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Introduction

Film and Theory

Deleuze concludes his two volumes on cinema with a short reflection on the relationship between film and theory. He argues that 'a theory of cinema is not about cinema, but about the concepts that cinema gives rise to and which are themselves related to other concepts' (Deleuze 1989: 280). In this brief statement we find a comment that summarises one of the most significant turns that film theory has taken in recent times. These theoretical developments have become more focused on the idea that what resonates in cinema is far more than the elements of the films themselves, and to understand what cinema is, and how it operates, we must turn to these wider issues.

This is the first major development in recent film theory – the recognition of the vastness of the scope of both the material and the theories. To understand film, that is, to theorise it, position it within different contexts (including the cultural, philosophical, political, etc.), and to develop analytic models, necessarily moves the points of discussion beyond the celluloid. The theories dealt with in this book, that is, the dominant theoretical models of poststructuralism and postmodernism, are vital to the study of film because it is through the complex ideas of these theories that we might come to better understand the nature of the cinematic apparatus.

Another key development is related to this, and in one sense it is an inversion of the relationship between film and theory. Cinema (both the various theoretical models of film studies as well as the texts themselves) has come to be seen as an essential part of a complex set of theories that have grown out of a number of different disciplines, including philosophy, psychoanalysis, women's studies, cultural studies, gender studies, deconstruction, and semiotics – in short, the sweep and turns, factions and fragments, of poststructuralism and postmodernism. Film has become essential to the development of many of these critical movements, not simply as a textual example, but as a direct contributor to the theoretical operations and concepts. One of the consequences of both these developments is that it has become increasingly more important for us to engage in a range of theoretical issues, and to acknowledge the vitality of these issues to the development of film theory. This is one of the aims of this book; not to attempt to map out all of the developments that have taken place in film theory, but to consider how film and the wider issues of critical theory have come to change each other. The result is not simply hybridisation, but the continued growth of a series of new disciplines. From this point on, the relationship between cinema and different theoretical projects has become entwined. The 'new developments' indicated in the title of this book refers to this dynamic process between film and theory. What this challenges is the idea of film studies/film theory as something only to do with film.

Part of the relational context of film to theory is how cinema itself has come to be a space and praxis for the analytic processes and issues. Cinema is the one textual form that has developed specifically within the theoretical contexts of structuralism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism. It is a form that has continually been surrounded by a devising of self-reflexive theories, many of which have directly challenged the established ways of looking at the world and how we operate in it. Gone is a sense of certainty, wholeness, resolution, and completion. They have been replaced by restless signs, driven by certain passions towards a status of the question and absence, rather than answers and presence. Of course other textual forms (literature, painting, music, etc.) have also shifted within these theoretical developments, but cinema's role has a certain uniqueness because it is the one born in the time of these theoretical challenges.

If film needs theory, just as critical theory needs and enjoys cinema, we are then led to ask what does this relationship produce? The intellectual projects of poststructuralism and postmodernism, such as the interpretation and re-evaluation of topics such as subjectivity, culture, meaning, gender, power, discourse, pleasure, language (to name but a few), represent a profound shift in the climate of Western thought. It would be a sleight of hand to simply argue that these same sorts of issues are part of film's subject-matter, and therefore we need theory to work through them. We should always treat such a simple equation with suspicion, even if there are often specific cases where this is precisely what is taking place. What is more interesting – and this is what Deleuze is getting at in his summation of theory and film – is to examine how film itself can be read as a theorising of these issues. So we move away from the usual interpretation of films as representations of certain themes, and then theory is applied to the texts to 'extract' such concepts, and towards a model that argues that theory and film perform the same sorts of tasks. What we are interested in here is the idea that the critical concepts of poststructuralism and postmodernism are themselves part of the film process. This includes the films, the act of watching them, the socio-cultural contexts, as well as the systems of interpretation.

To consider these issues and relationships a number of the major issues of critical theory have been selected here. These topics have been selected in part because of their centrality to the critical developments, and in part because they offer fresh perspectives on how we might go about analysing the cinematic text. The book is divided into four sections, each consisting of two chapters. Ostensibly these four sections map out some of these issues of critical theory, notably subjectivity, discourse, culture, and meaning. However, there are a number of inflections given to these topics, in part to work as illustration, and in part to push certain lines of thought in different directions. By this we mean that the discussions of both theory and film are directed at offering different perspectives on these key themes and ideas.

The first section considers the issue of the gaze, initially from the perspective of the formations of subjectivity, before moving on to examine cinematic aspects that cannot be held within a relationship of the spectator to image. Fundamental to this is the idea that the spectator's position and relations to the cinematic image tell us something about the larger issues of the formation and operation of subjectivity, textuality, and the social order. Four different concepts are employed to offer a range of approaches to this idea of the gaze and the subject. These are masochism, identification, phantasy, and the *punctum*. These four engage in ideas from psychoanalysis, feminism, gender studies, and semiotics, allowing us to consider how the gaze is part of the construction of a certain type of subject position. Chapter 2 considers this relationship of the spectator to the image from a more detailed perspective. Broadly speaking it deals with how certain ideas from Lacan's psychoanalytic theory and Derrida's theories of deconstruction might be employed in the analysis of film, and how film might be used to explore these ideas. What organises these two models is the idea of the excess and beyond of the image as it is constructed by, and constructs, the spectator. This analytic strategy is adopted throughout the book: the connections between theory and film as they aim for the same purpose, and the use of film to explicate theoretical points.

The next section – on discourse – commences with a consideration of different theories on discourse, before focusing on some key ideas from Foucault and their cinematic potential. The first part of Chapter 3 considers some of the key ideas from semiotics, in particular Kristeva and Barthes. The idea of intertextuality is explored in depth, considering the movement from a simple textual referencing, to the more complex ideas developed by Kristeva. This leads to a point where discourse is seen as an unending roll of textual orders, where pluralism dominates. The second half of the chapter considers Foucault's ideas on discourse, particularly in terms of constructions of power and knowledge. What this means for film is that its discursive practices are diverse, heterogeneous, dynamic and invested with a particular type of knowledge.

This is followed up in Chapter 4 by a more specific set of issues, particularly how we might engage in the discourses of cinema in terms of the body. This is more than the representation of the body in film, instead arguing that film has devised a discursive practice that is driven by the body and its various parts. This chapter on the flesh and body also considers how different aspects of poststructuralist and postmodernist theories might be utilised to produce a theory of film discourse. These include Lacan's readings of the body and Lyotard's ideas on postmodernism, before returning to Foucault to re-evaluate some of his particular notions of discourse in terms of cinema. Of primary concern is the idea that we might speak of a formation of a cinematic knowledge that operates within and through film discourse.

Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned with the relationship of film to social contexts and processes. Chapter 5 considers these issues through the example of love, arguing that in order to understand better the cultural contexts of cinema, we can investigate how it treats a particular social phenomenon. The pervasive, yet heterogeneous, representation of love in cinema makes it an ideal example. Two specific examples are taken up – the kiss and true love – to investigate how there is a cultural process in such representations, and yet at the same time there are resistances in any sense of shared interpretation. Put another way, one of the issues is how there is an interplay between cultural orders (such as love) and the challenge to how we might read them. Both the kiss and true love are common elements in film, yet they both offer problems in reading them.

If both the kiss and love are part of a recognisable cultural order (and set of representations within film) Chapter 6 extends the examination of how cinema both fits into and resists social orders. This is film as it utilises both themes and structures to disrupt, challenge and sometimes even escape the rigours of social patterns and processes. At one level this chapter deals with overt representations of social disruption, in particular the idea of the carnivalesque. This idea is then taken up in terms of realism. By considering both the role cinema plays in disrupting social orders, and the disruptions within its own discourse, this chapter moves towards the idea that these disturbances actually have a positive, creative effect. This is traced through Lyotard's idea of the *dispositif* and Kristeva's study of the carnivalesque.

Chapter 7 considers how films produce and operate within a sense of meaning. This chapter takes phenomenology as a primary example of a critical model of meaning, before turning to other ideas, including psychoanalysis and deconstruction. This is not simply how a film might come to be seen as meaningful, or as having meaning. Rather it is a consideration of how meaning can even begin to exist in cinema, and what cinema has done to expose a certain attitude towards meaning. The final chapter of the book – on seduction – is not meant to act as a point where all that has come before is distilled into a resolved form. Rather it is a sometimes circling back over what has been considered in these earlier sections, as well as provocation of all that has been left unsaid. Seduction also becomes the metaphor for how meaning is always figured as a beyond in this theorising of film. We are seduced towards a sense of meaning, only to be drawn elsewhere. That is to say, that no matter how much we might try to resolve, what remains in both cinema and theory is the seduction towards another point.

Lacan, in negotiating the Reality Principle and the Pleasure Principle, makes the following statement: 'That whole organism seems designed not to satisfy need, but to hallucinate such satisfaction' (Lacan 1992: 28). We can adapt this description to say that cinema is not about satisfaction (of needs and demands, but also of the analytic questions themselves), but the hallucination of such satisfaction. This is not to lessen the power of the cinematic drive, but rather to illustrate the force of cinema in our subjectivities, our cultural orders, and our psychical processes. Part of what defines cinema is its role as a meeting place for all these processes. The hallucination of satisfaction that cinema provides allows it to hold contradictions, splits and doubles without necessarily having to attempt to resolve them or even acknowledge difference.

A Note on the Films and Some Terms

A great many films are referred to throughout this book – more than 200 are cited as examples – and of these some are returned to and discussed in detail. The strategy behind this is that the interrelationship between film and theory is best handled across a great many examples. The critical concepts become clearer if we see them in different contexts, and the films are potentially enlivened by being approached from different critical perspectives. Similarly the concepts discussed shift according to what issue is at hand. Sometimes it is important to utilise the films to work through the critical theories, and other times the theories are there to offer analysis of the films. This fluidity between theory and film is also one of the key developments in film studies in recent times.

1

The Gaze: Masochism, Identification and Phantasy in the Spectator

What I look at is never what I wish to see.
(Lacan)

On the Gaze

The primary concern in this chapter, and the following one, is the gaze as it has been theorised in terms of film, and what some of the implications of these readings are. In order to do this we will take up some of the key points of film studies in the last thirty years, and then offer alternatives to some of these. In one sense what is being set up here is the idea that we can never fully articulate the processes of the gaze in film, simply because the complexity of what is involved constantly moves the issues beyond description and analysis. No longer is the gaze just a term for perception, but now includes issues such as subjectivity, culture, ideology, gender, race, and interpretation. This chapter will tend to locate such issues, rather than explicate any single one, for what is of primary concern here is how the theory of the gaze fits into so many of these other issues and concerns.

To work towards an understanding of what the gaze means in film – what can possibly be meant by it, what its interpretative gestures are – we shall consider certain conceptual points of operation: masochism, identification, phantasy, and the *punctum*. What links all these together is the idea that the gaze is fundamentally about the formation of certain relationships between the spectator and the film. In other words to theorise the gaze is to engage in the interplay between cinematic textual systems (diegesis, montage, *mise-en-scène*, intertextuality, etc.) and the act of viewing, as well as the competing, dynamic and heterogeneous processes involved between the two. As these processes enfold, we witness the theoretical formation of the spectating subject – that is, a type of subjectivity primarily defined through the act of spectating. Many of these issues originate from the point of the relationship between the spectator and the film text, but this is a far from simple interaction. To consider key aspects of this relationship we can take our lead from one of the major theories dealing with these matters – psychoanalysis.

A considerable number of the connections between psychoanalytic theory (in particular Freud and, more recently, Lacan) and film studies can be traced to a very specific set of issues and ideas that developed in the mid-1970s. As with most sorts of histories, there seems to have been a mixture of some design and some accident that shaped this relationship. (Why, for example, were certain passages from Freud taken up and not others? and why did Lacan's interpretations and influences come on to the scene so much later – even given the travails of translation?) This section will map out in broad terms these histories and issues, and then, in the following chapter, we will explore some alternatives to these perspectives. That said, it is important to recognise the major influence that these ideas, drawn from interpretations of psychoanalytic theory, have had on the development of film theory; not simply as an approach to the analysis of film, but also the broader issues of how film itself might be utilised in the examination of a wide range of concepts, and how film studies contributed to the development of critical theory in general. In short, as with a great many of these theories, what we find in the psychoanalytic approach is of relevance to a radical shift in the studies of texts, culture, constructions of meaning, interpretations of ideology, etc. This upheaval in the humanities was greatly empowered and influenced through developments in film studies. The point of origin for this particular paradigm in film theory was the formation of a poststructuralist and postmodernist concept of the gaze.

What is essential to recognise from the outset is that for poststructuralism and postmodernism (largely via psychoanalysis) the gaze is not simply about perception. It is not about the mechanics of viewing or the processing of the image in some physical manner – although both of these aspects may be part of the overall concern. The conceptual field of the gaze covers both the act of looking, and the act of being watched; of perception and interpretation; of things going before one's eyes, and things entering and leaving that optic/subjective domain. So when Lacan urges his audience to contemplate optics, as he does in, for example, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, he is doing so to encourage a much wider perspective and sweep for the concept of the gaze via psychoanalysis. And it is no coincidence that when many of the initial utilisations of psychoanalytic theory in the analysis of film focused on the gaze, they immediately found themselves involved in much larger issues. There was, for example, a critical concern with feminism and the representation of women, and the ways in which the gaze could be seen as masculinised – an issue we shall return to shortly.

Through its very definitional processes and theoretical premises, a psychoanalytic approach necessarily returns us to issues caught up with the idea and operation of the unconscious – such as, desire, pleasure, repression, and drives. In doing so, something like the operation of the gaze is actually stitched up to the fundamentals of subjectivity itself. In other words, for psychoanalysis, when we analyse the gaze we are also examining the structures, functions, and operations of ourselves as subjects (both conscious and unconscious beings) within socio-cultural and historical contexts. This is an extraordinary project, an undertaking of sometimes breathtaking proportions, and perhaps this is part of the reason why there is always a passion in the arguments both for and against this approach.

Masochism

To some extent the legacies of Mulvey's article 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema' have been both a blessing and a burden. Quite rightly, this piece is positioned as a key work in the development of a psychoanalytic approach to film. Written at a time (1975) and in a culture (British academe) that was not uniformly receptive to psychoanalytic ideas, Mulvey's article blended ideas from Freud with a feminist perspective in an attempt to analyse the relationship between the film text, the act of looking, and the operation of the subject. To understand what was involved in this strategy, and then to offer some alternatives, we need to briefly consider Freud's ideas on scopophilia.

In what has become an increasingly significant article, Freud (1987) in '*Trieb* and Their Vicissitudes'[1] outlines his theory on the creation, function and operation of drives. What concerns us here is the relatively short section midway through the piece. It is at this point that Freud develops the relationship of the self-reflexive subject to him/herself, to others, and to the external world order. As is consistent with Freud, he details a set of common (that is, both individual and cultural) developments in order to discuss what happens when such processes collapse. In this particular discussion Freud is concerned with the scopic drive (which has come to be seen as a fundamental part of the gaze) and its relationship to formations of subjectivity in terms of exhibitionism (the pleasure of being looked at) and scopophilia (the pleasure of the gaze). The first of these is the passive, looked-at position; the latter the active, looking position. Such a binarism is misleading, and these attributes of active and passive have often been taken out of context. In Freud's theories there is always a sense of the active in the passive, and vice versa. This entwining is significant to the notion of the agency of the subject to the self and the outside world.

For Freud, we all commence with a self-reflexive sense of the gaze: 'For the beginning of its activity the scopophilia instinct is auto-erotic; it has indeed an object, but that object is part of the subject's own body' (Freud 1987: 127). Later this changes to an emphasis on an object outside of the body. This shift is important for a number of reasons, not the least being the interplay of what Freud sees as displays of sadism and masochism, and the formation of active and passive subject/object relations. What this means, in the simplest of terms, is that we are continually negotiating sites of the active and passive, subject and object, scopophilia and exhibitionism, through our processes of the scopic drive. This is our scopic and subjective intervention on the world, and the world's intervention on us as subjects. Freud himself sums this up when, turning to love of all things, he states:

> our mental life as a whole is governed by three polarities, the antitheses
> Subject (ego)–Object (external world),
> Pleasure–Unpleasure, and
> Active–Passive.
>
> The antithesis ego–non-ego (external), i.e. subject–object, is ... thrust upon the individual organism at an early stage. (Freud 1987: 131)

In an extremely important couple of sentences Freud states that in this whole development of the active and passive, of scopophilia and exhibitionism, and of the changes from the early auto-erotic to the relationship of the subject to others, none of the stages are negated, but continue to coexist, and exert an influence on the psychical operation of the subject.

The significance of this is that it makes it impossible to simply say that we are active lookers or passively looked at; or that there are categories of subject formations that make us driven totally by scopophilia or exhibitionism; or that there is a masculine/active/sadistic gaze and a feminine/passive/masochistic gazed at. For Freud, the point is not a binarism of masculine and feminine, active and passive, but an interplay between the two, with each depending on the other to form a relational context. Given that much of Mulvey's work hinges on her reading of the pacification (read masochistic attributes) of the feminine gaze in terms of a binarism to the masculine active gaze, we need to look a little further into this area. To follow this line we can note some of the points from Freud's 'The Economic Problem of Masochism',[2] as it is from the Freudian source that Mulvey, and others, have drawn their points of departure and conclusion.

In this essay Freud speaks of three different forms of masochism: erotogenic, feminine, and moral (Freud 1987: 415). What is significant to note is that even in the type designated feminine, Freud very clearly states that it is not gender specific and begins his discussion with the example of men.

The fact that Freud designates this as 'feminine' should not be misread, although of course there remains the potential problems with such a term. However Freud is specifying a cultural type premised on a phallocentric order, where the masculine is privileged and the feminine position is located as other. In other words, the idea of feminine masochism is more about cultural positioning than it is about gender as a formulating process. This particular type of masochism, Freud explains, is 'entirely based on the primary, erotogenic masochism, on pleasure in pain' (Freud 1987: 417). A couple of film examples will help illustrate this, and lead us back to the idea of the gaze.

Perhaps one of the most striking films to depict such classic Freudian interpretations of (feminine) masochistic phantasies is Buñuel's *Belle de Jour* (1967). The opening scene represents what seems to be a sadistic beating of a woman; the abrupt cut, however, reveals that this is in fact a day-dream that the woman is having. Initially we are left with what appears to be the only viable reading, which is one of feminine masochism. The depicted scene parallels Freud's classic description of such phantasies, representing: 'the manifest content of being gagged, bound, painfully beaten, whipped, in some way maltreated, forced into unconditional obedience, dirtied and debased' (Freud 1987: 416). During the film we witness Severine/Belle in all of these situations, sometimes in phantasy and sometimes in reality (and various surrealistic combinations of the two), and yet there is always an aspect running counter to this. Just as Freud describes the holding together of the oppositional elements of the passive and active, pleasure and unpleasure, Severine's phantasies contain both masochistic loss of control, and a subject who produces the self for the self in very specific ways.

In these terms it is important to note that for Freud the twisting of sadism back to the self is a consequence of 'a cultural suppression of drives' (Freud 1987: 425) (translation modified). This echoes what Freud describes in his work on narcissism, and in particular its feminine manifestations. His argument is that narcissism is in part a result of the social repression of women's desires.[3] Severine's desires, repressed and denied, become manifested in these masochistic phantasies which also contain elements of narcissism. Parallel to this is the viewer's own masochistic (and sadistic) feelings for watching such scenes, and the narcissistic inflection of the self watching the self.

In such a scenario what happens to us as spectators? Returning to that first scene (and it is very much part of a primal scene as Severine is shown to be sexually repressed), we as viewers are caught in a painful situation. There can be no pleasure (except a forbidden, antisocial and ruthless one) in witnessing this seeming rape, beating and subjection of a women to cruelty, yet who continues to demonstrate her love for her husband throughout. However, when it is revealed that the construction of this phantasy is by the woman, then questions as to how the gaze is operating are raised. Freud would argue that out of the guilt (the guilt of the spectator for watching such a spectacle, as well as Severine's guilt for thinking it) comes the third masochistic type, that of the moral. And *Belle de Jour* plays with this morality (out of guilt) entirely throughout its narrative, right up until the closing scene. Here Severine is seen as having complete control, almost in a sadistic manner, over her husband, who, along with the other men, stands as a synecdoche for the phallocentric order. In this sense there is a confirmation that throughout the film it is Severine who is in control. In all these scenes (but the closing and opening ones in particular) the idea of a binarism of the controlling, sadistic gaze and the passive, masochistic gazed at, is manipulated, contorted and challenged. From the moment the viewer is forced to reread the opening scene as a phantasy (and in particular a sexual phantasy) he/she is made aware of the tenuous nature of narrated events and the problematics of defining the gaze as some sort of uniform and homogeneous act.

Of course the alternate reading to this is that *Belle de Jour* in fact demonstrates perfectly the controlling processes of the masculine gaze, causing the feminine to be located within a masochistic and passive position: that it is a masculine construction of a sexual phantasy about a woman who has masochistic phantasies for this male gaze. But this would be to miss entirely the function of the viewer in the construction of the diegesis. The act of spectating, the role of the gaze, is continually active, even when there seems to be a restrictive and limiting textual formation. The gaze in *Belle de Jour* is located simultaneously within Severine and outside of her. It is always both a sadistic and masochistic gaze, shifting from being controlled to controlling. And this is entirely in keeping with the psychoanalytic model of the subject and his/her interaction with the external world and the internal psychic apparatus. Like Severine, the film's viewer takes pleasure in the exchange between a lack of control and a sense of total control. This raises one of the problems of Mulvey's approach. Her investment in the idea of a Freudian feminine masochism doesn't take into account fully the points Lacan makes when he is analysing the gaze and the drive. For Lacan the idea of feminine masochism has been misinterpreted: 'It belongs to a dialogue that may be defined, in many respects, as a masculine phantasy. There is every reason to believe that to sustain this phantasy would be an act of complicity on our [i.e., psychoanalysis] part' (Lacan 1986: 192). Such a reading makes the whole idea of female masochism a deeply problematic one not only for psychoanalytic theory, but for any approach that wants to premise itself on such an idea. Later we will consider how Foucault handles such a situation, but for the moment let us take a look at another example.

In the film *Les Diaboliques* (Clouzet 1955) the struggle out of masochism is presented in a curious fashion. Christina Delasalle is in a masochistic relationship with her husband, Michel, but she attempts to emerge from it through the seductive and irresistible urgings of Nicole Horner's plan to murder him. In one sense this is a classic *noir* triangle (compare, for example, *The Postman Always Rings Twice* (Garnett 1955 and Rafelson 1981)) with the position of the other male being taken up by Nicole Horner. The twist in the plot means that Christina escapes one masochistic relationship for another.[4] Her attempt to resist the patriarchal order fails in part because of this swapping of one submissive relationship for another, and in part because of the morality invested in these different relational orders. Freud argues that moral masochism leads to a sexualising of morality which in turn leads to a playing out of the Oedipus complex (Freud 1987: 424).[5] In these terms Michel is the father who has to be overcome, but the seeming immorality of the act of killing the father in order to 'have' the mother becomes entwined in the fact it is the arche-figures of daughter and mother, that is two women.

The viewer, in true *noir* style, is denied the psychological motivations behind Nicole's acts until the end of the film, and our knowledge matches that of Christina. Once more, it would seem, the viewer's gaze is tied up to a masochistic site of passivity and limited information. However, just as in *Belle de Jour*, we must go beyond this straightforward reading and consider how Christina's, and our own, gaze are controlling processes as much as they are manipulated. It would not be enough to simply say that the spectator and Christina hold the morally correct position, and that Nicole and Michel are caught and punished at the end. Perhaps one way out of this paradox is to consider how the spectator of films willingly allows for a certain type of manipulation to take place. In this sense *Les Diaboliques* is as much about ways of spectating and interpretation as it is an exercise in (European) *noir* cinema. For in Christina the audience finds a figure who represents precisely the masochistic positionality of the spectator. She lacks knowledge and control over the events, is manipulated and deceived, but she also usurps this situation by working counter to many of the textual devices. Put another way, the diegetic processes offer a site of viewing, some of which are taken up in the act of viewing, whilst others are resisted and denied. What is certain is that the gaze is never uniform in such constructions and operations.

Herein lies one of the key problems with Mulvey's article. She concludes with the following summary: 'the female image as a castration threat constantly endangers the unity of the diegesis and bursts through the world of illusion as an intrusive, static, one-dimensional fetish. Thus the two looks materially present in time and space are obsessively subordinated to the neurotic needs of the male ego' (Mulvey 1986: 209). There is much psychoanalytic force here, driving the argument as well as informing it. But the problem is that in Mulvey's view of narrative cinema (Classic Hollywood in particular) there is no space (or time) for the female spectator. Everything is restrictive and negating; women's image has 'continually been stolen' (Mulvey 1986: 209). But such an argument denies the subversive potential of the spectator, with the implication that the act of reading for women is necessarily a pacified one. It is undeniable that in classic narrative cinema the representation of women as passive and men as active is a recurring one, but this is not a watertight and compulsive representation which offers a homogeneous viewing position. Nor is it possible (or analytically wise) to speak of such a uniform site of spectatorship based entirely on gender. What is central to this debate is the idea of identification.

Identification

One of the major contributions to the theorising of identification in film is Christian Metz's *The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and Cinema* (1985). It is a book heavily influenced by Lacan's theories, demonstrating a sharp (and somewhat understandable) turn towards psychoanalytic theory after the largely semiotic based *Language and Cinema* (1973). The connection between the two works is subtle but significant. When, for example, Metz speaks about Barthes's work in an earlier volume *Film Language* (Metz 1974: 267–71) he does so within a context of the spectator's/reader's participation in the creation of the text. It is, to use a Barthesian term, a writerly rather than a readerly process.[6] Such an approach is quite in keeping with the issues and debates raised in *The Imaginary Signifier*, with its emphasis on what we do when we read a film (which necessarily includes watching, analysing, responding to, interpreting and constructing the film text).

Another specific example of this early blending of the semiotic with the psychoanalytic approaches is to be found in the section on syntagmatic and paradigmatic formations (chapter 8 of *Language and Cinema*). Metz's theorising of these filmic structures is often premised on the role and function of the reading of the film, and the film's textual processes as influencing the act of reading/spectating. In such an argument the reader of the film is firmly positioned as a creative agent not simply in the formations of meanings, but the actual structure of the film itself. For Metz, following the semiotic line, it is the paradigmatic which is 'missing' from the film, and which must be supplied through the act of viewing. In doing so the spectator becomes an active part of the textual formations of the film. Even at the syntagmatic level, Metz indicates that the spectator participates in their operation.

To give an example, Metz speaks of inter-codical syntagms (Metz 1974: 181–3), by which he means the combinations of codes as they operate within the textual system: codes of one type (lighting, for example) combine with another (montage, sound, etc.) to construct possible meanings or referential systems of interpretation. So, for example, a dimly lit scene with the low, steady sound of a heart beat, utilises inter-codical syntagms of light and sound within particular code structures. But for such an inter-codical syntagm to operate, the spectator must firstly make the connection, and then construct possible meanings. Such connections and meanings may be presented by the film (in this case the most likely being tension, fear, suspense, or even passion and pleasure), but many other, equally valid, ones may not. Metz points out the potentially disruptive quality of the meta-cinematic, that is, when a film makes it apparent that it is making references to itself, for itself. We have come to expect it in films by, for example, Godard, such as *A bout de souffle* (1959) which construct inter-codical syntagms based on montage and narrative – the jump-cut reflexively reveals the syntagmatic code of editing, and in doing so disrupts the narrative process. However when films purposefully set up disruptive inter-codical syntagms we often find a particular generic field in operation, such as, broadly, comedy, or more specifically parody. When one of the Spice Girls, at the end of *Spice World* (Spiers 1997), argues that she would like to utter 'We're not from London' during the film, two inter-codical syntagms operate: the positing of an extra-diegetic paradigmatic (the utterance is never actually made in the body of the film); and an intertextual reference to Richard E. Grant's (who plays their manager) earlier film *Withnail and I* (Robinson 1987), where exactly just such an exclamation is made. Both such coding syntagms rely on the spectator's participation, and, at a further level, a formation of identification. This latter phenomenon is derived from the breaking of the tradition that characters do not address the audience, or make extra-textual references.

Such an idea leads us to one of the issues at the heart of *The Imaginary Signifier*, where we find Metz exploring the issue of identification with a sustained vigour. Part of the aim of this project is to analyse and categorise different strata of identification, devised largely from Lacan's theories of the subject.[7] The influence of Lacanian theory operates at a number of levels in Metz's theories, and one of these is to allow for a differentiation between semiotic, narrative and psychoanalytic approaches to cinema in a manner that is often as much strategic as it is analytic. For example, Metz discusses the viewer's identification with characters but is able to dismiss it on the grounds that it is 'only valid for the narrative-representational film, and not for the psychoanalytic constitution of the signifier of the cinema' (Metz 1985: 46–7). Because Metz defines his project as being concerned precisely with this psychoanalytic signifier, he is able to exclude such identifications from the central issues of his analysis. Similarly, he excludes the viewer's identification with actors because it is at a secondary level, with the camera, the image, and, perhaps most significantly, with oneself. Metz's strategy is a good one, even if it does not always come off. By acknowledging that actor and character identification are prevalent and common processes (often working in combination), but also stressing that they yield little in the understanding of the psychoanalytic processes and issues at hand (including the explication of this psychically constructed cinematic signifier), Metz makes a significant contribution to an understanding of the processes of the spectator (but of course at the cost of not analysing these other variations and manifestations).

If these two most apparent forms of identifications are to be placed to one side, what is left? For Metz himself points out that comprehension of the film depends on the process of identification, which in itself necessarily includes all formations. Metz is concerned with a truly Lacanian project, which includes the analysis of the positioning of the subject in relation to the cinematic signifier. This leads him to the theme of the mirror, and specifically to Lacan's theory of the mirror stage.[8] Metz's theorising (at times via Jean-Louis Baudry) on how identification operates, and for what reasons, commences with a comparative positioning of the spectator of a film and the formation of the subject through the mirror stage. The self-reflexivity of the mirror stage becomes the self-consciousness of the film spectator as he/she negotiates the position of the self in terms of the film and meaning. This idea allows Metz to make the conceptual leap that identification for the film spectator is actually a self-identification: 'the spectator identifies with himself, with himself as a pure act of perception . . . as the condition of possibility of the perceived and hence as a kind of transcendental subject, which comes before every *there is*' (Metz 1985: 49). This is a Metz who designates both structure and meaning/interpretation as part of the psychic processes of the spectator. Nothing, according to such a position, can make sense without the caveat of the self-reflexive/self-reflecting subject. This is the absent/present status of the spectator which leads Metz to state: 'At every moment I am in the film by my look's caress' (Metz 1985: 54). In short, the identification which takes place in the spectator's relationship to the film is one of self-identification. This is entirely in keeping with Lacan's own theorising of the mirror stage, for at one point he states: 'As I have often underlined, the mirror stage is not simply a moment in development. It also has an exemplary function, because it reveals some of the subject's relation to his image' (Lacan 1988a: 74). The idea of the gaze, in these terms, is as much a confrontation to the spectator, as it is a way into the film. In terms of the previous ideas on masochism, it may well involve such an inflection, but the self-reflexive turn is not necessarily masochistic in design or intent.

It is important to realise that Metz's ideas on identification are based on a sense of cultural phenomena; it is a model constructed to define the cinematic signifier, that is, a designated process unique to spectatorship and film. This cinematic signifier, Metz argues, is 'not only psychoanalytic', it is 'more precisely Oedipal in type' (Metz 1985: 64). It is this because it positions the viewer in a secretive, almost impossible site, like the child who observes the 'amorous play of the parental couple' (Metz 1985: 64). But how far can such a connection be made? This designation of the Oedipal moment presents a number of problems, not the least being the conflict of the primal scene, and the emergence of the self into the social world order. The first of these Metz attempts to resolve by linking elements from Freud's theory to the act of watching a film (the child/spectator as voyeur; the parents/filmic text as unknowing objects of being watched, or who is watching; the solitude of the child/spectator, etc.).[9] However, this does not allow for the fundamental issue of the conflict within the child that such an observation creates.

The other difficulty, this time with the comparative link to the Oedipus complex, is similar. To describe the cinematic signifier as Oedipal means that it does not simply represent this process, but reflects and perhaps even reiterates it (even Metz would stop short of saying it causes it). However, the Oedipal complex, especially for Lacan, is part of the fragmentation process of the mirror stage. It is the forceful positioning of the subject in terms of language (the signifier and the vast complexity of chains of signification) as it forms the Symbolic order. Clearly not all cinema performs such a complex task (perhaps only a few films at all can do so), so the question arises as to how Metz can claim such a force as a defining point of the cinematic signifier. The answer lies in part in a separate, but closely linked, psychoanalytic reading of phantasy.

Phantasy

So far the two main readings of the gaze we have considered have taken up the issues of masochism and identification. A concept that can be seen to connect the two is the idea of phantasy,[10] which continues this theme of the subject's relationship to that what is 'observed' (that is, either literally through the gaze, or in the operation of dreams, daydreams, and phantasising). This was an important concept for Metz and Baudry, both of whom continually attempted to match aspects of the cinema and the act of watching with psychoanalytic concepts such as the unconscious. In these terms, if the idea of masochism insists on a sexual differencing of the filmic spectator, and identification with a positioning of the spectator in a referential status to the self via the text (this curious act of mirroring), then phantasy, it can be argued, through the theories of phantasy (especially Freud's), ties the two together by positing the notion of a psychic reality. By considering this aspect we witness a further theorising of the gaze.

It is in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1986) that Freud struggles constantly with his attempts to distinguish a psychical reality (a reality of unconscious wishes and desires) from a material reality (the 'outside' world order) or a reality derived from immediate conscious thoughts. What quickly becomes apparent when we introduce the spectator of the film (and its order(s) of reality) into this schema is where he/she might be located. The most obvious reading is that the filmic text represents a reality which is derived from all three sources, with the addition of its own textual world order. Such a reading of the heterogeneity of the filmic reality accommodates the interplay of active/passive acts of reading, as well as certain dimensions of identification. When we watch a film we see certain images which relate to an interpretation of a material world order; we consciously negotiate the similarities and differences with our own experiences (both in the world and through other texts, including films); and we contribute a phantasising quality to the filmic world through our dreams, desire and unconscious drives.

There is much to be said about such a neat, symmetrical order; however there are also a number of difficulties, especially if one continues to follow Freud's ideas on phantasy. Laplanche and Pontalis, in their influential essay 'Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality', make the following point: 'phantasy is not merely material to be analysed, whether appearing as fiction from the very start (as in daydreaming) or whether it remains to be shown that it is a construction contrary to appearances (as in screen-memory), it is also the result of analysis, an end-product, a latent content to be revealed behind the symptom' (Laplanche and Pontalis 1986: 14). What such an interpretation suggests is that if phantasy is to be located within the act of viewing a film, then consideration must be made of the relationship between the construction of a phantasy beyond the heterogeneous realities, and their various combinations. This is the production of a something else, beyond the phantasies as they appear on the screen, or are reconfigured in the psychic reality of the spectator. Furthermore, as Laplanche and Pontalis point out (for example, Laplanche and Pontalis 1986: 19–20), the relationship between primal phantasy (those of the unconscious) and a second order of phantasising (such as daydreams) must be made distinct in order to understand how they differ in their relationship to the world out there and to the subject's internal world of the unconscious.

The key point for us here is how Freud attempted to resolve this dilemma over what began, early in his career, as a difficult theory to sustain – that of the scene of seduction. This was an early version of what would later be incorporated into Freud's theories on sexuality.[11] We do not need to be too concerned with the finer points here, but the relevant part is how Freud resolves the issue of events that may or may not have actually taken place in childhood (for his concerns) but have a currency and psychic reality. This is Freud's *Urphantasien* or primal (original) phantasy.

Significantly, Freud's theories on phantasy insist on a type of enfolding between phantasy and structure, so that the initial 'moment' of the phantasy becomes an integral part of the organising of representational structure. In other words, the way the phantasy is manifested is linked to the actual material of the phantasy itself, and the context in which it was initially encountered. Freud's earliest mention of primal phantasies recounts the story of a patient who believes she is being photographed by others under the instructions of her lover: 'Lying partly undressed on the sofa beside her lover, she heard a noise like a click or beat. She did not know the cause, but she arrived at an interpretation of it after meeting two men on the staircase, one of whom was carrying something that looked like a covered box. She became convinced that someone acting on instructions from her lover had watched and photographed her during their intimate *tête-a-tête*' (Freud 1984: 154). Such an image is seductively cinematic in its story and composition and lends itself to these points of comparison. It is particularly relevant to the ideas on the formation of the spectator through a type of self-reflexivity. To illustrate better how we might approach an analysis of a film (or film sequence) in terms of these ideas on phantasy and the gaze, a specific example might help.

One of the issues that becomes foregrounded in such an approach is that of identification. Clearly there is a difference between the sort of identification that takes place in daydreams (which Freud argued is always a first person subject position) and primal phantasy (which Freud saw as having no point of subjectification), and the act of watching a film. The identification processes might sometimes converge (a film might correspond to some primal phantasy; a film might correspond to, or provide material for, a daydream, etc.); however we must guard against taking such identifications too literally. Many of Hitchcock's films, for example, seem to take such literal convergences as their narrative premise; one of the effects is that quality of the thrill so compulsive in these films, but it does produce some curious inflections of these concepts. In *Psycho* (1960), for example, we are presented with a playing out of Norman Bates's phantasies at a number of levels. There are the second order phantasies based in voyeurism (the shower scene), daydreams (the recounting of wishes and desires to Marion), and the playing out of such desires, such as the bizarre decorations and designs of the parlour room (what Freud would term *Wunschphantasie* or wish-phantasy). The primal phantasy is Mother, and the continued manifestation of her through Norman's belief that she is still alive (through a transposition of mother to son) and an active part of his life. The quasi-psychoanalytic explanation of Norman's actions (revenge on the mother and father, but keeping the mother 'alive') at the end of the film is quite in keeping with the (broad) Freudian idea that the structure of this primal phantasy mirrors its manifestation. Indeed, the acts of Norman even parallel the primal phantasy as part of the primal scene,[12] as it is Norman's Oedipal desires (and his discovery of his mother's sexual acts) which brings him to kill first her, and then the others. Even if Norman is unaware of the sexual transgressions of Marion (a sexual relationship outside of marriage) the spectator is capable of providing this link for him and themselves.

Psycho constantly forces a type of identification through the viewer's gaze with these different levels of phantasy. From the literal offering (compulsion) of the voyeur to a more abstract rendition of the primal scene, the film plays out phantasy and identification. There are even recurring motifs of these fantasies; the primal scene, for example, occurs (extra-diegetically) for Norman with his mother, and so is re-presented to the viewer as a motivation for Norman's subsequent acts. But this is paralleled for the viewer in the opening scene of Marion and Sam. Before the viewer has even encountered Norman, he/she mirrors Norman's act of voyeurism and the encounter with the primal scene. Such a reading means that the levels of identification shift dramatically. In the first instance this opening scene becomes a secondary phantasy, providing an erotic daydream sequence; however it also operates as part of the primal phantasy of the film – the dark punishment of illicit desires by the son against the parents. Such a reading also helps us negotiate the difficult terrain of subjective positions. In the first manifestation there is a clear point of subjectification (the spectator is positioned in terms of a masculine point of view/phantasy – just as happens with the shower scene), whereas in the second manifestation of this material (that is, the primal scene itself) things are more diffused through the actions and sequences of the film so that there is never any clearly marked point of subjectification. (This is also part of the disquiet of the killing of Marion a third of the way through the narrative.)

One of the questions that such a reading raises is that of the spectator's own primal phantasies and their relationship to a film. Is such an approach to film arguing that the text itself manifests primal phantasies? Does *Psycho* offer a textual representation of the primal scene, and if so how does this operate in terms of the psychic processes of the viewer/subject? These may well prove to be unanswerable questions, but the issues they raise are as important as any answers posited. It is significant, for example, that Freud's ideas on phantasy relate to a theory of hallucination. As Laplanche and Pontalis put it: 'The origin of phantasy would lie in the hallucinatory satisfaction of desire; in the absence of a real object, the infant reproduces the *experience* of the original satisfaction in a hallucinated form' (Laplanche and Pontalis 1986: 24). If we were to replace 'infant' with 'film spectator', then hallucinatory processes are films themselves, and the act of watching a film becomes part of this important acting out of desires for their satisfaction. It is important to recognise that this interpretation of the operation of the gaze is not simply about the insertion of the viewer into the represented world order (the filmic phantasy), even though this may form part of the overall process. Just as Metz proposes forms of identification outside of camera and character alignment as central to understanding the cinematic signifier, the spectator's relationship to phantasy may be a part of that phantasy, or his/her gaze may form part of the structure of the phantasy. Similarly, the levels of operation for the gaze in the phantasies presented may be at the level of secondary (akin to daydreams) or primary (at the level of the unconscious) processes. In the case of the latter, the idea of identification may never be realised by the spectator of the film.

Another example, one no less convoluted in its structure or phantasy, is to be found in *The Last Seduction* (Dahl 1993). The 'original satisfaction' in this case is power, or, more specifically, the capacity to break social rules and morality and still remain free from punishment. The phantasies of sexual freedom (without guilt), financial gain, power and control over others, entwine to form the idea of the 'real object' which is necessarily always absent. The fact that in this film it is a woman who enjoys the playing out of such phantasies is significant not only for the analysis of the processes of identification, but also in the challenge to the conventions to film *noir*.

The *Punctum*

In his book *Camera Lucida* (1984), Barthes's main point of discussion is photography; and even though he begins by saying that for him the photograph and cinema are inseparable yet positioned as opposites, we can draw out a number of ideas to discuss further the idea of the gaze and the active/passive pleasures involved. That said, it is important to recognise that Barthes's relationship to cinema is far from an easy one, and he seems much more comfortable in this book with the stillness of photography than the motion of film.[13] A key idea in *Camera Lucida* worth considering in terms of the issues at hand is that of the *studium* and *punctum*.

Barthes employs these two terms in much the same way as he does in distinguishing texts of pleasure and texts of *jouissance*, and issues of the readerly and writerly;[14] that is, an attempt to negotiate the terrain between active and passive reading, and the relationship between reader (for us here, the spectator) and text. One particular problem or idiosyncrasy with Barthes's discussion of the *studium* and the *punctum* is that it is heavily invested with personal tastes and details. We need to pick carefully around these relative indulgences to glean the wider implications of Barthes's ideas. Often Barthes (especially in his later works) is a theorist trapped in his own fascinations, but there is still much on offer here, including these important ideas of the *studium* and *punctum*. The *studium* is that part of the image that the photograph brings to us, the spectator. It is the more-or-less closed-off aspects of the image, the culturally saturated parts. As Barthes puts it: 'The *studium* is that very wide field of unconcerned desire, of various interest, of inconsequential taste: *I like/I don't like*. The *studium* is of the order of *liking*, not of *loving*; it mobilizes a half desire, a demi-volition . . .' (Barthes 1984: 27). It is also tied in to the intentionality of the photographer, and has a sense of closure (both textually and in its cultural readings and interpretations) attached to it.

It is the *punctum* that is of far greater interest to Barthes, for this is the concept he sees as being invested with much creative force, dynamic, and interaction between reader and text. If the *studium* drags the viewing process towards a shared understanding and a certain type of desire for a fixed meaning, the *punctum* represents those moments of looking that disrupt both the image (as it has been established) and the spectator. Barthes describes the image as being 'speckled with these sensitive points' and that these are the disturbing of the *studium* as well as the viewer (Barthes 1984: 27). The *punctum* is a specific detail, a moment in the image, as opposed to the *studium* which stretches across the entire image. This detail is that which arrests our gaze, makes us re-evaluate the image and our relationship to it. It is also the element in the relationship between image and spectator that forces a *beyondness* to the image. The *punctum* is invested with a dynamic which makes connections (new and old) between the image and other images, and the image and the spectator.

Before we proceed there is a point that needs to be taken up regarding the idea of a *punctum* of film. Barthes very specifically argues that it is not possible for the moving image to have a *punctum*, but it does have, comparatively, a blind field (Barthes 1984: 55–7) – which is that dimension which goes beyond the screen, a futherness to any image appearing. What we wish to argue here is that on the one hand Barthes is correct to distinguish between the photograph and the film in terms of the operation of a *punctum* and this blind field; however it is not realistic to dismiss entirely the *punctum* from film. This is because all images (photographs, paintings, scenery, films, etc.) must have this same operation of *studium* and *punctum*, even if it differs in how it is performed according to the properties of the medium. Furthermore, even if the 'pure' form of film (its eidetic notion) is its moving image and the flows of motion (from the fluid to staccato), an integral part of the reading of a film (that is, watching, recalling, speaking about, experiencing it, as well as interpreting it) involves both moving and still images. There are moments in a film that we experience as stills, just as there are moments dominated by movement (for example, the camera movements in *Raising Arizona* (Coen Bros. 1987) or *Miller's Crossing* (Coen Bros. 1990)); or the movement on the screen itself such as the masses of the armies in *Ran* (Kurosawa 1985) or the sweep of figures across a seemingly impossibly long and wide plain at the end of *They Died With Their Boots On* (Walsh 1941); or colour, such as its symbolic use in *Three Colours: Red* (Kieslowski 1994) or *Marnie* (Hitchcock 1964); or sound, such as the sound of the breeze through the bushes in *Blow Up* (Antonioni 1966) or the mixture of Ripley's straining breath and ruptured machinery in the closing sequences of *Alien* (Scott 1979). The shower scene in *Psycho*, to return to an earlier example, is a scene dominated by movement and sound. It makes sense to refer to this in terms of the blind field (which also contributes to the terror of the scene) and lacking a *punctum*; however there are scenes in, for example, *Lawrence of Arabia* (Lean 1962) or *La Belle Noiseuse* (Rivette 1991) that operate precisely in terms of Barthes's ideas of the *punctum*. Such scenes (the panoramic sweep of the desert in *Lawrence of Arabia*, the contorted and naked body of Marianne in *La Belle Noiseuse*) may not function in the same way as a still photograph, but we can still argue that the idea of the *punctum* operates, both on the screen and in our later memories and visualisations of the film. Barthes may resist this, arguing that slow, careful time is required to catch the *punctum*, but this would seem to miss a fundamental aspect of reading a film.

The significant thing about the *punctum* is that it works to destabilise what would otherwise be seen as a presented image, a whole and settled configuration. As with other legacies of Barthes's theories, how this disruption takes place, and where the elements themselves are derived from (the text, the reader/spectator, the act of reading, the historical moment, the cultural contexts, etc.), is left largely open. That the phenomenon can take place, and that we, as spectators, should actively contribute to it, is the defining point. There is a scene in *Manon des sources* (Berri 1986) where Ugolin spies on Manon as she dances naked in the hills, playing a harmonica. The *studium* of this image feeds into a whole range of backdrops: there is the very painterly composition of the shot, echoing a series of paintings from the late Renaissance to the Neoclassical (especially in that theme of Susanna caught bathing, and the interaction of nature and humanity in some of Poussin's work); there is, similarly, a *studium* of filmic scenes (the scene in *Sirens* (Duigan 1994) is an example of an ironic construction of this theme as the women are discovered by a blindman, and also has the inevitable self-referential status to painting given that it is a film about a painter); there is also the *studium* of the voyeur, and the construction of a phallocentric gaze. The *punctum* here (or at least one possibility of this) is the moment when the camera reflects back into Ugolin's eyes, and this punctures the eroticised image with a far more powerful emotion of madness. For this is the scene that leads to Manon's revenge through Ugolin's mad love. Such a *punctum* undercuts the Neoclassical contrivances, the intertextual connections, and perhaps even the phallocentric voyeurism.

The *punctum* operates as a point which causes an often radical reappraisal of the image. A principle of Eisensteinian montage is based on a similar idea. An image alters in itself through its juxtapositioning with another image (or images). Such a *punctum* sounds as if it must be of a different order from that devised by Barthes. This is a point outside of the image, but yet is still a part of it. However, such a concept (based on the operation of montage) is echoed in Barthes's own definition. Of the *punctum* he states: 'whether or not it is triggered, it is an addition: it is what I add to the photograph and *what is nonetheless already there*' (Barthes 1984: 55). This addition from the reader to what is there can, it is argued here, be derived from the processes of montage, as much as from *mise-en-scène*. This suggests that we might speak of a *punctum* derived from montage, as distinct from one derived from *mise-en-scène*. Similarly, we might distinguish between a *punctum* as it impacts on the gaze during the scene, or one which is experienced in a recalling of the image. What all of these share is this construction of the gaze, and the interaction between spectator and film.

The four issues through which the gaze has been tackled here – masochism, identification, phantasy and the *punctum* – are ultimately reflections on how some of the debates and issues of the gaze have been dealt with in film theory. These include the relationship of the subject to the image, the politics of gender and feminist readings of the image, the attempts to deliver a psychoanalytic model of film analysis, and the studies of how the spectator and image interact. These constitute the broad scope of the theorising of the gaze. They provide an inmixing of psychoanalysis, feminism, phenomenology, reception theory, semiotics, and, more recently, gender theory. What is curious to note is that even a cursory review of the literature of these debates reveals an explosion of material up until the mid-1980s, and then a sharp turn towards new and developing ideas. Why this might have taken place is open to speculation, but one large intervention that took place is the translation of a number of Lacan's seminars, and it is to some of these ideas that we shall now turn to in the following chapter.

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