which has not yet been seen. Every phase of perception is thus a radiating system of actual and potential intentions of anticipation. In the case of normal perception, when the continuous procession [*Ablauf*] of the phases is not obstructed, i.e., in what is ordinarily called perception pure and simple, there is a continuous process of actualizing stimulation and then a progressive fulfillment of expectations, a fulfillment which is at the same time always an ever more precise determination of the object. The *satisfaction of interest*, the fulfillment of tendencies in the progressive striving from one phase of perception to the next, from one mode of givenness of the object to the next, also constitutes fulfillment of the intentions of anticipation. Such is the normal case in the unobstructed procession of intentions; the object then stands before us in a simple certainty of belief as existing and as being such and such.

The opposite case is that in which the tendencies are obstructed. We then remain, for example, with *one* image of the object. The object does not come to be given from all sides but only "from this side." Then, the act of perception is interrupted, whether because the object has now disappeared from the field of perception or because it is hidden by another, which has slipped in front of it, or again because, though it always remains before our eyes and is still perceptible, another, stronger interest

asserts itself, giving rise to another thematic preoccupation, and the interest in the object is supplanted, without the tendencies inherent in it being completely worked out and fulfilled. The interest thus remains more or less unsatisfied.

a. The origin of negation.

But there is still another way in which obstructions can intervene in the process of fulfillment of tendencies: the interest taken in the perceived object can persist. The object continues to be examined; it continues to be given in such a way that it can be further examined. However, instead of the fulfillment of the intentions of anticipation, a *disappointment* enters in. For example, suppose that we have observed a ball uniformly red; for a time the course of the perception continues in such a way that this apprehension is harmoniously fulfilled. But now, in the progress of the perception, a part of the back side, not seen at first, is gradually revealed; and, in opposition to the original prescription, which ran "uniformly red, uniformly spherical," there emerges a consciousness of otherness which disappoints the anticipation: "not red, but green," "not spherical, but dented." But here, so that in all events the unity of an intentional process can still be maintained, a certain measure of continuous fulfillment is presupposed. Correlatively, a certain unity of objective sense must be upheld throughout the flux of successive appearances. It is only in this way that we have, in the process of a lived experience and its appearances, the unanimity of *one* consciousness, one unified intentionality spreading over all phases: here, the unity of the perceptive consciousness of this object, and the unity of the tendency, the orientation toward the contemplation of this object. A uniform framework of sense thus maintains itself in successive fulfillment; only a *part* of the intention which prescribes the pattern of anticipation—in our example, that pertaining to the respective surface of the ball—is concerned, and the corresponding part of the objective sense (of the object supposed as such) acquires the character "not so, but otherwise." In this way a *conflict* arises between the still living intentions and the content of sense which appears in the originality which has just been established. But there is not only conflict: the newly constituted objective sense in its vivacity throws its opponent, as

it were, out of the saddle, for it blankets the latter, which was merely anticipated in advance in an empty way, with its living plenitude and so overpowers it. The new objective sense "green" in its power of impressional fulfillment has a certitude of original power which overcomes the certitude of the prior anticipation of "being red." But the certitude which has been overcome is still present to consciousness, although with the character of the "null." On the other hand, the "green" conforms to the rest of the framework of sense. "Being green and dented," which makes its appearance in the new phase of perception, as well as the total aspect of the thing from the side in question, continues the preceding series of appearances, which is still present to consciousness in retention, in conformity with the sense of a harmonious series.

To be sure, there results from this a certain *doubling in the total sense-content of the perception*: just as the anticipated "new" and "other" blankets the protentionally prescribed sense "red and spherical" in the earlier train of perceptions and nullifies it, the like also takes place *retroactively* in the totality of the preceding series. That is, the sense of the perception is not only changed in the momentary new stretch of perception; the noematic modification streams back in the form of a retroactive cancellation in the retentional sphere and modifies the production of sense stemming from earlier phases of the perception. The earlier apperception, which was attuned to the harmonious development of the "red and uniformly round," is implicitly "reinterpreted" to "green on one side and dented." This implies essentially that if we would make intuitive in an explicit recollection the retentional complexes, that is, the series of appearances which are still fresh to consciousness but have become completely obscure, we would find in all of its horizons, in conformity with memory, not only the old prescription with its old structure of anticipation and fulfillment as it was then originally motivated, but also, built up over it, the appropriately modified prescription, which now refers in its totality to "green and dented," and this in such a way that the moments of the old prescription which are in conflict with it are characterized as null. But insofar as these moments of sense are only moments of one uniform and tightly organized, unified sense, the entire sense of the series of appearances is modally altered and at the same time doubled. For the old sense is still present to

consciousness, but it is overlaid by the new and is canceled out in the corresponding moments.<sup>1</sup>

Thus is described the *original phenomenon of negation*, of the "other," of nullification or "annulment" [*Aufhebung*]. What holds in the analysis of the example of external perception holds in an analogous manner for every other intending, object-positing consciousness (positional consciousness) and for its objectivities. It thus appears that *negation is not first the business of the act of predicative judgment but that in its original form it already appears in the prepredicative sphere of receptive experience*. Whatever kinds of objectivities are in question, the superposition of a new sense on one already constituted is always essential for negation, along with the displacement of the first by the second; likewise essential, from a noetic point of view, is the formation of a second apprehension, which is not merely *adjacent* to the first, which has been displaced, but is superimposed on it and in conflict with it. Belief struggles with belief: the belief in one content of sense and mode of intuition struggles with the belief in another content of sense, taken in its mode of intuition.

In our example, the conflict consists in the peculiar "annulment" of an anticipating intention, i.e., of an expectation by a new impression; "disappointment" is another expression for this same phenomenon. In fact, this annulment concerns only a limited component, whereas for the remainder the unanimity of fulfillment continues to be maintained. What is immediately affected by the annulment, what primarily sustains the character of the "not," is the objective moment "red" and its anticipated "existence." It is only in consequence of this that the thing itself as the substrate of the alleged red is canceled in belief: the thing "meant" as being red all over is not; on the contrary, this same thing is green in this area and that. Following the change which the originally simple and normal perception has sustained because of the cancellation, we again have a perception which resembles normal perception to the extent that the change of sense which goes hand in hand with

1. [*Moment*, translated as "moment" (sometimes also as "feature"), has a much wider meaning in this text than in standard English. It designates any aspect of an object which is in question or under analysis, and so it usually does not at all refer to a temporal moment, though such a moment is also expressed in German by *Moment*.—Trans.]

the cancellation produces a perception having a sense which is uniform and completely harmonious, a perception in which we find the continuous fulfillment of intentions: with the substitution "green and dented," everything is again in agreement. But there is a difference with regard to the past in that for consciousness the system of the old perceptive apprehension also remains retentionally preserved and is partially interfused with the new. This old apprehension is still present to consciousness, but in the character of the annulled. One can also say that the old sense is declared invalid and that another is substituted for it as valid. These are only other expressions for negation and the substitution of a new fulfilling sense for the one intended.

It follows, therefore:

1. In its originality, negation presupposes normal, original object-constitution, which we designate as normal perception: the normal, unobstructed execution of perceptual interest. It must be present in order to be able to be modified in its originality. *Negation is a modification of consciousness which manifests itself as such in accordance with its own essence.* It is always a partial cancellation on the basis of a certitude of belief which is thereby maintained, ultimately, on the basis of the universal belief in the world.

2. The original constitution of an object of perception is realized in intentions (in the case of external perception, in apperceptive apprehensions) which, in conformity with their essence, can always undergo a modification by the disappointment of protentional anticipations of belief. This modification takes place in unity with the superposition, occurring essentially in such a case, of intentions directed against one another.

#### b. Consciousness of doubt and possibility.

However, it is not only the original phenomenon of negation which is already to be found in the prepredicative sphere; the so-called *modalities* of judgment, which constitute a central element of traditional formal logic, also have their origin and their foundation in the occurrences of prepredicative experience. Nor need a radical interruption of the normal course of perception, a radical disappointment of one of the intentions of anticipation which belong to it, always be involved. In place of simple cancellation, we can also have a mere becoming-doubtful,



in which case a perceptual apprehension, which up to now has been held to be simply true, is not immediately canceled. *Doubt represents a mode of transition to a negating annulment*, which, however, can also appear as an enduring state. For example, perhaps we see a figure standing in a store window, something which at first we take to be a real man, perhaps an employee working there. Then, however, we become hesitant and ask ourselves whether it is not just a mere mannequin. With closer observation, the doubt can be resolved in favor of one side or the other, but there can also be a period of hesitation during which there is doubt whether it is a man or a mannequin. In this way, two perceptual apprehensions overlap; the one continues within the normally developing perception with which we began; for a period we see a man there in a way which is consistent and undisputed, like other things in our environment. These are normal intentions, partly fulfilled, partly unfulfilled—being fulfilled normally in the continuous sequence of perceptual processes, without any conflict, without any interruption. But what occurs afterward is not a radical break in the form of a decisive disappointment, thus not a conflict of an anticipatory intention with a newly emerging perceptual appearance, resulting in the cancellation of the first. Rather, the full concrete content in the actual appearance now obtains all at once a second content, which slips over it: the visual appearance, the spatial form imbued with color, was until now provided with a halo of anticipatory intentions which gave the sense “human body” and, in general, “man”; now there is superposed on it the sense “clothed mannequin.” Nothing has changed regarding what is really seen; indeed, there is even more in common: commonly perceived on both sides are clothing, hair, and the like, but, on the one hand, flesh and blood and, on the other, probably painted wood. One and the same complex of sense data is the common foundation of two apprehensions superimposed on each other. Neither of the two is canceled out during the period of the doubt. They stand in mutual conflict; each one has in a certain way its own force, each is motivated, almost summoned, by the preceding perceptual situation and its intentional content. But demand is opposed to demand; one challenges the other, and vice versa. In doubt, there remains an undecided conflict. Since the empty horizons constitute objectivity only in unity with the common intuitive core, we accordingly have,

as it were, a *bifurcation of the original normal perception*, which in unanimity constituted only *one* sense, into a *double perception*. They are two perceptions, interpenetrating each other by virtue of the content of their common core. And yet not really two, for their conflict also implies a certain reciprocal displacement. If the one apprehension takes possession of the common intuitive core, if it is actualized, then we see, for example, a man. But the second apprehension, oriented toward the mannequin, does not become nothing; it is suppressed, forced into the background, deprived of its power. Then, perhaps, the apprehension "mannequin" suddenly obtrudes; we see a mannequin, and it is the apprehension "man" which is put out of action, suppressed.

The doubling is therefore not really a doubling of [distinct] perceptions, although the fundamental character of perception, the consciousness of a living presence [*Leibhaftigkeitsbewusstsein*], is found in both cases. If the perception of the man suddenly changes into that of the mannequin, then first there is the man in living presence, and next the mannequin. But in truth, neither one is there in the same way that the man was before the onset of the doubt. In all evidence, the mode of consciousness is changed, although the objective sense and its manner of appearance has the mode of living presence, after as well as before. Nevertheless, the mode of belief and, in consequence, the mode of being are essentially changed; the way in which what appears is present to consciousness has become other. Instead of being present to consciousness as simply there, as in normal perception, which runs its course unambiguously and at the same time harmoniously, it is now present to consciousness as questionable, doubtful, disputable: disputed by another appearance, which is given in person [*Leibhaft*] in another phase of perception, both interpenetrating in conflict.

One can also express this as follows: the consciousness which presents its object originally and in person not only has the *mode of living presence*, which differentiates it from both presentifying and empty consciousness, each of which gives the same objective sense, although not in a living presence; it also has a variable *mode of being or validity*. Normal original consciousness has the *primal mode of being existent*, of being simply valid: such is naïve certainty pure and simple. The ob-

ject which appears is there in indisputable and unbroken certainty. The undisputed<sup>2</sup> refers to possible matters of dispute or even to outright breaks, precisely to such as we have just described, where, because of the split, an alteration of the mode of validity takes place. In doubt, the two mutually conflicting elements given in living presence have the same mode of validity, namely, that of the "questionable"; and what is questionable is exactly what is in dispute, disputed by another.

However, all this is true not only for the momentary perceptual situation in its now-phase, but, just as in negation, the conflict reacts essentially on the phases already elapsed. In these phases, too, the univocal consciousness disintegrates into an equivocal consciousness, i.e., the fact of being split, with its apperceptive overlapping, is continued in retentional consciousness. If we then explicitly realize the presentification of the perceptual field which precedes the doubt, it is now no longer present like an ordinary recollection in its univocality but has taken on the same doubling. Throughout, the apperception of the mannequin is superimposed on that of the man, and the like is true of recollection. By means of a regressive ray back into retention, and thereby into the explicit recollection, a modalization likewise takes place in it. Naturally, by this we have in view only stretches of the past duration of the same object, which still actually endures as present in person. While normal remembrance, in that it is the reproduction of a normal perception, makes us conscious of what is reproduced in the normal mode of validity of the certain, i.e., the certainly existing, the remembrance that is affected by the split presents, by means of this regressive ray, the modified mode of validity we term "questionable": what is in question is whether it was this or that, whether it was a man or a mannequin.

In this case of becoming-doubtful, as in the case of negation, there is also *obstruction* in the process of the fulfillment of the tendencies of perceptual interest. This, of course, does not amount to an obstruction of the perceptual tendencies in the form of a flat disappointment, as in the case of negation, but still there is not a harmonious satisfaction and fulfillment of the anticipatory intentions belonging to the act of perception. Their procession, and the satisfaction of interest it provides, is

2. [Reading *Das Unbestrittene* in place of *Das Unbestritten*.—Trans.]

obstructed, so that the ego, in giving way to the inclination of the affections, does not come to absolute certainty, or to the cancellation of certainty, but is, so to speak, drawn this way and that between *inclinations of belief*, and, in the case of doubt, is unable to decide in favor of one. The ego vacillates between the apprehensions: man or mannequin. The expectant anticipatory intentions belonging to the perception do not give a univocal prescription but only an ambiguous one. This leads to a conflict of consciousness, with inclinations to believe either of the two sides. That is, as the ego at first actualizes the motivations tending toward one side, toward the apprehension "man," it follows the harmonious demand which goes toward this side. Since the ego, as it were, devotes itself exclusively to this side, and since that which speaks for the other side—"mannequin"—remains out of action, the ego experiences a power of attraction, an inclination to turn toward this side in certainty. But the opposite intentions are also actualized in the same way.

Thus the normal ego-act of perception is modalized with its simple certainty of belief in the acts which we call *presumptions of belief*. With regard to the noematic side, that of objects present to consciousness, we also speak of the *presumption of being*. This implies that the affection goes out from the object so that the ego *presumes* it, as well as its adversary, to exist, and to exist in a particular way. This presumed existence we also term *possible* (considered independently of its relation to the ego); it is in this conflict of inclinations of belief, correlatively of presumptions of being, that a *concept of possibility* has its origin. *Being-possible, possibility, is thus a phenomenon which, like negation, already appears in the prepredicative sphere* and is most originally at home there. In this case, these are *problematical possibilities* which are in conflict with one another. We can also call them *questionable possibilities*. For the intention, born in the doubt and concerned with a decision in favor of one of the two elements successively presumed in the doubt, is called a *questioning intention*. It is only where presumptions and counterpresumptions are in play, *for* and *against* which something speaks, that one can speak of *questionableness*. But the most exact expression for this kind of possibility is *presumptive possibility*.

It is only in this case of possibilities for which something speaks that we can also use the term *probability*: depending on

the total perceptual situation, the inclination to believe, and in consequence the presumption of being, can be stronger for one of the two sides and weaker for the other: "It is probable that it is a man." There is more on the side of the possibility that it is a man. Probability thus refers to the *weight which belongs to the presumptions of being*. The presumed is more or less presumed, and this is also true in the comparison of all problematic possibilities, no matter how multifarious, which belong to the same conflict and are synthetically linked together by it: for even conflict, the splitting of consciousness by alternating inhibitions, creates a unity; noematically it is the unity of opposites, of possibilities bound to one another by just this.

### c. Problematic possibility and open possibility.

The specific nature of problematic possibility, which arises from the situation of doubt, will present itself still more clearly if we contrast it with another kind of possibility which we designate as *open possibility*, whose appearance is also grounded in the structure of the process of perception but of that process which proceeds unbroken and unobstructed. To be sure, what is intentionally prescribed in the apperceptive horizon of a perception is not possible but certain. And yet possibilities are always included in such prescriptions, in fact, whole series of multifarious possibilities. In the perception of a thing from the front, the prescription given for the side not seen has the character of indeterminate generality. This generality is a noetic characteristic of consciousness which prescribes in an empty manner, and, correlatively, it is a characteristic of the objective sense of what is prescribed. For example, if a thing is still unfamiliar to us and we have not yet looked at it closely from the other side, the color of the back is not prescribed as a completely determinate color. But still, "a color" is prescribed, and perhaps even more. If the front has a certain design, then we expect to find it continued on the back; if it is a uniform color, spotted in this way or that, then at least we expect to find spots on the back, etc. But still there is indeterminateness. Now, this prescription, like all other intentions in normal perception, has the mode of naïve certainty; but it has this mode precisely in conformity with *what* it presents to consciousness and with *how* this is presented, i.e., according to the sense in which it is presented. What is certain is "some color or other in general,"

or "a color in general broken by spots," etc.; therefore, indeterminate generality.

Naturally, this talk of generality is employed here only as a makeshift of indirect description referring to the phenomenon itself. For we are not to think here of logical concepts of generalizing or classifying generalities but simply of this foremeaning [*Vormeinung*] of perception, such as it is present in perception with its mode of consciousness: that of indeterminateness.

Explicability in the form of presentifications belongs to the general essence of every empty intuition, therefore to the essence of such an indeterminate preliminary indication. We are able freely to form intuitive presentifications of what is not seen; for example, by imagining that we go around the object. If we do this, then intuitions embodying completely determinate colors appear. But we can obviously vary these colors freely within the frame of indeterminateness. This implies that if we are directed purely toward a mere presentifying intuition, therefore toward a quasi-fulfillment of the perception by presentified perceptual series, then from time to time a concrete intuition bearing a determinate color will indeed appear. Nevertheless, this determinate color has not been prescribed, therefore is also not required; what is presentified is there as certain, namely, as *the* back of this thing, but precisely in a consciousness of indeterminateness. If other presentifying intuitions, with other colors, present themselves, then certainty extends itself just as little to them; for none of them is something ever stipulated in advance; none is required.

The above is true of the presentifying intuition of what is yet unseen. If we contrast it with the lack of actual fulfillment in the actual progress of a perception, we see that the appearance of the colors fulfilling the indeterminate prescription is characterized in itself as certain. There follows from this, and in certainty, a determinative particularization, and therewith an enhancement, of what is known. In its certainty of content, the newly emerging stretch of perception raises the indeterminate generality, which was prescribed, to a more precisely determinative concretion, which, encompassed by the unity of perceptual certainty, uniformly fulfills the prescription, the anticipatory expectation. The fulfillment is, at the same time, an accretion of knowledge. But this is not the case with the exemplary presentification; any color whatsoever can serve just as well for the color which does make its appearance. The presentification

is endowed with the mode of certainty only to the extent that, despite the determinate coloration appearing in it, it keeps its own mode of indeterminateness with regard to this coloration. It is only in this way that the presentification differs from a definite remembrance, the kind of remembrance we would have if, having actually perceived the back, we representified it to ourselves.

It is, accordingly, clear that every merely intuitive presentification which precedes actual knowledge must have the character of a modalized certainty with regard to the quasi-determinative content. But this uncertainty has the special characteristic that the color contingently given in it is precisely one that is contingent, for which nothing chosen arbitrarily can be substituted, but only some *color* or other. In other words, the general indeterminateness has a field of free variability; what falls within it is in the same way implicitly included but still not motivated, not positively prescribed. It is a member of an unbounded field of more precise determinations which can be accommodated to this framework but which, beyond this, are completely uncertain. This constitutes the *concept of open possibility*. This possibility designates a *kind of modalization completely different from problematic possibility*, because the modalizing consciousness has in the two cases a fundamentally different origin. In problematic possibility there are inclinations to believe that are in conflict with one another and are motivated by the perceptual situation. It is a possibility for which something speaks, a possibility which at any given time has its due weight. But with open possibility one cannot speak of weight. There are no alternatives present, but, within the determinate frame of generality, all possible particularities are open in the same way. Here the modalization consists in this, that an indeterminate general intention, which itself has the mode of certainty, in a way bears implicitly in itself a stratification of its certainty with reference to all conceivable particularities. If, for example, a color flecked with spots is required with certainty in an indeterminate generality, then the fulfillment is fixed to this extent, namely, that this must be just "some color or other" with spots of "some form or other"; and every particularity of this type fulfills this requirement in the same way.

Starting with a primal mode of simple, naïve certainty, a closed and exactly delimited group of modalities can thus be determined, in that they are modalizations by virtue of a con-

flict between a demand, originally simply certain, and demands opposed to this. Problematic consciousness, together with its problematic possibilities, belongs in this domain. It is absolutely essential, therefore, to distinguish the *modalities arising from conflict* and the *modalities of open particularization*. Both together make up a determinate concept of the modality of belief and, correlatively, of the modality of being. *Here modalization stands in opposition to certainty of belief and, correlatively, to certainty of being.*

d. The double sense of discourse about modalization.

But one can speak in still another sense about modalization. A new investigation of the phenomenon of doubt will make this clear. To the essence of doubt belongs the possibility of its *solution* and eventually an active decision. In contrast to this decision, doubt itself signifies indecisiveness, and consciousness of doubt signifies an indecisive consciousness. In the domain of perception, decision is necessarily carried out in such a form (as the form of the most highly original decision) that in the transition to new appearances (for example, in the free bringing-into-play of the corresponding kinaesthetic processes) a suitable plenitude, in conformity with what was expected, fits into one of the empty horizons which are in mutual conflict. The modified or completely new sense data which make their appearance require apprehensions in the intentionally given situation which complete the intentional complexes remaining uncontested in such a way that the source of the conflict is blocked off and so that what specifically motivates the doubt is annulled by the power of a new impression. We approach [what is perceived]; perhaps we also set about touching it; and the still doubtful intention, oriented toward something wooden (instead of a human body), acquires a privilege of certainty. It acquires it by the harmonious transition to new appearances which do not accord with the unfulfilled horizons of the apprehension "man" and which negate this apprehension by the weight of their fulfillment and their living presence. In this decision, relative to the one side, that of the apprehension "man," which governs the original perception, there thus occurs a *negation* when this modalized apprehension becomes doubtful. In the contrary instance, there would have been an *affirmation* of it or, what amounts to the same thing, an endorsement



of the original perception which later became doubtful. What appears in a living presence would then acquire the modal validity-character "certainly," "really." Although it provides certainty of belief and being, the confirmatory "yes," like the "no," is in a way a *modification as compared with the completely original, completely unmodified primal mode of certain validity* in which the simple constitution of the object is realized uniformly and entirely without conflict. Thus the term "modalization" contains *an ambiguity*. On the one hand, it can mean *every change in the mode of validity with regard to the original mode, that of naïve certainty, so to speak*, which is not broken by being split, that is, by doubt. On the other hand, it can mean a *change of the mode of validity of the certainty, by which it ceases to be certainty* (such are modalizations according to possibility, probability, etc., in the sense considered above). The primal mode is certainty, but in the form of simplest certainty. As soon as a positive or negative decision ensues after we have passed through the doubt, certainty is restored. What proves "in fact" to be real or not real again becomes certain. And yet consciousness [of the certainty] is now changed. The passage through doubt to decision gives consciousness precisely the character of decisiveness and gives its noematic sense the corresponding character, which is then expressed by "indeed," "in fact," "really so," and similar phrases.

However, if we speak of *decision in the true sense*, we are already carried beyond the sphere of receptivity to the domain of *spontaneous position-taking on the part of the ego*. On the other hand, in receptive perception it is only a matter of syntheses which proceed passively, which continue harmoniously or break up in conflict, or which lead, in the passage through the fluctuation of apprehension, again to unanimity and resolution of the "doubt." It is all these phenomena, then, which, on a higher level, provide occasion for the formation of modalities of judgment in the usual sense of the term, i.e., of modalized, predicative judgments. This will be taken up later on. The theory of the modalities of judgment hangs in the air if it is developed simply with respect to predicative judgments, as is traditionally the case where the origin of all these phenomena of modalization is not sought out in the prepredicative sphere. But here we understand *modalizations as obstructions in the procession of the original perceptual interest*. Such an elucidation of the origin reveals that *the simplest certainty of belief* is

*the primal form* and that all other phenomena, such as negation, consciousness of possibility, restoration of certainty by affirmation or denial, result only from the modalization of this primal form and are not juxtaposed, since they are not on the same level.

It is necessary to distinguish this kind of obstruction in the realization of perceptual interest, therefore of *obstruction as modalization*, from that which was first mentioned, namely, the obstruction of tendencies as an *interruption* of the course of perception, whether the interruption has its ground in the mode of givenness of the object (its disappearance from the field of perception, its concealment, etc.) or in the displacement of the interest in the given—which continues to be given in perception—by another, stronger interest. Both kinds of obstruction can work together and condition each other reciprocally. The interruption of the course of perception can result in a further, and subsequently insoluble, doubt, a retroactive modalization of what has already been seen of the object; or the modalization can motivate an interruption, a diminution of interest in the object, which has become doubtful in regard to its nature or has proven to be not so, but otherwise (e.g., mannequin instead of man).

## 2 / Simple Apprehension and Explication

### § 22. *The levels of contemplative perception as the theme of the analyses to come.*

IN WHAT FOLLOWS we limit ourselves to *modes of the unobstructed process* of perception, hence to perceptions in which there is neither modalization nor obstruction by an interruption of the process. Even here there are *operations at different levels*, one aspect of which has already become visible in the analyses of modalization, although it has not yet been mentioned explicitly up to now. If it is granted in general that modalization takes place in the way we have described, namely, as the becoming-uncertain of the object in its being such and such, then it is also presupposed that a part at least of the process of contemplation of the object is also unobstructed. Its individual moments and properties must have come into prominence; expectations as to the nature of what is to come, for example of the back side which has not yet come into view, must have been awakened which are then disappointed and lead to the modalization "not so, but otherwise." In a word, these occurrences of modalization presuppose an element of *explication* of the object of perception. Indeed, this explication is for the most part already required by the tendency of perceptual interest. As a rule, the active apprehension of the object immediately turns into contemplation; the ego, oriented toward the acquisition of knowledge, tends to penetrate the object, considering it not only from all sides but also in all of its particular aspects, thus, to *explicate*

it. Of course, it is not necessary to succeed immediately in this. The road which leads to such explication can be blocked, the realization of this aspiration obstructed. For example, if we interest ourselves in a visual object in our indirect field of vision, it can be seen by us so indistinctly that at first we are unable to distinguish anything in particular about it; there is nothing about it which stands out. If the position of our eyes changes, it may be that the mode of appearance of the object is altered in a way such that, in the continuous synthesis of identification, "the" object appears without its different internal characteristics being made prominent, and hence recognition of its particular features does not become possible. In general, with conditions of experience that are normally favorable, matters naturally stand otherwise; we pass immediately to a process of explication which fulfills the interest. But even if there are no obstructions, it can happen that explicative penetration of the object does not take place immediately, insofar as, for example, we aim above all at a total apprehension of the object and in a way at a total contemplation of the object, which presents itself as a unity in its variable modes of appearance. The object first presents itself in modes of appearance which, because of distance, are unfavorable; then we bring it nearer by a change in these modes in the form of a suitable deployment of our kinaestheses, whose subjective processes condition the modifications of the appearance. At the same time, in the case of normal perception, as one gradually approaches, the various prominences, which grow ever richer, stand out from the object; these prominences will thrust themselves upon us and even be apprehended fleetingly. But the ego still need not yield to these tendencies of apprehension; keeping to a simple undivided seeing of the object in the continuous synthetic alteration of appearances, the ego remains solely oriented on the unity of identity of this continuous synthesis. We can therefore distinguish the following *levels of the contemplative perception* of an object, which will provide us with a guide for the analyses to come:

1. The contemplative intuition which *precedes* all explication, the intuition which is directed toward the object "taken as a whole." This *simple apprehension and contemplation* is the *lowest level* of common, objectifying activity, the lowest level of the unobstructed exercise of perceptual interest.

2. The *higher level* of the exercise of this interest is the true *explicative contemplation* of the object. Even the first appre-

hension and initial simple contemplation already has its horizons—to begin with, an internal horizon—which are immediately coawakened. (On this point, cf. § 8, above). The object is present from the first with a character of familiarity; it is apprehended as an object of a type already known in some way or other, even if in a vague generality. Its appearance awakens protentional expectations with regard to its being-such, with regard to the back side still unseen, etc., in general, with regard to what will emerge in the way of properties on further consideration. If the contemplation then turns into explication, the interest follows the direction of the expectation which has been awakened. It also remains concentrated here on this one object, made prominent for it, and strives to explain all that it “is,” what it manifests of itself as regards *internal determinations*, to enter into its content, to grasp it in its parts and moments, and to enter anew into these by taking them separately and letting them display themselves—all this within the frame of a synthetic unity which continually maintains itself “on the basis of” the unity of the total appearance and total apprehension of the object. *Explication is penetration of the internal horizon of the object by the direction of perceptual interest.* In the case of the unobstructed realization of this interest, the protentional expectations fulfill themselves in the same way; the object reveals itself in its properties as that which it was anticipated to be, except that what was anticipated now attains original givenness. A more precise determination results, eventually perhaps partial corrections, or—in the case of obstruction—disappointment of the expectations, and partial modalization.

3. There is an *additional level* of perceptual operations when the interest is not satisfied with the explicative penetration into the internal horizon of the object but makes the objects which are copresent in the external horizon, which are with it in the field and which at the same time affect it, thematic and considers the object in relation to them. In this way, in contrast to its internal determinations or explicates, *relative determinations* arise which display what the object is in its relation to other objects: the pencil is *beside* the inkwell, it is *longer* than the penholder, and so on. When such relative determinations are apprehended, the perceptual interest is not divided equally among the plurality of objects present in the field; it remains concentrated on one of them. The others will be drawn in only to the extent to which, by their relation to the object, they contribute

to its more precise determination. This development of external determinations depends, therefore, on the cogivenness of other objects in the external horizon of the perception, in the present *field*, and on their addition or disappearance, whereas internal determinations remain unaffected by this change in the surroundings by the majority of the coaffecting objects.

§ 23. *Simple apprehension and simple contemplation.*

- a. Perception as immanent-temporal unity. Still-holding-in-grasp as passivity in the activity of apprehension.

EACH OF THESE THREE LEVELS of perceptual contemplation requires a distinct analysis. Let us stick first of all to *simple apprehension*. In spite of its simplicity, it is in no wise a single datum but exhibits in itself a multiplicity of structures in which it constitutes itself as an immanent temporal unity. Even if the problems of the constitution of time—the most elementary in the construction of the systematics of constitution—are not to be treated here in their full compass (cf. Introduction, p. 68), still they must be taken into consideration to the extent necessary to enable us to grasp in its root the difference between simple apprehension and explication.

As a ready example of a simple apprehension, hearing the continuous ringing of a sound will do. Let us suppose that it is continually the same and remains invariable (in intensity and pitch) in the temporal flow and continual change of the phases of its ringing. It sounds *in* single phases; they are modes of appearance of the temporal object, the sound which endures, and whose duration extends continuously with every moment. It appears in the form of a concrete present with the now-point, the horizon of the continuous past, on the one side, and that of the future on the other. This phenomenon of the present is in a constant original flux, which goes from the now into an ever new now and includes a corresponding change of the horizons of past and future. Furthermore, the sound is for the most part also given as spatially localized; it is apprehended as sounding

in spatial proximity or remoteness—determinations which have reference to a spatial null-point, our own bodies, on which every here and there is oriented. In this way, the sound is *passively pregiven* as unity of duration.

If we now come to the active (receptive) apprehension of the sound which rings out, then the apprehension itself endures continuously—it endures “as long as” the sound rings out, i.e., is audible. As it always takes place in an actual now-point, the apprehension is directed toward the sound which itself is ringing out in its vivid continuance. But the apprehending regard is not directed toward the *phase* actually sounding now, as if the sound which is apprehended were purely and simply the sound taken in this strictly momentary now. To lay hold of such a now, such a phase of duration, as a moment and to make it an object for itself is rather the function of a specific act of apprehension of another kind. If we apprehend the sound as enduring, in short, as “this sound,” we are not turned toward the momentary and yet continuously changing present (the phase sounding now) but *through* and beyond this present, in its change, toward the sound as a unity which by its essence presents itself in this change, in this flux of appearances. When we examine this more closely, we see that the activity of apprehension is directed toward the sound which is presently vivid in such a way that it is apprehended as a sound which continuously endures as present, so that the primary ray of apprehension of the ego traverses the central moment of the original now (toward the moment of the sound appearing in this form); and that is to say that it goes toward the now in its continuous transitional flux, i.e., from a now to an ever new now, and therewith to an ever new moment appearing in the flux of moments emerging for the first time. A now never remains as such; each one becomes one just past and then becomes the past of the past and so on; and the moment in question, in the continuity of this change of appearance, remains in passive self-congruence as one and the same in a continuously active grasp. Thus *the modified activity of the still-in-grasp* constantly traverses the continuum of pasts according to the way in which it is joined onto the living now; and the modified activity, in unity with the new activity springing up originally, is a *flowing unity of activity* and as such is *in coincidence with itself* in this flux. Naturally, an analogous situation holds for the flux of the horizons of the future, which appear in the protentional mode, though these do

not merely flow off as being still in grasp but as being continuously in an anticipating foregrasp, which cooperates with the still-in-grasp.

We see by this that the activity of apprehension of a (concretely enduring) sound has a complex structure founded on the laws of constitution of living duration, a constitution taking place in a specific passivity prior to all activity. This structure belongs to the essential structure of activity, considered simply as activity. It is a continuously flowing activity, a continuous stream of activity springing up originally [*urquellender*] and united with an activity which flows continuously from it and which is modified in its horizon, having the character of still-holding-in-grasp and, from the side of the future, the character, modified in another way, of an *anticipatorily grasping activity*, therefore, once again, not that of an activity springing up originally but as an activity inserted in a series. In general, as long as an active apprehension of the sounds occurs, and such must be possible *a priori*, this activity, which takes place in an inseparable unity and in an invariable self-coincidence in the continuity, is—concretely speaking—an act of the ego, having its source in the ego; but in this activity it is necessary to make a *distinction between the active ray actually springing up continuously* and a fixed, *passive regularity*, which, however, is a *regularity pertaining to the activity itself*. With the active apprehension there goes hand in hand, in a double direction and according to a double form of modification, a modified activity belonging essentially to it. Accordingly, there is not only a passivity *prior* to the activity, as passivity of the originally constitutive temporal flux, which is only *preconstitutive*, but also a passivity erected on this, a passivity which is truly objectivating, namely, one which thematizes or cothematizes objects; it is a passivity which belongs to the act, not as a base but as act, a kind of *passivity in activity*.

This formulation shows that the distinction between passivity and activity is not inflexible, that it is not a matter here of terms which can be established definitively for all time, but only of means of description and contrast, whose sense must in each case be recreated originally with reference to the concrete situation of the analysis—an observation which holds true for every description of intentional phenomena.

What has been brought to light here in the simplest case naturally holds for every simple apprehension of an enduring



temporal object (whether unchanged or not, at rest or not). It is only on the basis of this active-passive retaining-in-grasp that it can be apprehended in a simple perception as an enduring object, as one which not only is now but which was also the same just before and will be in the next now. However, this first description of the retaining-in-grasp is still not sufficient. Only its contrast with other phenomena, with which it is easily confused, will allow its specific character to stand out in relief.

b. The different modes of retaining-in-grasp and how these modes differ from retention.

A still-retaining-in-grasp can also take place if the ego turns successively toward several objects which have nothing to do with one another and each of which awakens a separate interest but in such a way that these interests have no connection with one another. If these objects enter into the unity of a present of consciousness which they affect, the ego, if it at first pursues only one of them, is able in an anticipatory protentional grasping to be already turned marginally toward another of them; if it then pursues the latter, the first is no longer an object of primary apprehension, but it need not for this reason be abandoned completely. It is *still in grasp*, i.e., after the turning-toward has taken place, it does not merely sink retentionally, in a purely passive way, into the background of consciousness: the ego is still actively directed toward it in a modified mode. This "still-in-grasp" must be distinguished from that mentioned above, in which the modified activity *coincided* with the original grasping *in regard to the object*. Such a coincidence naturally does not show up here, although, on the basis of the synthetic apprehension of the two objects, a certain overlapping does occur. We will discuss this later (cf. § 24b).

With both of these kinds of still-in-grasp, further complications are possible, which should be mentioned briefly at this time. If the ego turns toward a new object while the first still remains in grasp, this can take place in such a way that the first still endures, being given as still enduring, or in such a way that it itself is no longer given at first hand (in such a way that the sound, for example, has ceased to ring out, or—if it is a question of a visual object—that it has been removed from the visual field), although in its retentional reverberation it is still retained

in grasp while we turn toward the new object. The retaining-in-grasp can thus be *impressional*, a retaining-in-grasp during the continuous givenness of the object, or it can be *nonimpressional*, still persisting after the original givenness of the object has come to an end.

To the first, independently of what has been considered under subsection a, which is constitutive for the active apprehension of an enduring object, there also belongs the case, already mentioned, of the retaining-in-grasp of an object still given as enduring while the ego turns toward a new object.

In the same way, a nonimpressional retaining-in-grasp is possible in the two cases: on the one hand, an object no longer given at first hand can be still retained in grasp although we are turned toward a new one; on the other hand, after the givenness of this object has ceased, the ego can still remain turned attentively toward it in its retentional reverberation. Then a synthetic coincidence relative to the objective sense takes place between the active apprehension in retention and the still-having-in-grasp of its duration, which has been given previously in the impressional mode. It is the *same* sound "which I just heard" and toward which, even though it has already faded away, I am still turned attentively, perhaps with the intention of finding out "what kind of sound it may have been."

From this description it is evident that retaining-in-grasp as a modified activity, as passivity in activity, must be distinguished from the preservation caused by *retention*, from the remembrance which is frequently called "fresh" remembrance. The latter is an intentional *modification in the realm of pure passivity*; it takes place according to an absolutely fixed law without any participation of the activity radiating from the ego-center. This modification belongs to the regularity of the original constitution of immanent temporality,<sup>1</sup> in which every impressional having-consciousness of an original momentary now is constantly changed into the still-having-in-consciousness of the same in the mode of the just-past (the just-having-been-now). This retention is in turn itself subject to retentional modifica-

1. On this, cf. Edmund Husserl, "Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins," ed. Martin Heidegger, *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Vol. IX (1928); English translation by James S. Churchill, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1964).

tion, and so on. It appears, then, that the consciousness of a concrete present includes in itself a consciousness of a retentional extension of the past and that, when the concrete present is at an end, a concrete, flowing retentional past must be joined on. And the like holds true of what is to come, namely, that to every new experience in the flow of lived experience there belongs a horizon of original, even if entirely empty, expectation, an expectation at first purely passive (*protention*). Thus, to the consciousness of a concrete present belongs not only the retentional extension of the past but, just as much, the protentional, although completely empty, extension of the future.

This lawfulness concerns *all* phenomenological data, those which are purely passive, as well as those acts of the ego which make their appearance in the stream of consciousness. *Every act of the ego*, for example every act of simple apprehension of an object, *appears in the temporal field as a temporally self-constituting datum*. In this mode of appearance—in the original springing-forth in a momentary now or in a continuous series of such nows—an ego-act is subject in each of its phases to the law of retention and protention—even if the ego releases the object from the grasp of its activity. In this case a modification of the activity originally springing forth, in the sense of a purely passive retentional maintenance, results. In retaining-in-grasp, on the other hand, the activity springing forth is indeed also a modified activity, but not in the form of a simple retention; rather, the phases retentionally dying away still remain really functional, although modified, elements in the concretion of a real act. It is only as such an element that the retention is “still” a real activity or, more precisely expressed, a real activity in the mode of the “still.” In the same way, when an act is interrupted, then, in spite of the continuing operation of the passive law of protention, the horizon of the future loses the character of that which is actively anticipated; the protention is no longer real activity in the mode of anticipatory grasping.

If, on the other hand, we consider the still-retaining-in-grasp in its different forms, we see that it already differs from the phenomenon of retention in that, as has been shown, *it can just as easily concern objectivities present to consciousness impressionally as retentionally, and, in general, objectivities of every possible mode of consciousness—precisely as a form of activity modified with reference to these objectivities*. If this activity is withdrawn from them, if the ego completely turns its

"attention" away from them, therefore no longer retaining them in grasp, they then remain as impressions or retentions or as some other forms of consciousness in the field of consciousness, affecting still further, according to their ways of becoming prominent. But then they are given in a pure passivity, subject in their intentional modifications exclusively to the laws of passivity.

§ 24. *The activity of explicative contemplation and the explicative synthesis.*

- a. The explicative synthesis as the locus of origin of the categories "substrate" and "determination" and the problem of their analysis.

LET US NOW PROCEED to the next level of objectifying activity, that of *explicative contemplation*. Provisionally, it has already been characterized as an orientation of perceptual interest in the sense of an entering into the internal horizon of the object, a horizon which is immediately coawakened by the givenness of the object. This signifies the following: assuming the case of an unobstructed exercise of perceptual interest, the ego cannot long remain with a merely simple contemplation and apprehension; rather, the tendency inherent in the contemplation of an object immediately pushes it beyond this. In streaming forth in a linear continuity, the act of contemplation would become a simple fixed view if it did not disengage itself and pass over into a chain of individual apprehensions, of individual acts, in a discrete succession of separate steps which, bound internally to one another, form a *polythetic unity* of the individual theses. The individual apprehensions fall into sequence with one another, directed toward singularities *in* the object. The object, *every* object, has its peculiarities, its internal determinations. In the terms of phenomenology, this means that every object conceivable in general as an object of possible experience has its subjective modes of givenness: it can rise up out of the obscure background of consciousness and from there affect the ego and determine it to an attentive apprehension. It has thereby its differences of appearance according to "near" and "far," it has its

own way of moving from distance to proximity, which allows ever more individual moments to come to prominence and to determine particular affections and orientations. For example, what first strikes the eye is its total surface color or its shape; then a certain part of the object becomes prominent—in the case of a house, for example, the roof; finally, the particular properties of this part—its color, shape, and so on. And, in conformity with the nature and mode of givenness of the object, the expectations, which are immediately coawakened and refer to what it exhibits of itself by way of its properties, are more or less determined. The object is present from the very first with a character of familiarity; it is already apprehended as an object of a type more or less vaguely determined and already, in some way, known. In this way the direction of the expectations of what closer inspection will reveal in the way of properties is prescribed.

Disregarding the fact that each stage of the originally intuitive explication already takes place within this horizon of familiarity and is not the sheer bringing-to-givenness of an object completely new, but is only the more precise determination and correction of anticipations, we seek at first to bring out the *general essence* through which the process of explication is distinguished from a pure and simple act of contemplation. Only after this is done should we take into account the different *modes of accomplishment* of explication which are possible in view of the full concretion of the consciousness of horizon wherein explication is always situated—for these modes of accomplishment are all of the same fundamental structure.

Let us take an object, call it *S*, and its internal determinations  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ , . . . ; the process set going by the interest in *S* does not simply give the series: apprehension of *S*, apprehension of  $\alpha$ , of  $\beta$ , etc., as if the apprehensions had nothing to do with one another, as if there had been a change of themes. This process is, therefore, not like the case where, after the weakening of the interest of cognition in an object, this interest having been supplanted by interest in a second and then in a third, we turn toward those which have forced attention on themselves by an affection of appropriate power. On the contrary, in the whole process of individual acts which lead from the apprehension of *S* to the apprehension of  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ , . . . *we come to know S*. This process is a *developing contemplation*, a unity of articulated contemplation. Through the entire process the *S* retains the

character of *theme*; and while, step by step, we gain possession of the moments, the parts, one after the other—and each one of them is precisely a moment or part, i.e., what is generally called a property or determination—each is nothing in itself but something of the object *S*, coming from it and in it. In the apprehension of the properties we come to know *it*, and we come to know the properties only as belonging to it. In the development, the indeterminate theme *S* turns into the *substrate* of the properties which emerge, and they themselves are constituted in it as its *determinations*.

But how does it happen that the ego, in the apprehension of *a*, *β*, etc., is conscious of knowing *S* in them? In what way is *a* present to consciousness in another way than *S* or as some other *S'* toward which we turn after *S*? In other words, what makes *S* the general theme in a privileged sense, so that *a*, *β*, . . . , even if they are apprehended successively and thus in a certain way also become thematic, still lack, in comparison to *S*, equal status? Indeed, why is it that they are simply themes *in which* is realized in a coherent way the dominant interest in *S*, and why is the transition to them not an entering into another object, and therewith a turning away from and weakening of the interest in *S*, but a continuing fulfillment and augmentation of this interest? It is necessary, therefore, to describe the intentional functions which determine that the "object" of explication is presented to us in the sense-form "substrate" and that the moments explicated are presented in a wholly different form, namely, as "*properties*," as "*determinations*," of the object, in such a way that we can speak of an *explication*, of a development of *S* in its determinations, and say that it is *the S* which is determined as *a*, as *β*, and so on.

The process of explication in its originality is that in which an object given at first hand is brought to explicit intuition. The analysis of its structure must bring to light how a *twofold constitution of sense* [*Sinngebung*] is realized in it: "object as substrate" and "determination *a* . . ."; it must show how this constitution of sense is realized in the form of a process which goes forward in separate steps, through which, however, extends continuously a *unity of coincidence*—a unity of coincidence of a special kind, belonging exclusively to these sense-forms. We can also say that it is necessary to show that this process is one of "self-evidence," for in it something is originally intuited as "*object-substrate*" as such, and, as such, having something on

the order of "determinations." With this, we are at the *place of origin of the first of the so-called "logical categories."* It is true, we can only begin to speak of logical categories in the proper sense in the sphere of predicative judgment, as elements of determination which belong necessarily to the form of possible predicative judgments. But all categories and categorial forms which appear there are erected on the prepredicative syntheses and have their origin in them.

b. Explicative coincidence as a particular mode of the synthesis of overlapping [*Überschiebung*].

What strikes us first of all in the process of explication, in the transition from the apprehension of *S* to that of *a*, is a certain mental overlapping of the two apprehensions. But this is by no means sufficient to characterize explication. For such an overlapping of all apprehensions is common to explication and all cases in which the ego advances from apprehension to apprehension in a synthetic activity unified by the bond of a single interest. This overlapping is realized just as much when a thing is apprehended at first in undivided unity and then in view of its peculiar form, sound, or odor, i.e., whatever elements stand out, as when what is apprehended synthetically is at first a thing and then, as separated from it and not belonging to its determination, a form, a sound, an odor. *In every synthesis of this kind, even if wholly dissimilar objects are contemplated as a unity, an overlapping takes place.* The ego plays a continually active role through the series of steps run through; in the second, it is still directed toward the object of the first; it is directed, therefore, in spite of the privileged position of the new object of primary apprehension, on both of them together: with the new and, through the new, on the old. The two are together actively taken up by the ego; the indivisible ego is in both. The succession of the rays of attention and of apprehension has become *a single double ray*.

But there is an essential difference, depending on whether, in this synthetic activity, it is *according to the objective sense* that a synthesis of *coincidence* is produced, thus in an entirely special identity-synthesis, or whether such a thing does not take place. If we pass from a color over to a sound, then this is not the case. But if we pass, always synthetically, from one color to

another, there is already a synthesis of coincidence; the moments which overlap one another coincide according to likeness or similarity. If we now take the case of the synthesis "thing and property of the thing" and, in general, the synthesis "object and objective property," then a completely unique synthesis of the coincidence of identity confronts us here. The synthesis relative to the intentional objects (the sense-content of acts of individual apprehension) appearing here one by one is a synthesis of a certain coincidence of identity which goes forward continuously and through the sharply separated stages of the act.

This *explicative coincidence*, as we will call it, should not be confused with the *total coincidence of identity* with regard to objective sense, such as occurs when we pass synthetically from one representation (mode of givenness) to others of the same object and thereby identify that object with itself. Such a coincidence belongs, for example, to every perception of a thing which goes forward continuously, as the continuous synthesis of the multifariously changing appearances in the consciousness of the same thing (of a thing which remains continuously one); but it also belongs to every synthesis of identity of sensuous intuitions; for example, of a perception and a remembrance of the same object. But in the case of explicative coincidence, it is a question of an identification which is wholly other, completely unique, in which continuity and discreteness are bound together in a remarkable way. Substrate and determination are constituted originally in the process of explication as correlative members of a kind of coincidence. When *a* is present to our consciousness as a determination, we are not simply conscious of it as being absolutely the same as *S*, nor are we conscious of it as something completely other. In every explicative determination of *S*, *S* is *present* in one of its particularities; and in the different determinations which appear in the form of explicates, it remains the same, but in conformity with the different particularities which are its properties.

c. The retaining-in-grasp of explication in contrast to the retaining-in-grasp of simple apprehension.

The special nature of explicative coincidence becomes clearly evident in the contrast to simple apprehension. If we carry out simple apprehension, still without explicative contemplation—



for example, if for a certain time we are turned toward an object enduring in time in order to apprehend it but without determining anything about it—then this apprehension is an activity of the ego, a spontaneity which springs originally from the ego-pole. We thus distinguish the active *laying-hold-of*, which begins discretely, and the continuous *holding-fast-to* into which it is transformed. This laying-hold-of is an original springing-forth of the grasping activity of the ego which is carried on continuously.

Let us now turn to partial apprehension. We observe, for example, a copper bowl which is before us: our glance “runs over” it, remains fixed for a moment on the roundness, and returns to it again, attracted by a spot which stands out, a variation from the uniform roundness. Then our glance jumps to a large shiny spot and goes on a bit farther, following the shimmering glitter; then it is struck by the bosses; the cluster is thrown into relief as a unity; we run over these bosses one by one, etc. In all this we are continuously oriented toward the entire object; we have apprehended it and hold fast to it as a thematic substrate. While we apprehend the singularities in particular, we actively carry out afresh particular orientations and apprehensions which cause what is apprehended to stand out in a privileged way. These partial apprehensions naturally are active “operations,” just like the first simple apprehension.

If we now carry out a partial apprehension, what happens during this time to the total apprehension, the apprehension of the bowl? It still always remains what we “look at.” We are continually turned toward it in an apprehension, but the partial apprehensions coincide with the total apprehension in such a way that in each partial apprehension we apprehend the whole to the degree that, in the coincidence, the whole overlaps the particularity which is apprehended and is present to consciousness in this overlapping. But here again there is the difference, which we have already noted regarding simple apprehension, between original grasping and still-retaining-in-grasp. In the initial apprehension of the whole, without consideration of its particularities, a flux of activity, springing originally from the ego, is directed toward the undifferentiated unified object. If the explicative contemplation is put into play, a new flux of original activity is directed toward the properties in question. But now, on the other hand, the activity springing up initially is not maintained and directed toward the whole as it was before. As soon

as the explicative contemplation begins, its intentional mode manifestly changes; to be sure, we are and remain directed toward the entire object which we apprehend—which is precisely the object of contemplation—but the active apprehension of the whole does not remain in the original form which first gave it life but is a *maintaining of the activity in an intentional modification*, precisely as a still-retaining-in-grasp.

The same thing is true in the passage from one explicate to the next. The moment no longer apprehended momentarily in virtue of being partial, but apprehended as just having been, continues to be retained in grasp in the transition to a new stage of activity. This *retaining* grasp, a grasp in the mode of the “still,” is a *state of activity which endures*; it is not a laying-hold-of or an apprehension which is carried on continuously as an act. Just as in simple contemplation, such a grasping in the mode of retaining can be more or less firm and then become loose, or it can be loose and again become firmer; but it can also stop completely: the object is let go, it slips from our grasp. In the explication being considered here, it hardly needs particular mention that the retaining-in-grasp is impressional.

Exactly as in continuous simple apprehension, therefore, there is *at each stage of explication a retaining-in-grasp of the substrate*. But here the retaining-in-grasp is totally different from that which is likewise under consideration in simple apprehension. That is, the apprehension of the object which is included in the constant retaining-in-grasp of the substrate takes upon itself, step by step, all of the particularities which have been thrown into relief: the having-in-grasp of the object being explicated is not a having-in-grasp which is unchanged with regard to content, i.e., a still-having-in-grasp of the *same*, “such as” it was for consciousness before this stage; on the contrary, thanks to constantly new partial coincidences, it is an always different having-in-grasp. In every step, what is gotten hold of as singular is incorporated by the coincidence into the sense content of the substrate. The individual graspings are transformed, not into merely retentive individual graspings such as occur when something is still retained in simple contemplation or when one passes on to a new object, but into *modifications of a total grasp*, in other words, into enrichments of its content.

In the clarifications presented up to now, it is already implied that the way in which *S* is still retained is essentially different from the ways in which  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ , . . . , are retained. On the

one side we have the activity, constantly springing up originally, of the inaugurative grasping and actually holding-in-grasp—which is a grasping and a having-in-grasp carried on in a continuous way—up to the point in which the explication begins, and, after that, the modified activity of the secondary still-retaining-in-grasp. Both forms coalesce into a permanent unity; in them, the active ego is and remains constantly turned toward *S*. On the side of the explicates, on the other hand, the phenomena are different. The inaugurative activity, carried on in an original springing-forth, is one in which an explicate comes to original apprehension and persists until its time is elapsed; this activity again changes when a new explicate is apprehended. However, the first is certainly not abandoned; it remains valid during the entire continuing process. To this extent, we also say here that it still remains in grasp. But here, this continuing-to-be-retained has its exclusive source in the intentionality, already described, of active coincidence, by means of which the explicate, and everything which constitutes an element of determination of *S*, is included as a *sense-determinative precipitate* of *S* which subsists unchanged. After the explication of the *a*, the *S* becomes *S<sub>a</sub>*; after the emergence of the *β*, (*S<sub>a</sub>*)*β*, and so on. Thus *a*, *β*, etc., are no longer apprehended—either primarily or secondarily; the ego is no longer directed toward them; it is directed toward *S*, which contains them as precipitates. Accordingly, we see that the intentionality of an explication is constantly in movement, in a continuous internal transformation, and that, at the same time, it consists of a series of discrete steps, whose intentionality, however, is traversed by a continuity. This continuity is a permanent synthesis of coincidence which concerns the content of apprehensions as well as the activities themselves: the active apprehending and being-directed toward the “whole,” or, to speak more precisely, the being-directed toward the substrate *S*, is implicitly “co”-directed toward the *a*, . . . ; and, in the “emergence” of the *a*, it is the *S* which is apprehended and displayed “in its relation to” *a*.

#### d. Explication and apprehension of plurality.

Now that we have made sure of this specific mode of the process of explication, it is easy to contrast it with a mode of synthesis related to it but from which it must be rigorously differentiated, namely, the synthesis which occurs in the *appre-*

*hension of plurality.* To be sure, a plurality—for example, a cluster of stars, a cluster of colored dots—can also, on the basis of a unified prominence and affection, become a unitary theme, and its objective particulars can be explicated as determinative parts. Then we have before us only a special case of explication. It is also an ideal limiting case if plurality is apprehended as a unitary whole and all apperception of plurality is lacking.

But the normal case is one in which the unity of configuration is apperceived from the first as existing in a pluralistic way, as a plurality of objects, and this apperception is “realized.” This means that the coming-into-prominence of plural existents does not lead to a unitary objective turning-toward but that, on the contrary, it is the *individual* members of the plurality which excite the interest in advance and which are immediately thematized as individuals—but not as mere isolated individuals but as individuals linked together thematically. This linking occurs to the extent that the interest follows the likeness or similarity already given by an association in the background with other moments of a configuration, and each individual interest works not only to the benefit of each new particular, by a kind of coincidence of interest which flows over it, but also to the benefit of everything which has already been apprehended previously and to which it remains attached. In that the interest is now fulfilled through the particular and continues on to new particulars, a uniform active process grows up in which each of the aspects already apprehended still remains in grasp in such a way that in fact not only a *succession of activities* but also a *unity of activity grows up which persists throughout the succession*. In this way the pervading activity moves constantly on the permanent background which this plurality constitutes by appearing continuously in a uniform configuration; thus, we have to do here in a certain way with partial apprehensions within what is present to consciousness as a whole.

But however far the analogy with the case of the explication of a particular object extends, and however true it may be that what we have shown, up to the last point, with respect to the process of running through a plurality also holds in its essentials for explication in our sphere, still an essential difference comes into view. The thematic object which is explicated belongs to the explication and in it assumes the character of substrates for its explicates. But in the present case, however much it may appear as a uniform configuration in original intuition,

the plurality is *not a goal of effective activity*; it is not a goal of knowledge gained through experience. It is not seized in advance and retained in active grasp in particular apprehensions; in the progress of these apprehensions, that specific partial identification which we have called explicative coincidence does not take place—a coincidence in which activities of both sides have a share. It is also clear that the individual activities of running through a plurality, precisely for this reason, are not united according to the same principle as those of explication. In general: *the unity of the activities in the running-through of a plurality has its source, not in activity itself, but in connection arising from passivity*. If, when a plurality is run through, it is also actively taken together, then matters evidently stand otherwise. But then the uniting activity is obviously completely other than that which gives unity to an explication. It is an activity of a higher level, one to be described later on, a spontaneity in which the plurality is constituted as a specific object, as a "set."<sup>1</sup> But in explication as such we do not perform separate acts taking the explicates together; it requires a special interest of a new kind in order to bring about, in addition, an explication in the form of an explicating which collectively links the explicates together. However, such a collective assemblage [*Zusammennehmen*] of the explicates is not necessary for explication considered in its normal course. From the very first, the explication has its unity in that the object is continuously the theme and as such remains constantly in grasp in a modified activity such as we have described.

§ 25. *The precipitate of explication in habitus.*  
*The act of impressing something upon*  
*oneself [Sich-einprägen].*

WE HAVE THUS DESCRIBED the process of explication in the way in which it takes place in original intuition. To be sure, this originality never implies an apprehension and explication, occurring simply for the first time, of an object which is com-

1. Cf. below, § 59.

pletely unknown; the process taking place in an original intuition is always already saturated with anticipation; there is always more cointended apperceptively than actually is given by intuition—precisely because every object is not a thing isolated in itself but is always already *an object in its horizon* of typical familiarity and precognizance. But this horizon is constantly in motion; with every new step of intuitive apprehension, new delineations of the object result, more precise determinations and corrections of what was anticipated. No apprehension is merely momentary and ephemeral. To be sure, as this lived experience of the apprehension of a substrate and an explicate, it has, like every lived experience, its mode of original emergence in the now, to which is adjoined its progressive sinking into corresponding nonoriginal modes: retentional reverberation and, finally, submersion into the totally empty, dead past. This lived experience itself, and the objective moment constituted in it, may become “forgotten”; but for all this, it in no way disappears without a trace; it has merely become latent. With regard to what has been constituted in it, it is a *possession in the form of a habitus*, ready at any time to be awakened anew by an active association. At every stage of the explication there is constituted for the object of the apprehension, the object being at first indeterminate, i.e., already vaguely familiar in its horizon and determined solely by anticipation, a precipitate of cognitions *in habitus*. After the process of explication in the mode of originality has run its course, the object, even though it has sunk into passivity, remains constituted as the one having been determined by the determinations in question. The object has incorporated into itself the forms of sense originally constituted in the acts of explication by virtue of a *knowledge in the form of a habitus*. Thus all contemplation which enters into an object has a *lasting result* with regard to the object. The subjective activity which has been realized remains attached to the object *qua* intentional by virtue of a *habitus*. From now on, the subject in question regards the object, even if it returns to it after interruptions of the givenness of experience, and of givenness in general, as a familiar object, having such determinations as were allotted to it by the explicative cognition. This means that, even if the object has been given again originally, that is, perceptually, and is not only realized in memory, the new cognition has a content of sense essentially other than the preceding perceptions. The object is pre-given with a new content of sense; it

is present to consciousness with the *horizon*—an empty horizon, to be sure—of *acquired cognitions*: the precipitation of the active bestowal of sense, of the preceding allotment of a determination, is now a component of the sense of apprehension inherent in the perception, even if it is not really explicated anew. But if the explication is renewed, it then has the character of a repetition and reactivation of the “knowledge” already acquired.

This transformation of the result of an originally intuitive apprehension into a *habitus* takes place according to a general law of conscious life, without our participation, so to speak, and it therefore takes place even where the interest in the explicated object is unique and transient, satisfied after a single explicative contemplation, and where the object itself is perhaps entirely “forgotten.” But it can also be that one strives to establish this *habitus* voluntarily. Then we say that the interest is oriented toward a bearing in mind, an appropriation of the perceptual image, so as to make an impression of it upon oneself. Such an interest will frequently give occasion to a *repeated running-through* of the explicative synthesis, at first, for example, to a repeated act of contemplation of the object in its original present, but then perhaps also to a repetition of the course of the explication in a fresh remembrance—a case to which we will return further on (cf. § 27). The particularities thrown into relief in the explication become *attributes*, and the object as a whole is apprehended and retained as a unity of attributes. The interest is not thereby divided equally among all the particularities thrown into relief; rather, the regard is directed toward especially impressive qualities, by means of which an object of precisely this determinate type, or this individual object, is distinguished from other objects of like or similar type. For example, what is apt to strike our attention about a man may be a bulge, a squint, etc., which impress us as especially prominent attributes and enable us later on to recognize him among a group of other men. If the interest is thus not satisfied by a merely fleeting acquaintance but is directed toward making an impression upon oneself of the perceptual image, it will, following a first explicative running-through of the particularities, in a repetition, then single out from among the totality of particularities those which are characteristic and will direct the regard toward them above all. For the most part, this will in fact go hand in hand with a predication—a procedure which will not be analyzed until later. But even without any predication, such an

act of making an impression upon oneself is possible in simple explicative contemplation as a tendency of the interest toward bearing something in mind. The contemplation becomes a *penetrating* contemplation in which, from among the plurality of quiddities brought to light by the activity of explication, the perceptual interest is directed toward those which are specially striking and characteristic.

§ 26. *Explication as elucidation of what is anticipated according to the horizon, and its difference in comparison to analytic elucidation.*

WE HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED in the Introduction (cf. above, pp. 34 ff.) the fact that such establishment of habitualities at every stage of explication, of coming to know an object in its particularities, is not something which concerns only this object itself; it is also that by which, at the same time, is prescribed a *type*, on the basis of which, by apperceptive transference, other objects of a similar kind also appear from the first in a preliminary familiarity and are anticipated according to a horizon. Hence at every stage of the original apprehension and explication of an existent the horizon of the experienceable is completely changed; new typical determinations and familiarities are established and give the apperceptive expectations, which are associated with the givenness of new objects, their direction and their prescription. With regard to this, each explication, as it takes place in original intuition as the explication of a newly experienced object, can likewise be characterized as an *elucidation* and clarification, as a more precise determination of what is indeterminate in the horizon-form, of what is implied therein. Every real *explication has the intentional character of an explication which fills the horizon-intention (as an empty anticipation)*, realizing it in definite stages, in which the various unknown determinations become corresponding determinations that are henceforth known—known in the manner of an elucidation of what was implied in the horizon in an indeterminate way. Precisely by reason of the apprehension of



the object (and also the other apprehensions according to region, kind, type, and the like), a certain implication has acquired a particular sense, that of something already included therein, but "without delimitation," "vague," "confused"; the explicate set forth is that which clarifies the corresponding confusion. In its coincidence with the object apprehended (and at the same time apprehended according to its type) the explicate is encompassed by a residual horizon of confusion as that which is now further to be clarified. Clarity, although it is always the fulfilling, the showing-itself, of what was previously prescribed in an empty way, meant in advance, is never a pure and simple giving of something itself, as if the prescription were able to proceed to the point that the sense prescribed was already meant in advance in an absolute determination and only passed over into the intuitive clarity of the "in itself." Even where the object is "completely familiar," this completeness does not correspond to its idea. What is meant in advance in an empty way has its "vague generality," its open indeterminateness, which is fulfilled only in the form of a *more precise determination*. Instead of a completely determined sense, there is always, therefore, a *frame of empty sense*, which is not itself apprehended as a fixed sense. Its extension, very different according to circumstances (object in general, spatial thing in general, man in general, etc., depending on how the object has been apprehended in anticipation), is first revealed in the fulfillments and can only afterwards be delimited in specific intentional actions, which there is no occasion to describe here, and be grasped in concepts. Thus, with the clarification, simple fulfillment at the same time realizes an enrichment of sense. If the object apprehended with a horizon now comes to be explicated, this horizon is clarified at every stage by the fulfilling identification, but only "in part."

More clearly expressed: the horizon, which in its unity is originally completely vague, undifferentiated, is furnished by this fulfillment with the explicate which comes to light each time and which clarifies it; this explicate, to be sure, supplies only a partial clarification, insofar as an *unclarified residual horizon* remains. The *S* henceforth determined as *p* again has a horizon which, although altered, is, in virtue of the continuous self-coincidence of *S* (provided with the still vague horizon-sense), the same as that of the earlier, completely indeterminate horizon, which has not yet been clarified by the *p*. Thus the

progress of the explication is a progress of the clarification that fulfills what is vaguely meant by way of horizon. The clarification, to be sure, is still always presented as a progressive unfolding of particular moments, henceforth detached, of *S*, as determinations in which it is in its particularity; but on the other hand, and at the same time, it is presented as a clarification fulfilling ever new empty horizons, which are the ever new residual forms of the original horizon. The *S* is ever the *S* of one and the same "apprehension"; it is always present to consciousness as the same in the unity of an objective sense but in a continuous transformation of the act of apprehension, in an ever new relation of the emptiness and fullness of the apprehension which goes forward in this process as the unfolding of *S* as it is in itself, explicating it as this. In consequence, the clarification at the same time always proceeds as a "*more precise determination*" or, better, as *elucidation*, since the word "determine" has a new sense here. It is only the actual clarification which reveals what was meant in advance in a distinctness which delimits it.

If, in this way, all explication can be viewed as elucidation, it must be remembered that in ordinary usage "elucidation" has another sense. That is, this "elucidation" of explication is not to be confused with what is so called in the proper sense of the term, i.e., with *analytical elucidation*, which, to be sure, also represents a kind of explication, but an *explication in empty consciousness*, while in our study we have always moved in the domain of intuition. We speak of analytical elucidation in every judgment, in every judicative meaning *qua* predicative. An act of judicative meaning can be confused; and, according to what is meant in it, it can be "elucidated." It thus becomes an act of explicit judgment, an act of judgment "in the proper sense." This elucidation is thoroughly possible within empty consciousness. This means that it is not necessary that what is meant in the judgment be intuitively given; it is enough merely to render distinct the judicative meaning as such.<sup>1</sup> This is because the act of predicative judgment has a founded intentionality—something which will be examined in detail later on. Here we must be satisfied with these hints, since, for the time being, the prepredicative sphere is still prescribed for us as the frame which delimits our analyses.

1. On this subject cf. also *Logic*, § 16a.

However, it is still necessary to note that this analytical elucidation, as one taking place in empty consciousness, is only a special case of a modification which, in general, *every* empty consciousness can undergo.

§ 27. *Original and nonoriginal modes of accomplishment of explication. Explication in anticipation and in memory.*

IF, ON THE ONE HAND, we take into consideration the constant interweaving of the process of explication, in its originality, with anticipations and, on the other, the founding of habitualities which results from every stage of explication, then we can distinguish the following possible *modes of accomplishment of explication*.

1. The point of departure is naturally that of *original explication*: an object is determined for the first time. But, as we have seen, it is always apprehended apperceptively in advance in such and such a way as an object of this or that type. The sense of apprehension from the first implies determinations which have not yet been experienced with this object but which nevertheless are of a known type insofar as they refer back to earlier analogous experiences concerning other objects.

From this result *different modes of synthetic coincidence between what is anticipated and the explicate now giving itself in intuition*, according to whether there is simply a confirmation of what was expected in a wholly determinate way or a disappointment of a particular prescription in a "not so, but otherwise," or whether—as is the case with objects still completely unknown—the anticipation is so indeterminate that the expectations are directed only toward some novelty to come, toward "some quality or other," etc. Then there is room for neither a confirmation nor a disappointment in the proper sense. The fulfillment which comes with the giving of the object itself is a confirmation only to the extent that in general precisely something and not nothing is given.

2. But before it is itself given, an object can also *be explicated in an anticipatory way* on the basis of a kind of intuitive

picturing in the imagination, a picturing in which memories of objects already given of the same or related types play their joint role. This case presents itself particularly often if we go from the mere analytical elucidation of a predicative judgment to a "clarification" which allows us to envision its content intuitively. But also, all the other modes of explication enumerated here can function just as well as clarifications to make matters intuitively vivid.<sup>1</sup>

3. Still another mode of accomplishment of an explication is the *return to an object already explicated* and, following that, if the occasion should arise, the deployment of the previously determined object in its determinations. What was known implicitly is brought once more to explicit knowledge and is, therefore, actualized anew. It is necessary to distinguish several possible modifications in such a coming-back-again:

a) The object already explicated is *explicated anew* just as it remains in our memory, *and simultaneously it is perceived anew*, as far as that is possible with objects of external experience. Explication in memory enters into synthetic coincidence with the successive stages of the renewed perception and is confirmed therein. We satisfy ourselves anew as to the way the object is and remains unchanged, for we have new and original cognitions and, at the same time, recollections of the old.

b) However, one can also *return* in memory to an object explicated earlier *without its being given simultaneously again in the manner of perception*. This can happen in one of two ways:

Either in memory one returns *in one grasp* to the object already explicated, in a memory relatively obscure but where the object nevertheless is made present otherwise than as a remembered object which has never been explicated previously; for in this memory the object already has horizons which make possible a new penetration into determinations which are already known.

Or, the stages of the earlier explication are *accomplished anew* in memory *according to their articulations*, and everything which earlier had been given in the manner of perception is brought to a renewed intuitive, pictorial givenness in memory. Such an explication in memory naturally has exactly the same structure with regard to the transition from the substrate to the

1. Cf., on this point, *Logic*, § 16c.

determinations, with regard to the differences of their retaining-in-grasp, etc., as an explication in perception; it is only that it is then precisely a matter of a nonimpressional retaining-in-grasp.

4. When we speak of *explication in memory*, we can understand by this something still different. An object can have been given *originaliter* in one grasp in perception, and we may begin explication after it is no longer itself given. For example, in passing, we cast a fleeting glance through a garden door, and only afterwards, when we have already passed by, do we first make clear to ourselves "everything we have actually seen there." It is an explication in memory, on the basis of what has been previously given *originaliter* in a simple apprehension. This then becomes originally explicated, although not in the mode of self-giving.

A further modification of this case is the following: during a part of the ongoing explication the object remains perceptually given *originaliter*, but then its perceptual givenness comes to an end, although the explication still goes on further in memory. This is, so to speak, a combination of the previous case with that considered under paragraph 1, above.

In all these cases of explication in memory, it is still necessary to consider that the horizon-intentions, which are always awakened in advance on the basis of the typical familiarity of each object even with its first becoming-given, and which belong to the essence of *every* explication, here provide the occasion for particular possibilities of *error*, in that something is held to be a memory of what has actually been given originally when in reality it is merely an anticipative picturing on the basis of this typical familiarity.

## § 28. *Multileveled explication and the relativization of the distinction between substrate and determination.*

THE PREVIOUS ANALYSIS operated with a schematic simplification of the process of explication insofar as only those explications were considered which progressed in a single line without bifurcation. It is now time to go beyond this simplifica-

tion and ascend to the more complicated forms, namely, to *ramified explications*, whereby the concepts of substrate and determination, and the sense of this distinction, will be subject to further clarification.

The ramification of explication comes about in this way, that, in going out from a substrate, determinations do not, as it were, step out in the direct path; rather, the latter themselves function in turn as substrates of additional explications themselves. This can take place in two ways:

1. The ego *abandons its original substrate* instead of continuing to hold it in grasp, while it retains in active apprehension what has just been characterized as explicate. If, for example, a flower bed attracts our attention and becomes the object of contemplation, it may happen that one of the flowers apprehended in the explication attracts our interest so strongly that we make it our exclusive theme, while we abandon all interest in the flower bed. The explicate, here the flower, thus loses its particular character as explicate; it is *rendered independent* as an object for its own sake, that is, it becomes a proper substrate for a continuing act of cognition, for the exposition of its own properties. The previous S then sinks into the passive background while also continuing to affect us as long as it remains prominent. It behaves then in a way similar to the case we previously contrasted to explication, namely, the running-through of a plurality, objectively nonthematic, which previously we had also been able to think of as being apprehended objectively. The explicate, changed into a new substrate, is still in coincidence with the former substrate, which now, however, has the passive form of a background appearance. The former active synthesis of coincidence is changed accordingly; it loses its fundamental character of a synthesis drawn from sources of activity.

2. But the case which is essentially more interesting for us is the following: *the original substrate*, once its determination has acquired this independence, still *remains the object of principal interest*, and all particular explication, penetrating further into the emerging determination, indirectly serves only *its own* enrichment: as when, in the transition to the individual flower and its explication, the bed remains continuously within the principal interest. This bifurcation can be repeated if particular forms of the calyx, of the pistil, etc., are singled out and explicated on their part, and thus for every new part of the bed.

The thematizing activity which, going on continuously in the modifications described above, objectifies  $S$  in the particular sense of the term and makes it the theme of a progressive cognition realizes itself in the activity of individual apprehensions. These are included in and subordinate to the coincidence with the apprehension of  $S$ . The apprehension of  $S$ , *qua* thematic apprehension in the specific sense, has its *end* in its object: this is *the object simply and solely*, valid "in and for itself." This is not true of explicates. They do not have their own validity, but only a relative one, as something *wherein* the  $S$  is determined or, better, wherein it is in its particularity and, subjectively speaking, wherein it reveals itself in its living presence, in the perception of which the  $S$  is experienced. This lack of independence with regard to its validity belongs to the essence of the explicate. If the explicate is then explicated in its turn, while the same  $S$  remains the general theme, then, indeed, the explicate itself becomes in a certain way the theme and receives the substrate-form relative to *its* explicates. But its unique validity as  $S'$  is then *relative*. It does not lose the form of an explicate of  $S$ , and its own explicates retain the form of mediate explication of a second level. This is possible only through a *superimposition of what is retained in grasp* during the progress of the explication. If, in connection with the explication at a single level, so to speak,  $S$  is retained in grasp in the transition to  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ , . . . , as that which is constantly enriched, while the explicates are not retained for themselves but only as enriching  $S$ , then, in the transition from  $\alpha$  to its explicate  $\pi$ , it is not only the  $S$  as enriched by  $\alpha$  which is retained, but, superimposed on  $S$ ,  $\alpha$  itself is also retained. But it is retained as a substrate, not for itself, but in synthetic coincidence with  $S$ , as something *of* it. This retention therefore occurs in another way than in the progression of the direct explication of  $S$ , in the transition from  $\alpha$  to  $\beta$ , whereby  $\alpha$  is not at all retained for itself, but only  $S$  enriched by  $\alpha$ . If this first stage of dual-level explication is accomplished and the  $S_{\alpha\pi}$  is constituted, the explication can then continue in various directions.

a) It can lead to a further direct explicate of  $S$ , to  $\beta$ . Then it is only the  $S$  which is retained in grasp, as enriched on a dual level by  $\alpha\pi$ , and indirectly by  $\pi$ . But the  $\alpha$  is no longer retained for itself.

b) However, it can also lead to a further explicate of  $\alpha$ , which we will call  $\rho$ . Then the apprehension of  $\rho$  takes place on

the basis of the retention of the  $S_{a\pi}$ , on the one hand, and, on the other, of  $a_\pi$  ( $a$  enriched by  $\pi$ ), which is in synthetic coincidence with  $S_{a\pi}$  but is still truly retained for itself as the substrate of new explications in addition to the principal substrate  $S_{a\pi}$ . All of the enrichments of  $a$  are naturally not directly attributed to  $S$  as enrichments, but to  $S$  only insofar as it has  $a$  in itself.

Thus, if it is continued,  $S$  can be explicated mediately on multiple levels, in a process repeatable at will.  $\pi$  itself can again become a substrate, and so on. At each level, the *form of the relative substrate and of the correlative explicate occurs*. But in the series of levels, the *dominant substrate* remains privileged; in relation to it all other substrates are subordinate, ancillary. The active synthesis of identity is carried on in stages, which are all centered on the activity continually directed toward  $S$ , no matter how many ramifications there also may be, and which modify it in the process in corresponding ways. We aim continually at the  $S$ , the central theme; and the dominant aim is fulfilled in the concatenations and sequences of explicates in which, by virtue of gradual coincidence, it is always again the  $S$ , and only it, which "is" and which reveals itself in its particularities. In the occurrences of possible explication, it is the *principal substrate which is objective in a privileged sense*, by virtue of the validity which it has by itself, a validity which only it has (as opposed to other substrates). What is thematic in other respects is so only in a relative sense; it is not straightforwardly thematic, and it can become so only if the original object is abandoned. Such autonomy is naturally possible at any level of explication desired; every explicate, at no matter how high a level, can become thematically autonomous.

§ 29. *Absolute substrates and absolute determinations, and the threefold sense of this distinction.*

THE DISTINCTION between substrate and determination thus shows itself at first as purely relative. Everything that affects and is objective can just as well play the role of object-substrate as that of object-determination or explicate. And just



as we can, continuously and at ever higher levels, make explicates independent and thus make them into substrates, "substratize" them, in the same way we can also colligate every object, every autonomous substrate, with other objects, and then make the collection as a whole into a theme, enter into its members by explication, in this way exhibiting the whole by determining it, so that each of the formerly independent object-substrates henceforth acquires the character of explicate; or it can from the first be a collection, consisting of substrates independent in themselves, affecting us as a whole in the same way as an individual object. Accordingly, the concept of substrate leaves open whether or not the substrates in question have arisen from the operation which has made the determination thematically independent and whether the objects in question are originally one or plural (pluralities of independent objects). In any case, the explication inherent in the experience bears in itself the distinction between substrate and determination; it progresses in apprehensions of ever new substrates and in the passage to the explication of what is apprehended in them. We can make a substrate, particularly a principal substrate, of whatever can enter into attentive regard, and from this we can form the idea of a substrate in general and of the difference between substrate and determination.

But as soon as we inquire from the genetic point of view about the operations of experience from which, in original self-evidence, this separation of substrate and determination arises, this arbitrariness no longer holds true. The continuing relativization *in infinitum* of the distinction between substrate and determination in the course of experience has its limits, and we must come to distinguish between *substrates and determinations in an absolute and a relative sense*. To be sure, what occurs as a determination in an activity of experience can always take on in a new experience the new form and dignity of a substrate; we then explicate it in *its* properties. In this transformation of the determination into a substrate of new determinations, which are now *its* determinations, the original determination is the same for consciousness and, what is more, is given in itself, although its function has changed. If a substrate occasionally arises from this substratification, as it were, of a determination, still it is soon apparent that not *every* substrate can arise in this way. What is substratified has preserved precisely this origin in its being-sense; and if it is now

the theme of experience, it is still evident that it could become this originally only in the following way: that previously another substrate has been explicated, from which it has arisen as its determination. With this, we come finally and necessarily to substrates which do not arise from substratification. In this context, they merit the name of absolute substrate. But with this, we do not say that their determinations should straightway be called absolute determinations (absolute object-determinations). On the contrary, we are led here to a new relativity.

It is, to be sure, toward relative substrates of the sphere of experience that every act of correspondent relative experience is directed, but this being-directed-toward, the start of the act of experience, is mediated by the experiential activities in which the absolute substrate in question has been explicated and where, finally, the relevant determinations (immediate and mediate) have been substratified. *An absolute substrate, therefore, is distinguished in this way, that it is simply and directly experienceable, that it is immediately apprehensible, and that its explication can be immediately brought into play.* Individual objects of external sensuous perception, that is, bodies, are above all what is immediately apprehensible and are therefore substrates in an exemplary sense. Therein is found one of the decisive prerogatives of external perception as that which pre-gives the most original substrates of both the activities of experience and the predicative activities of explication.<sup>1</sup>

But also simply experienceable in this particular sense is a *plurality of bodies*, as a spatiotemporal configuration or as a causal whole of material bodies which are experienceable in unity because they condition one another in a unity of reciprocal connection, as, e.g., in a machine. In the realization of intention in experience, the act of simple and direct apprehension which here is possible turns into determinations of this plurality, into its quiddities (into that which it is in its singularity). Thereby, under the term "determination," we come to parts, pluralities of parts, and finally, in any case, to individual bodies; and naturally not only to these, but eventually also to determinations which are not themselves material bodies. Thus we come upon an *alteration of function of a new kind*: absolute substrates, here material bodies, can function as determinations, can take over the function of parts, of members of wholes, of

1. On this, cf. the Introduction, above, § 14.

substrate-unities of a higher level. But this changes nothing about the fact that they are absolute substrates insofar as they are experienceable and explicable simply and directly. Since such a plurality taken as a whole is also an absolute substrate, it follows that not everything which appears as a determination in an absolute substrate must on that account itself be an absolute determination. *Absolute substrates, therefore, are divided into substrates which are "unities" of and in pluralities, and into substrates which are themselves pluralities.* At first this division is *relative*, but it leads—in experience—to *absolute unities and pluralities*, whereby the pluralities themselves can in their turn be pluralities of pluralities. In retrocession, however, every plurality leads ultimately to absolute unities—a plurality of material bodies to ultimate material bodies, which are no longer configurations.

It is not a question here of the causal possibility of cutting up a material body—whereby the pieces first result from the causal activity of the dismemberment and only afterwards are ascribed to the whole as parts which are potentially contained in it; and still less is it a question of the ideal possibility of division *in infinitum*. In actual experience there is no division *in infinitum*, and above all there is no experienceable plurality which, in the progress of experience (for example, in drawing nearer), is resolved into ever new pluralities *in infinitum*.

If, accordingly, we consider the determinations of absolute substrates, we indeed come upon determinations which themselves can again be absolute substrates, therefore upon plural substrates (upon actually experienceable wholes with their parts, upon unities of pluralities); but it is also clear that every absolute substrate has determinations which are not absolute substrates. The ultimate unities—in the material world, the ultimate material unities—certainly have determinations which are originally experienceable *only* as determinations, which, therefore, can be only relative substrates. Thus it is, for example, with a shape, a color. They can appear originally only as determinations of the body of the object as shaped and colored, of the spatiotemporal thing which is their substrate. It is the *object* which must first come into prominence, at least in the background, and affect us—even if the ego does not turn toward it at all but, rather, the interest passes immediately over and beyond it and then seizes exclusively upon its color, etc., so that it is the color which immediately monopolizes the principal

thematic interest. But the plural substrates also have determinations which can appear only *as such*, and indeed in abstraction from the determinations of their individual material bodies, which mediate are also *their* determinations. These are obviously the determinations which give a unity to the plurality as plurality, the *determinations of configuration or complexio*n in the broadest sense, and from them come all relative determinations which, in a plurality experienceable as unity, accrue to every individual member (just as to every partial plurality) as its being-in-relation-to [the plurality].<sup>2</sup>

In the sphere of experience, in the self-givenness of existents as objects of possible experience, there is thus *a basic distinction between absolute substrates*, the individual objects which are simply experienceable and determinable, and *absolute determinations*, which are experienced as existent, that is, as substrates, only by substratification. Everything capable of being experienced is characterized either as *something for and in itself* or as something which is only in another, *in an existent for itself*. Otherwise expressed: absolute substrates are those whose being is not that of mere determinations, those to which, therefore, the form of determination is nonessential, consequently, whose being-sense does not lie exclusively in this, that in its being another being "is such." Absolute determinations are objects to which the form of determination is essential, whose being must be characterized originally and on principle only as the being-such of another being; they can appear in original self-givenness in substrate form only where they have previously appeared as determinations and where other objects in which they occur as determinations are first given as substrates. *A priori*, they acquire the substrate form only by a specific activity making them independent. In this sense, *absolute substrates are independent; absolute determinations are dependent*.

In addition, absolute substrates are divided into *unities* and *pluralities*; and if we understand unity in an absolute fashion, the distinction arises between absolute substrates, which can be determined "only" by absolute determinations, and substrates which themselves must still be determined by absolute substrates.

The sense of the discourse about the independence of abso-

2. For greater detail on these points, see below, §§ 32b and 43b.

lute substrates must be understood, to be sure, with a certain *restriction*. No individual body which we bring to givenness in experience is isolated and for itself. Each is a body in a unitary context which, finally and universally understood, is that of the world. Thus universal sensuous experience, conceived as proceeding in universal accord, has a unity of being, a unity of a higher order; the existent of this universal experience is the totality of nature, the universe of all material bodies. We can also direct ourselves to this whole of the world and make it a theme of experience. *To the finitude of the experience of individual bodies is contrasted the infinity of world-explication*, which exhibits the being of the world in the infinity of the possible progression of experience from finite substrates to other, always new ones. To be sure, the world in the sense of the totality of nature is not encountered as substrate in a simple experience; its experience is therefore not a matter of something being simply displayed in substrate moments, in "properties." On the contrary, the experience of the totality of nature is founded in the prior experiences of individual bodies. But the totality of nature is also "experienced"; we can also direct our attention toward it—even as we experience individual bodies—and also explicate it in its particularities, in which its being is revealed. Thus, *all substrates are* connected together; if we move about in the world *qua* universe, none of them is without "real" relation to others, and to all others, mediately or immediately.

This leads to a *new understanding of the concept of absolute substrate*. A "finite" substrate can be experienced simply for itself and thus has its being-for-itself. But necessarily, it is at the same time a determination, that is, it is experienceable as a determination as soon as we consider a more comprehensive substrate in which it is found. Every finite substrate has determinability as being-in-something,<sup>3</sup> and this is true *in infinitum*. But in the following respect the world is absolute substrate, namely, everything is in it, and it itself is not an in-something; it is no longer a relative unity within a more comprehensive plurality. It is the totality of existents; it is not "in something" but is itself something total. Another absoluteness is also connected to this: a real existent, a finite real plurality, i.e., a plurality which has the unity of a reality, is

3. Cf. Introduction, pp. 34 f.

subsistent in the causality of its alterations; and all realities which are causally connected and thus make up relatively subsistent unities of pluralities are themselves again causally interlaced [*verflochten*]. This implies that *everything mundane*, whether a real unity or a real plurality, is *ultimately dependent*; *only the world is independent, only it is absolute substrate in the strict sense of absolute independence*; it does not subsist as a finite substrate does, namely, in relation to circumstances exterior to itself.

But the world of our experience, taken concretely, is not only the totality of nature. In the world there are also others, our fellow men; and things do not sustain only natural determinations, but they are determined also as cultural objects, as things shaped by men, with their value predicates, predicates of utility, and so on. What we actually and straightforwardly perceive of the world in simple perception is the external world. Everything pertaining to the external world we perceive sensuously as corporeal in spatiotemporal nature. Where we come up against human beings and animals and against cultural objects, where we do not have mere nature but the expression of a mental being-sense, we are led beyond what is sensuously experienceable.<sup>4</sup> Now these determinations, on the basis of which an existent is not merely a natural body but is determined and experienceable *qua* human being, animal, cultural object, and so on, are determinations of a completely different kind from those of material bodies as such. They do not appear in the spatiotemporal thing which founds them as determinations in the same way as its color, for example, is a determination. Rather, an existent which is not merely a natural object but is experienced as human, as animal, as cultural object, has its *personal* determinations; it is itself a substrate in regard to them, and an *original* substrate, in the sense that it does not first become a substrate by a substratification of determinations which would have to be experienced beforehand as determinations in the material thing which founds them.

From this results a *distinction between substrate and determination in a wider sense*. Notwithstanding the fact that these objectives are founded in existents which are the objects of simple perception, of simple experience—corporeal being—

4. Cf. Introduction, pp. 55 f.

they are original substrates, although here, with regard to their being founded, any mention of absoluteness is not in order, or at least is admissible in only a loose sense. As substrates, they have their independence, but an independence which, since it certainly does not imply a nondependence with regard to the objectivities which found them, is only a *relative independence*—but relative in quite another sense than that of original determinations, which are independent only because they have later been made such; that is to say, the substrates referred to here never appear originally in the form of “in something” but always as original substrates, which can be explicated through experience in their *own*, in personal, determinations.

To sum up, we can say that the relativity in the relation between substrate and determination has its limit in an *absolute difference*, and, what is more, in a threefold way.

1. *The absolute substrate in a pre-eminent sense is the totality of nature*, the universe of material bodies in which it is exhibited and which are, accordingly, dependent with regard to it and can be considered as *its* determinations. Its absoluteness lies on its independence, but it is not an *original* substrate in the sense that it could become as a whole simply the theme of an act of simple apprehension.

2. *The individual objects of sensuous external perception*, of the experience of material bodies, are *absolute substrates in the sense of what can be originally the object of a simple experience*. They are independent in the sense that they can become, as singular or plural, a theme of simple, straightforward experience. In contrast to them, their determinations are absolute determinations, dependent in the sense that they can be encountered originally only *in* the objects in the form of determination.

3. In a *loose sense*, the *objectivities founded* in objects capable of being simply given can also be designated as absolute substrates. They are absolute in the sense that they can be originally experienced only in the form of substrates (although not apprehensible simply and straightforwardly) in contrast to the determinations in which they are exhibited.

A broader concept of absolute substrate is that of *something completely indeterminate from the point of view of logic*, of the individual “this here,” of the ultimate material substrate of all logical activity—a concept of substrate which can only

be mentioned here, and whose discussion belongs in the next section.<sup>5</sup> This concept of absolute substrate, in its formal generality, leaves open what the nature of the experience of an object is, whether simple or founded, and includes in itself only the lack of all logical formation, of everything which is called forth in the substrate as determination by a logical activity of a higher level.

### § 30. *Independent and dependent determinations.*

#### *The concept of the whole.*

THE ESSENCE of the determinations of simple, experienceable object-substrates, that is, individual spatiotemporal-material things (absolute substrates in the sense described under paragraph 2, above), which by their nature are especially interesting in the context of an analysis of the receptivity of external perception, still requires additional clarifications and distinctions.

It has already been shown that absolute substrates in this sense can be unitary, as well as plural, objects. This implies that not everything which appears in them as a determination need necessarily be an absolute determination. Indeed, the individual members of a configuration, of a plurality, appear in its explication as determinations; but they can just as well appear originally, according to the nature of the affection and the direction of the interest, as independent substrates (cf. above, pp. 134 ff.); it is equally possible for either the plurality or the whole to be apprehended from the first and become the substrate, and the same is true of any individual element whatsoever. To the members of a configuration, of a plurality, the form of the determination is not essential. Thus the determinations of absolute, simply experienceable substrates divide into *independent* and *dependent*, i.e., *original*, determinations: in-

5. For this concept of an ultimate substrate, cf. Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1913), p. 28; English translation by W. R. Boyce Gibson, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (New York: Humanities Press, 1931), p. 66. See also *Logic*, pp. 181 f.; ET, pp. 204 f.



dependent like the trees lining an avenue, or dependent like the color of an object. This difference includes in itself differences in the mode of givenness, which will be discussed at the same time.

First let us mention what follows from this for the *concept of a whole*. For possible internal determination, every substrate can be regarded as a *whole* which has *parts* in which it is explicated. The *concept of the whole*, like that of the part, is then taken in the broadest sense:<sup>1</sup> by "whole" is understood *every unitary object which admits of partial apprehensions*, that is, a penetrative, explicative contemplation, and by "part" every explicate which results therefrom. In this sense the relation of a sheet of paper and the white color of the paper can also be viewed as a whole-part relation; if I pass from the color, which caught my eye and which I have first made my object, to the paper, the latter is still a "whole" relative to the white. In this way I include something "more" in my glance, just as when I pass from the base of an ashtray, taken as a part, to the whole ashtray. In both cases, it is a transition from explicate to substrate. This concept of the whole in the broadest sense thus includes every object which in general can possibly become an object-substrate to be explicated, it being a matter of indifference whether it is an original object-substrate, either unitary or plural, or whether it is not.

In contrast to this is a *narrower concept of the whole*, which includes only original object-substrates. Every whole in this sense, then, has determinations ("parts" in our broadest sense), and these are either independent or dependent. Under a still narrower, and the truly *pregnant, concept of the whole* are included those wholes which are composed of independent parts, into which they are capable of being dismembered. We will designate their parts, *qua* independent parts, "pieces," and the dependent parts contrasted to them we will designate "dependent moments" (also called "abstract parts" in the Third Logical Investigation). It belongs to the concept of the whole in this pregnant sense that it is capable of being dismembered; this means that its explication leads to independent determinations. But, nonetheless, as we shall see, it is *not a simple sum of*

1. For this broadest concept of the part, cf. Edmund Husserl, Third Logical Investigation, *Logische Untersuchungen* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1913), II, 228; English translation by J. N. Findlay, *Logical Investigations* (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), II, 435.

*pieces*, like a class, the explication of which *also* leads to independent determinations. The form of the determination is not essential to pieces and members of sets, nor is the form of the substrate to moments. The latter have taken on the substrate form only by the particular activity which makes them independent.

§ 31. *The apprehension of pieces and dependent moments.*

HOW IS THE INDEPENDENCE of pieces characterized in relation to the dependence of moments? The question is that of their constitutive origin in the operations of explication. An independent object is originally given in another way than a dependent one, and, within a whole in the broader sense, independent parts (*pieces*) are brought into relief in another way than dependent parts of different levels. To the essence of every whole of this kind belongs the possibility of contemplation and explication. It is given as a unitary object in which other objects, its parts, stand out as parts. It is a unity of affection with particular affections included in itself. If it is now a question of a whole composed of pieces, we have seen how the independence of the latter is realized so that each of them can be separately apprehended and contemplated without the whole being apprehended, as is the case, for example, in the contemplation of one tree out of a row of them. On the other hand, the whole can also be apprehended without one of the parts, or all of them, being apprehended separately. However, as a whole, it is apprehended and given with complete clarity only if it is first taken and contemplated in a unitary thematic grasp, then progressively apprehended and contemplated according to its parts, whereby it is retained in grasp, in the familiar manner, as a unity which, in the transition from part to part, constantly enriches itself and which coincides with itself in its different parts.

How, then, are its pieces apprehended *as such*, that is, as pieces belonging to the whole? For the sake of simplicity, let us take a whole which is composed of only two pieces. It is called a whole inasmuch as it has only these two immediate

parts, is "divided" only into them. It is from the first provided with these particular affections, which converge to form the unity of a single affection. Let us now suppose that the explication is directed toward *one* of the two pieces; the essence of this explication implies that, by such explicative disassociation of a piece in the whole, an *excess*, a surplus, comes into prominence, a surplus which has its own affective force and is apprehensible as a second piece *connected* with the first. *Apprehensible*: for the coming-into-prominence does not signify that what has come into prominence is already actually apprehended for itself. To begin with, only one of the pieces is apprehended on the basis of the contemplated whole. It is in coincidence with the whole, but in a wholly unique way, which differs from the coincidence between a substrate and a dependent moment. In both cases—thus, in *every* explicative coincidence—with the dissociation of a part on the basis of a whole (both terms taken in the *broader* sense) something is dissociated and something is left over which is not dissociated. This means that the congruence is only partial. But the way in which the nonexplicated "remainder" is present to consciousness is completely different in explication by pieces than in explication by dependent moments. In the one case, a color in the object is apprehended, e.g., the red of a copper ashtray; in the other, a piece, e.g., its base. If a piece is brought into relief, then the nonexplicated "remainder" is "*exterior*" to it and prominent in relation to it, even though connected with it. As for a dependent moment—in our example the red color which, as it were, overlies the entire ashtray—there is nothing which has come into prominence "*exterior*" to it. The other dependent moments of the ashtray do not affect us as separated from the color and only connected with it; on the contrary, the substrate which is explicated as red, and retained in grasp as such, affects us as being *at the same time* rough or smooth, etc., and in a further explication can then be apprehended accordingly. By means of this description, we understand from the subjective side what has already been established in the Third Investigation<sup>1</sup> from a purely noematic point of view, namely, that dependent parts "*interpenetrate*," contrary to independent parts, which are "*exterior* to one another."

In the concept of a piece (of a part, in the pregnant sense

1. § 21, p. 276; ET, II, 475.

of an independent part) the implication is that it is *connected* in the whole with other parts (in consequence of its independence); in the concept of a dependent moment, and, moreover, of an immediate, qualitative one, [the implication is] that it does not have moments which complete it, with which it is connected. On the other hand, it is this being-in-connection which characterizes the pieces of a whole, despite their independence, as against the members of a set. The members of a set are not connected with one another. This implies that *the whole is more than the mere sum of its parts*.

The following important propositions result from this:

*The whole is divided by the pieces into a complex of connected parts*; every member of such a connection, which constitutes the essence of the whole, is a piece.

*The bringing-into-relief of a single piece already divides the whole*, at least relative to this piece in connection with its complementary totality, this also having the character of a piece. If A, for example, is a piece, the connection of A and B is also a piece, etc. A whole, therefore, can never have a single piece; it must have at least two.

Obviously, every connection of independent objects is again an independent object.

Up to this point, we have always contrasted pieces with dependent moments and have conceived the latter as immediate. To this we should add: a dependent moment is *immediate* if it is the moment of an object and not the moment of any piece or of the connection of several pieces. (The connection of several pieces will be discussed in the next section.)

This implies that the essence of an immediate moment entails that it cannot be "connected" in the whole with other components of the object (parts in the broadest sense of the term).

Thus, the moment is itself capable of being parceled out, divided into interconnected moments. Then, in relation to these moments, it is regarded as a *relative substrate*, again capable of being parceled out into relatively independent objects.

Only objectivities relatively independent of one another can be in connection, can found a "moment of connection" in virtue of their essence. It is thus implicit in the *pregnant concept of a whole* that it represents a *connection of independent pieces*.

The question remains open here whether and in what way independent objects *must* found a connection, whether one can

say of any kind of independent object that, in conformity with its genus, it can found a connection and that between two objects of such and such a genus a connection is possible. Likewise, [the question] whether every object-substrate must be a whole in the pregnant sense of the term, that is, a whole capable of being parceled out. But surely, each has "qualities" and each has "dependent moments." In its turn, every piece also has dependent moments—that is, "parts"—which are not pieces.

It should be stressed once more that all these distinctions, like those discussed in the following sections, refer first of all only to simple object-substrates, to spatiotemporal objects of external perception, and cannot by a formalization be transferred without further ado to objectivities of a more elevated kind founded on them, for example, to cultural objects; nevertheless, in these objectivities, relations like those of whole to part, property relations, etc., must also be capable of being exhibited, but in a way peculiar to these objectivities.

### § 32. *Dependent moments as connections and as qualities.*

#### a. Mediate and immediate qualities.

UP TO NOW, as examples of originally dependent determination, therefore of determination by dependent moments, we have always chosen qualitative determinations. But is the concept of quality adequately defined by this original dependence? Are the terms "quality" and "originally dependent moment" synonymous? Or are there also dependent moments of still another kind?

Let us consider, for example, the edge of a material thing or the total surface which defines it as a spatial figure; these are certainly dependent moments and not pieces: we cannot take away the surface or the edge from a thing so that it falls into two independent parts. On the other hand, the surface which defines it is certainly not a quality of the thing. It follows, then, that *not every dependent, concrete moment belongs to the thing as a quality.*

Among the qualities of a thing are its color, roughness,

smoothness, total form, and the like. However, if we dismember the thing, then the color, etc., of an individual piece is *its* quality, and only mediately the quality of the whole. The thing is red on this spot, in this piece, blue in that, etc. The thing glitters here, is smooth here, but rough in that part, and so on. If we simply say, "The thing is rough," it is then necessary to add: according to this or that piece. It is similar when we say, "The thing is defined by its surface." Strictly speaking, the thing is first of all extended (extension being understood as its immediate quality); its extension (as its abstract moment) has a limit (the surface) of this or that form as its immediate quality, which is then only a mediate quality of the total thing. Dependent concrete moments which do not belong to the thing as immediate qualities thus are *mediate qualities*, i.e., qualities of either its independent pieces or its dependent moments. When we speak of quality in an unqualified sense, as a rule we mean an immediate quality.

b. The pregnant concept of quality and its difference as compared to connection.

Now, are all *immediate* dependent moments of an object (everything belonging to it as a whole) straightway to be termed qualities?

The following expresses a contrary thesis: *the forms of connection* of independent pieces—for example, the connection of a piece, singled out from the whole, with the "rest," the total piece which complements it—certainly are also dependent moments of the whole and not dependent moments of its pieces; and still only with difficulty could one designate them as qualities of the whole.

We must say, therefore, that qualities are dependent moments of an object which do not belong to its pieces as their moments or to any sum of pieces as their connection. We would then need to distinguish three things in the possible internal determinations of a substrate: *pieces, connections, and qualities*.

As dependent moments, one could also take connections and qualities together, and distinguish:

1. Dependent moments of an aggregate, a collective, which are not dependent moments of its members (qualities in the

broader sense of aggregates: qualities of connection, qualities of form); and

2. Independent moments of a nonplural substrate, of a singular object, which belong to it in virtue of its being a whole and, therefore, do not belong to its pieces or to their collections (*qualities in the narrower sense: immediate qualities*).

3. Close to this, another *concept of quality*, the *broadest possible*, should be noted here. It embraces everything which pertains to the object: everything which in general can be stated about it, the fact of its having parts, the qualities of the parts, the qualities of aggregates of the parts, etc.

On the other hand, if we take into account how both a quality in the narrower or proper sense and a connection are constituted, then *another classification* and another distinction will result. That is, there are essential differences in the mode of givenness of dependent moments according as they are immediate qualities of the whole or otherwise dependent moments, whether they are qualities of pieces or forms of connection. An immediate quality of the whole is already in evidence in the simple explication of the whole. A dependent qualitative moment of a piece can be apprehended only when the piece is made prominent and apprehended for itself; in conformity with its mode of constitution, it is thus also a *mediate explicate* of the whole. Naturally, the same thing is true of dependent moments of moments, themselves dependent.

In what concerns the forms of connection, they are apprehensible only as moments of connection of the elements connected; this means that these must be apprehended first, and only then can the connection be apprehended. *The connection is, therefore, a dependent moment which is given only after the explication of the whole with respect to its parts*, therefore in the whole already divided. This takes place in the following way: on the basis of the whole retained in grasp, each piece is apprehended for itself and is added to the whole as an enrichment, so that the whole is now a divided whole. The connection then emerges not as a third part, which the whole might have in the same sense as the two others, but as a *mediate determination* of the whole or, to begin with, as a mediate moment, which is an immediate moment of neither one part nor the other but of their togetherness. This moment can emerge only if the togetherness is given as such, that is, if the whole is explicated in its parts and hence is divided evenly into them. Thus the

moments of connection within a whole are mediate states and, to begin with, mediate explicates.

If we limit ourselves to *immediate explicates*, only two kinds remain:

the immediate explication leads either to a *piece*,  
or to an immediate independent *moment* of the *explicandum*.

An immediate piece of the whole (every piece is immediately apprehensible, naturally, if it is not the piece of a moment) is differentiated by its mode of explication from a dependent immediate moment, and the latter is always and necessarily a "quality." We can thus define a *quality* as an *immediate dependent moment of a whole* or as an immediate part of a whole, a part for which there are not any other immediate parts with which it might be "connected."



### 3 / The Apprehension of Relation and Its Foundations in Passivity

#### § 33. *Horizon-consciousness and relational contemplation.*

BY THE OPERATIONS of explication, the object of experience (within the limits of our study, it is a question only of the objects of *simple* experience, of external perception) is disclosed in accordance with *one* kind of its possible determinations. However, in apprehending an object, one almost never stops at a contemplation concerned only with entering into the object. For the most part, the object is from the first immediately put into relation with other coaffecting objectivities given with it in the field of experience. Thus, with the first survey (§ 22) we have already contrasted explicative contemplation, which enters into the object, with relational contemplation, which goes beyond the object; and it is to the analysis of the latter that we now apply ourselves. In an anticipatory way, it was first characterized as an entering of the contemplative regard into the external horizon of the object, whereby we had in view, above all, its objectively copresent surroundings [*Umgebung*], given in an intuitivity as original as itself, these surroundings being always cogiven by way of background as a plurality of simultaneously coaffecting substrates. This plurality of what is cogiven in the surroundings is a *plural unity of the affecting*, constituted according to the laws which govern the field of passivity. Whenever we direct our contemplative regard toward the object, its coaffecting objective surroundings are in

the background of our consciousness, but their power of affection is less intense and hence does not get through to the ego, does not constrain it to turn toward them. Likewise, the internal horizon is in the background and calls forth an active apprehension, the putting-into-relation of the thematic object with its surroundings, and the apprehension of the attributes and the characteristics which are relative to it.

But it is not only what is cogiven *originaliter* as perceptible in the objective background which provides occasion for relational contemplation and the acquisition of relative determinations, but also the horizon of typical preacquaintance in which every object is pregiven. This typical familiarity codetermines the external horizon as that which always contributes, even though it is not copresent, to the determination of every object of experience. It has its ground in the passive associative relations of likeness and similarity, in the "obscure" recollections of the similar. Now, instead of investigating, as in internal explication, the object for itself on the basis of these relations, which remain concealed, *we can also thematize these relations themselves*; the recollections can be made distinct and intuitive, and the object given intuitively in its selfhood can be put actively into relation with remembered associated objects; it can be brought into a kind of intuitive unity with them. The contemplative regard can go back and forth from what is given in itself to what is presentified, in connection with which the relations of likeness and similarity in the true sense of the term are first actively preconstituted.

That which is for us an object self-given in a simple intuition, such that it can be apprehended in its internal as well as in its relative characteristics, rests, therefore, not only on what is intuitive and self-given itself and capable of being self-given intuitively as the object's surrounding field of intuition. It rests also on all the relations—which for the most part remain undisclosed—to what has been once given and which can possibly be representified, indeed, possibly on all the relations to the objectivities—to the extent that some relation of similarity can be established—of free imagination. In order to understand in their complete range the operations of prepredicative apprehension, and then of predicative determination, possible on the basis of simple firsthand experience, we will reach out beyond the domain of the self-given, indeed, even beyond that of positional consciousness; and in addition we will have to

take account of the domain of presentifications and of the intuitions of imagination. It is only in this way that we will acquire a view of everything which contributes to relational contemplation and the relative determination of the intuitively self-given.

There are, therefore, *different kinds of intuitive unity* on the basis of which the relation-seeking contemplative regard moves back and forth between the object-substrate and the object-in-relation; at one time it is a unity of the self-giving in a perception, at another a unity in which what is self-given is united with what is not self-given; and this union, again, takes place in different ways. In accord with the type of this unity there will emerge *a specification of the forms of relational contemplation*. If, by this specification, we arrive at a breakdown of the basic forms of the act of putting into relation, a breakdown which exhibits relations and forms of relation which constitute themselves as categorial objectivities in the higher sphere and thus also exhibits the basic components of a theory of relations, then the result of our present study can obviously still not provide a survey of the *totality* of the basic forms of relations but only of those which preconstitute themselves precisely in the sphere of simple receptive experience of individual objects of external perception. In the domains of objectivities founded at a higher level, and on the higher level of productive spontaneity, new specific forms of relation again emerge.

Naturally, everything which has been pointed out in the preceding chapter concerning the habitual precipitate of determinations already given and the participation of this precipitate in the recurrent or completely new determination of an object for *internal* determination is also true for all of the determinations which accrue to the object on the basis of relational contemplation. Likewise, in the same way as with explication, there are differences here between a nonrecurring and ephemeral interest, one associated with a merely single and momentary contemplation, and a penetrating interest—the tendency, for example, to take note of an object in its situation, in its proportion to other cogiven objects—all this before any turn to predication.

§ 34. *General characterization of relational contemplation.*

BEFORE WE LOOK into the specific forms of relational contemplation, we will try to obtain a general characterization of it and bring out the essential features common to all its forms.

- a. The act of taking things together in a collection and relational contemplation.

What is involved is always a plurality of objects which must be brought together in a pregiving consciousness. We will not at the outset consider the question of how this plurality is constituted as an affective unity and how it comes about. It can be originally established in passivity, but it can also have been constituted by an activity of the ego and then have fallen back into passivity, as when objects now in relation to one another were originally taken together by an act of colligation. This already implies the following: merely actively taking objects together, *adding other objects to the initial object, is still not an act of relational contemplation*. It can at most provide the preconditions for such an act. Directly apprehending a plurality of objects by running through them successively (§ 24d) only involves taking more and more objects together while those previously apprehended still remain in grasp, as when, for example, I successively run through the objects on the table: inkwell, book, pipe, penholder, etc., by letting my glance "slide over them." Without my actively taking these objects together in a specific act to form a set or number of objects, the preceding object still remains in grasp with each new apprehension; the consciousness of a plurality of objects run through is realized—but, for all that, nothing is apprehended of a relation which the one object may have to the others.

Rather, a specific interest—taking the term "interest" in our broader sense—is required, an interest in the contempla-

tion of one of these objects, which causes it to be apprehended as a principal theme. We carefully observe the penholder, for example. Our attention wanders from it, which (as our theme) is still retained in grasp, to the table top. We also draw the latter within our sphere of observation, not as a principal theme but only as a *theme in relation to* the penholder. Without our having once again to turn expressly to the penholder in a new original apprehension, it is for us, as long as it is retained in grasp, "the penholder lying on the table." In the same way, when we bring into consideration the pencil, which lies beside the penholder, there follows an apprehension of the "lying next to," but still without any predicative formation. Here a synthetic overlapping of the two apprehensions—the principal theme which is retained in grasp (the penholder) and the theme related to it (the table or the pencil)—also takes place, so that there is not a mere succession of two apprehensions and rays of attention but a double ray (cf. above, § 24b). (How, specifically, such spatial relations among objects are constituted belongs in the general context of the problem of the constitution of space and cannot be discussed in greater detail here, where, in only one example, the most general structures of relational apprehension and the apprehension of relative determinations are to be exhibited.) On the basis of this unitary consciousness, in which the two objects are apprehended as lying beside each other, new determinations can then be constituted for the penholder in original intuitivity; for example, "The penholder is thicker than the pencil." Again we have the same structure: the penholder is retained in grasp as the principal theme, and, with the passing of attention to the pencil, something more [*Plus*] stands out in relief with regard to it on the basis of the overlapping coincidence in relation to the extension; as still retained in grasp, the pencil now receives the determination "thicker."<sup>1</sup> Conversely, if from the beginning we make *it* the theme of our observation, the pencil naturally can be apprehended in the same way as being thinner—the two apprehensions having as a foundation the *unity of the being-together in one consciousness*, in the same way as, on this basis, the "beside-one-another" or the "lying-on" was previously apprehended as a determination of the substrate.

1. Cf. also the more exhaustive analysis in § 42, below.

b. The reversibility of relational contemplation and the *fundamentum relationis*.

What is of importance here is first of all only this, that on the basis of such a unity, no matter how established, of the being-together of several objects in one consciousness, with the passage from one object, considered as the principal theme, to another, the new determinations are precipitated on the latter. Which object in this plurality is apprehended before the others depends on the direction of the interest at that time. Thus, on the basis of such unity entirely different determinations can result, now of the one object, now of the other; at one time the one can stand out in relief as thicker, then the other as thinner; now the one as lying-on, then the other as lying-beneath. A fixed order is not prescribed here, as it was in the case of internal explication, where in an essential way objects as original substrates took precedence over others which could appear originally only as determinations. In the case of relational contemplation, we have from the first to deal with independent objects, and each one of the members of the relation can originally just as well be the principal theme and substrate of the relation as the relative theme (a theme which is only considered with the other), according as the interest requires it at the time. This relation underlies what we will come to know later, at the higher predicative level, as the *reversibility of every relational state of affairs* [*Sachverhalt*].

At the level we have occupied up to now, there certainly has been no question as yet of relations as a kind of state of affairs but only of stages of the act of contemplation. Nevertheless, considering the fact that these stages provide the presupposition for the constitution of relations, we can designate the unity which underlies this act of relational contemplation, in whatever way it may be realized, as the *fundamentum relationis*.

c. Relating and explicating.

It is obvious that this unity need not itself become thematized before an act of relational contemplation can be instituted; rather, it acts in a purely passive way as a conjoint affecting of the objects pre-given in *one* consciousness and thus makes the synthetic transition from one to the other possible. Accordingly,

this relational contemplation is not to be understood as if a glance of attention must first encounter the unity—the latter, therefore, having to be actively apprehended as unity—as if only then, on the basis of this unity, the act of putting-in-relation could be instituted as a kind of explication of this previously established unity. But, as a matter of principle, explication is distinguished from putting-in-relation because, with explication, there is always a partial coincidence by means of which what is explicated is apprehended as attached to, or in, the explicand, as pertaining to it. On the other hand, the relational determinations certainly appear as determinations of the substrates: it is the substrate which manifests itself as greater or smaller, etc.; but these determinations do *not* appear as *attached to, or in, the unity* between the two members of the relation, as would have to be the case if relational contemplation were an explication of the unity. Rather, the relational determinations emerge *on the ground* of the pre-given; this unity itself does not become thematic, but only the object considered according to the mode of relation. It is *about* the object, as we said, that we apprehend relative properties, just as we apprehend the internal explicates about it. But the internal determinations we apprehend, at the same time, as contained *in* the object, in partial coincidence with it; the relative determinations, on the other hand, are never *in* the object but first come into being with the transition to the relative object, extending “tentacles” toward it, so to speak.

• A synthesis of coincidence certainly also occurs in relational contemplation, namely, the overlapping described under subsection a, in which relative determinations emerge and are apprehended. But as *discrete*, this consciousness of coincidence must be rigorously distinguished from the *continuous consciousness of coincidence*, in which the unity of an object is continuously present to consciousness, whether in a simple apprehension or in its explication.

§ 35. *The question of the essence of the unity establishing the relation.*

UP TO THIS POINT we have spoken entirely in general terms about the unity of the members of a relation, a unity which is the presupposition of every act of relational contemplation. However, we have already alluded to the fact that there are different kinds of intuitive unity, on the basis of which the contemplative regard can go back and forth between the object-substrate (the principal theme) and the object-relation (the theme in-relation-to). There can be an immediate unity in the giving of a thing itself in perception, but there can just as well be a unity in which something self-given and something not self-given (presentified, imagined) are united. We must now inquire into these modes of the constitution of unity in order to obtain insight into the particular forms of possible relation, at least as regards their basic types. In accordance with our starting from the self-giving of individual spatially concrete objects in external perception, the unity of the examples examined up to now was conceived as a unity of simultaneously intuitive and affecting objectivities pre-given in the field of perception, as a unity of the simultaneity of the affecting: what is situated in a field of perception as given at first hand, or as able to be such by means of a turning-of-regard, affects in unity; from all this, stimuli flow out to the ego. This unity of the field, on the basis of which any orientation of apprehension toward individual objectivities affecting us, as well as their explication and reciprocal putting-in-relation, is first possible, has been, up to this point, simply presupposed; and it has only been mentioned that these are achievements of the passive synthesis of time-consciousness, by means of which such unity becomes fundamentally possible (§ 16). These achievements must now be followed up a bit further in order to understand the structure of such a complex unity of affection. Also, the ego-acts occurring on the basis of this field, the acts of turning-toward, of apprehension, have, as themselves acts, their temporal structure, which has already been explicated (§ 23). It is not about this structure, therefore, that we now inquire, but about the *temporal structure of the passive field itself*, which precedes all acts;



accordingly, about that which constitutes the passive unity of the pregivenness of a plurality of perceived things.

We must start out from the unity that is nearest at hand, namely, that of a plurality of perceived objects intuitively united in a single *presence*, and then further ask, *in addition to the unity of original intuition, what other kinds of relation-establishing unity are also possible*, and, specifically, what kinds of unity contribute to the relational determination of objects of perception.

### § 36. *The passive (temporal) unity of perception.*

IN ORDER FOR A *unity of the perception of a plurality of individuals* to be possible, it must be given as simultaneously affecting in a *single* now of consciousness. This means that the unity of a sensuous perception, the unity of an intuitive object of consciousness, is the *unity of a sensuous consciousness* in which everything objective, whether it is a self-enclosed individual or a plurality of such individuals, attains original givenness in and with the *form of a temporal duration*, rendering an encompassing and objective unity possible.

If we assume, to begin with, *one* individual that comes to intuition, then the unity of the intuition of this individual extends exactly as far as the unity of its original duration, i.e., of the original duration which is constituted in original time-consciousness. The individual emerges anew from the intuition, even though it may also further endure in itself and may even be intended relative to consciousness, although not intuitively, as enduring somehow or other—if the continuing original constitution of time does not constitute this duration as the duration of the individual in question, therefore as duration filled with the individual plenitude of the moments of its material content.

The same thing holds for a plurality of individuals. But they are then present together to consciousness in the unity of an intuition only if a unity of the consciousness constituting original duration and temporality in general includes this plurality according to the modes of the simultaneous and the successive. Then, not only is each of these individuals intuited and each

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intuitive intention of the plurality in a present lived experience but a *unity of objective togetherness*. This will become clearer in contrast to other cases in which intuitive unity is also present but where the objects united intuitively are objectively intended as existing at different times or, as in the case of imagined objectivities, as in general existing at no objective time.

These cases will compel us to go a little beyond the domain of that which is proper to oneself alone, a domain to which in other respects our study remains limited (cf. Introduction, pp. 57 ff.). If, up to now, it has been a question of perception, thus of a positional consciousness intending objects as *existing*, these objects were thought of only as objects *for me*, as objects of a world only for me. But the reference to objective time—which is unavoidable here and in the following if we are to understand in depth the contrasts between perception and memory, on the one hand, and the lived experiences of imagination, on the other, and the differences conditioned by the unity founding the relation—already leads beyond this domain of being-only-for-me. Objective time, objective being, and all determinations of existents as objective certainly designate a being not only for me but also for others.

### § 37. *The unity of memory and its separation from perception.*

IN CONNECTION with the question about the other kinds of intuitive unity which can still exist beyond the immediate unity of perception, we will, for the present, hold ourselves within positional consciousness. Consequently, the most immediate question will concern above all the *connection of perception with memory* as positional [*setzender*] presentification and the *mode of their intuitive unity*, of a unity, therefore, which can also appear when the unified objects, which are in reciprocal relation, are not given simultaneously in a perception but are given partly in perceptions, partly in presentifications.

The following serves as an example: through perception I see a table before me, and at the same time I am reminded of another table, which formerly was in its place. Although I can, as it were, “place” the remembered table beside the perceived

table, it is still not beside the latter in the unity of an actual duration; it is in a certain manner separated from the perceived table. The world of perception and the world of memory are separate worlds. But, on the other hand, there is still a unity, and this, as will become apparent, in a multiple sense, insofar as I have both tables before me in a single intuitive presence. *In what sense are we talking here of separation, and in what sense of unity?*

Certainly, there is a legitimacy to talking about the *separateness* of the perceived and the remembered. If I live in memory, I have a unity of intuition of memory; what is remembered is there *before* all acts of comparing, distinguishing, relating; the remembered is "sensuous" and made of flowing parts, "intuitive," unitary, and self-enclosed—just as long as I live in *one* intuition of memory which persists uninterrupted, as long as I don't "leap" from memory to memory in a chaos of sudden "whims." Every uniform memory is in itself continuously uniform and in itself constitutes for consciousness a unity of objectivities, which is an intuitive-sensuous unity: intuitive in flowing parts, we said. That is, the running-through in memory of an event of sufficiently long duration has exactly the same structure as its apprehension in original perception. Just as in perception there is always only a single phase intuitively present to consciousness in the original, which phase, immediately detached from the next and retained in grasp, is united synthetically with it, so, in the memory of the event, the whole event is, to be sure, intuitively intended in its unity, namely, in all of its phases, although always only a single stretch of its flowing temporality is "really intuitive."

*The principle of the closed nature [Geschlossenheit] of memory* is naturally exactly the same as that which we have determined previously for perception, namely, it is based on a unity of temporal duration. It is a unity, not only in relation to the extraction and thematic contemplation of a perceived individual thing or event, but in relation to the unitary phenomenon of the "impression" which founds this activity, a phenomenon in which a unity of objectivity (however numerous its components may be) is sensuously pregiven to us, is already passively there for us. It is an originally constituted structure which flows along continuously. This structure, whether of perception (firsthand sensuous givenness) or of memory, is always for itself, and only the horizon-intentions give it a con-

nection with the objectivity which extends beyond it, with the objective world of which it is a constituent part.

In such memory there can occur, on the basis of these horizon-intentions, what we call *continuous running-through* in memory, for example from a more recent past up to the incipient present. The memory which first appears in isolation admits of being "freely" extended; we press on in the horizon of memory away from the present, we progress continuously from memory to memory. All the memories which thereby appear are now stretches, flowing into one another, of one interconnected, homogeneous memory. As a rule, the process undergoes at the same time a loss of detail and curtailment (contraction) by the omission of unessential parts of the memory. It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish:

1. The unity of the specific (always flowing) memory-field, which is an *intuitive unity in the narrow sense*: the running-through in memory of an event of longer duration is *one* memory insofar as in every phase of this recollective lived experience what has been intuited in the preceding phase, the earlier past, is "still" intuitive, still retained in grasp, while what newly appears in it is just attaining "primary" intuitiveness.

2. The *total intuitive memory-field in the broad sense*: to this belongs, first of all, the continuum "run through" in a unity of consciousness, a continuum of truly intuitive memory-fields, among which the no longer truly intuitive still have a retentional vividness and are not "absorbed." Further, to this also belongs everything which, though not recollected anew, is still included in the horizons of the past—included as the mere potentiality of bringing intentions in the form of recollections to fulfillment, at first in the form of intuitive recollections which then themselves dwindle away retentionally, becoming retentions which are nonintuitive but still vivid, which are absorbed but still not lost.

All these unities of recollection are *separate from one another* (if they are not traced back to an original perception in separate and individually structured processes or bound together by a continuous bond into an interconnected unity of one recollection). The sensuous unities, objects, and connections that appear in recollection are separate from one another and also separate from whatever appears in the respective world of perception. Therefore, we obviously cannot say that the given makes its appearance here [in recollection] and there

[in perception] in a false or in a genuine "intuitive," "sensuous" connection. An object of perception, for example the fountain pen which I now perceive lying on the table here, is not connected intuitively with the book which a year ago lay in the same place on the table and which I now remember. The book is not "beside" the fountain pen; it has no relation of spatial unity with it at all, because, for such a relationship, precisely the unity of what is intuited within *one* temporal duration is required. Such relations, and the act of relational contemplation directed on them, the *relations of the spatial situation* of objects to one another, are therefore not possible in the case of objects which appertain to intuitions separated in such a manner.

§ 38. *The necessary connection, on the basis of time as the form of sensibility, between the intentional objects of all perceptions and positional presentifications of an ego and a community of egos.*

NEVERTHELESS, despite this separation, there is still a *unity* here, and *relations of unity* based on it. Of what sort they are will become clear to us when we recall the *horizon-intentions* already mentioned. Every perception, as a consciousness intending an actual objectivity, has its horizon of before and after. It refers back to what was perceived before, which can be presentified in memories, even when these are not immediately connected with the respective perception but are separated from it by obscure unremembered stretches. Apart from the connection, to be considered later, that everything perceived "reminds" one of something past that is similar or like even though temporally separated—a connection which is therefore a relation of likeness and similitude—there is also still another kind of unity, lying at a deeper level: when through memories, starting from a perception, I am led back into my own past, this past is precisely *my* own, the past of this same subject who is present and living. And the past environing world [*Umgebungs-welt*] which is now remembered belongs to the *same*

*world* as the world in which I now live, only it is presentified in a fragment of its past.

To introduce the matter of intersubjectivity, what we have said also holds true if another person tells me about his past experiences, communicates his memories: what is recalled in them belongs to the same objective world as that which is given in my and our common present lived experience. The remembered environing world of the other, about which he tells us, may certainly be another world than that in which we find ourselves at present, and likewise the environing world which I myself remember may be another world; I can have changed my place of residence, have come to another country, with other men and other customs, etc., or this same geographical neighborhood with its inhabitants may have so changed in the course of a human life that it has simply become another; but, despite all this, all these different remembered environing worlds are *pieces of one and the same objective world*. This world is, in the most comprehensive sense, as the *life-world* for a human community capable of mutual understanding, *our earth*, which includes within itself all these different environing worlds with their modifications and their pasts—the more so since we have no knowledge of other heavenly bodies as environing worlds for possible human habitation.<sup>1</sup> In this unique world, everything sensuous that I now originally perceive, everything that I have perceived and which I can now remember or about which others can report to me as what they have perceived or remembered, has its place. Everything has its unity in that it has its fixed temporal position in this objective world, its place in objective time.

This holds for every object of perception as such, i.e., as an intended object, as an object alleged to actually exist. This signifies that in perception, in the sphere of the living present, there is conflict, the sudden change of one perception into a second which is in a conflict of interpenetration with it (cf. above, § 21), and this is also true of every past perception

1. In view of this, the objective world is, to be sure, equated with the life-world of humanity, the all-embracing community wherein mutual understanding is possible. In our context we can disregard the problem of knowing how the world, taken concretely as the life-world of humanity, stands with regard to the objective world in the strict sense, i.e., to the world as determined in the sense of natural science.

which has emerged. Conflict occurs in sensibility itself (therefore, prior to all activity). But at the same time it should be noticed that *intentional time*, the time which pertains to what is intended as objective as such, is *not affected* by conflict, insofar as the intentional objects which are in conflict and which interpenetrate are not in conflict with respect to the temporal moment itself; as if, for example, two temporal situations with the same coloring were to come into conflict in the same way as the colors of an object can come into conflict as two different colors at variance with each other in the same temporal situation. Sensuous conflict, originally occurring as passive, necessarily involves two objects of the same temporal determination and presupposes this identity of temporal determination.

Thus the sensuously constituted temporal series is unique in every respect: it is in it that everything intentional as such which is sensuously constituted (appears originally) is ordered, irrespective of further characteristics of unity and independence already constituted or to be constituted. Therefore, all *that appears originally*, even if it appears in conflict, *has its determinate temporal position*, i.e., it has not only a phenomenal time, that is, one given in intentional objectivity as such, but also *its fixed position in the one objective time*. More precisely, even if objects, in the mode of their reciprocal suppression, can appear only one after the other, and, when the one appears, the other is present to consciousness in the mode of concealment, still, every such object, whether given as concealed or manifest, must have its intentional temporal situation and its own position in the one time.

We now understand the inner truth of the Kantian thesis: *time is the form of sensibility*, and thus it is the form of every possible world of objective experience. Prior to all questions about objective reality—prior to the question concerning what gives priority to certain “appearances,” to intentional objects which are self-giving in intuitive experiences, by reason of which we bestow on them the predicate “true” or “real object”—is the fact of the essential characteristic of all “appearances,” of the true as well as those shown to be null, namely, that they are *time-giving*, and this in such a way that all given times become part of *one time*. Thus, all perceived, all perceptible, individuals have the common form of time. It is the first and fundamental form, the form of all forms, the presupposition of all other connections capable of establishing unity. But, from



the first, "form" designates here the character which necessarily precedes all others in the possibility of an intuitive unity. Temporality as duration, as coexistence, as sequence, is the necessary form of all objects of intuition as unities and in this respect is the form of their intuition (the form of concrete, individual intuitivities).

At the same time, the expression "form of intuition" has still a second sense: every individual intuited in the unity of an intuition is given in a *temporal orientation*, which is the form of the givenness of all that is present in one presence. But, in addition, it is also true that all concrete individuals (abstract individual moments are affected by this in an obvious consequence), which are first given to consciousness in unconnected intuitions, pertain to the unity of a single time (which is certainly not intuitive but can become intuitive in free development, i.e., in the fulfillment of the intentions which are in the intuitions and which must be brought to givenness). *The one time is the form*, the one unique form, of all individual objectivities which an ego has given or may have given in intuitions at first unconnected, e.g., in perceptions and in memories separated from them. Or: every perception has its horizon, which is capable of being developed in an infinity of intuitions to which correspond objectivities, presented to consciousness through this development as given in a single time; it is one time, which, in its development and therefore in its givenness, appears as the same, to which also pertain the intuitive lived experiences themselves and the lived experiences of the ego in general.

This is then continued in *empathy*. In empathy an objective, intersubjectively common time, in which everything individual in lived experiences and temporal objectivities must be capable of being ordered, is constituted. This constitution can be reduced to the fact that for every ego empathy is nothing other than a special group of positional presentifications in relation to memories and expectations and that, like all positional intuitions, the ego can unite these intuitions in the way already mentioned.

When we inquired about the connection which makes possible the unity between all the perceptions and positional presentifications of an ego, this was found to be the *temporal connection*. It is established in the sphere of passivity, and this implies in sensibility. Any perceptions whatsoever within an ego-consciousness necessarily have a connection, whether the

ego actively combines them, putting them into relation with others, to which it links them, or whether it does not live in them at all and is occupied with other objects, no matter what they may be—they have this connection in themselves: they constitute an all-embracing connection of their intentional objects. Each perception has its retentional horizon and provides the possibility of entering into this horizon and of developing it in memories. Thus all connections not given intuitively in the unity of a perception refer back to enchainments [*Verkettungen*] of connections in the unity of actual intuition, that is, to the possibility of continuous recollections which reproduce the enchainment intuitively. On the other hand, what is actually intuited exhibits new actual intuitions, and this exhibition is protentional expectation. It pertains to the nature of the perceptions of an ego that they occur only in continuous enchainment. The unity of an ego extends, and can extend, only as far as we have a unity of internal consciousness; and all intentional objects of the perceptions which appear in this consciousness must, to the same extent, also constitute a temporal connection which coincides with that of the immanent time of the acts. Every perception and every recollection as the reproduction of a perception must, therefore, set up for their objects a *temporal relation which on principle is capable of being made intuitive*. They are connected with each other as referring to objects, either actual or intended, within one world. This connection serves as the basis for a certain kind of relation, for relations of the temporal location of all perceived objectivities intended in perceptions as actually existing.

In a general way, and formulated as a law, we can say: *all perceptions and experiences of an ego are in connection with regard to their intentional objects; they are related (even where they enter into conflict) to a single time*. And, similarly: *all perceptions and experiences of all ego-subjects which are in mutual understanding are in connection with regard to their intentional objects*—a connection which is that of an objective time being constituted in all their subjective times and of an objective world itself being constituted in objective time.

It is, to be sure, a fundamental problem of phenomenology to explain fully how every experience (e.g., every recollection) comes to have this connection with every other (e.g., a recollection has a connection with the corresponding actual perception) of the same ego or in the stream of consciousness of the

same ego, a connection which produces the association of everything that is experienced in one time; and it is also a problem to understand the kind of necessity which claims to hold good for every possible ego and its experiences.

If one speaks of the stream of consciousness, then in a certain way one already presupposes infinite time, under the guidance of which, so to speak, one goes back or moves forward from consciousness to consciousness. If a consciousness is actually given (or represented as given in possibility) and if it necessarily continues to flow on, then the possibility exists that recollections of consciousness arise which lead to a stream of consciousness unified in memory. These difficult problems, and in particular that which concerns how the apprehension of absolute temporal determinations of objects, the constitution of their location in objective time, comes about, and how in general this continuity of absolute, objective time manifests itself in the subjective times of lived experiences: all this is the great theme of a more worked-out phenomenology of time-consciousness.<sup>2</sup>

§ 39. *Transition to quasi-positionality. The unconnectedness of intuitions of imagination.*

IF, UNTIL NOW, we have considered only the possibilities of intuitive unity within *positional consciousness*, within the unity of perceptions in respect of one another and of perceptions in respect of positioning presentifications, we now pass to quasi-positionality, that positionality appertaining to perceptive or to reproductive imagination; we ask what possibilities of intuitive unity can exist within it (considered as the unity of its intentional objects) and likewise between it and the intentional objects of positional lived experiences.

In between the lived experiences of the perceptive intention of objects in the actual world there can appear—without connection with them—lived experiences of imagination, which are directed toward fictions, toward objectivities intended as fictions. These have *no connection with the perceptions*; this means: while all perceptions with regard to the objects intended

2. For further, more detailed, indications, see below, § 63b.

in them are joined together in a unity and have reference to the unity of a single world, the objectivities of imagination fall outside this unity; they do not join together in the same way with the objectivities of perception in the unity of a world intended as such.

Certainly, the imaginings [*Phantasien*] of one ego have a connection, not only among themselves but also with the perceptions of this ego, *as lived experiences*, as do all the lived experiences of internal consciousness, which, relative to them, is perceptual. As lived experiences, imaginings are ordered in the unity of the ego, just as all acts are—which means that internal consciousness constitutes intentional connection. But they still have no connection in their *objective relations*, either among themselves or with perceptions. The centaur which I now imagine, and a hippopotamus which I have previously imagined, and, in addition, the table I am perceiving even now have no connection among themselves, i.e., they have *no temporal position in relation to one another*. Though all experiences, past and present, are united in the connection of *one* experience, and though they have therein the unequivocal temporal order in absolute time of the before, the after, and the simultaneous, this is not true of the objectivities of the imagination; the centaur is neither earlier nor later than the hippopotamus or than the table which I now perceive.

In a certain sense, to be sure, every objectivity of imagination has its time; it is present to consciousness as a unity of temporal duration. Thus time also functions here as constituting a unity, exactly in the same way as was shown for a perception or a memory complete in itself. *What is imagined is always something temporal*; e.g., all sensuous imagination imagines a sensuous object, and intentional temporality pertains to this merely by its being an intentional object. The object of imagination is present to consciousness as temporal and temporally determined, enduring in time; but its time is a *quasi-time*. Consider, for example, the imagining of a red-colored triangle such as it appears in my mind. I can describe it and, by describing it, also arrive at its duration. It is a temporal object, it has its time. And yet it is not in time. This means: the temporal duration of the triangle, with all of its points of time, is modified in the same way that the quasi-coloration which it has is a modification of the color of an actual red triangle. Everything has a color. A thing of imagination is an imagined thing; it is imagined

as colored in such and such a way, etc. The imagined color is the intentional correlate of the imagination and as such has the mode of as-if. Nevertheless, it makes good sense to say that what is merely represented (or, in general, represented, perceived, remembered, imagined, etc.) might also be actual, or that it might not be actual: namely, that something unreal, given in a representation or presented to the mind, and being identified according to rule, might conform, point by point, determination by determination, to something actual. The same thing holds in reverse, namely, that for each thing given regularly in normal perception we could construct a pure fiction which represented exactly the same object in exactly the same manner of representation. But one thing which distinguishes actually existing objects is necessarily lacking in the mere fiction: *absolute temporal position*, "actual" time, as absolute, rigorous uniqueness of the individual content given in temporal form. To put it more plainly: time is certainly represented in imagination, and even represented intuitively, but it is *a time without actual, strict localization of position*—it is, precisely, a *quasi-time*.

To be sure, we also have intuitively in imagination phenomenal places and distances, references relative to place or position. But imagination still offers us no positions which allow themselves to be identified in the sense of an "in-itself" and which can be distinguished accordingly. We can represent to ourselves a red-colored triangle in as many completely detached imaginings as we wish, [and we always represent it] in a complete self-identity, in a duration completely the same: each triangle is then different from every other as the content of a different imaginative consciousness, but *qua individual object* it differs in no way. If the things imagined are actually without connection, then it is impossible to speak of several objects or even of one and the same object represented repeatedly. In view of this, we want to assume, in order to be exact, that the imaginings in question present their objects within exactly the same "horizons," hence, that when one represents object *A* in a context of temporal objectivity, determined or undetermined as so and so, the other does it in exactly the same context, determined or undetermined in exactly the same way. With the freedom of imagination, this possibility of imaginings being exactly the same is given *a priori*.

Thus the sense of the affirmation of the disconnectedness of

*the intuitions of imagination* has become clear. *Objectivities of imagination lack absolute temporal position*, and so they also cannot have a temporal unity among themselves, a unique temporal order like the objects of perception—that is, insofar as we speak, as previously, of imaginings which do not constitute among themselves a cointended connection relative to consciousness, [which do not constitute] a unity of imagination. *Such a possible constitution of unity is external to the essence of imaginings*. It is not part of their essence that they must appear in a continuous enchainment, which would be, as [a form of] unity, a continuity of imagination. Imaginings separate from one another have no necessary connection *a priori* and, as a rule, also have none in our actual experience. Hence, in such cases there is no sense in asking whether the object of the one precedes or follows that of the other. Every act of imagination, being divorced from all [temporal] connection, has its own *imagination-time*, and there are as many such, incomparable with one another (disregarding their general form, their concrete essence, in general), as there are or can be such imaginings, thus, infinitely many. No absolute position of one can be identical with that of another. However, what other relations are possible between them is still to be examined.

*Note:* If we speak of several disconnected imaginings of a completely like objectivity, with respect to which, despite this likeness, we can talk of neither individual identity nor non-identity, it is to be remarked that we do not mean by this a plurality of imaginings of one and the same imagined thing, in the rigorously positive sense which implies that, relative to consciousness, these imaginings are imaginings of the same. For if I imagine A, then I can, forming an image of the content A, completely similar, intend this imagined A a second time as the same thing that I had imagined earlier. This takes place in a very simple way in an act which is related to the first act of imagination exactly as a recollection is to an earlier perception of the same thing. We thus behave “as if” we called to mind again a quasi-perception; and such a quasi-recollection (which in the change of attitude [of consciousness] involves an actual recollection of the previous act of imagination and what was imagined as such) can be linked as often as we like to the first act of imagination, possibly having at the same time the character of a recollection of what was previously already recollected, etc. We then have a chain of imaginings, not of unconnected

but of intentionally interrelated imaginings, which on their part can be transformed into a unity of interrelated recollections in which what is repeatedly intuited is present to consciousness and given intuitively as the same. However, this is already a case of the constitution of a connection between imaginings, which must now be examined in greater detail.

§ 40. *The unity of time and connection [instituted] in imagination by the combination of imaginings into the unity of a world of imagination. Individuation as possible only within the world of actual experience.*

IN SPITE of the essential disconnectedness of all intuitions of imagination, unity is still possible to some degree even here, namely, as far as in all imaginings—speaking in terms of the modification of neutrality—there is constituted a single *quasi-world* as a unique world, partly intuited, partly intended in empty horizons. To be sure, it remains within the province of our freedom to allow the indeterminateness of these horizons to be quasi-fulfilled in an arbitrary way by imaginings. But this changes nothing regarding the fact that, so far as this is the case, all these imaginings have a connection in the unity of an object-consciousness which encompasses all of them, a consciousness actual and possible. The “unity of an imagination” is manifestly nothing other than *the unity of a possible experience or the modification of neutrality of a unity of experience*. But this unity affords precisely the ground for the *essence*: unity of experience.

There is thus a formation of unity in all free imaginings belonging to a fairy tale, which, in order to have an unencumbered imagination, we conceive to be free from all relation to the actual world. Whether our imagination runs through the story at one stretch or in separate sections, each new stretch is linked to the preceding one by an obscure horizon, but one capable of further development, whereby the obscure memories are for me, the continuing reader of the tale, actual memories

of what I have already read and which have been imagined by me, while in the course of my engagement in the tale the linkage takes place in "memories in imagination," which are themselves quasi-memories.

A *single* act of imagination—this encompasses, therefore, an arbitrary "complex" of imaginings which, precisely by their specific sense, converge to form an intuitively possible, unitary act of imagination in which, concordantly, a unitary world of imagination is constituted as a correlate. Within such a world of imagination we have, for every individual object of imagination (as quasi-actuality), an "individual" singularization [*Ver-einzelung*] for every temporal point and every duration. We have it first of all in the most strictly defined unity of an act of imagination, namely, within a single presence; in it, like is distinguished from like on the basis of individuality. But, in addition, there is an "individual" singularization in imagination, *as far as* it is possible in general (in the unity of interrelated individual imaginings) to convert this act into an intuitive unity, into the unity of a single presence in the extended sense (as a continuum of flowing presents), without supplementation by new imaginings relative to new objects and extending the imagined world.

But how is it possible to make this conversion if we pass from one imaginary world to another to which it is unrelated? In the nature of any two imaginings there is nothing at all to imply that they *require* to be unified in a single act of imagination. As soon as we move intentionally within a single complex of imaginings, correlatively, within a single imaginary world, there is agreement and contradiction, there is incompatibility, and all the relations of spatial and temporal position which we have pointed out for objects within an actual world are also equally possible here: everything is now carried over to the quasi. But between complexes of disconnected imaginings there is nothing like this. For the "things," the events, the "actualities" of one world of imagination have "nothing to do" with those of the others. Better: the fulfillments and disappointments of intentions constitutive of one of these worlds can never extend to intentions which are constitutive of another, in connection with which it does not matter that we are dependent on quasi-intentions. Here the unity of time plays its special role as the condition of the possibility of a unity of the world, as the cor-



relate of the unity of "one" experience and, so to speak, of the ground on which all incompatibilities occur in the form of "conflict."

How are the singularizations of temporal points, temporal durations, etc., related to one another within different imaginary worlds? We can speak here of the likeness and similarity of the components of such worlds but never of their *identity*, which would have absolutely no sense; hence, no connections of incompatibility can occur, for these would indeed presuppose such identity. It makes no sense, e.g., to ask whether the Gretel of one fairy tale and the Gretel of another are the same Gretel, whether what is imagined for the one and predicated of her agrees or does not agree with what is imagined for the other, or, again, whether they are related to each other, etc. I can stipulate this—and to accept it is already to stipulate it—but then both fairy tales refer to the same world. Within the *same* tale I can certainly ask such questions, since, from the beginning, we have a *single* imaginary world; but the question ceases to make sense where the imagination ceases, where it does not supply more precise determinations; and it is reserved to the development of imagination, in the sense of the pursuance of the unity of a complex of imaginings, to seize upon determinations arbitrarily (or, in the case of instinctively continuing again, to leave open the possibility of such determinations).

In the actual world, nothing remains open; it is what it is. The world of imagination "is," and is such and such, by grace of the imagination which has imagined it; a complex of imaginings never comes to an end that does not leave open the possibility of a free development in the sense of a new determination. But, on the other hand, there is still, in the essence of the connection which constitutes the "unity" of imagination, an abundance of *essential limitations*, which must not be overlooked. They find their expression in this: that in the continuation, although free and open, of the unity of a complex of imaginings, it is the unity of a "possible world" which is constituted with an encompassing form of the time of imagination pertaining to it.

In what has been pointed out, the implication is that *individuation* and *identity of the individual*, as well as the identification founded on it, is possible only within the world of actual experience, on the basis of absolute temporal position. We may

call attention to this only very briefly here, for a complete theory of individuation is not now our intention.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, the experience of imagination in general provides no individual objects in the true sense but only *quasi-individual* objects and a *quasi-identity*, namely, within the fixed unity of an imaginary world. Thus our initial exclusion of the sphere of neutrality for the purpose of laying the foundation of a theory of judgment proves to be justified, insofar as a theory of judgment must begin precisely with the experience of the individual as yielding ultimate self-evidence, and such experience of the individual does not occur in imagination or in general in a neutral consciousness.

§ 41. *The problem of the possibility of an intuitive unity between objects of perception and objects of imagination of one ego.*

IF, NONETHELESS, the experience of imagination has been taken into consideration within the field of our inquiry, this has its ground in that imagination involves more than a merely indifferent parallel to actual experience and the determinations being realized therein. It is therefore not enough merely to transfer everything which has appeared in the domain of positionality to the quasi. Rather, in spite of the lack of connection between objects of perception and objects of imagination, an intuitive unity of a kind which can contribute to the (relative) determination of individual objects given in experience is still possible even here. The pursuance of this question concerning the unity which remains possible here will lead us to the *broadest concept of the unity of intuition*—broader than those set forth up to now—and to the most inclusive kind of relations, namely, the relations of likeness and similarity, which are possible between all objectivities capable of being united in such a unity of intuition, whether they are objects of perception or of imagination.

1. For a few supplementary observations, see § 42 and, above all, Appendix I.

By way of anticipation, we call attention to the fundamental function of these relations and hence also of free imagination in the higher dimension of the consciousness of generality and, in particular, the intuition of essences. This function will be discussed in detail in Part III. Here we remain in the sphere of the experience of the individual, and we now ask: what sort of unity of intuitions makes these relations possible, and on what does it rest?

§ 42. *The possibility of the establishment of an intuitive connection between all objectivities constituted in one stream of consciousness by association.*

- a. The temporal unity of all the lived experiences of an ego.

THE UNITY we inquire about here cannot be the *unity of objectivities* in absolute world-time as the unity of simultaneity or succession. For it has been shown that objects of imagination have no temporal connection, either with objects of perception or among themselves, and consequently also no possible unity *based on* such a connection. Therefore, if the unity is not a unity of objectivities, it can only be a *unity of the lived experiences constituting objectivities*, of lived experiences of perception, of memory, and of imagination.

All the lived experiences of an ego have their temporal unity; they are constituted in the absolute flow of internal time-consciousness and in it have their absolute position and uniqueness, their unique appearance in an absolute now, after which they retentionally fade away and sink back into the past. Naturally, this *time of the lived experiences is not the time of the intentional objectivities in the lived experiences*. If, e.g., while I perceive my material environment, a flash of memory comes to me and I devote myself entirely to it, this world of perception does not then disappear; no matter how much this world may lose its "actuality," may "withdraw from me," perceptively it is

always there, perceived, in the broader sense of the term. The memory in which I now live furnishes me a time for what is remembered, which is implicitly oriented toward the present of perception. But what is remembered is past and even "lies far behind" in relation to the perceived (a character which is not an immediately intuitive, temporal character but refers to a deployment in chains of intuitions), while the memory as a lived experience is contemporaneous with the lived experience of perception. And if we form a foreseeing expectation, the expected is then characterized as futural, as becoming (although this is also not intuitive), while the lived experiences of expectation and perception are partly contemporaneous and partly successive, the perception in one part preceding, the expectation following. Since here it is a question of positional lived experiences, all these intentional objectivities, the individual objectivities intended in them, have an absolute position in objective time, in world-time, and this position is in principle capable of being made intuitive by the establishment of a series of memories, going back from the present perception. More precisely: it belongs to their objective sense; they are intended as determined by their absolute position in objective time. Leaving this out of account here, the constitutive *lived experiences*, as *lived experiences* in internal time-consciousness, have, in addition, *their absolute temporal position relative to one another*, their before and after. The like is true of the lived experiences of imagination which appear in this stream, but the imaginary objectivities intended in them have no absolute, identifiable temporal position.

Thus, there is a temporal unity among all the lived experiences of an ego, a unity which, to be sure, is not yet a unity of intuition. For what is intended, intuited, in the lived experiences, namely, the objectivities perceived, remembered, or imagined, are separated from one another. And although among all perceived and remembered individual objectivities of *positional* lived experiences there is the unity which it is possible to render intuitive and which these experiences have, on the basis of their absolute temporal position in the objective world, *this possibility of connection disappears for imaginary objectivities*. Nevertheless, on the basis of being constituted together in the flux of *one time-consciousness*, there is the *possibility of the establishment of an intuitive connection among all objectivities constituted in it*.

b. The double function of association for the connection of positional consciousness.

However, in order to actually establish such an intuitive connection, i.e., a unity of intuition between the intentional objects of the same ego, temporally separated from one another, the fact of their being constituted together in one ego-consciousness is not yet sufficient. Time-consciousness is, after all, a consciousness which establishes only a general form (cf. §§ 16 and 38). The *actual awakening*, and, therewith, the actual intuitive unification of perceptions and memories or, correlatively, of intentional objects of perception and memory, is the achievement of association, that mode of passive synthesis founded on the lowest syntheses of time-consciousness. We have already had to go back to the regularities of association and affection in order to understand the structure of a sensuous field, a field of pregivens actively affecting us, which are together in a single presence, and in order to understand, further, both the possibility that particular givens stand out from this field and that the ego is induced to turn toward them and apprehend them objectively (homogeneous association) and the possibility of the unification of data from different sensuous fields given in a single presence (heterogeneous association). But beyond this function of unification within a presence, association has a broader one, namely, that of uniting what is separated, insofar as this was ever at all constituted within a single stream of consciousness, thus, of uniting the present with the not-present, the presently perceived with remote memories separated from it, and even with imaginary objects: <sup>1</sup> the like here recalls what is like there, the similar recalls the similar. Hence a unique reciprocal relationship takes place, though, to be sure, in this sphere of passivity and in the sphere of receptivity which is constructed on this, it is not yet a relation in the logical sense of a spontaneous, creative consciousness in which a relation as such is constituted.

If we still limit ourselves for the time being to positional consciousness, it is thus the function of association first of all to vivify the connection which all perceptions, past and present, of one ego have with one another on the basis of their being

1. Cf. above, pp. 74 f.

constituted in one time-consciousness and to establish among them an actual unity relative to consciousness. Only on the basis of an associative awakening can separated memories be related to one another and be inserted, as we move back from one member to the next, into *one* intuitive nexus of memory. This means that, once memories are associatively awakened, they can then be ordered in the temporal connection, the *before* and *after* "as they actually were," and their temporal position in the past can be determined.<sup>2</sup> Associative awakening thus constitutes the *presupposition for the constitution of temporal relations*, of the "earlier" and "later." To be sure, in the domain of receptivity, to which we now limit ourselves, nothing more occurs than the establishment of a unified connection of memory; the connection of memory, as it is awakened by association, is run through and presentified. It is on the basis of this that, at a higher level, the temporal relations which find their expression in the temporal modalities of the predicative judgment can then be apprehended.

Through associative linkage, the no longer living worlds of memory also get a kind of being, despite their no longer being actual; the present "awakens" a past, flows over into a submerged intuition and its world. From the like or the similar the tendency goes in the direction of a complete recollection, and, even before anything actually emerges in memory, "remembering" has a peculiar "intention going back into the past to the like or the similar"; it calls the similar to mind, which thereby is not an empty nothing but for consciousness is comparable to the horizon, which has receded, of the just-now-intuited, or (what amounts to the same thing) of the just-having-been-intuited past, which persists obscurely in the horizon of what is still actually intuitive. It is, therefore, an inverse process. From what is given intuitively (perception or memory) emanates an intention, an intentional tendency, in which, gradually and uninterruptedly, what is submerged and no longer living seems to steadily change over to the vivid and ever more vivid, until, at a tempo now more deliberate, now more rapid, what has receded appears again as intuition. When the tempo is very rapid, we speak of a "sudden" appearance, whereas in fact the difference is only in degree. *Complete submergence* is thus only a *limit of what has receded*, as, on the

2. On this point, cf. the essential supplements in Appendix I.

other hand, the opposite limit is complete intuitiveness; thus, intuitiveness does not really denote a breach. Linked to this, to be sure, are the processes of overlapping and interpenetration, of the fusion of memories belonging to different "awakened" worlds of memory.

That such "awakening," radiating out from the present and directed toward the vivifying of the past, is possible must have its ground in the fact that between the like and the similar a "sensuous" unity is already passively constituted in advance, a unity in "subconsciousness," which unites the different situations of actual and submerged intuitions. Thus, in all situations, and in conformity with all likenesses and similarities, there are constant connections, and the "awakening," the calling-to-mind of the earlier, is only the vivifying of something which previously was already there. To be sure, this vivifying does bring in something new, in that now a new intention, radiating from the awakening situation, goes to what is awakened, an intention which, after this irradiance, changes its state to neutrality and thus to a phenomenal persistence.

All these occurrences of associative awakening and linkage take place in the domain of passivity without any participation by the ego. The awakening radiates from what is presently perceived; the memories "rise up," whether we will or no. But the ego can also have the desire *to remember*, the desire, for example, to presentify again a past event in its order of occurrence. At first it may be that only pieces are presentified, still not ordered as to earlier and later. It may be that the intermediate parts are missing, which the ego, by the probative presentification of connecting members having an awakening function, seeks again to vivify until it finally has the entire occurrence before itself in a closed sequence of memories in which each individual part can be assigned its temporal position. But even this *active remembering* is possible only on the basis of the *associative awakening which has already taken place*; the awakening itself is an event which always occurs passively. The activity of the ego can provide only the conditions for this; it can discover the appropriate intermediate members by tentative actualization of the stretches of memory not forgotten, and from these members the associative awakening ray can go toward what is submerged and make it again living. The analysis of all this is the theme of a phenomenology of presentifying consciousness, which cannot here be further carried out.

Association thus has a *double function* for positional consciousness; on the one hand, it establishes, on the basis of absolute position in the stream of time-consciousness, the actual connection of all perceptions of an ego, present and past, in the unity of one memory, and, on the other hand, it establishes an intuitive unity of the remembered, in that it brings the awakened into the unity of an intuition with the awakening, in a way to be discussed forthwith.

- c. The intuitive unification of the intuitions of perception and imagination on the basis of association, and the broadest concept of the unity of intuition.

All this is of particular importance if we consider that this associative connection exists among *all* the lived experiences of an ego as far as they at all objectively constitute in themselves anything similar and anything comparable, therefore that this connection includes not only the positional intuitions but also those of imagination, which in themselves are unconnected with regard to their temporality. Consequently, not only is there a unified correlative objectivity constituted within every section, present in the broadest sense (present, whether in a perception, a memory, or even in an imaginary perception), of the stream of consciousness, and, furthermore, not only is a cohesive unity constituted in the flux of these presences; there is also, beyond these connections which unify sections of individual presence, a *connection which is instituted between arbitrarily different presences*, of which one is actual, the other submerged. The submerged is reawakened by association and presentified in intuition and is thus intuitively unified with the awakening in a new presence.

On this depends the possibility of a unity between the present and the presentified, between perception and associatively awakened memory or imaginary intuition. It is an intuitive, sensuous unity, constituted in an actual and proper field of intuition and, beyond this, in a living temporal field, i.e., a *unity founded in intuitive singularities*. This unity presupposes a unity of consciousness in which is constituted an original temporal field with content, or in which a modified, quasi-original field is constituted in the unity of a memory or of a memory leading back to a perception. Here we always have, not



only some connection or succession of intuitions, but *one* intuition with one correlative unity of the objective. To the intuition belongs the form of time—as the form which connects and at the same time makes all further connection possible—and (with transcendent objectivities) the form of space which is ordered with time; naturally, in the case of the unitive intuition of elements not actually coexistent, the form of space does not appear as the form of objective space but as the form of apparent space, in which things that appear are not actually constituted as connected in the unity of an objective duration but are collected on the basis of the associative awakening.

If we place the remembered table beside this perceived table, then we have a space with a spatial plenitude and, giving itself in it, a vivid second table and a time in which this juxtaposition of both tables appears for a while. Here it does not matter that the remembered table in itself “belongs” to another objective time than the perceived table. We have a unity of “image,” and this is the image of a present, of a duration with a coexistence to which pertains a spatial unity. Thus we can spatially “bring together” objects belonging to different fields of presence if they are physical objects, “juxtapose” them in an apparent space; we can also juxtapose them or bring them together temporally, and this last in every case, even in that of nonspatial objects, or where objects are not capable of coexistence. We can then say: we bring objects which belong to different fields of presence together by transposing them to *one temporal field*; we move the first objects to the intuitive temporal field of the others. In this way we bring them into one intuitive succession or into an intuitive coexistence (that is, into a unity of simultaneous duration). If they are spatial objects, they then appear *eo ipso* in the unity of the one same space, in fact in the unity of the part of infinite space which includes the objects of the privileged intuition, and they appear in the case of contemporaneity as enduring side by side or as appearing one after another in this space and remaining there. A *unity of intuition*, a unified assemblage of objects of intuition (it being of small importance whether perceived or presentified), means, therefore (since we are in the sphere of individual or quasi-individual objects), a *unity of time in which these objects are intuitively together*. To be sure, we must also distinguish here between what is the business of passivity—being awakened—and what, built on this, is the business of (receptive) activity—the appre-

hension of what is awakened, the act of turning toward what has been pre-given in the unity of an intuition.

This unity of intuition, originally established by association, is such, therefore, that it is possible, not only between perceptions and memories of the same ego, but also between positional and imaginary intuitions. With this we have attained the *broadest concept of the unity of intuition*, which we can define as follows:

*The unity of intuition is the unity of an intuitive object-consciousness and has as a correlate the intuitive unity of objectivity. Different individuals (or quasi-individuals of imaginary intuitions) can, however, attain the unity of an intuition, or, correlatively, can in general form a unified intuitive objectivity, only insofar as they are encompassed by the unity of an intuitively constituted time, insofar, therefore, as they appear phenomenally as simultaneous or consecutive (or in reciprocal temporal displacement, partly simultaneous, partly consecutive) in the unity of an intuitive presence.*

This implies: *the unity of the intuition of time is the condition of the possibility of all unity of the intuition of a plurality of objects connected in any way, for all are temporal objects*; accordingly, every other connection of such objects presupposes the unity of time.

#### § 43. *Relations of connection and relations of comparison.*

##### a. Relations of comparison as pure relations of essences ("relations of ideas").

FOR A SUBJECT of consciousness (a pure ego), multiple objects can in general be given in the unity of a having-consciousness-of, both passive and intuitive, only in these two forms: either the multiple objects are given to consciousness in the unity of an intuition and are intuited in a presence which encompasses them, or they are given in several disconnected intuitions, i.e., intuitions not connected in the unity of a presentational [*präsentierend*] intuition: in intuitions which have, instead of the unity of *one* intuition, only *the* unity which binds

*all* the lived experiences of the one ego in internal consciousness and in the experiential time [*Erlebniszeit*] which belongs to it—to which also belongs the overlapping unity, blending with it, of intentional lived experiences which are nonintuitive. To be sure, all these intuitions can, on the basis of their being constituted in *one* stream of consciousness and the possibility pertaining to it of an associative awakening, be *brought together* in the unity of a presence in which is then intuitively combined what materially does not belong together: the remembered table which we have “placed mentally” in perceptual space beside the table which is actually perceived is for consciousness now in intuitive unity with this. Certainly, the remembered table has no actual spatial position with regard to the actual table; it is beside the latter only in the mode of the “quasi,” just as it has no absolute temporal position with regard to it. But I can still compare the two tables in the unity of this intuition.

The unity of intuition in the broadest sense thus constitutes the *foundation for all relations of likeness and similarity*, which, accordingly, are *not relations of actuality*. Hence traditionally (Hume, etc.) they were counted among “relations of ideas” because they were said to be founded purely in the “contents” of representations. This means that their form of unity is founded exclusively by the essential content or by the specific moments of the essences of the members combined. If the objects in question *are*, then necessarily the unity pertaining to them is also. Phenomenologically speaking: if the objects connected by means of such a form of unity are given “all at once,” relative to consciousness in a present, if in general they are represented intuitively (at least as regards the founding essential moments) within a horizon of the intuitive present, their unity is also intuitively at hand in this form (passively preconstituted), whether they are apprehended or not. It is also irrelevant whether the objects are perceived, remembered, or expected or whether all or some of them are pure fictions, imaginary objects in fictive temporal modes. These unities which found relations of comparison are not bound to temporal objects, to individuals, and hence have a relation to time only as mediated by their members. If *a* is later than *a'*, then their likeness is ascribed to neither time *a* nor time *a'*, nor to the time between, but to the temporal objects and, therewith, to the whole of time and its particular stretches. Such unities or relations are individualized by individual representatives or are particularized by the generic

or specific particularity of their representatives. If a member is fictive, the relation is not lost; the real member in that case truly has the relational predicate, except that the opposite number has the mode of fictive being (merely imaginary quasi-being), in which case the relation itself undergoes a particular modalization.

b. The constitution of the most important relations of connection (relations of actuality).

Opposed to the relations of comparison, which are based purely on the essential content of the things compared without regard to their being *hic et nunc*, are the *relations of actuality*, i.e., those which *rest on the actual connection of the things related* ("relations of matter of fact"). They are relations which are only possible between individual objects. The lowest unity founding them is the *unity of actual connection in the one time* in which the things connected have their absolute temporal position (cf. § 40). All individual objects have a temporal duration and position; they are extended with an essential content over the original continuum of time and have, in their total essence as a general essence, a temporal extension of definite magnitude, which is their duration, and a temporal content, which fills this duration. The temporal parts of such objects (corresponding to the division of the duration) are, in terms of their general essence, united in the one total essence which extensively connects the essence of the parts. As an individual, the total object is a whole of time, and its unity is a unity of temporal connection. The whole *is* here in becoming, and it is as a whole only as it has actually become; the assemblage of its parts is its having become assembled and, furthermore, its having become step-by-step, which extends to all its parts and to parts of parts. Every temporal object has a temporal content, an extended essence, and this whole can be individual only in that it is extended, that it is *becoming*. Moreover, this becoming which individualizes has *its* essential form endowed with formal particularities, precisely the different modes of becoming of duration, together with what pertains to them otherwise. All real connection of that which is temporal is also a connection of temporal extension within the form of time. An arbitrary assemblage of representations united in a present of conscious-

ness does not make the temporal connection present to mind; to speak precisely, a temporal object is not intuitive in the fullest sense, that is, as a temporal object in its individually determined duration (which essentially coindividualizes it), if it is present to mind according to its complete *essence* (according to what is repeatable, comparable, respecting it). The connection is not based on its repeatable essence, in the manner of formations of unity which found comparison, but, over and above this and necessarily, also on its temporal uniqueness, on the becoming which individualizes the temporal content. *Only in the reproduction of the becoming or in the otherwise individually donative [gebenden] representation of a becoming can temporal objects (those which exist in becoming) be present to mind as unities of becoming and having-become.* A like temporal object can (as essentially "the same") occur in different individual complexes of becoming, whereby its essential relations to other such objects (of like duration *qua* form of becoming and of like matter) remain undisturbed. The temporal connection and order are then different. All individual objects are temporally "connected"; they belong to a unique order of becoming and can be represented only in the reproduction of this order in the representation of becoming that is constitutive of time. The individuality of this becoming founds the connecting unity and order (relations).

Matters are similar with the *order of spatial position*, which is founded in the temporal order of individual objects. Space is the order of the individual simultaneity of sensuously given (material) things. Individualizing moments (and in the temporal form of at-the-same-time, the here and there individualizes) can found continuity [*Zusammenhang*]; and spatial position, spatial extension, founds spatial continuity. Extension is itself an unbroken continuity of connection. Just as a time is what it is only in its universal continuity of becoming, so a space (a spatial position, a spatially determined figure, a spatial order, etc., also a distance) is what it is only in a universal but individual continuity, therefore one which is unique. In the isolated representation of a temporal object, and likewise of a spatially qualified form, there is nothing in the quidditive content which distinguishes it intuitively from any other similar object represented in the same way; but the individual element of the position is also not yet given in merely isolated representations. Only when I intuitively represent a comprehensive

temporal continuity with two objects, a continuity in which each has its place of becoming, do I have an intuition of the interval, of the relative temporal order, of the temporal position; just as when, instead of the isolated objects, *I represent intuitively their encompassing space as the form of their order, I have represented something "more," something which distinguished them spatially.* To be sure, only relatively; I have complete individualization only when I return to my *hic et nunc*. Otherwise, I have a nonintuitivity; an intuitive representation, certainly, but, with regard to that which individualizes the situation, it is an indeterminateness; I have a relative individualization of bodies compared with other bodies in a relative spatial order, but the latter itself is, however, not yet fully determined as regards its position. It is only when I appeal to the *here and now* that I obtain (despite the lack of logical determination) *the determinateness required for individual intuition as such.*

Two intuitively given bodies, therefore, still do not permit an original representation of the distance between them as a spatial relation in the same way as they produce an original representation, an intuition of their similarity, if they are representable together at all. In order for there to be a spatial relation, the two intuitive spatial surroundings must be combined into *one space* in which the two bodies are located, and this requires that both be gradated in a *single* visual or tactile field. On the other hand, we do not yet have, with this, an adequate representation of the distance between the bodies and hence do not know whether the distance between them is greater or smaller than the distance between two other bodies. We cannot yet see at once whether, relative to that other distance, the first distance is greater; for this, we must run through the connections constitutive of both distances; similarly, if we wish to represent the equality of the size of the distances, these connections must be run through and the bodies must be related to like perspectives.

Finally, to the relations which rest on actual connection (relations of connection) belong those of cause and effect, whole and part, part and part, to mention only the most important. On principle, no relations of actuality can subsist between the actual and the quasi-actual; this means that they cannot be constituted in self-givenness if one member is present to consciousness as actual and the other as fictive. If a whole is actual, so also is the part; and something fictive cannot be

joined to something actual in a whole. The like is true, e.g., of spatial distance. Two things have a distance between them; the distance belongs to them, and, although it has no existence as a thing, still it has existence precisely as founded by the existence of the things. Spatial distance, and, in general, spatial position, is a relation presupposing an actual connection. Of course, all these relations of actuality can be carried over to the quasi and can appear in the quasi precisely as far as the unity of an intuition of imagination and a world of imagination extends.

c. Narrower and broader concepts of the unity of intuition.

On the other hand, the relations of likeness and similarity are completely indifferent to such disconnectedness of things not actually joined together. They are indifferent precisely because they have their original source exclusively in the linkage which is preconstituted by the unity of association. However great and however continuous the efficacy of association is for the constitution of uniformly interconnected objects and objective worlds, it is also efficacious where objects, so to speak, snow in upon consciousness without connection. It creates a bond, especially as association according to similarity. This linkage, entering into the thematic regard, is the foundation of the active constitution of relations of similarity and likeness. Hence we must also distinguish here the passively established unity between two objects and that apprehended in the receptive activity based on it as likeness and similarity, and, at a still higher level, what is constituted as a relation of similarity in an act of spontaneous production.

Contrary to the relations of likeness and similarity, relations of actuality *presuppose intuitions resting on actual connection*, intuitions which are called, in the *narrower and proper sense*, *binding intuitions*. They constitute a unity of intuition, not only of what is *brought together*, but of what *belongs together*—belonging together in the context of a world (or quasi-world) which, on principle, can be made intuitive.

We speak of *unity of intuition in the narrowest sense* when objects intuitively united in a presence are actually self-given as existing simultaneously and objectively, and only *insofar* as they give themselves. If, e.g., an avenue is given in the unity of

an intuition, then in all of its parts it must fall under the unity of the intuition. If one part is hidden, then we indeed have unity of intuition in this narrowest sense for the parts which are seen but not for the avenue in its entirety. This unity is, therefore, the *unity of a genuine perception*; what is included in any perception and is not genuinely cogiven no longer belongs to the unity of the intuition. This unity of intuition naturally has its analogue in presentification (memory or imagination) (cf. §§ 37, 40).

This separation of the connections of actuality from the unities of the intuition of what is brought together only by comparison gives rise, in the higher categorial level, to the contrast of *relations of connection and comparison*. One can compare all things which are constituted in lived experiences that occur in internal consciousness precisely because these things are brought together in the intuitive unity of one presence. In other words, everything which can enter into the unity of a possible experience, i.e., correlatively, into the unity of a possible world, can be compared. But only what is actually constituted in unity, originally and objectively, has *connected unity*.

To be sure, in a certain way there is also connection between things which are not connected, which do not actually belong together but are brought together in the unity of an intuition; but this is not an actual *connection* of the *objects* but only a *connection of the constitutive lived experiences*, namely, their connection in the stream of consciousness. The lived experiences have their absolute temporal position relative to one another, the positional as well as the neutral, the latter being constitutive of the objectivities of imagination but not of the objectivities constituted in the lived experiences.

d. The formal constitution of unity as the foundation of formal relations.

Still to be mentioned here is a special kind of constitution of unity which provides the basis for special relations, for the *formal relations*. It is the formal-ontological unity, which neither rests on the actual connection of the objects united nor is founded on their essential moments or their entire essence. It is a unity which extends to *all* possible objects, individual or not



individual; it is the *collective form* of unity, that of assemblage. This unity is originally given wherever any objects whatsoever which are united by it are given intuitively in a consciousness (a present of consciousness). The unified "whole" of the collection becomes objective (theme) in the particular sense if a continuous apprehension [of these objects] one by one and of their totality takes place. Hence [it follows that] the proposition *each and every thing* (everything possible and hence everything actual) *is capable of being intuited in one consciousness* (in an original intuition as actual or possible), and [the proposition] *each and every thing is in principle capable of being colligated*, are *equivalent*. A collective unity is essentially not founded on material elements; the essence of things is not taken into consideration at all, except insofar as it makes differentiation possible. To make the collection in its entirety an object is, to be sure, already an operation of a higher level, not of receptivity but of productive spontaneity; likewise, formal relations in general first appear at this level and always presuppose the operations of predicative thought. Consequently, we must be satisfied here with this hint and leave further discussion to the analyses to come (§§ 59–62).

#### § 44. *The analysis of comparative contemplation. Likeness and similarity.*

WE NOW PROCEED to the relations of likeness and similarity, especially important because of their universality. Although here we keep to the sphere of receptivity, it is still necessary to indicate, at this point, that these relations are also of marked significance at the highest level of objectivation for the constitution of the consciousness of generality and, at the highest level of all, for that of the consciousness of essence, so that it will be necessary to return to them in Part III.

Comparison as an activity, as an act of relational contemplation, an active going to and fro of the apprehending regard between the members of the relation, originally presupposes a "sensuous" likeness or similarity, something operative in sensibility prior to any apprehending of particulars and bringing them into relation. Several objects, coming to prominence sensu-

ously, sensuously found the form of unity of sensuous similarity or likeness of the sensuous group.<sup>1</sup> The sensuously given exerts a stimulus; it awakens the interest of the lowest level, the practice of apprehending particulars and of holding them together while they are run through. In this process, we always think of a group of similar objects which, in the unity of an intuition in the broadest sense, are brought together in a quasi-coexistence, are united in a single "image." The contemplative running-through changes into a succession of single apprehensions, and in the transition from apprehension to apprehension there comes to prominence for observation what was already stressed to some extent on the level of passivity, namely, a foundation of similarity or likeness between this and that, as well as what is made dissimilar and unlike by contrast. The things which are common "coincide," while those which are different separate. There is not only the overlapping which takes place in every consciousness of unity with the transition from one object to another in the form of retaining-in-grasp, but a *coincidence in the objective sense*. With the transition from the apprehension of A to that of B, which is like or similar to A, B is brought in consciousness to an overlapping coincidence with A, which is still retained in grasp, and there is in both of them coincidence of like with like, while the unlike enters into conflict.

However, the *coincidence of likeness* must be distinguished from that of *similarity*. Let us first remain with the former: if I apprehend A and then go to B, what in B is said to be like A is united with A in such a way that the feature [*Moment*] of B in question is marked out, made prominent; this takes place because the feature of B coincides with the corresponding feature of A, and coincides without any "gap," is completely one with it, so that what is covered [in the coincidence] is seen entirely through the covering. The distinct duality of A and B, and also what they have in common, is changed into a unity, which preserves a doubling in consciousness but materially is not a separation or duality of elements "outside one another." The two are within each other, and only to this extent are they two. They constitute a unique assemblage, which, so to speak, is present in two "editions."

On the other hand, if the relation is one of mere *similarity*,

1. Cf., on this point, § 16.

then there is certainly still coincidence; the feature of *B* in question, which is perceived originally, coincides with the corresponding feature of *A*, still retained in the consciousness of the "still." But the feature of similarity of *A* which is seen through the feature of similarity of *B*, and "coincides" with it, has a "gap." The two features are blended in a community; yet there also remains a duality of material separation, which is the separation and coincidence of what is "akin." They do not go together to form a "like" but to form a pair, where the one is certainly "like" the other but "stands off" from it. This duality, with its unity of community, can approach more and more the unity of perfect community, which is precisely likeness and essential coincidence without disparity, and can come so close that we speak of an approximate likeness, of a similarity which is almost complete likeness, only with slight deviations. But the difference still remains extant, despite the continuous transitions.

Naturally, this coincidence of likeness or similarity must be distinguished from explicative coincidence, in which parts of an object are apprehended as being *in* it. This does not involve, in any sense, an objective inherence of parts in a whole. But this coincidence, as has already been mentioned, is also to be distinguished from the general nature of the overlapping which takes place in any act of colligation, of merely gathering a plurality of objects together. Merely gathering objects together does not yet lead to a coincidence of likeness, to an active overlapping of what is gathered together relative to their likenesses and similarities—an active operation which is motivated only by sensuous likenesses and similarities. To be sure, any objects can be held together, gathered together conjunctively, but this becomes an act of comparison only when we have an *intention toward a likeness or similarity*, in other words, an intention to "seek" a common element. This means: although originally only a sensuous likeness already affecting us motivates, as a kind of unification, the transition to a comparative running-through of particulars and the tendency to set off in relief what is common, still, even with what is given as heterogeneous, we can make *trial* of similarity and see if it actually obtains.

The opposite of sensuous similarity, which can appear in such cases, we designate as *dissimilarity in a pregnant sense*; by this we do not mean a limited degree of similarity, a very slight similarity, but the complete negation of similarity, which

we will designate as *heterogeneity*. It occurs when an intention toward homogeneity has preceded and is disappointed, if, e.g., with the attempt at an overlapping coincidence, complete conflict takes place. The question whether such complete heterogeneity is in general possible at all, or whether everything constituted in a consciousness does not still have a community, a kind of likeness, we leave open here.

§ 45. *Total and partial similarity*  
(*similarity with-reference-to*).

THE SIMILARITY or likeness about which we have spoken up to now was understood as *concrete similarity* and likeness, that is, similarity of concrete objects, as, e.g., a roof colored red is similar to a dark red roof. From this concrete similarity we distinguish *transferred similarity*, which is similarity with reference to similar parts, and not similarity of the whole object, not similarity pure and simple. It is a specific relation in which *concreta* and wholes participate in a similarity in consequence of the similarity of the subordinate features to which the similarity belongs.

If the similarity is concrete, that is, such that the *concreta* are similar through themselves, through their total quiddity, and "coincide" as *concreta*, then the similarity certainly also belongs to each feature which we can distinguish in the related *concreta*; more precisely, we can separate the two *concreta* into "corresponding" features, and if these features are put into unequivocal coordination, the similarity belongs to each corresponding pair. The concrete similarity is thus resolved into partial similarities. But here the wholes are not similar "in consequence of" the similarity of the parts. On the contrary, the similarity of the parts is here merely "transferred" to the similarity of the wholes. A particular kind of coincidence takes place. The wholes enter necessarily into a genuine mutual relationship by the coincidence of the parts; since the parts have the sensuous unity of the coincidence, the wholes themselves attain a sensuous unity. And to this [the wholes], what is said about similarity is transferred, especially since similar consequences are connected with this secondary "similarity." The similar re-

calls the similar. To this particular kind of coincidence corresponds a particular kind of association by similarity: the association "one recalls the other." In the association of the memory evoked ( $B$  as recalled by  $A$ ), this "by" is given; and also given is that  $A$  recalls  $B$  "in consequence of  $a$ ." The recollective tendency goes from  $a$  to  $a'$ , ( $a$  being the grounding element); but since  $a$  is given only in  $A$ , which, as concrete, is what is primarily given, and since  $a'$  is given only in  $B$ , which, on its side, is also primarily given, it is by transference that  $A$  acquires the memory-relation to  $B$ . But this is an *actual* memory-relation, even though it is founded in the founding relation  $a-a'$ .

To be sure, we can also grasp this relation in such a way that we regard the similarity of the *concreta* as an actual similarity but as a similarity having a modified character, a similarity "based" on the similarity of  $a$ . Then total or concrete similarity and partial similarity are different *modes of similarity*, and the one mode makes possible an unequivocal coordination of all features as partial similarities, while the other mode lets only individual features appear as features of similarity. Consequently, we must distinguish:

1. *Total similarity*, or *pure* similarity of the concrete wholes.
2. *Partial similarity*, which is pure similarity of the parts but not pure similarity of the concrete wholes.

Two contents are in the relation of pure similarity if no immediate part of the one is dissimilar to that of the other. Impure similarity is clouded similarity, clouded by components of dissimilarity.

Pure similarity has its degrees. But this gradation is different from the not-genuine, not-continuous gradation of impure, partial similarity, which is all the more perfect, the more parts stand in pure similarity; but within this similarity the parts can again differ according to the strength with which they determine the "extent" of the similarity of the wholes.

§ 46. *Determinations of relation and determinations of contrast ("absolute impressions").*

TWO MEMBERS of a relation need not always actually be present in the unity of an intuition as in the cases of comparative determination discussed hitherto. A pre-given substrate of determination can be linked associatively with other similar substrates without these having to attain genuine awakening and the envisionment resulting from it. They can remain in the background and still be co-effective for the determination. For example, a tall man can be present as being tall without, in general, there needing to be people who are short in our field of vision. The man *contrasts* with "normal" men, examples of whom may be vaguely "called up" without an explicit comparison being made. The same thing is true, for example, of the determinations "hot" and "cold," "long"- or "short"-lived, "fast" or "slow." All of these determinations are drawn with reference to a *normality of experience* which can vary from environing world to environing world. "Cold" weather in the tropics means something else than "cold" weather in the temperate zone; a "fast" vehicle in the era of the stagecoach means something else in the age of the racing car, etc. The standard for such determinations arises from the structure of the environing world immediately and entirely as a matter of course; the contrasting terms of the relation do not have to be expressly evoked. Only the one substrate stands at the focal point of the apprehension; missing, therefore, is what in our general characterization we have indicated to be the essential element of relational contemplation: the going to and fro between two substrates of the contemplative regard. It is, so to speak, an incompletely constituted relation. From the psychological point of view, such determinations, which arise on the basis of the members of the relation remaining in the background, are called "*absolute impressions*." We have an absolute impression of size, of weight, etc. We must, therefore, distinguish *relational determinations* in the proper sense from *determinations of contrast*.

PART II  
Predicative Thought  
and the Objectivities  
of Understanding

# 1 / The General Structures of Predication and the Genesis of the Most Important Categorical Forms

## § 47. *The interest in cognition and its actualization in predicative operations.*

THE CONFIRMATION of what exists, how and what it is, is the sense of all cognitive activity.<sup>1</sup> It does not yet attain its goal in the domain of receptivity, which, up to now, has been our exclusive concern. Objects as identical unities are already constituted in this receptivity, in a multiplicity of steps of turning-toward which refer to them, which apprehend and explicate them. What affects is accepted, the given is run through, we return in memory to what has already been run through, we put it in relation to other elements, and so on. But all these activities are bound to the immediate intuition of the substrate, whether this intuition is self-giving or reproductive. If it is also true that nothing in consciousness which has once been given in experience, especially in intuition, is lost, if it is true that everything remains efficacious in that it creates and develops a horizon of familiarities and known qualities, still, what is experienced has, on this account, not yet become our *possession*, which henceforth we have at our disposal, which we can come up with again at any time, and about which we can inform others. The *interest in perception*, which guides receptive experience, is only the

1. With regard to these remarks, cf. also the Introduction, above, § 13.



*forestage of the interest in cognition in the proper sense*; it is the tendency, the disposition to bring the intuitively given object to givenness from all sides (cf. § 19). But the *will to cognition*, whether for its own sake or at the service of a practical goal, aims at more than this. In receptivity, although the ego is indeed actively turned toward what affects it, it does not make its knowledge, and the individual steps of cognition as the means to its achievement, an object of will. In genuine cognitive interest, however, a voluntary participation of the ego is in play in an entirely different way: the ego wishes to know the object, to pin it down once and for all. Every step of cognition is guided by an active impulse of the will to hold onto the known as the same and as the substrate of its determining characteristics in the later course of life, to put it in relation, etc. Knowledge is an act of the ego; the goal of the will is the apprehension of the object in the identity of its determinations, the fixing of the result of contemplative perception "once and for all."<sup>2</sup>

This achievement of knowledge is an activity *attached* to pre-given objects, but attached in a completely different way than the merely receptive activity of apprehension, explication, and relational contemplation. Its outcome is the possession of knowledge. In the pregnant concept of an object as the object of knowledge it is implied that the object is identical and identifiable beyond the time of its intuitive givenness, that what is once given in intuition must still be capable of being kept as an enduring possession even if the intuition is over, and, what is more, in structures which, through indications at first empty, can again lead to envisionment of the identical—to an envisionment whether by presentification or by renewed self-giving. Thus it is a matter here of objectifying achievements of a new kind, not merely of an activity *attached* to the pre-given and receptively apprehended objectivities; rather, in predicative knowledge and its deposit in the predicative judgment new kinds of objectivities are constituted, which can then themselves be apprehended again and be made thematic as logical structures, i.e., as what we call *categorial objectivities*, since they arise from the *katēgorein*, the act of declarative judgment, or also (since judgment is certainly an activity of the understanding) ob-

2. Concerning the necessary qualifications, see the Introduction, above, p. 63.

*jectivities of the understanding.*<sup>3</sup> Thus the work of cognition, this higher stage of activity, must, in contrast to receptivity, be characterized as a *creative spontaneity*, itself already productive of objects. These are the objects which, as logical structures, have exclusively engaged the attention of logicians, without the manner of their original production and their arising from the lower level of cognitive activity being investigated. In these structures, cognition is deposited in such a way that it can first really become an abiding possession, an object over which, inasmuch as [it remains] identical, not only I myself can exercise control, but which, because it remains identical, is intersubjectively constituted in such a way that, on the basis of expressions tied in with the logical operations and their indications, what was first given in *my* intuition can also be intuited as identical by others.

The whole layer of expression, which is certainly inseparably linked to predicative operations—all the questions concerning the connection of utterance and predicative thought, accordingly whether and to what extent all predication is tied to words, as well as the question of how the syntactical articulation of expression hangs together with the articulation of what is thought—all this must remain aside here. The predicative operations will be examined purely as they phenomenally present themselves in lived experience, apart from all these connections—namely, as subjective activities.

The objectivities constituted in these logical operations will turn out to be objectivities of a particular kind, which certainly always refer to their background, yet are also capable of being detached from it and leading their own lives as judgments: as such, in the multiplicity of their forms, they are the theme of formal logic. With this, the *principal themes of the following observations* are indicated. They will first have to follow up *the structure of the predicative activities in general*, the manner in which they are erected on the operations of the lower level (Chapter 1); then it will be necessary to consider *the structure and mode of being of the objectivities arising from them* (Chapter 2); and, finally, the fact of the detachability of these objectivities from their background will lead to the difference between intuitive and empty judgments. In this difference we

3. On this subject, see the more exact analyses below, § 58.

will find the source of the *modalities of predicative judgment*, and from the point of view of their constitutive origin (Chapter 3) we will grasp these modalities as *modes of decision of the ego*.

#### § 48. *Comparison of cognitive action and practical action.*

BEFORE PASSING to the specific analyses, a few general problems relative to predicative activity remain to be discussed. The predicative achievement of cognition has been characterized as an *action*, and this is justified in that the general structures of all action are also capable of being exhibited in this cognition, though in other respects cognition is still to be distinguished from action in the ordinary sense of the term. We prefer to think of action as an external doing, a bringing-about of external objects (things) as self-giving from other self-giving objects. In cognitive activity, new objectivities are indeed also preconstituted, but this production has an entirely different sense from that of the production of things from things (cf., on this, §§ 63 f.); and—what is here important above all—this production of categorial objectivities in cognitive action is not the final goal of this action. All cognitive activity is ultimately referred to the substrates of the judgment—without prejudice to the possibility of moving, on the mere self-evidence of clarity, a great way in the progress of cognition merely in the domain of made objects, of logical *structures*. The goal of this activity is not the *production of objects* but a *production of the knowledge of a self-given object*, therefore the possession of this object in itself as that which is permanently identifiable anew. If every act of will which realizes itself in external action is grounded in an evaluative striving, the striving for possession of an object valued as useful, pleasing, and so on, then what is in question here is not an evaluative striving of this kind but merely the realization of a tendency toward self-givenness: the ego does not live in the positing of values and in the desirous striving grounded therein; rather, it lives in the activity of objectivation.

The striving of cognition, however, has its analogies with desirous striving. *Desirous striving* leads to an action which is

instituted by a "fiat" and tends toward realization. In the progress of the action, the striving fulfills itself more and more, developing from the initial mere intention into a realization. The path to the goal can be simple, consisting in a simple act, or it can be complex, proceeding through interim goals which are intended in specific acts of will and have the character of being of service to the dominant "aim." With the growing fulfillment of the intention during the activity and with the approach to the goal, a growing feeling of satisfaction sets in, and it is necessary to distinguish between the *fulfillment of the tendencies toward satisfaction* and the *fulfillment of being directed voluntarily toward the goal*. This voluntary realization is always characterized by the fact that it is an active realization in unity with the perception of the spatiophysical occurrence as brought about by the action. We do not have a willing and, next to it, a perceiving, but in itself what is perceived is characterized as being produced voluntarily.

If it is true that we do not have, with the actualization of *cognitive striving*, such realization of external occurrences and objects, still there is in its structure an exact analogy with action characterized by external realization: the goal here is knowledge, and we also distinguish between the [at first] completely unfulfilled intending and its growing fulfillment in cognitive action to the point of complete realization, to the point where the object stands before us as completely known. In the same way, with cognitive action we distinguish between goal and path, between interim goals and terminal goals; cognitions can be classified as *actions-in-the-service-of* and *dominant actions*. Each individual action has its result in these or those predicative determinations, and the total action has its total result in the complete predicative knowledge of the object. What emerges here as regards determinations (predicative determinations) of the object is not merely what is accepted, what is received on the basis of affection in the turning-toward; rather, it is everything which is intentionally characterized in itself as a *product of the ego*, as *knowledge produced by it* through its cognitive action.

This becomes clear in the act of returning again to cognitions previously acquired, i.e., in the reproduction of intuitions in the form of memories or in any other form of presentification. Such reproductions are then more than a mere memory of an earlier intuition. We return to what is reproduced as to an *acquisition*,

actively produced in an act of will oriented toward this acquisition. As such, it is intentionally characterized. It is reproduced otherwise than in a mere memory: a *modification of the will* is present, as with every acquisition. This gives it the character, not only of something which has been voluntarily apprehended earlier, but of an acquisition which still continues to be valid, which we still hold in our will, not now simply repeating the act of will, but willing in the form of reproduction, which is that of the "still": I, the present ego, as belonging to the particular mode of the present, am *still willing*; therein it is implied that I am in accord with the past act of will, that I am also willing it, holding it as conjointly valid—I, the present ego, presently willing. Thus, what was once apprehended in its truth as "itself" in an act of predicative judgment is now an enduring possession, ever at one's disposal because it can be reproduced, and apprehended again, in a repetitive process.

The knowledge of what is truly the identical self [*Selbst*]<sup>1</sup> is the end-form toward which the entire process, sustained by the interest in cognition, ultimately strives; precisely toward the completely achieved "in itself"; but in a relative sense it is the result, correct for each occasion, "through" which, as means, the horizon of action passes to further new results, which draw ever closer to what is truly the identical self. Every step of cognition is determined in that it signifies not merely *fulfillment with clarity and intuitiveness* but, at the same time, *fulfillment of cognitive striving* and thereby the growing satisfaction of this striving. The satisfaction which goes hand in hand with the growing fulfillment of cognition is not *satisfaction in the being of the object* or in its possession, as in the case of external action, but *satisfaction in the mode of cognition of the object*, in the clarity of the object's givenness. Thus *cognition as action is an activity with an aim*, an activity directed toward the possessive apprehension of the true being and being-such of an object, its determinative characteristics, in the corresponding states of affairs. This possessive apprehension is accomplished in the medium of an anticipatory intention of being

1. [*Selbst* has not been translated merely as "self," because here *Selbst* refers not to a personal self but to the "itself" of the object, the "thing itself," and because it is also meant to suggest the self-sameness of the object (its being identical with itself throughout its appearances), since the core of the word, *selb-*, means "same."  
—Trans.]

which is unclear and unfulfilled; throughout intending there goes a striving; and in cognition, which is lived out in acts, there is a realizing action in which the intention, so far as it is intended, is confirmed. The confirmation takes place in the identifying transition to what is correspondingly truly the same, in the self-evident grasping of the objective being and being-such of the identical self, or mediately in the self-evident grasping of the thing as logically included in another thing which earlier had already become known to be true.

The interest in cognition can be dominant or in-the-service-of. It need not always be a purely autonomous interest in the object, one that is actually purely theoretical; rather, the knowledge toward which this interest is directed can also be merely a means for other final ends of the ego, for practical goals and practical interests directed to them. On the other hand, it can also be, like other interests, momentary, fleeting, and supplanted, even before its actualization, by others. But to the extent that it is realized as an interest directed toward knowledge, it creates the preconditions for ever new cognitive activities, erected one on another, ever different in form but alike according to their structure, whether they are ends in themselves or whether they are in the service of some practical end or other (cf. Introduction, p. 66).

§ 49. *The sense of the distinction of different levels in objectifying operations. Transition to constitutive analyses.*

WHEN WE DISTINGUISH two levels of interest and, corresponding to these, two levels of objectifying operations, viz., that belonging to *receptive experience*, on the one hand, and that of *predicative spontaneity*, on the other, this distinction of levels should not be construed as if the different operations were somehow separate from each other. On the contrary, things which must be treated separately for the sake of analysis and which, genetically, are recognized as belonging to different levels of objectification are *as a rule actually closely entwined*. That receptivity precedes predicative spontaneity does not mean

that the former is in fact something independent, as if it was always necessary first to run through a chain of receptive experiences before there could be any awakening of genuine interest in cognition. On the contrary, from the first we can already thematize a pregiven object in the interest of cognition, not only to examine it carefully but in enduring cognitions "to confirm how it is." In this situation, predicative forming and cognizing go immediately hand in hand with receptive apprehension, and what is distinguished from a genetic point of view as belonging to different levels is in fact inseparably entwined in the concretion of one consciousness. These levels are, to be sure, always erected one upon the other; each step of the predication presupposes a step of receptive experience and explication, for only that can be originally predicated which has been originally given in an intuition, apprehended, and explicated.

The same thing will hold when, from the operations of predicative thought (determinative and relational) and its predicative formation, we later distinguish, as a *third and highest level*, *conceptualizing thought* and the *formation of generalities* taking place in it. Here also it is only a question—and to a still higher degree than with the distinction of the first two levels—of an *abstract separation*. There is no act of predicative judgment, no constitution of predicative forms, which does not already include in itself at the same time a formation of generalities. Just as every object of receptivity stands forth from the beginning as an object of a type known in some manner or other, so correlative in every predicative formation there already takes place a determination "as" this or that on the basis of expressions inseparably entwined with every predication and on the basis of the general significations pertaining to these expressions. If, for example, in a judgment of perception of the simplest form, *S is p*, we determine this particular object of perception as red, then, in this "being-determined-as-red," there is already contained implicitly, in virtue of the generality of the signification "red," the relation to the general essence "redness," although this relation need not become thematic, as occurs, for example, in the form "this is a red object." It is only in this case that we can *speak of conceptualizing thought in the proper sense* and hence legitimately distinguish it from merely determinative and relational thought as such, in which the relation to generalities is contained only implicitly and has not yet become

thematic. Here we intentionally neglect the problems which result from the fact that to every predication are linked an act of expression, a general signification, and, in this sense, an act of conceptualization.

If we now look into the genesis of the predicative forms, the *order of our inquiries*, apart from the general limitations of the total theme mentioned by way of introduction (§ 14), will first of all be determined by the progress of the discussions of Part I. There we started from the explication of an object in perception. This led to the predicative stage, to a judgment of perception, at first of the simplest form, *S is p*. As we follow up its constitution, general fundamental structures of predication will come to light; and thereby insights, already more general, will open into the essence of predicative formation in general and its relationship to events on the lower level—insights which concern not only this most simple initial instance of predicative judgment but all predicative formation. When we then advance further, to the more complex formations, the order [of our inquiries] will be determined solely by the degree of complexity, for we will advance from the simple to the ever more complex. Our inquiries will consequently no longer be able to run parallel to those of Part I. We can already take for granted here the insight into the full concretion of the structures of receptivity and can *let ourselves be guided exclusively by the point of view of the simplicity of the constitution of predicative forms*. For what in receptivity proves to be simple need not always give rise to a predicative judgment of primitive form, and, conversely, incidents of receptivity of the most complex structure can be imparted in a completely simple predicative judgment.

#### § 50. *The fundamental structure of predication.*

- a. The two-membered nature of the predicative process.

WE WILL THEREFORE take our point of departure from the simple perception and explication of an as yet undetermined substrate *S* and, for reasons to be discussed later, will limit our-



selves at first to its explication according to a dependent internal determination, a moment which we will designate as *p*. The simplest case is one in which the explication (as the contemplation of an object) does not go on to ever new moments at all. In our example, the contemplation stops at once and leads only to *p*, and immediately thereafter it proceeds to a fresh determination. What is the new achievement which occurs when, on the basis of explication, we come to the predicative determination "S is *p*"?

We have seen that, in the explication of a substrate *S*, a coincidence takes place between *S* and its determining moment *p*. As a substrate still remaining in grasp, the substrate has obtained in this synthesis of transition from *S* to *p* an accretion of sense. But when, retaining *S* in grasp, we pass to its moment *p*, therefore when we witness this coincidence, this "contraction" of *S* in *p*, we have not yet, for all that, posited *S* as *subject* in a predicative judgment, and we have not yet determined it as having the moment *p* in the manner "*S* is *p*." This, rather, is the *achievement of a new kind of activity*. Already in the act of apprehension and receptive explication there were active steps: in an active turning-toward, the substrate *S* was first apprehended in its undifferentiated unity, made a theme, and then its determination *p* was actively apprehended in the explicative synthesis. The work of the activity of the ego went thus far. Beyond this, the explicative coincidence arose *passively* between the substrate *S*, still retained in grasp, and its determination *p*, and the thematic object-substrate found its enrichment of sense in this passive modification (cf. above, § 24).

When the transition from *S* to *p* has taken place in this way, there then develops on the basis of active contemplation an *interest of higher level* in the object-substrate, an interest, proceeding from this contemplation, *in retaining* the accretion of sense arising from it, the *S* in its enrichment of sense. *S* which, at the end of the process of contemplation, is other than in the beginning, the *S* which has receded and remains only retained in grasp, which no longer stands at the "focal point" of interest, returns again to this focal point inasmuch as it now shows itself as extended in sense. We go back to the *S*, thus identifying it with itself, which only means, however, that, in the return, it "again" stands there as *S*: in this new thematic apprehension we have its enrichment of sense as mere protention, in connection with the retention of the transition which has just taken

place. The interest now betakes itself in the direction of *S* in its enrichment of sense, which supposes that we *again* pass to *p*. For originally, *p* emerges as the enrichment of sense [of *S*] only in the synthetic transition [from *S* to *p*] in the explicative coincidence. But the transition is now guided by the cognitive will to retain *S* in its determination. An *active* intention aims at apprehending what previously was a merely *passive* coincidence, therefore, in the active transition to *p*, at producing in an original activity what accrues to *S*. As an active ego, directed toward *S* in its accretion of sense, and in my interest focused on this accretion itself, I bring about the transition and the partial coincidence as free activity and thus bring about the fulfillment of the determining intention, the intention toward *S* in the sense accruing from the transition and coincidence. I have *S* as the substrate of a determination and actively determine it. The object-substrate takes the form of the predicative subject; it is the subject-theme as *terminus a quo*, and the activity goes over to the predicate as the opposed *terminus ad quem*. It is only then that there is realized in a productive activity—which is not only a synthetic activity in general but, at the same time, the *activity of synthesis itself*—the consciousness that *S* receives a determination *by p* in the mode “*S* is *p*.”

We have said that what is peculiar to the predicative synthesis consists in the active accomplishment of the synthetic transition from *S* to *p*, in the active accomplishment of the unity of identity between *S* and *p*. We are therefore directed in a certain way toward the unity of identity. But this must not be understood as if we (noetically) were directed *toward the identifying process*, toward the multiplicity of lived experience in which the synthetic unity between *S* and *p* is established. We are in this attitude *now*, when we phenomenologically elucidate the predicative synthesis; but when we accomplish this synthesis itself, we are *directed objectively* toward *S* in its partial identity with *p*. On the other hand, this does not mean that we then explicate the result of the receptive explication, namely, this successively constituted unity of identity which is preconstituted in the explication. This would mean running through the succession anew, therefore renewing the explication “in memory.” Such a repetition of the explication generally takes place in receptive experience (cf. § 25, pp. 123 f.) [only] when we endeavor to impress an object on ourselves in its intuitive determinations (“attributes”). For this, a simply appre-

hending regard is first directed toward the unity of coincidence already constituted; this unity becomes a theme in a simple thesis with a single ray of attention, and then the explication is accomplished anew. But this still does not lead to a predication.

On the contrary, in order for the substrate of the explication to become a subject and for the explicates to become predicates, it is necessary that the regard turn back to the unity which is passively preconstituted within the receptive activity of the process of explication and is in a sense concealed. *Being turned toward this unity in order to apprehend it* implies *repeating the process in a changed attitude*, making an active synthesis from a passive one. This synthesis is not something which can be originally apprehended in a simple turning-toward in the manner in which, at the lower level, everything was apprehended in acts of simple turning-toward; rather, they can be perceived only by repeating the act of running-through. This takes place, as was mentioned, in a change of attitude: we do not again carry out a merely contemplative explication but an activity of predicative identification, and this is an *apprehending consciousness*, whose *activity* is characterized not by a single ray but by *several rays* (*a polythetic activity*). The action of determinative identification goes from the spontaneous apprehension of *S* as subject to *p*: the apprehending regard lives in the apprehension of its being determined as *p*. In the activity of explication, the object is already implicitly "determined" as *p*, i.e., it is clarified and made explicit as such, but the "being-determined-as" is not apprehended. It is first apprehended in the repeated active accomplishment of the synthesis, an accomplishment which presupposes the preceding explication. As present to consciousness, the *S* must be already explicated, but it is now posited predicatively simply as *S*, which is identical, no matter how it may be explicated. On the other hand, it pertains to its form that it is the explicand; it is posited in the form of subject, and *p* expresses the determination. In the "is," the form of the synthesis between explicand and explicate is expressed in its active accomplishment, i.e., as the apprehension of being-determined-as, and in the predication this form is a component of the total "state of affairs" which attains expression.

To sum up: *essentially, the predicative synthesis always has two levels:*

1. In the transition from *S* to the moments *p*, *q*, . . . ,

emerging in coincidence: the  $p$ ,  $q$ , are apprehended for themselves. The interest which followed the objective sense of the preconstitution, or, correlatively, the quidditive content of the object coming to prominence therein, drains off into the determinations, but  $S$  and each of the moments already apprehended remains in grasp.

2. But then there is something new; namely, the ego in its interest turns back to  $S$  and, for example, first taking  $p$  particularly in grasp again and directing a new ray of attention toward it, becomes aware of the enrichment of sense and is saturated with it, while it again reproduces it by an original activity in a new passage to  $p$ ; and thus for each of the determinations. *Determination always has two members.*

Thus is described the process of predication which tradition always already had in view under the terms "synthesis" and "diaeresis" without actually being able to come to grips with it.

#### b. The double constitution of forms in predication.

The progress of the objectification of this higher level is revealed in the *spontaneous fashioning of new thematic forms*, theme-subject and theme-determination. These are no longer thematic objects like those of the lower level, where the thematic form is everywhere the same—that of receptive turning-toward and apprehension; rather, they are new thematic forms, arising from an original spontaneity and in accord with each other. Each has a *syntactical (categorical)*<sup>1</sup> formation: subject-form,

1. In what follows, the expressions "categorical" and "syntactical" will be employed in accordance with the meaning and practice already used in *Ideas* and *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (cf. *Ideas*, esp. pp. 23 f. [ET, pp. 61 f.] and *Logic*, pp. 100 ff. [ET, pp. 120 ff.], and, above all, Appendix I to the *Logic*, pp. 259 ff. [ET, pp. 294 ff.], to which we refer here once and for all for a further clarification of the concepts of syntactical form and syntactical matter [Stoff]). *The concept of syntax and syntactical*, which refer exclusively to the logical form, *should not, therefore, be confused with the linguistic concepts of syntax and syntactical form*. If one keeps this in mind, the ambiguity of these expressions will not be troublesome and give rise to confusions. It is advisable, in spite of this double signification, to retain the expression *syntactical* in alternation with *categorical* because it is indispensable in facilitating expression in that it provides the possibility of compounds like "syntactical category" and derivations like "syntax" and "syntagma," in

predicate-form, etc., and they are connected in a *syntactical unity*, which is that of a judicative "proposition." These are forms which as such can then be apprehended for themselves in a kind of reflection and objectivation still to be discussed.

Examined more closely, a *double formation* is carried out in even the simplest predicative judgment. The members of a judicative proposition not only have a *syntactical formation* as subject, predicate, etc., as *functional forms* which belong to these propositions as elements of the proposition, but, underlying these, they have still another kind of formation, the *core-forms*:<sup>2</sup> the subject has the core-form of substantivity; in the predicate, the determination *p* is in the core-form of adjectivity. The form of substantivity, therefore, should not be confused with the subject-form. It designates "being-for-itself," the independence of an object (an independence which, naturally, can also be derived from the act by which the object has been made independent, as we shall see later on), as contrasted to adjectivity, which is the form of "in something," of the dependence of the object-determination. This formation has nothing immediately to do with the function of what is formed (of the "core-structure") in the totality of a predicative judgment; however, it is the presupposition for the syntactical formation, for the investing of the core-structure as syntactical material [*Stoffe*] with functional forms such as the subject-form, etc. Formation as subject presupposes a matter having the form of substantivity. But the latter need not necessarily have the subject-form; it can also, as we shall see, have the syntactical form of a relative object. In the same way, what is apprehended in the form of adjectivity can just as well play the role of predicate as attribute. Later, we will also have occasion to speak of this.

What is said about adjectivity, substantivity, etc., must not be understood as if we were concerned here with differences of linguistic form. Even though the designations of these core-forms are drawn from the mode of designation of linguistic forms, nothing more is meant by them than *difference in the manner of apprehension*. At one time an object or an objective moment can become a theme as existing "for itself," and at

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the place of which the exclusive use of the expression "categorical" would not allow an equivalent.

2. On this distinction, cf. also the more detailed analyses in *Logic*, Appendix I, pp. 259 ff.; ET, pp. 294 ff.

another in the form of "in something," and by no means must these differences in the manner of apprehension always correspond also to a difference in the linguistic form of expression—indeed, for indication of such differences in the manner of apprehension, many languages simply do not have different kinds of words with accompanying word-forms at their disposal, as is the case with German, but must use other means for this.

All of these form-constructions must be understood according to a *relativity* which manifests itself in continuous levels. The core materials, which take the core-form of the substantive and, in addition, perhaps the syntactical form of the subject, can surely have any form whatsoever arising from other predicative processes; they can even be, as we will show later, themselves already entirely predicative propositions. The like holds true for all formations. We will at first disregard these relativities and will assume in our immediate analyses—as is indeed a matter of course, considering our point of departure in perception—that it is a question of *substrates* still *completely indeterminate and formless*, which thus acquire, in the greatest conceivable originality, the various predicative formations as a new sedimentation of sense—a constitution of sense which, as *logical*, must be completely distinguished from the forms of sense which, at the level of receptivity, already admit the substrates as poles of sense.<sup>3</sup> To be sure, everything which has been set forth for this most original case holds good for substrates more complicated in structure (already formed in another way). If these attain determination, then this has exactly the same structure which has been pointed out here for the simplest case. Hence, *any determinable something whatsoever* can, in general, function as the S in our simplest judgment, S is p. Whatever affects the cognizing ego, whatever can be the substrate of a turning-toward, whether originally independent, or whether dependent and only later made independent, can become the subject of determination. We will be able to fully evaluate the extent of this generality only when we have also discussed the possibility of the "substantivation" of objectivities preconstituted on the higher level (cf. § 58).

We speak of a *sedimentation of sense in the object*. This means that, like every step of receptive experience, every step

3. On this, cf. § 56, below; and on the concept "ultimate substrate," cf. § 29, above, especially the conclusion.

of predicative judgment has its lasting result. Habitualities are established by it which are realized in the further course of actual judgment in the most diverse fashion. We also disregard this at first and trace the genesis of the forms of judgment in the actuality of their becoming, just as if they were produced for the first time without any cooperation by habitual sedimentations [of sense]. When we speak of the *originality of the constitution of forms*, this expression has a *double sense*: on the one hand, it means the temporal originality [*Erstmaligkeit*] of their production in actual becoming on the basis of the self-evident pre-predicative givenness of the substrate; on the other, and related to the preceding, it indicates a constitution of forms attached to substrates still entirely without form as ultimate core material.

- c. The judgment as the original cell of the thematic connection of predicative determination and the significance of its independence.

With our analysis of predication we have taken the first step of determination, "S is p," for itself, separated from possible connection to subsequent determinations involved in it. This was naturally an abstraction; but when we cast a preliminary glance on the total structure of a thematic connection of determination, we will see to what extent this abstraction is possible and justified. *The primary factor is certainly always a total complex of determination*, and interest is not satisfied as long as the cognitive goal indicated in this complex has not been attained in a number of steps. Hence, in fact, the determination will rarely come to a halt after the first step, but just as the underlying affective unity and, in its turn, the receptive contemplation are already multifarious, progressing in many directions, and at once entering in and going out, explicating and relating, so in most cases also the continuing predicative determination, which is based on this, will exhibit this multiplicity. Therefore, if a thematic interest in an object is once brought into play, then, as a rule, from then on a number, indeed—even if it is not a matter of cognition in the service of limited practical ends but of a purely theoretical striving for knowledge—an *open infinity*, of *thematic determinations* will open up, which are all thematically bound together in an open, boundless

unity. From among the ever new objects which force their way to our attention, the only objects which are joined, in thematic attention and predicative adjudication, to the series already brought into play are those which have something in common with those which have gone before, which have something to do with them. A constant change occurs in the thematic horizon. Such a horizon will always be present, and, in the breakthrough to attention, the *thematically alien* will always be separated from *that which belongs together thematically*, from that which, in some way or other, enriches and fulfills the interest in the initial theme. This already declares itself, as was indicated previously, in affection in the form of affective connections, and it unfolds in judgments which establish judicative ties between objects which are apprehended one by one. The thematic objects are then put into relation with one another externally, and at the same time they are determined internally, explicated individually, whereby the explicates, in their turn, themselves have a direct or indirect thematic connection with all previously existing substrates.

If, therefore, an interest in cognition is realized, that is, is fulfilled, then it changes necessarily into a *plurality of divergent thematic interests, which, however, are organized within the unity of one interest*. The corresponding judicative activity progresses in steps; each step is a *single* judgment but one which is bound to other judgments, already constituted, in a judicative unity. In this process it does not matter whether we take a unique substrate, in at least fictive isolation, or a plurality of substrates as a guiding theme. It is an essential peculiarity of every thematically unitary process, grounded most deeply in the internal structure of consciousness, that no matter how many objects may affect thematically and join together in the unity of a theme, still, *a satisfaction of interest is possible only by [the mediation of] concentrations in which, at any given time, one object becomes a substrate* and thereby a subject of determination. Naturally, the subject itself can also be composed of many members; it can have a plural form and any number of other annexes, and the same with regard to the predicate, but in every step of the act of judgment there is always this *caesura*, which corresponds to the synthesis of transition from subject to predicate. That is, it is part of the essence of a thematic process to always begin with simple apprehensions of substrates and with the appropriate syntheses of transition leading to the side



of determination—each such step being a predicative judgment closed in on itself, which, to be sure, is only *one* member in the total thematic complex; each is a closed operation, i.e., a completed satisfaction of the interest.

The fact that in this complex ever new thematic interests are aroused and are then satisfied in new acts of judgment does not speak against this. In any case, every judgment has a closing [*Abschluss*] in itself; it is in itself something thematically independent. And yet it is a member of an open and, according to ideal possibility, constantly widening thematic complex, which therefore is not closed. This complex is erected entirely on judgments, and it produces, with each new step of judgment, a unity of function on the basis of individual functions, a unity of satisfaction out of satisfactions already attained. If judgments which have first been constituted in independent self-containment are inserted in a complex of judgments, they certainly again obtain forms of connection and lose their independence. We must return to the most important of these changes. Independent unities constantly arise, but only as judgments of a higher level, founded on those of a lower level. Hence, *every theoretical unity of judgment must be identified as a single moment of a higher order*, which, in its much greater complexity, is founded in judgments which are again founded in judgments, and so on.

With this, it has been established to what extent it is legitimate to exhibit in an isolated step of judgment, taken for itself, the structure of predication in general. What has been laid bare by this is *the structure of the original cell of the thematic complex of determination*, which consists of cells constructed in a purely analogous fashion. It is the *original structure of the truly apophantic predicative judgment*—the judgment ordinarily favored by logic as judgment in the specific sense<sup>4</sup>—that is characterized by its “copulative” form of unity, a form which attains clearest linguistic expression in the connection of the subject and predicate in the “is” form.<sup>5</sup> In contrast to this are

4. Cf. *Logic*, pp. 265 f., 294; ET, pp. 301 f., 336.

5. That is, it is by no means meant by this that all languages must be capable of such a mode of expression; indeed, even where there is such an expression, there is often, in place of the copulative proposition using the auxiliary verb, a verbal proposition of logically equivalent meaning. The matter does not depend on such differences of linguistic expression. In either case, the designation of a

the predicative "propositions" in the broader sense, in which there is a connection in the form of "and," "or," etc.—"conjunctive" connections, which do not confer on what is formed by them an independence of the same kind as does the copulative connection. It is only in the "is" of this connection that the positing of what "exists" "once and for all" is truly accomplished, and with this a constitution of sense of a new kind in the object-substrate. The copulative connection is that to which the objectivating consciousness in its different levels ultimately aspires, and thus objectivation in the pregnant sense attains its goal in this copulative positing of the "is," as it is accomplished in every original cell of the thematic connection of determination.

Hence, this original structure can be exhibited in *every* predicative judgment, no matter how it comes to be; in no matter how complicated a way it may be constructed, it always has this two-membered structure. This holds, not only for judgments on the basis of explicative contemplation, but also for those based on relational contemplation; and it holds not only for judgments of perception, for it makes no difference what kind of underlying unity in the receptive givenness of the objects of the judgment is involved, whether these judgments are self-given in the unity of a perception, or whether they are judgments on the basis of memory or imagination: *as far as the possible unity of an intuition extends*, in the broadest sense which we have shown, and by which the unity of a determinative contemplation is rendered possible, *thus far are there also predicative judgments based on this unity*, and all have the basic structure exhibited here. Naturally, we are not saying by this that there are not also nonintuitive judgments, but genetically they always refer to such unities of possible intuition.

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purely logical structure of signification is taken from the mode of designation of a linguistic formation, and precisely from the one whose articulation most clearly reflects the articulation of the logical process which confers signification. It should once again be remembered in this connection that the problem must remain open as to whether the view of tradition is justified, according to which there is a *general convertibility* of verbal propositions into copulative propositions of logically equivalent signification. (Cf. Introduction, above, p. 15).

§ 51. *The forms of judgment corresponding to simple progressive explication.*

a. The act of progressive determination.

WE NOW PROCEED, mounting step by step, from the simplest form, "S is *p*," to the more complex. We are first led to those forms which correspond to unramified progressive contemplation, therefore to the contemplation which was the theme of Part I, § 24—with regard to which, for the time being, we again make the restriction that it is to be a matter of explication in dependent moments only.

We attained the first form of predication, S is *p*, which at the same time represents the archetype, when we conceived the act of determination as being conclusive with its first step. We now assume that the movement of explication goes further, from *p* to *q*, *r*, etc. Then, as has been indicated, the substrate S remains in grasp, and, as we lay hold of the explicates, it is progressively enriched by the *p*, *q*, *r*, provided that each of them is not only apprehended for itself but is at the same time attached to what has gone before, whereby, as belonging to S, they also enter passively with one another into a synthetic overlapping. If, on the strength of this, one passes to predicative determination, it naturally has the same two-membered structure which has been shown above for simple determination. The apprehension returns anew to S, now enriched by its explicates, and then accomplishes spontaneously the identification between S and them. But not only this. The coincidence of the individual members of the determination with one another, a coincidence which takes place on the basis of the coincidence of each individual with the identical S, is also renewed in this way and is in fact accomplished spontaneously, in connection with which the spontaneity of the accomplishment can be expressed by "and": "S is *p* and *q*" and so on. To each member belongs a specific synthesis of identity with S; rays of identity run, so to speak, from the one S to *p*, *q*, and so on. But these are not only linked together in the S; they have a collective linkage on the side of the determination. The one thematic interest grasps them together in their successive order, which, however, is an

ideal order, since the ideality of the proposition involves no individual temporal positions, no objective temporal succession of the determinations. Only the order is constituted.

This progressive predicative synthesis must not be understood as if it were necessary to return anew from every individual member to *S*, therefore as if, after the spontaneous accomplishment "*S* is *p*," it were necessary to return to *S* in order to accomplish the synthesis "*S* is *q*." This, rather, would yield a new form of predication, which must be discussed later. But here the spontaneous transition takes place *only once*: namely, between *S* and the members gathered together collectively in a unity.

It must still be noted that this *collective linkage*, as it is presented to us here from the side of the determination, is naturally also possible from the side of the independent substrates. It is then the expression of the spontaneous two-membered accomplishment of a contemplation of plurality.<sup>1</sup> The contemplated substrates are not simply run through in series, *S*, *S*<sub>1</sub>, *S*<sub>2</sub>, etc.; rather, they are retained in grasp according to their order in the series, and it is to this series that we return, and the successive aspect of the contemplation gives rise to an act spontaneously accomplished. The substrates are gathered together collectively in the mode of "enumeration": "*S* and *S*<sub>1</sub> and *S*<sub>2</sub>," and so on—a unique form of categorial synthesis which, as already noted, must be distinguished from the "copulative" synthesis of predicative judgment in the proper sense.

#### b. Determination in the form of "and so on."

The progressive determination does not always have the character, just considered, of a process concluding with a determined number of members. We have already seen in Part I that every substrate of determination is originally always already passively pregiven as something determinable, as something with a horizon of indeterminate determinability and known in conformity with a most general type. In the course of the explication, this prescription is increasingly fulfilled, but there still constantly remains a *horizon* beyond the succession of actually constituted determinations and *open to new properties which must be expected*. Every mental process with several mem-

1. With regard to this, cf. §§ 24d and 61.

bers, progressing in an orderly manner, carries with it such an open horizon; it is not *one* next unique member which is prescribed but the continuance of the process itself, which thus always has the intentional character of an *open process*.

This is important for the constitution of a particular form of progressive predicative determination. If we take the process of judgment in the middle of its movement and interrupt it, it is possible to do this in a double way, according to the nature of the thematic interest. This can be limited to *p* or to *p* and *q*; it is then not an unlimited interest in *S*, or it does not maintain itself as such; it limits itself. The open horizon of further ongoing determinability does not for that reason disappear; it is still always passively preconstituted, but it is not jointly included in the apprehension of the ego. Its spontaneous predicative function exhausts itself in the predicative determination "*S* is *p*" or "*S* is *p* and *q*," or in other similar forms, richer in determinate members. On the other hand, it is equally possible that the determinative movement indeed breaks off but that the thematic interest in *S*, the intention directed toward perfect knowledge, continues to be maintained as unlimited. The substrate is not only determined predicatively as explicated in conformity with *p*, or *p* and *q*, . . . , but in its character as being further determinable; *the open horizon of determinability which is passively pregiven with it is therefore cothematized*, and there emerge, accordingly, the predicative forms "*S* is *p*, etc.," "*S* is *p* and *q*, etc." There appears here the *new form of determination*: "*and so on*," a basic form in the sphere of judgment. The "*and so on*" enters into the forms of judgment or it does not, depending on how far the thematic interest in *S* extends; therefore, it produces differences in the forms of judgments themselves.

Properly speaking, we have designated by this an *infinity of forms*. (The word *infinity* really signifies the same thing as "*and so on*," with the exception that it indicates, in addition, that there is always another term.) We can say, if we draw upon the concepts of number to aid in our characterizations: the forms constituted with and without this tail of "*and so on*" can have one member, two members, and so on. To be sure, one cannot say *a priori* that any determinate object whatsoever will produce, or can produce, from itself infinitely many real determinations or even that it is objectively true that every object *must* have infinitely many properties. But essentially, its

horizon of indeterminate determinability is always pregiven with it and can also be cothematized.

c. The act of determination which links by identifying.

A new form, already somewhat more complex, to be sure, but nevertheless still belonging to the domain of simple, unramified progressive determination, is produced when (which is always possible *a priori*) the predication is accomplished in such a way that, after the determination by *p* or by several members, *p*, *q*, etc., the *S* again moves into primary apprehension, and a new determination then results, but in a mode of thematic connection. The syntheses *S* is *p*, *S* is *q*, therefore, are not merely accomplished spontaneously in a series, in which case these determinations would remain separate, and also the determinate members would not be gathered together into a collective unity (which would give the case mentioned under subsection *a*, above). These two judgments, *S* is *p*, *S* is *q*, would then naturally have no judicative unity, no spontaneously accomplished unity of identity, even if they were accomplished by the same ego, and they could easily occur at different times and without connection [between them]. To be sure, if both are accomplished one after the other in a single presence, or again, if they are linked by the medium of recollection, then *S*, which is present to consciousness twice in different modes, comes straightway to passive coincidence, even if, between, there is a break, brought about by an interruption of interest. However, if the interest in cognition remains unbroken, then not only is the succession of the two judgments, *S* is *p*, *S* is *q*, bridged over by the passive coincidence of *S*, but *by this bridging the thematic activity will pass over into S itself*. It then returns from the synthesis *S* is *p*, first accomplished in spontaneity for itself, again to *S*, which is then determined by a simultaneous activity as *q* and, from the other side, is actively identified with the *S* which was previously determined as *p*. The determinations *p*, *q*, therefore are not thereby, as in the case of progressive determination, taken together into a unity; they have no immediate intentional connection between themselves but only a mediate connection in virtue of the active identifying of *S*, to which in like fashion they both belong. There is then constituted *a unity*

of the two identifying activities, traversed by a single identifying activity, and thus a single judgment arises which is erected on two judgments: *S is p*, and *the same S is q*. With this, we are already confronted by a kind of active identification of the substrate, concerning which we shall see, in connection with the discussion of the judgment of identity, that it has, with its different modifications, a very far-reaching significance (cf. § 57).

The nature of the steps of receptive apprehension which provide the foundation in this case is irrelevant; continuing on the basis of *S* retained in grasp, the apprehension can progress from *p* to *q*; but after each step of explication, it can also return to *S* anew in an active apprehension, whereby the *S* which has been previously explicated in regard to *p* enters into passive coincidence with the *S* now explicated in regard to *q*, and so on. In any case, the predicative spontaneity is independent of the particular form of the explication which is necessarily presupposed; this spontaneity only presupposes that, in general, *S* has already been explicated in regard to *p*, *q*, . . . .

## § 52. The "is"-judgment and the "has"-judgment.

- a. Explication according to independent parts corresponds to the form of the "has"-judgment.

OUR PREVIOUS ANALYSES applied to predicative internal determinations which were erected on explication according to dependent moments. Although the fundamental structure thus laid bare can also be found in *every* predicatively determinative judgment, the initial limitation to internal determinations by *dependent moments* was still necessary because determination by independent parts provides, in the case of predication, certain modifications of the basic structure and does not develop according to exactly the same schema as the lower level. Predicative determination by dependent moments requires on the side of the predicate a determination in the form of adjectivity. This, indicated symbolically by the small letter *p*, proved to be the form of the dependence of the determination, in contrast to the form of substantivity, which corresponds to the independence of the substrate of determination. It follows from this that a de-

terminative judgment in which, from the side of the determination, there is not a dependent moment but an independent part, a "piece," must be constructed in another way. It does not have an adjectival predicate; rather, to the independence of what is predicated corresponds the syntactical form of the object belonging to the predicate, an object which, like the subject, has the core-form of substantivity. Verbally expressed, the judgment does not read, as in the first case, "S is *p*," but "S has *T*." As a new and simple form of predicative judging, we contrast this "has-judgment" to the simple "is-judgment," whereby again, as already in other cases, a difference of verbal expression serves as an indication of a purely logical difference in meaning. Obviously, both forms have in common the same fundamental structure: the separation into subject-side and predicate-side. Unlike the is-judgment, however, in the has-judgment there not only appears a single independent object with the core-form of substantivity, namely, the subject, but also, on the predicate side, a second such object. Genetically, the "has"-judgment, so far as it refers to the independent parts of a substrate, *has the same claim to originality as the "is"-judgment*; for every substrate of determination can, from the first, be explicated just as well in regard to its dependent as to its independent parts and can then be assigned predicates on the basis of these parts. Accordingly, everything set forth in the preceding sections also holds true for determination in the form of the has-judgment. Here also the determination can be terminated with the first step or it can continue, and this in all of the particular forms presented above.

b. The substantivation of dependent determinations and the transformation of the "is"-judgment into a "has"-judgment.

The has-judgment can never be transformed into an is-judgment without a complete modification of its sense. This is because an originally independent object, since it is an independent part of an original substrate, can never lose this independence and be changed into an object of determination. On the other hand, it is indeed quite possible, as we have seen, that original objects of perception, therefore objects originally dependent, can be made independent. This is expressed in the predicative sphere by the fact that these objects can be sub-



*stantified* and then either enter as subjects into new judgments or assume other functional forms, to be discussed shortly.

Thus *the universal significance of the core-form of substantivity* becomes clear to us (cf. *Logic*, pp. 272 f.)<sup>1</sup> from its genetic origin. It is based on the universality of the concept "object in general" and on the fact that it belongs to the original sense of every object, a sense already preconstituted in passivity, not only to be purely and simply a something in general but, from the first and *a priori*, something *explicable*; it is originally constituted according to its most general type with a horizon of indeterminate determinability. This implies, then, that, on the level of spontaneity, anything whatsoever which, in general, is capable of being posited, any "something," can be a substrate of explications and, further, a subject in predicative judgments. We will concern ourselves later on with what additional consequences are involved in the universal possibility of substantivation grounded in these relationships (cf. Chapter 2, § 58).

In the present context, the following is of importance: no original has-judgment, therefore no judgment predicating the independent parts of a substrate, can be changed into an is-judgment. But inversely, the *possibility of transforming every is-judgment into a has-judgment* is indeed based on the possibility of substantivation, i.e., the possibility of substantivating an originally dependent determination, which first yielded an adjectival predicate *S is p* (*S is red*), and then not letting it function as a subject in a new act of judgment but setting it over against its original object-substrate so that it confronts it as an independent determination, which then yields a judgment of the form *S has P* (*S has redness*). With this, it is by no means asserted that for every straightforward determinative judgment there is an *equivalent* relational judgment, namely, one putting independent objects into mutual relation; rather, this form always manifests itself clearly as a *modification* which refers back to a more original form, that of adjectival predication—so far as it is a question precisely of dependent moments. Their substantivation, and the act of predication erected on it, presupposes the result of the explication. And not only this: the substantivation presupposes that the dependent determination has already been formed adjectivally in a more original predication; it is this adjective which now receives the form of the substantive, as can

1. ET, pp. 309 f.

also be seen by the verbal expression. Stated more precisely: the dependent moment as core-material must first have received the core-form of adjectivity before it is able to receive the form of substantivity.<sup>2</sup>

So much for the forms of determination erected on simple internal explication.

§ 53. *The act of judgment based on relational contemplation. Absolute and relative adjectivity.*

THESE RELATIONSHIPS have their parallel in external relational determination, that is, in the predicative determinations based on relational contemplation. Here, also, forms of judgment of an analogously simple kind are produced.

Let us take, for example, a judgment of comparison, that is, a judgment erected on a comparative contemplation, e.g., "A is larger than B." Obviously, we also have here an articulation into subject and predicate side, in which the two-membered process of predicative synthesis comes to expression; but the predicate side now has a more complex structure. This is immediately understandable if we consider that the determination which comes to prominence in A occurs in it only on the basis of the transition to B, on the basis of the intuitive unity between A and B, a unity first established in a passive association and then receptively apprehended. We recall how this determination "larger than" came about: when the apprehending regard passed from A to B, A was retained in grasp as the substrate of determination and became enriched on the basis of the transition to B, while it still remained in grasp because of the determination "larger than." If the predication erected thereon is to succeed, then the A, enriched by the determination in question, must first be taken again in grasp and the transition to the determination must be actively accomplished. But since the relation to B belongs to its sense, the transition to the determination must also be a re-

2. On the difference between substantivity and adjectivity, see above, pp. 210 f.

newed transition to *B*. The predicate which results is "larger than *B*."

Here, also, the determination appears on the predicate side in the form of adjectivity. But it is an adjectivity which is bound to something which is *not* itself an adjectivity. The "larger than *B*" belongs to the subject as a predicate. It includes an adjective but is not merely an adjectival predicate. The adjectival is what can be apprehended "about" the subject, belonging to it as a determination. Nevertheless, the "than *B*" is nothing about the subject, nor is the "larger than *B*," taken in the complete sense. The "than *B*" belongs to the predicate and is united in it as the *adjectival core*, which it requires as a relative predicate. The two constituents of the predicate, the adjective (the adjectival core) and the relative object, thus refer to the subject, in virtue of their different forms, in a wholly different way. The adjectival is "about" the subject, although not, as in the case of internal determination, "in" it. But in what concerns the relative object, a relational regard goes from subject to object. This is expressed in the turns of phrase cited above, which give expression to the relative object as separate. The adjectival is, so to speak, apprehended for itself on the basis of the positing of relational unity.

To emphasize the matter once again, all these things are *structures whose signification is essentially logical*, which, to be sure, we follow up as a matter of course in the light of the articulation of expression in our German language, but which must find equivalent expression in other languages, even though their grammatical structure is often entirely different.

Adjectivity constituted on the basis of external contemplation in the act of relative determination, or, as we can also say, in relational judgment, is thus distinguished from adjectivity constituted in simple determinative thought (erected on internal explication) in that, apart from the substrate, a substantive functioning as a subject, it requires a counterpart, so to speak, an additional substantive, namely, the relative object, with which it is united relative to consciousness. *Every determination of a subject which is relative determines it on the basis of a synthesis of transition to a second substantive object.* There are as many different relative determinations as there are forms of such syntheses of transition, based on different aspects of the intuitive constitution of unity. Accordingly, we must distinguish:

1. *Absolute adjectivity.* To every absolute adjective corre-

sponds a dependent moment of the substrate of determination, arising in internal explication and determination.

2. *Relative adjectivity*, arising on the basis of external contemplation and the positing of relational unity, as well as the act of relational judgment erected on it.

Naturally, a relative determination which is at first dependent can also be rendered independent. In the predicative sphere this implies that, like every absolute adjective, every relative adjective can be substantified. From the relational is-judgment arises a relational has-judgment; consider, for example, the conversion of "A is similar to B" to the form "A has similarity to B."

#### § 54. *The sense of the distinction between determinative and relational judging.*

WE CONTRAST simple determinative judging (judging on the basis of internal explication) with relational judging. It should be noted, further, that in a way it goes without saying that *every* act of judgment, even the simply determinative, can be characterized as a putting-in-relation. It relates a predicate to a subject, and the expression *to relate* then means nothing other than *the active accomplishment of the predicative synthesis*. We can identify this *concept of putting-in-relation as a broader concept* and set over against it, as a narrower concept, the one mentioned above. As such, it has good justification. For it is only in an act of judgment based on external contemplation that objects are actually put into relation with one another in a thematic way. When we talk about *putting-into-relation in the narrower sense*, we always mean that *two independent objects (or objects rendered independent) are present as members of the relation*. The independence of both sides establishes an ever present *reversibility*. It is not essentially prescribed which object functions as subject and which as relative object: the judgment can just as well, and in just as original a way, read "A is larger than B" as "B is smaller than A." This depends only on the actual direction of interest.<sup>1</sup> In the simple determinative

1. Cf. also, above, § 34b, and below, § 59.

judgment  $S$  is  $p$ , one finds nothing resembling such reciprocity of relation and, accordingly, no reversibility either. Essentially,  $S$ , as original substrate, must first be the subject in a determinative judgment before  $p$  can be substantified.

This distinction between determinative and relational judgment (in the narrower sense) cuts across the distinction between is-judgments and has-judgments. Determinative as well as relational judging can have both forms depending on whether the determination has retained its original dependence, and consequently its adjectival form, or whether it is made independent and is joined to the substrate in a has-judgment or, again, has from the first been independent, that is, has been an originally independent part (aspect) of the substrate. In this, we give expression to the fact that *this distinction between determining and relating includes an ambiguity*. That is, *considered purely from a formal point of view*, according to the pure form of judgment, every judgment which includes more than one substantive, therefore which, in addition to the substantive on the subject side has yet another on the predicate side, must, as relating two independent elements to each other, be reckoned among relational judgments. Then there would appear, on the one hand, as determinative judgments, only those in which the determinations are internal, those in which the substrate of determination is the *only* independent object, the only substantive in the judgment, and which has, as opposed to it, only dependent, adjectivally formed determinations—therefore, only judgments of the form  $S$  is  $p$ . On the other hand, as relational judgments, there would appear all those in which, in addition to the object functioning as a subject, there is a second substantive, the relative object. That this object might be part of the subject (originally independent or made independent) would be completely irrelevant. All that would be important is the logical form, the fact that the judgment has two substantives logically opposed and in relation to each other. Therefore, under the concept of relational thought would fall, in addition to all judgments on the basis of external contemplation, all has-judgments about independent internal determinations and likewise about the containment of independent parts in a whole ( $S$  has  $T$ ). But according to the analyses of Part I, it is immediately clear that these determinations are, from the *genetic point of view*, absolutely equivalent to internal determinations of the is-form ( $S$  is  $p$ ) and, with re-

gard to their constitutive presuppositions, completely different from relative determinations in the proper sense. That is, these determinations predicate precisely what an object is, taken in and for itself, in contrast to relative determinations in the proper sense, which presuppose a wandering of interest back and forth between objects given together in the field. Therefore, if one takes as a basis the narrower concept of putting-in-relation defined above, there emerges a *double sense to the distinction between determinative and relational thought, depending on whether one takes as authoritative the formal or the genetic point of view.*

§ 55. *The origin of attribution in the unequal distribution of interest among determinations.*

- a. The division into main and subordinate clauses.

THE FORMS OF JUDGMENT given to us up to now were all simple in the sense that their members were simple subjects and simple predicates, arising from an initial original formation of previously formless materials and consequently deprived of all annexes arising from any previous predicative operation. But on the basis of explicative contemplation, more complicated forms, in which the individual members are in themselves already two-membered, are also possible. Naturally, the basic structure remains preserved in these forms, but it no longer represents a mere skeleton, so to speak. These complex forms have their origin in a modification of interest with regard to their realization in the activity of striving toward cognition. In the forms hitherto considered, the thematic interest in *S* was fulfilled in the determinations *p, q, r*, etc., emerging, so to speak, in the first natural outflow. The material content of *S*, as well as its relative determinations, emerged in sequence and was predicatively apprehended in the same way. The *interest*, so far as it was an act of determination, progressing in some way or other, was thereby conceived *as divided in an equal way among all the emerging determinations.* And this may actually be the case in

the beginning of a process of determination. In progressive contemplation, all determinations which emerge in sequence are equally "important" for the thematic regard.

But the thematic significance, the *importance for the interest in cognition in regard to the individual determinations, can also vary*. The interest may head immediately toward the determination *q* and there may be only an incidental interest in *p*. This happens in the following way in receptivity: while only a fugitive glancing ray is directed toward *p*, which is apprehended only incidentally, the principal weight rests on *q*, which is taken in view in a privileged way. Apprehension as primary and apprehension as incidental constitute a difference in the mode of cognitive activity and must not be confused with the difference between dominant and subordinate interest, dominant and subordinate "aim." Accordingly, in the predicative sphere there is then not a simple progressive determination of the form "S is *p* and *q*"; rather, the active accomplishment of the synthesis "S is *q*" will take on the character of the *main clause*, that of the synthesis "S is *p*" that of the *subordinate clause*—expressions which here again, as is clearly evident, *primarily* indicate nothing linguistic. On the contrary, the mode of categorial synthesis which confers signification on the linguistic expression *can*, but need not *necessarily*, find its expression in grammatical hypotaxis, depending on whether it is allowed by the structure of a language. There emerges, therefore, a judgment of the form "S, which is *p*, is *q*," wherein it is evident that the ego is not directed toward the synthesis of identification in a *simple* but rather in a *double ray*, which divides into a main and a subordinate ray.

Frequently this form is also realized in such a way that S appears in the active transition to *q* as that which has been determined earlier as *p* and is recognized as such, therefore with the deposit "*p*" acquired from previous cognition. Then *q*, as the *new* determination, has the main interest; only incidentally is a glance directed toward the *p* previously known, and the subordinate clause is constituted in a renewal of the active transition. It is also possible that *p*, in the moment of the determination of S as *q* on the basis of an actual intuition, is by no means intuitively self-given but only presentified as belonging to S. Therefore, the modes of receptive givenness underlying such a complex proposition and establishing its self-evidence can be of a completely different kind; intuition and presentification can

commingle in the receptivity which lies at the basis of the predication.

b. The attributive form as a modification of the propositional form.

We said above that this construction exists on the basis of the underlying structure. The subject and predicate sides are retained exactly as before, but on the subject side an *annex* is added in the form of a relative clause "S which is *p*. . . ." This form of the relative clause, more generally, of the subordinate clause, has the intentional character of a *modification* which refers back to an original form, the simple predication *S is p*. In both, an identical element has been preserved, the "judgment-content" "*S is p*,"<sup>1</sup> which originally had the form of the *independent clause* and which now has taken the form of the *relative subordinate clause*, therefore the form of an attributive function. Main clause and subordinate clause consequently are forms which the independent clause can assume and which have arisen genetically from successive levels of interest. The modification is traversed by the identity of *S* as determined by *p*; it is predicatively posited in a different "way." The subject, which previously was the subject of a predicate, has become the subject of an attributive determination. In a modified way, the result of the predication has passed over into the attribution; the spontaneous accomplishment of the synthesis of transition is not lost; there is also formed in it a predicative propositional whole, but this has a changed character. It has lost its character as an independent proposition, as a closed, self-sufficient step of predicative objectivation, and with this has sacrificed its character as the unity of a satisfaction of cognitive interest and has become, as this totality, only something which belongs to the subject. It is an annex of the subject, from which, henceforth, the spontaneous synthesis, oriented in the direction of the principal interest, leads over to *q*, which is the predicate in the superordinated whole of the complex proposition and is what is predicated in the principal positing.

1. On the concept "judgment-content" or "judgment-material," cf. *Logic*, pp. 192 f., 268 f.; ET, pp. 215 f., 304 f.



Without prejudice to the one and only main positing, various subordinate positings can occur in different gradations and in such a way that in the subordinate positing there again appears a subordinate-main positing and a subordinate-subordinate positing, and again, in this, etc. Then to the main positing, which governs the whole of the predicative synthesis, corresponds the main clause, and to the subordinate positings correspond the subordinate clauses, modified into attributions—all bound to one another in unity, owing to the fact that every subordinate clause has a subject, through which goes the aim of the next-higher main positing.

This holds for all of the forms discussed up to now, the determinative as well as the relational act of judgment. Ideally, we can convert them all into attributive forms, in connection with which, to be sure, each new form of determination yields new forms of attributes, such as, e.g., "O, which contains B." *To each original predication corresponds an attribution, just as each attribution refers originally to a determination.*

Up to now we have always conceived *attribution* as effected in the form of the subordinate clause, i.e., we have conceived the synthesis of transition to the predicate of the subordinate clause, in our example to *p*, as still being effected spontaneously, if only in virtue of a secondary interest. But this can also be dropped; the predicate adjective of the subordinate clause can become an *attributive adjective*; the form *Sp is q* can then result (e.g., "The cold air is refreshing"). The original predicative positing *S is p* is here contracted still further; the synthesis of transition to *p* is no longer accomplished spontaneously at all; rather, in the spontaneous transition to *q*, the determination *p*, adjoined to *S* in the previous predication, whether as the principal theme or as a subordinate theme, is taken along with *S* in the character of the result. No glancing ray, nor any subordinate ray either, is directed any longer to the synthesis of *S* and *p*; rather, *S* is taken immediately as *p*, and only the transition to *q* is spontaneously effected.

The attribution can naturally be linked not only to the subject side but wherever in the predicative clause a substantive occurs or can occur; therefore, it can also be linked to the predicative side as long as this contains a substantive, whether originally as a relative object, or whether on the basis of the substantivation of a dependent determination. The form of attribution is precisely a particular one, on the one hand character-

ized as a *modification*, and on the other always occurring as an *annex* attached to a substantive. In the fact that this form, unlike a subject-form or a predicate-form, is not confined to a definite place in the judgment but can occur as an annex wherever a substantive occurs, it is similar to the core-forms; however, it is still on principle different from these because it arises by modification and hence is *always* assigned to materials which have already undergone formation in another way, whereas the primary function of the core-forms is the formation of completely formless stuffs [*Stoffe*], although they can also form (as in the substantivation of entire propositions; cf. above, p. 211) what has already been formed in another way.

c. The attributive linkage on the side of the determination.

Let us now take a somewhat closer look at the attributive linkage on the side of the determination. We judge that *S* is *p*; a thematically determinative interest is now awakened for *p*, and this is determined as *a*, whereas the interest for *S* continues to be retained and superordinated.<sup>2</sup> First, the transition to *a* naturally requires the act which makes *p* independent (even though it is only a relative independence), i.e., its substantivation. The judgment *P* is *a* is based on this. Moreover, if the privileged interest in the main substrate has continued to be upheld, then two propositions now emerge, bound together by a unity of thematic interest: *S* is *p*, and the same moment (namely, *p*) is *a*; e.g., "This thing is red" and "This red is brick red." However, since, in conformity with our assumption, the interest in *S* is to remain dominant, the second proposition must take the form of a subordinate clause; for the interest which is directed toward the second judgment is subordinated to that directed toward the first. Thus the second proposition acquires the form of attribution, whether in the form of a subordinate clause or in the still continuing modification of the adjectival attribution, which can then be expressed linguistically in the compound adjective (e.g., brick red): *S* is *p<sub>a</sub>*. A form of determination thus arises which

2. See the more precise analysis of this relation in receptivity in § 28, above.

on its side is determined and which, as determined, is determining.

§ 56. *The constitution of logical sense of the object-substrate as the result of predicative operations.*

WE CONCEIVE all these formations as springing from the progressive determination of a substrate *S* which, since it has already been receptively apprehended, remains the pervasive theme and gives unity and cohesion to all judgments arising in connection with its determinations. These formations are all forms of meaning which are centered around an object-pole which is held to as identical. This pole is the identical substrate about which one judges, that which, in the form of a subject, enters into predicative judgments and is intended there in an ever new predicative how; as subject, it is subject of ever new predicates and attributive determinations. If we compare, for example, the judgments *S* is *p*, *S<sub>p</sub>* is *q*, *S<sub>p</sub> and q* is *r*, then we see that in such a thematic context of determinations there is always an *S* pinned down as the *same*. But in spite of its identity, the judgments are different; on the subject side they first have the *S* without attribution; then *S<sub>p</sub>*, *S<sub>p</sub> and q*. The same thing can naturally be repeated on the object side. It is the same *S* intended in an ever new sense, in a sense which does not come from receptive apprehension but accrues to it in predicative spontaneity, logical spontaneity in the specific sense, and which we accordingly call *logical sense*. The logical sense in which *S* as subject enters into a judgment belongs jointly with all its constituents to the total "judgment-content," to that which is "posited" in the judgment as the judicative proposition, that is, is present to consciousness in a thetic character (in our examples, above all in the mode of certainty).

The substrate of the judgment in its logical sense, the sense which has accrued to it by predicatively determinative activity, constitutes a *concept of concept*<sup>1</sup> which is not to be confused

1. Compare, on this point, and on the entire section, *Logic*, § 43e.

with other concepts of concept—neither that which refers to the term as core material,<sup>2</sup> nor the concept in the sense of generic universality.

If we now compare the change of logical sense as it takes place in a thematic context of determination with the changes of sense which we have already found in receptivity, it naturally appears that *all enrichment of logical sense presupposes an enrichment in receptivity*. A spontaneous synthesis of identification can, indeed, take place only where receptive apprehension and explication have already gone before. But, on the other hand, this change of logical sense nevertheless also has a peculiar *independence with regard to what takes place in receptivity*. A system of receptive contemplation, erected in a complicated way and directed toward an object from within and without, can indeed already have been constituted; on the basis of these operations, an object can even already have been viewed from all sides in the greatest possible plenitude of intuition without, for all of this, there necessarily having to result even a single step of predicative apprehension. As long as this step has not been taken, the object, the theme of all contemplative apprehensions, is, despite the rich profusion of its modes of givenness, indeed the theme, but a theme *completely indeterminate from the point of view of logic*. If, then, the predicatively determinative spontaneity is instituted with the first step of judgment, *S is p*, *S*, which up to then was completely undetermined from the point of view of logic, undergoes its first determination. It becomes the subject of a judgment and, further, perhaps the object of a judgment. In the first step of the judgment "*S is p*," it is the one element which occupies the place of the subject as yet logically undetermined, but it is the undetermined element which obtains determination in this act of judgment and has its determination on the predicate side. Because, subsequently, the determination accomplished by this first predication is adjoined to the subject by an attributive activity, and, furthermore, in the predications which follow, *S* is pinned down as being *p* and is subject to further determinations in new activities, we now no longer have a logically indeterminate substrate in these subsequent steps but a substrate already affected with logical sense, with the attributive sense *p*. Only this *p* belongs for us, after this first step, to the *logical* sense in which the substrate stands forth for us. But

2. *Logic*, p. 274; ET, p. 311.

all that has already been constituted in receptivity as its objective sense, all that is further cogiven in intuition as regards explicates, does not belong to this logical sense as long as it itself has not been apprehended in the two-membered synthesis as the predicate of S. Here again is indicated the *privileged position* (cf. § 50) occupied by the *predicative judgment* (the copulative) as the original cell of the thematic connection of determination in relation to all other syntheses which in the broader sense must also be called predicative, e.g., the conjunctive: *it is only in the predicative judgment that an object, hitherto logically undetermined, can be invested with logical sense*. In every such proposition there is accomplished a *production of logical sense closed in on itself*, which for the object-substrate signifies an accretion of logical sense.

Just as the object in receptivity is the identical pole of a multiplicity of apprehensions which refer to it, so also it is what is identical in predicative determination—no longer identical, however, as the unity of its sensuous multiplicities and its changing modes of givenness but *identical as the unity of predicative actions* and of the results emerging from them, overgrown by evolving logical sense. It is what is identical in the multiplicity of spontaneous identifications which determine it as the point of intersection of the various judgments and, correlatively, as the identical reference point of corresponding attributes. Whichever of the attributive formations we take, however they may be laid out in the progress of the determination—this, this house, this red house, etc.—each one of these formations is a thematic member of the judgment. Each one, no matter how different its content may be, as a member of the judgment has its theme, and each in an obvious way has the same theme. We here take the “this” as, so to speak, the zero-point of attribution in this series. (This is its *logical* significance. Its fully concrete significance is naturally more than this. To it belongs the “deictic” character of pointing to, of calling attention to, of the demand to take cognizance of.)

As the identical pole of predicative actions, the bearer of logical sense, the object has become in the true sense an *object of cognition*. Naturally, this does not mean that the object as the pole of receptive activities and as the pole of predicative spontaneities is in each case a different object but rather that, when the object, as it is receptively constituted with its evolving sense, for the first time enters into predicative synthesis, it be-

comes an object of cognition as it passes from receptive apprehension to the two-membered predicative synthesis.

### §57. *The origin of the judgment of identity.*

IN THE MOVEMENT of the progressive determination, of the progressive investment of the substrate of the judgment with logical sense, a unique judgment-form, distinguished from the forms of simple determinative judgments hitherto considered, namely, the *judgment of identity*, can now arise.

In the first unobstructed discharge of the thematic determination of a substrate, we are directed toward the substrate as the identical element of ever new determinations. The *S* which endures as identical is invested with ever new logical sense, without our being ourselves directed toward its identity, maintained in this way. To begin with, there is as a rule no occasion to do this. If, for example, *S* is determined intuitively as *p* and again as *q*, etc., if in determinative identification the transitions from *S* to *p*, *q*, . . . , are actively carried out, then *S* which is determined as *p* passively coincides with *S* determined as *q* with a certain obviousness. *S* is before us in intuition as the identical, and our thematic interest is directed exclusively toward its ever richer determination.

On the other hand, if the act of determination is not achieved in this originally interconnected continuity, constantly imbued with intuition—if, for example, on the basis of an original intuition, *S* is newly determined as *r*, and when, in addition, it stands before us already provided with the determinations *p*, *q*, determinations which are based on memories of previous complexes of determination and sedimented in *S* but no longer self-given, without, as in the case with the determination as *r*, being newly carried out with the same originality; or when, for example, the determinations “*S* is *p*” and “*S* is *q*,” effected separately from each other, appear in memory—then the need can arise of definitely pinning down the identity of *S* at one time determined as *p*, another time as *q*. The synthesis of identity, which at first takes place passively between *S<sub>p</sub>* and *S<sub>q</sub>*, is then accomplished spontaneously, and a judgment arises having the form “*S* which is *p* is identical with *S* which is *q*.” It goes without saying that,

through the linkage which produces the continuing identification, there exist here various possibilities of working up the judgment of identification ever more richly, of advancing toward ever broader determinations, and of effecting the identifying coincidence of their substrates in two-membered spontaneity. Judgments then arise like " $S_a$ , which is  $b$ , is identical with  $S'$ , which is  $b$  and  $c$ ," and so on, in many complications which can be derived according to simple laws. Furthermore, many judgments of identity can themselves be brought to the unity of a single judgment through identifications serving as bridges, for example, in the form " $S$  is identical with  $S'$ , and the same is also identical with  $S''$ ," and so on.

We see from this the *fundamental function of the judgment of identity* for the unification of determinations arising in different contexts of intuitive determination—a unification on the basis of the interest in cognition, which aims to gather together the acquisitions of judgments resulting from different contexts of judgment and to hold them in a new judgment. Solely from the point of view of form, these judgments have a certain similarity to judgments of relation: in them, two substantives appear which are spontaneously determined as identical. But with regard to content, they belong rather to determinative judgments, which determine a substrate from itself, from what it is in itself, without regard to a possible transition to other substrates. However, these are not judgments which are actually originally determinative judgments; as a rule, one finds that there is no originally spontaneous predicative apprehension of determinations newly apprehended in receptivity but only a unification of those already acquired. Hence judgments of identity also need not necessarily be accomplished in the self-evidence of clarity; the original intuitive givenness of their substrates with the determinations which belong to them is not required; rather, the self-evidence of distinctness is sufficient to establish the identity.

## 2 / The Objectivities of Understanding and Their Origin in the Predicative Operations

§ 58. *Transition to a new level of predicative operations. The preconstitution of the state of affairs as categorial objectivity and its “eduction” [Entnehmen] by substantivation.*

AFTER THIS SURVEY of the most original and simplest forms, as well as the consequences, of the activity of predicative cognition, we turn toward a *new level of operations*. Our investigation of them will lead us to inquire into the specific character of the objectivities originating in predicative thought: the *categorial* objectivities.

Up to now we have pursued the genesis of the proliferation of formations which can be constituted around a judgment of the simplest form, the original cell of the thematic connection of determination. We conceived of these forms as arising, as actually proceeding and continuously developing in a judicative process. But once such a cell has been constituted, for example, *S is p*, or *S is p and q*, or a judgment bearing any annexes whatsoever, like *Sp is q*, or with any elaboration of its simple form, then the judgment need not be discarded as soon as it is completely constituted in an actual becoming, and the transition to the next step need not take place; on the contrary, since every step of judgment represents a production of sense enclosed in itself, *one can also build further on this operation itself*. Just as it fades away in retention and yet is preserved, it is possible to



continue by linking-on to it, which is expressed verbally, for example, in the form "This fact, that S is *p*. . . ." All languages have at their disposal demonstratives, "indicator words," for this kind of linkage, which then serve, not to indicate present things directly, but to refer to an earlier place in the context of discourse and, correlatively, in the connection of judgments which give significance to the discourse. The mere linguistically simple form which these demonstratives, as a rule, have suggests that a peculiar *change* has taken place with regard to the previous judicative proposition to which they refer. It has lost its form as an independent proposition and now presents itself as a substrate in a new judgment. This naturally presupposes that the proposition has been substantified. This proposition, previously *multirayed*, and constituted in an original two-membered synthesis of determination, is now apprehended in a *single ray*, and it must be apprehended in this way in order to be linked on in the manner described. For, as indicated, every new step of judgment in the progressive connection of determination always begins with an apprehension of the substrate in a single ray. When, in an act of judgment, one links on to a past judgment, this past judgment is therefore treated exactly as any substrate that enters into a predicative judgment as a subject, namely, as the object of a simple apprehension. This implies that it must have been preconstituted as such and that this is the function of the preceding judgment. Accordingly, this function has, so to speak, a double face: in each step of judgment not only does a determination (and a determination ever more extensive) of the substrate, originally pregiven and already receptively apprehended, take place, not only is this substrate predicatively intended in an ever new way and invested with logical sense, but at the same time a new *kind of objectivity is preconstituted: the state of affairs* [Sachverhalt] "*S is p*," which is produced in a *creative spontaneity*. It can then, on its part, assume all formations which all independent objectivities can assume; it can be substantivated and can become a subject or object in new judgments.

This kind of substantivation is *different in principle* from all that we have previously studied under this name. We earlier chose to consider the substantivation resting on the act which makes previously dependent determinations independent, therefore the substantivation which already has its preform in the sphere of receptivity. Even in this sphere there is the apprehen-

sion-for-itself of a previously dependent moment, whereby it becomes the substrate of a specific explicative contemplation. This is a moment inherent in the object itself, which moment thus becomes a substrate. However, *for the substantivation in which the state of affairs is educed from a judgment*, so that it henceforth functions as a substantive in a new judgment, *there is nothing analogous at the lower level*. The object which here becomes the subject in a new judgment is nothing which could also be apprehended in simple receptivity; rather, it is an object of an entirely new kind, a result of the judicative operation of predication, which could occur only in the upper level of predicative spontaneity. Consequently, in reference to their origin, we call such objects *syntactical* or *categorial objectivities*, or also, because they have arisen from activities of the understanding, *objectivities of understanding*.

§ 59. *Objects capable of being simply given as  
“sources” of situations [Sachlagen].  
Situation and state of affairs.*

NATURALLY, the categorial objectivities arising in this way are founded in objectivities apprehensible in receptivity. The latter are implied in them, as, e.g., the state of affairs “The earth is larger than the moon” includes an object capable of being given in receptivity, namely, the earth. But the state of affairs itself as a meaningful structure is not something which can be exhibited in the sense-pole “earth,” in the way in which internal (e.g., qualitative) and relative determinations belong as moments of sense to the objective sense according to which this object “earth” is receptively apprehended. What corresponds in receptivity to such a state of affairs is *relations* or, as we prefer to say, *situations*: relations of containing and containment, of greater and smaller, etc. They constitute something identical, which, in virtue of its essence, is explicated in two ways, in such a manner that equivalent predicative judgments refer to one and the same situation as an intuitively given fact [*Verhalt*]. Every situation involves several states of affairs: the most simple situation, founded in a pair, involves two states of affairs, e.g., the

quantitative situation  $a - b$  involves the two states of affairs  $a > b$ , and  $b < a$ .

Accordingly, situations are founded objects; they refer ultimately to objects which are not situations. Every object is the possible and actual substratum of several situations; therefore, every situation is such in its turn. Every object is also a "source" of situations, i.e., it establishes situations by itself, inasmuch as it is explicable only so far as it bears elements which come to prominence in possible intuitions. It is then, depending on the circumstances, a source of *qualitative situations* or, if it is a matter of the coming-to-prominence of independent parts, of *relations of whole to part*. In external or relational contemplation, the terms of the relation are sources of *relational situations*, which are explicable in relational states of affairs.

On the basis of these situations—among which, as is immediately obvious, nothing more must be understood, to begin with, than passively constituted relations, which themselves need not yet be objectified—*predicative judgments* can be formed *in conformity with different aims*. If it is a question of *relations of whole and part*, the judgment can bear on the *containing and containment*, and different forms result from this, depending on whether it is a question of immediate or mediate containment, therefore of the relation of immediate and mediate parts to the whole. On the other hand, one can judge about the *forms of connection of the parts in the whole*: "The whole has such and such a form," "The assemblage of the parts has this form of connection," etc. Still another kind are *judgments on the basis of external relations* in the passage from one part to another. Each part is certainly something for itself, apprehended for itself, but each is precisely a *part*, participates in the whole, and, even though it is not directly the actual substrate of determination, still lies within our attention and apprehension; and the form of unity becomes prominent in the datum which is rendered distinct. If  $S$  and  $S'$  have a community in their participation in the same, and if we pass from  $S$  to  $S'$ , then supposing that each is present to consciousness precisely as a part and that each is apprehended with the sense which has accrued to it from the orientation of interest toward the whole, there is present in  $S$  a new accretion of sense which arises from the passage and the coincidence in what is common. If an activity is brought into play which makes  $S$  the theme of determination by which  $S$  is related to  $S'$  with regard to the form of the whole, and the de-

termination is originally produced, then the judgment of the external relation is originally constituted; S is originally constituted as being in relation to S' (a relation of similarity, likeness, position, etc.).

These relations of part to whole and of part to part are not the only ones. Two objects can be not only in the relation of the contained and the containing but also in the *relation of intersection*: if, in intersection, S is identical with S' (according to a certain common part S''), then this is defined in different ways: S contains S'', and S' contains the same S''; or, in plural form: S and S' contain S'', whereby the determining object S'' appears only once, while two rays of identification diverge from it, the one toward S, the other toward S'—all of these forms of judgment naturally understood in the most universal syntactical generality, whereby it remains open whether the particular objects are themselves one or many, whether they are simple objects or already affected by a complex logical construction of sense.

Thus, simple objectivities are sources of different predicative states of affairs; they are such on the basis of their receptively constituted formations of unity, which we call relations or situations: identical situations which are explicated in different predicative states of affairs. We have called the situations themselves "founded objectivities." We must say more precisely: *in receptivity* we do *not yet* have *situations as objects*, and certainly not situations thematized as founded objects. We have here nothing but simply apprehensible objectivities, which "are what they are," and the passing to and fro of the contemplative regard between the substrate and its parts or between the mutually related moments which thereby come into prominence, for example, as larger or smaller, always on the basis of their sensuous unity. What we call a situation thus appears here merely as the *passively preconstituted foundation*, qualitative or relational, of all these states of affairs; but subsequently, if the states of affairs have been constituted and objectified in an original predication, this foundation can be apprehended objectively as the identical situation which underlies them.

§ 60. *The distinction between a state of affairs and a complete judicative proposition.*

EVERY CLOSED judicative proposition thus preconstitutes in itself a new objectivity, a state of affairs. This is "what is judged" in the proposition, not only because what is judged signifies an accretion of logical sense for that "about which one judges," the substrate of the judgment—and henceforth one can add this accretion attributively to the substrate as its logical sense—but because what is judged is *itself* an object and, in virtue of its genesis, a *logical* object or object of the understanding.

Yet we must make a more precise distinction here: what is preconstituted in the act of judgment as a new object, and what we call a state of affairs in the current sense of the term, is not the judicative proposition with its total "matter of judgment," but only what is currently "stated." This means: in every current act of judgment we have our theme: the "judged," e.g., the determinative identification of *S* and *p*. It is immediately accomplished in the act of judging. However, an admixture of various acquisitions from preceding activities of judgment referring to the same substrate can be mingled with the actual judging. Let us suppose, e.g., that, with the accomplishment of the judgment "*S* is *p*," *S* is given as already determined by *q* in a previous determination; therefore, we judge that *S<sub>q</sub>* is *p*. Such attributive annexes originate, as we know, from previous acts of predication and are characterized as modifications of these predications which refer to the preceding predication in which *S* was explicitly determined as *q*. The determination, given to consciousness in this modified way, naturally coappertains to the complete matter of the judgment; it is naturally also in our regard, is also coapprehended in unity with *S*. But the synthesis of identity between *S* and *q* is no longer explicitly accomplished; only the result of this accomplishment is jointly retained in *S*. It is necessary to distinguish between the *functioning theme*—the "*S* is *p*" explicitly judged—and the themes *no longer functioning* but only implicated in the unity of the judging consciousness. If, after a simple act of judgment "*S* is *p*," we have attributively packed into the subject and the predicate any

number of other objects and predicates ( $q, r, \dots$ ) from other judgments, nothing is changed in the reaccomplishment of the judgment having the old form when we also reactivate all these ideas which have been brought in ( $S_{q,r}$  is  $p$ ) because we accomplish the *same* determinative identification and *only* this explicitly—whereas with the attributions we accomplish none of the predications indicated by them. In reality, what we actually accomplish is only the judgment “ $S$  is  $p$ ,” even if  $S$  is conceived as affected by no matter what other store of ideational content from earlier judicative achievement.

What we have described noetically has its correlate in the judicative proposition and in the objectivity which is preconstituted in its explicit accomplishment. Only *this something which remains identical in all these modifications*, therefore, what is constituted in the explicit act of judgment “ $S$  is  $p$ ,” we call a *state of affairs in the proper sense*. It is the *pure synthetic unity of the themes*; and here the theme is everything which is thematically and explicitly apprehended in the accomplishment of the judgment in question and is explicitly posited in this or that predicative relation to it. If individual things are the themes of the determination, then in their syntactical formation they enter into the state of affairs; they are the terms which are “stated” therein. States of affairs are correlates of judgments, i.e., they are originally constituted only in judgments, and to the thematic inclusiveness of every apophantic step of judgment corresponds the inclusiveness of what is constituted in it; *every state of affairs is a complete syntactical objectivity*, and all the members of the state of affairs, or terms which are not simply terms, are in their turn themselves potential syntactical objectivities.

A *state of affairs* and a *judicative proposition* with its complete “*judicative sense*,” the complete unity of signification which includes all the logical significations of the judgment in question, *therefore do not coincide*. In the transformation of the involvement of the results of the various activities of judgment, which refer to themes of determination momentarily explicit in the new judgment coming to completion, the state of affairs in its identity remains unaffected. Every explicit theme can become, not only the substrate of explicit judicative operations, but also the substrate of the modified linkage of acquisitions resulting from former operations. This does not alter the state of affairs, which is constituted thematically, but it does alter *how* it is meant. In this how, the state of affairs is the

thematic product, not only of the present judgment, but also of implied judgments. The explicit thematic product thus has a frieze of configurations which each time refer to implicated judgments—configurations which, naturally, can be resolved into their original form, the form of their original accomplishment. This resolution leads finally to simple judgments which are as yet only skeletons of judgments and whose members contain nothing more in the way of attributive or other annexes.

As we have already stressed repeatedly, such judgments must be considered as a *limiting* case [*Grenzfall*]. With regard to them, *we cannot distinguish between the state of affairs and the judicative proposition itself*. The state of affairs is here the unity of meaning itself. In spite of this, even for these judgments this double formulation is required, having regard for the fact that they are indeed mere null cases and that there are infinite multiplicities of judgments which at any time harmonize with such a null judgment as regards the state of affairs. The concept of the state of affairs designates from the first the identical thematic skeleton which all judgments have in common which have identical explicit themes and connect these themes in the same syntactical forms: the null proposition is the *pure* proposition belonging to such a framework, the correlate of the pure determinative actuality.

That the correlate of the judging, the state of affairs itself, should be a judgment and, what is more, a limiting case, loses its paradoxical character when we consider that it is a question here of objects intended as such and likewise of states of affairs so intended. The "state of affairs itself" is precisely nothing other than the idea of the completely fulfilled judgment (on this subject, see the more detailed comments below, pp. 284 f.).

§ 61. *The set as a further example of an objectivity of understanding. Its constitution in productive spontaneity.*

STATES OF AFFAIRS are not the only objectivities of the understanding which are constituted in predicatively productive spontaneity. They have a privileged position which is grounded

in the basic function of the predicative judgment in the narrow sense of the copulative unity of linkage. We have contrasted the copulative linkage to the collective, which, to be sure, does not lead to the logical formation of sense, to deposits of sense in object-substrates in the same way as copulative spontaneity, but which is still to be counted as predicative spontaneity in the broader sense.<sup>1</sup> It leads, like all predicative spontaneity, to the preconstitution of a new objectivity, that of the object "set."

In the domain of receptivity there is already an act of plural contemplation in the act of collectively taking things together; it is not the mere apprehension of one object after the other but a retaining-in-grasp of the one in the apprehension of the next, and so forth (cf. § 24d). But this unity of taking-together, of collection, does not yet have *one* object: the pair, the collection, more generally, the set of the two objects. In a limited consciousness, we are turned toward one object in particular, then toward another in particular, and nothing beyond this. We can then, while we hold on to the apprehension, again carry out a new act of taking-together [of, let us say,] the inkwell and a noise that we have just heard, or we retain the first two objects in apprehension and look at a third object, as one separate from the others. The connection of the first two is not loosened thereby. It is another thing to take the third object into the combination or to take a new object into consideration in addition to the two objects already in special combination. And then we have a unity of apprehension in the form of  $([A, B], C)$ : likewise  $([A, B], [C, D])$ , etc. It is necessary to say again here that each apprehension of complex form has as objects  $A B C \dots$  and not, for example  $(A, B)$  as *one* object, and so on.

On the other hand, we can direct the regard of attention [*Zuwendung*] and the apprehension toward the *pair*, toward the one and the other of the pair, whereby *these* are objects. If we do this, then the repeated individual concentration, the concentrated partial apprehension, now of the *A* and then of the *B*, functions as a kind of explication, as an act of running-through the total object  $A + B$ . Looking into the matter more closely, the act of representation  $(A, B)$  has priority over the act of collection  $(A + B)$ , in which the *sum* is the object. That is, in order that the sum may be given, in order that it may be appre-

1. Cf. § 51, above, and *Logic*, p. 95; ET, p. 107. [The cross-reference is in error in the German edition.]



hended in self-givenness and contemplated as such, we must apprehend the A and B together; in the unity of this apprehension of the two objects, the new object is preconstituted as its result, so to speak, as something which we now apprehend as one and which we can explicate in the individual apprehension of A, B. . . .

Thus, in order for the collective connection, originally sprung from the act of plural explication of A and B to become a substrate—i.e., a true object, something identifiable—a *turning of regard* is first required. But this implies that, as long as we carry out a merely collective assemblage, we have, more than ever, only a *preconstituted object*, a “*plurality*,” and only in retrospective apprehension, following the active constitution, do we have as *an object plurality as unity: as set*. It is the same here as with all objects produced in predicative spontaneity: a syntactical objectivity is preconstituted in a spontaneity, but only after it is completed *can it become a theme, it being an object only in retrospective apprehension* [Rückgreifen]. The collective synthesis, the “A and B and C,” is, indeed, the noetic unity of a consciousness but not yet the unity of an object in the proper sense, that is, in the sense of a thematic object-substrate. Here A, then B, then C is thematic, but the collective is not yet thematic. The colligating consciousness contains several objects encompassed in unity but not a unique object having several members. Nevertheless, through every synthetically unified consciousness, a new object is essentially preconstituted, precisely one having many members; there is then required only an act of thematic apprehension, possible at any time, to make what is thus preconstituted into an object and thereby a substrate of judgment. In the present case, the colligating is a *polythetic operation* through which a collective is essentially preconstituted. It becomes a thematic object after completion of the act of colligation through a *retrospective apprehension* [rückgreifendes Erfassen] by which the set is given to the ego as an object, as something identifiable. Subsequently, it is an object like any other; not only can it be totally identified as the identical element of many modes of givenness, but it can be explicated in an ever renewed identification; and this act of explication in its turn is always an act of colligation. But, like any substrate-objectivity, it can again also enter as subject in new connections of judgment, etc.

Naturally, sets can also be colligated in their turn with

other disjunctive sets and can therefore be constituted as *sets of a higher order* and then be thematically objectified. The objects, disjunctively united in a set, can thus be sets in their turn. But finally, every set, preconstituted in intuition, leads to ultimate constituents, to particularities which are no longer sets. For it belongs to the idea of such a set that in its first givenness as substrate there is already present a pregiven multiplicity of particular affections which we actualize by its apprehension. To be sure, it is not precluded that, by "approaching," intuition can put new affections into play which previously were not yet available, so that the intended unities are again resolved into pluralities. But, in spite of this, *every set must be conceived a priori as capable of being reduced to ultimate constituents, therefore to constituents which are themselves no longer sets.*

But we can still add that, within the unity of a set, it is possible to delimit different partial sets by affectively particularizing connections, that in this way *mutually overlapping sets* are possible, and that, in general, sets in relation to other sets can exhibit all possible relations of containment.

*Consequently, a set is an original objectivity, preconstituted by an activity of colligation which links disjunct objects to one another; the active apprehension of this objectivity consists in a simple reapprehension or laying-hold of that which has just been preconstituted.* As a pure formation of spontaneity, the set represents a pre-eminent form in which thematic objects of every conceivable kind enter as members and with which they can themselves function again as members of determining judgments of every kind. One of the syntheses of predicative objectivation is the "and," and one of the syntheses of relation—which, to be sure, belongs to a wholly different orientation—is the "disjunct." These are the basic components of the particular syntactical form which is the collection or set.

There are, therefore, no originally passively preconstituted sets. Passivity can only create the preconditions; but it is not necessary that, in advance, the many objects as preconstituted in disjunction be already available and exercise their combined affective power. The objects can also enter into the thematic field of vision one after the other; and while we are already occupied with judging in various ways what has gone before, they fulfill by their succession the described conditions of the collection. The unity of affection is constituted successively, it

provides the channels for changes of interest; and if the emerging objects are disjunctive, the collection can make its appearance. But it can also spring into activity from the first, as when an *S* is explicated step by step in its disjunctive properties and these properties at the very beginning attain collective connection. In any case, a turning of regard which makes the collective into an object is always possible here.

§ 62. *Objectivities of understanding as sources of situations and states of affairs. The distinction between syntactical and nonsyntactical connections and relations.*

ALL OBJECTIVITIES of the understanding, sets, etc., are—as explicable in moments belonging essentially to them—totalities in a very broad sense of the term. Because they are founded in objectivities capable of being receptively given, they are naturally *totalities of a higher level*, which should not be confused with the wholes for which every original object-substrate or receptivity can serve as an example.

In particular, for an object which is a set, this implies that no sensuous whole is constituted by collection; the members of a set within a set (whereby we assume that it is a question of sensuous objects which are colligated) are not related to it as the parts of a sensuous whole are to the whole itself. Here there is not that synthesis of partial coincidence which we have found between sensuous wholes and their parts; the members of the set remain in a certain way “exterior to one another.” Their form of connection is not sensuous but syntactical; it is precisely one of “*being colligated*.” And since we can colligate everything and anything we please, this implies that this form of connection is completely independent of the conditions of homogeneity—at least of the relations of being like and unlike—which hold for the intuitive unification of the sensuous. It is a *form of syntactical connection*. All colligated elements have in common the fact that they are colligated. If we turn to states of affairs, we also find syntactical forms of connection of a

similar nature. For example, all qualities of any objects whatsoever have in common the fact that they are qualities.

We have already mentioned the difference between *material community*, with the connections and relations grounded in it, and *formal community*, with its relations and conditions (§ 43d). Material community is always grounded in the unity of a sensuous intuition, even if in the broadest sense of the term, whereby it is then only a question of similarity or likeness. *What is common from the point of view of the material determines the nature of the corresponding homogeneity*. In contrast to this community, there are formal communities which are not grounded in the possible unity of sensuous intuition but are established by syntactical formations. Here also, the communities naturally go back to similarities, to the *homogeneity of form as form*. But it is a similarity which lies on another level than the similarity of formed object-substrates—in which what remains common to them is precisely the relations which refer to similarity. Underlying all putting-in-relation is connection in a most general sense, a sense which also includes relations of similarity; and connection is connection of what belongs together in some way or other, of all the elements made prominent on the basis of a community.

Objectivities of the understanding, therefore, are themselves sources of states of affairs and situations; i.e., in addition to relations which they can have in common with all objectivities, relations which belong to them as wholes in general and in which they can participate like all wholes, they are also sources of unique connections and relations which are grounded in their specific character as syntactical objectivities. Accordingly, we must distinguish:

1. *Syntactical connections* from *other connections*, i.e., syntactical wholes from wholes which are not syntactical. The latter are objects which are not preconstituted by predicative spontaneity but are separated only by explication into a plurality of immediate parts which are "connected" in the whole; i.e., the parts are in relation to one another on the basis of both the preceding unity of the whole and the fact that they are what it contains. Furthermore, they enter into relations, e.g., of the degree of likeness, and so on.

2. Accordingly, it is also necessary to distinguish *syntactical* from *nonsyntactical relations*. Every relation is an objectivity of

the understanding. It is a state of affairs and, what is more, one that is simple and not a concatenation of several states of affairs,  $S_1$ – $S_2$ . A state of affairs is syntactical if its terms are themselves objectivities of the understanding or if the foundation of the state of affairs as a whole is an object of the understanding. Every state of affairs has a foundation which establishes community between its terms and which itself can be objectively apprehended (cf. above, pp. 241 f.). This objectivity is itself a whole in the broadest sense insofar as it is explicable; and everything which emerges by explication is a part in the broadest sense, i.e., it has a community of partial identity with the whole, and it grounds the two correlative relationships: the relationship with the determinative whole and the relationship with the determinative part. Relative to one another, the parts have their foundation in the whole, i.e., two explicates of one such whole as such are in relation to each other; these are essentially relations of intersection or of connection, capable of being constituted by determinative activity.

§ 63. *The difference between the constitution of objectivities of understanding and objects of receptivity.*

NOW THAT WE HAVE COME to know some of the principal types of objectivities of the understanding arising from spontaneous operations of the understanding, we seek further to clarify for ourselves their constitution and mode of being by contrasting them with those of objectivities given in receptivity.

The objectivities of the understanding are totalities of a higher level and hence, as will later become evident, objects of a specific region. It belongs to the essence of every object that it is *capable of being perceived* in a very broad sense, i.e., that it is capable of being apprehended *originaliter* as it itself and, furthermore, of being apprehended as something explicable. Every active apprehension of an object presupposes that it is pregiven. The objects of receptivity are pregiven in an original passivity with their structures of association, affection, etc. Their apprehension is a lower level of activity, the mere act of receiving the

sense originally preconstituted in passivity. On the other hand, objectivities of the understanding can never be originally apprehended in a mere act of reception; they are not preconstituted in pure passivity—at least, not originally (it will be necessary to speak further of secondary passivity)—but preconstituted in predicative spontaneity. *The mode of their original pregivenness is their production in the predicative activity of the ego as a spontaneous operation.*

Here the similarities which at first sight appear in the comparison of receptive apprehension and productive spontaneity should not mislead us. In the analysis of receptive apprehension we also spoke of voluntary and involuntary action of the ego, of its kinaestheses, of the active production of perspectives by moving about, by eye movements and the like, by means of which the external object is in general first constituted in receptivity. It seems that this object also is constituted by the entire manifold of its figurations on the basis of eye movements, moving about, etc., constituted only at the end of a temporal and largely voluntary process, exactly as the state of affairs “S is p” is produced in a judicative action as a voluntary and temporal process. Therefore, in both contexts we have had to speak of a kind of productive activity.

But these obvious similarities should not let us gloss over the fundamental difference: for every sensuous object, static or in process, its being apprehended is nonessential. The “behavior” of the ego which motivates the procession of the multiplicities of sense data can be completely involuntary; the processes of appearance passively combine into unities in just the same way whether or not the ego turns toward what appears in them in receptive apprehension. In a sense, the object is also situated in this manner “there” in the field, although, to be sure, it cannot be apprehended as such unless there is a turning-toward. On the other hand, *an objectivity of the understanding, a state of affairs, can essentially be constituted only in a spontaneous productive activity, therefore, under the condition of the being-there [Dabeisein] of the ego.* If this condition is not realized, then at best one remains with the receptively constituted object; it remains capable of being perceived in the field, but nothing new is constituted on the basis of it.

To this the following distinction must be added, which leads us still deeper: although objectivities of either kind are constituted in a temporal process and are finally constituted only at its

termination, still the perceived object is in some measure already present in one grasp; its mode of givenness is certainly enriched by each new figuration, but the procession of its manifolds of appearance can be interrupted at any moment, and yet we always have *one* object, although perhaps not yet "from all sides" and in its greatest possible fullness. What the ego *produces* here in its activity are precisely *only figurations of the object, not the object itself*; <sup>1</sup> throughout all these figurations, the ego is constantly directed toward the object as the one and the same which presents itself in them or toward the one process which proceeds gradually in its temporal phases before the ego's regard. Each phase of the object's procession is a phase of this process, and it is *toward the process* that the ego is directed as toward its object. On the other hand, *in spontaneous production, the state of affairs itself is produced and not a figuration of it*; in contrast to the first case, the ego cannot let the process be interrupted at an arbitrary point; then it would not have this objectivity of the understanding. And this for the reason that in this production the ego, during the constitution of the state of affairs in its temporal development, is in no wise directed toward the state of affairs in the same way as before; the object of the ego is not the state of affairs, for in the act of judgment it is *S* which is the direct object, the substrate which is determined in this act as *p*, etc. In its activity of judgment, the ego is directed toward what is determined and progressively enriched by its determinations; this is the object of the act of judgment. It is in this productive activity of judgment that the objectivity of the understanding is first preconstituted as something pregiven. This objectivity of the understanding is not objective in this act in the same way as the substrate of determination *S*; rather, for it to become objective, a *turning-of-regard is first required, by which we "educe" the state of affairs from the judgment*. Then we are no longer directed toward *S* as our object but toward the "fact" "that *S* is *p*." First, the primary judgment "*S* is *p*" must be constituted, in which *S* is objective; only then, in linking-on to it, can we continue: "This fact (that *S* is *p*) is pleasing," etc.; or again, if the orientation of regard changes, the judgment can become the subject of the

1. That the object itself is, from the transcendental point of view, also a product of constitution can be omitted within the framework of this contrast, which concerns an ontic distinction.

fact that it contains the "S" as subject and the *p* as predicate. In the same way, the determination can be made independent and become a substrate or, on its side, the S can be made objective in its subject-form. It already receives this form in the accomplishment of the judgment; but in the act of judgment, it is S simply as S, the substrate of determination, which is objective and not S in the subject-form. The form is allotted to S in spontaneous production; and, in order to apprehend S as object in this form, another step is required after the production of the judgment, a step which, on the objectified ground of the judgment, lays hold of its components, the subject of the judgment in its form as subject, making it a new substrate of determination and in this way attaining the concept of syntactical form.<sup>2</sup> All these orientations of regard, which are possible only after the production of the judgment is completed, and in which objectivities of the understanding are educed from what has been engendered according to a multiple aim, are *completely different from that turning-of-regard by which we go from a sensuous object back to figurations or appearances in which the object is constituted for us.*

#### § 64. *The irreality of objectivities of understanding and their temporality.*

- a. Immanent time as the form of givenness of all objectivities in general.

THE DIFFERENCE between the constitution of objectivities of the understanding and the constitution of objects of receptivity also finds expression in the difference of the temporality of the objectivities on both sides: indeed, the essential difference of their modes of being must ultimately be conceived as a *difference of their temporality.*

The universe of real individual objectivities has its "actuality"—in the sense of objective identifiability, which provides the basis for discourse about objectivity existing in itself—in

2. Cf. *Logic*, p. 117; ET, p. 131.



the way in which it is intersubjectively constituted in the unity of one objective time: world-time. It is in this time that everything real has its fixed temporal position, by which it is individually distinguished from every other real thing that is otherwise like it (cf. § 38). Objectivities of the understanding certainly do not belong to this total domain of real objectivities, which at the lowest level is that of simple natural things. We do not find states of affairs and the like in the world in the same way that we find other things. In contrast to this domain of realities, states of affairs are *irreal objectivities* and are not bound to objective time and objective temporal points in the same way as real objectivities. But for all this, they are still not without any relation to time or deprived of all temporality. We still say in this regard that, e.g., a state of affairs has been preconstituted in a temporal process, in the course of a temporal development, after the close of which it is completely constituted and can now be "educed" as a new objectivity. And yet, it is said not to be in objective time.

Let us consider this. Every lived experience, every consciousness, is subject to the original law of flow. It undergoes a continuity of alterations which cannot be indifferent to its intentionality and which must, therefore, come to light in its intentional correlate. *Every concrete lived experience is a unity of becoming and is constituted as an object in internal consciousness in the form of temporality* (cf. § 42c). This is already true of all immanent data of sensation, but, further, it is also true of the apperceptions which encompass them and likewise of all other intentional lived experiences.

Lived experiences are objects of internal consciousness, but in them objects are also constituted as intended in them. With reference to the intentional objects of lived experience, what is the influence of the necessary constitution of time which belongs to these experiences and confers on them their temporal position itself and their mode of presence to internal consciousness? When will the object constituted in firsthand lived experience necessarily have to assume a temporal form as one belonging to its own essential content?

In any case, we must state at once: *immanent time, in which lived experiences are constituted, is thereby at the same time the form of givenness of all the objects intended in them*; and, so far as it belongs originally to all objects, it is not something which we only add to them, as if there were an in-itself for

them which was completely without relation to time. The necessary relation to time is always present. But it is one thing for individual sensuous objects of perception and another for objectivities of the understanding.

b. The temporality of real objectivities. Givenness-time and objective (natural) time.

The contrast will be clearest if, to begin with, we consider the objects of perception. Individual objects, spatial things, are constituted by "apprehension," "apperception," of *sense data*, which, as immanent, already have their time as a form belonging to their individual essence; and in fact every such datum has not only the general essence "duration" but its individual duration, its own time; and all the times of immanent sense data are, in reference to the pure ego, *one and the same* time, which includes in itself all positions, all absolute times proper to individual data already run off, to all individual times. Each newly appearing datum brings, so to speak, its new time along with it, and this new time is immediately a part of the one time which continues to unfold; all objects of this "world" of immanent sensibility constitute a single world, and this world is held together by the form of time belonging to this world itself, which is, therefore, the *objective* form of time. Hence, like all objects, sense objects<sup>1</sup> also have their givenness-time. But their particular essence stipulates that for these objects *givenness-time* is also *essential time*. Sense objects are in givenness-time, and have in it not only a givenness-form but an existence-form as a constitutive essential form.

We pass now to the individual *spatial objectivities* constituted from these sense data by apperception, i.e., to natural objectivities. As we said, they are constituted mediately, by the apperception of sense data. Sense data do not form an integral part of the constituted spatial world, neither they themselves nor

1. This talk about objects is, to be sure, admissible here only with reservations. For in the natural process of external perception we do not have sense data objectively, but *through* them we are directed toward the "perspectively shaded" perceived things appearing in them. They first become objects in the proper sense (thematic objects) in reflection by means of an abstractive separation.

their substantial or temporal determinations. But all these determinations serve as apperceptive representatives. The apperceptions are intuitions and enter into association with one another; they constitute the unity of an intuition, of an experience of nature. There is constituted thereby, as the apperceptive (constitutive) unity of the temporal matter of the representative data, the "matter" of the spatial thing; through the apperceptive unity of their differences in local sensation, the spatial form; and, through the apperceptively constituted unity of the temporality of sensation (functioning as a representative), *apperceived or objective time*. Therefore, when objects are originally constituted as sensuous, but mediately so, that is, as "physical" spatial objects, in such a way that immediate sensuous objects, with the immediately constitutive immanent time pertaining to them, serve as apperceptive representatives for apperceived objects of a higher level, then there accrues to the latter, by apperceptive representation of an immanent time, an "objective" apperceptive time. Immanent time, it is true, does not itself enter into the intentional object of a higher level of constitution, but through it, a time, presented in it in conformity with its appearance, is intended as a unity which has its multiplicities [of appearance] in immanent times, according to all their points of time, orders, and so on: a peculiar situation which, for time (as for qualities and places), leads us to designate the presenting and the presented with the same words, corresponding to a certain coincidence which pervades all moments capable of being distinguished, therefore, to speak of two aspects [immanent and apperceived] of colors, of shapes, localities, times.

Like all objectivities, natural objects have their givenness-time and also their *natural time* as objective time, which is the specifically essential form which encompasses them. For every being that experiences nature there is a sensible time, a givenness-time for all his sense data (aspects) and for all the things which have ever been given to him. Givenness-time is a fixed form, which grounds a fixed order. It provides fixed simultaneities and sequences. But it does not entirely agree with natural time (as Kant in certain respects has already noted, however far he also was from analyses of the kind given here). They can agree in part, that is, to the degree that givenness-time and objective time can "coincide"; then the orders and the durations

agree. But a *given* succession need not be an *objective* succession; the duration of givenness is not duration of the natural object itself, which certainly also endures outside its givenness. Givenness-time belongs to the immanent sphere, natural time to nature.

Nature, therefore, has its time "in itself" as its existence-form, and the form which is called time is an *encompassing continuum* which includes in itself, in its individual singularization, the essential determinations of individual duration of all objects, which we call their temporal durations, by means of which this continuum orders and unites, producing material continuities on the first level, thereby making other continuities possible. For this *singularization* [*Vereinzelung*] of duration makes possible and conditions the *singularization of what endures*, i.e., the remaining determinations extending over the duration. Thus, time is here a form and also an infinity of individual "forms" incorporated in it, which themselves make up the constitutive moments of objectivities. All temporal objects are embedded in time, and every object by its duration, by the particular form which belongs to it, cuts out, so to speak, a piece of time. Time is a real feature of the world; individual objects which are in different times and in separate locations can be the same only so far as they endure continuously through these temporal positions, therefore, so far as they are also in the intermediate times; otherwise, they can only be objects which are alike but individually different. In the case of individual objects, the temporal position itself belongs to the object, which is constituted point by point as fulfilled temporal duration. The experiencing consciousness (giving individuals at first hand) is not only a flowing consciousness, spreading itself out in the flux of lived experiences, but a consciousness-of, an integrating consciousness. In it, therefore, there is to be distinguished in every phase an objective correlate, and, in each new phase, a new correlate, but only in such a way that all the continuous momentary objects join together in the unity of a *single* object, like the moments of consciousness in a *single* consciousness-of.

The same thing is true of individual objects of the imagination. They have their givenness-time as the time of the lived experiences of imagination which constitute them, and, on the other hand, they have their quasi-objective time, and, on its

basis, their quasi-individuation and quasi-identity in the unity of a world of imagination and in the form of imaginary time belonging to this world (cf. § 40).

c. The temporal form of irreal objectivities as omnitemporality.

We now pass to objectivities of the understanding. Like all objects, they certainly have their givenness-time. Like their unformed substrates, they are constituted in immanent time in a process of becoming. The judicative proposition is a unity of becoming; here, the becoming is a being-created by the subject. And thus the original being-itself of the judgment, that of its constitution, is also a being in the mode of being-created, therefore a being in the form of temporality. That is, a temporal form belongs to it as the noematic mode of its mode of givenness. But here this form signifies something completely different from what it signifies in the case of individual sensuous objects; these objects are individualized in themselves by their appearance at an objective temporal point which presents itself in the immanent time of givenness. The judicative proposition, on the other hand, is not an individual. The difference which arises between the two indicates a difference between two *fundamental kinds of modes which temporality has* as the form of objectivity.

To be sure, a judicative proposition can be *immanently simultaneous*, therefore constituted in the same givenness-time as the sensuous objectivities which form its substrates. But the proposition does not thereby share in the objective time in which these objectivities are themselves individualized. So it is with all constituted objectivities belonging to a higher level; contrary to what is the case with spatial objects, the times constituted in objects of the lower level have a figurative function for higher objects. When acts are erected on objects of a lower level (or on the intentional lived experiences which constitute them), and the objectivities of this lower level do not enter into the objectivities of the acts in question, then the time of these lower objectivities also does not enter into them. And even if the acts constituting time at a lower level enter the objectivities of a higher level, it is still not necessary that the times, like the objectivities themselves, enter into the objectivi-

ties constituted at the higher level. If, for example, we begin with a receptive intuitive object given in its duration as red, then the judgment which lays down this fact predicatively in a judgment "S is red" is constituted as something which comes to completion now and refers to the now, that is to say, to a certain temporal extension which belongs to the judgment itself and which is other than the extension of the duration of the object. If we form any recollections whatsoever which, in their concatenation, yield the unified consciousness of the same object, repeating the same judgment, then the latter each time has its newly constitutive self-becoming, its new duration; the tempo of the judgment can even be a very different one. And yet *the* judgment as a judicative proposition is one and the same. That is: all judicative actions of this kind enter essentially into the unity of an inclusive total identification; they are composed of multiple acts, but in all of them there is an identical judicative proposition. This proposition attains original givenness only in a temporal act, which has its determined temporal position, or in several acts, indeed in any number of acts and temporal positions. But the *proposition itself* has no binding temporal position, no duration in time; and its self-development in becoming, which belongs to it, does not have the individuality of a contingent act. A proposition is not like a real object, individuated in an objective point of time; rather, it is an irreal object which, so to speak, is everywhere and nowhere. Real objectivities are joined together in the unity of an objective time and have their *horizon of connection*; to the consciousness we have of them there belong, accordingly, horizon-intentions which refer to this unity. On the other hand, a *plurality of irreal objectivities*, e.g., a number of propositions belonging to the unity of a theory, *does not have for consciousness such horizon-intentions* referring to a temporal connection. The irreality of the proposition as the idea of a synthetic unity of becoming is the idea of something which can appear in individual acts in any temporal position, occurring in each as necessarily temporal and temporally becoming, but which is the same "at all times." It is referred to all times; or correlatively, to whatever time it may be referred, it is always absolutely the same; it sustains no temporal differentiation, and, what is equivalent to this, no extension, no expansion in time, and this in the proper sense. It is contingently (*kata symbebēkos*) in time, insofar as it can "be" the same in any time. The different times do not extend

its duration, and ideally this is arbitrary. This implies that, properly speaking, it has no duration as a determination belonging to its essence.

The world, *every* possible world, is the universe of realities, among which we count all objects individualized in spatiotemporality, as the form of the world, by their spatiotemporal localization. Irreal objectivities make their spatiotemporal appearance in the world, but they can appear simultaneously in many spatiotemporal positions and yet be numerically identical as the same. It belongs essentially to their appearance that they are subjective formations, therefore localized in worldliness (spatiotemporality) by the localization of the subject. But they can be produced in different moments of time of the same subject as the *same*, as the same in relation to their repeated productions and as the same in relation to the productions of different subjects.

Objectivities of the understanding make their appearance in the world (a state of affairs is "discovered") as irreal; after having been discovered, they can be thought of anew and as often as desired and, in general, can be objects of experience according to their nature. But afterwards we say: even before they were discovered, they were already "valid"; or we say that they can be assumed—provided that subjects which have the ability to produce them are present and conceivable—to be producible precisely at any time, and that they have this mode of omnipresent existence: in all possible modes of productions they would be the same. Similarly, we say: "there are" mathematical and other irreal objects which no one has yet constructed. Their existence, to be sure, is revealed only by their construction (their "experience"), but the construction of those already known opens in advance a horizon of objects capable of being further discovered, although still unknown. As long as they are not discovered (by anyone), they are not actually in spatiotemporality; and as long as it is possible (how far this is possible, there is no need to decide here) that they never will be discovered, it may be that they will have no world-reality. But in any case, *once* they have been actualized or "realized," they are also localized spatiotemporally, but in such a way, to be sure, that this localization does not actually individualize them. That a subject conceives a proposition in self-evidence gives the proposition localization, a unique localization as something conceived by a particular thinker in a particular situation, but

not with regard to the proposition as such, which would be the same if conceived at different times in different situations.

*The timelessness of objectivities of the understanding, their being "everywhere and nowhere," proves, therefore, to be a privileged form of temporality, a form which distinguishes these objectivities fundamentally and essentially from individual objectivities. That is, a supertemporal unity pervades the temporal multiplicity within which it is situated: this supertemporality implies omnitemporality. The same unity is present in each multiplicity of this kind, and it is such that it is present in time essentially. If I make a judgment now, then the what of the judgment, the judicative proposition, is present to consciousness in the mode of now; and yet it is not at a point in time and is not represented in any such point by an individual moment, an individual singularization. It is itself and becoming itself in every temporal position in which a corresponding act of judgment unfolds; but whereas the individual has "its" temporal position and duration, begins at one point, fades away and finally disappears in another, such an irreality has the temporal being of supertemporality, of omnitemporality, which, nevertheless, is a mode of temporality.*

Furthermore, it should be noted that this omnitemporality does not simply include within itself the omnitemporality of *validity*. We do not speak here of validity, of truth, but merely of objectivities of the understanding as suppositions and as possible, ideal-identical, intentional poles, which can be "realized" anew at any time in individual acts of judgment—precisely as suppositions; whether they are realized in the self-evidence of truth is another question. A judgment which was once true can cease to be true, like the proposition "The automobile is the fastest means of travel," which lost its validity in the age of the airplane. Nevertheless, it can be constituted anew at any time as one and identical by any individual in the self-evidence of distinctness; and, as a supposition, it has its supertemporal, irreal identity.

d. The irrealty of objectivities of understanding does not signify generic universality.

The irrealty of objectivities of understanding must not be confused with generic universality. Since, in particular, any



number of affirmative acts, of no matter how many subjects, affirm this one and the same proposition, it can have one and the same sense, and it is a great temptation to think that the proposition belongs to the various acts of which it is the sense by virtue of its generic universality, as, for example, many red things belong to the generic essence "redness." Just as all these things have red in common and the red apprehended by an ideating abstraction is a general essence, so will the ideal-identical proposition, which indeed is common to the many acts, be a general essence, and this means a generic essence.

But one must say in opposition to this: certainly, the proposition is general insofar as it refers to an infinite number of positional acts in which it is precisely what is intended; but it is not general in the sense of generic universality, i.e., *the generality of an "extension,"* which belongs specifically to the generality of a species, to a kind or genus, and, at the lowest level, to a concrete quiddity; it is, therefore, not general in the manner of essences, which correspond to so-called general concepts such as color, tone, and the like. When the generic universal which is an essence, e.g., the *eidos* color, is exemplified in a number of colored objects, each of these objects has *its own* individual moment of coloring; we have many individual moments of color and, in contrast to them, the one *eidos* color as a generic universal. This *eidos* is capable of being envisioned only because, having been given several individual moments of color, we bring the colored objects into overlapping "coincidence" by comparison and then apprehend the universal, which is given in the coincidence as what is common to them—but not common in the real [*reell*] sense—and which we separate from what is irrelevant in the exemplifications. This is the *intuitive* [*schauende*] *process of abstraction of a generic universal*. We will say more about this later on.

It is quite another thing to isolate the sense of a statement and make this sense an object. In order to apprehend the proposition  $2 < 3$  as a proposition which, perhaps, we wish to divide according to its grammatical sense, we do not have to deal comparatively with the acts of judgment which judge that  $2 < 3$ ; we do not have to perform a generalizing abstraction; and, accordingly, we also never find the proposition to be on the order of a genus, as if, correspondingly, a unique moment, an individual proposition, were present in every act of judgment. Every judgment as such intends the proposition: *the proposi-*

tion; and this intended proposition is from the first irreal. Two acts of judgment, intending the same proposition, intend *identically the same thing*: one act never intends for itself an individual proposition which might be contained in it as a moment, and the other act a proposition only *like* the first, so that the irreal proposition  $2 < 3$  would be only the generic universal of all such particularizations. Each act intends the same proposition. The intending is an individual moment of either positing, but what is intended is not individual and cannot be isolated. In its real [*reellen*] properties, either act indeed has its individual modes of *how* the proposition is present to consciousness, e.g., one in a clearer, another in a more obscure way; the one act may be an act of so-called insight, the other a so-called blind act. But the proposition itself is, for all these acts and act-modalities, *identical as the correlate of an identification and not general as the correlate of a comparative coincidence*. The identical sense does not become particular in individuals; the generic universal in coincidence has particulars under it, but the sense does not have particulars under it.

One could object at this point that general objectivities of different levels, up to essences as pure generalities, certainly also belong to objectivities of the understanding. And yet they are particularized, insofar as they have an "extension" of individual objects, or, if they are generalities of a higher order, as they in turn have an "extension" of general objectivities.

To this we must reply that, like every objectivity of the understanding, a general objectivity is irreal in the sense of being omnitemporal. It can always be intended as the one continuously identical moment in the various possible acts which intend it, whether intuitively or not, and it has its own givenness-time in these intentions. But this *multiplicity of constitutive lived experiences* in which it appears *is not the extension of the objects which it embraces in the manner of generality*. Even if it is given intuitively, so that we intuit the universal from a cogiven object pertaining to this generality as a particularity, it is certainly exemplified *in this object*, but not in the constitutive lived experience in which it is intuitively given; and in this lived experience we are directed toward the general objectivity as toward an identical moment which can appear just as well in another lived experience with another givenness-time. Therefore, *the "appearance" of general objectivities in a certain givenness-time must be distinguished from their particular exempli-*

fication. In the one instance, the identity of the universal corresponds to a multiplicity of operations of sense referring to it, in which it is there for us; in the other, to a multiplicity of particulars, which "fall under it," which can be individual objects but also, in the case of higher generalities, can themselves again be objectivities of the understanding. The *multiplicity of objectivities of the understanding*, which in the latter case constitute the extension of the universal, must, as belonging to its objective content, be rigorously distinguished *from the multiplicity of sense in which this generality is intended at any given time*, in which, therefore, it is posited, whether in an empty intention or intuitively.

§ 65. *The distinction between real and irreal objectivities in its broad significance. Objectivities of understanding as belonging to the region of objectivities of meaning (intended objectivities).*

FROM STILL ANOTHER ASPECT, the characterization of objectivities of understanding as irreal and their contrast to real objectivities require supplementation, in the course of which the concept of the real as well as of irreal objects will undergo a necessary amplification.

The limitation given to our inquiry involves that in the case of real objects we think primarily in terms of purely natural things, of objects given in external perception as doxical receptivity. But just as in the act of experience, taking this word in its concrete sense, doxic passivity and its activation in external perception is only one, although a fundamental, level (on this point and what follows, cf. Introduction, § 12), so also the total domain of the real is not yet exhausted by the object of external perception, the mere natural thing. The world as the universe of realities is, within its spatiotemporal form, an articulated, open, boundless universe of particulars, of "objects," "things," of concrete entities, individualized spatiotemporally. They are substrates of individual qualities, particularities in relation to gen-

eralities, members of combinations, parts of wholes, and so on. This indicates the most general concept of a real thing, or of a real *concretum*. We can also say that by this is designated the *broadest concept of thing*. The world is the universe of things. But physical things are only a special case; works of art, books, cities, and so on, are also real objects and things in the broadest sense. There belongs to their objective sense, to the sense in which these things are given to us and intended by us, not only determinations arising from doxic experience (perception); rather, they also bear determinations of sense in themselves which refer to our evaluative and voluntary behavior and arise from this. These are also determinations which we find in the experience of objects; such determinations really belong to them as individual objects, e.g., the usefulness of a particular tool. By these determinations, the object, to be sure, is determined, not in what it is *in and for itself*, but in relation to us, to our appraising and willing, according to what it signifies for us. These are constructions of sense which, as founded, can appear in objects, i.e., as founded in their purely natural determinations (the concrete in the narrower sense). We can also designate these determinations as *determinations of significance*, or, so far as they are apprehended logically in a spontaneity founded at a still higher level, as *predicates of significance*, and we can differentiate them from purely *material determinations*, from those which belong to objects as mere things. An objectivity can be present for us in our everyday dealings with all sorts of determinations of significance ("value-predicates") and nevertheless still be a theme logically completely indeterminate, still not bear in itself any logical sense stemming from logical spontaneity, still be something, an individual, completely indeterminate from the point of view of logic. Under the concept of a real object, of a *thing in the broadest sense*, fall, therefore, mere things as well as significant things, objects of experience in the concrete sense of the term.

Every quality of a real thing is a real quality, and thus *the determinations of significance also belong to the real determinations of things*. We can now determine a *pregnant concept of reality* by the difference between real characteristics in the specific sense and unreal ones. We call *real* in a specific sense *all that which, in real things in the broader sense, is, according to its sense, essentially individualized by its spatiotemporal position; but we call unreal every determination which, indeed, is founded*

*with regard to its spatiotemporal appearance in a specifically real thing but which can appear in different realities as identical—* not merely as similar. And this concerns not only objectivities of the understanding in the narrow sense discussed up to now, namely, states of affairs which are educed from judgments and can be intended as identically the same in as many judgments as desired. It also holds for all *cultural objectivities*. Goethe's *Faust* is found in any number of real books ("book" denotes here what is produced by men and intended to be read: it is already a determination which is itself not purely material, but a determination of significance!), which are termed exemplars of *Faust*. This mental sense which determines the work of art, the mental structure as such, is certainly "embodied" in the real world, but it is not individualized by this embodiment. Or again: the same geometrical proposition can be uttered as often as desired; every real utterance has this sense, and different ones have identically the same sense. To be sure, the mental signification is "embodied" in the world by its corporeal foundation, but different materials can be precise embodiments of the same "ideal," which for this reason is termed irreal.

To be sure, an ideal object like Raphael's *Madonna* can *in fact* have only one mundane state and in fact is not repeatable in an adequate identity (of the complete ideal content). But *in principle* this ideal is indeed repeatable, as is Goethe's *Faust*.

Another example of an irreal objectivity which will lead us to an important distinction in the domain of irrealities is a civil constitution. A state (a nation) is a mundane reality, at once unitary and plural. It has a localization of a specific kind, inasmuch as it has a territory as a real national domain in which it enjoys jurisdiction. A civil constitution has an ideality so far as it is a categorial objectivity, an expression of the national will (or of what ought to be from the point of view of the state) which is repeatable at different times, is capable of being reactivated, and can be understood and identified by different people. But in its relation to a definite mundane nation, this ideal still has an irreality of a particular kind. The repeatability (the possibility of reactivation) by anyone whatsoever implies that anyone can repeat it in its sense of obligation, which then bears an identical relation to the mundane localization. In addition, we must distinguish the possibility of reactivation *in the proper sense*, by the citizen, who in his civic will bears within himself the national will and who is a functionary of this will,

from the possibility of *figurative* reactivation by the outsider, for example by one who understands this constitution in a merely "historical" fashion.

Thus it appears that even cultural systems are not always completely free idealities, and this reveals the *difference between free idealities* (such as logicomathematical systems and pure essential structures of every kind) and *bound idealities*, which in their being-sense carry reality with them and hence belong to the real world. All reality is here led back to spatiotemporality as the form of the individual. But originally, reality belongs to nature; the world as the world of realities receives its individuality from nature as its lowest stratum. When we speak of truths, true states of affairs in the sense of theoretical science, and of the fact that validity "once and for all" and "for everyone" belongs to their sense as the *telos* of judicative stipulation, then these are *free idealities*. They are bound to no territory, or rather, they have their territory in the totality of the universe and in every possible universe. In what concerns their possible reactivation, they are omnispatial and omnitemporal. Bound realities are bound to Earth, to Mars, to particular territories, etc. But free idealities are in fact also mundane: by their historical and territorial occurrence, their "being discovered," and so on.

Objectivities of the understanding are accordingly a special case of an all-embracing region of ideal objectivities, which, as ideal, are unreal. Every objectivity has in itself its objective sense; it is itself sense in the fullness of self-sameness [*Fülle des Selbst*]. It is by means of the identity of sense that it can be experienced, conceived, etc., as the same in multifarious acts. Every explication of an object is an explication of its sense; every explicate, or predicate essentially its own, determines the object by moments of sense essentially its own. But *mere* sense is not itself an objective determination; such a determination is derived only from evidence, from what is objective itself; or it is a determination justified by a direct comparison with what is objective, what is truly the same, and is therefore a correct or true determination. To be sure, one can say that objective sense, the intended as such, which has its own identity whether it is or is not and which can, by a turning of regard, be transformed into an object, resides in every object as its sense-content; but mere sense-content is not, in the true sense, a predicate of the object. Predicates of the object are no more sense than the object itself, which as such is "in itself," is the identical pole of various self-givings,

and—whether for me alone or for everyone and for every society—is accessible in itself, as there itself at all times and for everyone.

Now it is possible, however, for objects to stand in relation to sense in still another way, so that in themselves, in their intended and true being, they exhibit *sense as a predicate*, as a determination coming to them in truth, belonging to their being-itself. This is the case with those real objects in which, as bearers of signification, irrealities have their mundane, spatiotemporal occurrence. A very familiar example is provided by the words of a language, the letters, even a complete work, all of which are bearers of signification so far as the words are spoken or written by persons who intend this or that by means of them. There is here a remarkable implication. The wording and the “sense” belong to the objective sense of a declarative sentence. When we have the sentence from the grammatical, linguistic point of view as a theme, as an objectivity of the human, cultural world, then the wording, taken in specific unity with the sense intended in the sentence, belongs to its proper essence (which includes all its predicates). That is, the sense intended by the wording is then itself a component of the object. As a linguistic objectivity, this “has” its signification. The *objective sense* corresponding to such an object is, consequently, a *sense of sense*, a second-level sense. Therefore, *from sense as objective sense* we must distinguish *sense as the determination of an object*. Sense as objective determination belongs to the object itself as a theme, but this is not true in the same way for objective sense. Rather, *through* it we are directed toward the object.

The irrealty of irreal objectivities, therefore, can also be interpreted in such a way that we say they are *objectivities of sense*, objectivities to whose proper essential determinations there belong the determinations “sense of . . .,” “significance of. . .” They are objectivities of sense, or contents intended through objects, to the objective determination of which “to have a sense” belongs. It belongs to the essence of objectivities of sense not to be otherwise than in real embodiments whose significance they constitute. Thus the one identical signification of the many exemplars of *Faust* is the ideally one *Faust*, or the significance of its many reproductions is this one unique *Madonna*. To signify this one work, to have this sense, belongs to the many real objects in which its reproductions can be embodied. Like all objects, irreal objectivities are identical poles of

a multiplicity of intentions which refer to them. But they are not simply intended in a multiplicity of apprehensions related to them in a multiple how; rather, they are themselves intended as intended contents, as sense-of. . . . To be an intended content (in multiple exemplars, reproductions, etc.) belongs in itself to their objective determination—which is only another way of saying that they are not objects simply apprehensible in receptivity but objects which can be only by means of a spontaneity which first produces and then reproduces them. Hence we can also grasp *the difference between real and unreal objectivities* as the difference between *objectivities which are not intended contents* (to whose objective sense it does not belong to be such a content) and *objectivities which are themselves intended contents, objectivities of sense*, or which have sprung from intended contents. Objectivities of the understanding are a special case of such objectivities.<sup>1</sup>

Sense as sense (the intended content as such) is precisely also an object, or can be made one. It falls under the broadest concept of something in general, which in conformity with its essence is an explicable something. It can become the substrate of a judgment and a judicative act of identification and explication. As such, it has an objective sense of the second level: the sense of sense is fulfilled in the having of sense. But we then say that the sense lies in the object, that is, the sense of sense lies in the sense, therefore also in a corresponding object; and thus we come to an infinite regress, inasmuch as the sense of sense can by turns become an object, then have sense, and so on. This indicates that sense cannot be a real [*reelles*] component of an object. Thus, sense and objects—which are not sense—stand in contrast to each other and in essential correlation; they are relative to each other as levels which can always be repeated but which are based on this absolute difference.

1. Cf. *Logic*, p. 118; ET, p. 133.





### 3 / The Origin of the Modalities of Judgment

#### § 66. *Introduction. The modalities of judgment as modes of ego-decision (active position-taking).*

IN OUR PREVIOUS INVESTIGATION of the most general structure of predication and of the novel objectivities arising in it, we made use of a simplification. We took account of the act of judgment only as an act of categorical judgment in the mode of certainty, a simple uncontested certainty; i.e., we thought of the prepredicative experience on which it is based as proceeding in an unbroken unanimity, as unfolding in an unobstructed realization of the tendencies of the contemplative interest. The phenomena of the modalization of the simple certainty of belief which already appear in the domain of contemplative perception have indeed already been analyzed, but in the wider course of our investigation we began by disregarding them. This simplification, necessary at first from the point of view of method, must now be set aside, and the significance which the modalizations also have for the higher level, that of predicative thought, must be taken into consideration. For though we previously thought of the act of predicative judgment as taking place on the basis of completely unbroken and unmodalized perception, it is clear that this could only be a matter of a *limiting case*. After all, the anticipations operative in every perception on the basis of passive expectations certainly condition, in the domain of receptivity, a kind of modalization, namely, at least the modalities of open

particularization (cf. § 21c). And, like every other kind of modalization, this will, as a matter of course, also reveal its effects on the higher level and give rise to particular forms of predicative modalities. Thus the full concrete sense of the act of judgment as an *act of confirmation* [*Feststellen*] will be disclosed to us only if we include the phenomena of modalization in the domain of our inquiry. Of course, assuming the limiting case of a completely unbroken and unmodalized perception, there may occasionally arise an interest in the confirmation of what is receptively experienced, whether for purposes of communication or to impress upon the mind the result of a process of experience; but as a rule an interest in confirmation will develop only where the simple certainty of belief has already been challenged for whatever motive, where it has perhaps given place to doubt, and where it is now a question of arriving at certainty from the doubt, of resolving it by a *decision*, and of taking a position with regard to what has become doubtful. As already indicated, even the reinstated certainty which results in such decision must be characterized as modalization, in contrast to the immediate, simple certainty of belief. And if in what follows we speak of modalization, if we inquire into the origin and motives of the modalities on the higher level, we will at first take as a basis that broader concept of modality (cf. § 21d) which includes in itself every modification of the original mode of validity, namely, simple certainty. Only later (§§ 76 ff.) will we disclose the sense which the distinction between modalities in this broad sense and those in the narrower sense (that of the modifications by which certainty ceases to be certainty) has on the level of predicative thought.

*The modalities of predicative judgment* must be understood as *modes of decision*. In addition, one should certainly take note of the fact that the expression "decision" is ambiguous. That is, even in the domain of receptive experience one can already speak, in a certain sense, of a decision: in passing through the irresolution of [conflicting] apprehensions, in the fulfillment of possible prescriptions as open in the course of the activity of perception, there is already a kind of decision. But these are *passive* syntheses (cf. § 21). They are modal variants of the passive *doxa*, fulfillments of the passive intentions of expectation, the resolution of the obstructions passively grown up around them, and so on. But *decision in the proper sense*, i.e., *the responsive position-taking of the ego as an activity of the ego* in

the act of predicative judgment, is something entirely different.

It is clear that the concept of belief and the modalities of belief are themselves modified thereby. For we have now to distinguish the essentially different processes and events of passivity and activity according to their constitutive operations:

1. *The passive syntheses of unanimity or discrepancy*, the intentions which are unobstructed and freely realized on the one hand, or those which are obstructed, undergo cancellation, etc., in prepredicative experience.

2. *The active position-takings of the ego* in the act of predicative judgment, the active decisions, convictions, allowing-oneself-to-be-convinced-by, taking-the-side-of, etc., and finally the activity of conviction in the broadest sense, which no longer really involves evidence and counterevidence, owing to the fact that the underlying receptive experience is unbroken. These activities also have their noematic correlates. It is not a question here of an act which merely makes the passive intentionality patent, not simply of a veridical act of perception, e.g., in the form of a mere attentive turning toward a presumption which is lived through and succeeds automatically; rather, the ego passes its judgment in a specific position-taking, it comes to a decision for or against, and so on. Indeed, as a rule, the word "conviction" already indicates: allowing the receptive situation of perception to determine a judicative position-taking and thereupon to determine one's judging—whereby we also understand why, practically speaking, "judging" and "being convinced of" are often equivalent expressions.

When, in what follows, we look into this relation between passive and active modalization, we will also understand that the acts of judicative position-taking which occur here are *completely dependent from the intentional point of view*, namely, so far as they presuppose the events of the passive *doxa*. It is only with the act of decisive position-taking that we attain the full sense of the word which normally denotes the act of judgment; it is only here that we attain an act of *confirmation in a wholly pregnant sense*, one which in fact constitutes the essential function of the act of predicative judgment. Thus, only here have we reached the point in which the essence of the act of judgment is revealed in a wholly concrete way and from which, at the same time, not only the theory of the modalities of judgment but also that of the so-called qualities of the judgment—both core-elements of traditional logic—must be constructed originally from

the sources of constitutive genesis. In particular, we will attain by this the understanding that modalization is not an event which merely appears *on occasion* in the context of judgment, but that the passage through modalization and the desire to attain by its confirmation and certainty of belief are phenomena by means of which the sense of striving for judgment first becomes intelligible at all in its ultimate roots.

Finally, this act of position-taking in the judgment, the act of conferring validity and its modification, must not be confused, to speak of the matter in advance, with other modes of behavior of the ego which belong to the sphere of judgment; in particular, not with active explication, colligation, comparison, differentiation, and the like—all of the operations to which we are indebted for the logical forms of different states of affairs. In all of these actions, the act of judgment is always only the act, issuing from the ego, of conferring or denying validity.

In this pregnant sense, the ego does not always take a position; if it simply perceives, observing, merely apprehending, what is present and what appears of itself in experience, there is then—where nothing else presents itself—no motive for taking a position. There must be countermotives in play, open or not being realized in a particular consciousness; disjunctive possibilities in reciprocal tension must be on hand. Thus it is necessary to distinguish *the act of judicative position-taking itself* from its *motives*.

#### § 67. *Empty modifications of judgment as motives for modalization.*

BEFORE WE CONSIDER the possible kinds of position-taking and, corresponding to them, the different modalities of judgment, we now pass to the question concerning these motives, i.e., to the question of how, from a genetic point of view, judicative position-taking, in the pregnant sense which has been discussed, comes about, how modalized judgments, i.e., those which do not have the original form of simple certitude, are obtained.

Such modalizations will always appear when the simple cer-

tainty of belief has become doubtful, whether in the receptive substratum or with respect to predicative judgments already carried out; and this will everywhere be the case where the act of predicative judgment does not take place in complete originality, on the basis of the completely original self-giving of the judicative substrates. For where such completely self-giving intuition of the judicative substrates takes place, there is absolutely no possible doubt with regard to the "so" or "otherwise" and hence no occasion for an explicit judicative decision. Within the limits of our previous study it was implied that we conceived the act of judgment as taking place in such complete originality of production. But as we have said, this is a limiting case which is almost never realized in fact. This has already been shown (§ 26) for the domain of receptive, perceptive apprehension and explication. Nowhere in its actual context is an explication or relational contemplation ever accomplished in a wholly original way in the sense of a primal establishment; anticipations referring to what was previously experienced and to characters of familiarity founded thereby always take part. In this relation between anticipatory grasping and the possibility or impossibility of its fulfillment in experience, a relation which is essential for all experience, there is thus found the *basis for the occurrence of modalities* and, especially on the higher level, of modalized predicative judgments and judicative position-takings. Stated more precisely, if we inquire into the origin of modalities in the higher sphere, there are *two modes, different from each other, in which these modalities can be motivated*: on the one hand, they can be motivated in a way similar to the way the act of predicative judgment is immediately erected on an act of receptive experience, following it and its anticipations; on the other hand, they can be motivated in modifications which admit predicative judgments already constituted and the objectivities of the understanding produced in them by their sedimentation, i.e., by the continuous transformation of what has been originally acquired and has become a habitual possession and thus something nonoriginal—a transformation which takes place quite independently of the further course of experience and which yields, in the effort to reactivate these judgments acquired in the past and their adjustment to the acquisitions of subsequent experience, a continuous source of modalization and critical position-taking.

a. The empty modifications and modalizations founded in the anticipations of experience.

To begin with, we will consider the first case. The modalizations constantly appearing in receptive experience will naturally *not* give rise to modalities in the sphere of predicative judgment erected on it if, in the course of perceptive contemplation, explication, and setting into relation, one does not immediately pass over to predicative judgment and if *only the final result* of such a receptive course of development is concentrated in a predicative judgment. However, in its course of development, receptive experience is in continuous self-correction; on the ground of the certainty of experience which pervades it, partial cancellations constantly occur. In letting one's glance wander over an object and in fixing on what is seen in a doubtful way, the object in question appears more clearly and precisely, whereby this "more precisely" often signifies an "otherwise." The object, the substrate of contemplative experience, is there for us in *the* explicates and determinations which each time emerge in the last intuition and which may be the result of a multifarious contemplation. If thereby one is led to make corrections and, on the basis of their conflict with others which are "more distinct," to cancel images (figurations) which have previously emerged, then certainly what has been canceled can itself become the object of a reflection; it can be held on the basis of memory or retention, but as a rule the normal course of experience provides no occasion for this. We are directed toward the object itself; it is there as it presents itself, precisely on the basis of the clearest intuition, and the presentations, the intuitions, previously canceled and displaced by this intuition are no longer of any importance to us. They have disappeared with their retentional reverberation and submergence into an ever more distant past. They have undergone a radical cancellation, and it is from the standpoint of the thing that it has been (passively) decided "what is there"; the ego need not take part in a *personal* decision, it need not take its stand on the ground of one of the possibilities. Each of the other possibilities, as a possible ground of a position-taking, has given way under its feet, and the one and only ground as the ground of an objective certainty is there of itself; the ego sees itself standing on it and merely adds its subjective confirmation of this fact.

A still simpler case is that in which there can no longer be the slightest reason to speak of coming to a decision because, *from the beginning, there is a lack of contrary enticements*, which would give rise to open possibilities. This is the case in external experience, in which every event and every moment of experience of a static or changing material being is encompassed by a horizon of open possibilities: these are possibilities for which nothing speaks in the given moment; accordingly, the expectations are simple certainties which encounter no obstruction. If the final result of such a complex of contemplative receptivity is then concentrated in a predicative judgment, this will have the mode of simple certainty and will no longer bear any trace of the cancellations and corrections which might possibly have arisen in the prepredicative process which lay at the basis of the judgment.

It is otherwise if the act of predicative determination—whether for purposes of communication or simply because of an intention to fix the result of every step of the perception and impress it upon oneself—*continuously follows the progress of the perception*. Then all the oscillations of the certainty of belief find their expression in predicative propositions of the form “presumably so,” “possibly so”; another form occurs when what was given initially as certain, and concerning which a corresponding predicative judgment has been formed, must subsequently be withdrawn in a correction of the perception: “nevertheless, it is not so but otherwise”; and still another form when, after passing through doubt, one is able to verify that “it really is so”—all these are forms which must be discussed later in greater detail. Likewise, there will, in addition, always be judgments, and, what is more, judgments having the form of certitude, which anticipate what actually has already been perceived and which are inspired by anticipations awakened by the object of perception on the basis of preacquaintance with regard to type. We will predicate determinations of the object by way of *anticipation*, determinations which we expect really belong to it as an object of this familiar type. We will judge as “one judges about objects of this kind,” in the implicit expectation that “they will also be correct for this particular one.” In fact, most of the time one cannot, for this reason, exhibit an act of judgment and a production of states of affairs actually accomplished in perfect originality in the actual progress of thematic determination; rather, one often judges only in inauthenticity on the basis of



"prejudices" without complete envisagement, and in this way propositions, i.e., intended state-of-affair objectivities, are constituted. But when self-giving envisagement occurs, then it sometimes happens that the judgments already formed prove to be false and demand correction or complete cancellation and the construction of appropriate new judgments, which henceforth are intended to count as true. As objectivities already constituted previously, the old judgments are then still there in their objective character, but as *mere propositions*, whose claim to truth could not be realized.

Thus, the course of the activity of judgment, as it immediately follows the progress of receptive experience and conforms to it, step by step, already provides the occasion for the construction of empty and anticipatory judgments and then, correlatively, for cancellations and the other modalizations. The original production of categorial objectivities is, here also, always already permeated by nonoriginality, by anticipation.

b. The empty modifications springing from the sedimentation of originally constituted judgments.<sup>1</sup>

But still greater is the domain of the empty judgment, of the judgment which is not immediately fulfilled in experience and is not verified in it (and is perhaps not *capable* of being verified in it), i.e., the domain of an act of judgment which, with the attempt at confirmation, turns out to be an empty intention giving rise to negation. Not only can such empty, unfulfillable intentions be constituted in the immediate continuity of a process of judgment following the course of experience; they also *have their origin in modifications* which follow from the *essential nature of the predicative layer* as one that is separable from the lower level and independent; these modifications yield a new source for the constitution of modalities of judgment.

All these modifications proceed from the original form of the completely original act of judgment, constituted on the basis of intuition. As spontaneous production, this is at the same time the appropriate mode for the firsthand givenness of the objectivities of the understanding. But just as, in conformity with the

1. On this point, see also the more detailed analyses of Appendix II in *Logic*, pp. 275 ff.; ET, pp. 313 ff.

essential lawfulness of internal time-consciousness, a chain of modifications in the case of *every* objectivity is joined to its being given at first hand in a now of consciousness, so this also holds for the spontaneous production taking place in the judgment. All these modifications are characterized in themselves as *intentional* modifications, i.e., they refer intentionally to the original form from which they have been derived.

The first modification is that of *retention*: after the act of judgment originally accomplished in spontaneity, the judgment which has actually just been accomplished is still present to consciousness in the mode of the just-accomplished; it can then *be retained in grasp* in this retentional transformation exactly as we have indicated for objects constituted in receptivity; then the possibility exists of deriving from it, in the way described above, different syntactical objectivities, or also of returning to it once more in its actual accomplishment, of reproducing it once more, and thus bringing it again to firsthand givenness, whereby the reproduced coincides in the consciousness of identity with the previously produced. But the judgment can also be *abandoned* in its retentional reverberation. It then sinks ever further into the background and at the same time becomes ever more indistinct; the degree of its prominence gradually lessens until it finally disappears from the field of immediate consciousness, is "forgotten." It is henceforth incorporated into the passive background, into the "unconscious," which is not a dead nothingness but a limiting mode of consciousness and accordingly can affect us anew like another passivity in the form of whims, free-floating ideas, and so on. In this modification, however, the judgment is not an original but a *secondary passivity*, which essentially refers to its origin in an actual spontaneous production. In this passive modification it therefore represents, like every other passivity which has arisen through the modification of what is originally constituted as a source, a *habituality of the ego*, a permanent possession, ready for a new associative awakening. We can turn again toward what is awakened in the form of a whim, a free-floating idea; we can bring it nearer, make it more distinct; and, finally, by renewing its articulated accomplishment under certain circumstances, we can restore the judgment to self-givenness.

The passively free-floating judgment, the sudden idea, must not be confused with the presentification of a past judgment. Presentification presupposes an ego which presentifies and which

can participate in the elaboration of the past act of judgment or, again, can refuse its concurrence. Nothing of this is to be found in connection with free-floating thought. This is an affection, a mere expectation, directed toward the ego, inviting it, so to speak, to a reaccomplishment.

Here a *reactivation* in the form of a renewal of the spontaneous accomplishment can take place in different ways:

1. The accomplishment can be an original activity "through and through." This not only from the fact that every step of judgment is explicitly accomplished anew, but also because the judicative substrates are brought anew to self-giving or presenting intuition.<sup>2</sup> Thus the entire two-membered synthesis of predication is accomplished anew, whereby naturally this entire process is intentionally characterized in itself as the repetition of an act of determination already accomplished earlier and enters into synthetic coincidence with it.

2. But the case can also arise, and very frequently, in which the activity of judgment is *linked to* earlier acquisitions of judgment and brings what has been previously judged to an accomplishment articulated anew, therefore to an accomplishment in the proper sense, without the founding, receptively constituted judicative substrates having to be given anew with equal intuitiveness and clarity; or again, the intuition can be more or less fragmentary, according to a gradation which goes from an act of judgment which is completely empty, i.e., indicative in a merely symbolic way, to one which is perfectly fulfilled by intuition. It goes without saying that the initial original constitution of a categorial objectivity also presupposes the first-hand givenness of the substrates, and so must be original on two levels.<sup>3</sup> But if the objectivity has been once constituted, we can come back to it again, produce it once more, without the substrates having necessarily to be given again intuitively. This means that it is then *no longer, properly speaking, a two-membered synthesis which is accomplished*; there has been no renewed intuitive transition from *S* to *p* and then a new return to *S* enriched by *p*; the synthesis of transition has not been spon-

2. With reference to the modifications possible here, cf. § 27, above.

3. [That is, the temporal originality in the constitution of objectivities (*erstmalige ursprüngliche Konstitution*) presupposes the originality (*originäre Gegebenheit*) of directly given data and of substrates as opposed to modifications.—Trans.]

taneously accomplished; only the second step has been actually and properly reaccomplished. The fact that *S* is enriched by the determination *p*, that *p* belongs to *S*, is more or less intuitively present for us in memory, but it is not confirmed by a new return to firsthand intuition but is simply taken for granted. Indeed, perhaps it is no longer capable of being confirmed at all; perhaps a new envisagement would establish the contrary. Nevertheless, this objectivity, the state of affairs "*S* is *p*," can again be brought to givenness as the same on the basis of its original constitution and the habitual efficacy of this constitution. The judgment *S* is *p* can be accomplished anew as something clearly identical even though the judgment lacks intuitive fulfillment.

3. Still another modification is possible. In its renewal, the original judgment can be newly accomplished *without being completely articulated*. Word sequences presenting themselves associatively can produce the unity of a judgment but in a confused way, so that nonsense is mingled with sense. In this case, with regard to mere judgment (without reference to possible envisagement) one can no longer speak of a spontaneous production in the proper sense, or at least not with regard to the individual parts. These are merely propositions which are constituted in conformity with the requirements of language. Confused judgments of this kind can be "*clarified*," sense separated from nonsense, even though intuitiveness, the self-evident givenness of judicative *substrates*, is not produced—is something which in fact perhaps cannot be produced at all. Instead, a mere act of judgment, a *mere judicative intention* or association of such intentions, is regiven in the self-evidence of distinctness.

§ 68. *The origin of judicative position-taking  
in the critique of empty intentions. The  
critique bearing on verification  
[Bewährung] (Adäquation).*

A VARIEGATED LIFE of predicative experience thus also develops *outside* receptive experience and *in addition* to it. Independently of the course of original experience, there is a

ground composed of all the judgments already passed and all the categorial objectivities already constituted in them, objectivities which depend on the law of sedimentation, previously described, with its possibility of reactivation. As such sedimented acquisitions, they can take effect within the new and original reaccomplishment of an act of judgment. Anticipatory expectations, if aroused, are fulfilled, but in the sphere of empty intuition; a new belief adapts itself to the previous one, now become habitual. But doubts also spring up, conjectures are raised; possibly the doubts are resolved, conjecture changes again into an unbroken certainty which may conform to the entire complex of certainties without protests arising from the side of what has become habitual. Therefore, even within this sphere of the empty, reactivated act of judgment, which does not return again to the original self-givenness of the substrates, we have a progressive taking-cognizance-of, an adaptation of the knowledge previously acquired to what arises anew; but this is not a cognizance in the pregnant sense of cognizance by experience. At the same time, the possibility exists in each case that the knowledge already effected as valid and made part of one's habitual possession, instead of becoming united with the new—enriching it, completing it, and determining it more precisely—is, on the contrary, modalized in a *negation* (is canceled), or again is modalized in *another* way: is nullified disjunctively in doubt, in mere conjecture, etc. From this springs *the striving for decision* and the necessity of a criticism of the judgments already passed, of the categorial objectivities already spontaneously produced; this criticism as regards the supposition of their truth bears on the question of whether they can be brought to a synthesis of fulfillment coincident with the original givens of experience. And this even where, in the context of the judgment itself, a doubt has not actually arisen relative to the actual content of the judgment in its original motivation but where, in reflecting on the growing future of devaluation of the results of the judicative position-taking already obtained, the need arises of protecting what has been obtained from such a devaluation. While in direct contemplation we do not doubt the situations in question, we will, however, frequently admit the possibility that what is certain to us may or may not be such. What speaks in favor of this possibility is precisely the general experience of the frequent reversal taking place in judgment, but in the given case nothing in addition to this; on the other hand, in the actual context

itself, *everything* speaks in favor of our certainty: it is and remains certainty, but, to be sure, a certainty which has, in addition, a counterpossibility; it is a certainty, therefore, which has lost its purity. Concerning these modes of certainty, more later on. Here, it is necessary only to understand how the *modalities of judgment* arise from the criticism of judgments already passed—whether they are passed by way of anticipation or are acquisitions of previous judgments which are then reactivated—and from the criticism of the categorial objectivities constituted in them.

The effort, through criticism, to attain a decision and a guarantee of the position-taking of belief does not aim at a mere decision (of some doubt or other, some disjunction in belief); as a striving toward cognition, it is directed toward *truth*. The verb “to know” [er-kennen]<sup>1</sup> indicates that knowing is a striving to bring to the level of knowledge (naturally, to *empirical* knowledge) what has not yet attained this level but is merely intended by way of anticipation. Understood in this broad sense, every ongoing experience would already be a knowing. But, as already mentioned, the normal sense of the word includes the striving for truth, for the knowledge of truth, hence, the striving to obtain truth as such in empirical knowledge. The experience of truth toward which knowledge tends presupposes a lower experience and embraces it. *Knowledge is the consciousness of the “agreement” between an empty anticipatory belief, in particular a predicative belief (empty, or not genuinely intuitive), and the corresponding experience which gives at first hand the object of this belief—the object judged in the predication—as the experience of its self-evident givenness*<sup>2</sup>—an agreement in which the anticipatory belief comes to synthetic coincidence with the belief from experience and is fulfilled in it. From another perspective: there is agreement between the mere judgment, between what is posited with such and such a predicative sense, and the experience of this sense in the mode of “it itself.” We can also say that the objective intention, the objectivity posited as such, the state of affairs posited as such in its being anticipatively directed-toward . . . is confirmed, verified, and completed in

1. [It is not possible to express in English the import of the prefix *er-*, which is meant to express the striving for, and achievement of, a goal.—Trans.]

2. On the concept of self-evidence, cf. § 4, above.

the synthetic unity with the state of affairs of the object itself. Therefore, what is experienced in this agreement, which itself is a matter of experience, is truth.<sup>3</sup>

Such agreement can be established in an uninterrupted verification of experience by experience; knowledge of truth can then have the character of an *unbroken corroboration*, of a fulfillment of empty judgments, of suppositions. But if the knowing subject in his striving has as part of his motivation the consciousness, actual or habitual but in any case fully awakened, of the possibility that, instead of a positive verification, an unsettling of the already uncertain belief can take place, or, if in his search for truth, he has before himself the disjunction of truth and falsehood as the unity of mutually appertaining possibilities, knowledge then acquires the character of a decision based on the passage through criticism of judgmental suppositions of the states of affairs intended as such; and this is the normal case.

In the critical attitude motivated by the lived experience of the act of empty judgment, of judgmental suppositions which cannot be brought to fulfilled verification in the self-givenness of the underlying substrate-objectivities, the state of affairs supposed as such is separate from the actual state of affairs.<sup>4</sup> In this critical attitude, the merely intended [*vermeinte*] state of affairs, which can be intended either as completely empty or as more or less fulfilled by intuition, is separate from the state of affairs which is completely fulfilled, completely saturated by intuition, in which the state [*Sichverhalten*] of its substrates comes to perfect intuitive givenness. The "state of affairs itself" is nothing other than *the idea of the completely fulfilled sense of the state of affairs*, of its completely fulfilled intention, of a sense which is naturally a sense of the second level because the state of affairs itself is an objectivity of sense.

3. On the different concepts of truth, cf. *Logic*, § 46.

4. Cf. also *Logic*, § 44β.

§ 69. *The intention of the judgment as such  
and the true state of affairs. In what respect  
the state of affairs is an objectivity of sense.*

FROM HERE ON, there is no longer anything strange about the statement that states of affairs, as they can be educed from judgments by a "substantivation," are objectivities of sense, objectivities of a particular region of intentions. This in no way implies that in the inference, which in the course of judgment renders the state of affairs, as a specific object of a particular region, independent and thematic, we would be directed merely toward what is intended as such instead of toward something actual. It is always the actually existing state of affairs that we are directed toward. It is the *actual* "state" of the objectivities first constituted in receptivity, and which have entered into it, which invariably makes up our final thematic goal. But, once constituted, predicative judgments, as soon as they have been produced, as soon as new objectivities have been spontaneously constituted in them, certainly have a kind of autonomy. They can be produced anew, possibly reproduced in communicative interchange, and thereby have their own way of being able to be brought to self-evidence, the self-evidence of distinctness, as intentions, without on that account their having to be capable of being fulfilled. In this way, they show themselves to be a region of autonomous objectivities. And this autonomy—the fact that a new kind of objectivity is preconstituted in the act of judgment, i.e., that judgments, once constituted, and categorial objectivities in general, apart from their possible fulfillment by intuition, have a kind of inner life and an independence with regard to the lower level so that, as mere sense, they can attain the self-evidence of distinctness and themselves become substrates of various judgments—all this requires again and again that we pass from the original straightforward attitude, directed toward truly existent substrate-objectivities and their determinations, their state, to the critical attitude, in which the empty intention, the mere proposition, parts company from the state of affairs itself.

The state of affairs itself is the idea of the completely fulfilled intention of the state of affairs, and this intending is origi-



nally accomplished in a judicative proposition—thus the relation already touched upon above (§ 60, pp. 243 f.) between state of affairs and judicative proposition becomes intelligible to us. The question of knowing in what respect the state of affairs can be looked upon as a sense and the question of knowing in what respect it is a judgment (a judicative proposition) are, then, basically the same. This means that the intention of the state of affairs as such is a judicative proposition, and the latter is nothing other than the objective sense in which precisely the state of affairs itself is intended. But this “identical self” [*Selbst*] of the state of affairs is intended not only as *every* objective identical self is intended in an objective sense and eventually given in it as such; rather, so far as it is a matter of a perfectly fulfilled judicative intention, the identical self of the state of affairs is not merely given in the intention (as the objective identical self is eventually given in the fulfilled intending of objects of receptive experience); rather, it is first of all *produced*: the state of affairs itself as sense in the fullness of self-sameness is produced in the perfectly fulfilled judicative proposition, is given in it in the manner of spontaneous production.

Furthermore, we note that *the concept of objective sense has become ambiguous here*. Originally the concept of sense, as one contrasts it linguistically with that of “proposition,”<sup>1</sup> is obtained by the generalization of the distinction, appearing in *Logical Investigations*, between the quality and matter of judgment. From this generalization, especially as applied to the judgment, resulted *the concept of sense* as “*judgment-matter*” or “*judgment-content*” and, distinguished from this, the full judicative proposition, i.e., the sense with its thetic character. This unity of judgment-content and thetic character constitutes a broader concept of the “sense” of the judgment,<sup>2</sup> the judgment-intention as such, to which also belongs the thetic character as a structure of the judgment-noema. Since the word “proposition” is ambiguous—since one can understand by it the proposition merely intended as such, as well as the true, realized proposition, the state of affairs itself—we will, where we mean the *mere* proposition, always add “*proposition taken as mere sense*,” in order to indi-

1. Cf. *Ideas*, p. 274; ET, p. 340.

2. Cf. *Logic*, pp. 192 f.; ET, pp. 215 f.; and, on the concept “judgment-matter,” see the passage already often cited, *Logic*, p. 269; ET, p. 305.

cate by this that it belongs to the region of intentions, to sense in the broader sense. What is substantified in the normal, ongoing course of judgment is then not the proposition enclosed within quotation marks, the judgment-intention as such, but the judgment maintained as valid, precisely the intended state of affairs itself.

§ 70. *The self-evidence of the givenness of states of affairs as analogous to the self-evidence of the underlying substrate-objectivities.*

CONCERNING THE RELATION between a state of affairs and the objects which found it, the following should also be noted.

Where, in virtue of their essence, the underlying substrates themselves can never come to perfectly adequate givenness, as is the case with all actual objectivities, where anticipation belongs essentially to their mode of givenness (and perfectly adequate givenness is an idea located in infinity), then this also holds true for the states of affairs erected on them; they too are then, in virtue of their essence, given only in an anticipatory way. The perception of the underlying object-substrates is obviously a consciousness constitutive at first hand—in virtue of their essence, such objectivities cannot be originally given in any other way and cannot become self-evident in their being in any other way than in the manner of an indeterminate identical self, referring to possible further determination. Firsthand constitutive consciousness in all its extensions through the endless continuation of determinative experience never furnishes the identical self fully determinate in itself—this is something which exists only as an idea of reason, as the correlate of an ideally closed, multilaterally infinite, possible perceptive system, as the unity of an infinity which allows itself to be beheld as a possibility in processes of infinity. It is an identical self which is prescribed as actuality by rational motivation always in only a provisional way, and which, as true being-in-itself, is possible only under transcendental, categorial conditions.

Every state of affairs referring to concrete things therefore

shares in this character. It has its self-evidence, its truth; this means, however, that it is given at first hand as provisional, as an indeterminate truth. It is constituted originally in the form of something indeterminate and not as an identical self in its true determinateness: the concrete judicative state of affairs is also an idea [of reason]. Just as the underlying perception can never be adequate, just as it never contains the thing itself [*das Ding selbst*] but only the sense of the thing, fulfilling itself as continually changing and expanding, so also *the judgment of perception never contains the state of affairs itself*, if we understand by this that which truly exists, that which the judgment "intends," that which is judged in it. No truly existing state of affairs, relative to a transcendent real thing, is given "adequately"; or again: in no judgment of experience, be it ever so saturated with experience, can the act of judgment bear in itself what is true, the state of affairs itself.

§ 71. *Judicative position-taking as recognition or rejection. Recognition as appropriation and its significance for the striving [of the ego] for self-preservation.*

UP TO THIS POINT our discussions have shown the connection which in general unites the modalities of predicative judgment with the essential structures of the cognitive life, the different motives which lead it to empty judgments going beyond what is capable of being verified in experience, whether in the mode of anticipation, as in the case of judgments which immediately follow the course of experience, or, going beyond it, after the manner of judgments which refer (back) to original experience but are reactivated as empty intentions which have become habitual. *Acts of modalized judgment occur wherever the act of judgment does not have the form of simple certainty, immediately justified in experience.* They occur as a becoming-uncertain or as the re-establishment of certainty in the passage through criticism, which brings about a new verification in experience, possibly by correction. No matter how an empty judgment may arise, whether from an anticipation of coming experience follow-

ing its proper course or by the reactivation of previous acquisitions of judgment, verification ultimately always has only one possibility, namely, the *return to the self-giving experience of the substrates of judgment*. All verification leads back to the substrates of judgment. The origination of modalized judgments is always connected with the act of empty judgment which goes beyond what is self-given and with the criticism of these anticipations. Thus, *all modalities of judgment must, on principle, be conceived as modes of position-taking, as modes of decision*, which emerge in the criticism of empty intentions and must be understood with reference to it.

*In the pregnant sense, the act of judgment* is deciding thus or so and, consequently, is decision for or against, *recognition or refusal, rejection*. This should not be confused with *the modalities of being themselves*: with the simple "existing," with the modality of already appearing in objective sense which is merely becoming patent, with the "null," or again the "not-null," with the "still so" which follows from a double cancellation. All of these modalities can already appear in receptivity; the ego need not spontaneously effect any position-taking, but it can also be motivated to do so by these passive modalizations. In the specific act of position-taking characteristic of the judgment, the "yes" and the "no" arise noetically, and their noematic correlate is what appears in objective sense as "valid" or "invalid," characters which result from the interpretation of validity or invalidity conferred by the ego. In this specific sense the act of judgment is therefore the ego-act of *positio*, of *positing* in its possible double form: that of concurrence or refusal, rejection. First of all, this means only that where it is a question of an act of judgment on the basis of a motivating perception, two opposed positions are possible, which are actualized according to the circumstances. Whether this means that positing itself has a double "quality," in the sense of traditional logic, is still to be considered.

These acts of position-taking are *completely dependent* insofar as they have their motivational foundation in what takes place in the perception itself, in its proper and perhaps purely passive course. Perception has its own intentionality, which as yet involves nothing of the spontaneous activity of the ego and its constitutive function, since this intentionality is, on the contrary, presupposed if the ego is to have something for or against which it can decide. The two opposed acts of position-taking are intimately associated with each other in virtue of the unity of

this motivational situation or in virtue of the unity arising from their division; for example, where two possibilities are in conflict with each other, the decision *for* one of the possibilities has juxtaposed to it, as a correlate, the decision *against* the correlative possibility—if not actually, then at least potentially.

If we look more closely at how the motivation exerted on the ego functions and how the ego reacts to it by a positive or negative response, the following must be said.

The motivational foundation in favor of a decision which is a firm positing-as-valid by the ego, or in favor of a corresponding negative decision, is the re-establishment of perceptual unanimity. The split and the conflict of the perceptual apprehensions mutually displacing one another is returned to an unbroken unity. The ego is affected by all this; it itself, as ego, and in its *own* way, is disunited with itself, is divided, and is finally reunited. It was inclined to stand on the ground of one of the apprehensions, i.e., to carry out, above all, the expectational tendencies of *this* apprehension, to make them into active expectations radiating from the ego-center. But the ego still finds itself prevented from doing this; it is dragged in the direction of opposing expectational tendencies and is inclined toward the opposing apprehension. If the unanimity of the perception is re-established, if a single perception again unfolds in normal form, then the internal conflict of the ego with itself is resolved. The ego can no longer be inclined now in this direction, now in that; the nullified apprehension with its nullified intentional tendencies, above all with its still living, still dynamic, but canceled expectations, can no longer be carried out. Moreover, the field in which the ego now operates is not only the horizon of free expectation and the intentionality now established in unanimity; the ego also actively takes a position on this ground, adopts what is given in unanimity as existing absolutely. "Recognition" is that which accomplishes a peculiar *appropriation*, a *fixation*, the fixation of a being-valid for me henceforth and in an enduring way. By this means the ego actively appropriates through its striving an acquisition, therefore an enduring cognition, and this in full consciousness. For in the essence of declaring to be valid, of what we call the recognition effected by the ego, it is implied that what is presented to it as valid has the character of being valid *henceforth*, of continuing to be valid later on; this means a validity within an open temporal horizon of a conscious ego. What we posit affirmatively as valid in judgment we thereby in-

tend as being settled for us, as established for the future, and, furthermore, as existing, or existing as such.

And this not as an isolated event; rather, just as in general in practical life, so also in active cognitive life a unity is organized, though it always actually develops in individual successive strivings. *All certainties are organized in the unity of a single certainty*; correlatively, everything which exists for me is organized *in a single world*, to which are then related at any given time the particular paths of adaptive striving, of activity in the broadest sense, which also includes cognitive praxis. Every modalization of a certainty concerns the subject of the world; this concerns at the same time the entire system of certainty and signifies an obstruction in a continuing praxis insofar as what has already been settled is again brought into question, and thus an advance is impeded. Because of this, a *practical interest* hangs on every belief, every position-taking. Every modalization in the sense of a becoming-uncertain is thus something on the order of a transformation of what is complete (of something which has been attained, constituted in a striving which has been completed) into the form of something not complete—into the particular form of the doubtful, etc., in the broadest sense of a nullification of certainty. Thus every modalization necessarily takes the form of a positive striving toward the corresponding certainty. The life of judgment, and, at first sight, even that of the isolated ego, is pervaded by the striving for consistency of judgment in a very broad sense, for the maintenance of unanimity of the act of judgment. This means that modalization is not merely a phenomenon which concerns objects and the objective and practical world in their *character of being* but that the judging subject is *personally concerned* if he is compelled to abandon a judicative certainty (and thus, in general, a certainty of belief). *Striving for consistency of judgment and for certainty is thus a characteristic which is part of the general striving of the ego for self-preservation*. The ego preserves itself when it can abide by its acts of position-taking, its "validations," its "This is actually so," "That is valuable, good." The ego reacts to everything which disturbs this self-preservation by a striving which is ultimately a striving toward unmodalized certainties, among which are certainties of judgment. So much, then, for the general significance of the modalities of judgment and the striving for certainty.

§ 72. *The problem of the "quality" of judgment.*  
*The negative judgment is not a basic form.*

WHAT, THEN, HAPPENS to the opposite apprehension which has come to nothing in decision? Naturally, this apprehension is still preserved in retention; the ego was previously involved in it and perhaps already inclined toward it by preference. Indeed, it may be that precisely this apprehension previously occurred in the form of a normal perception, unfolding in unanimity, and that it was completed by the ego as it contemplated the allegedly existent thing. Affective motives to orient the regard also in this direction, or to reorient it, are therefore present. But in this case the ego answers by a *refusal*, by a *declaration of nonvalidity*. This declaration is obviously directed either against a past declaration of validity or against a mere inclination toward such a declaration; therefore, it is already opposed to a position-taking or the tendency toward it and is hence opposed to its final result in a confirmation. With this, it is clear that *affirmative and negative acts of position-taking, the position-taking of recognition and that of rejection, do not simply represent two coordinate "qualities,"* like red and blue in the sphere of color, for example, and that consequently the expression "*quality*" in general is not suitable here. The act of negation of the ego consists in the exclusion of validity, and the secondary intentional character [of negation] is already implicit in this expression.

It is a *basic error of traditional logic* that it established basic forms of the judgment without having clarified the sense in which one can speak of them and, above all, that it allowed negation (the negative categorical judgment) to appear among them. Opposed to this, it is necessary to emphasize that one cannot speak of a *series* of basic forms. There is *only one basic form*, which is *the simple* (positive, and not, for example, "recognitional") *categorical judgment*: "S is p." This has its essential forms, which, to be sure, can then *also* be characterized as basic forms in a specific sense, namely, as essential particularizations of the original form. They are, without exception, variations, and, as we have seen, this is also true of recognition; these are

variations and, in this broadest sense, modalizations of the simple original form.

With this emerges a point of view which is still of the highest importance for every logical concept of the judgment. We have characterized decision-for by taking-possession-of, by the appropriation of what henceforth will be valid and definitive. Decision-against implies that such validation, as somehow expected of us and possibly adopted by us previously, is rejected—just as we find something analogous in other acts, e.g., when we reject a decision because the motivating situation has changed or because of an inclination of the will. But corresponding to negation as decision-against is the “invalid,” which, in turn, can itself be made valid by us by an easy reversal of attitude, in which we make a confirmation of it and judge positively. The “no” or the “null” then enters into the content of the confirmation. Consequently, one can also grasp the *concept of judgment* in such a way that it is concerned *exclusively with the act of confirming being*, and the null is included in it as a moment of content, as existent nonbeing, so to speak. In fact, logic and science reduce everything to confirming judgments, and with good reason. However much it is possible to deny, in theoretical statements there is nothing of denial; on the contrary, at one time they confirm a being-thus, at another a being-not-thus, etc. Accordingly, the favored concept of judgment is that which knows only *one* “quality”: the confirmation of what is valid. Naturally, this changes nothing about the fact that coming to a decision itself does not have a *single* modality but develops in opposing modalities, even if the interest which logic serves is directed exclusively toward confirmations, toward affirmations.

§ 73. *The judgment of existence and the judgment of truth as acts of position-taking of a higher level having a modified judgment-subject.*

THE SIMPLEST CASES of judicative position-taking, those of recognition and rejection, which posit validity and nonvalidity, respectively, are those in which the act of position-taking is immediately erected on the passive syntheses of unanimity and



discrepancy, and on their criticism, as they appear in perceptive receptivity. But if the predicative judgments have already been constituted, if they are still vivid, and if, when reactivated, they then occur as claiming the verifiability of the substrates and states of affairs intended in them, the transition to the critical attitude in which the legitimacy of this claim is examined will be the occasion of a particular form of judicative position-taking: specifically, of the form of a *judgment of existence* and of a *judgment of truth*. Thus, not every predicative affirmation or denial already includes a judgment of existence. Rather, this will be the case only where the objective sense in which the existent is actually intended by us has itself been objectified as such. In the case of judgments of existence, and then in the same way with judgments of predicative truth, it is thus a question of *acts of judicative position-taking of a higher level* and not, as in the case of simple recognitions and rejections, merely of the predicative fixation of the result of the self-correction continually taking place in prepredicative experience. Consequently, an act of judgment on this higher level, that of the specifically critical attitude, can be neither one that is simply determinative and relational (as judging about simple substrates) nor one having as substrates pure intentions as such, as objects of a particular region, and requiring, for example, to be determined according to their content; rather, in the act of judgment the two terms are put into relation in a peculiar way which yields judgments of a particular kind.

In the simple determinative, identifying transition from act of judgment to act of judgment, what is maintained in the identity, what continually coincides with itself in its ever new determinations, is the *object in an absolute sense*, the object-about-which of all these judgments. It actually "exists" if one succeeds in fulfilling the judicative intentions with an intuition which is given at first hand. Otherwise, there remain only empty intentions, "mere propositions," to which nothing "actual" corresponds. The object appears as the identical self in intuitions given at first hand; if it is what is individual, it appears in perceptions. The act of perception which progressively fulfills the intention, the transition from perception to identifying fulfillment, is a process of the production of the identical self of the perceived object, of this self as the ultimate *telos* toward which all judicative activity is directed. Through all activities constitutive of propositions, the intention is directed toward this identical

self in such a way that every formation is a proposition which has its *telos* in self-evident givenness, in the givenness of this formation in the mode of the identical self. In this ongoing process, a synthesis of coincidence is continuously brought about with regard to the sense which becomes present to consciousness as one and the same; and the synthesis of fulfillment, which confirms the identical self, is a privileged synthesis of coincidence.

So it is with original predicative or prepredicative determination, which progresses in a direct line. The intended as such enters into an identifying coincidence with the true identical self without our being directed thematically toward this synthesis of identification. If we then go over to the *critical attitude*, all propositions confront us as mere intentions, but intentions which claim to bear in themselves the true identical self as fulfilling sense. These are propositions for us; in them as propositions we distinguish the mere sense—predicatively speaking, the “judgment-content” (the judgment-matter)—and the thetic character<sup>1</sup> and are now directed toward the synthesis of identification which arises between the sense and the true identical self—insofar as the sense is precisely a sense capable of being fulfilled. In a completely general way, we then say, “An object corresponds to this sense—the sense is valid sense,” or “No object corresponds to this sense—it is invalid sense.” We thus predicate “being” of the sense. This is the original act of existential judgment.

The phenomenological self-evidence that our act of judgment includes within itself the proposition as sense, and that this sense is posited in the mode of “existing,” is not in question here. Rather, this self-evidence presupposes the above-mentioned *reflection on the intended as such*, which does not inquire into the possible identification of this intention with its true identical self. On the other hand, this attitude must also be distinguished from *noetic reflection*, in which the noematic unity of the judicative proposition and its sense is given as the unity of noetic multiplicities. We are in this attitude *here* when we practice transcendental logic and point out all this. If we *judge existentially*, we posit, on the other hand, the existential predicate as we posit any other predicate (which is not the predicate of a sentence taken as sense). We intend what exists, and in this intention, as

1. On the concepts “sense” and “proposition,” cf. pp. 286 f., above

in every other judicative intention, we are directed toward "true being." More precisely, we are directed here toward the synthesis of identification in which precisely "what truly is" emerges.

The judgment of existence "A is"—for example, this intended object, which has been previously determined by us as a house and which as such is intended by us as existing—thus signifies: *The sense "A" has a corresponding actuality.* In the judgment of existence, therefore, *one predicates of the sense.* This was inadmissible as long as one regarded the sense as a real [*reelles*] moment of the act. For then the insurmountable difficulty arose that obviously the accomplishment of the judgment of existence requires no such alteration of position-taking with respect to the categorical judgment, an alteration which we designate as (no-etic) reflection on the act and the moments of the act. We retain the objective orientation insofar as we no longer concern ourselves with the act on its noetic side.

To the judgment of existence: "The object (state of affairs) exists"—in which one judges concerning the mere sense, the "matter" of the proposition—corresponds the "judgment of truth": "The proposition is true." In this judgment we have as a subject "the mere proposition," what is judged as such, therefore the sense of the judgment with its thetic character (whereby this proposition is the same, whether we actually judge<sup>2</sup> or whether we imagine a judgment ourselves; it is a *possible* proposition). If we then pass over to the corresponding insight, the actual judgment, the intention of the state of affairs, coincides with the state of affairs itself and finds its "affirmation." The state of affairs "exists"; it is a state of affairs which actually is. Correlatively, the proposition (in which it is posited) is a true proposition.

Naturally, in the progress of perceptions, we can repeatedly come upon the identical self without being interested in existential statements or in statements of truth and without being directed toward them. But if we are directed thereto, then we affirm it; and, preceding the identification in question, there is indeed the relation between what is posited and the identical self, between the proposition-object and its original. But what is posited is the pure objective sense; we do not commit ourselves to the positing. We can just as well identify with the identical self a term proposed "hypothetically," by way of trial, and then judge:

2. [Reading *urteilen* in place of *Urteilen*.—Trans.]

X is "actual" or "not actual." To the noematic "object" corresponds the "object itself" of the consciousness of the original. *The judgment of existence is a judgment based on the identification of the intended object as such* (of the objective sense) *with the original* and, if it is negative, on the identification which is realized in the conflict.

On the other hand, the *judgment of truth* has as a subject the object-proposition as the idea of a possible positing, *the proposition taken as sense*. We say of it that it is "true," that it agrees with the object, with the state of affairs itself. But the object itself, the original, is, on its side, the identical, and not only with regard to actual acts intending it as original; rather, it is an *idea*, since it is identical for all the possible acts which, as original, would be in coincidence with any such act. In such a case, we have in view, in affirming the truth, an identification effected just then in the identical self, i.e., between the object-proposition, the posited as such, and the self which we have in the original.

If we formulate the judgment without actual givenness, the assertion about the relation of agreement is made in the same way as an assertion about any other relation, and, like any other assertion, it has its objective truth; furthermore, the relation itself has its actual being. We can satisfy ourselves of this. The following pertains *a priori* to every proposition: each one is true or false.<sup>3</sup> Thus, *judgments of truth have their particular fundamental function*, inasmuch as all other judgments presuppose and demand verification. Therefore, in every affirmation of the truth of predicative propositions we have the relation of the proposition, as the idea of a possible judicative positing, to the original of the proposition, that is, to its truth, which is given in a consciousness of the original, which means *self-evident* consciousness. In this case, the agreement is also something self-evident as the foundation of the judgment; the proposition is true, it agrees with its truth, with its original self. Otherwise it is false, it conflicts with the original proposition.

3. Relative to the presuppositions and necessary limitations of this thesis of the decidability of every proposition, cf. *Logic*, §§ 79 f.

§ 74. *The distinction between predications of existence and predications of actuality.*

a. The origin of the predication of actuality.

PREDICATIONS OF EXISTENCE, which have their counterparts in negations of existence, must not be confused with predications of actuality, which have their counterparts in predications of nonactuality, of fiction. We turn now to this distinction.

We proceed from experience, whose ground up to now was presupposed as pregiven. Everything given absolutely in normal experience is simply taken for granted as actual in normal predications on the basis of experience. It is not subsumed under the concept "*actuality*." It is subsumed under the concepts which, within nonreflective consciousness, determine the actual. *In the natural attitude, there is at first (prior to reflection) no predicate "actual," no genus "actuality."* It is only when we imagine, and, taking a position beyond the attitude which characterizes life, we pass to actualities given in the attitude of imagination (the attitude of quasi-experience in its different modes), and when, in addition, going beyond the occasional isolated act of imagination and its objects, we take them as examples of possible imagination in general and of fictions in general that there arise for us the concept of fiction (or of imagination) and, on the other hand, the concepts of "possible experience in general" and "actuality."

Moreover, a fiction is an object posited from and on the basis of experience as an object of imaginary experience; its intentional objectivity is in the very mode according to which it is imagined. Of the imaginer (the "dreamer"), who lives in the world of imagination, we cannot say that he posits fictions as fictions; rather, he has actualities that are modified, actualities as-if. The as-if character is always connected with the fact that the ego is an experiencing ego, that it accomplishes unmodified acts of the first level, and that in its internal consciousness it has, among such acts, those of the imagination, whose objects then have a modified character. *Only he who lives in experience and from there "dips into" imagination, whereby what is imagined contrasts with what is experienced, can have the concepts*

of *fiction and actuality*. To be sure, we must say: before all conceptualization a contrast between them is already present. Actualities experienced on the first level and actualities of a higher level, constituted in them, form their necessary connection of actuality; the imagined, which as such is precisely without connection, falls outside and as a fictive element constitutes a world which "contrasts" with the world of experience. In this way a specific relation between the actual and the modified is established, though one cannot speak of a true contrast.

In the confrontation, we have a general community of essence: an "object" here and an "object" there; likewise, on either side there is an individual, a temporal extension—in short, all things which are predicable. But "objects" of imagination are "illusions" within the world of objects as such. They are what they are only as referred to the ego, as correlates of acts referred to its objects and to lived experiences as such. In the imagination, therefore, even an object in quotation marks is modified: it has a double set of quotation marks.

b. Predications of existence are directed toward significations, predications of actuality toward propositions as subjects.

Now, how are the statement-forms "A is an actuality," or "is actual," and "A is a fiction," "is nonactual," to be understood in opposition to the predications of existence: "A exists," "A does not exist"?

We say, for example, with regard to experienced things, men, landscapes, that they are actual things and, with regard to imagined things, or to those which are presented in a fictitious image, that they are feigned, that they are not actual men, things, etc. It should be noted that this is true not only of experiences and judgments of experience in the mode of certainty (and, correlatively, with reference to being in the absolute sense) but also with reference to the modalities of being: "It is possible, doubtful," etc. If we remain on the ground of the actuality of experience, that is, if we actually experience and thus have an actuality in the mode of certainty, and from this follow conflicts, doubts, conjectures, and possibilities, these are then all actualities: *actual possibilities*, *actual conjectures*, etc. But if we attend the theatrical performance of a new play, there then arise "meta-

phorically" "in the play," in the fiction which is presented, conjectures concerning the future action of the hero, probabilities, doubts, which, consequently, all have the modified character of fiction.

Every normal statement is produced in the mode of actuality; the anomalous therefore stands within quotation marks or requires reference to the circumstances of the statement, from which the modification of sense becomes clear. This modification is not an alteration of sense of the kind which takes place *within* the consciousness of actuality—for there we have sense only in the mode of the "actual"—but a modification which confers the character of fiction on the sense itself.

Within the consciousness of actuality, sense is there for us as a being-certain or probable or conjectural, and it is concerning this which one predicates "A exists," "A is probable," and so on. If the sense is canceled and cannot be brought to fulfillment, but proves itself to be in conflict with another sense and thus proves itself as not existing, and if, accordingly, one judges "A is not," then one does not mean by this that A is a fiction, an object of imagination. On the contrary, it is and remains an object of experience but precisely one that is canceled, one which cannot be brought to a confirmation of fulfillment on the ground of a thoroughgoing experiential certainty. That the distinction between existence and nonexistence lies on a plane completely different from that of actuality and imagination is shown by the fact that *such cancellations* can take place *even on the ground of a coherent system of imagination*. We can make up imaginary themes which, as not belonging to the unity of our world of imagination upheld until now, get canceled. And just as everything which appears in actual experience and in the actual world has its parallel here in the as-if, so also with existence and nonexistence. There is a *quasi-existence* on the ground of a coherent world of imagination and, in the same way, a *quasi-nonexistence* and judgments of existence relating to it.

From this it follows that *in predication about actuality and fiction the subject is not the mere sense*, the mere matter of the judgment, as in the judgment of existence, but the sense posited as certain, probable, conjectural, or nonexistent, therefore, *the proposition*. It is the proposition which is the subject of the opposing predicates "actual-fictive." To every statement simply posited by us (or so entertained by us) corresponds a statement—"proposition," and this, as the correlate of an actual act of judg-

ment, is precisely actual in conformity with the character of its presence to consciousness. It is called "actual" in contrast to statement-propositions which are given in "fictions" in the form of quasi-judgments (judgments as-if) and are possible derivations from them.

§ 75. *Predications of actuality and predications of existence are not determinative predications.*

IN ORDINARY LANGUAGE, an object as such is synonymous with "real object." *Objects acquire no determination by the "actual."* Objects acquire determinations, i.e., determinations given in conformity with experience, in acts of experience; posited objects are determined in experience or are encountered in a determinate way by consciousness in acts of experience and are grasped in explications and predications of experience as subjects and assigned a determination (which is experienced in the act of experience). The predicate "actual" does not determine the object but means: I do not imagine, I do not carry out an act of quasi-experience or of quasi-explication and predication; I do not speak about fictive objects but about objects given in conformity with experience. This contrast implies that one judges about objects within quotation marks, about object-propositions, and thus about "objects of experience" as stores of meaning of experience as opposed to those of imagination, therefore, of fiction, which arises within experience. If we have "the same" object in experience and "the same" in imagination or as a fiction, then on both sides we have the same essential sense, but this is naturally not the subject of predication; rather, on the one side the subject is the sense which has actual validity, i.e., the proposition drawn from experience or rather living in it and apprehended in a noematic reflection, and on the other side the subject is the fictive sense drawn from the imagination, uncovered in a noematic reflection as the correlate of the imagination and provided with a quasi-validity: therefore, the imaginative proposition. If we say, "X is an actuality," the one is subsumed under the domain of actuality, the other under the domain of fiction.

The object, e.g., the house, acquires no "determination" in the proper sense, no further determination in the way of an ex-



plication, if the object is designated as an actuality. Consider, e.g., an object determined as a house (posited in experiential consciousness) and reduced to a proposition, so that in noematic reflection the intention of the house is apprehended and subsumed under the genus "actual proposition." The positing of the house can be completed or can remain complete as it is; then we say: as far as its proposition is concerned, the house is an actuality. This does not mean, therefore, that the house belongs to the class of objects which are actualities, as if there were a class of objects which are not actualities—every class of objects is a class of actualities—but rather that propositions of experience, unmodified propositions, have over against them propositions of imagination which are the reflections of actual propositions, to which the predication "fiction" belongs.

Naturally, something analogous must be worked out for *predications of existence*. They also are not determinative predications in the proper sense; they do not judge about the objects of which they seem to speak, about the objects of the domain in question in regard to a material relation, which provides the opportunity for predications of existence. Rather, since their subjects are objective meanings and not the objects themselves, the "existence" they predicate applies to the *meanings* and does not provide a determination of the objects. In this way, predications of existence, therefore, are not determinative like simple predications.

§ 76. *The transition to modalities in the strict sense. Doubt and conjecture as acts of active position-taking.*

WE NOW TURN BACK AGAIN to the modalities of judgment, among which the predications of actuality are certainly not to be reckoned. The domain of modalities is by no means yet exhausted by the acts of judicative position-taking, of recognition and rejection, thus far considered. On the contrary, it is clear that modalities in the strict sense, namely, those in which certainty has ceased to be certainty, which up to now we have examined only in the domain of receptivity (§ 21b-d), must have their correlates on the higher level.

To the consciousness of doubt and possibility already appearing in the vacillation of perceptive apprehension also corresponds an active behavior on the part of the ego, to begin with, that which we designate by the verb "to doubt" in the proper sense ("I doubt if it is such and such"). It is here no longer a question of the mere phenomenon of the cleavage of perception but of a *disagreement of the ego with itself*, though a disagreement obviously founded in and motivated by these passive occurrences. The ego is now at odds with itself, is in dissension with itself, inasmuch as it is inclined to believe now this, now that. This being-inclined, then, does not *merely* signify the *affective pull* of the attracting possibilities; rather, they attract *me* in their being, and I go along, now with the one, now with the other, in the mode of a personal decision, confer validity now on one, now on the other, in an active position-taking, which, to be sure, is obstructed again and again. This going-along-with of the ego is motivated by the weight of the possibilities themselves. From these possibilities as attractions issues a tendency toward judgment, which I actively follow for a certain time and which entails that I bring about something like a momentary personal decision in its favor. But then, in consequence of the effective claims of the opposing possibilities, I remain stuck fast. This claim will also wish to be heard, so to speak, and make me inclined to believe. *This being-inclined-to as an impulse to act*, an inclination to act, as a feeling-oneself-drawn-into an act of judging thus or so, belongs to the phenomena of reaching out, tending, of striving in the broader sense and *must be distinguished from the position-taking of the ego*, from the act of judgment, which (as in active doubt) may be accomplished only momentarily but by which I espouse one of the two sides. On the other hand, *the inclination to judge must be distinguished both conceptually and materially from the affective attraction*, the attracting possibility by which it is motivated, although the two are often closely entwined with each other. The active position-taking of doubt in which I place myself by alternatively complying with one or the other of the opposed inclinations, on the basis of the attracting possibilities which offer themselves to me, is characterized by the fact that it is obstructed. The obstruction here is not a mere privation but a mode of the phenomenon of a frustrated decision, precisely of a decision which is stuck fast along the way. The ego, as it were, goes along part way in the accomplishment, but it does not go all the way to firm resoluteness of belief. Likewise, the decisions of

refusal taken by the ego and directed against the other possibilities in such motivating situations are frustrated, negative decisions.

It is necessary to distinguish the position-taking of doubt from that of *conjecture*, or *holding-as-probable*, which will arise when one of the attracting possibilities obtains the greater weight, when it has more speaking in its favor. If we run through possibilities of different strengths, the stronger can motivate a decision in favor of itself, a kind of preferential recognition, which, for all that, still does not include a confirmation, an affirmation of the thing as absolutely existent. In conjecture, considered as position-taking on the part of the ego, which must be distinguished from passive, affective attractions, we take one side, in a certain way decide for it, but in such a way that we can also admit the other, although with reduced weight. This decision, in the form of conjecture, can undergo ever fresh corroboration; for example, when, with the clarification of adverse tendencies and opposing possibilities, their relative weakness and inferiority come out ever more distinctly, or when new positive motives appear, which strengthen their conjecture. But conversely, it can also happen that the greater weight of the one side diminishes. Conjecture thus has its own *dimension of strength*, which is essentially determined by the strength of underlying attractions, and this strength can increase or decrease. As long as the greater strength of the one side endures, the decision of conjecture is continued as a decision, independent of these fluctuations of strength; it retains the sense "A is conjectural (possible, probable)." But if the fluctuation shifts over to the other side, and if the greater weight falls now on this side, now on that, then the conjecturer turns into a doubter.

The negative correlate of conjecture is naturally holding-to-be-improbable, where again a kind of rejection is meant, but not an outright rejection.

Obviously, what has been said about predications of existence and of actuality is also true of the predications arising from them here, like "A is possible, conjectural": namely, that they also are *not determinative propositions*.

§ 77. *The modes of certainty and the concept of conviction. Pure and impure, presumptive and apodictic certainty.*

ANOTHER FORM of position-taking vis-à-vis different attracting possibilities is that of espousing one of them and inwardly resisting the others. In this way a decision in the sense of certainty of belief is realized, a fixation, an affirmation, but one that is impure, so-to-speak ailing, a decision with a bad logical conscience—unlike those cases where this firm decisiveness of belief is motivated by the thing itself, by an experience constituted in unanimity or by the cancellation of adverse possibilities. This shows that *the certainty of the position-taking which accepts or rejects has itself its modes of purity and impurity*, of perfection or imperfection. Impurity is always present where other attracting possibilities still operate affectively but where we still decide with certainty for one. In an uninterrupted positing we execute the “it is thus.” But at the same time it can still be the case that, while we are so completely certain, so completely “sure,” many things can speak against the being-thus, that another being presents itself to us as an attracting possibility. Such attractions can have a different *weight*; they can exert a stronger or a weaker pull, but they do not determine us. Only the one possibility determines us to believe, namely, that for which we have decided, for which we have possibly decided earlier in a process which passed through doubt and conjecture. A certain concept of *conviction and strength of conviction* has its roots in this state of affairs. The strength of the conviction corresponds to the degree of purity or perfection of this certainty.

*These degrees of strength of conviction* have their analogue in *the degrees of strength of conjecture* already mentioned. Correlatively, conjecture can also have, in a certain sense, its *own* modes of pure and impure certainty. The position-taking of conjecture is certain when that in behalf of which it takes a position is present to consciousness as invested with a certain preponderant strength of possibility such that no opposing attractions prevail against this preponderance. Thus, here also, there is something on the order of acts of conjectural position-taking

with a better or worse logical conscience: with a bad conscience when, granted the weight of the attracting possibilities, a doubt rather than a conjecturing position-taking would be justified for one of the two sides, i.e., when the opposing weights have not been sufficiently taken into consideration. For another point of view, to be sure—in this case, another underlying concept of certainty, and, corresponding to it, another distinction between pure and impure certainty—conjectural certainty can *as such* be characterized as impure certainty.

Strictly to be distinguished from these modes of certainty is the mode of “*empirical*,” “*presumptive*” certainty, which has, alongside it, the *opposing mode of apodictic certainty*. That first group of modes of certainty refers to the domain of attracting possibilities, those which we have called problematic, i.e., those in favor of which something speaks on occasion. On the other hand, wherever we have certainties which refer to realms of *open* possibilities, we speak of empirical, presumptive possibilities. Thus, at every moment all external perception carries with it, within the certainty of the general prescription, a realm of particularities, for which, as particularities, nothing speaks. We can also say that the same thing speaks in favor of all the open possibilities of a given realm, that they are all equally possible. This implies that nothing speaks *in favor* of the one which speaks *against* the others. Here, nonbeing is not excluded; it is possible, but not motivated. Consequently, the certainty of external experience is always, so to speak, on notice, presumptive, although this certainty is repeatedly confirmed in the progress of experience. Hence, *one must not confuse this confirmed, presumptive certainty with a mere conjecture*, which is accompanied by opposing attractions, in favor of which something also speaks; and one must likewise not confuse it with *probability*, which expresses the privilege of a greater weight, which prevails over the others, having been perhaps intuitively appraised and, depending on circumstances, decisively acknowledged by its greater preponderance.<sup>1</sup> (The insight that the certainty of the world of external experience is only presumptive in no way implies, therefore, that it is a mere conjecture or probability.)

The mode opposite to presumptive certainty is that of *absolute, apodictic certainty*. It entails the exclusion of nonbeing or,

1. For essential supplementary comments concerning the self-evidence of probability, see Appendix II, below.

correlatively, that this nonbeing is in turn absolutely certain. There are no opposing open possibilities here, no realms of free play [*Spielräume*]; and hence to the concept of absolute certainty corresponds that of *necessity*—which is another modality of predicative judgment. But since in the present context we are tracing the genesis of the modes of judgment from experience, especially from external experience, it is clear that here we cannot encounter the origin of this modality.

§ 78. *Question and answer. Questioning as striving for a decision by judgment.*

THE PHENOMENON of *questioning* has its origin in the domain of modalized certainty and is found there in close association with doubt. Like doubt, it is originally motivated by events in the passive sphere. In this sphere a disjunctive fluctuation of apprehensions corresponds to the intuitions which are split in an intentional conflict; in the unity of the conflict, A, B, and C are present to consciousness as united in their reciprocal opposition. We cannot express this otherwise than by the words: for consciousness there is “whether A, or B, or C is”; and we find this precisely in the expression of the question and the doubt as acts, namely, as the content of the question or of the doubt. We say, for example, “I question, I doubt, whether A is.” Therefore, what precedes the questioning, as, similarly, what precedes the doubting in the passive sphere, is a unified field of problematic possibilities. Naturally, there are at least two such. But, in addition, it can also be the case that only one of these conflicting possibilities consciously emerges, while the others remain unnoticed in the background, in the manner of empty and thematically uncompleted representations. Each ego-act has its theme; and the theme of a doubt, like that of a question, is either a problematic singularity, whose disjunctively opposed members then remain extrathematic, as when I merely ask, “Is this a wooden mannequin?” (see the example in § 21b), or the theme is the whole problematic disjunction, as in the question “Is this a mannequin or a man?”

What is now the particular character of questioning as a peculiar active mode of behavior of the ego? The passive, disjunc-

tive tension of the problematic possibilities (doubt in the passive sense), to begin with motivates an active doubting, a mode of behavior which puts the ego into an act-cleavage. This cleavage brings with it, on the basis of the essential striving of the ego for the unanimity of its acts of position-taking, an immediate discomfort and an original impulse to get out of this condition and into the normal condition of unity. Thus arises the striving for a firm decision, i.e., ultimately for an unfrustrated, pure decision. If this striving does not remain a merely affective, passive propensity, if, on the contrary, it is actively accomplished by the ego, it gives rise to a questioning. Taken in a completely general sense, *questioning* is the *striving, arising from the modal modification, from the cleavage and obstruction, to come to a firm judicative decision*. Questioning has its intentional correlate in the question; the latter is the categorial object, preconstituted in the activity of questioning, just as the act of judgment has its correlate in the judgment, in which the state of affairs is preconstituted as objectivity. Questioning is not itself a modality of judgment, although naturally it is inseparable from the sphere of judgment and cognition and belongs necessarily to logic as the science of cognition and its objects, more precisely, as the science of cognitive reason and its structures. And this because the life of judgment, likewise that of rational judgment, is a medium of a wishing, of a peculiar striving, of a willing, an acting, whose goal is precisely judgments, and judgments of a special form. All reason is at the same time practical reason, and the like is also true of logical reason. Of course, one must nevertheless distinguish valuation, wishing, willing, and acting—which aim at judgments and truths through the act of judgment—from the act of judgment itself, which itself is not a valuation, wishing, or willing. *Accordingly, questioning is a practical mode of behavior relative to judgments*. If I ask a question and fail to reach a decision, I find myself in an unpleasant frustration, which perhaps also frustrates me in other decisions of my practical life. Accordingly, I wish for a decision. But questioning is not merely a state of wishing; rather, it is a striving directed toward a judicative decision, which as such belongs to the sphere of will and becomes a decisive willing and acting only when we see practical ways to actually bring about the judicative decision.

To be sure, the normal concept of a question is that of a *question addressed to another* and, possibly, in turning back to myself, of a question which I address to myself. Communication

with others continues to be left out of consideration here; but also we can leave out of account turning-toward-oneself, which would make oneself an end of communication like another person (for the ego can actually associate with itself). We then understand primitive questioning as a practical striving toward a judicative decision and, more broadly, as a habitual practical attitude, which, perhaps effective for a long time, is always at the point of passing over to corresponding volitions, endeavors, activities, to testing methods of solution, etc.

The true sense of questioning is revealed by *answers*, or in the answer. For with the answer comes the fulfillment of the aspiration which relaxes tension and attains satisfaction. To the different ways and levels in which satisfaction can occur correspond various possible answers. For example, to the question "Is A?" the answer reads "Yes, A is" or "No, A is not." This question thus has two firm judicative position-takings as possible answers. Since the striving inherent in questioning is fulfilled in corresponding judgments and is answered therein, it is obvious that the experience of the forms of judgment which are suitable, parallel to the purport of the sense of the questions, entails that the questioner already consciously anticipates these possible answer-forms and that they already appear in the expression of the questions themselves, as their content. *Every possible content of judgment is thinkable as the content of a question.* In the question, it is naturally not yet an actual content; rather, it is in the question only as a contemplated, a merely represented (neutralized) judgment and is, as the content of the question, oriented equally toward the yes and the no. If the question has several parts, put in the form of a complete disjunction, then it may read, for example, "Is this A or B?" Thus, it leads disjunctively to the corresponding judgments, which we have previously examined. The answers come out accordingly; they are oriented in conformity with the possible judgments which were contemplated in the members of the disjunction as the content of the question.

*In the proper sense, an answer is a judicative decision*, above all, an affirmative or negative one. In a certain sense, to be sure, it is an answer to a question to say, "I don't know." This obviously concerns my commerce and communication with another; by this answer, I let him know that I cannot comply with his wish, that I have no answer to his question. But even where an answer is given, as a judicative decision it need not always have the



mode of firm certainty. Holding-for-probable is also a position-taking which decides, although it cannot definitively satisfy. By deciding, it always resolves the dissension in some fashion, inasmuch as the ego, in holding-for-probable, has taken on a belief on the basis of one of the probabilities. In fact, we will frequently answer the question "Is this A?" by "Yes, it is probable" or "No, it is improbable." In the same way, even still weaker answers are possible, insofar as precisely *every mode of judgment which still embodies in itself something of decision*, even any form of frustrated decision, *can serve as an answer*: for example, to the question "Is this A or B?," the answer "I am inclined to believe that it is A." To be sure, one often prefaces this answer by: "I don't know," or "I am undecided," or "I am in doubt." Such comments show that the practical intention of questioning really is directed toward a "knowing," toward an act of judgment in the pregnant sense of certain decision. But these weakened answer-forms are also answers, even if they are not completely satisfying; although it would *not* be an answer to say: "A is charming."

§ 79. *The distinction between simple questions and questions involving justification.*

ALL OF THIS INVOLVES structures and relationships which are common in the same way to all kinds of questioning and are equally possible to all. But within this general sphere it is necessary to take into account a hierarchy of questions and therewith two essentially different *kinds of questions*. On the one side we have simple questions, which, from a situation of original doubt, aim at a decision and obtain it in the answer. Yet frequent experience of the fact that the unanimity produced and the inner unity of the ego with itself, realized by it, can again be lost can carry with it an additional motivation; it can awaken the impulse to overcome a new uncomfortable insecurity. In this case the ego does not have to rest content as usual with the striving for a judicative decision and an appropriation and fixation of the pleasing judgment; on the contrary, the striving aims at a conclusive assured judgment, i.e., at a judgment in the possession of which the ego can be subjectively certain of not falling again into the dissension of modalization. In other words, ques-

tions can obtain a firm answer right away through a firm statement, by which we seem to attain a conclusive position but in spite of which the questioning can recur. For example, "Is A?"—to which the answer runs: "Yes, A is." But we ask again, "Is A actual?"—perhaps without our actually doubting. Indeed, this situation may be based on the perceptive sphere in the following way: a discordant perception is changed into a unanimous one embodying the decision in conformity with the signification of one of the apprehensions. But nevertheless, the possibility constantly remains open that the further course of perception will not confirm the anticipations which belong to this apprehension and, consequently, will not confirm the validity of its sense. Thus the need can also arise of additional assurance, of *justifying* and corroborating the judgment of perception, for example by drawing nearer, by freely bringing the activity of perception into play in conformity with the prescribed possibilities in order then to see whether there actually is accord. Hence, from *simple questions* we must distinguish *questions involving justification*, which are directed toward a conclusive, assured judgment, toward a judgment which the ego can ground and justify, one which, correlatively, is directed toward actual, true being. For, in the confirmation, what has been previously judged as existing is provided with a new character: truly, actually such; so that we could also designate these questions as *questions of truth*. Accordingly, the answer which corresponds to them will often be a judgment of truth, a judgment about predicative truth (to this, compare § 73, above). Naturally, this progressive ascent can be repeated. The "actual" and the "true" need not necessarily be genuinely conclusive; for example, new horizons can open up and cause the need for a renewed justification to arise.

Every certainty that we have, every conviction we have acquired, no matter how, we can bring into question in this way. We are indeed sure that something is so, and yet we ask, "Is it actually so?" This means that we ask: how can it be justified, how objectively proved? Similarly, in a lawsuit, one can be sure that witness A is right and from then on be personally convinced that the whole matter is decided and no longer in doubt; and yet one can continue to ask questions, still hold the matter to be in dispute, in order, by an objective clarification, to obtain a "better" decision, a *decision based on reasons*, capable of nullifying the opposing possibilities completely. These possibilities then certainly no longer have any validity, but it is necessary that they be

identified as being objectively null. The question of justification is thus not directed toward mere judicative certainty but toward a *grounded certainty*. It is a question relative to the ground of the certainty which has been attained, and, accordingly, it can be posed for every certainty already acquired, even for absolute certainty. This must be understood in such a way that to everything that is self-evident one can think of corresponding non-self-evident judgments which judge about the same thing. Every nonself-evident intending of the same content can be brought into question, even if it arose originally from self-evidence; we can, in demonstrating it, trace it back to self-evidence, confirm it, and thus arrive at the answer: it is truly so, yes, actually. In the question involving justification we refrain from passing judgment, we change it into a "mere" thought. Furthermore, at the same time we have, as a corresponding goal of cognition, a way of motivation by which to attain anew, as an actual judgment, this judgment which has just been inhibited, and attain it as one which is completely motivated, i.e., correlatively, as a cognition bearing within itself its own ground, as a cognition obtained from this ground, motivated "objectively" by it. Hence, it is necessary to distinguish, on the one hand, between being-certain, being-decided, being-convinced in a subjective way, and, on the other, being-certain objectively, in other words, being-decided from intuitive grounds, from insight into the thing intended itself. Accordingly, it is clear that, in particular, *the modes of impure certainty*, certainty with a bad conscience, will provide a special *inducement for the raising of questions of justification*, since they are precisely questions which bear on the grounds of certainty of belief, of a conviction already extant; but inducement is also provided by all the modes of empty judging, judging which, though it has become habitual, was certainly obtained originally from objective self-evidence, whether inherent or extraneous, and can give rise to a question relative to a justificative return to the grounds. The foundation lies in the return to the thing itself, to its self-giving in original objective self-evidence.

*Theoretical interest, in the specific sense, is interest in a foundation, in a norm, to which the confirmation, the fixing in a tenable expression, and the remembrance of the foundation conform. Every judgment which has passed through [the test of] a foundation has the character of normative justification, of orthos logos. Obviously, the foundation can be either more or*

less complete. It is not necessary that a thing be brought into question absolutely; it can also be questioned only with regard to the completeness of its foundation and only in this sense give rise to questions involving justification. The theoretical intention toward foundation, taken in itself, is certainly not yet a questioning intention. But to the extent that, in the theoretical attitude, we know that notions [*Meinungen*] are sometimes fulfilled, sometimes disappointed, in the working-out of a theoretical intention of fulfillment, we adopt, as a rule, the questioning attitude.

In addition, it is necessary to note here that, just as, in general, we do not, without further ado, give up a conviction as soon as other convictions appear which are in conflict with it, and just as doubt certainly modalizes the character of a conviction, even if it holds firm, but still does not annul its character of "I believe that . . ." (making of it, for example, a mere presumption): so it is also with demonstrations, which make us "momentarily" doubtful and which for that reason we check by asking the question "Is this actually true?" The following two cases must be distinguished: whether we still have not actually decided (which means, here, taken a stand), i.e., whether we merely say "That seems so," "That presents itself as such," and then also, on the other hand, "That seems to be the case, but this one certainly does not agree with that," and "I doubt whether it is this or that"—or whether we have decisions; for example, we have previous firm convictions and then notice that convictions newly decided upon clash with these, and we *then* fall into doubt. But, in general, all desire for verification, the desire to convince oneself again (calling up witnesses), is motivated in science and the scientific attitude by the thought that memory can deceive, that fulfillment is perhaps never entirely complete, etc. And this is no empty possibility but one that is real, a possibility which, in becoming conscious, makes everything doubtful, to a certain extent, as to its status here and now. Thus, even intuitive certainty, transformed into a habitual possession, leads again to uncertainty, to doubt, to a question. Everything becomes questionable again. Nevertheless, we still strive for incontestable knowledge, for convictions not subject to question.

**PART III**  
**The Constitution of**  
**General Objectivities and the**  
**Forms of Judging “in General”**

§ 80. *The development of the observations to come.*

IN ALL OF THE PREVIOUS observations, in which we have attained insight into the origin and the basic forms and modalities of the predicative categorical judgment, we have drawn exclusively on examples of judgments with individual judicative substrates—judgments about individuals. This was understandable, since we were concerned with the origin of judgment in experience, where “experience” means ultimately the self-givenness of individual objects. Nevertheless, there was in this an abstraction and limitation. For even the act of judgment on the basis of experience will, for the most part, not be satisfied with the confirming of individual specificities, their being and being-thus, but will strive to bring what is judged under general concepts and thereby to grasp it in a specific sense. Thus, the activity of objectification is not yet exhausted with the forms considered up to now. On them is erected, and in them is for the most part inseparably entwined, another level of activity, in which arise objectivities and forms of judgment of a new kind: those of *conceptual thought*.

To be sure, in all apprehension of a particular there is already at work a reference of the particular object to the general type—through that horizon of typical familiarity and knowledge in which every existent is essentially encountered in advance and, further, through the necessity, in all predicative judging, of utilizing names, whatever they may be, which have a general

signification.<sup>1</sup> But there is a *fundamental difference between the case where this reference to the universal in the act of judgment is itself thematized and the case where it is not*. Up to now we have considered the anticipations prescribed by the horizon of typical knowledge only with regard to the significance which they have for the constitution of the modes of inauthentic receptive givenness and of empty anticipatory predicative judgments. But we have not yet taken account of the fact that such typical characteristics of cognition can themselves lead to the constitution of objectivities of a new kind, precisely to that typical generality of which every object can be the "representative" and can be immediately apprehended as such in its first appearance, without, on this account, this reference to the type having to be already thematic. If this reference is thematic, then judgments of a new form result, modifications of the original categorical judgment whose original type we have come to know as the form "S is p." These are the different, so-called universal judgments, or judgments "in general" [*Überhaupt-Urteile*], in which an object is no longer thematized as an individual object but as any object whatsoever of this kind, this type. If such judgments are to be possible, it is naturally presupposed that the generalities under which the objects are conceived in them are not only *passively preconceived* in the way we have found them to be up to now and that, in consequence, the object does not merely stand before us with a character of being known, the general type to which it owes this character remaining unthematic as such; on the contrary, the generality itself must be *apprehended as such*, and this apprehension, the active constitution of the general objectivities themselves, is a *new kind of spontaneously productive activity*. In it, new objectivities are actively constituted which can then enter into judgments as cores—cores which are no longer, like those which we have considered up to now, *individual cores*, but *general cores*, belonging to some level of generality or other.

The modification which represents the form of the act of universal judgment, as opposed to the forms considered up to now, is, therefore, to be sought above all on the side of the *judgment-core*, while the form of the predicative synthesis remains the same *as regards its fundamental structure*, whether it is a matter of individual or general cores in connection with the

1. Cf. the Introduction, pp. 42 ff., above, and § 40.

*S* and the *p*. To this extent, the validity of our previous analyses of the predicative synthesis and its modalizations is of *universal generality*—though, since concrete examples had to be drawn upon, we limited ourselves there to judgments with individual cores because, with the introduction of universal judgments, the basic structure undergoes certain modifications which complicate it.

In what now concerns the general objectivities themselves which are constituted in the activities of conceptual thought—i.e., the generalities, types, kinds, genera—these are objects and possible judgment-substrates of *different levels*; and the generality which first suggests itself, that of the empirically presumptive type, turns out to be only one level, and a lower one at that. That is, generalities can be constituted not only on the basis of that which is already passively preconstituted in experience as a type which is known although not yet apprehended; they can also be freely constructed in spontaneity. This leads, on the highest level, to pure or essential generalities and, based on them, to judgments which no longer spring from the thematization of the relation of objects to their empirical type in knowledge but from the thematization of their relation to their pure essence.

It is only with these operations of the act of universal judgment that logical activity attains its *telos*. Objects are not only constituted as unities of identity on the basis of predicative formation but are at the same time *conceived* and, by this means, *known* in a wholly specific sense. Only general thought leads to determinations which create a store of cognitions available beyond the situation and intersubjectively. And this is indeed the goal of cognitive activity (cf. Introduction, pp. 62 ff.). The predicative act of determination and the putting into mutual relation of the singular substrates which are self-given in experience is, as an act of judgment about individual specificities, certainly always more or less bound to the situation of experience—which is conveyed verbally, for the most part, by the use of demonstratives or other expressions with “occasional” significance. It is only the act of apprehension in the form of generality which makes possible that detachment from the here and now of the experiential situation, implicit in the concept of the *objectivity* of thought. Thus here we actually have to do with the highest level of logical activity.

*The order of our observations* to come follows from what has



been said. From the lowest generalities, the simplest from a constitutive point of view, we will ascend to the highest, searching out all such forms in the originality of their production. But what, constitutively speaking, is most original is not what is nearest at hand and presents itself first, as is the case with empirically presumptive types. Genetically, they are preceded by generalities constructed even more simply (Chapter 1). From them we must press on, step by step, to the highest, to pure generalities, whose constitution is independent of the preconstitution of such empirical types and rests on a freely productive construction (Chapter 2). Only after we have thus followed up the hierarchical structure of the general objectivities can we then examine the constitution of the forms of judging "in general" (Chapter 3) as the highest spontaneous activity, for which the constitution of general objectivities is certainly the pre-supposition.

## 1 / The Constitution of Empirical Generalities

### § 81. *The original constitution of the universal.*

#### a. The associative synthesis of like with like as the basis of the prominence of the universal.

THE FACT THAT all objects of experience are from the first experienced as known according to their type has its basis in the sedimentation of all apperceptions and in their habitual continued action on the basis of associative awakening. Association originally produces the passive synthesis of like with like, and this not only within a field of presence but also through the entire stream of lived experience, its immanent time, and everything which is constituted in it.<sup>1</sup> Thus the synthesis of like with like is constituted by associative awakening, and the two terms can then be brought together in the unity of a presentifying intuition. If we would seek out the universal in its most original production, we must not first have recourse to syntheses of likeness which lead to empirical types, because in this case what is brought together through association is not necessarily self-given. To be sure, associative relations of likeness also subsist between the self-given in an actual perception and the more or less clearly remembered; these relations found the characteristics of typical knowledge, through which the empirical types are preconstituted. Of all this, therefore, we must first take no account and limit ourselves to what is self-given in

1. On this point and on what follows, cf. § 16.

the unity of a presence in a perception, in order to track down how generalities are originally constituted in self-givenness on the basis of the self-given.

We return to the result of our analysis of the associative constitution of unity. Every object affects us from a plurality of cogiven objects present in a field, and it may happen that the plurality as such, as a multiplicity of distinct objects, can also affect us as a unity. It is not a mere assemblage of distinct givens, but already in the passivity of its preconstitution it essentially includes a bond of internal affinity insofar as the individual objects belonging to it have common properties, on the basis of which they can then be taken together as entering into the unity of one thematic interest. In the activity of colligation which runs through the individual members there takes place a coincidence of similarity as regards what is common to them, and a distinction as regards what is different. In conformity with the "magnitude" of similarity, the common elements have a power of mutual evocation of corresponding importance; in a pair of objects closely bound together in this way there may come to prominence colors which are alike or very similar; in another pair the shapes may become prominent; and so on. As we carry out a colligation, each of the members coincides with its partner in that it is an identical substrate, namely, the substrate of the moments of similarity or likeness. In the moment of coincidence, the similar blends with the similar in proportion to their similarity, while the consciousness of a duality of what is united in this blending still persists. These similarities have their degrees, which are called contrasts of similarity, or "differences" in a determinate sense. In the case of complete likeness, the blending is, for consciousness, a perfect blending, that is, a blending without contrast and without difference. These are all processes taking place entirely within passivity. Blending and the coincidence of likeness arise quite independently of whether we actually spontaneously run through and colligate individual members coming into coincidence or whether there is only a passive preconstitution of multiplicity.

As has already been shown, the form of the states of affairs of the judgment of relation can be constituted on the basis of such syntheses of likeness. As we pass from one ink spot to another, a coincidence is accomplished in the form of a synthesis of likeness, and the state of affairs "A is like B" is engendered by

the fact that they are both kept apart and synthetically combined.

But the act of judgment can go in still another direction: whereas on the basis of the associative awakening of like by like, an object no longer affects us merely for itself but in community with those akin to it, likewise, every judgment which is valid for an object taken for itself can enter into connection with judgments which are valid for kindred objects. Otherwise expressed: in the unity of a plurality founded on kinship, a singular judgment can enter into community with another singular judgment, whereby new kinds of judgments going beyond singularities arise. This becomes intelligible in view of the unique character of the synthesis of like with like. Its peculiarity lies in the fact that, though it indeed very much resembles a synthesis of identity, it still is not one. It resembles such a synthesis so much that as we pass from like to like we often simply say: "This is surely the same thing." But the like are two distinct objects, and not one and the same. And yet *in every such duality*, and in any manifold of like things, there is actually *a unity and a sameness in the strictest sense*. It makes its appearance in the synthesis of the coincidence of likeness; in other words, it is preconstituted originally as an object through this synthesis. It is on this that a new mode of judging is then grounded.

b. The universal as constituted in productive spontaneity. Individual judgment and general [*generelles*] judgment.

To begin with, we assume that the thematically determinative interest concentrates and particularizes itself on *S* and does this without loss of the general interest in what is connected with *S*. The affection which provides the impulse for the excitation of an ongoing interest, bringing about an encompassing synthesis and a continuous activity of unification, is constantly efficacious. In the restriction to *S*, the moment *p*, which comes to prominence as its property, is first apprehended in the form *S* is *p*. Suppose that the interest now shifts over to *S'*—which coaffects us on the basis of a completely like moment *p*, an individual moment *belonging to S'*. This *S'* must become predicatively determined by its moment *p* in the same way that just previously

was true of *S*. The passive synthesis of coincidence between *S* and *S'*, which was the ground of the common affection, can now be actively apprehended; we say that *S* and *S'* are the same—are *p*: although *S* still has *its* moment *p*, and *S'*, in turn, has *its* moment *p*. Like the substrates, their properties are separated; but in the thematic transition we make, they are coincident, and there is an activity of identification. But this does not mean that the qualitative moments on both sides, or even that the *S* and the *S'*, are present to consciousness as identical, although we say that *S* and *S'* are the same. With this, obviously, there is no question of a total identification; but, on the other hand, there is also no question of a *partial identification* of the kind which we have called explicative coincidence and to which we owe the qualitative moment as determination.

In any case, it is clear that when we pass from like moment to like moment a unity emerges in the coincidence, a unity in the duality of elements which are both separated and linked together, and that this unity emerges over and over again as totally and identically the same when we pass to a new member *S''*, then again to *S'''*, in which we have a moment *p* which is always like. The unity first emerges on the basis of the passive coincidence of likeness of the individual moments; and if one comes back to it, it can then be apprehended for itself. We must, therefore, distinguish the *first series of judgments*, in which there is predicated of each substrate *its own individual moment*—*S'* is *p'*, *S''* is *p''*, etc.—and, in contrast to this, the *judgments in which the same p*, as *everywhere* like, is predicated as the *universal*, as the identically one in all, that which emerges in *p'*, *p''*, and so on. This means that the unity is preconstituted in the passive coincidence of likeness of the moments *p'*, *p''*, and so on, as the *unity of the species p*: on the strength of this, an act of judgment oriented in a new direction is possible, in which, if we return to *S'* and re-effect the identification, we no longer determine *S'* by *p'* as its individual moment but by *p* as *identically the same in S, S'*, and so on. There result the judgments *S'* is *p*, *S''* is *p*, and so on, in which *p* no longer designates an individual predicative core but a general one, namely, the universal as that which is common to two or more *S*'s successively apprehended. Instead of being determined by the fleeting and variable moment, this is determined, therefore, by an *element ideally and absolutely identical*, which, in the mode of repetition or assimilation, goes through all the individual objects and their

multiform moments as an ideal unity. As we will see later on, this is a unity which is not at all a function of the actuality of the moments; it does not come into being and disappear with them, and, though it is individualized in them, it is not in them as a part.

First of all, we take note of the fact that here different forms of judgment must be distinguished from one another and that a new form is constituted, different from those which we have considered up to now. The judgment  $S$  is  $p^2$  in which  $p$  designates the *individual moment* in the individual object  $S$  is completely different from the judgment  $S$  is  $p$  in which  $p$  designates the *universal*, the *eidos*, and, in the same way, the judgment  $p'$  is  $p$  (the individual moment  $p'$  is of the kind  $p$ ). In the one case, there is an identification between the substrate and its individual moment, in the other, a universal is predicated of the substrate. It is determined as being of the kind  $p$ ; or  $p'$ , on the basis of coincidence with other like moments  $p''$ , is determined as being of the kind  $p$ . In the one case we thus have a judgment which contains individual cores in itself and predicates something individual of them; we call it an *individual judgment*. In the other case, new cores appear, namely, generalities, at least on one side: the judgment is a *universal judgment*. This is a new *form of judging* because the difference of the cores has as a consequence a *modification of the form of the synthesis of identity* in contrast to the simple explicative synthesis, such as we conceived it as originally underlying our basic form of the categorical judgment:  $S$  is  $p$ ; this is a synthesis which naturally can occur only on the basis of such a simple explicative synthesis or a plurality of such syntheses.

Speaking genetically and as a matter of principle, such a general core, a *hen epi pollōn*, naturally can be present to consciousness as the unity of an *a priori* generality, and can be ready for a possible thematic apprehension, only after the active accomplishment of the separate apprehension of like objects in a synthetic transition. But no act of relational judgment of comparison need necessarily have preceded, for example a judgment of the form  $pS$  (the moment  $p$  of  $S$ ) is like  $pS'$ ; rather, this requires another attitude. The direction of interest toward the universal, toward unity as opposed to multiplicity, does not aim at the determination of the like in relation to another as its

2. [Reading  $p$  instead of  $p'$ .—Trans.]

like. Hence it is not the synthesis of coincidence of the like, presenting itself passively, which is actualized in the form of an "is"-predication. What awakens interest is rather *what is passively preconstituted in the coincidence of the like as individually apprehended*; this is the *one* which comes into prominence on the basis of the coincidence, the identical which is one and always the same, no matter in what direction we may continue; it is this which is *actively apprehended*.

Furthermore, what is achieved is obviously no longer something on the order of an *explication* of like objects. The *one* which comes to light here is not in the objects as their part, as a partial-identical; otherwise, it would indeed be only a like which is present everywhere, and the like elements would be in a relation of intersection.

Hence, the *one* does not repeat itself in the like; it is given only once, but in many. It confronts us as an *objectivity of a new kind*, as an objectivity of understanding, *arising from original sources of activity*, although obviously on the foundation of sensibility; for the activity of apprehending and running through particulars and bringing them into coincidence is necessary if the universal is to be preconstituted at all and then become a thematic object. Its original apprehension has a field of interest of a different sort, which the interest must run through as in the case of an individual object of simple receptivity. The glancing ray of attention must go *through* the individual objects already constituted; and, as it pursues the bond of likeness and brings about the coincidence, the one which is thus constituted is thematized as something which is *inherent* in the individual objects and yet is not part of them; for the objects compared can also be completely separated.

### c. Participation in the identity of the universal, and mere likeness.

This kind of self-giving inherent in particulars points to a *wholly unique relation of identity*, different from all other such relations. If the universal  $a$  which is brought into prominence in the same way in  $A$  and  $B$  is apprehended objectively, it gives itself as *in A, in B*, and in the corresponding transitions. States of affairs of a new kind can arise:  $A$  is an instance of the universal, it participates in the universal, it is *conceived* through  $a$ . If we make  $a$  the subject, this means:  $a$ , the predicate, belongs to

the particular, to A, to B; the concept dwells in the particular (*koinōnia*). To express the first state of affairs in ordinary language, we say, for example: "This is red, that is also red." We should notice here that the adjectival form belongs essentially to the state of affairs and is not an accident of grammar.<sup>3</sup> It will be necessary later on to discuss the way in which the forms of judging "in general" emerge on the basis of these relations.

The relation of *participation* is not to be confused with that of *mere likeness*. We must not think that the identity of the universal is only an exaggerated way of speaking. Through overlapping, the like here and there stands out from the different. But just as the concrete individual objects are separated in multiplicity or plurality, wherein the coincidence by overlapping which makes its appearance in the active accomplishment of colligation changes nothing, so also the moments of likeness which become objects of attention are separated and, in the same way, the moments which differ; each object has *its* indwelling moment, for example, that of redness, and each of the many objects which are red has its proper individual moment, but in likeness.

As against this, it should be emphasized that *likeness is only* a correlate of the identity of a universal, which in truth can be considered as one and the same and as a "counterpart" of the individual. This identical moment is first "particularized" [*ver-einzelt*] into two, and then, as we will soon see, into as many as desired. All of these particularizations have a relation to one another through their relation to the identical and are then said to be like. Metaphorically speaking, the concrete objects which have such particularizations in themselves are then said to be like "with regard to red" and can themselves be considered in an improper sense as particularizations of the universal.

## § 82. *Empirical generalities and their extension.*

### *The ideality of concepts.*

WE FIRST THOUGHT of the universal as given to us by the cohesion of two substrates. And, in fact, a universal is al-

3. On the concept of adjectivity, cf. pp. 210 f., above.



ready constituted in this case; it is, to be sure, a universal of the *lowest level*—precisely, what is common to *two* objects. However, the comparison can go further, at first from *A* to *B*, then from *B* to *C*, to *D*, etc.; and, with each new step, the universal acquires a greater *extension*. As we have already indicated, not only the singular judgments *A* is red, *B* is red, *C* is red, and so on can emerge on the basis of this coincidence of likeness, but also *new forms of the state of affairs as plural*: *A* and *B* are red, *A* and *B* and *C* are red, where “red” designates the species. By inverting the terms, the judgments read: Red (now as the main substrate, as the subject in a new syntactical form) belongs to *A*, *B*, *C*. . . . In the first form there is then a multiple subject, a plural; a synthetic ray goes out from each member, directed toward the general predicate, which is posited only once. Conversely: the one general term as subject discharges a multiple ray of predication. Each individual ray terminates in a member of the collection: *A* and *B*, etc.

In these cases, the comparison which leads to a universal concerns individually determined objects, which appear in a finite closed experience in their individual determinateness. Although opposite to them as unreal, yet still bound to them, the universal then appears as something standing out *in* them, as a concept dwelling in them. However, as soon as the experience broadens and leads to new like objects, while the first are still in hand or associatively awakened in a recollection, a resumption of the synthesis immediately occurs; new elements of likeness are immediately recognized as particularizations of the same universal. This can proceed to infinity. As soon as an *open horizon* of like objects is present to consciousness as a horizon of presumptively actual and really possible objects, and as soon as it becomes intuitive as an open infinity, it gives itself as *an infinitude of particularizations of the same universal*. The generalities individually apprehended and combined then get an infinite extension and lose their tie to precisely those individuals from which they were first abstracted.

In addition, it should be noted that a synthetic linking-on to an original constitution of the generality is by no means required in order to apprehend a particular object as the particular instance of a universal. If the concept, e.g., the concept *flower*, previously appeared in an original comparison, then a new *flower* making its appearance is recognized on the basis of associative awakening of the type “flower,” established in the past, without

an intuitive recollection of the earlier cases of comparison being necessary. But actual givenness of the universal then requires that we pass beyond what is particular in the likenesses, eventually toward an open horizon of possible continuation. Whether the earlier cases are individually represented in addition does not matter. Thus it is evident that *the universal is not bound to any particular actuality*.

We can now also go beyond experience, and the comparison of objects actually given in experience, and pass over to free imagination. We imagine similar particulars—similar to actualities which have been actually experienced to begin with—and thereupon as many as we choose, that is, always new, individually different from one another, as similar particulars, and such that, if the experience had continued, they could actually have been given to us. Thus, to every concept belongs *an infinite extension of purely possible particulars*, of purely possible conceptual objects. If I imagine things, I apprehend in them as pure possibilities the concept of a thing. I can find this same concept in actual things; stated more precisely, in intended things which I posit as actualities on the basis of actual experience. In the transition from imagination to actual experience, these give themselves as particulars realizing the same universal which, in imagination, is not truly realized but only quasi-realized in the possibilities discerned.

Consequently, *the possibility of the formation of general objectivities*, of “concepts,” extends as far as there are associative *syntheses of likeness*. On this rests the *universality of the operation of the formation of concepts*; everything which, in some way or other, is objectively constituted in actuality or possibility, as an object of actual experience or of imagination, can occur as a term in relations of comparison and be conceived through the activity of eidetic identification and subsumption under a universal.

The concept in its ideality must be understood as something objective which has a *purely ideal being*, a being which does not presuppose the actual existence of corresponding particulars; it is what it is even if the corresponding particulars are only pure possibilities, though, on the other hand, in the realm of experienced actuality, it can also be the realized concept of actual particulars. And *if there are* actual particulars, other like ones can just as well be taken in their place. *Correlative to the pure being of the universal is the being of the pure possibilities which*

participate in it and which must be constructed as its bases and as an ideally infinite extension of the bases of the pure abstraction giving access to the universal.

Naturally, concepts as *pure* concepts can, from the first, originate *outside of all relation to current actuality*, namely, by the comparison of pure possibilities of the imagination. It is clear thereby that every actual likeness, acquired in this way, of possibilities given as existing (as existing, not in the sense of a reality of experience, but precisely *as* a possibility) intentionally includes in itself a possible likeness of possible actualities and a possible universal in which they can possibly participate. On the other hand, even if they were formed originally on the basis of experience as actual generalities, concepts can always be apprehended as pure concepts.

Despite all the Platonic turns of phrase by which we have described its relation to the particular, the ideality of the universal must not be understood as if it were a question here of a being-in-itself devoid of reference to any subject. On the contrary, like *all* objectivities of understanding, it refers essentially *to the processes of productive spontaneity* which belong to it correlatively and in which it comes to original givenness. The *being of the universal* in its different levels is essentially a *being-constituted* in these processes.

In accordance with our starting from experience and from the comparison and formation of concepts taking place on the basis of experience, we have, up to this point, not yet been able to deal with pure generalities. What we have described is the acquisition of *empirical* generalities. All the concepts of natural life bring with them, without harm to their ideality, the copositing of an empirical sphere in which they have the place of their possible realization in particulars. If we speak of animals, plants, cities, houses, and so on, we intend therewith in advance *things of the world*, and in fact the world of our actual, real experience (not of a merely possible world); accordingly, we think of these concepts as *actual* generalities, that is, as bound to this world. The extension of such concepts is indeed infinite, but it is an *actual* extension, the extension of things actually and really possible in the given world. These real possibilities, which belong to the extension of empirical concepts, must not be confused with the *pure* possibilities to which pure generalities refer. On this, more later on.

§ 83. *Empirico-typical generality and its passive preconstitution.*

- a. The attainment of empirical concepts from types in natural experiential apperception.

IN THE FIRST PLACE, there are still important distinctions to be made in the domain of empirical generalities; above all, it is necessary to examine more closely the path which leads from passively preconstituted typifications to empirical concepts, specifically to empirical concepts understood not only in the sense of everyday concepts but, on a higher level, to concepts of the empirical sciences.

We return to what has been said previously. The factual world of experience is experienced as a typified world. Things are experienced as trees, bushes, animals, snakes, birds; specifically, as pine, linden, lilac, dog, viper, swallow, sparrow, and so on. The table is characterized as being familiar and yet new. What is given in experience as a new individual is first known in terms of what has been genuinely perceived; it calls to mind the like (the similar). But what is apprehended according to type also has a horizon of possible experience with corresponding prescriptions of familiarity and has, therefore, types of attributes not yet experienced but expected. When we see a dog, we immediately anticipate its additional modes of behavior: its typical way of eating, playing, running, jumping, and so on. We do not actually see its teeth; but although we have never yet seen this dog, we know in advance how its teeth will look—not in their individual determination but according to type, inasmuch as we have already had previous and frequent experience of “similar” animals, of “dogs,” that they have such things as “teeth” and of this typical kind. To begin with, what is experienced about a perceived object in the progress of experience is straightway assigned “apperceptively” to every perceived object with similar components of genuine perception. We anticipate this, and actual experience may or may not confirm it. In the confirmation, the content of a type is extended, but the type can also be subdivided into particular types; on the other hand, every concrete

real thing still has its *individual attributes*, though at the same time they have their *typical form*.

Everything apprehended according to type can lead us to the *general concept of the type* in which we apprehend it. On the other hand, we are not *necessarily* directed toward the universal in this way; notwithstanding the possible utilization of the name "dog" in its general signification (cf. above, pp. 318 f.), we need not thematize a dog according to its type as a particular of the universal "dog"; rather, we can also be directed toward it as an individual: then, the passively preconstituted reference to its type, in which it is apprehended from the first, remains unthematic. But on the basis of this reference we can always constitute a general concept "dog," represent other dogs known by experience to ourselves; in an arbitrary creation of the imagination we can also represent other dogs to ourselves in an open multiplicity and hence discern the universal "dog." If we are once attuned to apprehension of the universal, then in conformity with the synthesis discussed in § 81, each part, each particular moment in an object, furnishes us something to apprehend conceptually as general; every analysis will then go hand in hand with a general predication. Thus the uniform general type, the universal first apprehended on the basis of the associatively awakened relation of the likeness of one object with other objects, will be a universal, a concept which includes many *particular concepts*. But if the objects are real objects, then a sensuous type coming to prominence does not exhaust every like element which we can find in continuing experience and, consequently, in the exposition of the true being of these objects as that in which they are like. The more the objects reveal themselves as they are, the more each of them enters into intuition, then all the more numerous are the possibilities which present themselves of finding likenesses. But it then also becomes evident that further determinations are as a rule in regular connection with the determinations already apprehended or, what is the same thing, that in the course of experience they must be expected as copresent.

To the type "dog," e.g., belongs a stock of typical attributes with an open horizon of anticipation of further such attributes. This implies that, according to the "universal," one dog is like every other, specifically, in such a way that the universal, which, through the previous experiences of dogs, even if these were only

superficial and wholly incomplete, has been prescribed as characterizing all dogs and which is already known according to its type, brings with itself an indeterminate horizon of typical attributes still unknown. If we were to go on in experience, at first to this or that particular dog, we would in the end constantly discover ever new attributes, belonging not merely to *these* dogs but to dogs *in general* and determined by the typical attributes which we have ascribed to them up to that point. Thus, superseding the *actual* concept, specifically acquired in actual experience, a *presumptive idea* arises, *the idea of a universal*, to which belongs, in addition to the attributes already acquired, a horizon, indeterminate and open, of unknown attributes (conceptual determinations). Specifically, this is a horizon in the sense of a constant presumption, of a constant empirical certainty, according to which what is identified as a dog through the known attributes will also have, through empirical induction relative to dogs given and examined more closely, new attributes which are found in conformity with a rule, and so on and on. Thus empirical concepts are changed by the continual admission of new attributes but according to an empirical idea of an open, ever-to-be-corrected concept which, at the same time, contains in itself the rule of empirical belief and is founded on the progress of actual experience.

b. Essential and nonessential types. Scientific experience as leading to the exposition of the essential types.

To be sure, there are certain typical generalities of experience already passively preconstituted and then apprehended thematically, e.g., grass, shrubs, and the like, in connection with which no such infinitely open typical horizon is linked to the attributes which are determinative in the beginning. This means that, in conformity with the nature of experience, the eventual presupposition that there will always be typical attributes to discover is not confirmed. Immediate experience often separates and distinguishes things solely on the basis of certain obvious differences which can mask an actually existing internal correlation; for example, the membership of the animals called "whales" in the class of mammals is masked by the outward analogy which whales have with fishes with regard to their mode of life, something already indicated in the verbal designa-

tion.<sup>1</sup> In such cases we speak of *nonessential types*. In the comprehensive experience of concrete nature, individuals are ordered increasingly under *essential types*, in different levels of generality. Scientific investigation of empirical natural history is based on this. Necessarily underlying it is *the prescientific and multifariously nonessential typification carried out by natural experiential apperception*. Scientific concepts of species seek to determine essential types by a systematic and methodical experience. Scientific concepts can include only *a finite number of determinate attributes*, but they also carry, with a scientifically extraordinary probability, an infinitely open horizon of typical attributes, codetermined by this conceptual content, although these attributes are at first unknown; this horizon can be explored and circumscribed in subsequent investigations. In addition, the typical also concerns causality: the causality of the "life" of animals or plants of the relevant types (species) under the conditions of life, the mode of their "development," their reproduction, etc., with regard to which it is not necessary to go into more detail at this point.

#### § 84. *Levels of generality.*

- a. Concrete generality as the generality derived from the repetition of completely like individuals. Independent and abstract, substantival and adjectival generalities.

THE TYPICAL GENERALITIES under which the content of experience is ordered are of different levels. For example, when we juxtapose the types "fir" and "conifer," which we come by in the course of experience, the latter has a greater "extension" and is, therefore, a higher generality. The levels of generality are conditioned by the degrees of likeness of the members of the extension.

If we start from the experience of individual objects, then the lowest universal, which, from a genetic point of view, we

1. One of the elements in the German word for "whale," *Wal-fisch*, is the word for "fish."—Trans.]

come upon from the very first, is that one which arises from the mere "repetition" of individuals capable of being experienced as independent and completely like. We call it a *concretum*. Every individual object can be thought more than once; a second object completely like it is always conceivable in comparison with it. Every individual is an individual particular of its *concretum*; it is a concrete individual. *This universal, born of the repetition of like independent objects*<sup>1</sup> (that is, from individuals), is the lowest generality, the most independent; this implies that it is one which is not founded in other generalities, therefore, which does not presuppose them. Thus, e.g., the universal "brightness" is founded in the universal "color," which includes brightness; in turn, color is only conceivable as formed color; and this—in other words, the colored shape (the spatial shape), more precisely, the formed spatial thing itself—is the complete *concretum*, i.e., the universal, which, as a universal, is completely independent.

We see by this that the lowest concrete generalities found other generalities, those of their abstract moments, which, in turn, naturally yield a universal of repetition, but one that is dependent: a member of the class of the lowest dependent generalities, the *abstract species*. As generalities which have an extension of originally dependent particulars, predestined to an originally adjectival apprehension, they are themselves originally *adjectival generalities*. To them we contrast the originally independent generalities as *substantival generalities*.

#### b. Higher-level generalities as generalities on the basis of mere similarity.

If the likeness of the individual members of the extension of a generality is no longer *complete* likeness, then generalities of higher levels emerge. We have understood complete likeness as the limit of similarity. With the transition from the similar to the similar a coincidence appears which is still not a complete coincidence. The similar members which have overlapped one another are *divergent*. Different similarities can have different divergences, and the divergences are themselves again comparable, have, themselves, their own similarities. Similarity, there-

1. Concerning independence, cf. §§ 29 f., above; for the concepts "*concretum*" and "abstraction," cf. also *Ideas*, pp. 28 ff.; ET, pp. 66 f.



fore, has a gradation, and its limit, complete similarity, signifies an absence of divergence in coincidence, i.e., the coincidence of elements which merely repeat themselves. It is the foundation for the lowest level of similarity. In what concerns the mere similarity in which the higher levels of generality are grounded, we have found as its principal differences those of *total similarity* (similarity in relation to all the individual moments of the similar objects) and *partial similarity* (similarity in relation to individual moments, each with its limit of likeness, while the others are not similar).<sup>2</sup> Generalities of different levels emerge, depending on these differences. Levels of generality are thus conditioned not only by *the magnitude of the divergences in similarity* of all the similar moments which are found in the individual members of the extension of the generality in question—in the case of total similarity these are *all* the moments—but also by the *number of similar moments*, i.e., by the degree of approximation to total similarity. Stated more precisely, *complete likeness* is the *limit of total similarity*, while, in the case of merely partial similarity (even if, in relation to the *individual moments*, this attains the limit of complete likeness), this limit can never be attained in relation to the *whole*. It always remains the merely similar. Nevertheless, the universal of similarity also contains, by virtue of its relation to its limit, a universal of likeness, but only of a partial, mediate likeness, likeness “in relation to this or that moment.” Thus, even in the coincidence of likeness, a *common* moment comes to light, or, rather, a moment which originally shines through as a common moment. It comes to perfect givenness in the process of the transition from the universal of the repetition of completely like members to the next-higher species, to the universal of mere similarity—of total similarity, to begin with, and then to the universal of partial similarity (likeness), which does not include the absolutely like or totally similar but the like (similar) in relation to this or that moment.

The universal of mere similarity is one of a higher level since the members of its extension, even if it is formed only by the coincidence of *two* similar objects, can already be conceived as a universal arising from the possible repetition of like members. It

2. On the concept of likeness as the limit of similarity, see p. 74, above; on the concepts “total similarity” and “partial similarity,” as well as “distance of similarity,” cf. §§ 44, 45.

is thus a *specific universal*, which already has under itself two or more concrete generalities; later on we come to higher species, genera, and so on. These are *dependent generalities*, and this because they spring from the comparison of generalities (at the lowest level those of repetition). Thus, universals can be compared like other objects, e.g., red and blue; and in this synthetic activity a generality of a higher level is constituted. In this activity, the generality comes to self-givenness as a generality which has generalities under itself as particulars. Thus, on the basis of like *concreta* there arises a "concrete" species and, from concrete species, a "concrete" genus. Naturally, this is not to say that the "concrete" species, and so on, would itself be a *concretum*. We call it a "concrete species" only to call attention to its origin from the concrete, since there are also species which have under them dependent generalities, universals arising from the repetition of abstract moments, e.g., species of shapes and so on. In contrast to generalities of higher levels, we call these *abstract*: abstract genera and species.

It hardly needs to be emphasized that empirical types, as the kind of generality which first thrusts itself on our attention and rests on the passive preconstitution of typical familiarities, are for the most part universals which belong to a higher level, to that of the generality of species or genus; for the lowest universal, arising from the mere repetition of the completely like, is obviously a limiting case.

## § 85. *Material generalities and formal generalities.*

ANOTHER IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE is that between *material* and *formal* generalities. In order to understand it, we must remember our breakdown of objectivities into those devoid of logicosyntactical form and those which are syntactically formed, namely, the objectivities of the understanding. Depending on the kinds of objects compared for the purpose of apprehending the universal, two kinds of fundamentally different generalities result.

1. The synthesis of coincidence of the like can obviously link objects as objects of simple experience, thus objects which still have undergone no syntactical formation. They acquire a syn-

tactical form only from this synthesis of coincidence and the abstraction inherent in it. Thus concepts arise which are *purely material* as well as concrete—concepts which, to be sure, do not have a name. For concepts expressed verbally, like tree, house, etc., already include, in addition, a variety of predicates acquired in the activity of judgment. However, it is important to fix the simple limiting case at the outset. It is a matter here of concrete concepts preceding all explication and syntactical linking of predicates.

2. But if we then compare syntactical structures, *new likenesses* appear in them, namely:

a) Those which belong to contents elicited from passive experience by explication, which thus depend on a material community.<sup>1</sup> They yield *material general concepts*.

b) Likenesses which belong to the syntactical forms springing from spontaneous production, i.e., those which refer to *merely formal communities*. For example, in the statement "Red is different from blue," in addition to the material concepts red and blue, pure forms are also expressed in our talk about difference and in the whole form of the proposition: subject-form, predicate-form, object-form. Concepts such as likeness, difference, unity, plurality, group, whole, part, object, property—in short, *all so-called purely logical concepts* and all concepts which can and must be expressed in the diversity of state-of-affairs forms and, verbally, in statement forms are, if we merely allow what is material in the propositions to be undetermined, *purely formal concepts*, formal generalities.

1. On the difference between material and formal communities, see § 62, above.

## 2 / The Acquisition of Pure Generalities by the Method of Essential Seeing [*Wesenserschauung*]

### § 86. *The contingency of empirical generalities and a priori necessity.*

EMPIRICAL GENERALITIES, we said, have an extension of actual and really possible particulars. Acquired at first on the basis of the repetition of like and then merely similar objects given in actual experience, these generalities refer not only to this limited and, so to speak, denumerable extension of actual particulars, from which they have been originally acquired, but as a general rule they have a *horizon* which presumptively exhibits a broader experience of particulars which can be acquired in free arbitrariness by opening up this presumptive horizon of being. When it is a question of the realities of the infinite pre-given world, we can imagine *an arbitrary number of particulars capable of being given later on*, which likewise includes this empirical generality as a *real possibility*. The extension is then an infinitely open one, and still the unity of the empirically acquired species and the higher genus is a “contingent” one. This means that a contingently given particular object was the point of departure of the formation of the concept, and this formation led beyond the likewise contingent likenesses and similarities—contingent because the member acting as the point of departure for the comparison was contingent, given in actual experience. The concept opposed to this contingency is that of a *a priori necessity*. It will be necessary to show how, in contrast to these em-

pirical concepts, pure concepts are formed, concepts whose constitution does not thus depend on the contingency of the element actually given as the point of departure and its empirical horizons. These concepts do not envelop an extension which, as it were, is open merely *after the event*, but beforehand, *a priori*. This envelopment beforehand signifies that they must be capable of *prescribing rules to all empirical particulars*. With empirical concepts, infinity of extension implies only that I can imagine an arbitrary number of like particulars without its actually being evident whether, in the progress of actual experience, this presumptively posited "again and again" might perhaps undergo a cancellation, whether this being able to continue might one day actually reach a limit. With pure concepts, on the other hand, this infinity of actually being-able-to-continue is *given with self-evidence*, precisely because, *before* all experience, these concepts prescribe rules for its later course and, consequently, rule out a sudden change, a cancellation. This idea of *a priori* generality and necessity will become even clearer in the course of our presentation.

### § 87. *The method of essential seeing.*

#### a. Free variation as the foundation of essential seeing.

FROM THE PRECEDING it has already become clear that, for the acquisition of pure concepts or concepts of essences, an empirical comparison cannot suffice but that, by special arrangements, the universal which first comes to prominence in the empirically given must from the outset be freed from its character of contingency. Let us attempt to get a first concept of this operation. It is based on the modification of an experienced or imagined objectivity, turning it into an arbitrary example which, at the same time, receives the character of a guiding "model," a point of departure for the production of an infinitely open multiplicity of variants. It is based, therefore, on a *variation*. In other words, for its modification in pure imagination, we let ourselves be guided by the fact taken as a model. For this it is necessary that ever new similar images be obtained as

copies, as images of the imagination, which are all concretely similar to the original image. Thus, by an act of volition we produce free variants, each of which, just like the total process of variation itself, occurs in the subjective mode of the "arbitrary." It then becomes evident that a unity runs through this multiplicity of successive figures, that in such free variations of an original image, e.g., of a thing, an *invariant* is necessarily retained as the *necessary general form*, without which an object such as this thing, as an example of its kind, would not be thinkable at all. While what differentiates the variants remains indifferent to us, this form stands out in the practice of voluntary variation, and as an absolutely identical content, an invariable *what*, according to which all the variants coincide: a *general essence*. We can direct our regard toward it as toward the necessarily invariable, which prescribes limits to all variation practiced in the mode of the "arbitrary," all variation which is to be variation of the same original image, no matter how this may be carried out. The essence proves to be that without which an object of a particular kind cannot be thought, i.e., without which the object cannot be intuitively imagined as such. This general essence is the *eidos*, the *idea* in the Platonic sense, but apprehended in its purity and free from all metaphysical interpretations, therefore taken exactly as it is given to us immediately and intuitively in the vision of the idea which arises in this way. Initially, this givenness was conceived as a givenness of experience. Obviously, a mere imagining, or rather, what is intuitively and objectively present in it, can serve our purpose just as well.

For example, if we take a sound as our point of departure, whether we actually hear it or whether we have it present as a sound "in the imagination," then we obtain the *eidos* sound as that which, in the course of "arbitrary" variants, is necessarily common to all these variants. Now if we take as our point of departure another sound-phenomenon in order to vary it arbitrarily, in the new "example" we do not apprehend *another* *eidos* sound; rather, in juxtaposing the old and the new, we see that it is *the same*, that the variants and the variations on both sides join together in a single variation, and that the variants here and there are, in like fashion, *arbitrary particularizations of the one* *eidos*. And it is even evident that in progressing from one variation to a new one we can give this progress and this formation of new multiplicities of variation the character of an arbitrary

progress and that, furthermore, in such progress in the form of arbitrariness the same *eidos* must appear "again and again": the same general essence "sound in general."

b. The arbitrary structure of the process of the formation of variants.

That the *eidos* depends on a freely and arbitrarily producible multiplicity of variants attaining coincidence, on an open infinity, does not imply that an *actual* continuation to infinity is required, an actual production of all the variants—as if only then could we be sure that the *eidos* apprehended at the end actually conformed to all the possibilities. On the contrary, what matters is that the variation as a process of the formation of variants should itself have a *structure of arbitrariness*, that the process should be accomplished in the consciousness of an arbitrary development of variants. This does not mean—even if we break off—that we intend an actual multiplicity of particular, intuitive variations which lead into one another, an actual series of objects, offering themselves in some way or other and utilized arbitrarily, or fictively produced in advance; it means, rather, that, just as each object has the character of *exemplary arbitrariness*, so the multiplicity of variations likewise always has an arbitrary character: it is a matter of indifference what might still be joined to it, a matter of indifference what, in addition, I might be given to apprehend in the consciousness that "I could continue in this way." This remarkable and truly important consciousness of "and so on, at my pleasure" belongs essentially to every multiplicity of variations. Only in this way is given what we call an "infinitely open" multiplicity; obviously, it is the same whether we proceed according to a long process, producing or drawing arbitrarily on anything suitable, thus extending the series of actual intuitions, or whether we break off prematurely.

c. The retaining-in-grasp of the entire multiplicity of variations as the foundation of essential seeing.

In this multiplicity (or, rather, on the groundwork of the open process of the self-constitution of variation, with the variants actually appearing in intuition) is grounded as a higher level *the true seeing of the universal as eidos*. Preceding this

seeing, there is the transition from the initial example, which gives direction and which we have called a model, to ever new images, whether these are due to the aimless favor of association and the whims of passive imagination (in which case we only seize upon them arbitrarily as examples) or whether we have obtained them by our own pure activity of imaginative invention from our original model. In this transition from image to image, from the similar to the similar, all the arbitrary particulars attain overlapping coincidence in the order of their appearance and enter, in a purely passive way, into a synthetic unity in which they all appear as modifications of one another and then as arbitrary sequences of particulars in which the same universal is isolated as an *eidos*. Only in this continuous coincidence does something which is the same come to congruence, something which henceforth can be seen purely for itself. This means that it is *passively preconstituted* as such and that the seeing of the *eidos* rests in the *active intuitive apprehension* of what is thus preconstituted—exactly as in *every* constitution of objectivities of the understanding, and especially of general objectivities.

Naturally, the presupposition for this is that the multiplicity *as such* is present to consciousness as a *plurality* and never slips completely from our grasp. Otherwise, we do not attain the *eidos* as the ideally identical, which only *is* as *hen epi pollōn*. If, for example, we occupy ourselves with the inventive imagining of a thing or a figure, changing it into arbitrarily new figures, we have something always new, and always only one thing: the last-imagined. Only if we retain in grasp the things imagined earlier, as a multiplicity in an open process, and only if we look toward the congruent and the purely identical, do we attain the *eidos*. Certainly, we need not ourselves actively and expressly bring about the overlapping coincidence, since, with the successive running-through and the retaining-in-grasp of what is run through, it takes place of itself in a purely passive way.

d. The relation of essential seeing to the experience of individuals. The error of the theory of abstraction.

The peculiar character of essential seeing on the basis of variation will become still clearer if we contrast it with the intuitive experience of individual objects. Over against the specific



*freedom* of variation, there is in all experience of the individual a wholly determined *commitment*. This means that when we receptively experience an individual on the basis of a passive *pregivenness*, when we turn toward it in order to apprehend it, when we take it in as existing, we thereby take our stand, so to speak, on the ground of this apperception. By it, horizons are prescribed for further possible experiences which will take place on this ground, *pregiven* from the first step. Everything which we further experience must be brought into a context of unanimity if it is to count as an object for us; failing this, it is canceled, nullified, is not taken in receptively as actual; unanimity must prevail on the ground of a unity of experience, a ground already prescribed for each individual object of experience; every conflict is excluded or, rather, leads to a cancellation. Every *experience in the pregnant sense*, which includes activity, at least of the lowest level, thus signifies "*taking a stand on the ground of experience*."

The same thing holds for *imagination* insofar as we imagine within a context such that the individual imaginings are to be linked together in the unity of one act of imagination. Here, in the mode of the quasi, is repeated all that has already been said about actual experience. We have a quasi-world as a unified world of imagination. It is the "ground" on which we can take our stand in the course of a unified act of imagination—only with this difference: that it is left to our free choice to decide how far we will allow this unity to extend; we can enlarge such a world at our pleasure, whereas fixed boundaries are set to the unity of an actual world by what was given previously.<sup>1</sup>

In contrast to this constraint in the experience of the individual object, the specific *freedom of essential seeing* becomes intelligible to us: in the free production of the multiplicity of variations, in the progress from variant to variant, we are not bound by the conditions of unanimity in the same way as in the progress of experience from one individual object to another on the ground of the unity of experience. If, for example, we envisage to ourselves an individual house now painted yellow, we can just as well think that it could be painted blue or think that it could have a slate instead of a tile roof or, instead of this shape, another one. The house is an object which, in the realm of the possible, could have other determinations in place of, and

1. On all this, see the detailed discussions above, § 40.

incompatible with, whatever determinations happen to belong to it within the unity of a representation. This house, the same, is thinkable as *a* and as *non-a* but, naturally, if as *a*, then not *at the same time* as *non-a*. It cannot be both simultaneously; it cannot be actual while having *each* of them at the same time; but at any moment it can be *non-a* instead of *a*. It is, therefore, thought as an identical something in which opposite determinations can be exchanged. "Intuitively," in the attainment of this self-evidence, the existence of the object is certainly bound to the possession of one or the other of the opposing predicates and to the requirement of the exclusion of their joint possession; however, an *identical substrate* of concordant attributes is evidently present, except that its *simple* thesis is not possible, but only the *modified* thesis: if this identical something determined as *a* exists, then *a'* belongs to it in the canceled form *non-a*, and conversely. To be sure, the identical substrate is not an individual pure and simple. The sudden change is that of an individual into a second individual incompatible with it in coexistence. An individual pure and simple is an existing individual (or one capable of existing). However, *what is seen as unity in the conflict is not an individual* but a concrete hybrid unity of individuals mutually nullifying and coexistentially exclusive: a unique consciousness with a unique content, whose correlate signifies concrete unity founded in conflict, in incompatibility. This remarkable hybrid unity is at the bottom of essential seeing.

The old theory of abstraction, which implies that the universal can be constituted only by abstraction on the basis of individual, particular intuitions, is thus in part unclear, in part incorrect. For example, if I construct the general concept tree—understood, of course, as a pure concept—on the basis of individual, particular trees, the tree which is present in my mind is not posited in any way as an individually determined tree: on the contrary, I represent it in such a way that it is the same in perception and in the free movement of imagination, that it is not posited as existing or even called into question, and that it is not in any way held to be an individual. The *particular*, which is at the bottom of essential seeing, *is not in the proper sense an intuited individual as such*. The remarkable unity which is at the bottom here is, on the contrary, an "individual" in the exchange of "nonessential" constitutive moments (those appearing, as complementary moments, outside the essential moments, which are to be apprehended as identical).

e. Congruence and difference in the overlapping coincidence of multiplicities of variation.

What has already been said implies the following: with the *congruence* present in the coincidence of the multiplicities of variation there is connected, on the other hand, a *difference* in various aspects. If, for example, we pass from a given red color to a series of any other red colors whatsoever—whether we actually see them or whether they are colors floating “in the imagination”—we obtain the *eidos* “red,” which, as the necessarily common, is what is congruent in the alteration of the “arbitrary” variants, while the different extensions in the coincidence, instead of being congruent, on the contrary come to prominence in conflict.

The *idea of the difference*, therefore, is only to be understood in its involvement with the *idea of the identically common element which is the eidos*. Difference is that which, in the overlapping of the multiplicities, is not to be brought into the unity of the congruence making its appearance thereby, that which, in consequence, does not make an *eidos* visible. To say that a unity of congruence is not attained means that in the coincidence the different elements are in conflict with one another. Consider, for example, an identical color; at one time it is the color of this extension and shape, at another time of that. In the overlapping, the one conflicts with the other, and they mutually supplant each other.

But, on the other hand, it is clear that *things cannot enter into conflict which have nothing in common*. In our example, not only is an identical color already presupposed; it is even more important that, even if the one colored object were square, they still could not enter into conflict if both were not extended figures. Thus, every difference in the overlapping with others and in conflict with them points toward a new universal to be brought out (in our example, shape) as the universal of the superimposed differences which have momentarily come into the unity of conflict. This point will be of great importance for the theory of the hierarchical structure of ideas up to the highest regions.

By way of summary, we survey the three principal steps which pertain to the process of ideation:

1. The productive activity which consists in running through the multiplicity of variations.

2. The unitary linking in continuous coincidence.
3. The active identification which brings out the congruent over against the differences.

f. Variation and alteration.

One point still requires clarification. We speak of *variation* and of variants, not of *alteration* and phases of alteration. In fact, the two concepts are essentially different, despite a certain affinity.

An alteration is always alteration of a real thing, understood in a completely general sense as a temporal existent, something which endures, which continues through a duration. Every real thing is subject to change and is only in alteration or nonalteration. Nonalteration is only a limiting case of alteration. Alteration signifies a continual being-other or, rather, a becoming-other and yet being the same, individually the same, in this continual becoming-other: the alteration of a color, its fading, and so on, is an example of this. A real thing changes as this individual real thing; its state changes, but it retains its individual identity in this change of state. Nonalteration, on the other hand, implies: being the same in duration but, in addition, remaining continually the same in every phase of duration. With alteration, the state of being in duration and through the phases of duration is a state of being-other, or becoming-other, in each new phase, i.e., certainly remaining individually the same but, at the same time, not remaining continually the same.

When we direct our attention to the *phases* of the duration of the real thing and to that which occupies these phases, we have a multiplicity of figurations of the same thing: the same thing now, the same then, and so on, and, correspondingly, from phase to phase, the same as like or unlike. But when we change the orientation of our regard, directing our attention to the one enduring thing which presents itself in the phases, which "gradates" itself through time as the same, we experience the unity, the identity, which alters or does not alter, which continues and endures through the flux of multiplicities of figurations. This unity is not the universal of the individual temporal phases, any more than these are its variants. This unity is precisely what constitutes the unity of the individual which endures and which, as enduring, changes or remains the same. *In all alteration, the individual remains identically the same.* On the other hand, varia-

tion depends precisely on this: that we drop the identity of the individual and change it imaginatively into another possible individual.

On the other hand, it pertains to the alteration of an individual that we can also deal with its phases as variants (although by changing our point of view). Then we see that *no alteration is possible in which all the phases of the alteration do not belong together generically*. A color can change only into a color and not, e.g., into a sound. From this it is clear that every possible alteration is accomplished within a highest genus, which it can never contravene.

§ 88. *The meaning of the phrase: "seeing" generalities.*

WE SPEAK OF an essential "seeing" and, in general, of the seeing of generalities. This way of talking still requires justification. We use the expression "to see" here in the completely broad sense which implies nothing other than the *act of experiencing things oneself*, the fact of having seen things themselves, and, on the basis of this self-seeing, of having similarity before one's eyes, of accomplishing, on the strength of it, that mental overlapping in which the common, e.g., the red, the figure, etc., "itself" emerges—that is, attains intuitive apprehension. This, naturally, does *not* mean a *sensuous seeing*. One cannot see the universal red as one sees an individual, particular red; but the extension of the expression "seeing," which not without reason is customary in ordinary language, is unavoidable. With this, we wish to indicate that we appropriate, *directly and as itself*, a common and general moment of as many examples as desired, seen one by one, in a manner wholly analogous to the way in which we appropriate an individual particular in sensuous perception; although, to be sure, the seeing is more complex here. It is a seeing resulting from the actively comparative overlapping of congruence. This is true of every kind of intuitive apprehension of commonalities [*Gemeinsamkeiten*] and generalities, though where a pure *eidos* is to be seen as an *a priori*, this seeing has its special methodological form—precisely that which has been described, namely, that indifference with regard to actu-

ality which is generated in variation, whereby what presents itself as actual acquires the character of an arbitrary example, an indifferent point of departure of a series of variations.

§ 89. *The necessity of an explicit exclusion of all positing of being for the purpose of attaining pure generality.*

IT MIGHT NOW be thought that our description of essential seeing makes the task appear too difficult and that it is unnecessary to operate with the multiplicities of variation, which are stressed as allegedly fundamental, and likewise with the functions of imagination which participate therein in so peculiar a way. Would it not be enough to say that any arbitrary red here and red there, any arbitrary, pregiven plurality of red things, pertaining to experience or to any other representation, furnishes the possibility of an essential seeing of the *eidos* red? What would be necessary to describe is only the activity of running through what is given in overlapping coincidence and bringing the universal into view. However, it should be noted here that the word "arbitrary" in the context of our remarks must not be taken as a mere manner of speaking, or as constituting a non-essential attitude on our part, but that *it belongs to the fundamental character of the act of seeing ideas*.

But if in such a way of talking there is the notion that a determinate plurality of similar objects is enough to enable us to obtain a universal by a comparative coincidence, it is necessary to emphasize the following once more: certainly we obtain for this red here and that red there an identical and general element present in both, but precisely only as what is common to this and that red. We do not obtain pure red in general as *eidos*. To be sure, taking account of a third red or several, whenever they present themselves to us, we can recognize that the universal of the two is identically the same as the universal of the many. But in this way we always obtain only commonalities and generalities relative to empirical extensions; the possibility of progress *in infinitum* is still not given intuitively by this. However, as soon as we say that every arbitrary like moment, newly to be taken

account of, *must* yield the same result, and if we repeat once more: the *eidos* red is *one* over against the infinity of possible particulars which belong to this and any other red capable of being in coincidence with it, then we are already in need of an infinite variation in our sense as a foundation. This variation provides us with what belongs to the *eidos* as its inseparable correlate, the so-called *extension of the eidos*, of the "purely conceptual essence," as the infinity of possible particulars which fall under it as its "particular exemplifications" and, Platonically speaking, are found with it in a relation of participation; every conceivable particular in general is referred to the essence, participates in it and in its essential moments. How the *totality* of the particulars which fall under the pure universal belong correlatively to it as its extension we will discuss forthwith.

First of all, it is necessary to point out that *even totally free variation is not enough* to actually give us the universal as pure. Even the universal acquired by variation must not yet be called *pure* in the true sense of the word, i.e., free from all positing of actuality. Although the relation to the contingent example, actually existing as a point of departure, is already excluded by the variation, a relation to actuality can still cling to the universal, and in the following way: For a pure *eidos*, the factual actuality of the particular cases by means of which we progress in the variation is completely irrelevant. And this must be taken literally. The actualities must be treated as possibilities among other possibilities, in fact as arbitrary possibilities of the imagination. This treatment is achieved only when every connection to pre-given actuality is most carefully excluded. If we practice variation freely but cling secretly to the fact that, e.g., these must be arbitrary sounds *in the world*, heard or able to be heard by men on earth, then we certainly have an essential generality as an *eidos* but one *related to our world of fact* and bound to this universal fact. It is a secret bond in that, for understandable reasons, it is imperceptible to us.

In the natural development of universal [*universalen*] experience, the unity of which is continually being realized, the experienced world is granted to us as the universal permanent ground of being and as the universal field of all our activities. As the firmest and most universal of all our habitualities, the world is valid and remains in its actual validity for us, no matter what interests we may pursue; like all interests, those involving eidetic cognition are also related to it. With all exercise of imagi-

nation, like the one which we have already considered, set in motion by the supposition of possible particulars, chosen arbitrarily and falling under a concept attained empirically, and so also with every imaginative variation involving the intention of seeing ideas, the world is coposited; every fact and every *eidos* remains related to the factual world, belonging to this world. Because of its universality, we, of course, do not notice in the natural attitude this hidden positing of the world and this bond to being.

Only if we become conscious of this bond, *putting it consciously out of play*, and so also free this broadest surrounding horizon of variants from all connection to experience and all experiential validity, do we achieve perfect purity. Then we find ourselves, so to speak, in a pure world of imagination, a *world of absolutely pure possibility*. Every possibility of this kind can then be a central member for possible pure variations in the mode of the arbitrary. From each of these possibilities results an absolutely pure *eidos*, but from any other only if the series of variations of the one and the other are linked together in a *single* series in the manner described. Thus for colors and for sounds a different *eidos* emerges; they are different in kind, and this with respect to what is purely intuited in them.

A pure *eidos*, an essential generality, is, e.g., the species red or the genus color, but only if it is apprehended as a pure generality, thus free from all presupposition of any factual existent whatsoever, any factual red or any real colored actuality. Such is also the sense of the statements of geometry, e.g., when we designate the circle as a kind of conic section, that is, when we apprehend it in an eidetic intuition; we are then not speaking of an actual surface as an instance belonging to a real actuality of nature. Accordingly, a *purely eidetic judging "in general,"* such as the geometrical, or that concerned with ideally possible colors, sounds, and the like is, in its generality, *bound to no presupposed actuality*. In geometry, we speak of conceivable figures, in eidetic color-theory of conceivable colors, which constitute the extension of purely seen generalities.

The whole of mathematics also operates with concepts originally created in this way; it produces its immediate eidetic laws (axioms) as truths which are "necessary and universal in the strict sense," "admitting of no possible exception" (Kant). It sees them as general [*generelle*] essence-complexes [*Wesensverhalte*], producible in an absolute identity for every conceivable exempli-



fication of its pure concepts—for those rigorously circumscribed multiplicities of variations or *a priori* extension—and, *as such*, self-evidently cognizable. From them, in a deductive intuition (*a priori* “self-evidence” of a necessary inference), mathematics then produces its theories and derived “theorems,” again as ideal identities, perceptible in the arbitrary repetition of the activity which produced them.

### § 90. *Pure generality and a priori necessity.*<sup>1</sup>

WE NOW TURN to the problem, already touched upon above, of the *extension of pure generalities* and to the problems, closely linked to this, concerning the relation of pure possibility and empirico-factual actuality.

In conformity with its origin in the method of free variation and the consequent exclusion of all positing of actual being, pure generality naturally can have *no extension consisting of facts*, of empirical actualities which bind it [to experience], but only an *extension of pure possibilities*. On the other hand, eidetic generality must always be posited in relation to admitted actualities. Every color occurring in actuality is certainly, at the same time, a possible color in the pure sense: each can be considered as an example and can be changed into a variant. Thus, in the realm of arbitrary freedom we can lift all actuality to a plane of pure possibility. But it then appears that even arbitrary freedom has its own peculiar constraint. What can be varied, one into another, in the arbitrariness of imagination (even if it is without connection and does not accord with the understanding of a reality conceivable in the imagination) bears in itself a necessary structure, an *eidos*, and therewith *necessary laws* which determine what must necessarily belong to an object in order that it can be an object of this kind. This necessity then also holds for everything factual: we can see that everything which belongs inseparably to the pure *eidos* color, e.g., the moment of brightness, must likewise belong to every actual color.

The universal truths, in which we merely display what belongs to pure essential generalities, precede all questions bearing on facts and the truths which concern them. Hence, these es-

1. On this point, see also *Ideas*, pp. 15 f.; ET, pp. 53 f.

sential truths are called *a priori*; this means, *by reason of their validity, preceding all factuality*, all determinations arising from experience. Every actuality given in experience, and judged by the thinking founded on experience, is subject, insofar as the correctness of such judgments is concerned, to the unconditional norm that it must first comply with all the *a priori* "conditions of possible experience" and the possible thinking of such experience: that is, with the conditions of its pure possibility, its representability and positability as the objectivity of a uniformly identical sense.

Such *a priori* conditions are expressed for nature (for the actuality of physical experience) by the mathematics of nature with all its propositions. It expresses them "*a priori*," i.e., without dealing with "nature" as a fact. The reference to facts is the business of the *application*, which is always possible *a priori* and is self-evidently intelligible in this possibility. And now we can say in general: *judging actualities according to the laws of their pure possibility*, or judging them according to "laws of essences," *a priori* laws, is a universal and absolutely necessary task which must be carried out for all actuality. What is easy to make clear in the example of mathematical thinking and mathematical natural science is valid in a completely general way for every objective sphere. To each belongs the possibility of an *a priori* thinking, consequently an *a priori* science having the same functional application as this science—insofar as we give the *a priori* everywhere the same strict sense, the only one which is significant. There is not the slightest reason to consider the methodological structure of *a priori* thinking, as we have exhibited it in its general essential features in mathematical thinking, as an exclusive property of the mathematical sphere.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, in view of the general essential relationship of actuality and possibility, of experience and pure imagination, even to admit such a limitation would be completely absurd. From every concrete actuality, and every individual trait actually experienced in it or capable of being experienced, a path stands open to the realm of ideal or

2. In this connection, however, it should be emphasized that the method of mathematical thinking of essences is, as a *method of idealization*, in important points to be distinguished from the intuition of essences in other subjects, whose fluid types cannot be apprehended with exactitude; this analogy thus holds only in the most general respects. On this difference, see also Edmund Husserl, *Crisis*, esp. pp. 16 ff., 48 ff.; ET, pp. 17 ff., 48 ff.

pure possibility and consequently to that of *a priori* thinking. And in conformity with this completely general method, the method of formation of pure individual possibilities, as well as of the infinite "extensions" of the possibilities which merge into one another in the transformations of variation, is everywhere the same, and thus naturally also the originally intuitive formation of pure essential generalities pertaining to them: "ideas" (essences, pure concepts) and laws of essences.

§ 91. *The extension of pure generalities.*

- a. The totality of the pure extension of a concept affords no individual differentiation.

PURE GENERALITIES have an extension of pure possibilities; on the other hand, they also have reference to empirical actuality as far as they "prescribe rules" to every actual thing. However, this is not to be understood as if, in addition to their extension of pure possibilities, they had an extension of actualities. This remarkable relation will become clear to us if we contrast a *pure conceptual extension* and a possible *empirical extension*.

To the extension of the pure concept "man" belong all men whom I can imagine, whether or not they are also to be found in *the* world, whether or not they are possible in the unity of this world, whether or not they are put in relation to it. They then occur in imaginings, which possibly are completely disconnected, and in other intuitions as being representable in themselves, and they constitute the explication of "a" man. It is just the same in the case of temporal durations. The extension of the idea "temporal duration" encompasses all temporal durations: those which are imaginable in a disconnected way and those which are actually experienced or capable of being experienced, as well as all temporal durations in the *one* time, namely, actual time. This *totality of the extension* of the concept of temporal duration affords *no individuation of the species* "temporal duration," just as the totality of imagined colors which belong to the smallest eidetic difference of color are not individual colors in the actual sense, are not individuations of this lowest species.

The species "duration" is specified insofar as within different intuitions, positing or not positing, interconnected or not interconnected, one can conduct a comparison of size. But then we come across the remarkable thing that within the *same* imagining and the arbitrary amplifications which pervade the unity of it and its world of imagination, and, accordingly, also within the unity of one experience, a *further differentiation* takes place, which is *not specific* and which cannot be taken out of this world; hence, if we compare the corresponding differences of one and another imaginary world, we can affirm neither identity nor nonidentity concerning them.

This is certainly true of all objective determinations, such as color, etc. But we see that it is *mediately* true of them in virtue of their temporal (and then, further, of spatial) differentiations, which are possible only in a "world." What ultimately differentiates the smallest difference of color within a world, i.e., individuates it, is the *hic et nunc*, thus the ultimate spatiotemporal difference, which on its part still also has its own specific differentiations.

There is individual differentiation only within a "world": actual individual differentiation in an actual world, possible individual differentiation in a possible one.<sup>1</sup>

#### b. Differentiation of possibility and differentiation of actuality.

How the *totality of pure conceptual extension* must be understood follows from what has been said. It refers to *pure possibilities* as its *particularizations*. This *logico-conceptual particularization* is *not a particularization of something objectively identifiable*; otherwise expressed, the logical requirement of individuality, which is the requirement of an object as an identical substrate of predicates and of objective truths (subject to the principle of noncontradiction), is not fulfilled by the particularization of a conceptual extension but is subject to the conditions of time. This means that for individual particularization we are subject to the requirement of a possibility of confirmation by a continuous connection of actual and possible (capable of being connected to actual) intuitions. *The totality of the pure extension*

1. On this subject, cf. §§ 38–40 and Appendix I.

sion of the concept is not the totality of (real) objects in the world, is not an empirical totality, a totality in the *one* time.

For every essence we must therefore distinguish *two kinds of differentiations*:

1. *Differentiations according to possibility*, differentiation in the form of disconnected possibilities, referring back to disconnected imaginings or experiences giving them.

2. Differentiation within the framework of the unity of an interconnected actuality or quasi-actuality or, better, *differentiation within the framework of a possible actuality* whose form is *one and the same* time. All such differentiations of an essence are constituted within an infinity of possible acts, which, however, are bound together insofar as they have a connection among themselves.

The universe of free possibilities in general is a *realm of disconnectedness*; it lacks a unity of context. However, every possibility which is singled out of this realm signifies at the same time the idea of a whole of interconnected possibilities, and to this whole necessarily corresponds a *unique* time. Each such whole defines a world. But two worlds of this kind are not connected with each other; their "things," their places, their times, have nothing to do with one another; it makes no sense to ask whether a thing in this world and one in that equally possible world are the same or not the same: only privative nonidentity and all relations of comparison—to call briefly to mind what was established in Part I—find an application here.

§ 92. *The hierarchical structure of pure generalities and the acquisition of the highest concrete genera (regions) by the variation of ideas.*

IN OUR INVESTIGATIONS, pure generalities, essences of wholly different levels, have already come into prominence. For, obviously, the essences which we said determine the necessary laws for a whole sphere of objects are distinguished from those of the lowest kinds, like, for example, the *eidos* red. In other words, just as we have already been able to establish that there exists a *hierarchical structure* in the order of empirical gener-

ality, rising from lower generalities to those ever higher, so also there is naturally one for pure generalities. Which, then, are the highest, in the apprehension of which the activity of essential seeing culminates?

We start from the fact that, from one and the same example as a directive image, one can attain, by means of a free variation, pure essences which are very different. This is true in spite of the fact that all the multiplicities of variation in which an *eidos* is attained in an original seeing are linked to a unique multiplicity and, in some measure, are only aspects of a multiplicity unique in itself. For the linking of series of variations in a unique multiplicity can have a very different sense. Starting from an arbitrary red and continuing in a series of variations, we obtain the *eidos* red. If we had taken another red as our exemplary point of departure, we would certainly have obtained by intuition another multiplicity of variations; but it immediately becomes apparent that this new multiplicity belongs in the open horizon of the and-so-forth of the first, just as the first belongs in the horizon of the latter; the *eidos* is one and the same. Likewise, naturally, if we had varied an arbitrary green and had attained the *eidos* green. On the other hand, it should be noted that, in a certain way and in spite of their differences, the two series of variations, namely, that which gives the red and that which gives the green, are in their turn to be linked in an encompassing multiplicity of variations—in a unique multiplicity which no longer gives the *eidos* red or the *eidos* green but the *eidos* color in general. In the first case we have as our goal the attainment by variation of the seeing of red; for this, we must keep directing ourselves toward red; in other words, we must, despite the arbitrary nature of the activity of variation in other respects, confine ourselves to *one* direction: if at the beginning of the variation a common red lights up for us, we can then immediately arrest it and intend nothing other than red in general, therefore that identical red which any additional variation whatsoever would give us. If we are confronted with a green, we reject it as not belonging to this series of variations, as entering into conflict with the seen red which continues to be intended. If, on the other hand, we direct our interest on the fact that the variant green, which has just been rejected, is in conflict with all the variants of red and yet has something in common with them, therefore a point of coincidence, this commonality apprehended as a pure *eidos* can determine the variation: then, the multiplicities of variation for

red and green, as also for yellow, etc., belong together reciprocally; the universal is now color.

Thus we could have this attitude from the start, *in the mode of a complete absence of commitment*, therefore without being committed to vary any universal already illuminated and to seek out the universal which lies beyond all the generalities which present themselves to be seen and then are limiting: in our example, the universal which lies beyond the generalities red, blue, yellow, etc., as the highest generality. For this, it is merely required that the variation, no matter how it may proceed, be simply a variation, that is, be joined together in general, in a thoroughly unified synthesis of coincidence, with a pervasive universal. *Such is the way to the constitution of the highest essential generalities as highest genera.* These are generalities which can have none higher than themselves. On the other hand, they have at the same time the property of being *contained in all the particular generalities* which it was necessary to produce in this total variation—because they belong to the limited spheres of variation of the latter—as *that which is ideally common to them*. The ideas red, green, and so forth, have an ideal participation in the idea color.

We can also say: ideas, pure generalities, can themselves function as variants in their turn; from them, one can then on a higher level intuit a universal, an *idea from ideas*, or idea of ideas; its extension is constituted by ideas, and only mediately by their ideal particulars.

In our example, the variation led to a highest abstract genus, to an *abstract essence*. For such is color; it is not an independent object, not an independent real thing existing for itself. It is extended, distributed over an extension; and extension belongs essentially to what is extended—above all, to a surface. But even this is nothing for itself but points to a body as that of which it is the limit. Thus we are finally led to a concrete object, here a spatial thing, of which the color is an abstract moment. To be sure, no process of variation from a given color leads to such an object. *Variation which sets out from the abstract always leads only to the abstract.*

But in the case of variation, we can start out *from the beginning from a concrete, independent object*. Thus, for example, by the variation of this fountain pen we come to the genus "useful object." But we can also drop this limitation and discover ever new possibilities of variation; we can, for example, imagine the

fountain pen changed into a stone, and there is still something common which runs through them: both are spatially extended, material things. We have thus come to the highest genus "thing," which as the highest genus of *concreta* we call a *region*. Another region, for example, is the region "man" as a corporeal and mental essence. Regional essences have no other, higher generalities above them, and they set a fixed, unsurpassable limit to all variation. *A fundamental concept of a region cannot be converted into another by variation.* As a possible further operation, there is, at most, formalization, by which two concepts are apprehended under the formal category "something in general." But formalization is something essentially different from variation. It does not consist in imagining that the determinations of the variants are changed into others; rather, it is a disregarding, an emptying of all objective, material determinations.<sup>1</sup>

The higher generalities are obtained by variation of ideas. This implies that *the seeing of ideas is itself an analogue of simple experience*, insofar as it is a consciousness, to be sure, a higher and actively productive one, in which a new kind of objectivity, the universal, attains self-givenness. That which we can accomplish, beginning with experience, under the name "ideation" we can also bring about beginning with any other consciousness of a different sort, provided that it realizes something analogous, namely, brings a kind of objectivity to consciousness in original selfhood. Every form of ideation does this of itself; the idea seen is called seen here because it is not intended or mentioned vaguely and indirectly by means of empty symbols or words but is precisely apprehended directly and in itself (cf. also § 88). Thus, from the basis which furnishes us with any kind of intuitive apprehending and having, we can always practice ideation, essentially by the same method.

Hence we not only can vary things of experience and thereby attain concepts of things as essential generalities, but we also "experience" sets which we have collected independently, real states of affairs, internal and external relations, whose seeing requires an activity which relates them, and so on. In this way we also obtain pure and general ideas of collections, of relations, and of every kind of state of affairs, in that, starting from the intuitive activities in which they attain givenness, we constitute

1. On this difference between generalization and formalization, cf. also *Ideas*, pp. 26 f.; ET, pp. 64 f.



precisely for all such objectivities multiplicities of variation which bring out the necessary and general essence. For the ideas obtained in this fashion we can then proceed in the same way, and so on. *We obtain therewith ideas of the "formal region": object-in-general.* It includes the ideas of the forms of possible objectivities.

§ 93. *The difficulties of obtaining the highest genera, demonstrated in the obtaining of the region "thing."*

THE OBTAINING of the highest concrete genus, however, is not so simple as perhaps it might seem after our previous descriptions. A simple variation does not provide access to it if we have not also taken methodological precautions that it be actually universal and actually take account of everything which belongs to the complete concept of a concrete region.

a. The method of establishing the example to be varied.

If, to obtain the region "natural thing," we take as a point of departure either an exemplary thing of factual actuality or an already purely possible thing of pure imagination in order to carry out free variation on it, it is necessary not to overlook that the establishment of the example to be varied already demands an intricate method.

If we set out from an object of perception, it is certainly "given originally" to us in perception, but in principle only imperfectly; a systematic disclosure of the objective sense in an ongoing intuition is first required; we must first procure for ourselves a complete intuition of this thing. But we cannot freely institute an actual experience going to infinity of everything that this thing in truth is (*if it is*); on principle, what we obtain in the unity of an actual experience is something self-given imperfectly and from "one side"; what comes to self-possession as a *thing* is surrounded by a presumptive horizon, an internal horizon and

an external horizon. We can at best proceed only to the unfolding of this horizon, which, with its systems of disjunctive possibilities, is a horizon of what is anticipated as possible, making clear to ourselves how subsequent experience could advance (what, in several mutually incompatible ways, it could be), how, in consequence, the thing could appear, and how it would be realized intuitively in this sequence as the same, as the unity of all these concordant appearances in the course of harmonious experience. We already stand, therefore, in a system of possible variation, we pursue one line of the possible harmonious experiences and their content of appearance, and let ourselves be continually guided by the initial perception with the objective sense established in it—but established only in such a way that this sense, with its actually and properly intuitive content, prescribes the style of the subsequent content of intuitive experience in conformity with the horizon, in the mode of a general determinability which is not an arbitrary determinability but one according to *rule*.

But, that this is true, we ourselves know only from variations and the contemplation of essences. If this is missing, then we naïvely follow the path from actual experience to a possible one; we naïvely accomplish what is intelligible to us when we talk obscurely of rendering intuitive the way in which this thing could be in an anticipation of its appearance, and which it must be for the progress of an experience to be implemented somehow or other. This possible experience is conceived here as a taking-cognizance-of, as unfolding in deliberate individual apprehensions, with corresponding individual determinations (preconceptual determinations). We can then carry out free variation, at first by retaining (in the consciousness of free arbitrariness and the purely general) the initial contents of the perception and by throwing into relief the universal of the style being examined. But we can also drop the commitment to the initial content insofar as we change the initial perception into pure possibility and think this possibility itself as varying freely, indeed as arbitrary and capable of being pursued in conformity with all the horizons of sense, including the systems resulting from them of the possible arrangement of experience in the style of harmonious experience of the same. In orienting regard, not toward subjective acts, but toward what is experienced in them as a thing, toward the thing experienced as always remaining identical and toward its various properties, there arises, in the variation and in the

continuous self-coincidence in the universal, the *self-same in general*, in the general determinations which accrue to it in general. The generality which belongs to the fact, and to every possible fact (particular case) not as fact but as far as it can be represented as at all the same and as a modification of the exemplary fact, is a pure generality, referred to pure possibilities.

But there is the difficulty here that the thing intended in the exemplary initial intuition—the first, preliminary intuition, finite and self-contained, with which we must begin—indeed, as “this thing itself,” but still provided with an open infinity, only implicitly includes these “infinities” in its intention, and in fact in such a way that each of these infinities, moreover, is entwined in a multiplicity of *relativities*. It is not the case that the harmonious experience of the thing signifies a direct linear infinity (an open endlessness), with a continuity of self-appearances of the thing, in which the unity of *one* self-appearance is constituted synthetically in the unity of one style visible at a glance; as if one could establish a subsistent essence for this continuity of appearance as a whole, as well as for the kind of “thing” always appearing in this continuity. On the contrary, what the thing is, and what is revealed in experience, it is in relation to *circumstances* which are subject to the *stylistic forms* of *normality* and *abnormality*; these are forms which, at the same time, determine ways of disclosure of possible intuition (establishment of continuously possible experience). Thus the words *rest* and *alteration* are already designations of norms which determine the sense of possible motion and alteration, in other words, the course of possible experience productive of intuition. Further, every single thing has its *own essence*, which, so to speak, is solipsistic—irrespective of all material surroundings and the appertaining causalities which bind the real. Here we have, as the normal, what is sensuously intuitive (intuitive in the primary sense) about the thing in its alteration and nonalteration, something which leaves all causality—for causality already presupposes it—out of play. As what is proper to the thing considered for itself, there first presents itself what is above all intuitive in the case of *normal sensibility* (pertaining to a normal organism) and then what is thus intuitive *for me*, the subject of the experience. But this sensibility can become abnormal, the perceptive functions can function abnormally, and, moreover, the thing and its intuitive content can be presented otherwise in the intuition of the others who are there for me. If I take this content at first simply as belonging to

the thing itself, this is because, without meaning to, I intended it habitually as appearing identically to me *and* to all others—irrespective of an intersubjective abnormality. The relation to a normal community of experience, in which individuals and communities with abnormal functions do not occur, thus makes its appearance only later.

b. The problem of obtaining full concretion. Abstract and concrete contemplation of essence.

All this is *not a contingent fact*. On the contrary, when I represent a thing intuitively to myself, such relativities and such references of systems of experience to normality and abnormality belong to the possibilities of the exposition of the sense in conformity with all its determinations. All this has its ordered connections, and a systematic and perfect intuition must satisfy them in order to reveal the complete essential style of a thing whose existence is possible. If we begin, for example, by the involuntary contemplation of static and changeable things and subject them to ideation, then straightway we take into consideration only a normal organism and a community made up exclusively of such organisms. But then the result is tainted by a *relativity* which is not revealed and taken into account. It is only when all relativities are displayed and brought into the contemplation of the essence that the idea arises of the regional essence of a thing in general: henceforth in the context of an infinitely open nature in general, and, further, of a possible concrete world in general with reference to a community of subjects in general, whose open enviroing world it is. It is only then that we obtain an *insight into essence in full concretion*. Every contemplation of essence which is on a lower level and remains stuck in an implicit relativity is not, on that account, without result; but it is *abstract* and, in what concerns the sense of its result, has an imperfection which presents grave dangers. An abstract, although pure, essence is *dependent*; correlatively, it leaves unknown essences open; it is a heading for dependent possibilities, whose thematic variation has a sphere of nonthematic covariation attached to it which codetermines the thematic sense. To the being-sense of a thing (as actually existing) belongs a sensuous thingliness, with sensuous qualities in a sensuous figure, etc., but in relation to subjects with sensibility. Further, it belongs to the

actually existing thing to be capable of being experienced as the *same* for "everyone," with everyone's sensibility, which can be "normal" or "abnormal." With this is involved the fact that every sensuous thing stands in a system of *causality which binds the real*, a causality which involves intersubjectivity because of the relativity of sensibilities which are related to bodies. Everything which is relevant here for the essence of a thing as objectively actual is intuitively apprehensible, although not at the lower level of primary sensuous intuitiveness; in ideation, essential generalities are produced which, to begin with, however, are merely stages toward obtaining an unbroken concretion, which includes in its essential seeing all the relativities which belong to it.

Precisely for this reason the old ontology has fallen short of its objective: it has not seen the enormous task of a systematic exhaustion of ontological concretion and has not clarified the method of the concrete intuition of essence and of an intuition of essences in general. Every concept of essence attained according to an authentic method, even though one-sided, *belongs at the same time to universal ontology*. All ontological relativity is with respect to essence.

All eidetic possibility, relatively or actually concrete, likewise offers occasions for abstract limitations and free variations, occasions for the constitution of *abstract essences*, such as, e.g., color, figure, triangle, etc. Special problems arise for the differentiation of the highest generality, as the most universal and the freest. In being directed toward exclusively pure possibilities, and without abandoning this attitude, that is, by practicing pure imagination and the objectivation of its structures, we can bind ourselves voluntarily to presuppositions, but to presuppositions within pure possibility. For example, we bind "figure in general" in the mode of intuitive accomplishment when we posit it as bounded by three sides and, in the constitution of this "difference," inquire into the essential properties of such a free structure. Naturally, such particularizations of essential generalities are not to be confused with concrete concepts like "dog," "tree," etc. As we have seen, empirical concepts are not actual particularizations of pure generalities; they intend typical generalities, realms of experience which await from actual experience an ever new prescription.

### 3 / Judgments in the Mode of the “In General”

§ 94. *Transition to the observation of the modifications “in general” [Überhaupt-Modifikationen] of the act of judgment as the highest level of spontaneous operations.*

WE NOW GO an important step further in the study of the different structures of syntactical objectivities and forms.

The formation of concepts does not merely produce new objectivities in like manner with other syntactical objectivities, and with the newly formed objects it does not merely ground new forms of states of affairs of analogous kind, as other syntactical objectivities also do. That is, the occurrence of the universal brings into being not merely a unique judicative relation between the particular and the universal, e.g., between the concept “red” and particular red objects, and thus the judgment-form “This is red.” This would be [merely] analogous to the origin of the novel relationship between an individual member of a set and the set, which arises *eo ipso* with the syntactical form “set.” But much more than this happens: *along with the universal there also comes into being the specific so-called universal act of judgment, the modification “in general” of the act of judgment.* With this are indicated *syntactical structures of a completely new style*, which presuppose the formation of concepts, the constitution of general objectivities, and with this constitution embrace all con-

ceivable forms of objects and states of affairs. It is a question, therefore, of a *highest level of spontaneous operations*, which also, from an axiological point of view, represent the highest operations as regards their cognitive value. In these operations lies everything scientific, in the pregnant sense of "science," i.e., that which gives the idea of science its essential content.

§ 95. *The origin of the modification "in general" in our becoming indifferent to individual specificities.*

HOW ARE THESE NEW FORMS of judgment to be understood in contrast to those which have been studied up to now? They are not necessarily already given from the fact that general objectivities are constituted in spontaneous production. Like all other objects, general objects can make their appearance as cores in judgments without on that account the judgment itself having to undergo modification into a judgment "in general." For example, in the judgment "A and B are red," the general core "red" appears on the predicate side; nevertheless, this judgment is an unmodified categorical judgment. In the same way, unmodified judgments can emerge when genera, species, and so on, are found on the subject side, e.g., "This color is bright." However, as soon as general terms occur in a judgment, *a relation between a particularity and a generality is preconstituted* in them, though this relation need not itself, for this reason, already have become thematic. But if it does become thematic, *modifications "in general" result*.

Let us make this clear in an example. We see a rose in a garden; we look upon it as an individual *this-here*. This means that, affecting us, it attracts our interest to itself; we turn toward it, apprehending it in order to become acquainted with it. The intention is directed toward *an explication of the individual object*, and we search into the object from all sides in the progress of our predicative determination; for example, we first find that the rose is yellow, and now judge predicatively: "This rose is yellow." From the first, the rose is constituted as already known in conformity with its general type, on the basis of our previous expe-

rience of roses. Accordingly, there is still *another orientation of interest possible*, an intention of another form. The glance can run through these chains of likeness, and, as the term "equivalence" indicates, the like can in fact be valid as completely equal for our interest; the individual differences can become "indifferent." There is thus constituted a form of intention of the particular in which the particular is considered only in terms of that which grounds the equivalence (and precisely for that reason is not the indifferent): as *any A whatsoever*, as "a" rose, and never as this rose determined more and more precisely, in connection with which every other is individually determined otherwise. It is precisely this which is indifferent here and goes beyond the intention expressed in the form "an A." What is thus indifferent is—if we presuppose an original intuition—copresent, to be brought to light by an explication; but in the attitude which characterizes the present bestowal of sense, the present orientation of judgment, it remains out of play. In our example, we then see this yellow rose only as "a rose" among others and are not interested in its individual specificity. Interest is turned toward the fact that, among the roses given here, there is one which is yellow. We no longer judge "This rose is yellow," but "A rose (in this area, e.g., here in the garden) is yellow." Perhaps we find another such; then we judge, keeping the same attitude: "Still another," or "Two roses are yellow," or, in an indeterminate plural, "Some roses are yellow"—"some" meaning one and one, and so forth. To this open "and so forth" the unconditioned "again and again" does not belong but rather, as a general rule, only this: that we can find an A "repeatedly," "several times."

#### § 96. *The particular [partikuläre] judgment.*

a. The particular judgment as a judgment of existence-in. Particularity and the concept of number.

ON THE BASIS of this change of interest a *new* element has been constituted *in two senses*: on the one hand, in the transition from like to like, there arose in this new attitude the forms "an A," "an A and an A," or, likewise, "an A and another," "an A



and another A, and again another A, and so on," and likewise indeterminate plurality. With this we are *at the origin of primitive numerical forms*, which arise here as formations having the function of indicating the "some or other," and this in an active and productive attitude which determines the activity of judgment and saturates it in a peculiar way. On the other hand, *new modifications of judgment* have been constituted, namely, *particular judgments*, e.g., "A rose is yellow." They are completely different from *singular judgments*, which refer to individually determined terms, e.g., "This rose is yellow." The domain of particular judgments can also be an openly infinite one, referring perhaps to roses in Germany. Obviously included in the sense of such judgments is an existence-in, a being in a context, a domain. These are *judgments of existence-in*: in this garden, in Europe, on earth, there are, are extant, yellow roses.

Up to now, we have come to know only the simplest particular judgments, containing only "some A or other in general." But generally we can say: *particular judgments are characterized in that they have one or more "terms of particularity."* By this we understand precisely such phrases as "some A or other in general," "some B or other in general," and so on, in each of which is accomplished that peculiar positing of an indeterminate particular of a conceptual universal. In addition, each plural term of particularity intentionally harbors—explicitly or implicitly—a plurality in itself and, in the case of an indeterminate plural, an indeterminate plurality of terms of particularity.

*Numbers [Anzahlen] are determinate pluralities of particular terms.* Yet it belongs to the sense of a number that the determinate particular plural be brought, by way of comparison and the formation of concepts, under a corresponding formal concept: some apple or other and some apple or other, some pear or other and some pear or other, and so on. That which is conceptually common is expressed as some A or other and some additional A or other, where A is "some concept or other." Such is the numerical concept "two"; likewise for "three," and so on. These are numbers as they are originally and directly produced. With good reason, arithmetic introduces *indirect concepts*, concepts of the generation of numbers and their determination by the agency of the generation of sums:  $2 = 1 + 1$ ,  $3 = 2 + 1$ , and so on.

A multiplicity of particular terms need not combine in plural complexes, e.g., emerge as number; the particularities can be apportioned very differently (e.g., "Some roses grow on trellises,

some as free plants"). They also do not appear only in these primitive forms of states of affairs; rather, every modification of these forms and every total formation which can be produced from the modified forms can admit the particularity in various ways which must be systematically followed up; and precisely for this reason terms of particularity, apportioned very diversely in partial syntactical structures, can appear in the very complex structures of states of affairs.

b. The particular judgment as a modification of the determinate judgment.

In addition, it is also to be noticed that even the most primitive form "Some A or other is B" under the heading "some A or other" does not really produce a new objectivity, of which B expresses the predicate.<sup>1</sup> "Some rose or other" is not a new object of which one can affirm its being yellow, as it is affirmed of some definite thing, e.g., a definite rose or a definite apple. On the contrary, to the determinate predication or determinate state of affairs "This is yellow" corresponds *the particular modification of the state of affairs as the structure of a peculiarly indeterminate mode of predication*, which does not produce a new subject but, positing it in an indeterminate way, thinks a subject in general, and thinks it as an A. The "some or other" affects the "is" along with the "yellow," therefore the total sense of what is judged; we have a mental structure which is indeterminately related to a state of affairs but which itself is not really a state of affairs. The particular formation designates, so to speak, a mental operation which originally must be exercised on individually determined states of affairs, i.e., on their determinate terms and then on all combinations of states of affairs and all their modifications, which produce new determined terms from those previously determined. Thus, in conjunctive, disjunctive, or hypothetical formations of states of affairs, particularities arise in appropriate places; and for these total structures, for propositions, no matter how complex, particular propositional forms emerge. We then have particular hypothetical and causal antecedent propositions and, pertaining to them, particular consequent propositions. Likewise, it is a matter of indifference whether the propositions affirm simple certainty or problematic

1. [Reading *das Prädikat* in place of *des Prädikat*.—Trans.]

possibility, probability, and so on. Even a thought-possibility of imagination leads to particularities; e.g., I can imagine that there are blue roses in this garden—it is a possible thought.

c. Particular judgments of imagination as *a priori* judgments of existence.

If we transpose acts of judgment and the states of affairs judged about into pure imagination, we then attain new particularities; we attain them with respect to the fact that all modifications in the mode of as-if yield specific forms whose nature has been described above, in which pure possibilities accrue to us from imaginary realities. If in pure imagination we think that some triangle in general is right-angled and obtain this particular state of affairs in the unanimous unity of an intuition in the as-if—as if we had obtained the triangle existing as such and actually formed in the requisite operations—then in a change of attitude we can meet with the pure possibility as *actualized* that some triangle or other is right-angled. Included in all this, moreover, is the simpler pure possibility of particular form: a triangle is a possibility, a triangle can be, it is conceivable that it is. More clearly: we utilize for this being-conceivable in the sense of pure imagination expressions of *a priori* possibility: “It is possible *a priori*, conceivable *a priori*, that. . . .”

There arise here *judgments of existence* or, rather, judgments of existence-in, the “there is” having undergone the *peculiar modification of the a priori*. Verbally, they are equivocal by virtue of the expressions “there is,” “there exists,” and by the various other formulations of particularity. But, as we said, these are *not particularities pure and simple*, actual particularities, but *a priori possibilities of particularity*. All mathematical propositions of existence have this modified sense: “There are” triangles, squares, polygons of any increasing number of sides; “there are” regular polyhedrons of fifty-six lateral surfaces but not of *any* number of such surfaces. The true sense is not simply a “there is” but rather: *it is possible a priori that there is*. To be sure, they are themselves also actual existential propositions, actual particular judgments in general; they speak, that is, about *the existence of possibilities*: about the possibility that there are triangles, but not purely and simply about the fact that there are

triangles. And so everywhere. All existential judgments of mathematics, as *a priori* existential judgments, are in truth judgments of existence about possibilities; all particular mathematical judgments are direct particular judgments about possibilities—but about possibilities of particular judgments concerning mathematics.

We can then also correctly say: among *a priori* possibilities there are possibilities of such particular occurrences. Still, that requires elucidation. Every *a priori* possibility is an *a priori* possibility of . . . , is an *a priori* possible actuality, and so is the *a priori* possibility that something is, that there is some A or other, that some particular state of affairs or other subsists, precisely a pure being-conceivable of such a thing. But, on the other hand, we again have the duality: the pure possibilities themselves have being, they are something which truly is, and thus the particular propositions which are self-given in original production as pure possibilities are also something having being. Among existing triangle-possibilities there are certain possibilities of right-angled and of obtuse triangles; these are actual judgments of existence, and they are particular judgments concerning possibilities. At the same time, however, these possibilities include *a priori* representations of conceivable particular states of affairs, of conceivable existences, and so on.

## § 97. *The universal judgment.*

### a. The origin of the universal [*universellen*] “in general” in the modification of particularity.

WE NOW OPEN THE WAY to original universal judgments, therefore to the original self-giving production of the content of universal judgments, universal propositions. We will see forthwith that the “in general” again plays its role therein but acquires an essentially modified sense.

We again proceed from acts of judgment in a sphere of actuality. Let us assume that in this sphere, by experience and conceptual thought, we perceive that this A here and that A there are B, and that in the progress of perception we find another A again and again, and again and again find that it is B.

In this progress arises an ever stronger presumption with each new instance; we expect to find again the newly apprehended *A* as being *B*. But not only that: in this progress there comes into being an open horizon of possible *A*'s as real possibilities, which we presume are always to be found. We now add, which we are always free to do, some *A* or other referred to this open sphere. Thus we hold a presumptive *A* before ourselves by producing it, and, in the attitude of particularity, "some" *A* or other. And yet again, not in this attitude of mere particularity. That is, what is added anticipatively as "some *A* or other" we apprehend, at the same time, in the form "something or other, whatever it may be," an arbitrary something or other from this open sphere which we represent anticipatively as an open chain of *A*'s. As soon as we form this thought of the universal "something or other," at the same time there is attached to it in its universality a necessity of being *B*. Something or other, no matter what, is as such necessarily *B*.

The novelty is found in this: in the continuous survey of the prescribed and intuitively anticipated chain of new *A*'s eventually to be expected, we have not merely extracted "something or other" in this particular form; rather, the *A* which has been directly extracted (and which indeed is some *A* or other) is such that another in the chain could have been taken arbitrarily instead of it. It is, as it were, the representative for an arbitrary something in general. This "*arbitrary something in general*" is a *completely new form* and, what is more, a *dependent form*; for it pertains to a completely new form of sense of states of affairs, or of judgments, which in its novelty refers back to simple predicative, possible judgments. Correlatively expressed: carried out in judicative thought is *an operation of a completely new kind*, an act of judgment which is not simply limited to placing a predicate by a subject given in a determinate way and determining it conceptually; rather, the act of judgment produces and apprehends the novelty of validity "in general" for such predications. It is in general that *B* is given with *A*, in general that, if something is *A*, it is also *B*.

From this exposition of the original givenness of a universal content "in general," it is evident that this universal *being thus "in general"* is a *higher structural form which includes in its sense the idea of a particular "in general"* and raises it to a higher form. The universal "in general" [*universelle Überhaupt*] has a universality of signification which is encompassed by

thinking in the mode of the "in general." It is a universality which admits the particularization of its sense and which can find, in everything thought under the particular form "an A," its immediate particularizing fulfillment. Every determinate A is an A and is a suitable example for the universal "an A in general." Every A is as such a particularization which is to be joined to the universal. With this arises a unique form, that of the example: an arbitrary A, whatever it may be, e.g., this A—and that naturally as a dependent piece in the corresponding judgment.

It is now necessary to say with regard to universal judgments what was said with regard to particular judgments. Just as every form of a state of affairs erected on determinate terms by the transformation of this or that determinate term into particular terms passes over into particular modifications of this form, so also, by the corresponding transformation into universal terms, the initial form passes over into forms of universal states of affairs. A universal judgment becomes precisely universal by such terms, and it can have several of them. Obviously, one and the same judgment can be *at once* particular and universal, therefore can have terms of both kinds, and, besides, can naturally also have singular terms; every proper name, for example, and every individual "this A" expresses such a judgment.

b. The judgment of totality.

Finally, we have still to mention a very essential transformation of original universal thought, namely, the thought of totality and the *judgment of totality*. If, to begin with, we form the collection "some A or other and some additional A or other," and so on, and further determine it by the thought that every A in general must belong to it, we then obtain the idea of totality. "All A's are B" signifies the plural judgment of totality, equivalent to "Every A of the totality is B"—a logically unnecessary complication of the simple thought that every A is B.

c. The obtaining of *a priori* possibilities in universal judgments of imagination.

If we now pass over to universal judgments of imagination, we are immediately struck by the following contrast between

them and universal judgments in the domain of actuality, in the domain of the experience which originally gives actuality: with the latter, the generality is an empirico-inductive generality, and the necessity which belongs to it is "empirical" or presumptive. We have thus distinguished empirical generality and necessity as against nonpresumptive but unconditioned *a priori* necessity; accordingly, empirical universal judgments as against *a priori* universal judgments. But there is also a relevant *a priori* in empiricism, and one must distinguish a *pure a priori* and an *a priori bound to the empirical*, bound to the empirical and yet such that the empirical is "inessential" to it.

Let us begin with the *pure a priori*. As we have seen, its place of origin is pure imagination. How then do we obtain the act of *a priori* universal judgment and its *a priori* structures? Naturally, we can imagine empirically universal judgments and thus in the realm of pure possibility conceive connections of empirical generality and necessity, e.g., if we imagine an empirical world and in it conceive inductive generalities, general states of affairs, grounded by induction. We then assume, for example, "Generally, under such circumstances, A must be B," or "Generally, when something is A, it must also be B." The being-A causes the being-B to be expected as presumptively necessary. If something of this kind attains quasi-self-givenness in a corresponding intuitiveness, then at the same time a certain kind of possibility, the possibility of empirically universal and empirically necessary connections, attains givenness as an *a priori* possibility. But we do not thus obtain an act of *a priori* universal judgment with matching *a priori* necessities.

Such an act is attained, rather, in an act of judgment which is connected with the obtaining of pure generalities in free variation. We have, for example, obtained the *eidos* sound and have found that a quality, an intensity, and a timbre belong to it and that these qualities, when we run through like sounds, are also like. We can then make a particular judgment: some particular *sound* or other of this *sound-concretum* has in itself a particular moment of the concepts of concrete intensity, quality, etc. But continuing on the basis of an arbitrary repetition, we can also say that the concrete concept "sound" (the *sound-concretum*) includes the dependent partial concepts "this intensity," "this quality" and that every possible individual particular of this *sound-concretum* includes a particular moment of this intensity, this quality. And this is in the activity of free variation. We see

that it is in general so and that the universal state of affairs subsists in the realm of *a priori* possibility; that is, just as the concrete concept includes its partial concepts, so in general every possible state of affairs that is some particular sound or other includes the state of affairs that this same particular sound has intensity and quality.

We can then also carry out a formal abstraction and obtain a *formal law*. We imagine arbitrary individuals, which, by repetition, give arbitrary *concreta*. We construct the formal concepts "individual," "concrete concept," "concrete partial concept," etc.; and we can then see: to every concrete individual belong qualitative moments or parts; to every concrete individual, partial concepts; and every individual particularization of one and the same concrete concept has predicates corresponding to each partial concept of this *concretum*. Every internal moment, every part (in the broadest sense) of a particular, is subordinate to a predicate which is a partial concept of its concrete concept.

Let us start from the thought "a sound," which we have constructed originally in pure imagination, therefore *a priori*, and therefore of such a kind that we have before us, as *a priori* possibilities, individual particular sounds and, in relation to them, the concept of sound constructed originally in absolute identity. We analyze an arbitrary intuitive example of sound and find quality, intensity, and the corresponding concepts or predicates. We can then construct particular states of affairs in self-givenness and in the sense of *a priori* particularities: some sound or other has some quality or other, some sound or other has some intensity or other—these understood naturally as *a priori* possibilities.

But we obtain still more here. If we make a free variation and at our pleasure take some sound or other from the *a priori* possibilities, then we recognize that every sound whatsoever (as an *a priori* possibility) has some quality or other, every sound has some intensity or other. One can also say: every possible sound, every sound conceivable in general, includes a possible intensity. But this is ambiguous; for it could mean that the possibility of a sound in general carries with it the fact that I can also think it as being determined by the concept of intensity. This would leave open the possibility that it can be thought of just as well without intensity, in the same way as I can imagine, for example, that some sound or other belongs to the kind of sound typical of the violin. But what must be said



here is this: that in the original constitution of some possible sound or other we can in general see that the thought of being-a-sound includes that of having-an-intensity. In the universal attitude, in which we think a sound in general, we also think its having intensity as included therein; in the same way, its having quality, its having timbre. We can also say: if, by varying the example, we construct the *a priori* concept "sound," we find contained in it the partial concepts "quality," "intensity," and "timbre." If we retain the concept of sound and think of some individual particulars or others of this kind in thinking "in general," it belongs in general to this concept that it also participates in the partial concepts of sound. To be completely general: *if one concept is contained in another, then it is true of the corresponding predication that they are contained in one another*, that is to say, that universally every subject which has the last concept as a predicate must also have the first.

Certainly, when we go beyond the pure concept of sound into this general sphere of concepts in general, and the objects of concepts in general, we have then accomplished a broader generalization, a purely *formal generalization* and, in the sphere of formal generalities, an *a priori* thinking "in general." As in our example, so in general we obtain general states of affairs brought out in a pure *a priori*, states of affairs which have as their form an implication, an into-one-another, a being-included-in-one-another. Proceeding from the lowest, absolutely concrete concepts, which arise from individual repetition and from their concrete partial concepts, and ascending to concepts of a higher level of generality, we can always determine such connections of *a priori* implication anew; and each furnishes us self-given judgment-complexes which are, as we can now also say, apodictically universal. This can also be stated in formal generality in universal judgments and be grasped in an absolutely formal self-constitution. We always have the remarkable characteristic here that the constructions realized in pure *a priori* thought, therefore in pure imagination, give rise to structures which can be taken as objective and that these *a priori* structures enter into relations of inclusion with constructions to be newly realized. Furthermore, for these constructions of *a priori* universal judgments of implication, just as for the previous constructions of *a priori* particular judgments, we have the absolute certainty that whenever we wish to produce these structures—with the same content, of course—we must also find the same relations of

inclusion. Also, these relations can always attain self-givenness in judgments properly *a priori*, which, however, obviously belong to a completely different line of descent and accompany all absolutely self-giving constructions as correlates.

### § 98. *Recapitulation.*

LET US GLANCE OVER what we have obtained and consolidate our terms in an appropriate compliance with tradition—to be sure, with some modification.

Our point of departure was that of the original categorical judgment. In this judgment, an individual subject is apprehended in itself and directly. Through all its modifications, there are individual objects functioning as original terms, and their conceptual predicates are themselves originally material predicates. All such judgments, however complicated they may otherwise be, we call singular [*singuläre*] judgments. Their terms are called singular terms. Linguistically, every proper name and every conceptual predicate which is considered actual, like “red,” “house,” and the like, designates a singular term. Hence the following levels emerge:

1. *Singular judgments* are those which have only singular terms. To be sure, these judgments again have their gradations, the lowest level being the singular categorical judgment of the most simple formal group, like “This is red,” and so forth.

2. We obtain this level under the heading of the *particular judgment*. Every singular term can be particularized, and thereby the whole sense of the judgment becomes particular. There then result the multiple forms of particular judgments, according to whether we particularize more or fewer singular terms.

3. This level is that of the *universal judgment*. To it belongs every judgment which has at least *one* universal term. The rest can either remain all singular or even be particular. *Particularity and universality are not mutually exclusive within the same judgment.*

Another distinction is that of *individual* and *general* [*générale*] judgments. This means that the terms in categorical judgments need not be individual objects only; they can also be general objectivities. Nevertheless, the judgment can be an un-

modified one, a singular judgment, and accordingly both of them—not only the individual singular judgment, but also the general—can undergo one of the modifications “in general.” There are therefore, for example, individual universal judgments (with an individual core in the form of “something or other in general”) and general universal judgments.

Still another *distinction*, which *intersects the two previously mentioned*, is that of *singular judgments* [*Einzelurteile*]<sup>1</sup> and *plural judgments*, therefore those with one or more subjects or one or more predicates (or relative objects). The distinction intersects the first two named; this means, e.g., that every individual universal judgment can be a singular or a plural judgment or also, conversely, that a general singular judgment can be a plural judgment, and so on, in indifferently many combinations.

1. [In parentheses, Husserl adds that *Einzelurteile* “are also often called *singuläre*”; this is a peculiarity of German—in English both terms are translated as “singular.”—Trans.]

## APPENDIXES

## Appendix I

(to §§ 40 and 43) / *The Apprehension  
of a Content as "Fact" and the Origin of  
Individuality. Modes of Time and Modes  
of Judgment*

"THE SAME" OBJECT which I just now imagine could also be given in experience: this same merely possible object (and thus *every* possible object) could also be an actual object. Conversely: I can say of every actual object that it need not be actual; it would then be "mere possibility."

"The same object"—this does not mean, therefore: the object *pure and simple*; for, when we simply speak of an object, we posit it as actual, we intend the actual object. Rather, it is a matter here, and in all similar turns of phrase, of a *content which is capable of being seen as identical*, which, as "complete sense," lies both in the experiencing consciousness, or rather in its noema, and there has the experiential character (the correlate of experience) "actual"; and, in the corresponding imaginary consciousness of quasi-experience, it has the character "imagined" (correlate of quasi-experience "quasi-actual"). If, by a change of attitude, I accomplish a positing of possibility, the positing of what is imagined as such, then what is thus posited, the possibility, is precisely this complete sense itself. It is called possibility as possible actuality; i.e., every such complete sense could evidently be the "content" of an actuality, could be experienced with the character "actual."

This obviously constitutes a *concept of "mere representation,"* that is to say, the concept of a thing as merely represented: this concept is the *noematic essential stock which is identically the same in a positing of experience and in a positing of quasi-experience*. It is not the correlate of a pure imagining (which in an entirely *other* sense is itself called mere representation) but a

common essence in the perceived as such and in what is imagined as corresponding to the perceived according to an exact parallelism.

This concept is, therefore, the *individual essence* of the particular object that obviously encompasses both the identical temporal duration of the object and the identical distribution of temporal fullness over this duration. But temporal duration is here an identical essence, just as much as color, etc. Likeness, similarity, and so in general the unities of coincidence unite the "object" posited in the mode "actual" (precisely this essence with the character "actual") with what is posited in the mode "quasi-actual." This is done in the same way as, in general, regularities, in whatever modes and modifications, achieve coincidence, and, in particular, in such a way that what is immediately combined are precisely the individual essences. Individual essence coincides with individual essence, or is in a relation of similarity with it, or is brought into contrast with it.

But to what extent is this individual "essence" a *universal*? An essence in the usual sense? It is still disjoined in the coincidence of the object posited as "actual" and that posited as "quasi-actual" and tends toward unity in the case of their perfect likeness—but in the noematic stock of each lived experience there is *always one* individual essence. And if we oppose two perfectly like objects, this means naturally that one identical universal is particularized here as an individual actuality and there as an individual possibility. In this way, one and the same color is particularized here and there, or a duration here and there, and this for every point of time.

But now let us consider the fact that relations of coincidence take place not only for two objects of experience—let us say, for example, for two objects given in a unique presence—but also for two objects of which one is given in a remembrance and the other simultaneously in a perception. The times of the objects which are experienced are different, and still they are in "perfect coincidence." It is the same in quasi-experience as long as we move within the contextual unity of such a quasi-experience. On the other hand, if we take intuitions which do not belong in the same context, which do not belong to the unity of a single experience or quasi-experience—the one being, for example, a perception (or a quasi-perception), the other a quasi-remembrance—a "complete coincidence" can certainly take place; but while in the preceding case we view the like times as different

times within a single time, as different but similar temporal stretches within this time, and while possibly we might be able to see this with self-evidence, there is no question of this in the other case. If I imagine within a remembrance, what is remembered is then something past in comparison with what is now quasi-perceived in the one interconnected imagining; if, however, I have an imagining which is associated with the first but is *not* in connection with it, then what is imagined in the one and what is imagined in the other have no relation at all of earlier and later.

Let us first consider the case of a unique presence, within which appears a sameness of different individuals. The "complete essence" of the two sides coincides; temporal duration coincides with temporal duration. In the process of original experience, which is a process of constitution, a constitution that is continually constructive and is always continually positing such and such a content—a content which is in a continual becoming in the continual flux of changeable givennesses which "exist," a content which expands in being—the *one* and the *other* enduring individual, or their enduring and their duration, arise. They arise in an encompassing process in two places, through different modes of givenness, in different posittings, etc.; every new positing (positing as now [*Jetztsetzung*]) posits its content in the form of a new point of time. This means that the individual difference of the point of time is the correlate of a certain primal establishment through a mode of givenness which maintains an identical correlate in the continual transformation of the retentions which pertain to the new now; to the change itself corresponds a continual alteration of orientation as a change in the mode of givenness of the identical.

However, one must demand still greater clarity here. Every new original present which lights up is a new immediate "positing," with a "content" which, in the continual flux of the presentation (of the becoming of ever new points of the present), can be a content which remains identical in its essence or else is continually variable in its essence. Let us assume that it endures as unaltered: in this flux, the content, identical in its essence, is present to consciousness as continually different, as "new," as continually other, although as precisely the same "in content." In other words, specifically the same content is present to consciousness as "factual," as different in its existence, and, in its individuality, as continually other in the succession of

presents. It is as such that it is present originally to consciousness. Here is *the point of origin of individuality, of factuality*, of the difference in existence. The most original having, or *apprehension of a content as fact* and of a different content as a *different fact*, is accomplished *in the actuality of the original presentation* and in the consciousness of the firsthand present of this content. The content is in the mode of the now, is an "actual content" for consciousness, and is in this content individual, the only thing of this content; at least the first and most radical character of individual existence makes its appearance in the form of being-now. A second possible character, being-here, already presupposes it. We will not go more deeply into this matter here.

In the case of immanent objects, that is, objects of sensation, we can study how being-now is connected with individual existence, with the differentiation of the contents which, constantly coming forward, supersede one another in the flux of consciousness. Being-now is necessarily connected with, and indissolubly linked to, the actuality of the consciousness positing at first hand the content in question; this actually positing consciousness, which, as immanent firsthand consciousness, is *eo ipso* actually positing, posits at first hand a temporal position of the content; it posits *this content in the form of a temporal position*, and this position is *not* the mode "now." For the mode of now continually changes, in conformity with the change of firsthand, presentative consciousness, in retentions which give the "just past" in continuously differing gradations or levels; through all these continuous lived experiences of consciousness goes the consciousness of the same individual as content, having its determinate temporal position but having it in continually flowing modes of pasts. Firsthand consciousness posits the temporal position as "now," and the pasts are pasts of the same content or, rather, of the same individual which is termed the content of this now; they are, *according to their form*, past nows, and, *according to their content*, they are the same content which is not *now* but is in continual modification. The now is *actually* now in firsthand consciousness; and it is a *modified* now, a past now, in retentional consciousness. And yet, through all these modifications it is *the same now*, as the now of the same content, its relative situation with regard to the continually new firsthand consciousness changing and thus taking on an ever new mode of the past. The past is changing without end; ideally, the



change goes to infinity. And thus it goes for any being that is given now, that is given in firsthand consciousness and in the continual process of this consciousness, which for every ego is a unique process without end. Every now is, as the firsthand character of the existence of the content which through it becomes an individual fact, the source-point of an infinite continuum of pasts; and the totality of pasts, actual and still possible, is so remarkably structured that all lead back to the one process of original presentation. Every past is unilaterally coordinated with an original now and its content; all are separated in linear continua of endless pasts and are joined together in a two-dimensional system in which these linear continua continuously blend into one another and constitute a *single* linear continuum of linear continua—a continuum which is precisely determined by the linear continuum of the flow of firsthand presents.

What, therefore, is the *identity of the temporal position*, or, rather, the identity of the *one* time as a one-dimensional linear continuum over against this two-dimensional continuum of eternally flowing pasts which have one unique source-point in the momentary present, a present which in turn runs flowing through a linear continuum? Every line of pasts designates a temporal point; the continuum of these lines designates the continuum of the one ("objective") time. Thus, every temporal point is the form of identity of the same existent thing which is constituted in a complete system of pasts which flow out from the same source-point, i.e., from the same "now," and which is determined univocally and uniformly during all infinity. Its position in time, and then, more precisely, its situationally determined duration, gives for each individual a determination which concerns its existence, its factuality as such. It is ordered according to its own system of pasts and is the identical element which, continually fading away, sinks ever further into the past. It remains *the same fact*, and because of this it is different from every other fact, each being differently determined in time (we still disregard the question of coexistence).

The *essence of factual being*, as being that is constituted in time-consciousness and at first hand in presentative consciousness, is to appear and disappear, appear once and for all and disappear perpetually, and yet to do this in such a way that it is past once and for all, after each of the phases of its past: each phase of the past takes place only once. But one-dimensional

identical time is only an objectivation; it does not really exhaust all that we understand by time and what here is its essentially necessary form. The heading *objective time*, i.e., the continuum of points of time "in itself," completely misses the distinction of the modes "present" and "continuum of pasts"; yet it is to this distinction, and necessarily so, that both our commonplace and our scientific judgments refer; hence the expressions "now," "present" (in a loose, but typically intelligible, sense), and "future," "the near and distant past," and so on, are completely indispensable—even if the question of knowing how vague expressions of this kind can attain an exactitude must also have its proper place. Here it does not concern us.

Every point of time is constituted as a unity of arisings and descendings of a now given at first hand through the endless continuity of retentions; and what is true of the point is also true of every duration. Everything that is, *is* so far as it *becomes in infinitum* and is *engulfed* in the continuum of the corresponding pasts. It is the *identical element in the flux of the change* from present into pasts of continuous gradation. "Enduring" is constituted in the flux of an ever new becoming, of the becoming of ever new being; it is in a continual springing-up and passing-away. In the continual springing-up and passing-away (sinking down into the past) of harmonious content an *identical substrate* is constituted as the identical element which always *becomes* and, in becoming, always *is* as the persisting, and which endures throughout its time: inasmuch as every point lights up the new present in becoming, while, "passing away," it sinks into the modes of the past, it constitutes through all these modes its position in the objective past, its objective temporal position, in relation to which all these modes are modes of givenness and have a relation to the firsthand point of the now. We have, therefore, *two* fundamental *processes*, which, however, are two inseparable aspects of one and the same concrete total process:

1. The continuous appearance of a new punctual present, in which what exists as becoming enters the present ever and again, appearing with a content always new.
2. The continuous passing-away of every point of the present or point of appearance of the becoming, in which, however, identically the same temporal point is constituted.

*Duration* is original duration, present or past, and it is *itself an objective unity*, like the temporal point. It is objectively con-

stituted as identical through all modes, from the most original moment down to any level of having-been or the past. Duration is originally constituted; i.e., the first point of the present, which constitutes the appearance of something becoming, *is*, and already sinks into the modes of the past; and, in unity with the continuity of this sinking, a punctual present ever newly appears. Thus we have a *continuum of continua*, a continuous series of continuous coexistences. In this continuous series, each continuum serving as a phase has a unique point of appearance and a unique mode of pasts, so that these continua of pasts are also continually differentiated according to "length" and in corresponding points have a like gradation-form with differing content. In this continuous succession, original duration is constituted as original, so that there is a thoroughgoing successive coincidence, and in a determinate way. But this succession does not break off when the duration originally enters the mode of *having-been*. In the continuation of the process of sinking-down, in connection with which new contents no longer appear as new presentations pertaining to that which endures, the stretch constituted in its entirety sinks down and maintains its identity as a stretch, that is, as a duration which now always endures as having been in the endlessness of passing-away; it maintains its identity in the having-been.

Can one seriously relate what one calls *the modes of time* (the present, the past) to *judgment*, to protodoxa [*Urdoxa*] (non-modalized belief), as correlates of the modes of judgment or of belief? And, correlatively, do these modes of time designate *modes of existence*, inasmuch as the consciousness of the having-been of belief is, in an acceptable sense, consciousness of what exists?

Is belief in general differentiated when we pass, for example, from belief which concerns essence (as in the seeing of essence) to belief in individual being? Is being-there [*Dasein*] a mode of existence in addition to being-essence [*Wesenssein*],<sup>1</sup> and must one then speak also of specific differentiation in this case, as if the genus "existence" were differentiated into being-essence, being-that, and whatever else?

1. [Usually *Dasein*, literally "being there," means simply existence, factual existence, i.e., the kind of being a thing or a fact has. But in this passage Husserl employs its literal meaning to provide contrast with the kind of being which characterizes essence.—Trans.]

"Firsthand consciousness" is a source-consciousness from which spring the multiple modifications of all the acts which "coincide" with it and which all "believe" the same thing, which are all conscious of the being of this thing and find their fulfillment in it. These modifications are everywhere the same. Therefore, if we consider consciousness which gives at first hand, it is obviously not a genus which is differentiated in the same way as the genus "color" (and, in general, care is called for in connection with generalizations, even with those to which we are indebted for concepts like genus and species). The consciousness of essence has another and more complex structure than the consciousness of being-there. When we study the consciousness of being-there, we find in it temporal modal differences and, in a completely necessary way, their continuous connections—the fusions, "identifications," and so on, which go through them. But should one call them *modes of positing*, as if belief as such changed the specific quality and not the *sense*, in a way conforming to rule? We find a necessary change in firsthand consciousness where existence [*Dasein*] is in question, it is true; but it concerns the entire noetico-noematic structure and not, for example, what constitutes the doxical in it.

Certainly, one can also call the temporal modalities, modalities of "existence" [*Existenz*], especially when one understands by "existence"—as the usual, more narrow, meaning of the word allows—precisely *being-there* and, equivocally, *what-is-there* [*Daseiendes*]. The temporal modalities—present, past, and future—are modes of *what-is-there*, of the *individual* existent [*Seienden*] as *temporally* existent.

Originally, the individual existent is given in original presence and, more precisely, in the change of these temporal modalities; it is given in this change of endlessly "flowing time," in which fixed or *objective time* is constituted as *unity* (of the mutually correlated multiplicities of what flows): that time (as the fixed form of fixed "being," in which alteration only apparently transgresses fixity), therefore, which is the essential form of all of what-is-there (in itself, fixed). To attain this time, it is essential that we put aside recollection and the modification of recollection, in which a stretch of original presentation and presence is given in the mode of recollection. When we do this, we see originally, or have "again" intuitively, the continual awakening of ever new primal source-points of the now, and with this, new temporal positions; but they do not give them-

selves originally as such in a mere *now-point* but in the continual unity which goes through the continuity of flowing pasts (as the just-now-having-been) and is already visible in the least stretch of the flow. In recollection, everything is modified in corresponding fashion, the positings as repositings, the now as a renewed now, the past as a renewed past, and the unity of the temporal point and the temporal stretch as the essential form of the individual is no longer apprehended at first hand but is re-apprehended.

If we have, in addition, a second recollection, relative to another individual and to a stretch of time pertaining to it, then it seems that—since the two are intuitively regiven—we would have to have self-evidence with regard to their *temporal relations*. But how does it happen that we can be confused about this relation, that we can be swayed by doubt and error about the succession, about the intervals, even when we have an intuitive clarity in the recollections? Why is there need of, as there seems to be, the re-establishment of an encompassing unity of recollection in which the two recollected stretches are coordinated in an objective point of view according to their succession?

It is clear that, with regard to this, one cannot argue in the following way: the relation is given in the essence of the points in relation; an original intuition or appropriate equivalent re-intuition [*Veranschaulichung*] of the points in relation must, therefore, suffice to make the relation visible. For here it is necessary to solve exactly the problem which Hume has posed for the phenomenologist in his separation of relations. Why are certain classes of relations founded in the *essence* of the points in relation, and why are others not? And isn't time an *a priori* form with *a priori* laws of order? But can this be otherwise understood than by holding that the *temporal points*, like the qualitative species, found *temporal distances* and *temporal relations in general*, to which precisely the temporal laws apply?

## Appendix II

### (to § 76) / *The Self-Evidence of Assertions of Probability—Critique of the Humean Conception*

THE CLARIFICATION of the relations between presumption and conjecture (or actual possibility and probability) has great significance for the question concerning the justification of the grounding of statements about the future by means of actual experience, especially for a very well-known kind of inferences from past to future: the *causal*. If we know in advance that an event of type *U* necessarily involves an event of type *W*, that it "produces" *W*, then, when *U* is given to us, we expect *W* as a matter of course. And, furthermore, with indubitable right, since it is a matter of syllogistic inference. But how do we ever know that there is such a connection of necessary temporal succession between events of type *U* and type *W*? What justifies the conviction that, given the circumstances *U*, a *W* must take place or that any causal relation exists at all? Since necessity is equivalent to lawfulness, with this we find ourselves led to the question of *the justification of universal judgments of experience*. By what right do we in general assume that any relation of experience holds *universally*, that this or that law of nature subsists or, even, the law of laws: the proposition that all being and everything that comes to pass are encompassed in one unique system of laws which embraces the whole of nature and the totality of time?

Hume, as the first to have made this problem the object of an extensive inquiry, ended with skepticism. He found no possibility of justifying even the most insignificant question of causality, to say nothing of any natural law and the affirmation of the unity of the laws of nature or, as he usually says, the uniformity of nature's course. With complete rigor he separated the sphere

of rational insight from the sphere of blind opinion. On the one side is the domain of the *relations of ideas*.<sup>1</sup> In this domain relations are inseparably linked to the points in relation, therefore are necessarily cogiven in intuition, and thus (by a generalizing abstraction) we can obtain the laws of relation founding the essence of the concepts in question. Every attempt to represent a state of the determinations which fall under these laws as diverging from them is charged with evident contradiction and is hence impracticable. The negation of these laws signifies a manifest absurdity. On the other side is the domain of *matters of fact*,<sup>2</sup> the general assertions concerning facts and the singular assertions of fact which presuppose them. The causal relationship is not a relation like that of higher or lower in the case of qualities and intensities. The necessity which links the facts to the cause, the producing and being produced, which we so gladly represent to ourselves according to an animistic schema, is nothing which can ever be seen in an individual case.

There is therefore no place here for a generalizing abstraction which would permit us to infer the general from the individual case. And this is in conformity with the idea that nothing in the content of the fact which we call the *cause* and in that which we call the *effect* so demands the necessary connection of the two that a dissolution of the connection would be unthinkable. The denial of a causal relation and, correlatively, the denial of any natural law, no matter how certain, does not imply the slightest absurdity. In this whole domain, according to Hume, one can find nothing which is rationally justifiable; every conceivable attempt to exhibit the sources of justification which confer a rational privilege on any such judgments, as opposed to their contraries, comes to nothing. The only thing one can do here is to explore the psychological origin of the relevant judgments and concepts, i.e., search out, in the actual human psyche, the sources from which arises the semblance of rationality of these judgments and, above all, also to explain genetically how in general we come to believe, beyond what is given in perception and memory, in what is to come, how the *feeling of necessity* arises, and how it is confused with that objective necessity which has its seat exclusively in the sphere of the relations between ideas.

It is easy to see that this—like every other—skepticism is

1. [Husserl employs the English phrase.—Trans.]

2. [Here, too, Husserl uses English.—Trans.]

involved in an evident contradiction: If judgments of experience admit of no justification, then likewise no psychological explanation is possible; if all the convictions of the sciences based on experience are illusions, then psychology cannot provide us the satisfaction of exhibiting the source of these illusions or even of marking them as illusions: for psychology is certainly itself a science based on experience and rests on the very principles whose lack of validity it attempts to uncover.

Naturally, Hume himself did not fail to see this circle; it is precisely on this account that he called himself a skeptic: he recognized that his theories were not wholly satisfactory and, on the other hand, he saw no way of escaping their paradoxicality.

In his despairing efforts to master these difficulties, he even considered the idea that perhaps the *principles of probability* could be adapted to the justification of our causal inferences and, in general, all our judgments of experience which extend beyond the immediately given. He rejected this idea. He believed he could show that judgments of probability spring from the same psychological principles of blind habit and association as judgments of causality and would thus bring us no further.

It is clear that his failure here was inevitable because he did not make clear to himself the essence of purely phenomenological analysis in opposition to the psychological and, in connection with this, because he did not clarify the nature of the rational justification which is possible in the phenomenologically realizable domain of the relations between ideas. In the domain of the relations between ideas, reason consists in nothing other than the fact that here we can raise the laws of relation to an adequate consciousness of generality, that we can make clear to ourselves the sense of such a general self-evidence and can then further recognize that the objective validity of the laws themselves consists in the ideal possibility of such an adequate general consciousness. In conformity with an analogous method, one will also look into the domain of judgments of experience which set forth general and necessary connections. If we know that judgments of experience of this kind can have only the dignity of judgments of probability, we must then investigate—before all questions of their psychological origin—whether the principles pertaining to objectivity are not here also to be apprehended through adequate generalization, therefore if reason is not the same in the sphere of probability as in the sphere of the relations between ideas.

Where Hume asked how it happens that a great number of



possibilities so "act on the mind" that they awaken assent or belief, we ask ourselves from our point of view: *with regard to a series of favorable chances, do we have the right to objectively assert a probability?*

To clarify the question, we go back to Hume's example of the die. Four faces of the die are provided with a certain figure; the other two are blank. If the die is thrown, we hold it to be more probable that the figure, rather than a blank face, will appear, and in fact we hold it to be twice as probable, in conformity with the proportion 4:2. There are six equal possibilities, each having the probability  $1/6$ . There are four favorable chances for the appearance of the figure; thus the probability works out at  $4/6$ . Isn't this evaluation justifiable by self-evidence? That the falling die, if we have no grounds for assuming that it is not uniform, in general falls to begin with on one of the faces, we know from experience. We have experienced again and again that one face turns up, and we also assume this in the present case. *With what right* do we judge so? It is, we will say, self-evident that the judgment "A thrown die falls in the way specified" differs from a proposition uttered at random in that it has *grounds in experience*; and it is self-evident that every instance of previous experience which we remember lends *weight* to our proposition, and the weight increases with the number of previous experiences.

It is *from this* that Hume ought to have started, from self-evidence: the fact that in circumstances *U*, a *W* appears, *in and of itself already* lends something like weight to the assertion "In general, in circumstances *U*, *W* appears"; and this weight increases with the number of cases experienced. If there are no contradictory instances, no conflicting perceptions or remembrances, then the assertion "In general, *W* appears after *U*" is a statement of probability justified by more or less weight. In our example, the situation is this: the remembrances motivate precisely the evidence of the indeterminate judgment "Some one or other of the faces turns up." Now if this *indeterminate* judgment is given with a certain weight of experience and is motivated as probable to a certain degree, it is then further evident that this *weight is divided* among the six cases, that these cases are all *equally possible*, if experience up to now favors none of them, i.e., if these cases are completely symmetrical with regard to the motivating power of experience or if the weights of all six cases are equal. Let us assume, then, that there has been a preference;

thus, for example, four and only four faces bear a figure; four of the possible cases, therefore, have the common determination that a figure turns up. It is then self-evident that the hypothesis "A figure will turn up," insofar as it includes four of the equally probable cases, receives a fourfold weight in comparison with the probability of the appearance of a determinate side; and it is self-evident that its weight is to the weight of the opposing hypothesis—"A blank face will turn up," which includes only two possibilities—in the proportion of 4:2.

In observations of this kind, which require to be refined and made more precise, there is absolutely no talk of the "mind" of man, of the effects which he experiences on the basis of empirico-psychological law. On the contrary, *we simply look toward the given*, the peculiar relation of motivation, the experienceable character which the general *hypothesis* obtains through the *weight* of previous experiences, and we accomplish here, exactly as in the domain of the relations between ideas, an ideating abstraction in which we consider the *principle of probabilities* in question, according to essential necessity. *Every assertion of probability*, whether purely symbolic or partially intuitive, is then justified; *it is an assertion of correct probability if it permits us to assess it by what is firsthand and genuinely empirical*, if the power of motivation of the intuitive situation which belongs essentially to it can be experienced here: if, therefore, the justification is given in the fulfillment. Since it is a question of relations subject to essential laws, we can formulate a principle here and can also say: an empirical assertion is justified if it can be grounded precisely on such a principle, i.e., if the principle guarantees the ideal possibility of its verification.

*Afterword to Husserl,  
Experience and Judgment:  
Phenomenology and  
Philosophy of Language*

By Lothar Eley

1. Husserl conceived of phenomenology as a working philosophy. In "teamwork," as we would now say, researchers and philosophers were to work out a subject—for example, the constitution of an object of perception. Husserl saved his manuscripts in order to offer working foundations for such scientific discussion. *Experience and Judgment* is an example of such collaboration. The intention of this work is to make available certain research manuscripts in the area of logic.<sup>1</sup> Ludwig Landgrebe comments that the text is the

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This Afterword is a translation of the *Nachwort* prepared by Professor Doctor Lothar Eley for the new edition of *Erfahrung und Urteil* soon to be published by Felix Meiner Verlag of Hamburg. This text, translated by Karl Ameriks, is used by permission of Felix Meiner Verlag.

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1. Texts from manuscripts which were also used in *Experience and Judgment* have recently been published in Edmund Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie, Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925, Husserliana IX* (The Hague, 1962). As to construction of the text,

result of a collaboration of a wholly unique kind, which can be characterized roughly as follows. The *content of the thought*, the raw material, so to speak, stems from Husserl himself. There is nothing here which was simply added by the editor or which in itself involves his own interpretation of phenomenology; but the *literary* form is his responsibility [p. 7].<sup>2</sup>

2. In this Afterword, the relation of language to transcendental-phenomenological demonstration is to be critically exhibited.

J. L. Austin suggested that, in place of the slogan "ordinary language philosophy," it was more correct to speak of "linguistic phenomenology."<sup>3</sup> The method of *Experience and Judgment*, however, is not one of language analysis. Husserl does not attempt to clarify the primacy given by logic to predicative judgment by recourse to the grammar of language. According to Husserl, what is intended and cointended in language can be brought to light only by means of the transcendental guiding principle, the *ego-cogito-cogitatum* relation. For him, predicative judgment refers back to prepredicative experience. If *Experience and Judgment* were to be classified within the framework of modern philosophy of science at all, the task of this book would have to be designated as that of a "logical propaedeutic"; the predicative judgment and a few logical structures, such as a state of affairs and a set, are to be constructed step by step, *a primis fundamentalis*.

3.1. Sciences and philosophy refer to language, though it is according to its own horizon of questions that each science

see *ibid.*, pp. 544 f.; for ascertainment of the original pagination see *ibid.*, p. 648, and the Introduction of the editor, Walter Biemel, p. xxiii. See, further, Edmund Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis: Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918-1926*, *Husserliana* XI (The Hague, 1966). As to the construction of the text, see *ibid.*, p. xxi, and the Introduction of the editor, Margot Fleischer, p. xxi. Also Rudolf Boehm has prepared an initial overview of the manuscripts which were used in *Experience and Judgment* and which are available in the Husserl-Archives in Louvain.

2. Unless otherwise indicated, pages given in parentheses refer to *Experience and Judgment*. [Page numbers refer to the present translation.]

3. Rüdiger Bubner, Introduction to *Sprache und Analysis: Texte zur englischen Philosophie der Gegenwart* (Göttingen, 1968), p. 24; Kuno Lorenz, *Elemente der Sprachkritik: Eine Alternative zum Dogmatismus und Skeptizismus in der analytischen Philosophie* (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), pp. 17, 106 ff.

presents its subject, i.e., expresses it in language. For this reason alone, the question of language takes on special importance.

In *logic*, as in *linguistics*, language becomes an object. One might conceive the task of philosophy in respect to language to be the question of the conditions of the possibility of the linguistic categories of the science of language. In particular, this would involve showing how language makes logic possible.

In the present text, language is, to be sure, the object of investigation, but with a restriction: language, insofar as it is the object of *linguistics*, is not to be reflected on. A note in *Experience and Judgment* expressly emphasizes that here the terms "syntax" and "syntactical" should not, therefore, be confused with the linguistic concepts of syntax and syntactical form (p. 209, n. 1). In respect to judgmental propositions, Husserl distinguishes the syntactic forms (of subject and predicate) from the core-forms; these are, according to him, "substantivity" and "adjectivity." In view of these categories, he also comments:

What is said about adjectivity, substantivity, etc., must not be understood as if we were concerned here with differences of linguistic form. Even though the designations of these core-forms are drawn from the mode of designation of linguistic forms, nothing more is meant by them than *difference in the manner of apprehension*. At one time an object or an objective moment can become a theme as existing "for itself," and at another in the form of "in something," and by no means must these differences in the manner of apprehension always correspond also to a difference in the linguistic form of expression—indeed, for indication of such differences in the manner of apprehension, many languages simply do not have different kinds of words with accompanying word-forms at their disposal, as is the case with German, but must use other means for this [pp. 210–11].

Finally, Husserl uses still a third determination, which is also found in German grammar: the division of a complex sentence into a main and a subordinate clause. In the text, both expressions are used as terms

which here again . . . *primarily* indicate nothing linguistic. On the contrary, the mode of categorial synthesis, which confers signification on the linguistic expression, *can*, but need not *necessarily*, find its expression in grammatical hypotaxis, depending on whether it is allowed by the structure of the language [p. 228].

This last quotation above all makes it clear that language has its measure in that which gives a linguistic expression *meaning*; both the meaning-bestowing act *as such* and the meaning *as such* intended by the act are *nonlinguistic*. Language is not the guiding principle of meaning; on the contrary, *meaning is the guiding principle of language*.

Meaning can be *mutely* referred to; this is especially requisite when the "difference in the manner of apprehension cannot at all be expressed in a particular language" (cf. p. 210).

The realm of meaning is, as such, nonlinguistic; but, if it is to be a *realm of meaning*, it is directed toward articulation in language. To this extent, meaning is *prelinguistic*.

In the present text, language itself is not the topic; as the title indicates, only *judgment, predication*, is investigated. The prelinguistic is thus thematized as "prepredicative . . . experience" (cf. pp. 69 ff.). If this restriction of the investigation is noted, it is easy to understand why the prepredicative conditions of predication are demonstrated in Part I and predication is presented in Part II.

3.2. According to Husserl, meaning (the realm of meaning) is the guiding principle of language and especially of *reflection* on language. Of course, if we want to *represent* what predication is, then we are already using language. But here language serves only to *elucidate* what is intended in thought. It has the further function of communicating thoughts to others. Language thus has the character, *first*, of *elucidation* and, *second*, of *communication*.

Language as an object of investigation is different from language as a means of representation. *To this extent*, phenomenology is not caught in a circle of language. The *object* of the investigation of the text is predication, which is one mode of *prelinguistic* thought. Language (especially scientific language) simply represents the meaning-bestowing act and its meaning.

We can now understand the headings of the first two parts and the tasks indicated by them: Part I, "Prepredicative (Receptive) Experience" and Part II, "Predicative Thought and the Objectivities of Understanding."

3.3. In predicating, we are proximally and for the most part turned toward an object, in that we assert something of it. In our orientation toward an object, language remains *in the background*. It has the function of elucidation and communication. We can also say: the *sense* of the predicate is not the theme; on

the contrary, "through it we are directed to the object" (p. 268). Sense is the "determination of the object" (*ibid.*). (It should be noted that "sense" [*Sinn*] and "meaning" [*Bedeutung*] are used by Husserl as synonymous.)<sup>4</sup>

Reflection on predication, on language, is to be distinguished from the predicative determining of an object:

When we have the sentence from the grammatical, linguistic point of view as a theme, as an objectivity of the human cultural world, then the wording, taken in specific unity with the sense intended in the sentence, belongs to its proper essence (which includes all its predicates). That is, the sense intended by the wording is then itself a component of the object. As a linguistic objectivity, this "has" its signification. The *objective sense* corresponding to such an object is, consequently, a *sense of sense*, a second-level sense. Therefore, from sense as objective sense we must distinguish sense as the determination of an object [p. 268].

Given the fact that language remains in the background in determining an object, in predicating, and that the horizon of language remains *mute*, it is precisely this horizon, as *sense of sense*, which comes to be expressed in language. In *Experience and Judgment* language is thus not only *elucidation and communication*, but, *third*, it is that *horizon in which sense is reflected as sense*.

Is phenomenology then caught up in a *circle of language* after all? Does it not express in *language* the horizon of *language*? The determination of language in *Experience and Judgment* is contradictory. At first, this circle is recognized, insofar as it is *broken*: sense as the sense of sense, as sense of a second level, is distinguished from sense as the determination of an object. The circle of language is broken in the *iteration* of sense. This is to say that the horizon of language remains in the background in predicating (it remains *mute*), but in such a manner that it becomes a *guiding principle* in reflection. Predicating is carried out in the *horizon of language*, even though, in predicating, this horizon remains in the background. On the other hand, according to Husserl, in predicating we are not only *mutely* turned toward an object; rather, predicating is, as such, *pre-linguistic*: in respect to (prelinguistic) thought, language is used *only* as a means of elucidation and communication.

4. *Logische Untersuchungen* (Tübingen, 1968), Vol. II, Pt. I, p. 527.

4.1. Paul Lorenzen maintains that predication *as* predication cannot be circumvented (and especially not doubted), inasmuch as any such attempt already presupposes it, since there would already be predication in the attempt.<sup>5</sup> This argument must be examined.

According to metaphysical tradition, the *predicate* designates a possible function of the *concept* in a judgmental proposition. The *subject* of a proposition designates another possible function of the *concept*. Concepts are either higher or lower concepts, genus or species—they are ordered in a *tree*.<sup>6</sup> Such a tree can be constructed in a progressive bi-unity [*Zwei-Einheit*]:<sup>7</sup>



Concepts are *empirical* when they are gathered by means of experience; to this extent they can go on and on, that is, more and more concepts can always be ordered under them. This subordinating is itself a methodical *process*; it is a *succession*. The condition of the possibility of a succession is the *schema*, the bi-unity. The schema is *sensible* (*synthesis speciosa*), insofar as it schematizes sensory material on the one hand; but, on the other hand, it is also *intelligible*—as a form, it is a form of judgment (*synthesis intellectualis*). The form of judgment is written: “This is a *P*,” in which *P* designates a concept of the given tree; “this” merely indicates the position, which can be filled by subject concepts, i.e., by concepts of a lower level than *P*. The expression “this” is a variable; we can also choose the letter *x* for it. The form is then  $x \in P$  (or  $x \varepsilon P$ );  $\in$  designates the copula and signifies that the predicate is affirmed of the subject (this is expressed in language by “is”);  $\varepsilon$  designates that the

5. Paul Lorenzen, *Normative Logic and Ethics* (Mannheim, 1969), pp. 14 ff.

6. Lothar Eley, *Metakritik der formalen Logik: Sinnliche Gewissheit als Horizont der Aussagenlogik und elementaren Prädikatenlogik* (The Hague, 1969), pp. 323 ff. See also Eley, *Transzendente Phänomenologie und Systemtheorie der Gesellschaft: Zur philosophischen Propädeutik der Sozialwissenschaften* (Freiburg, 1972).

7. Cf. Hermann Weyl, *Philosophie der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft*, 3d rev. ed. (Vienna, 1966), p. 74; E. W. Beth, *The Foundations of Mathematics: A Study in the Philosophy of Science* (Amsterdam, 1965), pp. 194 ff., 444 ff.



predicate is denied of the subject (this is expressed in language by "is not").

The schema cannot be circumvented now, because only in respect to the schema does a circumvention become understandable. The schema is intelligible only in virtue of the form of judgment, because, as Kant showed, the (possible) forms of judgment are modes of the *ego cogito*. According to him, a form of judgment is a *function*, for it is determined as the "unity of an act of ordering various representations under a common one" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 93).

Thus the form of judgment is not unable to be circumvented because any such attempt (to get around it) already presupposes it but rather because it is a *function of the ego cogito*; and *the ego cogito presupposes itself*.

4.2. If it is contended that language cannot be circumvented because any attempt to circumvent it already presupposes language, then the Cartesian argument, which Kant also takes over, is being uncritically transferred to language. Lorenzen does not commit this mistake. For him, predicating is *interlingual*; the guiding principle of its form is not language.<sup>8</sup> Husserl's analysis of language makes understandable the extent to which the functions of the *ego cogito* are prelinguistic.

According to Kant, the *ego cogito* is carried out in respect to appearance; in Husserl's terminology, it is carried out as the "determination of the object" (as "sense"). Reflection on predication is reflection on the form of judgment, i.e., on the concept of a concept; it is reflection of a *second level*. In Husserl's terminology, reflection on predication is reflection on sense, and thus it is sense of a *second level* because the form of judgment is the sense of sense.

For Kant, the *ego cogito* in itself is unknown; that is, reflection on a concept is carried out in respect to appearance. The concept of the second level can be *used* only in respect to appearance; thus reflection schematizes itself in respect to appearance. In Husserl's terminology, sense iterates itself as the sense of sense.

The *ego cogito* presupposes itself; it is *certain* of itself. But

8. Cf. Paul Lorenzen, "Methodisches Denken," in *Methodisches Denken* (Frankfurt am Main, 1968), pp. 26 ff.; Wilhelm Kamlah and Paul Lorenzen, *Logische Propädeutik: Vorschule des vernünftigen Redens* (Mannheim, 1967), pp. 37 f.

it does not know the *truth* of its certainty. And because it does not know the truth of its certainty, it must refer to others, to appearance. Husserl repeats the insight of Hegel. Generally, Husserl speaks not of certainty but of *evidence* [*Evidenz*]; he distinguishes *adequacy* of evidence (= truth of certainty) from *apodicticity* (= certainty). The *ego cogito* is apodictically certain, but its evidence is not adequate.

In respect to an object (of appearance), determination is accomplished *mutely*, for what is to be determined is present, to be sure, but that upon which the determination issues, the *foreconception* [*Vorgriff*], remains anonymous. In the name of its determination, its foreconception, the *ego cogito* is already passed over, as Hegel above all has shown. Husserl repeats this insight.

In the reflection on a determination, on a form of judgment, the foreconception becomes certain *as a guiding principle*, i.e., *as the sense of sense*. For the *ego cogito* knows itself in reflection on a determination *as determining*, i.e., *as present*. Its certainty is apodictic, but its presence is not adequate. This signifies that that which allows the determined to be determinate, the determination of the determined, the foreconception, no longer remains in the background. The act of determining can be certain *as determining* only if it knows the foreconception from which the determining originally issues, i.e., only if it lets itself be guided by the *truth of certainty*, even when the *truth of certainty* is still to be had. *Apodictic and adequate evidence are differentiated as presence and foreconception*.

4.3. In virtue of the *determination* of appearance, in virtue of the *foreconception*, the *ego cogito* is already passed over. Presence is a *temporal feature*. The *ego cogito* can determine appearance only by means of time. According to Husserl, *schematization* is carried out in virtue of time. Thus, that which allows appearance and allows the passing-over of appearance, the foreconception, is at first carried out in the dimension of time. Insofar as the foreconception is a temporal feature, Husserl calls it *protention*. In respect to appearance, presence is elapsing and is preserved as such in presence. Husserl calls this temporal feature *retention*.

According to metaphysical tradition, however, the form of judgment *as such*, and thus the *ego cogito*, is not temporal. On the basis of this presupposition, that which allows appearing—protention—also has its determination through a *contempora-*

neity which itself is not temporal and in which protention and retention are superseded. Protention and retention are symmetrical. For Husserl, protention is reversed retention.<sup>9</sup>

We can now finally determine to what extent predication can be circumvented and to what extent it cannot. The *ego cogito* presupposes itself. But this self-presupposing precisely does not allow the *ego cogito* to become known; rather, it iterates the sense of sense. It is the condition of the possibility that consciousness above all determines objects and that the horizon of the determination remains in the background, i.e., that consciousness determines appearance. The *ego cogito* cannot be circumvented insofar as it is identical with itself. But as just this identity it is at the same time *not identical*, since it experiences its determination through what is prior to it. To this extent, the *ego cogito* has already been circumvented. Insofar as the *ego cogito* functions as the *ego cogito*, insofar as it is first, one cannot ask what is prior to it; but insofar as what is first refers to what is other, what is first becomes untrue.

The circle of the *ego cogito* and the foreconception is clearly that of the circle of language. Thus a fourth feature of language is indicated. Husserl, to be sure, did not explicitly work it out, but he knew of the dialectic involved. The circle of the *ego cogito* and the foreconception is the prerequisite of the fact that language can iterate sense as sense.

4.4. The circle of the *ego cogito* and of the foreconception cannot be traced back to a first element, not even that of language. This is precisely where Husserl differs from Heidegger. For Heidegger, the circle of language means bringing language as language to expression (in language).<sup>10</sup> For Heidegger, as for Husserl, the *ego cogito* becomes untrue by virtue of its foreconception. But according to Heidegger, the truth of the *ego cogito* is founded in what is primary *qua* appearance, i.e., in being and not in the *ego cogito* as the *categorical determination* of appearance. That which allows appearance is to be determined by means of itself; language is to be brought to expression (in lan-

9. Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*, pp. 186, 212; Lothar Eley, *Metakritik der Formalen Logik*, pp. 308 f.; Klaus Held, *Lebendige Gegenwart: Die Frage nach der Seinsweise des transzendentalen Ich bei Edmund Husserl, entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik* (The Hague, 1966), pp. 39 ff.

10. Martin Heidegger, "Der Weg zur Sprache," *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen, 1959), p. 242.

guage) as language. Under this presupposition, the *ego cogito* as a function, as the determination of appearance, is the temptation to comprehend language by something other than language, to comprehend being through beings. This is the attempt of metaphysics, which becomes untrue to language. In particular, according to Heidegger, language is displaced by logic. But language which aims at being comprehended by means of itself overlooks the possibility of demonstration and the rules of such demonstration. Such language (Heidegger's) forgets phenomenology as well as criticism. But (apophantic) logic does grasp—as Husserl recognized—one possibility of language. The possibility of logic is in the *grammar* of language. Language which aims at expressing itself by means of itself must necessarily bring grammar to an end. Its only possibility is onomatopoeics, and that in the form of etymology. Heidegger is able to show that language is primary, and, as primary, circular, only by exhibiting the etymology of expressions like “to sound,” “to hear,” “to happen,” etc. But, on the contrary, what really belongs to language is what is other than it, and this is to be represented according to *rules of grammar*. Language is the dialectic of the *ego cogito* and the foreconception.

5.1. In respect to the determination of an object, the horizon of language remains in the background. What is prelinguistic and objective belongs to language, but it is met only in the *horizon of the linguistic*, and in such a manner that this horizon, viewed straightforwardly, remains anonymous. We have seen that Husserl's determination of this feature of language is contradictory: what is prelinguistic and objective is encountered in the horizon of language; on the other hand, language is secondary to what is objective. Language becomes mere communication.

This contradiction is based on a contradiction in Husserl's *determination of time*. As opposed to idealism, subjectivity for Husserl is itself temporal, i.e., the condition of the possibility of protention is not the present, which elapses; on the contrary, protention is the condition of the possibility of the elapsing present.<sup>11</sup> Thus the guiding principle for any phenomenological description is the *foreconception*. “Preknowledge,” “prefamiliarity,”

11. Cf. Ludwig Landgrebe, “Husserl's Abschied vom Cartesianismus,” *Der Weg der Phänomenologie: Das Problem einer ursprünglichen Erfahrung*, 2d ed. (Gütersloh, 1967), pp. 200 f.

"induction," are only other expressions for "foreconception"—they all indicate aspects of that one horizon already guiding every experience (and especially every description as well) (cf. pp. 31 f.). As proof of this thesis, a few comments from *Experience and Judgment* can be quoted:

Thus, it is not open to doubt that there is no experience, in the simple and primary sense of an experience of things, which, grasping a thing for the first time and bringing cognition to bear on it, does not already "know" more about the thing than is in this cognition alone. Every act of experience, whatever it may be which it experiences in the proper sense, as it confronts itself, has *eo ipso*, necessarily, a knowledge and a potential knowledge having reference to precisely this thing, namely, its unique character, which it has not yet confronted. This preknowledge is indeterminate as to content, or not completely determined, but it is never completely empty; and were it not already manifest, the experience would not at all be experience of this one, this particular thing. *Every experience has its own horizon* [pp. 31–32].

. . . and by "horizon" is meant here the *induction* which belongs essentially to every experience and is inseparable from it, being in the experience itself [p. 32].

Husserl also speaks of an "original 'induction' or anticipation" (p. 32).

The condition of the possibility of anticipation, of induction, and hence of every act of consciousness is *temporality*, and *protention* in particular:

Every lived experience, every consciousness, is subject to the original law of flow. It undergoes a continuity of alterations which cannot be indifferent to its intentionality and which must, therefore, come to light in its intentional correlate. *Every concrete lived experience is a unity of becoming and is constituted as an object in internal consciousness in the form of temporality* [p. 254].

From every past experience there develops a prescription for further experience. But what is the condition of the possibility for prescriptions developing from an experience? If protention is the condition of the possibility of any description, then a prescription cannot develop out of a past experience, because this determines itself according to the measure of the past. Hence the basis for prescriptions developing out of each experience is rather that every presentation is a presentation by virtue of its

*elapsing horizon*. For it is only in a particular act of consciousness that a horizon is actual, i.e., that it necessarily *presents* itself. But a horizon can become actual *as a protention* only as a presenting which *elapses*. The prescription which develops from a past experience is the indication [*Anzeige*] which just this past experience has also made possible. Husserl forgets his own point of departure, insofar as protention again has its measure in the past.

5.2. The contradiction of Husserl's conception of protention has its effect, above all, in his construction of logic. Like logical positivism, Husserl inquires about *elementary propositions*—in Husserl's terminology, about "immediate 'ultimate' judgments" (p. 25). "Elementary propositions" can be sensibly spoken about only if they refer back to something else which is nonlinguistic, and that is to "individuals as the ultimate objects-about-which," to "ultimate substrates" (*ibid.*). Such "ultimate objects-about-which" would then be barren of prescription. Starting from an individual datum, prescriptions would develop in the course of experience only by habits based on association: the occurrence of one datum, frequently found contiguous with others, awakens a remembrance of these.

On the other hand, Husserl does emphasize that "every experience," thus clearly also the "self-giving of individual objects" (p. 28), has "its own horizon of experience" (p. 32). An immediate contradiction arises if individual objects are to be ultimate substrates; for these can only be thought as barren of any prescription, whereas "every experience" is supposed to have "its own horizon of experience." Thus the analysis of §§ 5–8 of the *Introduction* changes without notice from an attempt to designate ultimate substrates into a determination of the horizon which is presupposed in each and every experience and which Husserl conceives of as the *world-horizon*. Thus, on the one hand, he writes: "Experience in the first and most pregnant sense is accordingly defined as a direct relation to an individual" (p. 27). On the other hand, he points out: "A cognitive function bearing on individual objects of experience is never carried out as if these objects were pregiven at first as from a still completely undetermined substrate. . . . *Every experience has its own horizon*" (pp. 31–32).

5.3. The search for an "elementary proposition" is futile, because the determination of an elementary proposition necessarily leads to a contradiction. The expression "This animal here is a

tomcat"—where "this . . . here" means a gesture or hand signal or can even be replaced by a name, such as "Peter"—is not an elementary proposition; of course, the condition of its possibility is an *elementary schema*, an elementary form of judgment, as a mode of the *ego cogito*. Kantian transcendentalism presupposes a *formalism*, the formalism of the forms of judgment, in that it exhibits their truth. For Kant, evidence is the certainty of the *ego cogito*. For him, formalism is based on schematic acts as modes of the *ego cogito* and refers to *the certainty of the ego cogito*.

Husserl, on the other hand, would like to get around formalism *descriptively*. It is now understandable why Husserl speaks *primarily* of *evidence* and not of certainty. Evidence is "*self-givenness*, the way in which an object in its givenness can be characterized relative to consciousness as "itself-there," "there in the flesh" (p. 19). This means: a thing comes to view *adequately* or *inadequately*. Of course, evidence also applies to a judgment insofar as a concept is asserted correctly or incorrectly of an object (or a predicate of a subject). But, in the name of evidence, judgmental evidence refers back to objective evidence.

The concept of the object as something in general, as a possible judicative substrate in general, therefore is not sufficient, in the formal emptiness in which it is employed in formal logic, to enable us to study in it alone what it is that we call self-evidence in contrast to judicative self-evidence [p. 26].

One might now try to dissolve the contradiction of ultimate substrates and prescriptions by the concepts of adequate and inadequate evidence. An ultimate substrate of judgment would then be only inadequately given and thus, as inadequate, bound to reference to others. But Husserl inquires about *ultimate* substrates of judgments—these are *also* only in references. The contradiction would be dissolved only if inadequacy itself were a moment of prescription—or of the schema. Husserl, however, would like to inquire *beyond* the form, the schema, to evidence, as his encounter with formalism shows.

Against formalism in logic, Husserl raises the objection:

Therefore, however much in formal logic one thinks of the "terms" in judgments, the "S" and the "p," etc., as formalized, still there are limits to the permutability of the "something" which can be inserted in the empty places, something which is arbitrarily chosen in regard to its quiddity when judgments are viewed from

the point of view of pure form. But still, what can be inserted is not completely arbitrary; rather, the presupposition, never made completely explicit, remains that this something which is introduced must be precisely an *existent* which enters into the unity of experience, correlatively, into the unity of the world understood as the totality of objects of experience in general [p. 39].

The form of judgment is apparently to be based on the world. But in the same context "world" means two things which contradict each other: first, the world as the *referential context*; every experience already presupposes a world-horizon. ("Accordingly, everything which can be arbitrarily chosen as the object of an activity of judgment, as a substrate, has a homogeneity, a common structure, and it is only because of this that judgments which have sense can be made at all" [p. 39].) In this sense, logic is "logic of the world" (p. 40). However, when Husserl writes, "In this way a limit is set to the free variability of the nuclei" (p. 39), then, without notice, the world already has become understood as, *second*, the "totality of objects of experience in general" (*ibid.*). World as referential context and world as the "totality of objects of experience in general" stand in contradiction.

The relation of the form of judgment to the world as the "totality of objects of experience in general" is determined more precisely as a *secondary* interpretation of the form of judgment, in the sense that a property is clearly assigned to the predicate, an individual to the subject.<sup>12</sup> The variability of the "nuclei" of entities is then the set of things which are determined by a property. Against such formalism it can rightly be objected that things are being discussed here only *on the level of formalism* and that only an isomorphism of subject/predicate and thing/property is in question. The *actual* entity and its reference are then precisely not in view. The world as the "*universe of objects of experience in general*" reduces the world as the *referential context* to silence. *To this extent*, phenomenology is right as opposed to formalism.

There is a limit to the variability of entities with respect to form, insofar as an entity is already caught in a *context of experience* and takes on a "common structure." But according to Husserl the structure is supposed to be initially presupposed by means of the form of language, by means of the form of judg-

12. Cf. Hans Hermes, *Einführung in die mathematische Logik* (Stuttgart, 1963).



ment. But how can one, *right at the start*, exhibit a structure for a form of language in general? Phenomenology only repeats the error of formalism: the world is a "totality of objects of experience in general"; the world as reference is left out. Whereas formalism recognizes *reference as a form of judgment, a schema*, but forgets the *world as reference*, transcendental phenomenology grasps the *world as reference* but does not recognize the fundamental *formal* character of this reference. A form of judgment is, namely, a *function of the ego cogito* which refers, by a schema, not to entities in general, not to "the world as the totality of the objects of experience in general," but only to an entity, insofar as the entity is referred to the *ego cogito* in respect to its determination. Thus the horizon of the world is, on the one hand, what allows appearance; but, on the other hand, it refers, of necessity, to the *ego cogito*.

5.4. It has been shown that the contradiction of Husserl's conception of time is at the same time the contradiction of his theory of assertion. We will now determine the relation of temporality and the form of judgment even more closely.

5.4.1 For Husserl, the predicate is *as such* universal. When metaphysical tradition distinguished a universal judgment from a particular judgment, this difference amounted to *the relation* of predicate and subject, and this in respect to their extension. A universal judgment, e.g., the judgment that "All pigs are mammals," simply means *the relation* of the lower concept (in our example, the "pig") to the higher concept (in our example, to "mammal"), and precisely in respect to its extension, its *quantity*. In addition, concepts stand in a *categorical relation* (as in our example) or in a *hypothetical relation*. The predicate can be *affirmed* (as in our example) or *denied* of the subject—this is how a given judgment is determined with respect to its *quality*. The sense of quantity is not rendered by quantifiers, because the form of judgment designates a *grammatical* rule, according to which the predicate is determined in relation to the subject in the tree of concepts. Logical rules are to be distinguished from grammatical ones. Quantifiers are *logical* rules.<sup>13</sup>

The term "validity," customary since Kant, is taken over by Husserl, and it simply designates the *acceptability* of a judgment of a certain form in respect to appearance. The validity of a

13. On the introduction of quantifiers, see Lorenzen, *Normative Logic and Ethics*, p. 21.

judgment presupposes the form of judgment and a finite canon for the possible determination of the judgment. A particular form of judgment can be used in respect to appearance by means of a corresponding *schema*. The determination of a schema is *temporality*. However, if the *ego cogito* itself is already temporal, then the form of judgment *as such* is already a schema, that is, it is that rule according to which concepts are generated in a tree. *Thus the temporality of a schema is to be distinguished from its validity*. For Husserl, the predicate form receives its determination through omnitemporality. *Omnitemporality* means apparently two things for Husserl:

5.4.1.1. A form of judgment as such can be carried out by *anyone at any time*—thus, e.g.,  $2 + 2 = 4$  can be carried out by anyone at any time. It does not matter whether it is Mr. Meier or Miss Miller who does this sum or whether it is carried out now or later. On the other hand, a form of judgment is a *schema of an act*, thus of an operation. But it is an operation of such a kind that it does not matter who the person carrying it out is.

A schema is a *generation* of concepts in respect to appearance. Only if protention is the guiding principle of generation can generation take place in time and at any time. For predication is carried out with respect to *appearance*, i.e., in respect to an *object*, something already *present*; that which allows it to appear, protention, remains *mute* in the determination; *the presentation prevails*. Hence, insofar as protention already guides predication, it is, *as generating*, an *operation*; insofar as protention *remains mute*, the beginning of the generation is *arbitrary*, i.e., the generation can be carried out at *any time*.

5.4.1.2. A form of judgment is omnitemporal insofar as it can be carried out at any *time*. "Omnitemporality" is "*a mode of temporality*" (p. 261). Nonetheless, Husserl hypostatizes protention; protention as the determination of a schema is forgotten, language is muted. The form of judgment becomes "supertemporal," it becomes "irreality" (*ibid.*). For Husserl, omnitemporality signifies "supertemporality" (*ibid.*).<sup>14</sup>

5.4.2. Husserl writes: "Furthermore, it should be noted that this omnitemporality (the omnitemporality of the objectivities of

14. By its form a judgment is omnitemporal. This means: (1) The form  $x \in P$  ( $x \notin P$ ) is omnitemporal as a schema for possible content (which can be carried out at any time; cf. pp. 259 f.). (2) " $x \in P$ " (" $x \notin P$ ") is true or false (omnitemporally) (the state of affairs is omnitemporal).

understanding) does not simply include within itself the omnitemporality of *validity*" (*ibid.*). The assertion that the train is the fastest means of transport is false today, but earlier it was true—and thus time does belong to the determination of judgment. For Husserl, such time, *time as an index*, is to be distinguished from the time of *ever possible repetition, the temporality of a schema*. The determination of the (here-) now as an elapsing now is, namely, the retention of retention; the retention of retention guarantees the concept its *position* in the tree. But the temporality of generation is to be distinguished from the "now" position, because it is what originally makes the positions in a tree possible. Nonetheless, Husserl allows the temporality of the schema and time as an index to become two things: the world as reality (more exactly, as the "universe of objects of experience in general") is to be distinguished from the world as reference:

The world . . . is the universe of realities, among which we count all objects individualized in spatiotemporality, as the form of the world, by their spatiotemporal localization. Irreal objectivities make their spatiotemporal appearance in the world, but they can appear simultaneously in many spatiotemporal positions and yet be numerically identical as the same [p. 260].

The world as the "universe of realities" (= spatiotemporality) is separated from the world of irreality (as omnitemporality).

6. The title *Experience and Judgment* indicates an *ordering*, namely, that of prepredicative experience (Part I) and predicative experience (Part II). We have already pointed out and discussed this ordering. In addition, we have seen that the difference here is a difference of time, namely, of spatiotemporal reality and of omnitemporality, the irreality of the possibilities and products of thought.

We distinguished further between *validity* and the *temporality of a schema*, and this difference was determined as that of *temporal position* and *temporal succession* (of protention as the prevailing of presentation and protention). Husserl confuses this difference; for him, the spatiotemporality which appears in judgment (as an index) is different from the omnitemporality of the possibilities and products of thought. We now understand why the two previously mentioned parts of *Experience and Judgment* are followed by a *third* part, namely, "The Constitution of General Objectivities. . . ." In the heading of Part III, Husserl also

designates a further task: ". . . and the Forms of Judging 'in General.'"

Concepts like "table" and "green" can be constructed only in respect to and by means of experience. They are "empirical generalities" (Part III, Chapter 1). A schema, a form of judgment, is, however, already presupposed in respect to any *empirical* examination. For Husserl, forms have the mode "in general." In *Experience and Judgment*, two "modifications 'in general'" are investigated: particular judgment and universal judgment. A critical review of Husserl's analysis will be omitted here. Chapter 3 of Part III treats "Judgments in the Mode of the 'In General.'"

Husserl distinguishes "empirical generalities" and "modifications 'in general'" from "pure generalities." Consider these sentences, for example: "All men are living beings"; "All pigs are mammals." In respect to their form (the modification "in general"), they are not different. In both judgments a predicate concept is asserted of a subject concept. Still, the concepts "thing," "living being," "man" are special. On the one hand, they are concepts and can function as predicates (or subjects) in judgments. On the other hand, the concept "living being" is distinguished from the concept "thing" (and the concept "man" from the concepts "living being" and "thing") in that "living being" (and "man") is only a predicate or a subject by *analogy* to the way "thing" is. For example, if it is said that "The stone smiles," the judgment is syntactically correct in construction; but that it is still not semantically acceptable is due, according to metaphysical tradition, to the fact that concepts are not only generated as higher and lower in a tree but, rather, can also be modified by *analogy* to one another. Thus, for example, the concept "stone" is subordinate to the concept "thing." But the concept "man" is not simply subordinate to the concept "thing." Rather, it functions as a predicate or a subject only by analogy to the ways in which the concept "thing" and the concept "stone" are predicates or subjects. Thus some things can be asserted of man which cannot be asserted of a thing or a stone.

The analogous modification of a subject or a predicate concept means two things:

6.1. In metaphysical tradition, the *arbor Porphyrania* is distinguished from other conceptual trees by the fact that all trees of concepts can be constructed only *within its horizon*. Husserl takes over this view: pure concepts are distinguished from empirical concepts in that their

constitution does not thus depend on the contingency of the element actually given as the point of departure and its empirical horizon. These concepts do not envelop an extension which, as it were, is open merely *after the event*, but beforehand, *a priori*. This envelopment beforehand signifies that they must be capable of prescribing rules to all empirical particulars [p. 340].

6.2 Concepts are not only generated as *genus* and *species* within a tree; they are, moreover, discoverable only within the horizon of those concepts which are related to one another as *matter* and *form*. Thus the *arbor Porphyranica* consists of *levels of matter and form*. Husserl also takes over this view, though with a transformation of the determination of matter and form: pure concepts are *regionally ordered* (cf. pp. 339 ff.). Pure concepts express the *general essence*, which in turn is prelinguistically seen [*erschaut*]. Husserl's doctrine of essence will not be discussed here.<sup>15</sup> (Chapter 2 of Part III treats "The Acquisition of Pure Generalities by the Method of Essential Seeing.")

Here we will make reference only to a modern transformation of regional ordering, which Husserl also took up. Two features are essential to regional ordering: one is *genetic*; the other pertains to *linguistic analysis*.

6.2.1. Proximally, and for the most part, we live turned *directly* toward the world. A thing is not something independent of consciousness; rather, the thing-like designates a special mode of consciousness, the mode of being straightforward, *direct* [*das Geradehin*]. A thing is a *hypostatization* [*Verdinglichung*] of consciousness. Higher levels develop *genetically* from lower ones, and precisely in such a manner that it is in levels that consciousness becomes aware of itself as participating in others.

6.2.2. According to Wittgenstein, the generation of concepts in a tree is a *language game*. Language games are ordered by their *similarities* into *families of language games*. Analogy becomes a *principle of method*. How can analogy be a principle of method? Through variations in their linguistic syntactical models, language games can be *made* semantically *uncertain*. But making something uncertain is *negation*. Husserl writes:

. . . every experience refers to the possibility—and it is a question here of the *capacity* [*Vermöglichkeit*] of the ego—not only of

15. On this see Lothar Eley, *Die Krise des Apriori in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls* (The Hague, 1962).

explicating, step by step, the thing which has been given in a first view, in conformity with what is really self-given thereby, but also of obtaining, little by little as experience continues, new determinations of the same thing [p. 32].

That which makes the referential context of experience possible is the *horizon of the world*. And if it is recognized that this is protention, and thus a language rule, then the context of experience is a language game. A language game is a capacity, which, as such, allows other possibilities, and it does this in two ways:

6.2.2.1. Properties are asserted of a thing, and this is done by selecting determinations from fields of sensibility. This thing is, for example, red, not green; sweet, not sour. Whatever is determined is determined by exclusion, by nonbeing, in that arbitrary possibilities of combination are posited as other and are not posited for the thing. The selection in determination already takes place within the horizon of the thing, i.e., in the horizon of the schematization which is carried out within the frame of fields of sensibility.

6.2.2.2. At the same time, the affirmation of properties is a leaving-alone—negation is *affirmative* in its leaving-alone. There remain the other and the other of the other; the *semblance* [Schein] of what is present remains, and this semblance demands a critique. Our language game is made uncertain by the negation of the negation which is taken as affirmative. Here linguistic analysis unites with speculative genetic analysis. Husserl endeavored to unite regional classification and transcendental genesis. But a region cannot—as Husserl thinks, in continuity with metaphysical tradition—be an *essence*, for essence is a pre-linguistic objectivity and is *seen*, as such, as an omnitemporal irreality. A region, on the other hand, is a horizon in which concepts are generated; regional *classification* is the critical examination of a region, undertaken so that the world does not petrify into a “universe of realities.” The critique of a region is, of course, only a modification of the original region into another one. *The semblance of semblance is perennial.*

Theoretical determination presupposes praxis. In his later work Husserl concerned himself with the unity of theoretical and practical reason, but his reflections remain fragmentary.

7. The subtitle of the text is *Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic*. In respect to logic, genealogy, means two things:

7.1. According to Lorenzen, formal logic, also called logicistic,

is the doctrine of inference.<sup>16</sup> Precisely in respect to formal logic, Lorenzen has shown that a *propaedeutic*, a doctrine of concept and judgment, must precede the doctrine of inference.<sup>17</sup> This propaedeutic is a genealogy of logic in the sense that the structures of logic are constructed *a primis fundamentis*. In this sense, *Experience and Judgment* is also a genealogy of logic. Husserl thus distinguishes, for example, not three *classes* of concepts; rather, his concepts develop in a *genesis*, which is that of the constitutive construction of logic.

For Husserl, as for Lorenzen, logic has its beginning in *predication*. For Lorenzen, predicates are introduced by examples and counterexamples. But this is possible only insofar as predicates have the unity of a *species*. This is just what Husserl established: "The one (of the predicate) is given in the many" (p. 326). But how is the one given in the many? Clearly the one is determined by examples and counterexamples, as Lorenzen has established. But then the one is—and neither Husserl nor Lorenzen realizes this—a *negative unity*. Husserl understands the one *affirmatively* as a "new kind of objectivity, an objectivity of understanding" (*ibid.*). He abandons the approach of logic and consigns this to phenomenological-psychological description.

For Kant, Husserl, and Lorenzen the predicate is a syntactical form, which as such is an *act*. For Kant it is the presupposition of such an act that it be schematic and, as schematic, that it be carried out in respect to appearance. But it needs to be shown, not only that the forms of judgment can treat appearance by means of the schemata, but also, conversely, that the world can be schematized only *as appearance*. What has to be demonstrated is not only the aspect of the *act* but also the linguistic aspect of this as a linguistic act.

For Husserl predication refers back to *prepredicative experience*; predication is, after all, an *act*. Of course, predication never merely repeats what is already done in prepredicative experience. Then predication would be superfluous. But in predication *one* predicate can be given in many things only when it *can* already *apply* to these many things. Thus, if predication is to be possible, the one must already have *explicated* itself in respect to the many, as the one of the many.

16. On this see Paul Lorenzen, *Formale Logik*, 3d rev. ed. (Berlin, 1967), pp. 4 ff.

17. Kamlah and Lorenzen, *Logische Propädeutik*.

The *explicative synthesis* is in turn already a *passive unity*; it is carried out in the horizon of fields of sensibility, of immanent temporal unity. The explicative synthesis presupposes the *passive synthesis*. It is significant for the construction of logic that we do not perceive the field of sensibility as such but that perceiving is, rather, already *apprehending*. Thus, for example, red is already apprehended as something which appears with an object. In such original turning-toward, appearance, thus passivity as well as activity, is in a passive unity. Husserl determines this unity as the "still-holding-in-grasp as passivity in the activity of apprehension" (p. 106).

We now understand to what extent the genetic construction of logic has its beginning in the field of *passive givens* (Part I, Chapter 1). This field makes the *second* step possible: "simple apprehension and explication" (Part I, Chapter 2).

In the following, only a few features of the genetic construction will be laid out. So far we have introduced only the judgment which is *categorical* in form. But judgments can also be connected with one another, and, in particular, according to the *if-then form*. The if-then form is not to be confused with a logical connective of *propositional logic*, namely, subjunction; the if-then schema is a *schema of language*. For Husserl, the category of relations refers back to the *passive consciousness of the horizon*. The *internal horizon* refers to the *external horizon*. The *third* step in the construction of logic is the "grasping of relations" (pp. 149 ff.). A simple predicate (pp. 205 ff.), like a complex predicate (pp. 223 ff.), a judging of relations, is constituted on the level of predication.

Husserl introduces the category of relation differently from Kant. It is striking that Husserl orients himself on the syntax of language (cf., for example, the title of § 53: "The act of judgment based on relational contemplation. Absolute and relative adjectivity"), even if he does comprehend the possibility of syntactical linkage as an objectivity of understanding, which, as such, is, of course, nonlinguistic. This is exactly where a more accurate analysis would be necessary.

Husserl does not understand modality—as Kant does—as "the value of the copula in relation to thought in general" (B 100; A 74). Modality is rather the *modalization of the horizon of questioning*. The world is, proximally and for the most part, certain for us. Husserl speaks of *certainty of belief or being*. "Modalization stand in opposition to *certainty of belief* and, correlatively,



to *certainty of being* (p. 99). "It is absolutely essential, therefore, to distinguish the *modalities arising from conflict* and the *modalities of open particularization*. Both together make up a determinate concept of the modality of belief, and correlatively of the modality of being" (*ibid.*).<sup>18</sup> The modality of judgment hence has its genetic origin in the negativity of the horizon of the world. We have shown above that it is precisely the negativity of the world which grounds the capacity of the *ego cogito*. Modality is thus *two-sided*; it is *objective* (as the modalization of certainty of being), and, at the same time, it is *subjective* (as the modalization of certainty of belief).

Modality also has its origins in the prepredicative sphere (pp. 87 ff.). Hence predication (cf. Chapter 1 of Part II, "The General Structure of Predication and the Genesis of the Most Important Categorical Forms") can be *modalized* (cf. Chapter 3 of Part II). Here I want to take up only the determinations "actual-possible." The actual is, *first*, what is possible. It presupposes possibility as a *free realm*. "Actual" means: within the free realm of possibilities, it is the case. "Actual" in this sense is a *predication of a second level*. Husserl speaks of "existential predication," but this is a predication of a second level (cf. pp. 293 ff.).

But, *second*, *actual* can also mean the opposite of the fictive, the imagined. Thus we say: Hansel and Gretel are not actual; rather, they are phantasized, they are fairy-tale figures. Husserl speaks of "predication of actuality"—but this, too, is a predication of a second level. "*In the natural attitude, there is at first (prior to reflection) no predicate 'actual,' no genus 'actuality'*" (p. 298).

When predication is introduced, a *new* level of achievements can be exhibited. "Categorical objectivities" arise from predicative thought. Categorical objectivities are *states of affairs* and *sets* (cf. Chapter 2 of Part II). We will first positively exhibit how *states of affairs* and *sets* are to be introduced in a genetic construction of logic.<sup>19</sup>

For Husserl a *state of affairs* has the linguistic form "that S is *p . . .*" or, in our notation, "that *x* is (or is not) *P . . .*" Husserl continues:

18. A further possibility of differentiation will not be elucidated here (cf. pp. 99 ff.).

19. On this see Kamlah and Lorenzen, *Logische Propädeutik*, pp. 91 ff., 128 f.

All languages have at their disposal demonstratives, "indicator words," for this kind of linkage, which then serve, not to indicate present things directly, but to refer to an earlier place in the context of discourse and, correlatively, in the connection of judgments which give significance to the discourse [p. 238].

States of affairs arise from reflection of a *second level*. The condition of the possibility of reflection is the *iteration of time*. The above quotation is the continuation of the following text:

. . . since every step of judgment represents a production of sense enclosed in itself, *one can also build further on this operation itself*. Just as it fades away in retention and yet is preserved, it is possible to continue by linking-on to it, which is expressed verbally, for example, in the form, "this fact, that S is p . . ." [p. 237].


Here "states of affairs" will be introduced in the manner required for a construction of logic. "That x is (or is not) P . . ." is completed by a truth-value, true or false. True and false are predicates of a *second level*. Of course, only a particular content of judgment can be judged, that is, decided as true or false. But this presupposes that a truth-value can be applied to the form of judgment. If the rule holds that the truth-value of true (or false) is applied to a judgment  $J_1$  exactly when the truth-value of true (or false) is applied to a judgment  $J_2$ , then these judgments are *equivalent* in respect to their truth-value. And, by means of the equivalence of truth-value, we can construct an *abstraction*, a *state of affairs*. The state of affairs is an abstraction, a "syntactical objectivity," to the extent, and only to the extent, that it designates the invariance of statements about statements which are equivalent in respect to their truth-value.

Concepts can be generated in a tree, notably when their guiding principle, their horizon, is fulfilled in the tree. Of course, sometimes a succession may not be fulfilled; no context is constructed. Whether concepts can be generated in a tree or not involves a reflection of a second level, which allows trees to be compared with other trees and, in the case of equivalence, allows an invariance to be constituted. This invariance itself has its determination in a chain of reflections, which in turn are retentions of retentions.

It seems surprising that for Husserl a state of affairs is supposed to be an "objectivity of understanding," in the sense that it is capable of being perceived" (p. 250), that it has the "tem-

poral being of supertemporality" (p. 261). But if a state of affairs is a supertemporal objectivity, then, before this, a form of judgment must already be supertemporal. In the end, it appears that the relation between the form of judgment and the passive consciousness of the horizon has not been adequately determined.

That syntactical objectivities have been incorrectly determined becomes even clearer if we consider the constitution of a set. A set is naïvely understood as a "collective linkage" (p. 244).<sup>20</sup> "The copulative linkage is contrasted with the collective . . ." (*ibid.*). A set, to be sure, is not "passively preconstituted"; it is not a whole apprehended by the senses, since we can colligate anything and everything; for Husserl, an angel, a beer, a piano can be taken together in a set. Nonetheless, such a construction of sets is naïvely oriented on nonlinguistic activity. A set in the sense of mathematics has nothing to do with such naïve bringing-together. It arises from a reflection of a *second level*. The law of formation for a set is similar to that for a state of affairs. The predicate is an identical *one*, as opposed to the objects of which it can be asserted. That it can be asserted of several objects is a reflection of a *second level*. This reflection is different from original generation in a tree, which is carried out in an *order*. When we speak of the *one* predicate which is asserted of many things, then we have already abstracted from the order of levels in a tree. Thus, in the tree shown in the accompanying diagram,



the levels ( $L_1, L_2, L_3, L_4, L_5, L_6$ ) are levels of the genus,  $G$ . We can speak either of it—( $L_1, L_2, L_3, L_4, L_5, L_6$ )—or of ( $L_3, L_1, L_4, L_2, L_6, L_5$ ). What has been constructed in the latter case is equivalent in respect to *extension*; this in turn designates an abstraction, which can be called a *set*.

7.2. Husserl does not inquire about a genealogy of logic in the sense of a genetic construction of logic. For him logic is "logic of the world" (p. 40). Thus a genetic construction of logic

20. Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Philosophie der Arithmetik: Mit ergänzenden Texten (1890–1901)* (The Hague, 1970), pp. 14 ff.

inquires within what is already a particular *horizon of understanding*, which is itself to be originally elucidated.

If we speak of *objects of science*, science being that which as such seeks truth valid for everyone, then these objects, which find their adequate expression in predicative propositions, are *not objects of experience*, considered as [reflecting] the complete structure of categorial actions, on the basis of pure experience [p. 44].

For Husserl the ideal, exact objectivities of logic refer to the "experience of the life-world," which is "*still unacquainted with any of these idealizations*" (p. 45). A *genealogy of logic* is, *second*, a *transcendental elucidation of origins*. Its primary concern is to make clear *why* logic has developed as apophantic. Lorenzen does not raise this question. That logic can have and did have its beginning in predicative judgment is based on the fact that the *world* is the "horizon of all possible substrates of judgments" (p. 39).

Cognition, action, all *cogitationes*, already presuppose as a matter of course a *world*. This demonstrates a *third* determination of the world. The world is that positing which does not occur in an act; it is rather the *presupposition of any thesis* (p. 30). Husserl understands original life in the world as "belief in the world" (*ibid.*). Therefore, the world is, *fourth*, "the ground of the universal passive belief in being" (*ibid.*). And this means:

. . . before every movement of cognition the object of cognition is already present as a *dynamis* which is to turn into an *entelecheia*. This "preliminary presence" means that the object affects us as entering into the background of our field of consciousness, or even that it is already in the foreground, possibly already grasped, but only afterwards awakens the "interest in cognition," that interest which is distinguished from all other interests of practical life [p. 29].

This world is, in Kant's sense, *appearance*.

Kantian transcendental philosophy is still tied up with the psychology of sense data. Appearance is still a "chaos of sensations." Husserl attempts to purify transcendental philosophy from the psychology of sense data, but he remains caught in it, though in a different way from Kant. The search for the beginning of logic in elementary propositions refers to something pre-predicative, i.e., a *datum* which stands out from its environment and affects us.

7.3. Transcendental philosophy presupposes *nominalism*. For Husserl, genesis is, *third*, the *order*, familiar in ontology since Aristotle, *from intuition to thought*. The presupposition of ontology is that a general concept, as an essence, is a *parte rei*. Along with nominalism, Husserl recognizes that, in respect to general concepts, conceptual realism is understandable, to be sure, but at the same time it misconceives the possibility of logical operations. Thus, in propositional logic, "and" and "or" are logical operators. But it cannot meaningfully be said that "and" and "or" are a *parte rei*. Logical structures, such as states of affairs and sets, are certainly not a *parte rei*. On the other hand, they are also not *in mente*; this would confuse a logical operation with a psychic act. The dilemma is that one has to distinguish, from things and from subjectivity, a *third* realm, the realm of meanings. Husserl recognizes the realm of meanings as that which constitutes itself through subjectivity; hence, meanings are modes of givenness, are evidence. That the realm of meanings is indebted to *subjectivity* can be shown only if logical evidence refers back to the original evidence of lived experience and precisely to its subjectivity.

8. The predicative judgment is clearly distinguished in that in it a semantic structure corresponds at the same time to the syntactic structure. It has to be shown, however, that a semantic structure does at the same time correspond to the syntactic structure. That these structures correspond to each other is based on the fact that syntactic structure is as such a *model for action*, and as a *model for action* it is a *linguistic model*. A twofold movement is involved here.

Predicating is a linguistic activity, precisely as a function of the *ego cogito*. The *ego cogito* is not recognized in linguistic activity; it is directed toward appearance, i.e., toward the world as "passive givenness." It schematizes appearance in the horizon of time. The world is the *referential context*.

But for Husserl the world is not only appearance and, as appearance, a referential context; the world is rather the general thesis, already coposited in any particular thesis. How is the world already coposited in any thesis? The world receives its determination from the horizon (of the world). The horizon of the world is what allows reference; as *protention* it is the guiding principle of appearance, in that appearance is made *perennial* through it. The world is a world *in becoming*. The horizon of the world is the horizon of *language*.

What enables appearance to be perennial? The horizon of the world is a *limit*, and this in two ways: as appearance, i.e., as *semblance*, the world refers to a presupposed praxis, a *praxis of language*. But the horizon of the world is also the *limit of language and activity*, of the *ego cogito* and the foreconception. As the limit of language and activity, the horizon of the world is perennial as the *limit of limits*.

As a linguistic *activity*, language refers to a prelinguistic field, to passive *pregiveness*, and thus to *association*. But association is association *in a linguistic field*. On the basis of this presupposition, Husserl's notion of a field of passive *pregiveness* can be taken up and, for the first time, brought to its truth.

We have pointed out the contradiction of the world as the universe of realities and the world as reference, the contradiction of being an ultimate judgmental substrate and an indicator. This contradiction is repeated in the sphere of *passive pregiveness*. Husserl writes:

Objects are always present for us, *pregiven* in simple certainty, before we engage in any act of cognition. At its beginning, every cognitive activity presupposes these objects. They are there for us in simple certainty; this means that we presume them to exist and in such a way as to be accepted by us before all cognition, and this in a variety of ways [p. 29].

If that which is supposed to affect us is valid before any cognition, then actual cognition would be superfluous; but if what affects us is only a presumed entity, then affection would be only semblance. If affection is actual, then cognition is superfluous; if cognition is actual, then affection is only semblance. On the other hand, Husserl maintains:

But always preliminary to this grasping is affection, which is not the affecting of an isolated, particular object. "To affect" means to stand out from the environment, which is always copresent, to attract interest to oneself, possibly interest in cognition [pp. 29 f.].

The opposition of affection and spontaneity can be dissolved if "standing out from the environment" can be adequately determined. The environment cannot be a field which already exists; on the contrary, it must be one which has a *being* which *becomes negated* by the limit of the horizon of the world. The environment must be a *linguistic field*. A few basic features of such a linguistic field will, in what follows, be more indicated than worked out.

In respect to states of affairs, Husserl refers to the function of demonstratives, and writes, "All languages have at their disposal demonstratives, 'indicator words,' for this kind of linkage, which then serve, not to indicate present things directly, but to refer to an earlier place in the context of discourse" (p. 238). Demonstratives function in a linguistic field. But reference to an earlier position is itself surely a *result* of direct pointing. In direct pointing, language becomes *mute*; the linguistic field refers back to a prelinguistic one. And this becoming-mute of language is precisely *affection*. That language becomes mute in prelinguistic pointing can be immediately shown by the example of a conversational situation. I ask, "What is this object here?"—and I mean something pointed to by me. If the answer is not to immediately pass over the pointing, then, in respect to *the situation* in which the question is raised here, it has to say, "This object here is a house."<sup>21</sup> Pointing becomes linguistic as *naming*. But, at the same time, naming is prelinguistic—hence it becomes untrue. Naming takes *this* as "this here," as a presumed being, which affects us. Consciousness hypostatizes the "this" because only by means of hypostatization can it catch sight of the affection. Thus, in hypostatization, consciousness becomes untrue. This is shown in the pointing itself, for it points beyond what is pointed to, thus beyond what is present, into emptiness. It is only by means of the linguistic prescription that the other whom I question knows what I mean. Affecting thus proves to be a standing-out from an *environment*. Pointing proves to be a "demonstrative." The "this" is *not affirmative*, as consciousness at first mistakenly thinks; rather, it is a *limit*. Only a *limit* can prescribe, and the prescribed can be fulfilled in a process, e.g., in turning around. A tree appears, not *the* tree; for what is new is an *instance*, as what elapses in turning around is an instance. Therefore, one must say not *the* house but *a* house. Instances are suspended at a limit. On the one hand, they are *at the limit*—and to this extent they are affirmative. On the other hand, they are in themselves *nonbeing*, hence they are limits. A limit continues *as a limit of limits*, and it does this in the following manner: what is directly present points beyond itself with the

21. For the following, cf. G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie (London, 1910), Part A, section 1 ("Sense certainty . . .," pp. 149 ff.), and the transition to section 2 ("Perception," pp. 160 ff.).

intention of further fulfillment, so that the original past sinks further back as a retention of retention, on the basis of the fulfillment of prescription. A tree of concepts is formed, a tree of subject and predicate levels.

For Husserl the *functional forms* of judgment are distinguished from their *core-forms*. The functional forms of judgment are *subject* and *predicate*. The core-forms are *substantive* and *adjective*. The functional form as well as the core-form as *substantive* is determined by the tree of higher and lower concepts. We can read off from the tree that a subject as well as a predicate can be a substantive.

What an adjective means is given as a result of the *dialectic* of the given tree. Instances are *external* to a limit: as they are not taken in *by the limit*, they are not *internal*. A limit proves itself as a limit only when it *mediates* the instances, when it determines them *internally*. The manner of exhibition also changes then: we take the limit as *true*, we perceive [*wahr-nehmen*] it. The first level of genesis, the passive synthesis, has genetically suspended itself in the *explicative synthesis*: a limit explicates itself in perspectives; it schematizes itself, but precisely in such a manner that this schematization is *linguistic*.

How does a limit *internally* determine instances? A limit is grasped as a *capacity*. But, as a capacity, it is grasped only by *leaving other possibilities out*, that is, by leaving out *other limits and the instances determined by them*. A limit mediates an instance, but what mediates is itself *immediately* given, insofar as it delimits, leaves others out. Two things are involved here. A limit appears as a subject *level* and thus is *externally* different from other levels. Second, the original tree is repeated, but in such a manner that every level is delimited against another and precisely through this delimitation is *internally* differentiated in properties. Thus, *internal* differentiation takes place through *external* differentiation. Internal differentiation is *linguistically* indicated by syntax, in the schema of predicate and property, and thus refers back to the mute-linguistic function of naming.

How is *internal* differentiation carried out? A limit is a mediating *unity* of internal schematizations. It mediates by *delimitation*. Thus, for example, something is green—but is therefore not red. But the mediation (the delimitation) is itself immediate. It is *in* its property, it is an *instance*. But an instance is itself a limit, as a difference of limits, so that it, in turn, as a limit mediates limits. Thus, for example, *that which is green*



(and thus not red) is immediately sweet, but not sour. Concepts are again generated in a tree; the second tree is a further development of the first. What generates it is the *adjectival* determination of the first tree, insofar as this tree is differentiated in respect to others, insofar as it is differentiated in an external and an internal horizon. What an adjective means is determined by this second tree. One immediately sees that in a judgment an adjective can be a *predicate* but not a *subject*; otherwise an adjective would be made substantive.

In this way we have introduced the predicative judgment. According to its form, the predicative judgment can be *universal* or *particular*. One now tends to distinguish a *particular* judgment from a *singular* one. A *singular judgment* designates an *instance* in respect to a higher presupposed concept; for example, "This animal here is a cat"—"this one here," i.e., the one I am pointing to. "This . . . here" can also be replaced by a name. But in truth, the name (as "this . . . here") is the point of connection in the tree. If I say, "This . . . here is red," meaning this one here, e.g., this table, then *this table* can certainly be further differentiated. That I do not inquire further is simply a matter of convention, which is made possible by the fact that instances, even when they are mediated by a limit, remain external to the limit.

The attentive reader has surely noticed that in each case I have considered only two modes of the Kantian table of judgments. The third mode concerns the determination of a limit, insofar as a limit progresses as a limit of limits, thus in a bivalence, limiting and disjunctive. To the extent that instances remain behind in every progression, singular *seeming propositions* (pseudo-object propositions) are possible, for example, "This . . . here is the house."