postfoundational phenomenology

Husserlian Reflections on Presence and Embodiment

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This book is dedicated to

Joshua Saul Mensch

my son and my friend

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Introduction

To say we are present to ourselves through our bodies is to express something so obvious that most people hardly give it a thought. Philosophers, however, came late to this recognition. The idea that our embodiment shapes our apprehensions seemed to Descartes to designate a problem rather than a topic of study. His effort was to overcome embodiment, that is, to reach a realm where the unencumbered mind could confront the world. The same prejudice informed the modern tradition he founded. It took for granted that the mind, or self, was unextended. Since the nonextended could not interact with the extended, Leibniz assumed that the self was a "windowless monad." God provided its impressions of the external world. The same position was embraced by Berkeley. Realizing that matter had entirely lost its function of supplying the disembodied self with impressions, he denied its existence altogether. Even Hume, the dedicated empiricist, refused to speculate on the origin of such impressions. They could as well come from God, the external world, or the mind itself. The latter, as disembodied, was a mere theater—a ghostly stage on which our impressions and ideas succeeded each other. Kant pushed this tradition of taking the self as nonextended to its logical extreme. The disembodied self, he declared, was entirely noumenal. It could not even appear. It was only with Nietzsche's biologism that a break with this view appears. Nietzsche's will to power, however, was something more than an organic will to life. Its appeal was ultimately to something beyond our bodily being.

If we ignore Nietzsche's disquiets, the first systematic escape from this tradition appears in a most unlikely quarter. It is carried out by a philosopher who appears to be its culmination. Husserl, in the *Cartesian Meditations*, presents himself as a proponent of a philosophy of a "pure"

phenomenological observer. This purity seems to point to the philosopher's escape from the particularity implied by being embodied. Yet, beginning in the 1920s and continuing to the end of his career, Husserl also focused increasingly on embodiment. Preoccupied by the same themes that were later to engage Merleau-Ponty, he sought in a series of largely unpublished manuscripts to describe presence, in particular self-presence, in terms of embodiment. What unifies his descriptions is the thought that presence and embodiment imply each other: to be present is to be engaged in some form of embodiment and vice versa. The self, taken as a place of presence, is formed by the entanglement of the two. Concretely, this means that things are present to us insofar as they affect us bodily. Similarly, our own self-presence is founded on our bodily self-affection. In both cases, the affection begins a constitutive process in which coming to presence and embodiment occur together.

This insight does not just separate Husserl from the tradition of modern philosophy that begins with Descartes. It also runs counter to what can be loosely called the "postmodern" tradition as exemplified by Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida. These philosophers share a distinct concept of being a self. Selfhood, for Husserl, is a function of presence. Since our self-presence is founded on our bodily self-affection, it entails having a body. For the postmodern tradition, however, selfhood is a function of absence. The self exists in its escape from presence. One way in which the major figures of the postmodern movement express this is in the notion that the self is such by being self-aware. Aware of itself, the self is there "for itself." To be a self is, then, to be a for-itself. This, however, requires an inner absence or nonpresence, *across which* the self can affect itself. Thus, Derrida, like Husserl, traces our self-presence to our "autoaffection." For Derrida, however, what lies behind our auto-affection is "differ*a*nce." The term signifies an alterity that is prior to any identity. It indicates an absence that has to be conceived independently of presence. Because it includes this absence, the self can be distinct from itself, such self-separation being required for it to affect itself and, hence, to be present to itself. For Husserl, by contrast, the origin of our self-affection is the fact that ego in its being-affected cannot be thought to exist apart from affecting content. In other words, the ego implies the nonego in requiring affecting contents, and vice versa. Together they make up the "awake ego" in its autoaffection, i.e., in its self-presence as an embodied being. Here, the difference is between two mutually implicit components of our self-presence.

Two very different attitudes towards presence are obviously at work here. For Husserl, presence is primary. The goal of his reductions is to uncover presence in its ultimate, founding givenness. What presence, broadly speaking, "gives" is an ultimate court of appeal. It provides us with the basis for our assertions. In this sense, it founds our common life together by supplying the evidence that permits mutual agreement. For Derrida, however, this view is a "metaphysical prejudice." To escape it, we have to "deconstruct" it. This means focusing on "the tensions, the contradictions, the heterogeneity" within it.[1] Once we expose them, we are "in principle excluded from ever 'cashing in the draft made on intuition' in expressions" (Derrida 1973a, p. 92). We thereby free language from its dependence on intuitive presence. What is at issue in these contending views is the concept of presence as foundational. The notion that the self is a place of presence goes hand in hand with the belief that such presence founds its assertions. For Husserl, we cannot assert one without the other. This is why the postmodern tradition that begins with Heidegger's break with the concept of founding presence has always included, at least implicitly, an attack on Husserl. Postmodernism sees the modern tradition as essentially a foundationalist enterprise, one that ultimately looks to presence to justify its assertions. Thus, to go beyond the modern to the postmodern is, in its eyes, to abandon the foundationalist enterprise that is implicit in Husserl's emphasis on presence. This, however, is to abandon Husserl himself. As the last representative of the modern tradition, he must be left behind.

To counter this view, it is not enough to say that Husserl does not share the prejudices of modernity with regard to the body. It is insufficient to point out that he does not conceive of presence as Descartes, Leibniz, or Hume would—namely as the result of a disembodied picture show. The only way to respond is to open up the issue of foundationalism. We have to ask: What is wrong with the notion of foundationalism? How do the problems associated with it involve presence? Are these problems such that we must turn to absence, or is the very focus on absence itself a part of the modern, foundationalist paradigm? In raising such questions, the purpose of this Introduction is not to answer them in any definitive manner. It is simply to break the certainties that prevent our hearing what Husserl has to say on presence and selfhood.

1. For Derrida, this focus defines deconstruction. See Caputo 1997, p. 9.

Presence and Foundationalism

Historically speaking, "foundationalism" refers to the modern attempt to get to the root of things, to their foundations or origins. In philosophy this project is tied up with the effort to introduce the deductive or axiomatic method into philosophy. Here, the foundations appear as the axioms, the beginning points to which all else can be reduced. The ideal, in Descartes's words, is a "certain and indubitable" beginning. He writes: "Archimedes, to move the earth from its orbit and place it in a new position, demanded nothing more than a fixed and immovable fulcrum; in a similar manner I shall have the right to entertain high hopes if I am fortunate enough to find a single truth which is certain and indubitable" (Descartes 1990, p. 23). The "truth" sought here is an account of what truly is. For Descartes, who with Galileo initiated mathematical physics, the account is given by measuring and numbering. Reality is what is mathematically describable. Such reality serves as a "ground" or "foundation" insofar as we can reduce all our descriptions of the world to its terms.

The result of this procedure can be described broadly as a splitting of the world. On the one side we have the world as it appears. This is the world given through our five senses. As Descartes observes, our sense perceptions are *not* given to us to provide accurate information about objects. Their purpose is our bodily preservation rather than truth. They are given, he writes, "only to indicate to my mind which objects are useful or harmful" (Descartes 1990, p. 79). To go beyond these pragmatic concerns, we have to grasp the world through mathematics. Mathematically describable properties constitute the "true" world, the world that is "behind" the appearing world. Heidegger, reflecting on the Cartesian legacy, describes this split in terms of "metaphysical thinking." Such thinking, he writes, "rests on the distinction between what truly is and what, measured against this, constitutes all that is not truly in being" (Heidegger 1991, II, 230). Thus, the sensible world is not "truly" existent. It fails to come up to the standards of the "true," mathematically describable world. This "true world" has a double relation to the apparent. It serves as its ground, its explanatory principle. It also, however, serves as a standard to judge the apparent. Thus, the wave properties of light, in their mathematical formulations, are not used just to explain the properties of visible light. They also claim to be descriptions of what light is. In this view, our visual experience, say of colors, is only an experience of the *appearance*, not the *reality* of light.

This separation of appearance from reality raises the question of distinguishing the two. Is there something in their presence that allows us to say that in one case, but not the other, we are in contact with the "real"? The question reminds us that foundationalism, as initiated by Descartes, involves not just being but also certainty. Descartes's "plan" is "to put aside every belief in which I could imagine the least doubt" (Descartes 1990, p. 23). He will continue this process until he reaches "a single truth which is certain and indubitable" (ibid.). This "single truth" will serve as a *ground* for all further assertions. For Descartes, then, the ground-grounded relation has a certain ambiguity. The ground has both an ontological *and* an epistemological meaning. It is both what "truly is" *and* what can be known without "the least doubt." In the second, the focus is on knowing. More particularly, it is on what provides the evidence for our assertions. For Descartes, this evidence is provided by the clear and distinct presence of what we assert. Clarity and distinctness designate this presence in its most self-confirming and unambiguous sense. The example Descartes uses is the certainty of the statement "I am." The statement is not a deductive inference from the "I think" that precedes it. It rests on an immediate givenness. Every time I attempt to deny it, my own self-presence overwhelms my denial. The statement confirms itself in my immediate presence to myself. The upshot is that my own self-presence comes to stand as an epistemological standard. It gives me a "truth which is certain and indubitable," a truth against which I can measure other truths. They can be considered to be "true" or "certain" to the point that they have its clarity and distinctness.

The difficulty with making the self an epistemological standard appears once we ask about the nature of its presence. Is the self present like a thing? Is it mathematically describable as an extended entity is? To serve as a standard for the latter sort of entity, it would have to have the latter's type of presence. It would have to be what I number through weighing and measuring a given, sensuously appearing thing. Yet, it is not a thing; it is what grasps things. I am certain of it only as the "I" of the "I think." Such an "I," however, cannot even be granted extension. My certainty of it does not include its embodiment.[2] In fact, according to Descartes, "I am entirely and truly distinct from my body" (Descartes

2. In Descartes's words, it does not include myself as having a "face, hands, arms, and all this mechanism composed of bone and flesh and members" (Descartes 1990, p. 25). The only thing I can say about myself is that I am a "thinking thing." "Thought," Descartes asserts, "is an attribute that belongs to me; it alone is inseparable from my nature" (p. 26).

1990, p. 74). Given this, how does the self fit into his account of what "truly is"? A nonextended self is not part of the "*true*," mathematically describable *world*. Since it is what grasps appearance, rather than appearance itself, it is also not part of the sensuously *appearing world*. The splitting of the world into appearance and mathematically describable reality, in fact, excludes it altogether. In terms of this world, it has the status of an "absence."

The full consequences of this result took several hundred years to develop.[3] As the subsequent history of Cartesianism made apparent, the working out of its foundational project left no room for the subjectivity engaged in it. The postmodern reaction was to see the desire for presence as a prejudice of foundationalism. Foundationalism understood presence as an epistemological correlate to the notion of an ontological ground. Both, then, had to be denied. The completely "certain" presence that would validate our assertions was as illusory as the "true" world that was somehow behind the apparent one. The error in both cases concerned the very attempt to describe reality in terms of the ground-grounded relation. This always ended in the problematic ontological reduction of the apparent to the "true" or the equally problematic epistemological reduction of the doubtful to the "certain." To avoid such reductions, the postmodern tradition concluded that every type of foundationalism has to be avoided. It asserted that the very notion of a founding, validating presence must be abandoned.

Absence and Foundationalism

The actual working out of this reaction had a curious result. Shut off from presence, the philosophers of the postmodern tradition turned towards absence. It became the basis of their accounts of the self. Heidegger, for example, claimed that at the heart of our selfhood was a nothingness. The anxiety we feel facing death reveals this to us. In his words, "The 'nothing' anxiety confronts us with reveals the nothingness (*Nichtigkeit*) that determines Dasein in its very *basis*" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 308). If, at the basis of my self, there is only a nothingness or absence, the whole notion of self-presence must be rethought. I cannot say that my self-presence is a privileged sphere where I confront directly what I have "in mind." In fact, my relation to my own thoughts is like my relation to another person's thoughts. Hearing this person speak, I take his

3. For an account of these consequences, see Mensch 1996b, pp. 1–65.

words as indications. They serve as marks or signs to me of his thoughts, which I cannot directly grasp. For Derrida, my own inner absence has the same consequence. In his words, "The subject cannot speak without giving himself a representation of his speaking" (Derrida 1973a, p. 57). This holds not just for my speaking of myself. Language as such works by representation. Its spoken or written signs always stand in the place of what they signify, the latter being necessarily absent. This denial of presence thus drives Derrida to assert, "The absence of intuition—and therefore of the subject of the intuition—is not only *tolerated* by speech; it is required by the general structure of signification" (p. 93).

A similar focus on absence informs the postmodern approach to ethics. Thus, Heidegger's *Being and Time* understands ethics primarily in terms of self-responsibility. In his words, I heed the "call of conscience" when I realize my responsibility for my being. The nothingness at the heart of my being means that my being is not something given. I achieve it through my various projects.[4] In a certain sense my being is this achieving. It is my responding to my present nothingness. I do so when, through my plans and projects, I am "ahead of myself." The crucial point here is that I can be ahead of myself only because, as present, I am "essentially nothing." Regarded ethically, my being ahead of myself is my being there for myself as an *obligation* to fill this nothingness. I do this by choosing or obligating myself to realize a given future. When I do, my being there in this future is *my presence to myself as an ought.* Levinas's account of ethical responsibility has a similar reliance on absence. The absence or nothingness I respond to, however, is *not* my own. It is that of the other person. This other person is "in" me, i.e., inherent in my selfhood. Yet, as Levinas writes, I have to think "the *in* differently than a presence." He adds, "the other is not another same. The *in* does not signify an assimilation."[5] He is not something "in" me that I could assimilate in the sense of synthesizing into something present. Rather, he is within me as an absence. This absence gives me the self-separation, the self-alterity that makes me a for-itself. The result of confronting it is, in Levinas's words, "the awakening of the for-itself . . . by the inabsorbable alterity of

4. This inherent nothingness of Dasein is behind Heidegger's assertion, "Dasein is not the ground of its being insofar as this first arises from its own project" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 285).

5. "Il faut ici penser comme catégorie première l'Autre-dans-le-Même en pensant le *dans* autrement que comme une présence. L'Autre n'est pas un autre Même, le *dans* ne signifie pas une assimilation" (Levinas 1993a, p. 133).

the Other" (Levinas 1993a, p. 32). My responding to this absence is, as we shall see, not just "the beginning of ethics"; it is also my ongoing responsibility for the Other. This is a responsibility that cannot be avoided since it is the Other who first makes me a for-itself.

This reliance on absence is quite striking. Heidegger, Derrida, and Levinas, the major figures of what I am calling the postmodern movement, are involved in a paradoxical endeavor. Apparently engaged in an attack on foundationalism, they nonetheless continue its practice of getting to the basis of things and of using this basis to account for them. This basis is absence, which is variously named. As we shall see, it appears as the "lack of intuition," which Derrida sees as essential for language. It occurs as the "nothingness" (*Nichtigkeit*), which Heidegger places at the heart of Dasein. It turns up in the "beyond being," which Levinas appeals to in his attempt to differentiate his position from Heidegger's. What is common to these formulations is an antifoundationalism that does not go beyond an attack on presence.

The persistence of the practice of foundationalism in such formulations raises the question of whether they are actually examples of antifoundationalism. Could they not be the last, most extreme examples of the foundationalist enterprise? This question can be put in terms of the logic of foundationalism, which is that of the ground-grounded relation. As Fichte observed, the relation splits what it relates. Its usage in Descartes results in the splitting of the world into the apparent and the real. Similarly, in Kant, it results in the phenomenal-noumenal split. In each case, the ground (the "real," the "noumenal") is distinguished from the grounded (the "apparent," the "phenomenal"). This split occurs because, as Fichte noted, "by virtue of its mere notion, the ground falls outside of what it grounds" (Fichte 1982, p. 8). If the two were the same, the ground would lose its function, which is that of explaining the grounded. Like the grounded, the ground would, itself, be in need of an explanation. Their distinction implies that when philosophy attempts to "discover the ground of all experience," this ground must fall outside of what it grounds. As a result, it "necessarily lies outside of all experience" (ibid.). The ground, in other words, becomes something that cannot present itself in experience; it becomes an absence. The postmodern focus on absence thus seems to be the logical consequence of pursuing the foundationalist project to its end.

The real difficulty with this project stems from its logic. As long as the ground "falls outside" of the grounded, foundationalism always

makes the ground absent on the level of the grounded. The very logic inherent in the relation demands its nonappearance. To describe the ground as an absence may acknowledge this fact. It does not, however, go beyond it. Modernism fails because its project always directs us towards a ground, which, as absent, *cannot* serve as a foundation. Its problem is not presence, but *a lack of presence.* Given this, the postmodern attack on presence is not a "going beyond" modern philosophy. Postmodernism's attempt to use absence as a foundation seems to be, rather, modernity's culmination. This implies that the difficulties of the postmodern project are actually difficulties it shares with modern philosophy. Chief among these is the problem of dealing with the body. Whatever else it is, *the body is not an absence.* It is our self-presence on the most fundamental level. It is precisely this self-presence that modernity ignores.[6] This becomes clear once we consider the abstractions implicit in the postmodern project.

Embodiment and Presence

As already indicated, the foundationalist project involves a distinct type of understanding, one informed by an initial skepticism regarding our senses. Our senses, Descartes realized, were developed for survival rather than to provide accurate information. In indicating "which objects are useful or harmful," their purpose is utilitarian. As Nietzsche was later to put this insight, "we have senses for only a selection of perceptions—those with which we have to concern ourselves in order to preserve ourselves" (Nietzsche 1968, p. 275). In other words, utility, rather than truth, determines what we see. Descartes's response has already been indicated: to get at the truth of things, we have to attend to the numerable aspects of reality. We must, in other words, abstract from their *secondary,* directly sensible qualities—their tastes, odors, sounds, colors, and textures—and turn our attention to their *primary,* mathematically describable qualities. Descartes's assertion that as a "thinking thing," he is "distinct" from his body, points to a corresponding abstraction with regard to the self that grasps these primary qualities. It must be understood in abstraction from

6. And not just modernity. As Hans Jonas writes, regarding *Being and Time:* "But is the body ever mentioned? Is 'care' ever traced back to it, to concern about nourishment, for instance,—indeed, to *physical* needs at all? Except for its interior aspects, does Heidegger ever mention that side of our nature by means of which, quite externally, we ourselves belong to the world experienced by the senses: that to which we, in blunt objective terms, are a part? Not that I know of" (Jonas 1996, p. 47).

its embodiment, i.e., from its physical nature as a sensing subject. This requirement follows from the universal understanding that science engages in. For such understanding to be possible, a corresponding level of selfhood must be assumed. This is the level of the self conceived apart from the body; it is the level of the self as a disembodied, pure observer. Every such self is substitutable for every other. Each can perform the same crucial experiments and observe the same results, since each limits itself to the selfhood that is a correlate of the abstract and measurable aspects of reality.

The understanding that characterizes the modern, foundationalist project is, then, that engaged in by the disembodied observer. This cannot be otherwise, given that the abstraction that allows the move from the grounded to its mathematical ground demands a corresponding abstraction in the self that engages in this move. As for the project itself, its initial impulse situates it as a reaction against embodiment. Arising as it did out of a skepticism regarding the senses, it may be understood as a recoil from the body's situatedness or localizing entanglements. Over against the body's finitude and inevitable mortality was situated the pure observer who grasps the universal and unending aspects of reality. The implication here is that moving beyond foundationalism is going beyond this reaction. To go from the modern to the genuinely postmodern, we would have to embrace a type of understanding that is *not* a reaction to embodiment.

This "going beyond" may be put in terms of two opposed conceptions of selfhood. On the one side, we have the self that understands through abstracting in order to measure and count. It distinguishes itself from its object, which it observes at a distance. Opposed to this is the self that understands by embodying and particularizing. It apprehends by overcoming the distance between itself and its object. Its grasp is through its own embodied states. Thus, its characteristic mode of expression is not "I observe," as in "I observe heat," but rather "I am," as in "I am hot." Foundationalism, in proposing the first type of selfhood, necessarily conceives it in terms of the ground-grounded relation. Thus, it constantly faces a choice of reductionisms. In its idealistic mode, it takes the self as a ground of the world, that is, as a basis for both the world's presence and certainty. Here, it reduces the world to our consciousness of it. In its realistic mode, the opposite reduction occurs. Understanding the self as grounded by the world, i.e., by its material, mathematically describable processes, foundationalism attempts to take consciousness as an illusion.

In this view, as Dennett expresses it, "we are all zombies. Nobody is conscious" (Dennett 1991, p. 406). In either mode, the reality of the ground absorbs the grounded. The grounded is reduced to the categories of the ground. To avoid this reduction, selfhood has to be conceived outside of (or "beyond") the ground-grounded relation. This means that the embodiment that characterizes the self's grasp of the world must position it as neither a ground of—nor as grounded by—the world. Rather than functioning as a ground, the self must be considered simply as the "place" where a particular environment can come to presence. As we shall see, this coming to presence both requires and determines this place. Without the self, the environment cannot appear. Determination occurs inasmuch as the world's coming to presence in the self *situates* the self as a particular place of presence. Such determination does not reduce the self's consciousness to an illusion. Similarly, the self's role in providing a place of presence for the world does not reduce the world to a mere content of consciousness.

Both alternatives are excluded once we conceive of being as embodied functioning. To do so is to say that being is present where it is materially "at work," i.e., where it functions by embodying itself. Thus, as Aristotle observed, color is color by being at work in the eye, that is, by functioning in and through a particular bodily environment. The "ground," here, if we could use this term, is not outside of the grounded. Rather it manifests itself through it. It only functions as a ground *through* the grounded. Thus, color exists only in the eye. It can as little be reduced to the electromagnetic waves of the environment as such waves can be reduced to the conscious content of color. The waves that "ground" color function only as its basis in the environment of the eye. Their presence as color is through their operating in this bodily environment. The point here is that we cannot search beyond the actual presence of a color—or, indeed, of any entity, for the ground of such presence. This ground "is"—i.e., is "at work" acting as a ground—in the embodied functioning that manifests an entity.

The overcoming of foundationalism has a double effect. On the one hand, it overcomes the ground-grounded relation in its refusal to posit a "true" world behind the appearing one. On the other, it does not abandon presence. Things "are" where they are present, i.e., where they are "at work" embodying themselves in particular environments. When the bodily environment is a self, then this presence is "in" this self. As such, it takes the form of conscious presence.

Phenomenology and Embodiment

According to the above, to overcome foundationalism is to master its tendency to seek a ground of experience (and, hence, of presence) beyond all experience. To do so, however, is to understand presence as embodiment. How are we to do this? Is there an appropriate method that would allow us to pursue a study of embodiment? Is there a philosopher who could serve as our guide? The required method would have to be presuppositionless in the sense of *not* assuming the logic of foundationalism. It would not engage in the assumptions that underlie its tendency to reduce things to the categories of their supposed basis. Equally, it would not abandon presence. The method would not be drawn into the attempt to seek a ground for presence. Examining the manifold ways in which being appears, it would, instead, study presence as such. Remaining within presence, the method would "cash in" every ontological assertion in the currency of being's appearing. The "cash value" of assertions about being would, in its eyes, be the phenomena that manifest the presence of being. Such requirements fix the method as phenomenological. They also point to Husserl as a guide for this study.

In terms of the traditional understanding of Husserl's phenomenology, this is, admittedly, a paradoxical choice. Husserl, as I stated, is commonly viewed as advocating a philosophy whose descriptions are carried out by a "pure" observer. Similarly, his "phenomenological reduction" is often understood as leaving a Cartesian disembodied ego as its "residuum." Were this the case, Husserl would fail as a guide *in spite of his insistence on presence,* because this insistence would be undermined by an essential Cartesianism. With Descartes, his philosophical position would be informed by a recoil from embodiment, one which expresses itself in his positing of a "pure ego." Disembodied, this ego must be conceived *as prior to the presence* that arises through embodiment. In this view, then, Husserl's Cartesianism brings with it a foundationalism that ultimately undermines his notion of presence. If we accept this, then the way is open for Derrida's deconstruction of Husserl's concept of presence. His examination of the "tensions, contradictions, the heterogeneity" within Husserl's insistence on presence uncovers what is already there.

As with most criticisms of Husserl, the above can be drawn from his own reflections on his project. His insistence on presence constantly led him to revise his positions when the descriptive evidence he uncovered failed to support them. Thus, Husserl himself criticized the notion of a

disembodied, pure phenomenological observer. The result he ultimately came to is the account of embodiment that will be presented in the chapters that give his reflections on this theme. Here, it is sufficient to note that he engaged in a series of examinations of how the body functions in knowing. As part of these, he analyzed the ways our bodily sensations—the kinesthesia—function in our grasp of objects. The conclusion he came to was that external perception and perception of one's body "proceed in a unity of an intentionality" in which both are conjoined (Ms. C 16 IV, p. 40b).[7] My perception of an object, for example, a coin, includes my perception of my fingers closing about it. The intention I have to "see" this coin is fulfilled not just by the "optical data" giving its shape. Its fulfillment includes the "kinesthetic data" of my fingers holding it. This conclusion has an obvious implication for the attempt to posit a disembodied ego. Given that such kinesthesia supply an essential part of its perceptual material, the ego, *qua* perceiving, implies the body. The ego's perception is through its embodiment. I perceive the coin, for example, through the fingers closing about it as well as through focusing my eyes as I bring it closer to me. To reverse this, the sensed coin, with its feel, weight, color, distance from my eyes, etc., implies an embodied perceiving. Sensations from the embodied subject, the kinesthesia, form an essential part of the material through which the coin presents itself. They underlie its appearing sense as having such and such a feel, weight, color, and so forth.

The implication of this analysis is not just that the perceiver is embodied. It is that perceiver and perceived mutually imply each other. The perceived in its appearing sense implies the bodily perceiver, while the perceiver is such through its embodied relation to the perceived. As we shall see, the dependence of the perceiver on the perceived extends to the specific sensuous contents that "awaken" it as a perceiver. Awakened, it instinctively seeks out the contents that satisfy its bodily needs. The search for specific contents is, thus, inherent in its perceptive intentions. Ultimately, these considerations lead Husserl to assert that there are no "value free" sensations or sensible objects. Since the embodied ego is inherently tied to the world through its bodily needs, it follows that "nothing can be given that cannot move the feelings (*Gemüt*)" (Ms. A VI 26, p. 42a). Everything we apprehend has its coloring of desirability or value.

7. I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Rudolf Bernet, the director of the Husserl Archives in Louvain, for permission to quote from the Nachlaß.

These thoughts led Husserl to transform his account of temporalization. Ultimately, he comes to understand its retentional and protentional processes as bodily functions. With this, temporalization became understood as a kind of embodiment. This point can be put in terms of his descriptions of these processes. The "retentional process" is that by which we retain the impressions we have had of some object. According to Husserl, the process preserves, not just our past impressions, but also their order. "Protention" performs an analogous service for the future. The protentional process "protends" or anticipates the series of impressions we expect to receive from some given object. With the experience of what we retain and anticipate, the changing instant of our now is broadened out to include extended time. "Temporalization" occurs in the sense that the objects we grasp through these processes are grasped as extended in time. They become present as enduring entities. Now, as part of his attempt to describe embodiment, Husserl takes these retentional and protentional processes as instinctive drives. They are instinctive functions directed toward acquiring and retaining impressions. Thus, protention with its anticipatory having-in-advance of contents is taken as manifesting our instinctive drive to actually acquire the contents we anticipate. Each new impression activates an anticipation of a further impression. This anticipation does not exhaust itself in simply expecting an impression. The expecting is also a striving after the acquisition of the anticipated impression. Similarly, our instinct to hold fast or retain what we have acquired is taken as manifesting itself in the retentional process. Here, the new impression activates the retention of the previous "just past" impression.

Chapter Two will go through the details of this account. The important point here is that the processes of temporalization are tied to our instinctive need to acquire and retain sensory information. We have, according to Husserl, an instinctive attachment to certain contents. This attachment points back to our embodied state, i.e., to the fact that our survival depends on our making appropriate sense of our environment. An organism must perform those syntheses that bring its affecting objects to apprehension. It has to grasp what preys upon it as well as its own prey. It must also grasp the aspects of its environment—for example, the sexual displays of potential mates—it needs to reproduce. Given this, the enduring presence that arises from the retentional and protentional processes has a similar, instinctively driven, bodily basis.

This conclusion can be put in terms of the claim that being "is" where it is present, i.e., is where it is "at work" embodying itself in a par-

ticular environment. When this bodily environment is a self, this presence is "in" this self. It takes the form of conscious presence. Husserl's analyses indicate that such presence is both temporal and bodily. Thus, temporal nowness begins with the bodily presence of an affecting content. The "being at work" of this content is its affecting us. Affecting us, it triggers the retentional and protentional drives that transform its presence into the content-filled nowness that we experience. As we shall see, the self-awareness that characterizes this experience arises in the self-presence that is inherent in retention and protention.[8] The result of such "work," then, is the conscious presence of the content. In the context of the self, the affecting content's presence *is* experienced nowness. Since this context is bodily, i.e., involves retention and protention as bodily drives, we have to say that this presence results from temporalization taken as a bodily function. In other words, in the context of consciousness, such temporalization is *embodiment.* The processes of temporalization embody—i.e., make sensuously present in consciousness—the objects of our world. This embodiment is driven by our own embodied status, i.e., by our bodily needs. It is precisely through such needs that the self is attuned to the world, becoming a place of presence. Its dependence on the world is inherent in its providing the embodied functioning (the temporalization) that manifests its entities. Open to them by virtue of our dependence, we provide the place where these entities can manifest themselves, i.e., "be" in our consciousness.

Naturalistic Presuppositions

Husserl is known for warning philosophers against the dangers of "naturalistic presuppositions"—i.e., those in which we assume some current theory regarding nature. The danger of such "presuppositions" is that they are often overturned. The progress of science includes its revolutions, and these can render obsolete the accounts that are based on its previous positions. With its talk of "affections," "instincts," and "drives," one may ask how far Husserl's description of conscious presence escapes these dangers. What, for example, is the status of the "instinctual strivings" used to explain perception as embodiment? Is this notion biological or phenomenological? If the former, to what extent does it rely on the biology of his day? If the latter, what assures its independence? The

8. Such self-presence will turn out to be a function of the recursive nature of retention and protention.

more general question here concerns the point at which phenomenology shades off into biology. Phenomenology, if nothing else, is a reflective, descriptive relation of what presents itself to consciousness. Biological concepts, however, lay claim to a level that is prior to consciousness. How does Husserl's "genetic" account of consciousness, which attempts to describe the *emergence* of consciousness through the instinctive drive processes of retention and protention, account for itself? How can it qualify as phenomenological?

The answer to this question turns on the nature of phenomenology as a descriptive endeavor. Phenomenology does not describe the *results* of the natural sciences. Its focus, rather, is on the evidence that such results presuppose. It is, then, the priority of such evidence to all such "naturalistic presuppositions" that allows it to avoid their dangers. This point may be put in terms of Husserl's assertion that phenomenology, taken as a "theory of knowledge, precedes all empirical theory, thus, preceding all explanatory sciences of the real, all physical science on the one hand and all psychology on the other" (Husserl 1984, I, 27). This precedence is, first and foremost, descriptive. It is on the basis of the priority of its descriptions that the essential, eidetic accounts it provides—accounts of the "ideal sense of the specific connections" required by scientific knowledge—avoid the obsolescence of such knowledge. In fact, since the evidence it uncovers is presupposed by scientific theory, phenomenology can be taken as setting the boundaries for such theory."[9] Any scientific theory—biology included—that undermines its phenomenological basis ends by undermining itself as an empirical science.

Given this, we cannot say that Husserl's account of embodiment is simply a possible application of the current biological theories of his time. (Were it such, it would by now be threatened with obsolescence.) It is, rather, an attempt to sketch out the essential lines of what an account of the embodiment of consciousness requires. From a phenomenological perspective, what is crucial are the retentional and protentional processes. They allow consciousness to embody, in the sense of making sensuously present, its surrounding world. A biological account, which makes use of instincts and drives, must tie these to such processes. This, however, does not mean that an account of these processes must be biological. As we shall see, Husserl's description of the emergence of

9. This is, in fact, its "application to all naturally developed, in a good sense 'naïve' sciences, which it transforms in this way to 'philosophical' sciences" (Husserl 1984, p. 27). See also Husserl 1973c, pp. 22–23, 32.

consciousness can be applied to machines. The essential structures of retention and protention—in Husserl's phrase, "the ideal sense of the specific connections" these processes manifest—can be abstracted from its biological basis. Such connections can be implemented in nonliving matter. The possibility of such implementation points on the one hand to Husserl's "idealism." This term designates the belief that one can grasp the "specific connections" through which the presence of the world is constituted. It also, however, points to the descriptive basis of his method, such connections being simply the formal structures of what one grasps concretely in experience. What we have here, in fact, is a *descriptive* idealism. Its attention to the phenomena is an attention to the connections it manifests, the very connections that must be present for presence to be constituted. This holds even when we speak about the emergence of consciousness, i.e., the coming to presence of the phenomena whose connections allow consciousness to be a place of presence. When Husserl uses the formal structures of retention and protention to elucidate such emergence, his basis is not some theory taken over from the sciences; it is rather the evidence provided by consciousness itself.

The Outline of the Chapters

The chapters that follow are shaped by the foregoing reflections. Their outline will, accordingly, introduce the way these reflections function in this book. In its calling into question Heidegger's critique of presence, the first chapter opens up an initial space for my inquiry. Heidegger's critique occurs in his analysis of Aristotle's account of time. Heidegger claims that this account has determined every subsequent analysis of time: they all adopt Aristotle's position that being is the same as being-temporally-present. This concept of being has, he asserts, determined the subsequent philosophical tradition of the West. Thus, for Heidegger, the "destruction" of this tradition occurs with the destruction of Aristotle's account. Postmodernism sees this destruction as a premise for its focus on absence. Accordingly, to open up an alternative to this focus, the destruction must itself be undermined. This is done by showing that it is based on a faulty historical analysis, one that misconceives Aristotle's fundamental conception. What Heidegger fails to grasp is the notion of being as embodiment; he misses the insight that being "is" where it is at work embodying itself.

The following three chapters use Husserl's analyses to develop this

conception of embodiment. Thus, the second chapter, in presenting Husserl's theory of the instincts, examines how the body functions in knowing. This functioning includes the bodily activities—such as turning to get a better look, focusing one's eyes, lifting and handling objects, etc.—that inevitably enter into our grasp of objects. As already indicated, our bodily instincts are at the basis of this apprehension insofar as their drives direct us to the things about us. In doing so, they become the source of our intentions to apprehend them. On the most basic level, that of temporal synthesis, our instincts supply the motive force, the energy that impels the processes that result in the apprehension of the things of our world. As will become apparent, Husserl's account of the instincts is nothing less than a phenomenological description of knowing as an instinctive bodily function.

My third chapter analyses freedom into the levels of selfhood that found it. From a phenomenological perspective, freedom is not opposed to the instinctive striving that continually animates our lives. The freedom that appears as rational choice is actually a reappearance of the instinctual foundations of the constitutive process. It is instinct in the guise of reason. The key point here is that our instincts can, according to Husserl, take on a plurality of forms. The particular form in which an instinct manifests itself depends on the level of self-constitution in which it appears. Thus, on the lowest level, that of "primal temporalization," our instinct to preserve ourselves appears as the ego's drive to preserve its "awakeness" by preserving through retention the affecting contents that awaken it. The same drive towards self-preservation becomes, when it appears on the level of rational selfhood, the drive to preserve rationality. As such, it manifests itself in the will not to contradict ourselves. It also shows itself as the drive to maintain a consistency in our choices and actions by examining the consequences of our various impulses. It thus appears as rational choice, i.e., as the choice that traditionally defines freedom.

This freedom should not be confused with the freedom that Kant defined. It is not the freedom of a self whose autonomy is bought at the price of its radical separation from the world. This separation, which prevents freedom from ever appearing sensuously, is a consequence of Kant's embrace of the foundationalist paradigm. For Kant, the self's autonomy follows from its position as a nonappearing ground of the world's appearing presence. In the phenomenological account, by contrast, freedom is part of the constitution of selfhood. Since this consti-

tution signifies the self's progressive embodiment, the self's freedom must appear. Correlated to our instincts and the environment that prompts them, such freedom is never noumenal. It is always a part of the appearing of the sensuous world.

Constituted on the basis of our instinctual needs and desires, the sensuous world appears desirable. This affects my self-presence in this world. Desiring, I am present to myself as I will be at the moment of enjoyment. The fourth chapter explores the fact that, as desiring, the self is already ahead of itself. This being ahead of itself is inherent in the notion of freedom insofar as what freedom "chooses" is a future. The idea advanced in this chapter is that our senses of futurity and freedom both have the same instinctual basis. Both are ultimately to be analyzed as bodily functions. At their basis is what Husserl calls the "pull" (*Zug*) of affecting contents, a pull that is correlated to our instinctive drives towards acquiring and embodying what we desire.

On its lowest level, this acquisition is not a matter of choice. While we may rationally choose to pursue some desires and suppress others, we cannot do without affecting contents. Conscious life as such demands them. For Husserl, its awakening as a conscious life occurs through the temporalization these contents occasion. The fifth chapter draws the conclusion that follows from this position: temporalization is the link between affecting contents and consciousness. It is what turns a mere physical possession of "data" into an actual conscious experience. I use this conclusion to propose a solution to what has come to be called the problem of qualia. "Qualia" are conscious experiences in their felt, sensuous presence. The problem is to give an account of how we move from the physical impressions received from objects to the conscious experiences we have of them. My solution makes use of Husserl's account of temporalization. I claim that qualia are impressions (affecting contents as determined by our biological needs), which are undergoing the retentional and protentional processing that positions them in time. As indicated, the result of this processing is a temporally extended presence. The processes broaden out the sheer spatial presence of the world in its momentary nowness into a corresponding temporal presence. The latter manifests the world's being across time, and this manifestation is the world's embodiment in our consciousness. The underlying assertion here is that, in the context of conscious presence, embodiment is temporalization. This position has important implications for research into artificial intelligence. As the last section indicated, the actual implementation

of the processes of temporalization is not limited to flesh with its instinctive attachments to specific contents. Translated into algorithms, the processes of retention and protention can also embody qualia in intelligent machines.

While Chapters Two through Five focus almost exclusively on Husserl's analyses, the next two chapters engage in a series of comparisons. Thus, Chapter Six is concerned with language and its relation to what Derrida terms the "autoaffection of consciousness." It compares Derrida's and Husserl's descriptions of this. The focus of Chapter Seven is on ethics, in particular, on Heidegger's and Levinas's accounts of responsibility. Once again, a contrasting Husserlian position is brought forward.

At issue in these chapters are two contrasting views of the self. On the one hand, we have the phenomenological position, which sees the self as a place of presence. On the other hand, we have the account that regards it as an absence. As noted, the second position appears in Derrida's insistence that to grasp what I have "in mind" I must make use of language. I must employ its indicative signs to re-present myself to myself. Immediate self-presence is impossible since, in Derrida's view, the self is ultimately absent. Derrida's concept of the autoaffection of consciousness presupposes this absence. It is precisely because the self is not self-present that it possesses the inner distance that allows it to affect itself through the medium of the spoken linguistic sign. For Derrida, this means that when I hear myself speak, I affect myself. Becoming present to myself through my speaking, I achieve through language my self-consciousness. For Husserl, by contrast, the self-affection of consciousness is prior to language. It occurs through the affecting contents that "awaken" it. Our being affected by these contents is a *self*-affection insofar as they are inherent in the temporal constitution that makes the self a *place of presence.* Such contents cause it to "be" as a place of presence by awakening the retentional and protentional processes that yield this place. Regarded in such terms, the "inner distance" that allows the self to be self-present is temporal. It arises through the subject's being *stretched out along time* as it retains and protends the contents that affect it. In this view, the self that is *now* grasps itself across a temporal distance when it regards the self it *was* or *will be.*

If we are a place of presence, then we cannot follow Heidegger and Levinas when they see our ethical responsibility as a responding to an absence. In particular, we cannot describe Levinas's face-to-face encounter in these terms. Levinas asserts that the encounter is marked by a diachrony—

i.e., by the inaccessibility of the other person's past and future. To experience this is to experience the other person as an absence. It is, in Levinas's words, to experience the face as "the rupture of phenomenology" (Levinas 1994a, p. 107). Yet once we do phenomenologically bracket the past and the future, we find something quite different. The temporal reduction that brackets the two reveals, as my seventh chapter shows, the sheer immediacy of the presence or nowness existing between them. It is with this presence that the ethics of the face-to-face encounter begins. The same holds for the empathy from which this ethics springs. In my final, eighth chapter, I conclude by giving an account of ethics as embodiment. As part of this, I show how a person's self-presence, as springing from temporalization, is never wholly private. Both temporalization and presence are constantly shaped by other persons. This is why self-responsibility and responsibility to Others are inevitably conjoined.

1

Presence and Postmodernism

To open up a space for our inquiry into presence, we have to confront Heidegger's critique of presence. The postmodern, postenlightenment debate on the nature of being begins with his assertion that the "ancient interpretation of the being of beings" is informed by "the determination of the sense of being as . . . 'presence'" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 25). This understanding, which reduces being to temporal presence, is supposed to have set all subsequent philosophical reflection. At its origin, Heidegger insists, is "Aristotle's essay on time." In his reading, Aristotle interprets entities with regard to the present, equating their being with temporal presence. He also takes time itself as a present entity—i.e., "as one being among other beings" (p. 26). In an interpretation that is essentially "oriented to the world," Aristotle thus collapses being and temporal presence to the point that the countable nows are, in their presence, taken as entities. Aristotle's essay, Heidegger claims, "has essentially determined every subsequent account of time—Bergson's included." Even "the Kantian interpretation of time" remains under its sway (ibid.). The "destruction" of the tradition that Heidegger proposes is thus a destruction of Aristotle's interpretation of time.[1] Only through such a

1. Heidegger 1967a, p. 22. Positively, this signifies, in Derrida's words, "the transcendental horizon of the question of being [temporalization] must be freed from the traditional and metaphysical domination by the present or the now" (Derrida 1973b, p. 139). There is "a close, if not exhaustive and irreducibly necessary, interconnection" between this project and Derrida's conception of "differance as temporalizing-temporalization

destruction can we uncover what the Aristotelian account conceals. In making time objective, it hides *Dasein*'s (or human being's) role in temporalization. The project of *Being and Time* is to uncover this role through "the repeated interpretation of the structures of *Dasein* . . . as modes of temporalization" (p. 17).

I shall argue that the above analysis is mistaken on several points: Aristotle does not equate being and temporal presence, nor does he understand "time itself as one being among other beings" (Heidegger, 1967a, p. 26). His account does not determine subsequent philosophical thought about time. As I shall show, modern thought, in particular that of the enlightenment project, positions time as subjective. Its relation to Aristotle is negative. It forgets his basic positions. Given this, the postmodern critique of philosophy that begins with Heidegger is undermined by a faulty historical analysis.

Heidegger's Reading of Aristotle

Nowhere is this forgetting more evident than in the 1927 lectures on Aristotle that appear in Heidegger's *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Aristotle's essay on time in Heidegger's account is "the conceptual expression" of "the common understanding of time" (Heidegger 1988, p. 230). This understanding takes space and time as independent features of reality. It asserts that nothing can exist without being in space and time. Space and time, however, can continue as containers even while things within them come and go. Infinite and unending, they ground the very possibility of the being of what they contain. Now, to take Aristotle's position as expressing this essentially modern view is to commit oneself to a highly anachronistic reading. Aristotle's explicit position is the opposite. In the *Physics*, he reduces space to place and asserts that there is no place without a body. Neither is there time without the presence of bodies. In fact, from an Aristotelian perspective, to consider space and time as independent is to commit a category mistake. It is to confuse an attribute of a reality (something that cannot exist on its own like quantity or quality) with the reality itself (*Categories*, 1b 25–2a 15).

Heidegger, however, is quite willing to consider place apart from the moving body. He writes, interpreting Aristotle, "if the moving thing has run through the places in its movement, these places are, as such, still

(which we can no longer conceive within the horizon of the present)" (ibid.). The connection will become apparent in the latter part of this chapter.

existent as definite locations" (Heidegger 1988, p. 238). Time is also independent of the moving thing and its motion. According to Heidegger, "although we may look all around the moving thing and the motion itself as change of place, we shall never find time if we hold to what Aristotle says" (p. 239). He justifies this assertion of time's independence by fastening on Aristotle's remark that time is "a number," a counting, of motion. "Number," he writes, "is not bound to what it numbers. Number can determine something without itself being dependent" (p. 249). From this Heidegger draws the limitless, infinite character of time, which is that of number. Its independence and its position as a container also follow. As a number, time, he claims, "does not itself belong to the entity that it counts." This means that "time is bound neither to the intrinsic content nor to the mode of being of the moving thing nor to the motion as such" (p. 250). It is, in fact, "*before* beings, *before* things moving and at rest, encompassing them" (p. 252). Lest we have any doubt what this encompassing implies, Heidegger adds that, "in a suitable sense, we can call time . . . a 'container'" (ibid.).

This emphasis on time as a number does not just allow the derivation of the "common understanding of time"; it also permits Heidegger to derive this understanding from Dasein's behavior. In other words, having freed time from its status as a bodily attribute, Heidegger can trace time's origin to the counting itself, that is, to the behavior of the *Dasein* that counts. The crucial link in Heidegger's argument occurs in his account of how we grasp motion. This grasp occurs because "we *retain* the first traversed place as the *away-from-there* and *expect* the next place as the *toward-here.* Retaining the prior and expecting the posterior, we see the transition as such" (Heidegger 1988, p. 245). This means, as Michael Kane writes, "Dasein [in its retaining and expecting] is the ontological ground for motion itself" (Kane 1995, p. 307). Dasein is what makes possible motion's sense as transition. As such, it also becomes the ontological ground of time. Retaining and expecting, as Heidegger writes, we grasp the motion in such a way that we can say "now here, formerly there, afterwards, there. Each there in this nexus of 'away from there—towards there' is *now*-there, *now*-there, *now*-there" (Heidegger 1988, p. 245). Each, in other words, is a *counted* now. At the root of this counting is, thus, Dasein's behavior, a behavior that allows it to retain and expect. This behavior (which is rooted in Dasein's structure as care) is the original temporalization. In allowing the counting of nows, it places things in time. Such behavior, Heidegger claims, is

the hidden basis of the Aristotelian or common understanding of time.

Whatever else we might say of this interpretation of Aristotle, one thing is certain: it is highly tendentious. For Aristotle, as I mentioned, neither time nor place can exist apart from a body. Rather than being "before" it, they are simply categories we can apply to the body. The category of time has its origin in our account of a moving body. In Aristotle's words, it springs from the fact that "the moving body is the same . . . yet differs in the account that may be given of it." In particular, it differs by being in different places "and the now corresponds to it as time corresponds to the movement" (*Physics*, 219b 20–23). This now, Aristotle writes, "is not part of time" (218a 15). Not only can it *not* be summed up (as parts can) to produce a whole—i.e., a duration. It is also not a part because it refers in the first instance, not to time, but rather to the moving body. The now is the *presence* of the body to the soul that experiences it.[2] As for time, understood as the shifting or changing now, it first appears through the body's motion. More precisely, it appears in the *change of presence* that registers this motion. Thus, the now "corresponds" to the body by virtue of being part of the body's continuous self-manifestation.[3] Similarly, time, as the shift of the now, corresponds to the body's movement insofar as it manifests the body's shifting relation to its environment.

It is always now for us, yet the now we inhabit changes constantly. We experience time as a kind of stationary streaming, as an unchanging nowness that frames a changing content. This experience is the result of the functioning of the entity in its presence to us. The now's dual nature (as stationary and streaming) reflects the constancy of the body's presence *as it shifts* with regard to its environment. "At work" in the experiencing soul, the body has a presence that manifests itself as the now that shifts

2. My position is similar to Paul Conen's, who asserts that the "substrate" of the ongoing present (of "the dynamically grasped now") is the entity that is moved. This implies that this now, which Conen says is "not in time," but rather "is time," is the entity's attribute. See Conen 1964, pp. 78–84, 167. Eva Brann's position is somewhat different. She asserts that "the now" which "hovers, as it were, over the moving thing . . . must be the *presentness of the perception* of the moving thing" (Brann 1983, p. 75). I think it is the presentness, not of the perception of the thing, but of the thing to perception. The now is, in other words, an attribute not primarily of our perception but of the thing perceived.

3. The continuity of time depends upon this continuity, this lack of any gaps in the body's presence. The same point can be made, *mutatis mutandis*, about the continuity of motion. As Aristotle writes in *On Generation and Corruption*, motion is not continuous "because that in which the motion occurs is continuous," but rather "because that which is moved is continuous. For how can the quality be continuous except in virtue of the continuity of the thing to which it belongs?" (337a 27–29).

with regard to *its* environment. Appearing in the milieu of the anticipated and remembered experience of the moving body, the body's current (momentary) presence situates itself between them. It becomes the now that appears as a shifting center between the past and the future. There is, we may observe, a clear line of determination here. The entity in its presence determines the soul in its memories and anticipations and, in so doing, determines time. If its presence did not change with regard to its environment, our memories and anticipations of it would all have the same content. They would not yield a distinct before or an after or a nowness situated between the two. If, as occurs in dreamless sleep, we do not register any presence, all experience of nowness ceases. The key point here is that time, in this account, is not equivalent to being. It is rather the result of its presence to the soul, its "being at work" there. To make a general point, we can say that for Aristotle, being is understood as the functioning or "at workness" (ἐνέργεια) that results in an entity's presence. The presence of an entity is the *totality* of its effects. Entities can affect nonsentient entities as well as sentient ones. Only the moving bodies that affect sentient beings have the possibility of *temporal* presence taken as flowing nowness.

Modernity's Accounts of Time

Heidegger claims that Aristotle's position determines the modern accounts of time. What actually determines them, however, is not his position, but rather the "common understanding" Heidegger derives from it. The examples of Descartes and Kant suffice to make this point. From Descartes onward, space and time come to be understood as receptacles of bodies. Indeed, they are taken as grounding the very possibility of spatial-temporal being. This conception, however, is not Aristotle's. It is part of the "new" physics Galileo and Descartes introduce to replace the "old" Aristotelian physics. It is implicit in the system of spatial coordinates (the X and Y axes) Descartes introduces in his new analytical geometry. The system allows us to specify figures through equations giving their locations in space. Adding a time axis, events can be specified through the numbered coordinates giving their positions in space and time. This opens up the possibility of the mathematical description of natural processes. Presupposing the conceptual framework of Descartes's coordinate axes, such descriptions also presuppose the notion of space and time as containers. Rather than being objects, the notion of such

containers is rather that of conditions for the possibility of objects in their "true" mathematizable being.[4]

The inordinate success of the new physics inspired Kant to give it an a priori character based on the subject. In working this out, he becomes one of the chief representatives of the enlightenment project. This project, which begins with Descartes, makes subjectivity normative. In the ancient world, the Platonic ideas or Aristotelian forms supplied the standards or norms for knowledge. The enlightenment project, as part of its drive to establish our autonomy, derives these standards from the structures of the subject. To accomplish this, Kant makes two crucial moves. He limits the presence of being to temporal presence. He then makes this presence the result of the subjective function of temporalization. The rules of this function thus become the norms of presence. Here, the line of determination is the reverse of Aristotle's. For Kant it runs from the subject (or soul) to time and thence to the presence of being.

This reversal can be seen in Kant's doctrine of synthetic a priori judgments. These judgments are normative in the sense that they have a universal validity, a validity holding for all possible experience. Such validity follows from the basis of these judgments, which, in Kant's words, is the "universal and necessary connection of the given perceptions," a connection that is required if we are to intuit a unified, self-consistent world.[5] The "connection" of the perceptions underlying our judgments occurs in the before and after of time. Thus, only if there are necessary structures in the temporal sequences of perceptions (structures that determine what must occur earlier and later if the judgments' objects are to appear) can we speak of a priori judgments. The necessity of an a priori judgment depends on there being a necessary connection of the perceptions; and this depends on there being necessary structures in the temporal sequencing of the perceptual flow. Kant's attempt to detail these structures appears in the "Schematism" of the first *Critique.* They

4. For Descartes, the ability to be mathematically described is the sign of being. He writes of "corporal objects," "everything which I conceive clearly and distinctly as occurring in them—that is to say, everything, generally speaking, which is discussed in pure mathematics or geometry does occur in truth in them" (Descartes 1990, p. 76). See also p. 68. The implicit premise of this position is the Cartesian equivalence of mathematics, truth, and being. Thus, for Descartes, it is not just the case that "everything that I recognize clearly and distinctly [through mathematics] is true." It is also the case "that everything which is true is something, as truth is the same as being" (p. 62). Space and time here become conditions for the possibility of being because they are numerable and, hence, through the new analytic geometry permit the mathematical description of being.

5. Kant 1955c, IV, 298; see also p. 304.

are given by the doctrine of the threefold synthesis of the imagination, the synthesis that inserts perceptions in the before and after of time.

The details of this doctrine need not concern us. The above is sufficient to point out the radical distinction between the Kantian and the Aristotelian projects. For Kant, norms are drawn from the structures of the subject—specifically from the synthetic structures that make it a subject. On the level of the Schematism, such structures are understood as modes of temporalization. For Aristotle, by contrast, the norms for presence are drawn, not from the subject, but from the beings it encounters. Entities, rather than the subject itself, are the origin of temporalization. They are the "agents." The subject is the "patient." Through their presence, entities temporalize the subject.

Temporality and Absence

In his attempt to interpret the structures of *Dasein* as "modes of temporalization," Heidegger appears as an heir of the enlightenment project. Even though the norms he draws are the ambiguous ones of authentic vs. inauthentic, resolute vs. irresolute, and so forth, *Being and Time* remains on the Kantian level of seeking a constitutive (human) origin of presence. As he writes to Husserl in 1927, "Which kind of being (*Seinsart*) is the being in which the 'world' constitutes itself? This is the central problem of *Being and Time*, i.e., a fundamental ontology of *Dasein*. At issue is showing that human *Dasein*'s kind of being is totally distinct from all other beings and that it is precisely this [kind] that contains in itself the possibility of transcendental constitution."[6]

There is an inherent difficulty in seeking "the being in which the 'world' constitutes itself." Ultimately, it undermines the whole enlightenment project. The project is foundationalist. But, as I noted in the Introduction, foundationalism always makes the ground absent on the level of the grounded. In Kant, this difficulty expresses itself in the fact that the subject, whose constitutive, synthetic activities ground the world's presence, cannot itself be present. Given that presence *per se* is the result of such activities, if the subject were present, it would be a result rather than a ground of synthesis. In Kant's terms, this means that the synthesizing, constituting subject must be a *noumenal* rather than a *phenomenal*

6. This letter, dated "Meßkirch, 22. Oct. 27," appears in the textual critical notes to Husserl's *Phänomenologische Psychologie* (Husserl 1962a), pp. 600–602. The passage quoted is on p. 601.

agent. None of the categories that we draw from experience can apply to it. Indeed, given that the action of synthesis is that of placing its perceptions in time, even the categories of temporality fall away.[7] Having limited presence to temporal presence, Kant thus finds himself basing his project on an *absence*.[8] What is pulling the phenomenal and noumenal apart is the distinction between the ground and the grounded. As I cited Fichte, "by virtue of its mere notion, the ground falls outside of what it grounds" (Fichte 1982, p. 8). It must, since its function is to explain the grounded. Were it the same, it would also be in need of the explanation it supposedly provides. This opposition means that when we attempt to "discover the ground of all experience," the ground we seek "necessarily lies outside of all experience" (ibid.).

If Heidegger is, as I claim, an heir of the enlightenment project, the same logic can be seen at work in his philosophy. At the basis of his account of temporalization, there must be an *absence*. Its connection with temporalization appears when we ask why we engage in the counting that places things in time. Heidegger's answer is that we count nows to reckon with them; and we do so because of our concern with our being in the world (Heidegger 1967a, p. 333). Such concern demands that we reckon up, plan, prevent, or take precautions (p. 406). Because of this, we do not just reckon with time, we retain and anticipate the things that are of concern to us. "Circumspective concern" (*umsichtiges Besorgen*) is, then, the proximate ground of our retaining and anticipating. Given that the final object of our concern is our own being, the ultimate ground is found in Dasein itself. It is found in the fact that "Dasein exists as entity for which, in its Being, that Being is an issue" (ibid.). For Heidegger, this phrase signifies that on a fundamental level "Dasein's Being is care (*Sorge*)" (p. 284). Care is Dasein's being responsible for its being. As care, my being is an issue for me (p. 325). It is the result of my projects, of the choices I make in deciding not just what I will do but (as inherent in this) what I will be.[9] This does not mean that every choice, every possible future, is open for me. For a choice to be real, for it to be a possibility I can realize, it has to be rooted in my "having-been." The resources

7. As a result, even our "inner sense" cannot grasp it. In Kant's words, "this sense represents to consciousness even our own selves only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves" (Kant 1995c, p. 120).

8. For a more extended discussion of this point, see Mensch 1996b, pp. 54–58.

9. In Heidegger's words: "'The Dasein is occupied with its own being' means more precisely: it is occupied with its *ability* to be. As existent, the Dasein is free for specific possibilities of its own self. It is its own most peculiar able-to-be" (Heidegger 1988, p. 276).

for it must be present in the situation in which I have been "thrown" by my history and culture. Thus, as care, Dasein already has a primordial temporal structure guiding its behavior. Engaged in its projects, Dasein is rooted in its past—the "having-been" of its factual situation (p. 328). It is also, however, ahead of itself. The "there" of its being there, when viewed in terms of the goal of its projects, is not the present, but rather the future (p. 327).

Between its past and the future stands, not a presence, but rather an absence. In Heidegger's terms, it is precisely because I am neither "present to hand" nor "ready to hand" that my being is an issue for me. My nonpresence or absence on this ontological level is at the heart of my projective being. It is what allows me to "be there" with the possibilities I choose to realize. In Heidegger's words: "Not only is the projection, as one that has been thrown, determined by the nothingness (*Nichtigkeit*) of the being of its basis (*Grundseins*); as projection it is itself essentially null (*nichtig*). . . . the nothingness meant here belongs to Dasein's being-free for its existential possibilities."[10] Heidegger claims that I come face to face with this nothingness when I face my death resolutely. My anxiety in the face of death reveals the void inherent in my projective being. To cite Heidegger again: "The 'nothing' anxiety confronts us with, reveals the nothingness by which Dasein, in its very basis, is defined."[11] As null, it is constantly "in debt" to itself. It owes itself its being.[12] This owing determines the structure of its temporalization. Attempting to pay this debt, Dasein *anticipates* as it projects forward its future possibilities. It does this while *retaining* its having-been, i.e., the past that gives concrete shape to the choices confronting it.

Whatever the psychological truth of these descriptions, the following points are clear. For Heidegger, temporalization is a human process. It is rooted in the structure of Dasein's projective being. Rather than being grounded in presence—the presence, for Aristotle, of some entity

10. Ibid., p. 285. Sartre makes the same point in his discussion of bad faith. Bad faith is possible only because "human reality" or Dasein "must be what it is not and not [be] what it is" (Sartre 1968, p. 112). Given that its being is essentially projective, Dasein *is*, in its future possibilities, *what it* presently *is not*. As such possibilities, *it is not what it* presently *is*. To accept this, we must assert with Heidegger: "the projection is the way in which I *am* the possibility; it is the way in which I exist freely" (Heidegger 1988, p. 277).

11. Heidegger 1967a, p. 308. By virtue of such nothingness, Heidegger can assert: "Dasein is not the ground of its being insofar as this first arises from its own project" (p. 285).

12. For Heidegger, this means that it is "guilty" (*Schuldigsein*) in the sense of being responsible for (*schuld sein an*) its own being. See Heidegger 1967a, pp. 282–85.

to us—its origin is an absence. Since this absence is the "nullity by which Dasein . . . is defined," Heidegger can assert that "Dasein's kind of being is totally distinct from all other beings." It is distinct as a constitutive ground, that is, as the being in which "the possibility of transcendental constitution resides." Such constitution is the making present that is accomplished through the realization of Dasein's projects. The presence of what is thus made present is not Dasein's, and as Heidegger constantly stresses, the Aristotelian categories appropriate to such presence are not those of Dasein (Heidegger 1967a, pp. 45–46, 54). They cannot be if Dasein, in its nullity or nothingness, is absent on the level of the things that it makes present.

Throughout the above, we can see the logic of the distinction between ground and grounded. It appears in the difference between temporality, taken as the structure of Dasein's Being as care, and ordinary time, understood in terms of entities that are in time. As Professor Michael Kane pointed out, at the origin of Heidegger's ontological difference is the distinction between the two. In his words, "the difference between temporality and ordinary time is really the difference between Being and beings. Dasein as Being, in the ontological difference, is determined by temporality. Beings are simply held in time by time" (Kane 1995, pp. 304–5).

The logic that makes Heidegger distinguish temporality and time moves him ultimately beyond our human being or Dasein. After *Being and Time,* that is, after the "turn" in his thinking, Heidegger sees the grounding of time (and hence of presence) not in *Dasein*'s "concern" for its "being in the world," but in the Being that guides this concern by determining the "epochs" of *Dasein*'s grasp of entities. Taken as a ground, however, such Being cannot appear. The logic Fichte uncovered is relentless, infecting even Heidegger's later interpretation of the ontological distinction. Being's distinction from entities is such that it conceals itself even as it determines time, that is, determines the "epochs" that form our history. This concealment expresses itself in the "turning in need" that is our history.[13]

As we shall see, this same concealment plays itself out in Derrida's assertions with regard to "differance." In his claims that presence always has its origin in absence,[14] that structure always refers to "a basis of a full

13. "Wendung in die Not," (Heidegger 1967b, p. 92).

14. The name of this absence, which cannot be conceived as a simple opposition to presence, is "differance." Derrida writes: "We thus come to posit presence . . . as a 'determination' and 'effect.' Presence is a determination and effect within a system which is no longer that of presence but that of differance" (Derrida 1973b, p. 147). This "differance"

presence which is out of play" or absent from this structure,[15] Derrida appears as yet another heir of the enlightenment project.

Overcoming Concealment

How does Aristotle avoid the difficulty of this project? That he does so is clear. For Aristotle, the grounding of time in being does not result in the concealment of being. Fichte's logic, which asserts that the ground of experience cannot appear, does not apply to his account of being. Aristotle's account takes being as "at workness" or functioning (ἐνέργεια). This means that being *is* where it is at work. As functioning, being is where it functions. Thus, Aristotle asserts that "the functioning of the sensible object" is "in the sensing subject" (*De Anima*, 426a 10). Similarly, the teacher *qua* teacher is "in the one taught" (*Physics*, 202b 8). In each case, as Aristotle says, there is only "a single functioning" (ibid., 202a 19). The functioning, which *is* being, is where it is present. This is the ancient, forgotten truth behind his equation of being and presence.[16] Given this, we cannot search behind the actual presence of an entity for its ground. To raise the question of such a ground is to enter into a philosophical tradition that stretches from Descartes to Derrida. Rather than being determined by Aristotle, this tradition's course is set by its denial of the actual "ancient interpretation of being." This is the interpretation that sees being wherever it is "at work."

How can these thoughts be pursued? Is this interpretation capable of being revived and renewed, or is it inextricably tied to an ancient way of thinking? What we require is an account of presence that avoids the paradoxes of foundationalism. Rather than seeking a ground for presence, the account would attempt to describe it as embodiment. To choose Husserl as guide for such an account is, of course, not to appeal to the proponent of the "transcendental idealism" that takes the subject as a constitutive ground of the world. It is rather to follow the patient phenomenological observer of the late manuscripts, the Husserl whose interest turned increasingly towards the body's instinctual life.

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can never be characterized positively: "[D]ifferance is not. It is not a being-present . . . differance is even the subversion of every realm" (p. 153).

15. Derrida 1993b, p. 225. This, of course, does not mean that there is such presence. The point is that it is always out of play or absent. The reference to it is always to something beyond what is present.

16. For a more extensive account, see Mensch 1996a, pp. 153–67. See also Mensch 1991a, pp. 465–82.

According to the standard, accepted view of Husserl, the notion of a Husserlian account of the instincts appears paradoxical. Is not Husserl the proponent of a philosophy conducted by a "pure" observer? Instincts relate to the body, but the reduction seems to leave us with a disembodied Cartesian ego. Quotations are not lacking to support this view. In his "Afterword to *Ideas I*," Husserl writes: "When one performs the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, . . . psychological subjectivity loses precisely that which gives it its validity as a reality in the naively experiencible pregiven world; it loses its sense of being a soul in a body in a pregiven spatial-temporal nature" (Husserl 1971, p. 145). As Husserl puts this in the *Cartesian Meditations*, the ego that remains, "is not a piece of the world" (Husserl 1963, p. 64). That it is not is commonly taken as differentiating *Existenz* philosophy and phenomenology. The dividing line between the two is that between the engaged and the disengaged "nonworldly" observer. Even within phenomenology itself, the contrast is drawn between Husserl's transcendental ego and Merleau-Ponty's embodied self. Dismissing the "intellectualism" of the disembodied perceiver, Merleau-Ponty asserts: "External perception and the perception of one's body vary in conjunction because they are two facets of one and the same act. . . . it is literally the same thing to perceive one single marble, and to use two fingers as one single organ" (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 205). The perception of the marble includes the grasping fingers.

How accurate is this view of Husserl? How fully did Husserl himself embrace the presupposition of a disembodied, "pure" phenomenological observer? An examination of the *Nachlaß*, Husserl's unpublished manuscripts, indicates that from the 1920s Husserl began to question it.[1] He engaged in a series of examinations of how the body functions in knowing. As part of this, he considered the ways our bodily sensations—the kinesthesia—function in our grasp of objects. The role of these sensations in fulfilling our perceptual intentions points back to the bodily origin of these intentions. As such, it points to the bodily instincts themselves as the source of perceptual intentions. The resulting theory of instincts, developed over several hundred pages of manuscripts, stands in sharp contrast to the Cartesian version of phenomenology. More importantly, it puts in question the traditional subject-object and mind-body dichotomies. In doing so, it indicates how self-consciousness in a prereflective, bodily sense is built into consciousness.

A General Account of the Instincts

Two notions enter into the conception of instincts. In the broad sense an instinct signifies a natural impulse or urge. The term can also be used to refer to an inborn organized pattern of behavior, one that proceeds more or less automatically to reach its goal without the benefit of prior experience or learning. A classic example is the nest building of birds. The first appearance of this instinct, if not perfect, is still sufficient to ensure the survival of the young and the continuance of the species. Such "hard-wired" behavior decreases as organisms become more complex. Inborn patterns become increasingly supplemented by experience, habit, learning, and, in the case of humans, acquired culture. This does not mean that the instincts disappear. Although submerged, they remain as powerful impulsions from within, as drives urging the organism to actions that serve biological ends. Two examples will suffice to make my meaning clear. In less complex organisms, the sexual drive results in a fixed pattern of behavior—a courtship ritual—leading to mating. In humans, by contrast, its object can assume the most diverse forms as witnessed by what Freud calls the "perversions." Here, early childhood experience and learned behavior play their part. The same holds for the drive

1. Nam-in Lee lists three periods of intensive work on the instincts: fall 1921 to February 1922, May 1930 to March 1931, and October 1931 to February 1932. See Lee 1993, pp. 62–63, for a listing of the relevant manuscripts.

for nourishment. The particular object of this drive, although it may have been satisfied originally by a mother's milk, is soon culturally determined. As the individual grows, the satisfaction of this drive becomes more complex. Our experiences of various tastes and foods are combined and the results themselves recombined. Speaking phenomenologically, there is a constitutive process here: fulfillments on one level combine to produce intentions whose fulfillment requires a higher-level synthesis, a more elaborate preparation of the meal.

Husserl draws a number of points from this general account. The first is the all-pervasive character of the striving that originates in the instincts. He writes: "All life is continuous striving, all satisfaction is transitory" (Ms. A VI 26, p. 42a). This means that "the ego is what it is essentially in a style of original and acquired needs, in a style of desire and satisfaction, passing from desire to enjoyment, from enjoyment to desire" (Ms. E III 10, p. 8a).[2] Thus, for Husserl, there are no "value free" "mere sensations or sensible objects." On the contrary, "nothing can be given that cannot move the feelings (*Gemüt*)."[3] When it does move the feelings, the ego turns to the source and this turning towards is itself a striving. This does not mean that the object must be given for the original striving to occur. The relation is reversed: for Husserl, the striving is what first motivates the process of grasping the object. The grasp follows the striving. Thus, it is not just in the simpler animals that instincts operate without the organism having any initial conception of their intended goal. This also occurs in us. The infant placed at the breast is motivated by smell, then by touching the nipple, then by the kinesthesia of sucking and swallowing before the goal of the drive towards nourishment appears.[4] As

2. As Husserl also writes: "Life is striving in the manifold forms and contents of intention and fulfillment; in the broadest sense, [it is] pleasure in fulfillment; in the lack of fulfillment, [life is] a tending towards pleasure as a pure striving that desires or as a striving that slackens off in the realization that fulfills it and that accomplishes its purposes in the process of the realization of the life-form of pleasure with its release of tension" (Ms. A VI 26, p. 42b).

3. The extended quote here is: "Bloße Emfindungsdaten und in höherer Stufe sinnliche Gegenstände, wie Dinge, die für das Subjekt da sind, aber 'wertfrei' da sind, sind Abstraktionen. Es kann nichts geben, was nicht das Gemüt berüht" (Ms. A VI 26, p. 42a). Criticizing Descartes and, by implication, Husserl, Heidegger writes that the problem of values is "perverted in principle" when one assumes that "values ultimately have their sole ontological sources in the previous construction of the actuality of the thing as [their] fundamental layer" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 99). For Husserl, however, values are not something added on to objects, which are first given as mere things. Insofar as their original givenness is correlated to our instinctive striving, value is cogiven with their initial presence.

4. As Husserl describes the process: "When the smell of the mother's breast and the sensations of moving one's lips occur, an instinctive directedness towards drinking awakes, and an originally paired kinesthesia comes into play. . . . If drinking does not immediately

Husserl states the general principle: "Striving is instinctive and instinctively (thus, at first, secretly) 'directed' towards what in the 'future' will first be disclosed as worldly unities constituting themselves" (Ms. A VI 34, p. 34b). This acting before the goal is known is not limited to the original expressions of the instincts. It is present throughout our instinctual life.[5]

Husserl describes this life as a layered one, with fulfillments on one level providing the materials for intentions to the next. He writes, "Developmental stages—on every level new needs appear, needs formally essential for this level. They appear as dark 'instinctive' modes of egological valuation (feelings), which first reveal themselves in their attainment" (Ms. E III 9, p. 4a). Their attainment gives rise to needs whose fulfillment requires the next level of synthesis. The result, then, is an ongoing series of "levels of instincts, of original drives, needs (which at first do not yet know their goals), systematically ordered, pointing beyond themselves to higher levels" (ibid., p. 5). Now, throughout this process, the instincts remain the same. What changes is their fulfillments. The instincts continue to "designate the original, essentially universal primary drives, the primal affections that determine all development" (p. 4a). With a particular level of fulfillment, "the instinct is not at an end. It takes on new modes." "I," Husserl writes, "continue to be the instinctive ego and the process of revealing continues as an act process" (Ms. C 13 I, p. 5a).[6]

Nonobjectifying and Objectifying Instincts

There is an obvious relation to constitution implicit in the above. The layered process just described is that of constitution. Broadly speaking constitution is the production of synthesis.[7] Elements from one level are

occur, how does it happen? Perhaps the smell alone awakens something else, an empty apperception, so to speak, which has no 'conscious' goal. If touching occurs, then the way to fulfillment is first properly an ongoing instinctive drive, which is an unfulfilled intention. Then, in fulfillment, [there are] the movements of swallowing, etc., which bring fulfillment, disclosing the instinctive drive" (Ms. C 16 IV, p. 36b).

5. For Husserl, then, striving underlies the *Vorhaben*—the "fore-having"—Heidegger proposes as a characteristic of our being-in-the-world. Cf. Heidegger 1967a, p. 150. We are not "ahead" of ourselves because of some inherent "nothingness," but rather because of the instinctive striving underlying our being-in-the-world. Chapter 4, "The Sense of the Future," will draw these thoughts out.

6. Husserl also writes regarding this continuance: "Every instinct is immortal. It just continues in different modes of realization" (Ms. C 13 I, p. 10b).

7. "To begin with, this life is an egological life. It is my life, the life of the person reflecting—a constituting life. 'To constitute' is again and again to produce continuous

combined into elements of the next. Thus, in regarding a die, views of its different faces are combined together to produce a grasp of the die as that which shows itself through them. The die itself is not any of the aspects that manifest it. It appears as a three dimensional object, while the aspects (as its perspectives) do not show themselves perspectivally.[8] We cannot turn them about as we do the die to see their different sides. Now, if we ask why we do engage in this synthetic activity, Husserl's answer in the *Nachlaß* is that we are impelled by our instincts. These primal urges supply the motive force, the energy that pushes the process forward.

Two types of instincts are involved in this process. To describe the first, we must note that the reduction is the reverse of constitution. As a synthetic process, constitution may be described as the action of connecting phenomena and the positing belief in the unity that appears through these connections. This synthetic process, at least in its initial stages, is a passive one; it is performed unconsciously. By contrast, the reduction that attempts by analysis to uncover the work of constitution is, by definition, a self-conscious effort. It begins with a deliberate suspension of the positing belief in the appearing unity. Performing it, we no longer take the posited as "there" (*da*), as "available" (*vorhanden*), and hence, as an "actuality" (*Wirklichkeit*) to which we can return again and again (Hussserl 1976, p. 65). Our attention is, rather, on what motivates this belief. What are the experiences and connections that enter into its positing? In Husserl's words, our effort is "to discover in this reduction an absolute sphere of materials (*Stoffe*) and noetic forms to whose determininately structured combinations pertains . . . the marvelous consciousness of something determinate . . . , which is something over against consciousness itself, something . . . transcendent" to such materials and forms of combination (p. 228). Thus, in our example, the positing belief in the being of the die is motivated by the appearances of its different sides and the perspectival form of combination that links these aspects. Discovering these in the reduction, we move from the constituted to its constituting phenomena. If the latter owe their own appearing to the connections occurring between even lower-level phenomena, the reduction can be exercised again. We can, for example, suspend the positing belief in the individual aspects of the die. We can examine the

and discrete syntheses. It is thereby an egologically centered life of passivity, affectivity, and activity" (Ms. C 3 III, p. 33a).

8. "Ein Erlebnis schattet sich nicht ab" (Hussserl 1976, p. 88).

forms of connection (essentially those of the retentional process) that constitute an aspect's presence as occupying a definite moment in our perceptual experience. We can also examine the impressional material that is subject to these retentions. In doing so, we focus on the "purely hyletic," i.e., on what provides "possible materials (*Stoffe*) for intentional formations" (p. 199).

This practice of the reduction is not an endless process. Proceeding step by step, it reaches its goal, which is that of discovering the "ultimately constituting" level. With this, the question arises of the ultimate "hyle" or material of the process. What is its relation to the instinctual striving that animates the synthetic process? The hyle affects the ego. The ego in turn responds by striving. As Husserl describes the situation: "Content is non-ego (*das Ichfremde*), feeling is already egological. The 'address' of the content is not a call to something, but rather a feeling being-there (*fühlendes Dabei-Sein*) of the ego. . . . The ego is not something for itself and the non-ego something separate from the ego; between them there is no room for a turning towards. Rather the ego and its non-ego are inseparable; the ego is a feeling ego with every content."[9] There is, in fact, a certain identity between the two. It is one where we can say: "What from the side of the hyletic data is called the affection of the ego is from the side of the ego called tending, striving towards" (Ms. B III 9, pp. 70a–70b).

One way of understanding this is in terms of the analogy of the lock and the key. Only if the key fits will the lock turn. For hyletic data to be recognized as contents by the ego—that is, for the data to count as hyle, as material for its syntheses—the data must affect the ego. This being affected is the ego's striving. It is what awakens it as an ego.[10] Thus, the awake ego, its striving, and the affecting contents are all given together. Each by itself is only an abstraction. To continue the analogy, not every key fits the lock. Similarly, not every material affects the ego. What we

9. The full quote in German is: "Das Inhaltliche ist das Ichfremde, das Gefühl ist schon ichlich. Das 'Ansprechen' des Inhaltes sei nicht Anruf zu etwas, sondern ein fühlendes Dabei Sein des Ich und zwar nicht erst als ein Dabeisein durch Hinkommen und Anlangen. Das Ich ist nicht etwas für sich und das Ichfremde ein vom Ich Getrenntes und zwischen beiden ist kein Raum für ein Hinwenden. Sondern untrennbar ist Ich und sein Ichfremdes, bei jedem Inhalt im Inhaltszusammenhang und bei dem ganzen Zusammenhang ist das Ich fühlendes" (Ms. C 16 V, p. 68a).

10. In Husserl's words: "The ego is awakened by affection from the non-egological because the non-egological is 'of interest'; it instinctively attracts, etc; and the ego reacts kinesthetically as an immediate reaction" (Ms. B III 3, p. 5a).

have is a linking of specific material with specific strivings. In Husserl's words, we have "determined ways of striving that are originally, 'instinctively' one with [their] hyletic complement." There is a "primal association" between the two.[11]

Husserl calls the instincts that are these original ways of being affected "nonobjectifying instincts." As just noted, they are directed to specific types of contents.[12] They determine our being affected, our turning towards some contents rather than others—for example, those contents that indicate what can provide us nourishment. In Husserl's words, instinct in this instance designates "the interest in the data and fields of sensation—before the objectification of sense data," that is, before there is "a thematically actualizable object" (Ms. C 13 I, p. 11b). To obtain a thematic object, something more than simply being affected must occur. An "objectifying instinct" must arise. When it does, a drive towards synthesis animates the ego's turning towards the data. The drive seeks to make objective "sense" of the data. Its goal is a grasp of a one in many, a unity that exhibits itself through the shifting fields of sensation. Husserl terms it "the original instinct of objectification" (Ms. C 13 I, p. 10b).[13] To speak in this context of "affecting contents" is to see them as a "terminus a quo [a starting point] for instinctive intentions. These ultimately fulfill themselves in the constitution of 'visual things' ('*Sehdingen*')" (Ms. C 16 IV, p. 40a). In other words, things—not contents—are the goal of this type of instinct.

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11. As Husserl writes: "First, the affection arouses affective activity. It thus engenders a striving-towards [the affection] in [the awake ego's] present mode of action or being as striving. This is the field of kinesthesia in the narrower and broader sense. Determined ways of striving exist that are originally, 'instinctively' one with their hyletic accompaniments. This, therefore, would be a form of primal association, one, however, that is not an association through coincidence" (Ms. E III 9, pp. 23a-23b). The "association through coincidence" (*Deckung*) is that occasioned by retention. As will become apparent, the striving it manifests is that of the objectifying instinct.

12. As Nam-in Lee puts this, the nonobjectifying instincts are those "that, as particular interests, are directed to the data of sensation on account of their particular contents, e.g., on account of their beauty, sweetness, warmth, etc." (Lee 1993, p. 109). The objectifying instincts, by contrast, have "a universal interest which is universally directed at the objects of sensation independent of their particular contents" (ibid.).

13. The term appears in a pair of rhetorical questions. Husserl asks: "Kann man von einem urprünglichen Instinkt der 'Objektivierung' sprechen?" (ibid.). Four lines later, having mentioned the nonobjectifying instinct, he asks: "Sollen wir als *zweites* Urinstinkt . . . den Instinkt der Objektivierung setzen?" (11b). Ms. page 11b follows immediately on page 10a. See p. 9 of the Louvain revised typescript.

The Body's Role in the Constitutive Process

The discussion of nonobjectifying and objectifying instincts shows how intimate the relation is between instincts and constitution. Constitution requires both data and synthesis. Both are grounded in instinctive processes. Instincts decide which contents can be present as affecting data. They also determine the syntheses that unify these data into affecting objects. Given that instincts are bodily processes, the body, as we should expect, plays a determining role in constitution. Thus, its physical makeup determines which contents can affect us. Eyes are required for visual stimulation, ears for being affected by sounds, and so forth. The actual makeup of the sensing organ is obviously related to the type of content that can affect it. There is, then, a bodily basis to the "primal association" between sensation and striving. Beyond this, the body plays an essential role in our synthesis of contents into objects. Here, Husserl's descriptions begin with the fact that our drives are directed towards satisfying our needs, and the "first, most universal" of these are "bodily." Through the movement of its members, the body is also the means of their satisfaction[14]. Because it is, bodily sensations (the kinesthesia) are mixed with the optical in our grasp of the world. Something catches our attention, we turn our head, focus our eyes, move to get a better look. As we do so, we do not just have "optical sensations." Mixed in with these sensations are the "oculomotor" and "other systems of kinesthesia." The instinctive drive to see embraces the whole ensemble (Ms. C 16 IV, p. 40a). As Husserl describes the process, "This [optical] datum changes with the passage of the kinesthesia. It does not run alongside the kinesthetic-hyletic sensations, rather both are instinctive, drive processes . . . the running off of the optical and the change of the kinesthetic [data] do not occur alongside each other, but rather proceed in the unity of an intentionality that goes from the optical datum to the kinesthetic and through the kinesthetic leads to the optical, so that every optical [datum] is a *terminus ad quem* and, at the same time, functions as a *terminus a quo*" (Ms. C 16 IV, p. 40b). The datum, in other words, is both an end and

14. In Husserl's words: "Es sind als die ersten, allgemeinsten [Bedürfnisse] der Alltäglichkeit unmittelbar leiblich und mittelst der Leiblichkeit ausserleiblich-weltlich bezogene Bedürfnisse und erfüllende Betätigungen. Die leiblichen Organe sind vom Ich in Aktion gesetzt (leibliche Aktion) und mittelbar geht die Aktion weiter, leiblich macht sich das Ich mit Weltlichem, Ausserleiblichem zu schaffen" (Ms. A V 5, p. 135a). Here, the body seems to be the ultimate referent of the "Form des Instinktes," mentioned on p. 132a.

a beginning in the continuous passage from visual to bodily sensations and back again. Both are required in our grasp of objects.

The picture here is the opposite of the standard view I began with. There is no "disembodied perceiver" over or against which the objective world appears. Rather, as Husserl writes, "To every system of constitutive appearances . . . there pertains a motivating system of kinesthetic processes" (Ms. D 13 I, p. 25a). These imply the body insofar as "every particular kinesthetic system is associatively one with a part of the body," be this the hand that grasps an object, the legs that propel us towards something, or the eyes that focus on it (ibid., p. 52). The object synthesized is thus a combination of both visual and kinesthetic sensations. Insofar as the kinesthetic refer to me, I am in my bodily being part of every synthesis. On an immediate phenomenological level, this holds for all the features synthesized. On this level, the object is myself focusing my eyes *and* a specific shape appearing. It is myself moving *and* a specific flow of perspectival appearing. It is not just that external perception and perception of one's body vary conjointly. Given the "unity of the intentionality" that unites them, we have to say with Merleau-Ponty that the same act embraces both.[15] This implies that even when we are apparently focused exclusively on the object, we have a certain prereflective consciousness of ourselves in our bodily being. All this puts into question the traditional subject-object and mind-body dichotomies. Since kinesthesia supply an essential part of its perceptual material, the mind, *qua* perceiving, implies the body. Similarly, the object implies subjectivity, since the subject, *qua* embodied, is a constituent part of the object's appearing sense.

To speak in this context of an "objectifying instinct" is to ask why we engage in those bodily activities such as focusing our eyes, moving to get a better look, and so on, that allow us to grasp the object. One answer is that the satisfaction of an instinctual drive results in pleasure. There is then a certain "pleasurable affection" (*Lustaffektion*) in seeing regarded as instinctual drive. "Here," Husserl writes, "Aristotle's [assertion that] 'all humans naturally have joy (*Freude*) in sense perception' gains its truth" (Ms. C 16 IV, p. 306).

15. This is just one of a number of similarities between the two philosophers. Husserl gives what may be the original version of Merleau-Ponty's description of hand touching hand in Ms. D 13 I, p. 52. Since Merleau-Ponty visited the Husserl Archives at Louvain, there is a possibility of a direct influence here.

The Question of Reason

Because the nonobjectifying and objectifying instincts are somatic, there is a ready, biological interpretation of their origins.[16] The nonobjectifying instinct is the link between content and affection (between stimulus and response). Taking it as genetically determined, we can see it as part of the animal's evolutionary inheritance. This inheritance is made up of those features that allowed a species' members to survive and reproduce themselves. We can thus say that the organism registers and reacts to a particular set of stimuli because of their utility in its preservation. The same holds for the objectifying instinct. An organism could not survive if it could not make appropriate "sense" of its environment. It must perform those syntheses that bring its affecting objects to apprehension. It has to grasp what preys upon it as well as its own prey. It must also grasp the aspects of its environment—for example, the sexual displays of potential mates—it needs in order to reproduce.

The epistemological implications drawn from this interpretation have often been quite skeptical. For Nietzsche, it implies that "we have senses for only a selection of perceptions—those with which we have to concern ourselves in order to preserve ourselves" (Nietzsche 1968, §505, p. 275). Utility, rather than truth, determines what we see. The same holds for our "knowledge." Nietzsche's theory of the instincts thus leads him to assert: "The utility of preservation—not some abstract-theoretical need not to be deceived—stands as the motive behind the development of the organs of knowledge—they develop in such a way that their observations suffice for our preservation" (§480, pp. 266–67). If this is so, then a change in the conditions of preservation does not just change "utility"; it changes what counts as knowledge as well. The skepticism implicit here is that of relativizing reason considered as an "organ" of knowledge.

What prevents Husserl from drawing the same conclusion? That he does maintain his faith in reason is apparent from a number of passages. Having asserted that the instincts are "the primal predisposition of the ego presupposed by all constitution," he writes, "the irrational is the inborn predisposition of subjectivity that makes possible rationality" (Ms. E III 9, p. 4b). This does not just mean that reason is "a transformation

16. To give such an interpretation does not imply that Husserl's phenomenological descriptions are posterior to it. As noted in the Introduction, the relation is, rather, the reverse.

of the original instincts" (Ms. E III 4, p. 16b). It signifies as well that "developing from a basis of 'unconscious' instinctual drives," reason ultimately becomes such as to comprehend these drives (Ms. E III 4, p. 17a). Through the method of free variation, it can, in fact, know them in their essential structure.[17] The question of reason is: What gives Husserl this confidence in reason? How can he claim that "the universe of rationality," rather than being opposed to the instincts, "is statically and genetically included within them?" (Ms. E III 9, p. 4b).

The Instinctive Basis of Temporalization

To answer these questions, I have to return to the link between the instincts and constitution. What precisely are the drives that make us constitute? What are their mechanisms? What is the relation of the constitutive process to its underlying drives and corresponding intentionalities? A complete answer would require a monograph devoted to the instincts.[18] Here, a few schematic indications must suffice. Chief of these is that constitution is an inherently temporal process: its connecting of data occurs through temporal association. In Husserl's words, "constitution in all its forms is association in a constantly expanding sense. All association presupposes primal association in the sphere of primal temporalization" (Ms. C 16 V, p. 62a).

Three instinctive drives are at work here. The first two, which are nonobjectifying, are retention and protention. As its name implies, "retention" is the retaining of data. To speak of it as an instinct is to recognize that on its most basic level, instinctual striving is a striving to possess, to have, to hold its object fast.[19] This striving is not limited to the holding fast [or retaining] of what we have already experienced. It also manifests itself in a having-in-advance. This occurs through the "protention" or anticipation of what we will experience. The third drive is that of the objectifying instinct. It directs itself to objects.

17. Husserl's essentialism is readily apparent in such assertions. Having described the "psychological concept of the instincts" he turns and asserts: "All this has its essential form, which, eidetically presented, is one of essential lawfulness" (Ms. E III 9, p. 7b). The assertion, in other words, is that there is an essential structure to our constituting life. Its instinctive basis does not prevent us from examining this structure.

18. See, for example, Lee 1993.

19. This holds for striving as such, i.e., on all its levels. In Husserl's words, "The striving life . . . All act-life is a life of striving, directed towards possession" (Ms. A VI 34, p. 34a).

Husserl's account begins with retention. Its drive results in the self's holding fast or retaining the affecting content. This occurs as part of a serial process. Thus, a primal impression is retained and this retention is itself retained. The retention of this retention is in turn retained, and so on. The result, in Husserl's words, is "a continuous chain of retentions of retentions" of the original impression (Husserl 1976, p. 183). The sense of pastness arises because each further retention modifies the impression. In retaining it, it adds precisely that additional degree of pastness that allows us to experience its content as fixed in the flow of the departing past. The same thing happens to each of the primal impressions we successively experience. Each is held fast (or retained) in the present through its retentional chain. Since these chains differ in length, i.e., in the retentional modifications of pastness they add to their original impressions, our experience of time has a certain thickness. It includes different degrees of pastness. Primally associated with the present impressional moment are the retentions of the previously experienced impressional moments. The present moment is thus always experienced with a horizon of pastness.

Husserl terms the intentionality that links a retention to the impression it presents "*Langsintentionalität.*" He does not provide any special term for the protentional intentionality that is directed to the future. In a certain sense, the protentional process is the inverse of the retentional.[20] The chains of retentions of retentions increase with the advance of time. The protentional chains exhibit a serial having-in-advance of a having-in-advance . . . of what we will presently experience. They decrease as what they protend advances from the future. This decrease signifies the decreasing sense of the futurity of the contents they protend. Their differing lengths thus are correlated to our experience of time as having different degrees of futurity. The anticipation formed from them involves the expectation of an ordered sequence of contents, each with a distinct temporal position corresponding to its protended futurity.

Both protention and retention are included in what Husserl calls a "universal drive intentionality (*Treibintentionalität*)." In his words, this intentionality "unitarily constitutes every primordial present as a lasting temporalization and concretely propels (*forttreibt*) it from present to present" (Ms. E III 5; Husserl 1973b, p. 595). Interpreting Husserl, we can say that the propelling is a function of the instinctive having-in-advance that underlies our protentional intentionalities. This having-in-advance

20. See Husserl 1966a, pp. 55–56. Chapter 5 will further develop this point.

includes a drive towards having in the present. The fulfillment of perceptual expectations is an actual present intuition. What moves us forward is the fact that we are instinctively driven to make sense of our environment. In Husserl's words, we are moved by the striving that appears as "instinctively (thus, at first, secretly) 'directed' towards what in the 'future' will first be disclosed as worldly unities constituting themselves" (Ms. A VI 34, p. 34b). Activated by the input of affecting content, this striving "propels" us "from present to present" as we focus our eyes, move to get a better look, and generally engage in the bodily activities required to sensuously experience and make sense of the world about us. With regard to the past, the effect of this "universal drive intentionality" is the linking of retention with retention, the outcome being the unity of the retained with the ongoing present. The resulting "lasting temporalization" is the thickness of experienced time. It is made up of the present instant and its associated horizon of retained past moments. It also includes the hyletic data contained by such moments. The outcome of the retentional process is thus the unification and merging of both hyle and time. In Husserl's words: "Ultimately, the whole hyle is united in passive temporalization including the heterogeneous [contents]. Everything homogenous, however, is united in the special mode of merging; within the total merging, [there is a merging] into fields and then particular mergings into unities that stand out" (Ms. E III 9, p. 16a). In other words, by virtue of their being retained in the present, the impressional contents merge. The result is rather like that observed in a series of overlapping transparencies. Similar qualities reinforce each other, while heterogeneous qualities cancel each other out. The consequence of this reinforcement of similar qualities is their standing out. Concretely, it is the presence of what Husserl calls the "noematic nucleus"; that is, the connected, relatively stable features that allow us to distinguish an object from its background.[21]

With this, we come to the third of the instinctive drives at work in the constitutive process. Like protention and retention, it forms part of

21. A further consequence is the constitution of the duration that corresponds to the unity formed by the merging of the object's sensuous contents. As Husserl writes in discussing our grasp of a melody: "primarily merging, the temporalizations unite together and thereby produce a unity of a temporalization for all the tones and their temporalizations and times. Here, however, the homogeneity of the tones plays its part. The unities [of the retained tonal impressions] merge their contents and times according to the constant, homogeneous temporal form arising from the homogeneous temporalization" (Ms. C 15, p. 4b).

the "universal drive intentionality." Based on the presence of affecting contents, it is directed to the object that appears through them. Husserl, having described the "particular mergings" that yield the "unities that stand out," writes: "We say that everything that stands out affects [us]. How is this to be understood? It pertains to everything hyletic, insofar as it is there for the ego, that it moves the ego in its feelings. This is its original mode of being there for the ego in the living present. Feeling, to be determined as feeling, is nothing else but what is termed 'affection' from the side of the hyle" (Ms. E III 9, p. 16a). The result of this affection, as we have already noted, is the ego's "being directed" or "striving towards" what affects it. Here, however, this original, nonobjectifying relation to the affecting contents occurs in the context of their merging. As a consequence, we have a "*Querintentionalität*," an intentionality that cuts "across" the retained moments to direct itself towards the hyletic unity that stands out. *Arising with the merging*, it intentionally presents the intentional object in its noematic nucleus.

Temporal constitution does not just result in objects. It also yields the ego in its "concrete being" as a "center for affections and actions" (Ms. C III 3, p. 38a). It does so because the basic concept of the ego is simply that of the centering of experience.[22] By this is meant more than the fact that I find myself at the center of my environment, that is, at the point from which spatial distances are experienced. The first concept of egological centering is temporal. In all my experience, I am always at the now, always between the departing past and anticipated future. Retentions give me my sense of pastness. As for the future, its constitution is a matter of anticipations or protentions. As noted, the impulse that drives this anticipation is instinctual. It is directed towards "what in the 'future' will first be disclosed" (Ms. A VI 34, p. 34b). This does not mean that such striving is a completely empty intention. In most cases, I expect that what will come will repeat the patterns of the past. Anticipating, I project forward the features of my past experience.[23] With

22. "Here, we have the first concept of egological centering . . . , namely as the ego center that gives the sense of the temporal present, the center that stands in the present of time and is that to which past and future time are sensibly referred" (Ms. C 3 III, p. 45b). Husserl also writes: "The ego is the 'subject' of consciousness. 'Subject' is just another word for the centering that all life has as egological life and, hence, as living to experience something, to be conscious of something" (Ms. C 3 III, p. 26a).

23. See Husserl 1966a, pp. 52–53. Thus, the general drive to the future is instinctive, but the concrete shape it takes is determined by our past experience. A similar structural relation holds in Heidegger's account of the structure of "care." "Care," as involving the projection of our possibilities, is inherently directed to the future (Heidegger 1967a,

the constitution of the past and future comes the underlying experience of selfhood. Constantly situated between them, I experience myself as "a lasting and remaining primal now," i.e., as the point *through which* time streams and *in which* its content laden moments appear to well up as present and actual. As long as time continues, the ego is constituted as this point of passage. In Husserl's words, with the constitution of the continua of the past and future, the ego is constituted "as a fixed form for a content which streams through it and as the source point for all constituted modifications."[24] Its appearance as a source point means that the affections associated with this streaming content appear to affect it. The instinctual strivings they engender appear as its strivings. The ego thus appears as "the center of affections and actions," as the "pole of the as yet undetermined instincts" (Ms. C III 3, pp. 38a-38b).

This sketch of the constitution of the ego allows me to return to the question of prereflective self-awareness. Aware of my strivings, I am aware of myself as the center from which they apparently originate. Behind this, there is the level of prereflective self-awareness that arises from retention. Retention does not just help constitute me as a center. The object appears as enduring through the unification of the retained moments that present it. Thus, reference to the object prereflectively includes a reference to such moments. But this is a reference to the self in its instinctive action of retention. With this, we have the fundamental level of prereflective awareness. It arises from the self-referential character of retention. Aside from the initial retaining of the impression, retention always has *itself* as its immediate object. It instinctively retains the result of the activity of retention. Thus, each retention retains the original impression by retaining the previous retentions of the impression. Given this self-reference, there is always a certain prereflective self-presence to the flow of consciousness.[25] Insofar as this flow is composed of affecting

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p. 336). Such projection, however, achieves its concrete shape by being based on our having-been (p. 343). In other words, the possible goals we can set ourselves receive definite content from the past, which forms our factual situation (p. 384).

24. The extended statement here is: "A lasting and remaining primal now constitutes itself in this streaming. It constitutes itself as a fixed form for a content that streams through it and as the source point for all constituted modifications. In union with [the constitution of] the fixed form of the primally welling primal now, there is constituted a two-sided continuity of forms that are just as fixed. Thus, in *toto*, there is constituted a fixed continuum of form in which the primal now is a primal welling middle point for two continua [understood] as branches of the modes of [temporal] modifications: the continuum of what is just past and that of futurities" (Ms. C 2 I, p. 11a).

25. In Husserl's words, "The flow of immanent time constituting consciousness does

contents, this self-presence is through the body. It includes a reference to the bodily affections and actions (beginning with retention) these contents occasion. This reference to our embodied selfhood is built into our consciousness of time.

Instincts and Reason

This discussion of constitution has a natural bearing on the question of reason raised above. The question is: What accounts for Husserl's faith in reason? Why is his confidence in it not undermined by his description of the instincts? The answer is to be found in his account of constitution. In Husserl's descriptions, constitution is positioned as the mediating term, linking the instincts to reason. Thus, constitution is termed an inherently rational act (Husserl 1976, pp. 316–17, 329, 336). To succeed in its positing or "production" of synthetic unities, it must follow certain rules. Reason is simply the formalization of these rules.[26] This means that the relation between evidence and assertion that distinguishes the rational from the irrational assertion is a relation embedded in the constitutive process. Reason's rules of evidence are actually formalizations of the relations between phenomena and the unities posited through their synthesis. All this does not affect the fact that the instincts supply the drives for temporal synthesis. Given that this synthesis is inherently rational, Husserl can claim that reason is the teleological ground for the ego's constituting life.[27] He can also claim that this ground is present in the ego's instincts[28]

not just exist, but does so in such a remarkable and yet understandable manner that a self-appearance of the flow occurs and, therefore, the flux itself must necessarily be grasped in its flowing. . . . What is brought to appearance in the momentary actual [phrases] of consciousness are the same past phrases of the flow of consciousness in the series of retentional moments" (Husserl 1966a, p. 83).

26. This is why Husserl asserts that "an all-sided . . . solution of the problems of constitution"—i.e., problems that involve the positing of being—"would obviously be equivalent to a complete phenomenology of reason in all its formal and material formations" (Husserl 1976, p. 359).

27. As he expresses this: "In order that the world and the subjectivity constituting it can exist (the world that in essential necessity has the form of the Logos, of true being, which, however, is only later recognized as such by the scientific phenomenologist), the world, preceding from prebeing to being, must constitute rational persons within itself. Reason must already exist and must be able to bring itself to logical self-revelation in the rational subject" (Ms. E III 4, p. 19a).

28. "The 'system' of efficacious instincts. . . . This innate primal nature, the primal disposition of the ego [that is] presupposed by all constitution, encloses statically and 'genetically' the constituted world with all its essential forms; [it encloses], respectively, the totality of rationality. Thus the irrational, which makes the rational possible, is the innate

and its "pre-egological temporalization."[29] Both assertions follow since constitution is not just instinctively driven, but also rational.

What about the claim that the rationality inherent in constitution is relative to the utility of preservation? This would hold, if the constitutive process were determined by specific contents, i.e., if its forms differed depending on the type of content. At this point we could say that preservation determines the types of content we register and hence the forms of synthesis. As such, it would determine the rationality inherent in these forms. Such a view, however, confuses the nonobjectifying and objectifying instinct. While the former directs itself to specific contents, the latter does not. All it requires for its presence is the merging of similar contents. Given this merging, it directs itself to the unity that stands out, whatever its particular quality. There is, then, a certain elementary process of abstraction from the contents present in synthesis. It is one that gives the forms of synthesis the independence that allows the constitutive process to proceed from level to level.

This point can be put in terms of the nonrelativity of logic. On each level of objective synthesis, there is a grasp of a one in many. For Husserl, the forms of unification that structure this grasp appear in formal logic. As its name implies, such logic begins by abstracting from specific contents. This abstraction simply mirrors the *independence* of the forms of synthesis from particular contents. Thus, the logical law that we cannot contradict ourselves, i.e., assert that a predicate belongs and does not belong unambiguously to an object, has its necessity in the process of synthesis. Verbal contradiction, of course, is always possible. What is impossible is the synthesis that would intuitively present an object confirming a contradictory assertion. Such presentation depends, as we said, on the merging and consequent reinforcement of similar qualities. In synthesis, contradictory qualities (those that would result in unambiguously contradictory predicates) cancel each other out. They thus cannot appear. Although this example is taken from the elementary level of grasping sensible unities, the same general necessity holds as we proceed

disposition of subjectivity. It possesses its rationality by being the 'teleological ground' for everything rational" (Ms. E III 9, p. 4b).

29. "Every transcendental ego possesses its innate [character]. It includes innately the 'teleological ground' for its streaming, constituting, transcendental life where, in temporalizing the world, it temporalizes itself as a human being. In its essential form, in its own founding structure, it includes the streaming, purely associative pre-egological temporalization, which arises without the participation of the ego. The specific egological being is essentially one with this in its essential form, in the intentionality that indeed temporal-

through the levels of constitution. It is grounded in the fact that constitution is synthetic. As such, it inherently attempts to place its data within the framework of unity in multiplicity. Contradictory qualities break apart this unity. To affirm them is to affirm that we are in the presence of not one, but two or more objects.

The levels of constitution are, for Husserl, also levels of instinctive striving. This leads to an important point with regard to freedom. When, through self-reflection on its own processes of positing, humanity becomes self-consciously rational, its instinctual striving also takes on a new form. It appears as rational choice. Such choice is based on examining the consistency and consequences of our various impulses. The examination can lead us to postpone or even deny an instinctual satisfaction. Rational considerations, in other words, determine the pursuit of what we desire. Because of this, striving appears as freedom in its traditional definition. It manifests itself as the choice that involves rational deliberation.[30] With this, we have the profound insight that can be drawn from these late manuscripts: freedom, like reason, is not opposed to the instinctive striving that continually animates our lives. Through the link between instincts and syntheses, freedom is actually an upper level manifestation of the instinctual foundations of our life processes. It is instinct in its guise of reason. To see how it attains this guise, a separate chapter is needed. We have to consider freedom, not just as rational choice, but in all its essential aspects. As will become apparent, the features traditionally associated with freedom stem from the processes of our self-constitution.

izes itself associatively, but does so in a new type of essential form of egological, intentional performances. [Such performances] constitute obtaining unities from affectivity and activity. They do so on the continual basis of associations that always play their part, having participated in every formation of validity" (Ms. E III 9, p. 7a).

30. Aquinas is a good example of this traditional view. He writes that "the very movement of the will is an inclination to something." Free choice arises when our intellect presents us with different desirable options and we take counsel (or reason) about which of them to prefer. See Aquinas 1961, I, q.1, a. 1, resp.; I, 576.



Freedom is one of the perennial topics of philosophy. It is also one of the most puzzling. Regarding it, we are tempted to say as Augustine did of time, "I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me" (Augustine 1964, p. 264). We all sense its presence. We use the word constantly, yet an account of it seems to elude us. My purpose here is to try and provide such an account, one that includes in its descriptions the features philosophers ascribe to freedom. In doing so, I will have recourse to a number of Husserl's positions. Although never brought together by Husserl to describe freedom, their presence makes the account a phenomenological and, in a broad sense, a Husserlian one.[1]

Freedom and the Presence of Selfhood

Certain features are commonly brought up when philosophers discuss the notion of freedom. The first is the free act's *not* being determined

1. My focus will be on the later manuscripts. For an excellent account of Husserl's attempts to describe the phenomenon of willing in the manuscripts written between 1910 and 1914, see Melle, 1992, pp. 280–305. Melle draws the following conclusion regarding Husserl's attempt to describe willing in terms of a static conception of consciousness: "When, however, all consciousness has the character of a striving-volitional intentionality, this obviously signifies a basic modification of this static concept of consciousness. Instead of being visualized in geographic or geological images as a country or as sedimented layers, consciousness is better illustrated in a biological image as life" (p. 304). This insight forms the guiding thread of the present chapter.

beforehand. The act is spontaneous. We cannot find the prior conditions that would completely determine it. Indeed, it is free to the point that such conditions are lacking. This very lack has been considered as the second of freedom's features: the nothingness that detaches us from determining factors. Sartre, for example, asserts that the possibility of freedom is that of withdrawal, of detachment. He writes: "For man to put a particular existent out of circuit is to put himself out of circuit in relation to the existent. . . . Descartes, following the Stoics, has given a name to this possibility, which human reality has, to secrete a nothingness which isolates it—it is *freedom*" (Sartre 1966, p. 60). We "secrete" this nothingness every time we reflect upon ourselves, every time we "step back" from ourselves and grasp our relation to some existent. Beyond spontaneity and the nothingness that detaches us, a third factor is mentioned in connection with freedom: desire. Being free, I act autonomously, but I also act to achieve some object, something I desire. Without desire, action generally ceases. The world turns flat in the absence of desire. Desiring nothing, I live in a state of listless suspension. Acting out of desire, however, does not, as such, make me free. Desire can enslave. What prevents it from doing so is reason. Thus, a free act is also seen as a rationally considered one. Aquinas, for instance, writes that "the very movement of the will is an inclination to something" (Aquinas 1961, I, q. 82, a. 1, resp.; I, 576). Free choice arises when our intellect presents us with different desirable options and we take counsel (or reason) about which of them to prefer (I, q. 83, a. 3, resp.; I, 585). Kant pushes this emphasis on reason to the point that freedom stands opposed to inclination. For him, reason and freedom imply each other in the moral act. Thus, I act morally when my maxim can satisfy the test of reason. I ask: Can the maxim be universalized and still be self-consistent? Can I, for example, allow everyone to lie, or will this undermine the very notion of lying? (Kant 1955a, p. 422). Since to universalize the maxim abstracts it from all particular motivating circumstances, that is, from any particular desires growing out of these circumstances, acting on a universal maxim is acting apart from any inclination. In the tight web of reasoning that characterizes Kant's moral works, being free, acting apart from inclination, being rational, having a universal maxim, and being moral all imply each other.

Spontaneity, nothingness, desire, and reason are, then, the features traditionally associated with freedom. The question that confronts us is how we can combine them. How can we see them as aspects of that

whole we call "freedom"? One way to do so is to assert that the principle of combination is the self. Willing is an activity of the self. What we call "freedom of the will" is actually freedom of the self that wills. Granting this, the different aspects of freedom indicate different aspects of the self. To combine them, we must see the self as spontaneous, as possessing a nothingness or inner distance, as desiring, and yet as rational.

Three Husserlian positions allow us to see the self as embracing all these aspects. The first is that the self is not a substance or a thing but rather a process. When Husserl says that subjectivity "constitutes itself," he means that it is engaged in the ongoing process of self-constitution. In fact, subjectivity *is* this process.[2] The process involves all the aspects of freedom. They appear as levels or stages in the self's constitution. This does not mean that a level, once achieved, is left behind. It is not the case that the self enjoys a spontaneous childhood, gets caught by desire, and finally proceeds beyond this to reach the stage of autonomous, rational selfhood. Nothing is left behind. All the aspects of freedom are copresent as different stages of the same ongoing process. The process called the "self" is constantly proceeding from a pure undetermined spontaneity through intermediate stages to a rationally autonomous selfhood.

The second position is one that allows us to see the underlying identity of freedom in this process. It can be expressed in terms of the insights of our last chapter, the chief being that the constitutive process is an instinct-driven one. Instinctual drives supply the motive force, the energy that moves the process of self-constitution from level to level. As they do so, the drives remain the same, yet the forms in which they appear change. Present at each level of constitution, they take on the forms of that level. On the lowest level they appear as a spontaneous, egoless striving. On the highest level they appear as expressions of an autonomous, rational self. Thus, by virtue of the process of self-constitution, not just the self appears different depending on the level we regard it. The drives appear in different forms. This means that the desire that expresses itself as the blind tending to some sensation reappears ultimately in the guise of human freedom. In other words, the freedom that appears in rational choice is actually a reappearance of the instinctual foundations of the constitutive process. It is, as I wrote, instinct in the guise of reason. Whatever its guise, instinct provides the underlying identity that unites the different aspects of freedom. All the aspects of freedom can be traced to the forms it takes. Since these forms

2. For a defense of this thesis, see Mensch 1996a, pp. 138–48.

are also those of selfhood, freedom becomes as multiple as selfhood. It has as many appearances as there are stages in the self's constitutive life.

The third position has to do with the self in relation to its environment. To assert that the self is not a substance but a process is to assert that, rather than having inherent qualities, it is defined in terms of its environment. This means that the ego or self "is only possible as a subject of an environment."[3] The environment gives the self its specific features; it "individualizes" the self.[4] Because of this, the different forms its instincts take on are set by its different environments. The resulting correlation between the forms of selfhood, instincts, and environments does not mean that the self is simply passively determined. The process that is the self also works to constitute its determining environment. Husserl's account of its self-constitution is one of mutual determination. In other words, it involves selves determining environments determining selves, the result being the constitution of the self in its full concreteness.

A full account of the multiple forms of selfhood and freedom would involve a description of all the stages of the self's constitution. Here, however, I shall outline only the stages that exhibit the basic features of freedom I began with. In what follows, I shall describe the initial appearance of selfhood, giving an account of the foundations of its spontaneity, its detachment and desire. After noting some of the more important intervening stages, I shall also describe the appearance of the rational self with the corresponding appearance of its instinctive life as rational autonomy.

Selfhood as Determining and Determined

The initial appearance of the subject or self is a matter of temporal centering. As Husserl puts this, "The ego is the subject of consciousness. 'Subject,' here, is only another word for the *centering* that all life possesses

3. "The ego is only possible as a subject of an 'environment,' only possible as a subject who has facing it things, objects, especially temporal objects, realities in the widest sense" (Ms. E III 2, pp. 22b–23a).

4. This position appears most explicitly in Husserl's discussion of the ego of the cogito. This ego depends on the stream of experiences for its content. In Husserl's words, "An ego does not possess a proper general character with a material content; it is quite empty of such. It is simply an ego of the cogito, which [in the change of experiences] gives up all content and is related to a stream of experiences, in relation to which it is also dependent" (Ms. E III 2, p. 8b). This dependence includes its individualization: "One can say that the ego of the cogito is completely devoid of a material, specific essence, comparable, indeed, with another ego, yet in this comparison an empty form 'individualized' only through the stream: this, in the sense of its uniqueness" (ibid.). See Husserl 1952, pp. 110, 112.

as an egological life, i.e., as a living in order to experience something, to be conscious of it" (Ms. C 3 III, p. 26a). What makes "life" egological is the centering of its experience about a subject or pole. This centering positions it as the ego's experience. The ego and such centering are thus given together. Initially, this centering is temporal. In Husserl's words, "the first concept of egological centering" is to be "the center that stands in the present of time," the center "to which past and future time are sensibly referred" (p. 45b). To be a center, then, is to be at the "present of time," i.e., at the now that is constantly situated between the departing past and the anticipated future. Given this, the constitution of this now is the constitution of the center. This occurs through the action of retention and protention which, in giving the stream of experience the dimensions of the no-longer and the not-yet, gives it a midpoint between these two. Through this action, we experience our selfhood as occupying "a lasting and remaining primal now." We appear as the central "midpoint" *through which* time streams and *in which* its content-laden moments appear to well up as now. This initial appearance is one of the self as both determined by and determining its environment. Awakened by the data of its environment, the self responds through the processes of retention and protention. The resulting temporal environment determines the self as a "center of affections and actions." As such, it continues to determine its surrounding world.

This can be put in terms of the fact that for retention and protention to occur at all, affecting contents must be given. For Husserl, as we saw, the processes of retention and protention are manifestations of the basic form of instinctual striving, which is a striving to acquire, possess, and hold fast (Ms. A VI 34, p. 34a). Affecting contents trigger this striving. The resulting retentional and protentional processes yield the temporal centering of experience, which is the ego. Given this, we do not have two distinct realities: the ego and the nonego, i.e., self and affecting hyle. "Rather," as Husserl asserts, "the ego and its nonego are inseparable" (Ms. C 16 V, p. 68a). The awake ego is inseparable from the contents that awaken it. In other words, the process of this awakening is such that the awakened ego, its striving, and the affecting contents are given together. Each, by itself, is only an abstraction. Because each demands the other, we have to say that from its inception, the ego is determined by and determines its environment. The determination by its environment begins with the calling forth of its instinctual strivings by the hyletic data. These very same strivings, however, determine the

environment by organizing it temporally. The processes of retention and protention shape the affecting contents into a temporally centered field of experiences. These in turn shape the self into a temporal center, a center of the actions that work to further determine the environment.

The Initial Aspects of Freedom

Three of the four features of freedom are already implicitly present in this initial appearance of the self as a center. The processes that result in this appearance are driven by the constant input of impressional data. A *pure spontaneity* is exhibited by the original givenness of this data. This is because there is nothing prior to such givenness, which means that all determination is posterior to it. In other words, we can only speak of determination in terms of what comes to be constituted from this original, factually given material. The upshot is: the facticity of this material, its not being determined beforehand, and its undetermined spontaneity are all the same thing. Originally, that is, prior to the processes of centering, the spontaneity is egoless.[5] But with temporal centering, it appears egological. One way we experience it is through the spontaneous welling up of time. The spontaneous welling up of contents is the welling up of impressional moments in which the presence of each content is registered as nowness. This registering does not mean that presence and nowness are two distinct things. Rather, in the original identity between self and affecting hyle, experienced nowness *is* the affecting content's presence.[6] The same holds for the succession of contents. Regarded egologically, they are the succession of nows. The temporal centering of experiences makes them appear as moments welling up from our central nowness. Their departure into pastness appears as a departure from this same nowness.[7] With this, we have the temporal basis for the spon-

5. As Sartre describes this level: "This transcendental sphere is a sphere of absolute existence, that is to say, a sphere of pure spontaneities which are never objects and which determine their own existence" (Sartre 1957, p. 96). What we have here is "an impersonal spontaneity. It determines its existence at each instant, without our being able to conceive of anything before it. Thus each instant of our conscious life reveals to us a creation *ex nihilo*. Not a new arrangement, but a new existence" (pp. 98–99).

6. The relation is the same as that between affection and hyle. As we cited Husserl, "What from the side of the hyletic data is called the affection of the ego is from the side of the ego called tending, striving towards" (Ms. B III 9, pp. 70a–70b). The primal form of affection is a being-present of the hyle. From the side of the ego, this being-present is being-now. It is nowness in its original form.

7. As Husserl puts it: "I [am] in the 'stationary' now, in the lasting streaming that, in its initial sense, I designate as temporalization, as the present, which is equivalent for the

taneity of the ego's action. Husserl writes, "This acting is a letting loose from itself. It is a primal welling up, a creative allowing to depart from itself of that which itself streams, namely the acts."[8] In this welling up, departure into pastness is a making way for the new. It is correlated with possibility of new action, each new moment being the undetermined stage for the new, the spontaneous, the factually unforeseen.

This same departure into pastness results in the *self-transcendence* that is the second aspect of freedom. The original transcendence is that of pastness in relation to presence. It is the arising of a "temporal distance" between the two as each moment departs from the present to the retained past. As Husserl describes it: "I exist in streaming. In streaming, a self-transcending is continually accomplished, namely, a past is constituted."[9] This constitution is the result of an ongoing series of retentional

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now, thus, also the first 'now.' This now is my stationary now. It is that in which or during which I am a stationary (lasting and remaining) ego. In this stationary or 'lasting' streaming, however, the new is always occurring. . . . In the lasting streaming [taken] as temporalization, this is the temporal in the sense of what streams up or enters, remains, and then passes away to make place for another" (Ms. D 13 III, pp. 9–10).

8. Husserl describes this acting as follows: "Everything contained in the streaming streams. It has the indescribable primal form of streaming. . . . The ego, however, is, in a specific way, lasting and remaining; namely, it does not stream. But it acts, it posits, and the acting is a letting loose from itself as primally welling up—[it is a] creatively letting depart from itself of what once again streams, namely the acts" (Ms. B III 9, p. 10b). As he also puts this: "An act, an egological activity, is essentially a primally welling 'I act.' As primally welling, it is a lasting and remaining primal welling up. In union with this, it is also, however, a streaming away of what has just been in its continuous [retentional] modification; . . . this whole primal welling up . . . is a unity of a lasting and remaining primal phenomenon, a lasting and remaining change, the primal phenomenon of my 'I act,' in which I am the lasting and remaining ego, in which, more precisely, I am the actor of the 'nunc stans.' I act now and only now, and 'constantly' act. But the 'I act' also constantly flows away, and constantly I have what advances towards me, which will be authorized by me" (p. 15a). This temporalization of the ego's acts is the ego's self-temporalization. Husserl continues: "Thus in the constancy of primal phenomenon, in which I am the active ego, the act originates as a temporalized process. In the act's temporalization, I myself, as in a certain manner a cotemporalized ego, have my temporal position; and I have my extension, my temporal duration with the extended act of the ego. Thus, I exist across time through time, streamingly given as just having been and yet enduringly existent—given to me" (ibid.). Once again the self's action determines its environment, which in turn determines the self.

9. "and I am in streaming. In streaming, a self-transcending is continually accomplished; namely a past is constituted. In this [constitution], what was just now the actual present with all its momentary transcendencies experiences a modification. As a new present, the modification has constituted the past present as transcendent. This happens again and again in the streaming" (Ms. C 7 I, p. 22a). The result is that "in every present, taken as a phrase, and thus in the lasting, persisting present, I am such that I transcend my present being" (p. 21a). As Husserl also puts it, "I exist in the streaming creation of

modifications.[10] To distinguish the retained from a new impression, each retention marks the retained as not new or past. This happens again and again, the result being the ongoing departure of the retained into pastness. Self-transcendence arises insofar as I grasp myself through these retained contents. The apprehending self remains now, remains at the temporal center of experience. The apprehended self, because it is synthesized from *retained* contents, transcends me as past. This creation of transcendence is the secreting of "nothingness," which Sartre takes as freedom. Such "nothingness" does not imply that the self is an absence. It is not the "nothingness that determines Dasein in its very *basis* (*Grunde*)" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 308). Such a view takes nothingness or absence as the *origin* of temporalization. Here, however, it is the *result* of its processes. These processes situate the acting self as a presence that stands as a point of departure. It is the point of my "welling up," my allowing my acts to depart from myself. Fixed as I am in the temporal center, I always experience an inner distance between the self I presently am and the self that has acted, which is the self that I can grasp objectively. The former, as the acting self, exhibits its spontaneity. The latter, the objective self, is already fixed in departing time. The contrast between the two gives the self its sense that it is not determined by the face it shows to the world, that it can either step out of its already given persona or act to maintain it, that there is a choice.

The third aspect of freedom is the presence of *desire*. In the primitive appearance of selfhood I am now sketching, desire takes the form of the self-presence of striving. It is our sense of being affected on the basic level of the turning towards or striving occasioned by the hyle. The original striving is a striving to possess by holding fast or retaining the affecting content. Self-awareness, as the last chapter noted, arises from the self-referential character of retention. Thus, if my momentary retention of a content is not to slip away, I must retain this retention. To con-

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transcendence, of self-transcendence" (p. 21b). From the point of view of the present, such self-transcendence includes not just my past being, but also my future being. See ibid.

10. As Husserl writes: "On every level of temporalization, functioning as [pertaining to the] stationary present is constantly primal functioning. It is also, however, a constant letting loose from itself of retentions, which signify egological modifications as 'still' functioning in the streaming change that constantly exists as change" (Ms. A V 5, p. 6a). In other words, the process of retentional modification is a "change" or modification of the present into pastness that constantly exists as such. It is by virtue of the process's "letting loose of retentions" that the transcendence of self-pastness is constantly created. At the origin of the letting loose is, as we said, the drive to hold fast or retain the affecting contents.

tinue to hold fast to the content, I must retain my retention of this retention. As the process continues, retention always has *itself* as its immediate object. In retaining the retention, it retains the *result* of its activity of retention. Given this self-reference, there is always a certain prereflective self-presence to the flow of consciousness. In Husserl's words, the "flow of immanent time constituting consciousness" is such "that a self-appearance of the flow occurs." "What is brought to appearance . . . are the same past phrases of the flow in the series of retentional moments" (Husserl 1966a, p. 83). This self-presence of the flow occurs through the self-directed character of retention. Apprehending an object through a series of retained contents, I prereflectively apprehend myself in my action of retention. But this apprehension is a grasp of the original striving, the striving to hold fast, that animates the retentional process. The self-presence of this striving *is* felt desire. It is, I maintain, our most primitive awareness.[11]

Intermediate Stages

The fact that we can trace several of the aspects of freedom to the founding layer of selfhood does not mean that they are sufficient for us to speak of the self as free. At most they suffice for what Husserl calls "passive willing." For will to be active, several intermediate stages must be added. The lowest is the empty "fiat" or "let it be done." The simple actions of walking, of scratching one's head, and so forth, have no sense of the "fiat." For it to arise, we must be confronted by a choice. In walking, for example, a division must occur in the road. One has to choose one path or the other. The lowest level of active willing occurs when, by virtue of an accident in your stride or the momentary fixing of the gaze, you take one path rather than another.[12]

To move beyond the empty fiat to self-conscious choice, some grasp of the future is needed. This requires memory.[13] For example, choosing

11. Insofar as the satisfaction of an instinctual drive results in pleasure, we can also speak of certain "pleasurable affection" (*Lustaffektion*) that results from retention. The pleasure is our awareness of the satisfaction (the fulfillment) of the instinctual drives that animate the synthetic process of perception. In Husserl's words, "the instinctive pleasure in seeing is a process of instinctive intentions and fulfillments" (Ms. A VI 34, p. 36a).

12. Usually these choices come from the focusing of attention. William James, who developed extensively the notion of freedom as the "fiat," saw the essence of freedom in the effort of attention. See James 1948, p. 237.

13. By this I mean "long term" memory rather than the immediate or "short term" memory carried out through the process of retention. Long term memory recalls the unities first grasped through retention.

a path, you remember having gone down both paths and what lay at the end of each. Beyond this, you have to project forward memory. Your memories have to give rise to anticipations. On this level, self-consciousness arises because your memories include a reference to yourself having performed some action. Projected forward, the memory becomes the anticipation of your reperforming this action and again achieving its goal. To add an obvious point, what decides the choice is the desirability of the goal. The mouse, for example, wants the cheese. It recalls that the cheese lies down the left-hand path and proceeds accordingly. In this action, there is no question of reason, that is, of conceptualization or deduction. All that is required is association. The present perception calls up remembered ones. Thus, the mouse associates one path with one remembered outcome, the other path with another outcome.

Broadly speaking, the types of choices available depend on the type of animal. Its evolutionary history determines the strivings it experiences. Thus, the choices that present themselves to a parrot differ from those available to a shark. Behind each is a different set of strivings and a different set of bodily activities organized to satisfy them. As for the complexity of the choices, this depends on the complexity of the animal's memory and ability to associate. How many memories can its brain hold? How many associative pairings between them are possible? How many degrees of strength are available for different pairings—that is, how strongly can one thing remind the animal of another? For the higher animals, an enormous complexity is possible. The choices these animals make reflect their environments, but they do so in often surprising, barely predictable ways.

Reason and Freedom

This does not mean that their choices are genuinely human. For this, another level has to be added: that of reason. I am going to take "reason" in the traditional Greek sense of the term, "**logos**." The term's primary meanings are "word," "speech," "language," and "reason." They imply that reason's human place is language. We become human, i.e., "rational animals," when we become capable of operating within its conceptual and logical structures. When our instinctive striving assumes these structures, they become specifically human.

This point can be put in terms of our capacity for newness. The

choices that confront us as we attempt to satisfy our instinctual strivings stretch beyond the repetition of a past experience to include the never experienced. In this we are unlike the nonlinguistic animals. Their anticipations are formed from what they remember. They anticipate by projecting forward their previous experience. Newness, in their case, is not a function of anticipation, but rather of their experience exceeding what they expect. It arises from the facticity, the chance character of experience. Humans, however, can anticipate the new. They can desire what they have not yet concretely experienced.

Two features of language seem to underlie this capacity. The first is that most of its nouns are general rather than proper names. For example, if someone says, "I am going to build a house," the use of the word "house" leaves undetermined what this house will be. The word, we can say, functions as a concept. It involves a general notion, a one-in-many, that can be applied to a range of instances—particular houses that can be built. To use the general term effectively, we must be able to conceptualize.[14] We have to grasp what transcends the particular circumstances of a particular environment. We do this each time we abstract from such circumstances to grasp what is common in them. Apprehending the latter, we have the possibility of practically transcending these particular circumstances. With this comes the possibility of escaping the constraints of a particular environment. The same capability to grasp a one-in-many is behind our ability to apprehend what can be put to a multitude of uses, both good and bad. A particular implement, say a knife, can be used both to cut food and to kill.

The point here is not to delve into the mysteries of conceptualization, i.e., how we actually perform the abstractions that allow the use of general terms. It is rather to note that this linguistic capability involves "human reality" in a new form of distancing. This is a form that is essential to the human sense of freedom, which implies newness. Newness arises from the fact that the conceptual abilities inherent in language allow us to transcend rather than simply repeat the factual presence of our physical environment.

A further sense of distancing and of newness arises from a second feature of language. We use language not just to assert, but also to argue and draw conclusions. A classic anecdote from an elementary logic textbook gives the essence of this ability:

14. Husserl's defense of this ability as a genuine grasp of a one-in-many occurs in the second of the *Logical Investigations.*

> While talking of his early experiences as a priest, an elderly abbé responded to the comment that the secrets of the confessional must often be of a kind disturbing to a young man, by admitting that it had indeed been so in his case, as the first confession he ever heard was a confession of a murder. Shortly after his departure his visit was mentioned to a later caller, a local proprietor and notability, who remarked that the abbé and he were very old acquaintances. "Indeed," he added, "I was the abbé's first penitent" (Sinclair 1950, p. 45).

Hearing this tale, we infer that the visitor was the murderer. How did we do this? How did we draw a conclusion that was not present in the assertions of the abbé or the visitor? As with conceptualization, the answer involves abstraction. Hearing a set of assertions, we abstracted from their contents and concentrated on the identities that linked them together. Similarly, when we draw the conclusion that all A's are C's from the assertions that all A's are B's and all B's are C's, our reasoning is independent of the particular content of the A's, B's or C's. To claim that humans are "rational"—i.e., language-using animals—is, in part, to point to this ability. Hearing a series of assertions, they can abstract from their contents and simply regard their forms. Using these to infer, they can draw a conclusion that was not present in its separate premises.

This ability allows a special projecting forth of the future. In it, we infer the possible consequences of an action rather than simply picture them through association. Abstraction and association are actually opposites. Association works through the pairing of specific contents. Seeing Peter, for example, reminds me of Paul. Inferring, however, proceeds by abstracting from given contents. This abstraction is also a liberation. Using it to work out our goals, we create the distance that frees us from our already experienced environment. This freedom, of course, is not total. The sensuous basis for abstraction is empirical. Thus, without an appropriate range of experience, we cannot perform the abstraction that results in the general term. Limitations of experience limit the terms available to us. The meanings they can take on can be further limited by the linguistic community we find ourselves in. We can be held back by the conventional usage prevailing in our particular linguistic environment. Such limitations, however, should not be exaggerated. They are no more inherent in language than transcendence is. By virtue of the abstractions involved in its conceptual and logical structures, the linguistic community is always proceeding beyond the particular experiences and usages that define it.

In this we have yet another example of Husserl's position that the self (here, the language-using self) both defines and is defined by its environment. Functioning within a linguistic environment, the process that is the self becomes capable of the distancing that characterizes human freedom. This "located" freedom allows it to transcend and redefine its present environment and, hence, itself insofar as it has been determined by it. It is precisely because it is capable of this freedom that foundationalist paradigms cannot capture the self. In a mileau of human selves determining environments determining selves, there is no ultimate foundation. Where each of our actions is both ground and grounded, the notion of a ground is robbed of its foundational character. What we face is a situation of such complexity that we cannot speak of any finite set of ultimate determinants. The environmental factors we might appeal to are themselves open to determination by our desires and choices. Given that reason results in the distancing of self and environment, it also acts as a determinant.

Choice and Desire

When reason is combined with desire, our freedom appears as rational choice. It manifests itself in our rationally working out the options that would satisfy our instinctual strivings. Inferring the consequences of our actions, we choose the most satisfactory path. As Aquinas writes in this regard, "The proper act of free will is choice. . . . two things concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive power" (Aquinas 1961, I, q. 83, a. 3, resp.; I, 585). Thus, the appetitive power is not left behind in the stage of rational selfhood. Aquinas notes that it is still present as a direction to the end or goal.[15] Reason, Husserl would say, is another level of its appearing, one correlated to the constitution of the self as rational. Such constitution requires our gaining the powers of abstraction required for participating in a linguistic community. We have to be able to hold concepts stable and grasp logical arguments.

To grasp explicitly the forms of such arguments, we have to reflect on our thought processes. Such forms, as Kant first pointed out, are actually formalizations of the rules of synthesis. To succeed in its positing or

15. "ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo," (ibid., I, q. 82, a. 1, resp.; I, 576). In translation: "Thus, the will necessarily adhers to its ultimate goal, which is happiness."

"production" of synthetic unities, the understanding must follow certain rules. Reason, in its forms of judgment, is simply the formalization of these rules.[16] This fact brings us to the final stage of freedom. It is one where, having reflected on its own thought processes, reason seeks to choose itself. The rational agent takes as its goal a rational self-consistency in all its position takings. This involves the universalization of its maxims for action. Here, it attempts to formulate principles that hold regardless of any particular circumstances. For Kant, as I noted, this leads to an abstraction from the desires growing out of these circumstances. My rational autonomy in following my self-imposed maxims expresses itself in a freedom from inclinations, that is, from all motivations springing from the sensuous world. As is well known, the reality of the autonomous subject in Kant's formulation is strictly noumenal. It is a reality that is radically other than the sensuously appearing world with its particular motivations and structures of causality. Given that the appearing world cannot sustain the autonomously acting subject, the latter seems confined to the noumenal realm.

The position of my phenomenological account is the opposite of Kant's. Its claim is that freedom is not beyond, but rather inherent in the world. It is yet another level of the world's appearing to itself through the continual process of subjective constitution. Thus, the attempt to maintain a rational self-consistency in one's position-takings is motivated by reason's desire not to contradict and, hence, undermine itself. It is, in other words, motivated by the goal of reason's self-preservation. The motivating force thus seems to be our instinctive drive to self-preservation. As Husserl notes, this drive is present on all levels of the self's constitution.[17] On the lowest level it appears as the self's determination to

16. Kant 1955d, §22. Husserl makes the same point when he asserts that a "solution of the problems of constitution would obviously be equivalent to a complete phenomenology of reason in all its formal and material formations" (Husserl 1976, p. 359).

17. This means that on all levels, "satisfaction is an intentionality of the actual 'self-preservation.' Dissatisfaction is the blocking of self-preservation" (Ms. E III 4, p. 2b). The result then is "a life of constant and pure self-preservation that, having secured itself, is concerned with its future self-preservation or will be so concerned through constantly new work, either its own or other's. Making such work possible, however, now becomes itself a matter of concern, of needs, of satisfaction on a higher level" (p. 4a). Nam-in Lee writes that, abstracting from their particularities, "it is possible to see the different inborn primal instincts as particular forms of the same instinct, namely that of the instinct for self-preservation." He continues: "Accordingly, the instinct of self-preservation shows itself as the 'universal instinct, which synthetically unifies all the particular instincts' ([Ms.] A V 34, [p.] 37, 1931), consequently as 'the total instinct, which embraces all the particular instincts and acts through their particular disclosures or particular constitutions' ([Ms.] E III 9, [p.] 18, 1932)" (Lee 1993, p. 168).

hold fast to itself, that is, to retain the affecting contents that "awaken" it. On the level of rational autonomy, it is present as the self's desire to preserve itself as a rational agent. On this level, as Husserl writes, "I exist in my convictions (*Überzeugungen*). I preserve my one and the same ego—my ideal ego of the understanding—when I can constantly and securely continue to strive towards the unity of the aggregate of my convictions" (Ms. A VI 30, p. 54b). What is at stake here is nothing less than my unity as a thinking self. In Husserl's words, "As an ego, I am necessarily a thinking ego . . . I preserve my egological unity, the unity of my subject, only insofar as I remain consistent in my thinking."[18] The fact that this desire can lead to the denial of particular inclinations, that is, to an acting on the basis of universal maxim, does not mean that it springs from some nonappearing, noumenal agency. As in its earlier stages, freedom continues to be part of our self-constitution. It is correlated both to our instincts and to our environment. As such it is a feature of the self-appearing of the world.

This self-appearing insofar as it is correlated to instinctual needs and desires positions the world as desirable. The presence of the self in the world thus gains a new temporal dimension. Desiring, it achieves a self-transcendence in which it is present to itself, not as it was, but as it will be at the moment of enjoyment. It is already ahead of itself, awaiting itself in an anticipated world. The instinctual basis of its freedom thus inherently directs the self to the future. In fact, as we shall now see, the same instinctual basis is what makes the self ahead of itself.

18. Husserl 1956, p, 398. See also 1973b, p. 404.

IV

The Sense of the Future

At first glance, a phenomenological account of the future seems a contradiction in terms. Phenomenology's focus is on givenness or presence. Attending to what has *already been given* in its search for evidence, it seems incapable of handling the future, which by definition, has *not yet been given* since it is not-yet-present. Thus, for Heidegger, phenomenology misses the fact that the *Da-*, the "thereness" of our *Dasein*, is located in the future. Because phenomenology equates being and presence, it misses the futurity inherent in our "being-there" in a world.[1] As part of this misconception, it forgets that "values" are inherent in this world. Attending to the constitution of the thing as already given through its visible features, phenomenology leaves out the quality of its desirability, of its being a thing of value. Such desirability, however, is what moves us to possess things. Desire directs us towards attaining what we do not yet possess, i.e., what is not already given. In this sense, it presents the future.

1. Heidegger, by contrast, continually stresses the importance of the future. Having defined Dasein as a being that is concerned about its being, he sees its being-in-the-world as a being constantly engaged in projects. At issue in its projects is not just what it will do, but what it will *be*. The focus of its concerns in its plans and projects is its future. Thus, as Heidegger writes: "The totality of Dasein's being as care means: being-already-ahead-of-itself-in (a world)" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 327). Heidegger adds, "This being-ahead-of-itself is grounded in the future." Directedness towards the future is, in fact, an ontological characteristic of our being as *Dasein*. In his words: "The projecting of oneself [forward] for the sake of oneself, which is grounded in the future, is an essential character of existentiality. Its primary sense is the future" (ibid.).

Value or desirability, then, must be thought of in terms of our inherent future directedness. Phenomenology, however, is incapable of this thought. In fact, its indifference to the future is nowhere more apparent than in its assumption that values are constituted *after* we grasp a sensuously appearing object. Taking them as something "tacked on" to the latter, it misses the role that futurity plays in our intentional life.[2]

For all its initial plausibility, this Heideggarian critique needs to be revised. An investigation of Husserl's writings reveals an increasing concern with the future. Husserl, in fact, comes to see directedness towards the future as inherent in the formation of our intentions. Analyzing this directedness, first in terms of the "pull" of affecting contents and then in terms of our instinctive drives, he sees it as foundational for our positing of both being and value.

Retention and Protention

Husserl's treatment of the future begins modestly enough. His 1905 lectures on internal time consciousness barely mention it. In one section, he does assert that expectation is the inverse of remembering. Thus, the intention to the now of what we retain *goes back* in time to the original event. Expectation, by contrast, *goes forward* to intend the now that is not yet present (Husserl 1966a, p. 29). A second, rather cryptic section consists of an inserted page, which was written in 1917 at the request of Edith Stein. It claims that "every memory contains expectation intentions whose fulfillment leads to the present" (p. 52). This means that "remembering, although it is not expectation, does have a horizon directed towards the future of the remembered" (p. 53).[3] As part of these remarks, there is the further assertion that "every original constitutive process is animated by protentions [or expectations] that emptily constitute what is coming as coming, that catch it and bring it to fulfillment" (p. 52).

To understand these last remarks, we have to turn to the L manuscripts from 1917, in particular to their descriptions of the protentional process. This is the process by which we present to ourselves what is to

2. As Heidegger expresses this objection, the problem of values is "perverted in principle" when one assumes that "values ultimately have their sole ontological sources in the previous construction of the actuality of the thing as [their] fundamental layer" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 99). This perversion can only be overcome when we acknowledge that the future is "ein Wesenscharakter der Existenzialität" (p. 327).

3. This doctrine repeats the assertions of section 4, which takes expectation as a form of phantasy.

come. Since it is described as the inverse of the retentional process, let me briefly recall the latter's features. Chief of these is retention's serial nature. Thus, I have a perceptual impression. This impression is retained as I experience the next impression. As I experience the next, I retain not just the previous impression, but also the retention of the first impression. In Husserl's words, the result, as the perceptual process continues, is a "steady continuum of retentions such that each later point is a retention of the earlier" (Husserl 1966a, p. 29). Thus, each of my successively experienced perceptual impressions continues to be present through this continuum. Each is retained by a "continuous chain of retentions of retentions" of its original content (Husserl 1976, p. 183). These retentions do not just present this content. Every successive retention adds the "retentional modification" of pastness to it. Thus, the lengthwise intentionality (*Langsintentionalität*), which proceeds along this lengthening chain, presents the content as increasingly past. I experience the content as expiring.

In Husserl's descriptions, the protentional chain also expresses a mediated intentionality.[4] If the retentional chain is an already-having of an already-having . . . of an original impression, the protentional chain, as the inverse of this, is a having-in-advance of a having-in-advance . . . of a future impression. While the retentional chains *increase* with the advance of time, the protentional chains *decrease* as the contents they intend approach the now. Their differing lengths correspond to different degrees of futurity. By virtue of such protentional chains, we thus expect an ordered sequence of contents, for example, the tones of a melody, each with a distinct temporal position corresponding to its protended futurity.

According to the L manuscripts, our protentions grow out of our past experience. The retention of a stretch of this experience has a "horizon of futurity" that stretches through the retained past to what is coming. This horizon arises because, as Husserl says, "the style of the past becomes projected into the future."[5] In other words, experiencing, we

4. "Every preceding Protention is related to every following one in the protentional continuum just as every succeeding retention is related to every preceding one of the same [retentional] series. The preceding protention intentionally contains all the later [protentions] in itself (implies them); the succeeding retention intentionally implies all the earlier ones" (Ms. L I 16, p. 6a).

5. "The further an experience proceeds, the more it inherently supports more differentiated protentions, 'the style of the past becomes projected into the future.' . . . The course of the retentional branches (or the present intentional content of the retentional

constantly anticipate. We assume that fresh experience, in maintaining the "style of the past," will confirm what we have already experienced. When fresh experience does meet our expectations, the protentional consciousness, which "grows" from the retained, "fulfills itself."[6] According to Husserl, this relation between expectation and fulfillment is not just between past and fresh experience. It ties together the material we have already retained. As the temporal process continues, this fresh experience itself becomes retained. Thus, the original protentional relation between past and fresh experience becomes a relation between two retained stretches of experience. The retention of this fresh experience is a retention of it *as having met our expectations.* Given that every retained stretch has a protentional tendency and that every such stretch was once itself the object of a protentional tendency of an earlier stretch, this relation of expectation and fulfillment unifies the whole of the retained experience that has met our expectations.

The New Time Diagram

To represent the growth of our protentional consciousness, Husserl modifies the time diagram that appeared in his lectures, *On the Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness.*[7]

In the original diagram, the horizontal line, E1E2, represents a given sequence of primary data, the vertical line, $E1^1E2$, represents the retention of this data, and the succeeding vertical line, $E1^2E2^1$, expresses the

branch) influences protention, determining its content, and prescribes its sense" (Ms. L I 15, p. 32b).

6. In Husserl's words, "every retentional momentary continuity"—that is every retention of a past stretch—"contains a protention directed to the following [retained stretch] and, in continuous mediation, is directed to those [retained stretches] that follow. Genetically put: when, again and again, continually new core data appear, the old do not just sink down retentionally; rather a protentional consciousness 'grows,' which advances towards the new primary data and, terminating with them, fulfills itself" (Ms. L I 15, p. 22a).

7. Both diagrams occur on p. 22b of Ms. L I 15. The lettering has been slightly altered for reasons of clarity. The following equivalents restore Husserl's original lettering (my letters are the first of each pair). For the first figure: E1=E1, $E1^1=E1^2$, $E1^2$ is not lettered in Husserl's diagram. Instead, E appears at the end of this line. E2=E2, $E2^1$ is not lettered in Husserl's diagam. Instead, E2 appears at the end of this line. E3 is not lettered in Husserl's diagram. For the second figure: E1=E1, $E1^1=E1^2$, $E1^2=E1^3$, $E1^3=E1^4$. In Husserl's diagram, the end of this line is labeled E1. E2=E2, $E2^1=E2^3$, $E2^2=E2^4$. In Husserl's diagram, the end of this line is labeled E2. E'3=E'3, E3=E3, $E3^1$ is not lettered in Husserl's diagram. E4=E4. In Husserl's diagram, the horizontal line extends beyond E4, its endpoint being designated by E.



Figure 1
The original diagram



Figure 2
The modified diagram

retention of this retention. In the modified diagram, the vertical line E1¹E2, which represents the retained data, is extended above the horizontal to include E2E'3. This new segment represents the protended stretch of time attached to the series of retentions. The expectations of E2E'3 direct themselves to the primary data lying along the horizontal stretch E2E3. If these data occur as expected, the intentions of the protended stretch are fulfilled. Now, with the advance of time, the experienced stretch that fulfills these protentions is itself retained. Thus, by time E3, it becomes the retained stretch E2¹E3. The result, then, is that the original protentional relation between E1¹E2 and E2E'3 is now a relation *between two retained stretches.* Thus, the line E1²E3 both reproduces the earlier retention, E1¹E2, with its protentional tendency, E2E'3, and reproduces (retains) the data that fulfilled this tendency. As Husserl describes this relation, "The earlier [retained] consciousness is protention, that is, an intention directed to what is later. The retention that follows this would then be the retention of an earlier retention, which is also characterized as protention. This new occurring retention reproduces the earlier retention with its protentional tendency and at the same time fulfills it, but in such a way that a protention proceeds through this fulfillment to the next phase" (Ms. L I 15, 24b). The reference to fulfillment occurring in the next phase or stretch of experience points to the fact that this stretch also has its protentional horizon, one that

points to the stretch following it. Thus, the vertical line, $E1^2E3$, also extends above the horizontal, the extension symbolizing *its* protentional tendency or horizon of futurity. This horizon arises because, as we cited Husserl, "the style of the past becomes projected into the future." In other words, experiencing, we constantly anticipate. We assume that fresh experience, in maintaining the "style of the past," will confirm what we have already experienced.

Self-Awareness and Intentionality

All this merely fills out the brief sketch provided by the lectures on internal time consciousness. The deeper question of why we anticipate—i.e., why we project the past onto the future—is not yet explained. The L manuscripts do, however, add two important items to our understanding of protention. The first concerns its role in our prereflexive self-awareness. In the lectures, such self-awareness comes from the fact that retention retains the *result* of the activity of retention. Thus, retention always has *itself* as its immediate object. Given this self-reference, there is, as noted, a certain prereflective self-presence of consciousness in its flow (Husserl 1966a, p. 83). The L manuscripts extend this reasoning to the protentional process. We anticipate the future by a protentional having-in-advance of *our* protentional having-in-advance . . . of future contents. Since protention refers to *itself* in its serial anticipation of the future, self-reference (and, hence, self-presence) also characterize its process. As Husserl remarks, "because it is continually new, because it streams, transforming itself in such a way that the consciousness of the past and future are transformed, the consciousness of these [transformations] is present. A thus structured streaming consciousness is necessarily a consciousness of itself as streaming" (Ms. L I 15, pp. 38a-b). The result, in other words, of the protentional and retentional transformations is a "self-consciousness of the stream of consciousness in each of its phases."[8]

The second item is a "genetic" account of the formation of our perceptual intentions. The best way to put this is in terms of Husserl's assertion that "perception is interpretation." According to Husserl, the perceptual object appears because "I interpret, in a certain fashion, actu-

8. In German, the assertion is that consciousness has "Seiner-selbst-bewußt-Sein des Bewußtseinsstromes, und zwar in jeder seiner Phasen." It has, with regard to itself, "seine 'Allwissenheit'" (Ms. L I 15, p. 37b).

ally experienced contents of sensation."[9] I take them "in the same sense," i.e., the sense of the object I intend to see.[10] This "interpretative sense" becomes confirmed or "fulfilled" as long as the contents I experience in viewing the object support my interpretation. An example will make Husserl's position clear. Suppose I notice what seems to be a cat crouching under a bush on a bright sunny day. As I move to get a better look, its features seem to become more clearly defined. One part of what I see appears to be its head, another its body, still another its tail. Based upon what I see, I anticipate that further features will be revealed as I approach: this shadow will be seen as part of the cat's ear; another will be its eye, and so forth. If my interpretations are correct, then my experiences should form a part of an emerging pattern that exhibits these features, i.e., that perceptually manifests the object I assume I am seeing. If, however, I am mistaken, at some point my experiences will fail to fulfill my expectations. What I took to be a cat will dissolve into a flickering collection of shadows.

As this example indicates, to interpret is to anticipate. It is to protend a sequence of contents, which will present the object. For Husserl, this protending is an intentional shaping of the contents we experience. Protending, we attend to some contents rather than others. We focus on those that match our protentions (Ms. L I 16, pp. 2a–2b). We also interpret these contents as fulfillments. Husserl thus writes in describing our hearing a tone: "As long as the tone sounds, . . . protention continually directs itself to what comes and receives it in the mode of fulfillment, intentionally shaping it. Every primal presence is, therefore, not just content, but 'interpreted' content. Primal presentation is, thus, fulfilled expectation" (Ms. L I 16, pp. 4a–4b; see also pp. 5a–5b). What we have here is the "specific mode of intentionality" that characterizes perception. This intentionality refers the actually

9. Asserting that "perception is interpretation," Husserl explains: "It belongs to perception that something appears within it, but interpretation makes up what we term appearance—be it correct or not, anticipatory or overdrawn. The house appears to me through no other way but that I interpret in a certain fashion actually experienced contents of sensation. . . . They are termed 'appearances' or, better, appearing contents precisely for the reason that they are contents of perceptive interpretation" (Husserl 1984, p. 762).

10. As Husserl writes in describing how "we suppose ourselves to perceptually grasp one and the same object through the change of experiential contents," "different perceptual contents are given, but they are interpreted, apperceived 'in the same sense,' . . . the interpretation (*Auffassung*) according to this 'sense' is a character of experience that first constitutes 'the being of the object for me'" (Husserl 1984, p. 397).

experienced contents "back to what preceded," i.e., to the retentions that formed the basis for our protentions.[11] The conception of the appearing of the perceptual object is thus a dynamic one. The appearing is a continual fulfillment of the protentional reference of a preceding consciousness by a new consciousness with its new impressional data. Each preceding consciousness embodies our interpretative intention to see a given object precisely in having a protentional reference present in its retained contents.

On its most basic level, this intention is an anticipation of a given sequence of contents in a given order. The intention, however, also anticipates the object in its specific features. This occurs through the "merging" (*Verschmelzung*) of contents. As our earlier discussion noted, merging results from retention. Simultaneously with the appearing of a new impression, the previous impression is "shoved back" and retained. Both are merged in the present that includes them. As Husserl describes the process, "A primal merging of contents takes place between the impression and the immediate primal retention in the simultaneity of both. This steadily continues for each moment as an immediate merging of content in each moment."[12] Such merging extends to the retention of this retention and, indeed, to all the retentions of a given impression as it continues to be shoved back.[13] By virtue of it, the similar qualities of the retained reinforce each other. Reinforced, they achieve the prominence of distinct features of hyletic unities. Composed of such features, these unities themselves achieve a certain prominence, one that allows them to stand out from their backgrounds. For Husserl, then, merging

11. In Husserl's words, "every protention fulfills itself through the arising of the new. . . . When a fulfillment takes place, for example, a perception in the advancing process of perceiving, a [protentional] consciousness fulfills itself through a [new] consciousness in successive 'coincidence' [with the new]. But what does this signify if not a specific mode of intentionality that intentionally points back to what preceded?" (Ms. L I 15, pp. 15a–15b).

12. The extended quote is: "The passage from primal impression to primal impression means in fact that the new impression unites with the immediate retentional modification; [it] unites simultaneously with the modification of the earlier [modifications], and this simultaneous uniting is itself retentionally modified, etc. The simultaneous uniting is, however, only possible as a merging of contents. Thus, a primal merging of contents takes place between the impression and the immediate primal retention in the simultaneity of both. This steadily continues for each moment as an immediate merging of content in each moment" (Ms. C 3 VI, pp. 75a–b). Husserl also speaks in the context of "das Durchscheinende" (see p. 79a).

13. "A unity of merging binds in constant mediation the momentary primal impressional [content] with the momentary retentional and continually different layered [retentional] transformations of the earlier impressions" (Ms. C 3 VI, p. 75 b).

results in "the unities that unite and stand out through the particular simultaneous mergings" that yield their features.[14] An important point here is that the merged contents keep their distinct temporal referents. Thus, the total merged content is taken as *enduring through* the retained temporal positions of the contents making it up. In other words, it appears as the content of an enduring object.[15] Now, the anticipations that are based on this content are directed to the continuation of the object with its objective features. More generally, our protentional references assume that the "style of the past," which presents a given objective world through the mergings of its contents, will continue. In forming our perceptual intentions, we thus project forward not just particular sequences of retained contents, but also the mergings of these contents that yield particular objects. Anticipating, we intend to see these objects with their particular features.

The same point can be made by noting that the merging embraces not just the retentions but also the anticipations of contents. Both are present in consciousness. In Husserl's words, "In the primordial [consciousness], we do not just have the unity of the momentarily actual perception. Rather, united with this, we have the retentional consciousness of the just past and the protentional consciousness of the just coming" (Ms. C 7 I, p. 20b). To use Husserl's term, the perceptual intention that embraces both involves a future-directed "crosswise intentionality" (*Querintentionalität*). Proceeding up the vertical of Husserl's time diagram, it cuts "across" the retentional and protentional chains of the diagram. It thus intentionally presents the unity that stands out through the merging of the contents we retain and those we anticipate. This, of course, *does not mean* that such anticipated contents have an original hyletic presence. What is merged are the anticipations of such presence. The content that forms the basis for this merging is a retained content whose original presence occurred in the past. It is this content that we project forward when we anticipate.

14. "In the impressional momentary field, we have the unities that crystallize and achieve prominence through particular simultaneous mergings, those [unities] that in the streaming, between the streaming [up] and streaming away, concretely continue to endure as the duration continually 'builds up' or constitutes impressional (perceptual) unities. The constitution of a unity signifies the constitution of a persisting impressional present in the streaming" (Ms. C 3 VI, p. 76a).

15. See the previous note as well as Ms. C 3 VI, p. 76b.

Affectivity and Temporalization

For all the details of his analyses, Husserl, in the L manuscripts, does not yet go beyond Hume. As he notes, Hume already observed that we anticipate on the basis of our past experiences. We anticipate "the continuance of the sequence in the same style."[16] The deeper question here is: What is the origin of such anticipation? What is the quality of our retained experiences that points us to the future?

In his *Analyses of Passive Synthesis,* Husserl turns to the affectivity of experience to answer these questions. He defines "affection" as "the conscious stimulus (*Reiz*), the unique pull (*Zug*) that an apprehended object exercises on the ego. This is a pull [or tension], which relaxes in the turning of the ego [to the object] and which continues in the striving . . . to more closely observe the object" (Husserl 1996b, pp. 148–49).[17] This drawing power of the object is actually that of the impressions whose coincidence and merging make it present. In Husserl's words, "The primal source of all affection lies and can only lie in the primal impression and its own greater or lesser affectivity" (Husserl 1966b, p. 168). According to the *Analyses,* this affective pull is what draws consciousness to the future. As such, it is responsible for the future-directed *Querintentionalität.* To see this, we have to note with Husserl that the affective power of retained contents decreases as their retentional chains lengthen; that is, as they are experienced sinking further into pastness.[18] Conversely, this drawing power augments with the increasing freshness of retentions. At the now, i.e., at the moment of the "primal impressional occurring," it is at its height. This increasing draw or pull of affecting content is what yields the protentional intentionality inherent in the retained. In Husserl's words, "*Ceteris paribus,* the primal impressional occurring in the living present

16. Summing up his position, Husserl mentions Hume: "If a piece of a primal sequence of hyletic data has run off, . . . a retentional context must form itself. But not only this—Hume already saw this—consciousness remains in character and anticipates the continuance. Namely, a protention directs itself towards the continuance of the sequence in the same style, and this is a protention with respect to the passage of the primal data that function as core data" (Ms. L I 16, p. 8a).

17. For a general summary of the *Analyses*' treatment of affection, see Anne Montavont 1994, pp. 119–39.

18. "During the constant retentional modifications of primary impression, it keeps its affective power as an identically constituted datum, but this power does not remain undiminished. . . . It is clear that the affective power pertaining to [the primal impressions] and to the whole [they constitute] continually diminishes in the [retentional] process" (Husserl 1966b, p. 169).

has a stronger affective tendency (*Tendenz*) than what has already been retained. Precisely because of this, with regard to the direction of propagation, affection possesses a unitary tendency towards the future. Intentionality is primarily directed to the future."[19]

The tie here between affection and intentionality occurs on the basic level of intentionality as *intentio,* the Latin word signifying a "stretching out" or "straining" towards something. The "tension" implicit in this notion is occasioned by the "pull" (*Zug*) of the affecting content.[20] This pull directs the ego towards the content. The ego's "stretching out" towards the content manifests itself in a directedness to the future, which proceeds *through the retentions* to what is to come.[21]

Two main points follow from this analysis. Since we have discussed them before, I will simply summarize them. The first is that affectivity is a necessary condition for our temporalization. The striving, which affection engenders, is a striving to possess, to have and hold fast its object (Ms. A VI 34, p. 34a). On the primordial level, it manifests itself in the formation of the retentions and protentions that drive the temporal process. Thus, our retentions arise from our striving to hold fast or retain affecting contents. Such contents, as new impressional moments succeed each other, gradually lose their affecting power. Yet, as long as this power is present, they are held fast in retention (Husserl 1966b, p. 173). As noted, the same affective power is behind our protentional having-in-advance. Such having is correlated to the striving that exceeds the present impressional moment. Given that constitution is a temporal process, the second point is that constitution is also dependent on affection. There is, here, a line of dependence that begins with the affective power of new impressional moments, proceeds through the retentions and protentions occasioned by this affection, and ends in the syntheses underlying constitution. As Husserl writes, "Every living present brings . . . ever new sources of new affective power . . . which can make possible, in each coincidence [of contents] the syntheses of merging, connecting and contrast" (p. 172). With the right contents, each of these syntheses can

19. Husserl 1966b, p. 156. The same position is repeated in Ms. C 4, p. 5a.

20. "Stretching out," "straining," and "tension" are the three basic meanings listed by Lewis and Short for "intentio." From thence its meaning comes to be "a directing of the mind towards anything" (*A Latin Dictionary,* ed. C. Lewis and C. Short [London: Oxford University Press, 1966], p. 976).

21. As Husserl notes, insofar as this pull (Zug) is diminished in retention, "the horizon of the future has an affective advantage (Vorzug) over that of the past" (Ms. C 4, p. 5a).

occur. The fundamental necessity here is affection. To cite Husserl: "What is constituted in consciousness is there for the ego only insofar as it affects [it]."[22] This is because "actual connection, actual formation of a unity always necessarily presupposes affective power, or rather distinctions in affection" (p. 172). The distinctions referred to come from the fact that affective power increases with the freshness of retained contents. This increase, as noted, is what directs the ego to the future.[23]

Husserl combines the notions of affective power and merging to explain why we anticipate on the basis of our experience. Suppose, for example, we observe the sequence p, q. When p appears again, as p', an anticipation of a corresponding q' arises. According to Husserl, "the unified data, bound together through their commonality must lie at the basis of this [anticipation]." As he describes it, with the appearance of the fresh p', p, "which has retentionally sunk down, . . . receives an additional affective power." In other words, the merging of p with p' *includes their affective powers*, the result being an increase in the affective power of the retained p. This affective power spills over to q, which lies temporally proximate to p, having been retained as its immediate successor. In Husserl's words, when p "receives an addition of affective power, the surplus goes over to the q" (Husserl 1966b, p. 187). The result is a primitive association between the two. The retained p is now experienced with the increase of the retained q's affective drawing power. It is experienced with the increased "pull" of q on itself. An intention, that is, a certain tension or stretching out from one to the other thus arises. The merging that brings about this result for the retained p and q has the same effect on the just occurring data, p' and q'. Thus, the inherent directedness of p' to the next impressional moment is merged and shaped by the retained p's directedness to q. Husserl concludes, "In union with this [addition of affective power to q], q' is also expected in connection with the just occurring p'" (ibid.). In other words, the merging of the anticipatory intentions of the retained p and the just occurring p' results in the "stretching out" of p' towards a new q'. Repetition strengthens this effect. As p is continually followed by q, the "streaming over" of affective power from new impressions to corresponding retained contents increases the affective bond between such contents. Since these contents are all merged in the ongoing now,

22. Husserl 1966b, p. 162. This affection involves the pull towards the future: "Obviously the associative awakening [directed towards an object] goes forward into the future. From the point of awakening, the awaking broadens forward following the line of merging" (p. 157).

23. The style of this directedness is, of course, set by the past.

this bond manifests itself as an increase in our expectation that the p we presently experience will again be followed by a q.

Teleology and Self-Constitution

After the *Analyses of Passive Synthesis,* Husserl's account of the future focuses on its role in our self-constitution. Once again the notion of affection plays a crucial role. Our self-constitution begins with the retentions and protentions that unify our streaming life. We exist through the temporal synthesis they occasion. As such, our selfhood depends on the affection that makes this synthesis possible. Thus, the dependence of temporalization on affection comes to be seen as a dependence of the ego on affecting contents. Such contents "awaken" it. They bring about its concrete being as "a center of affections and actions" (Ms. C 3 III, p. 38a). In Husserl's words, the retentional and protentional processes these contents engender constitute the central nowness of the ego "as a fixed form for a content that streams through it and as the source point for all constituted modifications."[24] As I noted earlier, the result of this constitution is that the affections associated with the streaming content appear to affect it. The striving these affections engender appear as *its* strivings. Genetically regarded, however, these affections and actions, which seem to spring from the ego, are actually constitutive of it. The constitutive powers that appear to characterize the ego are actually the results of the processes underlying it. Thus, the ego's appearance as a temporal center and source point is based on the retentional and protentional processes, which affections engender. We thus have to say that affecting contents "awaken" the ego by awakening the processes that underlie its being as a "center of experience."[25]

Since a future-directed *Querintentionalität* passes through the reten-

24. (Ms. C 2 I, p. 11a). The identification of this primal now [or present] with the primal ego occurs on the previous page when Husserl mentions the reduction that uncovers it. The reduction occurs "when I go back in the transcendental attitude (actively with theoretical interest) to this, my transcendental primal-ego, to my transcendental primal present" (pp. 10a–b). This primal present, which is the "primal form" of our subjective being, is something that constitutes itself: "The primal phenomenal concrete streaming present, transcendental subjectivity in the primal form of its being, is the primally streaming present in the ontological form of streaming-streaming away [which is] yet present and constantly present; [it is] a continuous change and in such change a present that continuously constitutes itself" (p. 10a). The constitution is through the retentional and protentional "*Abwandlungsmodi,*" which situate it as a "*Mittelpunkt.*"

25. The awakening is *through* the retentional and protentional processes. These are what first constitute the ego. Natalie Depraz ignores this when she writes, "C'est dans l'af-

tions and protentions that underlie the ego, the ego is necessarily turned to the future. Its being as "a center of affections and actions" is, in other words, essentially teleological or future directed. Husserl thus writes, "Every transcendental ego has what is innate to it—innately, it bears in itself the 'teleological ground' for its streaming, constitutive life in which it temporalizes the world and itself as a human being. The ego inherently bears the streaming, purely associative, subegological temporalization in its founding construction, in its essential form [as the temporalization] that begins without the participation of the ego" (Ms. E III 9, p. 7a). Several assertions are implied by this statement. The first is that the "unique founding" of the ego occurs through a "subegological" temporalization. This is the temporalization that occurs through the retentional and protentional processes. What drives these processes is the continuous input of affecting contents. Insofar as temporalization begins with the "pull" toward the future brought about by affecting contents, it is inherently future directed. This is why, prior to the ego, the temporal process functions as the ego's "teleological ground." When Husserl calls it "associative," his reference is to the coincidence and merging of hyletic data. These bring about the specific intentions or "stretching forths" *that form the basis of association.* Thus, to revert to Husserl's example, the continued experience of p followed by q results, through merging, in the increase of the affective bond between them. This bond unites them in a primitive association. This association leads us to anticipate q when we have a fresh experience of p. The result, then, of this associative temporalization is an "associatively temporalizing intentionality." The very merging that brings it about also yields, in Husserl's words, "a specifically new essential form of egological, intentional performances, performances constituting new posited unities on the basis of affectivity and activity."[26]

This last assertion gives us a definite sense of the ego's orientation towards the future. It is an orientation towards constitution. The temporalization that founds the ego acts as its "teleological ground" by

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fection, dans la tension qu'elle provoque et l'impulsion qu'elle confère et déclenche, que le moi se constitue tout d'abord passivement" (Depraz 1994, p. 73).

26. The full passage here, which immediately follows the passage quoted in the beginning of the paragraph, is: "Essentially united with this is the specific being of the ego in its essential form, not just in its associative self-temporalizing intentionality, but also in a new kind of essential form of egological intentional performances, performances constituting new posited unities on the basis of affectivity and activity. This, however, on the constant basis of association, which always plays its part, participating in every formation of validity" (Ms. E III 9, p. 7a).

directing it towards the constitution of unities. In Husserl's words, the merging, reinforcement, and standing out that this temporalization occasions signifies that "affection and action are already directed towards (*abgestellt auf*) ontological constitution." Thus, the very same temporal process that results in the ego's being as a center also drives the ontological constitution that gives it a surrounding, centering world. Its constitution as an ego—i.e., as a center of affection and action—is, in fact, "essentially one" with the "associative, self-temporalizing intentionality" that leads it to constitute a surrounding world of objects.[27] By virtue of its temporal basis, we thus have to say that its "being-there" in this world is essentially future oriented. It does not just anticipate, but acts to constitute what it anticipates.

Instincts

One final element remains to complete this sketch of Husserl's account of the future. It can be introduced by noting a certain problem in the account of the *Analyses*. For Husserl, as I mentioned, the pull of affecting content is at its height at the moment of the "primal impressional occurring," i.e., at the now point. Given this, how can we say this pull does not terminate with the primal impression, but rather exceeds it? In other words, why does our protentional having-in-advance go beyond the now if the presently experienced content of the now is, indeed, the source of the pull? In a series of manuscripts that culminated in the early 1930s, Husserl redefines this pull towards the future in terms of our instinctive strivings to acquire *new, not yet experienced* contents. Our future-directedness is, then, not occasioned merely by our present impressions but by the fact that "all life is continuous striving, all satisfaction is transitory" (Ms. A VI 26, p. 42a). For Husserl, this "striving is instinctive."

27. The extended passage here is: "Affection and action are already directed towards ontological constitution. The Teleological. Even the process of associative temporalizing functioning has a teleological meaning, even this functioning is 'directed towards' [something]. [This directedness appears in] the type and division of the appearing hyletical unities, their division in fields of sensation—and the interplay of the unities of the different fields of sensation—*so that* nature can constitute itself with its natural spatial, temporal forms" (Ms. E III 9, p. 5a). Following on these remarks, Husserl adds a point that we shall take up in our next section, namely that this teleology is instinctively based. He writes: "But this is only an abstract component of the dynamic. Tendency has here been abstracted away (a dangerous abstraction). On the side of the ego: instinct, drive." What has been left out is the teleology of our "instinctive being-directed to bodies—the instinctive noetic-noematic tendency towards the constitution of bodies" (ibid.).

Present at the very beginning of our constitutive life, "striving is instinctively (thus, at first, secretly) 'directed' towards what in the 'future' will first be disclosed as worldly unities constituting themselves" (Ms. A VI 34, p. 34b). This striving, as we saw, supplies the motive energy for the constitution of these worldly unities. In parallel with this, constitution itself comes to be seen as an instinctively based function.

This reworking of the notion of affective "pull" can be put in terms of a fact considered in the earlier chapter on the instincts: not all contents affect us, not all give rise to a striving on our part. Some, in fact, leave us indifferent. It all depends on whether a specific content can fulfill an instinctive need. If it can, it will be matched to a specific striving that seeks to satisfy this need by acquiring the content. For Husserl, then, specific contents affect us because "there exist determined ways of striving that are originally, 'instinctively' one with [their] hyletic complement." A "primal association" exists between the two. This is not an "association through coincidence" (Ms. E III 9, pp. 23a–23b). It is not, in other words, the association occasioned by the coincidence and merging of affective powers discussed above. Husserl's focus is rather on what first gives rise to the affecting power that makes merging possible. The "primal association" between striving and content rests on a "nonobjectifying instinct" that impels us to seek this content. In Husserl's words, this instinct designates "the interest in the data and fields of sensation—before the objectification of sense data," that is, before there is "a thematically actualizable object" (Ms. C 13 I, p. 11b). Thus, the "primal association" underlying striving consists simply of the instinctive, inborn interest in specific data. The affective power of such data comes from our innate attachment to them.

This instinctive origin of affective power allows Husserl to express the assertions of our previous sections as claims regarding the instinctual foundations of our life. The processes of temporal synthesis are all viewed as instinctive functions. Behind them lie the instinctive "drives" (*Triebe*) to have and hold fast contents. Thus, the retentional and protentional processes are understood as part of a "universal drive intentionality" (*Triebintentionalität*). This intentionality, Husserl writes, "unitarily constitutes every primordial present as a lasting temporalization and concretely propels (*forttreibt*) it from present to present" (Ms. E III 5; Husserl 1973b, p. 595). As noted, this propelling can be seen as a function of the instinctive having-in-advance that expresses itself in our protentional intentionalities. So regarded, such having-in-advance

includes a drive to have in the present, i.e., to actually experience the contents that would fulfill our protentions. In the *Analyses of Passive Synthesis*, this protentional tendency was seen as a result of the affective "pull" of affecting contents. It reaches its high point in the present impressional moment. In the later manuscripts, the pull towards the future is regarded as the consequence of an instinctive drive to *acquire* new contents. This is why it proceeds *through the present moment* to embrace the future. With regard to the past, the effect of this "universal drive intentionality" is the linking of retention with retention, the outcome being the unity of the retained with the ongoing present. Once again the affective pull of contents is seen as the result of a drive to possess and keep them.

As already indicated, a similar transformation occurs in the account of constitution. In the *Analyses*, constitution is seen as the result of the coincidence and merging of contents. The affective pull of the hyletic unities that arise through this process is taken as drawing the ego towards them. Thus, simultaneously with this merging, there arises a future-directed *Querintentionalität*, which intentionally presents, i.e., constitutes, these unities. As pointed out in the chapter on the instincts, a parallel description appears in the later manuscripts. It is couched in terms of "the original instinct of objectification" (Ms. C 13 I, p. 10a). At its basis lies the instinctive "interest in the data." The merging of this data transforms the nonobjectifying instinct into an objectifying one. Thus, the *Querintentionalität* becomes a function of the instinctive drive towards the constitution of objects. Similarly, the "affecting contents," whose merging results in this "crosswise intentionality," come to be seen as a "terminus a quo [a starting point] for instinctive intentions. These," Husserl writes, "ultimately fulfill themselves in the constitution of 'visual things' ('*Sehdingen*')" (Ms. C 16 IV, p. 40a).

A corresponding reinterpretation occurs with respect to the notion of "awakening" the ego. We have described this in terms of the affective pull of sensations, the pull beginning the processes that make the ego a temporal center. Once we translate this pull into an instinctive relation, the awakening can be described in terms of our bodily reaction to affecting sensations. We can then say with Husserl, "The ego is awakened by affection from the nonegological because the nonegological is 'of interest,' it instinctively indicates, etc.; and the ego reacts kinesthetically as an immediate reaction" (Ms. B III 3, p. 5a). What is indicated "instinctively" by the affecting contents are the objects that fulfill our bodily needs.

Instinctively, we take them as pointing towards these objects. Thus, the kinesthetic (or bodily) reaction mentioned here occurs because our instinctive drives are directed towards satisfying our bodily needs. The body, through the movement of its members, reacts to the affecting contents by attempting to satisfy them.[28] The result is that the "awake" ego is not just awakened as a temporal center. Its presence to itself is through its body. The contents that affect it do so through the sensory capacity of its body. The hand, for example, that touches the book also feels itself. This sense of self is not just static. The self's kinesthetic reaction gives rise to the sensations of its own bodily movements. These "kinesthesia" are present in every grasp of a sensible object. Focusing our eyes, turning our heads, moving to get a better look are all examples of "the striving . . . to more closely observe the object." As Husserl notes, the resulting kinesthesia mix with the visual data provided by the object. A "unity of intentionality" unites the two as we constitute the object.[29]

The "awake" ego, then, is necessarily embodied. Its awakening—or constitution—is a function of specific contents. Those that it has been instinctively determined to seek out first are the contents that satisfy its bodily needs. The same point holds for objects in general. Grasping them, we take them in as objects that can satisfy a specific need. They are not apprehended as merely present. They are there for us in response to a felt need. This implies, as Husserl writes, "Mere sensory data and, on a higher level, sensory objects, things that are there for the subject but are there as 'value free,' are abstractions. Nothing can be given to the ego that does not move the feelings" (Ms. A VI 26, p. 42a). Since this striving yields the retentional and protentional processes, the awake ego necessarily takes on the form of a temporal center. It becomes

28. As Husserl describes this: "The first, most universal, everyday needs are immediate bodily needs, and, mediated by the body, the needs and satisfying actions that are related to the world outside the body. The bodily organs are put in action (bodily action) by the ego, and the action goes forward by means of them. The ego occupies itself bodily with the things of the world beyond the body" (Ms. A V 5, p. 205).

29. In Husserl's words, "This [optical] datum changes with the passage of the kinesthesia. It does not run alongside the kinesthetic-hyletic sensations, rather both are instinctive, drive processes . . . the running off of the optical and the change of the kinesthetic [data] do not occur alongside each other, but rather proceed in the unity of an intentionality that goes from the optical datum to the kinesthetic and through the kinesthetic leads to the optical, so that every optical [datum] is a *terminus ad quem* and, at the same time, functions as a *terminus a quo*" (Ms. C 16 IV, p. 40b). The datum, in other words, is both an end and a beginning in the continuous passage from visual to bodily sensations and back again that characterizes the constitution of the visual object.

an *embodied, instinctively based* "center for affections and actions."

Conclusions

In retrospect, this last phase of Husserl's account of the future can be seen as a response to the two related objections we began with. The first is that the phenomenological method, with its focus on evidence and givenness, is inattentive to the role that the future plays in our intentional life. It misses the futurity of the "thereness" of our "being-there" in a world. The second is that this method forgets that "values" are inherent in this world. Attending to the constitution of the thing as already given through its visible features, it leaves out the quality of its desirability, of its being a thing of value.

Husserl's descriptions of constitution as an instinctively based function are framed to avoid these objections. In fact, neither the *Analyses of Passive Synthesis* nor the manuscripts that follow it assume that objects are first given as mere things, to which values are later added. Insofar as original givenness is correlated to our instinctive strivings, value must be regarded as present from the start. It is cogiven with the initial presence of the thing as affecting or moving the ego. For Husserl, the same instinctive strivings give us our orientation to the future. Husserl's final position, then, is that we are innately, instinctively directed towards the future. Rather than being disembodied, Cartesian spectators, we are, in our being in the world, situated participants.

This last point may be put in terms of the changing role of the *world* in Husserl's accounts of temporalization. In his early *Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness*, its role is simply that of providing "primal impressions." This role, however, is essential. The fact that "the primal impression . . . is not produced" by consciousness implies that "consciousness is nothing without impression." Without it, the retentional process cannot begin (Husserl 1966a, p. 100). With the *Analyses of Passive Synthesis*, Husserl's focus shifts to the affections occasioned by impressions. This shift brings to the fore the role of the world. The impressions it provides are no longer seen as supplying an essentially passive material for our retentional and protentional processes. The affections they arouse motivate these processes. The "pull" of affective power makes them proceed. Corresponding to this, the self is seen as *pulled towards the world.* It becomes a self drawn to its objects. When Husserl traces this pull to our innate instinctual drives, the transformation of the self from a disem-

bodied spectator to a fully situated participant becomes complete. Temporalization itself becomes an instinctive function, one fully tied to our bodily needs and, through these, to our being in the world.

So regarded, Husserl's developing account of temporalization can be viewed as a progressive realization of the self's necessary embodiment. It is an account that ends with the claim that "the ego and the nonego are inseparable." We cannot really distinguish the awake self from the contents that awaken it. To assert, in this context, that the ego has its "teleological ground" in itself is to point to just such contents. The temporalization they awaken is what gives the self its quality of always being ahead of itself. The same temporalization gives the *Da-* of its *Dasein* its futurity. Drawn towards a world that will satisfy its needs, the self is always ahead of itself. Innate instinctive drives always situate its "thereness" as not-yet.

If we abstract from such drives, two quite general conclusions can be drawn. The first is that conscious life demands affecting contents. This is because its awakening as conscious life occurs through the temporalization that these contents occasion. Implicit in this is the second conclusion. Temporalization must, itself, be seen as the link between the contents that initiate its processes and the resulting consciousness. It must be what turns a mere possession of "data" into an actual experience. There is, here, a solution to the problem of qualia, that is, of how we move from such data to a conscious experience. The next chapter will make this solution explicit. It will show how an account of temporalization is also an account of the genesis of our first-person experiences in their qualitative character.



David Chalmers expresses a general consensus when he writes that "the really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of 'experience.'" It is the problem of the "subjective aspect" of our perceptions. Beyond the visual processing, there are also qualia—e.g., "the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field." They present us with a twofold problem. The first aspect concerns the relation of these "qualia" to the brain's processing. As Chalmers puts this: "It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises" (Chalmers 1996a, p. 2). We can see how physical processes can give rise to further physical processes. In John Locke's words, we can grasp how a change in "the size, figure, and motion of one body should cause a change in the size, figure and motion of another body" (Locke 1995, p. 444). A physical change, however, is not itself a perception with its qualitative contents. The difficulty, then, is that "the structure and dynamics of physical processes yield only more structure and dynamics." But the qualia we seek are apparently distinct from structure and dynamics (Chalmers 1996a, p. 8). The formulation of this aspect of the problem is quite old—dating from at least the time of Locke and Leibniz.[1] Thomas Nagel introduced its sec-

1. Locke's formulation is: "We are so far from knowing what figure, size or motion of parts produce a yellow color, a sweet taste, or a sharp sound, that we can by no means conceive how any size, figure, or motion of any particles, can possibly produce in us the idea of any color, taste, or sound whatsoever: there is no conceivable connection between

ond aspect. It is precisely qualia's first-person, subjective character that prevents our formulating an objective, physical account of qualia. For Nagel, "every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view"—that of the subject experiencing it (Nagel 1974, p. 437). But a physical account makes use of "objective facts . . . the kind that can be observed and understood from many points of view and by individuals with differing perceptual systems" (p. 442). Given this, such an account must either ignore the subjective phenomenon or transform it into something it is not, that is, a physical item that is publicly available. In Nagel's words: "If the subjective character of experience is fully comprehensible only from one point of view, then any shift to greater objectivity . . . does not take us nearer to the real nature of the phenomenon: it takes us farther away from it" (pp. 444–45). So regarded, the problem of qualia comes close to the problem of other minds. Given the subjective character of experience, how do I know that others experience what I do? How do I know that there are other minds? As Nagel observes, "If one understood how subjective experience could have an objective nature, one would understand the existence of subjects other than oneself" (p. 448, n. 14). Unfortunately, we cannot. Qualia can no more be objectively exhibited than other minds. Neither has a public quality.

These problems have led some—notably Daniel Dennett—to deny the very existence of qualia.[2] Others have contented themselves with declaring qualia epiphenomenal. They exist, but since they are not objective, "[t]hey do nothing, they explain nothing." They are "a useless by-product" of our evolutionary development (Jackson 1982, pp. 135, 134). To counter such views, more than simple first-person testimony is

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the one and other" (Locke 1995, p. 445). Leibniz makes the same point in his analogy of the mill. "Perceptions," he writes "are inexplicable by mechanical causes, that is to say, by figures and motions. Supposing that there were a machine whose structure produced thought, sensation, and perception, we could conceive of it as increased in size with the same proportions until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would into a mill. Now, on going into it he would find only pieces working upon one another, but never would he find anything to explain perception" (Leibniz 1962, p. 254).

2. Part of the difficulty in reading Dennett's *Consciousness Explained* is that while denying qualia, he often seems to imply them. Thus, on the one hand, he feels compelled to offer an explanation for why secondary qualities, for example, colors, turn out to be so "'ineffable,' so resistant to definition" (Dennett 1991, p. 382). The reason is that "[c]olors . . . are the product of biological evolution, which has a tolerance for sloppy boundaries" (p. 381n. 2). On the other hand, the conclusion of this and other similar arguments is the dismissal of qualia as "mere complexes of mechanically accomplished dispositions to react" (p. 386).

required.[3] We have to explain why qualia can only be available as first-person experiences. This can be put in terms of the demand for "an explanatory bridge" between structures of processing and qualia (Chalmers 1996a, p. 8). This bridge must not just show how qualia arise; it must also explain how the process of their arising is such that qualia refer only to the person experiencing them. Insofar as the problem of recognizing other minds (the intersubjectivity problem) is that of qualia, what is called for here is *not* its solution, but rather its grounding. We need to know why subjective experience cannot have an objective nature, that is, why subjects, as recipients of this experience, can never be public objects.[4] The same holds for the first aspect of the qualia problem, at least as traditionally conceived. A successful account of qualia must explain why we cannot imagine any immediate connection between them and the physical processes from which they arise. We need an account of their arising as nonpublic objects, which are fundamentally different from the spatial-temporal entities of physical processes. As part of this, we have to explain their apparent lack of exercising any physical causality. In a word, the account must not deny but *explain* the features of qualia that make them problematic.

As Nagel suggests, we could meet these demands if we had "an objective phenomenology not dependent on empathy or the imagination." This phenomenology would focus on the "structural features of perception," features "more accessible to objective description" (Nagel 1974, p. 449). The result, then, would be an objective (thirdperson) structural account that explains the origin of what must remain a first-person presence. Such an account would *not* allow the communication of alien mental states to individuals who have never experienced such states. It would, rather, show why such states remain essentially private.

The purpose of this chapter is to present just such a sketch of an "objective phenomenology"—one that would fulfill the requirements just outlined. My basic premise is that the subjective "felt" character of qualia is a function of their first-person character. This means that if we can

3. To remain on the level of such testimony is to reach an impasse in arguing with those who deny having such experience. Terrence Horgan provides a good example of this. He writes: "I take the intrinsic, non-relative nature of qualia to be a self-evident fact. . . . The point is virtually impossible to *argue* for, however, because it depends upon an individual's first-person perspective towards his own mental life." Functionalists deny this fact and hence, "[d]ialectically, we seem to have reached an impasse. . . . I shall not try to break this deadlock" (Horgan 1984, p. 459).

4. As opposed to their bodies or behavior being public.

explain why qualia are accessible only to a single point of view, we shall have accounted for this subjective character. Such an account will be the first step in constructing an "explanatory bridge" between the physical structures of processing and qualia. A description of the structural features that make qualia private should, in other words, serve as a guide in constructing this bridge. My account will make use of Husserl's theory of time consciousness. I believe that this theory can be read as offering us the two basic elements required by a computational model of consciousness: nonegological data and a functional view of the performances of consciousness.

Husserl as a Functionalist

This claim will appear surprising to those who believe that Husserl presents an unabashed description of subjectivity *qua* subjectivity, that he makes no attempt to reconcile this description with the objectivity of physical processes. Such a view would limit Husserl's descriptions to the "felt" qualities of conscious experiences. Defenders of this position point to Husserl's early attack on psychologism in the *Logical Investigations.* They assert that his conception of meaning or intentional content renders it in principle irreducible to any physical or psychological processes.

Pushed to the extreme, this view would make consciousness independent of any external influence. Yet, the assertion that consciousness is dependent on nonegological data for its performances occurs throughout Husserl's work. Thus, even in the *Investigations,* Husserl speaks frequently of "contents of sensation." In the *Lectures on Time Consciousness,* he insists on the need for the "primal impressions" to provide these contents. For Husserl, the fact that "the primal impression . . . is not produced" by consciousness means that "consciousness is nothing without impression." Without it, the retentional processes, which give us our sense of inner time, cannot begin (Husserl 1966a, p. 100). The same general point is made in his *Analyses of Passive Synthesis.* Here, however, the focus is on the psychological affection that impressions provide. Without this affection, as the last chapter stressed, constitution cannot occur. In Husserl's words, "For the ego, what is constituted for consciousness is there only insofar as it affects [the ego]. Anything constituted is pregiven insofar as it exercises an affective stimulus (*Reiz*). It is given insofar as the ego has followed up on the stimulus, has attentively, graspingly turned to it" (Husserl 1966b, p. 162). The conclusion, then, is that from the very

beginning of the process, "affection already plays an essential role in the constitution of all objectivities so that without it there would be no objects" (p. 164). This need for affection is a need for impressions. For Husserl, "the primal source of all affection lies and can only lie in the primal impression and its own greater or lesser affectivity" (p. 168).

The unpublished manuscripts of the late 1920s and early 1930s further develop this theme. They make external, nonegological stimuli an essential part of the ego since they are required for the ego's wakefuless. As I cited Husserl in the last chapter, "The ego is awakened by affection from the nonegological because the nonegological is 'of interest,' it instinctively indicates, etc.; and the ego reacts kinesthetically as an immediate reaction" (Ms. B III 3, p. 5a). This reaction is the beginning of the constitutive process. The process itself involves both the ego and the nonego. This means that we cannot abstract the "awake ego" from the impressions that awaken it: "The ego is not something for itself and the nonego something separate from the ego; between them there is no room for a turning towards. Rather, the ego and its nonego are inseparable" (Ms. C 16 V, p. 68a). There is, in fact, a certain identity between the two. It is one where we can say: "What from the side of the hyletic data is called the affection of the ego is from the side of the ego called tending, striving towards" (Ms. B III 9, pp. 70a–70b). This striving manifests itself in the constitutive process.

These citations, which sum up the doctrine of the previous chapters, indicate that Husserl did not conceive his project as simply a description of subjectivity *qua* subjectivity. The nonsubjective or nonegological is not only seen as a condition for the possibility of consciousness; it is intimately involved in its constitutive processes, the very processes through which objects of experience arise for it. What we have here, in fact, is a functional or performative view of consciousness. As Husserl expresses it:

> is not consciousness function . . . ? What is necessary? There are intentional experiences. We have to examine experiences as functions, as relatively closed functions, examining them while reliving them, living them anew, performing acts, repeatedly reperforming them. We have to ask ourselves: What is 'accomplished' in them? What kind of sense is present in them, what kind of sense is progressively forming itself in them? What is one doing? What does this accomplish for the production of sense in the passage to the embracing connections [present] in the unity of life? How do functions

> synthetically, teleologically unite into the unity of a function, etc.? (Ms. A VI 31, p. 19a)

As this passage makes clear, to take consciousness as a "function" is to analyze its performances. It is in terms of these performances that the senses it grasps are progressively formed and united with each other into greater and greater wholes.

This functional conception of consciousness stands in sharp contrast with the view of those commentators who hold that, for Husserl, intentionality is an irreducibly primitive feature of consciousness. "Intentionality" designates the ability of certain contents of consciousness to refer beyond themselves. These contents are generally taken as the senses or meanings we entertain. Proponents of this view sharply distinguish these referring "semantic" contents from the nonegological data and "syntactic" (or symbolic) processes of computational models. They assert that such processes are functions. To write them we must analyze the steps in a given performance and instruct the computer accordingly. Such analysis, however, is impossible when it comes to intentionality. When McIntyre, for example, claims that noematic senses "have an 'intrinsic,' as opposed to 'derived,' intentionality," he is claiming that their ability to refer "cannot be reduced to causal roles, computations, or to anything else" (McIntyre 1988, p. 70). This implies that objects with their qualia are present to consciousness, not through any performance of consciousness, but rather through the intrinsic, nonanalyzable intentionality of the senses that present them.[5]

5. McIntyre also, rather surprisingly, claims noematic senses "are conceived by Husserl as intentional, not because of any relations they bear to anything *else* (e.g., not because they are 'interpreted' by someone or caused in some particular way) but simply because they are a sort of entity whose very nature is to *be* representational" (McIntyre 1988, p. 70). In the *Logical Investigations*, however, Husserl asserts again and again that "perception is interpretation." He writes in explanation: "It belongs to perception that something appears within it, but *interpretation* makes up what we term appearance—be it correct or not, anticipatory or overdrawn. The *house* appears to me through no other way but that I interpret in a certain fashion actually experienced contents of sensation. . . . They are termed 'appearances' or, better, appearing contents precisely for the reason that they are contents of perceptive interpretation" (Husserl 1984, p. 762). The doctrine, here, is that nonintentional elements—e.g., particular "contents of sensation"—become intentional through our taking them as appearances of some object. To take them as such is to place them in a framework of identity in multiplicity. We do so when we continually take them in the same sense. As Husserl writes in describing how "we suppose ourselves to grasp perceptually one and the same object through the change of experiential contents," "different perceptual contents are given, but they are interpreted, apperceived 'in the same sense,' . . . the interpretation (*Auffassung*) according to this 'sense' is a character of experience that first constitutes 'the being of the object for me'" (p. 397).

The view this chapter advances is the opposite of McIntyre's. My position is that Husserl's conception of consciousness as a function demands an analysis of this performance. This conception is inherent the *Cartesian Meditations*' description of the intentional object: "The object of consciousness, in its self-identity throughout the flowing of experience, does not enter into this flowing from outside. It lies included within it as a sense; it is this [sense] as a result of the intentional performance (*Leistung*) of the synthesis of consciousness" (Husserl 1963, p. 80). Without this performance, there is, then, no intentional object and hence no intentionality. The syntheses that constitute an intentional object are, in other words, prior to intentionality.[6] If we grant this premise, then we must also admit with Husserl the possibility of nonintentional contents of consciousness. In Husserl's words, the implication is "that not every inherent moment in the concrete unity of an intentional experience has, itself, the basic character of intentionality, that is, the characteristic of being 'consciousness of something'" (Husserl 1976, p. 74). It gains this character only when it is part of a successful constitutive synthesis, one that establishes the object's presence. For Husserl, these nonintentional elements are, ultimately, impressions. They provide the original material for synthesis. The "stimulus" that arises from them awakens the functioning that ultimately results in the presence of the object with all the qualia that characterize it. Given this picture, we cannot

6. Given this, John Brough's assertion that Husserl does not "claim in *Ideas I* or elsewhere that the object of perception is a synthesis of perspectives" is, to say the least, surprising (Brough 1981, p. 334). One such claim occurs in the passage cited above: "The object of consciousness . . . is an intentional accomplishment of the synthesis of consciousness" (Husserl 1963, p. 80). The view that such performances are a matter of synthesis carries over into the conception of consciousness. For Husserl, "Consciousness —intentional experience—is inherently synthesis; it is the first instance a continual synthesis that, in the ongoing total coincidence of the phrases of consciousness, 'constitutes' the unity of an intentional objectivity" (Ms. A VI 3, p. 12a). It also carries over to Husserl's conception of constitution as synthesis. In his words: "This life, first of all, as an egological life, as my life, the life of the person reflecting [is] a constituting life. 'Constitution' is the production again and again of continuous and discrete syntheses. It is thereby an egologically centered life of passivity, affectivity and activity" (Ms. C 3 III, p. 33a). Husserl, it should be noted, does not hesitate to identify constitution with Kant's conception of synthesis: "What is called constitution, this is what Kant obviously had in mind under the rubric, 'connection as an operation of the understanding,' synthesis. This is the genesis in which the ego and, correlatively, the surrounding world of the ego are constituted." (Ms. B IV 12, pp. 2–3). The reference to the ego's constitution comes from the fact that the retentional process itself is understood as "a continuous identity synthesis" (eine kontinuierliche Synthesis der Identifikation") (Husserl 1966b, p. 168). The same retentional process is, as we shall see, responsible for the ego's presence as a center.

say that from a Husserlian standpoint there is any inherent incompatibility between intentionality and a functional account of consciousness. What Husserl's standpoint requires is, rather, a description of the performances that result in the qualia of external objects.

Three Elementary Features of Being a Subject

The first step in analyzing a performance is knowing its goal, i.e., what it is supposed to accomplish. This requires a description of the goal. As noted, the most striking feature of both qualia and the subjects who grasp them is that neither are public objects. In fact, the connection between the existence of qualia and that of a subject is such that those who deny the one usually deny the other.[7] The denial ties being a *subject* to having *experience.* The two, experience and subject, are thought of as correlatives. Admitting this, any account of qualia must include the subject. In fact, their correlativity gives rise to the strong suspicion that, if they exist, they are the result of the same performative process. The process that gives rise to the "subjective character of experience" also results in the subject as "a single point of view."[8] If this is correct, then an account of qualia must begin with a description of what it means to be a subject.

When I regard my own subjectivity, the most immediate and constant feature that strikes me is that of viewing the world from *a single point of view.* This point is a privileged one insofar as it is situated at the *center* of my surrounding world. Thus, spatially, I appear at the zero point of my world, the point from which spatial distances are judged. However I move in my environment, I remain "here," the objects that surround me remaining at a certain remove. How do I judge how far away they are? Binocular vision helps, but even without it I can gain a sense of distance through the apparent motion of objects. When I look out the window of a moving car or train, objects quite close to me display a greater relative motion than those further away. The same thing happens when I move about the objects in my room. To reverse this description, these relative rates of change are a dynamic structure of experience that have as their

7. Thus Dennett's denial of qualia also extends to the conscious subject. He writes: "A philosopher's zombie, you will recall, is behaviorally indistinguishable from a normal human being, but is not conscious" (Dennett 1991, p. 405). "We're all zombies. Nobody is conscious" at least in the sense of having qualia (p. 406).

8. The terms are Nagel's. See, e.g., Nagel 1974, pp. 444–45.

correlate a particular spatial point of view—a "here" in the field of vision.[9] If I regard this field simply in terms of its contents, this "dynamic structure" consists in the temporal sequencing of its contents in perspectivally ordered patterns. Thus, if I move a certain distance, I find that a nearby object has "turned," so to speak, twenty degrees. A more distant one has turned only five degrees. The larger angle corresponds to a greater pattern, one showing more features of the object. Yet, both turnings are experienced in the same stretch of time, the time of my moving from one position to the next. One is thus experienced as more rapid than the other. The more rapid the sequencing, the nearer I take the object to be. Rates of departure into the past (and of advance from the anticipated future), when arranged in a systematic way so as to yield a single viewing point, give me a "here." This presence of the "here," it should be noted, is not the result of an "inference." I do not first have to know the laws of perspective in order to infer my position in the world. This position is simply a correlate of these different, systematically related rates of departure. It is cogiven with them.[10]

A single point of view involves not just being a spatial center, but also a temporal center. Given that the now is always situated between the past and the future, the spatial centering of experience about a "here" occurs in tandem with a temporal centering about a "now." My experience is so structured that whatever time it is, it is always "now" for me. In the flow of experiences, my now remains situated between what I anticipate and what I remember. Thus, the temporal sequencing of qualitative contents must be so structured that its correlate is not just a "here," but also a "now." The result is the centering of experience about a "particular point of view," one embracing a particular "here" tied to a particular "now." This centering is essential for the unity of consciousness. Whatever else this unity involves, it must include the structures that position us as distinct spatial-temporal centers. A consciousness that experiences itself simultaneously in two different positions involving distinct points of view can hardly be considered unified. Given this, we have to say that the unity of consciousness involves the systematic, coherent ordering of experience required for a single point of view. Any disruption of this ordering is a disruption of this unity.

9. The addition of binocular vision adds to this effect, but is not essential, as witnessed by the host of animals which do not possess it.

10. Film directors use this fact in making the viewer see the world first through one character's and then another's eyes. The director moves the camera to where the character was seen to be standing and films from this position.

Aside from being a spatial-temporal center, there is another feature of subjectivity that always seems to be present. This is its self-consciousness. Seeing, I am conscious that I am seeing. The same goes for hearing, thinking, or any other activity I engage in. No special effort seems to be required for this self-consciousness. I do not, for example, have to reflect on myself to be conscious of myself. The consciousness is prereflective. It seems to be inherent in having experience. This means that to know "what it is like" to be, say, a bat, one must not just experience what the bat experiences, one must experience one's experience of it. Frank Jackson illustrates this with his example of "Fred" who sees a color others cannot see. Fred knows both the color and "that he himself is seeing it" (Jackson 1982, p. 132).

Given that this self-consciousness is a feature of experience, it must be inherent in its structure. In other words, the dynamic structure of experience must be such as to position "a single point of view" that is self-conscious. Since being a subject involves both self-consciousness and being here and now, i.e., being a spatial-temporal center, any common grounding of qualia and subjectivity must include these features.[11]

The Temporal Root of Centering

According to Nagel, an objective phenomenology has to proceed without recourse to empathy or imagination. This means that an account of the features of being a subject cannot remain on an imaginative level. It cannot simply rely on the reader's sense of being a center or being self-aware. It must detail the dynamic structures, the particular performances and processes, that yield these features.

Spatial centering, as I said, is the result of the perspectival unfolding of contents. This is the unfolding that shows first one side and then another of objects. Such unfolding, which represents the apparent "turning" of objects as we move among them, occurs through a continuous series of intermediate stages. The elementary geometrical laws of perspective give us the structure of this "turning." In principle, the computational algorithm for it is unproblematic. An example of it occurs in the

11. Chalmers distinguishes "awareness" from "consciousness." While the "awareness of information" involves "the ability to knowingly direct behavior depending on that information," consciousness involves having "phenomenal experience" (Chalmers 1996c, p. 28). To avoid any confusion, I have used the term "self-consciousness" rather than "self-awareness" to designate our phenomenal self-experience.

computation that allows us to rotate objects on a computer screen. All that is required is a transformational algorithm that allows the mapping of points from one view to the next. The hard problem concerns the temporal processes presupposed by such "turning" or unfolding. The unfolding is given through a temporal sequencing of contents where one view gives way to the next *as it departs into pastness.* The basic question here is: what is the process of this departure? Given that this departure occurs in tandem with an advance from the future, the question of the process of this advance also arises. Temporal centering is a matter of being between past and future. Thus, a third question is also implied: How do such processes result in the centering that gives us the temporal aspect of being a particular point of view?

Husserl provides a schema for specifying the process of temporal departure. Its basic concept is that of a chain of "retentions of retentions." It can be represented symbolically by considering the requirements it is designed to fulfill. Kant first specified these requirements. As he observed, I could not grasp any temporally extended event if my impressions of it vanished immediately upon their apprehension. In Kant's words: "If I were to lose from my thought the preceding impressions . . . and not reproduce them when I advance to those which follow, a complete presentation [of an enduring object] would never arise" (Kant 1955b, A 102, pp. 78–79). For such a presentation, I need a sense of pastness. It has to include the contents that have preceded those of the present impressional moment. They have to be reproduced in the present and yet also have to be distinguished from those that fill my present field of vision. If they were not distinguished, i.e., if they were not marked as past, I would wind up, when I retained them, with a chaos of present impressions (A 103, p. 79). Husserl fulfills both demands by positing the dynamic structure of the retentional chain. The first requirement is met by asserting that each impression of an extended event, rather than vanishing after its occurrence, is retained. These retentions, rather than vanishing after their occurrence, are themselves retained. The process continues serially. For each originally given impression, the result, then, is a "constant continuum of retentions such that each later point is a retention of an earlier" (Husserl 1973, p. 29). Thus the originally given impression is, as time advances, retained through the growing chain of retentions of retentions of it. This process can be represented symbolically by a series of parentheses.[12] If "i" is the origi-

12. The symbolism that follows is not intended to alter Husserl's account in any sub-

nal impression, its retention can be represented by (i), the retention of this retention by ((i)), and so on. Each further parentheses designates a further retention of the original content. The growing series of parentheses shows how these chains satisfy the second of Kant's requirements, that of distinguishing the present from the past. In order to do so, each retention must tag what it retains as not new—that is, as old or past. If what it retains is itself a retention, the result is a tagging—a "retentional modification" in Husserl's terminology—that adds a further degree of pastness to its content.[13] Symbolically, the present is distinguished from the past by its *not* having the "modification" of parentheses.

Retentional modification does not just distinguish the present from the past. It allows us to distinguish among different degrees of pastness—for example, (i) and ((i)). Suppose, for example, we hear the successive notes of the scale, A, B, C, D, E. Using the symbolism of the parentheses, their retained presence would be, successively, (A), (B(A)), (C(B(A))), (D(C(B(A)))), (E(D(C(B(A))))). Thus, A in the last item is surrounded by five pairs of parentheses, symbolizing that it has undergone five retentional modifications; B is surrounded by four parentheses, symbolizing four retentional modifications, and so on. This symbolism represents how Husserl's retentional chains give us a structural account that meets Kant's demand that for an extended presentation, we need to "distinguish time in the succession of impressions following one another" (Kant 1955b, A 99, p. 77). This temporal distinction occurs through their retention, which is also a "modification."

Given that the presently perceiving subject remains now, the effect of these modifications is the subject's exclusion from the past. As a present perceiver, it is distinguished from the retained contents, which appear at a temporal remove. The retentional chains thus situate the sub-

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stantial way. Its purpose is to exhibit the structure of retention, a structure that can be causally implemented in humans or machines. The distinction between a given structure and its various possible implementations was first worked out in Husserl's *Logical Investigations* in his attack against psychologism. For an account of this see Mensch 1991b, pp. 109–10.

13. Given that the sense of pastness is simply that of not-newness, the sense is a relational one. Structurally, it is a function of the retentions of retentions that intervene between the present retention and the original impression. In terms of our "objective phenomenology," regarding the impression's content through such retentions, each of which presents itself as a not new or past moment, *is* grasping this content through a stretch of past time. Similarly, if in retaining the impression we also retain the pastness (not-newness) that is presented by the retentions of its content, then the appearance of the retained content is also the appearance of the pastness *through which* it is given.

ject on their leading edge. It is positioned at the point of departure into the past. We can thus see why its "here" and "now" go together. The "here," as we said, is a structural element implicit in the process of perspectival unfolding. The sequence of contents that forms the pattern of such unfolding determines the point—the "here"—from which the unfolding is viewed. Insofar as this sequence is retained, it also situates a "now" as its point of departure. This "now" gives a temporal dimension to the "here." Neither is static, since the structure is dynamic. The "here" changes with the addition of further contents and, with it, the "now," as the point of departure into the past, changes. The result then is a particular spatial-temporal point of view. It is a subjective center of the flow of contents. Insofar as this flow is maintained by the continual addition of new contents, this center becomes the place of newness.

To speak of the subject as a temporal center, we must, of course, bring in the structure of the future. As a temporal center, the subject exists between the past and the future. It is not just the point of departure for the past, but also that toward which the future advances. Subjectively, the future is present through anticipation. Suppose, for example, I reach for a glass. As my arm moves toward it, the fingers of my hand extend to its anticipated shape. My arm extends to its anticipated distance. Grasping the glass, I apply just enough strength to lift its anticipated weight. Knowing how to do this involves having the correct anticipations. In the performance of this action, each anticipation is matched by a corresponding perception. When the match is perfect, the action proceeds effortlessly, the flow of perceptions being just what I anticipate. The dynamic structure of these anticipations can be given by a mirror image of the retentional chain. This, of course, is the "protentional" chain, which consists of anticipations of anticipations (Husserl's "protentions of protentions"). Suppose, for example, we anticipate the sequence, A, B, C, D, E. The anticipation of E's being presently given involves the prior anticipation of D, which involves the prior anticipation of C, and so on to the first element. Symbolically, this can be represented by [A[B[C[D[E]]]]], each pair of brackets designating an anticipational framing or modification. The approach of E to the present can, accordingly, be symbolized by the series [A[B[C[D[E]]]]], [B[C[D[E]]]], [C[D[E]]], [D[E]], [E], E. If A, B, C, D, and E are given in the anticipated order, then the subject's grasp of the future is confirmed.

Since the presently perceiving subject remains now, there is the same sort of exclusion I noted with regard to the retentional chain. Distinguished

from the past, the present subject is also distinguished from the future. The contents of the latter, as anticipated, appear at a temporal remove. As now, the subject is "before" their appearance. As it is also "after" the retained past, it achieves its position as a temporal center or midpoint. Since the environment for which it is a center is constantly shifting, this center cannot be thought of as a static geometric point. Still less can it be considered a "substance," i.e., an entity that somehow could be on its own. It is, rather, a structure set up by the processes of retention and anticipation. The subject that is now is a point of passage, i.e., the point through which time appears to stream and in which its content-laden moments appear to well up. As the "fixed form" of such welling up, the present subject is present only so long as the processes that set it up continue (Ms. C 2 1, p. 11a). In setting it up, these processes appear as its processes. Retention appears as its action, so does anticipation. This is because, situated at the now, the subject appears as their origin.

The Intentional Object

Husserl writes, "The ego is the 'subject' of consciousness. Subject, here, is only another word for the centering that all life has as egological life, and as such, a living to experience something, to be conscious of something."[14] In Husserl's analyses, such centering has two main requirements. The first is hardly ever mentioned. It is given by his assertion that "the factual is the course of consciousness."[15] The reference here is to the *hyletic data* or impressions the subject receives. For consciousness to have a surrounding world, these impressions must be such as to mani-

14. Ms. C III 3, p. 45b. Sometimes the "center" is called a "pole": "I exist-I live . . . 'I'—that means here, first of all, only the 'primal pole' of one's life, one's primal stream" (Ms. C 2 I, p. 4a). "The central ego is the necessary ego pole of all experience and of all noematic and ontic givenness which can be legitimated by experience" (Ms. M III 3, XI, p. 21). See also Husserl 1952, pp. 105, 109–10. For an extended account of Husserl's concept of the ego, see Mensch 1988, pp. 75–105 and Mensch 1997, pp. 61–78.

15. The extended quote here is: "The factual (*das Faktische*) is the course of consciousness. This holds for every case, whether or not this consciousness be sufficient for the constitution of an exact nature, i.e., our nature, and whether or not it be, as well, one that requires this. . . . It is also clear, however, that appearances and, in general, the formations of consciousness must proceed in a *determinate* manner in order for reason to be able to univocally designate a nature within them, i.e., indicate that *the* nature should be placed under them. Prior, then, to transcendental phenomenology, it is, therefore, a fact that the course of consciousness is so structured that within it a nature as a 'rational' unity can constitute itself" (Husserl 1956, p. 393). In other words, without this "fact," the constitution of nature cannot occur.

fest perspectivally arranged patterns. If they are not factually given with this character, their retention cannot manifest it. As Husserl remarks, the disruption of such patterns is the subject's disruption. It is its dissolution as a center of experience.[16] This does not mean that the mere occurring of impressional contents in a certain factual ordering is a sufficient condition for the presence of a subject. Besides this factual course, a certain *performance* is required. We must, first of all, have the retentional and protentional processing of these contents. This is what yields the temporal sequencing of the actually registered and the anticipated impressional material. With this, however, we do not yet have a surrounding world. We do not have objects exhibiting themselves in perspectival patterns. What we have are simply "impressional moments," that is, impressional contents occupying distinct temporal moments. How do we move from such contents to *intentional* objects? What sort of performance is involved?[17]

Once again, to understand the required performance, we have to understand the goal. What is an intentional object? Why does Husserl in the *Cartesian Meditations* equate its presence, its "being-in" consciousness, with the presence of a sense?[18] To understand his reasoning, we have to analyze what we do when we make sense of our experiences. Suppose, for example, I take my pencil and turn it continually in my hand. As I do so, the contents that I perceptually experience are retained. The pencil is a finite object and, thus, the contents that I do retain, as I continue to regard it, will recur. In the unity of coincidence

16. Husserl asks: "What could the ego [or subject] be that has no nature facing it, an ego for whom—if nature is not even given as something sensibly approximate and yet as a self-persisting illusion—there would, instead, be given a mere tumult of sensations?" (Ms. K IV 2, p. 14). Husserl's answer is that the ego cannot exist without its centering environment, since "a complete dissolution of the world in a 'tumult' [of sensations] is equivalent to the dissolution of the ego" (p. 10).

17. If we take Chalmers's "microscopic phenomenology" as referring to these impressional contents, the question here is the same that he raises regarding the move from microscopic to "macroscopic phenomenology." The problem is to "try to understand a way in which macroscopic phenomenology might be *constituted* by these microphenomenal properties. . . . We tend to think about this in terms of a physical analogy, based on the way in which microphysics adds up to macrophysics, but this may be the wrong way to think about it. Perhaps phenomenology is constituted in a different way entirely" (Chalmers 1996c, p. 307).

18. Describing the way the intentional object is "in" consciousness, Husserl writes: "This in-consciousness is a completely unique being-in. It is not a being-in as a real, inherent component; it is rather a being-in as something intentional . . . it is a being-in as the object's immanent *objective sense*" (Husserl 1963, p. 80).

in which all these contents are placed, the recurrent contents will reinforce one another and achieve the prominence of definite features. These features will themselves reoccur. Grasping the pencil, I grasp the pattern of this reoccurrence. In fact, when I look for a pencil in the shift of perspectives as I approach my desk, it is just such a pattern (or fragment thereof) that I am expecting. I see an elongated yellow object. The shift of perspectives reveals its hexagonal beveling. I pick it up and regard its reddish brown eraser.

This example indicates the elements required for making sense of our experiences. First of all, I have to take my experiences as referring to something, in this case, a pencil. The sense "pencil" embodies an interpretative intention. Intending to see a pencil, I place my experiences in a certain interpretative framework (Husserl 1984, p. 397). This means that I look for emerging patterns in the features I distinguish. A second element is the grasp of the appropriate pattern. Both elements involve my distinguishing the object from these features, even while I acknowledge its dependence on them. The object is not the same as the features, since, as Husserl observes, in the flow of experience, it "is continuously apprehended, but continuously presents itself differently; it is '*the same*' but is given with other predicates, with another determining content" (Husserl 1976, p. 301). This does not mean it can be present without such content or the pattern of its appearing. To recur to an example from the last chapter, what I take to be a cat crouching under a bush on a bright sunny day may turn out, on closer approach, to be simply a collection of flickering shadows. When the pattern is disrupted, the object is no longer present. Husserl, in attempting to satisfy both requirements, writes: "the object for us is a title for the essential connections of consciousness." These are the connections that allow the object as a "unitary X" to be posited.[19] This "X" is the object taken as distinct from such features. It is the object that shows itself as *the same* in the perceptual flow. Husserl's point is that we refer to this object through the connected features, even while distinguishing it from them. In an actual perceptual experience, a perceptual feature's reference to this object occurs through the consistent patterns that mark our experience of it.

A third required element can be introduced by recalling Husserl's remark that the individual contents of consciousness are not intentional. As the last chapter indicated, they achieve the character of being con-

19. Husserl 1976, p. 336. When the connections are rationally motivated, then the "unitary X receives its rational positing" and has the title "actual object."

tents "of" some object first through their merging with and consequent reinforcement by similar recurring contents that have been previously experienced. With this, they attain a reference to what I have previously experienced. This reference transcends their own momentary presence as impressions. It does so in referring beyond the present moment to a feature that endures. We can now say that this relation to the enduring object is a mediated one. It occurs through the patterned ordering of the features. As for the object itself, it is, phenomenologically speaking, simply a title for the connections (the patterned consistency) manifested by such features. An enduring object shows itself as the same, and hence, as distinct from the "determining content" that specifies it, by manifesting a repeating overall pattern of differing contents. We distinguish the object from its background in the visual field through the identification of this pattern.

The actual performances involved in recognizing a pattern need not concern us.[20] What is important is the principle underlying them. This is that the notion of a pattern is not a spatial, but rather a temporal concept. Ultimately, recognition concerns the temporal sequencing of our perceptions. We can put this in terms of the fact that in attempting to grasp an object, we place our perceptions in a given interpretative framework. This, as our last chapter stressed, always involves anticipation. When, for example, I interpret the shadows I perceive in the bushes as a cat, I anticipate that further perceptions will confirm this interpretation. If it is a cat, then a certain pattern of perceptions will unfold itself over time. Such anticipations are embodied in my protentions. The sequential patterns I anticipate are, in other words, embodied concretely in the perceptions I protend. The sequence of such protentions, thus, contains my interpretative intention, i.e., my intention to grasp a particular pattern. If my actual experience matches what I protend, this intention is fulfilled. As a result, the object, taken as a "title" for a particular set of perceptual connections, appears to me. This protentional intentionality is, of course, impossible without the retentional process. I anticipate on the basis of my retained experience. In Husserl's words, "The further an experience proceeds, the more it inherently offers for more differentiated protentions, 'the style of the past becomes projected into the future.' . . . The course of the retentional branches (or the present intentional content of the retentional branch) influences protention,

20. For an account, see Mensch 1991b, pp. 121–27.

determining its content, and prescribes its sense" (Ms. L I 15, p. 32b).

Several points can be taken from the above analysis. The first is that when Husserl equates the presence of the intentional object with a presence of a sense, he is taking sense as a one-in-many.[21] The ultimate referent of the "many" is the multiplicity of contents contained by our impressions. This multiplicity is carried over to their retentions and protentions and, from thence, to the features that arise from their merging. As for the unity, its actual presence is embodied in the recurring pattern that continues to manifest itself in the perceptual flow. Projected forward from the pattern manifested in our retained experience, it becomes an anticipated pattern. It embodies what we intend to see. This intention becomes fulfilled when fresh experience exhibits this pattern. It is at this point we say that we are in contact with one and the same object, an object that manifests itself in a certain "style" (a certain patterned consistency) of perceptual experience.

Given this, we cannot say, with McIntyre, that noematic senses "have an 'intrinsic,' as opposed to 'derived,' intentionality." Such a view takes intentionality as a nonanalyzable feature of sense. It assumes that it is irreducible to subjective performances. Husserl's view of the intentional object (the object that is present as a noematic sense) as a "title" for the connections of consciousness has the opposite implication. It implies that the intentional relation is inherent in the one-in-many structure of noematic sense. As such, it implies a performance, that of grasping the connections that unify a multiplicity of perceptual features. Concretely, this involves distinguishing the pattern of such connections.

The subjective conditions for this performance show why the objects we do grasp are inherently private. The nonsubjective, "material" condition for the performance is, as I noted, a matter of the hyletic data or impressions the subject receives. The factual contents of these impressions must be such that, in their merging, they manifest perspectivally

21. This position first appears in the *Logical Investigations*. Being a one-in-many is not just a feature of a species or a kind. The same universality, Husserl claims, is also found in the senses attributed to individuals (Husserl 1984, p. 564). The only difference is in what constitutes the "many." For a species, it is the individual objects falling under its notion; for an individual existent, the multiplicity that corresponds to the unity of its sense is composed of the perceptual experiences through which we grasp it (p. 565). When such experiences reveal an identical content, we grasp the object and its "fulfilling sense" (p. 56). This is why all "real unities" are "unities of sense" (Husserl 1976, p. 120). As he writes in the *Cartesian Meditations*, the intentional object is present to consciousness by virtue of "being-in" it "as the object's *objective sense*" (Husserl 1963, p. 80).

arranged patterns of features. The subjective conditions for this performance involve the retention and protention of these contents as well as their merging and consequent reinforcement. When these conditions yield the perspectival patterning of our perceptions, they result, not just in the presence of intentional objects, but also, correspondingly, in the presence of a subject as a spatial-temporal center. The result is that the subject's appearance as a "single point of view," i.e., as a first-person experiencer, is implicit in these objects' presence in their qualitative features. Their qualia refer to this single center since their presence results from the same conditions that yield this center's presence. Inherently, they are not public objects since the performances that underlie them imply not many, but only an individual point of view, that of the center. Such a center, it should be stressed, is not a Humean "bundle" of experiences. For its presence, our experiences must exhibit a patterned, systematic structure, one that gives the centering of experience. The center, itself, is their internal reference point. It can be compared to the "I" of the Kantian "I think." In Kant's formulation, such an "I" must accompany all our representations, all the performances by which we grasp the objects of the world. Here, the performances refer to the action of grasping patterns. The "I" designates the central point of reference that is the inevitable correlate of the success of these performances. As such, the center appropriates the action that helps set it up. In its constant nowness, it appears as the origin of the processes that identify objects.

Recursion and Self-Consciousness

According to the above argument, the nonpublic nature of qualia stems from the fact that their presence refers to the subject as a center. As for the subject, its nonpublic nature comes from the fact that the processes that set it up as an experiencing subject are inherently self-referential. This point can be put in terms of retention. In retention, the subject does not just have experience of the retained, it experiences itself having this experience, i.e., as retaining the retained. Accordingly, when it grasps an object through a series of retained contents, it prereflectively grasps itself in its action of retention. This grasp is a grasp of itself as having experience, i.e., of itself as a subject. Such self-experience implies that the self-referential character of retention grounds the subject as nonpublic, i.e., as referring (or being present) only to itself. The same character also gives it a primitive self-presence. The result, then, is that the

experiencing subject always has two items of knowledge; he knows what he sees—e.g., a particular quale—and he knows "that he himself is seeing it" (Jackson 1982, p. 132). This second item, as I said, arises from the fact that the action of having experience works on itself.

As noted earlier, an objective phenomenology must be structural. It must give an account in terms that transcend the first-person quality of experience. This demand does not mean that experiences can be directly shared. It concerns only the structures of first-person experience. As such, it can be met by translating the structures of retention into an algorithm that would be intelligible to all who possess a knowledge of the symbolic means employed in its formulation. The type of algorithm required stems from the type of process to be modeled. Retention is a self-referential process. It proceeds through a constant iteration of the same action. An ideal way to model this process is through a recursive algorithm. Recursive algorithms accomplish their tasks by feedback loops, i.e., by handing on to themselves the results of their action. The data they process are the very data that resulted from their previous operation. The same structure is present in the retentional process where what is handed on to be retentionally modified is *itself* a retentional modification. Retaining a retention, we modify retentionally the results of the retentional modification function. In this way, as the process continues, the retention becomes a retained retention and this a retained retention, and so on.

To write the algorithm for this process we require a language with the resources to express recursive functions. In the following example, I shall employ common LISP. As before, I shall use parentheses to express retention. Thus, in the series, i, (i), ((i)), . . . each later member will be taken as a retention of the earlier. To express the self-reference and, hence, the self-consciousness occasioned by retention, I define the following elementary computational algorithm:

```
(Defun Retention (X Impression)
    (cond ((= X 0) Impression)
        (T (Retention (- X 1) (list Impression)))).
```

"Defun" means simply define the function. "Retention" is the name of the function. Its variables are "X" and "Impression." "X" stands for the number of retentions the impression is to undergo. "Impression" stands for the impression to be retained. The second line states a condition for the computation. If X is equal to 0, i.e., if the number of retentions

required is zero, the function returns the impression and the computation ceases. Otherwise, it proceeds to the third line. The "T" tells it to perform the computation that follows to the right of it. First, 1 is subtracted from X—i.e., the number of required retentions is reduced by one through the instruction "(- X 1)." Then, the impression to be retained is surrounded by parentheses through the instruction "(list Impression)." Finally, the original function is called again through the instruction "(Retention (- X 1) (list Impression)))." The variables of this function, however, *have been transformed through the first two operations just specified.* For example, if "X" was originally given the value 3, the first operation reduces it to 2. If "Impression" was given the value i, the second operation gives it the value (i). Thus, the call to the original function, "Retention," is a call for it to carry out its computation on a set of values arrived at through the results of its previous computation. This iterative process continues with 2 being reduced to 1 and then to 0, and (i) being transformed to ((i)) and then to (((i))). When X is 0, then the second line tells it to stop and return the value that "Impression" now has—that is, (((i))). Thus, (Retention 3 'i) yields (((i))). This signifies that "i," the impression, has sunk back to a retention of a retention of a retention of "i."[22]

The above algorithm is quite elementary. Its purpose is simply to give an example of what is entailed by an objective phenomenological description of retention. To apply it to an actual case of machine processing, Chalmers's principle of implementation would have to be

22. A similar function can be written to express the self-awareness occasioned by retaining a phrase containing the successively given contents, A B C D E. The function includes the above, that is, involves a call to it. Its arguments are: "phrase"—e.g., A B C D E—a given "initial element"—e.g., A—and "X," which signifies the number of retentions. The function is:

```
(defun phrase-retention (phrase initial-element X)
    (cond ((equal nil (cdr phrase)) (Retention (- X 1) initial-element))
(T ( phrase-retention (cdr phrase) (cons (cadr phrase) (list initial-element)) (- X 1))))).
```

Here, (phrase-retention '(A B C D E) '(A) 10) yields ((((((E (D (C (B (A)))))))))). Of the ten retentions, five are used to retain the phrase and result in (E(D(C(B(A))))). Five more occasion the sinking down of the phrase as five further degrees of pastness. Self-awareness is inherent in this processing insofar as this algorithm is also recursive. The third line of the algorithm calls up the initial function "phrase-retention," which means that the function processes the results of its previous operation. Within this reprocessing there is also a call to the function "Retention," given in our text, which also reprocesses the results of its previous operation.

followed. There would have to be "a one-to-one mapping from formal states of the computation to physical state types" (Chalmers 1996b, p. 3). Such mapping is an embodiment. This follows because what is mapped is a part of the process of temporalization, the very process which, in the context of consciousness, embodies or makes sensuously present the objects of the world. The next section will draw out the theoretical implications of this principle. In a practical sense, the implication is that the machine, using recursive algorithms, will have to tag temporally the data it receives from its traducers.[23] Similarly, the temporal relations signified by this tagging would have to be respected in its processing of data—particularly in the operations by which it identifies the repeating patterns that allow it to distinguish objects from their backgrounds. If we remain with the symbolism of the parentheses and brackets, this entails giving them a special operational value. For all the processing operations of synthesis, the machine should proceed through the parentheses or brackets, going from the outer to the inner. Thus, in anticipating the sequence of a pattern, say that of A B C D E, it would operate according to the symbolism, [A[B[C[D[E]]]]], its physical state types being such that A would be examined to see whether it is received before B, B examined to see if it is received before C, and so on.[24] This physical imple-

23. Strictly speaking all such data are present. This holds not just for the machine, but also for ourselves. As Augustine remarks, subjectively, "there are three times, a present of past things, a present of present things, a present of future things" (Augustine 1964, p. 269). Retention gives us the first, perception (our present, momentary experience) gives the second, and anticipation gives the third. The tagging of data represents the structure of the performances of retention and protention.

24. The use of recursive algorithms here avoids a difficulty raised by Van Gelder. Noting that "time consciousness unfolds in the very same time frame as the temporal object itself," he asserts that computational models of pattern recognition are incapable of replicating this (Van Gelder 1996. §28). The reason is that in computational systems the incoming "pattern is first encoded symbolically and stored in a buffer. Only when the entire pattern has been stored in the buffer do the recognition algorithms go to work; and it is only when those algorithms have done their work that the system could be said to have any kind of awareness of the pattern as such" (§29). If this were the case, then a computation could never replicate the process where we grasp, say, a melody *as it unfolds.* A computational system would have to wait till the end of the melody to grasp it as a melody. This difficulty, however, is more apparent than real. What is required to avoid it is a symbolic encoding of the incoming pattern that includes its temporal unfolding. This, however, is precisely what the symbolism of the parentheses in our algorithms represents. As the pattern, for example, A, B, C is supplied, the machine encodes it as A, (A)B, ((A)B)C, each pair of parentheses symbolizing a retention. The process by which it encodes a retentional chain need not be unduly extended. Human retentional awareness is not indefinitely extended. Normally, we retain only a few phrases of the melody before these are converted to a different, longer term memory. As for pattern recognition, the brain also seems to

mentation, involving as it does a series of physical state types in the machine's functioning, would insure that the processing would not be a mere simulation. It would, rather, embody in the environment of the machine, an environment involving real physical processes, the dynamic structures that found our actual grasp of qualia.[25]

Qualia Qualified

I said earlier that a successful account of qualia must explain those features that make them problematic. Specifically, it must explain (1) why they are not public objects and (2) why we cannot imagine any physical relation between qualia and physical objects. As part of the second requirement, we must explain why qualia, apparently, cannot exercise any physical causality. The first of these explanations has already been given. Qualia are not public objects because their presence is always to a single point of view. Thus, they always appear as features of a surrounding world. As such, their presence is to its center. The same point can be made by noting that the contents that embody qualia are present through retention. The process of retention is a recursive one. Because recursive processes always refer back to themselves, their results lack any public (nonself-referential) quality. Thus, the experiential contents that are present through a retention continue to be present through a process referring to this retention, specifically, through the retention of this retention. Their presence, rather than being public, is a presence to the process that makes them present. Given that this *process* of making contents present *is experiencing*, it follows that experiencing is both self-present and private. Experiencing, I also experience the fact that I experience, since this fact is inherent in the retentional process. Inherent as well is the fact that I cannot directly share what I experience. I can only

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have a buffer. It scans its data every few seconds. There is no need to repeat this human interval. We can, for example, choose a single second interval for the machine. With the right encoding algorithms, the ongoing advances in the speed and complexity of computation should lead to systems that exceed our ability to recognize patterns.

25. This point has reference to Searle's Chinese room argument. As Chalmers writes: "this argument equivocates between programs and implementations of those programs. While programs themselves are syntactic objects, implementations are not: they are real physical systems with complex causal organization, with real physical causation going on inside. In an electronic computer, for instance, circuits and voltages push each other around in a manner analogous to that in which neurons and activations push each other around. It is precisely in virtue of this causation that implementations may have cognitive and therefore semantic properties" (Chalmers 1996b, p. 13).

report it verbally and compare my report with another's. Only through language does first-person experience achieve any publicly available quality. This quality arises through language's physical presence as spoken and written as well as through its possessing, through convention, a more or less common set of referents for its expressions. As for the experience itself—i.e., the experience taken as what is expressed by statements of the form, "I see x"—its presence always refers back to me as a center. Its referent is the "single point of view" set up by the retention of perspectivally arranged series of contents. To require that this experience be publicly available would be as contradictory as asking that the same perspectival series yield multiple points of view.

What about the fact that qualia seem to lack any connection to physical objects? The answer to the question involves three interrelated parts. The first consists of an analysis of our subjective *experience* of qualia. We must show why our experience prevents us from imagining this connection. The second involves turning to the retentional processes underlying our experience. Here, we must show how they account for our inability, on the experiential level, to make this connection. The final part concerns the ontological status of qualia as both experienced and as actual physical items undergoing processing. As experienced, they do not seem to their possessors to be public, physical events. Yet qualia must include a public element if, as I indicated, they can be implemented through recursive algorithms; namely, those that follow the structures of our retentional processing. How, then, can they be experientially private and yet be implemented through a physical process? What is their reality as experienced and as implemented?

On a subjective level, it is easy to see why qualia lack the qualities that would allow us to connect them to physical objects. Taken as individual experiences, they are not yet three-dimensional, physical objects. Thus, it makes no sense to ask how large my experience is of an object placed before me. The object, *qua* experienced, fills up a certain portion of my visual field. But this will change as I move away or towards it. Moving around it, my experiences of it change: I have a succession of views, none of which, as an experience, qualifies as having a definite size. Being a definite size is not something pertaining to individual experiences but rather to the public object *of which* I am having an experience. Its size is given through the ordering of my experiences, for example, through their progressively filling up more or less of my visual field as I move about an object. As for an individual experience, I cannot move

about *it.* I cannot take one view of an object and perceive *this view* from another side. The view is a member of a patterned series—the series that presents the object. The view is not, itself, this series.[26] Given that a physical object presents itself through a series of experiences, we cannot then expect that a member of this series will, itself, appear as a physical object. Physical connections, however, can be imagined only between physical objects. Since the individual experience does not present itself as physical, it thus will always lack the features that would allow us to imagine its relation to the physical.

To explain this inability in objective phenomenological terms, we need to turn to the retentional processes underlying it. This is because a view with its impressional contents becomes a quale with all its distinctive features *as it is retained.* Retained, it enters into the retentional process, becoming a retention of this retention, and so on. Each successive retention *does not change its contents.* It only modifies or tags it with a further degree of pastness. If it did not, it would not fulfill its function which is simply to retain or hold fast the momentary impressional experience. Given this, a retained experience *cannot show itself differently.* In other words, its entering unchanged into pastness through the retentional process is what prevents it from having the presence of a physical thing. The thing, in its objective presence, shows itself through a changing, perspectivally ordered series of contents. The contents change as we view it first from one side and then another, lift it, measure it, and so on. As we do so, these changing contents enter successively the retentional process. It is because they do that our impressions of the physical object do not vanish immediately after their apprehension, but rather permit the grasp of it as something temporally extended, something that we come to take as possessing physical, causal properties. Since this object is present through our retentions, it is a category mistake to equate it with the retained experiences—the qualia—that compose our experience of it. The qualia, in their *unchanging presence,* present what *does change,* that is, the physical object, which does present itself through a changing pattern of qualia. It is this distinction between what changes and what does not that makes qualia seem to their possessors so different from public, physical objects.

Because they do not have the features that would allow them to be three dimensional physical entities, qualia have been taken as epiphe-

26. It is not because, as Husserl writes, "An experience does not show itself perspectivally" (Husserl 1976, p. 88).

nomenal, i.e., incapable of exercising any physical causality. But if they were genuinely epiphenomenal, we would, as Dennett points out, be incapable of verifying their existence. They could not even occasion a verbal report by us, since this would imply some causal action on their part.[27] In fact, they do play a role in the processing that allows the grasp of things. Here, qualia have a dual status. On the one hand, their lack of qualitative change gives them the status of information. They are data to be processed. On the other hand, since processing is a physical event, the impressions that lie at their basis also play a causal role. In a machine, they are involved in the real physical causation by which the machine implements its program. Within the context of such implementation, they are public, physical events. In an electronic computer, their reality is that of the "circuits and voltages" that "push each other around" (Chalmers 1996b, p. 13). Now, it is precisely by virtue of this causation that qualia seem to their possessors to manifest a presence that is nonpublic and nonphysical. The key is the type of computational structure that the causal system implements. When the structure is recursive, that is, when the system synthesizes its impressions in the temporal sequences specified by the account of retention, qualia should achieve a "private" presence, that is, a presence correlated to a single point of view.

What then is the ontological status of qualia implicit in the above explanation? To answer this question, I must first define some elementary terms from information theory.[28] The first term is an "information state." The state represents a choice of possibilities—for example, 0, selected from the possibilities 1, 0. An "information space" consists of the range of available possibilities (for example 0 and 1) as well as the structure of the difference between them. When the structure is well defined, each of the possibilities represents an item of information. "Information" thus involves the selection of an information state. When implemented in a physical system, it also involves a causal pathway. The transmission of information occurs when the choice of a state causes a corresponding change at the end of this pathway. Thus, in terms of the transmission of information, a light switch has two information states, up

27. As Dennett puts this argument, if qualia have no causal effect on the world, they have none on us insofar as we are part of the world. But then, how could they be empirically known or reported on. In Dennett's words, Given that "x has no physical effects," . . . [h]ow then could there be any empirical reason to assert the presence of x?" (Dennett 1991, p. 402).

28. The theory stems from C.E. Shannon (Shannon 1948). I here follow Chalmers's simplified version (See Chalmers 1996c, pp. 278–83).

and down. Corresponding to these states, the light bulb shines or does not shine. All other positions of a toggle switch leave the light unaffected.

The application of this theory to the question of the ontological status of qualia may not at first seem very promising, since the physical transmission of information begins and ends with a public, physical change. Thus, we may admit, with Husserl, that consciousness is nothing without impressions. We may then see such impressions as embodying, in their differences, distinct information states. Impinging on our senses, the various causal pathways of our nervous system transmit the information they embody to the brain, the result being a corresponding set of differences in its structure. The difficulty, here, is that such differences, insofar as they are physical, are public. This is what we should expect from the example of the light switch. The switch has two distinct spatial positions. Thus, the structure of the difference determining the information state it embodies is spatial. The same holds for the different states caused by moving the switch. When the light bulb is on, it is surrounded by light, i.e., by an electromagnetic field. When the light bulb is off, the field is no longer present. Again the difference is spatial. But spatial relations, involving relative positions, do not capture the distinct quality of our conscious experience. Our experience of the switch is that *first* it was down and *then* it was up. Similarly, our experience of the light bulb is that first it was off and then it was on. This experience is a grasp of the "first this then that" relation. This relation is temporal. To embody the information it contains, we thus need a system of *temporal differences.* This involves conceiving information states and spaces in a temporal fashion.

The difficulty I am raising can be put in terms of the fact that in the physical universe, it is always now. The physical world does not remember. Considered as a set of copresent relationships, it is innocent of any grasp of the past *as past.* Thus, what happened in the past is present *now,* not as something past, but only as the present physical effect of past events. My flipping the switch, for example, results in a new spatial position of the switch. In turning on the light, the result is a new set of spatial relations, all of which are simultaneous and copresent. The same point holds with regard to the compact disk I put into my CD player. All the pits and lands on the disc that encode the notes of the music are copresent. Listening to the player, I hear the melody. I grasp it as it unfolds over time. Considered as a physical object, however, my stereo system has no such experience. The physical embodiment of data on the disk causes corresponding physical differences in the player, the amplifier, and the

speakers. Yet, the present momentary state of the speakers does not remember the past. It is only an effect of what occurred. Of course, I can picture to myself the successive positions of the vibrating sides of the speaker cones. I can trace this back to the successive movement of the laser as it reads first one information state and then another from the pits and lands on the compact disk. The difficulty, however, is that I am using my conscious experience to reconstruct this succession. I am interpreting the world in terms of my own grasp of the "first this then that" relation. Yet, in the physical world, the temporally "first" no longer exists at the moment of the "then." As past, it is gone. What remains are simply its present effects.

How, then, can qualia have a physical *and* an experiential reality? What is their status as embodying a system of both spatial and temporal differences? An initial answer to this question is that, in both cases, they are information states. Considered as physical data embodied in our impressions, qualia are spatial information states. They are temporal information states when considered as conscious data. Now, if we leave out the fact of retention, this answer would leave us with an unmediated dualism. We would be asserting, with Chalmers, that "information (in the actual world) has two aspects, a physical and a phenomenal aspect" (Chalmers 1996c, p. 286). We would, with Chalmers, claim that in principle, "the same information state [is] realized both physically and phenomenally." The two realizations are, in fact, "isomorphic" (p. 285). The difficulty with this dualistic view is that it implies that to every physical realization of an information state there is a corresponding isomorphic phenomenal state. At this point, as Chalmers concedes, even thermostats can be conceived as having experiences.[29] Having experiences is, in this view, not connected to memory, self-consciousness, or intelligence (p. 295). It is simply a function of Chalmers's "dual property" or "double aspect" theory. According to its principle, every information state has two realizations, a physical and an experiential one.

To prevent this inflation of the concept of experience (and, hence, of qualia), retention must be seen as a necessary condition for their presence. In other words, the retentional process itself has to be seen as pro-

29. In Chalmers's words, "Considered as an information-processing device, a thermostat has just three information states (one state leads to cooling, another to heating, and another to no action. So the claim is that to each of these information states, there corresponds a phenomenal state" (Chalmers 1996c, p. 293). "Perhaps we can think of these states by analogy to our experiences of black, white, and gray: a thermostat can have an all-black phenomenal field, an all-white field, or an all-gray field" (p. 294).

viding the "explanatory bridge" between the physical structures of processing and qualia. It does this by transforming spatial information states and spaces into corresponding temporal ones. Retention's ability to preserve temporal order means that a series of spatial differences—those, for example, embodied in the pits and lands on a CD disk—are preserved unchanged in a temporal system of differences. They are maintained in the "first this then that" structure of conscious experience. Insofar as this experience involves retention and, hence, the centering of experience, this preservation makes qualia nonpublic.

One way to think about this nonpublic character is to note the crucial difference between third- and first-person experience. Third-person experience regards the physical world. It is characterized as third-person insofar as this world is one which "they" (the grammatical third-person) and "I" observe in common. When we regard this common world directly, we observe what is present. This is because the presently visible world preserves the past only in terms of its present effects. To regard a past state of the world, we have to turn inward, i.e., away from what is common. We have to consult what we privately retain and remember. It is through this that we grasp the past as past. Such a grasp is necessarily a matter of *our first-person experience.* I have no access to other persons' retentions or memories, nor they to mine. Were we to mutually regard the physical state of our brains, we would grasp only the present effects of the past, effects that would manifest themselves in our brains' electrochemical states. These states would be present, not past. Our access to pastness, however, is what makes conscious life conscious. The retentional processes underlying it make it a field of self-present, first-person experiences. Because we do have access to these first-person experiences, we do not, in fact, apprehend the world in the momentary copresence of its features. Our experience embodies a temporal system of differences, a system that makes its past available to us. The retentional basis for this experience is what allows qualia to be present.

Given this, we have to modify our initial assertion. The ontological status of qualia is not simply that of an ontologically neutral information state. Qualia are physical impressions undergoing retentional processing. Thus, when I respond to the qualia I experience—for example, when I produce a verbal report on them—my reaction is not to a disembodied information state. My response is, rather, to my retained impressions. The response involves a physical component, since it cannot occur without their physical presence. Yet, the response is not to this

presence in its spatial character—i.e., in its expressing a spatial set of differences. (Such a response would leave me on the level of the light that turns on and off in reaction to the position of the switch.) It is, rather, a response to the impressions as grasped temporally—the impressions as expressing a temporal set of differences. This expression is what *embodies or makes sensuously present* the objects of the world. The retentional processing that makes this embodiment possible is tied to the external world. Yet, the nature of this processing is such that the report I give on it necessarily has a "first-person" character.

This first-person character determines the way language functions. Because of it, whenever I report on what I experience, my words refer to a nonpublic event, one that my auditor cannot experience. For the person listening to me, my words are signs functioning in the absence of their referents. They are physical signs that re-present the experiences I am reporting on by standing for them. As such, they function indicatively. For Derrida, this functioning characterizes language as such. His claim is: "The subject cannot speak without giving himself a representation of his speaking" (Derrida 1973a, p. 57). This implies that speaking requires an absence, a nonpresence that permits the indicative sign to stand in the place of what it indicates. Thus, Derrida asserts, "The absence of intuition—and therefore of the subject of the intuition—is not only *tolerated* by speech; it is required by the general structure of signification" (p. 93). For Husserl, however, speech must be anchored in intuition. The ultimate ground of its functioning is our ability to embody or make sensuously present the world we report on. To deny this ability is to deny consciousness. It is to embrace a position that affirms "we are all zombies. Nobody is conscious" (Dennett 1991, p. 406). The questions that have occupied us in this chapter—those concerning presence and consciousness—thus reoccur when we ask how language functions. In considering Husserl's and Derrida's contrasting theories of language, our task will be to answer them in the context of such questions. This will involve, first of all, a consideration of the boundaries that define language in its functioning.

VI

Language

Discussions on language are distinguished by a lack of clear boundaries. This is because language claims to represent the world. We take its signs as referring to items in the world. How do they accomplish this reference? To answer this question, it seems that we cannot limit our inquiry to the signs themselves. The question of how they achieve this reference merges with the question of how we come in contact with the world. How do we grasp the objects referred to by linguistic signs? What is the role of language in this grasp? Are linguistic signs shaped by the world, drawing their meanings from its different objects, or do such signs shape these meanings? Are we to take language as an openness to what is beyond itself—that is, the world? An alternate view is that we are sealed within language. We cannot escape its determination of meaning.

These issues cannot be decided without examining our apprehension of the world, which then raises a fresh set of questions. How do we intuit its objects? How is it possible for intuition to *independently* confirm our assertions? If we conceive of language as determining intuition, such inquiries are, of course, fruitless. Sealed off from the presence of what is beyond itself, language can only be thought of as a self-defining, self-referential system of signs. If this is the case, the focus on intuitive presence can only lead us astray. It prevents us from confronting the real task, which is that of examining language in terms of itself, i.e., in terms of how *it* determines the meanings of its signs. Once again, the question of language expands. At issue, here, is what we mean by presence. The

position that appeals to intuition understands presence as ultimately determinative. It takes the presence of the world—in particular, the presence of meanings embodied in objects—as responsible for the meanings words have. This is why a word can refer, through its meaning, to an object. In the opposing position, the notion that presence is ultimately determinative is a "metaphysical prejudice." According to Derrida, to escape this prejudice, we must "deconstruct" it. We must focus on "the tensions, the contradictions, the heterogeneity" within its concept.[1] Once we have abandoned this prejudice, we can see the system of linguistic signs for what it is. It is a self-defining system of signs referring to signs. The ability of a sign to refer does not point to some nonlinguistic, confirming presence. It is inherent in the sign itself. Were we to eliminate the notion of a confirming presence, we would see that the reference of a sign terminates in another sign, one that passes on this reference to yet another sign, and so on indefinitely.

With this, we come to yet another expansion of the question. Having extended our inquiry to include the question of presence, we find ourselves confronted by its temporal sense. Thus, the "present" of presence signifies nowness. The movement of time makes things present by making them now. What is the relation of this "making present" to the world? Is the movement of time to be traced ultimately to that of the world? In such a view, we take the successive nows that constitute time's movement as a function of the world. Their origin is the successive impressions we receive from its objects. We thus come to affirm that nowness is the world's presence to us in the impressions it leaves. Augustine gives the classic expression of this position when he writes: "It is in you, O my mind, that I measure time. . . . What I measure is the impress produced in you by the things as they pass and [the impressions] abiding in you when they have passed."[2] The impress is registered as the present now. We register the abiding impression left in the mind as the remembered now. If, however, we break the tie between presence and the world, we have to say that the impress is the result of our own activity. The impression that results in the now comes, in other words, not from the world, but from ourselves. It is a result of our affecting ourselves. In Derrida's phrase, its origin is "the autoaffection" of consciousness.

1. For Derrida, this focus defines deconstruction. See Caputo 1997, p. 9.

2. Augustine 1993, p. 25. It is interesting to note that for Augustine, the world does not just determine presence and, hence, time; it also determines the meanings of words. See *Confessions*, Bk. I, chap. 8.

Affection, by definition, implies otherness. It implies a distinction between the affecting and the affected. With this, the question turns on the origin of this otherness. Is the origin of presence and, hence, of time to be located in the fact that the world is other than the self and, as such, affects the self? Or should we, rather, say that such otherness is inherent in the self? The second implies that we are never immediately self-present. Our supposed self-presence depends on a prior otherness. Thus, even in the apparently privileged sphere of self-presence, an irreducible otherness or absence must be assumed. Since consciousness involves the self-awareness that demands self-presence, the question of language expands once again. In answering it, we must inquire into the nature of consciousness.

The Question of a Phenomenology of Language

In tracing out the increasing compass of the question of language, I have followed the course of inquiry Derrida takes in his *Speech and Phenomena.* The overriding issue in this work is the possibility of a phenomenology of language. Does phenomenology, as Husserl conceived it, have the resources to investigate the functioning of language? Husserl's investigation focuses on the role of intuition. In its main lines, his position is that of the first of the opposing views sketched out above. Derrida's position is given by the second. In his view, Husserl's effort is undermined by a "metaphysics of presence." Once we abandon this metaphysics, we realize that "[t]he absence of intuition—and therefore of the subject of the intuition—is not only *tolerated* by speech; it is required by the general structure of signification, when considered *in itself.*"[3] According to Derrida, this structure is that of indication. Indicative signs stand for their referents. Substituting for them, they require their absence. Thus, when I hear another person speaking, I take his spoken words as signs indicating the presence of the person's mental acts. Such acts are not present to me. If I could see them, if I could somehow enter the other's head and observe his mental functioning, such signs would be useless to me. Husserl, while acknowledging this indicative function, asserts that these signs also have an expressive function. The words spoken by another person have *inherent senses.* Since these senses are drawn from the world, they are capable of being confirmed intuitively by turning to the world. Intuitive confirmation allows us to distinguish between a sign's

3. Derrida 1973a, p. 93. The term "metaphysics of presence" occurs on p. 51.

expressive and indicative functions. Arguing against the possibility of this distinction, Derrida attempts to undermine the very notion of intuitive confirmation. In his view, the possibility of language rests on our avoiding any metaphysics of presence and this requires our being "in principle excluded from ever 'cashing in the draft made on intuition' in expressions" (Derrida 1973a, p. 92). As an alternative, Derrida advances a model of signs standing for signs, one where indication (or "re-presentation") replaces Husserl's notion of intuition providing the evidence for our assertions.

To follow the course of the debate between Husserl and Derrida, we will have to consider each of the issues raised above. The question of the functioning of language, i.e., of its indicative and expressive functions, will lead us to examine if intuition can be taken as confirming our expressions. The arguments on this point will be seen to turn on the nature of presence—in particular, on the nature of its temporal origin. Thus, we shall find ourselves examining Derrida's and Husserl's explanations of time. This will lead us to consider their respective positions on the autoaffection of consciousness and the role it plays in our self-presence.

The linking thread in all these inquiries will be the requirement of language for both presence and absence. Language must be able to refer in the absence of its referent. Otherwise communicative speech, the speech where I take another person's words as indicating his thoughts, would not be possible. It also, however, demands presence. If it did not, I could never confirm what a person says by regarding the objects he is talking about. Moreover, if my own thoughts were never present to me, I would have no motive for taking a person's words as indicating the presence of such thoughts in him.

As we shall see, these necessities motivate Husserl to adopt positions that Derrida claims are impossible within his understanding of Husserl's "metaphysics of presence." In fact, once we leave the compass of Husserl's *Logical Investigations,* we shall find him developing an account of language where indication and intuition, rather than standing opposed, work together in our grasp of the world.[4] To show this, I shall

4. One of the surprising elements in Derrida's analysis is its ignoring the changes that occur in Husserl's later work. As Mulligan observes, "He seems to be tempted not at all by the hypothesis that there is a 'rupture,' a 'break,' a 'difference' between the earlier and the later Husserl" (Mulligan 1991, p. 199). Seebohm notes that the later work is not even cited when Derrida comes to speak on Husserl's lectures on time consciousness. In Seebohm's words, "The citations in *Speech and Phenomena* show that the material used by

focus on those items in Husserl's phenomenology that Derrida sees as undercutting his analysis of language. My claim is that phenomenology has unexpected resources, resources that allow us to move towards a phenomenology of language that satisfies its requirements for *both* presence and absence. In establishing this, I shall alternate between Husserl's and Derrida's positions, examining where they agree and where they do not. The goal of what follows is not to criticize Derrida's reading of Husserl.[5] It is to use his account to exhibit, from a Husserlian perspective, the possibility of a phenomenology of language.

Reading *Speech and Phenomena*

There is a certain assumption implicit in my last remarks. It is that Derrida's account can be read as phenomenologically based. Derrida's *Speech and Phenomena* is more than a commentary on Husserl's text. When Derrida points out "the tensions, the contradictions, the heterogeneity" he claims to find in Husserl, his goal is not simply the deconstruction of Husserl's text, his focus is, rather, on language itself.[6] In its recourse to the concrete phenomena of language, in its attention to the actual elements required by linguistic functioning, Derrida's account can be considered as guided by the "*Sachen selbst.*" As such, it can be taken as phenomenological; thus the elements he uncovers can be used as "transcendental clues," that is, as aids for constructing a phenomenology of language.

The special character of this use of Derrida can best be seen by contrasting it with the way *Speech and Phenomena* is usually read. Rudolph Bernet has noted two common types of readings. The first approach "takes this text as a mere illustration of what one calls 'the thought' of Derrida." Its interest is not in Husserl, but in this thought, specifically,

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Derrida for the explication of Husserl's *Phenomenology of Inner Time Consciousness* is restricted to *Ideas I* and material which—though published later—was written before *Ideas I*. Especially the research of the 1920's, in which Husserl develops his new conception of a transcendental aesthetic, and, in this connection, the concepts of association and kinesthesis, is not considered by Derrida" (Seebohm 1995, p. 189). This holds, in particular, for "the *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis.*" It also holds for "the C manuscripts, which have certain relations to his theses about Husserl" (p. 190). Both of these works will be used here to develop our Husserlian account of language.

5. The best such critical account is still Evans 1991.

6. One indication of this is the fact that when the same points are made in his *Grammatology*, their target is not Husserl, but rather Plato, Hegel, and Rousseau.

in the evolution of Derrida's attack on the metaphysics of presence.[7] The second type reverses this bias. Its judgment of Derrida is based on whether "his listening to the voice of Husserl has been faithful or not." Derrida is understood as providing a commentary on the first chapter of the first of the *Logical Investigations.* At issue is his faithfulness to Husserl's intentions. The weakness of this approach, as Bernet writes, is that it "gives very little importance to Derrida's concerns such as they are seen in his other texts" (Bernet 1995, p. 2). While the first type of reading is often positive,[8] the reactions of the second range from coolness to outright hostility. Natalie Alexander, for example, sees Derrida as providing a "hollow deconstruction," one that loses credibility by the way in which it dissimulates Husserl's texts (Alexander 1995, p. 149). Claude Evans's (1991) careful and patient reading of *Speech and Phenomena* presents us with a whole catalogue of such dissimulations. To these, Burt Hopkins has added the thought that Derrida misreads the crucial role reflection plays in Husserl's descriptions of the temporal process (Hopkins 1996, p. 74). Other Husserlians have pointed out further misreadings.[9]

I shall not attempt to add to this critical effort. The fact that I shall not engage in the second type of reading does not, however, imply an acceptance of Derrida's positions. In particular, my reading of *Speech and*

7. In Bernet's words, "*Speech and Phenomena* is presented as the first milestone in the evolution of an autonomous thought which has used the philosophy of Husserl only to better adjust its aim on the whole metaphysical tradition which is guilty of the same attachment to presence" (Bernet 1995, p. 2).

8. See for example, Caputo 1987.

9. For Kevin Mulligan the misreading involves the relation between species and instance (Mulligan 1991, p. 205). For Steven Crowell, it involves Derrida's insistence that the "punctual now . . . alone may count as presence and fullness." Crowell writes in this regard, "it is Derrida, not Husserl, who holds to a [pre-Heideggerian] 'metaphysical' concept of time" (Crowell 1996, p. 64). Even Bernard Waldenfels's more generally sympathetic account of Derrida's reading of Husserl still focuses on its errors. For Waldenfels, these include Derrida's assumption of the "pure immanence" of the voice. He writes, "The voice comes from somewhere. Besides its personal character the voice has a 'spatial quality of origin'" (Waldenfels 1993, p. 70). Rudolph Bernet, in his reading of *Speech and Phenomena,* attempts "to avoid the pitfall of treating this text on the basis of prejudices that this same text wants precisely to shake off (Bernet 1995, p. 3). This, however, does not prevent him from giving his own list of Derrida's misreadings of Husserl's work (see pp. 9, 13, 19–20). Among Husserlians, Thomas Seebohm seems to be the most sympathetic to Derrida's overall project. He acknowledges Derrida's scholarship, but then qualifies this immediately. He writes, "There can be no doubt that Derrida's interpretation of Husserl's personal attitudes and ontological biases can be provided with sufficient textual evidence. It can be shown, however, that some of Husserl's descriptions lead far beyond the results for which Derrida is willing to give him credit" (Seebohm 1995, p. 189).

Phenomena will not assume his conclusion that "no means exists . . . to assure us that an interpretation coincides with the meaning of the author" (Bernet 1995, p. 16). To accept this is, as Bernet indicates, to assume in advance the correctness of Derrida's deconstruction of Husserl's distinction between expression and indication.[10] In its refusal of all such assumptions, the approach of this chapter will remain phenomenological. It will direct itself to the "matters themselves," namely, those involved in the functioning of language. Only a phenomenological investigation of such matters can decide this issue. The same holds for the nature of the absence required for linguistic functioning. In this regard, my approach comes closest to that suggested by Seebohm's when he writes that "the givenness of radical absence in several dimensions, which have to be investigated in phenomenology, is constitutive for the givenness of the present in principle."[11] In what follows, this givenness will be the subject of an ongoing phenomenological investigation. In focusing on the role absence plays in constitution, my aim will be to show how absence opens up constituted presence to indication.

As Derrida's emphasis on the spoken voice reminds us, the functioning of language also involves our embodiment. In particular, it involves the being affected that is inherent in our having a body. Phenomenologically speaking, such embodiment will turn out to be decisive for the question of language. It will make concrete the notion of absence by showing its foundation in our needs. As we shall see, need will turn out to be the absence across which the indicative function extends. In its needs, that is, in the absence of what it requires, the body points beyond itself. It gains the indicative function that is the foundation for its signifying acts. The phenomenological givenness of the absence required for indication will thus be disclosed as the givenness of need. To begin this investigation, some preliminary yet essential distinctions have to be examined.

10. Bernet criticizes those who limit themselves to pointing out Derrida's misreadings as not realizing that "the deconstruction of the Husserlian distinction between 'expression' and 'indication' . . . implies also the impossibility of an expression and of an understanding that is absolutely faithful to Husserl's thought" (Bernet 1995, p. 2). As he also expresses this conclusion: "If Derrida has made us understand one thing, it is precisely that no purely expressive language exists, and therefore, no means exists either to assure us that an interpretation coincides with the meaning of the author. It is not even certain that the author can faithfully reproduce his own thought, or that he is in full possession of his thought when he thinks" (p. 16). All of this follows, however, only if we accept this deconstruction.

11. Seebohm 1995, p. 200. Unfortunately, except for a few schematic indications, Seebohm does not carry out this investigation in the article cited.

Husserl's Distinction Between Expression and Indication

In the *Logical Investigations,* Husserl begins his analysis of language by differentiating its expressive and indicative signs. He writes, "Every sign is a sign for something, but not every sign has 'meaning,' a 'sense' that the sign expresses" (Husserl 1970, p. 269). Expressions are distinguished by being "meaningful signs" (p. 275). What they express is a meaning or sense. Thus, the word, "horse" expresses one sense, the word, "house," another. The case is different with indications. All sorts of things can serve as indicative signs. A brand can be seen as the sign of a slave. A chalk mark can indicate a house to be robbed. Although they are deliberately produced, these signs do not by themselves have meaning. Their relation is not that of expression, but rather that of one thing standing for another (p. 270), behind which is a relation of beliefs. All indicative relations share the "common circumstance" that a belief in the existence of one thing motivates the belief in another. The relationship, here, is not logical (p. 272); it is psychological. The motivation to proceed from one to the other is based on "association" (p. 273–74). By contrast, the relation between an expression and the sense it expresses is not a question of belief. The expression seems to point away from itself to its sense. "But this pointing," Husserl writes, "is not an indication. . . . The existence of the sign neither 'motivates' the existence of the meaning, nor, properly expressed, our belief in the meaning's existence" (p. 279).

In the examples just given, the distinction between indication and expression appears to be one of signs. Actually, it is between two different types of functioning. The same sign can have both an indicative and an expressive function. In communicative speech, this double functioning is absolutely required. Thus, in speaking to another, a person must not just produce an "articulate sound-complex." "[H]e must," Husserl writes, "endow it with a sense in certain acts of mind, a sense he desires to share with his auditors." Expressing this sense, the sound-complex becomes an expression. Yet, for it to function as such in communicative speech, it must also function as an indication. The auditor must "take the speaker to be a person, who is not merely uttering sounds but is *speaking to him,* who is accompanying those sounds with certain sense-giving acts" (Husserl 1970, p. 277). These acts, however, cannot be experienced directly. My immediate experience of the speaking person is only of his sounds. Given this, what counts as an expression also has an indicative function. In Husserl's words, "all expressions in *communicative* speech

function as *indications*. They serve the hearer as signs of the 'thoughts' of the speaker, i.e., of his sense-giving inner experiences" (ibid.). In doing so, they function in the absence of the indicated. They stand in the place of it.

In spite of this double functioning, Husserl insists that indication is not "the genus of which an expression is the species. To mean is not a particular way of being a sign in the sense of indicating something" (Husserl 1970, p. 269). If it were, then all expressions would also have an indicative function. In communicative speech they do. Speaking with others, however, is not our only type of discourse. We also speak to ourselves. In a move that Derrida takes as absolutely crucial to his argument, Husserl claims that in interior monologue, the expressive function continues, but the indicative one drops away. In his words, "expressions also play a great part in uncommunicated, interior mental life." They "continue to have meanings as they had before" (p. 278). They do not, however, function as indications. It is not the case "that in soliloquy one speaks to oneself, and employs words as signs, i.e., as indications, of one's own inner experiences" (p. 279). This is because indications stand for their referents. But such standing for seems out of place when the referent itself is present. Given the referent, we have no motivation to employ a substitute for it. In Husserl's words: "In monologue words can perform no function of indicating the existence of mental acts, since such indication would there be quite purposeless. For the acts in question are themselves experienced by us at that very moment" (p. 280).

This possibility of a direct experience yields another distinction between indication and expression. It concerns their relation to their referent. Referring in the case of indications is a matter of standing for something. This is a direct relation where the existence of one thing brings about the belief in another. By contrast, an expression's relation to its referent is mediated by its sense. The expression refers *through* its sense. In so doing, it has the possibility of having its reference confirmed by a direct experience of the referent. There can be a "fulfillment" of its sense in a corresponding intuition. In Husserl's words, the "meaning conferring acts or the meaning intentions" that endow an expression with sense can be fulfilled by the "meaning fulfilling acts" that actualize their relation to objects. When this occurs, the intended sense of an expression, e.g., "the book is on the table," is intuitively confirmed. We see the object on the table and agree with the assertion. Since the assertion's reference is mediated through its sense, there is here a double identification. We grasp the

spoken sounds in terms of their sense, and grasp this sense in terms of a corresponding intuitive presence. As Husserl puts this: "The sounded word is first made one with the meaning-intention, and this in its turn is made one with its corresponding meaning fulfillment" (Husserl 1970, p. 281). In a subsequent section, I shall examine the nature of this "making one." Quite apart from this, however, the distinction Husserl wishes to draw is clear: While expressions can be confirmed intuitively through their senses, indications, insofar as they lack inherent senses, cannot. Such confirmation, in fact, undermines the indicative function. In soliloquy, the intuitive presence of the referent robs the indicative relation of its purpose. By contrast, when expressions indicate the mental acts of another, they do not (and, in fact, cannot) require intuitive confirmation.

An expression, in *indicating* a mental act, has a one-to-one relation to it. Understood indicatively, e.g., as an articulate sound-complex, it is a distinct reality. So is the mental act it stands for. With this, we come to another important distinction Husserl draws between the indicative and expressive functions. While indications stand for distinct realities, the relation of expression to sense is *not* one-to-one. This is because sense is "ideal." To be "ideal" is to be one-in-many rather than being simply one. Such ideality shows itself in the fact that a single assertion, e.g., "the book is on the table," can be made by many speakers *without a change of sense.* Through this sense, they all can refer to one and the same state of affairs. They can do so because the sense keeps its unity in the multitude of their transient mental acts. This one-in-many quality obtains even if the state of affairs they refer to does not, in fact, exist. In Husserl's words, it obtains "in the case of all assertions, even if what they assert is false and absurd. Even in such cases we distinguish their ideal content from the transient acts of affirming and asserting it: it is the meaning of the assertion, a unity in plurality" (Husserl 1970, p. 285). For Husserl, then, this quality of being a "unity in plurality" is what allows different speakers to say the same thing. It also gives them the possibility of intuitively confirming (or fulfilling) one another's assertions. This is because intuitive fulfillment is a fulfillment of the sense, the very sense that can remain the same in different people's assertions. Since it can remain unchanged, this sense permits the possibility of a return to itself. Returning to it as the same, people can seek to intuitively confirm the different assertions expressing it. For Husserl, as we shall see, the very possibility of knowledge, as involving assertions that can be repeatedly confirmed by others, presupposes the ideality of sense.

The Reduction and the Possibility of Interior Monologue

All of the remarks just cited come from the first of Husserl's *Logical Investigations.* For Derrida, the crucial, if implicit, distinction employed there is that between presence and absence. This is apparent from Husserl's account of communicative speech. "When I listen to another," Derrida remarks, "his lived experience is not fully present to me 'in person,' in the original." This is why his words have an indicative function. Such functioning implies the absence of their referents. With this, we have the "core of indication: indication takes place whenever the sense giving act . . . is not fully present." This very nonpresence, however, has to be mediated by some substitute. It "must pass by the mediation of its physical side." In speech, this is the voice. In writing, it is the signs on a page. This requirement for mediation, which is "irreducible" in communication, "involves every expression in an indicative operation" (Derrida 1973a, p. 38). If, with Husserl, I assume that expressions can function in soliloquy without such mediation, it is only because I suppose that the meanings they express can be directly present. "Presence," Derrida remarks, "is the core of this demonstration." Thus, for Derrida, the distinction Husserl draws between expression and indication assumes that "pure expression will be the pure active intention . . . of an act of meaning (*bedeuten*) that animates a speech whose content (*Bedeutung*) is present." This is not a physical presence, i.e., something, like the voice, which "takes place in nature and across space." It is a presence "in consciousness." In soliloquy, then, "the meaning is . . . *present to the self* in the life of a present that has not yet gone forth from itself into the world, space, or nature." The latter occurs when the meaning is communicated by means of some physical medium. Insofar as the medium *indicates* the meaning, Derrida concludes: "All these 'going forths' effectively exile this life of self-presence in indications" (p. 40). "Exile" occurs because the meanings are no longer self-present. What is present is simply the medium, e.g., the sounding voice, which indicates them.

Derrida's emphasis on the role of presence in soliloquy has a definite purpose. He wants to equate the possibility of soliloquy with that of the phenomenological reduction. In fact, for Derrida, the move to soliloquy is actually an implicit reduction. His emphasis on the physical nature of indication—i.e., on its requiring a medium, like the voice, that "takes place in nature and across space"—is intended to make indication subject to the reduction. In Derrida's words: "Having its 'origin' in the

phenomena of association, and always connecting empirical existents in the world, indicative signification in language will cover everything that falls subject to the 'reductions': factuality, worldly existence, essential non-necessity, nonevidence, etc." (Derrida 1973a, p. 30). There is a twofold conception of the phenomenological reduction at work in Derrida's remarks. The reduction is, first of all, taken as a bracketing of empirical existence. Given that "an indicative sign cannot be conceived without the category of empirical, which is to say only probable, existence" (p. 42), it must fall to the reduction. But this means that the "reduction to monologue" Husserl uses to distinguish the expressive from the indicative function is implicitly a phenomenological reduction. This holds since "the reduction to the monologue is really a putting of empirical worldly existence between brackets" (p. 43). The second sense of the reduction is implied by the self-presence Husserl assumes in interior monologue. Speaking to ourselves, we have no need of indications since our meaning is immediately present to us in consciousness. The reduction thus appears as a reduction to consciousness taken as a field of intuitive self-presence.

Equating the possibility of the reduction with that of interior monologue introduces a certain instability in its concept. It makes the reduction depend on Husserl's distinction between expression and indication. If expressions could not function without indication, not just interior monologue would be impossible. The reduction itself would be undermined, since its goal has been defined as the self-presence that allows expressions to function on their own. This can be put in terms of the bracketing of empirical existence that the reduction is supposed to accomplish. For Derrida, indicative signification implies empirical existence. If expressions could not function without such signification, then the bracketing of empirical existence also brackets the functioning of expressions. What would remain after this bracketing would, then, be devoid of both language and meaning. We could not speak to ourselves, since our possibilities of expression would be bracketed. The meaning intentions that animate our speech would also be bracketed if their functioning required indication. Thus, the reduction would leave us with nothing at all. Its result would be a sense-less silence.[12] To assert this, however, is to say that it is impossible. It cannot reach its intended goal.

12. Bernet puts this conclusion somewhat differently. He writes: "If the phenomenological reduction depends upon the search for an example of pure expression, and if for Husserl the soliloquy seems to be the only example which realizes such purity of

A similar point can be made with regard to Husserl's position that an expression, in expressing its sense, expresses what is ideal. If expression cannot function without indication, how can it point to a one-in-many? The indicative relation is one-to-one. Its basis is association. Limited as it is to empirical existence, "the indicative sign," as Derrida writes, "falls outside the content of absolutely ideal objectivity, that is, outside truth" (Derrida 1973a, p. 30). It is outside of truth because the indicative sign does not express a sense. For Husserl, however, senses in their one-in-many character are required for mutual agreement and intuitive confirmation. Truth depends on this agreement and confirmation.[13] Thus, given the connection between ideality and sense that Husserl draws, undermining the distinction between indication and expression undercuts his distinction between the real and the ideal. To reverse this, we can say that if we can distinguish between the reality of empirical existence and the ideality of senses, we can differentiate indication from expression. To do so, however, is to assume that a "reduction to monologue," i.e., the phenomenological reduction, is also possible.

In the tight web of reasoning that Derrida spins, we thus see four distinct possibilities becoming entangled in each other. We cannot separate the possibilities of the reduction and interior monologue from *either* the possibility of differentiating indication from expression *or* that of distinguishing the real from the ideal. They all become equivalent. They all, then, can be collectively undermined.

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expression, it follows that the reduction to transcendental consciousness would be a reduction to solipsism or to a 'voice that keeps the silence'" (Bernet 1995, p. 9). He immediately adds, "Every reader of Husserl knows nonetheless . . . that transcendental consciousness disclosed by the phenomenological reduction is in no way cut off from the world and from commerce with other subjects." Evans makes the same criticism of the attempt to equate the possibility of the reduction with that of soliloquy. Derrida's reading, he writes, assumes that "the reduction is a search for an 'inside' that bans all exteriority and difference, an inside that is pure self-presence indebted to no difference at all, whether 'spatial' or temporal. But this is not the sense of the transcendental reduction. Husserl speaks repeatedly of the 'field of transcendental experience.' . . . Intentional life is shot through with 'coawareness,' 'potentiality,' and 'horizon intentionalities," all of which involve exteriority (Evans 1991, p. 121). My position, which will be put forward in this chapter, is that the reduction reveals this exteriority and in doing so uncovers the *indicative* basis of all constitution.

13. Thus, for Husserl, "Each truth is an ideal unity with regard to an infinite and unbounded multiplicity of possible true statements having the same form and content" (Husserl 1975, p. 190). For an extended account of the notion of truth in the *Logical Investigations*, See Mensch 1981, pp. 9–10, 42–46, 58, 68–71.

Husserl's Notion of Fulfillment

How accurate is Derrida's notion of the reduction? Is its possibility really that of expressions functioning without indication? Before answering these questions, it is first necessary to examine how expressions function in Husserl's account. For Husserl, as I noted, expressions refer to their objects through their senses. This reference is confirmed or "fulfilled" by intuition. When it is, "the meaning-intention is . . . made one with its corresponding meaning fulfillment." What precisely is the relation between sense and intuition underlying these remarks? How can sense be "made one" with intuitive presence?

To answer these questions, I have to expand upon my previous chapters' remarks on the intentional relation. In perceptual life, as I noted, reference to an object is a function of the "fitting together" of our various perceptions. When our experiences fail to fit, i.e., become disharmonious, their referent is lost. We can no longer "make sense" of them by assuming that they are perceptions of one and the same object. Suppose, for example, as you turn a box, the perspectivally ordered sequence of perceptions you have been experiencing suddenly starts to become scrambled. At this point you are likely to say that you are experiencing a hallucination. You no longer assume the box's existence since your perceptions can no longer be taken as perceptions of a given object. If they could, then you could make the thesis (the assumption) of the box's being-there. You could also say that its presence bears an intelligible sense. It is something you can describe in terms of its perceptual appearances.

The Husserlian account of this begins with his position that sense is a one-in-many. This characteristic is perfectly general. The fact that the content of expression can be the *same in many* different acts is what allows it to be called a meaning or sense. The same holds for an object that shows itself as the *same* in the flow of our perceptual experiences. Its presence as the same is its presence as a sense. This means that in direct perceptual experience, the theses of the object's being and sense are made simultaneously. The object of a coherent perceptual experience is, in other words, not just grasped as something real, "a real unity." It is also apprehended as a sense. Thus, as Husserl constantly stresses, all "real unities," are "unities of sense" (Husserl 1976, p. 120). They are such because of the way they are present to consciousness. In the words of the *Cartesian Meditations*, "The object of consciousness, in its self-identity

throughout the flowing of experience, does not enter into this flowing from outside. It lies included within it as a sense" (Husserl 1963, p. 80).

The presence of an object as sense is, as I noted, a function of our "making sense" of our perceptions, that is, of our taking them as perceptions of the same object. In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl sees this as the result of the interpretation of our perceptual experiences. "Perception," he claims "is interpretation." He explains: "It belongs to perception that something appears within it, but *interpretation* makes up what we term appearance—be it correct or not, anticipatory or overdrawn. The *house* appears to me through no other way but that I interpret in a certain fashion actually experienced contents of sensation. . . . They are termed 'appearances' or, better, appearing contents precisely for the reason that they are contents of perceptive interpretation" (Husserl 1984, p. 762). For Husserl, then, perceptual experiences—e.g., particular "contents of sensation"—achieve their status as appearances *of* some object through interpretation. The interpretation places them in a framework of identity in multiplicity. This happens whenever we continually take them in the same sense. As Husserl writes in describing how "we suppose ourselves to perceptually grasp one and the same object through the change of experiential contents," "different perceptual contents are given, but they are interpreted, apperceived 'in the same sense,' . . . the interpretation (*Auffassung*) according to this 'sense' is a character of experience which first constitutes 'the being of the object for me'" (p. 397).

It is important to distinguish three different elements in this general account. On the objective side, we have the object that is present to consciousness as an appearing sense. Its presence in consciousness, Husserl writes, "is a completely unique [kind of] being-in, not a being-in [consciousness] as an intrinsic component, but rather a being-in as something intentional. This is an appearing, ideal being-in or, what is the same, a being-in as [the object's] immanent objective sense" (Husserl 1963, p. 80). On the subjective side, the side of the "intrinsic" components of consciousness, we have "contents of perception." On the same side, we also have the "perceptual acts in the sense of interpretative intentions" (Husserl 1984, p. 397). The acts make the intrinsic contents into contents of some object insofar as they take them "in the same sense," i.e., in a specific one-in-many framework. They do this by attempting to find for them a single referent, i.e., by attempting to see if they do fit together so as to form the recurring perceptual pattern through which an object exhibits its specific sense.

The above makes clear why, for Husserl, expressions refer to their objects through their senses. This reference is simply a function of sense's one-in-many character. To express a sense of a perceptual object is to express an interpretive intention to grasp a one-in-many. In other words, as a one-in-many, the sense implies reference insofar as it embodies the thought of a possible existence, which stands as a correlate of a range of possible perceptions. Given this, the relation between sense and intuition is also clear. In Husserl's terms, it is one between "intention" and "fulfillment." Intuition "fulfills" the intention of a sense by actually exhibiting the pattern of perceptions composing its range. When it does, it is "made one" with the sense. The sense becomes unified with intuition by becoming perceptually embodied. It becomes the "fulfilling sense," which fulfills by perceptually embodying the expression's sense (Husserl 1984, p. 56).

Of course, in actual perceptual life, not every intention is fulfilled. We are sometimes mistaken in what we intend to see. We realize this when we move closer to get a better look. For example, what we took to be an animal crouching under a bush dissolves, as we approach it, into a flickering pattern of shadows. The moment of recognition that we are not seeing an animal, but rather shadows, marks a shift in our perceptual intention. There is, in fact, a certain dialectic in the relation of intention and fulfillment. The dialectic is such that, although every perceptual sense experienced by us is a sense we intend, not every sense we intend comes to be fulfilled by a corresponding intuition. What we have, instead, is an adjustment of our interpretive intention until it reaches fulfillment.

With regard to presence and absence, two points stand out in the above account. The first is that the functioning of an expression implies both. Absence is implied when the theses of sense and being become separated. This occurs each time we verbally report what we have seen. So detached, the thesis of sense continues to carry with it a reference to the thesis of being—i.e., the being-there of the object we report having seen. But the hearer of the report can confirm it directly only when she experiences the intuitions that can be subsumed under the sense's range. When she does, then intuitive presence occurs. Such presence does not mean that expressions cannot function in the absence of their referents. It only shows that the sense that becomes separate from perception in a verbal report (the nonperceptually embodied sense) itself has a mediated intentionality. Just as expressions refer through their senses, these

senses refer to their objects through the possible perceptions that could fill up their range.

The second point concerns the fact that "presence" in this account is a differentiated concept. Husserl's position that "perception is interpretation" implies three basic kinds of presence: (1) the presence of the interpreted elements, ultimately, the "hyletic data" or elemental material for the perceptual interpretation, (2) the presence of the interpreting act with its interpretative intention, and finally (3) the presence of the perceptually embodied object or feature thereof. This last is a sense-filled presence. Its being "in" consciousness, as I cited Husserl, is an intuitively "appearing, ideal being-in." As such, it is distinct from the individual "intrinsic components" (the contents and acts) that make up the first two categories. This schema, it must be emphasized, is perfectly general. Since it applies to perception as such, it applies to both external and internal perception—the latter being the perception that occurs when we inwardly reflect on the constituents of our consciousness. Both types involve the distinction between interpretation and contents that are there to be interpreted. Both distinguish these from the appearing sense that is the result of the interpretation (see Husserl 1970, p. 860). Of these three elements, only the contents, taken as the original hyletic material, can count as originally present. The other two have a "constituted" presence.

The Reduction and Constitution

How accurate is Derrida's account of the reduction? Is it the case that the indicative function falls to the reduction? For Derrida, it must, since the reduction is a bracketing of empirical existence. This existence includes the "association" that grounds the indicative function. Husserl, however, conceives this bracketing in a very different way. For him, it is only a preliminary stage of the reduction. It is the stage of the reduction as an "epoché." The term designates the suspension of our belief in empirical existence. If we ask why we should suspend this belief, the immediate reason is that this is required to avoid a logical error: that of *petitio principii* (see Ingarten 1975, p. 12). We commit this error whenever we assume, as part of our demonstration, the conclusion we wish to prove. For Husserl, in the "Prolegomena" of his *Logical Investigations*, empirical existence has a definite sense. It is the domain explored by the natural sciences. They shape its concept. An account of the difficulties

Husserl finds in natural science would divert us from our purpose. Briefly noted, they involve the paradoxes that arise in our attempting to use the natural, scientific description of the world to explain our grasp of this world.[14] After the *Logical Investigations,* Husserl attempts to avoid these difficulties by bracketing empirical existence. Such bracketing means that we cannot use science's account of the world to explain how we came up with this account. It does not mean, as Derrida states, that the phenomena of association fall to the reduction. Insofar as they are immanently given, these phenomena are possible objects of inner perception. They form part of the domain that is open to the inspection of consciousness. This inspection reveals the role they play in consciousness's making sense of the world, i.e., in its constitution of the world's sense-filled presence. As such, rather than falling to the reduction, their inspection is part of its goal: that of showing how the world comes to presence.

A more complete sense of the reduction is implicit in this last remark. As I observed earlier, the practice of the reduction is the reverse of constitution. Constitution describes the process by which we build up, layer by layer, the sense of the world. Basically, this process involves the layered positing of unities in multiplicity. Different unities posited on one level become the multiplicity that supplies the material for the positing of a higher level unity. For example, our perceptions of individual objects in a room supply the material for the positing of such objects, and these, in turn, supply the elements for our grasp of the sense of the room as a whole. The reduction, I noted, reverses this process layer by layer. Performing it, we suspend our belief in the posited unities present on one level so as to regard their constituting elements. We can do this again and again until we reach the "ultimately constituting" level. So conceived, the reduction can be applied to every constitutive process, including those that build up our interpretive, perceptual intentions. To the point that the phenomena of association lie at their basis, the reduction should uncover them.

For Husserl, the reduction in the sense of the epoché opens up the possibility of the reduction understood as the process by which we undo the work of constitution. The reduction in this more complete sense is not really equivalent to Derrida's "reduction to monologue." Pursued to the end, it leaves intact neither our meaning intentions nor the objects that fulfill them. It thus does not end with a set of self-present meanings,

14. For a description of these paradoxes, see Mensch 1981, pp. 9–25.

i.e., the meanings of the expressions we employ in monologue. Turned towards our interior mental life, it undoes (or suspends our belief) in their presence to seek out the constitutive basis of such presence. Thus, rather than being a reduction to the presence of meaning, the reduction, as it proceeds, is a reduction *of* this presence. This follows from its character as the reverse of constitution. Given that constitution proceeds level by level, the presence it constitutes also has its levels. The reduction, in reversing the work of constitution, suspends (or "reduces") the layers of such presence one by one. The only presence that it does not undo is that of the original, nonconstituted layer. The reduction of presence ends with this. If we wish to conceive it as a reduction *to* presence, such presence is that of the original hyletic data of consciousness.

This has a curious consequence. As a subsequent section will show, this original hyletic material includes the phenomena of association, the phenomena underlying the indicative function. Because of this, rather than suspending the indicative function to reach a sphere of what Derrida takes as "pure expression" and "pure meaning," Husserl actually employs it to uncover the opposite result. He uses it to exhibit the indicative basis of all constitution.

Ideality and the Critique of Presence

The discussion of the role that sense plays in Husserl's concept of presence brings us closer to the center of Derrida's critique, which is not aimed only at Husserl's distinction between expression and indication. Its object is his conception of knowledge. This is clear from the beginning of *Speech and Phenomena*, where Derrida poses a series of rhetorical questions. He asks: "do not phenomenological necessity, the rigor and subtlety of Husserl's analyses . . . conceal a metaphysical presupposition? Do they not harbor a dogmatic or speculative commitment . . . ?" (Derrida 1973a, p. 4). Such a commitment is, in fact, present, in phenomenology's "'principle of principles': i.e., the original self-giving evidence, the *present* or *presence* of sense to a full and primordial intuition." Thus, when Derrida asks, "Is not the idea of knowledge and the theory of knowledge in itself metaphysical?" (p. 5), the reader must agree insofar as knowledge implies the presence of sense.

To see what Derrida has in mind, I have to return to Husserl's position that assertions, in expressing senses, express what is ideal. For Husserl, this is a "fundamental fact" of his theory of knowledge: "The

fact, namely, that all thinking and knowing is directed to objects or states of affairs whose unity relative to a multiplicity of actual or possible acts of thought is a 'unity in multiplicity' and is, therefore, an ideal character" (Husserl 1900–1901, II, 9; Husserl 1984, p. 12). This "fact" explains "how the same experience can have a content in a twofold sense, how next to its inherent actual content, there should and can dwell an ideal, intentional content" (ibid., II, 16; Husserl 1984, p. 21). The latter content is embodied in the objects' or states-of-affairs' presence as a sense. This is their presence, in perception, as a unity in a multiplicity of possible perceptual acts. As I noted, this ideal content can be returned to again and again. Its sense can be repeatedly confirmed as the same. Because of this, the intuitively confirmed sense can function as an item of knowledge. An individual can claim to know something and express his knowledge in an assertion whose sense can be repeatedly understood and confirmed by others.

As Derrida points out, this conception of knowledge involves both ideality and presence. Ideality is assumed as an "infinity of permissible repetitions" of presence. It thus appears as "the very form in which the presence of an object in general may be indefinitely repeated as the *same*" (Derrida 1973a, p. 9). To assume ideality is to assume the indefinite availability of presence. In Derrida's words, "Ideality is the preservation or mastery of presence in repetition" (pp. 10–11). Knowledge, insofar as it presupposes ideality, assumes this "mastery of presence in repetition."

Given this, Husserl's account of knowledge can be undermined fatally by breaking the tie between ideality and presence. Now, their connection could be broken *if* the repetition implied by ideality were *not* a return to presence. Conversely, we can say that it would be a return to presence if we could assume that what makes possible the repetition is an ideal presence that could be returned to again and again. Here, the possibility of the return is grounded on the presence—the being—of the ideal. Such an assumption, however, ignores the subjective origin of ideality. In Derrida's words, "ideality is not an existent that has fallen from the sky; its origin will always be the possible repetition of a productive act" (Derrida 1973a, p. 6). This act, however, is not limited to senses, which Husserl takes as ideal. It directs itself to signs in general, which thus can also count as ideal. Indeed, they must if they are to function as signs. In Derrida's words: "A sign is never an event, if by event we mean an irreplaceable and irreversible empirical particular. A sign which would

take place but 'once' would not be a sign. . . . A signifier (in general) must be formally recognizable. . . . It must remain the *same*, and be able to be repeated as such" (p. 50). This means that "it can function as a sign only if a formal identity enables it to be issued again and to be recognized. This identity is necessarily ideal" (p. 52). The conclusion follows because ideality has been reduced to its subjective origin—i.e., to the "the possible repetition of a productive act." Given that signs as such depend on this repetition, they are all ideal. The premise here, as Derrida states, is that the "ideality" that Husserl brings forward to describe "the structure of speech," "depends entirely on the possibility of acts of repetition. It is constituted by this possibility" (ibid.).

This assertion of the general ideality of signs allows Derrida to break the connection between ideality and presence. Given that indicative signs lack an inherent sense, the return to them as the same is not a return to sense. It is thus not a return to what can be intuitively confirmed as a sense-filled presence. This means that the return must have the form of indication. In other words, it must involve the re-presentation of the indicated by a substitute. The ideality of signs "thus necessarily implies representation." It does so, Derrida adds, "insofar as 'each signifying event is a substitute (for the signified as well as for the ideal form of the signifier)'" (Derrida 1973a, p. 50). The ideality of the sign, Derrida believes, is constituted by this repeated act of substitution. In fact, all forms of ideality are. The model of constitution through substitution holds for "the ideality of the sensible form of the signifier," "the ideality of the signified (of the *Bedeutung*) or intended sense" and, "the ideality of the object itself" (p. 52). All three achieve their ideal presence through re-presentation. Re-presentation (*Vergegenwärtigung*) is the "productive act" whose repetition produces ideality.

If we accept this conclusion, we break the tie between knowledge, ideality, and presence. This, however, means we leave Husserl's account of knowing without the foundation it demands. A number of other consequences, equally fatal to Husserl's position, also follow. Thus, Derrida's conclusion makes impossible the distinction between expression and indication. For Husserl, as we recall, indicative signs stand in place of (or substitute for) their referent. As such, they function in the absence of their referent. Expressions can also function in the absence of their referent. When we follow a report concerning something we have not seen, expressions can even be said to substitute for their referents. This functioning, however, depends on their giving the senses that structure the

presence of their referents. To function, then, an expression cannot just not re-present its referent. It has to express what makes its referent's presence possible, i.e., its one-in-many structure in an actual intuition. This, of course, is its tie to intuition. Expressing the sense of its referent, an assertion can be confirmed by its presence. This happens whenever such presence intuitively embodies its sense. When it does, then, as Husserl says, the "meaning-intention" and the "meaning-fulfillment" are "made one." Their unity is the result of an *identity of structure,* i.e., of both manifesting the same one-in-many structure of a specific sense. None of this is possible in Derrida's model of re-presentation. Accepting it, we exclude "from the start" the "possibilities . . . that the unity of intuition and intention can ever be homogeneous at all and that meaning can be fused into intuition without disappearing" (Derrida 1973a, p. 92). This position follows because the ideality of sense, as involving re-presentation, demands absence. Presupposing absence, it can "never form an 'intimately blended unity' with intuition."[15]

If we accept that all forms of ideality involve re-presentation, we also, of course, undermine Husserl's distinction between the real and the ideal. The ideal no longer counts as a one-in-many presence. The return to it is simply a matter of repetitive substitution. The same fate befalls Husserl's distinction between interior monologue and communicative speech. Insofar as it demands our distinguishing expression from indication, it cannot obtain if *all* signification is fundamentally a matter of re-presentation. If all signification is a matter of re-presentation, then the expressive function is also indicative. The function also involves the presence of one thing standing for (or re-presenting) another. According to Derrida, the repetition of this relation yields the idealities Husserl assumes are available in interior speech. This, however, implies that the direct presence Husserl takes as definitive of such speech cannot obtain. Such presence is negated by the absence required by the representative relation. As Derrida sums up his argument, "the primordial structure of repetition that we have just evoked for signs must govern all acts of signification. The subject cannot speak without giving himself a representation of his speaking" (Derrida 1973a, p. 57). Furthermore, insofar as

15. Derrida 1973a, p. 93. The extended quote here is: "My nonperception, my nonintuition, my *hic et nunc* absence are expressed by the very thing that I say, by *that* which I say and *because* I say it. This structure will never form an "intimately blended unity" with intuition. The absence of intuition—and therefore of the subject of the intuition—is not only *tolerated* by speech; it is *required* by the general structure of signification, when considered in itself."

the "reduction to monologue" is equivalent to Husserl's phenomenological reduction, its concept must also be abandoned.

This set of consequences is itself a consequence of the entanglement noted in a previous section. Derrida's reading of Husserl demands that we see Husserl's concepts of knowledge, ideality, sense, and expression as implying one another. Their mutual implication is a function of their having a common basis. In Derrida's understanding, they all rely on a common concept of presence, one enshrined in Husserl's "principle of principles." They depend on the "original self-giving evidence" that is exemplified by our self-presence.[16]

Ideality and Self-Presence

Derrida's argument against this "principle" is at the heart of his critique. Without it, his assertion that the subject cannot speak to himself apart from representation remains more a claim than a conclusion. Its demonstration, as Derrida recognizes, depends on his explanation of our self-presence. Do we have direct access to our interpretative senses or does this access require a process of substitution? The latter would be the case were our self-presence itself constituted by a repeated process of substitution. This, however, involves the contention that our living present results from the "primordial structure of repetition." The assumption here is that the presence of the present is not something already given that we can return to continually. Rather, it is continually constituted by a repetitive substitution, i.e., by a repetitive standing-in-the-place-of that has the same form as the indicative relation. In Derrida's words, the claim is that "the presence-of-the-present is derived from repetition and not the reverse" (Derrida 1973a, p. 52).

16. Husserl's expression of this principle of principles occurs in *Ideas I*, §24. He writes, "No conceivable theory can make us err regarding the principle of all principles: *that every originally giving intuition is a legitimizing source of knowledge*" (Husserl 1976, p. 51). This principle is immediately qualified by Husserl's adding that what intuition offers us is to be accepted "as what is given there, but also only within the limits in which it is given there." Evans notes that this qualification signifies: "Intuition is the source of legitimacy in cognition, but that does not mean that intuition is necessarily incorrigible" (Evans 1991, p. 109). Having quoted Husserl that seeing is "imperfect" and that one seeing can come in conflict with another, Evans writes: "Husserl's statement that intuition can be undermined by intuition clearly shows that the principle of principles itself does not assert or require 'the self-identity of the now as point, as a "source-point"'" (p. 110). As we shall see, one can deny this self-identity and still assert the principle.

This contention can be put in terms of the tie between ideality and presence assumed by Husserl. For Derrida, the ideal is what "may be indefinitely *repeated* in the *identity* of its *presence*" (Derrida 1973a, p. 6). Thus, to include the ideality of the "sense or noema in consciousness" is to assume "that presence to consciousness can be indefinitely repeated" (p. 10). This, however, assumes that "the present, or rather the presence of the living present" can sustain this repeated presence. Here, as Derrida remarks: "The ultimate form of ideality, the ideality of ideality, that in which in the last instance one may anticipate or recall all repetition, is the *living present*, the self-presence of transcendental life".[17] Derrida's position is that this supposed self-presence is actually the result of a repeated substitution. As such, its ground is a nonpresence. Its basis is the absence that allows the substitute to take the place of what it substitutes for.

Derrida's arguments for this position are what make his account more than simply a counter to Husserl's. In his view, the assertion of this grounding nonpresence is phenomenological. It follows from phenomenology's "own descriptions of the movement of temporalization and of the constitution of intersubjectivity." In his words, "at the heart of what ties together these two decisive moments of description, we recognize an irreducible nonpresence as having a constituting value, and with it a nonlife, a nonpresence or nonself-belonging of the living present, an ineradicable nonprimordiality" (Derrida 1973a, pp. 6–7). The nonpresence inherent in intersubjectivity is apparent in communicative discourse. Such discourse binds the community together, but it does so through indicative signs. The necessity of indication follows from the fact that we cannot directly experience the mental life of others. We indicate it because we cannot make it directly present. Husserl, of course, would agree with this. As the *Cartesian Meditations* makes apparent, his whole analysis of intersubjectivity concerns how we come to terms with this nonpresence. In fact, for Husserl, such nonpresence is what makes the other person other. Without it, intersubjectivity would collapse into an undifferentiated unity.

17. Derrida 1973a, p. 6. The extended passage here is: "In order that the possibility of this repetition may be open *ideally* to infinity, one ideal form must assure this unity of the *indefinite* and the *ideal:* this is the present, or rather the presence of the living present. The ultimate form of ideality, the ideality of ideality, that in which in the last instance one may anticipate or recall all repetition, is the *living present*, the self-presence of transcendental life."

The real issue concerns Husserl's analysis of temporalization. Does it reveal an irreducible nonpresence in the living present? If it does, then consciousness's self-presence implies absence. It requires the same standing-for-an-absent-referent that the indicative function manifests. Its self-presence thus becomes a matter of substitution. At this point that we can say that ideality, as involving repeated self-presence, is actually a result of repeated substitution. In other words, if Derrida's claim regarding temporalization holds, then so does the model he proposes for the ideality of signs. All forms of ideality can be explained through the model of constitution as repeated substitution. As already noted, the model breaks the connection between knowledge, ideality, and intuitive presence, which is essential to Husserl's argumentation. This, of course, is Derrida's point. As he writes, "if the present of self-presence is not *simple*, if it is constituted in a primordial and irreducible synthesis, then the whole of Husserl's argumentation is threatened in its very principle" (Derrida 1973a, p. 61). All this, of course, depends on Derrida's analysis of temporalization.[18]

Temporalization and the Supplement of Retention

As its name implies, the "living present" is the present in which we constantly live. Insofar as we are temporal beings, this present's "life," which is that of temporalization, is our own. It lives through the continual *addition* of new nows and the *retention* of nows that have passed away. Now, for Derrida, both this addition and retention of moments occur through substitution. He names the process of such substitution "supplementation." This is because the requirement of the substitute comes from an original nonpresence. The substitute is needed to make up (or supplement) a lack of presence. Supplementation thus designates a process where an "addition comes to make up for a deficiency, it comes to compensate for a primordial nonself-presence" (Derrida 1973a, p. 87). So defined, the notion of supplementation is perfectly general. Its concept applies to every indicative relation. In Derrida's words, "This concept of primordial supplementation not only implies nonplenitude of presence . . . it designates this function of substitutive supplementation in general, the 'in the place of' (*für etwas*) structure which belongs to every sign in

18. As Natalie Alexander writes, "Without the pivotal deconstruction of internal time-consciousness, the entire argument of 'Speech and Phenomena' would remain 'provisional' and fall apart" (Alexander 1995, p. 124).

general" (p. 88). To apply this structure to temporalization is to assert that the living present is not originally present. Its continued presence is the result of a repetitive supplementation, one where supplements are put repeatedly "in the place of" this present. The actual life of this present thus manifests "the strange structure of the supplement," one where "by delayed reaction, a possibility produces that to which it is said to be added on" (p. 89). The assertion here is that the living present is produced by additions to itself, additions that stand "in the place of" itself. These additions are the new moments and retained moments that make up this present's life.[19]

Derrida's initial focus is on the addition of retained moments. His position, he claims, is inherent in Husserl's descriptions of the retentional process. Yet, in spite of this, he says very little about the functioning of this process. He does assert that the retentional process shows that "presence of the perceived present can appear as such only in as much as it is *continuously compounded* with a nonpresence and nonperception."[20] This nonpresence is inherent in the notion of retention. Retention retains the moments that have departed from the present. In Derrida's words, it retains "a nonpresent, a past and unreal present" (Derrida 1973a, p. 64). This is what makes retention a nonperception. Husserl, Derrida admits, "says that retention is still a perception." But this assertion is undermined when we realize that it involves an

19. Those commentators (Crowell 1996, Alexander 1995, Evans 1991, etc.) who see Derrida's strategy as reducing the living extended present to the punctual now and then showing the inadequacy of the latter to account for presence tend to overlook the fact that Derrida's focus is not on the punctual versus the spread out now, but rather on the now *as it is renewed.* He is interested in the now in its gaining the material that allows it to extend into the retained and protended moments that form its horizon and allow it to "spread out." In other words, the issue concerns the now as it functions in the process of temporal constitution: does this involve indication or not?

20. Derrida 1973a, p. 64. Such nonpresence also includes "expectation" or "protention" (ibid.). But aside from mentioning this fact, Derrida does not provide any account of the protentional process. Alexander sees this omission as deliberate. She writes: "The deconstruction of time with its empty hollowed out present actually requires the dissimulation of protention and the future" (Alexander 1995, p. 149). Behind this dissimulation is Derrida's dissimulation of the role that primal impressions play in the constitution of time. Ignoring this role, Derrida ignores the correlative role of protention as an anticipation of the coming impression. In Alexander's words, "He dissimulates the role of primary impression as openness to the 'foreign' and the correlative role of protention to such an extent that he can write that 'the source-point or primordial impression . . . is a receiving that receives nothing'" (p. 132). Here, he ignores "the way in which protention gradually opens—as retention slowly shuts—the 'eye' of the living present. *The Derridean deconstruction of time dissimulates protention*" (p. 149).

"absolutely unique case," that of "a perceiving in which the perceived is not a present but a past."[21]

For Derrida, the nonpresence or nonperception of retention is "indispensably involved in [the living present's] possibility" (Derrida 1973a, p. 64). Repeatedly supplementing the living present with retained moments, the retentional process helps constitute its apparent self-identity. The deficiency that requires this retentional supplementation arises because the now of the living present continually expires. This present's advance to the next now is one with its abandonment of the moment it previously occupied. The moment was its nowness. With the advance, it becomes a past or absent nowness. This loss can only be compensated for by the *retention* of the expired moment. The retained moment thus supplements for the loss of presence that is the inevitable consequence of the living present's being in time, i.e., its advance from moment to moment. In a later section, this being in time will turn out to be a function of a difference inhabiting the living present's apparent identity. The advance of time will be explained in terms of "the strange 'movement' of this difference" (p. 85). Difference will count as the original absence requiring supplementation. Here, however, it is sufficient to note the inadequacy of attempting to compensate for the loss of an expired

21. Steven Crowell puts this argument as follows: "Derrida insists that the moment must be undivided in the sense of absolutely *simple*. He thus reads the *Augenblick* not as the living present but as the now. By treating the now as the sole possible locus of phenomenological fullness and presence, he can argue that the structure of 'retention' (or primary memory) is a *repetition*, a re-presentation, and thus constitutes a 'non-presence and otherness' that is 'internal to presence'" (Crowell 1996, p. 63). Against this, Crowell argues with Evans (1991, pp. 102–3) and Alexander (1995, pp. 138–39) that for Husserl "'retention' is not re-presentation of perception but a constituent part of perception, a horizon of the now (neither of which exist as independent parts) in which the past is as such 'present'" (p. 63). Yet, the fact that retention functions as part of perception, i.e., helps give us the extended perceptual presence that includes the retained and protended moments as dependent (i.e., "mutually founding") perceptual elements, does not per se obviate Derrida's point. When I grasp what is past through its retention, the retention (which is not itself past) stands as its representative. The point is not that retention isn't part of the perceptual process; it is that such process involves indication or re-presentation. As such, it involves absence. Seebohm, I think, puts the issue correctly when he writes: "Husserl is not willing to assimilate the necessity of retention to the necessity of signs because the nature of absence, which is grounded in retention, is more radical and onesidedly founds the absence indicated in signs" (Seebohm 1995, p. 191). At issue is the nature of the absence that retention grounds. Are we to understand it in terms of the sign, seeing retention as a kind of "arche writing," or are we to see retention as involving a more radical absence, one that makes possible the absence required by signs as well as other forms of absence; for example, the absence required by the intentional relationship. See p. 193.

moment by retaining it. What is retained is an expired moment, i.e., "a past and unreal present." Thus, as compounded continually with the nonpresence of the retained, the living present manifests continually the deficiency that requires further supplementation, i.e., further retentions of this expired present as it advances in time.

Derrida's brief remarks raise two basic questions: Does the fact that retention retains the past really disqualify it as a perception? Is it the case that the pastness of the past makes absence inherent in our present's self-identity? For Derrida it does. His position is "that phenomenology seems to us tormented, if not contested from within, by its own descriptions of the movement of temporalization" (Derrida 1973a, p. 6). It is, in fact, tormented by just such questions. To see how accurate this is, we must return to Husserl's analysis of the retentional process. As we shall see, a justification can be made for Derrida's contention that the retentional process involves nonpresence and hence is one of supplementation. Whether such nonpresence robs it of its perceptual character is another issue.

A Husserlian View of Retention as Supplementation

For Husserl, the necessity of the retentional process arises because I cannot apprehend a temporally extended object—e.g., the flight of a bird through a garden—if my perceptual impressions of it vanish as they succeed each other. To avoid this, the impressions must be reproduced or "retained." Only as such can they function in the expended perception of an object. The requirement for supplementation (in the Derridean sense of an addition making up for an absence) has the same basis. It occurs because the present retention of a just past impression *itself becomes past* with the advance of time. Yet, its functioning as a retention depends on its *not vanishing* with the arrival of the succeeding impressional moment (the moment that contains the next perceptual impression). To avoid this, the retention itself needs to be retained. To continue to function, i.e., to continue to retain the past impression, it must, as time advances, be continuously supplemented by further retentions. There must, in Husserl's words, be a "continuous chain of retentions of retentions" of its original impression (Husserl 1976, p. 183). When the chain ceases, the retention of the latter ends. Without further supplements, i.e., further retentions, the original impression with its content is no longer held fast by short term memory.

In Husserl's account, we may recall, the retentions do not just retain impressional contents, they also modify them. Each retention adds a sense of greater expiration or "pastness" to the content. The continuing retentional process thus gives the content its sense of ever increasing pastness. In Husserl's words, the process inserts the content into an "identical, immanent temporal position" in departing time.[22] The result, then, is that the content is retained as a *past* impression, one that has a definite temporal position with regard to the retained impressions that proceeded and followed. Each of these latter impressions was once now. Each slips into pastness by virtue of the increase in its retentional chain. As these preceding and past impressions become past, so does the impression that holds its place between them through a corresponding lengthening of its chain.

This description allows us to see the temporalization of the past as a result of repetitive supplementation of the retentional process. In fact, given that each departing temporal position is constituted by such supplementation, it can be taken as "ideal" in Derrida's sense. This follows because its identity or self-sameness is the result of *repeated return to it via retention.* What about Derrida's claim that the process setting up this position involves a basic "nonpresence and nonperception"? If we distinguish the retentions from what they retain, this point also seems to hold. It follows from the special structure of nowness and pastness (presence and absence) displayed by the chain. To function, the retention of an impressional content must be *now.* It must occupy the living present of the ongoing perceptual act. This is why it constantly needs a supplement. As the present advances, the retention must be supplemented by a further retention to function in the advancing present. Yet, what the retention retains is *not now,* not part of the momentary actuality of the living present. The retentional chain sets up an impressional content occupying an identical temporal position in *departing* time. The content occupies an expired now, a now that is no longer. In Derrida's words, what is thus

22. Ms. C 3 III, p. 41b. As Husserl also puts it, by virtue of the retentional modifications, "es konstituiert sich eine identische Zeitform mit identischen Zeitpunkten als Phrasen dieser Form" (Ms. C 2 I, pp. 11b–12a). In the *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness,* Husserl speaks of "a multitude of modified primary contents that are characterized as retentional modifications of primary contents in their now character." He writes that by virtue of the process of their retentional modification, "these primary contents are carriers of primary interpretations, *interpretations which* in their flowing connectedness *constitute the temporal unity of the immanent content in its sinking back into pastness*" (Husserl 1966a, p. 92, emphasis added).

set up is "a nonpresent, a past and unreal present." Given this, the relation between the present retention and what it retains can be taken as one of indication. *Standing in the place of* this expired impressional content, the retention that is now acts as an indicative sign for it. It is a presence pointing to an absence. Insofar as the perception of a temporally extended event requires retention, the living present can function in perception only by being "continually compounded with a nonpresence."[23]

In spite of these agreements, there is a significant difference between Husserl's and Derrida's positions. It stems from Husserl's insistence that the absent impression is its retention's origin, its *raison d'être.* Had there been no original impression with its content, there would have been nothing to retain. In this, the retention shows a certain similarity to the word functioning as an indicative sign for a mental act. For Husserl, the *raison d'être* of such a sign is its referent—i.e., the act itself. If our mental acts were never originally present, if we had never had an experience of them, we would lack all motivation to take linguistic signs as indicating their presence in other persons' minds. For such signs to function as indications, that is, for them to stand in the place of their referents, more than the absence of such referents is required. A motivational basis, one presumably grounded in our own inner experience, must also be assumed. The same can be said of retention if its relation to the retained is indicative. For indication to work, a motivation must be assumed. But this requires more than the presence of the indicator. It requires some form of direct experience that would move us to take it as "standing for" its referent. The same holds for the association that Husserl places at the origin of the motivation to take a thing as the sign for something else. To form an association, I must have, at least at *some time,* experienced each of the different terms I associate.

A subsequent section will discuss the associative basis of temporalization. For the present, it is sufficient to note how for Husserl both presence and absence, both immediate experience and indicative substitution work in the positing of the identical temporal position. Presence is required in the form of the immediately given impression. This is the presence of the ultimately constituting hyletic material, which

23. As Seebohm indicates, this compounding with nonpresence occurs throughout the retentional chain, because each retention "refers to some other retentions as its protention and to a continuum of other retentions as its own specific past horizon." Given this, "what is absent in the proper sense in the field of retentions is absent in a formal sense" for each member of the field (Seebohm 1995, p. 193).

is uncovered in the final stage of the reduction. The absence of this hyletic material as it slips into pastness is matched by its repetitive retrieval by the retentional process. This retrieval, as I said, involves indication insofar as what we once immediately experienced is no longer present.

Here ideality and indication function together. For Husserl, this holds because the retained content has a one-in-many status. It is a unity that presents itself through a multitude of retentional modifications, each of which indicates it. For Derrida, it holds because the presence of the retained is based on a continuing process of re-presentation. The re-presentation is through a substitute presence, namely, that of each successive retention. As the retentions succeed one another, the identical position is constituted through a repeated act of substitution, which makes it "ideal" in the Derridean sense.

The two senses of ideality are, of course, quite different. In making ideality the result of indication, Derrida's emphasis is on the fact that the indicative relation *does not express a sense.* Its referent is not a one-in-many. The return that constitutes ideality for Derrida is merely a matter of repetitive substitution. Here, the relation of the indicator to the indicated remains one-to-one. Now, to read Husserl in this way is to miss the subtlety of his description of the constitution of an identical temporal position. Such constitution is not simply a matter of one thing, an individual retention, being substituted repeatedly for another. The model, here, is rather that of a multitude of different perceptual contents being taken as contents of one object. This object, as a one-in-many, is present as a sense. The same one-in-many structure characterizes the relation of the retention to the retained. Thus, Husserl's account requires a multitude of *different* retentions. Each retention is different insofar as each relates to the original impression, not directly, but through different portions of the same retentional chain. Each thus retains the original impression with a different degree of pastness. This, however, implies that the result of an increasing chain of retentions of retentions is both the same and different. It is the same insofar as the result is one and the same content occupying an identical temporal position. It is different insofar as this position is taken as departing in time. The increase of the chain yields the sense of departure. It does so because each new retention refers to the original impression through a series of retentions, each of which adds a further degree of pastness to its temporal position. Given this, the constitution of the impression's departing position is a

constitution of a sense. It is the constitution of the *sense of departure* that is essential to it as a position *in time.* As already noted, the position has this sense as a one-in-many, i.e., as unity constituted through an ongoing series of retentional modifications. The fact that each present modification re-presents it, this by standing in the place of it, does not undermine its presence as a sense. It simply shows how indication and ideality imply each other in Husserl's description. For Husserl, each retention functions as an indication, i.e., as a presence referring to an absence, by being part of a process that sets up a one-in-many.

This is why, for Husserl, retention is still perception. The fact that the perceived appears through a constitutive process, which sets up a one-in-many, does not contradict the perceptual character of our grasp of it through the retentional chain. It simply indicates that the presence of the retained is a constituted presence. The point holds even when we take the relation between retentions and the retained as one of representation. The self-identical temporal content that is constituted through repeated acts of representation is *not,* in Husserl's account, *itself a representation.* It is an original, if constituted, presence. Its originality signifies that it is given in the only way it can be given, i.e., as a constituted one-in-many. As such it stands for nothing except itself. This point can be put in terms of Husserl's remark that "perception is here the act that places something itself before our eyes, the act that *originally constitutes* something." Retention (or primary memory) is perception because it originally constitutes the past. In Husserl's words, "if we call perception *the act in which all 'origin'* lies, the act which *constitutes originally,* then *primary memory* [retention] *is perception*" (Husserl 1966a, 41).

The fact that retention is perception means that we must qualify Derrida's assertion: "The living now is constituted as an absolute perceptual source only in a state of continuity with retention taken as nonperception" (Derrida 1973a, p. 67). Derrida argues that it is "nonperception" because in retention "the perceived is not a present but a past" (p. 64). Such nonperception must be inherent in the living present given that we can see extended events only if we can retain *past* perceptions. Given that our certitude with regard to extended events depends on retention, Husserl, according to Derrida, can avoid this conclusion only by insisting on the perceptual character of retention. He must make retention share in the perceptual certitude of the living present. This is the certitude of our *present* perceiving. In Derrida's words, "The source of certitude in general is the primordial character of the

living now; it is necessary therefore [for Husserl] to keep retention in the sphere of primordial certitude" (p. 67). This, however, is impossible given that retention retains what is *not* present, and given that presence, for Husserl, grounds certitude. In analyzing this argument, we must be careful to distinguish retention from what it retains. Regarded in terms of what is immanent, i.e., its "intrinsic components," the living present contains only the *present* retentions of past impressions. It does not contain the nonpresent or past impressions. It rather contains their representatives. Thus, it is the "source for certitude" with regard to the past, through such representatives (i.e., the retentions themselves). Through them, it constitutes the past. Its certitude with regard to retentions is a certitude about a constituted sense of pastness. Put in another way, the relation to the identical temporal positions of departing past is intentional. The present retentions serve as the immanent basis for an intention to what is no longer present. Serving as this basis, they become what Husserl calls "representing contents" (*repräsentierende Inhalte*), i.e., contents that "unambiguously point to" (*eindeutig hinweisen*) their referents (Husserl 1984, p. 609). This pointing is inherent in their unification into an intention directed to a sense of pastness.[24]

The structure manifested by the retentional process is, according to the above, that of constitution in general. It has to be, given that retention is perception and perception is a constitutive act. The necessity, however, lies deeper than this. The constitutive structure of retention follows from the fact that constitution itself is a temporal process. It is, as I noted, a layered process, with each layer yielding a level of presence. The lowest level is that of the retentional process itself. This process supports the operation of every subsequent level of perception. It does so because, as temporal, constitution presupposes not just presence, but absence and retrieval. On the lowest level, constitution assumes the presence of a primal impression. Were this impression to remain, it could not begin its work. For constitution to proceed, the impression must give way to another. But this requires its absence. It presupposes a presence that has to be retrieved. That this retrieval requires representing contents, i.e., retentions that indicate or point to

24. If the retentional chains are disrupted, this intention can no longer be formed. My present retentions no longer function as representing contents, and I become "perplexed in my inner temporality" (Ms. B I 13, VI, p. 5). Given the dependence of the ego on its surrounding temporal environment, such disruption is also a "dissolution of the ego" (Ms. F IV 3, p. 57a). For a more extended account see Mensch 1988, pp. 79–80, 93–99, 212–15.

the absent content, does not undermine Husserl's account. It does not make constitution incapable of setting up a perceptual presence. What it does point to is the indicative basis of every constituted presence.

We may thus admit with Derrida that each substitution of the retention for the retained can, by itself, be considered as a one-to-one relation. We may even consider the present retention and what it retains as two distinct existences. Such a *static* conception of their relation, however, ignores the fact that the retentional process, if it is to continue to work, i.e., continue to retain, must be ongoing. *As ongoing, it transforms this one-to-one relation to a one-to-many relation.* Thus, each successive substitution of the retention for the retained involves a retentional modification, one that adds a degree of pastness. By virtue of this, the retained, as held fast by an increasing chain of retentions of retentions, undergoes a continual constitution of its one-in-many presence. It bears the sense of something continuing to depart into pastness.

Temporalization and the Autoaffection of Consciousness

The living present's life consists in more than the retention of past moments. It also involves the advance to new moments. Can such an advance be understood as a process of supplementation, one based on a constant attempt to supply a deficiency in original presence? Husserl and Derrida disagree radically in their answers. For Husserl, the advance, rather than coming from a lack of original presence, is a consequence of such presence. The new now is the result of the original, nonconstituted presence of a primal impression. Originally given, the impression is what is serially retained. A succession of primal impressions yields a succession of impressional moments. The retention of these results in the series of identical temporal positions that make up extended time.[25] For Derrida, by contrast, the origin of temporalization is something underlying every primal impression taken as an actual now. It is "the possibility of re-petition in its most general form." This, he writes, "is a possibility which not only must inhabit the pure actuality of the now but

25. In Husserl's words, "The primal impression is the absolute beginning of this production [of retentional modifications]. It is the primal source from which everything else is produced. . . . Consciousness is nothing without impression" (Husserl 1966a, p. 100). It does not even have temporality. Thus, "the primal impression" is "the moment of origin" (*das Ursprungsmoment*). It is "the primal source for the respective now of the constituted content," i.e., the content constituted through the series of retentional modifications (p. 101).

must constitute it through the very movement of differance it introduces." His position is that the advance of time to the next now can be thought of as "the return of the present which will be retained in a finite movement or retention." For Derrida, this "re-turn, as a return of the same is . . . inscribed in presence itself" (Derrida 1973a, p. 67). This is because underlying presence is what Derrida calls "differance." The "a" marks its distinction from the individual differences it occasions. "Differance" is "the operation of differing."[26] It "is always older than presence and procures for it its openness." By virtue of the difference in the now it occasions, differance "prevents us from speaking about a simple self-identity '*im selben Augenblick,*'" i.e., at the same moment (p. 68).

To move from this difference in the now to "the return of the present" that is time's advance, we have to speak of the autoaffection of the present. The argument here is that because there is "no simple self-identity" in the momentary present, there is an inherent divide in it. Its internal division makes it affect itself, the result being a new present. Derrida's position, then, is that the present returns to presence in a new now by affecting itself. The contrast here with Husserl could not be more marked. For Husserl, the fact that the "the primal impression . . . is not produced" by consciousness means that "consciousness is nothing without impression" (Husserl 1966a, p. 100). The now that animates consciousness is engendered by an externally provided impression. For Derrida, however, "the absolute novelty of each now is . . . engendered by nothing; it consists in a primordial impression that engenders itself." As just noted, this self-engendering is a result of an autoaffection. In Derrida's words, "The 'source point' or 'primordial impression,' that out of which the moment of temporalization is produced, is already pure auto-affection. . . . it is a pure production . . . it is a receiving that receives nothing" (Derrida 1973a, p. 83). This follows because what occasions it is nothing "empirical"—i.e., nothing external. The primal impression results from the difference introduced into the now by the original differance.

Derrida draws a number of consequences from the above. "Time," as "the 'movement' of this auto-affection," is actually "the 'movement' of this strange difference" (Derrida 1973a, p. 85). The "strange" difference is differance, taken as the "operation of differing." This operation results

26. Derrida 1973a, p. 88. It also signifies the action of deferring, i.e., "of postponing till later" (Derrida 1973b, p. 136). This sense, as will become apparent, is required for supplementation to be "successive supplementation."

in the "pure production" of the new now as well as the retention (or "retentional trace") of the now that this new now replaces. Both production and retention, as I said, make up the life of the living present. Thus, for Derrida, "The living present springs forth out of its nonidentity with itself" (ibid.). Differance is also responsible for this present's self-presence. According to Derrida, the living present cannot be present to itself unless it can return to itself—i.e., encounter its presence in a new or retained moment. This return arises from the "operation of differing," i.e., the action that introduces a "pure" difference into the now. Insofar as this yields both a new and a retained presence, "this pure difference . . . constitutes the self-presence of the living present" (ibid.). The term, "pure difference" thus designates the "non-identity with itself" of the living present's nowness, a nonidentity that allows it to affect itself. Insofar as this self-affection results in a return to presence, it permits the living present to be self-present.

For Husserl, as I mentioned, the advance of time is the result of a succession of primordial impressions. Their successive presence *is* the experienced succession of impressional moments. The premise here is that distinct impressions give rise to distinct moments. Time's advance thus depends on the impressions' *not* being implicitly included in each other. They must count as distinct original presences. Derrida's account of autoaffection makes him deny this. He writes:

> The process by which the living now, produced by spontaneous generation, must, in order to be a now and to be retained in another now, affect itself without recourse to anything empirical but with a new primordial actuality in which it [the living now] would become a non-now, a past now—this process is indeed a pure auto-affection in which the same is the same only in being affected by the other, only by becoming the other of the same. This auto-affection must be pure since the primordial impression is here affected by nothing other than itself, by the absolute 'novelty' of another primordial impression. (Derrida 1973a, p. 85)

To claim that the primordial impression is "affected by nothing other than itself" and to equate this with its being affected by "another primordial impression" is actually to suppose that the second is implicitly included in the first. For Derrida it is, insofar as difference is inherent in the first. This difference allows the primordial impression to affect itself. In other words, its being affected by "another primordial impres-

sion" is actually a self-affection. Thus, the advance of time is not, as it is for Husserl, a function of distinct identities—i.e., distinct primordial impressions affecting consciousness. Difference is, rather, prior to identity. The "pure difference" inherent in each impression makes it affect itself. This auto-affection gives rise to the next impression. Each impression thus has its identity as a distinct impression "only by becoming the other of the same." It has it by virtue of the self-affection of the same, which makes explicit the otherness, the "pure difference," inherent in the same. This also holds for the past moments given by the retentional "traces." They are also inherent in the present by virtue of the "pure difference" they embody. This difference makes the "living now . . . affect itself . . . with a new primordial actuality," which is a next now, a new impressional moment. This, however, makes it "become a non-now, a past now." Given by the retentional traces they leave behind, such past moments come to be posited as identical temporal positions in departing time.[27]

Once we take this difference as expressing a lack, a *deficiency* inherent in the living present, the above account can be put in terms of the notion of "supplementation." To do so is to assert that this deficiency requires constant supplementation, a supplementation that yields the arising of time in both temporal dimensions. Thus, the nonplenitude of presence of the living now is supplemented in the direction of the past by the retention that stands in the place of the just-departed moment. In the future it is supplemented by the new now. Both supplementations

27. The key to this argument is that difference is prior to identity. This is what allows Derrida to escape Evans's critique. Commenting on Derrida's assertion that "the primordial impression is here affected by nothing other than itself, by the absolute 'novelty' of another primordial impression which is another now," Evans writes that this "betrays a misplaced concreteness. The 'nothing other than itself' must move on the generic level or rather on the level of form . . . but the 'another now' must be a particular primal impression" (Evans 1991, p. 123). Since difference is prior to identity, we cannot think of otherness of the "another now" as involving *already given* identities—i.e., distinct primordial impressions. Neither can we think of the "generic level" as expressing what is *common to such identities.* The level on which differance functions is prior to that assumed by such thoughts. Thus, on this level of functioning, one can assert that the now that affects the present now is both formally the same with this now and *also* other than it. This is because this formal identity includes the otherness that *will manifest itself* in another primal impression. This inclusion is what Derrida means by differance. As Bernet puts it: "The thought of 'différance' contests the philosophy of presence in the name not of absence but of the indissoluble 'entanglement' of presence and absence" (Bernet 1995, p. 3). It is this entanglement that allows one to say that within the formal identity of the "nothing other than itself" there is the separating absence or alterity of "another primordial impression which is another now."

are based on an original nonplenitude, i.e., the absence that is implicit in this pure difference and, indeed, in differance itself. Both occur together. Thus, the supplementation by the new now makes the present now a just-past moment. But this departure from presence is one with the supplementation occasioned by retention. The result, then, is time. "Time," as I cited Derrida, "is the 'movement' of this strange difference." Its origin is the differance that is prior to the self-identity of the living now.

To fill out Derrida's conception of this movement, a second sense of "differance" must be brought in. As I said, there is "supplementation" only because there is a deficiency, a lack in the living present. This lack is that of an inherent self-identity. It is a function of the difference inhabiting the presence of this present. At its basis is "differance" understood as "the operation of differing." Now, a second sense of differance is required by the fact that time does not happen all at once. Its movement is experienced as successive. This means that the supplementation that yields time must itself be a "successive supplementation." For Husserl, the successive quality of time is ultimately the result of the successive presence of primordial impressions. But Derrida, having dismissed such primordiality, cannot use it to account for succession. Its origin is, in fact, differance understood as deferring or delaying, i.e., differance in the sense "of postponing till later" (Derrida 1973b, p. 136). Differance, then, means both differing and delaying. In Derrida's words, "the operation of differing . . . both fissures and retards presence, submitting it simultaneously to primordial division and delay" (Derrida 1973a, p. 88). By virtue of the first sense, "the same is the same only in being affected by the other, only by becoming the other of the same" (p. 85). This "auto-affection," insofar as it results in the "becoming the other of the same," brings about supplementation. By virtue of the second sense, this supplementation is successive.

The concept of supplementation helps us understand Derrida's assertion that "differance is always older than presence and procures for it its openness" (Derrida 1973a, p. 68). The sense of "openness" meant here can be taken from his statement that "this concept of primordial supplementation not only implies nonplenitude of presence . . . ; it designates this function of substitutive supplementation in general, the 'in the place of' (*für etwas*) structure which belongs to every sign in general" (p. 88). Given this, we have to say that the "openness" of presence is an openness to language. It is its openness to the indicative linguistic signs that manifest the "'in the place of' structure" that is inherent in supple-

mentation. Insofar as such supplementation is a function of the "differance" underlying presence, the latter "procures for it its openness." This openness appears in the repeated return to the same that is, for Derrida, the origin of the ideality of signs.

As for differance being "older than presence," this claim follows from the "pure difference" it occasions being prior to self-identity. By virtue of this priority, the presence of self-identity can be seen to arise through the process of supplementation, that is, through the living present's repetitively standing in the place of itself. As a result, the other that affects the same is not itself a presence—a primordial impression in Husserl's sense. The affection, as grounded in the "pure difference" of the now, is prior to this presence. Thus, the supplement that does appear through autoaffection stands *in the place of* the same. Instead of primordiality, we have, then, a serial relation of indication, i.e., of signifiers standing in the place of signifiers. This serial relation of signification is inherent in the concept of supplementation. In Derrida's words, "The structure of supplementation is quite complex. As a supplement, the signifier does not represent first and simply the absent signified. Rather, it is substituted for another signifier" (Derrida 1973a, p. 89). The process continues iteratively, with signifier signifying signifier. The result of this repetition is the ongoing presence of the living present. It is its ideality, given that it is constituted through repetition.

As already noted, retention, for Derrida, is also a process of supplementation. In the retentional chain, each member "stands in the place of the next," supplementing it as it departs into pastness. For Husserl, of course, the anchor of this repeated return to a departing moment is an absolutely given primordial impression, one that was originally present at a given instant. For Derrida, however, there are no primordial impressions in this Husserlian sense. There is only "the play of difference" (Derrida 1973a, p. 89). Its result is simply signs successively standing for signs. This cannot be otherwise, given Derrida's denial of primordiality. The ultimate consequence of making the "operation of differing" primordial is, in fact, to seal us within a world of signification.

Language and Self-Presence

As observed in the previous section, differance makes presence open to language. As "the operation of differing," its result may be termed "the play of difference." For Derrida, "the play of difference is the movement

of idealization" (Derrida 1973a, p. 89). This is because it is responsible for the repeated return to the same through which the ideal is constituted. This holds for the ideality of signs as well as the ideality of the living present. According to Derrida, "the more ideal a signifier is, the more it augments the power to repeat presence, the more it keeps, reserves, and capitalizes on its sense" (ibid.). The origin of this "power" is the "pure difference" that, inhabiting the living present, causes it to differ with itself, affect itself, and, as a result, return to itself. This return is the repetition of presence presumed by the ideality of signs. So regarded, their ideality is actually a manifestation of the ideality of the living present. For Derrida, "the ultimate form of ideality, the ideality of ideality, that in which in the last instance one may anticipate or recall all repetition, is the *living present*, the self-presence of transcendental life" (p. 6). It is such because of "the play of differance" at work within it.

The living present is the "self-presence of transcendental life" because its "life" is our own. Just as its self-presence is a function of the return to presence that originates in differance, so our own reflexivity, our own self-presence is a result of this return. If the defining characteristic of subjectivity is its reflexivity, i.e., its ability to access itself, then as Derrida says, "the movement of differance is not something that happens to a transcendental subject; it produces a subject." It does so since it makes the living present differ with itself and affect itself. The result of this autoaffection is a present (either retained or new) through which the subject can access itself. Here, of course, the priority of differance to identity is crucial. The subject is not something already given that experiences an affection. It is produced by this affection. Thus, Derrida immediately adds: "Auto-affection is not a modality of experience that characterizes a being that would already be itself (*autos*). It produces sameness as self-relation within self-difference; it produces sameness as the nonidentical" (Derrida 1973a, p. 82). What is actually produced is the supplement. The new present produced by the autoaffection supplements the original. As a present, it is the same. As an addition, i.e., as something standing in the place of it, it is nonidentical.

The supplement, for Derrida, is the basis of the "for-itself" quality of a subject. It can be for itself only if it can access itself. Such access is through its supplement. It is through what stands in the place of itself. In Derrida's words, "the for-itself of self-presence (*für sich*) . . . arises in the role of supplement as primordial substitution, in the form [of the] 'in the place of' (*für etwas*), that is, as we have seen, in the very operation

of significance in general. The *for-itself* would be an *in-the-place-of-itself:* put *for itself,* instead of itself" (Derrida 1973a, p. 89). With this, we have Derrida's claim that self-presence of the subject is mediated by indicative signs. What underlies this claim is the fact that our self-presence *necessarily* exhibits the "in the place of form" of the indicative relation. This necessity follows from the constitution of the subject. For Derrida, "the movement of difference . . . produces a subject." If it does, then its self-presence must be a matter of indication. In fact, it involves indicative signification in the most original way possible. Such signification is not something that comes to a subject. It is not something added on. It is a feature of the self-presence that makes it self-conscious. Given this, we have to say that its being a subject is one with its openness to language. Both are constituted simultaneously.[28]

By now, it should be clear why Derrida opposes so strenuously Husserl's claim that indication has no place in interior monologue. To abstract from indication is not just to do away with the possibility of signification. It is to eliminate the very self-presence that characterizes our consciousness. For Derrida, it is to make consciousness itself impossible. The best way to explain this is in terms of the connection Derrida draws between the voice and consciousness. The requirement of the voice arises because the indicative relation needs a physical medium—be this an object, a written sign, or the sounding voice. The medium makes present the absent referent by substituting the medium's own presence for that of the referent. Thus, in communicative speech, the voice indicates by standing in the place of the mental life of the other. This life, which is not itself present, is made present through the physically sounding voice. For Derrida, the same requirement holds for our self-presence. Insofar as it involves indication, self-presence is actually a function of "hearing oneself speak." If we ask why the voice (as opposed, say, to writing) is required, Derrida replies: "The operation of 'hearing oneself speak' is an auto-affection of a unique kind" (Derrida 1973a, p. 78). This is because "the voice meets no obstacle to its emission in the world" (p. 79). Thus, "the subject can hear or speak to himself and be affected by the signifier he produces, without passing through an external detour, the world, the sphere of what is not 'his own'" (p. 78).[29] The necessity of

28. This is why Derrida can speak of "arche writing." Crowell seems to ignore this when he sees the reference to such writing as simply a matter of "convenience" (Crowell 1996, p. 64).

29. Waldenfels notes that the sphere of the voice actually also includes what is *not* "our own"—i.e., "the voice of the Other." He writes: "The 'sphere of ownness' originates

the voice thus arises because indication has been explained in terms of supplementation. But the origin of the latter is autoaffection. Given that indication requires a physical medium, so does the autoaffection of consciousness. It requires the voice, considered as a medium that the self can produce without dependence on anything external. If we accept this, then Derrida's conclusion follows: "No consciousness is possible without the voice. The voice is the being which is present to itself in the form of universality, as con-sciousness: the voice *is* consciousness" (pp. 79–80). The "universality" referred to here is that of the repeated return to the same that makes the living present "the ultimate form of ideality." The return is based on its autoaffection. Insofar as this requires the voice, so does consciousness. The subject has "con-sciousness" by being self-present, i.e., by embodying the *self*-presence of the living present. Derrida's assertion that the voice "is the being which is present to itself in the form of universality" holds because this self-presence involves the *repeated* return to the same. We are present to ourselves through an ongoing process of autoaffection. The medium through which this return is accomplished, i.e., the voice, achieves "the form of universality" through this repetition. It thus exhibits the ideal universality of the significant sign. The upshot is that our own self-presence (our consciousness) occurs through the "ideal" spoken signs composing our language.

Derrida's contention that "the voice is consciousness" is both startling and problematic. Since the voice is the speaking voice, it seems to deprive all nonspeaking creatures of consciousness. This, however, returns us to the widely discredited Cartesian position that animals, lacking mind and, hence, consciousness, are but machines. Derrida seems to embrace this consequence when he asserts, "Deaf and dumb go hand in hand" (Derrida 1973a, p. 78). The inability to hear oneself speak makes one "dumb," i.e., deprives one of mind. Can we really assert that the voice is a unique kind of autoaffection, one absolutely required for

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from an 'abstractive epoché' which abstracts from the constitutive achievement of others and consequently presupposes them. If we start from the performance of speech, monologue and dialogue appear as two forms of speech which, according to the particular situation and through variable forms of intertwining and emphasis, are always both manifest at once" (Waldenfels 1993, p. 68). The inference is: "Thus, the irreducible 'non-presence' that Derrida looks for in his book on Husserl characterizes not only writing but also the voice. However, this is primarily the voice of the other, and one's own voice only insofar as it responds and has always responded to the other's voice" (p. 73). Derrida, however, ignores this Levinasian theme. His focus is on the sounding voice, i.e., the voice as supplying the physical medium required by indication.

conscious life? Such life certainly requires temporalization. Temporalization may, indeed, be a process of autoaffection. But time does not stop when I cease speaking. Neither does my consciousness. The retentional process continues apace. I continue to be aware of departing moments, of what I have done, whether I speak or not. The same self-awareness seems present in animals even though they cannot speak.

Given these difficulties, why does Derrida argue that "the voice *is* consciousness"? The contention seems to spring from a motivation present from the beginning of *Speech and Phenomena.* Derrida wants to deny Husserl's contention that indicative signs are absent in interior monologue. Given that they are present, the necessity that all indicative signs require a sensual basis leads to his assertion that the voice is this basis. The question here is whether consciousness, conceived as a process of autoaffection, requires this basis. If it does, then Derrida's conclusion follows. This question can be expressed in terms of temporalization, understood as a process of autoaffection. Does autoaffection require the voice as a medium? To consider it as an indicative process does imply the presence of *some* medium. But why cannot this medium be the impressions we receive from the world? For Derrida, of course, this hypothesis is ruled out by his denial of primordiality. The medium cannot be received. It must be something the subject gives himself. For Husserl, as we shall see, the process of temporalization can be seen as an autoaffection. It also can be understood as requiring a medium. But this medium is not limited to the voice, i.e., to the impressions *it* provides us. "Consciousness," for its autoaffection, requires only the primal impressions that set the temporal process going.

Instinct and Autoaffection

In *Speech and Phenomena,* Derrida's account of time rests ultimately on his concept of differance. Why should we accept this concept? Is there any evidence for it? Given the nature of the concept, we cannot, of course, ask that it be manifested directly in some self-giving insight. This, however, does not mean that it is some "arbitrary story." As Thomas Seebohm notes, "Nobody would be interested in it, if it was not about something that belongs to our condition with necessity" (Seebohm 1995, p. 200). Pertaining to who we are, it must manifest itself, if not directly, then in a "trace." Such a trace, if it is to be experienced at all, must have phenomenologically verifiable consequences. Regarded phenomenologically,

these can be considered as "transcendental clues" pointing back to the functioning of this differance. Another way of regarding the question of evidence is to recall Derrida's contention that his position is anchored in Husserl's own account of time. A regard to the latter should, accordingly, help us to look for evidence for Derrida's conclusions. Correspondingly, these conclusions should guide us in searching out the essential points of Husserl's account—all of this assuming that both are concerned not with an arbitrary story, but rather with what belongs to our condition. Now, Husserl's analyses, particularly in the late manuscripts, do show him positing a certain difference (or nonidentity) at the origin of time. This difference, however, appears in a way unsuspected by Derrida. Based upon our instinctual bodily being, it originally exists between feeling and content.

Husserl's descriptions of this difference are, in some points, strikingly similar to Derrida's. We cannot, for example, speak of it as a difference between two distinct presences, i.e., between a given ego and the primal impressions it encounters. The difference is rather internal to the ego. Thus, Husserl, on the one hand asserts: "Content is nonego (*das Ichfremde*), feeling is already egological." He also, however, follows this assertion by claiming, "the ego and its nonego are inseparable; the ego is a feeling ego with every content" (Ms. C 16 V, p. 68a). The two assertions come together in the fact that the ego's awaking to its self-presence requires content. The "nonego" that is content is, in fact, part of the awake ego. This point carries over to the Husserlian account of our self-affection. Since the difference between content and the affection it engenders is *internal* to the awake ego, the ego can be said to affect *itself* through content. The affection, in other words, can be termed an "autoaffection." At its basis is, of course, our instinctive need for contents—those that fulfill our bodily needs. With this, the Husserlian parallel to Derrida's account assumes what can be taken as a "biological" (as opposed to a dialectical) cast. Thus, for Husserl, the result of the ego's affection is its instinctive striving. Correspondingly, the "movement of the difference" is the movement of this striving. Insofar as such striving gives rise to the retentional and protentional processes, time can be considered the movement of this difference. Ultimately, however, what drives the temporal process is the input of fresh impressional content. The advance of time, understood as the arising of the new now, requires not just striving but the continual arising of the content that provokes striving. In this context, to claim that time's advance is a function of our

autoaffection is to assert *both* the primordial givenness of such content *and* its being internal to the awake ego.

All of the elements of this Husserlian parallel have been discussed before. Previous chapters have considered the ties between instinctual striving, the processes of retention and protention, and the advance of time. Rather than repeating these discussions, I shall simply note a few of the most important points. The first of these concerns the Husserlian analogue to Derrida's account of the subject. For Derrida, differance underlies the subject's self-presence, because its self-presence is through its affecting itself. The affection allows it to return to itself either in a retained or a new moment. For Husserl, the same general process of self-affection and self-presence follows from the difference, internal to the awake ego, between content and the affection it arouses. This affection, as we have seen, manifests itself in the striving that retains the past and protends the future. Here, however, the primordial level of our self-awareness is not just that of our being present to ourselves through our retentions and protentions. It arises from the self-referential character of retention and protention. It is an awareness of ourselves *as* retaining and anticipating. Ultimately it is an awareness of ourselves in terms of the striving that animates these processes. This awareness of ourselves as striving requires that the ego have a surrounding temporal environment. Without the temporal environment provided by retention and protention neither experience nor striving, that is, neither affection nor action, would be egological. This is because the environment defines the ego in "concrete being" as a temporal center. The implication, here, is one that has been drawn a number of times. For Husserl, the ego "awakes" in its "concrete being" as a "center for affections and actions" through the temporalization that affection provokes. Insofar as this temporalization involves retention and protention, this awakening is also a self-awaking, i.e., a self-presence through what we retain and anticipate. In the Derridean parallel, the arising of the ego comes from the constitution of its "for itself" quality, this being understood as an indicative self-relation. The ego is a "for-itself" by having a re-presentative stand for itself. Insofar as this requires a physical medium, subjectivity, as "con-sciousness," requires the voice. Husserl's account, with its demand for affecting contents, can also be said to require a medium. This, however, is provided by primal impressions that the world affords us. Internal to the awake ego, they provide the flowing "content that streams through it" as it remains now.

A further point has to do with the missing element in Derrida's description of retention as indication. As our last section noted, for indication to work some motivation must be assumed. Indication requires more than the experience of the indicator. To take it as standing for its referent, we have to have some experience of the latter. There must, moreover, be a certain association between the two, one which would motivate us to take the indicator as indicating the referent. Husserl's description of temporalization as instinctive striving meets these demands. Since the motivation is provided by the striving occasioned by the affecting content, the experience of this content is one with the motivation. The striving, for example, that results in retention is a striving occasioned by an affecting content; it is a striving to hold fast this content as it passes away. Insofar as the *present retention* holds fast a *past content* by standing in place of it, their indicative relation has its motivational basis in such striving. Ultimately, the link between the indicator and the indicated is the "primal association" that is based on our bodily being and its instinctive needs. This is what makes some contents affect us and what leaves us indifferent—i.e., without motivation—with respect to others.

Mutatis mutandis, the same point can be made with regard to protention. Insofar as a present protention can be taken as standing in the place of a future content, a similar indicative relation can be said to exist between the two. Of course, given that we have not yet experienced this future content, we cannot say that *its* experience motivates the striving that brings about the protentional relation. What, then, is the experiential basis for our taking a present protention as standing for an anticipated content? An everyday example gives the answer. Lifting a glass of water to my lips, I anticipate the sensations of water in my mouth. This is because I have experienced the action before. Each time I repeat it, the same general series of sensations is experienced. Anticipating, I project forward the features of my past experience. Such features shape my general expectations. Thus, each time I raise a glass to my lips, my present experience includes the protentions (the indicative having-in-advance) of experiencing the liquid. Pointing toward the future, such protentions re-present it to me as what I shall experience. The specific motivation comes, then, from my *present experience as shaped by the past.* Beyond this, there is a general motivation springing from my instinctive needs. Its basis is the above-mentioned "primal association" that links specific contents to specific strivings. Thus, my striving towards water comes from my being affected by thirst. I lift the glass because I am

thirsty. In other words, my present experience of the glass is combined with a present experience of thirst. Both, of course, are informed by my past experience regarding the quenching of this thirst. My underlying motivation to drink, however, does not come from the past. Its origin is my *present* experience of instinctive need. Because of this, my having-in-advance includes an instinctive drive towards a future *having in the present.* I protend (or indicatively re-present) the future as that which I shall presently experience. Thus, the actual presence of water in my mouth appears as the fulfillment of both my instinctive striving and my specific expectations.

A final point concerns the fact that, for Husserl, instinctual striving is not simply a striving after particular contents. Like the constitution it drives, striving is a layered process. Its initial goal may have been a particular set of contents, but with their synthesis, the goal takes on a new form. This is because the fulfillment of instinctual striving on one level provides the material for the intentions that express such striving on the next. With a particular level of fulfillment, as I cited Husserl, "the instinct is not at an end. It takes on new modes" (Ms. C 13 I, p. 5a). Now, this taking on new modes can be understood as a feature of Derrida's "movement of the difference." For Husserl, however, such movement does not just concern temporalization. It involves our ascending the levels of constitutive life. With the constitution, on each level, of a new form of affecting content, we have a *new appearance of the difference* between this content and the striving it arouses. Internal to the ego that is present on this level, this difference can be said to occasion a *new self-affection.* The resultant striving leads to the constitution of a more developed content and with this to yet another appearance of the difference. Thus, each new constituted content awakes the ego to a new level of striving, one which directs it beyond itself.

These points make clear the distinct character of Husserl's account. "Differance," for him, is not a metaphysical concept. Rather, the Husserlian parallel to this concept is founded on our instinctive, bodily being. Thus, the "movement of difference" is the movement of our instinctive striving. Instinctive striving gives rise not just to the advance of time, but to all the levels of temporal synthesis. As such, it gives rise to continually new forms of difference and self-affection. Now, the fact that this "movement" is instinctual shows that it is based on need. As such, it points beyond the self to what the world provides. It is because of this that the "movement" demands the continual arising of new impressions. As I

noted, the advance of time depends on primordial impressions; so does striving insofar as it results from the affections their contents provide. To describe this advance as an autoaffection simply emphasizes the fact that such primordiality is prior to the awake ego. Its awakening is one with the retentional and protentional processes that make it self-present as a center of experience. Given that affecting contents are inherent in its being a self, their affecting it can be described as its self-affection.

This account may be contrasted with Derrida's claim that differance is *prior* to identity and, hence, to the identity of the self. For Derrida this claim signifies that the identity of the self is founded on the "pure difference" that inhabits its living present. For Husserl, in a certain respect, this is also true. Difference appears when he asserts, "content is nonego." The identity of the self founded on the difference between the ego and content makes Husserl add that this nonego is not "something separate from the ego; between them there is no room for a turning towards. Rather the ego and its nonego are inseparable" (Ms. C 16 V, p. 68a). This inseparability, which includes and is based on a difference, is a phenomenological one. No principle of differance, working in secret and available phenomenologically only through its consequences, is required by it. The same holds for Husserl's descriptions of the ego's autoaffection, which are based on the givenness of contents and the affections they arouse. What distinguishes his account of this autoaffection is, then, his insistence on the primordiality of affecting contents. These allow him to speak of difference in phenomenological terms that are far more direct than those Derrida can employ. Moreover, because autoaffection requires given contents—basically those arising from our bodily needs and activities—the self-presence based on such contents does *not* require language. It is actually inherent in the instinctive striving we share with other animals.

Language and Re-Presentation

The self-presence that distinguishes us from animals occurs through language. We can present ourselves to ourselves through significant signs. This fact is central for Derrida. In *Speech and Phenomena,* the concept of differance is introduced to open up the living present of the subject to the agency of signs. His whole attack on the "metaphysics of presence" is put forward as a critique of phenomenology's tendency to reduce everything to immediate presence. Focusing on presence, Husserl's phe-

nomenology supposedly misses the absence required by language. It cannot grasp how its signs function in the absence of their referents. Thus, in Derrida's view, phenomenology's demand for presence is actually a closing off of the subject. Its ideal, as expressed by the reduction, is a solitude lacking the openness required by language. How accurate is this critique? Can phenomenological description allow for this openness? Can it give an account of the absence (or nonpresence) that allows signs to stand in the place of their referents?

To answer these questions, I have to return to the phenomenological description of how we grasp an object, for example, a box. For the moment, my description will assume that the primordial hyletic data have already undergone a constitution that allows me to speak of perceptions corresponding to distinct perspectival views of the box. Let us say, then, I pick up the box and turn it in my hands. As I do, I experience sequences of perceptions that are ordered perspectivally. One sequence is given by turning it in one direction; another occurs as, manipulating it with my hands, I turn it in a different direction. A third occurs as I open it up, look inside, and then close it again. The number of such sequences can be multiplied indefinitely. One sequence can lead to another. I turn the box in one direction. But I can also, at any point, rotate it in a different direction. Part of my grasp of the box is my seeing how each perception can serve as a starting point for a different sequence of perceptions, one which, if I continue the rotation, will return me to the same perception. Seeing this is grasping the interrelatedness, the coherence, of the various sequences. Together they form a whole, one which has a reference to a single three-dimensional object. Taken as pertaining to each other through their membership in this set of interrelated, perspectival patterns, the perceptions are also taken as pertaining to one and the same object.

To describe my grasp of the features of the box, this broad sketch has to be refined. The sequences of perceptions that reoccur as I turn the box in a given direction include, as sub-sequences, those that correspond to particular features. Thus, rotating a square box in one direction, I experience the recurring perceptions that correspond to a given corner. Rotating it in another direction, another recurring sub-sequence appears. It, too, corresponds to the same corner. Just as I passed from the first set of perceptions to the second, so I can pass to a third. When I grasp the interrelatedness of the different sequences corresponding to the given corner, I grasp the overall pattern through which the corner

appears as a corner. The same holds for each of the box's features. To grasp them as features *of* the box, I must of course, grasp the box in the totality of its features. I do this when I grasp the total pattern that includes the patterns corresponding to its individual features. This description should not lead us to think that in an actual experience of the box, I first grasp the features and then grasp the box. The operations just described proceed more or less simultaneously. The intentions that animate them are subject to mutual correction as we adjust our grasp of the different features to one another as well as to our grasp of the box as a totality containing such features. In a certain sense, we can speak here of a kind of "parallel processing" animated by a whole collection of interpretative intentions. Each such intention corresponds to a given interpretative process, which proceeds in parallel with the others. Each such process informs the others of the success or failure of its particular interpretation. This is part of their mutual adjustment.

This description returns us to a point made in the last chapter: when we say that a perception is "of" an object, its intentionality involves a mediated reference. An initial sense of such mediation can be gained by recalling the role that patterns play in this reference. A perception refers to an object in its coherence with the other members of the perspectivally ordered series. The reference is through them. More precisely, it is through their pattern. The mediating role of a pattern follows from the fact that we cannot posit a corresponding unity on the basis of a randomly arranged multiplicity. The multiplicity must exhibit a definite sequence—that is, it must exhibit a pattern. This necessity is apparent in the sub-sequences that form the total pattern of a given feature. Their common reference to this feature is undermined when they clash, i.e., when they cannot integrate themselves into a total pattern. Similarly, the patterns corresponding to the features must cohere, i.e., form an overall pattern, if they are to refer to one and the same object, e.g., a box.

In pointing to the necessity of coherence, the above description implies a whole series of nonequivalencies. An individual perception is, by definition, not equivalent to the retained groups of perceptions that correspond to a given feature. These groups, in turn, are not the same as the pattern that they exhibit. The latter appears through their sequencing. To focus on the pattern is to focus on such sequencing. Similarly, the pattern is not equivalent to a given feature of the box. Thus, the corner, taken as something there, adds what Husserl calls a "point of unification" to the pattern. It appears as a feature that shows

itself *through* the pattern. It is a one-in-many, a common point of reference for the multiple recurrences of the pattern. The feature, in turn, is not the same as the box. The box, in its being-there, is taken as exhibiting itself through its different features. Such nonequivalencies are crucial for a phenomenological understanding of language. This is because they play the same role as nonpresence or absence in the Derridean sense. They allow for the openness of language. They do so by introducing into the phenomenological context the nonidentity that permits the indicative relation. What we have, then, is a highly mediated indicative relation, one that follows these nonequivalencies. Thus, within the phenomenological context, we can speak of an individual perception standing for the retained sequences that correspond to a given feature of the object. Such sequences, in turn, can be seen as standing for the pattern that appears through them. The pattern, itself, stands for the feature showing itself through it, while this feature can be taken as standing for or indicating the box itself.

The general sense of such nonequivalencies can be put in terms of Husserl's assertion, "The object of consciousness, in its self identity throughout the flowing of experience, does not enter into this flowing from outside. It lies included within it as a sense; it is this [sense] as an intentional performance of the synthesis of consciousness" (Husserl 1963, p. 80). Broadly speaking, this performance (*Leistung*) involves our distinguishing the interrelated sets of perceptions that make up our experience of the box. This requires their *synthesis*, that is, our putting them together or connecting them so as to distinguish the patterns that give us the box's features. A further, overall synthesis is required to give us this box having these features.

As my description of grasping the box indicates, this general account can be refined. There are a number of interpretative intentions and "performances" involved in the grasp of the sense of the box. On the lowest level, there are the intentions that yield the individual perceptions as distinct experiences occupying definite positions in departing time. Here, present retentions are taken as representations of past impressions—this, through their attached chains of "retentional modifications." The perceptions that result from this process can also be said to undergo interpretation as we take them to be members of specific sets of retained perceptions. These, in turn, form the basis of the interpretative intentions directed to particular patterns. Similarly, the move from the patterns to the features and from the features to the box all require

interpretative intentions. In each case, our "performance" involves taking elements on one level as standing for or re-presenting elements on the next. The possibility of such re-presentation is based on the nonequivalence of the elements occupying different levels.

Husserl's understanding of this nonequivalence comes out most clearly in his doctrine of the object as an "X." The doctrine gives us a further sense of the mediated character of intentionality. According to the above, each describable feature of the box, its inside, its corners, etc., shows itself through a distinct pattern of appearances. The interpretations of these yield its individual features, the features that enter into the description of the box. This description provides the senses we can predicate of the box. As for the box itself, its unity of sense is a unity of unities. It is the final point of unification of the various predicate senses. Husserl calls this point an X. He describes it as the "central point of unity," the "bearer of the [perceptual] predicates." The predicates are its predicates, "unthinkable without it, and yet distinguishable from it" (Husserl 1976, p. 301). He terms the point the "'object,' the 'identical,' the 'determinable subject of its possible predicates'—'the pure X in abstraction from its possible predicates'" (p. 302). This abstraction is its *nonequivalence* to such predicate senses. Because the object is not the same as its predicate senses, it can be distinguished from them. The same point holds when Husserl describes each of the predicate senses as an X. For Husserl, "distinct senses are related to the *same* object only insofar as they are capable of being ordered into unities of sense, unities in which *the determinable X's of the unified [lower level] senses achieve a coincidence with each other and with the X of the total sense of the ongoing unity of sense*" (pp. 303–4). Such coincidence is not an identification. It is not a collapse of a pattern and its point of unification. When we identify a pattern, we can be said to grasp the basis for a predicable sense. The sense itself is a one-in-many. As such, it involves the thought of a common referent for the sequenced multiplicity, i.e., the pattern, that forms its basis. The referent is the pattern's "point of unification." Thus, the lower-level senses, which are based on particular patterns, refer to the object's features through their particular points of unification, their "determinable X's." The latter refer to the object itself when these determinable X's are themselves taken as having a single referent, this being "the X of the total sense." Such a total sense includes the total pattern, just as the individual senses include the individual patterns corresponding to the features. The move from the first set of patterns to the total pattern is, here, medi-

ated by the "determinable X's" of the predicate senses. Grasping them, we grasp the features. The nonidentity of the features with the object is a function of the X of the object, taken as "pure X in abstraction from its possible predicates."

What drives Husserl to this talk of the "X" is the nonequivalency inherent in the perceptual process. In the perceptual flow, as he writes, the object "is apprehended continuously, but continuously presents itself differently; it is '*the same*' but is given with other predicates, with another determining content" (Husserl 1976, p. 301). The object is the same as a one-in-many. As such, however, it is not equivalent to the multitude it unifies. A single perceptually based predicate sense cannot, by itself, posit the X—e.g., the box. Conversely, the X cannot display its "total sense" (*Gesamtsinn*) in a single predicate sense. *A fortiori*, the same point holds with respect to the relation between an individual perception and the object. Strictly speaking, we do not "see" the box. As a total unity of senses, the box is absent on the perceptual level. To posit it as something there, affording us perceptions, we have to take it as a correlate of an indefinitely extendible range of perceptions. Its nonequivalence to our retained perceptions, which form a finite collection, underlies the thought of its transcendence. To take it as transcendent, we also have to assume that we can return to it again and again as the same object. We assume that it is there even when we choose not to regard it. This is part of what we mean when we say that its being is distinct from that of a momentary perception. This distinction is inherent in its status as an X. For Husserl, then, the object's reality—its presence as a "real unity"—does not contradict, but rather is based on its character as ideal, i.e., as a perceptually embodied one-in-many. Strictly speaking it is, as an X, a unity of multiple elements (predicate senses), which are themselves, as X's, unities of multiple elements. Each of the latter is also a unity of multiple elements. If we follow this one-in-many relation backward through all its stages, we arrive at the ultimate multiplicity, that of the original hyletic data.

The fact that a perception refers to the X through a series of multiplicities is implicit in Husserl's twofold definition of an object. He refers to the object ("*der 'Gegenstand,' das 'Objekt'*") as "the pure X in abstraction from its predicates." It is to this X that the predicate senses correspond. The X is their point of unification. He also, however, writes, "the object for us is a title for the essential connections of consciousness." These are the perceptual connections in which the "unitary X" comes to

be posited.[30] Here, the object appears as a title for the interconnections (the patterned consistency) of our experience of it. Both definitions are implicit in the object's presence as a one-in-many. As being one-in-*many*, the object can be taken as a "title" for the connections that make its multiplicity into a distinct over-all pattern. But to posit it as a *one*-in-many is also to posit it as the X, the "point of unification" not just of the predicates, but also, ultimately, of the perceptual experiences underlying them. The upshot is that we refer to the X through the connected perceptions, even while distinguishing it from them. In the concrete phenomenological situation, a perception's reference to the X occurs through the consistent patterns composing our experience of it.

Since the layered process of constitution is a successive positing of unities in multiplicity, a nonequivalence between unity and multiplicity must occur at each level. It is because of this that we can speak of representation. To do so is to acknowledge that a posited one-in-many has not the presence of the patterned multitude that allows its positing. Absent on the level of the many, the posited unity can only be indicated. A member of the multitude is "of" it by standing in the place of it. The structure of this in-the-place-of relation follows the schema that was discussed in the examination of retention. Each present retention *stands in the place of* a departed impression. Regarded statically, i.e., regarded apart from the ongoing *process* of retention, the relation can be said to be *one-to-one*. Thus, a present retention stands for a given content at some temporal remove. Retentional constitution, however, is ongoing. Its continuance yields not just an iteration of this indicative relation, but also an increase in the "retentional modifications" that increase this temporal remove. Thus, the result of this successive standing-for is a *one-in-many*. It is the content bearing the *sense* of continuous departure into the past. Serving as the basis for this constitution, our present retentions achieve the status of "representing contents." They point unambiguously to the departing impression as a one-in-many.[31]

The same schema can be applied to the different levels of indication involved in the claim that we "see" an object even though we are presently seeing just one of its aspects. An individual perception comes

30. Husserl 1976, p. 336. When the connections are rationally motivated, then the "unitary X receives its rational positing" and has the title "actual object."

31. It seems to me that some such explanation is the answer to Mulligan's question about "describing the venerable relation of instantiation/repetition between an ideality and its instances as a relation of 'representation'" (Mulligan 1991, p. 205).

to be related to an object, first of all, by standing for a group of retained perceptions—i.e., those that present the object's different aspects. The retention of this group preserves its sequence. Accordingly, a perception's first reference is to this retained group in its temporally sequenced multiplicity. Statically regarded, each perception can be said to indicate this group. It has a *one-to-one* relation to a definite collection of retained perceptions. The actual perceptual process, however, is ongoing. As it continues, further members are added to the group, and the pattern unfolds as a pattern. For example, in examining a box, I can return to my original starting point and experience the same sequence of perceptions as I turn it in my hands. The result of such repetition is the grasp of a repeatable sequence, i.e., of a pattern. As the perceptions succeed each other, the pattern shows itself as the same. In pointing toward it as the same, a second level of indicative reference is achieved. Each perception stands for something more than a definite collection of retained perceptions. It points rather to a pattern that manifests itself continually *as the same* in the ongoing perceptual flow. With this, the static nonequivalence between each perception and a group of retained perceptions becomes an ongoing nonequivalence between each perception and the unfolding pattern. Standing for the latter, the perception gains its indicative function by being part of a process that is setting up a unity in multiplicity. It comes to re-present a single pattern exhibiting itself in a multiplicity of perceptions. Since an actual perceptual process is always ongoing, this "genetic" relation includes the statically regarded one. A perception has a one-to-one re-presentative relation to a group of retained perceptions only as part of a genetic process where it re-presents the one-in-many of a pattern.

The same points hold when we grasp a pattern as the basis for a predicable sense, i.e., the sense of a given feature of an object. Statically regarded, we have a one-to-one indicative relation in which a given pattern stands for a given feature. Since, however, the perceptual process is never static, this one-to-one relation is part of a process setting up a one-to-many relation. Thus, when a square box is turned continually in one direction, a particular pattern is established indicating one of its corners. When I turn the box in another direction, another pattern appears with the same indication. A third pattern appears as I again change the rotation. It, too, has the same indicative reference. My grasp of the coincidence of these references yields the presence of the corner as a one-in-many. Following Husserl's twofold definition of an object, we can

say that this feature is a title for the interconnections that establish it. As such, it is a title for the coherence of the patterns that form its basis. But we also have to say that feature is distinct from these patterns. As a one-in-many, the corner is their point of unification.

Essentially the same description applies to the grasp of the object in its "total sense." Statically regarded, each of the predicable senses can be taken as having a one-to-one indicative relation to the object. This one-to-one relation appears in the assertions where we identify the object with its individual features. We say, for example, "the box *is* red," the box *is* square," and so on. Such statements, however, do not imply that the box itself is multiple. The indicative relations that are expressed in such assertions occur as part of our grasp of the object as a *unity* of such senses. Genetically regarded, their context is my ongoing experience of the patterns, which forms the basis for the predicates' senses cohering into a total pattern. Once again, the one-to-one and the one-to-many relations function together. As the patterns cohere, the one-to-one relations, which allow me to predicate particular senses of the box, occur in the situation of my grasp of the box as a one-in-many. In Husserl's words, their context is the genetic one where I grasp "the X of the total sense of the ongoing unity of the sense."

The account just given could be further refined. It is, however, sufficient to describe the elementary functioning of language. According to it, when I say, "I see the box," I take my immediate perception as indicating an overall perceptual pattern, one that indicates the box. This fact is essential in teaching a child the use of the word "box." Such teaching occurs after the child has learned to see, that is, after the child has learned to identify the box as one and the same in the flow of experience. Such experience, of course, includes not just optical but also kinesthetic experiences, the experiences of picking up and manipulating the box. The parent points to the box and says, "box." Hearing this, the child links it to the perception. The word, at this point, can be said to stand for the perception in a one-to-one relation. The box is turned by the parent or the child itself moves. The parent repeats the word, "box." Again there is a one-to-one relation, but now the word is linked to a new perception. Yet even though the perception has changed, it still possesses the same "in the place" quality, the same mediated reference to the box for the child who has learned how to see objects. For this child, the perception is part of a total pattern that indicates the box. In learning to use the word with multiple perceptions, the child thus learns that the

link of the word is not to the perception but to its signing quality, to its standing-in-the-place-of the box. When the word takes on a life of its own, when it can refer in the absence of the object, then it takes on this specific signing quality. It assumes, as part of its sense, the common quality of referring that all the perceptions have. They all ultimately refer to the box, understood as a point of unification of the total perceptual experience. Their reference is to its being-there as an X, i.e., as a specific one-in-many. Thus, considered as bearing an intrinsic sense, the word signifies, or stands in the place of the unity set up by the patterned perceptions.

The perceptual confirmation of the word involves the same mediated intentionality. Used in the absence of the object, the word points to the patterned multiplicity that is inherent in the box's status as a one-in-many. This is composed of the coherent patterns of perceptions that could fill up the range implicit in the specific sense of the word. These perceptions, when experienced in the intended pattern, "fulfill" this sense. They "perceptually embody" it. Such embodiment does not mean that fulfillment requires a duplicate of the perceptions that originally comprised the intuition of the box. The word's ultimate referent is not to these, but rather to their point of unification. This reference, of course, is through the overall pattern of perceptions. Thus, as long as the pattern remains generally the same, fulfillment can arise. A general use of the words, "square box," is possible through a generalization of the pattern. As long as it exhibits certain features, e.g., pointed corners, right angles, etc., the perceived pattern can embody the general sense inherent in the word.

The fact that a word refers to its object on the basis of a given pattern of perceptions does not mean that the latter is sufficient for its use. The pattern forms what Husserl calls the "internal horizon" of the object. Its "external horizon" also plays a role in its reference. This horizon arises from the fact that an apprehension of an object always occurs in a context. The individual thing is perceived as part of a visual field, which includes other objects. Each of these objects, when we turn to it, has its own field. Regarded subjectively, such fields extend themselves to include the whole of our present, remembered, and anticipated experience. Embracing all of these, the external horizon of an object links it to the other objects of such experience. By virtue of the consistency of this experience, these objects are placed in a coherent context. The ultimate expression of this context is the world as *a* world, the world as a coherent whole (Husserl 1962a, pp. 165–66). Apropos of the word's standing

for its object, this requires, as I mentioned, the word's being linked associatively with the perception's ability to stand for the object. Given that this standing-for is mediated by the other perceptions, the same holds for the word. The perception cannot refer except in the context of the other perceptions directed to the object. This "internal horizon," however, is linked to the object's "external horizon." A disruption of this second horizon disrupts our taking the object as an object in the world. As a consequence, this world-less object tends to be taken as an illusion, an apparition or some sort of "otherworldly" vision. Thus, as referring to an object *in* the world, the word, too, functions only in a wider context. Ultimately, the horizon that allows it its symbolic function is the universe of discourse, the universe that corresponds to the world as *a* world.[32] For a child, of course, this world is relatively limited. Even so, learning to use language requires the child's first having learned to see its world as such. This involves a grasp of the internal and external horizons that make the child's world a more or less coherent whole. This primitive context functions as the background for its first use of words, and for the fact that the child's learning involves multiple words. These are understood more or less simultaneously with a syntax relating them.

Does this description imply that Husserl is, in the end, committed to an account of perception (and, hence, of language) as an indefinite series of re-presentations of re-presentations? Such would be the case if the perceptual object's presence were *itself* a re-presentation, i.e., if it indicated another presence that could be made present only through another re-presentation, and so on indefinitely. Such endless series occur when we equate presence *per se* with re-presentation. For Husserl, however, the perceptual object stands for nothing but itself. Although the constitution of its presence does involve re-presentation, the resulting presence is not *itself* a representation. It is an original, if constituted, presence. The point here is the same as that made in the earlier discussion of the constitution of a retained, temporally determinate content. In both cases, "originality" signifies being given in the only way a higher

32. I say "ultimately" because just as there can be regional horizons, horizons corresponding to particular experiential contexts, so there can be regional language games. If we give up the thesis of the world as a coherent whole, we can still speak of regional horizons, such as those afforded by particular practices; for example, the sciences, and, corresponding to these, particular language games. At this point the assertion of a universe of discourse is abandoned. We have to say with Lyotard, "There are many different language games—a heterogeneity of elements. They only give rise to institutions in patches" (Lyotard 1984, p. xxiv).

level presence can be given, namely, as a constituted one-in-many.

Representation enters into this constitution in the relation of the many to the one. The many can be said to indicate a unity insofar as this unity *does not have their type of presence.* In terms of the presence of its constituting elements, the unity is an *absence.* This is why the many can be said to stand for it. The origin of this absence is to be found in the constitutive process itself, more specifically, in the one-to-one indicative relation that is embedded in it. One thing can stand in the place of another only when this other is absent. Thus, a present retention can stand for an impression only because the impression has departed, i.e., is no longer present. Similarly, a present perception can stand for a temporally sequenced group of perceptions because the latter are retained, i.e., no longer actual perceptions. As the constitution process continues, the absence inherent in these indicative relations carries over to the corresponding unity in multiplicity. This unity's genetic constitution includes these static one-to-one relations. The upshot is that this unity does not have the presence of the elements that form its indicative basis. This, however, does not mean that a constituted unity, say that of a feature, does not have its own higher level presence. Such presence is, in fact, presupposed when, together with other features, it functions in the constitution of an even higher level unity, e.g., that of the object. For a feature to stand for this new unity is to be a presence indicating a new absence. This absence, however, is not a sheer absence. It is only absence on the level of the constituting features. In their terms, it appears as an "X." On the level that is constituted, however, there is presence. This is the presence that fulfills the interpretative intention that is formed from the elements appearing on the constituting level.

The same points can be made about the functioning of signs. I have noted how, in Husserl's account, they function in the absence of their referents. Such functioning does involve an indicative relation. But this relation does not assume an endless series of signs standing for signs. Above all, it does not imply that we are "in principle excluded from ever 'cashing in the draft made on intuition' in expressions" (Derrida 1973a, p. 92). The indicative relation of language mirrors the indicatively-based many-to-one relation that is inherent in intuition taken as a constitutive process. It can thus be "cashed in," i.e., confirmed, through intuition. The important point here is that the many-to-one relation is what *opens up presence to the possibility of language.* Since the relation involves absence and, hence, indication, it allows linguistic signs to function indicatively

in our accounts of presence. They do so by becoming linked associatively with the indicative function that is already inherent in perception. Perception, by virtue of this function, is inherently open to language, just as language is open to perception. Both follow from the link that humans can make between linguistic signs and the sign-like quality of our perceptions.

Self-Presence and Re-Presentation

One final point remains in the parallel that can be drawn between Derrida and Husserl. It concerns the ultimate basis of the subject's openness to language. According to Derrida, "the subject cannot speak without giving himself a representation of his speaking" (Derrida 1973a, p. 57). The fact that he can only refer to himself indicatively points to his non-self-presence. The latter makes possible his openness to linguistic signs. In the *Logical Investigations,* Husserl takes the opposite position. We have an immediate self-presence. Thus, we need not assert "that in soliloquy one speaks to oneself and employs words as signs, i.e., as indications, of one's own inner experiences" (Husserl 1970, p. 279). Derrida's critique of Husserl begins with this remark. In his view, it closes off the subject to the possibility of language. Husserl, however, later reversed himself. Abandoning the notion of a direct self-presence, he also came to the position that our objective self-presence occurs through representation. This reversal is demanded by his notion of a self as a nowness defined by a centering environment composed of the retained past and anticipated future. To objectively present himself to himself, the subject must represent himself in terms of this environment. Doing so, he represents objectively his nowness, his present functioning, in terms of what is *not* now.

To understand Husserl's position, we must, first of all, distinguish between our reflective and our prereflective self-awareness. As I noted, we have an immediate prereflective self-awareness through our ongoing present activity of retention and protention. This awareness is inherent in the self-reference of these processes. Since they are part of our present functioning—being, in fact, the functioning that defines us as temporal centers—this awareness is direct. It is, however, only a background awareness. When we want to focus on ourselves in an explicit manner, we have to reflect on ourselves. The difficulty here is that reflection always splits the self. On the one side there is the reflecting self, the self that is actively

functioning. On the other, there is the self that is reflected on. As Husserl describes this: "Whenever I am occupied with myself and my specific egological functions, I have this distinction between myself and what I am occupied with, i.e., between my being actively engaged and that with which I am actively engaged" (Ms. A VII 11, p. 90). Given that the latter is the object of my reflection, my "actively engaged" reflecting self is *not itself* present objectively. For Husserl, this nonpresence is its anonymity. As he states the conclusion, "The actively functioning 'I do,' 'I discover,' is constantly anonymous."[33] It cannot be made an object of reflection.

This split can be explained by returning to the description of the self as a temporal center. For Husserl, the self is constantly now because it is constantly located between the retained past and the anticipated future. In its nowness, it appears as "the center of affections and action." This central nowness, appearing as a "source point" for the welling up of time, is the ego's place as functioning (Ms. B III 9, pp. 13–14). Each time it does function, its acts, having been retained, become part of its past. Now, any perception of a temporally extended event must avail itself of retentions. This holds not just for outer perception; it also holds for inner perception, i.e., for reflection. Thus, when the subject attempts to reflect on its extended acts, it must make use of its retentions. The very pastness of the retained, however, sets what it grasps at a temporal remove from its present functioning. By virtue of this temporal transcendence, the unity constituted from the retained becomes "objective." To use the German word, the unity is *gegenständlich.* It is something that "stands against" the present. Given this genesis, its very objectivity implies a split with the presently functioning self. As objective, it cannot be the self in its nowness. Rather than grasping the functioning self, reflection apprehends the self that *has* functioned. The split, then, comes about because, as Husserl writes, "in reflection, I encounter myself in the temporal field in which my just past (*mein Soeben*) has functioned."[34]

33. Ms. A VII 11, p. 92. The same point is made by Husserl when he writes, "the ego that is the counterpart (*gegenüber*) to everything is anonymous. It is not its own counterpart. The house is my counterpart, not vice versa. And yet I can turn my attention to myself. But then this counterpart in which the ego comes forward along with everything that was its counterpart is again split. The ego that comes forward as a counterpart and its counterpart [e.g., the house it was perceiving] are both counterparts to me. Forthwith, I—the subject of this new counterpart—am anonymous" (Ms. C 2 I, p. 2, Aug. 1931).

34. Ms. A V 5, p. 3. As Seebohm expresses this conclusion: "But that means that the nunc stans, the absolute subjectivity, the actual now, does not belong to the contents that can be given in original intuition in the living present. It can be known only indirectly" (Seebohm 1995, p. 196). We know it only as represented in the retained past.

Given the nonpresence of the self to reflection, we have to say that our self-presence is always a matter of re-presentation. It is a presentation of ourselves in terms of what we retain. The same point holds when we anticipate ourselves, i.e., grasp ourselves objectively in terms of what we will do or be. A temporal remove underlies the objectivity of this apprehension and, hence, distinguishes it from our present functioning. In both cases, then, our self-presence is mediated through an indicative relation, one where our objective, temporally extended presence stands for our "anonymous" presence—i.e., for our *non*objective presence as functioning in the *non*extended now. Since it is based on the necessities inherent in grasping any temporally extended object, this point holds for every perceptual act. The present functioning that is making the world visible cannot grasp itself objectively. Given this, we have to say with Rudolph Bernet, "the invisible absolute consciousness must borrow its visibility from that which it makes visible" (Bernet 1994–95, p. 208). It has to grasp itself in terms of the world (both inner and outer) that its functioning makes present. The world that it does make present re-presents its nonappearing functioning by presenting its results. The nonpresence of such functioning in these results, thus, makes us say with Bernet, "the subject cannot but apprehend itself in a representation of itself" (p. 210).

There is, I should note, a certain ambiguity in calling our self-presence a "re-presentation." The designation holds insofar as we can speak of a constituted self as representing the self that constitutes it. It fails insofar as we take representation as implying two distinct realities, one standing for another and both having the same type of presence. The constituted self obviously does not have the same type of presence as the anonymous functioning that constitutes it. Their relation is not the one-to-one relation of separate entities. It is, rather, that of our functioning manifesting itself in our constituted, worldly presence. This point follows from the special nature of the constitution that results in the self. As Husserl's description makes apparent, the constituting and constituted self are the beginning and the end of *one and the same constitutive process.* The process of the subject's "self-constitution" begins with the anonymity of its functioning. The subject achieves its initial self-definition through the processes of retention and protention. These yield the temporal environment that defines the subject as "a center for affections and actions." Motivated by the continuing input of hyletic data, the constitutive process continues, layer by layer, to build up the subject's visible surrounding

world. As an active, functioning center, the subject is increasingly defined by this world. Its own acts achieve their constituted, "worldly" presence through the results of its progressively defined functioning. It acts in and through the world it constitutes. Thus, by virtue of this functioning, we can say that it borrows "its visibility from that which it makes visible." We can also speak of its constituted presence as a "visible representative" of its functioning selfhood. Such descriptions, however, do not imply the thought of one reality standing for another. Their basis is an ongoing *process of self-constitution, which,* taken in its totality, *is the self.*[35] So defined, selfhood involves *all* the levels of self-constitution. A self is, simultaneously, the anonymous functioning at its core, the fully constituted worldly social presence available to other persons, and all the intermediate levels linking the two. Given this definition of self as a process, we have to say that the self's existence is one with its functioning. This functioning is its process of self-definition and self-manifestation. Here, the result of this ongoing process "represents" its continuing source by *manifesting* it. Such manifestation is an original presence. It presents the self to the self in the only way that the latter can be perceptually given, namely, as a constituted presence.[36]

The subject's openness to language is a function of this self-constitution. It is inherent in the many-to-one constitutive relation that yields the subject as a one-in-many, that is, as the subject of the various predicates we assign to ourselves. Because this relation is indicatively based, i.e., includes the one-to-one relation of indication as a constitutive element, we can use language to represent ourselves. This occurs when we link linguistic signs to the indicative function that is inherent in perception. When we do, we name the various qualities we assign to ourselves. Their ultimate referent is the constituted self taken as the *bearer* of these appearing qualities. In Husserl's terms, it is the self as a nonappearing X. For Husserl, as I noted, this X is both distinguishable from its predicates and yet inseparable from them. In this, it mirrors the "functioning I do" in its anonymity. Qua functioning, this self is inseparable from the results of functioning, even as it distinguishes itself temporally from them. Thus, when we attribute the predicates of the X to our

35. For a defense of this thesis see Mensch 1997, pp. 61–77.

36. One cannot, then, compare the nonpresence of the anonymously functioning core with that of differance. If the former manifests itself as a constituted presence, the latter appears only in a "trace." More specifically, it appears in the tensions, the contradictions, the heterogeneity that ultimately undermine constituted presence.

functioning selves, we actually engage in a double process of representation. The predicates represent the X of our constituted self-presence, and this in turn, is understood as representing the active self. The link allowing this twofold representation is the nonappearing shared by both the X and the "functioning I do."

This nonappearing of the self can be understood as its openness to language. As my example of learning to use a word suggests, nonpresence or nonappearing can, in general, be considered the openness *of* language. "Openness," here, means language's being open to indicating and expressing what is distinct from its signs. It is language's openness to what is not itself. Behind this openness is the nonidentity of the different levels of the constitutive process. By virtue of it, an openness *to* language characterizes its different levels. It is present in the ability of one level to stand for the next in the constitutive process linking them. Linguistic signs draw their indicative power by being associated with this prelinguistic process of standing-for. This openness to language does not imply that such signs cannot be confirmed intuitively. The possibility of such confirmation is intrinsic to the constitutional process. Each level, functioning as a sign, points to what, in regard to itself, is not a sign, but rather a constituted presence, namely, the very presence that fulfills its signative reference. This holds for every constitutive process, including that of our self-manifestation. Since the indicative function is present on each of its levels, the self can be represented in all the ways language permits. Open to language, the self is both appearing and nonappearing. It is capable of being indicated and expressed in a multitude of ways. Its self-constitution, involving as it does both absence and presence, grounds the possibility of the ongoing self-description that is phenomenology.

Representation and Embodiment

In the context of consciousness, embodiment can be said to be temporalization. Things become embodied in consciousness by being temporalized. Temporalization, however, is also the means by which we manifest ourselves to ourselves. We constitute ourselves through the temporal synthesis that moves us from one level to the next. If the possibility of self-description is inherent in our self-constitution, it must, then, characterize this embodiment. Since the possibility of self-description is that of phenomenology, this last must also be linked to it. The tie between phenomenology, embodiment, and our *having bodies* can be made by drawing

a series of inferences. These inferences can also serve to review the conclusions of this chapter. The first is that the possibility of phenomenology implies the openness of the subject to language. Such openness, as I noted, follows from its constitution having an indicative structure. This means that the elements of a lower level can be taken as standing for those of the next level, i.e., those that they constitute. It also implies that such constituted presences can be taken as fulfilling the references of these lower level elements. As the retentional process makes clear, this basic structure characterizes temporalization itself. Retentions both indicate and constitute impressions. Each retention stands for an absent impression. Each, however, works with others to constitute this impression as a distinct temporal moment departing into pastness. Such constitution is an embodiment, viz., the embodiment of the impression in the retentions that make it a distinct moment.

The inference that connects the retentional process to our bodies comes from the fact that temporalization is not autonomous, but requires affecting contents. For Husserl, as we saw, affecting contents stand at the origin of the successively given nows, and hence of their retention. Now, affection implies a being-affected and hence that which can be affected. The inference, then, is that temporalization, in its dependence on affecting contents, requires the body as that which can be affected. In fact, as we saw in the chapter on the instincts, it requires the body's receptivity as flesh—the body with its needs and instinctual strivings. Given that need as need points beyond itself, such needs give embodiment its indicative structure. More particularly, the structure appears in the fact that the body's being-affected shows itself in its taking affecting contents as *standing for* the objects that will fulfill its needs. To revert to Husserl's example, the first sight of the breast is taken by the baby as a sign of the milk that will fulfill its needs. Initially, of course, the baby has no developed sense of this fulfillment. In Husserl's words, its first strivings "appear as dark 'instinctive' modes of egological valuation (feelings), which first reveal themselves in their attainment" (Ms. E III 9, p. 4a). Thus, the initial stretching forth of the baby's intention is its striving after that which will first reveal itself as satisfying its need. In this process, the triggering affection *stands in the place of* a satisfaction yet to be revealed. Its ability to do so shows how indicative function is built into our bodily being through its neediness. The ability exhibits need as the absence across which the indicative function extends. Correspondingly, the satisfaction of need points to the presence that fulfills this function.

Need, of course, is *an* origin, but not *the* origin of indication. It is a necessary but not a sufficient cause. Insofar as temporalization is based on affection, both need and presence are required for its processes. As such, both are part of our self-manifestation. Taken together, they point to the embodied self as need and fulfillment. Such a self can be thought of as a place of presence (fulfillment) that points beyond itself to a further fulfillment. For Husserl, this pointing beyond is a function of its *need as based on presence*; concretely, on the presence of those contents that, affecting the self, draw it outside of itself. For Derrida, by contrast, this pointing beyond itself is abstracted from presence. Its origin is an absence that has to be compensated for by a supplement. Here, the primacy of absence shows itself in the inadequacy of this compensation. Since the original lack can never be made up, the supplement must itself be supplemented. As a result, we have supplement standing for supplement (that is, sign signifying sign) in an endless round.

As noted, what is at issue in this debate is the nature of the self. The disagreement concerns presence and absence in their competing claims for priority. Is the self a place of presence? Is it the place of the nowness that, in its most immediate form, arises through our bodily self-presence? Is it, on the contrary, an absence, one that needs to be supplemented endlessly? These questions will confront us in Heidegger's existential account of the self as a "nullity." They will also appear in Levinas's account of the selfhood of the other person as "beyond being." In considering their positions, however, our focus will shift. It will no longer be on the stretching forth of language, that is, its indicative structure. It will, rather, be on the source of our sense of moral responsibility. Is the stretching forth that occurs in my turning to and responding to another person rooted in the self's presence or absence? How does my embodiment (taken as temporalization) function in this responding? It is to these questions that we must now turn.

VII

Presence and Ethics

What is the origin of ethical responsibility? What gives us the ability to respond? An ethical response involves responding to ourselves: we answer the call of our conscience. It also involves answering to the Other: we respond to the appeal of our neighbor. Is one form of response prior to the other? Recent thinking about these questions has been largely taken up by the debate between Levinas and Heidegger. Responsibility, according to Heidegger, begins with our concern for our being. The "call of conscience" originates in our responsibility for what we are. By contrast, Levinas sees this "call" as beginning, not with ourselves, but with our neighbor. Its origin is "the face of the other." So framed, the debate can be expressed in the opposition: self-responsibility versus responsibility for the other.

My purpose in what follows is to establish two claims. The first concerns our theme of embodiment. To be embodied is to be subject to the body's being alive and its eventual dissolution. The latter is our mortality. An ethics that takes account of our embodiment must take both into account. The question that this raises is one of emphasis. Do we focus on mortality and understand responsibility in terms of mortality, that is, in terms of the encounter with death that it implies? Alternatively, do we see responsibility as a responding to the life whose qualities are thrown into relief by its possible loss? On the one side, we see the origin of our responsibility in the absence and loss of death. On the other, it is taken to originate in life understood in terms of presence and bodily need. My

first claim is that behind their apparent opposition, both Heidegger and Levinas agree on the origin of our ethical obligations. Both hold that ethical responsibility springs ultimately from our encounter with death. Their real quarrel concerns its location. Where do we first confront death? Is the "first death" our own or that of the other person? Do I confront death in the anxiety I have over my own demise or does it make its primary appearance in what Levinas calls "the face as the very mortality of the other person"?[1] My second claim is that, ethically speaking, it does not matter. In neither case can ethical responsibility be based on the encounter with death. Death for both philosophers is nontransferable and, hence, ultimately isolating. Both philosophers agree that to face it is a traumatic experience. A traumatized self, however, cannot act. It can only flee. Given this, the response death actually provokes is avoidance. To ground ethical responsibility adequately, we must, I conclude, change our focus. We must turn from seeking its basis in death understood in terms of absence. We need to rethink this ground in terms of life taken as presence and bodily need.

Being and Beyond Being

From a Levinasian perspective, there is an obvious objection to my position. It is one that I must take up if my own interpretation is to gain a hearing. Levinas would claim that the quarrel over the location of death masks a deeper dispute, one involving the ontological status of the mortality we respond to. For Heidegger, as Levinas reads him, the relation to mortality is ontological. Heidegger's concern is with being, the being that one can lose through death. The "face to face," however, is not an ontological relation. For Levinas, the transcendence of the face is an exceeding of being. The opposition between the two philosophers thus involves the more fundamental level of being versus what is "beyond being." Corresponding to this, there is a different sense of absence. The absence of death, for Heidegger, is ontological. As Levinas interprets him, he takes death as an intraworldly event.[2] Its nothingness thus does not get us beyond the world or its being. For Levinas, however, death

1. The encounter with the latter is "an exposure unto death: nudity, destitution, passivity, and pure vulnerability" (Levinas 1994a, p. 107).

2. "Dans l'être-pour-la-mort, la possibilité imminente concerne l'être-au-monde lui-même qui est menacé, mais menacé par cet être-au-monde et à-la-mort" (Levinas 1993a, p. 55).

points to the "infinite," that is, to what cannot be captured by the ontological categories of being and nonbeing. With this, there is a different sense of presence. The analysis Levinas provides is based on the primacy of "obligation." His claim is that the genesis of the sense of presence can be understood only if we allow, at its basis, an "ethical response." Insofar as this response is called forth by the face, the sense of presence is based on the face's being beyond-being. The result is a paradigm shift from what Levinas calls Heidegger's "ontologism." The primacy of the ethical signifies that the ontology of presence must be based on the nonontological, that is, on the "infinite" or "beyond-being" that distinguishes the face.

One cannot judge how far this position is justified without taking up the issue of Levinas's interpretation of Heidegger. Here, two points must be mentioned. The first is that Levinas's Heidegger is primarily the philosopher of *Being and Time*.[3] This holds for *Totality and Infinity*;[4] it also holds for Levinas's other major works.[5] The second point is that within this limitation, there is a certain "distortion" in his account of Heidegger. As the commentator Robert Bernasconi writes, the account "must be judged with reference to its underlying purpose" (Bernasconi 1989, p. 28). Levinas's intent is to emphasize the paradigm shift mentioned above. To this end, as Boothroyd notes, "Levinas sets up a Heideggarian straw man and refers to it as 'Heidegger's ontology.'" The result is that "Levinas' reading of Being in Heidegger 'traditionalizes' Heidegger; by

3. I will therefore confine myself to the position outlined in this work. To bring in the later Heidegger, as Bouckaert 1970, Keyes 1972, and Benso 1996 do, runs the danger of an anachronistic reading. Levinas himself says, "*Sein und Zeit* has remained the very model of ontology. . . . I think the later work of Heidegger, which does not produce in me a comparable impression, remains valuable through *Sein und Zeit*. . . . it is much less convincing" (Levinas 1985, p. 41). For an excellent account of Heidegger's later notion of responsibility, which goes beyond *Being and Time*'s notion of self-responsibility to encompass our being a "shepherd of being" in general, see Arendt 1978, II, 182–87.

4. In Bernasconi's words, in *Totality and Infinity*, "Heidegger is understood primarily in terms of the account of Being-in-the-world to be found in the first division of *Being and Time*" (Bernasconi 1989, p. 28).

5. In particular, it holds for "Death and Time," which is the major source we have for Levinas's mature consideration of Heidegger. Tina Chanter writes, regarding this work, "In devoting close attention to Heidegger's *Being and Time*, the lectures represent a crucial contribution to sorting out the politically and ethically difficult, if not impossible, relationship that Levinas's philosophy bears to Heidegger's. They are especially illuminating since they not only constitute a rare instance in which Levinas' published work treats of Heidegger's philosophy in any detail or at any length, but they also present a unique record of Levinas' mature meditations on Heidegger" (Chanter 1997, p. 19).

a particular irony, he makes Heidegger pre-Heideggarian." (Boothroyd, 1988, p. 18).[6]

To see this, one need not contest Levinas's interpretation by referring to the writings that follow Heidegger's "turn." Within *Being and Time*, it is clear that the absense to which death refers is not simply a negation of being. Rather than being a traditional ontological concept, such absence appears as generative of the sense of being. In his analysis of our Being-in-the-world, Heidegger sees this sense as coming from our plans and projects. What I choose to do illuminates being. It is a presencing that reveals certain aspects of being, and, in this very process, conceals others.[7] In his own "paradigm shift," Heidegger traces this action to our "projective being," that is, to our being ahead of ourselves in our plans and projects. He then traces this being to the absence, the nothingness, that is our death. Such nothingness is not an item in the world. It is not part of its ontology, taken as an account of the sense of the world's being. Rather than being captured by this sense, it is generative of it: In Heidegger's account of care and temporalization, the sense of the world comes about through our relationship to the nothingness of death. The same holds for the ethical relation, understood as a call to self-responsibility. This, too, arises in the encounter with such nothingness. It is a call, in the face of death, to assume our obligation for our own being. We are responsible for it. In motivating our projects, the call is at the origin of our sense of the phenomenal presence of what is. The upshot is that for Heidegger, no less than for Levinas, the analysis of such sense is based on the primacy of "obligation."

6. Keyes put this criticism in terms of Levinas's attempt to make Heidegger guilty of totalization. For such an accusation to be valid, we would have to read Heidegger's ontological difference in a pre-Heideggerian way, turning him into a philosopher of presence. Thus, for the accusation to be valid, "Heidegger's Being would have to open itself as a permanent presence. It seems clear, however, that being for Heidegger is never openly disclosed in a permanent way, but rather that along with the disclosure comes the concealment" (Keyes 1970, p. 140).

7. James's version of this appears in his description of the finitude of our disclosure. He writes that, in disclosing an entity, "I am always unjust, always partial, always exclusive. My excuse is necessity—the necessity which my finite and practical nature lays upon me. My thinking is first and last and always for the sake of my doing, and I can only do one thing at a time." From the tie of my disclosure to my finitude it follows that "the essence of a thing is that one of its properties which is so important for my interest that in comparison with it I may neglect the rest" (James 1948, pp. 355, 357). The interest, here, is the subjective norm for disclosure. For Heidegger, an "epoch" of being occurs when a common interest (e.g., in scientific measurement) gives a common norm for disclosure. Such an epoch necessarily involves a concealment.

Given this, Levinas's interpretation of Heidegger cannot be accepted. This holds even when we limit ourselves to *Being and Time* and the works that immediately follow it. As will become apparent, absence for Heidegger is just as much "beyond being" as it is for Levinas. In both cases, it points to death as the locus of our ethical obligations. For both, these obligations determine the sense of being. This, of course, does not mean that they have the same doctrine. Within the paradigm shift that they equally engage in, the question of the location of death is crucial. It determines the object of our obligations.

Death and Self-Responsibility

Heidegger introduces the concept of death by noting the difficulty that arises when we say of "Dasein," or human being, that its "being is care (*Sorge*)."[8] Care is Dasein's being responsible for its being. As care, my being is an issue for me (Heidegger 1967a, p. 325). It is the result of my projects, of the choices I make in deciding not just what I shall do but (as inherent in this) what I shall be.[9] For Heidegger, "the primary element in care is the 'ahead-of-itself.'" In all my projects, I am ahead of myself. My being is not yet accomplished. There is always some "potentiality for being" that remains "outstanding" (p. 236). The difficulty is how to grasp my Dasein as a whole. In Heidegger's words, given that "as long as Dasein exists, it must, as such potentiality for being, not yet be something," how can we grasp it "as a total being (*als ganzes Seiendes*)"? (p. 233). His answer is to see the solution in *the very statement of the problem.* The not-yet, which apparently makes it impossible to grasp Dasein as a totality, is what characterizes its totality. More precisely, the not-yet of death does this. As long as I am alive, my death remains "outstanding." As my "uttermost possibility," which cannot be realized in my lifetime, it remains "not-yet." Constantly remaining such, it characterizes the *totality* of my being as not-yet.[10]

All this may seem like a bit of word play. We all die. As long as I am alive, I have death ahead of myself. How does this general fact charac-

8. "Das Sein des Daseins ist die Sorge" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 284).

9. In Heidegger's words: "'The Dasein is occupied with its own being' means more precisely: it is occupied with its ability to be. As existent, the Dasein is free for specific possibilities of its own self. It is its own most peculiar able-to-be" (Heidegger 1988, p. 276).

10. Through death, then, "Dasein is essentially disclosed to itself, and disclosed, indeed, in the mode of the ahead-of-itself" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 251).

terize my being in its uniqueness? How does it move me from a general concept of being, that of being-alive, to the being that I alone live, the being that is my individual existence? Heidegger's response is to note that death cannot be shared.[11] It is not a "not-yet" in the sense of some project that I could hand over to another to accomplish. My death can only be realized by myself. The same holds for my experience of dying. In a remark that fundamentally distinguishes him from Levinas, he writes, "We do not experience the dying of others in a genuine sense; at most we are always there only at their side" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 239). For Heidegger, our being there with the dying is relational. It involves more than ourselves. By contrast, the dying we experience genuinely (personally) is nonrelational. It lays claim to us as individuals and, as such, individualizes us (p. 263).[12]

In the deepest sense, death cannot be shared because the result of the accomplishment of this "not-yet" leaves us with absolutely nothing to share. The result is annihilation. Death does not touch some particular aspect of our being in the world, i.e., some particular project or accomplishment. It undoes "our being in the world as such." Facing death, we confront "the possibility our not being able to be there" in the world at all (Heidegger 1967a, p. 250). Heidegger adds, "When Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it is referred back *completely* to its ownmost possibility to be. All its relations to any other Dasein [any other human being] are undone when it stands before itself in this way" (ibid.).

One way to see how death refers us back to our "ownmost possibility for being" is to note how it raises "the question of reason." To ask for a reason is to ask why something is as it is, i.e., why it is this way *rather than* that. We can only do this if we can conceive the thing as an alternative, as a "this" rather than a "that." To do so, however, both the "this" and the "that" must be conceived as possible (as opposed to necessary). It is, in other words, our grasp of a thing's lack of necessity—its grasp as something that could be otherwise, that could, in fact, *not* be—that moves us beyond its givenness to inquire into its ground. It moves us to

11. As Heidegger puts this, "Insofar as it 'is,' death is essentially, in every case, mine" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 240).

12. Noreen O'Conner ignores this when, following Levinas, she writes regarding Heidegger, "Insofar as being can be approached only in terms of generality, the question, 'who am I?' can be posed only as a neutral 'what-question?' The primary interpretation, therefore, occurs in terms of a grasp of the particular in the light of the general." (O'Connor 1980, pp. 214–15).

ask *why* it is given as we experience it. Now, it is just this lack of necessity in my "being in the world as such" that I grasp when I genuinely confront my death. Death thus raises the question of "why" with regard to each of my actions, each of the projects by which I actualize one possibility rather than another of my being. For Heidegger, the ground it refers me back to is my "ownmost possibility to be" in the sense that it points out that I myself, in my being as "care," am responsible for this being.

Summing up, the isolation of death has two effects. It isolates, in the sense of identifies, the question of Dasein's being. The annihilation Dasein confronts in death makes the question of reason—the question, "Why?"—embrace the totality of this being. Secondly, it isolates Dasein as responsible for its being. It points out that "to be," it has to choose. To choose authentically, it must grasp its "ownmost, nonrelational" potentiality for being. It must, in other words, grasp itself as a totality that is such by virtue of the nonrelational or individual character of its ability to be.

Heidegger claims that this sense of individual responsibility frees us from daydreaming. It prevents us from being caught up by the possibilities that belong to everyone and no one.[13] This is because individualization, in this context, involves accepting finitude. When I face death, I face the fact that my life is not unending, but rather only occurs in a located, finite stretch of time. Facing death thus requires that I accept my factual situation. Not every choice, every possible future is open to me. For a choice to be real, for it to contain a possibility that I can realize, the resources for it must be present in the situation that I have been "thrown" into by my history and culture. Individualization, then, involves my responding to my factual "having been." If I do not, I simply daydream. I respond to a not-yet that is not mine. I am ahead of myself inauthentically in the sense of imagining a future that I can, given my circumstances, never authorize.

13. These are possibilities of what Heidegger calls the "they-world." In his words, "When by anticipation [of death as the inmost possibility of my being], one becomes free for one's own death, one is liberated from those possibilities that may accidentally thrust themselves upon one [by the relations one has with the they-world]; and one is liberated in such a way that for the first time one can authentically understand and choose among the factual possibilities lying ahead of that possibility that is not to be outstripped" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 264).

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Temporalization and Nothingness

There are two further consequences of the confrontation with death that should be mentioned before considering Heidegger's "call of conscience." The first concerns the temporal structure of care as described in the first chapter. As I noted, the three temporal modes, understood as structures of Dasein's being as care, are its having-being, its being-ahead-of itself, and its *non*presence in the present. Each, according to Heidegger, is made manifest in the encounter with death. Thus, insofar as death shows Dasein to be individually responsible for its being, it reveals Dasein as rooted in its past—that is, in the *having been* of its factual situation (Heidegger 1967a, p. 328). In its fulfilling this responsibility by actualizing the possibilities available to it, Dasein is revealed as *ahead of itself*, that is, as awaiting itself in the future. The "there" of its "being-there" as it works to actualize a given possibility is its not-yet (p. 327). It grasps itself in terms of this goal. The present of Dasein, as revealed by its death, is, as indicated, *not* a presence. It is rather an absence. According to Heidegger, my anxiety in the face of death reveals the void inherent in my projective being. In his words, "The 'nothing' with which anxiety confronts us, unveils the nothingness that determines Dasein in its very *basis*; and this *basis* is itself in its thrownness-into-death."[14] What is actually revealed to me is the "null basis" of my being as care. I can *be* ahead of myself in my plans and projects precisely because as present I am "essentially nothing." A thing, in its "presence to hand" (*Vorhandenheit*), has no future. Its being is its presence. To reverse this, it is my absence in the present that makes my thereness not present, but future. Thus death, in confronting me with my possible annihilation, makes me realize that I am a being that can collapse, i.e., lose the temporal distance, the being ahead of itself, that is my projective being. In making me face the nothingness spanning this distance, it does not reveal a future state—a time when I shall no longer be present. It shows me that this lack of presence is something that I always carry with me.

The second consequence is that lack of presence is the foundation for Dasein's disclosure of beings. The nothingness that opens up my projective being allows it to make beings present. As Heidegger put it in

14. "Das Nichts, davor die Angst bringt, enthüllt die Nichtigkeit, die das Dasein in seinem Grund bestimmt, der selbst ist als Geworfenheit in den Tod" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 308). By virtue of such nullity, Heidegger can assert: "Dasein is not the ground of its being insofar as this first arises from its own project" (p. 285).

1929, "For Human Dasein, the nothing [of such being] makes possible the manifestness of beings as such" (Heidegger 1998, p. 91). This disclosure allows beings to appear in the only way they can, finitely to a finite being. In Heidegger's words, "Only in the nothing of Dasein do beings as a whole, in accord with their most proper possibility—that is, in a finite way—come to themselves" (p. 95). They come to presence through our projects. If my project is to build a fire, wood will be disclosed as combustible. If it is to build a structure, another aspect of its being will be disclosed. My finitude—the fact that I can do only one thing at a time—makes their disclosure finite. It makes me reveal and conceal at the same time. That I engage in this activity at all is a function of my projective being, that is, my being as care. This, however, depends on its null basis, that is, on the nothing (*Nichts*) that is my ground as Dasein. This is the same nothingness (*Nichtigkeit*) that raises "the question of reason" with regard to my projects and, hence, with regard to the beings that they disclose. Heidegger sees it as the origin of the "wonder" that is the starting point of the "Why?" He writes, "Only because the nothing is manifest in the ground of Dasein can the total strangeness of beings overwhelm us. Only when the strangeness of beings oppresses us does it arouse and evoke wonder. Only on the ground of wonder—the manifestness of the nothing—does the 'Why?' loom before us. Only because the 'why' is possible as such can we in a definite way inquire into the grounds and ground things" (ibid.). The grounding pointed to here gives a reason and discloses. Disclosure occurs through our projects. Through them, we "ground things" in their finite presence. We give reasons for such presence when, confronting the nothingness of death, we assume responsibility for our choices. Doing so, we answer the inquiry into the ground of things by giving an account of the actions that have disclosed them.

If "the nothing makes possible the manifestness of beings as such," it cannot be understood in their terms. Its possibility is not that of the inner worldly beings it makes possible. Functioning as their ground, it cannot take its place among them. Its transcendence signifies that it is *beyond* their being. The same holds for the Dasein it characterizes. As Heidegger expresses this conclusion, "Holding itself out into the nothing, Dasein is in each case already beyond beings as a whole. Such being beyond beings we call *transcendence*" (Heidegger 1998, p. 95). In this ontological transcendence, we have Heidegger's own "paradigm shift" from the "ontologism" that preceded him. His parallel to Levinas's tran-

scendence of the face comes in his "answer to the question of the nothing": "The nothing is neither an object nor any being all. The nothing comes forward neither for itself nor next to beings, to which it would, as it were adhere." It is not a "counter concept of beings"; rather "[i]n the being of beings the nihilation of the nothing occurs" (ibid.). This nihilation is both the constant assertion of its alterity and the ground for Dasein's self-responsibility.[15] In Heidegger's words: "If in the ground of its essence Dasein were not transcending, which now means, if it were not in advance holding itself out into the nothing, then it could never adopt a stance towards beings nor even towards itself" (ibid.). This holding itself out into the nothing is its being ahead of itself. It is the inner distance that allows it to assume responsibility both for the beings it reveals and for itself in its revealing them.

The Call of Conscience

The call of conscience that arises from this analysis is essentially that of a call to self-responsibility. It is a call to recognize that we are individually responsible for the being that discloses things. In Heidegger's words, call is "a calling-forth to that potentiality-for-being, which in each case I already am as Dasein." This calling-forth is, he writes, "a summons to being-guilty (*Schuldigsein*)" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 287). "Guilt" here has the double sense of "debt" (*Schuld*) and of "being responsible" for something (*Schuld sein daran*) (pp. 282–85). Facing death, I respond to the nothing at the heart of my projective being. I realize my responsibility for my being. This realization is that of my *self*-indebtedness. I *owe myself* whatever being I have. Thus, the call of conscience comes down to a call to face one's situation, to recognize the factual possibilities inherent in it. In Heidegger's words, "The call of conscience has the character of Dasein's *appeal* to its ownmost potentiality-to-be-itself (*Selbstseinkönnen*); and this is done by summoning it to its ownmost being-guilty (*Schuldigsein*)" —i.e., its ownmost self-indebtedness (p. 269). Hearing this summons, I realize that my being is the result of my choices. My being springs from the possibilities I choose to actualize.

15. Insofar as such nihilization keeps open the difference between being and beings, there is, as Silvia Benso points out, a parallel concern in both Heidegger and Levinas in "not being oblivious to differences." What constitutes the difference in Levinas is "the difference between being and beyond being; in Heidegger, it is the difference between Being and beings" (Benso 1996, p. 135). My position is that what lies behind this parallel is the alterity of the nothing of death.

According to Heidegger, the process of paying this debt *is* temporalization. Endeavoring to pay it, I must *anticipate,* that is, see myself in terms of my future possibilities. For such possibilities to be realizable, this projecting myself forward must be done in terms of my factually given past. I must, then, anticipate while *retaining* the past that gives these possibilities their concrete shape. Since, however, I am essentially null, I am always in debt to myself. The debt of being, as long as I live, can never be repaid. To satisfy the debt would be to collapse my projective being into the inanimate presence of a mere thing. The call of conscience is thus synonymous with my life in its ongoing temporalization. It is, in fact, what ultimately characterizes this life as a whole.

Going Beyond

Levinas's rather acid comment on the above is that Heidegger would probably be more afraid of dying than of being a murderer.[16] His comment follows from the fact that my obligations concern *my* being. My anxiety revolves around its loss. Thus, for Heidegger "there is only one value, that of being" (Levinas 1993a, p. 109). Given that my being is the locus of my obligations, there is nothing for which I would sacrifice my life. At most, following Heidegger's "call of conscience," I could help another person take self-responsibility (Heidegger 1967a, p. 122). I could not, however, respond to him on an ultimate, ontological level. His being is his own responsibility. It is the focus of his structure as care. Because of this, responsibility for a self can no more be shared than death can.

Heidegger, in Levinas's view, is forced into this position because being is central to his thought. This centrality of being positions Heidegger as an exemplar of Western philosophy in ontology's attempt to understand being as such, i.e., to grasp the totality of beings. What we have here, in fact, is an interpretation of the history of philosophy (and, by extension, of the West) that links this attempt at a total understanding to the denial

16. ". . . la crainte d'être assassin n'arrive pas à dépasser la crainte de mourir" (Levinas 1993a, p. 108). The lecture series "Death and Time" will be a major source for my comparison. As Tina Chanter writes, "the lectures provide the first available sustained critique of the Heideggerian notions of temporality and being-towards-death. . . . it was only with the appearance of the 1975–76 lectures that we were given the opportunity to knit together the context for Levinas's frequent, but often abrupt and undeveloped remarks about Heidegger's conceptions of time and death. These apparently gnomic utterances now take on the character of a well articulated, albeit partisan, critique of Heidegger's celebrated analyses of being-towards-death" (Chanter 1997, p. 19).

of the "alterity" of the Other (the alterity that positions the other person beyond knowledge). This denial of alterity is itself linked to "the permanent possibility of war" that marks the West (Levinas 1969, p. 43). The best way to summarize this position is to examine, first, the link between ontology and totalization, and then the tie between totalization and war.

In Levinas's interpretation, the basic philosophical motivation of the West is to gain total knowledge. Ontology manifests this in its attempt to grasp being *qua* being, that is, being in its totality. This can only be done by searching for the sense of beings, that is, by knowing them through concepts in their "generality." In Levinas's words, "For the things the work of ontology consists in apprehending the individual (which alone exists) not in its individuality but in its generality (of which alone there is science). The relation with the other is here accomplished through a third term [the concept] which I find in myself" (Levinas 1969, p. 44). Ontology thus does not grasp the other person as an individual. It apprehends the person through the generality of a concept. In doing so, it conceals the ethical relation, whose focus is the individual. It also reduces this relation to the realm of the "same." It attempts to express it in the "same" terms as those of the "generality" that "I find in myself." From Socrates to Heidegger, this attempt has characterized the West. In Levinas's reading of the tradition, "Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by the interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being. This primacy of the same was Socrates' teaching: to receive nothing of the Other but what is in me" (p. 43). The reference here is to Plato's doctrine of recollection, where to know is to recall what is already within one. According to Levinas, the "ideal of Socratic truth" implied by this is clear. It "rests on the essential self-sufficiency of the same, its identification in ipseity, its egoism. Philosophy is an egology" (p. 44).

What links egotism, egology, and the reduction of the Other to the same is, as Levinas writes elsewhere, "the correlation between knowledge and being." The correlation "indicates both a difference [between the two] and a difference that is overcome in the true. Here the known is understood and so appropriated by knowledge." In this, it is "freed from its otherness. . . . [B]eing as the other of thought . . . becomes . . . knowledge" (Levinas 1989, p. 76). Being becomes the known as it is grasped in the circle of the same that is composed of our concepts.[17] According

17. In becoming known, being becomes present: "Knowledge is re-presentation, a return to presence, and nothing may remain other to it" (Levinas 1989, p. 77).

to Levinas, "modernity" completes this appropriation insofar as it attempts to move from "the identification and appropriation of being *by* knowledge toward the identification of being *and* knowledge" (pp. 77–78). Here, its foremost exemplar is Heidegger. In *Being and Time,* according to Levinas, he makes Being "inseparable from the comprehension of Being." In doing so, he embraces the same ideal as Socrates. For Heidegger, "Being is already an appeal to subjectivity" (Levinas 1969, p. 45). As with Socrates, "philosophy is egology," a study of the senses the ego imposes in its attempts to gain a total comprehension.

The tie between war and totalization comes from war's all-embracing character. In Levinas's words, war "establishes an order from which no one can keep his distance; nothing henceforth is exterior. War does not manifest exteriority and the other as other" (Levinas 1969, p. 21). Rather, its relation to alterity—e.g., the other nation, the other race—is that of conquest and absorption. Its link to ontology comes through the totalization that characterizes the latter. This means: "The visage of being that shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of totality, which dominates Western philosophy" in the form of its ontology. Such ontology involves the "reduction of the other in the Same" (p.43). This reduction occurs because "the meaning of individuals (invisible outside this totality) is derived from the totality" (p. 22). The "totality," however, is only known through the imposition of concepts, that is, through "generalities" that miss the individuality of the individual. In their impersonality, i.e., in their relation to "being in general," such concepts are "anonymous." Philosophically, then, we are involved in a situation where there are no individuals apart from the totality. With this, we conceal the ethical relation. The unique relation to an existing individual has no field for its disclosure. The loss of this relation, however, is the state of tyranny and war. Now, it is precisely in implying such a state that Heidegger's ontology is seen by Levinas as a culmination of Western philosophy. Rather than involving any paradigm shift, "Heideggarian ontology, which subordinates the relationship with the Other to the relation with Being in general, remains under obedience to the anonymous, and leads inevitably to another power, to imperialist domination, to tyranny" (pp. 46–47).

Correspondingly, what is beyond knowledge is beyond such immanent presence. This is the Other in his or her alterity. Levinas, of course, is not alone in this desire to go beyond presence. As Bouckaert writes, "Levinas' endeavor to break through every philosophy of immanence fits in very well with all other contemporary French efforts to break away from the 'utopia of presence' and the 'supremacy of the logos'" (Bouckaert 1973, p. 418).

As noted, the paradigm shift that Levinas proposes in order to break from this tradition involves going "beyond being." It involves a departure from the "ontology" and "totalization" that characterize philosophy. The break from the two occurs through the "face," which, in its mortality, is beyond being. Yet, as indicated, there is a difficulty in this "going beyond." Explicitly, such going beyond is an exceeding of a tradition whose chief exemplar is supposed to be Heidegger. Here, Heidegger, as we cited Boothroyd, is positioned as a "pre-Heideggerian." Implicitly, however, this going beyond brings Heidegger along with it. As we shall see, in developing his position, Levinas continues to accept Heidegger's early account of being. His going beyond being thus remains conditioned by Heidegger's existential analytic. Nowhere is this clearer than in Levinas's treatment of death. "Going beyond," with regard to this central Heideggarian concept, signifies *relocation.* Death continues to play its leading role. It still determines our being ahead of ourselves, our temporalization, and our moral obligations. All these, however, now involve the Other. The other person becomes the place where we encounter death. This will become clear through a series of comparisons.

Diachrony and Death

To begin with, we may note that in Heidegger's formulation, death signifies the possibility of an impossibility—i.e., "the impossibility of any existence at all" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 262). As such, it signifies the impossibility of the temporalization that characterizes human existence. It is the end of our "having-been" and our "being ahead" of ourselves. Every temporal synthesis, every thematization, every knowing that is based on these temporal modes ends with death. Death thus "gives Dasein nothing to be actualized" (ibid). Purely passive in the face of it, Dasein faces the end of its powers.

Levinas, taking death as this possibility of an impossibility, locates it in the Other (*autrui*). I experience the impossibility of temporalization when I encounter another person. This is because both the person's past and future escape me. The person's past is "immemorial." I do not remember it. It is not part of the "having been" that situates me. Facing the Other, I thus face, in Levinas's words, "the dia-chrony of a past that does not gather into re-presentation" (Levinas 1994b, p. 112). The past that I can gather together (or synthesize) is my own. Gathering my "having been" together, I re-present myself to myself. The Other, however, is

experienced as the impossibility of this representation. The same holds with regard to the Other's future. My future is the time offered to my intentionality. In it I intend myself as not-yet. I re-present myself as awaiting myself. I take myself as the self I shall be when I actualize one of my possibilities. My access to these is through my past, which I project forward to shape my anticipations. Thus, projecting forward the possibilities that my "having been" has made available to me, I give a definite content to my anticipated possibilities. Since, however, the Other's past is "immemorial," I cannot use it to shape a corresponding future. Levinas thus writes that the future of the Other is "a future contrasting strongly with the synchronizable time of re-presentation, and with the time offered to intentionality, where the *I think* would keep the last word" (p. 114). Once again, my experience of the Other implies an impossibility: here, the impossibility of re-presenting an intended not-yet in the "I think" of an act of cognition. These two impossibilities signify, for Levinas, the Other's "refusing every retreat from its transcendence" (p. 117). The Other in its otherness remains transcendent. It escapes my "I think" even as it escapes my temporalization. Levinas asks, in a pair of rhetorical questions, "Can one seek the sense of death starting from time? Doesn't it show itself in the diachrony of time taken as a relation with the Other?" (Levinas 1993a, p. 123). Confronting this diachrony, I confront the impossibility of engaging in the temporalization that is my existence. My sense of death—understood as the impossibility of such existence—is that of the impossibility of temporalization. The claim here is that I experience this impossibility facing the Other.[18]

The same point can be expressed in terms of Levinas's characterization of "the face as the very mortality of the other person." (Levinas 1994a, p. 107). I experience this mortality "in the rupture of phenomenology, which the face of the Other calls forth" (ibid.). According to Levinas, this rupture is not a one-time affair. It is an ongoing breech in my powers of representation. As he writes, the "enigma or ambiguity" of the face is that it both "calls forth" and "tears itself away from . . . presence and objectivity" (ibid.). The calling forth occurs in the fact that I can "see" the face of the Other. Synthesizing my experiences, I can describe phenomenologically and represent objectively its physical features. The face, however, is not a catalogue of such features. Insofar as it

18. The fact that this argument depends on our accepting Heidegger's equation of Dasein's existence and temporalization shows how Levinas continues to accept Heidegger's ontology, even while claiming to go beyond it.

is grasped as the face of another person, it is grasped as exceeding this description and representation. Thus, when I look at the eyes of another person, I "see" and I do not see. I see the eyes as features of the face. I do not see *what makes them eyes*—that is, their seeing. Both what they *have seen* and *will see* escape me.[19] This escape is the ongoing "rupture of phenomenology," a rupture that I experience as the face, grasped as a face, continually "tears itself away" from my re-presentation. To experience it as a face is, then, to experience this tearing away, this escape from the senses that are the noematic correlates of my intentions. This experience is that of the "mortality of the other person." It is an experience of an escape that becomes permanent when the other person dies.

Relocations

Levinas's assertion that I confront death in my experience of the Other can be understood as a response to the difficulty he finds in Heidegger's talk about Dasein's "experiencing" or grasping its own death. The only death I can experience, according to Heidegger, is my own. Levinas asks: Can the death, which is "the alienation of my existence . . . still be *my* death?" (Levinas 1994b, p. 77). What sense does the "my" have here? The sense it has for Heidegger springs from his assertions that "death is essentially, in every case, mine" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 240). It "lays claim to me as an individual." Because it cannot be shared, "the nonrelational character of death individualizes Dasein down to itself" (p. 263). Thus, for Heidegger, what makes death "my" own is its nonrelational character; it is the fact that I must *undergo it in solitude.* Against this, one has to ask if death even allows us to speak of solitude. In Levinas's words, "does [death] not simply come to crush this solitude, to crush subjectivity itself?" Is not its arrival subjectivity's undoing, *one that undoes its grasp of death?* Here, Levinas's question is: "How can an event that cannot be grasped still happen to me?" (Levinas 1994b, p. 77). As he also puts this: "If, in the face of death, one is no longer able to be able, how can one still remain a self before the event it announces?" (p. 78). As noted, Levinas's solution is not to deny the centrality of death. It is to relocate it. I encounter death as the possibility of an impossibility—in Levinas's phrase, the possibility of being "no longer able to be able"—in my

19. Insofar as representation involves both, that is, requires a synthesis of retained and anticipated experiences, the seeing that escapes me is the Other's representation. I cannot represent this representation.

encounter with the Other.[20] For Levinas, then, "Everything we can say and think about death" actually "comes from the experience and observation of others" (Levinas 1993a, p. 17). The experience of death is, first of all, that of the face. It is our experience of its escape from re-presentation. As a face, it "tears itself away from . . . presence and objectivity." Actual death, which leaves us only the physical face, the face that is seen but does not see, simply confirms this escape.

Heidegger, of course, would reply that I need not actually undergo death to experience its individualization. I need only experience my death in anxiety, that is, in anticipation. Death is my uttermost possibility. It is my ultimate not-yet, the furthest place from which, in anticipation, I can await myself. Levinas's response is that "I" cannot await myself at this place. Both the "I" and the anticipated experience are annihilated in the death I undergo. Given this, I cannot reduce the experience of death to anticipation (Levinas 1993a, p. 37). There is no "there" there, no "not-yet" as a place I could occupy, to anchor such anticipation.[21] The actual experience of death can, then, only be through the Other. It is an ongoing experience of other persons in their escape from presence.

This relocation of the experience of death brings with it a relocation of human futurity. Our futurity is our being ahead of ourselves. For Heidegger, death is our ultimate not-yet. It can never become *past* for us, since it is our annihilation. Its accomplishment is the *end of the self that has a past.* Thus, as long as we are alive, death keeps its character as a possibility. In our "being towards death," i.e., in our always having death as a possibility still to be realized, we are always ahead of ourselves. Futurity remains a feature of our existence; the "not-yet" continues to characterize Dasein's being as a whole.[22] As Levinas notes, the connection between death and futurity that Heidegger is appealing to occurs in Epicurus's

20. Bouckaert writes is this regard, "Whereas for Heidegger the relation to death is experienced as [a] horizon of nothingness, constituting Dasein into freedom and into relation to itself, for Levinas the relation to death puts us in touch with the mystery of the radical alterity which takes the initiative away from us and fills us with fright. Only in relation to the Other can this frightening alterity assume a meaningful sense and open a new future" (Bouckaert 1973, p. 404). As we shall see, death, even in relation to the Other, maintains its traumatic quality.

21. Derrida puts the same point in terms of the aporia we face in anticipating death. Awaiting it, "we expect no longer to be able to await ourselves" (Derrida 1993b, p. 75).

22. As Levinas writes, "Si l'existence est un comportement à l'égard de la possibilité de l'existence, et si elle est totale dans son existence à l'égard de la possibilité, elle ne peut être que pour-la-mort. . . . (si l'être-pour-la-mort est supprimé, du même coup est supprimé le au-devant-de-soi, et le Dasein n'est plus une totalité)" (Levinas 1993a, p. 64).

description of death: "If you are, it is not; if it is, you are not." This "adage," Levinas writes, "insists on the eternal futurity of death." It brings to the fore, "the fact that it deserts every present" (Levinas 1994b, p. 71). Our actual experience of this desertion is, however, our experience of other persons in their escape from presence. Thus, given that the "authentic future . . . is what is not grasped," but rather constantly escapes the being present that we do grasp, we have to say that "the other is the future" (p. 77). For Levinas, then, the "relationship with the future" is "accomplished in the face-to-face with the Other." The "presence of the future" is accomplished in the escape of the face from presence (p. 79).

This transfer of the future to the Other involves a relocation of my ethical obligations. For Heidegger, the future is the locus of my obligations to my being. I pay my debt to my being through my projects. Through them I answer the call of conscience, which is the appeal to recognize my responsibility for my being. As noted, this recognition involves recognizing the nothing at the heart of my projective being. It is precisely because as present, I am "essentially nothing," that I can be ahead of myself. Regarded ethically, being ahead of yourself means being there for yourself as an *obligation* to fill this nothing. I do this by choosing or obligating myself to realize a given future. As a result, my being there in this future is *my presence to myself as an ought.* For Levinas, the same points hold when I take this nothingness or nonpresence as pertaining to the Other.[23] Not only does this make the Other my future, it makes the other person the locus of my obligations. The Other becomes the presence of my ought.

Selfhood and Absence

To understand this transfer of ethical obligations, we first have to consider the role that nothingness (or absence) plays in selfhood. Heidegger and Levinas are, in this regard, remarkably similar. They agree on the role of nothingness, but not on its origin. For Heidegger, the role of such nothingness is clear. In his doctrine, I am a self insofar as I am ahead of myself. Being ahead of myself, I have the inner distance that allows me to be "for myself." This inner distance is the nothingness, the absence that my death reveals to me. In Heidegger's words, "The nothing

23. That they do is, of course, another sign of Levinas's fidelity to the premises of Heidegger's analysis. See note 14.

(*Nichts*)," which death uncovers, "unveils the nothingness (*Nichtigkeit*) that determines Dasein in its very *basis*" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 308). This nothingness, as I noted, is not just my death as a future state. It is something I always carry with me as a self. In allowing me to be *for* myself, it distinguishes me from an inanimate thing in its "identity in the same," i.e., in its being entirely the same with itself. I am a self, then, insofar as I carry death in myself *as an absence.*

Levinas writes in apparent agreement, "Death . . . affects my identity as an 'I.' It is sensed in its rupture of the same, its rupture of my 'I,' its rupture of the same in my 'I'" (Levinas 1993a, p. 22). Levinas, however, is referring not to his own, but to the Other's death. The experience of the latter is what splits my identity and makes me a for-itself. As already indicated, I experience the Other's death, not directly, but in the diachrony of the face-to-face encounter. Phenomenologically, this experience is one where the face of the Other "calls forth" and "tears itself away from . . . presence and objectivity." Levinas uses a number of expressions to describe this. The experience, he writes, embodies a "relation with the different, which, however, is not indifference." It is a relation "where the diachrony is like the *in* of the other-*in*-the-same—without the Other (*l'Autre*) being able to enter into the same." What is pointed to here is the fact that the Other is somehow present to me, yet this presence is not one that I can synthesize or represent to myself. The other person is "in" me, i.e., in my consciousness, yet is not "of" it. The person is *not* one of the elements forming its synthetic unity. Diachronous with me, the Other is *not* synchronizable with my temporality. Encountering another person, I thus experience "this other-in-the-same . . . who cannot be together with the same, who cannot be synchronized with it." All this, of course, affects my self-experience. My grasp of myself necessarily includes a grasp of the Other who is "in" me. The Other, however, is "in" me *as other than me,* i.e., as escaping all my attempts at representation or comprehension. Thus, facing the Other, my self-experience is that of the disturbance or "inquietude of the Same by the Other, without the same being ever able to comprehend the Other, to encompass it" (p. 29).

For Levinas, this "inquietude of the Same by the Other" has two effects. The first is that of "placing my I in question." He describes this as a "questioning where the conscious subject liberates himself from himself, where he is split by . . . transcendence" (Levinas 1993a, p. 127). The "transcendence" referred to is that of another person. It is a feature of "the inabsorbable alterity of the Other." Because it is "in" me, this

alterity makes me other than myself. It splits me in the sense of constantly indicating an alternative to whatever I can synthesize and know. It thus provides a standpoint outside of myself from which I can question myself. With this, we have the second effect of "inquietude." The very unease of my being "put to the question," "confers an identity on me" (ibid.). In questioning myself, I bring myself forward to face my questioning. Confronting myself, I am a for-itself. I achieve my identity *for myself* as I respond. As Levinas describes it, the result is "the awakening of the for-itself (éveil du pour-soi) . . . by the inabsorbable alterity of the other" (p. 32).[24]

To see the essential similarity between Heidegger's and Levinas's positions, the above can be put in terms of the "question of reason." We raise this question with regard to something when we see it as an alternative, that is, as a thing that could be otherwise. We do so by grasping an alternative to this thing. The alternative reveals the thing's lack of necessity and, thus, raises the question of why the thing is as it is (rather than some other way). For Heidegger, as I mentioned, death raises this question with regard to the totality of my being. It makes me a for-itself in making me confront myself. For Levinas, the alterity of Other performs the same function. Thus, confronting the Other's otherness, I confront the could-be-otherwise, that is, the alternative to everything I can thematize about myself and my world. Questioning myself on the basis of the alterity of the Other, I stand outside myself. I face myself from the perspective of the other-than-myself. The Other's placing me in question thus makes me a for-itself. The reason for this parallelism is clear. Since death, for Levinas, is encountered in the alterity of the other person, Heidegger's claims about death become claims about this alterity. Thus, for Levinas, we can say that the Other's alterity is the "absence," the inner distance, that allows me to be a for-itself rather than a thing. I am a self insofar as I carry the alterity of the Other in myself.

24. Since the Other gives one the necessary inner distance, one must be for the Other to be for oneself. This implies that "[r]esponsibility in fact is not a simple attribute of subjectivity, as if the latter already existed in itself, before the ethical relationship. Subjectivity is not for itself; it is, once again, initially for another" (Levinas 1985, p. 96). Because, in fact, subjectivity only exists in being for the Other, the face-to-face relation is prior to it. In Bernasconi's words, this "relation is prior to the relata" (Bernasconi 1982, p. 275). Thus, "the 'terms' of the relation should not be thought of as being pre-given, which is why it is not a conventional relation, but a Relation without relation" (p. 274).

Obligations

According to the above, the questioning that makes me a self can arise either from my death or from my Other. The choice between the two affects our sense of being obligated. This can be put in terms of Levinas's and Heidegger's notions of our "having a conscience," our being intentional, and our being responsible. To begin with, we can consider the concept of having a conscience. For Levinas, the questioning prompted by the Other makes possible "the soul's dialogue with itself" (Levinas 1993a, p. 53). Engaging in this dialogue, I question myself in light of the Other. Given that the Other is the source of my questioning, my answering is a responding to the Other. Having a conscience, in this context, is both seeing myself put into question by the Other and self-consciously responding to this Other. For Heidegger, by contrast, "having a conscience" points inward. I have a conscience when I raise the questions posed with regard to my own being. More precisely, having a conscience is asking myself what I should be and accepting responsibility for this being.[25] The standpoint from which I question myself is *not* that of the Other. It is, rather, the one I occupy in awaiting myself in the future. Thus, as noted, there is an inner absence at the heart of Dasein's being. I respond to this absence by focusing on my possibilities to be. Responding, I am already there ahead of myself. Ahead of myself, I am "for-myself." I am continually "for-myself" insofar as I exist as an ongoing response to the nothingness or absence that grounds my projective being. I ask myself what I should be and act upon the answers.

In the tight web of mutually defining concepts that make up the thought of *Being and Time*, the same derivation applies to the self's intentionality. Taken in its basic sense of *intentio*, which signifies a "stretching forth" towards something, intentionality is also a response to the nothingness within me. As a feature of my being, intentionality is inherent in my being ahead of myself. It is a stretching towards the future, which is motivated by the nothingness at the heart of my projective being. Being responsible, being "for myself," and being intentional all have the same root. They all arise in my responding to an absence, which presents itself to me as an obligation, as a call to respond.

25. In Heidegger's words, "Understanding the call [of conscience], Dasein lets itself act on its own chosen potentiality to be. Only in this way can it be responsible" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 288).

The same assertions can be made in Levinas's thought. What distinguishes this thought is the absence, which presents itself to me as an obligation. The Other, in his alterity, is this absence. Present in the heart of my being, the Other is not a presence. To think "the other *in* the same," I must, Levinas writes, think "the *in* differently than as a presence." He adds, "the other is not another same. The *in* does not signify an assimilation."[26] He is not something "in" me that I could assimilate in the sense of synthesize into something present. He is there for me in my *inability* to grasp him. I experience him in my attempting and failing to make him present. As already indicated, this experience is one of disquiet. Levinas describes the Other's being "in" me as a "situation where the other disquiets the same and where the same desires or waits for the other. The same [that is, my identical selfhood] is not in repose." As including the Other, "the totality of its signification [as the same] is not reducible to the identity of the same. The same contains more than it can contain. This is desire, seeking, patience, and the length of time" (Levinas 1993a, p. 133). For Levinas, this lack of repose, which expresses itself in desire and seeking, is the basic form of intentionality. The stretching forth, which is intentionality, is rooted in nonrepose. In his words, "Disquiet is not a mode of intentionality. Rather, intentionality is a mode of this inability of disquiet to repose in itself" (p. 32).[27]

Once again, the parallelism between Levinas's and Heidegger's thought follows from the similar role that absence (or death) plays. For Levinas, the root of intentionality is disquiet, a disquiet occasioned by the Other's presence to me as an absence. This, of course, is the very absence that makes me a for-itself. Thus, the nullity at the heart of my projective being is given to me by the Other. I am intentional in the sense of being ahead of myself, stretched forth towards the future, by virtue of the Other. For Heidegger, this stretching towards the future is motivated by my ongoing, never successful attempt to make *myself* present. The absence that remains "outstanding" is *my own.* For Levinas, it is that of the Other. It is, however, also my absence. It is such because I exist as a

26. "Il faut ici penser comme catégorie première l'Autre-dans-le-Même en pensant le dans autrement que comme une présence. L'Autre n'est pas un autre Même, le dans ne signifie pas une assimilation" (Levinas 1993a, p. 133).

27. This basic form of intentionality is, of course, prior to the intentionality that Levinas criticizes as part of the "logic of the same." In particular, it is prior to the intentionality that arises through the synthetic constitution of the intentional object. Stretching forth is here a response not to a presence, but to an absence. As such, it can never reach fulfillment in the Husserlian sense.

self (as opposed to a thing) by virtue of this nullity. Since, however, this absence is "mine" because it is not mine, i.e., not reducible to my "identity as the same," I have to say my selfhood, i.e., my being a for-itself who is intentionally directed, depends on the Other.

With this, we have the transfer to the Other of all the obligations to such selfhood. Heidegger, having drawn these obligations from the absence that makes a person a for-itself, assumes that they are self-obligations. Levinas, having drawn them from the same absence, turns and derives it from the Other. He thus takes them as obligations to this Other. Thus, for Levinas, the absence that presents itself to me as an obligation, as a call to respond, is that of the Other. The same holds with regard to the debt to my own being, the debt whose paying off would collapse my being-for-myself. This unpayable debt is actually an obligation to the Other.

Several features characterize the nature of this debt for Levinas. The first is that it cannot be avoided. Since the self is founded on the Other—that is, on intending, responding to and, hence, on acknowledging its alterity—it cannot escape such responding. Its very being as a for-itself is conditioned by this. To use Levinas's phrase, there is a "beyond being" included in the self's being. This "beyond being" disquiets it, tears its inner self-identity, its being as the same. The result is its awakening as a "for-itself." To be a "for-itself" is, then, to acknowledge an alterity in one's being as the same. The ethical dimension of the debt appears when Levinas writes, "It is necessary to think this tearing of the same in an ethical manner. . . . The interior identity [caused by this tearing] exactly signifies the impossibility of being in repose. It is ethics at its beginning." The claim, here, is that ethics begins with the intentionality, which is a turning towards, an acknowledging and responding to the Other. Another feature of the debt is that it is uniquely my own. My relation to the Other individualizes me. I can be a for-itself only by responding to the Other in the uniqueness *occasioned by the Other.* Thus, Levinas adds, "This turning to the Other responds according to a multiple intrigue to the Other, my neighbor. [It is] an inaccessible responsibility whose urgency identifies me as irreplaceable and unique" (Levinas 1993a, p. 128). As he also puts this, "The I . . . rises up in its unicity in responding to an Other in an inescapable responsibility . . . The I is a self-identity that has engendered itself by the impossibility of replacing itself" (p. 29).[28]

28. Levinas adds, "I am I in the sole measure that I am responsible, a non-interchangeable I" (Levinas 1985, p. 101).

From a Heideggarian perspective, all these assertions follow once we identify the Other with death. In Heidegger's words, "death individualizes Dasein down to itself." It does so because my relation to it is inescapable and nontransferable. Insofar as my death is uniquely my own, its experience is isolating. When I claim with Levinas that the experience of death is actually that of the alterity of the Other, this isolation attaches to my relation to the Other. It makes the relation not just something I cannot avoid. It makes it a unique, nontransferable relation.

Responsibility and Temporalization

The above remarks bring us to two of Levinas's more striking claims. He draws from the alterity of the Other my responsibility for his death. He also draws the infinite nature of time from this alterity. Both follow from my responding to it.

The first claim can best be understood in terms of my dependence on the Other for my uniqueness. As Levinas describes this dependence: "The fact of being irreplaceable in responsibility for the Other defines me, the I, and the unique I (me définit, moi, et moi unique)" (Levinas 1993a, p. 39). My uniqueness is defined by the uniqueness of my responsibility. My unique being as an "I" is, accordingly, defined as a being-uniquely-responsible for the Other. Thus, I cannot transfer this responsibility. To do so would be to give up my being. This dependence can also be expressed as an indebtedness: I *owe* my being as an "I" to the Other. More precisely, I owe it to the Other's alterity. It is, after all, my response to this alterity that defines me as a self. Thus, as the previous section emphasized, my being-for-myself is based on a lack of repose, a disquiet occasioned by the other person's alterity as expressed in the person's escape from presence. I respond to the Other and yet my response is never sufficient to make the Other present. The Other, by virtue of the diachrony of our relationship, always slips away. For Levinas, this diachrony designates the alterity of the Other. My encounter with this alterity is the way I encounter death; the "first death" for me—indeed, the only death *I* can experience—is the Other's death. Given this and given that my response to this alterity defines me as a self, I have to say that my indebtedness is actually to this "death." Thus, the responding to the Other that makes me a self is, in Levinas's terms, a responding to the Other's death. I owe my unique being as a for-itself to it.

To draw from this indebtedness my responsibility for this death, we

have to recall that a "for-itself" can die. Rather than being a mere thing, my being as a "for-itself" involves an inner temporal distance (or absence) that can collapse. Now, the same inner distance is implicit in Levinas's defining alterity in terms of temporal diachrony, i.e., in terms of the Other's having a past and future distinct from mine. The other person's escape from me is based on the distinction of his past and future from the present he shares with me. As such it implies the temporal self-separation that opens up the possibility of death that is mortality.[29] The result, then, is that I owe my own being as a for-itself—a type of being that includes the possibility of my death—not just to the alterity of the Other; I owe it to his mortality. The other person's alterity is his mortality. It implies his ability to die. With this, we have a way of understanding Levinas's claim that my responsibility for the Other includes his death. According to him, one has a "responsibility for the Other in supporting his . . . death as if one were culpable" (Levinas 1993a, p. 50). This culpability does not mean that I cause his death, but rather that *it causes me. I require it* (or at least its possibility, as expressed in the face of the Other) *in order to be.* In fact, I owe the possibility of my own death to the Other, insofar as I owe to him the fact that I am a for-itself. As Levinas expresses this relation: "My death is my *part* in the death of the Other, and the death I die is the death that is my fault" (ibid.). Interpreting Levinas, we can say that my death is my *part in the Other's* death insofar as I am a self who is capable of death because I include as *part of myself* the Other's alterity or "death." Including it, I have my "share" in this death. The death that I do die is "my fault" in the sense that it is the consequence my requiring alterity in order to be. Requiring it, I require the mortality of the Other. The Other's escape from presence grounds my own. It grounds the very possibility of being outside of myself that allows me to be a for-myself.

Levinas's claim that time is infinite follows from this shift from Heideggerian self-responsibility to responsibility for the Other. This is because it implies a corresponding shift in the notion of temporalization. For Heidegger, as I noted, the call of conscience is synonymous with Dasein's life in its ongoing temporalization. The three temporal structures of past, present, and future are based on Dasein's care for its being; more precisely, on Dasein's attempt to pay the debt it owes with regard to its being. Because this being is inherently finite, the resulting temporalization

29. In plain terms, if he could not escape from me, he could not die. He would either be a mere thing or else, having already died, be present simply as a corpse.

is itself *finite.* Its "having been" stretches back only as far as its limited being does. Its "not yets," as specified by its actual projects, are always at a finite remove. The same holds for the ultimate "not yet" of its death. It is not something that can be prolonged indefinitely. For Levinas, by contrast, "care," understood as an attempt to fulfill an original obligation, is care for the Other. The Other is the focus of my indebtedness and hence my responsibility. The temporalization that is founded on care is thus based on my responding to the Other. It appears as an ongoing, *nonfinite* attempt to catch up with the alterity of the Other.

Levinas puts this in terms of the split in my being, which is occasioned by the Other. He writes, "The disturbance by the Other puts into question the identity where the essence of being is defined. This split of the same by the nonpossessible Other at the heart of myself . . . this is temporality" (Levinas 1993a, p. 128). This split gives rise to my attempt to possess what I cannot possess. It occasions the intentionality, the stretching forth, which is my being ahead of myself. The stretching forth is towards the Other, who in his alterity, always remains "outstanding." For Levinas, then, "Time is *both* (*à la fois*) this Other in the same and this Other who cannot be together with the same, who cannot be synchronized with it. Time is thus the inquietude of the same by the Other, without the same being ever able to comprehend the Other, to encompass it" (p. 29). My attempt to encompass the Other is an attempt to make him or her present. It may be compared to Dasein's making present one of its future possibilities. Such making present is the advance of time. For Heidegger, as just noted, this advance is finite. It corresponds to the finite remove of Dasein's "not yet." Such finitude, however, is just what escapes me in my relation to the Other. Each time I make the Other present, its alterity appears. It confronts me with a further task of making present. In fact, the otherness of the Other signifies that I can never catch up. My intentionality, understood as my desire to make the Other present, can never be satisfied. This, for Levinas, is the root of the infinity, the "always" of time. In his words, this "always" is "engendered by this disproportion between desire and the desired—and this desire would be the rupture of intentional consciousness in its noetic-noematic equivalence."[30] A noetic-noematic equivalence is the equivalence between think-

30. Ibid., p. 127. He also writes: "Time, rather than the flowing of the contents of consciousness, is turning of the same to the Other. This turning [is] to the Other who, as other, would jealously preserve, in this turning that is not assimilatable to representation, temporal diachrony. Like the immemorial at the origin, infinity is the teleology of time" (p. 128).

ing and the thought. It is the fulfillment of the intentionality of thinking by the presence of the thought. The very alterity of the Other makes impossible this fulfillment and hence makes possible the "always" of time. Even the death of the Other does not end this alterity. The inanimate body that remains is not the Other. It is simply a sign of the permanence of the Other's escape and, hence, of the longing that is the "patience" of time.[31]

Standards

What is striking about Levinas's and Heidegger's talk of responsibility is the absence of any extended descriptions of how we ought to respond. The nature of the response is always left indefinite. Thus, Heidegger's "call of conscience," taken as a call to be responsible for one's own being, is a perfectly general appeal. It does not specify the choices one should make. The most one can say is that these will be set by the factual circumstances into which Dasein has been "thrown" as a finite entity. The same lack of specificity is present in Levinas. To be a self, I must respond, but it is unclear what determines the specific nature of the response. In the absence of any concrete guidelines, I am left only with the factual circumstances of the encounter. The most I can say is that I should respond to the Other out of the uniqueness of our situation. This responding is my "having a conscience" in the Levinasian sense. The difficulty, however, is that my responding need not be ethical in any recognizable sense.[32] There is, after all, a distinction between *having* a conscience and *examining* one's conscience. Not everything my conscience tells me is correct. Not every response I make to being "put into question" by the Other need be appropriate. Because of this, I cannot justify my actions through a simple appeal to my conscience.[33]

31. In Levinas's words, "Time is not the limitation of being, but its relation with infinity. Death is not annihilation, but a question necessary for this relation with infinity where time produces itself" (Levinas 1993a, p. 28).

32. Silvia Benso makes a virtue of this lack of specification. She writes, following Levinas, "The ethical imperative comes from Otherness, from its right to existence as a form of reality. The only imperative is the injunction to let this Other be" (Benso, 1996, p. 136). This letting-the-Other-be does not imply any concrete moral guidelines. Indeed, for Benso, "any ethics that wishes to be believable must renounce the claims normative ethics make of being a practical guide, or a moral ought, or a science of mores, traditions, behaviors; of being able to posit rules and values as conditions for the development of human beings. . . . Ethics must renounce its normativity" (p. 134).

33. A nice example of the need to go beyond the promptings of conscience is given

How, then, do I ethically evaluate the "call" of my conscience? How do I justify my particular response to the Other? One answer is provided through Kant's categorical imperative. Following it, I examine the maxim of my action. If it can be universalized without contradiction, then it is ethical. In other words, if I can will that everyone perform the same action (or, alternately, heed the same call of conscience), then I may proceed. Kant, in proposing this procedure, reminds us that ethics involves more than responsibility. It may begin with intentionality, taken as a turning towards and responding to the Other. As such, its basis may be the disquiet occasioned by the Other. Given, however, that the response to this disquiet need not be ethical, ethics cannot, itself, be this responding. In fact, as an inquiry, ethics actually begins with the questioning of this response. Its origin is not the "call of conscience," but our putting this call into question. Its traditional focus is the examination of the "call."

Levinas asserts that the "tearing of the same" by an Other within the same gives rise to a disquiet, which is "ethics at its beginning" (Levinas 1993a, p. 128). The issue here is whether we can move from *this* beginning to ethics in the traditional sense. Do we have a basis to question the response that arises from this disquiet? Can we draw standards from this "tearing" and "disquiet"? The difficulty in attempting to do so stems from the exceptional character of the "face-to-face" relation. The "face," in this relation, is characterized as "the very mortality of the Other." As noted earlier, such mortality signifies the "possibility of an impossibility." It is the possibility of death understood as the state where I am *not* able to be able, that is, where I can*not* exercise my "I can." My relation to death is, thus, passive. In Levinas's words, my being affected by it "is passivity, affection by the measureless, affection of the present by the nonpresent, . . . an immemorial diachrony which one cannot integrate with experience."[34]

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in Huckleberry Finn, where Huck feels guilty for lying to help Jim, a runaway slave, to escape: "I knowed very well I had done wrong. . . . Then I thought a minute, and says to myself, hold on; s'pose you'd done right and give Jim up, would you felt better than what you do now? No, says I, I'd feel bad—I'd feel just the same way I do now" (Clemens 1977, p. 95). Here, his conscience tells him both that, as the "property" of Miss Watson, Jim should be returned and that he should not betray him, but rather aid his escape. The difficulty is that conscience can prompt in many different directions. As Mill observes with regard to the "moral faculty," "Unhappily it is also susceptible, by a sufficient use of the external sanctions and of the force of early impressions, of being cultivated in almost any direction, so that there is hardly anything so absurd or so mischievous that it may not, by means of these influences, be made to act on the human mind with all the authority of conscience" (Mill 1979, p. 30).

34. Death here is that encountered in the Other. This is why it involves a "fissure" in

Insofar as this characterizes the face-to-face relation, it designates an unbridgeable alterity. In particular, it positions the Other beyond every "I can" that would allow me to take the initiative. In the face of such alterity I am, in Levinas's words, reduced to "a passivity more passive than every passivity" (p. 132). The question this raises is whether, in such passivity, I can assume responsibility for my response.

Ricoeur puts this question in terms of "the face of the Other." In response to the question, "whose face is it?" he answers, "this face is that of a master of justice, of a master who instructs and who does so only in an ethical mode: this face forbids murder and commands justice." Can this instruction take place in the asymmetrical relation I have to the Other? The difficulty, he writes, is that "the summons to responsibility has opposite it simply the passivity of an 'I' who has been called upon." This "dissymmetry of the face-to-face encounter," if "left uncompensated, . . . would break off the exchange of giving and receiving and would exclude any instruction by the face within the field of solicitude" (Ricoeur 1992, p. 189). Ricoeur asks: Does the passivity of the subject allow for such compensation? Does it permit the responding subject "a capacity of discernment and judgment" (p. 339) or does it, rather, render its "interiority sterile" (p. 337)? Without this capacity, he asks, "who will be able to distinguish the master from the executioner, the master who calls for a disciple from the master who requires a slave?" (p. 339).

For Ricoeur these questions concern my resources to make this distinction. As part of this, one can also ask if the Other in its alterity offers me any assistance in my search for standards to gauge my response. Once again we come up against the exceptional character of the encounter with the Other. As Levinas writes, the encounter is a "relation with the singular, [a] relation of difference in non-indifference, [a relation] excluding every common measure, be this to the ultimate, the community, the co-presence" understood as common measures (Levinas 1993a, p. 127). From a Kantian perspective, this exclusion denies the possibility of universalization. It excludes every formulation of a universal or common maxim to judge the relation. The same exclusion occurs when we speak of the face as "the rupture of phenomenology." This rupture involves the face as excluding the "same," an exclusion that places it

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my being: "Mais l'affection par la mort est affectivité, passivité, affection par la dé-mesure, affection du présent par le non-présent, plus intime qu'aucune intimité, jusqu'à la fission, a posteriori plus ancien que tout a priori, diachronie immémoriale que l'on ne peut ramener à l'expérience" (Levinas 1993a, p. 24).

beyond our comprehension. Thus, Levinas describes the comprehension of being as a grasp of the "same." We posit being through an identity synthesis, i.e., a synthesis in which we continually reidentify something as "the same"[35] To assert that the relation to the Other involves this rupture is, then, to assert that it is nonontological in the sense of having nothing of the "same" inherent in it. It is thus intrinsically incapable of providing those common standards (standards that are "the same") by which we might judge it. The Other's alterity prevents it from offering any assistence.

One could, of course, reply that a judgment based on universal standards is the last thing called for in a unique relation to the Other. But even if this were granted, a crucial problem remains: In most of the situations where I am called to make ethical decisions, I face multiple Others. If I am to choose between my responsibilities to them, I must judge. Acknowledging this necessity, Levinas writes, "the simplicity of this primary obedience [to the Other] is upset by the third person emerging next to the Other; the third person is himself a neighbor, and the responsibility of the ego also devolves on him." The question I face "in the proximity of the human plurality" is: "Who in this plurality comes first?" To decide this, I must "compare unique and incomparable others." As Levinas remarks, "here is the hour of knowledge and then of the objectivity beyond or on the hither side of the nudity of the face" (Levinas 1994b, p. 106). The question, of course, is: How do I pass from one side to the other, how do I actually compare "incomparable others"? One may also ask: Is there any basis in my relation to the Other for this move?

Such questions bring to the fore the objection initially raised with regard to death's nontransferable and, hence, ultimately isolating character. Insofar as my relation to the Other involves alterity and death, it assumes death's nonrelational character. The relation is, paradoxically, a nonrelational relation. To the point that it does define me in my uniqueness, it isolates me *in my relation* to the Other. As such, its exclusive character implies the sacrifice of my relations to all the Others who are other than my immediate Other. I can of course turn from one per-

35. As Levinas expresses this in his essay, "Substitution," "In the relationship with beings which is called consciousness, we identify these beings through the dispersion of 'adumbrations' in which they appear. Similarly, in self-consciousness, we identify ourselves through a multiplicity of temporal phrases." In each case "an ideality corresponds with the dispersion of aspects and images, adumbrations or phrases," the ideality being the object as the same, i.e., the same thing showing itself through such aspects (Levinas 1996, p. 80).

son to the next, but in doing so I remain in an exclusive one-to-one relation. I must remain so if I am to maintain my unique selfhood. Given this, *I* can never answer the question: "Who in this plurality comes first?" What Levinas calls "the hour and birthplace of the question: a demand for justice" never arises *for me* in my uniqueness (Levinas 1994b, p. 106).[36] In fact, the arrival of such an "hour" would mark the end of my selfhood in its "unicity." The self that would remain would be nonunique. It would be a kind of "they-self." The arrival of the hour of justice would, in other words, mark the self's lapse into a kind of Levinasian parallel to Heidegger's inauthentic Dasein.

Levinas would probably reply that justice only makes concrete the obligation the self has to the Other. Its *original motivation* comes from the face-to-face encounter. Justice, in other words, is only a thematization, an objectification of the original impulses drawn from this encounter. As such, it both preserves and transforms the original motivation. The transformation occurs through the public quality of objectification. What is objective is public in the sense that it has, by definition, a presence available to everyone. When we institutionalize the original motivating impulse by creating the institutions of justice, we make the obligations springing from the face-to-face encounter present collectively. This presence, although a transformation, does not dispense with the original motivation. It simply re-presents publicly the indebtedness or obligations arising from the original relation.[37]

36. The person it arises for is "the third" person, i.e., the person regarding my relationship to the Other. Such a person, however, is precisely the person who is no longer defined by a nontransferable one-to-one relation. Bernasconi writes in this regard: "The third party who looks on does not belong within the face-to-face. . . . The third party is the symbol of observing reason, and as the third party has only a distorted access to the face, so reason's attempts to think the face are inept" (Bernasconi 1982, p. 267). Bernasconi attempts to get around the isolation of the face-to-face relationship by focusing on Levinas's assertion that the third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other. He writes, "When 'the third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other,' it is the look of judgment which takes place. This judgment passes beyond the immediacy or proximity of responsibility, institutes the order of justice and thereby refers to society" (p. 269). The difficulty with this solution is that social relations are reciprocal, but the face-to-face, even when the third party is somehow immanent within it, is not reciprocal.

37. Levinas writes, "A third party is also approached; and the relationship between the neighbor and the third party cannot be indifferent to me when I approach. There must be justice among incomparable ones. . . . there must be thematization. . . . But being must be understood on the basis of being's other" (Levinas 1991, p. 16). This basis is the encounter with alterity. The "third party" here is an actual Other, not a presence regarding me through the eyes of the other as in note 36.

The Death of the Other: Is It Conceivable?

This reply focuses on the question of motivation. It makes us ask: what kind of motivation can be drawn from the alterity we experience in the face-to-face encounter? Is the encounter with alterity, in its radical Levinasian sense, something that yields any motivation all? The encounter with death has, as Derrida notes, a certain paradoxical quality. Approaching it, I seem to be approaching a border, a limit. Yet, the border is such that I cannot cross it. To cross it is my annihilation. Death, then, has to be conceived as a border *with only one side.* Understood as a limit of life, it has the paradoxical quality of being between somewhere and nowhere. Death is somehow "between" this life and its system of places and the no-place, which is supposedly beyond life. Thus, facing it, one faces a boundary between place and no-place, which cannot be located (Derrida 1993, pp. 10–11). Given this, can one ever actually "face" death? What sense does its encounter have? The difficulty, here, can be put in terms of Heidegger's definition of death as the possibility of an impossibility—i.e., the possibility of "the impossibility of any existence at all." As Derrida notes, this impossibility, as all embracing, includes "the impossibility of appearing as such." As such, it includes the impossibility of death's appearing. Yet, if death cannot appear, how can we confront it authentically? If we cannot, "then," as Derrida concludes, "man, or man as Dasein, never has a relation to death as such" (p. 76). We cannot even talk here of anticipating death, i.e., awaiting ourselves, in anticipation, at the moment of death. This is because its borderless quality undermines the thought of death as a not-yet, i.e., as a locatable moment of the future.

The implication for Derrida is that our relation to death is "only to perishing, to demising, and to the death of the other." He writes, with regard to the latter, "The death of the Other thus becomes again 'first,' always first. . . . The death of the Other, this death of the Other in 'me,' is fundamentally the only death that is named in the syntagen 'my death'" (Derrida 1993, p. 76). This, of course, is Levinas's position. I cannot experience my death. My relation to it can only be in terms of the otherness of the Other. Here, however, we have to ask whether Derrida's analysis does not equally undercut Levinas's claim that facing the Other, I face death. Once again, the experience seems to be that of a borderless border. On one side of this "border," I have the outside of the Other, that is, his spatial presence. His "inside," however, is not a spatial, physi-

cal concept. It is not to be found in the workings of his facial muscles, eye balls, optic nerves, brain, and so forth. Thus, the border between this side and the other (the "inside") is not a spatial limit. It can no more be thought of in terms of the "outside" than death can be conceived in terms of "this side" of life.[38]

The difficulty is not just that the Other's subjectivity is unavailable to me. It is that my relation to the Other in his alterity is, for Levinas, always a disproportionate, asymmetrical relation. Such disproportion involves more than my passivity in relation to the Other. In its most general aspect, it embraces the divide between the ontological and the nonontological. On one side, we have the realm of the same, i.e., of being. This is the place of the "outside." On the other, we have what is beyond being.[39] This is the "inside," i.e., the "no-place" of the otherness of the Other. As is obvious, there is no conceivable border between the two. To conceive it, we would have to think of a common measure that would measure (or locate) the "step" that would cross from the first to the second. The distinction Levinas draws between being and beyond being is, however, precisely intended to deny any common measure. Given this, we cannot say with Derrida and Levinas that the Other's death is "first." It is, in fact, no more "first" for me than my own death is. In neither case does "death" name an experience. The "impossibility," which is death, is precisely the impossibility *per se* of its experience. Thus, the actual conclusion of Derrida's reasoning is that "the syntagen 'my death'" names neither my death nor that of the Other in me. What it designates is simply an aporia. In Derrida's terms, the experience of death, if we could speak of such, would be an experience of an aporia (Derrida 1993, p. 15).

38. I also cannot locate the border by appealing to the speech of the Other, i.e., by proceeding from what he says to conscious intentions animating his utterances. Such speech may be deceptive; it may conceal what the Other has "in mind." If it does, then my attempt to interpret the physical sounds emanating from the Other must fail. The possibility of such failure, as Husserl notes, is inherent in the fact that language can have only an indicative function in referring to what the Other has in mind. Since I cannot grasp the Other's consciousness directly, it must signify in the absence of its referent. Thus, language is in the same position as bodily presence. I cannot proceed through it to the Other. The boundary is not there in language, just as it is not there in space.

39. This is why Levinas criticizes Buber's I-thou relation for being symmetrical, i.e., for its involving two terms that have the same ontological status. According to Levinas, "in the Meeting between the I and the Thou in which the address is articulated, the relation is reciprocity itself: the I says 'thou' to a Thou inasmuch as this Thou is an I capable of replying with a 'thou'" (Levinas 1993b, p. 22). Both Marcel and Buber, "characterize the I-Thou relation in terms of being" (p. 23). According to Levinas, both thus misunderstand it.

What is at stake in the aporetic or paradoxical character of death is, according to Derrida, nothing less than "the very possibility of the existential analysis" that Heidegger advances. The analysis hangs on Heidegger's distinguishing Dasein's "authentic" from its "inauthentic" relation to death. Only an authentic relation reveals to me the nullity at the heart of my being. The "call of conscience," as a call to recognize my self-indebtedness, that is, as a call to self-responsibility for my being, demands an acknowledgment of this nullity. This, however, requires an authentic anticipation of my death. I must confront, in anticipation, the not-yet of my own not-being. I must, as it were, await myself at this not-yet. The thought of such a not-yet, is, however, a nonthought. The attempt to think it yields only an aporia. Thus, given our "nonaccess to death as such," we cannot distinguish an authentic from an inauthentic relation to it (Derrida 1993, pp. 76–77). Accordingly, we cannot base our "having a conscience" on this relation.

Once again, the argument can be extended to Levinas's position. Both philosophers trace the origin of our ethical responsibility to the encounter with death. The same aporetic quality characterizes their conceptions of this encounter. Thus, the same objections obtain. For Levinas, their upshot is that the ethics that "begin" with my facing the alterity of the Other *cannot, in fact, begin.* It cannot because my "nonaccess to death as such" includes this alterity. Confronting it, I confront a borderless border between being and the beyond being. Thus, just as Heidegger cannot really identify death and the "not-yet," so Levinas cannot say, "the Other [in his alterity] is the future." Both assertions assume a common temporal measure that is simply unavailable. Regardless of where I attempt to locate death, I still confront a total alterity. I face an otherness so complete that it offers me no resources to judge my response to it. Thus, I cannot draw any positive motivation from death. As a result, the disquiet that comes from facing it is without any positive implications for ethics. It seems that we can draw neither a Heideggarian ethics of self-responsibility nor a Levinasian ethics of responsibility for the Other from this disquiet.

Trauma

The normal expression of this disquiet is, in fact, not a responding to, but a turning away. As Heidegger observes, our "everyday being-towards-death is a constant flight in the face of death." Every day, we do our best

to conceal from ourselves the fact that we shall die. The death of others, insofar as it reminds us of our mortality is regarded he writes, as "socially distasteful, if not downright tactless" (Heidegger 1967a, p. 254). Pascal makes the same point in his comments on diversion. He describes our constant search for and engagement in diverting activities as a constant flight from the thought of death. Diversion, he writes, diverts us from facing our "mortal condition." Deprived of it, we cannot avoid the thought "of inescapable death and disease" (Pascal 1966, no. 137, p. 67). Heidegger, of course, stigmatizes such attitudes as "inauthentic." Yet, once we give up the dichotomy, authentic-inauthentic, the reasons for this flight become readily apparent. They stem from the traumatic character of death.

Levinas brings up this character at the end of *Death and Time.* He speaks of the "patience [or enduring] of the other (*l'Autre*) by the same" as a "traumatism." He then asks, "How can death take up a sense in time as the patience of the other by the same, the patience that constitutes the length of time?" (Levinas 1993a, 133). The "length of time," that is, its character of being "always," seems to follow from the self (as the same) being fixated by the traumatism that occurs in the direct (the face-to-face) encounter with the other. The "other" (*l'Autre*), here, is taken as the other-than-being. Once again we have an equivalence between the alterity of death and the alterity of the other person insofar as both express this otherness. Thus, Levinas asks whether "the traumatism of the other (*l'Autre*) does not come from the other person (*autrui*)?" He immediately adds: "Is not the nothingness of death the nudity itself of the face of the neighbor?" (ibid.). The point, here, is that in encountering this "nudity," we encounter "the nothingness of death" in an unmediated, unconcealed fashion. The traumatism we experience is the traumatism of the other, taken as the other-than-being. So understood, the other (*l'Autre*) is other than all our ontological categories. It is senseless by being outside of the sense we can draw from these categories. Its encounter is traumatic, then, because it overwhelms our attempts to assimilate it by making sense of it. It is in terms of just such "absurdity" that Levinas speaks of "my death, which is not the possibility of an impossibility, but pure rape" (p. 134). The comparison of death to a sexual assault is apt insofar as it points to the exceptional, nonintegrateable character of the traumatic event.

Levinas's use of the word "traumatism" is consistent with its psychological connotations. Freud writes that the traumatic experience is so

overwhelming "that assimilation or elaboration of it can no longer be effected by normal means" (Freud 1965, p. 286). Overwhelmed by it, we cannot assimilate it by integrating it into the sense of our lives. In "traumatic neuroses," this incapability of dealing with an overwhelming event causes us to be "fixated" by it. In Freud's words, persons suffering from such neuroses are "brought to a complete standstill in life by the traumatic experience . . . they give up all interest in the present and the future" (p. 287). "Alienated from both present and future," they "are marooned by their illness" (p. 284). In a certain sense, such persons do experience an "always" of time. The temporal infinity that results from this fixation is, however, that of continual return to the event. The neurotic symptoms that constitute our response to the event do not move us beyond it. They simply recreate it again and again on a symbolic level, thus isolating us further in the event. This isolation is not just temporal. In those suffering from trauma we find, according to Freud, "a self-seeking, egoistic motive, a straining towards protection and self interest." Fixated on the past event, the self continues to protect itself from the dangers that threatened it (p. 390).[40]

Two conclusions can be drawn from these remarks. On the one hand they support Levinas's sense that encounter with death is marked by an exceptional, traumatic character. On the other, they make it clear that, from a psychological standpoint, this character makes the encounter a highly problematic basis for ethics. This is because the normal response to trauma is not a turning towards, a responding to, but a turning away. When possible, the threat of trauma is met by avoidance or flight. The "constant fleeing in the face of death," which constitutes our everyday being-towards-death, is the ordinary response to the *possibility of trauma.* If ethics is not just responding, but being responsible for this responding, *actual trauma* leads to the very opposite of this. Actually undergoing trauma results in the laming of the self. Rather than assuming responsibility for his responding, the sufferer continues his attempt, on a symbolic level, to flee before the event. The flight continues in the neurotic symptoms, which, in expressing his failure to make sense of it, return him again and again to the very thing he is trying to escape.

40. This feature is particularly evident in the traumas resulting from the "terrors of war"—i.e., those where the person confronts death (either his own or another's) on the battlefield.

A Shift in Focus

Two positions are fundamental to Heidegger's and Levinas's conceptions of ethics as responsibility. Both assume that, in ethics, responsibility is a responding to the self, be this one's own or the self of the Other. They both conceive this self in terms of alterity and death. Thus, for Heidegger ethics is essentially self-responsibility. I respond to myself by responding to the nothingness that is at the heart of my being a for-itself. Responding to this is responding to the self-alterity that my death reveals. In the Levinasian parallel, ethics is being responsible for the Other's self. It is a responding to that person's selfhood as revealed by "the rupture of phenomenology," which is the face. This face is "the very mortality of the other person." Facing it, I encounter the Other as the alterity of death. Since my own selfhood is such by virtue of this being "in" me, such alterity is also my self-alterity.

The difficulties of these positions have been the subject of the last two sections. Essentially, they involve the fact that once we conceive selfhood in terms of alterity and death, responsibility becomes a responding to the alterity of death. The senselessness of this alterity gives this response an aporetic if not a traumatic character. Given this result, either we have to say that ethics is *not* responsibility—i.e., not a responding to the self—or else we must reconceive the self. Another way of putting this is to note that if ethics is responsibility, these difficulties imply that we have misconceived the self. It may be that its alterity is *not* based on the self's mortality, but rather on its life, i.e., the being-alive whose qualities are thrown into relief by such mortality. In the shift of focus that this implies, responsibility would be conceived as responding to the presence of life rather than the absence of death.

How can we decide this issue? Is there a method to examine whether presence or absence, life or death, lies at the basis of the self's alterity? To be valid, such a method would have to be implicit in the claims that Levinas and Heidegger make. It would have to be inherent in their accounts. Levinas's account of the face-to-face encounter is framed in terms of diachrony. Diachrony appears in the inaccessibility of the Other's past and future. Shut out from the Other's past and future, I can only experience the Other's present. This, however, is experienced as an escape from presence. It is experienced "in the rupture of phenomenology, which the face of the Other calls forth." There is, in fact, a *phenomenological* claim implicit in this description. It is that the bracketing

of the self's pastness and futurity brings about this rupture. Rupturing presence, it leaves us with the alterity of absence. Heidegger makes a parallel claim in his assertion that *as present*, Dasein is "essentially nothing." The nothingness that is at the basis of its projective being comes to the fore when we bracket its "having been" and its being "ahead of itself." So described, their claims seem to be based on an implicit phenomenological reduction, one which brackets both the past and future. Now, Husserl also performs this reduction. His claim, however, is that such bracketing leads to a radically different sense of transcendence. Rather than revealing the nothingness of death, it uncovers the alterity of the "living present." To adjudicate these claims, we must, then, perform this reduction.

The Reduction to the Living Present

In Husserl's descriptions, the radical reduction to the living present is called "a reduction *within* the transcendental reduction." Its aim, he writes, is to grasp "primal temporalization, . . . primal time."[41] Performing it, we reach "the sphere of primal temporalization in which the first and originary (*urquellenmässige*) sense of time comes forward—time as the living, streaming present."[42] To understand how we reach this present, a few words should be said recalling the transcendental reduction *within which* this reduction occurs. The aim of this reduction is to reach an "ultimately constituting level." We perform it, undoing one by one the levels of constitution, until we "discover in this reduction an absolute sphere of materials (*Stoffen*) and noetic forms" for connecting these materials (Husserl 1976, p. 228). The move to the living present that occurs as a

41. "One requires a reduction within the transcendental reduction to grasp, in a more complete manner, the streaming immanent temporalization and time, to grasp the primal temporalization, the primal time. . . . This is the reduction to the streaming, primal 'immanence,' to the primal unities constituting themselves in this [immanence]" (Ms. C 7 I, p. 14b, January–July 1932).

42. "The reduction to the living present is the radicalized reduction to that subjectivity in which everything is originally accomplished that is valid for me—i.e., to that subjectivity in which all ontological sense (*Seinssinn*) is sense for me as experientially apprehended, obtaining sense. It is a reduction to the sphere of primal temporalization in which the first and originary (*urquellenmässige*) sense of time comes forward—time as the living, streaming present. All further temporality—be it 'subjective' or 'objective,' whatever be the sense that these words might take on—receives its ontological sense and validity from this present" (Ms. C 3 I, p. 4a, 1930). As a reduction to that which is constitutive of being, it is also a reduction to "the pre-being that bears all being" (Ms. C 17 IV, p. 63 also *Beilage*, 1930).

reduction *within* this reduction is the final stage of this process. It arises because the ultimate forms of connection are those of retention and protention. Thus, the connections that give us a grasp of the past are those that link the retentions of an original content. Similarly, we grasp the future as advancing towards our nowness through the connections linking protention with protention.

To perform "the reduction within the reduction," we must suspend these connections. When we do, the past and the future, which they present, are also suspended. The result of such suspension or bracketing is not, in fact, an absence. To perform it with Husserl is to engage in "a radical 'limitation' to the living present."[43] This present does not appear as the *escape from presence* that Levinas describes. Considered apart from the past and the future, it appears, rather, as a *welling up of presence.* This welling up is the "life," so to speak, of the living present. One way to see this is to note the transformation the reduction works on our experience of the nowness we constantly occupy. Before the reduction, such nowness appears to be that through which extended time flows. Time seems to stream from the future towards our nowness. Simultaneously, it appears to stream away from it into the past. The nowness that I occupy thus appears as a stationary point of passage for an extended temporal stream. The reduction, however, brackets the connections that result in distinct temporal positions. It suspends the positing of an extended stream. The resulting "radical limitation to the living present" thus makes me *regard this passing through the present solely in terms of this present.* When I do, what appeared to transit through it shows itself as "welling up" within it. Passing through, in other words, is exhibited as the welling up of what comes to be regarded, through retention and protention, as the successive moments of extended time.

The Living Present and the Face to Face

Aside from exhibiting the "life" of the living present as a welling up, Husserl's reduction makes a number of its other features appear. The first is its nonlocatable quality. The residuum of the reduction, i.e., what is left after suspending the connections of retention and protention, is not "in" time. It is not a "modality of time" in the sense of being situated

43. Husserl adds: Our aim in performing it is "to speak only about this present" (Ms. C 3 I, p. 3b, Nov. 1930).

between a given past and future.[44] Given this, it is not my present in the sense of being defined by my past and future. In Husserl's words, "this present is not mine as opposed to that of other human beings. And it is not mine as the present of an existent, real human being with a body and a soul."[45] The present of an embodied "real" person is a present situated between a factually given past and the anticipated future that grows out of it. Bracketing these by suspending the connections of retention and protention, I bracket what distinguishes this present from that of my Others. Husserl puts this lack of distinction in terms of the unity of the nowness uncovered by this bracketing. With the reduction, "I discover that 'in my now, I experience the Other' and *his* now. I discover my now and his now are existing in one" (Ms. C 17 I; in Husserl 1973b, p. 332). From the perspective of the living present, as he also writes, "my ego and the other ego do not have any extensive distance in the community of our being with each other. But also life, my temporalization, has no distance from that of the Other."[46] This claim follows from the fact that the "distance" that would distinguish us is that of the "immanent extension" in time given by our having distinct pasts and, as growing out of this, dis-

44. " . . . properly speaking, the word 'present' is unsuitable in this context insofar as it already indicates a modality of time" (Ms. C 7 I, pp. 30–31, June-July, 1932). As Husserl also puts this, "We hear the word 'present' in an inauthentic sense. For its proper being as transcendental being in its original form is not, for example, [to be taken] in a normal (although extended) sense as a streaming, persisting piece of time for a costreaming past and future" (Ms. C 2 I, p. 10a). Not located between them, it does not stream along with them. This timeless quality of the original present is behind Husserl's assertion that "subjective time constitutes itself in an absolutely timeless consciousness that is not an object" (Husserl 1966a, p. 112).

45. "When, in self-meditation, I return to my living present in its full concreteness, the living present as the primal ground and source of everything that presently and actually obtains for me as a being, then I find that this present is not mine as opposed to that of other human beings. And it is not mine as the present of an existent real human being with a body and a soul" (Ms. C 3 I, p. 3b).

46. The extended quotation here is: "There is, indeed, community [of self and Others]—the word 'coincidence' has, unfortunately, the connotation of extended coincidence (*Deckung in Extension*), of association. . . . [The ego's] life, its appearances, its temporalization have an immanent extension in the stream's time, and so does that which is within the stream as something materially, temporally constituted. Everything that is temporalized, everything temporalized by the streaming modes of appearances within the immanent temporal stream and then, once again, by the 'external' (spatial-temporal) appearances, has a unity of appearance [and hence] a temporal unity, a duration. [But] the ego as a pole does not endure. Therefore, also my ego and the other ego do not have any extensive distance in the community of our being with each other. But also life, my temporalization, has no distance from that of the Other" (Ms. C 16 VII, May 1933; in Husserl 1973b, p. 577).

tinct futures. When we bracket these, making them inaccessible to our regard, the temporalizations at their origin cannot be distinguished. There is "no distance," i.e., no situating context, which would allow my temporalization to be distinguished from the Other's.

A further feature of the living present is that it is the primal source of newness. It is the place where everything I experience wells up as present and actual. As Husserl writes, when I perform the reduction, "I return . . . to the living present as the primal ground and source of everything that presently and actually obtains for me as a being" (Ms. C 3 I, p. 3). Since this present is not mine as opposed to an Other's, it has to be viewed as a source that is prior to us as particular actors. From its perspective, acting involves a departure from its nowness. This departure into pastness is what distinguishes one self from another. Giving each self a distinct past, it makes each a distinct for-itself.

This last point can be put in terms of three phenomenological insights. The first is that the present is the source of action. I can initiate action neither in the past nor in the future, but only in the present. I may be ahead of myself in anticipation, but as Husserl remarks, " I act now and only now" (Ms. B III 9, p. 15a). The second is that to act is to temporalize the welling up of the living present. It is to take the source of one's action and allow it to depart by placing what wells up in departing time. In Husserl's words, the action of a self "is a primally welling letting loose from itself—[it is a] creatively letting depart from itself of what once again streams, namely, the acts" (Ms. B III 9, p. 10b). As he also puts it: "An act, an egological activity, is essentially a primally welling 'I act.' As primally welling, it is a lasting and remaining primal welling up. In union with this, it is also, however, a streaming away of what has just been in its continuous [retentional] modification. . . . I act now and only now. . . . But the 'I act' constantly flows away" (Ms. B III 9, p. 15a). With this flowing away, we have the temporalization of both the act and the actor. In Husserl's words, through its retentional modification, "the act originates as a temporalized process. In the act's temporalization, I myself, . . . have my temporal position; and I have my extension, my temporal duration with the extended act of the ego. Thus, I exist across time through time, streamingly given as just having been and yet enduringly existent—given to me" (ibid.). In other words, I am given to myself as having departed with my acts. For Husserl, as we saw, my being for myself includes my being past to myself. I am a for-itself that can confront itself by virtue of the temporalization that individualizes me by giving me a distinct past.

Facing myself, I thus face *my* having acted. The same points hold, mutatis mutandis, for my givenness to myself through anticipation. The third phenomenological insight, then, is that temporalization makes me a distinct for-itself.

With this, we may return to Levinas's claim that the face of the Other calls forth "the rupture of phenomenology." Insofar as the face-to-face is an encounter defined by diachrony, i.e., by the inaccessibility of the Other's past and future, the experience of the face-to-face can be described as a bracketing, a stripping away of the past and the future. *The face-to-face,* then, is *an implicit reduction.* Levinas claims that this leaves us with an absence. Husserl's actual practice of the reduction, however, yields a different result. Engaging in it, we find that what is ruptured is not phenomenology, but only what Levinas calls "thematization." Thus, following Levinas, we can say that the diachrony of the encounter undoes the possibility of grasping the Other through the synthesis of a given past and future. Insofar as I encounter the Other apart from any regard to the past and the future—either the Other's or my own—the diachrony overcomes the thematization that distinguishes us as separate self-presences. This, however, does not "rupture" presence. It actually uncovers its fundamental, pre-egological level. In Husserl's terms, what the encounter points to is "the ability, within one's living present, to experience Others in a primal manner and, with this, to experience the primal coexistence of one's own and the Other's being" (Ms. C 17 I; in Husserl 1973b, p. 334). Experiencing this "primal coexistence," I experience the Other's living present as my own at this level. This is why I can, in parallel with Levinas, say that the Other is "in" me. Given that this present is the source of action, the self from which I act can be said to include the Other. In fact, on the level of the encounter, self-responsibility and responsibility for the Other (who is "in" me) cannot yet be distinguished. These parallel assertions point to a parallel level of phenomenological description. Ultimately, however, they rest on a completely different basis.

Alterity and Presence

To speak, in this context, of the distinction between self and Other, we have to move beyond the level of immediate presence. On the level of such presence, there is, of course, a distinction of contents. The contents that animate the processes that result in a self are distinct. So is the being-affected inherent in having a body. This distinction, however, is

pre-egological. It concerns the affecting contents that initiate the retentional and protentional processes that begin the constitution of the self. Without distinct contents, constituted selves could be conceived as having identical streams of consciousness. This, however, does not mean that content alone distinguishes them. On the level of immediate presence, it provides, at most, an anonymous, pre-egological distinctness.[47] To move beyond this, we have to have departure from presence. It is at this point that selves can be thematized in terms of distinct pasts with distinct contents. Thematized, they are not only distinct from each other. As defined by their pasts, they are also distinct from the immediate nowness from which they have departed. The otherness or alterity of one self from another on the objective level (the level of thematization) occurs, then, in parallel with their self-alterity.

This self-alterity is a matter of the distinction between presence on the original level and objective presence. I am other than myself insofar as the presence of sheer nowness, which is prior to temporal departure, is distinct from the objective presence to myself that results from the temporal synthesis of retained and anticipated data. This distinction may be put in terms of the fact that a self is given to itself through the departure of its acts. As was noted in the discussion of the anonymity of the self, such departure gives the self the temporal distance that allows it to be "objective" in the sense of standing over against itself (see above, p. 179). Being-for-itself signifies, here, being-objective: the functioning self is "for-itself" insofar as it is able to objectively grasp itself in an identity synthesis. The crucial thing to note is that, in this being for-itself, the actively grasping self is the self that is now. It is the self that functions in the nowness that wells up only to depart into pastness. By contrast, the self that is grasped objectively is *not* now. It is either the self that is synthesized from the retained content of past nows or else it is the self that is grasped in anticipation by synthesizing protended data. "Alterity," in the sense of being-other-than-objective being, characterizes the actively grasping anonymous self. Insofar as it is a feature of the preobjective nowness that I and my Other share, such alterity pertains indiscriminately to both of us in our *lack of objective otherness.*

"Alterity" in our discussions has been part of a set of mutually defining terms that include "disquiet," "temporalization," and "obligation."

47. Whether one can also speak here of a pre-egological *individuality* is, however, problematic. Individuality seems to be a predicate pertaining to the relatively stable identities that arise through the constitutive process.

Our redefinition of "alterity" implies, then, a corresponding shift in the meaning of these terms. For Levinas and Heidegger, the encounter with alterity provokes *disquiet.* This is because alterity, for them, is the alterity of death. By contrast, the disquiet that arises from the alterity uncovered by our practice of the reduction refers to the "life" of our preobjective nowness. As noted, the living present is the source of newness. It is the "place" where everything experienced—every affecting content—wells up in its immediate presence. This welling up is this present's life. Accordingly, disquiet is a function of the unsettling characteristics of the newness of what wells up.[48] Confronting it, I have to "keep up" with it. Levinas defines *temporalization* in terms of this keeping up. It is, for him, a matter of the longing or desire that expresses itself in my attempt to keep up with alterity's ongoing escape from presence. With the redefinition of alterity, temporalization has to be redefined as the attempt to keep up with the welling up into presence of the content that forms the living present's life. I do this through thematization, i.e., through retaining, anticipating, and synthesizing what wells up into temporally objective, enduring unities. Through these activities, I preserve what wells up as an enduring presence. In parallel with Heidegger, it can be said that my temporalization results from an *original obligation*—here, understood as obligation to preserve presence. Yet, the "ought" of this obligation does not stem from absence. Its origin is the welling up of presence. Temporalization is the way I pay off the debt I owe to myself regarding my objective being. The disquiet that prompts this repayment is not anxiety before death. It stems, rather, from the demands of life as it constantly presents me with new material for synthesis.

A similar point can be made regarding the disquiet occasioned by the face-to-face encounter. This disquiet is not that of death. It does not arise in confronting the face as the "mortality of the Other." Its source is the newness of the living present. It is in terms of such newness that one can say with Levinas, "the Other is the *future.*" For Levinas, what prompts this assertion is the alterity of the face in the encounter. The

48. Sartre describes this welling up as a function of consciousness taken as an "individuated and impersonal spontaneity" (Sartre 1957, p. 98). It is individuated by the particular contents that well up; it is impersonal by virtue of being prior to the ego (see pp. 96–97). Sartre's description of our disquiet in the face of this welling up is worth quoting: "There is something distressing for each of us, to catch in the act this tireless creation of existence of which we are not the creators. At this level man has the impression of ceaselessly escaping from himself, of overflowing himself, of being surprised by riches which are always unexpected" (p. 99).

"presence of the future" is accomplished in the escape of the face from presence. Like death, the face "deserts every present" (Levinas 1994b, p. 71). It is always in advance of us. In the Husserlian analog, this desertion is revealed once we bracket the past and the future. Through the radical reduction implicit in the diachrony of a face-to-face encounter, I open myself up to the alterity of the living present. This present's otherness from what has already been thematized appears in its constant newness, i.e, its undisclosed futurity vis-à-vis the thematized. Another way to express such newness is to note that, in the diachrony of facing the Other, I encounter the borderless quality of sheer presence. Such presence is within me—i.e., at the heart of my temporal core. Yet I cannot contain it. I cannot because in its pre-egological givenness, it "gives" me. In this giving, it is no more objectively mine than it is my Other's. To use Levinas's term, this sheer presence is "diachronous" with objective presence. By definition, it has no past or future in common with any objectively enduring person. Thus, in parallel with Levinas, we can say that "the same contains more than it can contain." This containing "more" is its holding open the possibility of newness. The new is what is "in" the same as "beyond" the same. This newness points to the essentially borderless, nonlocatable, nonobjective presence at the basis of the same.

The mirroring of Levinas's and Heidegger's statements in the above account does not, of course, imply a similar basis. "Alterity," in this account, does not express an "otherwise than being" that is beyond being per se. Equally, it does not signify the otherness of death understood as the "impossibility of any existence at all." Alterity, rather, is the otherness of the ontological difference conceived as the distinction between presence and that which is presented. The distinction, here, is between the borderless living presence in its welling up and the same presence located by the thematization of what wells up. Located presence has the being in time that allows it to be present as some entity. The presence that is so presented can be that of either an objective self or thing. The borderless, anonymously presenting presence is actually neither.[49]

This recasting of Levinas's concept of alterity overcomes the difficulty of the "borderless border" mentioned above. To conceive alterity in terms of what is completely other than being is literally to make it inconceivable. It is to declare in advance that there is no possible mediation, no possible access to such alterity. At this point, the alterity of the

49. This is why Husserl calls it the "prebeing lying at the basis of all being." "Prebeing" refers to being before it becomes temporally objective. See Ms. C 17 IV, p. 63 also *Beilage*.

Other is simply the expression of an aporia. It names otherness only to remove what it names from any locating context of sense. This aporetic quality of alterity undermines any attempt to judge our response to it. By contrast, the alterity of the living present is in continuous mediation. Temporalization, including thematization, is this mediation. This mediation does not come to it from outside. It is inherent in the self-locating quality of this anonymous present's welling up. The "life" of the living present includes temporal synthesis. As such, it consists in the continuous transition from the nonobjective to the objective.

The Transfer of Empathy

To make this position concrete, we have to consider the transfer of presence that occurs in empathy. Empathy, as the term's etymology implies, is a *feeling* for the Other by being *in* the Other. Experiencing it, I feel what the Other feels. I understand the Other, not from the outside, but from within. The experience, then, is that of the peculiar identity of self and Other, which allows me to grasp the Other by seeing myself as the Other. Husserl, in the *Cartesian Meditations*, describes this grasp as a transfer. When I see that the Other acts as I would in a given situation, I assume that he is a self like me. His similar behavior bespeaks a similar apprehension of the world. Like me, he is also a subject who thematises being by engaging in temporal synthesis. To see myself as the Other is, then, to *transfer* to him my capacity for temporal synthesis. This capacity defines me as an experiencing, grasping self. Any self who is like me must possess it.

Underlying the capacity for synthesis, there is, of course, the fact of temporalization. I am the self *to whom* things are present by virtue of the welling up of moments in my nowness. Expressed in these terms, what is transferred to the Other is the living present whose "life" is temporalization. This present is at the *core* of my being. My acting is a function of its welling up. It is, therefore, the "inner" of which my behavior, in all its bodily manifestations, is the "outer." Transferring this to the Other, I posit the "inner" to which his appearing bodily behavior stands as the "outer." With this, I not only see myself as the Other by assuming that the living present that makes possible my temporalization also makes possible the Other's temporalization. I also establish the border between the inner and the outer that makes this living present locatable.[50] Transferring

50. A similar type of transfer is required to make death thinkable. Levinas quotes from Fink's *Metaphysik und Tod* (p. 179) the words of a Japanese condemned to death: "I

it to the Other, I locate it *in* the Other. As a result, the transfer is a seeing myself *as the Other* by seeing the living present that makes me a self as present *in the Other*. The transfer is, then, empathy in the sense of my taking up the standpoint of the Other.

Empathy, as Husserl stresses, is not a simple identity. As he describes it, the transfer assumes that the Other's "synthetic systems with all their modes of appearance are the same" as mine. Since, however, the other person is experienced as there, i.e., at a physical remove from me, it also assumes that in him "the actual perceptions and . . . in part also the actually perceivable objects are not the same, but rather precisely those that are perceivable from there *as* they are perceivable from there" (Husserl 1963, p. 152). Interpreting Husserl, we can say that the sameness of "synthetic systems" and "modes" stems from the identity of the temporal form of the self, i.e., its form as a central nowness or "midpoint" that becomes such through the retentional and protentional processes. Here, the Other's being "like me" is a function of our possessing the same formal structures of these processes. Not only do we retain and protend in the same fashion, the resulting temporal synthesis has the same formal qualities of merging, reinforcement, association through repetition, etc. By virtue of it, the welling up of the living present becomes a situated welling up. It becomes the present that lives "in" a person who is "in" a surrounding world. The difference of "actual perceptions" arises from the fact that such surrounding worlds are distinct. Behind this are differences in affecting content and, correspondingly, the being-affected that is inherent in our bodily being. Thus, the world viewed from the "there" affects us differently; it presents us with a different content than the world viewed from the "here" does. The result is a different being-affected, one which corresponds to a different location of the self in its bodily being and behavior.

We can go beyond the *Cartesian Meditations*' concerns with similar "synthetic systems" by noting an implication of the above description. According to it, the same self-locating process of the living present can

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depart without anguish and without trembling at the gallows because I see the smiling face of my mother" (Levinas 1993a, p. 102). This experience is that of a living presence beyond death. To have it is to locate death as a border between this life and the next. If annihilation is what makes death a borderless border and, hence, inconceivable, then it seems that the only death we can conceive is the one that allows us to "live beyond the grave." Only those religions that posit an afterlife make death thinkable. Paradoxical as it may seem, Derrida's logic implies that the confrontation with death is always mediated by these religions' belief systems.

position it in *either the "here" or the "there."* It is thus *not tied to either.* This implies that the synthetic processes that situate it can function with *different* affecting contents.[51] With this, the sense of my identity with the Other who is "like me" is extended to include the alterity of the living present. This present is *other* than a given set of contents in the sense that it is confined neither to them nor to the definition it receives from them. It is capable of being defined as the present of the world viewed from multiple locations. Its alterity, then, is its otherness from a context of sense as given by a distinct point of view.

This alterity can be expressed in terms of the *openness* of this present's temporalization. The moments that well up from it are capable of embodying multiple possible contents precisely because they lack any inherent content. They are only empty containers of possible contents. Even the word "container" says too much. Such moments are, in a sense, containers without walls. Their emptiness signifies that we cannot, in fact, think of them as discrete units. Considered in themselves, their "what they are"—or rather their lack of any inherent "what"—is always the same. This is why the moments of time do not form a collection, but rather a continuum. Like the points composing a geometric line, they lack the boundaries, the "walls" as it were, to be considered distinct units. What distinguishes them as they well up can, in fact, only be what they "contain," i.e., their contents. Given that my selfhood originates in this welling up, it has a similar openness. To recognize this is to recognize that it can take multiple types of content in different locating orders or temporal arrangements. It is open to multiple possible locating contexts. This "openness" is thus simply another name for the borderless quality of the present at its core.

When in empathy I transfer my living present to my Other, such openness must function in the resulting recognition. This follows since the transfer is not just of my selfhood, understood as my synthetic systems. It includes the alterity at their basis. I thus have to say that the Other is like me in such alterity, i.e., in having a living present that is *distinct from* and, hence, *open to* the contexts of sense that can be manifested objectively in a surrounding world. Each of us has an anonymous, nonobjective temporal core of sheer, welling up presence. In each of us, this core is other than the objective presence it continually animates in this welling up.[52] Working on a given content, our synthetic systems locate

51. This fact was first noted in the chapter on the instincts. See above, p. 51–52.

52. This animation includes the retention of what wells up. The retention animates

this core as a living present of a given individual. The individual, engaging in temporal synthesis, grasps herself in terms of a surrounding world, a world in terms of which she attunes her behavior. Her behavior responds to the senses that locate her. Thus, in animating a given world as well as the behavior that responds to it, the core locates itself. The transfer of the living present from myself to the Other includes this self-locating quality. To recognize the Other as a self like me is thus to see the Other as an objective expression of this quality. Like me, the Other is not just an anonymous present. The Other is also defined by a context of sense that serves to locate the alterity of the living present. This context appears through the behavior of the Other, who is like me in responding continuously to this context and, thus, manifesting it in her behavior.

The fact that both I and my Other manifest locating contexts of sense does not imply that these contexts are necessarily the same. They would be only if we adopted one possible reading of the account of the *Cartesian Meditations*. This reading takes my transfer of the living present as *exclusively based* on a similarity of behavior. In doing so, it assumes that *my* behavior functions as the standard. If this were the case, then the experience that prompted me to make the transfer would simply be that of the Other behaving as *I* would in her situation. Assuming that the Other's behavior is like mine in that it responds to and is prompted by the senses of the appearing world, the transfer would necessarily include the context of sense manifested in *my* behavior. The difficulty, here, is that this reduces the Other to an expression of myself. A person who behaved differently than I would could not provide me with the evidence required to make the transfer. Lacking this, I could not recognize the person as a self. Thus, were I to recognize selfhood only to the point that its behavior matched my own, any recognition I had of Others would actually be only a self-recognition.[53] In Levinas's terms, I would reduce alterity to a function of "the same."[54]

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objective presence in its living temporal departure. As I cited Husserl, "The ego . . . acts, it posits, and the acting is a letting loose from itself as primally welling up—[it is a] creatively letting depart from itself of what once again streams, namely the acts" (Ms. B III 9, p. 10b). "An act, an egological activity, . . . is a lasting and remaining primal welling up. In union with this, it is also, however, a streaming away of what has just been in its continuous [retentional] modification" (p. 15a).

53. For an extended account of this difficulty, see Mensch 1988, pp. 36–39.

54. Levinas extends this criticism to the basic level of Husserl's description of retention and protention, i.e., of temporal synthesis. He writes: "The category of the same, which controls these descriptions, is itself never questioned. Becoming [in Husserl's account] is

This reading of Husserl's account in the *Cartesian Meditations* must, accordingly, be amended. We can do this by noting that it leaves out the dual quality of the Other. The Other is not just a context of sense manifested by a style of behavior. She is also an anonymous living present. Recognition involves the transfer of the living present. In its sheer nowness, this present is unconditioned by the borders or locating context established in its welling up. As indicated, the experience of its sheer presence or nowness occurs in the diachrony of the face-to-face encounter. The empathy that begins with this encounter is, then, conditioned by this borderless quality. The same holds for the transfer empathy occasions. As borderless, it is as much a transfer of the Other's living present *to me* as it is a transfer of my living present *to the Other*. Given this, I cannot say whose behavior should serve as a standard. To take my behavior as the standard would be to assume that it had some essential connection with the living present, that it was somehow a necessary expression of this present. This, however, is precisely the assumption that the face-to-face encounter undermines. In it, I experience the alterity of my living present in the form of its borderless quality. As we cited Husserl, "I discover that 'in my now, I experience the Other' and his now." I discover, in fact, the unity of our nowness or living presents in the implicit reduction of the face-to-face. From the perspective of this unity, neither my nor my Other's locating context of sense has priority. In the empathy that arises from this perspective, I do not, then, just assume that the Other will behave as I would in her situation, thereby taking myself as a standard. I also assume that were I in her situation, I would act as she does. In other words, I also take her actions, her behavior as a standard for verifying my selfhood. In doing so, I put myself imaginatively in her situation. I let my own self-presence be shaped by it.

The experience of empathy thus involves a double shaping of my self-presence. I am present to myself as shaped by my situation, my context of locating sense. The same alterity, however, which is at my core, is grasped in empathy as shaped by the Other's situation. Here, I present myself to myself as shaped by my Other, i.e., by another context of locat-

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a constellation of identical points. The other remains another same, identical to itself, externally discernible by its place in this [temporal] order" (Levinas 1993a, p. 125). The recognition of the Other cannot, however, be reduced to the constitution of the same through temporal synthesis. The transfer that forms the basis of such recognition involves time prior to such synthesis. This is why the transfer is an implicit reduction or bracketing of temporalization.

ing sense. Inherent in this is the possibility of the second context putting my own into question. On a deeper level, *I* can be put into question by my Other, precisely because, at my core, I am capable of being this Other. My recognition that this is the case yields the disquiet of the face-to-face encounter. As already indicated, such disquiet is a function of the borderless quality of sheer presence, i.e., of the fact that it is inherently no more mine than it is my Other's. Disquiet, we can now say, arises from the fact that, *as mine*, presence can be *not mine*. Engaging in empathy, my own self-presence, my own objective thereness to myself, can thus be disrupted. The openness of empathy is such that my self-presence can be shaped by two distinct and even opposed contexts of sense. This openness is inherent in the openness, the borderless quality of the living present. To encounter it in the face-to-face is, accordingly, to confront the basic *lack of context* of apprehending selfhood. In the face-to-face, we grasp selfhood in its alterity from objective presence; we apprehend it in a way that tears it from any already given context of intersubjective relations.

The disquiet of the face-to-face includes this tearing, this deinstitutionalization of my relation to the Other. For Levinas, it should be noted, the same description applies. Observing that the "relation to the Other in the question posed by the mortality of the Other can lose its transcendence through the customs which organize it," he also points to the disquiet that prevents this. For Levinas, however, such disquiet does *not* come from the sense-less quality of presence, i.e., from the fact that it can support multiple contexts of sense. It comes from the absurdity of death. In his words, "This absurdity is my mortality, which prevents my responsibility from becoming an assimilation of the Other in a [customary] comportment" (Levinas 1993a, p. 134). Responding to the Other in the lack of context implied by death, I can no longer place my responsibility in a system of customary exchanges. Responsibility is not part of an "economy" of exchanging one thing for another, i.e., of giving *because* one has received. It is gratuitous. In Levinas's words, "It is my mortality, . . . my death, which is not the possibility of an impossibility but pure rape, which constitutes the absurdity that makes possible the gratuity of my responsibility for the Other" (ibid.). Here, the freedom or openness of my response comes from death in its violent alterity from every possible sense I could make. The difficulties with this position have already been noted. Essentially, they involve the trauma that follows such a violent encounter. In the Husserlian position I am advancing, the openness of the response comes from the encounter, not with death, but with

life understood as the welling up of selfhood. The gratuity of the response is that of the life of the living present. So understood, gratuity characterizes the self's ability, in its openness to presence, to assume forms beyond those deemed acceptable by custom or convention.

Responding in this context is a responding both to original presence *and* to the Other as an embodied presence. In the face-to-face encounter, the response to original presence is an openness to it, a readiness to take it on. This involves the gratuity of letting one's self-presence be shaped by the Other who is encountered face-to-face. This taking on, in empathy, of the Other's self-presence responds to the Other's embodied presence. It is a responding by taking up the Other's standpoint in the world. With this, responding *to* the Other becomes a responsibility *for* him. It cannot be otherwise, given that when I do take up his standpoint, the self whose objective presence I act to preserve and enhance includes the Other. In empathy, I include the Other in my self-responsibility, i.e., in my being responsible *for* my presence in the world.

This inclusion is not an absorption of the Other. It is not an integration of the Other in my pregiven unity. What is pregiven to me is simply a pre-egological living present. Its becoming a definite self follows on its situation. When, in empathy, I attune myself to another person's situation, I do not abandon my own situation. My own self-presence as determined by my bodily being in the world remains. Empathy simply overlays this situatedness with that of the Other. As indicated, I experience a kind of dual shaping of my objective selfhood. My being in the world becomes, in a certain sense, doubled.

Justice, Need, and Empathy

The disruption of self-presence caused by this doubling is the beginning of my ethical life. It is also the beginning of objectivity and justice. Thus, when I view the world both from my own and my Other's standpoint, I have to take account of the way the world appears to me and the way it appears to my Other. The conflict between the two is also that of the truths and comportments based on these appearances. Taking account of what is true for me and what is true for my Other, the task facing me is that of making these "truths" agree. It is that of moving to objective truth, to the truth that would hold for both of us. Similarly, comparing our comportments, I begin the search for a maxim, a rule of behavior, which would hold in both our situations. What motivates me to under-

take these tasks is my desire to preserve my selfhood, i.e., preserve the unity of the self-presence that includes my Others. Thus, Levinas's "hour of knowledge and then of the objectivity beyond or on the hither side of the nudity of the face" does not first occur when I face the competing claims of multiple Others. It is a task that faces me as soon as I freely open myself up to a *single* Other. Facing this Other I am already in the position of a "third party" called to adjudicate competing claims.

The same point can be made regarding the traditional concerns of ethics—those of sorting out our obligations to self and Others. The paramount questions here are: When do the responsibilities I have towards Others override those I have to myself? When should I consider my advantage, rather than theirs? Why should I be ethical at all in the sense of attempting to balance these responsibilities? To ask these questions, I have to comprehend the different situations to which these obligations and advantages refer. Presupposing a capacity to take up standpoints distinct from my own, the questions presuppose empathy. When I do take up such standpoints, I overlay the self-presence defined by my embodied standpoint with those of my Others as defined by their standpoints. I feel their needs along with my own. This overlay is Levinas's "hour" of justice—that is, the hour when I face the competing claims of self and Others.

There is, here, an implicit connection between empathy and need. Each self embodies needs that it cannot satisfy by itself. Insofar as it is "born of woman," it is always already there with its Others. Its initial helplessness as an infant required their aid. Its developing needs continually require its Others for their satisfaction. Given this, a self cannot function organically, i.e., as an embodied individual with particular biological needs, without also functioning socially. Requiring Others, its needs place it with them and their needs. So situated, it has to negotiate the competing claims implied by multiple needs. In empathy, these claims involve the competing presences of different needs. Thus, insofar as I feel Other's needs as my own, the object of this negotiation is my self-presence as need.

The necessity of this negotiation springs from the unity of the self I present to myself as I engage in multiple acts of empathy. This unity is not something prior to these acts. It is, rather, a task occasioned by such acts. To ask why I *ought* to be ethical is, in this context, to ask why I should preserve the unity of my selfhood. The "ought" here is a call to self-responsibility, i.e., to responsibility for my being in the world along with Others. It is a responsibility for my presence to myself in my being

with Others, each of us apprehended in our needs. The "ought," then, is such that self-responsibility and responsibility for Others are as entangled as our needs are. Insofar as selfhood is based on multiple Others, i.e., on their presence as included in one's own self-presence, this "ought" is never private, never, in fact, exclusive. The hour of justice is present in this "ought" from the beginning. From the beginning one has to negotiate between the needs of oneself and one's Others.

We can gain a greater clarity on the connection between empathy and need by recalling that our temporalization originates in our bodily being. Temporalization, in its dependence on affecting contents, requires the body as that which can be affected. The presence of affecting contents is, we said, experienced nowness. A succession of such contents is experienced as a succession of nows (see above, p. 58). The body, then, as the place of affection, is the "place" of temporalization. Its continuous presence is experienced as the continuous nowness of our living present. What fills this nowness is the content that affects the body. Affecting contents are experienced as the content-filled moments of time—the moments that well up as present and actual in the nowness of the living present. This welling up is this present's "life." The implication here is that this "life" registers the body's being-alive. It registers the body's life in its constantly being affected. Thus, each affecting content is registered in the welling up of a content-filled moment. The body's continuous life, in its being affected, is registered in the continuous welling up of such moments. By "register" we mean simply that the presence of such content is experienced as temporal presence. With this, we can say that the openness of temporal presence, i.e., the living present's ability to support a multitude of contents, is founded in the body's receptivity to such contents. The living present can manifest a multitude of color contents because our eyes can be affected by them. The same holds for the contents of the other senses. Our bodily ability to be affected by different sounds translates in the ability of the nowness we experience to contain them. Thus, the openness or borderless quality of the living present is founded on this general receptivity. Similarly, the preobjective quality of this present points to the body in its founding a role. In the openness of its receptivity, it is distinct from the particular contents it can receive, i.e., that can affect it.[55]

55. Here we might add that the body, in making possible temporalization, grounds its own self-manifestation, i.e., its own self-presence in a surrounding world. Thus, the self-locating quality of the living present is actually that of the body.

A number of conclusions follow from this analysis. Together they illuminate the connection between empathy and need. The first concerns the fact that the living present is our self-presence in our bodily being. The face-to-face encounter begins with this being. It is an encounter with the Other in his or her flesh, such flesh being understood in its being affected, i.e., in its vulnerability. We cannot say that the reduction implicit in the encounter leaves us with an absence. Insofar as it uncovers the affective character of the body, its result is a presence. This cannot be otherwise given the body's receptivity. Such receptivity does not just signify that things are present to us by affecting us. Included in its notion is the fact that our being-affected is also a self-affection. In other words, the presence of an affecting content is also, necessarily, a self-presence. The body, for example, can suffer when it is affected because it is present to itself in its being affected. This self presence is part of its being-alive as a body. An earlier chapter showed that such self-presence is inherent in the retention and protention of the affecting contents (see above, pp. 49–50). As such it is inherent in the temporalization that the body founds. With this, we can say that the diachrony of the face-to-face, in its bracketing of the past and the future, does not just leave us with the presence that founds temporalization. It exposes such presence as the self-presence of the body. It exhibits it as the body's vulnerability to suffering. Insofar as the receptivity that makes vulnerabity possible grounds temporalization, the same exhibition leaves us with a sense of the body's indispensibilty. The impossibility of the body is the impossiblity of the being-alive, i.e., the being-affected, that the moments of time register. By virtue of a very different process of argumentation, we can thus say with Heidegger that the body's demise makes impossible the temporalization that characterizes human existence (see above, p. 202). In giving us this insight, the reduction implicit in the face-to-face uncovers the "life"—i.e., the being-alive that is our receptivity—which founds our possibilities.

Need enters into this picture by virtue of the strivings prompted by need. For Husserl, "tending, striving towards" and being affected are inseperable.[56] As the chapter on the instincts showed, our bodily needs determine both our being affected by specific contents as well as the strivings they occasion. Such strivings are essentially to have and hold-fast affecting contents. As such, they underlie the having-in-advance of the protention and the holding-fast of the retention of these contents. They

56. "What from the side of the hyletic data is called the affection of the ego is from the side of the ego called tending, striving towards" (Ms. B III 9, pp. 70a–70b).

also underlie the extended temporal presence that results from these processes. With this, we can say that it is not simply our bodily being-alive that founds temporalization. It is this life *as driven by need.* By virtue of such need, temporal synthesis has its intentionality. It stretches forth or points beyond itself to whatever it brings to presence. This indicative structure is present on all the levels of the synthetic process. As such, it is present throughout the process of the body's self-manifestion. On every level, then, the appearing body has an indicative structure. Manifesting the needs that drive the very process of manifestation, the body in its being in the world points beyond itself.

As already indicated, the reference of this need is first and foremost to Others. Our needs, starting with our infant dependencies, bind us to Others. Given this, the recognition of the Other as a source point of temporalization is also, implicitly, a recognition of the Other as embodied need. In transferring to the Other my own temporalization as based on my needs, I recognize the Other as pointing to myself in his needs. The indicative structure implicit here makes this a recognition of the Other *as a need laying claim to myself.* The Other in his bodily need lays claim *to my own enjoyment.* To the point that this Other is "within" me, i.e., included in my own self-presence, his or her needs interrupt the enjoyment that comes from satisfying my own needs. To use a phrase of Levinas's, the presence of the Other in his need is "like bread torn from my mouth." Given this, responsibility for the Other is also a responding to his need. I do not just recognize him as a place where the world comes to presence, that is, as a particular shaping of such presence through the temporalization that springs from his bodily needs. Such recognition involves the claims of such shaping on me. In empathy, in taking up his bodily standpoint, I take on this shaping. I take on the obligation to preserve it as the Other's shaping. The "ought" here comes to me from the need of the Other, that is, from the bodily need that underlies the Other's temporalization, the Other's shaping the world according to a given context of sense. The "ought" here is the call of consciousness. It is a call that has its urgency in the interruption of my enjoyment.

The evaluation of this call, which is the hour of justice, comes when one attempts to mediate between this shaping and one's own. This is a mediation of different needs, both of which lay claim to one's presence to oneself in enjoyment. That mediation is possible comes from the parity of claims insofar as both are based on presence. Concretely, this means that the call here is not to something outside of or alien to the

self. The call of conscience is to the self in its being as both presence and need.

Because of this parity of claims, we can move from the obligations imposed by a single Other to those of multiple Others. For Levinas, this is a move to justice taken as the attempt to negotiate their competing claims. From the Husserlian perspective, however, such negotiating is not essentially different than that engaged in with regard to a single Other. Ethics and justice are equally forms of negotiation. In both cases, to engage in it requires more than having a conscience. We have to evaluate its call. This evaluation is not a theoretical pursuit; it is not the province of some special course of study entitled "ethics." Insofar as it involves one's selfhood in the unity of its presence, it is inherent in our underlying drive to preserve ourselves. A final chapter will develop what is involved in this evaluation. Its claim will be that the task of evaluating the different shapings of our self-presence motivates Western thought about ethics. The same task informs the understanding of one culture by another. To see this, we shall begin by examining the special quality of this understanding.

VIII

Presence and Others

The Two Cultures: The Sciences and the Humanities

When we speak about cross-cultural understanding, we are at once confronted by two different types of understanding. They are exemplified by the sciences and the humanities. The understanding fostered by the sciences is global. Scientists all over the world share their results, collaborate, and make progress together. The universal understanding is that science embodies, thus crosses, cultural boundaries without any difficulty. It is "cross-cultural" in the sense that it is a collective enterprise. It is open to anyone independent of his or her cultural background.

The reasons for this character are easy to specify. They stem in large part from the modern, scientific project of mathematizing nature. The project originally arose from skepticism regarding our senses. As Descartes observes, our sense perceptions are *not* given to us to provide accurate information about the inherent qualities of objects. Their purpose is our bodily preservation rather than truth. They are given, he writes, "only to indicate to my mind which objects are useful or harmful" (Descartes 1990, p. 79). To move beyond this pragmatic concern, we have to attend to the numerable aspects of what we perceive, that is, to the bodies' extensions, sizes, weights, and so on. Grasping these, we apprehend what pertains to the objects in themselves. This grasp is, of course, an abstraction. Abstracting from the so-called "secondary qualities" of bodies, that is, their tastes, smells, colors, and so on, we abstract

from those things provided by nature for our preservation. This is also an abstraction from our embodiment, that is, from our physical selfhood as a sensing subject. Only the "I" of the "I think"—the "I" that grasps the primary, numerable qualities of bodies—is taken into account. This "I," Descartes assures us, can be considered apart from the body (p. 74). The gain here is in the universality of our understanding. Since selfhood is reduced to the status of a disembodied, pure observer, each observer is substitutable for any other. Each can perform the same crucial experiments and observe the same results, since each limits himself to the selfhood that is a correlate of these abstract and measurable aspects of reality.

When we turn to the humanities, we find a very different view of the understanding. The focus of the humanities is on the qualia of nature, its sensed existence. Colors, tastes, sights, and sounds are all crucially important. A person's appearance can affect his role in history. A historian can legitimately ask, for example, about Joan of Arc: How charismatic was she? Did she have a penetrating voice and manner? How was she able, through her visions, to move both king and commoner? As these questions indicate, the focus here is on Joan's embodiment, both physical and cultural. It is on her embodied presence as it reflects a specific cultural environment.

With this, we have the question of how we grasp another culture. In the sciences, cross-cultural understanding is possible by virtue of an *abstraction* from specific national cultures. What is understood is, in fact, *not* culture, but rather what *transcends* its boundaries. No such abstraction, however, is possible in the humanities. If they abstract from culture and more generally from embodied selfhood, they lose their objects entirely. They must focus on such items. Given this, how is cross-cultural understanding possible for them?

Understanding as Embodiment

A good example of understanding in the humanities is provided by reading a foreign novel. Reading Kawabata's *The Sound of a Mountain*, a North American becomes immersed in the world of its chief character Shingo (Kawabata 1970). The skill and intensity of Kawabata's description is such that the reader becomes Shingo, an older man living in a Tokyo suburb in the 1950s. The reader sees the world through his eyes, tastes what he tastes, feels the kimono he wears on his skin. All of this gives the peculiarity of humanistic understanding. At its most immediate and direct, it

is a living *as* another by a living *in* the Other. It is a sharing of the Other's embodiment. It is "empathy" in the sense introduced in the last chapter: empathy as a *feeling* or experiencing *in* the Other's body. To ask how cross-cultural understanding is possible is to raise again the issue of empathy and ethics. It is, first of all, to ask how empathy functions in this kind of understanding.

Are there, as some suggest, "universal" features of mankind, features that make possible cross-cultural understanding? This cannot be true if "universal" means what is grasped through an abstraction from the particularities of our nature. The selfhood grasped by disregarding such particulars would be no different from the abstract disembodied one presupposed by the sciences. That the selfhood in question is not such is shown by the peculiar universality of cultural artifacts. These artifacts, like Kawabata's novel, work through their particularity. The more particular the understanding they manifest, the greater, often enough, is their appeal. It is not his sharing in universal features that makes Shingo appeal to us. It is rather his uniqueness, his rootedness in a particular culture and time.

How, then, do we understand Shingo's particularity? If an appeal to universal or common features washes out the uniqueness that is the special object of cross-cultural understanding, to what should we appeal? How can our understanding work if it is denied its abstract universal objects? The dilemma, I believe, can be resolved only by broadening the notion of understanding. What is required is a shift in our paradigms. We must move from the scientific model of *understanding through observing and abstracting* to one of *understanding through embodying and particularizing.* A corresponding shift is required in the notion of the self that understands. The observing self distinguishes itself from its object, which it regards at a distance. In Descartes's scientific paradigm, this self is autonomous and disembodied. It grasps its objects, not through the senses but through the understanding that abstracts, counts, and measures. The embodying self, by contrast, understands through overcoming the distance between itself and its object. As was noted in the Introduction, its understanding is through its own states. Its paradigmatic mode of expression is not "I observe," as in "I observe heat," but rather "I am," as in "I am hot."

In a general sense, the condition for the possibility of this second type of understanding is the "transparency" of subjectivity. Rather than having any given features, the subject is transparent to such features. It

lets them appear through itself. This may be expressed in terms of Aristotle's position that "the actuality of the sensible object *qua* sensible is in the sensing subject" (*De Anima*, III, ii, 426a10). Each of our five bodily senses provides examples of what he means: The actual taste is in the tongue, the actual odor is in the nose, and so on. By "*act*ual" is meant the *act*ing taste, odor, etc. Aristotle's corresponding term is *energeia*, signifying not just actuality, but also being-in-act, being-at-work. Thus, to say that the actuality of an odor is in the nose is to say that it is at work there. The nose manifests the odor's presence. It lets it appear through itself. The same holds for each of our senses. It also holds for our selfhood insofar as it is a sensing self. Such a self is the place of sensuous presence. As such a place, it takes on its features from the affections of its environment. The contents it manifests spring from the nature of the objects it perceives. Insofar as we judge and understand on the basis of what we perceive, the self that understands is also shaped by its environment. It becomes the place where its intelligible relations can be present; in Aristotle's words, the "place of the forms" that specify *this* environment (III, iv, 429a 27). These forms can be "universal" or common features, but they are such as features of a particular, sensuously embodied environment. Their basis is not abstraction, but rather embodiment.

Behind this embodiment is, of course, temporalization. In the context of consciousness, embodiment *is* temporalization. As the previous chapter expressed this conception, the openness of the self in its taking on the features of its environment rests on the openness of time. It is a function of its moments' ability to manifest presence as the nowness of different sorts of contents. What sets limits to such openness is the bodily basis of temporalization. The being-affected that is responsible for impressional nowness points back to the body and its various sense organs. Such organs, in being attuned to distinct types of contents, help define the body as a place of presence. On this basis, a distinct understanding (with a distinct openness) begins to arise. The effect sexual difference has on the understanding shows that not just our sense organs, but the body as a whole acts to define us. Given that we experience the world in and through our bodies, the different bodies men and women have shape their experience. Modifying their self-presence, this experiential difference necessarily touches their self-understanding. Men and women can, of course, understand each other by abstracting from these bodily differences, which, in any case, are hardly total. But when they do so, they fail to grasp each other in their specificity. Men are not grasped

as men, nor women as women. To actually grasp them as such is, of course, more complicated than crossing the biological, bodily divide of sex. Cultural considerations also come in. Different cultures have different interpretations of the body. They have different body images. These often affect the body as a place of presence, transforming the self-understanding that is based on this presence.

Empathy and the Shaping of Selfhood

In spite of these difficulties, a good novel does allow us to cross biological and cultural barriers. In particular, it shows that cultural empathy is possible. To hazard a definition of such empathy, I would say that the possibility a good novel realizes is that of oneself as another. It presents symbolically through its prose the tastes, smells, textures, sounds, and sights of a different cultural environment. When I use my imagination to fulfill or make vivid the intentions given in its text, not just an environment is represented. As I enter imaginatively into the life of a character in the novel, my own subjectivity undergoes a doubling. In this, the novel represents the subject to itself as another by providing it with an alternate environment. In other words, the subject's transparency is such *that it can undergo a double shaping.* It is both itself, defined by its given environment, and it is an Other insofar as it makes vivid this second environment. The identity that allows me to see myself as another is thus not based on an empty universalization. I do not abstract from the distinguishing features of the two selves to regard what is the same. Its basis is rather a self-transformation. It is representing oneself as another by placing oneself imaginatively in the Other's defining world. The same thing can happen when another person is actually present to me. Genuine empathy, in taking up the Other's standpoint, enters into the Other's environment. As the last chapter noted, such empathy disrupts self-presence. It makes it dual by including the Other.

The notion of this disruption is impossible on the paradigm that takes the self as an objective observer. Such a self never encounters another. As Merleau-Ponty remarks, "The existence of other people is a difficulty and an outrage for objective thought" (Merleau-Ponty 1967, p. 349). For such thought, they stand as objects. They appear over and against the observer, who distinguishes himself from them as an abstract subject, that is, as a disembodied self. There is, then, in Merleau-Ponty's words, "a contradictory operation" required for objective thought to

grasp another. Confronting another person, "I ought to both distinguish him from myself, and therefore place him in the world of objects, *and* think of him as a consciousness, that is, the sort of being that has no outside and no parts" (ibid., emphasis added). In other words, I have to conceive him both as an object and as a conscious subject like myself. But a consciousness that has "no outside" cannot be made objective.

A solution to this impasse is possible only by redefining what counts as a self. Selfhood must be taken as embodied. For Merleau-Ponty, the self's embodiment places it within the perceptual world, making it graspable by another self.[1] As we have seen, such embodiment also defines it. It gives it its sense as a unique place where the world that situates it can come to presence in all its sensory richness. So regarded, selfhood should not be thought of as inhabiting a body like something placed in a box. On the level of what Aristotle called the "passive intellect," selfhood is particularized through its bodily senses. When it acts, its agency becomes personal by being situated.[2] This does not mean that its unity is given by its body taken as an objective physical structure. The body, which situates selfhood, is itself situated. It is, in the temporalization it founds, an openness rather than a pregiven unity. In the paradigm that I am advancing, the self's agency does not flow from any *pregiven* unity. The self is not pregiven as a Cartesian "thinking substance." Still less can it be conceived as a Kantian "transcendental unity of apperception." Its unity is a function of its situating environment. This is why it can encounter another person by attuning itself in empathy to the Other's situation.

Given that the self is defined by its situation, empathy always involves a certain self-disruption. It is not as if the distance between self and

1. In Merleau-Ponty's words, "If I experience this inhering of my consciousness in its body and its world, the perception of other people and the plurality of consciousness no longer present any difficulty. . . . If my consciousness has a body, why should other bodies not 'have' consciousnesses?" (*Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 351).

2. Such situatedness is a theme that appears in other philosophers, most notably Husserl and Sartre. For Husserl, "the ego is only possible as a subject of an 'environment,' only possible as a subject who has facing it things, objects, especially temporal objects, realities in the widest sense" (Ms. E III 2, p. 46). By determining its situation, these objects particularize the ego. Apart from them, it has no "material content" of its own. "It is quite empty as such." It is, in itself, "an empty form that is only 'individualized' through the stream [of its experiences]: it is this, in the sense of its uniqueness" (p. 18). Sartre ties the self's uniqueness directly to the body. The body is "our original relation to the world" (Sartre 1966, p. 428). It gives us a situated, contingent perspective. In Sartre's words, "the necessity of a point of view . . . is the body" (p. 431). We can, in fact, "define the body as a contingent point of view on the world" (p. 433).

Other is closed by a fusing of two distinct unities. One is rather overlaid on the other. There is, as the last chapter noted, a certain doubling of selfhood. This doubling can be highly disturbing. The disruption it causes is part of the risk of genuinely encountering another. The attraction of abstract thought may well be tied to this risk. Engaging in this thought, we avoid such disruption. Situated by an environment composed of abstract, measurable quantities, our selfhood, as long as we engage in scientific pursuits, becomes a self like every other. Everyone, at least in theory, can replicate the experiments another scientist performs. Everyone can make the same observations. As a disembodied Cartesian spectator, we can, for a time, avoid the risks of encountering differently situated selves. There is, of course, a price to be paid. When we abstract from our embodiment, we abstract from the kind of situatedness that yields the duality of our self-presence. Remaining within the scientific attitude, we do not see the necessities imposed on us by our being shaped by Others. Such necessities may determine our practice. They may be part of the life-world experience that makes it possible. Yet they escape our notice.

Negotiating Differences in Self-Presence

Since we do have to live with Others, the duality of self-presence is a fundamental phenomenological given. It follows from the situational character of the self. Encountering Others, I am drawn out of myself. My situatedness and, hence, my selfhood, becomes overlaid with those of Others. The result gives my self-presence its characteristic ambiguity. My self-presence is in part a function of my organic being. I am present to myself in my pleasures and pains. My agency is particularized by the appetites and fears that flow from my embodied state. It is individualized by my needs. Yet, as the last chapter indicated, such needs point to Others. Because I do not live alone, I am always being resituated in terms of Others. Functioning as both an organic and social being, I regard the world both from my own and these Others' standpoints. I take into account what is "true for me" and what is "true for Others." Concretely regarded, such truths point to a task, that of arriving at agreements I can share with Others. This happens whenever I attempt to mediate between my own self-knowledge and what Others say about me. This mediation is actually a "negotiation" of my self-presence. In the back and forth that this term implies, I attempt to find an acceptable solution to often competing claims.

We should not think of such negotiation as involving self and Others as given units. The ambiguity of self-presence is also that of the functioning self. Such a self maintains its unity through such negotiation. *It is its result rather than its cause.* Thus, the failure of the negotiation signifies its inability to function as whole both organically and socially. Given this, the primary task of the self is that of managing the dualities of self-presence involved in its being with Others. It maintains itself as a functioning self through negotiating the differences involved.

This notion of selfhood is, I believe, implicit in much of Western thought about ethics. The object of the various ethical systems that have been proposed is not just that of sorting out the obligations one has to oneself and to Others. It has to do with the presence underlying these obligations. Its goal is that of coming to terms with the duality of our self-presence. Ethical systems are attempts to negotiate this duality. In this view, the answer to the question, "why be ethical?" concerns the selfhood that is the result of such negotiation. Being ethical is its preservation. The ultimate sanction of morality is that ethical failure involves its progressive loss. It results in the self's increasing inability to function both organically and socially.

Illustrations

To make this point within the compass of this chapter, only a few major thinkers can be considered. The following remarks on Plato, Kant, Freud, and Darwin are no more than brief sketches. They illustrate the diversity of the ways in which the duality of self-presence can be approached. For Plato, this duality is one of appetite and mind. The self that is determined by appetite takes pleasure as the good. The self determined by mind chooses pleasure only insofar as it leads to the good (Plato 1971, p. 105). For this self, to know the good is to do it. In the dialectic that is, concretely, the working out of Plato's ethics, the mind constantly tries to persuade the appetite that it is mistaken about the good. In Plato's writings, their conversations take the dramatic form of dialogues between Socrates and various interlocutors. The back and forth of the dialogues manifests the ongoing attempt to negotiate the difference between the two selves. In the *Gorgias*, for example, Socrates plays the role of mind or reason. The self that is defined by its appetites appears as Callicles. As Socrates makes clear, what is at issue in the debate is Callicles' selfhood. Failure to engage in it means that Callicles "will

remain at variance with himself his whole life long" (p. 76). Limited to his appetites, he cannot acknowledge Others. In fact, "he is incapable of social life" (p. 117).

A similar sort of duality is present in the Kantian account. It consists of the sensible and the intelligible worlds. The self that is correlated to the sensible world is ruled by inclination. All its motives are drawn from this world, that is, from the particular appetites or desires it engenders. These desires determine the self as necessarily bound to the world in its willing. By contrast, the self correlated to the intelligible world is ruled, not by desire, but by reason. Its motives are those of rational self-consistency. Thus, in choosing the maxims for its actions, it asks whether the maxim can be universalized and still be self-consistent. Can a person, for example, allow everyone to lie or will this undermine the very notion of lying? (Kant 1955a, p. 422). Universalizing a maxim abstracts it from all particular motivating circumstances since it makes it apply to everyone in all possible circumstances. It abstracts the maxim from any particular desires growing out of these circumstances. Acting on a universal maxim is thus acting apart from any inclination. Rather than being motivated by the sensuous world, the rational self is, then, radically free. It manifests a complete "autonomy of the will," since what determines it is simply the standards for rational consistency it sets for itself.

As Kant notes, if the self inhabited either of these worlds exclusively, the sense of ethical obligation, the "ought," would never arise. In his words, "If I were solely a member of the intelligible world, then all my actions would perfectly conform to the principle of the autonomy of a pure will; if I were solely a part of the world of sense, my actions would have to be taken as in complete conformity with the natural law of desires and inclinations" (Kant 1955a, p. 453). But I belong to both worlds. I am both a rational and a desiring self. Because of this, I have the sense of ethical obligation. To cite Kant again, "when we think of ourselves as obligated, we consider ourselves as belonging to the world of sense and yet at the same time to the intelligible world" (p. 454). This duality of self-presence is responsible for the "ought." On the one side is my sensuous presence. On the other is my presence as a member of an intelligible "kingdom of ends" (p. 433). Here, the universality of my maxim places me in harmony with all other rational subjects whose maxims are similarly universal. Together we form "a systematic union of rational beings through common laws." Working out the "ought" in a concrete situation is my negotiation between my self-presence as sensuously

embodied and as a member of this "kingdom that may be called a kingdom of ends" (ibid.). My ethical selfhood—the selfhood that experiences the "ought"—arises in this process.

For both Plato and Kant this negotiation is rather one-sided. For Plato, it fails if reason does not succeed in gaining the upper hand.[3] Kant takes the demands of practical reason as an imperative, a command that must be obeyed if we are to achieve moral stature. We must follow it, even though our freedom cannot appear in the world where we act. A more nuanced account, one that does justice to the delicate balancing between the two parties, is presented by Freud. In his version, the appetites appear as "the instincts . . . which find a first psychical expression [in the id]." The id, in other words, is the place where they first come to presence (Freud 1969, p. 2). The imperatives of morality come to presence in the "super ego." This term involves a radical concretization of the "Others" considered when I universalize my maxim. For Kant, such Others are all possible rational agents. For Freud, the "super-ego" designates the influence of our actual parents in their action of imposing moral strictures on us. It includes as well the influence of "the family, racial and national traditions handed on through them, as well as the demands of the immediate social milieu which they represent" (p. 3). In its reference to Others, the super-ego is what Hegel would call a "concrete universal."

Freud adds a further element to this picture of the self. This is the "ego," which is taken as the place where the "real external world," the "individual's own experience," comes to presence (Freud 1969, pp. 2, 4). The ego is our opening onto the actual, contemporary world. As such it is a contested ground. Both the id and the super-ego ignore the demands of the real world. Both, in their demands, attempt to encroach on it. Yet if either succeeds in mastering it completely, psychosis results. To avoid this, the ego constantly negotiates between their sets of conflicting demands. In Freud's words, "An action of the ego is as it should be if it

3. This does not mean that Plato's position does not have its nuances. A good example of the balance he seeks is provided by the treatment of rhetoric in the *Gorgias*. Rhetoric persuades us by working on our fears and desires. It "engenders belief without knowledge" (*Gorgias*, p. 32). Its power is that of "an ignorant person" being "more convincing than the expert before an equally ignorant audience" (p. 38). The sciences, however, do produce knowledge. With their "rational accounts" they persuade by appealing to the mind. Thus, if we had complete knowledge, there would be no place for rhetoric. Conversely, if we had no knowledge, rhetoric would be all powerful. The difficulty is that we are in the middle state. We neither possess complete knowledge nor lack it entirely. Given this, we cannot do without its power. We can only attempt to control it. Thus, Socrates, most notably at the end of the *Gorgias*, uses rhetoric to persuade his opponents.

satisfies simultaneously the demands of the id, of the super-ego and of reality, that is to say, if it is able to reconcile their demands with one another" (p. 3). Now, for Freud, neither the ego, nor the id, nor the super-ego is the self. The self is a system involving all three. The id with its instincts represents its self-presence as an organic, bodily being. The super-ego expresses its self-presence as a social entity. It is its presence to itself as the Others of its milieu. Since the self is both organic and social, it is established through the negotiation of these different self-presences. The "ego," for Freud, is thus no more nor less than a title for the delicate and continuous process of this negotiation, which tries to keep open our grasp of reality. Its collapse is actually the collapse of the system that is the self.

A similar sort of duality and corresponding negotiation occurs in Darwin's account of our moral sense. For Darwin, however, it is a matter of two different types of instincts. On the one side, we have the social instincts. These "have been developed for the general good . . . of the species," this being defined as "the rearing of the greatest number of individuals in full vigor and health, with all their faculties perfect" (Darwin 1967, p. 490). On the other side, we have the instincts directed to the "search after pleasure or happiness" (ibid.). To illustrate their difference, Darwin gives the example of someone rushing into a fire to save someone else. The action is done impulsively, without reason or reflection. Were, however, the hero to reflect afterwards, "he would," Darwin writes, "feel that there lies within him an impulsive power widely different from a search after pleasure or happiness." The power is that of "the deeply planted social instinct" (ibid.).

In Darwin's example, the social instinct overrides the instinct for self-preservation. In most cases, however, there is a conflict between the two. We experience two sets of desires, those directed to self-preservation and enhancement and those directed to social preservation, that is, to the "good" of society as defined above. The evolutionary grounds for this split are not difficult to find. Our survival in primitive times depended on our success *both* as individuals and as tribes. The competition between individuals fostered their self-regarding instincts, while the social instincts were selected for in the struggles between competing tribes. Both types of instincts are required, yet they often come into conflict. The result, in Darwin's words, is "a struggle in man between his social instincts, with their derived virtues and his lower, though momentarily stronger impulses or desires" (Darwin 1967, p. 494). If we yield to the latter, we feel the sting of conscience. This sense of remorse is, Darwin writes,

"analogous to the feelings caused by other powerful instincts or desires, when left unsatisfied or balked" (ibid.). It is, in other words, "the sense of dissatisfaction" caused by the balking of the social instinct. Of course, if we follow only this instinct, other, equally strong, self-regarding instincts are balked. Once again there is dissatisfaction. The only solution is an ongoing negotiation between the two.

The point can be put in terms of our self-presence. Darwin's self-regarding instincts manifest our organic presence to ourselves. They do so in terms of bodily needs. Self-presence, in their case, takes the form of identifying the self with a bodily need. Thus, we say, in English, *I am* hungry, *I am* thirsty, and so forth. Agency here springs from this private, bodily need. The social instincts, by contrast, manifest the presence of Others. The *I* thus becomes present to itself as a *we*. Acting under their sway, our agency is not really our own, but rather pertains to the "we." Our sense of identity with the collectivity can, in extreme cases, lead us to sacrifice our individual organic being. In most cases, however, we do not blindly follow either agency. Since the body in its needs points to Others, who in their needs point to us, we are always negotiating our way between the needs of self and Others. We live in the tension of competing demands on our agency. Our sense of this tension is our sense of the "ought." It forms our moral selfhood.

This experience of the "ought" is the basic phenomenological given that Western moralists have sought to interpret in terms of their dichotomies. These can receive various titles. Pleasure and the good, inclination and reason, the id and the superego, the self-regarding and social instincts name but a few of the ways in which they have sought to interpret the "ought." Behind all such theorizing is the fact that we live in and through competing demands. They spring from the fact that we are embodied beings living with Others. That these demands are real, that they touch us in our very selfhood, points to the fact that the duality they express is that of our own selfhood, our own embodied self-presence. Our attempts to negotiate this duality, in whatever form it appears, work out our concrete response to this ought. This response is our ethical action in its most immediate form.

Outsiders

The above examples could be extended. Our paradigm could be applied to social ethics, in particular to the relations between individual

and state as specified by Locke's social contract theory. It could also be applied to Mill's attempt to reconcile, on utilitarian grounds, individual happiness and the happiness of Others. Were we to extend this sketch and fill in its details, a phenomenological account of the history of ethics would arise. It would devote itself to describing how the different forms of ethical theorizing arise from the fundamental fact of the division in our self-presence.

Rather than engaging further in this history, I would like to note a little-regarded fact about the origins of ethics in the West. The initiators of the three major streams of Western ethical thinking, the Jewish, the Christian, and the Greek, were all outsiders. Moses, to whom we owe the Mosaic law, was a murderer. Having killed an Egyptian overseer, he fled to Midian. The people to whom he gives this law were themselves outsiders. As he frequently reminds the Jews, they were "strangers in a strange land" before he led them out of Egypt. Christ was also an outsider. Apparently an illegitimate child, he was associated with the least regarded elements of his society. Ultimately, he was crucified by the local religious and political authorities. For medieval philosophers his death recalled that of Socrates, who was also executed for not following the norms of his society.

Being outsiders, all three represented a disruption of the self-understanding of their milieu. As they came to prominence, their presence disrupted its self-presence. When, through their disciples, they ultimately prevailed, their success added another dimension to this self-presence, one whose negotiation became an ongoing, culturally defining task. The nature of their accomplishment can be put in terms of the fact that the self maintains itself through an ongoing process of negotiation, one whereby it accommodates its different self-presences. Adding another dimension, they enriched this process. Both through their actual presence and their teachings, these figures made Others present in a new way. The result was not just a new sense of the ought, a new tension between the embodied self and its Others. It was a richer sense of self. Phenomenologically, these figures were involved in our self-constitution. This follows because our ethical selfhood, experienced as the "ought," arises in the very process of this negotiation. As such, it is dependent on the duality of our self-presence. To eliminate the duality is to eliminate this selfhood. It is, in Freudian terms, to lapse into the psychosis that marks the victory of either the id or the super-ego. As long as there is a duality, there is an ethical tension. There is also the negotiation between

the competing presences that is ethics in its most concrete form. Given this dependence of our selfhood, ethics in this sense is constitutive of the functioning self. As such, it is prior to it. The priority of ethics is, of course, a Levinasian theme. My position, however, is that this priority is based on presence rather than absence, on a symmetrical rather than an asymmetrical relation of the self and its Other. In terms of such presence, the relation of self and Other involves mutuality. Because neither is prior, a negotiation of their claims is possible.

Understanding as Participation

How, then, do we go about understanding different cultures? Can we draw some practical answers from this analysis? Such answers require taking "culture" in a sense that is appropriate to the analysis. This means understanding it in terms of the reciprocal definition of self and environment. On the one hand, the self is the place where this environment comes to presence. As such, it is informed by the things and persons it encounters. All of this, in defining the self, makes its agency personal. On the other hand, its action shapes this environment. It is not just informed by its Others, it informs them. The same holds for the things that make up its physical milieu. It does so through its body. Its body is both itself, being its most intimate, situating environment, and a means for its agency. Through it, the self determines the environment that determines itself. This reciprocal determination of self and environment never occurs in isolation. Every self engages in it and, in so doing, affects the environments that situate its Others and their agency. In a situation of selves determining environments that, in turn, determine selves, there is no first cause, no set of final determinants. Since the resulting whole is not a systematic structure with clear principles or beginnings, it cannot be subjected to a foundational analysis. It has no independent ground or foundation outside of itself, which is to say that its "ground" or cause is nothing but itself. What we have here is simply a nonfoundational, self-determining totality of actors, actions, things, and events, each of which functions both as cause and caused. "*Culture,*" in the broad sense, *is this whole.* Viewed from the perspective of the selves that are its human component, "a culture" designates the ongoing relationships that determine a group in its selfhood. Such relationships can exhibit definite patterns. But since the whole is nonfoundational, these cannot be deduced. To grasp the dynamics of this whole we have to participate in

it. The answer to the first question, then, is that *understanding a different culture requires our participating in it.*

The nature of this participation becomes clear when we consider particular cases. First, however, it should be noted that "culture" is a relative term. Given that no human group exists in complete isolation, every culture is part of a greater whole. To the extent that there is contact, the selves that form a particular group are always determining and being determined by a wider world. Yet, in spite of this, it is appropriate to speak of different cultures. This holds even when their members are in daily contact. In a hospital, for example, we can describe the "cultures" of doctors and patients. This is because their circumstances are different. The doctors are well; they dress in their street clothes. Their patients are ill; confined to their beds in hospital pajamas, they eat what the hospital provides them at the times it sets. To experience their world, it is not sufficient to know the patients' symptoms, diseases, and treatments. One would have to participate in it, i.e., experience one's body as an object of medical treatment. For doctors to grasp what it means to be a patient, they would, accordingly, have go through their hospitals' admissions and examination procedures. Only then could they begin to gain the empathy that comes through immersion in their patients' environment.

The understanding that comes through such immersion stands in sharp contrast to that arising from external analysis and observation. According to the foundationalist paradigm of modern science, to describe an environment objectively, to identify and systematically order its causes and effects, one must stand outside of it. One cannot be a situated participant. This, however, is precisely what is required to understand a different culture, given its *non*foundational nature. The paradigm for the type of empathetic understanding required is that of incarnation. Its basis is the experience of a particular world coming to presence in oneself. On the most basic level, this is an experience of how one's bodily being and functioning are particularized by a given world.

A second, more important case is provided by international relations. To apply the proposed paradigm, states would have to engage people for long term service in different cultures. Living like their inhabitants, their aim would be to take up the standpoints of such cultures. This means that they would not be shielded by the kind of imported lifestyle that generally accompanies a diplomatic mission. Rather than representing a foreign power, their task would be to enter into the environment that

determines a cultural group in its specific selfhood. This would include participating in the relations definitive of the group's subcultures. The members of this new type of diplomatic service could be drawn initially from a country's expatriates. Career diplomats could also choose to participate in it. Whatever its composition, its usefulness would depend on its members' having an important voice in their country's foreign service. Having experienced their own and another culture, their task would be to provide the type of understanding that state power obscures. Their experience of the disruption of self-presence that comes through being shaped by another culture would be particularly valuable in the negotiations between states of very different cultures. This is because they would already have experienced the general pattern of such negotiations within themselves. Their own self-presence would be a result of the balancing of the standpoints of their own and the foreign culture.[4]

This suggestion is, of course, the opposite of the practice of most states. Diplomatic services normally change diplomatic postings on a regular basis. They do so because they fear that a career diplomat would lose objectivity were the diplomat to remain in a country beyond a certain period. The paradigm of understanding underlying this procedure is that of the detached observer. In rotating their diplomats, states attempt to prevent this detachment from being undermined. What motivates this practice is the sense that relations between states involve external or "foreign" powers. This relationship demands an understanding that is similarly external to the standpoint of the observed. Behind this necessity stands the normal use of state power, which is that of determining circumstances to suit its interests. Insofar as these interests are distinct from those of other states, the understanding that serves them must maintain its detachment.

The misunderstandings that this attitude has fostered are present throughout the history of diplomatic relations. They are more or less inevitable as long as we equate culture and nation. The difficulty here is not just that nations may have divided cultures—as the Canadians do with their French and English speaking inhabitants—or that different nations may share the same basic culture. It is that the very concept of a "nation" involves state power. Thus, when we take culture and nation as

4. The same experience would also qualify them to deal with questions of immigration and asylum. Their presence in the responsible agencies would be a corrective to the powerlessness of the groups they deal with. In dealing with officials, the asylum seeker often has the feeling of being "invisible," of not being seen or understood in the particulars of his situation. The corrective here is the empathetic understanding that comes from actually taking up the stance of a different culture.

equivalent, the understanding of different cultures occurs in the context of distinct nations with distinct interests and powers. As such, it involves the subordination of understanding to the power employed to advance different national interests. This subordination distorts our grasp of the otherness of the Other. The determination of circumstances to suit an external power is, by definition, a limitation of such otherness. It is a limitation of what can appear through such circumstances.[5] A common example of this limitation occurs when employees react to the power of their employers by telling them what they want to hear. In doing so, they limit their appearance to the role or persona demanded by the circumstances that the employers have determined. Given the unequal power of nations, the same sort of factors limit their attempts to understand each other. To avoid this, a way has to be found to drain power from the context of their understanding. This is the purpose of the paradigm of understanding as participation. Participating in the otherness of the Other, one loses the standpoint from which power can be exercised so as to obscure the Other's alterity.

The Ethical Imperative

This paradigm may seem to be an unwelcome intrusion of ethics into politics. Since Machiavelli's time, their separation has been part of the *Staatrsräson* that views states only in terms of their abiding interests. The

5. This limitation affects our ability to draw the ethics of an act from its consequences. Power, in determining the circumstances, sets the paths along which things normally run their course. As such, it determines the consequences. Thus, given that there is always power, the relation between an act and its consequences is always mediated. Rather than revealing the ethics of an act, the consequences can simply point to power relations. Thus, the disastrous consequences of divorce for women a hundred years ago may point not so much to the act of divorce itself as to the unequal relations of economic, social, and sexual power between men and women. To take another example, the assertion is frequently made that social programs do not benefit minority groups since they cannot overcome the lower IQ of such groups. This lower IQ, however, could be the result of poor prenatal and infant nutrition or some other condition inherent in the group's lack of power, a lack which places them in a lower social class. If this is the case, the failure of such programs may point to the power relations of the society that provides these programs. Such relations, which may in fact be embedded in these programs, could be what keeps their recipients from demonstrating a higher IQ. As these examples indicate, an appeal to consequences in moral judgments can conceal an appeal to power. This is especially the case when those who hold power are found to exempt themselves from such consequences. When, for example, infidelity is socially punished in women but not in men, this can signify that its unfortunate results stem more from the unequal distribution of power than from the nature of the act itself.

disasters that have followed from this stance are well known. Reflecting on these, we have to ask if morality itself should not be included among such interests. Morality, of course, does appear in the current emphasis on "human rights." But these rights are often conceived in abstract, universal terms. As such, they can be opposed to "economic rights," which are also conceived abstractly. In the ensuing debates, the self that is the subject of such rights is rarely examined. Such a self, however, has been our underlying subject. The purpose of this chapter, indeed, of this book, has been to raise the question of this self in terms of the presences that constitute its selfhood. Viewed in these terms, the goal of cross-cultural understanding is not just political. It is a richer sense of self, a more complex understanding of the Others that underpin our self-presence. The consequence of this understanding is a deeper sense of the ought, a greater depth to the ethical dimension of life. In fact, in their attempt to understand each other, different cultures may be seen as taking up an ethical stance. This is because the imperative of cross-cultural understanding is, at bottom, an ethical imperative. It is a call to the negotiation of differences, a negotiation that is the very process of our ethical selfhood.

To speak of normativity in this context is to consider the demands of such selfhood. Both within and across cultures, richness of self-presence may be taken as a normative, ethical ideal. Those actions and attitudes that diminish this presence count as a departure from this ideal. This includes every expression of power that forcibly limits the Other to a narrow role. Such expressions may be necessary for maintaining our current economic and social structures. Yet, to the point that they prevent the Others from stepping out of the roles assigned to their groups, they come at an ethical price. Limiting their presence, they limit our own. Since self-presence always involves Others, ultimately they limit everyone's presence. No one is autonomous in the nonfoundational whole that is determined by intersubjective relations. This does not mean that the ideal of richness of self-presence demands our being overwhelmed by Others. As involving a *balance* between self and Others, it forbids an excessive focus on self or Others, on one's own or on other cultures. It also forbids their collapse into an undifferentiated unity. In this, the ideal respects the alterity that is implicit in empathy.

Respect for alterity does not imply that, in taking up an Other's standpoint, one cannot find it lacking. There are standpoints that are genuinely disbalanced. There are practices, both individual and national,

that undermine selfhood, that depart from the richness that is its normative ideal. The judgment that they are such, however, is the prerogative of empathy. Only by our admitting Others into our self-presence can we have the possibility of being admitted into theirs. Stepping out of the roles we assign to each other, there is the possibility of a "face-to-face" encounter that can genuinely change our self-presence. This encounter is difficult and not without risks. It is, however, inherent in the back and forth of every successful negotiation, be it personal or between nations. Given the nonfoundational nature of culture and, in general, of intersubjective relations, negotiating our differences is being faithful to who we are. Our status as embodied beings bringing the world to presence demands no less.

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