

We then have connections of similarity in primordial form and in the consideration of transition, and we have comparison for successions, e.g., series of repetition.

“Awakening” in the impressional sphere: Something occurs that already has my interest. There is one thing or are several similar things in coexistence within the impressional present—interest extends to the similar things.

Syntheses, like those of coexistence in an original present and those of succession in an original sequence, in streaming. The synthesis of coexistence is not one that generates; it does not later form a connection out of an entity prior to the synthesis; it does not first have one entity and then another one that links it up to the first and through this generates a whole. The successive synthesis constitutes succession, but it links up impression and retention. We can say here that it essentially conceals what has just occurred (belonging to the previous Now) by the occurrence of the current entity, the previous Now is causally modified by the new Now. These are constant causal necessities peculiar to streaming. They are necessary causal syntheses. If two similar elements occur in a present, it is not the case that they first exist [separately] and that then their synthesis follows; rather, we call “similar” what occurs in such a synthesis <as> coexistent. Being in a togetherness, the founding and the founded are inseparable, they are necessarily one. But is it not likewise the case with a pair in similarity, which becomes a “pair” because the one member has newly occurred? To be sure, something similar can emerge, can endure in a present, and then something that is similar to it can emerge anew. But then the synthesis does not first occur afterwards, for the synthesis is there with the existence of both. – Like when we consider awakening? Is it really different here? A synthesis occurs as soon as an *a* has a certain force through an interest, and something uniform with respect to this interest [arises] in the empty horizon. In particular: The emergence from emptiness arises with the characteristic of “consequence” because in the present the interest has fallen to the content or because the content of this interest has arisen. [398]

Appendix 17: (To: §28) <Sensible Connection of Similarity, Sensible Uniformity and Eidos>³⁷

Similarity and fusion; similarity, prominence, allure to run through [the individuals of a group]:

5 A totality of hyletic data (coexistent or successive, and that arise in one consciousness) possesses a sensible unification that combines the data by means of the similarity held in common, and this is the case to the extent that the similarity is sufficient.

10 This initially means that wherever we find data that are already prominent in one consciousness, data that we apprehend in relations of similarity, we find them connected sensibly in a certain manner, in a manner that is called the connection of similarity. And inversely, where we have a group of contents given in the connection of similarity prior to running through individuals and prior to a cohesive reciprocal relation, there exists the ideal possibility (the essential possibility) of an apprehension of similarity that forms relations, an apprehension of similarity in which the relationships of similarity that belong to the pairs of contents are constituted for us, that is, originally bring them to givenness for us. [399]

25 We speak of a gradation of similarity; this points back to a gradation of “sensible similarity,” that is, to the gradation of the sensible connection of similarity that is “more” or “less intimate.” (Here we do not yet need to discuss how this bears on connected contents, whether or not uniform contents can be connected in different modes of intimacy). Connections of similarity, groups of similarity can in turn possess connections of similarity (“coalescing” to form groups of similarity), etc.

30 The connections of similarity that we had in mind here refer to connections of contents that are already prominent, separate, and these can be a connection of concrete wholes as wholes, or a connection of wholes by virtue of the parts or moments—as analysis shows. And “analysis” plays its role in the constitution of relations of similarity which are relations between objects. And here both *concreta* and *abstracta* can be objects. If we ascertain,

³⁷ Editor: Probably from the period of the lecture.

analyze, and explicate similarities here, we "observe" that certain connections of similarity take place for moments, and then that the wholes themselves possess connections of similarity in a different way: The wholes are connected "through" moments and their groups of similarity.

We conceived of similarity as a relationship, and the nexuses of similarity as relations or unifications of prominent data. But how do data become prominent? When are data prominent in coexistence and when in succession? Here we are reminded of Stumpf's introduction to fusion which (as he proceeds) relates exactly to this point.³⁸ Fusion is what prevents the consciousness of a manifold, it thus prevents a prominence; only that he actually already has the following in mind here: If, as is usually the case, the nature of contents is such that the contents form a manifold, that is, such that they would be set-off in relief in a relation of coexistence (which he alone has in mind) and that would yield a sensible nexus, then an obstacle arises now at the very core of the contents, an obstacle that works against the formation of the "manifold." As one sees, and this will be sensed even more strongly upon closer consideration, there are enormous difficulties to overcome if one wishes to analyze clearly all the relationships that are intertwined here.

What is it that initially determines separation? Non-similarity (heterogeneity), that which is "without" materially relevant "interconnection." Similarity is the very first thing that fashions "interconnection," "interconnection" in the sense that is at issue with regard to relations. (Without interconnection = that which has nothing to do with the other, that which is alien in a materially relevant manner, heterogeneous).

Thus, there is something like homogeneity, and homogeneous contents form a nexus in coexistence and succession, and belonging together with this nexus are certain relations, relations of similarity and relations of uniformity.

Instead of similarity, perhaps it is still best to say throughout: connection and relation of homogeneity, as opposed to connection and relation that is not produced by homogeneity. Homogeneity refers then to a commonality of a materially relevant essence, and secondarily to a commonality of characteristics that are intertwined in a nexus.

Thus in a certain sense homogeneity is "fusing" in coexistence and succession. But in what sense?³⁹ The nexus of homogeneity, of "similarity," has its counterpart in the non-nexus peculiar to heterogeneity. Color and sound are (in accord with their essence) "separate," and this "separation" means that non-homogeneity is one of the (not necessary, but sufficient) conditions of "plurality," or it is one of the conditions of that prominence that makes possible an "affecting" of each one of the contents "for itself," namely, in coexistence. Non-homogeneous coexisting contents stand in a relation such that in the case of prominence, one content does not disturb another one, or it does not disturb another one because it exercises an affection for itself, and possibly gets apprehended as a prominence for itself. (But one of them can be privileged where attentiveness is concerned, e.g., one of them is quite intensive and therefore obtrudes, the other one does not. Here each one can have an equally sharp prominence, but to be prominent does not mean to be obtrusive.) This does not mean that other "disturbances" are not there, that either of the contents fulfills the conditions of prominence differently. And on the other hand, such conditions can be sufficient in the case of homogeneity like, for example, for sensible data in the visual field or for coexisting acoustical data.

In the case of coexistence, and all the more so in the case of succession, one cannot say of homogeneity that it disturbs separation with the degree of homogeneity's increase if the individualizing determinations behave in a corresponding manner. Spatio-temporally contiguous contents become all the more prominent the greater their distance in homogeneity, the more "dissimilar" they are, and they necessarily lose this prominence

³⁸ Translator: See, for example, Carl Stumpf, *Erkenntnis und psychische Funktionen*, (Berlin: Königl. Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1907), which is also to be found in Husserl's personal library.

³⁹ Why have we not taken into consideration spatio-temporal phenomena in this respect? They do indeed belong to "homogeneity."

when the distance becomes zero (ideally speaking). [The expressions] "prominence is all the greater" and "fusion is all the smaller" can be characterized as equivalent.

Prominence as separation does not actually admit of degrees. If we nevertheless do apprehend it as admitting of degrees, this means that their essential difference fulfills the condition of the "being-for-itself," and this goes hand in hand with the condition of the possibility of grasping an individual under the given individualizing circumstances, but [it also] means that the allure for grasping an individual is all the greater (or the "ease" by which it gets grasped individually is all the greater), the greater there is a distance of similarity. But all of this is a matter of necessary essential interconnections.

If similarity approaches the zero-point, which is to say, if similarity is either nil or if the essences continually pass into one another and the continuity coincides with that of the individualizing moments, the unification taking shape through coinciding in similarity attains a fusion of continuity shaped by affiliated laws, laws according to which the continuity of individualizing moments is sufficient to ground the "extension" of one and the same essence *via* this continuity and, on the other hand, in the case of varying essences, it is sufficient to ground extension in the form of an expansion of the essence-continuum *via* the individualizing element. The parts of such continua and the phases are united in an "unseparated" manner, and are only separable if other motives of prominence are produced. Again, similarity serves the following: Juxtaposition of the same individualizing form (expanse of space-time) in two ways of fulfilling essence; of them, one provides for separation, the other does not. Through this, a "figuration" arises in the extension that is internally undifferentiated, as coinciding goes down the path of forming relations.

But there are many difficulties here. Duration, for example, also comes into consideration where similarity and coinciding are concerned, as does spatial extension, but not absolute temporal locus. Does not absolute location, however, play its role here with such uniformities and similarities, i.e., comparators, at least with space, even if not with time? Perhaps not. We come to

comparative overlapping, and that is not an identification of locations and times themselves.

All the talk of contents that have these or those features, that have these and those internal predicates, this or that concrete essence, generic moment, specific moment, etc., points us back to comparison and to the nexus of similarity. Yet we still have to say here that we need a more general term in relation to individualizing determinations. We can say: communities of essence and differences of essence. One speaks of similarity with respect to objects, and then the question arises as to what we have posited as object, what we have set into relief. If we take individual objects in space and time, even immanent ones, we find that they are the same objects through the change of the spatial situation. Thus, this should also be taken into account. First for us is the nexus that is determined by homogeneity, but we describe the relationships as well as the laws that are found here by means of essences and relationships that we gain through comparison and through predication. But how could it be otherwise?

If we take a group of separated data from a sphere of similarity, there is the possibility that these data are completely uniform. That is, they are not only similar, and they are not only "very similar," but in relation to each other they are "repetitions." We also say that "the same thing" <is> there many times as "the same thing" again and again. It may be that this uniformity of repetition is an idea, an ideal limit, but the relation to this limit lies at the basis of all the talk of such repetition.

Phenomenologically, uniformity (in this sense of mere repetition) is distinguished from mere similarity; mere similarity is gradually removed from this uniformity through the way in which coinciding presents itself in coherence and in the mental "overlapping" that takes place in the "process of comparison." The possibility of comparative "coinciding" extends just as far as similarity, just as far as this peculiar form of connection unique to "sensible" similarity. One could say that the extent to which a manifold of separated contents is pre-given—let's say, a duality (which in the final analysis perhaps presupposes the very broadest commonality)—is the extent to which we have the possibility of coherence and comparison; in this instance, a certain synthesis is

carried out that brings the so-called elements of the comparison into a mental overlapping, into a line of vision in which one of the rays of vision traverses both contents. But only where there <is> similarity, and the extent to which we have similarity, is the extent to which we have a particular occurrence that we characterize as "coinciding." In a similarity-consciousness (as the consciousness of the relationship of a similarity), the similar elements that were previously merely juxtaposed and that formed a sensible manifold in a sensibly connected manner (a manifold that is especially characterized as a manifold of similar elements) come together into a new situation; and through this they gain a commonality; the overlapping data "coincide." In the case of uniformity, the uniform elements coincide completely, they become "congruent," they form an undifferentiated unity that allows the essential components of separated uniform elements to coalesce into a single essential component that is only there in two "editions"; that is, from which the essential components only one coinciding essential component has emerged through the process of comparison (of the bringing-to-coinciding). In the other case, the essential components of both of the similar elements also enter into a relationship of coinciding, but they continue to remain as two in the phase of coinciding; each one not only belongs to one of the separated elements, and is thereby separated, but each one is also in itself separate, and as the essential component, it is removed from the other one. In this distance, however, the two do have a certain unity, they have the unity of a commonality, and in this phase of coinciding, the very commonality of the objects related to one another becomes apparent. This duality with its unity of commonality can approach the unity of complete commonality more and more, precisely the uniformity and essential coinciding without distance, and it can approach <it> so closely that we speak precisely of an approximate uniformity, of a similarity that is practically complete, only with minute deviations, etc. But the phenomenal difference still remains despite the continual transitions.

Let us take as pre-given a sensible manifold of uniform data, one of them as the "repetition" of the other. In carrying out an ideally possible comparison, there arises a congruent coinciding of the

same data according to their "common essence." These essences come into relief here, and by forming an undifferentiated unity without distance, two aspects possibly come to the fore, and from the perspective of grasping.

5 <On the one hand, the One can be achieved by an ideating abstraction as the absolutely identical *eidōs* that is grasped as the object for itself, but as an object that is not the individual moment here and there, and not merely as the identical object of the essential moment coming into relief, the essential moment of this or that *individuum*; rather, it is grasped as a "universal" essence that "is individualized," and only "coincidentally" in this or that *individuum* such that it could be individualized "just as well" in any "arbitrary" *individuum*; in other words, just as <it> has *hic et nunc* these actual individualizations, so too does it have possible individualizations in arbitrary possible individuals being presented in phantasy (repetitions in phantasy of the given actualities and in relation to other ones exactly in the sense of such a repetition), and persists in an absolute identity in relation to all these individualizations, and is itself not disturbed by temporal coming into being or passing away, by the formation and transformation of "corresponding" individuals in phantasy, neither arising nor disappearing. One may call this Platonic *eidōs*, this pure essence, a "hypostasized" possibility, but this is the absolutely "unique" in which this "hypostasization" in itself has its absolute justification; it is the absolutely "unique" that, as it were, liberates the essence (coinciding in repetition) from its individual subsoil in free phantasy-modification of given individual-actualities or from the beginning in the phantasy-givenness of pure possibilities (to which no present actuality measures up); the identical can be brought to pure identity and can be posited as an object for itself—an object that implies an open horizon of all possible particularities in which the object is "repeated," individualized, particularized, but not as a fact, but rather as pure ideal possibility that allows new such possibilities (an "unending scope") to be freely construed in *infinitum*.

<<Correlatively, standing thus in opposition here to the *eidōs* itself which implies the horizon, is the particular "as such," the purely possible particular or a plurality, an open-"unending" scope of

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particulars in which the *eidōs* can be individualized. The inductive grasping of the *eidōs* is carried out on the basis of a "free exemplification," of a horizon of freely presented particularities that are conceived in the consciousness of "whatsoever"; these particularities are connected by sensible uniformity and are transferred by being transposed through the comparative process into the coinciding of the essence. The constitution of the *eidōs* as object is inexorably connected to the constitution of the "as such"-objects of this *eidōs*, a constitution included in the same consciousness; depending upon the focal orientation and the grasping, the *eidōs* is posited as object and as identical with itself, or the arbitrary particulars are posited as possessing the *eidōs*. But here the first [level of] objectivation⁴⁰ is sketched out as primary. For although the objects must be given in pure possibility, that is, not as actualities, but as free possibilities, and although in this case they are objects of the essence in question, they are not however already constituted as individualizations of the essence, as "participating" in what is ideally identical. Rather, only first in coinciding (overlapping) is each one there as the individualization of the same ideality; and only first in being liberated from the tie to determinate individuals and their determinate actualities or quasi-actualities in the consciousness of the whatsoever does there arise the correlation of *eidōs* and the scope of the *eidōs*. If I proceed, for instance, from actualities (of perception or memory), and if through this its actuality becomes irrelevant for me, if I vary them in any which way in phantasy, if I proceed to new individuals that would only repeat what has been given up to now, if what is constituted here is the consciousness of the open "*et cetera*"—if we characterize this as a consciousness of the possibility to progress in an unlimited way in such a repetition (and this is a completely unique consciousness); if we progressively carry out the synthetic coinciding in which the identical element comes to the fore, then what is first is the grasping of the identical element as the pure *eidōs* that is referred to this horizon of the *et cetera*, and what is second is the consciousness of any kind of arbitrary particular "as" the

particular of the identical element as its individualization—ideally possible individualization—, and again the consciousness of the particular as an element of this open infinity, of this "scope," of this totality of arbitrary particulars, "all" of which have the same pure essence.

Moreover, something else that is special is the grasping of a particular as a particular actuality, whereby we carry out the thesis of the consciousness of actuality, or the thesis of an imagined particular, whose actuality we carry out in phantasy in the "after a fashion" placing ourselves on its ground, putting into play and holding firmly to the particular as a possible actuality. Then, the actual object or the object that is put into play as a possible actuality is there as an actuality or <as> the onset of an actuality, in which the *eidōs* is actually individualized (or would be individualized); and in each case we have here a consciousness of relation, a consciousness where that posited particular is determined "predicatively" (as the foundation of a possible predication—not only from the perspective of verbal articulation, but from the point of view of meaningful expressions, of apprehending significance), as being *a*, where *a* designates the essence (the "concept" in a certain sense).

The individualization of the *eidōs*, of the eidetic essence—as a rule characterized simply as essence—offers in addition a two-fold concept of individualization in the individuals: The individuals themselves are called particular individuals, the individualizations of essence, but more properly speaking, the essential moments in them are called individualizations of essence. The essence is individualized, it is rightly said, in each *individuum*; in each *individuum* there is a moment of individualization, and in this respect, the *individuum* itself is called the particular of the essence; this moment is not the *individuum* that rather has different moments. To be sure, this requires its own exposition.

Yet the coinciding that overlaps still leads to something else. Still before the consciousness of the universal and the consciousness of the *methexis* of the particular with the universal <takes place>, a reciprocal prominence arises in one stroke with respect to particular data that are included in the process of overlapping. The common element comes into relief with respect

⁴⁰ Translator: cf. Main Text, Part 3, §65 c.

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to each particular and distinguishes itself from that which is different; with respect to each one, moments come to the fore, moments that do not coincide; and this holds not only for our case of the coinciding of the repeated element (that of uniformity), but for every similarity. Even here, what we call "coinciding" concerns only the genuine foundation of similarity, the essence entering into the relation of unity here and there, which is still connected to a different element.

Every comparison is *explicite* or *implicite* also a differentiation. If individual uniformity is a complete and strict uniformity, to which belongs the identity of the whole individual essence, the uniform elements are differentiated according to their individual difference. It is evident that the uniform element is differentiated, and that the different element is differentiated by something,⁴¹ and this Something—the differences of the uniform elements—comes to the fore in the respective focal orientation. In this connection, the necessity of the differences of the uniform elements is naturally given in the pure consciousness of universality, and in the knowledge that the sublation of an individual difference or of each one, at least of the individual difference, also sublates the separation and therefore the uniformity. Separated objects are "differentiated from one another," they necessarily have different determinations, something in or with respect to them that distinguishes them. The relationship of the difference stands in correlative relation to the relationship of congruent coinciding, and is regarded in and for itself as a positive relationship; this however stands in the relationship of exclusion (of incompatibility) to the relationship of coinciding.

⁴¹ different through something: the differentiation of uniform qualities through their intensities; the differentiation of uniform individuals (*concreta*) through their spatio-temporal situation; the differentiation of uniform concrete parts through their connection. In the case of partial uniformity, a whole can be uniform to a part (piece) of the other one, or a uniform part can be connected here and there to different supplementary parts.

Appendix 18: (To § 28) Association and Synthesis⁴²

Synthesis in its different shapes as universal unification of the life of an ego = association in the broadest sense. The apprehension as this tree, as this white piece of paper, etc. A fragmentary observation of the tree, an onset of actual experience. Synthesis in the same. Coinciding of the intentions in the direction of the optimum. Coinciding of the style of apprehension. In distancing [oneself] from the object, it becomes obscure. As opposed to approaching, which in one respect always leads to the optimum. But despite this, coinciding in the same. The modes of appearance of the same thing running-off, continual modification of modes of appearance insofar as there is a progression in similarity; but commonality here in the intentional relation under continual coinciding in it.

The consciousness of similarity without active relating, without the constitution of a relationship of similarity. Correlatively, similarity as a kind of nexus, connection (what I called sensible similarity), but a subjective nexus, constituted in the subject as the connective form of subjectively constituted objects.

Similarity as a special connection "becoming prominent," as a special nexus exercising an affection for itself. Perhaps one can say: Where similar apprehensions occur in a field of consciousness, here we also have a connection of similarity before us "sensibly," but therefore not yet "coming to the fore," being separated-off, coming into relief. What presents separation, what brings about prominence? These are questions that must also be posed for particular objects as constituted sensibly in the unity of one consciousness. The unity of the field of consciousness is always produced through sensible interconnections, in a sensible connection of similarity and sensible contrast. Without this there could be no "world." We could say that it is resonance as sensible similarity and sensible contrast (that for its part presupposes a similarity) that grounds everything that is once constituted. It is a universal law of consciousness that a resonance proceeds from every special consciousness or from every special object, and

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similarity is the unity of the resonating element. In addition to this, [we have the] special law of individuals in prominence. Resonance is a way of coinciding in distance, in separation. Belonging essentially to resonance is the possibility of transition and of the production of overlapping coinciding, while the elements that are coinciding here (elements that are brought to the place of congruence) are posited separately and meant in special acts. Constitution of a relationship of similarity, possibility of analysis and comparison, of intuitively extracting something identically in common as the universal, etc. Sensible unity as continual similarity in coexistence and succession. The momentary "fields" of coexistence and succession. In contrast to this: awakening at a distance.

If I am actively oriented toward an object, grasping it and examining it, all uniform elements are in resonance in my field of consciousness, indeed they are in a special resonance that grounds the special affection on the ego and makes the synthesis of similarity prominent, even if this resonance does not bring it to my special attention (not yet to a special affection). Contributing to this is the active turning of the regard toward something similar through which overlapping occurs; this takes place while both the objects remain grasped and meant in the separation. The pair emerges as a sensibly connected unity, as plural, which can become the singular. Proceeding from the *A* that is noticed first there is an awakening: in itself it has the relational character of awakening and of the substrate of being similar to *B*. Analysis and explication in the examination of *A*; and this then determines, in turn, the division within the uniform and the similar insofar as similar special moments must be awakened in the division through resonance. If the special interest is attached to α , then with respect to A' α is also attached to it; α and α' enter into a special similarity, they are connected sensibly in the form of a special unity of similarity. Etc.

Comparison, the way to the universal, is determined by the similarity that is awakened. If interest is attached to the *individuum* during its concrete explication, then the concrete similarity will be awakened and determinative. Concrete

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uniformity is there when "similarity" is there, for wholes as for explicated parts.

Let us note here that similarity is a unity through resonance, thus, through "harmony," "agreement." Harmony, however, does not exclude degrees, "Complete" harmony as resonance, coinciding at a distance, is repetition of uniform elements, i.e., the harmony of uniform elements. Nor does harmony exclude disharmony; but disturbed harmony is itself only possible on the basis of harmony. Disharmony is the correlate of conflict in a coinciding that overlaps. This yields an entirely different incompleteness of harmony! One of them is merely a lower gradation and has its contrast in the graduated *lines* of iterative uniformity. The other is the disturbance of harmony, regardless of the gradation of harmony, in any type of conflict concerning parts or moments.

Seen more precisely, one must say here that only something that is already there can resonate. Resonance is "association according to similarity." The expression, association, is fitting insofar as a passive-sensible unity is produced. Reproductive association according to similarity, reproductive association in the broadest sense, also belongs here. Even the reproduced element was already there, only not in the "effective realization" of the intuitive presentification. Something that is not yet presentified already enters into connection with something that functions as awakening. Awakening at the same time means a tendency toward reactivation. An object in the background becomes reactivated by being grasped and explicated. Even this is a "reproduction," reproduction in the form of making present again. (If I look at an object for a second time, I re-cognize it and also have the perception as a making-present-again as one with the non-intuitive, empty awakened memory—but here the process of making-present-again does not emerge from resonance, namely, an awakening uniform element is not already there, and the process of making present is not an awakened resonance.)

If an empty distant retention is awakened by resonance, for instance, as proceeding from the perceptual present, and in this way becomes an intuitive reproduction, then the original making

present will be renewed in the new mode of the "as-if," it is reactivated in this mode of re-membering.

Thus, we have different forms of unity that belong together under the rubric of association according to similarity: [408]

5 (1) the association of similarity as completely passive in continual retention and in continual coexistence (fields), likewise as completely passive;

10 (2) the association of similarity in coexistence, the connection of similarity produced by resonance as discrete in a field of the present. Here the awakening element is either already noticed or it awakens by virtue of an especially strong affective pull that it already exercises on the ego;

15 (3) the association of similarity by virtue of the discrete awakening proceeding from a prominent perceptual present or from a present remembering, resonating into the realm of closer and furthest retention (into the realm of what is passively disappearing and "the forgotten" in the natural process of sedimentation);

20 (4) even such occurrences like perception under steady re-cognition (re-perception) and (intuitive) remembering, a remembering that *eo ipso* is a steady re-cognition—referring to the distant retentions that are continually awakened and co-connected in passive synthesis.

25 The association of similarity, however, is indissoluble from the "association of contiguity." Association is awakening. Awakening is not only awakening through resonance. The resonating element awakens its entire nexus of its coexistence and succession according to the measure of its immediacy and mediacy. The awakened element necessarily awakens its surroundings and what is or was awakened in them gets privileged.

30 Yet, this description of association is insufficient. In the broadest sense, association is nothing other than synthesis most broadly understood, the unity of the whole of the ego's consciousness (as the first unity of consciousness as a whole, which is original, in contrast to social consciousness). Whatever an ego may experience, every special lived-experiencing is inserted into the entire unity of lived-experiencing, and all lived-experiencing is consciousness, all "lived-experiencing" is either

consciousness or an object of consciousness. But consciousness is itself no less given to consciousness. Nothing can filter into my life, occur to me, dawn on me that does not befit the unity of the nexus. This nexus is the nexus of consciousness in which a single nexus of the constituted objectlike formation of consciousness is given to consciousness.

Naturally, I know about this nexus from the reflection on the unity of my life, and through the method of induction, I recognize its *a priori* of the nexus.

10 (1) The first nexus—the realm of primordial association—is the nexus in original time-consciousness. Constituted here is the primordial level of the concrete present of consciousness, i.e., the primordial level of the primordial objectlike formation as a closed universe, which is essentially necessary for the ego. Namely, streaming consciousness itself is constituted as a synthetically unitary consciousness for itself in continually streaming association, in continually immediate intertwining, in fixed lawfully regulated passivity; and what is given to consciousness in it is constituted as the ever new concrete present; what conforms to perception in the form of the Now along with its retentional, vivaciously streaming past, constantly passing over into a dormant horizon of the distant past, and of an open future that, however, is only the horizon of expectation.

20 Nothing can be introduced into such a concrete present as element or moment that is not fitting ("concrete," insofar as we do not take as a present the merely punctual Now, the moment of genuine perception free from retention by means of abstraction or idealization). The respective entirety of the present, which itself is a streaming from present to present, is a whole.

30 But here one will ask: Is it not possible for there to be something completely without interconnection, absolutely separate—just like in the case of completely separate world-regions in a constituted world of things, so too in the pure immanent "world" of hyletic data, the sense fields (the visual, the acoustic, etc.) which are indeed without interconnection, and which indeed do not have anything to do with one another in terms of content and are not connected to one another? Let us leave the objective world, for considering its essential possibility would

lead us too far astray. But with respect to the immanent sphere, the answer is easy. Within each field we have an inner connectedness of the field; such an inner connectedness of the field can only have the optical as the optical, etc. But beyond this we have a universal unity of form, which as such makes connections, but also only makes connections in the life of a single ego. It is the immanent temporal form, initially as that of connection in a concrete present for this ego with its relationships of coexistence and succession.

(2) Belonging to an ego's complete life of the present outside of the sublayer of the original perceptual present with perceptual hyletic data and fields is a superior layer of founded synthetic accomplishments, passive and active, founded insofar as they already presuppose the sublayer and its "objective" accomplishments, i.e., its accomplishments that are objectlike in general. The relation of foundation can be an immediate or a mediate one; that is, we can again find distinguishable layers here, and all the more so since every new constitutive accomplishment in turn is subject to the law of original time constitution, and thus, the life of consciousness here, like everywhere, is subordinate to the grand principle of iteration. If we stay at the superior level that stems from mere passivity or receptivity (as a lowest form of activity)—and not like colligating, comparing, distinguishing, relating, and even explicative, relating process of making connections out of special connecting activities with affiliated peculiar synthetic products—then we will encounter association in the usual sense (in which reproduction plays the essential role), but we will also encounter an association with a broader sense. What is in question here quite generally is a mediate passive synthesis that is adjoined to the original present as a secondary one. Here is the place of the association of similarity as a connection of similar elements, a connection of a new, higher level that is produced by resonance; these are similar elements that are already connected in a field of the present from immediate, continual synthesis of similarity. Here we find the synthesis of coexistence in a lawfully regulated continual fusion of similarity with respect to what is originally occurring in a Now, and inseparable from it, we find the synthesis of succession in an original modification in which the phases of modification

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successively fuse together as continual similarities. In the higher level association we have the resonance-awakening as something new, and we have the awakening being connected to the resonance-awakening by the law of contiguity, according to which the resonating element co-awakens its nexus.

Contrast is still another possible phenomenon that appears here, namely, contrast as dissonance in relation to the element awakened by resonance, and in relation to the element awakened on the part of itself and in the coinciding with the awakened element through association (retroactive awakening).

A passive synthesis of association as fusion and coinciding is also carried out with the activity of mere reception and with the individual passing through special affective moments of the object that belong to this activity of mere reception: the object itself and its specially noticed moment. An active synthesis, which can later become a synthesis of predication, first arises if the thesis of the object and the thesis of the moment (that is otherwise merely passively unified with the object in a coinciding that forms unity) are joined in the "synthesis of judgment": This is α —and if, progressing in this way in the judicative supplement and in the higher synthetic unification of the state-of-affairs in question, the series of predicates are tied to the subject in the identification of the subjective element. In passive synthesis, they are merely passive in an order of succession, in a coinciding with the object that is being continually held onto.

In the receptivity that examines as it runs through [special moments], every special moment that gets grasped individually immediately awakens every uniform moment and brings it to a special resonance. But where the non-uniform element is there instead, this non-uniform element will be given to consciousness as belonging here "differently," as disharmonious, as contrasting. If *A* awakens *B*, which is "similar to it" in the manner of resonance, then through this, *A* and *B* will enter into the unity of similarity, and that is a unity of consonance, that is, they "fuse," they enter into a kind of coinciding at a distance while remaining separate. A partial dissonance is made possible here through the consonance of the corresponding moments that produces the ground for the discrepancies, according to a more universal

moment. The "otherwise than expected," however, comes about through the fact that [on the one hand] the uniform element points to the contiguous uniform elements in resonance or in the coinciding that is produced, while [on the other] something else is there instead, occupying its place in the given nexus, suppressing it. [411]

Appendix 19: (To §§ 28, 29, 31-36) <On the Phenomenology of Association>⁴³

Awakening and the unification—within the living sphere of presence. Awakening into the sphere of the distant past.

Awakening as reanimation—that is, being introduced into the "living" sphere of the present. Being roused from slumber in the distant sphere.

In the sphere of the present: Distinction between affective background and foreground. In the affective foreground: Distinction between the thematic sphere—what the ego has grasped and has held onto (possibly still holds onto)—and the unthematic sphere. The "foreground" is determined in such a way that the affective ray that has reached the ego excites [the ego]; it already knocks on its door to awaken the ego, but [does so] still before the ego follows with (or has to follow with) a "Yes."

"Vivacity" in "degrees of consciousness"—"consciousness" in a special sense; non-vivacity (not lesser vivacity)—what is "unconscious."⁴⁴ Hence, no gradation? But yet there is a *lines*.

Synthesis at a distance (in contrast to continual fusion as melding one to the other). Synthesis at a distance as melding one to the other, distant elements being connected to one another (non-contiguous elements). Thus a distinction: immediately contiguous connection of separated elements as direct separation within a continual fusion (contrast)—and mediate connection of separated elements, but a connection of elements that are non-contiguous: connection at a distance. Contrast at a distance: Something connected at a distance is continually connected, connected in the

unity of a continuity, and insofar as this is the case, mediately. The continual course of connection founds possibilities of contiguous and non-contiguous special data. What is separated as non-contiguous is the synthesis of connection (coinciding, fusion) under the prominence of moments that are not being melded together in this unity, but are being separated, being contrasted. Precisely thereby the *concreta* in contrast—contrast at a distance—"with respect to," the colors red and green for instance—in uniformity, similarity with respect to the shape. (What kinds of phenomena necessarily arise when, on the one hand, these contrasts at a distance decrease, and on the other hand, the contrasting in proximity, which found separation under contiguity, level out?)

Questions: (1) How is it with the "vivacity" of the specific "consciousness" of presence with respect to the degrees of this vivacity? In particular (a) the degrees of the entire sphere of presence taken as a whole (general freshness); (b) the degrees of the particular sense realms and the particularities in them, or the special connections in them?

Can the degree of vivacity be altered in one stroke for the entire presence? Distinctions of freshness. The degree of vivacity can be altered unitarily for a region of unity, a region of sense. And for the particular features. What determines the alteration, and since there is obviously something like the propagation of the augmentation of vivacity, of the "awakening" to higher levels of vivacity, what are the motives and laws of this propagation? [412]

(2) The scope of presence is the scope of the sphere of vivacity. Can the scope be altered? It is necessarily altered insofar as the sphere of presence is in flux and continually makes deposits in the sphere of the "unconscious" and takes up something new—new as something impressional, that is, not as taking it up from the sphere of forgetfulness. But together with this process that has its laws, it is still possible for there to ensue the appropriation from the sphere of forgetfulness—according to new laws.

Expansion of the scope by "awakening" that which lies dormant, by "awaking" the unconscious.

The scope and the extent of contrast is the scope and the extent of fusion as mixed fusion, continuing, interlaced.

⁴³ February 12-14, 1926

⁴⁴ *das "Unbewusste"*

Continuity has three forms: (1) continuity in the usual sense of a gradual transition, of a gradual distancing, of that distancing that no longer allows contrast in the special sense to arise by steady diminution of contrast (itself a phenomenon that belongs here), that is, ultimately its zero-form; (2) continuity as arising from the coinciding of uniform elements, as fusion of uniform elements, fusion of elements that are not merely assimilated in diversity; (3) Mixture of very similar elements—but not in the continual transition of phases—a mixture that allows a new similar element to ensue. Uniformity as the limit-case of mixture, as the zero of mixture. Naturally, the continuity of what is discrete and distant cannot ensue in the sphere of presence. What is discrete and distant is separated in the framework of the thoroughgoing continuity of gradualness, and is “connected,” bound in the special manner of the unification of separated elements. Binding connection is the counterpart of continuity, and presupposes continuity. In contrast, rivalry of visual fields and fusion of visual fields in the continuity of mixture.

Contrast is the affective unification of opposites, of elements that are being separated within a binding connection on the basis of a continuity, or on the basis of a synthesis of similarity of elements that are not integrally cohesive as the contrast of elements without interconnection. Rivalry, conflict, is the dissension of opposing things. Mixture is the unification of “different things,” opposing things that stand “close” to one another, but not by being bound together.

Where the constitutive lived-experiences are concerned, especially the appearances-of, these lived-experiences are contrasting ones, “integrally cohesive” or not integrally cohesive, integrally cohesive in the concordance of a constitution—the unity of the constitution of a living present, and especially the unity of the impressional sphere of being is the unity of a nexus. Conflict is constituted by intuitions that are not integrally cohesive. Fusion as mixture is a special form of the nexus of the “penetration” of intuitions forming a single unity of intuition. (In this case, a special repression takes place, a repression of elements, which were previously in conflict, into the “unconscious,” but not into the integrally cohesive sphere of the distant past; by contrast, in

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the living conflict, repression takes place as a suppression, as a suppression into non-intuitiveness, but not into non-vivacity—on the contrary, the vivacity gets augmented in the conflict, as analogous to other contrasts).

Awakening as the augmentation of vivacity, that is, of affectivity, radiating out from a place: Temporal awakening as propagation, that is, presupposing that the vivacity [or] affectivity has undergone augmentation at this place.

But must we not say that what takes place here temporally is in action in a non-temporal manner in connection to a present that is being augmented. The unities have interconnection and have the unity of vivacity—this kind of interconnective affectivity is determined by the functional interconnections of the awakening. Every special nexus is the nexus [formed] from special relationships of awakening, which relationships, however, are determined by the content⁴⁵, by the inner conditions of the unity of continuity and contrast.

But that is transferred into the continual “structure” of the impressional sphere of the present. In succession, in structuring the processes, this structuring is such a continual becoming, continual fusing and coming into relief. But what is presupposed here is the “timeless” structuration, the structuration that is not becoming in every momentary present. Only because the present “is” in continuity and discretion can it engender effects in its becoming, in its transformation.

Still it is necessary to consider in what sense this must be taken, indeed, to what point this is correct at all. Being born blind and the moment of gaining vision—is an ordered present already constituted in this moment? Can one not inversely say: Only first in the becoming continuity do unities congregate and separate-off from other unities and now also constitute a coexistence of something that is enduring. Only later can an articulated impressional “world” be immediately seen with a glance, with mere awakening, opening one’s eyes. The “chaos” of “impressions” becomes organized—the impressions are still not objects, elements [won by] the reduction, genetic primordial

⁴⁵ *Inhaltlichkeit*

elements; dismantling intentionality and the genesis of intentionality lead back to them.⁴⁶ Unarticulated affinity, unarticulated "objects." The syntheses produce the objects according to principles that can only be gained through "analysis."

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5 The "ready-made" structure of the impressional world, with its unities and with its affectivities conditioning it, is always given beforehand and with evidence. How can one sketch from this an ideal genesis out of chaos? The fusion continually becoming fulfilled in the successive path in this direction, the conditions of fusion and of the formation of contrasts whereby the special unifications, and then further, higher unifications, become possible. The synthesis of identification with respect to retention and protention dominate here.

15 But can a chaos of such successive momentary paths persist (every path belonging to a "sensible point" in the momentary present)? Is it at all <a> possible lawfulness of coexistence—as necessary creation of coexistent objects?

20 The parallel unities of succession can only be "concrete" unities, and they must be concrete in the concreteness of enduring coexistences of "concrete objects of the present" that are maintained in the continuity of succession as enduring concrete objects of the present. There must be able to be a more or less enduring present as the concrete present with objects. The conditions of concretion and of contrast must therefore also be fulfilled in the "enduring present." And now the system of parallel successive momentary paths are fused.

25 Conceptual distinction: chaos of "sensible points" in succession (no constitution of concrete objects of succession)—chaos of sensible points in momentary coexistence, and in each coexistence.

30 The sense-fields are chaotically connected to one another. We have up to this point a chaos only in a qualitative sense. But commonalities exist with respect to the shapes of time. But here the sense-spheres do not have to worry about each other, and yet

insofar as this is the case, there is chaos. But every sense-field is a harmonious, cosmic unity. One can also begin with this chaos and then ask: If such order (inner unification) already predominates in the primordially impressional present, then temporal synthesis belongs to each impressional present; however, if every such new present suddenly changes over into something new devoid of system, if the presents that are repressing one another do not go together, can then the law of temporal synthesis, of identifying synthesis predominate at all? Every new momentary impression pushes aside the one that was just there. It has "nothing in common" with the one that preceded it, and this one has "nothing in common" with its predecessor. (We can imagine different cases and types here that are less extreme and "extremely extreme.") No conditions of fusion and of concrete unification are fulfilled, and therefore everything that is repressed sinks without support into the "unconscious."

15 The original vivacity of impressional momentary-sensibility can only be maintained as "retentional" if it is supported by the new impressional momentary-sensibility. Steady successions must be able to proceed out of every sensible point of this impressional togetherness of the present. Now, can all of these points of the present be as alien to one another as the sense-fields are? Is each one a species unto itself? Then there would be no connection in coexistence, no concretions of coexistence, no enduring being.

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20 Such analyses, constructions of all ideal, abstractive possibilities that belong here must be carried out in order to understand the structure of affective formation of impressional "worlds" of the present.

25 A mistake in the lectures and also in the above: The sense-fields are not chaotically connected to one another, or this does not have to be the case. If each one constitutes objects for itself, it is indeed constituted as enduring in the shape of time. Since the fillings of uniform, i.e., parallel duration are not homogeneous, they cannot contrast with one another, they cannot conflict with one another, and this is precisely due to the fact that the duration is completely fused with the parallel duration—every simultaneous element is the simultaneous element of one fused simultaneity, a simultaneity that only diverges according to different, heterogeneous fillings.

⁴⁶ Translator: That is, both static analyses [i.e., "dismantling intentionality"] and genetic analyses [i.e., "genesis of intentionality"] lead back to the primordial elements. See the supplementary essays included under Section D.

Yet, this does not suffice to make intelligible the identity "of parallel" durations within duration. They each derive from a single primordially impressional present.

Thus, we also have affective nexuses of heterogeneous elements through the homogenous shape of time.

Thus, [we have] the appearances of rhythm that are begun by the simple repetition of unarticulated contents; [we have] commonalities of the form of time, which commonalities can occur in different spheres of sense as uniform and can ground the affective nexus. A rhythm of light signals can "recall" a rhythm of tone signals—the uniformity can be the bridge leading over to affective salience. Precisely for this reason, the usual association of sense-regions can also spread from sense-region to sense-region. Naturally, the awakening is the strongest when material similarity is connected to formal similarity, like in the examples of series of light.

But this also holds analogously, or could hold analogously, for spatial forms, spatial shapes in these forms. One cannot say here that the simultaneous feature of the uniform form is fused in an undifferentiated field.

There is still a question concerning how affections relate to one another—apart from propagation, or in addition to it, i.e., as awakening salience or rousing from the unconscious. Affections can play to each other's advantage here, but they can also disturb one another. An affection, like that of extreme contrast ("unbearable pain") can suppress all other affections, or most of them (not without first having to undertake a more precise consideration of the interconnections!)—this can mean to reduce to an affective zero—but is there not also a suppression of the affection in which the affection is repressed or covered over, but is still present, and is that not constantly in question here?

In particular: Affection of the *modus exci<andi>* of the ego, being irritated, conflict of affections. The one winning out does not annihilate the other ones, but suppresses them. (In the sphere of feelings or drives; feelings, strivings, valuations, that come to naught due to certain motivations, just like the absence of value becomes evident through clarification, and the affection of value comes to naught through an appropriation coming from the inside.

On the other hand, feelings, valuations that are overcome, suppressed from the outside, suppressed in conflict, while the conflict does not lead to any settlement, to any actual "peace.")

Perseverance. Affections can be there, i.e., progressing from the "unconscious," but suppressed. Intensive attentiveness—suppression of affections of interest, but of another interest.

In the mobile present something new that is advantageous to the thing suppressed, and awakens it.

Appendix 20: (to §30) Time as the Form of Individuality and Subjective Transformation⁴⁷

Individual being as temporal being: It has as its original mode of being, the mode of the present, and it has as its non-original modes of being, the "no longer" (the modes of its past) and of the "not yet" (the modes of its future). (The present is correlative to the life-present of the subjects, as subjects of possible experience of the respective *individuum*.) The individual concrete being in the concrete present is an enduring being. It is in a present duration and is as enduring in the necessary transformation from the Now that flows as a primordial source (primordial present) into the past and into the further and further past. It has before it the future that has not yet arrived, the future that approaches the present as the more distant future, while every becoming past of the Now clears a place for what is coming next, which itself has become the primordial present of the Now.

The mode of the concrete present is the current being in duration as enduring together with the sinking into the having been. The duration of the individual is the ready-made duration in the Now in which the duration has been completed and is no longer. That is, the *individuum* is no longer current actually. A completed duration has a beginning, an original Now of the individual content, a Now that does not have any past behind it, namely, the Now of this content belonging to the *individuum*. The completed duration has its end that concludes it. But the *individuum* in its current duration is in constant transformation of

⁴⁷ Editor: Probably between 1922 and 1926

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duration, and if the duration is completed, the completed duration is transformed into the mode of a having-been that goes further and further back. The past is finished time, the finished duration which as such always gets transformed in the modes of the past, but remains identical as the same duration. Finished time is the time of durations that are to be identified by the constant transformation of modes of the past. The future also has its identity in the transformation of the modes of the future. Futural being, futural enduring being (assuming here that it will in fact be effectively realized in a current present and from here will become an ever more distant past—but that belongs precisely to its being future)—futural being, I say, is identical being in and through the transformation of the modes of futurity, and in and through the transformation that goes into the distance, and that goes into the distance that is further and further back, into the distance of the modes of the past that link up in the transformation.⁴⁸ What remains identical is the form of the individuality of this respective duration, [and this] in abstraction from the presupposed fillings of content that coalesce in this form of individuality to form a unity; such presupposed fillings of content fulfill the conditions of unity. This is the form of time “being in itself,” time *simpliciter*, as it is regarded when we speak of objective time. But time is what it is only as the form of identity of temporal objects and <is> only what it is in the “eternal” transformation of finished time, of the current present and the future that is still to come—modes that are themselves only in relation to one another and in the process of transformation.

Appendix: 21: (To §§33 and 34) Sensible, Multi-Radiating Affection, Sensible Group—Genuine Collective Objectlike Formation⁴⁹

In the immanent sphere: Several disparate data, a tone, a color, etc., simultaneously exercise an affection, each one is prominent

for itself. The affected ego then follows, individually, the color, then the tone. A succession in grasping the individual thing emerges from the coexistence of affection (several affective special rays directed toward the ego, meeting in the ego and becoming one within the ego through this process); through this process, however, what is already grasped either gets abandoned or is possibly maintained, depending upon the circumstances; so that a collective succession results.

Such a collective succession is still not a genuine set (genuine set—everything is *one* object). Lacking is a unity of theoretical interest and, let me initially say, a unity of interest in an object—a unity of interest in being and in being-thus, etc.; this grants a unity to the special interests being played out in the graspings of the particular things. In the transition from tone to color, etc., what has just been grasped individually is still held onto because the special interest, because the special intention directed toward what is there, what is there to be seen, is not yet completely fulfilled, and the interest bearing on the next element becomes more pressing and more overpowering. The new case, however, is such that a synthetic intention encompasses particular intentions, and that *one* intention is there, as it were, an intention that is indeed fulfilled in each special grasp, but is fulfilled in each one simultaneously; by being fulfilled in the one special grasp, it is not yet satisfied with it, and <this> is because it still requires the other special grasp that is above and beyond this one.

If we imagine a situation that is still prior to all apperceptions, then the most primitive situation will consist in the different affections being homogeneous. For otherwise one would conceive only of instinct fashioning an integral togetherness. Then that would also be seen as a kind of anamnesis and as a kind of obscure background apperception. Thus, if we rule this out, we will have the case of sensible groups. Already prior to all turning toward, the particular elements have a community exercising an affection in their particularity; they stand in a relationship of “resonance”; one promotes the other, that is, the affective allure of the ego by the one promotes the affective allure of the other, and vice versa, but in such a way that these affective allures do not remain separated, but rather go together to form the unity of one

⁴⁸ Further modes to be considered: current-being in the mode of eternity, in an “eternal duration,” “To what extent is this conceivable?” Eternal past, And future?, etc.

⁴⁹ Editor: Probably from the period of the lecture.

multi-radiating affective allure in which the augmented affective allures are unified, and in this unification, each one bears the character of reciprocally furthering and resonating with one another ("recalling" each other).

5 Does the ego follow this? It can and it initially wants to follow the whole, the synthetic unity of affection; it grasps the sensible group as not separate; but by means of special graspings in the chain of succession, the intention inhabiting the affection, the intention directed to the whole presses on in the fulfillment toward the fulfillment of the affective intentions included in the fulfillment. Coinciding here in the transition through synthetic coincidence is the common element; it becomes prominent; what is different is separated-off. In this way, not only does a succession of special graspings arise, graspings that hold onto what was previously the object of a special grasping, but new unifying interests and intentions are now motivated: What is grasped, element by element, is not interesting for itself; rather, they have very much to do with one another; they stand in materially relevant relations, they participate in the same identical essence, they are distinguished by differences coming into relief, and what is newly constituted there in the transition through coinciding, namely, the common element, exercises an affection, and in this way exercises a tendency toward a new, higher level grasping, etc.

25 Let us then pass over to apperceptions: Just as such processes were initiated and carried out, so too are experiential apperceptions necessarily formed. That is, the sight of a group that is still not explicated (indeed already the background perception of the same group, the mere group-affection) awakens an apperceptive horizon, an intention toward the formation of a collection as the substratum for plural explications, predications, etc.

35 But belonging to the essence of the unitary, materially relevant interest that runs through the collection as unity (or with respect to the unity of the intending, the unity of the collective intention) is the fact that we must distinguish between the collection itself as the meant plural, and the succession peculiar to [the process] of running through [the elements], that is, peculiar to the temporal

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sequence of the givenness of the colligated elements. Collection is an intentional unity that can only be constituted *a priori* in successive sequences, so to speak, as aspects of collection.

5 We must distinguish here [a] the intention toward the explicit grasp of the individual and the synopsis, that is, toward the formation of the explicit collection, of the explicit ensemble, and [b] the intention toward the fulfillment of the further apperceptive horizon, <toward> comparison, differentiation, reciprocal relation, and determination. In the first respect, that of genuine collective intention, the intention is fulfilled if each thing grasped has been grasped as an individual in a non-explicit unity, in any kind of sequence of a grasp that passes through [the elements]; whereas a second passing through all elements in a different sequence produces the consciousness of the same collection. In the former, each special grasping coincides with the group's guiding grasp of the whole "in partial identification," and the chain of special graspings, i.e., partial identifications, yields a total identification, namely, in the form of a total fulfillment of the multi-radiating unitary intention. But repetition serves clear and "clean" fulfillment, the completeness of the evidence of the identity of the group-whole that is given as progressing in a unitary manner, as well as the completeness of the evidence of the totality of the particulars.

25 We should not overlook the following: If we have a lasting sensible object, its affection does not, for instance, cease with the turning toward. The allure is still lively, and it continually draws me toward it, even if I am there with it and I am already "occupied" just with it. Likewise, the group is constantly there in the unity of attraction, as the multi-radiating unity of the allure, as the multi-radiating unity of the tendency toward collective special knowledge, as an explicit, manifold knowing that encompasses the particular knowings, and then knowledge. Affection does not end in grasping, either in its single or multi-radiating forms.

35 The group is grasped as group, it is apperceived as set. A unitary intention toward an object, directed toward the ensemble, toward the ensemble of these objects that are implicitly included in a unitary manner in the group-intention—and toward all of them. But is a unique constitution of the thought of totality

required here? Prior to the apperceptive intention that already bears on the particular objects, I do not yet have a group; I only have it when I first have a unity of the apperceptive intention that is fulfilled in the particular graspings and posittings of objects, not in the particular ones however, but rather in the unity that is collectively synoptic, the unity of synthetic intending.

Appendix 22: (To § 35) <The Empty Horizon and the Knowledge of It>⁵⁰ [420]

How do I know that the empty horizon of retentionality still signifies the consciousness of the past, and just what actually is "empty horizon"?

We ask how the distinctions that we initially make, and that we have reasons for making, relate to one another, i.e., the modifications with respect to retention about which we speak:

(1) the modification of retention as retention, as the transformation of the mode of the primordial present into the primordial pasts. Can we speak here of a *limes* of nil?

(2) the fading away of intuitiveness with the *limes* of nil: emptiness.

(3) the change of clarity into unclarity, of prominence into non-prominence.

It is now questionable to what extent one can speak of steadiness here. If I hear the sound of car wheels rolling, or the sound of a uniformly paced pounding <or as> warbling, I have clear distinctions in the beginning; I can pay attention to each particular "piece" that is coming into relief in its cyclical process. But soon I only have an appearance characterized as a unitary process of uniformly articulated events, an appearance in which I can no longer extract particular things; it is only a typical rolling, warbling, or pounding coming into relief as an entire series, but which is "unclear" in its particularities. Even if there are cycles in it, I have precisely a chain of cycles, not however the determinate differences within the particular cycles, but only something typical that I can notice. But even that very quickly comes to a halt. It is a

unity generated from a continual self-coinciding. Every new rolling is a rolling and continues the previous one in uniformity, and this uniformity in succession is itself a phenomenon of intentional coinciding. But differentiation is lacking; only the phenomenon of the whole is precisely separated-off. In this case, the point of departure, the beginning, or the particular thing that is distinctive, that which interrupts the coinciding, i.e., the separation that is imposed (through the "other than expected") can continue to adhere as a distinctive point of prominence in the unity of the whole. The beginning, however, can become completely indeterminate, the uniform progression of the rolling does not have any clear, prominent beginning; it has a "mobile" beginning of intuitiveness, it advances in the prominent unity of the whole under the disappearance of prominence into emptiness; an indeterminate "horizon of beginning," no point, endlessness.

This is original forgetfulness, the retentional element that has become "unconscious," the just-past that has become unconscious. Another kind of unconscious is that which is already unclear from the beginning even though it is intuitive, the perceptual sphere—and already the primordially impressional sphere—which is lacking the force of its own affection. To be sure, one must distinguish here between that which possesses its prominences, its original distinctions, and that which has lost its distinctions in the process of change, and possibly takes them on again, but without exercising any "efficacious" affection on the ego. But then does it still possess prominence? Is prominence not equivalent to affection, only that the ego is not there for each prominence through the slightest momentary turning toward or a momentary "yielding a little bit" that is not yet a grasping? Something that is given as unconscious here would be something that is not grasped and that toward which the ego does not let itself to be drawn even one step of the way. Something forgotten however is something that no longer has any prominence.

But the situation has its difficulties. What does the re-emergence from the background mean? If the melody continues to go on and something from the submerged beginning emerges out of the empty horizon, then the entire nexus that has become empty emerges in a certain way with the Now, i.e., with the concrete

⁵⁰ Editor: Probably 1922.

present that is still basking in light of day: the anterior element of the past (which is one with the just-past that is found in affective consciousness) continues on in it. If I sing the first verse of a song to its end, the beginning of the song is prominent for a while, but finally it "disappears." But by the end reminding me of the new beginning, and by the latter coming on the scene and awakening my earlier beginning and its connection that has faded away in the verse to the end of it, the verse is there for me now as a unity without it being remembered, and even more so as I continue to sing the new verse.

What kind of awakening is that? Likewise if a sequence of tones arises and is repeated after its beginning has already faded away and has sunken into emptiness, and then gets awakened by a repetition and then a new repetition, then obviously none of these repetitions are rememberings. Certainly, the affective force diminishes in the series of repetition, and *quia* series itself, it is lost in an emptiness.

This would have to hold similarly if a musical phrase or a very large nexus enters into a musical relation with a nexus that is being played anew, and by means of this nexus becomes salient as a unity. Indeed, one can say nothing else than that the emptiness is also precisely a modality of intentionality, that it is the form in which the retentional modifications "get blurred," in which their special affective force "is forsaken," but which, according to certain essential laws, can be won back. The awakening is certainly a new mode, but we will surely have to say that this awakening does not create a new lived-experience, like, for instance, when a new sense-datum arises; rather, we will have to say that it brings the progressively changing retentional transformation to the form of affectivity in the retentional mode that exists precisely in the change. By something being awakened by a repetition, by something that was submerged being hauled up out of "forgetfulness," the mode of the past is also affected, which mode belongs to what has been hauled up through the awakening. The "forgotten" in the original sense of having become empty is not a mysterious nothing for which one would only affix a real possibility that a new phenomenon can be causally effected under certain circumstances; [it is not] a blind, external lawful regularity

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behind which nothing is to be found. Rather, there is internally a submerged life only in the form of phenomena that are "not prominent." Thus, one would have to say that the unconscious object has in principle the same style everywhere, even in the sphere of the present. And one will place prominence and unconsciousness in the following relation: Speaking from the side of the object, prominence for example is something that is presently available⁵¹ (being constituted in intentionality) having qualitative differences, etc. But that is not itself prominence; rather, prominence is special affection, and special affection presupposes precisely certain conditions such that one must always speak of one prominence in opposition to another (prominence of something).

Since every transcendental, subjective life is consciousness, intentional life, and since everything that we place as a *cogito* into immanent time itself corresponds to the primordial law of consciousness, to the primordial law of time-constitution, then the "immortality" of every retentional flux means the same thing as the immortality of every particular consciousness, that is, each particular consciousness is situated in the eternal temporal transformation as temporally modified, and each transformation maintains its individuality, its place in time, its individual content, its sense. The unending realm of forgetfulness is the realm of "unconscious" life that can be awakened again and again.

But certainly in addition to this there is the phenomenon of the overlapping of several pasts that are awakened together, and moreover, the phenomenon of reproduction and the phenomena of association and of associative fusion.

(1) Every perception has an empty horizon of retention that is itself an undifferentiated empty retention. How do I know that this empty horizon persistently swallows up the retentional component, that every one ultimately sinks into it? Only what remains in relief can be grasped once more. How do I know this? And if I turn toward another one, and turn toward it exclusively in such a way that I let loose of the one I had grasped, then it will sink into the empty horizon. How do I know this? I have the

⁵¹ *ein Vorhandensein*

phenomenon of "letting loose" and turning toward something new, and I have the phenomenon of turning back toward it again and then, further, the phenomenon of grasping that there is still "something" there; likewise, when I live in the perception of the present object and remain with it and a turning back does not ensue. If it ensues afterward, then I will still grasp something that is prominent and I grasp a background as something or other. But I know that it must have the same structure; I have something that has been; I know that there must be a temporal series. I have an empty, indeterminate, non-intuitive past. But surely, do I not know this only through the reproduction? In any case, it is something retentional—not just any appendage to retention that is constantly there, but rather, retention.

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We should also note that if I have seized something twice, and after a prior turning toward, I turn back again, I remember these prehensions and com-prehensions, while I no longer find anything different in the retentional field, namely, in the field of the retentional tone. Even the fact that there was a different multiplicity, a plurality, can be grasped by the regard turning back, and nevertheless, this plurality is not something that can be grasped in particular; but this is also likewise the case for the most general and indeterminate aspect of a retentional series as the necessary form, or better, the most general and indeterminate aspect of a progressing past in the process of being modally modified. But with all of this, I have at most an indeterminate infinity or something ineffable that I discover later, through remembering, as the infinity of the past (in the genuine sense).

Thus, it remains that the retentional field consists almost entirely of empty presentations that have a flowing continual nexus, that harbor indeterminacies; and it remains that this field passes over into an empty presentation that is in itself completely indeterminate, a presentation of an "endless" past whereby this endlessness of the past is not to be conceived on the order of a clean line, and not as finished by a horizon-point as an apparent end.

(2) Belonging to the essence of the empty retention is its capacity to be fulfilled, and this fulfillment is remembering. Not every remembering is the fulfillment of the retentional empty

horizon of the present. For this empty horizon is "the forgotten" that carries on the differentiated retentional path of the past; and what becomes disclosed there continues to be what has "just" been or what has been "just a bit ago," and its memorial elapse along with its memorial protentions leads into the just-having-been of the concrete present such that the remembered or the disclosed temporal expanse gives itself immediately as one with the living present.

(3) An emergent remembering, let us say a distant remembering, in accord with its temporal content, initially has the peculiar feature of positing a time in a re-presentifying manner (a temporal objectlike formation) as a *processus* with a constant protentional horizon; the *processus* is given as being situated in the direction of the retention of the present and in the direction of the latter's horizon, and it is <a> reawakening of the horizon; this is similar to what we have become acquainted with above. But we see with this that the horizon of emptiness possesses a proximity to the present, a just-a-bit-ago, and a previous past; and remembering fulfills an especially awakened empty place through a *processus*, like in the region of proximity, and at the same time it exercises an awakening [force] in the *processus* (association directed ahead), and what is awakened is fulfilled in further rememberings. Finally, the near horizon, and the realm of the retention that is still living, and the concrete present in general, will be reached, and with this the distant horizon gets disclosed in a path up to the present as the process of remembering.

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(4) With respect to its quasi re-constitution of the present, every remembering has a past; as every perception itself arises from the past—another perception has preceded it. Every perception has a background of the fresh past.

Every past (the retention attached to remembering) can be disclosed, etc. Finally, every past is disclosed as the trait of an unending time that terminates in the mobile present.

(5) The horizon of the past is disclosed by remembering, the horizon of the future by perception, and every perception itself is the fulfillment of an empty horizon of the perception that has just preceded it.

Remembering can occur, the past can be disclosed step by step, and can be entirely disclosed through the insight that a remembering is possible again and again, a remembering that uncovers the retentional horizon of something already disclosed.

5 Does the future have to be disclosed? Does it always yield a present? The question is whether the present can not be reduced to a completely empty horizon (the absolute black of intentionality). Is such a thing possible without a "new present"? The limit-cases are unique and not unimportant problems.

10 Appendix 23: (To §35) <On Questioning the Potentiality of the Empty Horizon>⁵²

The question for me is how one should interpret the potentiality of the empty horizon from which something emerges, and whether one should at all speak of a single horizon of forgetfulness. If something emerges, it evidently takes place only through the occurrence of an empty intention and fulfillment. And the empty intention already has an intentional relation to the Now and, for instance, to everything else still occurring in this manner. The intentional tendency toward fulfillment finally terminates in the unraveling fulfillment that awakens an ever new tendency toward fulfillment up to the current Now. Indeed, it belongs to the essence of every such intention that it can be fulfilled in such a way, possibly deliberately fulfilled.

On the other hand, belonging to the present is the fact that I can inquire into its past, that I can delve into it despite its limitation. But [I can] only [do this] in such a way that I awaken the past from the present; I cannot continually move down the path backwards. And if life were a "monotone" existence, for instance, a tone that is continuously elapsing in a homogeneous, undifferentiated manner, then I could not go back. This is really quite significant. If the "beginning" of life, the beginning period, were an endless monotony, then it would be a period of impenetrable forgetfulness. And if various periods of such monotony were conveyed by content-laden multiplicities, but by [425]

ones that did not fulfill any conditions of reciprocal association, then only one non-monotone life could be surveyed at a time, and not a synthetic unity of life above all periods. That would only be possible if the good "God" were to create for us such a new life after death with such a multiplicity of contents that associations could extend over all periods of life. But can a "continual infinity", e.g., an unending life without sleep be comprehended in *infinitum*, thus, can a springing back be possible, a springing back that however would then only proceed "in *infinitum*" and would not lead to any end, and never to a remembering that would remember the entire life? For remembering can only run forward, and where there is no beginning, there is no complete re-living running forward.

Thus, it must be said that if one should speak at all of an association that is continually turned backward, it cannot find any privileged motive either in the uniform continuum, or in a uniform elapse (for instance, "of the same" tone, again and again, in uniform distance); thus, it cannot motivate an efficacy of tendency in a passive reproduction, and therefore it cannot motivate any privileged affection, any attentiveness or any will to renew.

Only where non-uniform givings emerge can awakening take place, and accordingly remembering must have the form of springing back.

Appendix 24: (To §37) <Effect and Cause of Awakening>⁵³

But what can "awakening" mean here, and what can it accomplish? Breaking through the fog—a metaphor? Is it not a swinging back to a stage in the process, a stage that is still distinct in which the concealment has not really progressed that far? Finally, even the re-establishment of perception? The process cannot actually be established a second time.

If an interest is turned toward something sinking down and the latter remains prominent, the process will in fact not be halted, and yet a "prominence" is maintained. Can one speak of prominence in the same sense with respect to the prominence of the datum that

⁵² Editor: 1922?

⁵³ Editor: Between 1920 and 1926

has sunken down, like one speaks of the prominence of a figure on a white background? The latter is available or not, and it can only be produced by the production of differences of color, etc. Does the awakening make the retentional fog weaker? [Does it make] the fusion with the other retentions weaker? Or is not a synthesis produced between the present and a continually concealed past, a past [constituted] in and through all continual concealment, but which is not a Nothing, but rather [is a] concealed past. The modification of concealment, the present retentional distant horizon (namely, the horizon that has not halted its modification) does not come into relief in the sense that an earlier stage of the process would reappear, a stage of process that indeed does not lie in the distant horizon in an intimately inherent manner, and that would also only be able to be produced through remembering and by letting the "re"-perceived object fade away "again" in the mode of remembering. [426]

But this horizon is precisely a horizon that harbors *implicit* a concealment and a continuum of concealment, a concealment to the n^{th} level, let us say, in which something is given to consciousness as the present to the n^{th} level. If now the distant horizon is also a nebulous fusion <in> which everything is uniformly non-differentiated as "forgotten," [if we have] an eclipse of a present by another present (this in turn being eclipsed by a third, etc.), then precisely all presents are implied within the entire fusion (which is now a lived-experience), and each present is in a relationship of eclipse. These hidden presents can now be awakened. An awakening punches through all coverings as a single synthetic ray that bears on the respective object of a present. Can this mean that that empty retention in which the object is given in the present of awakening, in which it is "now" "still" given to consciousness is brought into relief (although not given to consciousness for itself in a consciousness that is brought into relief in the present)?

We have to consider the following here: When a melody is over and fades away, I turn my attention back to it in "a single ray," into the unity of retention that bears the melody within it as a successive temporal whole. As elapsing in the impressional stage, the melody is in the process of becoming. It is only finished with

the concluding phase, and then it is a melody that has become. The focal ray directed toward what is becoming is different from the focal ray that is directed toward the whole that has become. It is not a "focal ray" directed toward the last tone or toward the melody that is becoming in the concluding tone; it is directed toward the whole and can pass over to explication. This intention is fulfilled in a successive re-perception in which the melody elapses over and over "again."

Belonging to the unity of an object as such is a unity of constitution running its course in a successive manner. This unity is also at issue in the distant horizon, and the awakening is a "focal ray," an intentional ray toward the One that is there as the whole empty retention of the earlier melody, the whole empty retention of the whole melody, i.e., in this empty presentation, and is something that is awakened through this ray. Thus, my previous conception was correct, namely, that the awakening goes all the way into the distant horizon and awakens retentions there (albeit the respective retentions of concrete things, processes, etc.) in the form of the associative "rays": The awakening object is a present similar object, which, for instance, is perceived or in a fresh retention, etc.; and the synthesis is then a synthesis between perception and empty distant retention. [427]

But *must* a coinciding be produced between each and every thing that is capable of a coinciding, since the "distance" is there precisely as horizon in the present at all times? Where awakening is concerned, however, it is a matter of a special mode of synthesis as one that is causally becoming, and in this case it is a matter of a new accomplishment, namely, pointing from an a to b , that is, together with b being awakened by a . The a in the "present," the a that is first salient, must have a peculiar feature so that it functions as awakening, and does so in various degrees of intensity; and so that it awakens precisely this b , this must also, in turn, be somehow grounded in this a itself. To be sure, experiments are useful here. They supply us with examples, and therefore possibilities: through intentional analysis we can then see what can come into consideration here and to what extent essential laws are in play here, [and we can see] what in the final analysis must be the case. They are motivations.

If we assume that everything that is susceptible of coinciding within passivity *eo ipso* is in the synthesis of coinciding, i.e., without genuine causality, then the associative synthesis is not a mere synthesis of coinciding, but rather, something new that the synthesis of coinciding only presupposes: as the association of similarity. The present object that is to function as awakening, one could say, has a special interest, and not everything that is similar, but rather, something that is similar in the relation and that would correspond to a similar interest is at issue. The interest in an α depends upon its type in accordance with the complex of features (α, β, γ). What is uniform or similar or even identical to α with respect to (α', β', γ') gets privileged. Certainly, it is not merely inner features that come into consideration; rather, the interest belongs, for instance, to α in its situation, in its nexus (figurative synthesis). A nexus originally yields quality-like characters prior to explication and prior to the formation of relational predication. This yields external features for the α , which features also come into consideration. And, perhaps, even in a very significant manner. And so it is also the case within an impressional present. If an α arouses a special interest—a “pebble” turns out to be a piece of a fossil bone—other similar things immediately come to the fore, [and they do so] in special syntheses that favor a similar apprehension.

A person [looks] suspicious in a certain a situation—he immediately reminds one of similar situations. And then the association through contiguity arises (which we have not yet touched upon); the interest and the awakening passes over into that situation. But what do we understand by the term “interest”? Must it be an active interest, or a passive modification of an active interest?

Appendix 25: (To § 40) <Kinestheses and Potential Expectations>⁵⁴ [428]

As we saw previously, the path of the intention of expectation, where external perception is concerned, is only a path emerging

from the multi-dimensional continuum of the whole horizon – the whole horizon that characterizes the entire co-present. This path is the path that is actualized and especially motivated by the current course of kinestheses, the subjective eye movements, etc.; precisely through this motivation, it gets the character of an actual expectation.⁵⁵ What is remaining in the [whole] horizon is a system of potential expectations. It is the potentiality that corresponds to the subject having at its disposal systematically constituted kinestheses as a whole. Other paths of this horizon can, so to speak, be awakened associatively from their slumber without losing their non-intuitability, and they become awakened with the empty presentations of the kinestheses belonging to them. Every such awakening fashions a special empty presentation that is not an expectation, but is essentially related to such an expectation precisely as a potential expectation. The kinestheses belonging to them bear the consciousness of an ability, namely, of an ability to orchestrate them, and thereby consequently <the consciousness of> the ability to put into play the courses of appearance motivated by them (thus, the “co-present,” unseen sides of the object). Thus, it is a matter of modified shapes of protentions that essentially belong together with them.

Likewise for every external co-present, those co-presents of surrounding familiar things. If our regard runs along the room and lights upon the door, then the initially empty presentation of the foyer outside gets immediately awakened. It is not an expectation; we do not go out into it. By going out into it, we would naturally have the series of appearances as expected, and the path would become visible in this series of appearances (in the corresponding subjective modes). But the awakened presentation does indeed have the character of a modified expectation, of a potential expectation. The empty presentations that occur here, among them also the expectations (protentions)—all of them have a common, fundamental feature. A current present object always refers ahead, always points on to something else, and then further, something

⁵⁴ Editor: From the period of the lectures.

⁵⁵ On the transformation of the original “hyletic sphere of the present” through kinestheses. The constitution of “transcendent” objects is carried out with the formation of systematic protentions, that is, expectation also becomes constitutive.

given to consciousness that is possibly already empty refers further on to something else that is given to consciousness in an empty manner, and in the movement of progression, refers further on to something that is especially in the process of being given to consciousness. Every empty presentation that we encounter here stands in a peculiar connection such that one thing points to another, and this again points to another (now continuously, now discretely). <That> which is being referred to itself has a character of consciousness, the character of the "something being pointed to," the character of the "something being intended"; just like the element doing the pointing has the counter-character of pointer, the character of the point from which the intending radiates out. The element from which the intention proceeds and which stands within such nexuses is at the same time the point of departure and at the same time the end point of the intention. But it can also be the case that in the beginning there is a free element, an element that is given, e.g., perceptually, toward which no indication is produced, but from which an indication radiates out.

We obviously need a term for that consciousness in which something has the distinctive characteristic of being intended in this sense. Unfortunately, language fails us, namely, a language that cannot be interested in phenomenological distinctions. Even the language of phenomenology in its beginnings did not do justice to this peculiar feature of consciousness, whose special place and function was not immediately recognized. In what follows, I will speak of "associative intention"; what also gets expressed here is that it concerns a fundamental feature within the passive sphere, and is not a kind of intending on the part of the active ego.

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30 Appendix 26: (To §45) <Repetition and Essential Identity of Rememberings>⁵⁶

Two clear rememberings essentially belong together in such a way that they are to be conveyed in the continual unity of a single clear remembering. A clear remembering can be repeated in an

arbitrary manner (like every memory), but it can only have this conveying function in a complete, essentially identical, and clear remembering in one and the same nexus and at the same place. The repetition of a clear remembering is the repetition of an idea insofar as each one, irrespective of its contingency as lived-experience, would be completely uniform, and [would be] completely uniform insofar as it would give the same self in it, the same past of consciousness and the same intentional sense that was constituted in this repetition. The idea of a complete remembering of past consciousness and of its intentional objectlike formations—.

We call two rememberings memories of the same concrete essence or essentially identical memories, if the one is a mere repetition of the other, if they are distinguishable only as repetitions, or if they can only be distinguished as this or that.

A remembering, taken concretely, is a becoming in which a temporal objectlike formation becomes intuitive once again, and in this way becomes self-given as past. No remembering can contain two completely essentially uniform rememberings as elements;

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each remembering of the same essence gives a past and each memorial element gives a different past. Every memory has its horizons that belong together to its essence. And the horizons of memories, which are parts of a memory, are necessarily different. Every concrete part of a memory can also occur as a memory for itself. Every remembering is to be multiplied through repetition, but not through repetition in an expanded memory. Every adequate remembering as essence is an element of an encompassing clear remembering, and in this way, every adequate remembering is ultimately an element of an all-encompassing remembering that is eternally operative, is a operative idea insofar as this idea is a new idea for every current Now; namely, all adequate rememberings embraced in a continual unity, a unity that embraces all pasts in truth up to this Now. Of course, just as there is only one repetition for every adequate remembering, so too is this the case for the all-encompassing remembering; and the following law is also valid, [namely, that] two adequate memories, which connect the same starting and end points in the temporal objectlike formation, are only one single one. Two adequate

⁵⁶ Editor: 1920/21

memories cannot be connected by two adequate memories, which are different from mere repetitions.

Appendix 27: (To §45) <Two Fundamental Concepts of Evidence: Self-Giving as Such and Pure Self-Giving>⁵⁷

5 An encompassing theory of rememberings as self-givings for the stream of consciousness, as immanent objectivity, that is, for the multiplicity of the objectlike formations of lived-experience being constituted in the form of immanent time, and included in this as self-givings for immanent time itself—an encompassing theory, I say, would have to articulate in a systematically ordered manner the essential laws of rememberings, and among them, the essential laws of their *limes* forms that have to be intuitively exacted, that is, the essential laws of complete self-givings. These would obviously be the correlates of the pure laws of time themselves.

15 By means of the progress that we have made, we can draw positive consequences having the most universal import, and initially for the formation of the concept of evidence. It is now divided into two fundamental concepts. The *first* is that of self-giving as such. Properly understood, it extends as far as the concept of consciousness in general extends, namely, consciousness as the consciousness of something. Each consciousness is consciousness of its Something in the mode of belief; however, it can be a consciousness of something that is bifurcated, somehow modalized, and refers back to a different consciousness that is not modalized. Every sense-giving in the mode of belief is either self-giving or not self-giving, and what is not self-giving has to be verified or annulled. Both of them lead back to self-givings. Self-giving consciousness is evident in the

25 broadest sense, it is insightful consciousness as opposed to a blind consciousness, or (with reservations) merely anticipatory consciousness, as in the case of intuitive expectations. Evidence in this sense admits of degrees. It is already a correctly giving consciousness insofar as only something that is not self-giving can

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be directed, can be normatively regulated according to it, can be fulfilled in it. This evidence is the foundation of evidence in the higher sense. Only a consciousness that already harbors a self [of an object] can be normatively regulated in a higher sense, that is, can be approximated in a pure self [of an object].

5 The *second* concept of evidence, the narrow one, is then the concept of evidence as pure self-giving—belonging to the essential law that self-givings can be more or less clear and thereby more or less complete. The correlate of this evidence is the true self, true being. Rigorous evidence is an idea, the idea of a complete self-giving lived-experience, which an unclarity possibly approaches. Its correlate is the idea of a true being that is given in approximating consciousness in which the idea as *limes* is seen in intuition, and it is given as absolutely incapable of being crossed out.

15 All of this holds not only for individual objects or even only for those of immanent time—objects to which we have devoted our studies. When we said, for example (as we spoke of the essential laws of expectation), that the futural occurrence is motivated with evidence if the motivating factor gets clearly remembered, then the groundedness of the anticipation of the future to be expected is precisely self-given for these and those reasons, and in the case of complete clarity, it is precisely evident in the higher sense, a higher sense that determines all talk of Reason. If, in the case of evident motivation, two mutually rivaling anticipations are motivated, then a conflict between two futural possibilities and probabilities are given with evidence. Even non-being (likewise, probability, and the like) can become objective, or rather, it has its objectivity; it has its idea of pure evidence, of pure verification or annulment, and belonging to verification, its indestructible identity. We customarily speak in such a way that we understand evidence in a pure sense, and we quite often claim to possess this rigorous evidence. Though, one would probably have to confess that we come very close to the *limes* in many cases, and that this “coming very close” is also something given. Indeed, it seems to me that the true self possesses a *limes*-character in all cases, even for axioms, a *limes*-character that we can reach by “touching” it. But this already goes too far here.

You already see how very far we have progressed by our investigation into the constitution of the first in-itself, that of the immanent sphere, and how we have already clarified within this sphere the fundamental character of all the inquires into the constitution of an objectivity as an in-itself. Just as in that instance the idea of the in-itself leads us back to the distinction between self-giving and non-self-given lived-experiences, and to the essential possibility of the verification of self-giving by approximating pure evidence, and how pure evidence is an idea whose correlate is the idea of an in-itself that is absolutely incapable of being crossed out and is always able to be identified with itself, so too must this chain of nexuses obviously be valid in every instance. To seek out the system of self-giving lived-experiences in which each lived-experience would come to pure self-giving therefore means to construe concretely the idea of pure disclosure, [and to do so] to the extent that it can—and must—be conceived prior to all logical activity of the ego so that we can have the founding support for all possible knowledge of the world (as actively determinative knowledge). The thought that “what is” must be able to be brought to disclosive givenness, and that true being and possible disclosive givenness, namely, whole and complete givenness, are correlates, is a thought that has been achieved early on in our transcendental considerations. But this thought only first gains the full height of clarity with the knowledge that consciousness is such a stream of sense-giving accomplishments according to essential laws, that all its self-givings stand under ideas *qua* norms, which are not brought in from the outside, but are born from within, as it were. Thus, essentially, and not as an incomprehensible fact, but as an intelligible law that is given in insight, all sense-givings are subject to possibilities of confirmation and annulment; belonging to them are firm possibilities of ultimate clarification, of pure evidence. But the latter characterizes in each instance a *limes* that can be obtained intuitively, a *limes* which, brought out by the active ego and toward which the active ego strives, designates an absolutely unshakable pole in which all paths of consciousness converging in it necessarily preserve concordance and therefore necessarily preserve the incapability of belief being crossed out.

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Practically speaking, all striving toward completeness on the part of the ego tends toward concordance with itself, and that is to say that it itself seeks its eternal poles and seeks to direct its paths of consciousness in such a way that they are absolutely directed toward a goal and, which is to say, such that they are absolutely concordant. In its own way, every consciousness is belief. To remain concordant in itself means: What is given to consciousness as an object in the manner of the objective sense is maintained in belief in an unruptured fashion. But it could be ruptured in the further march of consciousness. What cannot be ruptured is an absolutely self-giving belief, and all [modes of] belief, all [modes of] consciousness, refer in themselves to a possible absolute self-giving according to laws of truth; they can be normatively regulated according to it, and in this absolute self-giving they have their norm as the norm of ultimate fulfillment that cannot be augmented any further.

Yet, transcendental logic must not remain content with such formal, general conceptions; where the objectivities of the transcendent world are concerned, and foremost where physical nature is concerned, it must especially bring to light the types of consciousness, their essential interconnections and essential laws that make necessary and intelligible the objectivity of nature in the immanence of pure subjectivity. Not only must it work out the general types of intentional lived-experiences that are intentionally related to a spatial world, and not only must it study in general the self-givings according to their noetic and noematic structures. It must also precisely construe the ideal self-givings, as ideas of course, and correlatively, in their noemas, the ideal selves that are being constituted.

Appendix 28: (To §47) <The Problems of the Definite Determinability of the World>⁵⁸

How is the idea of a nature related to subjectivity, which is inseparably intertwined with nature? Nature is a concordant unity in and through the variation of subjective multiplicities. Belonging

⁵⁸ Editor: 1923

to the constitution of nature, and a nature as such, is a formally and eidetically determined structural system that brings to light the discipline of the constitution of a nature. Belonging to a possible singular nature, to a nature conceived as determined individually, is not only the generality of the form, which is indeed abstract, but a determinate content. But is this content one that is completely determined, and to what extent is it completely determined? Thus, for example, the content of sense-data, but also everything that individuates the respective experiential phenomena and the entire life of experiencing subjects—the entire life belonging to communicative life.

If we take given, factual nature, it will belong to the factual universe of egos. To what extent can things and the phenomena of the world of the particular egos change, and is there an excess that remains in their individual content, an excess that is not determined on the part of the constitution of nature? Here, above all, we come up against the problem of secondary qualities and the corresponding general problems of possibility relating to a universe of egos in general, and a possible nature in general. To what extent does the essential system of forms of every constitution of nature have an indeterminate openness, an openness to which the constitution through secondary qualities belongs, and which—under the form of the constitution of a common intuitive nature for a normal communicative subjectivity—belongs to it according to its form, while, however, a content remains indeterminate over and above the formal aspect, indeterminate from nature itself, presupposed as continually constituted.

But now further questions arise. The definiteness of nature, its being-in-itself, implies an intersubjective being-thus of nature that is identifiable for "everyone" in relation to everyone—a being-thus of all that is, and according to all its things and properties; and accordingly, how one must show the necessary possibility of an "objective" science of nature, built up from "exact" truths in themselves as methodologically recognizable for everyone in a person's subjectivity and from the standpoint of this subjectivity's phenomena. In a word, nature is "calculable," "mathematizable"

for everyone. There is a *mathesis* of nature, a "mathematical" ontology of a nature as such, and in fact, a "mathematical physics" that can be produced as a general method by means of this mathematical ontology.

But now we must distinguish between nature (*physis*) and universe. In current life, I am and I find myself as the experiencing subject of my environing world; belonging to its infinity is also an open, unending multiplicity of other ego-subjects. Just as I "have" my lived-body, just as I am the functioning subject of this lived-body (and by means of the latter, I am the functioning subject for the cognizing and formative and communicative relation to my environment-world and its subjects), so too are these subjects given to me as having a lived-body, and through their lived-corporality, as functioning subjects; and we are reciprocally and especially, given to one another in communicative understanding, and we are belong. For us as functioning ego-subjects, functioning as individual ego-subjects and in social community, the world is the universe and the total unity of objects; and "object" means here whatever has individual, concrete existence for a functioning individual subjectivity or for a communal subjectivity. Seen more precisely, the sense of this objective existence is that it can be experienced and can be known experientially in such a way that it can be identified as the same by everyone, as the substrate of the same determinations. And as such, it should be able to be attested to at any time and by and for everyone.

In this respect, however, nature is distinguished as [1] the first and founding objectivity that is experientiable, perceivable in a genuine sense for all ego-subjects, albeit in endless, open infinities of experience; and [2] subjectivity itself, the ego itself that is only experientiable in perception as I am for myself, in the original, ego-subject only in the expression of lived-corporality and in the psycho-physical relation of unity that is instituted with this expression of lived-corporality.

The *animal*,⁵⁹ the human being, is experientiable as psycho-physical unity only in my lived-body/psychic inner experience; only I can experience my functioning in my lived-body, and thereby my lived-body as lived-body, and in this way, myself in this functional unity with this lived-body. I cannot perceive an alien lived-body as lived-body, and I cannot experience an alien ego as functioning in this lived-body—not genuinely. I experience alien subjectivity and human beings in the world in the mode of “empathy,” through the appresentation that is carried out in the expression, through the appresentation that can never become a presentation⁶⁰ for me.

The objective world is the psycho-physical world, and it is the cultural world that has received its cultural predicates from functioning human subjectivity bestowing them, predicates that possess their manner of experience and disclosure, but of such a manner of experience and disclosure that it presupposes the objective experience of alien subjects and their lived-body/spiritual functioning.

What kind of significance does this have for the question of the being-in-itself of the world, the definite determinability of the world? The universe exists with all things, animals, human beings, with all cultures and histories. Nature is objective, in itself, in the special sense; we mean that a mathematical knowledge is said to be possible for it; it is said to be calculable, every question for it is said to have its answer that is decided in advance and calculable for everyone in the same mathematical method. Nature, we mean, is said to be able to be anticipated theoretically, theoretically construable from the standpoint of given finite experience, from the standpoint of finite groups of experiential facts; it is said to be a definite mathematical system, and a natural science is said to be conceivable, a natural science which, à la Euclid, is said to comprehend the totality of natural truths and their substrates by deducing them from a finite number of axioms (ontological principles) and from finite facts.

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But can such an ideal even be constructed for the universe, the realm of possible natural experience (including the objectivities of non-genuine experience through the expression)? Is the *universum* that comes to givenness in expression determinable in a definite manner and in accord with the mathematical principles of definiteness? Does this have any sense at all?

The appropriate determination of sense and the limitation of the appropriate sense of a definite nature already gives rise to difficulties; the essential relation of nature to subjectivity that is essentially there with nature as experiencing and thinking, functioning subjectivity, functioning in actuality and in real and free possibility, already gives rise to difficulties. Insofar as I do indeed carry out perceptual kinaestheses, insofar as I move my eyes and hands, and through this intervene in nature itself, this functioning already gives rise to difficulties. And here we have the following general difficulty, one that has far reaching implications: What sense does the in-itself of nature have in relation to the actual and possible intervention of subjects, apart from which nature cannot at all be conceived? What kind of an in-itself is this that is included (and, as idea, is construable) in the idea of the concordance of possible experience—experiencing subjects?

This is why the sense of the definiteness of physical nature as a nature that exists in psycho-physical interconnections and that refers to subjects, especially free subjects, must already be elucidated and first of all be worked out according to its essence and possibility.

The world as such with its animal lived-bodies, with animal and human souls, with all “psychic phenomena” of these souls all acts and all social unifications and cultural formations, so one tries to assume, are supposed to be definite. How is a certain “definiteness” of the world to be determined in a beneficial, rational sense? What are the essential conditions of its possibility, how is it to be construed as the formal idea, precisely according to essential content and necessary essential constituents?

Can a complete world not first be “definite” under the idea of a universe of egos that is directed toward the telos of absolute Reason, or under the idea that the universe of egos, for which and

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⁵⁹ Translator: in English⁶⁰ *Präsentation*

in which the world is objectively constituted, exists in a "pre-established harmony," but one that is essentially necessary; that it exists in a necessary development toward personal and interpersonal Reason in such a way that the idea of absolutely rational universe of egos is entelechy?

Must we not say: We should in no way accept in advance, even only as a possibility, that a complete world be definite in exactly the same sense that physical nature is definite. We see upon closer inspection perhaps that the demand for a mathematically definite world, for a world that is calculable in each and every respect, is in principle absurd.

One could say: The becoming of the subjects may harbor a developmental tendency, and it may do so necessarily. But subjective development can and must take place only approximately. Psychic life can, indeed, must be mathematically indefinite and yet <be> directed toward a definite being. If the absolute of the phenomenal world only has a definite structure in itself, an idea, a system of ideas of Reason, which system makes natural science possible, then the question arises concerning what makes culture and cultural science possible, what makes a rational, ultimately, a social-ethical life possible. Definiteness of nature may suffice, while streaming life can and must remain irrational, indefinite. Certainly, if nature, sociality, culture, the objective world are such that they make continual, progressive science possible, then certainly even subjectivity must be rational insofar as it must be able to be reconstructed from the standpoint of this objectivity, and insofar as it must be continually and concordantly intuitive from the standpoint of subjectivity [itself]. But this [character of] reconstructability would only be a structure of rationality, and would not yet signify the rationality initially demanded above: as if it were patently a possibility, namely, the presupposed rationality of a subjectivity that is definite according to all particular moments, the presupposed rationality of a calculability of the entire pulse of life, and thus a "mathematical" rationality.

Thus, herein lie all problems of a possibility of the knowledge of nature, of a possibility of an entirely differently grounded somatological and psychological knowledge, of a possibility of

historical, social-scientific and cultural-scientific knowledge: the possibility of the corresponding sciences. The ultimate sense of a mathematics of nature, ultimate clarity of an impossibility of a mathematics of culture, despite the fact that even culture has its *a priori* and sociality has its *a priori*. The problem of the exact laws of nature with the idea of the exact determination of individual psychic existence, and the problem of the inexact scientific determination of facts of history. "Historical laws," concepts proper to the human sciences as opposed to concepts proper to nature.

<B.
APPENDICES TO PART 3>⁶¹

Appendix 29: (To §52) <Theme and Theoretical Interest>

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So that you do not get confused, I must not fail to point out the ambiguity in our talk of "theme." For instance, we do not usually call the theme of a whole treatise the nexus of articulated views or intentions⁶², but rather what is expressly given, for instance, in the title, e.g., "The Optative in Greek," or "The Sense of Color in Ants," etc. In this sense, the theme means the object that is to be determined scientifically, which is the task of the author. And accordingly, the theme of a whole science is its scientific region. It is thus the unitary thematic object as object for all themes to be propounded in another sense. Unfortunately however even the terms, view or intention, and all terms that come to mind, are ambiguous in the same way, and so we compromise by using a juxtaposition of both terms, view or intention and theme, each one delimiting the sense of the other here.

Let us go further. Not all acts have a thematic character; the subject as an intending, interested subject is not occupied in all of the acts—this was exemplified for us by linguistic acts. But if this character is lacking in them, they can all correspondingly be transformed; in this case, they are altered without their intentionality undergoing any other change. Whether or not they are thematic, they are judgments with exactly the same content, wishes, decisions having this or that content, only that these contents are not themes of interest. It does happen that complex thematic egoic acts are founded in one another and that thematic

distinctions internally cohere through this relation of foundation. For example, I am happy that the sky has cleared up and that the sunshine pours over the countryside, and perhaps I even say so explicitly. Then implicit in this pleasure is the intention of expression. But this pleasure is founded for me in the conviction of the given fact that the sky has cleared up; this judicative theme is foundational, but even though it is also a theme, it is still a subordinate theme; the main theme lies in the pleasing quality of this fact. As the subject of acts, I primarily actuate an affect-interest⁶³ and only secondarily a theoretical interest, an interest of ascertaining a fact; namely, that only insofar as it contains the substrate about which I am happy. In this way we distinguish between dominate and auxiliary themes⁶⁴, and through this, we draw distinctions in the thematic function.

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Appendix 30: (To §54) <Determining as Cognitive Act>

Act and intention. Every act is a *striving* that proceeds from the ego, more or less freely at work or inhibited. By the striving being completely or less completely at work, advancing or advancing less, breaking off, it always and necessarily effects something. Every cognitive act, every judicative act is directed toward an "object," and the extent to which it is already known, it is an object determined individually or according to its apperceptive type in this or that manner, implied in a situation and apprehended as this or that. Beginning in this way, the *cognitive act* consists in its *process of striving*, in a *progressive determination of the object*; whereby this object gets determined in a newer and newer manner, and as such becomes available to us again through habit.

Yet we naturally have to distinguish between the following: (1) the mere interpretation of the object that is already determined in

⁶¹ *Gemütsinteresse*

⁶² The expression "dominant and auxiliary" is not fitting here. But different concepts of "dominant and auxiliary"! More precisely, simply: founding and founded themes. But even that is ambiguous. Cf. the dominant and the auxiliary in signs and in the meaning intended with it in the appendix. Here we have a means-end-whole, the sign is the means that harbors an ought to, interest on the way is auxiliary, is interest passing on its way "toward" the goal.

⁶³ Translator: The following pagination to the German text corresponds to Husserliana

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⁶² *Meinungen*

its determinations. What is implicitly known is made explicit once more, thus, brought to a re-actualized knowledge (reactivation as re-execution of previous act-divisions). (2) Or by being joined to what is already known it is something new, new knowledge, new "determination" (feature), a determining process that fashions. But we can still make distinctions within this determining process.

Already in the intuitive (experiential) sphere: (a) (α) The object for instance has been perceived individually by me just now or earlier, and as perception progresses, it has been determined as this or that—then I remember and I go back again to its determinations that are already known somehow—without perceiving something new. Thus, I can go back through empty, unclear, or relatively clear rememberings, that is, the determinative process can accordingly be quite different in its mere reactivation. (β) Or I can perceive it again (as is possible with objects of external experience), I can be convinced again about how it is and has remained unchanged; in this case, I have a new original acquisition of knowledge and at the same time I have rememberings of the previous acquisition and an apprehension of its identity in an unaltered duration—thus apprehending that it remained unchanged in the meantime.

(b) An object of knowledge, however, can also be new, but be ap<perceptively> apprehended in this or that way, and it does have to be apprehended somehow. The sense of the apprehension implies determinations that have not been experienced with respect to this object, but nevertheless have a similar character insofar as they point back to previous, analogous experiences with respect to other objects.

The explication here presents something that does not stem from the experience of this object as determination, but rather, something that is anticipated, and thus, the explicit determination that is gained by the activity of explication is also anticipation. The act here is thus the act of the explication of apprehension as apprehension of something new, but not of a new kind of thing.

Every "knowing," every act in the sphere of belief, is determining. But the determinative process can be a perceiving. An apprehension already lies at its basis, but the intention goes through the (more or less determined) anticipation of this or that

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level of apprehension toward "effective realization." Thus, effective realization is here the fulfillment of the anticipation in the original itself.

The unclear remembering can be reactivated in a remembering. But it can also be the case that the intention goes further through this unclear reactivated determination to the reactivated object itself in its clear intuitiveness, likewise with respect to an explication of an object that is somehow apprehended. The intention toward the object can mean here the "anticipation" of explicated objects and fulfillment in these explicated objects themselves, but through this fulfillment, the intention can go further to the original self; the explicated object that is produced is merely an anticipation and not itself an original.

Appendix 31: (To §55) Syntactic Formation

15 *What is syntactic formation?* (1) Syntactic formation that the judgment accomplishes anew, the separate accomplishment of the judgments in question; (2) the syntactic formations that are characterized as the sedimentations of previous accomplishments.

Every original, newly accomplished syntactic formation, like "is," "and," subject-form, predicate-form is common to the judgment and to the state-of-affairs. The form as such does not have any manifolds of sense that harbor the object-theme through the process of identification. It is precisely form. Thus, on the whole, the form is only identifiable as it is. Where the *termini* are concerned, however, they are laden with sedimented sense, whereby categorical forms enter into <the> mode of sedimentation and secondary *termini* [enter into] a modification of the form of judgment.

In the attitude of actual judging, and specifically in the attitude of originally accomplishing judging, an attitude focusing on original foundations, I have primary, direct themes in their direct sense, which is to say, the sense through which the themes are constituted prior to every determinative accomplishment of judgment. "The regard rests" on these themes; the ego has them precisely as theme; sense is thematic sense and in a certain fashion, "its regard also rests" on the synthesis that is the

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connective accomplishment of judicative action. But it is not an objective sense that becomes thematic, but the new constitution of a sense in the bright daylight of active consciousness.⁶⁵

This newly constituted sense is newly constituted, but not for itself; rather, the newly constituted sense is something being formed or something that has been formed from the themes. And like everything that is originally constituted, this must first be made into a judicative theme through a reflection. In thematic judicative givenness, the thematic substrata are already no longer direct themata, and accordingly are no longer given in the same ways as in the judging itself. Nevertheless: In the transition from reflection to the direct attitude, and *vice versa*, an identification of themes of the direct attitude and of the thematic positions of judgment is carried out in reflective givenness; and we say, the same theme is the judicative theme, contained in the reflectively grasped judgment, only given to consciousness in a modified way. In judgment, the theme is a theme that is formed in this way and that, in judicative consciousness, the judgment is given to consciousness and the themes are given to consciousness, and each of them in different ways. In brief, what we ourselves have already said from such a change in attitude.⁶⁶

But now I make a distinction between judgment and categorial objectlike formation. The categorial objectlike formation that we call the state-of-affairs (and everything included in this) is the judgment made into an object, the judgment that is newly accomplished in the judging, and the original accomplishment that is carried out, the accomplishment with respect to the genuine objects-about-which, is necessarily distinguished in every judgment that does not consist of this accomplishment alone.⁶⁷

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⁶⁵ Is it just like appearances that synthetically run their course in bright light, but where the passive synthesis is not the theme, but instead the unity?

⁶⁶ The "reflective" collection, i.e., the collection grasped as set, thematically harbors even the single members. In this way, the judgment harbors the subjects themselves, the predicate themselves, i.e., the objects (the objects-about-which) intended in the judging.

⁶⁷ The "presentations," the sensible sense-givings prior to judging. Thematic grasping of the one: In contrast, reflection on the "appearance," on the objective sense that is a different one again and again, but in identifying synthesis "contains the same." Even this judging of identity arises in reflection: (a) the identity $S \equiv S$, a categorial object; (b) the S_{σ} ,

In every other judgment, the objects-about-which occur with sense-givings from other categorial accomplishments that have been sedimented on the object-about-which, i.e., on its pre-categorially constituted sense. Reflection discovers the themes of the main-judgment, of the one that is actually newly accomplished, with the encumbrments of sense. But if the "What" that is judged is the thematic object that is made into a unity, then in the series of judgments that are compared, judgments that are encumbered with different sense, the "What" that is judged is the same: that which I intend. But I can take every theme as the theme of its sense, in particular, of the sense that was previously attributed to it, [namely,] the sense acquired by thematic accomplishments. Then I have the thematic What, namely, the judicatively given What.

15 Appendix 32: (To §56) <The Ideality of the Objects of Sense and the Ideality of the Species> [92]

After my lecture, indeed, during and already in preparing it, I had reservations concerning my presentation, and quickly note the

$\equiv S_{\sigma}$, S in the noematic mode in the objective-sensual sense σ , identical to itself in another sense, and in the full sense. But that is an attributive identification!

The sense $\sigma_1(S)$ is different from the sense $\sigma_2(S)$, and in the reflection on the judgment, I have $\sigma_1(S)$ unified with $\sigma_2(S)$ by an "identical" in quotation marks; each of the two senses as thematic sense bear a thematic pole, and both senses are unified by an "identical" that proceeds from thematic pole to thematic pole: $\sigma_1(S)$, $\sigma_2(S)$. But if I bring this into relief through reflection, I do not identify, I do not make S a theme, but rather, $\sigma_1(S)$ and $\sigma_2(S)$, but not even S which is given to me in the mode of σ_1 and likewise S that is given to me in the mode of σ_2 , for that is itself a relation, namely, the relation between S and $M(S)$. It is a particular relation, S and mode of appearance of S (with respect to things), and this appearance is the appearance of S of the same S of that other appearance. The object in this mode of appearance, in this How, is already a relative characteristic. I cannot have the objective sense given to me in reflection without also having its objective pole given to me; I cannot reflect on the judgment-through-identity without having the synthesis of the poles given to me. But I can grasp merely the unity-through-identity of the poles in reflection, i.e., the state-of-affairs-through-identity; but I can also have the "phenomenal" σ_1 and σ_2 as themes, themes that are naturally not identical and identified, and the connected unity that they have as "identical" through the consciousness that identifies their poles that come to light along with the phenomenon: σ_1 presents the same thing as σ_2 ; they are appearances of the same thing. This already implies that what σ_1 presents is already a relation. Can one express it without relation?

following: In what sense does the judgment have an extension⁶⁸? The judgment has no extension? Is this not due to the thematic attitude by virtue of which the judgment is identified in the thematic interest from the very start and is not abstracted from its particulars?

The species as the universal is gained by abstraction with regard to the pre-given individual possibilities or actualities. And why must that be the case? Because bringing a common element into relief presupposes bringing the particulars into relief, and <because> the species is the common element.

If I judge that "*S* is *p*," the judging is not at all brought into relief, and likewise, the judged "What" <is> not brought into relief in its theme and in its constitution, in the sense of something exercising an affection on the cognitive ego.

S and *p* and "*S* is *p*" are identified by coinciding in the repetition. Here the ideal-identical is the *prius*. But does that mean that the ideal is not particularized? It only means that objectlike formations of sense are not constituted by "abstraction," that their ideation precedes the individual intuition of sense-giving consciousness and of its noema, that these individual intuitions can only be gained through reflection.

All objectlike formations whatsoever are constituted through sense-giving, but sense-giving and all modes of givenness are given through reflection. But the species are givennesses of a second order; to be sure, is not the attitude focusing on an individual, thematic grasping, <on> individuals *simpliciter*, but rather [the attitude focusing on] the corresponding possibilities. But I also do not need any attitude that focuses on the possibilities of judging in order to grasp the judgment.

Appendix 33: (To §57) <Main and Subordinate Determination and the Division into Main and Subordinate Clauses>

In the previous forms, the thematic interest in *S* was fulfilled in the determinations *p*, *q*, *r*, so to speak, in the first natural course [of determinations]. The material content of the *S*, its character as

property, emerges in the series and is grasped together in this series.

Now, it can be that the interest in the different determinations is a uniform one or even a non-uniform one. Let us take the first case, and for the sake of simplicity, only two determinations, *p* and *q*. If I repeat the judicative determining of *S*, for instance, for the purpose of communicating or remembering something for myself, I will not have any occasion to alter the form of the succession that is necessary for an initial original acquisition of knowledge. This is otherwise if the thematic significance, the weight of cognitive interest is different in relation to the particular determination. Then I will have to carry out a regrouping; I will have to immerse myself especially in the distinctive mode of determination, while the *S* and knowing it judicatively does indeed remain my dominant theme that I want to promote precisely by immersing myself in the distinctive mode of determination.

If, for instance, the *q*-being emerges as especially interesting, I will now start to judge, so to speak, going directly from the *S* to the *q*; this direction of determination becomes the main direction, the proposition, "*S* is *q*" becomes the main clause, as something that is important above all to fix for myself or for the communication. On the other hand, that *S* is *p* becomes the subordinate clause. In the unity of a synthesis of judgment, the main clause is distinguished from the subordinate clause in the form, "*S*, which is *p*, is *q*." Or "*S* (the same *S* is *p*) is *q*." An identifying connection is concluded here, but the two propositions, "*S* is *p*" and "*S* is *q*" are not equivalent; rather, the one determination is annexed as a subordinate determination to the *S* in parentheses, as it were, and the main determination bears on the *q*. This form can also arise in such a way that *S* already occurs with the sedimentation acquired by the previous knowledge, yielding out of itself the new determination *q* that already holds the main interest as new, and [it can also arise in such a way] that at the same time an explicating renewal of the sedimentation constitutes the subordinate clause.

That which is settled as such is the subordinate element as opposed to the main element, as opposed to what brings new fulfillment. Ideally, we can obviously transfer each one of the

⁶⁸ Umfang

previous forms into such attributive forms; corresponding to each determination is an attribution, just like every attribution originally points back to a determination. Thus, "S, which is *p*, is *q*," "S, which is *p* *q*, is *r*," etc. The same syntactic matters now have a new form; *p*, *q* are not grasped together successively in mere conjunction; rather, the holds on them have separated.

We will also be able to characterize the differences between the *S* that is still indeterminate and the *S* that already presents itself with a prominent sedimentation from an earlier judging—linguistically, for example, the adjectival annexes to substantive subjects that are explicated in relative clauses—as special differences of the subject-form. With this we would understand <the> difference between "the big house" and "the house, which is big." Where the differentiation is in dispute, the adjectival determination functions as subordinate clause, so it seems.

Let us now go back again to the original form-groups, "S is *p*, *q*, *r*."

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Appendix 34: (to §58) <Absolute Substrates and Substrates as Determinations that have Become Independent>

20 We can now add an important distinction to the function of becoming independent that we just mentioned. If we already have some kind of substrate, its explicated determination can become independent, can itself become a substrate in turn, and, if we like, even a main substrate that has become independent, a main substrate for further determinations that can be freed from the interest in the previous substrate. It can operate in a similar manner, in turn, for these determinations, etc. Obviously, on the other hand, even if the substrate that functions as the point of departure has already arisen from nominalization, we always arrive at an absolute substrate; this means here [we always arrive] at such a substrate that has not arisen in this manner. Viewed more precisely, however, it is not a matter here of arbitrary distinctions; namely, there are objects that can become substrata *a priori* and in original givenness only by having occurred previously in the judgment as determinations, and there are objects for <which> this is not the case. A house is given originally, but not given as a

nominalized determination. It is given independently. Its color is given in the judgment through the determination. But if it becomes independent, it is a substrate from then on, but it can only become a substrate through the process of becoming independent, and any other way is inconceivable.

10 In a certain way, the house can also emerge through a determinative accomplishment. For example, we see the street as a whole, and only first in the explication does the house emerge for itself. The image of the street obtruded in a unitary fashion and came to the fore before the house came to the fore for itself. The street is now determined in its houses that are grasped one by one. But however much the single graspings have the form of determinations here, the form of determination is nevertheless not something essential insofar as precisely this house could also be given independently from the very beginning; and, on the other hand, even if it were given previously as determination, even if it were to shed the form of determination completely, the house could extinguish, so to speak, every memory of it [i.e., the form of determination]. By contrast, as the color becomes independent, this origin cannot be extinguished; the interest in the substrate, house, has only become secondary, but it cannot entirely disappear from consciousness because the color is originally contained in the concrete object and owes its individuality for consciousness only to the thematic apprehension through determination.

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25 We learn here that there are original objects that are independent and those that are non-independent. The non-independent ones can only become thematic substrata (of complete and determinative identifications) by other objects upon which they arise as determinations, first being given in this way. Their first form of givenness is as a determination, and they bring it *a priori* to the form of substrate only through the process of becoming independent, which is a separate activity.

30 Thus, we differentiate the determinations themselves into independent and non-independent determinations. Belonging to the independent ones are all parts in the strict sense, parts whose substrata are called wholes, but further, all members of sets, as well. Belonging to the non-independent determinations are all moments whose substrata are called concrete objects. The form of

determination is not essential to parts and members of sets, the form of the substrate [is not essential] to the moments. The latter have taken on the nominal form only through the special, founded activity of becoming independent. The distinction between the independent and non-independent is a radical distinction in their syntactic matters⁶⁹; accordingly, this also conditions essential distinctions with respect to judgments. We should note that it is not a matter here of a distinction between arbitrary syntactic matters, but rather, a distinction of the universal type, one that belongs *a priori* to the idea of a possible judgment as such and of a possible objectlike formation as such. From every objectlike formation as such, from every determination of a Something and active identification of a Something, no matter how it has arisen, we arrive, depending upon the direction of the thematic activity, at distinctions of the independent and the non-independent, at determinations through the independent or non-independent. It is a formal distinction, that is, a distinction that belongs to the idea of judgment and correlatively to the idea of the objectlike formation, i.e., of the comprehension that corresponds to them. One also calls such distinctions categorical.

We arrive further at the side of the independent, at distinctions between the *immanent* and the *transcendent*, and then at the side of the non-independent, to the predicates of independent objects as absolutely real substrata: the predicates of the temporal position, of temporal duration, of the varying temporal fullness, of the identical properties running through the temporal duration, etc. The possible partition of the real into real parts as pieces yields the necessary partition of extension, of temporal extension, and in coexistence, of spatial extension, and <leads> to relationships of non-independent properties and determinations in general, determinations that are interconnected with them. But we do not yet have relationships. We have not yet treated any judgments of relation. The original constitution of relations that is carried out in relating activity will soon become our theme. We only need say explicitly that judgments of identity, judgments of determination—even judgments of determination in which parts

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function as determinative—are not judgments of relations, but can be changed into them in the change of the mode of judgment. Thinking is judging, but relating thinking is a special kind of judging.

5 Appendix 35: (to §§ 59 and 65b) Multiplicity and Judgments of Multiplicity

Original unity of thematic interest yields a commonality of separate objects (in the unity of an affection), and accordingly, original unity of thematic interest yields only a commonality of the particular features that extend beyond the particular objects (as uniformity or similarity). An original multiplicity is not merely a collection of separate objects, but already within passivity it essentially comprises a bond with an inner affinity. Corresponding to this is the new judicative formation that brings to light this affinity for the cognitive ego and produces higher levels of judgment. Each object can return as the identical one in consciousness, and can enter into connections of this kinship with other objects that are already constituted in consciousness, actively or passively, in an originally impressional manner or reproductively, i.e., no longer merely exercising an affection for itself, but in a multiple manner, in community with its kin. In this way, each judgment that is valid for the object for itself can connect up with judgments that are valid for the objects that are akin, or it can enter into a community in the unity of the multiplicity of single judgments with other single judgments—a multiplicity instituted through kinship—and new modes of judgment as such can arise, those that extend beyond the particulars, specifically, those new modes of judgment that are related to the non-independent “properties” of the particular features.

In passing over from one particular feature to another, a coinciding that forms similarity arises according to the commonality, a differentiation [arises] according to what is different. Each one coincides with its partner in the transition by virtue of it being the substrate of identity, and the substrate of moments of similarity and moments of uniformity. In the moment

⁶⁹ *Stoffen*

of coinciding, one element melds with one similar to it according to the law of similarity, while the consciousness of a duality (a duality that is being unified in the fusion) continues, and this fusion has its degrees that are called distances of similarity, or differences in a certain sense. In the case of uniformity, the fusion in consciousness is one without distance, without difference, a complete fusion.

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What influence do such interconnections have (interconnections that can already play their role in passivity) within the framework of judicative activity? If we assume that the respective multiplicity has already passed over into the collection of its single members, then this transition necessarily means a process of going through them, and through this, commonalities come into relief. Depending upon the "magnitude" of the similarity, the reciprocal awakening force will be greater, and with respect to a pair that is especially connected through this process, uniform or relatively very similar shapes come into relief; where a different pair is concerned, the colors, etc. This can also be regarded as the original source of the prominence of non-independent particulars in general.

Thus, judgments of properties " S_1 is p , q , r ," and " S_1 is p' , q' , r' " arise in this way. And in this case corresponding properties will occur here and there in uniformity or in differing degrees of similarity. But that would still not yield anything new, and several fundamentally new things occur, namely, through the fact that in the unity of a thematic consciousness, the connected unity of affection becomes effective in a thematic way.

Let us initially assume that the thematically determinative interest is to be concentrated on S_1 specifically, and is to act as if the universal interest in what is connected to it is lost. The affection, which is the drive to enkindle a progressive and synthetically encompassing interest and thoroughgoing active unification, is constantly at work.

Thus, in the limitation to S_1 , the prominent property-moment p is grasped as " S has p ." Likewise for S' , where a completely uniform p can occur. But now a synthesis of identification necessarily arises, S and S' are the same, are p , in spite of S having had its moment p , and S' in turn its moment p . Just as the substrata are

separate, so too are their particular features. But in the thematic transition they coincide and [this complex] becomes actively identified. But it is not the property-moments that are given to consciousness as identical, and not the S and the S' , although we say that S and S' are the same. Of course, we are not speaking here of a complete identification. The partial identification to which we owe the property-moment as determination is also not at issue.

However, if we reflect more deeply on the synthetic consciousness that underlies our analysis, we will notice that a unity emerges with the coinciding in the transition from one uniform moment to another, a unity in the separated and connected duality, and that it emerges again and again as completely and identically the same if we pass over to a new element S'' , then again to S''' , in which we have a uniform moment p , and a uniform moment p again. We see that our more precise symbolic formulation would have to read: " S_1 is p' , S_2 is p'' , S_3 is p''' ," and now in contrast to the latter, " S_1 and S_2 is p ," where p is the identically one that emerges in p and in p'' , possibly continuing as " S_1 and S_2 and S_3 ... are p ." For even " S_1 is p , and S_2 is also p ," etc.

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Within the thematically active attitude we have proceeded more precisely from " S_1 is p " to " S_2 is p ," and if, now, the unity that is constituted originally only in this coinciding, the unity of the species, p , comes to the fore, then S_2 is now determined as p , turning back, S_1 is determined as identically the same, as being of the same kind, and so with every new S as absolutely the same, as p .

Instead of the fleeting and varying moment, the S is determined by something identical that is ideal and absolute, something identical that runs throughout all particularized objects and their moments that are multiplied in the mode of repetition or in the mode of becoming similar, and it runs throughout them as an ideal unity, as a unity that, as we have shown, is not at all interested in the actuality of the moments, and that does not come into being or pass away with them, that is particularized in them, and yet not as a part in them. But initially we are attentive to the fact that different judgments diverge and separate from one another here. The judgment " S is p ," where p designates the moment, is something entirely different from the judgment " S is p ," where p

designates the *eidōs*, or again, from the judgment, "*p*' is *p*." Or, as we can also put it, these statements are misleading because as formulae they say the same thing. One time we have identifications between substrate and moment, another, we have the identification in which a *p*' (which, coinciding with another *p*", allows the intellectual⁷⁰ unitary feature to emerge), is determined as the species *p*, and then *S* is determined as *S*', etc.

Appendix 36: (To §59) Set and Whole

Our expositions dealing with the origin of the categorial object-type, set, are still insufficient. We conceived of the set as being given in a pre-constituted manner and to this extent it is given in a pre-constituted manner, namely, as having been connected from several disjunctive pre-constituted objects, and thereby as separate affections, into the unity of a single affection heading toward the ego simultaneously or successively in consciousness; and it can thus solicit a turning toward as an entire turning toward and as an entire grasping of the set. But seen more precisely, we must not say that a set is originally constituted as set. For our reference to a whole composed of disjunctive elements, a whole that is not merely a set, already shows a deficiency. Even such a whole can be given as pre-constituted, and can likewise be precisely given as pre-constituted.

Further insufficiencies can also be seen with respect to our first description and points to the need of supplementing it. If the simple grasping of set *T* takes place, which necessarily takes it as a whole, or if you like, in a single ray of attention, and through this, the set *T* becomes the substrate (even a substrate, thus, every object in the explicit sense, is necessarily something given thematically in a single taking hold), the interest in this substrate lives out its life in the chain of explications. But even if these are prefigured, and we can speak of a complete satisfaction of the drive toward grasping that was first awakened, namely, when one has gone through all members, it is indeed not yet clear why we must stop here and why belonging to the explicit consciousness of

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the set *T* as set is only the formation of the collection of member[*i*, ... *m_n*, and not the further canvassing of the single members of the set according to their inner particular features and their relations.

Finally, we spoke of an identification of the set *T* that is not explicated as it has become substrate with the obtained collection. But how does this identification come about? For two members, we have the figure:



but grasping them together, which takes place on the side of the object, does fashion a unity, but not an object that can become the object-member of an identity.

If *S*₁ is identical to *S*₂, then the object *S*₂ is given to consciousness exactly like *S*₁, as given in a ray of grasping. And we can simply reverse it, *S*₂ is identical to *S*₁, subject and object are exchanged and have altered their syntactic form, but not the givenness in a single ray of attention. In fact, we note that the collective connection that has originally arisen in the plural process of explicating member *m*₁ and *m*₂ first requires a change of view in order to become the substrate, thus, to become the genuine object, to become the identifiable object. But this means that as long as we have a mere collective grasping, we have with it even more so only a pre-constituted object, multiplicity, and only in grasping that reaches back to the active formation do we have the multiplicity as unity in an objectlike manner. What is curious here is that an activity synthetically pre-constitutes an objectlike formation, which as object however, can become a theme only first in a grasping that reaches back after the objectlike formation is complete. This is the case for all objects generated through thematic activity, thus, for all judgments and connections of judgments, and all elements of judgments occurring in them, elements of judgments that are not themselves judgments, and for all objects (among them, sets) that are being constituted in judgment's [noematic] sense first through manifold judicative

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action. For as special products of thematic activity, they are now easy to show. Passivity can only create preconditions here, and it is not necessary that the many objects are already pre-constituted, already finished in advance, as disjuncts and that they exercise their joint affective force. The objects can also come into thematic view successively, and while we are already occupied in a different way with the previous objects in judgment. In the succession, they fulfill the described conditions of collection, the unity of affection is formed successively. It paves the way for the transitions of interest, and if the emergent objects are disjunctive, collection can begin. But it can also arise from the very outset in activity, like when an *S* is explicated step by step in disjunctive particular features, and these particular features form a collective connection from the very outset. A change of view is possible here at all times, a change of view that objectivates the *collectivum* as object.

A set is nothing other than an objectlike formation that is originally pre-constituted by a collective activity, linking the disjunctively constituted objects to one another, actively grasping it consists in a simple reaching back or a seizing of what has just been constituted. As pure formation of activity, the set designates a distinctive form in the sphere of judgment into which thematic objects of every conceivable type can enter as members, and with which they can then enter into determinative judgments of every syntactic shape. The thematic objectivating process has its syntaxes, and one of these syntaxes is the "and", and one of the syntaxes of relation, which obviously belong in an entirely different direction, is the "disjunct."

These are the fundamental elements of the syntactic special form of collection, the set. Every objectivated *collectivum* is identifiable like an object, and can be identified in newer and newer processes of explication, and the explication is again and again colligation. Two sets can also be given by the fact that the members are constituted in different modes of givenness. Then, the identification of a set with another set is a mutually univocal ordering and collection of single identifications. We do not have to expound upon the fact that collective unities are in turn colligated,

i.e., that sets can in turn be built out of sets, and that all relationships of containment can exist between sets.

Now to the concept of whole.⁷¹ If we form the most general concept of whole, so that it encompasses every object insofar as it contains parts, then every set, but also, every object as such, is a whole. A more strict concept of whole is characterized by every object that can be explicated [and done so] completely⁷² in a disjunctive multiplicity, that is, in a set of immediate parts (things that are contained). Every set is then also a whole, since once formed, it can be dis-membered again into its unities, which means nothing <other> than that it is generated anew. But a whole is not merely a set, but an object that contains a set. A genuine whole is not self-given through collection, but self-given in a different way, but here the whole is fashioned in such a way that the object allows a set, the set of its parts, to be formed from the object itself through division and collection.⁷³

While the concepts of set and of whole can themselves be ranked among the concepts that have the distinction of having their origin in the syntactic sphere of judgment or in the most universal sphere of objectivation, which does not go into the ultimate cores and their categories, it is already quite different with the concept of the whole in the narrowest sense of the real whole, with the concept of real unity in general. A real unity is something constituted in the continually integrated unity of a sensible intuition. A real whole cannot have its parts divided among non-integrated sensible intuitions in self-givenness, something that is quite possible for a set-whole.

⁷¹ I will speak about connection later (pp. 342 f.) >

⁷² What does that mean, "completely"?

⁷³ Still unsatisfactory. Indeed, why is the concept of connection avoided and it is avoidable? The set is united through collection, but a whole has parts, and they are connected. The connection can be a categorical one or a real one. Every explication of an object in an interconnection of disjunctive connected parts, which are equivalent to the whole object (disjunctive parts <are> no longer possible outside of connection)—every explication of an object is graspable as a set, whose members have "connection."

Appendix 37: (To §§63 and 64) <Object and Content of Interest> [102]

Determining S, concentrating on S and the interest in it as theme in the process of examining it in explication or <concentrating> on other affiliated themes <in> a broader examination and in an examination fulfilling multiple determinations. The question is what takes place here. In the transition from S to one of its parts, we surely have a coinciding in the "overlapping"; S becomes restricted in S₁. But if, holding on to S, I pass over to its parts, that is, experiencing this coinciding, this unification, through this process, have I already posited S as subject, and [have I] determined it as having the part in the following manner: "S has S₁"? And likewise, vice versa with respect to the delimitation of the examination beyond the S: Do I already have there "S is the part of S₂"? Must we not say that in this transition, which is an overflowing of the interest in a containing or a contained, S takes on a content, which alters nothing with respect to its identity, that is, nothing with respect to its x in the "objective sense." It is one thing to have attention directed toward the object given in the objective sense, directed toward the one in the varying, intuitive, presentational content, the attention as grasping, and it is another to have the attention directed toward the presentational content itself. In the grasping, in the thematically examining directedness toward the object, we find the following: We have here a giving oneself over to this content and to its change in the form of an interest in it, but in the thematic consciousness of the One. As I have explained, "the thematic regard" directed toward x is the content, but in the light of interest.

Must I not go further and say that if the transition from S to S₁ has taken place, an "enrichment of sense" takes place for the S as a result of the coinciding, a content of sense that has arisen from the coinciding, and now after the transition, a new interest, the genuine thematic interest (the interest in S as determined in such a manner), turns toward the S as object; but being fulfilled in the determination, i.e., the content that has newly arisen and that is being actively and newly realized. Then we would have two levels: (1) the transition from S into the parts S₁, S₂ ... that are coming to the fore in coinciding, the S₁ and S₂ get grasped for

themselves. The interest that followed the objective senses of pre-constitution, the what-content of the object given in them, flows-off into the parts, but the S and each one of the parts that are already grasped, remain held onto.

(2) But then this is something new, namely, the ego is directed back in its interest to the S and—for instance initially taking S₁ in a special hold, directing a new focal ray to it—becomes aware of the enrichment of sense and is satisfied by generating the enrichment of sense again actively in an original manner in the new transition to S₁, and thus for every S_i. Determination is always bipartite. [103]

Thus, the most simple case is the case in which the explication (as the examination of the object) does not go any further at all to ever new moments. Let us assume that the examination would immediately halt and lead only to S₁. And through the transition under coinciding, the S has necessarily undergone something; through this, it has taken on a new "content" and this "arouses our interest." Thus, I go back to S, identify it with itself, which is only to say that in going back, it is there "again" as it, as S, and having turned toward it in the manner of the thematic object (of the center of the object), I "actualize" my interest in it in the direction toward the content accruing to it, and this presupposes that I do indeed pass over again to S₁. For originally it only comes to the fore in the systematic transition, in the coinciding. Previously it had come to the fore in the S as a result of the transition, but it was not yet in interest. Afterward it gets sensed (noticed), but the S is only "still held onto." But the transition has been carried out with its coinciding, but as transition, it was something that resulted passively. Now, however, turning again to S, it is grasped in a primary fashion anew. I have its enrichment of sense as a mere protention, in connection with the retention of the transition that has just elapsed. As active ego, directed toward the S in its accruelement and focused on the interest in the accruelement itself, I now carry out the transition and the partial coinciding as free activity, and in this way I bring to fulfillment the determinative intention, the intention toward the S in its sense that is being augmented from the transition and the coinciding: I have S as the theme of a determination, and I determine it actively. One must

not be led astray by the fact that after the determination is carried out and has been actively carried out often enough (e.g., as it is here) as the determination of an object as having a part, then in the new case of a transition of partial coinciding, which coinciding has not taken place actively at all (maybe the S had not even once been held onto; interest in it can be awakened subsequently). The "possibility" of a determination to be carried out can come to light as "associatively" grounded, and the determinative statement can also immediately arise without the determination being realized after the fact, without it being actually realized. The increasing, subsequent interest in S in its determination is empty, anticipatory, on the side of the determination; and it is therefore likewise empty and anticipatory with respect to the determinative action, which alone the determination can constitute originally, like the content of determination, the state-of-affairs, the judgment.

Further, we should not overlook what the *rudiments of the doctrine of interest* were, and accordingly, the rudiments of all active praxis that follows interests: the fact that we constantly have the distinction here between the thematic object as the object of interest, the presentational content from passivity or the content that is accomplished by activity, which as the accomplished content "fashions" for the object a new content in it [namely], the content of interest, but even with this, it is not its object. Indeed, here, where activity is in play, we would actually have still more to say.

Already when a sensible examining interest and not a determinative interest is being actively lived out, that is, already when we have the first level of active objectivation, i.e., the level of pure sensible examination, we will not only have here the one presentational object (the One, continually One of the varying presentation) and its content that is being modified. We modify the presentational object itself on our part, even if it should be varied or transformed with respect to content; we do not carry out alterations in the object on our part, but rather, transformations of content. We delve deeply and actively into it, we adapt ourselves to it, penetrate into it (the explicating process also belongs here, prior to the determining process). If it is an external object, we move our eyes, etc., we modify the "appearances." Consequently,

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we do not have only the respective presentational content, but also its subjective variations, possibly parts, divisions, the kinesthetic transformations that belong to them immediately and that serve as the means to transformation, etc. All of this lies for the ego in the circle of attentiveness, all of this has exercised an affection and the ego is directed toward it. But it is not the theme for the ego, the theme is the One in and through a multiple content; content is this multiplicity of the One, continually and discretely changed, but standing in its regard as content, as the What of the One; and this is thus a "third thing"; the fact that this content is constituted in the active process of objectivating as seized, as appropriated, as gone through and unitarily connected in the unity of interest by the ego, and that the content as content, the transformation of content as generated is precisely a product as the unity of several contents; and as such we [have] with every generating "doing" the crest of an "act"⁷⁴ that has something multiple, a multiplicity that is naturally not a product. An act is not action. Belonging to action is the active directedness of the ego and the noetic constitution of the stages of the act (eye movement, and the like) that are constituted in their own way in an objectlike manner.

The "in consequence of" that connects the kinesthetic feature with the appearance, all of this is something constituted: the examining act is in view, it runs-off as such, put into play and directed by the ego. It yields the course of the content of interest that is in view, but it is in the vicinity in a special sense, though not at the center of the thematic regard. But the theme is the object, it is the object that is "grasped" in a thoroughgoing manner, showing itself in its content; the interest bears on it as showing itself in such a way and is lived out practically in the deed of examination, in the deed of calling forth ever new contents.⁷⁵

As can be clearly seen, we must then, however, distinguish the active determination of something examined from the active examination. In a first sense, all examining is a determining. In

⁷⁴ "Handlung"

⁷⁵ Active examination = intuition – distinct from determination

active examining, the object is determined for us as object, that is, as theme in its multiple content.

An interest of a higher level in one and the same object arises on the basis of active examining, springing forth from it as the interest in the determinations arising in the special sense from *S*. The examining is *experientia vaga*. The object is intuited in its content, and the intuiting interest is actively satisfied. But by it being explicated into special objects, being clarified in them, the object undergoes something in the partial self-coinciding, it undergoes a clarifying determination, and it does this initially in a passivity that is based upon the subsoil of examining activity. An interest in the determination leads to the activity of determining in which the object that was examined only previously becomes the subject-theme of an explicating-determinative judging, a judging in which the state-of-affairs as the judicative content is constituted, a judging in which the determination originally accrues to the subject-theme in effective activity as belonging to the subject-theme, as being originally apportioned to it in the process of generation. The judgment and the subject as subject of determination is identified in the iterated, free generation of coinciding and in the iterated thematic identification of the object as the subject of the determination "attributed" to the object, apportioned to the object through the process of generation.

As the interest expands, the unitary examination can lead from one object to another, and in these transitions interest varies its object; but it is borne by a unity of connected interest because there is already a previously constituted "materially relevant unity" within passivity, or it gradually comes to the fore as constituted. A united satisfaction of interest, then, runs through the unitary examination, and it does so in such a way that the materially relevant unity here need not at all be thematic, even though it can be thematic. In the latter case, we have an object that is explicated, and—abandoning the theme of the object as a whole—the interest passes over to the explicated elements, and they get examined individually and are possibly held onto in the transition. But now these transitions also lead to determinations that are different from those that we initially considered; [they are] related to the transition of object and part.

Already the transition from part to whole allows a [106] determination to arise in the part, and the part can become a subject, and in actuating action, the determination and the determinative judgment are constituted in a higher activity.

Further, in the transition from an object to one that is separate from it, whereby the first belongs, along with the second, to one and the same sensible unity—a unity that is both salient and noticed for itself (in the higher level it belongs all the more to a connected unity). If now both terms also bear their passive augmentation of determination from the part of the whole, this augmentation will not have to lead to an active determination; on the other hand, however, in the transition from one element to another, a new augmentation of determination arises in the first one, and if the latter becomes activated, while the whole is in the field of interest, the judgment of relation will emerge in a manner analogous to the following: *S* is similar to *S*₁, etc.

We have as many ways [or types] of constituted wholes, connections as we do ways or types of relationships, namely, external relationships.

A whole is given, e.g., and initially so, if it is a sensible whole as a unitary object in which other objects, parts come to the fore: a unity of affection with special affections included in it. We assume here disjunctive parts, special affections are disjunctive. If a part is examined, grasped, then the whole does not have to be grasped, and if the whole is grasped, then the parts do not have to be grasped individually for themselves. It will be objectivated and given in full clarity as a whole if it is first grasped and examined in a thematic prehension, and then if it gets grasped according to its parts and examined step by step, and is held onto here as a unity, in this way becoming identified with itself. As the examination of the whole and the examination of the individual follow upon one another, and according to the way they are grasped, they coincide [insofar as] they are held onto [in a unity]. This is the case for every object that becomes subject to an explicative [process of] examination.

Now, how does the form of the whole and the form of connection of parts come to the fore? Two parts can form a special whole within the whole, can come into relief as a special whole.

that is, as a part that is itself a whole of parts. Let us take from the very start a connection of two objects, a whole of two objects. It is called a whole insofar as it only has these two immediate parts, [insofar as it] is "resolved" only in these parts. The whole is from the very start only equipped with these special affections that go together in the unity of a single affection, and these special affections yield the immediate parts and their connections of sets, the sum of parts. The form of connection is a non-independent moment that comes to givenness on its own according to the elucidation of the whole with respect to its parts, that is, in the divided whole. And it can probably do so in the following way: Every element is grasped for itself (merely "examined"), and both the parts come to the fore together and are grasped together in the whole in a "divided attentiveness." Now a connection comes to the fore not as a third part which the whole would still have in the same sense as these two parts, but as a mediate determination of the whole or initially a mediate moment that is not an immediate moment of one or the other part, but their ensemble. It can only come to the fore after the ensemble is there.

20 There can be several connections, and in the corresponding transformations, for example, they can turn out to be "founding" in moments of parts. The several connections are fused into one single connection, just like in the case of founding parts, the several moments [are fused] into the unity of one member.

25 There are different possibilities of determinative judgments here: "The whole has such and such a form," [and] "the ensemble of parts has this form as connection." Furthermore, [we have] the external relations [that are] in transition from one part to another. To be sure, every part is something for itself and is something grasped for itself, and insofar as this is the case, it is thematic. But each one is a part, and it participates in the whole, which, even if it is not the theme of determination, still lies in the scope of attentiveness and grasping, and the form of unity is salient in the givenness that is clarified. S_1 and S_2 share something in common when they participate in the same object, and if we pass over from S_1 to S_2 , (and if each one is given to consciousness precisely as part, if each one has been grasped with the sense that has accrued to it from the direction of interest toward the grasped whole)—

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then a new augmentation of sense is there in S_1 , an augmentation of sense that arises from the transition and from the coinciding in the common element. If an activity is put into play, an activity that makes the S_1 thematic and relates it to the S_2 with respect to the form of the whole, and generates the determination in an original manner, then the judgment of the external relation is constituted in an original manner, then the S_1 is constituted in an original manner as in relation to S_2 (the relation of similarity, of uniformity, of situation, etc.)

10 This can be repeated on all levels, whether we have at the lowest level concrete sensible wholes or wholes, connections made up of "abstract," non-independent moments, like a community, a connection of directions, of distances, etc. We have taken the term "whole" so broadly that it encompasses every kind of connection that passively connects objects or that is present through judicative activity. If the latter is the case, then I can have internal articulations within the original generating process and the product. But the whole as successively generated, thus, as having become, is only a whole after the generation, and it requires the explication into the elements first in order <to> have them as parts of the whole and, in the transition, in order to be able to make the community of participation efficacious.

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Appendix 38: (to §64) <Categorical and Non-Categorical Connections and Relations>

25 Relationship of containing and of what is contained. Let us assume that θ is an immediate relationship of parts. If " $S_1 \theta S_2$ " and " $S_2 \theta S_3$," then " $S_1 \theta S_3$ " can be valid: through an immediate step of explication, I go from S_3 and arrive at S_1 . But it can also be that the relationship between S_1 and S_3 is essentially mediate. Like when an intuitive thing immediately has a "piece," a piece of the piece is immediately a part of the thing. But the shape of the piece is immediately a part of the whole. The shape of the whole is immediately a part of the whole. The relationship of the mediate part (the shape of the piece or of its color to the concrete thing) to the whole is characterized differently as the relationship of the

immediate part. This relationship, however, is not merely the relationship instituted by judgments.

Every judgment is itself an interconnection, and every chain of judgments is in the broadest sense a "whole" in which relationships exist (are instituted) between the parts, be they judgments, be they elements of a judgment, be they thematic objects. In this way it is a law that if " $a \phi b \phi' c$," " $a \phi' c$ " is also valid. This says nothing more than that two state-of-affairs that are connected to one another produce a categorical interconnection between the first and the last thematic object, and thereby a categorical relationship as well.

But then we must distinguish: (1) Categorical connections and other connections, wholes that are categorical, and wholes that are not categorical; that is to say, there are objects that are not pre-constituted through thematic action, but separate-off from one another into a plurality of immediate parts only first through explication, parts that are "connected" in the whole, which is to say, they exist in relation to one another on the basis of the preceding unity of the whole and due to the fact that they are that which are contained in it, that is, they are its parts. They can exist in relationships beside this one, for example, in relationships of size, uniformity, degree, etc., mediate and immediately.

(2) Categorical relations and non-categorical relations. Every relation is a categorical one. It is an state-of-affairs, namely, a simple one; by this I mean one that is not a concatenation of several state-of-affairs, $S_1 S_2$. A state-of-affairs is categorical by the *termini* being categorical or by the foundation of the state-of-affairs being a categorical one. Every state-of-affairs has a foundation, i.e., an objectlike formation that produces the community between the *termini* of the state-of-affairs. This community founds an objectlike formation insofar as it can be explicated and everything that emerges through explication is a part, that is, everything that emerges through explication has a community of partial identity with the whole and founds both the correlative relationships with the whole being determined and with the parts being determined. Further, parts and parts of a whole have their foundation in the whole. Put more precisely: Two explicated objects of a whole as such have a relation to one another; they are essentially relations

of intersection or relations of connection that can be constituted through determinative activity.

Appendix 39: (To §64) <The Task of a Theory of Relations>

A systematic development of the forms of possible objectivation on the second level of objectivation would have to progress from the simple to the complex and to the derived.

(1) Accordingly, the first task would be to disclose all the primitive shapes of state-of-affairs, or what amounts to the same thing, the primitive forms of relations whose *termini* naturally remain conceived in undetermined universality.

(2) Then, we would have to pass over to the syntactic shapes of connection, to the formal possibilities, in order to link up different state-of-affairs to one another, but, on the other hand, also in order to provide the state-of-affairs that are simple in themselves with an abundance of significance, i.e., in order to fashion lawfully regulated integrated formations of main clauses and subordinate clauses that can then, in turn, be analytically explicated at any time into mere complexes of primitive simple-judgments.⁷⁶

The syntactic unity of the *terminus* itself with its attributive significance, a unity arising in the place of every *terminus* in a judgment, makes up the concept of concept. If in traditional logic one speaks of the concept of subject, concept of object, the concept of predicate, one often has nothing else in mind than the intentional object which is the subject-theme, namely, as the substrate of the attributions added to it in the judgment in question. In this sense, an expression like "the minister overburdened with work" is a concept, and every judgment in this sense has two concepts that correspond to both of its thematic poles; and then within the attributions there are further concepts. Obviously, this concept of concept has nothing to do with concept in the sense of the generic universality.

What has been gained with respect to the products of determination by the many judgments in relation to one and the same theme of determination can be sedimented on this subject

⁷⁶ *Null-Verbindung*

through attribution, and can be systematically linked together and conceptually grasped together in it. In this way, the consequences of the entire judicative work up to now for the substrate in question are all there together and can be clearly seen, and are ready for all further judicative work to be done. [110]

<Section 3.
RELATED ESSAYS>

<A. Perception and its Process of Self-Giving>⁷⁷ [291]

<I. Immanent and Transcendent Perception>

5 First of all, it makes a most fundamental difference whether we consider objectlike formations that can only be experienced by the experiencing subject because the subject has spontaneously generated them in its thematic egoic acts—as, for example, numbers are only there for us originally as objects in acts of counting, or theories in acts of theorizing. [Or] by contrast, [whether] we have an entirely different original mode of givenness, an entirely different mode of experience, if objects are pre-given to the experiencing subject passively in experience, and are only experienceable through pre-giveness in such a way that the subject merely exercises acts of receptivity, acts of grasping and then acts of explicating something that is already there, something that already appears. Since this latter realm of objects must precede all activity in general, and since, for example, cognitive objects, objects of theory, are only possible as intellectual⁷⁸ formations by having other objects pre-given through receptivity, then naturally the primary phenomena for all phenomenological investigations, and particularly for investigations that are distinguished noematically, are the phenomena of passively given objects. Normally, experience and perception only mean the experience and perception of such

⁷⁷ Editor: 1923? and 1920/21

⁷⁸ Translator: The following pagination to the German text corresponds to Husserliana XL, *Genève*

"sensible" objects, as it is said—a limitation to which we would not want to be confined, and for good reasons.

In the sphere of passively pre-given and receptively experienced objects, we are concerned exclusively with individual objects—all universals are structures of spontaneous activity. Here, the most radical and thus the most general distinction of all is the one between immanent and transcendent objects, a distinction that we have repeatedly utilized, but have not yet clarified thematically. [292]

Thus, on the one hand, we have immanent perception, that of our own lived-experiences; here we take care to see that there is phenomenological purity in our method. In this case, "the perceived" is itself a lived-experience, and in this respect, no bracketing is required. For example, we live through⁷⁹ a joyful experience. We have here an originally giving consciousness of this joy; not only does it exist, but it is an immanent perceptual object, and cannot but be anything other than that. We are constantly conscious of it, even though we do not have to be directed toward it attentively, and it is therefore pre-given for possible reflective cognition. Berkeley's formula, *esse = percipi*, holds for every immanent object, a formula that he promulgated for external objects, to be sure, though it does not hold for them, as we will soon see. Being and constituted-being for consciousness coincide where immanent objects are concerned. Both are inseparably one. I say "constituted-being." For when we appropriately limit ourselves to the sphere of objects of internal consciousness, we learn from our analyses of time that all lived-experiences in their internal flow are encompassed by internal time in which they have [both] a position and a duration for consciousness. Every lived-experience, as an internal temporal object, is initially and originally constituted on account of internal consciousness through which the temporal object is given to consciousness thanks to a flux of primordial impressions, retentions, and protentions as a thoroughgoing unity. Originally and perceptually, being and being-perceived do not coincide, but being, and in iterative rememberings, being *qua* perceivable, or being and constituted-being (which is adequate and fashioned

from actual perception and its primordial constitution) do coincide; and that is to say, correlatively, that we can no longer distinguish here between [a] constituted sense and sense that can be construed identically again and again in a reproductive manner, and [b] the object itself *simpliciter*. The appearance of sense in the flesh is the object itself in its actuality.

Inner consciousness as inner perception carries out a purely immanent sense-giving through which pure consciousness remains with itself; in contrast to this, we find the transcendent process of sense-giving peculiar to external perception, and especially peculiar to the perception of the thing-bodily being, we find material being, which is foundational for all further modes of transcendence. The lived-experience, "perception of any kind of bodily thing"⁸⁰, is an immanent object that is given to consciousness in internal time like any other lived-experience. But what is constituted in the lived-experiences through a peculiar kind of sense-giving is precisely a bodily thing as given to consciousness in the flesh. This object that has been given to consciousness does not give itself as an immanent object, and it is nothing less than contained in an intimately inherent manner in the *percipi*. To be sure, one says with good reason that despite the fact that they are perceived, perceptual, bodily things do not have to exist: It could turn out later that the perception was a deceptive one. And conversely: Things can be in actuality without being perceived. Of course, such statements go beyond the purely phenomenological sphere. But already when we as phenomenologists pay heed to what is perceived as such within perception, we find that the objective sense of external perception transcends itself in a peculiar way, and that it transcends what it actually brings to the appearance in the flesh. By its very nature, every such perception anticipates, so to speak, an accomplishment that it is in principle not in a position to accomplish in adequate self-giving; it anticipates a *plus ultra* (self-giving is at the same time always anticipation)—while immanent perception actually makes present its objective sense in a complete givenness in the flesh. [293]

⁷⁹ *erleben*

⁸⁰ *körperliches Ding*

External perception concerns the entire so-called external world: houses, trees, tables, and so forth. Even when we speak of animals and human beings, among which we find ourselves as human beings, this still takes place in "external" perceptions. All these human beings and animals are themselves objects of the external world. Initially their lived-bodies are there; they are there for us perceptually only because their physical lived-bodies⁸¹ are there. But they are for us by perceiving them as animals and human beings, not merely as thing-bodies, but as living beings, which for their part also perceive, remember, and have every kind of lived-experience⁸². Yet these lived-experiences are not given in the same way that our own are given; they are not perceived internally, but are only given to us through a transcendent sense-giving a sense-giving peculiar to external perceptions that we call precisely perceptions of those human beings and animals external to us. Obviously, this external perception is a perception of a higher order: Another level of transcendent sense-giving is carried out in a first transcendent sense-giving; the latter is carried out in our perception of physical lived-bodies, and it is through this perception that they are given to us as "external," as transcending our consciousness; through this transcendent sense-giving these distinctive bodily things, which we call lived-bodies, are constituted for us in consciousness as lived-bodies, that is, as lived-bodies for a psychic life, a life of consciousness that is not our own. Naturally, there are problems here, namely, how this marvelous process of sense-giving takes place, and initially the sense-giving of the founding level of external physical perception, how we can understand that our stream of consciousness in its immanence can be conscious of objects as given, seen, touched, etc., *originaliter* in so-called external perceptions, objects that lie "outside" of one's own life-stream. What does this sense-giving look like, a sense-giving through which this "outside" gets its sense at all? External perception and exteriority in general is initially just a word. What does the structure of one's own lived-experience look like, the lived-experience that we call "external

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perception"? How do we make its intentional accomplishment clear? How does it happen, in which lived-experience (structured in such and such a manner) does it happen that "the outside" gets its available sense? Which general and necessary forms does the objective sense of external perception have, and which essential typically do the modes of appearance have that are constitutive for these forms? Obviously, after this first question—namely, how nature in the narrow sense of mere bodily, thing-like nature is constituted through the sense-giving of consciousness—there is a second question that necessarily follows: How are psycho-physical and spiritual objectivities of different levels constituted, and then subsequent to this, the entire given world? For psycho-physical nature already presupposes that physical lived-corporeality is constituted for the perceiver as perceived.

15 <2. Temporal and Spatial Perspectives> [295]

We also call external things thing-bodies. This points to the form of spatiality, which in a curious way encompasses all bodily things as objects of possible perception and should encompass all thing-bodies, not only actual ones, but also possible ones, reaching into infinity. As individual objects, thing-bodies initially have the form of time, they endure, and all their durations belong to the one unending time. But where the fullness of time is concerned, they have spatial extension in every point of time, and are therefore integrated into space as a multidimensional continuum, as an absolutely firm system of locality that stretches through unending time, as a system of locality in its identity, invariably encompassing all possible bodily things through all their durations. All animated thing-bodies, human beings and animals, get their variable position mediately in this fixed system of locality, and thus at the same time in the *one* world, in this unity that is encompassed by the forms, space and time. Every object of the world, and the world itself, is obviously only there perceptually for an ego and its consciousness through the process of sense-giving that is carried out precisely in this consciousness through special accomplishments of consciousness. And this sense-giving is the problem.

⁸¹ *Körperliche Leiber*
⁸² *Bewußtserlebnisse*

As always, let us take up the phenomenological attitude. We consider pure consciousness according to essential necessities. Questions concerning the reality of the world remain out of play; we take the world only as the immanent sense of the correlative consciousness [of it]. Further, we work within the limitations of the transcendental aesthetic, we exclude all judicative knowing, and we exclude altogether the entire sphere of determinative and predicative thought that is grounded upon intuition. Thus, we restrict ourselves exclusively to intuition and more precisely to perception, that is, even to the phenomenon of the world only insofar as it is a phenomenon of perception. We restrict ourselves even further: We consider particular perceptions of thing-bodies.

We also take the noematic perspective. Let us have a look there. We said that objects of possible perception have the necessary sense-form⁸³ of time, objects of possible external perception also have the sense-shape⁸⁴ of spatiality, and this as the thoroughgoing form of their temporal content. We find both forms in a curious analogy. For both, the object is given in a "shaped" extension: in a temporal shape (duration) and in a spatial shape. For both, the shape is necessarily given in the multifarious modes of appearance, in modes of temporal, and on the other hand, of spatial appearances and perspectives. For both, the adumbration of shape is followed by a secondary adumbration, as it were, that of temporal or spatial fullness. [296]

Let us take any kind of bodily object as it is given in perception, like this table at rest. We direct our gaze now, not toward the alteration in temporal givenness and the sense-moments of duration, but toward the content. We observe it, and in this process our eyes move involuntarily, and with every position of our eyes we see the same object, but in a different mode of appearance. We also turn our head or change the position of our whole body, we move closer to it, or step back from it again, and the mode of appearance continues to change, even though we are conscious of the same object in this unflagging alteration of the modes of appearance. Looking at the thing, we are directed toward the

modes of appearance in a way that is not at all thematic, and we do not think about regarding its transformation as the transformation of the object. This becomes especially clear in our example, namely, in the example of an object at rest; its particular determinations of sense come to the fore in the alteration of perceptions and in the alteration of its phenomenal contents, but they are only transformed in them with respect to their appearance, though they are not themselves changed. The same surface and edge of this thing presents itself in different perspectives, like it presents itself successively in perceiving. It is evident that it is not even conceivable as perceived without such perspectives. A perceptual thing is only conceivable as perceived in such a way that its thing-bodily shape, which belongs to the objective sense of the thing, initially presents itself in some way as appearing perspectivally in this or that manner, and in such a way that the identical and even unaltered shape (and according to each moment for itself determining the shape, according to each line, surface, combination of surfaces) is a unity of infinite possible modes of appearance. The same holds for color. It presents itself in a parallel manner with the perspectival adumbrations of the thing-bodily shape, likewise in ever new modes of appearance. Let us take as an example a certain surface here, for instance, a visible rectangular table surface, as well as its color. With each new appearance we distinguish the color itself and the mode of appearance of the color. Of course, when we focus on the thing itself, looking at it, we do not at all distinguish the color itself and the mode of appearance of the color. But, we find this distinction the moment we reflect. This holds likewise for all other determinations of the object given in intuition that are spread over the spatial shape and that qualify it perceptually as spatial fullness. It is evident here that the perspective of colors—and all similar adumbrations of the qualitative determinations of the external thing—does not characterize for instance a manifold of modes of appearance that is on a par with the perspective of shape; rather, it characterizes a manifold of modes of appearances that is dependent on the shape, and is necessarily subsequent to it. This is just like what happens with respect to temporal adumbration, with the modes of appearance of the temporal perspective, something

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⁸³ *Sinnform*
⁸⁴ *Sinngestalt*

that we could have already noted earlier: The temporal shape of the object, that is, its duration, appears with the alteration of pasts, is oriented anew to the living Now in newer and newer perspectives, and is pushed back further and further into the distance. But even here, following the change in the appearances of shape is a change in the mode of appearance of what fills the shape of time, of what qualifies the form: As a consequence of the fact that the appearance of the shape alters, everything that endures there also alters its mode of appearance with respect to content.

It will serve us well to pursue this incentive of drawing a parallel between temporal and spatial form still further. It will help us to make progress. Even the relationships of temporal orientation have their analogues in such relationships of spatial orientation. Within each perception a temporal present is constituted, and within the latter, an absolute Now. All past and future, even [the temporal givenness] of memorial objects is oriented to this flowing Now. Corresponding to the absolute Now as the zero-point of temporal orientation is the absolute Here as the zero-point of all spatial orientation. Every external perception brings with it its current spatial present and within it, the absolute zero-point of the Here. The latter is located in the very lived-body of the perceiver, and this zero-point "appears," and yet does so in an inauthentic way. The zero[point] is itself nothing visible, etc., but a *limes*.⁸⁵ Thus, miraculously a perceptual object that we call one's own lived-body is distinctive in such a way that with each perception of an object, whatever it may be, the lived-body is always there and always co-constituted. And this object is entirely unique by virtue of the fact that it always "bears within it" the zero-point, the absolute Here, in relation to which every other object is a There. Just as universal, unending time is constantly and inexorably referred to the absolute Now, so too is the entire unending space inexorably referred to the absolute Here and to the coordinates of orientation attached to it: We have to distinguish

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⁸⁵ The zero-region of the right-left, the zero-region of the above-below, the zero-region of front-back. The head is above, the legs below, one hand is right, the other left, the chest is on the higher side, etc. The zero-point is the ideal reference point of right-left, etc.

Translator: See also *Ideas II*, §40 ff.

the continuum of pure distancings in depth from the absolute Here, the continuum of right-left, the continuum of above-below—and these three continua in their mixture yield the entire three-dimensional continuum of orientations, or rather, the shape of orientation in which space as a whole always presents itself. The distinguishing feature of one's own lived-body as the bearer of the absolute Here gives every other thing, and the entire thing-world appearing respectively to it, the character of a world surrounding one's own lived-body or the indeterminate orientation character of "outside," of external world, understood here as outside of the lived-body and its zero-thing-bodily nature. However things may move and however my lived-body may move, nothing changes with respect to this most general mode of appearance: The lived-body remains the center, and the other things remain outside. While the latter can in principle take on every and all orientation with the exception of a zero-position, one's own lived-body, however, can only take on very limited variations in orientation, precisely because of its tie to the zero[point]. For it, only changes in appearance are possible, changes that occur through an oriented turning, changes that emerge, for example, when the perceiver, in perceiving, turns his head and bends; here, the rest of his lived-body takes on a variety of altered aspects and accordingly changes in orientation in relation to the zero-position. Thus, one's own lived-body is characterized according to the objective sense in a fundamentally different way than other things, and is constituted phenomenologically in a fundamentally different way than other things. The question in all of this is how "it gets on as it does."⁸⁶

Many new problems radiate out from here: like the problems of change and above all the problem of movement whose possibility belongs to the fundamental nature of a bodily thing. A bodily thing can be altered in different respects, especially in relation to its thing-bodily shape; for example, it can become deformed. Mere movement and mere rest refer to the unaltered shape. Only through movement is the shape dislodged from the space that it occupies by merely changing place to newer and newer places. We

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⁸⁶ Translator: Husserl has similar reflections on the lived-body from the 1930s. But now the lived-body is itself rooted in the Earth. See "Translator's Introduction," fn. 48.

also notice the following here: The same thing can appear with an unmodified shape in its different orientation and thus in its different perspectival mode of appearance; this mode of appearance can change and the object can nonetheless be at rest, and it can remain unchanged and the object can nonetheless move. The lived-body plays its role here again, namely, depending upon whether it itself moves or rests. The movement of an external thing does not necessarily influence the modes of appearance of other things; the movement of one's own lived-body revolutionizes the mode of appearance of each and every thing. The lived-body can, so to speak, run along especially with a movement, so that every change of appearance is neutralized. Moreover, lived-body movement plays its role with respect to all perceiving: The hand moves in touching, the eye moves in seeing, and the rest of the body assists in manifold ways here.

All of this makes up a region of phenomenological problems; in solving these problems, we must make intelligible what belongs essentially to the noematic stock of an external perceptual givenness transcending the empirical, human fact of lived-corporality that is fashioned in just this way, with organs formed and organized in just this way; that is, we must make intelligible what typical function a co-constitutive lived-corporality exercises for every external perception, and how it makes indispensable contributions. We must especially clarify what necessary constitutive function the so-called apparent-movements⁸⁷ have, why they must always be there, and how it happens that the phenomenon of the movement of each and every alien thing is inextricably intertwined with the entirely different phenomenon of the movement of one's own lived-body. [300]

I would still like to say a few words about the way in which the thing-bodily shape, as the thing's own spatial extension which moves along with it, functions as the formal fundamental determination of the thing. In fact, all other properties of the thing are related to it; in the broadest sense, they are that which fill this form. The thing-bodily extension or shape is that in which the thing "is extended"—as I already said a moment ago. The thing-

body is divisible, and every division partitions the thing with all its properties in such a way that the particular qualities of the parts contain, as divided, the qualities as a whole belonging to the thing. It is not without reason that Descartes defined the bodily thing as *res extensa* and thereby esteemed *extensio* as the essential attribute of thing-bodily nature above all the other attributes as dependent attributes. Thus, for example, the color of the thing is nothing for itself, but it is extended over the thing-like extension; likewise, roughness, etc. Here we would have to study the stratification of the extending properties according to which the appearing thing has a layer "visual thing," with a visually appearing spatial thing-body, and a layer "tactile thing" with a thing-body appearing in a tactile manner, which is nevertheless given to consciousness as the same and is given to consciousness in numeric identity as the spatial shape that appears now visually and, at the same time, now tactually. Otherwise we would have two distinct thing-bodies, and not one thing-body. We must therefore study how other layers are related to these fundamental layers, the layers of warm and cold, the tonal determinations, the tone radiating out from the thing, even the radiating warmth that is not a warmth spread throughout the thing-body, etc., likewise radiating light.

We would then have to distinguish between the primary perceptual thing that has its intuitive content purely with respect to the thing-bodily form and with respect to its immediate fullness, and the specifically physical and chemical properties, the causal properties, all the properties in relation to which one speaks of forces. Naturally, these properties must be taken in the very manner we find them within the framework of perception: When, for instance, the hammer is given in intuition as forging the iron, and the "what follows," the result, the effect of the force is "seen," and with respect to the hammer, its weighty force. It is obvious that every thing-perception is only the perception of something material by virtue of such properties being co-intended in perception, that is, they belong to the sense. A thing that would have no mass, no dynamic force, that would not be elastic, etc., would be a mere phantom. Thus, in phenomenology we call the mere visual thing, the mere tactile thing, what appears to us as merely filled visual or tactile space, a thing-phantom; it is a mere

sublayer within the full sense of the material thing; the latter is a causal thing through and through, possessing causal properties. Thus, such differentiations must be made within sense itself, and with respect to it, the noematically constituting modes of appearance must be studied for every distinction.

<3. Time and Space as *principia individuationis*>

Now that we have sketched an entire horizon of highly ramified phenomenological problems pertaining to sense and appearance, let us augment our observations in another direction. Initially, the feature of both fundamental forms for the entirety of the structures of external thing-bodily nature, temporality and spatiality, must be understood in their function as *principia individuationis*. The bodily thing, like every individual object, is a temporal thing; it has its duration with a property-filled content that extends throughout this duration. The duration here, and every temporal point of the duration, is absolutely unique. It is called an individualizing moment because it confers its uniqueness, as it were, on the entire object. Namely, the temporal determination is unique in the following manner: Two durations can be equally long and be completely uniform with respect to their content. But they cannot be identical. Thus, not even two filled durations [can] actually [be] identical. Completely uniform objectlike formations can appear in succession at different positions in time, each one of which has its uniqueness: Completely uniform—what distinguishes them, at any rate, is the uniqueness of the temporal locus, that is, the uniqueness with which their temporal points have temporal fullness. What determines each object with respect to its properties is repeatable at any time. This also concerns its temporal shape. Different objects can appear one after the other in the same duration and with the same properties, filling the duration; only the temporal points themselves and the durations themselves are absolutely singular. It is precisely this singularity that is not repeatable.

Insofar as there can be objects of perception that are simultaneous and thereby completely the same with respect to all properties, their temporal locus (which only occurs once) and the

system of their durations are indistinguishable: When something is simultaneous it has the same temporal loci with their same singularity, and it does not have different ones, as is the case when something follows something else successively. Thus, time does not individualize that which is simultaneous. Taken by itself, it only individualizes the entire fullness of content that belongs to each one of the respective temporal loci and durations.

Now, the individual duration encompasses each individual object as the form of all its determination. Thus, this also holds for the bodily thing. No matter what the thing is, it is a thing as the unity of its duration, a duration that it fulfills in a successive manner. We already know, by the way, that the spatial extension, what we call the thing-bodily shape with all its properties being extended spatially in it, is thus the fullness of duration; this is to say that every temporal point of this duration is already a spatial thing with respect to content, but precisely the momentary phase of it. However, every spatial point, and therefore space as a whole, is also absolutely singular with respect to its spatial fullness. The thing-bodily shape does indeed remain in movement with the object, but it has its individuality in every temporal point with respect to the absolute singularity of the fullness of the piece of space in which it is momentary. Many completely uniform things can reoccur in space, and to be sure, simultaneously; their thing-bodily shape can also be the same, like all other properties. But what can never be the same (this is ruled out by the intuitive sense of the bodily thing-like nature and spatiality) is the spatial position, that is, the system of places that makes the two thing-bodily shapes into this singular one. Sameness of the spatial position necessarily means identity. But the same place, the same singular piece of space, cannot have multiple spatial fullness, cannot have multiple fulfillment with real content. Naturally, this is tied to the principle of impenetrability. If two things, let us say for the sake of simplicity two uniform things, could penetrate each other with their movement, thus coinciding in a temporal point, they would have to be mere phantoms. The same spatial points, the same spatial surfaces, etc., would have to be doubly occupied: visually and in some other sensuous-material manner. Which is

absurd. Every spatial point, every piece of space can only be real one time, and cannot be doubly occupied.

Now, how does the absolute singularity of space as the form of possible real thing-like nature relate to that of time? Obviously, time is the higher form; what is spatial (which is constituted in the sense of external intuition as form) is constituted as the fullness of time, constituted as belonging to the enduring content. The singularity of every spatial point is thus a singularity within every possible phase of the duration, the singularity of something simultaneous over against something else that is simultaneous. In every temporal point that we might happen to fix upon, we thus have the multi-dimensional system of absolute spatial positions, and so space becomes the individualizing form of coexistence and already presupposes time.

Everything that is constituted in the transcendent process of the sense-giving of external perception with respect to the thing is in space (and already with respect to the structure of the phantom), and has within it its absolute uniqueness according to each one of its positional points. Even if it were an immaterial phantom, outside of causality, it would have to appear as existing in space; it has within it its individuation through the spatial position by virtue of its absolute singularity. This rules out all repetition, dual occupation of the same thing-bodily shape with dual things, since precisely every *individuum* can only exist through the individuality of the site. Space is the abiding form of coexistence, which is to say, it is the individuating form of all transcendent temporal objects with respect to every transcendent experiential sequence of coexistences that stretches through time; and space has this character because it is constituted as the constant form of temporal content and as the identical temporal content of all possible temporal contents.

The preceding analyses of perception cannot yet give us insight into how the accomplishment of transcendence actually comes about in the immanence of lived-experiencing. We must work out such an understanding at least for the sublayer of the perceptual thing, for the phantom.

<B. Consciousness and Sense—Sense and Noema>⁸⁸

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<1> Perception and Memory

Let us now consider clear memories instead of perceptions, like when, for instance, we presentify to ourselves here and now, in a clear intuitive memory, the theater with these or those events that we experienced when we were there. Everything we said is repeated here in a certain, though modified way. We look at the theater, we observe it in memory in a thematic attitude, but taken in a purely phenomenological sense this intuition is still something quite different from a perceiving.

What makes it different? What makes memory and its entire intentionality so closely related to perception, and yet what distinguishes it so radically from it? What is distinctive to and different for each of them comes clearly to the fore in and through the contrast. We are conscious of an object in perception as being there, so to speak, as in the present and in the flesh, as given *originaliter*; we only have it in mind in memory as a presentification of something that is not itself present. Perception is that consciousness which, so to speak, seizes a present with both hands by its shock of hair; it is a consciousness that makes present *originaliter*. In contrast, there are different modes of presentification. In and of itself, a presentification refers back to a making-present, though it is not a making-present. It allows something presentified—in our example, the memorial object—to appear “as if” it were present once again. This “as if and again” is a feature of consciousness that occurs in the remembered object itself, a feature that characterizes the mode of givenness of the object as a modification of the original mode of givenness, presentified precisely as merely memorial.

<2.> Presentification and Pictorial Imaging⁸⁹

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One is tempted to say that we have a pictorial image⁹⁰ of an object internally, that memory is an internal pictorial imagining. But that is absurd. And no less absurd is the naive interpretation, so tempting to primitive thought (as it was all too often at work in Ancient as well as in Modern philosophy) that explained perception itself as having an inner image⁹¹ of what is out there in reality, in the original. But the process of perceiving is in and of itself original consciousness, whether the perceived really exists or not; the perceived object is given to consciousness as there in the flesh, that is, precisely as there in the original. In the concordant, synthetic progression of perception, the perception is thus confirmed as what it is, as an original prehension of the self of its object. Independently of the question concerning justification, whether it is legitimate or deceptive, memory is likewise in and of itself a presentifying consciousness: the thing remembered is characterized as the presentification of an original that is not present. Even it is not a pictorial imagining. Opposed to a straightforward memory, as opposed to straightforward perception, a pictorial imagining characterizes, rather, a new kind of consciousness. For an image, like a bust, is given to consciousness as a thing that serves to presentify something that is non-present. If we see it we have a perception, a perception of the thing, "bust." But in a peculiar way, a presentification is carried out in this perception, one that presentifies to us a different object, the head of a human being that the bust-thing resembles. Memory, however, does not harbor the perception of a first object that [presentifies] to consciousness a second object resembling the first. It is also clear, nonetheless, that since the pictorial resemblance, which is contained in each apprehension of an image, is itself a presentification, it would be absurd to reduce all presentifications to pictorial ones, and in this way to make it supposedly intelligible. At the same time it is clear that memory is

a completely primitive form of presentification, namely, that it is a pure presentification, while every ordinary apprehension of an image, every consciousness through which we intuit things as paintings, statues, in short, as pictorial images, is composed of perceptions and presentifications (closely akin to straightforward memory).

<3.> Self-Forgetful Remembering

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If we stay with memories and settle into a nexus of memories in a living manner, we will find that there are different ways of carrying them out. In the first instance, the peculiar form of memory, which is completely self-forgetful, is possible at any time. That is, we can allow the current present and ourselves as the current subjects of the present to become completely submerged [in memory], and we can live intuitively, purely in the world of memory. As in perception, a normal focal orientation and an orientation of action is initially prefigured when memory is carried out as an egoic act—we have those kinds of orientations in which we are directed toward objects, apprehending them, objects that are called "remembered" in the natural sense: in our example, directed toward the theater and the events that took place in front of it. All these objects and events have the character of a memorial, presentified past. But we can also reflect in this submersion; then the apprehending regard turns toward the changing past view of the objects (for example of the theater), toward the modes of appearance that were given with it, toward the identical element in the modes of appearance, toward the ontic modes of certainty, of doubt, etc., but even toward the past ego itself that was doing the viewing. What kind of discoveries are these that are found through reflection?

We do not actually view, we do not actually perceive, we do not really have modes of appearance as actual ones, at least not like they are contained in perception. In fact, even these phenomena given in reflection have the character of presentifications; they are presentifications of perceptions; and just as the memorial objects of the normal viewpoint are given to consciousness memorially as things and events of the past, so too [are] the perceptions, the

⁸⁹ *Abbildung*⁹⁰ *Abbild*⁹¹ *Bild*

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appearances of them [given to consciousness] as memorial presentifications, as past perceptions and past appearances. If we are consistently in the attitude of self-forgetfulness here, that is, removed from the actuality of the present, then each and every thing that reflection lays hold of is given to consciousness in the mode of presentification—even the ego that encountered these submerged views, further, the remembered ego, the ego of yesterday that viewed the theater—but [given to consciousness as] presentified in memory. Accordingly, it is also clear that whatever the analysis has offered to us with respect to perceptions, especially appearances, objective sense, and modes of being, we find once again [with respect to memory]; but that which has the character of being originary, of an original making-present in perception, has the character of presentification here. Thus, in contrast, we see that perception, according to all its straightforward and reflective phenomenological components, is a place of originality through and through. On the other hand, memory is through and through a place of presentification. To be sure, the latter only holds so long as we dwell in the attitude of the complete submersion in memory and cash in on its holdings in a normal and reflective direction. Then we will find a past (presentified) ego, past perceptions, past senses, modes of being, etc.

Now the one carrying out the memories could object: But I live now and have my lived-experience of memory in the Now; these are actual lived-experiences, original, and not merely presentifications. That is of course absolutely correct. But the presupposition that takes the form of carrying out this submersion of the ego in the world of memory says quite a lot about the legitimate sense of this objection. "I live now" must not mean that as a central ego of the present I am "awake" and in action. The situation will become clear when we let the ego "come to," as it were, when we let ourselves as the ones remembering awaken from our dreaming self-forgetfulness: Our ego, conscious of its present, now casts its thematic gaze into memory, that is, from the Here and Now to what it has in mind in a presentified manner in the current actual lived-experience of memory, and this is memory in the second sense: An entire piece of past egoic life is

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presentified with what it encountered at that time as the experienced external world, as the theater, etc. From the standpoint of the Now, the wakeful ego looks directly at this thing or, staying in the framework of presentification itself, carries out a reflection on the past acts, appearances, etc. The wakeful ego's gaze slides from the past and from the presentification to the current present as the realm of the originary and now also finds, reflecting in the Now, its present lived-experience and acts of the "I remember" in which those pasts are centered from the standpoint of the wakeful egoic center. Then it also finds, looking back to the previous stages, the past actual lived-experiences of submersion as egoless background lived-experiences. The contrast is now clear: If we, as a wakeful present ego, actually carry out the "I remember," then the apprehending ray toward what is presentified will proceed from this wakeful center. But when we were submerged, we were precisely not coming on the scene as the actual ego actively occupied now; we were dreaming, and making its appearance was only the dreamt memorial ego of the past. All egoic acts were given to consciousness as quasi-acts, they all had the character of presentifications of the previous acts belonging to the previous ego, in relation to the past objects of the past perception.

Thus we have clearly and firmly this most important distinction, the distinction between acts that are given to consciousness as acts actually carried out now, acts peculiar to the ego that is actually occupied now, and the quasi-acts carried out by the ego lost in memory, presentified acts of the presentified ego. In this way, there is at the same time a new determination of the concept of the wakeful ego, a determination that was not available earlier, since then we were only concerned with current acts of the present and were only in a position to contrast these with dreamless sleep and with egoless backgrounds. Now we have become acquainted with being lost in sleep in the special form of being lost in memory, which is not egoless like the background phenomena, but whose ego, however much it is actually my ego (namely, is given to consciousness as truly my ego of yesterday), is still only a presentified ego, and not an ego currently active now. And precisely for this reason it is now said that the ego is not awake.

The wakeful ego is the ego that carries out actual acts now and actuates in them a life of acts that is constantly arising in an originary manner in relation to a perceptual present. I live entirely submerged in memory, dreaming, which is to say, my present stream of lived-experience is egoless in a peculiar way, without actual egoic acts that proceed from the Now, the perceptual present, going toward [another] Now, and by passing through a current presentification in consciousness, going toward what is past; no matter how full of life the submerged life in memory is, however much this life takes place in present acts, this present is still not a thematic present; the one who is lost in dream does not have a thematic present at all; he is not awake for it and for himself. Only upon awakening does the sun of the central ego, as the radiating center of actual acts, first dawn in the stream of consciousness, and only now are the memorial lived-experiences transformed into those that are centered in the current, present ego, in actual acts of the "I remember."

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<4. The Complexity of the Ego>

But we learn still more. We encounter here a wondrous dual stratification in the intentionality of all memory, and it has become patent through the emergence of the wakeful ego as the subject of a current present, and at the same time, as the subject of present acts of memory. Living in the present, the ego is thus related to a past. But the past is itself a past present. I, the wakeful ego, am the subject within a realm of the present given to consciousness. But that means phenomenologically that I perceive all kinds of things and still much more is ready to be perceived by me; I am the ego of an actual stream of lived-experiences that are original lived-experiences in every Now, and of which I am conscious in perceptions, even if they are latent. But presentifying memories, among other lived-experiences, arise in this stream of lived-experiences, and however much they are themselves my present original lived-experiences precisely a non-present present, with a non-present ego and stream of lived-experiences is presentified through these memories, even with non-present external perceptions and with a non-present external world perceived in

perceptions, etc. I not only am, and I not only live, but a second, entire egoic life is given to consciousness, is mirrored in my life, as it were, namely, is presentified in my present memories. And that's not all, not [merely] a second life, but an infinity of such lives, insofar as the past is a continuum, and belonging to every point of the memorial past is another presentified present with the presentified ego and egoic life. The respective ego, however, is continually identical throughout all these reproductions, identically my ego, and I am conscious of it in the current memory with its past actuality in a secure certainty.

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<5. Memories of the Future and Memories of the Present>

We were afforded several insights into the wonders of memorial consciousness. Deeper forays would continually elucidate such wonders. To be sure, we must restrict ourselves to what is really necessary, specifically, to what is at stake for the sense-giving accomplishment of memory. For on our present path, which concerns the relationships of consciousness and sense and the clarification of the idea of sense, in force is the entire investigation into the intentional nature of memory as well as the previous investigation of the intentional nature of perception, of the demonstration of the contents of sense.

Before we pass over to this, let us expand our idea of memory. We previously understood by memory intuitive remembering, a word that not only characterized presentifying modifications of perceptions as such and in complete generality, but only those that re-presentify the pasts, "as if" they were once again presents of perception running their course. But there are also presentifications that go toward the future and even toward the present; thus, when we expectantly look forward to a future event, and even already allow it to take place in intuition as if it would run its course. Finally, where the presentifications of the present are concerned, we will only need to think once more of our example of the theater or the streets and the passages in the city, we only need to view them in intuition, but as here and now where we do not perceive them, and on the other hand, not as the objects in the mode of the past, as we saw them yesterday for instance, but

rather as existing now. What we have expounded upon (and are still expounding upon) regarding remembering as remembering-back obviously also holds to quite a large extent for these new presentifications, for these memories of the future and memories of the present. This can be recognized from the very beginning. On the other hand, we would certainly learn from a closer analysis that remembering is presupposed for an understanding of these new presentifications because they have an intentional structure that is necessarily founded in remembering. Thus, they do not have the originality and primitiveness like rememberings do. But we should not go into these questions, and we must let our rough considerations suffice.

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<6> The Clarification of the Immanent Sense-Structure of Memories

We had ascertained that everything found in perception, whose nature it is to be originality-consciousness, is found again in every memory, but [here it is found] in the mode of non-originality, of presentification: thus, presentified things and events, as those of presentified perceptions, and belonging to them, presentified senses, namely, the corresponding objective senses, and on these senses, the presentified modes of being. Concerning the latter, we are conscious of the objects concerned in memory as those objects that are before us either as actualities of which we are certain or as dubious, as probable actualities, etc. But memory, understood as the current, actual, intentional lived-experience, still carries out its own intentional accomplishment and, that is to say, it does not only presently and does not only harbor presentified senses and modes of being of itself as the presentified ego, but contains its own current senses and modes of being. Memory is not merely a reproduction of a previous consciousness, of a previous intending and a previous intended meaning, but related to this in a second layer. [remembering is] also a present intending or meaning of the current ego.

Insofar as memory precisely reproduces and perception does not, the talk of originality and non-originality depicts the mode of givenness, the mode of consciousness of the object from the

perspective of the lived-experiencing. But if we are directed toward the object itself without any reflection, then new values, new temporal values emerge that do not say anything of consciousness and its mode, but do speak for the fact that unique features emerge in the object itself corresponding to those modes of consciousness. Namely, in perception as directed purely toward the perceived object, we find the object as existing now, as a present object. In memory, turning purely toward the remembered object, we find it as past. And now we note that forms of sense arise here, indeed for both of them. For purely with regard to the object that is perceived as such, with regard to what is given to us as the identical sense of perception, we have the "now"; with regard to the remembered object as such, [we have] the "past." If we have specific act-intendings, at one time the object is meant in the temporal mode of the "now," the present, another time [it is meant] in the temporal mode of the past. Both are independent of whether it may be a matter of legitimate, verifying perceptions or memories. For both of them we have senses, and for both we have objective senses with temporal modes that belong to them.

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<7> Time as the Form of all Senses of the Object

Now what is it that is given to consciousness in any modality of being whatsoever, or most simply, that is given to consciousness within memory as existing with certainty? The object or the event as past. By contrast, in perception the object or the event [is given] as present, as now. Time, or rather, the modes of time, come into view here for us, and we must become clear what that should mean with regard to sense or for sense. We realize that our analysis of sense pertaining to perception was incomplete and that what we had gained for it under the rubric of "sense" was not its full sense. Lacking in the sense itself was a universal dimension, a sense-form. If time is objectively the universal form of all individual, real objects, then it is accordingly a universal form of all possible individual object-senses for consciousness. Furthermore, it is a universal form in which all objects in general and object-senses in general are embedded in a certain way and necessarily. If senses are the great theme of the logic of senses,

and if, as we can demonstrate, they are senses that are expressed in expressions and propositions, then the discussion of the form of time has universal, fundamental significance for us. In the Middle Ages and in the Modern era, one was helpless in the face of the interpretation of temporal modes within the doctrine of judgment: one was unable to discern whether the temporal modes belong to the so-called copula "is" or to the object, and what that should mean—all this goes together with the complete lack of profound investigations into time-consciousness and its structures of sense.

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Let us then go back once again to perception and reap the benefits of our analyses of memory. In these analyses we got to know presentifications in their primary and most impressive shapes of all. That will have made our mental eye receptive to understanding other and still more original shapes of presentification, shapes that are connected to perception itself. The extent to which we had to contrast perception as non-presentification with presentifying memory is the extent to which we must now also insist that, by its very nature, perception can only be a concrete process of making present by also necessarily being presentification.

<8.> Now and Originalness

In order to shed light on this paradox, let us consider what is contained in the form of this Now, in the form of the present, in which what is perceived is necessarily given. This moment corresponds to the mode of givenness of originality, to the mode of being presented in the flesh in which the perceptual object is given to consciousness. But does this mean that the thing is Now, that the event, the melody runs-off now? To be sure, it endures! This Now is obviously an entire expanse of time that is productive in an ordinary and wondrous way in a steady flux: An initial tone sounds and continues; it comes to an end, then a second one begins etc. But we easily recognize that within this broad Now, within this broad present, we can again distinguish presents and pasts, and each time a distinctive Now is noticeable, only to slip between our fingers just as quickly. A Now arising originally is filled with a tonal content. But the Now has already become a non-

Now, and the new Now has a new content, here a uniform one, here a qualitatively altered one, and so on, without stop. The Now changes into the just-Now. But the just-Now has not disappeared from consciousness and from the thematic hold. Not only is the Now and its content affected by the flowing change, but the just-Now is itself once more transformed into a just-Now from the just-Now, and so on. Only in this way can the tone and the melody as a concrete object in perception can be given to consciousness, not just because this continual process runs its course, but also because as the process of consciousness, a unity of sense-giving is carried out in a constant coinciding with itself, a constant coinciding, naturally, according to the immanent sense.

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<9.> Time-Consciousness

In our following reflections, we can make intelligible the necessity of a process, a process like the one that we have to describe now; and we can make intelligible the necessity of its intentional structures, and through this we can make ourselves more receptive to the very seeing of them. In the natural attitude bearing on the object, we say: An individual object is inconceivable without a duration; it is the identical element that endures throughout the continuum of the phases of the duration.

If we focus on the successive content of this duration, on what fills up the duration anew from temporal point to temporal point, we will have (for example, with the enduring tone) the momentary phases of the sounding tone, of the tonal process—we will have momentary phases that are newer and newer, now changing with respect to content, now [remaining] the same with respect to content. The tone itself is accordingly called altered or unaltered. Now, what in principle will enable such an identical tone to be given to consciousness, and thus the temporal object in general, as the identical temporal object of a process extending throughout the duration, and initially, such that it should be able to be given as original, given perceptually? How must such a perception be constituted with necessity? Every perception, like every lived-experiencing, is likewise and necessarily there for consciousness and its subject as something that can be experienced in a possible

reflection, and it is evident that it is itself something temporal; it begins and runs-off, it has its time, its duration, its process. Now, how must this process of consciousness be so fashioned—a process in which the objective process is given, the process of a melody or of some other object that we become cognizant of through perception?

If one poses this question as my teacher, Franz Brentano, has already done, it is tempting to say at once, of course, that what is primary is the fact that in every momentary phase of the perceptual process, a corresponding momentary phase of the perceptual tonal process is perceived, that is, is given in the mode of consciousness: "in the flesh." But that does not suffice. For if in the course of perceptual lived-experiencing, the respective momentary lived-experiencing has gone over into a new one, thus, past by, then the new one brings to consciousness precisely a new tonal content: Every momentary phase of perceiving [brings to consciousness] its content and no other. By no means could the consciousness of a tonal process, of a melody arise. But we have this consciousness, and during the perceiving, [we have it] in every moment; we are not only conscious of the momentary resounding tone or even of its momentary phase, but [we are conscious of] the protracted tone itself and the melody—to be sure, as a constant becoming, constant flowing and elapse. But fundamentally belonging to this is consciousness' possession of what has elapsed. That is, a perception is inconceivable without a continuum of so-called "fresh memories" being constantly and closely intertwined with the actually and genuinely perceived phenomenon of the momentary Now. The continuum of the tonal data, the tonal data that have been given to consciousness in the past perceptual phases, is further preserved in consciousness for a while, with a continuity, in the form of these memories, and naturally in the mode of "what has just been."

All of this is a good introduction, but it is still not a phenomenological elucidation of the structures of time-consciousness that would make possible an actual comprehension of the original sense-giving of time-consciousness. We now turn to a memorial content of perception; and it is evident from this (and entirely apart from the considerations of the kind we just

employed) that the memorial content is at no time and by no means separable from perception.

Let us reflect once again in a more precise manner. Belonging to the nature of perception is the process of presenting something to consciousness as there in the flesh, as Now. But a Now cannot be presented to consciousness without something that has just been. Thus, memory fundamentally belongs together in a unity with a perceptual process. This memory, which is connected to the Now-consciousness in a wholly immediate manner, we call retention. But we must now note that the same modification that the Now sustains in [becoming] the just-Now, the same modification that the momentary phase of an actually original making-present sustains in [becoming] presentification, is also sustained by this presentification itself. The just-Now is transformed into a new just-Now, a just-Now from the just-Now, and so on, *in infinitum*. Let us mentally fix any moment of the streaming perceptual process (whose streaming cannot actually be inhibited), that is, let us take a cross-section of the process, right in the middle of its course: for instance, when a melody sounds, the moment a certain tone begins anew. How does the affiliated perceptual consciousness look, the perceptual consciousness belonging to this moment? Here we do not only have the onset of the tone given to consciousness as now and in the strict sense as resounding originally; but in a whole expanse, we also have the past tone with all its phases in a fresh memory, and potentially even the past tones further back. But all of that is not given to consciousness as having-just-been in the same way, rather, corresponding to each phase of the process given to consciousness retentionally and having run its course is a new mode of "having-just-been," a new mode of the past. In other words, the consciousness of the retentional presentification has a new structure of sense for each one of these phases. In the direction of the thing perceived, our cross-section of the perception of the tone offers a phase of momentary present and a continuum of just-pasts being differentiated; in the correlative direction of the lived-experiencing there is distinguished a moment of pure making-present, limiting a continuum of presentifications that are undergoing transformation. When we put the accentuated cross-

section of the living perceptual process back into the flux, so to speak, and observe how it continually changes, we experience which kind of presentifications these are and how they determine the unitary structure along the unity of the process. The newly resounding tonal phase loses its originality, the original making-present becomes a presentification, the original Now becomes a having-just-been. But the presentification is transformed into a presentification of a presentification, the just-Now into a just-Now of the just-Now; the same holds for this one, and this takes place continually. In this way, we have now obtained a longitudinal section related to the certain tonal phase. Accordingly, when we go along the perceptual process we find, corresponding to it, a continuum that begins with the original onset of the tone, and lets this pure, original consciousness overflow into the continual network of presentifications of presentifications, *in infinitum*.

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But what we said about the phase of the onset of the tone also holds obviously for the entire cross-section of the perceptual process that we previously had in mind and that belonged to the moment when the tone had just begun. This momentary cross-section was an entire continuum, and the continuum of all the living presentifications of the previous tones in this moment. This entire momentary continuum, I say, succumbs to this law of sinking back into memory; it is constantly transformed. And while it is being transformed, it constitutes a steady consciousness of the momentary consciousness that has just past on, and does this in the continual mediacy of all moments that have past on. Thus, each lived-experience of perception is exhibited (in a marvelous intricacy, and yet in an understandable necessity) as an unflagging streaming process of becoming in which a successive continuum of continua of retentional presentifications is generated in a living manner, while a momentary-Now arises *originaliter* livingly in every full present, and is superseded in the streaming of a new one, but its comet's tail of retentions follow upon it. Precisely through this, a continual unity of consciousness becomes possible in the progression of the flux, a unity that has its correlate in the unity of the temporal objectlike formation with the temporal duration belonging to this unity itself. A unity of consciousness as the consciousness of one and the same datum, and therefore a

continual unity of the objective sense, runs thoroughly through every continual series of successive presentifications that brought into play any datum at all (for example, the newly resounding tone) arising in the original Now. However, the mode of consciousness may alter in the retentional modification; however much the lived-experience as such may change, it is the one and individually the same tone and the same tonal phase that remains given to consciousness in the change, and only the temporal mode of givenness necessarily becomes different. The identically same tone is constituted for consciousness precisely because on the whole an alteration of the lived-experience has not taken place; what has taken place, rather, is an alteration in the steady coinciding that forms identically peculiar to the intentionality that is instituted with the onset of the tone and that is then modified. In the steady, successive process of coinciding, one intention coincides with another intention according to its very sense. The modification in the form of a steady presentification maintains an identity of sense: As a steady modification that abides in consciousness retentionally, the modification maintains the identity of sense in consciousness in a steady and unitary manner. That holds for every new momentary phase of the object in its original emerging and fading away, and thus holds for the concretely full temporal object with respect to its constitution as a concrete object for consciousness, as concretely enduring.

25 <10. The Structure of Perception and Consciousness in General>

If, in this way, we immerse ourselves in the structure of perceptual consciousness with its intentionality that is systematically connected and regulated according to continua, and continua of continua, we will understand how it happens that all the presentifications, which stem from ever new points of originality (for example, from the ever newly resounding tones and tonal phases), cannot get confounded with one another, neither the reverberating residues of our tone with one another, nor with the other tones or noises and their retentional residues running their course along with them. Indeed, we are standing in an indefatigable and an exceedingly multiform alteration in the lived-

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experience; but by virtue of a synthetic coinciding of sense, an objectlike formation firmly regulated in itself, one also firmly regulated in contrast to other objectlike formations, is necessarily constituted in this alteration: with a firm duration, whose temporal loci are fixed, and with firm coexistences and successions of concrete objects becoming distinctive. Even if the one tone of the sequence is completely uniform with another one with respect to content, it is the tone of this duration, like that tone of that duration. The layers of the modification of retentionality are distinguished; they cannot be conflated. And this also holds for the particular momentary phases of one and the same enduring tone. For what has flowed from a newly resounding tone with respect to retentional presentifications is distinguished without confusion from what has flowed from every other one: The continuum of these derivations has its unity in the coinciding of sense into which something that is alien to the sense cannot intrude. [319]

That designates a primordial lawfulness of perception and therefore of all lived-experiencing in general, insofar as all lived-experiencing is constantly constituted by perception as being-conscious.⁹²

(1) The study of the general structure of perceptions, and of rememberings standing in contrast to them, provides us for the first time with the insight into how lived-experiences, so to speak, not only can be, but can be conscious of something, how they carry out within themselves a sense-giving, how through a continual coinciding of sense a unity of the objective sense can be formed and be maintained through the alteration of lived-experiences. It is completely evident that individual objects are inconceivable unless they are temporally formed objects. But such objects cannot be given to consciousness *originaliter*; for instance, they cannot be perceived through a conscious-having that is devoid of structure. Perceptual consciousness is not an empty box into which a perceptual object shows up unannounced and ready-made; rather, the perceptual object is immanently constituted in it by an exceedingly subtle sense-giving structure of perception. It is constituted in the steady alteration of the manifolds of lived-

experience instituting sense by virtue of their continual coinciding of sense. It is built up as steadily becoming with its temporal shape and in variable modalities of time. Here we must understand the absolute necessity that an object cannot be "there" perceptually for the ego any differently at all, that it can only appear to it as constituted in such a process of becoming.⁹³

(2) The lawfulness with which we have become acquainted in the structure of perceptions easily reveals its universal significance as a primordial lawfulness of the life of consciousness in general. For the latter is not only a lived-experiencing continually streaming along; at the same time, as it streams along it is also immediately the consciousness of this streaming. This consciousness is self-perceiving, although it is a thematically executed awareness on the part of the ego only in exceptional circumstances. Belonging to the latter is a reflection that is possible at any time. This perceiving that presents all lived-experiencing to consciousness is the so-called inner consciousness or inner perceiving. — Among lived-experiences are also, then, especially the so-called external perceptions, which are themselves given to consciousness internally, but for their part are modes of consciousness of "external" objects, namely, perceptions of them, of trees, of houses, etc.

⁹² It will become completely evident to you as we proceed that we can gain an actual philosophical logic only through such an elucidation of knowledge and its accomplishments, an elucidation that illuminates the innermost essence of the matters. According to our method, we let the idea of logic and its necessary problematic naturally develop and grow in us, and specifically by building it up by means of systematically organized founding elements. Watching the growth of logical fruits, we will show in the following reflections what logical fruit itself is. Drawing upon particular accomplishments, we should be able to show what, on the whole, can be accomplished and what the task of a proper science must be able to accomplish, a science of unprecedented significance, a science of *logos* in the most universal and at the same time deepest sense. Perception and its parallel modes of consciousness of intuition are, however, the first fundamental shapes of consciousness that are at issue for the structure of consciousness that is specifically logical; they are the first foundations in the logical structure that must be situated and understood. Thus, we are not digressing for instance; rather, we are already logicians here without knowing it. In our method, however, we must already be the logicians in order to be able to know it.

<11. Noematic and Noetic Directions of Description>

It was necessary for us to have embarked upon two directions of observations in a concerted manner; and these two directions had become interwoven with one another in our minds for the purpose of clarifying the constitutive accomplishments: namely, [1] the direction of lived-experiencing with its structures, and [2] the opposite direction of its sense and what, in this very direction, is seen with respect to sense and conjoined along with it. Like every consciousness, perceiving presents something to consciousness in this consciousness, [and it does so] as always, irrespective of all questions concerning legitimacy or truth. Thus, we can take the attitude toward this something and describe in a purely phenomenological manner what is presented to consciousness in this consciousness: we describe what is perceived purely as something perceived in this perception and in the very manner in which it is presented to consciousness there. This description of perception, but also of every other [mode of] consciousness, is called noematic description. In this attitude we come across sense with its temporal form and modes of being, but as we will soon hear, we also come across something else. The opposite direction is the direction of the perceiving lived-experience with all the structures in which sense, and everything that presents itself in it (in the mode of those described continua of making-present and presentification), is constituted as a thoroughgoing unity. This direction of description is the noetic one. We must embark upon both, each in their turn, so that we will understand how in the lived-experiencing, in the noesis, which is necessarily variable and changing, a unitary noema with an identical sense and the other noematic structures can be accomplished.

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<12. Identical Sense and Noematic Modes>

We make an extremely important observation here that holds for all senses, namely, that the sense does not belong, for example, as an intimately inherent component to the corresponding lived-experiences in which the sense is said to be enclosed. For if we take a chain of lived-experiences of an absolutely identical sense,

we will have separate lived-experiences, and not lived-experiences that have in common an intimately inherent piece that is individually identical. For that would rule out the separation. We can be conscious of absolutely the same thing today and tomorrow, but that does not mean that we have the same individual piece in consciousness like in a box. The identical sense is thus an ideally identical moment of all lived-experiences of consciousness that accord in sense.

If we distinguish consciousness and its objects, and take the object merely as a meant sense within the phenomenological attitude, consciousness itself will sketch out for us a course of possible identifications that proceed from the consciousness in question to a newer and newer consciousness, as the consciousness of the same meant object. Thus, there are identifications (like in the example of a perceived tone) in which the tone itself, as an object with its objectlike determinations, is what is to be apprehended thematically and identified as the same object of manifold rememberings. Precisely this determines the concept of objective sense. Likewise, within a living perception, the new tonal phase appearing in every new Now is in the process of sinking back steadily into the retentional modification for the consciousness of the same tonal phase, just that it undergoes the mode of the just-having-been and suffers progressive obscurity. As opposed to the identical content that is prefigured by the respective consciousness itself under the title of its sense-giving to an object, we have differences within the various lived-experiences that bear the same sense, differences that emerge in the sense as the character of givenness. Thus not only sense and mode of appearance, but also other modes of givenness that are not original or reproductive presentations. In this way, where a remembering is not completely obscure, it can be more or less lively or obscure. In the case of complete obscurity, the object is still meant, still given to consciousness but, so to speak, in a completely empty manner. All the same, it is not empty of sense, it is still given to consciousness with the same sense, as this object determined in this way or that—and likewise within the continuity of the retentional modification of the tonal phase that becomes obscure each time. It is preserved with respect to its sense,

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otherwise it would not arrive at the duration being constituted identically with the identical tone as a whole; but that which is identical, what we call sense, has modes of obscurity. We call the latter noematic modes of sense and not modes that belong within the sense itself. Thus, all differences have their place there [in the noematic modes of sense], differences that distinguish the perceptual sense from the corresponding reproductive sense.

There are still further noematic differences issuing from a domain with which we are familiar, where lived-experiences are concerned, these differences correspond to background-lived-experiences and act-lived-experiences and are quite manifold, since the background is in no way entirely dead. The objects that are constituted in the background come into relief, as we say, more or less intensely; they exercise a more or less intense allure on the slumbering or wakeful ego. If the ego becomes attentive, it will be able to occupy itself with the allures primarily and thematically, or only secondarily, or even only non-thematically, etc. All of that gives different noematic features to "objects" as identical senses, which as such do not belong to the series of possible identifications in which the meant object itself is determined. This object is what is identical over against all such noematic differences.

We likewise take into account the differences of temporal orientation within the mere noema, differences that have a distinctive place within the noema because they have a special feature, namely, the feature of modes of appearance in the strict sense.

<13. Primordial Impression, Retention, Protention>

We should introduce a further terminological definition right away. Perception is giving in an ordinary manner with respect to its immanent object, that is, its sense. But as we saw, this can only be the case insofar as it is an integration of pure acts of making-present and presentifications streaming along, which as phases of the stream are non-independent. We call the momentary, pure making-present of every perception, in which there is a new making-present in every moment, a primordial impression. Its

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accomplishment is the primordial institution of a new temporal point in the mode of the Now, filled with objectlike formations. The continua of presentifications of something that has occurred "just" now which belongs to every moment of perceiving, we take as retentions; they fuse into a unity of one retention, which however has a new mode in every phase of the continuum.

Under closer scrutiny—and this would be a necessary supplementation—we notice that a new sort of presentification still belongs to perception, what we call protention. Protentions are anticipations continually undergoing change and, from the very beginning, are constantly aroused by the course of retentions. A futural horizon is continually awakened, even if it is obscure and relatively indeterminate; a future is constantly constituted, namely, as an ever newly altered future just about "to arrive." The tone resounding and continuing to sound, sounds for consciousness into a future; it reaches out to perception, so to speak, with open arms. No matter how empty and indeterminate this anticipatory continuity may be, it cannot be completely indeterminate; the style, so to speak, of "what is to come" is prefigured through what has just past. The sense-content of what is to come is also necessarily altered along with the change of what has actually occurred and has past on—whereby even this change lingers and is preserved in retention. If every fresh past is a continuum of the adumbration of presents continually fading away, then every future about to arrive is a second-order adumbration, a shadow cast by that first continuum of adumbration. Indeed, it is a primordial law that every retentional course—in pure passivity, without co-participation by the active ego—immediately and steadily motivates and thus generates intentions of expectancy that are determined in the sense of a similarity of style. The intentions of expectancy can either be fulfilled or disappointed. The progression of the perception of the same thing is characterized by the fact that not only do expectations follow upon expectations, but by the fact that a new primordial impression occurs again and again, a primordial impression that necessarily fulfills the last series of expectation that was aroused—namely, insofar and so long as the same thing remains perceived. Disappointment can effect only particular moments.

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Through the systematic structure of lived-experience that is characterized by the general terms, primordial impression, retention, and protention, the perceptual object's sense-structure and the entire shape of its noematic givenness is prefigured for every possible perceptual object in general, and this is the case according to general and necessary features.

<14.> Retention and Remembering

Having studied in a detailed manner the noetic structure of perception and the noetic structure of remembering as the intuitive memory of something past, let us now compare them. Here the essential difference suddenly comes to mind, namely, that even presentifications, i.e., those so-called fresh memories, the complex of retentions we described, belong to the essential structure of perception. But [it is] not only [the case] that these are non-independent and thus, as they emerge, can never be made independent. In their very nature and with respect to their intentional accomplishment, they are fundamentally different from rememberings. Notice that, according to our analyses, making up the fundamental nature of remembering is a full, concrete perception, presentified once again in its concretion. Its immanent sense, its perceptual object, is thereby presentified as standing there, so to speak, once more before our eyes—and that is the memorial object. Perceiving is a synthetic accomplishment of sense that is carried out in a continual streaming. Accordingly, remembering is likewise, naturally, a synthetic accomplishment that is carried out in a continual streaming; and it has, as it were, the same contents, but precisely in the mode of the "as if." Perception is the consciousness of originality. But even though it is the consciousness of originality in its primordial impression, and in a superior way, it is not only this consciousness of originality. Certainly, we are conscious of only the new tonal phase in the pure character of its presentation in the flesh, the new tonal phase flashing forth in the pure punctual Now; that is, only for this new tonal phase is there a pure making-present. Yet, according to its other phases, the retentional ones, perception is also an original consciousness in a certain way. For if retention

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only presentifies the tonal phases that are fading away, this presentification in its necessary function is endowed with making concrete perception possible in an original accomplishment. What is constituted there originally is precisely the first, most primitive shape of the past as just-having-been and as necessarily belonging to the phenomenon of the living process. But it is through the constant coinciding of the original pasts being modified, and likewise the coinciding of the anticipatory futural phenomena, that the identity of the tonal process that is being structured temporally, and thus every perceptual object with its identical temporal points, comes about for consciousness. It comes about in the continual process of abiding and enduring. Or, as we can also put it, the constitutive accomplishment of the primordial impression and of continuity of retentions and also of protentions that steadily modify the primordial impression is a unique, indivisible accomplishment; through this alone the immanent, temporally extended object, that is, a concrete individual object, can be given to consciousness. Thus, taken completely and as a whole, perception is actually an original consciousness. In contrast, what we call a memory in the normal sense is completely the opposite of an original consciousness. Everything that a perceiving accomplishes *originally*, namely, its entire circuitry of noetic and noematic structures, memory brings in itself to a presentification; and its unique, new mode is the "re" or "again." It re-presents or presents again a temporal objectlike formation to consciousness in such a way that it allows it to run-off one more time, so to speak, as if it were perceived, but everything: the current Now, just-Now, what is to come, is merely "re"-presentified; its perceiving is not actual, but rather reproduced perceiving. Thus, the retentions and protentions that are contained in it are not actual retentions and protentions, but reproductions of them. Reproduction is not, as Hume thought, and the sensualistic psychology since Hume, something like a poor imitation of a perception or a mere weak echo of it; rather, it is precisely a new fundamental mode of consciousness wherein the ego is conscious of the fact that precisely a re-presentification of a previous perception with its perceptual object is taking place: Only from such a consciousness can the sense of the terms "re-presentification" and "memory"

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become intelligible. Obviously, we could also say something similar about expectation and the shape of its bringing the future to intuition.

To be sure, what we just said demands some supplementation, and practically a rectification. Retention and protention are the primitive, first forms of instituting the past and the future. But retention and protention as the primordial forms of presentification are empty forms. Only the intuitive remembering, which awakens the past, creates the past as the intuitively fulfilled shape of the present in the mode of past and, as it were, experienced once again; and likewise "fore-seeing" the future, the intuitive effective realization of protention, creates the shape of the future that is intuitively given to consciousness as the present in the mode of arriving and, as it were, in pre-enjoying, being experienced in an anticipatory manner.

Genetically, empty shapes precede all types of intuition, all perceptual constitution of objectlike formations, in all modes of appearance. Nothing can come to intuition that was not previously empty presented and that comes to fulfillment in intuition.

20 <15> Remembering and Objectivation. "Object."

These new modes of consciousness alone make a spiritual life possible, a life of knowing, valuing, willing, and doing. If there were no remembering (in the event a life of consciousness were possible without it), only the particular perceptually constituted objectlike formation would be there for the ego in its present temporal becoming. But in the full sense, there would actually be no object at all for the ego; lacking would be the consciousness of something graspable in multiple possible graspings, the consciousness of a being to which one can return again and again, and that one can recognize as the same, and further, that one can adopt as a possession freely at one's disposal. Thus, completely lacking is the presentation of a Something that is in itself, as opposed to the possible views that make something present to consciousness: in a word, precisely an object. To achieve this, as Kant has already seen in his transcendental deduction (to be sure, restricting it to spatial objectivity), one requires reproduction and

recognition. What perception presents to consciousness in an original manner as an existing unity in the process of becoming, through the flux of its primordial impressions and retentions and protentions, must be able to be remembered in repeated rememberings and be able to be recognized as the same, as the same thing that I had perceived earlier. But for consciousness itself, repeated remembering is grasped as a newer and newer remembering of the same thing, grasped through syntheses of identity. By becoming attentive in this way to certain identifying acts, cognitive acts, we take a look ahead to the acts that make up the field of what is specifically *logos*. Now we only have to recognize that the "One" that is constituted in perception itself and alone in perception, as it is constituted in pure passivity prior to all remembering and all active cognition, is not yet an "object." "Object" is the correlate of cognition, which cognition lies originally in the process of synthetic identification, which presupposes remembering.

This holds for every kind of object, even for the noetic and noematic structures of intuitive lived-experiences that have become for us scientific objects in our phenomenological investigations. Evidently, we have gained all of our determinations, for example, concerning sense and the structures of sense, on the basis of reproductions: We compared exemplarily manifold perceptions of the same sense-content, but we could only do that in chains of remembering related to lived-experiences that flowed-off by repeatedly running through them and identifying the common element.⁹⁴

⁹⁴ Chains of re-perception and chains of remembering and their function for knowledge. Chains of perception of something uniform for the knowledge of something general. Modes of knowledge in the framework of the unity of perception articulated successively and in uniformity, i.e., modes of knowledge in the framework of the unity of a continual, even if articulated perception, like when looking around in a room, I turn around and turn back again to the previous objects; here a unity of perception takes place, but which, in turning back around is the perception of the same objects; for them this is re-perception, but a re-perception of the same objects in an altered original temporal locus.

<16> The Temporal Extension of the Object as the Extension of Sense [328]

If we look back from our studies of memory to the previous studies of perception, we will not only recognize that we could gain all knowledge of what lies in perception only on the basis of rememberings and analyses on the basis of remembered perceptions. (Even our knowledge of memories required us not only to carry out rememberings, but also to carry out repeated lived-experiences of memory, and to regard even them in remembering, bringing them to analytical cognition and comparison.) But we also discern that belonging inseparably to all perception itself is a region of presentification, namely, of a special form of memory, the so-called primary memory or retention. Notice that every current perceptual-Now steadily and incessantly sinks back into a just-Now in consciousness, a just-Now that quickly fades away and is lost in obscurity. What we call the perceptual present is thus an ever new living Now with an immediate extension of the past, with the extension of the "just-now." Memory, which we had examined more closely, was remembering, and if it has the character of a presentification of perception, then it presentifies *eo ipso* the perceptual-Now with the originary having-just-been belonging to the Now, which in remembering is the previous, long past having-just-been.

Due to their difficulty, we cannot go into deeper analyses of all these intentional complexities. But what we see clearly is this: That departing from a perception it is not sufficient to distinguish its perceptual sense and its modes of being, but rather that belonging no less inseparably to the objective sense of perception, and then belonging no less to the objective sense of the objects of remembering, is a variable temporal mode as well. Perceptual objects are individual objects, and their remembering is a presentification of individual objects; all such objects are necessarily given in a temporality, and this temporality is constituted as a determination of the identical objective sense. Each individual object is initially given to consciousness in the modes of the ever new Now and ever newly changing past. However, on the other hand, every past, that is, every past Now, is

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identifiable as the same in any number of repeated rememberings, as the same temporal sense, and this temporal sense is already contained in original perception in its Now that originally institutes time.

We can also expound upon this here: To say that different perceptions, which follow upon one another and continually pass over into each other, harmonize according to their objective sense is precisely to say that the momentary Now-phase of perception and the retentional memories that are continually annexed [to the Now-phase of perception] harmonize in the objective sense, and it does so completely in the case of an unaltered object. Later corresponding rememberings have the same objective sense. In contrast, the temporal modes are different as well as the temporal points themselves that belong to the momentary phases of these acts. Belonging to the continuity of a perception with respect to the object is the unity of duration during which the object endures. Every point of duration is exhibited in the sense through a constantly variable modality of the Now or the modality of the having-been. But if we focus on a temporal point, or rather, on the object in this temporal point, it will remain identically the same throughout all alterations of the being-pushed-back-into-the-past and throughout all alterations of remembering with their temporal modalities. Accordingly, the object in its entire duration, and this duration itself, is also something identical in any number of repeated rememberings. Thus we find the object-sense, which presents itself in an ideally infinite number of appearances, as identically the same in a temporal extension, in the extension of duration. The latter does not lie in its appearances, which we characterized as aspects of the object; rather, it has its system of temporal adumbrations according to each one of its points, from the point of view of form, these adumbrations are uniform for every point, since every temporal point arising in the manner of an original source is constituted as Now and runs through its modes of the past and further and further pasts. The temporal duration is the duration of this object. This is to say that the temporal duration characterizes a coinciding that is inseparable from the continual coinciding of appearances, a coinciding that constitutes the objective sense, and thus characterizes a coinciding that is carried

out together with them, a coinciding of temporal adumbrations with respect to the same temporal point. Object-sense and the temporal sense intertwined with it form an integral unity of sense, and the mode of being, the "being certain" or the "being doubtful," etc., bears on both components. [330]

We have therefore elucidated the logical elementary ideas, the primitive structures of senses according to their origin; we have become acquainted with them and, in their generality, with the structures of lived-experience that constitute them originally and for consciousness.

<17. Reproductive Sense and Modes of the Past>

The latter observation has put the sense-giving functions of perception and of the corresponding rememberings and memories of the future in relation to one another, and it showed that they can work together. It will now be prudent, and even quite necessary, to work out in more detail the concepts of objective sense and noema that were first introduced, along with getting to know still more closely the constitutive accomplishments of these kinds of acts in their important features.

20 Corresponding to every perception is an ideally infinite manifold of possible memories, all of which presently the same perception, exactly as it is in itself, and thereby the perceived as such, the sense. Now, all these infinitely many possible lived-experiences have the same objective sense, wholly the same, and yet they are different in the so-called "noematic" regard. Let us reflect. Two rememberings that refer back to the same perception can obviously present to consciousness the remembered objectlike formation, e.g., the melody that was heard earlier only in a modally altered past. If I hear a melody now and if it comes to me tomorrow in memory, I will have the melody in mind in the mode of "yesterday," and in a memory occurring the day after tomorrow [I will have the melody] in the mode of "the day before yesterday." Obviously this holds generally for all similar cases. That is to say, just as the retentions already functioning within every perception are perpetually transformed, so too are the concrete retentions of concrete perceptions that remain in the

obscure background similarly transformed. All of the re-presentifications being carried out successively, through which something at rest in the obscure subsoil of consciousness receives a reproductive actualization, must deviate from one another according to a strict law; they must be altered in relation to one another. While they do harbor the same reproductive sense, they do so in an ever newly altered mode. In other words, the temporal object itself, the melody, the tone, is indeed individually the same in such a chain of rememberings—like the temporal object itself, its duration is also individually unique, and within the duration, each tonally fulfilled temporal point. But the mode of the past and therefore the mode of orientation to the current present continuously arising anew is incessantly transformed: a little while ago, yesterday, the day before yesterday, etc.

15 If we say that the object is pushed into the past, it will initially appear that we would want to say that it would alter its time and that the object would only keep the relative site of its fulfilled temporal points continually uniform in the unity of its process. But that would be false. Whenever we come back to the tonal process in rememberings, it is individually one and the same, and this implies that every temporal point of the process preserves its identity, but in and through the change of its orientation [to the present]. That is to be seen in evident, identifying modes of knowledge. Only in this way is it possible for a unitary universal time to be constituted for us, a time in which anything that can be given to us through a presentification as existing has its firm position. Time itself is the fixed system of positions in which every individual duration is strictly situated with its system of points. Because every temporal point and every temporal duration cannot in principle occur more than once in uniform orientations, there is no displacement of an object in time, there is no analogue to movement.

30 Thus, we must distinguish between the identical temporal point or the temporal duration belonging to the objective sense, and its mode of orientation, whereby the latter we mean the incessantly changing mode of givenness of this duration. But with this we distinguish in evidence between the objective sense and the noema as such. We called the noematic viewpoint that viewpoint with

regard to sense, and we called noematic everything that we find in and concerning sense in this viewpoint. But concerning sense, we find in an evident manner the mode of orientation, the "past," "further past," etc., that is modified in every new intuition. As being in the process of change, the mode of orientation does not belong to the objective sense, to what is meant identically. Belonging to the objective sense, to that which remains absolutely identical, is the duration itself and every temporal point itself, but not the contingent mode of the past. [332]

10 We can also say that we must distinguish between the duration itself, which appears there respectively as the temporal form of the perceived as such, and the "mode of appearance" of this duration, whereby the expression, "mode of appearance," can certainly have still other meanings; belonging here are, for example, the distinctions of clarity and those of temporal perspective.

15 What holds for the temporal form of the perceptual object (and then further for the temporal form of the memorially re-presentified object) holds for the concrete object itself, thus including the materially relevant contents that endure in the duration, the temporally distributed contents filling the duration. The concrete object that is determined in such and such a way with respect to content cannot itself essentially be given in any other way than in the changing temporal perspective and orientation. The object itself, as the appearing object, does not change with the alteration of appearance, an alteration of appearance that the object must undergo as being constituted temporally. From the normal perspective, the object is constantly presented to consciousness as the same object in perception or memory. Phenomenologically speaking, the identical objective sense, with its temporal determinations and its qualities, is only given in continually different orientations and temporal perspectives in a changing noematic How.

<18.> The Noematic Attitude

35 By focusing on the object purely as the object of a consciousness (or put differently, in focusing on the objective sense), we called a noematic examination an examination that

simultaneously investigates the modes of givenness in which this "object" presents itself; namely, the How of the "noematic" mode of givenness presents itself in the object itself as the object of consciousness. Accordingly, the mode of orientation, and everything else that is to be regarded as a temporal perspective is seen noematically. The noematic attitude describes in an entirely general manner the objects in the How of modes of appearance. It investigates all the modes of appearance without which the object could not appear at all, could not be perceived, and thus could not at all be given in intuition. Thus, the noematic attitude studies all types of objects purely as the objects of intuitions that give them; in other words, it studies their objective sense in its structure. But together with this, it also studies the changing noematic mode of appearance of the entire object as sense and studies every one of its intuitive components. Here we had examined objects as such, purely as temporal, and we had done so in an entirely general manner, in this way the noematic modes of appearance, which temporally brings about, came exclusively to the fore. Every temporal determination that lies in the respective objective sense—temporal point, temporal expanse, temporal shape—is a unity for a corresponding, unending manifold of modes of appearance. Every individual object as a temporally formed object is *res temporalis*, and in this first sense, *res extensa*, and thus it is essentially meant that it can only be experienced in a determinate regulated system of manifolds of appearance. This lawful regularity and thus the entire system of appearance that belongs to it is a common one for all conceivable individual objects, precisely as temporal objects, no matter the genus or the region to which these objects may belong. [333]

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The modes of appearance that are determined as necessary by the temporal form of sense, however, are not the only ones that the sense as the sense of individual objectlike formations can prescribe to the possibility of the experiencing intuition. In other words, the content of this form, that which is extended in the temporal form, that which fulfills it in different temporal shapes, the content of this form, also has its modes of appearance. It does not merely have modifications of appearance that accrue to it by

being adumbrated according to temporal perspectives with its temporal shape.

However, we cannot directly pose the question concerning the noematic constitution of objects irrespective of temporal extension. We know that all conceivable objects can be experienced, and along with this ability to be experienced, have a temporal constitution. But as soon as we abstract from this most general feature and inquire into the temporal contents and their modes of appearance, the investigation necessarily splits. For here is the place where the highest, but also the most empty Something in general, as the generality of something conceivable in general, as the object as such, is divided in the genuinely highest genera. But depending upon the genus in which we find ourselves, the temporal contents are heterogeneous and have as such fundamentally different modes of experience and modes of noematic constitution according to the objective sense and noematic modes of the objective sense—ignoring, naturally, the entirely general feature of time-constitution.

<19> The Object-Pole. Whether the Objective Sense is Ideally Identical⁹⁵

I have a chain of reproductions, of rememberings in which I am conscious of one and the same past immanent phenomenon, e.g., a datum of sensation. Two such rememberings are separated, they are themselves immanent temporal objects, themselves objects of possible, repeated reproductions and each one identifiable, existing in evidence as the same. Thus, we have different reproductions as different beings, belonging to different temporal loci. But the reproduced object is the same. Can we say that the reproduced object is found in each one in an intimately inherent manner, that is, as a momentary element of lived-experience? But then the one reproduced object that marks one single temporal locus or temporal expanse would be existing simultaneously at different temporal loci, then the time of the reproduced object and

the time of the reproduction would be the same time. If we take memories of something temporally different, then the temporal orderings of something different would be identical with the temporal order of their memories, which is absurd. Here the memorial object is conceived as a true being of its temporal locus, as we also speak of a true order with respect to the order of memories. Yet, if we take the meant past, that is, the meant temporal objectlike formation with its meant temporal locus, how do we conceive of the truly existing temporal loci where the memory itself is concerned? Can the temporally separated memories contain their meant objects as intimately inherent components? There is indeed no difficulty here. Every memory has its meant object, and the meant object as such has the same temporal locus as does the memory in the true nexus of precisely these memories, understood as the lived-experiences occurring in the true stream of lived-experience. Thus, this shows once again that there is no basis for dissociating the "noema" from the lived-experience, and for contesting its character as an intimately inherent moment.

⁹⁵ Here I stand in contradiction to the *Ideas* and deny that noematic unities, objective senses, are transcendent to the lived-experience.

<Section 4.
ON STATIC AND GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGICAL
METHOD>

<A> Static and Genetic Phenomenological Method⁹⁶

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5 We must make the following distinction under the rubric of the laws of genesis:

(1) Laws of genesis in the sense of one demonstrating laws for the sequences of particular events in the stream of lived-experience. They are either laws of immediate, necessary succession for concrete events or for abstract phases, moments of such events like, e.g., the necessary connection of retentions to lived-experiences that have elapsed, or the necessary connection of retentional phases to the respective impressional phase. Or they are also laws of a mediated sequence, for instance, the laws of association, laws for the emergence of reproductions for a present lived-experience within the present and the like for the emergence of intentions of expectation—in the widest sense of empty intentions, fulfilled or unfulfilled processes of pointing-toward or pointing-back.

20 (2) Lawful regularities that regulate the formation of apperceptions. Apperceptions are intentional lived-experiences that are conscious of something as perceived. [but this something as perceived] is not self-given in these lived-experiences (not completely); and they are called apperceptions to the extent that they have this trait, even if in this case they also consciously intend what in truth is self-given in them. Apperceptions transcend their immanent content, and belonging essentially to this transcending is the fact that within the same stream of consciousness

whose segments are being continually connected, a fulfilling lived-experience is possible that, in the synthesis of fulfillment, supplies its self-given matter⁹⁷ as the same, and in that other lived-experience supplies what is not-self-given and the same [self-given matter]. Insofar as this is the case, there is a law here regulating the future, but a law merely for future possibilities, concerning a possible continuation of the stream of consciousness, one that is ideally possible.

10 Defined in this general way, apperception is a concept that encompasses every self-giving, thus every intuitive consciousness.⁹⁸ *Original* apperception is perception, and every

⁹⁷ What is meant here is not intimately inherent, adequate givenness, but being perceived in the genuine sense.

⁹⁸ Consider how the concept of apperception is to be circumscribed. Apperception: a consciousness that is conscious of something individual that is not self-given in it (self-given does not mean being contained in perception in an intimately inherent manner); and it is called apperception to the extent that it has this trait, even if it has something in addition that is self-given in it. Namely, a consciousness can be apperceptively conscious of something, and that same something can also still be self-given in the same consciousness that extends even further than this apperceiving. For example, if in this way we call a consciousness of a sign an apperception, then the signified [*das Bezeichnete*] can also be self-given along with the consciousness of a sign in the unity of one consciousness. Or in the unity of a perception of a hexagon there appears a hexagonal plane and at the same time another; but one of them appears with reference to the other one, and the other one is itself appearing. This holds in general with respect to the components of self-giveness peculiar to external appearing phenomena.

Every motivation is apperception. The emergence of a lived-experience A motivates the lived-experience of a B in the unity of a consciousness; the consciousness of A is equipped with an intention that points beyond, "indicating" a coexistence. But here we must add that every unfulfilled intention, every unfulfilled horizon contains motivations, systems of motivations. It is a potentiality of motivation. When fulfillment takes place, a current motivation is there. One can also say that apperception is itself a motivation, that it motivates whatever may occur as fulfilling, that it motivates beyond itself into an emptiness. But that will depend upon more precise definitions of apperception and motivation. Moreover, one will certainly not be able to say that a sign [*Zeichen*] motivates if it is not an indication [*Anzeichen*], a word-sign, for example. But we must also ask whether one will want to speak of apperception in that case. Admittedly, we have formulated our concept in an extraordinarily broad manner. Deeper investigations are needed here. If one speaks of apperception, perception will not necessarily express a positing consciousness, for the co-perceived is then not necessarily co-positd, to say nothing of perceived in the broader sense of "perception" [*Wahrnehmen im Sinne von "wahrnehmen"*].

Fundamental for the theory of consciousness is the universal exploration of the relations of consciousness: intending beyond itself (beyond its self)—what we call here apperception—to association.

⁹⁶ Editor: From 1921.

Translator: The following pagination to the German text corresponds to Husserliana XI.

modification of apperception in imagination contains an apperception precisely in the shape of this modification. If we consider here that every present consciousness (every expanse of presence belonging to the stream of lived-experience) not only is, but is "perceived," that is, is present now to consciousness in an impressional manner, then we also mean that an "apperception" lies in every present consciousness. In fact, we cannot even conceive of a consciousness that would not go beyond the strict present in its essential flux from presence to new presences; consciousness is inconceivable without retentional and protentional horizons, without a co-consciousness (although a necessarily non-intuitive one) of the past of consciousness and an anticipation of an approaching consciousness (no matter how indeterminate it may be). Thus if something "arises out of something" at all in the stream of consciousness, then apperceptions necessarily arise from apperceptions. We do not need to consider here whether there are primordial apperceptions that could be placed at the "beginning" of the stream of consciousness. In any case, there are apperceptive horizons, kinds of such horizons, kinds of apperceptive intentions (I also say appresenting intentions) that must arise at each place in the stream according to the universal lawful regularities of conscious life—like the examples given above show. But this also holds likewise for those that can arise—even if they must not arise—at every place in the stream, namely, insofar as they are bound to conditions that are possible at each place. To the latter belong the intentions that customarily come into question under the rubric of association. At each place in the stream it is possible for constellations that are similar (I use an empty term [constellations] whose scientific content is still to be specified) to be produced again with earlier ones, to recall the earlier similar ones, to point back to them, perhaps to bring them to intuitive presence, and then as fulfillments, to show them synthetically unified with the present ones, etc. Yet even these apperceptions, and likewise these apperceptive connections—which exhibit the unities of a combined phenomenon, whose combinations presuppose apperceptions and encompass them—these apperceptions can only take place when other, especially suited apperceptions have preceded them.

(Could we not also define apperception in the following way: a consciousness that is not only conscious of something within itself in general, but at the same time intends this something as a motivation for a consciousness of something else; thus, a consciousness that is not merely conscious of something, and then still something else that it does not include, but rather, a consciousness that points to this other one as one that belongs to it, as what is motivated through it. In any case, we will have to expand and give sharper contours to our previous definition.)

In addition, types of intricate apperceptions can occur, which, once they are there, are repeated in a further stream of consciousness according to primordial laws under universally producible conditions; indeed, they run through this stream of consciousness steadily, like all natural apperceptions, all objective apperceptions of reality, apperceptions which in accordance with their essence themselves have a history, a genesis according to primordial laws. Thus, it is a necessary task to establish the universal and primitive laws under which stands the formation of an apperception arising from a primordial apperception, and to derive systematically the possible formations, that is, to clarify every given structure according to its origin.

This "history" of consciousness (the history of all possible apperceptions) does not concern bringing to light a factual genesis for factual apperceptions or factual types in a factual stream of consciousness, or even in all factual human beings; thus it is not at all similar to the development of plant or animal species. Rather, every shape of apperception is an essential shape and has its genesis in accordance with essential laws; accordingly, included in such an idea of apperception is that it must undergo a "genetic analysis." And what is given is not the necessary becoming of the particular, single apperception (when it is understood as a fact); rather, the mode of genesis is only given with the genesis of essence; in this mode of genesis any kind of apperception of this type must have arisen originally (in one stroke or piecemeal) in an individual stream of consciousness. And after it had arisen (as primordially instituting, so to speak), individual apperceptions of the same type were able to arise in an entirely different manner, namely as genetic after-effects of the earlier ones already

formed—in accordance with intelligible laws of a primitive form. The theory of consciousness is directly a theory of apperceptions; the stream of consciousness is a stream of a constant genesis; it is not a mere series,⁹⁹ but a development,¹⁰⁰ a process of becoming according to laws of necessary succession in which concrete apperceptions of different typicalities (among them, all the apperceptions that give rise to the universal apperception of a world) grow out of primordial apperceptions or out of apperceptive intentions of a primitive kind.

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Every apperception exhibits the structure of noesis and noema. Every apperception carries out in its own way a sense-giving and a positing of objects in doxic modalities. We have to undertake a unique form of analysis in order to elucidate the intentionality of an apperception, in order to describe, according to their noetic and noematic structures, the possible types of fulfillment and the systems of possible omni-faceted, complete fulfillment, or the systems of a fulfillment that is continually in the process of becoming complete. With these descriptions, namely the constitutive ones, we are in no way inquiring into an explanatory genesis. In our descriptions of all the modal modifications in retentions, rememberings, expectations, etc., we likewise do not inquire into genesis when we pass from the original impressions (perceptions) as a generally typical generic character that concerns all apperceptions, over to a constitutive character, and from there pursue a principle of systematic ordering of apperceptions, a principle of ordering that intersects the division of apperceptions according to the highest genera of objects (actual and possible existing regions of objects). A universal doctrine of consciousness is thus a universal doctrine of apperceptions, correlative to a universal doctrine of the highest categories of possible objects and their categorial modifications—a universal constitutive phenomenology. The latter is preceded by a universal phenomenology of the most general structures and modalities that

encompass all categories of apperceptions. To this one must add a universal theory of genesis.¹⁰¹

In a certain way, we can therefore distinguish “explanatory” phenomenology as a phenomenology of regulated genesis, and “descriptive” phenomenology as a phenomenology of possible, essential shapes (no matter how they have come to pass) in pure consciousness and their teleological ordering in the realm of possible reason under the headings, “object” and “sense.” In my lectures, I did not say “descriptive,” but rather “static” phenomenology. The latter offers an understanding of intentional accomplishment, especially of the accomplishment of reason and its *negata*. It shows us the graduated levels of intentional objects that emerge as objective senses in founded apperceptions of a higher level and in functions of sense-giving, and it shows us how they function in them, etc. But in these investigations we are concerned in the first place with apperceptive forms, with modes of consciousness that are conceived so generally (that is, left so indeterminate) that they must belong to the make-up of every monad (e.g., perception, memory, etc.). Other ones have a different universality and necessity. If we take as our point of departure the “natural concept of the world” and the human ego as the subject of knowledge, then what we have gained through an eidetic analysis is the idea of a monad that is precisely in relation to a “world” of this corresponding concept, and in this way we have a pure range of monads in whose stream of consciousness the corresponding types of apperceptions (spatial-causal thing, animal being, human being) “necessarily” emerge, although perhaps they do not necessarily belong to the idea of a monad as such; in any case, this is not immediately certain *a priori* from the start.

Further, in monads that correspond to human beings within the natural attitude, we find factually peculiar occurrences of reason in particular shapes. We <want to investigate> the intentional typicality that is made available to us through the phenomenological-eidetic analysis of the ideas “human being” and

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⁹⁹ Phenomenology:

1) Universal phenomenology of the general structures of consciousness

2) Constitutive Phenomenology

3) Phenomenology of Genesis

⁹⁹ Nachbetrachtung

¹⁰⁰ Auseinander-

"world"; we want to investigate it systematically according to all possible nexuses of reason (that is, we want to investigate its nexuses and ultimately the entire world of these monads most basically in the possible nexuses of "concordant," ratifying experience of the respective objectlike formations), and we want to gain its essential shape. Likewise, in the free realm of possibility we investigate the essential structures of the formal lawful regularity of a reason in general as formal-logical reason, etc. Aside from the fact that we form the corresponding thoughts and realize truths in ourselves, we recognize through them how possible rational subjects would think; through this we construe in an indeterminate generality subjects of pure reason and their shapes of rational activities in which they live toward and attain true being and truths, as well as true values and goods. But even with all this, we do not gain knowledge concerning how a monad, as it were, looks in its completeness, and which possibilities are prefigured for such complete monadic individualities, and through which lawful regularity of individuation [this takes place].

Let us note that we remain here within the sphere of reason, within the realm of the active ego, and that we cannot describe a shape of active apperception, that is, any integrally cohesive unity of active configuration (which as a unity of consciousness is intentional and accordingly is an apperceptive configuration) without also constantly speaking of genesis. Every inferring is an active apperceiving, and as an active process of configuring, it is a judging, because another judging has preceded it—one judgment is passed on other judgments that have been passed. The conclusion follows from the premises, it is generated from them; the lived-experience genetically issues from the grounding lived-experiences, even if other genetic interconnections play a founding role there. Thus, every activity is motivated, and we have pure genesis in the sphere of acts as a pure act-genesis in such a form that I, who execute acts, am determined by the fact that I have executed other acts. Further, we have acts that are motivated through affections and that stand in a genetic relation to spheres that fall outside of the sphere of activity. We have, finally, genesis in the sphere of pure passivity, even though formations that have

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their origin in an earlier activity may play their part in them; but now they themselves emerge passively.

Accordingly, in the doctrine of genesis, in "explanatory" phenomenology, we have:

5 (1) Genesis of passivity, that is, a general lawful regularity of genetic becoming in passivity that is always there and, without a doubt, has origins that lie further back, just as apperception itself does. Special types that belong to the general idea of passive genesis.

10 (2) The participation of the ego and relationships between activity and passivity.

(3) Interrelations, formations of pure activity; genesis as an active accomplishment of ideal objects and as an accomplishment of real generation. Secondary sensibility; general laws of the consciousness of habituality. Everything habitual belongs to passivity. Even the activity that has become habitual.

(4) Once we have gained all the kinds of genesis and their laws, we will then ask to what extent one can assert something about the individuality of a monad, about the unity of its "development," about the regulative system that essentially unites all the particular geneses in the form of one monad, and about which types of individual monads are *a priori* possible and construable.

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(5) And connected to all of the preceding we ask: In what sense can the genesis of a monad be implicated in the genesis of another, and in what sense can a unity of genesis, according to laws [of genesis], combine a multiplicity of monads [?] On the one hand, passive genesis, which in the case of the constitution of an anthropological world (or rather, an animal world) refers to the constituted physiological processes and to their conditions in the unity of the physical world with the lived-body of another; on the other hand, active genesis refers to the form of the motivation of my thinking, valuing, willing through that of others. Thus, considering the individuality of the monad leads to the question of the individuality of a multiplicity of coexisting monads, monads genetically connected to one another. With respect to "our" world

it leads to the question of making understandable monadologically the natural psychophysical world and the communal world.¹⁰²

(6) Again, all this relates to the question concerning the genetic explanation of a monad within which a unitary nature and a world in general is constituted genetically, and how a unitary nature and a world in general remain constituted from this point onward throughout its entire life, or through an exceptional span of life, and further how a world with animals and humans is constituted according to a constant process of attestation.

10 What precedes this [genetic analysis] is the static elucidation of world-apperception and of the sense-giving that is carried out in it. But, it seems, it is only possible to undertake an absolute consideration of the world, a "metaphysics," and to understand the possibility of a world first through a genetic consideration of individuation.

15 (7) My passivity stands in connection with the passivity of all others: One and the same thing-world is constituted for us, one and the same time [is constituted] as objective time such that through this, my Now and the Now of every other—and thus his life-present (with all immanences) and my life-present—are objectively "simultaneous." Accordingly, my objectively experienced and ratified locations and the locations of every other share the same locality; they are the same locations, and these are indices for ordering my and others' phenomenal systems, not as separated orders, but coordinated orders in "the same time." That is, my life and the life of another do not merely exist, each for themselves; rather, one is "directed" toward the other. Not only have sensations occurred in me in this or that order such that, in accordance with the laws of genesis, a nature had to be constituted for me, and not only has this nature endured, but a typically stable lived-body is conveyed in this process. Realized is also the

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possibility that there are things similar to my lived-body in the nature that is given to me. Furthermore, not only has empathy ensued, but this empathy has been ratified by the fact that the interior life of the other ego has expressed itself in a regular manner, and from then on, newly determined and ratified my presentations again and again.

5 Primordial laws of genesis are the laws of original time-consciousness, the primordial laws of reproduction and then of association and associative expectation. In relation to this there is genesis on the basis of active motivation.

10 If we compare static and genetic nexuses, then we will have to ask whether one can achieve a systematic phenomenology of static nexuses (like that of *noesis* and *noema*), that is, whether the genetic dimension can be completely suspended here. On the whole, the question concerns how the investigations are to be ordered. It is clear that one will initially proceed from particular fundamental types, some of which, as I already said above, will occur necessarily, others which will be presented as possibilities. The question concerns the leading clues of the system. As leading clues, we have types of objects, that is, leading clues from the standpoint of ontology. And with this [we have] constitutive teleologies. Here ideal possibilities of concordant modes of givenness are elaborated, ideal possibilities of monadic streams in which the unity of an accomplishment is constituted, and other possibilities outside of these are to be considered as opposing forms.

25 Another leading clue is the unity of a monad as a unity of a genesis, and then the investigation of the typicality of possible monads, namely, of possible types of the unity of an individual monad, of an individual ego, and of what it had to find [in its enveloping-world], and how it had to encounter itself, or how it bears within itself a rule of individual character traits that are then recognizable (perhaps through others).

30 Beginning with the natural attitude, one can also take the "natural concept of the world" as a leading clue. One raises the natural world to the eidetic level, analyzes it according to its strata, extracts types of constituting objects and describes constituting

¹⁰² Translator: The expression "our" world designates a first person plural world constituted through various historical and intersubjective processes of appropriation and disappropriation, as such it becomes for Husserl in the 1930s a term for the generative phenomenon of "homeworld" [*Heimwelt*]. However, it is interesting to note that the expression, "*Heimwelt*," first appears (to the best of my knowledge) in a manuscript dated ca. 1920, that is, about the time of the first version of the *Analyses* and Husserl's explicit distinction between static and genetic methods. In fact, it occurs in a context where Husserl speaks of static and genetic relations of foundation. Cf. *Ms. A V 10/L*, 127-29.

consciousness, and finally the constitution of this type, world—all without paying any attention to genesis.

Perhaps I can be more clear by writing:

- Necessary successions in the open sphere of lived-experience:
 5 What is arriving is then not only arriving, but necessarily "follows upon" according to the evident law of necessary succession. Naturally, one can call that a law of genesis.

- All "horizons" or all "apperceptions" naturally arise in this way. But in a "static" regard, we have "finished" apperceptions. Here
 10 apperceptions emerge and are awakened as finished, and have a "history" reaching way back. A constitutive phenomenology can regard the nexuses of apperceptions in which the same object is constituted eidetically, in which it shows itself in its constituted
 15 ipseity in the way it is expected and can be expected. Another "constitutive" phenomenology, the phenomenology of genesis, follows the history, the necessary history of this objectivation and thereby the history of the object itself as the object of a possible knowledge. The primordial history of objects leads back to hyletic
 20 objects and to the immanent ones in general, that is, to the genesis of them in original time-consciousness. Contained within the universal genesis of a monad are the histories of the constitution of objects that are there for this monad, and within the universal eidetic phenomenology of genesis this very process is [explicated
 25 as] accomplished for all conceivable objects in relation to all conceivable monads. And conversely, one gains graduated levels of monads corresponding to the levels of objects.

- I must now go through the *Ideas* once more to become clearer about what still distinguishes the doctrine of the structures of
 30 consciousness from the constitutive considerations if I also regard everything immanent "in a constitutive manner."

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<B.> The Phenomenology of Monadic Individuality and the Phenomenology of the General Possibilities and Compossibilities of Lived-Experiences, Static and Genetic Phenomenology¹⁰³

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- (1) Phenomenology of possible "phenomena" and of phenomenal interconnections and their constitutive accomplishments that can occur in monads, in general.

- (2) Phenomenology of monadic individuality, the investigations of laws that are included among the laws of lived-experience, and that establish what the individual unity and discreteness of a monad requires, [that establish] what belongs necessarily to an individual monad as its proper nature, [that establish] which universal form it necessarily has, which species of elements or moments this form necessarily contains, and what in this form guarantees to them precisely unity and discreteness. If the monad necessarily has the form of the unity of becoming, of a unity of unflagging *genesis*, then its concrete structure is only made up of "elements" that are themselves unities of becoming, and like the entire monad, these unities of becoming have an abstract structure with respect to their phases. Every phase has its own necessities and not merely compossibilities; in this way, every lived-experience that is being "delimited" for itself demands its "background," a horizon; every moment in a phase makes its demands with respect to becoming; thus, for the continued genesis of every streaming that constitutes the demand of temporality, etc. We must certainly not proceed with naturalistic concepts here. The monad is a living unity that bears within itself an ego as the pole of being effective and being affected,¹⁰⁴ and a unity of waktul and concealed life, a unity of abilities, of "dispositions"; and what is concealed, "unconscious," is a peculiar modality for the discreteness of the monad, a modality whose necessary sense must be fashioned originally in ways peculiar to it.

- But the title for (1) above is not sufficiently clear. We investigate the phenomena in the transcendental bracketing of

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¹⁰³ Editor: June 1921.

Translator: The following pagination to the German text corresponds to Husserliana XIV.

¹⁰⁴ And as the pole of personal characters.

5 "transcendent" reality. Belonging here in quotation marks is the
 thing-world with respect to the necessities and possibilities that it
 bears as the intuitive thing-world, and [belonging here is]
 experienced nature as such. I describe the mode of givenness of
 10 orientation according to time and space (of perspective), the
 modes of givenness according to sides, the appearing sides and the
 mode of appearance of the sides, the sense-data as adumbrations-
 of, the apprehensions, the nexuses of perceptual appearances as
 such that constitute unity and self-sameness, etc. I describe the
 relation to the ego, the grasping, relating, explicating,
 15 "comprehending" (thinking under universals, conceptually),
 predicating; I describe the meant states-of-affairs, propositions,
 syllogisms, the modes of attentiveness of the ego, of affection, of
 [latent] turning toward, cogitating activities of the ego. I judge
 the premises and motivated by it, as a consequence of it, I draw
 the conclusion, and so forth. These are all occurrences in
 20 "immanent time," in the time of "lived-experiences." And in
 considering the monad, we have precisely its inherent nexus of
 immanent time and its lived-experiences and the unities
 constituted in it. And this entire nexus itself (a further step!) has its
 constitution in the original flux of time in the corresponding
 primordial lived-experiences.

All of this sketches a certain path of phenomenological
 considerations—after one carries out the phenomenological
 reduction, which forms the point of departure. I must proceed step
 25 by step; at first I still do not even see that a stream of lived-
 experience is constituted internally; I have not yet fixed this
 stream scientifically at all, to say nothing of monadic individuality
 [or] the ego of abilities constituted in it, etc.

30 Do I not have to develop this consideration until I show that
 there is a unity of genesis in immanent time, and constituted
 within the unity of genesis, a unity of the monad being constituted
 for itself temporally? Do I not need to show that this unity of the
 monad must however be brought back to the analysis of the
 35 primordially living monad whose absolute being consists in a
 multifarious streaming, and that constituted within this streaming
 is the immanent phenomenon of filled immanent time, of the
 phenomenal immanent monad?

The investigation of the *individuation of the monad*, then, bears
 on both: on the individuation of the immanently constituted
 monad, and by going back to the lawful regularity of the
 5 primordially constituting streaming, on the individuation of the
 absolute monad. Here, the inquiry bears on the necessary form of
 this unity of filled immanent time, on what gives a necessary unity
 to all content in the succession and simultaneity of every phase,
 and gives to all individual components, moments within this unity,
 a singularly unique nexus that cannot be rend asunder. The monad
 10 is a "simple," indivisible being; that is, what it is as continually
 becoming in time, and everything that belongs to it, is at some
 location of this continual becoming, and has its being as temporal
 fullness in this immanent filled time and is nothing for itself, since
 this fullness is continual and is related to one and the same
 15 identical ego-pole. Everything that is related to one identical ego-
 pole belongs to a continual stream of becoming of a unique filled
 time, a time that is one unique time with one unique ego. Where it
 is a question of two monads we then have in mind two streams of
 becoming having a uniform temporal form, but not two streams of
 20 becoming having the same temporal form with two egos. The
 immanent time of one ego can never go unfilled, can never have
 gaps, can never crumble into several separate streams or be
 separated by pauses. Everything is connected to everything else in
 the monad.

25 But under the rubric "monad" we have had in mind the unity of
 its living becoming, of its history. But it also has its living present
 and it has become in this present, and directly continues in this
 becoming. It belongs to the nature of this present that, on the one
 30 hand, it is a primordially impressional present as the newly
 surging, actual moment of life having the shape, "impression"; on
 the other hand, as the heir to the past, so to speak, together with
 the impression, this present has its obscure backgrounds that can
 be illuminated; in every Now, the present carries its history as the
 horizon into which it can peer, which it can run through once more
 35 and, as it were, can live through once more in the shape of isolated
 or interrelated remembering. It belongs to the nature of monadic
 being that every phase of its becoming has this structure with all
 the accompanying marvels. We have a filled unity of immanent

time through the sequence of primordial impressions, but that is not everything that was or is in the process of becoming. In all phases, we also have the sedimented history of these respective phases, in each one the monad had its concealed "knowing," its habitual structure. And now this, now that was remembered in the present; the past became alive once more, and became related to the present. The monad not only is what it is now, it is also as having been, and it can gain knowledge of its past in the present, can endeavor to dwell upon its past, can have acts that connect present and past, etc.¹⁰⁵

Let this suffice. In this direction, we can thus regard the unity of the monad in itself and what the essential demands of this unity entail, although there is nonetheless something contingent in the stream; all sense-data, even if they occur through empirical motivations in expectation, are contingent; for something different can still occur.¹⁰⁶ But however much there is contingency here, and however much the idea of a color-sensation does indeed indicate that it belongs to some sensing ego (but in its ideal generality, leaves open an indeterminate infinity of possible egos as sensing), it is indeed different for an individual color-sensation. It is not the case that its individuality would be a trait, a moment, which comes to it via the general traits; rather, the sense-datum is what it is only as a sense-datum being constituted in this monad in its regulatively formed temporal context, and has its

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¹⁰⁵ Does all of this not concern the mere passivity of the monadic stream and, for the ego, have a general potentiality, the general "ability," to be able to have within it a field of affection and action? But in a special sense, the ego also has its individuality, i.e., a principle of regulating acts from the side of the ego, whereby new lived-experiences are integrated into the stream. Is this individual ego, in its unity of individual egoic abilities, not the counterpart of the unity of the thing, whose individuality is also not circumscribed by general laws of constitution?

¹⁰⁶ The sense-datum, contingent. The fact of regulation of sense-data, and in the direction of forming the apprehension of a thing, in the direction of constituting a nature and world is, as fact, contingent. How is this with the individual ego that is determined by what is contingent, but in its individuality is certainly not contingent in the same sense? Am I not a "necessary fact," and is my contingency only determined by what cannot be grasped with respect to the material codetermining my psychic (monadic) development? The necessity consists in not being able to be crossed out, and in the intelligible unity under these presuppositions, but a unity which under other presuppositions would still be the same individuality and never a different one.

being as the unity of a streaming life, as something that is intentionally unitary within it and as something that is identifiable over and over in this unity peculiar to the ego of the monad; and as the form of its individuality, it has the unique temporal location, the index of originally constituting life. Whatever is constituted in a monad does not belong to the monad like something that could be for itself and could then enter into this monadic nexus as a member and, in the final analysis, could just as well occur in a different monadic nexus. Everything immanent is indeed individual, but non-independently individual, and only the monad itself is independent. Through its phases, through its immanently objectivated order of lived-experiences, the stream yields the individuality that makes the monad distinct in the monadic nexus, that is, in the nexus of what is constituted with respect to immanent time. But all of these special individualities are just as non-independent as the individualities of each phase in relation to that of an independent *concretum*; everything concrete in the monad is non-independent, and we see that one cannot identify the concept of "the independent" with that of "the concrete" like I did in the *Logical Investigations*.¹⁰⁷

Now, I can however regard the structures of the stream of lived-experience noetically-noematically in their general typicality; I can [describe] their possible modifications, their interconnections of essence, etc., without pursuing the inquiry into the lawful regularity of the individuality of a monad. The phenomenological-eidetic reduction places me on the footing of a possible monad in general, but precisely not of a monad thought individually and identically, and under the charge of circumscribing the individual identity according to its possibilities and necessities. But I can also set this new task and, of course, do so by using the doctrine of the essence of acts, of structures being constituted, etc. One can even say that I can also describe individuated geneses and the laws of genesis without systematically tackling the problem of the universal genesis of a monad and the nature of its individuality.

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¹⁰⁷ Translator: See the Third Logical Investigation, and specifically § 17; and see *Ideas* I, § 15.

I can doubtlessly designate phenomenological investigations as static, investigations that attend to the correlations between constituting consciousness and the constituted objectlike formation, and exclude genetic problems altogether. I have to distinguish from the latter phenomenological investigations that consider the typicality of different self-exhibiting shapes of lived-experiencing and of genesis according to their essential possibilities, composibilities, etc., but without the problems of individuality in this connection. Finally, we have the phenomenology of monadic individuality, and included in it, the phenomenology of a genesis integral to it, a genesis in which the unity of the monad arises, in which the monad is by becoming.

A systematic phenomenology, as I have conceived it, attends to the levels of possible modes of constitution, at the lowest level, the continual, necessary constitution of the immanent temporal stream and the constitution of monadic being as an immanent temporal unity; then the genetically higher levels, the levels of transcendence, phantoms, etc., the constitution of a nature, the constitution of animals in nature, everything "aesthetic." Then the accomplishments of thought that could be set to all levels, and to its different shapes according to these levels (activity of the ego). Accordingly, these are genetic considerations, and as the description of already constituted structures and their modes of constitution, are placed into the framework of genetic investigations. One can also describe these correlations for themselves in their typicality and necessity of the integral relatedness of such correlates. It is through genesis that we will be able to understand their [i.e., the monads'] process of becoming from out of the constitutive founding levels.

As we proceed systematically, the foundation will also be laid for a systematic doctrine of the levels of monads, depending upon whether or not they carry out higher developments, that is, advance to higher modes or constitution. And every higher monad is developed from a lower monad; it was lower in a previous developmental level. But then that still requires its own consideration of the individuation of a monad, just that it is questionable whether it would have to be an encompassing theory. At all events, we must keep this problem in mind.

Which problems motivate the entire investigation? I must distinguish the questions:

(1) What belongs to the possibility of a monad, to its unique nature with respect to ideal possibilities and necessities?

(2) What belongs to a monad that is to be able to constitute a nature?

(3) What [belongs] to a monad that is to have other monads given, is to be able to experience and recognize a plurality of monads as coexisting, and what belongs to these monads themselves if they are to stand in *concomitum*?

(4) Among the essential possibilities of a monad as monad are those of conceptual knowledge. What kinds and forms of conceptual knowledge "are there," which are concordant possibilities with respect to possible concepts, judgments, and interconnections of judgments that are to be constituted, and which [are the concordant possibilities] with respect to truth? Here we consider, in all generality, possible knowing as such, possible meaning, possible true being as knowable for the knowing monad, and we continue to remain in the context of the possible monad as such. Thus, we do not gain knowledge of the monad here in the way that we gain general truths for all numbers as such, as valid for every single number. But just as we know that it <belongs> to the nature of a pure number as such to be integrated into a series of numbers, and just as there is a system of special laws for prime numbers, sums, products, etc., which do not have to be laws that concern every given number, or just as we inquire geometrically into possible spatial figures and find laws for the types and species of figures that do not express the essential features of every figure, so too are the essential laws that we find for possible monads not expressions, or not necessarily expressions of features that every monad must necessarily possess. Not every monad must be a logically thinking one, not every one practicing moral acts, and yet the essential laws of logical consciousness and of moral consciousness do certainly belong to the general realm of the science of possible monads as such.

(5) Another question concerns the systematic possibilities of monadic consciousness, concerning these or those possible

fundamental shapes (genera), concerning the essential laws that regulate the possible occurrences, acts, states, formation of systematic interconnections of the constitution of objectlike unities, of contents of thought, etc.; and it is still another question that concerns the laws to which is subject the individual identity of a monad; then further, the laws to which is subject a compossible plurality of monads, monads that are to be able to motivate each other reciprocally, that are to be able to be determinative in relation to one another spiritually, etc. Naturally, both lawful regularities go together. But not every essential possibility is compossible for the ego and the lived-experience of the ego within the individual unity of a monad. Every impossibility in the essential [possibility] also excludes something in the individual unity of a monad. But there are also laws that positively prescribe what belongs to the necessary formal structure of a monad, and moreover that prescribe what must become if a certain individual content is already there. Thus, the primordial law of genesis is the law of original time-constitution, the laws of association and reproduction, the laws through which the monad is constituted for itself as a unity, etc.

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Are not the specific laws of genesis the laws of individuality, or only a branch of these laws, namely, related to the becoming of the monad, while the other branch would concern the laws of coexistence? But is that not a poor approach?

Every law of compossibility in coexistence also prescribes a law for possible genesis. Laws of compossibility concerning temporal coexistence already presuppose the constitution of time, and also have along with them laws of compossibility in succession; these are general laws of compossibility in simultaneity and succession. But *in addition to this* we have laws that do not merely concern compossibilities, but necessities of succession. The former implies that if an *a* exists, then a *b* cannot exist (hence, coexistent); the latter implies that if *a* exists, then a *b* must exist, in temporal simultaneity or in succession. But what is temporal is constituted, and we encounter primordial nexuses of the stream in which, once again, both kinds of laws play their role, only in an altered sense.

These are fundamental questions concerning the distinction, but also the ordering of necessary phenomenological investigations. Where they are concerned, I will always speak of *static* and *genetic* phenomenology. What was actually the leading perspective here? My point of departure can be external perception; I take this type of lived-experience, I have the relation to the meant object, hold firmly to this, contrast it with meant features and with what is found with regard to sensations, adumbrations within and relating to perception itself; I can pursue the possibility of further perceptions, perceptions that are continually unified with the initial one and that are all the perception of the same thing; [I can] describe the changing sensations, the forms of apprehension, the forms of the synthetic nexuses, etc.; I follow the correlation: unity of appearing object and manifold of appearances being united harmoniously, noetically, etc. Here I construe essential possibilities for such lived-experiences and the nexuses of lived-experience, and therefore also for a monad in which they may occur. A monad is possible as bearing such possibilities within it. I do not inquire here after the genesis of the monad, after the way in which such phenomena arise. I pursue the idea of a concordant nexus of experience related to an object of nature perduring identically, but also at the same time, as another possibility, [I pursue] the branches of discordance [occurring] at any point, and naturally with this I alter the monad and its inherent genesis. Or (like the physical things before) I have given purposeful objects, spiritual formations, books, etc., and ask how they are given. I proceed entirely from objectlike formations, even ideal ones like conceptual thoughts, mathematical principles, and ask how the consciousness of them can look, how a manifold consciousness of them is possible, and how they are "constituted" as self-given in consciousness.

All of these questions here are constitutive ones, and constitution concerns the essential correlations between the object of knowledge and knowing, the consideration of the noetic interconnections in which are constituted ontic interconnections, even those between objects and concepts, truths, etc. By ideas "being for me," I have certainly always understood "objects," even

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if I am directed toward something immanent; and I regard modes of consciousness, or more clearly, noetic-noematic correlative modes that function constitutively there, or modes of activity, grasping, observing, comparing, etc., which once again are also constitutive for higher objectlike formations. We persistently attend to possible modes of consciousness in relation to objectlike formations that we had in mind and thought under the idea of true being; they still remain before us as intentional in the phenomenological bracketing of their existence, and guide the composition of the interconnections.

But attending to constitution is not attending to genesis, which is precisely the genesis of constitution and operates as genesis in a monad. *Is not static phenomenology precisely the phenomenology of leading clues*, the phenomenology of the constitution of leading types of objects in their being, and the phenomenology of the constitution of their non-being, of mere illusions, of nullities, of contra-concordance, etc.? I have here the integral relatedness of essences as those of correlation, but genesis is not conditioned by that: we are not making the conditioning into something conditioned here. By the phenomenology of genesis attending to original becoming in the temporal stream, which itself is an originally constituting becoming, and by attending to the so-called "motivations" that function genetically, a phenomenology of genesis shows how consciousness arises out of consciousness, how constitutive accomplishments are also continually carried out here in the process of becoming; thus it shows the relation of conditionality obtaining between the motivating and the motivated or the necessary transition from impression into retention, in which is constituted the consciousness precisely of this becoming, and correlatively of the alteration of the Now into a Now that is just past.

However, I do describe statically not only the constitutive possibilities in relation to an object as a leading clue. I also describe the typicality of the nexuses in consciousness of any kind of developmental level: thus, in the *Ideas*, the structures of pure

consciousness as structures of possibly appearing phenomena in the unity of an immanent phenomenal nexus.¹⁰⁸

But if we are to hold fast to the individuality of a monad, then all possibilities must be selected: there are demands within existence for individual unity, and individual unity can only be demanded according to laws. It is also a law that what occurs within the form of unity precisely fits into the unity according to specific laws, and that through the law of unity, what fits is something demanded by the framework (cf. *Logical Investigations* <2. *Vol*> *III*).

Is it therefore not the case that, on the one hand, we have the laws of possibility, of compossibility in the monads as such, and distinguish from them the laws that belong to the unity of a monad as an individual unity? But individual unity is subject to the laws of genesis. Thus, the phenomenology of absolute individuality, of the monad as individual unity, must clarify precisely the development of individual phases arising from one another, each one of which has its law of individuality. And general laws of the individuality of these phases?

¹⁰⁸ Question whether from the very beginning one must view the structures of pure consciousness as constitutive occurrences.

<C. The Intersubjective Validity of Phenomenological Truth>¹⁰⁹ [305]

I as the "phenomenological" ego, which is to say, I who have carried out the universal phenomenological reduction, can still say afterward, and in absolute Cartesian evidence, *ego cogito, ego sum*, and I can only say it after the phenomenological reduction. I, the *human-ego*, am then in brackets and am in the field of judgment only as correlate, just like things appear only as "correlates," that is, as meant objects (*noemata*) of particular acts or nexuses of acts. What I initially have in my field of judgment in such cases, and in an unmodified manner, is the "I perceive myself, the empirical human-being," "I perceive these things," I have this apperception, and in this [particular] doxic positing, and therein the "perception of this and that."

From here I can attend to doxic motivations that this belief indicates to me with this phenomenological content, indicated are the intentional self-contained matters with motivated doxic theses, with doxic presumptions, which include the possibilities of being crossed out in *doxa*. Therefore, *presumptively prefigured for me here is a structure of the pure consciousness of my pure ego, while the form of the pure stream of consciousness and of its pure ego remains non-presumptively prefigured in an absolutely (apodictically) certain manner*. Required, then, is carrying out this distinction in a careful and theoretical manner. In any case, what must be demonstrated in pure phenomenology first of all is this general and constant necessity of the form of the pure ego and its pure stream of consciousness *that can never be annulled*. But afterward, the possible forms of the "empirical contingencies," of the special apperceptions that genesis has brought about; here it must again be shown *which special genetic forms must occur in an a priori necessary genesis*, that is, which system of forms of genesis must occur and in what order in the unity of a progressively developing ego and egoic stream, and which essential laws govern genesis there. In contrast to the *abiding*

static form of the monad and the necessary forms of genesis, which particularize the static form on every level, we then have what is actually and empirically contingent; for its part, it is the material fact as opposed to the genetic *form* of facticity, which is a *priori* something in principle, necessary.

The Egological Validity of all Truth and "Objective" Truth as Intersubjective

After the phenomenological reduction, and continuing now as the phenomenological ego, the ego *can* be solipsistic in a certain sense, namely, insofar as there is said to be no essential necessity that the ego encounter other human-beings and animals.¹¹⁰

Here we must note that all truths adopted by the phenomenological ego, <in other words>,¹¹¹ that can appear in its possible field of truth, cannot accordingly have the sense of intersubjective validity. Essential truths have logical general validity, the generality belonging to universality of the "as such." But the fact that belonging to this general validity is also the validity for every possible knower points to a different direction of investigation. This latter general validity, the universally subjective one, does not belong, like the first one, to the meaning-content and ontological content of the respective truths. Here one runs up against the more general question concerning universally subjective or intersubjective validity of truths as *truths*, as well as the difference between this validity for essential truths and factual truths, and furthermore, within essential truths, between formally *a priori* and materially *a priori* truths.

All truths are referred back to possible doxic consciousness and to subjects of this consciousness, and thus referred back to phenomenological essential truths. The intersubjective (universally subjective) validity of phenomenological essential truths is indubitable and is in principle prefigured in the purely phenomenological sphere. If we stand within eidetic-transcendental phenomenology, then belonging in the dominant realm of

¹⁰⁹ Also on the doctrine of genesis and on the relationships of the static to the genetic, but in a certain sense, static: the abiding structures of the monad.
Editor: Probably from the beginning of 1923.

¹¹⁰ I should have proceeded: Supposing it were so, then the following holds.

¹¹¹ Editor: inserted later by Husserl.

transcendental phenomenological *possibilities* of the respective ego, who is investigating phenomenologically, is also the *possibility* of phenomena of alien ego-subjects as animal subjects in open, unending multiplicity. If I carry out the phenomenological reduction on these pure possibilities, I will gain with the method of 1910/11¹¹² an open unending multiplicity of *possible* pure egos (phenomenological, even if not themselves necessarily phenomenologically investigating egos), which stand to me in a possible relation of empathy; or rather, I do not gain *an* open, unending multiplicity, but rather, an *a priori* range of "unendingly many" groups of such open ego-multiplicities; that is, when I leave out of account the factually, phenomenologically investigating ego, and form the idea of an ego as pure ego as such through the eidetic variation of myself, the fact, I will find the eidetic nexus of possibility as the general operative nexus, as *eidōs*: a possible pure ego as such standing in relation to an open unending multiplicity of other egos as alien to it, but as standing to it in relationships of empathy and in I-you relationships, in relationships of communicative interaction, reciprocal-ego-determination. Likewise, when I do not carry out the eidetic reduction, I not only pronounce my "I am," but rather, exercising the phenomenological reduction with respect to the factual givenness of alien human-beings, and carrying out phenomenological legitimation by indicating phenomenological *empirica*, I know myself as pure ego and in addition am empirically certain (in the phenomenological field) of co-being and communicative solidarity with other pure egos. But I also therefore recognize that every truth into which I have insight is intersubjectively valid: It is valid above the empirical, namely, it is not merely dependent upon my empirical ego. It remains if I were to modify myself in thought into a randomly altered ego. But it also holds if I take as a basis any random alien pure ego (that is found in every empirical ego).¹¹³

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¹¹² Editor: Husserl refers here to the lectures, "Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie" [Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology], which are published as Text Nr. 6 in *Husserliana* XIII.

¹¹³ Thus for a *priori* formal truth and for mathematical-natural-scientific truth. No longer completely for empirically intuitive ("perceptual judgments") and for materially *a priori* truths.

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