

This holds, however, not only for the momentary situation of perception, for the Now-phase. For we recognize even here the essential retroactive efficacy of the conflict on the process of lived-experience that has flowed-off: We recognize even in this lived-experiencing the crumbling of the singular-sense consciousness into a many-sense consciousness; that is, the process of becoming bifurcated, with its apperceptive overlapping, advances into retentional consciousness. If we explicitly presentify the expanse of perception preceding the doubt, then it will no longer be there as having its singular sense like any other memory; instead, it has taken on the same doubling: the apperception of wax figure is everywhere superimposed upon the apperception of human being. But of no less importance—indeed, it is of the utmost importance—is the fact that the doubling is not really a doubling of perceptions, even though the fundamental character of perception, the consciousness of something being presented in the flesh, exists in both cases. If the apperception of human being suddenly changes into the apperception of wax figure, then the human being will stand there first in its presentation in the flesh, and then a wax figure. But in truth neither of them are there like the human being was prior to the onset of doubt. Evidently, the mode of consciousness has altered, although the objective sense and its modes of appearance, now as before, has the mode of being presented in the flesh. In fact, we have not yet thoroughly taken into account the essentially altered mode of belief or mode of being. The way in which we are conscious of what appears in the flesh is different. Instead of it being given to consciousness precisely as being there in a straightforward manner, like in normal, univocal perception, i.e., in perception running its course concordantly, it is now given to us as questionable, as dubious, as contentious: It is contested by another givenness, a givenness in the flesh, a givenness of another <apprehension> permeating it and in conflict with it.

We can also express this in the following manner: Consciousness, which gives its object in the flesh (originally), does not only have the mode of presentation in the flesh, which distinguishes it from presentifying consciousness and empty consciousness (both of which do not present the same sense in the

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flesh); it also has a variable mode of being or a variable mode of validity. Original, normal perception has the primordial mode, "being valid *simpliciter*"; this is what we call straightforward, naive certainty. The appearing object is there in uncontested and unbroken certainty. What is uncontested points to possible contestations, or even to breaks, precisely to those we have just described, and by becoming bifurcated, they undergo a modification in their mode of validity. In doubt, both presentations in the flesh contending with one another have the same mode of validity, "questionable," and each presentation that is questionable is precisely in dispute and contested by the other.

We already see here that what has been demonstrated for perception as the consciousness of something being presented in the flesh must be carried over to memory. For, modalization also occurs in memory by virtue of a radiating back into retention, and therefore into remembering that makes [what is retended] explicit. Naturally, we only have in mind here the segments of the past for the same object that continues to endure as being present in the flesh. While normal memory (by virtue of the fact that it is the reproduction of a normal perception) gives the reproduced element in the normal mode of validity, of certainty as certainly existing, the memory that is encumbered by discrepancy due to that radiating back yields the altered mode of validity, "questionable," questionable whether it was this or that, whether it was a human being or a wax figure.⁴¹

<§9. Resolving Doubt through the Transition to a Ratifying Certainty or Negation>

The possibility of deciding, of resolving, and the possibility of their potentially active forms belong to the very essence of doubt. In contrast, doubt itself means indecisiveness, consciousness is indecisive consciousness. In the sphere of perception a decision is necessarily carried out such that as we progress to new appearances (for instance in the free orchestration of

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⁴¹ For the completion of our descriptions concerning the essence of the situation of doubt, see pp. 81-2.

corresponding kinaestheses running their course), a fitting fullness that suits an expectation is integrated into one of those empty horizons engaged in a mutual dispute. This is the most original form of decision. Under the given intentional situation, modified or completely new sense-data that arise demand precisely [those] apprehensions that complete the remaining uncontested intentions; they demand the apprehensions to complete the intentions in such a way that the source of the contention is quelled, and what is especially motivating the doubt will be annulled through the force of a primordial impression. Fulfillment through a primordial impression is the force that mows everything down. We move closer to it, we clasp it with our hand, touching it, and the dubious intention of wax we just had gets the priority of certainty. It gets this through the concordant transition to new appearances that do not accord with the apprehension of human being and its unfulfilled horizons, and negates the latter through its fulfilling weight of being presented in the flesh. With respect to the one instance, a negation takes place in this decision; in particular, it takes place with respect to the apprehension of human being that is guiding the original perception and that then becomes modalized as dubious. In the opposite case, an affirmation would have occurred, or what amounts to the same thing, a ratification of the original perception, but which later became dubious. That which appeared in the flesh would have then received the modal validity character of "yes, really."

So, in a certain respect even the ratifying Yes, like the No, is a mode of modifying certain validity and is distinct from the entirely original, entirely unmodified mode of certain validity; the straightforward constitution of the perceptual object is carried out univocally in this mode, and without struggle. But I said "in a certain respect." For speaking of "modalization" is ambiguous. On the one hand, we can mean each transformation of the mode of validity as distinct from the original mode of validity, naive certainty, so to speak, that is not ruptured by discrepancy or doubting. And on the other hand, we can mean a transformation where the validity-mode of certainty is concerned, where it ceases to be certainty. The primordial mode is certainty, but in the form of the most straightforward certainty. Just as an affirming decision

occurs by passing through a period of doubt, so too do we have a restoration of certainty; when something turns out to be real⁴² "in effect" I become certain of it anew. And yet, consciousness is altered now. Passing through a period of doubt to a decision gives to consciousness precisely the character of resolved consciousness, and it gives to its noematic sense the corresponding character that expresses itself in the "yes," "in effect," "truly so," and in similar turns of phrase.

Here as everywhere it becomes clear to us, and it will become even more clear to us later, that everything that consciousness undergoes through changes and transformations, even after the transformations, remains sedimented in it as its "history," and this is, so to speak, the destiny of consciousness. But since consciousness is what it is as consciousness of something, as a process of giving sense, this means that every such transformation shows up in the sense, and that even where the objective sense is the same, yes even where the mode of appearance is the same, it expresses itself as a modality, as a transformation in this sense.

If we observe consciousness as a whole being at variance with itself, we find constituted uniformly within doubting consciousness the disjunctive "A or B," in the negation, the "not A but rather B," and further, in the affirmation, the "not Not-A, but A indeed." In this way, straightforward "being" of the objective sense is transformed into "doubtful being" or what amounts here to the same thing, "questionable being," and then possibly through a decision it is transformed into "not being" or into "being indeed." In phenomenological considerations above all, in considerations whose intentions are directed toward an ultimate understanding of consciousness and the accomplishments of consciousness, we must persistently orient our regard toward both these sides, toward the noetic, toward the side of the lived-experience, and toward the noematic, toward the side of that which gives itself to consciousness in the life of consciousness, toward the side of sense and its modes that are so diverse. This we must do in the sphere now under consideration.

⁴² *wirklich*.

Already guided by being and modalities of being, and in the focal orientation toward consciousness and toward the ego that carries out this consciousness, we find the original mode of naive perceptual certainty, or if you will, naive perceptual belief. Then we find the modified modes, doubtful uncertainty, negating as the negative decision that crosses out a certainty and annuls it in the form of a positive contrary certainty. We find further the affirming, the renewed becoming-certain, a certainty, however, that is in the form of a ratifying experience. We also speak here of active acceptance, just as in the opposing instance of rejection. We see here that active acceptance is something different from naive certainty, and unlike the latter, presupposes passing through uncertainty as doubting, questioning. Let us note in passing that when we speak of questioning, we are not concerned here with the wishful intention to decide, an intention that co-determines its sense. It does not concern us here, and logically, is not essential to it.

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Finally, let me mention some important parallel expressions: "To hold to be true" where any kind of certainty is concerned, and "to hold to be false" where "rejection" is concerned. Correlatively, we have on the side of sense the expressions that we have constantly employed, "being certain," "not being," and so forth, and appropriate to the latter way of speaking, we also have the "true," especially as an expression for the "yes really," and the "false" as an expression for "not being." We want to note that the concepts of true and false occur here as expressions for the modes of being we have characterized. In fact, all analyses of the origins of these concepts must begin at this point. I say begin. For we have not even hinted at how these concepts will develop all the way up to the full concept of truth.

<Chapter 3: THE MODE OF POSSIBILITY>

<\$10. Open Possibilities as the Indeterminate Scope of Intentional Prefiguring>

We still have to address the important group of modalizations with respect to possibility and probability. They fall completely within the scope of uncertainty, where we understand by uncertainty not merely a privation of certainty, which would encompass the case of negation; rather by modalities of uncertainty, we mean those that do not pertain to decision at all. Whenever consciousness has lost the mode of certainty and has passed over into uncertainty we will also speak of possibilities. But also more than that. For in this sphere we encounter several concepts of possibility.

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Let us mention first of all the concept of open possibilities with respect to the following context: What is intentionally prefigured in the apperceptive horizon of a perception is not possible, but certain. And yet, possibilities, indeed a whole range of manifold possibilities, are always included in such prefigurings. The prefiguring for the non-visible side, which is given in the perception of a thing from the front side, is as we know an indeterminately general prefiguring. This generality is a noetic trait of consciousness empty pointing ahead, and correlatively is a [noematic] trait of sense for what is prefigured. Thus, for example, the color of the thing's back side is not prefigured as an entirely determinate color when the thing is still unfamiliar to us, and when we have not yet looked at it from the other <side> with more precision. "A color" is indeed prefigured. But potentially still more than that. If the front side has a pattern, then we will expect the back side to follow this thoroughgoing pattern: if it is a uniform color with a medley of specks, we would also possibly expect specks for the back side, and so forth. But there is still indeterminacy. Pointing ahead has now, like all other intentions in normal perception, the mode of naive certainty; but it has this mode precisely according to what it gives to consciousness and in the manner in which it gives something to consciousness, that is,

according to the sense in which it gives something to consciousness. What is certain, therefore, is some kind of color in general, or a "color in general broken up by specks," and so on, i.e., indeterminate generality.

Let us reflect on the consequences of this. Naturally, we use the term generality here only as a provisional aid for an indirect description pointing toward the phenomena themselves. For we do not have in mind here logical concepts, classifying or abstracting generalities. Rather, we have in mind simply this intending into the future peculiar to perception as it is given in perception with its mode of consciousness of indeterminacy. Belonging to the general structure of every empty intention, and likewise to such an indeterminate pointing-ahead, is the possibility of explicating it in the shape of presentifications. We can freely form presentifications that bring to intuition what is non-visible, for instance, by imagining that we are walking around the object. If we do this, then intuitions appear with entirely determinate colors. But we can obviously vary these colors freely within the scope of indeterminacy.

What does that mean? If we are purely directed toward a mere bringing to intuition⁴³, in other words, toward a quasi-fulfillment of perception through presentified perceptual series, a concrete intuition with determinate color will occasionally set in. But this determinate color has not been prefigured, i.e., it has not been demanded. What is presentified is there as certain, and indeed as the back side; but it is so precisely in an indeterminacy-consciousness that does not indicate this determinate color appearing there in a fortuitous manner. If other intuitive presentifications occur with other colors, certainty will be extended just as little to these. For none among them is settled in any particular way in advance. None among them are demanded.

Let us contrast this with the following case. In the instance of an actual fulfillment in the actual progression of perception, the appearance of color fulfilling what is indeterminately prefigured is constituted in itself as certainty. In this case, what takes place with certainty is a specification that determines [more closely] and thus

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a gradation of knowledge. The new emerging expanse of perception with its content of certainty contributes a concreteness by determining more closely the generality that was indeterminate and prefigured; this concreteness is encompassed by the unity of perceptual certainty and therefore uniformly fulfills what is prefigured, the anticipation. The fulfillment is at the same time an increase in knowledge. (The specks that are determinate.) However, that is not the case with the illustrative presentification; every other color can serve just as well for the color that has just appeared. Presentification is only endowed with the mode of certainty to the extent that it retains its mode of indeterminacy in relation to the coloring, despite the determinate coloring occurring in it. Only in this respect does it distinguish itself from a determinate memory, like the kind [of memory] that we would have of it were we to presentify the back side to ourselves again after having actually perceived it. Accordingly, it is clear that every presentification that is merely an intuitive presentification prior to an actual acquisition of knowledge must have a modalized character of certainty in relation to the quasi-determining content. But this uncertainty has the distinctive feature that in it the color that is given fortuitously is precisely a fortuitous color for which not just anything could arise, but rather some other color. In other words, the general indeterminacy has a range of free variability; what falls within it is encompassed *implicitly* in a similar way, and yet it is not positively motivated, not positively prefigured. It is a member of an open range of closer determinations that can be adapted to this framework, but beyond this they are completely uncertain. This makes up the concept of open possibility.

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<§11. Enticing Possibilities as the Tendencies to Believe within Doubt>⁴⁴

Motivation prefigures something positively, and yet does so in the mode of uncertainty; what this means can be illustrated even more clearly by contrasting it with another kind of possibility that

⁴³ *Veranschaulichung*

⁴⁴ Editor: See Appendix 3: <Evidence of Possibilities as Such and Modal Modification in intuition> pp. 436ff.

we will come to know. Let us look back to the phenomenon of doubt. Whenever we speak of doubt, we also speak of propensities to believe. What occurs in the front side that is seen, together with its apprehended sense for the back side, may prefigure something determinate. But it does so ambiguously and not unequivocally. This happens when we become unsure whether what we see is a complete thing or a piece of scenery, for example. That yields a conflict in consciousness that plays itself out here in empty premonitions of what is to come, which was not the case with our example of the wax figure/human being. In this new case, the struggle can take the form of a static state of suspension. But as soon as the ego directs itself toward it and even carries out a presentifying intuition, the struggle passes over to a dynamic play of opposing [senses], to a doubting vacillation. This issues in a propensity to believe for each side. Namely, by initially actualizing for itself the motivations leading to the one side, the ego experiences the concordant demand that is coming from this other side. By exclusively surrendering itself to these motivations, as it were (while what speaks in favor of the other side remains out of action), it experiences a force of attraction, a propensity to turn toward it in certainty. But this also holds likewise when actualizing the opposing intentions. In this way the normal egoic act of perception is modalized into acts we call enticements to believe. From the side of the objective senses, from the side of the objects given to consciousness, we also speak here of enticements to be, which is to say that affection issues from the side of the object, that the object exerts on the ego an enticing demand to be, just as if the object were its hostile partner. The sense itself has the propensity to be.⁴⁵

Now, we likewise call this enticement, possible (regarding it outside of its relation to the ego); but it determines a fundamentally different concept of possibility than the concept of open possibility that was described previously. The difference between them both becomes completely evident precisely in their contrast.

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<§12. The Contrast between Open and Enticing Possibilities>

In principle, an open possibility does not imply a propensity. It does not exert an enticing demand to be; nothing speaks in favor of it; there is no demand directed toward it, even if there were one inhibited by opposing demands. Thus, we do not speak here of enticements at all.

Let us call these new possibilities problematic possibilities or questionable possibilities. We do this because the intention to make a decision arising within doubt between one of the enticing factions of the doubt is called a questioning intention. We speak of questionableness only where enticements and contraposing enticements play off of each other, when something speaks for or against them. The most direct expression for these possibilities, however, is enticing possibilities. It is completely clear that they designate a totally different kind of modalization than the modalization of open possibilities. For modalizing consciousness in each instance has a fundamentally different origin.

We can even characterize open possibility as a modalization of certainty. But this modalizing consists in the fact that an indeterminately general intention, which itself has the mode of certainty, implicitly bears in a certain way a diminution of its certainty with respect to all conceivable specifications. For example, if within an indeterminate generality a speckled color is demanded in certainty, then the fulfillment is restricted insofar as precisely "some kind" of color with "some sort" of shaped specks is demanded. And every specification of this type fulfills this demand in the same way. The specification fulfills the demand; thus, something of a demand also belongs to it. But not only does each one of them exert the same demand; rather, the demand is an implicit one insofar as each contingently occurring specification is essentially grasped in accordance with the indeterminately general demand; it is co-demanded in accordance with it, while as has been shown no actual demand aimed precisely at this specification is directed toward it from the beginning and at present, be it a diminished or even an unrestrictive demand.

This is entirely different where the enticements are concerned, where each one is intended in its particularity.

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⁴⁵ Translator: See the discussion of affection, Division 3.

It is now clear that we have determined a closed and exactly limited group of modalities from a primordial mode of straightforward naive certainty. We have done this by [recognizing] that they are modalizations by virtue of conflict, namely, by virtue of an originally and straightforwardly certain demand with opposing demands. Problematic consciousness with its problematic possibility belongs to this group. We therefore make a fundamental distinction between the modalities arising from conflict, and the modality of open specification.

We can continue our exposition of problematic possibilities by noting that they and only they appear with a different weight. The enticement is more or less enticing; and that also holds particularly when comparing all potentially diverse problematic possibilities that belong to one and the same conflict and that are bound synthetically through this conflict. For, the conflict, the bifurcation of a consciousness into reciprocal inhibitions, creates a unity; noematically speaking, it is the unity of opposition, of the possibilities bound to one another through it.

<§13. Modes of Certainty As Such in Their Relation to Enticing and Open Possibilities>

It is of no little consequence now to regard a unique group of modes of certainty that have this peculiar trait: Certainty remains certainty. [These modes] concern the differences pertaining to the "purity" or "completeness" of certainty.

Let us imagine the following situation. I believe that it is so; I do not doubt; I am not indecisive; I carry out the unbroken thesis: "It is so." But it can nevertheless transpire that while I am so entirely certain, so "sure," it may also be the case here that there is much that speaks against it being so. Another being (or several like it) stands before me as an enticing possibility.

Such opposing enticements, opposing possibilities, can have differing weight; they exercise a stronger or a weaker pull, but they do not determine me. Determining me in belief is just the one possibility for which I am resolved, for which I have decided earlier, perhaps in a process of passing through doubt.

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We see, moreover, that a concept of "conviction" belongs here. Different witnesses speak and present their testimonies, having different weight. I weigh them and decide for the one witness and his testimony. I reject the other testimonies. Here the weight of the other testimonies can even become null and void. In other words, they lose every bit of weight; in truth they have no weight. And yet, it must also be the case that they do retain a weight (and do not turn out to be downright false). But this one testimony in particular has such an "overpowering weight" that I decide for it and do not "accept" the others, do not "take them up," and in this sense reject them. I take the side of this testimony, I come out in favor of this testimony, and against the others.

Yet I can potentially mark the differing weights without deciding in favor of one of the enticements. I hold it in abeyance like the others. I wait possibly for an "objectively decisive" experience, withhold an opinion, wait for an experience that turns up one of the possibilities as an "indubitable" reality, namely, for one that will negate and annul every one of the other "possibilities" thereby robbing them of their weight. In this sense, one can characterize these groups of modes of certainty as modes of conviction.

Thus, the modes of impure (or incomplete) certainty are modes of certainty that refer to the realm or sphere of what is enticing. Let us ground this impure certainty phenomenologically, and more particularly, in the original field of perception. Then we will see still finer distinctions.

Something entices me as a possibility, something speaks in favor of it; but there are other opposing possibilities, and something speaks in favor of them, too; or rather, this or that speaks "against" the others. Or I am "conscious of" only one possibility. For example, a cloudy sky together with humidity speak in favor of a thunderstorm, but not "for sure."⁴⁶ It entices in this way, and it does so in varying degrees, changing according to the particular circumstances.

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⁴⁶ What does "being" conscious of mean here? Being in relief, I am "unconscious" of the other possibilities or entirely indeterminate other possibilities; they are not awakened, but inhibition is still there.

It may be the case here (a) that I am conscious of this possibility in and through its enticement and nothing more: I "do not let myself be determined by it." (b) I am inclined to decide for this possibility, I go along with it for awhile, as it were, and let myself be drawn into it; I am ready and willing to follow its pull. Insofar as the enticement as such means an affection on the ego, which from the perspective of the ego corresponds to a being-drawn, a "propensity" lies in the enticement itself. But the fact that I let myself "willingly" be drawn in, that I am about to follow after it, is still something new phenomenologically. However, here this "following" can be inhibited by opposing propensities, or not be "efficacious" at all. (c) This efficacy means that I straightforwardly yield to the inclination, perhaps without inhibition, that I take up its position, that I definitively "decide" for this possibility. I believe, I am "subjectively certain" that there will be a thunderstorm, and fetch my raincoat and my umbrella. We can then speak of presumption or of a presumptuous certainty in a specific sense. This is similar to the way in which we believe the one witness in the clash of testimonies, although the testimonies by the other witnesses are not shown to be simply false since they still have weight; but they have a weight that we no longer accept. It is not merely the case that the one testimony whose enticement is privileged is stronger: We lend it validity, believing in it in our subjective certainty; and this inner Yes means a No! for the other testimonies of the opposing enticements. They do not hold for us, that is, they are not valid for us "subjectively." In itself, in its own phenomenological character, this presumptuous certainty is characterized as an impure certainty. To be sure, the decision is made, but it is gnawed at internally, so to speak, weakened by the opposing possibilities whose weight is still there and still weighs upon us, only that we deny them their validity. That gives presumptuous certainty an inner character distinguishing it clearly from pure certainty. Obviously, this impurity, this murkiness, has its degrees.

We must take note of still another distinction here. When we say that "something speaks in favor of one or several possibilities" we confront an ambiguity that points us to different phenomenological connections.

(1) An enticement refers to leeways⁴⁷ of possibilities, and these possibilities are not merely imaginary possibilities. Insofar as this is the case, something "speaks" in favor of them all. [47]

(2) But that is only to say that they are "leeways," and from them the determinately directed expectations, inhibiting one another or uninhibited, (the determinate "signs"), mark out all sorts of things. And this is what we had in mind when we spoke in the more restricted sense of something speaking in favor of possibilities. And we hold firmly to this concept.

Whenever we have certainties that refer to leeways of open possibilities we speak of "empirical, primitive certainties." All types of external perception belong here. Each perception implicates a leeway of specifications at every moment within the certainty of a general prefiguring. Yet nothing speaks in favor of these specifications in their particularity. We can also say that the same thing speaks in favor of all the open possibilities of a leeway, they are all equally possible. This implies that nothing speaks in favor of the one possibility if it speaks against the other.

(a) Certainty is a pure certainty; only one single possibility is just right; "something speaks" in favor only of it and lacks the character of mere enticement. It is a complete certainty, complete precisely in the sense of this purity that has no "opposing motives." The raised hammer will fall!

(b) Certainty is an impure certainty.

But in comparison to the immanent sphere, and to the givenness within the immanent present that is evident in not being able to be crossed out, another opposition also emerges now, namely, the opposition between:

(α) those empirical-primitive certainties that implicate precisely the leeways of other possibilities, even if nothing speaks positively in favor of these possibilities (except for the decisive ones). Non-being here is not ruled out; it is possible, just not motivated.

(β) absolute certainties whose non-being is ruled out, or again, if you will, is absolutely certain. There are here no open opposing possibilities; there are no "leeways."

⁴⁷ *Spielelemente*

But there is still a question here concerning how we place what we have just said in relation to modes of evidence.

I can have leeways, "real possibilities" given in evidence, as in experience. On the other hand, I can have an apodictic exclusion of opposing possibilities, of a conceivable being-otherwise. And accordingly the decision can be "evaluated." (Empirical certainty—apodictic certainty.) Still, I can also be conscious of empty meant possibilities and opposing possibilities without such evident givenness; and I can decide, endorse a possibility when something speaks in favor of it presumptively, etc.

That is clearly a unique theme and yields its own distinctions. We have become familiar with modes of certainty, modes of straightforward belief. On the other hand, certainty can be "modalized," which is to say, can cease to be certainty at all: For instance, it can pass over into an enticement, and moreover, into an inclination to follow the enticement, but still without leading to a decision. Accordingly, this would be exactly not a resolve, not certainty, but a modalization of certainty. Likewise, [we have modalization as] a doubting understood as being divided in the vacillating propensity to believe one or the other; and in this indecisiveness, [we have the propensity] to believe the one or the other, striving further to reach a decision, to seek certainty. And likewise [we have a modalization when] calling-into-question, despite certainty; certainty is bracketed, put out of play, etc. Put more precisely, under the general structure of certainty, straightforward belief, we have different specifications, different modes of certainty: Empirical and apodictic certainty. We have still further distinctions within empirical certainty, namely, distinctions of act. Within empirical certainty and certainty in general, and potentially in doubting, distinctions of act can emerge as transformations of the mode of certainty. But there is always certainty! We had come to know impure certainty as a certain decision for an enticement. But there is also a decision that remains within uncertainty.

Let us consider doubting and questioning. Doubting is a doxic mode of comportment experienced as being torn between two or more possibilities; it is a vacillation between different possibilities concerning a judicative intending, namely, between possibilities

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that are enticements, and whereby judicative intending is precisely not actually passing judgment, not having certainty, but is rather a "problematic judging." I am not certain, but I am inclined to believe that A is; something speaks in favor of A, and I "would like" to judge it so. We see that this "I am inclined to" can initially mean the same thing as "something speaks in favor of." Thus, both expressions can be construed as merely correlative expressions. On the other hand, we distinguish from this an inclination-toward as an inner complying, as it were, a sort of deciding for, and yet without being decidedly resolved. I am about to follow the counsel, but an inner "contra-diction" inhibits me, a propensity that inclines me no less to believe otherwise. The decision is inhibited. I can inhibit this propensity, and I can explicitly become conscious of the enticement without already setting off internally to make the decision, that is, without "following" the lead, and perhaps only at this point then curbing or inhibiting myself.

Doubting is a wavering in decisiveness, and each member [of the doubt] which is not being decided upon is still a mode of making a decision. But it can also happen that we decide for the most weighty problematic possibility, for the one that is most strongly affective. What takes place here, however, is not making a decision in certainty, but a particular mode of making a decision that is peculiar to the enticement. Then we have presumption as taking-it-to-be-likely.

Where several problematic possibilities are separated and united we have then a consciousness of problematic disjuncts, the consciousness of "it is 'questionable' whether A or B"—to be sure, without taking questioning in the narrow sense of the word.

The question arising in doubt is a striving after a decision that issues from the comportment of doubt, a striving that is being motivated within this comportment of doubt. Or, it is a striving to reach a certainty that is motivated from an inhibited decision, from a decision that remains incomplete. But is not the propensity itself such a striving like when we have a singular propensity toward an enticement? Is the question: "Is that so?" a striving to overcome the inhibition, and to reach the corresponding resolved certainty? With respect to the genuine sense of a question arising in doubt, namely, as a multifaceted indecisiveness: Is this the striving

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intention to decide the doubt, to overcome the inhibition here or there, and to arrive at a certainty? Certainty of the fact that *A* is, then, annuls all opposing propensities. And it is not only the case that certainty annuls the propensity for *A* insofar as it is transformed precisely into a certainty, losing its inhibition, by finding completion in certainty; it crosses out the opposing propensities, too, insofar as these cannot also pass over into certainties. To decide for *A* means to reject *B*, *C*, etc., with certainty.

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10 In any case, it is now characteristic of doubt and also of the question arising in doubt that I am not convinced in advance about what is there in certainty; and it is not the case that I have only put this certainty out of play.

15 There is a type of question, then, that has different foundations, namely, where I am already interiorly resolved that it is for instance *A*, but where I call into question whether *A* is or *B* is, etc. (in other words, without being in a position to want to decide a doubt that has gripped me). But how do I arrive at this? What sense can that have?

20 Certainty can be incomplete, impure, and I seek a more complete or a completely pure certainty.

25 In⁴⁸ the previous lecture we distinguished between impure and in this sense incomplete certainties, and complete or pure certainties. And we have done this with respect to a particular type of certainty, namely, certainties of transcendent perception. Let us consider a little more closely the modifications of certainty about which we speak.

30 Such a certainty is impure insofar as it has the mode of making a decision for an enticement, more specifically, a subjectively secure decision for an enticement, even though opposing enticements are there, and against which the ego decides despite their weight; the ego does not accept them, although due to their weight, they "demand" being validated. Naturally, this demand or claim consists here in this weight itself, that is, in the affective force that the enticement exercises on the active ego. By affective force I mean a tendency directed toward the ego, a tendency

whose reaction is a responsiveness⁴⁹ on the part of the ego. That is, in yielding to the affection—in other words, by being "motivated"—the ego takes up an endorsing position; it decides actively for what is enticing, and it does so in the mode of subjective certainty.

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5 A "pure" certainty occurs here when the opposing enticements completely lose their weight, when, accordingly, they are entirely crossed out as the experience progresses; they are experienced as straightforward nullities. "What is there" is decided upon from the standpoint of the matter,⁵⁰ by itself, and in making a decision, the ego follows the decision on the part of the matter. It does not need to take sides; it does not need on its part to back one of the possibilities. Each one of the other possibilities, as the possible ground for taking a position, is yanked out from under its feet, and the only ground as the ground of a certainty pertaining to the matter is there of its own accord. The ego finds itself standing on it, and then merely establishes itself subjectively on its ground.

15 We have a simpler case still where we could not be further from speaking about making a decision, because the opposing enticements are lacking from the very start, and in their place are open possibilities. Let us take an example from external experience: Watching the smith, I expect the raised hammer to fall down and bend the iron; watching the glass fall, I expect it to strike the ground and break, and so forth. — Alternative possibilities are there: Some unforeseen effect can intervene, an accidental bump can make the glass fall on the nearby straw mat instead of on the stone floor, etc. Every event as a physical event is surrounded here by a horizon of open possibilities—but they are open; nothing speaks in favor of them in this given moment; the expectations are straightforward certainties that are not inhibited; a modalized expectation does not oppose other like expectations in relation to an enticement.

⁴⁸ Editor: The beginning of a new lecture.

⁴⁹ *antwortende Tätigkeit*

⁵⁰ *Sache*

<Chapter 4:
PASSIVE AND ACTIVE MODALIZATION>

<§14. Position-Taking of the Ego as the Active Response to the
Modal Modifications of Passive *Doxa*>⁵¹

5 *What strikes us now is the ambiguity in speaking of a decision*
that come to pass on its own or in the matter itself, namely, as
undergoing a decision that just arises, and the deciding position-
taking that is carried out on the part of the ego as the ego's
reaction. Looking back at our initial introduction to the modalities
of being and the modalities of belief, we recognize that everything
that was disclosed at that time was initially a modalization taking
place purely in the intentionality of perception, potentially as
completely passive; and in any case it had to be taken purely that
way at first. It is clear now that we must distinguish between the
passivity and the activity of the ego: (1) modal modifications of
passive *doxa*, of passive intentions of expectation, their inhibitions
passively accruing to them, and the like; (2) responsively taking a
position that is peculiar to making a decision, doing so actively, as
proceeding from the ego.

20 Furthermore, it is also clear that the concepts of belief and of
modalities of belief themselves undergo a modification with this
distinction. For now we have to separate out the essentially
different processes and occurrences of passivity and activity
according to their constitutive accomplishments. Thus, we have:

25 (1) Initially in passivity the syntheses of concordance or
discordance, of uninhibited intentions that are fulfilled freely, or
inhibited intentions that are crossed out, etc. And correlatively, we
have in the noema modes of being that maintain the identical
objective sense, possibly in connection with an opposing sense.

30 (2) The active position-takings of the ego, the active decisions,
convictions, letting oneself be convinced, and taking sides, etc.,
and finally the activity of conviction in the broadest sense (where
we no longer speak strictly of testifying for or against). These

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activities also have their noematic correlates. We must note here
that it is not a matter of merely making passive intentionality
patent; it is not a matter of becoming merely cognitively aware in
perceiving, a mere living through the enticement that is taking
place in an attentive turning-toward, that is, a matter of merely
becoming consciously attentive to enticements, nullities, and the
like. Rather, the ego passes its judgment in its own position-
taking, *it makes* a decision for or against, and so forth. One may
well say that here lies the specific source for what we normally
mean or can mean by judging. "Conviction" expresses more:
Issuing from the passive perceptual situation, letting oneself be
determined such that one has a judicative position and then has a
judicative determination. Thus, we also understand why in
practice, judging and conviction become equivalent expressions.
15 We will see shortly that this position-taking or this group of
position-takings that occur here are completely non-independent
from the standpoint of intentionality, namely, insofar as they
presuppose the occurrences of passive *doxa*. Let us note in
advance that these position-takings, this validation and its
transformations, further, are not to be confounded with other
20 modes of comportment by the ego that belong to the sphere of
judgment, especially not with active *explication*, *colligation*,
comparison, differentiation, and the like—all of the operations to
which we are indebted for the logical forms of different state-of-
25 affairs.⁵² In all these actions, judging is always only a process of
conferring or denying validity that stems from the ego.

The ego does not always take a position judicatively in this
strict sense. When it simply perceives, when it is merely aware,
30 apprehending what is there and what, of itself, is presented in
experience by itself, there is no motive for taking a position
provided that nothing else is present. There must be opposing
motives in play, open or not, effecting a particular consciousness;
disjunctive possibilities in a tension of opposites must be at hand.
35 Judging is always deciding this or that, and is thus deciding-for or
deciding-against, active acceptance or dismissal, rejection. But
that must not be conflated with the modes of being themselves:

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⁵¹ Editor: For §§ 14 and 15 see Appendix 4: <Levels of Decision, Receptivity and
Spontaneity> pp. 439ff.

⁵² Translator: See Part 3.

with straightforward "being," with the "null," and again the "not null" already appearing in the objective sense by merely becoming patent, with the "it is too so" resulting from being twice crossed out. In all these modalities the ego of itself does not need to take a position actively, even though it can also be motivated to take such a position by them.

The noetic Yes and No, however, arise from taking a position specifically as judging. As with every mode of consciousness, we have a noematic correlate. Here, of course, this correlate is the noematic "valid" or "invalid" arising in the objective sense; it occurs in the objective sense with the character of being declared valid or invalid by the ego. Judging in the specific sense is thus the ego's act of *posito*, of positing, in its possible dual shape: In the shape of the ego's assenting decision or in the shape of dismissal, rejection. We must still consider whether this means that the positing itself has a dual "quality" in the sense of traditional logic.

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We can at least say this much initially: Where a judging arises in the primordial sphere of a motivating perception, two opposing position-takings become possible, and as the case may be, actual. Both, however, are completely non-independent insofar as they have their motivation founded in what goes on in perception itself, in perception's proper and potentially purely passive course. Perception has its own intentionality that as yet does not harbor anything of the active component of the ego and of its constitutive accomplishment. For the intentionality of perception is rather presupposed in order for the ego to have something for which or against which it can decide. By virtue of the unity of this motivational situation, that is, by virtue of its unity arising from bifurcation, both opposing position-takings are intimately related. For example, where two possibilities were in conflict with one another, the decision for one possibility is accompanied, as a correlate, by the decision against the correlative possibility, potentially, if not actually.

If we look more closely at how the motivation bearing on the ego functions, and how the ego reacts to it with an active affirmative or negative response, then we would have to say the following: The motivational foundation for the decision as the ego's firm positing-as-valid, or again for the negative decision, is

thus the restoration of perceptual concordance. The split occurring in a conflict, in which perceptual apprehensions are reciprocally repressed, returns to an unbroken unity.

The ego is affected by all of this. As the ego, it is itself at variance with itself in its own way; it becomes torn and finally becomes united. It was inclined to endorse the one apprehension, that is, to carry out the apprehension's tendencies of expectation above all, to let them become active expectations issuing from the ego-center. But it still finds itself inhibited once again; it is drawn toward the opposing tendencies of expectation and is inclined toward the opposing apprehension. If perceptual concordance is restored, a single perception in the shape of a normal perception running its course, then the inner conflict of the ego with itself is resolved. The ego can no longer be swayed in this way or that; for the annulled apprehension along with its annulled intentional tendencies cannot be carried out, and this is especially the case with its expectations that are directed ahead in a living manner, but crossed out. But the ego does not merely have as its operational field the free horizon of expectation and the intentionality that is now concordantly established. It actively takes up this position, appropriates what is concordantly given as being *simpliciter*. "Active acceptance" is what carries out a peculiar appropriation, determination,⁵³ thereby establishing this being as valid for me from now on and abidingly.

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An important moment emerges here as characteristic of judicative decision-making. It is no longer a question of making something present, of merely making the intentionality of perception patent; rather, it is a question of appropriation through which the active, strivingly active ego appropriates to itself an acquisition, that is, an abiding knowledge. But it does this in a conscious manner. For what thereby accrues to the ego as being valid for it, having the character of being valid for it from now on, that is, continually, and remaining abidingly valid—this belongs, as we have said, to the essence of declaring-something-as-valid, to the essence of the so-called active acceptance that the ego carries out. In other words, it has a validity extending into an open, egoic

⁵³ *Festlegung*

temporal horizon of conscious life. Perhaps it is not too much to express it in the following way: When I posit something as valid in an affirmative and judicative manner, I mean by this that it is settled for me from now on, as established for the future, and in particular, as being in this way or that. If we were to stand already within the sphere of expressive, predicative judging and in the sphere of communication, then the accomplishment of judgment would be articulated most acutely with the phrase, "I ascertain," or also "I assert that." But we must observe—and this belongs to the essence of judgment—that we do not already find the communicative relation in judgment's first originality; as a rule the communicative relation is presented along with the expression, the assertion.⁵⁴

What happens now to the opposing apprehension that has been negated? Naturally, it is still held in retention; the ego was previously drawn to it, and perhaps already inclined toward it in a preliminary fashion. Indeed, it could be that precisely this apprehension was previously concordant in the form of a normal perception, and that it was carried out by the ego by regarding it as a presumptively existing thing. Thus, there are affective motives that also orient or reorient the regard in this direction. But here the ego responds by dismissing it, by declaring it invalid. The latter obviously turns either against a previous declaration of validity, or against a propensity to such a declaration; that is, it already turns against taking a position and its final result, establishing it.

But now it becomes clear that the affirmative or negative position-taking does not simply exhibit two interchangeable "qualities," like red and blue in the sphere of colors, and that consequently speaking of "quality" is not appropriate here at all. The negating act carried out by the ego is a process of striking down validity; this expression already suggests the secondary intentional character of negation.⁵⁵

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Yet something of the highest importance surfaces here concerning every logical concept of judgment. Namely, we have characterized deciding-in-favor-of by taking-possession-of, appropriation as being henceforth valid, as settled for me from now on. Deciding-against means that such a validity, which was somehow expected of us and possibly taken up by us earlier, is rejected—just as we find something analogous with other acts, for instance, when I reject a decision because a motivational situation has altered or when I resist an inclination of the will.

But the "invalid," which I can make valid once more by a slight shift in attitude, corresponds to negation as deciding-against; that is, by judging affirmatively, I can establish it. The "no" or the "null" then enters into the content of what is established. Accordingly, one can also take the concept of judgment in such a way that it deals exclusively with the activity of establishing being, and that it encompasses nullity as a moment of content, so to speak, as existent non-being. In fact, logic and science reduce everything to judgments that establish [something], and with good reason. No matter how much it is possible to deny, there is nothing of denial in theoretical statements; rather, at one time they establish that something is so, at another they establish that it is not so. Accordingly, a judgment that knows only one "quality," establishing something as valid, is our privileged concept of judgment. Naturally, this does not change the fact that making a decision itself does not have a single modality, but develops in opposing modalities: even if cognitive interest, which logic serves, is interested exclusively in establishing [something], in making assertions, and even if every dismissing negation is ultimately thought of as reduced to the position of a *negativum*, and then perhaps still further to positions with an exclusively positive content.

Still, these considerations need to be filled out considerably. Firm active acceptance and resolved rejection are not the only modalities of taking a position in belief that the ego carries out. Rather, it is clear that a subjective-active comportment of the ego—precisely what we characterize in the genuine sense by the term "doubt," or the expression "I doubt whether it is this or that"—also corresponds to what we called, already in perception

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⁵⁴ *Behauptung*.⁵⁵ Translator: The process of striking down validity (*Außer-Geltung-Setzen*) should not be conflated with the process of suspending validity (*Außer-Aktion-Setzen*) peculiar to the epoché. For the latter neither affirms nor negates validity; it merely puts it out of play, makes no judicative use of it. See *Ideas I*, esp. 59-61.

itself and in its passive course, a split perception, "perception modalized as a doubtful perception." Indeed, I already mentioned previously that the ego itself can be at variance with itself, even though this takes place on the motivational ground of that split running through the intentionality of perception. I am now at variance with myself, I am torn to the extent that I am inclined to believe now this, now that. This inclination-toward means in general, and in active doubting specifically, more than a mere affective pull of enticing possibilities. They entice me as being, which is to say in general, that I go along with the one, and then with the other already in the manner of a deciding for; I confer on it something of validity, though to be sure, [validity is conferred] in a such way that [it] can be inhibited again and again.

This "going along with" on the part of the ego is motivated by the weight of the possibilities themselves. A judicative tendency, which I actively follow for a stretch, issues from these possibilities as enticing. This means that I carry out something like a momentary decision in favor of it. But I am stopped in my tracks by the opposing possibilities making an affective claim on me. Even this wants to be heard, as it were, and makes me inclined to believe. The inhibition here is not a mere privation, but a mode of the phenomenon of an inhibited decision, precisely of a decision being arrested along the way. I do go along for a stretch in carrying out a decision, as it were, only I do not go all the way to a firm decision of belief. Likewise, in such motivational situations, the decisions on the part of the ego, decisions that dismiss the other possibilities and that go against them, are then inhibited negative decisions.

The phenomenon of taking the side of a possibility and internally closing oneself off to the others would belong here especially. In this case, a genuine decision already comes about, a subjective certainty and establishment, assertion; but it is an impure decision, one that is gnawed at so to speak, a decision not made with good logical conscience; this is unlike the case where the motivation for precisely this firm resolve issues from the matter itself as a concordantly constituted experience.

Also belonging here is the phenomenon of presumption, of taking-to-be-likely. If I consider possibilities having different

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weight, then the strongest weight will possibly motivate me to make a decision for it, it will motivate a kind of privileged active acceptance, which does not therefore mean establishing it or affirmatively asserting it as being *simpliciter*. To be sure, when one possibility has an overpowering weight, or when what continues to speak in favor of it on the side of the matter⁵⁶ takes on an overpowering weight from subjective motives, I can pass over even further to a certainty, albeit to an impure conviction. But then one no longer speaks of "presuming" or "taking to be likely." The negative correlate of this is naturally taking-to-be-unlikely, whereby a kind of rejection is expressed, but not a straightforward negation.

<§15. Questioning as a Multi-Layered Striving toward Overcoming Modalization through a Judicative Decision>

15 What happens, finally, with questioning, questioning that is so inextricably intertwined with doubting? Does it also belong, like doubting, to the rank of these judicative modalities? Within the passive sphere and, in particular, within the intuition that is split in the intentional conflict, the *disjunctivum* corresponds at the same time to the process of doubting and questioning that can be motivated here. In and through their rivalry, A, B, and C are apprehended and united in the unity of the conflict. We can express this in no other way than by saying: We are conscious that "either A or either B or either C is", and we find just this in expressing the active question and the active doubt, namely, as the content of the question or the content of the doubt. This is to say: I question, I doubt whether A, etc.

30 Stated in our previous manner of speaking: A unitary field of problematic possibilities in the passive sphere precedes questioning and doubting. Naturally, there are at least two of these possibilities. But it can also be the case here that merely one of these contesting possibilities comes consciously to the fore, or as we also said, becomes patent; meanwhile the others go unnoticed in the background in the manner of empty presentations that are

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⁵⁶ *das sachlich für sie Sprechende*

not carried out thematically. Every egoic act has its theme that can be a singular theme or a unitary manifold of thematic singularities, which then make up the entire theme in their unity. Obviously, either the theme of a question (like of a doubt) is a problematic singularity whose disjunctive opposing terms remain then unthematic (like when I merely ask: Is that a wax figure?), or it is the entire problematic disjunction (like in the question: Is that a wax figure or a human being?).

What now is characteristic of questioning as an activity that is obviously peculiar to the ego? The passive disjunctive tension of problematic possibilities (of doubt in the passive sense) motivates an active doubling, a mode of comportment that displaces the ego in an act-schism. This essentially and immediately implies an uneasiness and an original drive to get beyond it, to come back to the normal condition of unanimity. There arises a striving toward a firm decision, that is, one that is ultimately uninhibited and pure. Questioning already gives rise to this striving. It frequently happens that the established concordance, and through this the inner unity of the ego with itself that is aimed at, can be lost once again. This recurring experience can provoke a further motivation, namely, it can awaken a drive to overcome this renewed uneasiness. Unlike the other instances, in this case the matter does not rest with striving toward a judicative deciding and toward an appropriation and establishment of the passed judgment; rather, the striving is directed toward a definitive, secure judgment, that is, toward a judgment that the ego can justifiably ground and with regard to which the ego can be subjectively certain of not lapsing again into embarrassing modalizations. This multi-layered striving is expressed in the following two kinds of questioning.

(1) Straightforward questioning in general is the process of striving, from a modal modification (or if you will, arising from a schism and inhibition), in order to arrive at a firm judicative decision. Questioning has its intentional correlate in the question, just as judging has its correlate in the judgment. Perhaps it is clearer when I say that the ego-*actus* of judging as the process of passing a judgment is to be distinguished, naturally, from the judgment that is passed in the judging. In the linguistic sphere, the statement as that which is stated corresponds to the stating; what is

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written is there as a proposition, what is verbally expressed is there as what is asserted, as what is established. Likewise, we have the stated question as opposed to the activity of questioning.

The proper sense of questioning is manifest in and through the process of responding or in the response. For with the response there is a tension-releasing fulfillment of striving; satisfaction sets in. Corresponding to the various possible responses are [1] the diverse modes and levels in which satisfaction can occur, as relative and yet already as satisfaction, or as full and ultimate, and [2] the different directions in which the questioning intention can go. For example: Is A? The response runs: Yes, A is! Or, no, A is not. Thus, it has both firm modes of judgment as possible responses.⁵⁷

Since the questioning endeavor is fulfilled, answered in the corresponding judgments, it is clear that the experience of the forms of judgment, forms of judgment that in a parallel manner fit the sense-content of the questions, implies that the questioner already consciously anticipates these possible forms of response, and that they already occur in the articulation of the questions themselves as the contents of the question. Every possible judgment is conceivable as the content of a question; naturally, it is not yet an actual judgment in the question, but a prospective judgment, a merely intended⁵⁸ (neutral) judgment, which as the content of the question, points to Yes and No.

Even doubting within developed consciousness is a doubting comportment, an inhibition and being divided when taking a position in relation to prospective,⁵⁹ possible judgments.

If the question has several components and is posed as a complete disjunction, then it may read, for instance: Is A or is B?. Thus, it shows disjunctively the corresponding prospective judgments. When the question has two components it can also read here: Is A not or is B?, and so forth. The responses turn out accordingly; they are directed toward the prospective, possible judgments as contents of the question which are taken into

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⁵⁷ <Further> Is A not? "Yes, A is not," "No, it is not not A."

⁵⁸ wanting

⁵⁹ wanting

consideration according to the terms of the disjunction. Wasn't Rome victorious, or was it Carthage? Yes, Rome was victorious, but not Carthage.

Yet, there are still other parallel responses throughout insofar as the response is a decision, affirmative or negative, but not every decision must have the mode of a firm certainty. Even taking-it-to-be-likely is taking a position that makes a decision, even though it may not be satisfying in a definitive manner. Yet, in a way, it already resolves the indecisiveness insofar as the ego, in taking it to be likely, has endorsed one possibility by believing. In fact, we can also respond to the question, Is *A*? with, Yes, it is likely. No, it is unlikely.

As we might expect, then, further mitigated responses are still possible. This is the case insofar as every mode of judgment that still has something of a decision in it, and accordingly, every form of decision that is arrested, can serve as a response as well. For example: Is *A* or *B*? Response: "I am inclined to believe that *A* is." To be sure, this is usually preceded by: "I don't know," or "I haven't made up my mind," "I'm not sure." This shows that the practical intention of questioning is actually directed toward a "knowing," toward a decision in a special sense, toward a judgment in the strict sense. But it is nonetheless a response, even if incompletely satisfying. On the other hand, it would not be a response at all if we were to say, for instance: *A* is fascinating. So, response in the genuine sense of this word is a judicative decision, taken very broadly. Let me retract this statement. For in a certain sense, to say "I don't know," or even "I'm not sure," is also a response to a question. This obviously concerns communicative interaction in which I merely inform the other with my response that I cannot comply to his wish, that I have no response at all for his question. And in fact one can also reply in such cases with the phrase: "I have no response."

Still, our preceding analyses have not yet expressly taken a position regarding the extent to which questions themselves belong to the modalities of judgment. Following our analyses, this does not require a long exposition. Of course, questioning belongs to the sphere of judgment and knowledge, indeed, it belongs to them inseparably; and it belongs inextricably and necessarily to

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logic as the science of knowing and of the known, more precisely, as the science of cognitive reason and its formations. But it does this only because the judicative life, even the rational judicative life, is a medium for a peculiar wishing, striving, willing, acting, whose goals are precisely judgments, and judgments of a special form. All reason is at the same time practical reason, and this also holds for logical reason. Of course, we will still have to distinguish valuing, wishing, willing, acting (which aim at judgments and truths through judging), from judging itself (which is itself not a valuing, wishing, willing). That is, questioning is a mode of comportment that is related in practice to judging. I find myself disagreeably frustrated when I pose a question and do not reach a decision; this may also frustrate me in other decisions relating to my practical life. Accordingly, I wish for a decision.

Yet, questioning is not merely a static state of wishing, but a directedness striving toward a judicative decision that already belongs to the sphere of volition. Only later when we see practical ways of actually bringing about the judicative decision does it become a resolved willing and acting. To be sure, the normal concept of a question is an interrogation directed toward another person, and possibly toward myself in turning back to myself, an interrogation proceeding from myself toward myself. Here, communication with others does not fall within the scope of our reflections, just as predicative questions in their relation to predicative judgments do not. But we can also leave out of consideration turning-toward-oneself that makes oneself the terminus of communication, just like others are made the terminus of communication (for the ego can in fact interact with itself). Thus, primitive questioning is a practical striving toward a judicative decision, and is further a habitual practical attitude that can be possibly effective for a long time, being always on the verge of passing over to corresponding volitions, endeavors, actions, of trying out methods for solving problems, etc.

(2) Having also given a breakdown of questioning *implicit* in what we have just said above, which we are not in a position to carry out further here, we must now consider the levels of questioning alluded to above. First, it is apparent that questioning can find its firm reply through a firm assertion with which we

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seemingly reach a definitive position, and that then, in spite of this, we can renew the questioning. For example, we ask: "Is A true?" The answer runs: "Yes, A is true." But we ask once more: "Is A really true?" And we do this without ever doubting. This may happen in our perceptual sphere, and can be clarified in the following manner: A perception at variance with itself has passed over to a concordant perception that harbors the decision; it has passed over to a concordant perception according to the sense of one of the apprehensions. But all the same, there is always the open possibility that the further course of perception will not ratify affiliated anticipations, and thereby the validity of the apprehension's sense. The need may thus arise to secure it further and to justify the perceptual judgment, to ratify and strengthen it. This can take place by drawing closer, putting perception freely into action according to prefigured possibilities in order to realize and to see then whether it is actually true. Accordingly, the new question is a question permeating the open possibilities of the horizon and relating a justifying question, i.e., a question directed toward actual, true being to the anticipatory intentions. Through the ratification, then, what is already judged as existing is endowed with the new character, "truly and really so," such that we could also characterize this question as a question concerning truth and reality. Naturally, the interplay can be repeated here, indeed the actual and the true are not completely definitive, since new horizons can open up. What we have presented here suffices to bring to light the difference between straightforward questioning and questioning concerning justification or truth that are adjoined as higher levels to straightforward questioning.

The investigations of our previous lectures have presented a portion of the phenomenology of judicative acts in the higher sense, although our necessary analyses of the lower levels were not yet brought to completion. This was due to the fact that the fundamental theory of judgment initially leads to *doxa* and doxic modalities that belong to the passivity of intuition itself. Here it was quite necessary to disclose immediately its contrast with the higher level of judging that takes place as specific egoic decision making. Otherwise one would have formed the view that the theory of perceptual belief, and likewise the modes of judgment

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occurring in passive intuition of every other kind, would already make up a full theory of judgment. But it is important to keep this in mind from the very beginning, and not as an empty generality: that the cognitive life, the life of *logos*, indeed like life in general runs its course in a fundamental stratification. (1) Passivity and receptivity. We can include receptivity in this first level, namely, as that primordial function of the active ego that merely consists in making patent, regarding and attentively grasping what is constituted in passivity itself as formations of its own intentionality. (2) That spontaneous activity of the ego (the activity of *intellectus agens*) that puts into play the peculiar accomplishments of the ego, as was the case with judicative decisions.

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<DIVISION 2:
EVIDENCES>

<Chapter 1:

THE STRUCTURE OF FULFILLMENT>

5 <§16. Fulfillment: Syntheses of Empty Presentation and
Corresponding Intuition>⁶⁰

By pursuing our interest especially in the clarification of knowledge, that is, by focusing especially on the function of knowledge within pure subjectivity, we had acquired an orderly series of systematic insights before our break.⁶¹ At the end [of the lecture] we were occupied with the rudiments, the most basic elements of a theory of judgment. By undertaking a systematic study of perceptions we came across the moment of belief, of passive *doxa*, and attended to the modalizations of belief. 15 Naturally, what was demonstrated here is mirrored *mutatis mutandis* in each mode of intuition and accordingly in remembering, which in itself is characterized as a re-perceiving, as it were. We then contrasted with these doxic events occurring in the passive sphere, the functions of higher judicative activities that are founded in them. By doing this, we acquired an initial, 20 concrete understanding of the opposition between the passive and experiential accomplishment and, on the other hand, the spontaneous accomplishment of thought, the accomplishment of the ego who in the strict sense makes judgments, makes decisions, 25 and who actively appropriates and establishes its acquisition of knowledge.

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We are now going to study the peculiar characteristics and accomplishments of the sphere of judgment that are of particular importance for logic, characteristics and accomplishments that we already encounter in the sphere of passivity or mere receptivity. I 5 mean the functions of fulfilling confirmation,⁶² corroboration. They are special synthetic functions that we already encountered much earlier, but at that time we were unable to clarify their relation to other syntheses sufficiently. While carrying out our analysis of perception we had to point to its synthetic character as 10 something fundamental. Perception is a process of streaming from phase to phase; in its own way each one of the phases is a perception, but these phases are continuously harmonized in the unity of a synthesis, in the unity of a consciousness of one and the same perceptual object that is constituted here originally. In each 15 phase we have primordial impression, retention, and protention, and unity arises in this progression by the protention of each phase being fulfilled through the primordial impression of the phase that is continuously contiguous to it. Considered concretely, as in process, the perceptual lived-experience is continuously being fulfilled, and precisely for this reason, it is a unity of continual concordance. When this concordance is ruptured, which is 20 altogether possible, modalization occurs, and we no longer have a perception in the normal sense, namely, we are no longer continually consciousness of the one perceptual object as something existing in a straight-forward manner. 25

We also speak of fulfillment in other respects within the sphere of mere presentations to which we restrict ourselves now, within mere receptivity. And so, with respect to all expectations that arise as special presentations in presenting life. We expect something to 30 happen—now the very thing occurs, confirming the expectation in the most original confirmation of a ratifying perception. We are interested in such an original confirmation in which a presenting

⁶⁰ Editor: See Appendix 5: <Intuitive Presentations and Empty Presentations>, and Appendix 6: <Sense and Intuition> pp. 445ff. and 447ff.

⁶¹ Editor: Christmas break, 1925.

⁶² Translator: Throughout this Division, Husserl tends to use the term *Bewährtheit* and its cognates to refer to a corroboration or kind of "verification" belonging to the *passive sphere*, and the term *Bewährung* and its cognates to refer to a process of verification proper belonging to the *active sphere*. To remain consistent with Husserl's employment of these two different terms, I translate the former term *Bewährtheit* as "confirmation," and the latter *Bewährung* as "verification." See p. 133.

intention is fulfilled in a synthesis of the intended object and the corresponding object itself. We can also say that we are making an initial study of the nature of evidence. Making a presentation evident to us is indeed bringing it to originally fulfilling confirmation. Thus, it is not a question of an arbitrary synthesis of identification; rather, it concerns a synthesis of a presentation that is not self-giving with a presentation that is self-giving.

Naturally, we take at first the mode of certainty and positionality as a basis for these presentations. From the outset we see that the important distinction between empty and full or intuitive presentations, a distinction with which we are familiar, especially becomes an issue for the syntheses of confirmation. To be sure, we know that even a perception, in particular, an external, transcendent perception, can occur in syntheses of fulfillment—and not only as a perception confirming an intention; rather, it can even occur as a mere intention that becomes fulfilled in new perceptions. This happens, for example, when we perceive a tree from the front, and wanting to know it better, draw nearer to it and now perceive it in new perceptions; by determining the tree more closely, we also have a fulfilling confirmation. Meanwhile, every external perception harbors its inner and outer horizons, regardless the extent to which perception has the character of self-giving; this is to say, it is a consciousness that simultaneously points beyond its own content. In its fullness it simultaneously points into an emptiness that would only now convey a new perception. The self-giveness of a spatial thing is the self-giveness of a perspectival appearing object that is given as the same in the fulfilling synthesis of appearances intertwining and devolving upon one another. But it is the same object that itself appears now this time in one way, now another time in another way, appearing in other perspectives, always pointing from a perspective to ever new perspectives in which the same object that is exhibited is continually determined more closely, and yet is never determined definitively. For we always expect appearances of newly opened, empty horizons. Thus, where there is no horizon, where there are no empty intentions, there is likewise no [synthesis of] fulfillment. A datum that is given in immanent perception, i.e., that is adequately given in each Now does not therefore admit of any

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further confirmation with respect to this Now. Still, it does occur as a fulfillment insofar as the preceding perceptual phase already points to what is to come. This fulfillment is a fulfillment of an anticipation and is a definitive, absolute fulfillment, or evidence.

Accordingly, it may now seem that the unity of a synthesis of fulfillment (of a confirming one) would be characterized by the fact that an empty consciousness (be it a consciousness that is standing completely empty for itself, or a consciousness incompletely saturated by intuition) would be synthetically united with an appropriate intuition, whereby what is empty intended⁶³ and what is intuited coincide in the consciousness of the same [object], that is, coincide in the identity of the objective sense. One would like to think, however, that fulfillment is certainly a bringing to intuition: confirming an intending, that is, meaning an object but not having the object itself intuitively, or having it intuitively, but still meaning beyond what is already intuitively given, and now passing over to the intuition of what is not yet given. But we will see that this characterization would not work, for not every process of bringing to intuition, that is, not every fulfillment is confirming.

It is of fundamental importance to distinguish between the different possible syntheses pertaining here to intuitions and empty presentations, and to characterize them in more detail. The possible syntheses are determined according to their phenomenological character by the types of intuitions and empty presentations founding them. Conversely, one can become aware for the first time of the different sorts of founding presentations in the different operations of closely related presentations within the synthesis, and in the different character that the synthesis assumes in these cases. Without distinguishing between different possible syntheses, one might easily overlook distinctions within intuitions and within empty presentations that could occur here.

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⁶³ *Vorintelligenz*

<§17. Description of the Possible Types of Intuition>

Let us pursue this matter more deeply by proceeding initially from the general distinction between intuitive presentation and empty presentation. The intuitive presentation has for its part different modes. Perception is the primordial mode of intuitiveness (as always, understood as doxic positionality). It is to be contrasted with the mode of presentification, which, upon closer inspection has various forms, too. By studying intuitive remembering we have learned that a remembering in itself manifests itself as a presentification of a perception, thus, that it is not structured as simply as a perception. It is a present lived-experience that is not itself a perception; instead, it presentifies a perception in the temporal mode of a past perception, and precisely thereby it presentifies its previous perceptual object as having-been. Every other kind of presentification has a similar structure.⁶⁴ Thus, there are intuitive presentations of something present that are surely not perceptions of that present something, but rather are presentifications of it: for example, when we make intuitively present the back side of a thing that is more or less familiar from a previous perception, or when we make intuitively present the co-presence of other things, like when we intuitively presentify Berthold's Fountain.⁶⁵ Here we do not merely <present> it as the fountain seen yesterday in its mere pastness, but <present> it as now and as actual, just like the intuitions that we

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⁶⁴ Translator: Empathy (*Eingefühlung*) as a mode of presentification does not make present a previous or future perceptual object because the other or the alien can in principle never be given "originally." This is certainly different from a remembering that literally represents its object, or from a future presentification that anticipates a future object as present, or finally from a co-presentification in which something that is not given in the original at present, but can in principle be present (cf. below 367, 373f., 377f.). Accordingly, rather than translate *Vergegenwärtigung* as re-presentation, which would be well-suited for temporal acts, I prefer the common neologism, presentification, since it includes the full complement of acts ranging from imagination to empathy.

⁶⁵ The original Berthold's Fountain to which Husserl refers was located in the center of Freiburg at the junction of Kaiser-Joseph-Strasse and Salzstrasse. It was erected in 1807 for Berthold III, Herzog von Zähringen and was destroyed in 1944. In 1965 a new fountain was erected for the Dukes of Zähringen, the founders of Freiburg. (This is not to be confused with the fountain built in Freiburg to commemorate the Transcendentalist Friedrich Schwarz, which was erected in 1852 and is still standing on the Rathausplatz.)

have here and now of the outside entry ways and the vestibule, etc. To be sure, the memory of the past plays its role here—indeed the vestibule initially appears in the current intuition as a remembering—but what is past extends unaltered into the future in the manner of an object for consciousness. This future proceeds from the reproduced past and does so in such a way that this future is at the same time co-present, relative to our current perceptual present to which these things here in our current perceptual field belong.

Furthermore, we also have intuitive presentifications of what is to come from the future, that is, intuitive expectations. Proper to being subsequent, to what takes place tomorrow, being future as being-in-anticipation or being expected by us is what we fore-see⁶⁶ as a future duration, for example, the enduring-character of this lecture-hall, of the university, of the street, of the city, etc. Accordingly, we have a consciousness of something future in an intuitive presentation. Obviously, expectations are not always like this, merely extending the perceptual moment continuously into the future. Something unknown, something singular never yet experienced can also be fore-seen, like an event that is indeed expected, but yet is singularly new, an event that is accordingly expected as completely determinate, as in the case of periodic repetition, or an event that is expected as more or less indeterminate, which is more often the case.

We had focused on a tremendous, new theme in the previous lecture.⁶⁷ On the level of passivity, it concerned the tremendous problem of making evident or of confirmation, as well as the closely related problems of mere ratification and corroboration on the level of passivity. The problem of evidence led us back to the distinctive syntheses of coinciding that forms identities, namely to such syntheses in which intuitions and empty presentations (or intuitions and intuitions) are synthetically united, but whereby empty presentations and their fulfillment once again play an essential role. This happens insofar the intuition, on the one hand, brings empty horizon-intentions into play and the intuition, on the

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⁶⁶ *voranschauen*

⁶⁷ Editor: The beginning of a new lecture.

other, provides the appropriate fullness for these empty horizon-intentions.

A logic that would leave obscure the accomplishment of making evident within logic itself [would] remain hopelessly unclear. But should one not forgo this central problem, then the primary task becomes elucidating the founding level of the passive syntheses of "verification" lying at the basis of all active verification. To do this, however, one must gain deeper insights into the structures of the intuitions and empty presentations that may be functional here. The universal significance that we have repeatedly emphasized, a significance that all these types of consciousness possess for the entirety of a transcendental life as a whole-consciousness, leads us to analyses that are not at all a mere special problem of logic, no matter how important the latter may be. We will be led to insights into the most universal lawful regularities of essences, to the most universal lawful regularities of structure concerning the unity of transcendental inner life, but also to the most universal lawful regularities of genesis.

In the last lecture, we proceeded from a descriptive consideration of the types of intuition that can function in the syntheses of confirmation. They were either perceptions or presentifications; the presentifications were either memories of the past, like when a past lived-experience is presented, or memories of the present, like intuitive presentations of a co-present, for instance, the antechamber of this room, or the co-presence of alien psychic life that is given perceptually along with the alien lived-body; or finally, they were memories of the future, intuitive presentations of an expected future.

Indeed, it occurred to us there that in perception we are nevertheless "horizontally" co-conscious of the past and future. But we are conscious of them empty, even though they can be exposed subsequently and in an intuitive manner. Likewise in the case of remembering: In every remembering not only is there a past, which can be traced back by remembering, and a future, but there is also a relation to a current present, to the future by *perceiving*, and therefore to its current future. Finally, even expectation is not isolated and without relation to the current present and to the past of something expected. In all of this we

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find internal structural intertwinings. We will soon see that it will not suffice to juxtapose as types, perceptions, memories of the past, memories of the present, and memories of the future,⁶⁸ and to describe them in an entirely general manner according to the noematic character of their objectlike formations. Or that we cannot be satisfied with a general phenomenological impression and with the evident differences between all types. Only when we understand them in their structural interrelatedness can we also understand how they function in synthetic interrelatedness, including here, as well, how they can function as confirming or confirmed.

This holds not only for types of intuitions, but similarly for the other side, for the side of empty presentations.

<§18. Description of the Possible Types of Empty Presentation>

There are empty presentations of all possible objects in all subjective modes of inner givenness; in other words, corresponding to every mode of intuition is a possible mode of empty presentation. That we relate corresponding empty presentations and intuitions to the same [object] means that through a synthesis they achieve a coinciding with respect to the object.

In fact, we would not be able to speak at all of empty presentations and to attribute to them the character of having a relation to an object if it did not belong essentially to each empty presentation that it admit, so to speak, of a disclosing, of a clarification, of a manifestation of its objectlike character, i.e., that it could enter into a synthesis with a corresponding intuition. By bringing to intuition what is empty meant there, the synthesis allows us to realize for the first time that something is presented there in an empty manner. We can say without hesitation that non-intuitive presentations are only called presentations in an inauthentic sense; genuinely speaking they do not actually present

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⁶⁸ Translator: *Wahrnehmungen, Rückertnerungen, Mitwahrnehmungen und Vorwahrnehmungen*. See Supplements to the Main Text: "First Version of Main Text Part 2," p. 377, where Husserl explains his motive for using such formulations.

anything to us, an objective sense is not constituted in them; nothing is built up in them as the being of this or that content through actual intentional structures such that we could continuously acquire knowledge of it. What is genuinely presented to us is what is intuited in an originary manner. What is constituted perceptually in its ipseity and in its features, in its different facets, etc., comes to our originary knowledge. But then this is also true of what is quasi-perceived, what is intuitively presented to us in a presentifying modality of intuition, what takes place before our inner eyes piece by piece, reproductively or in the intuitive anticipation of what is to come. Nothing takes place genuinely in the empty presentation, an objective sense is not genuinely constituted. And yet we do say that it presents this or that, i.e., that I am conscious of this or that. In this case, however, we can always place this "something" given to consciousness next to an intuition of it: in the synthesis, we gain an evidence-consciousness, a consciousness that exactly the same [object] that was meant in an empty manner is there in intuition in a genuine way, as the same [object] actually presented.⁶⁹

20 Naturally, corresponding to every intuition is an empty presentation insofar as an intuition never disappears without a trace after it has elapsed. We are "still" conscious of what it had intuited, now in a non-intuitive way; to be sure, in the end it fades away in a general, undifferentiated emptiness. Every *such* empty presentation is a retention, and the fact that it necessarily connects up with past intentions characterizes a fundamental law of passive genesis. As we know, this law extends further than what is expressed here to the extent that it already plays an unflagging role in the inner becoming of every intuition itself. This is certainly the first aspect of the fundamental lawfulness of the constitution of original time-consciousness: that every lived-experience, speaking most basically, every Now-phase that arises in a primordialily impressional manner is continually modified in retention by essential necessity, and this [retentionally modified Now-phase] continues further no less in this manner. What holds for the phases

holds then for the expanses, for the concrete lived-experiences themselves. If nothing new occurs in a primordialily impressional manner, then the intuition as such is past, which is to say, it has entirely passed over into the living retention. The objects found in such a retention are disclosed through a process of bringing [them] to intuition; this process of bringing to intuition is connected to the retention according to an essentially lawful possibility, but not a necessity. In other words, they are disclosed in the synthetic transition to an appropriate intuition in the consciousness of them. This is obviously a synthesis of confirmation.

But now it must be said that not all empty presentations have one and the same nature and function; in particular, not all of them have the same nature as retentions do, namely, a nature that we find in the primordial genesis of the temporal stream whereby as retentions [these empty presentations] are connected to any kind of intuition, to any kind of presentation (thus even to any kind of retention); and as we have shown, [this holds] not only *in concreto*, but also in the structural integrity of every intuition itself, which (like every lived-experience in general) can *only* be in the process of time-constituting becoming. With respect to the doctrine of this primordial genesis, we have not only had to speak of retentions, but also of protentions. In our analysis of perception, which was in this regard an analysis of temporal modes of givenness, we have already observed and touched upon the essentially new role of protentions over against the role of retentions. The rubric, protention, designates the second aspect of genetic primordial lawfulness that strictly governs the life of consciousness as the time-constituting unitary stream. Just as a retentional horizon of the past is invariably connected to each impressional present, a protentional horizon of the future is no less invariably connected to an impressional present. Just as one can disclose the retentional horizon, so too can one expose the protentional horizon. Just as the past is first clearly exposed as such through intuitive remembering, namely, as just-having-been, so too is the constitutive accomplishment of protention exposed as the just-about-to-arrive, as becoming originally conscious of the future.

⁶⁹ One must avoid confusing relatively unclear reproductive intuitions and empty presentations, empty intentions.

All of this is familiar to us. But when we make the following question the focus of our attention we arrive at something new: whether the two empty presentations as empty presentations are essentially homogeneous, and whether they bring about differently characterized constitutive accomplishments (past – future), for instance, only through a differently regulated order of functioning or merely through an inner complexity. On the other hand, the expressions already tell us something, expressions that we had to choose, in differentiating them, by being intuitively immersed in both situations. In spite of its pure passivity, we spoke of protention as an expectation, and with the colorful image of the present meeting the future with open arms. Accordingly, we already speak this way in pure passivity, which is to say, even prior to [actively] grasping and viewing the perceptual object. We did not use such expressions, and we could not use such expressions with respect to retention. In this connection, there is a difference in the way in which retention and protention function in mindful perception, when we take note [of something] and grasp it. We are mindfully directed, purely and simply, toward the present object, toward the ever new Now that emerges as fulfilling the expectation; and in and through it, it is directed further toward the approaching object. Mindful perceiving follows the protentional continuity. The directedness-ahead, which already lies in passive perception itself, becomes patent in the mindful perceiving. On the other hand, there is however not a directedness in the retentional continuity; there is not a directedness that would follow the trail of pasts being pushed back further and further. One may object here that we can surely also cast a backward turning glance back toward the pasts. While this may be true, it soon becomes clear that there is a tremendous difference in the two cases, and that we must clearly differentiate between the direction of the egoic regard, and the direction in perception itself that already takes place prior to the apprehending regard. In one instance, the egoic regard follows the direction in perception itself, in the other, it does not. [74]

In order to clarify all this it will do us well initially to go beyond protentions as intentions of expectation, and to draw upon other empty presentations that are structurally related to them, and

that are at the same time different from all mere retentions. We have in mind making co-present,⁷⁰ memories of the present as forms of intuitive presentations, alongside memories of the past and memories of the future. Let us note throughout that these intuitive memories do not, for instance, come first in genesis, instead the corresponding empty presentations are essentially earlier. Thus, the corresponding intuitions first arise through motivations of awakening, already within perception (where empty retention and protention necessarily link up with the primordial impression, and likewise where a concrete empty retention, or even possibly an empty expectation of the future for a new perception, link up with the entire course of perception). [75]

If we now consider the genetically more original modes of making co-present, then at issue, e.g., for every perceptual object, are its entire horizons that are constitutive of it, horizons that belong immediately to it.

In the previous lecture⁷¹ we pointed to the entire compass of empty presentations that share a common structure with protentions and anticipatory presentations. Belonging here are all the horizon-intentions that have been awakened in the concrete connection of possible intuition, for example, when on occasion we become conscious of some elements of an environing-thing-world (that is not perceived) as co-present through particular empty presentations. We recognize this peculiar feature with respect to all such presentations: that they exist with other presentations in a synthetic nexus of a special kind, namely, in a synthetic nexus that lies entirely outside of the genre of identifying syntheses or syntheses of coinciding. In our example of the awakened co-presence of the antechamber, the empty presentation of this antechamber does not occur in an isolated way; rather, it arises in connection with the perceptual presentation in which we survey the seen room with our gaze knocking on the door, as it were. The connection of this perceptual presentation with the empty presentation is a "synthetic" one, which is to say, a unity of consciousness is produced that carries out a new constitutive

⁷⁰ *Mitgegenwärtigungen*.

⁷¹ Editor: The beginning of a new lecture.

accomplishment, whereby the both objectlike formations receive special characters of unity noematically. More precisely, the perceptual presentation, what appears perceptually in this way or that, points to the empty presented object as something that consequently belongs to it. A directed ray arises in perception and goes clean through the empty presentation to what is presented in it. From a genetic perspective, we also say with reason that the perception has awakened the presentation, but awakening means precisely both the emergence of a synthesis of directedness in which the one presentation is "directed toward" and in which the opposing presentation is accordingly directed in itself, or in which the one presentation is characterized as *terminus a quo*, the other as *terminus ad quem*.

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Let us now consider such syntheses of consciousness in a wholly general manner, syntheses that have essentially the same character. They are not syntheses that the ego has actively instituted; rather they are syntheses that are produced in pure passivity and that nevertheless can then be produced when the particular lived-experiences entering into connection with one another have arisen from the activity of the ego. If, from the very beginning, we remain focused most simply on the realm that already has our exclusive interest now, the realm of passive presentations as the material for passively emerging syntheses, then we will be concerned generally speaking with such syntheses in which a presentation points beyond itself to another presentation. The latter thereby gains a new inner character that it otherwise could not have. It is the character of the specific "intention," that is, of teleological directedness, of being-intended, of meanness, or correlatively speaking, the presenting is not merely a general presenting consciousness of its object, but rather, is in itself directed toward its object.

There is a danger in this description only insofar as it is not a matter of those very common meanings of the words, "to mean," "to be directed toward," "to intend," which refer to the ego and its acts, whereby the ego, and in a totally different sense, is the radiating point of directedness, of a directedness toward the object. For want of terms at our disposal, we avail ourselves of the apposition, "passive," passive intention. And from here on we will

speak only of passively intending presentations. At the outset we also want to name the synthesis in which this intention arises: associative synthesis. We will hold in abeyance for the time being what this association has to do with that association peculiar to the naturalistic psychologist and to empirical psychology; likewise, we will postpone for the time being any further foray into the general doctrine of association as one of the most important of all and completely universal functioning shapes of passive genesis. What we have expounded upon suffices to delimit sharply a class of empty presentations as "intending," as specifically directed toward their objects in the manner of an intention. This is to say that they stand in an associative synthesis, and that in it they have gained their oriented structure from counter-presentations that function as awakening—whether or not we look, incidentally, at this synthetic nexus.

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Now we have already said that not all presentations intend an object, and, coming back to our special theme, we now point to the fact that all retentions arising originally in time-consciousness are of this sort, completely unlike all protentions. Indeed, even retentions, those emerging originally, synthetically cohere with one another and with the primordial impression, but this synthesis proper to original time-consciousness is not a synthesis of association; retentions do not arise through an associative awakening directed backward from the impression, and thus, they do not have in themselves a directedness radiating out from there toward the empty presented past. Therefore, it was not phenomenologically correct when Brentano characterized the regulated connection of retentions to impressions as an original association. One could only speak like this if one employed the word "association" in a completely superficial and frivolous manner for just any connection of presentations to presentations, without regard to what kind they are and how they originally emerge. Association is only at work in the protentional path of original time-constitution, and also functioning there as

awakening⁷², as we know, is the continual retentional path. Accordingly, traversing the protentional path we have directed presentations, intending presentations in perception (in particular, in pure passivity), namely, expectations.

5 I said that retentions, as they arise in their originality, have no intentional character. This does not rule out that in certain circumstances and in their own way they can assume this intentional character later. Thus, we should not allow ourselves to get confused by the fact that we do encounter directed retentions occasionally, like in those instances where the ego directs its egoic regard toward something retained.⁷³ For it holds generally that what is presented, toward which the ego directs its regard—what is perceived, what is remembered, even what is retained—must already in itself be intentional, that is, must already have in its passive content a directedness toward its object. Now, how does a retention get this oriented structure? By a subsequent association, of course. In the normal case of perception, for example, in the perceptual course of a melody, a tonal phrase that has just sounded reminds us of one of the previous tonal phrases that we still hold retentionally in consciousness; it points back to it. Thus, an associative awakening proceeds from the present toward a retentional past that had already arisen originally prior to this association and is fading away. Naturally, the retention in question has now taken on an oriented structure. Likewise, out of the realm of forgetfulness that has apparently become nothing, out of the distant horizon into which all retentions finally sink, one of the stale, non-living retentions that is no longer in relief can once again be awakened as it were; in this case, it initially takes on and must take on the shape of an empty retention that is in relief. The awakening results from some kind of present presentation through association. Thus, from the very beginning every stale retention arising in this manner has the character of a passive intention. The remembered past is remembered by means of a pointing back, and this is analogous to pointing-ahead to what is to come, which is

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peculiar to every memory of the future, expectation. On the other hand, having stated this, we must however maintain the distinction between mere retentions prior to association, and the intentional shape of retentions corresponding to it.

5 <Chapter 2: PASSIVE AND ACTIVE INTENTIONS AND THE FORMS OF THEIR CONFIRMATION AND VERIFICATION>⁷⁴

<§19. Picturing, Clarifying, and Confirmation in the Syntheses of
Bringing to Intuition>

10 On those frequent occasions when we spoke about intention and fulfillment in phenomenology (and in fact the syntheses of fulfillment do play an enormous role), we certainly did have something particular constantly in mind, but we could not manage to clarify the particular trait of consciousness that the word "intuition" and correlatively the word "fulfillment" characterizes in a general and pure manner. Now, is the concept of intention that we have previously obtained sufficient to attain the particular concept of fulfillment as confirmation? Or does our concept only initially provide a framework for a further distinction that discloses, through a difference, the concept that is actually at issue?

It would be best to proceed by initially considering the possibilities of bringing to intuition, that is, of their verification for empty presentations, and in particular for the intending empty presentations as we have described them up to now. If we consider the types of presentations called protentions, then from the very outset they are presentations directed toward an object by virtue of genetic syntheses in which they emerge according to a primordial lawful manner. And this holds with respect to every expectation or making co-present. Here we find essentially two different modes of bringing to intuition, that is, two different kinds of syntheses of

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⁷² Translator: Strictly speaking, even though retention can sketch a protentional path, a retention cannot function as "awakening"; rather, it is more proper to speak of a retention being "awakened."

⁷³ Translator: i.e., a remembering.

⁷⁴ Translator: Chapter heading modified.

coinciding of the empty intention with an appropriate intuition giving intuitive fullness to the empty intention:

(1) The mode of bringing to intuition which is merely clarifying, merely disclosive, as for example when we picture an expectation that is initially empty, when we picture how it will arrive. And likewise we have the mere "picturing" of a co-present. The generality of expectation is always relatively determinate or indeterminate. By virtue of the generality of expectation, this process of bringing to intuition is actually disclosive only with respect to those components that were, so to speak, foreseen within what was prefigured, that is, [it is] disclosive as actually clarifying the intended objective sense. Only such components have the character of an affiliated filler; only they achieve an actual coinciding in the synthesis. But since intuition must yield a completely pictured image,⁷⁵ a concrete one, there is a remnant left out of the coinciding. This remnant is characterized in a purely phenomenological manner as mere filling.

(2) There is an entirely different mode of bringing to intuition, i.e., there is an entirely different synthesis of coinciding between intention and a suitable intuition, namely, the specific fulfillment of intention. Where expectation is concerned, this means that it enters into a synthesis with an appropriate perception; the merely expected object is identified with the actually arriving object, as fulfilling the expectation. Obviously, this is entirely different from merely picturing; it is a genuine confirmation. Thus, merely filling the emptiness is not yet the fulfillment of the intention.

What occurs here beyond what is prefigured, beyond what is determinately expected, we characterize not merely as filling, but rather as determining more closely. As such, the latter has the character of fulfillment. What first comes on the scene as coinciding with the prefigured element is a primary fulfillment. But the overabundance that intuition supplies is also a fulfilling, a secondary one, insofar as it is given as belonging to the object itself which is intended there and is now given in intuition as itself, precisely fulfilling the intention.

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Let us compare this with the process of bringing retentions to intuition. We realize that we are not concerned here with all retentions. Those retentions taking place *originally* do remain non-intuitive and sink into the undifferentiated general horizon of forgetfulness that has, as it were, become lifeless—provided that an associative awakening has not taken place. Thus, only directed retentions, namely, retentions that have become intentions by such an awakening are at issue for a synthesis of bringing to intuition.

If we consider the existing possibilities here, we will realize immediately that the process of bringing to intuition as a clarifying process, and the process of bringing to intuition as a confirming one, are not sharply distinguished here, as is the case with protentions. That is, they are not such that the first would be characterized as merely picturing, but then not confirming, and the other as confirming, but then not as merely "picturing." The matter is different here. If an intending retention passes over to an appropriate intuition under synthetic coinciding, then this intuition is indeed an intuitive remembering. Doubtless, we can say that through an intuitive remembering we become intuitively clear about what was only empty intended precisely in the empty retention. Surely the synthesis then accomplishes a sense-clarifying process of bringing to intuition. It discloses the intended objective sense, but an objective sense that is initially presented in an empty manner. But we can and must say no less that this synthesis simultaneously has the character of a confirming synthesis. The empty retention—which as reawakened should actually already be characterized as a remembering, though as a non-intuitive one—is confirmed by a coinciding with the appropriate intuitive remembering. Insofar as it is an empty memory-intention it is fulfilled in the specific sense: In a remembering-intuition the object *itself* is placed before the empty memory-intention, and it is before us as the very object that the memory-intention had merely intended.

Hence, clarifying and fulfilling confirmations are not to be separated here: here every synthesis of bringing to intuition must accomplish both *a priori*. In contrast to the parallel situation with respect to protentions, there is no mere picturing where the memories of the past are concerned. To be sure, mere picturing

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implies a process of bringing to intuition whose accomplishment is merely a pre-view⁷⁶ in which we picture for ourselves what probably will be, or as it must be called in our case, what probably has been. An anticipatory image of a matter is not the matter itself, that is, a merely anticipatory seeing is not an intuition of the self [of the object].

It is not as if a remembering could not also be a "picturing," but what we ascertain here is that it cannot merely be a picturing; rather it is simultaneously and necessarily self-giving and thus fulfilling-confirming. This will become completely clear in what follows (let us keep clearly in mind what we have already expounded upon): Every empty retention, like an empty presentation in general, presents in the way of an indeterminate generality. That is, it has a "prefiguring" for its content, a prefiguring that leaves open and indeterminate what goes beyond it, as is shown precisely through the process of disclosure. Remembering, which alone can accomplish a bringing to intuition here, now brings *the* past directly to intuition as [the past] itself, [namely,] a past that was intended in empty memory; accordingly, as we said, it accomplishes a fulfilling confirmation in the synthesis. What is prefigured initially is fulfilled, and this takes place in all circumstances. But the clear memorial image in its concrete fullness offers more than what the prefiguring determinately intended-ahead.

What happens now to this surplus? We obviously have two possible scenarios here for any of the moments accentuated in this filling surplus. Either the moments are characterized in and for themselves as belonging to what is remembered itself, to the past itself, and if this is the case, they will have the character of determining more closely what is remembered, the past, and will themselves belong to what is fulfilling. Or they are not characterized in this way; and if this is the case, they will have the character of mere filler, or as we can also put it, they will have the character of a mere picturing. A non-intuitive memory of a person who we had met some time ago is fulfilled, for example, by an intuitive remembering. Now, if we scrutinize the "memorial-

image" more precisely, we will notice for instance that the shape, the reproduced full beard, the glasses, and so forth, have an actual memorial character to be sure, but not the color of the beard, the color of the eyes, etc. What is intuitive there is filling, picturing. [82]

We should note, however, that we merely want to treat occurrences that are purely passive. The word "picturing," as useful as it proves to be for us, normally points to an active comportment of the ego. Where the prefiguring is no longer any help to it, the ego would at least like to get an image, and then pursuing this get various possibilities, various suitable images, possibly waiting for a more complete remembering to flash forth later through associative awakening and waiting for one image or another, according to its content, to take on the memorial character still lacking, the memorial character of determining more closely.

Naturally, we are not speaking here of such activities. Accordingly, mere picturing designates for us the merely distinctive character of filler that does not fulfill, as opposed to the actually fulfilling filler that is given in and for itself as belonging to the directly reproduced past: It is given as past in the mode of "itself."

We can say in general that the processes of determining more closely and picturing are actually always intermingled where remembering is concerned, and that a purely fulfilling confirmation is an ideal limit-case, so to speak, a *limes*, while nevertheless in the opposite direction—and that is a main point of our considerations—there is precisely no *limes*. That is, empty remembering does not admit of a bringing to intuition that thoroughly pictures and that would not be confirming. Now, insofar as it is actually a normal, constant process of picturing bit by bit, it is still an unfulfilled intention. Thus, only the ideal limit-case of an absolutely complete remembering is excluded here.

Every remembering is also an unfulfilled intention in other respects. On the one hand, it is unfulfilled insofar as it wavers in clarity, i.e., is only relatively clear. Obviously, a reproduced image is never absolutely clear, which points once again to an ideal. Unclearly is always intuitively unfulfilled emptiness. Moreover, it is an unfulfilled intention in another respect, namely, when remembering intuitively reproduces only a fragment of the intended past, for instance, only the beginning of an awakened

⁷⁶ *Vor-Bild*

melody. In this respect, then, it is entirely analogous to the case of an expectation being fulfilled; namely, insofar as an appropriate perception occurs, the expectation is fulfilled. Insofar as perception has not yet spoken, it is still an unfulfilled expectation, an unfulfilled intention.

<§20. Intention Toward Fulfillment is the Intention Toward Self-Giving>⁷⁷

The intention is directed toward its object; it does not want to be a merely empty intending toward it; it wants to go to the object itself—to the object itself, that is, to an intuition that gives the object itself, to an intuition that is in itself the consciousness of having a self. But the intention does not really just want to drive at coming into contact with the intended object in a corresponding intuition of the self, merely to find, for instance, that what was prefigured has been brought to fulfillment; even then it is still unsatisfied and strives onward from one closer determination to another, again and again. The indeterminate generality peculiar to what is prefigured in every abiding emptiness is always only a form for the fulfillment intended in an affiliated objective sense, a fulfillment which is to be accomplished in the form of a new, closer and closer determination.

What else does this entire manner of speaking of "driving at" mean than that there is still something more that belongs to the opposition, intention/fulfillment, and to the idea of confirmation than what had been expressly mentioned up until now. It has not only been shown that a directedness stemming from an awakening belongs to all actual intentions and thus to an actually fulfilling, confirming synthesis. Rather, now this comes to the fore as belonging to a confirming intention: This directedness is tendentious, and as a tendency, as a striving, it is from the very beginning "driving at" a satisfaction. This satisfaction is only possible in a special kind of synthesis that brings to intuition, in a synthesis that brings the presented object to self-giveness. And it does it in such a way that the satisfaction is merely a relative one

and leaves a remainder of dissatisfaction so long as the intuition still contains indeterminacy or mere filling. In general, confirmation has a merely relative character, or rather, confirmation can only become relativized precisely because of this essential relation to a tendentious intention; this is the case even though at any moment there is already, in a good sense, a fulfillment in it. It is not simply an issue of a synthetic unity of presentations for itself, but also of a synthetic unity which concerns the striving that traverses the presentations.

Corresponding to this is the double meaning of fulfillment, whose one side is equally expressed by satisfaction, as that relaxation of a striving in which the sought after goal is reached as such.

We spoke of *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem* with respect to association as the synthesis between what is awakening and what is awakened by it, between the directedness-toward and what is taken up in the directedness. This way of speaking now takes on a new sense, and a more authentic one. For now it concerns an actual taking-aim. The intention is that lived-experience that is a merely aiming-at, a having-in-sight; its fulfillment lies in the lived-experience of being-at-the-goal-itself. And this is not a seeing that pictures, but rather, a self-giving seeing. It is only that the intention remains an intention so long as something is still lacking with respect to having the goal-self, that is, with respect to what is to be reached. It is also clear that every lived-experience, which is in need of fulfillment, can be characterized as an intention even though, on the other hand, it can exist at the same time in relation to another intention as fulfillment, as confirming lived-experience. The latter, insofar as it is self-giving, the former, insofar as it is incompletely self-giving, i.e., it still contains facets that are possibly unsatisfied.

If we now regard the ego as comporting itself merely receptively, and if we do this within a genetic analysis, then we are obliged to observe that an affection precedes the receptive action. A presentation occurring in the background, a directed one, affects the ego, which is to say, a tendency heads toward the ego; the ego reacts by turning toward, the presentation assumes the shape of a grasping in which the egoic regard is directed toward the object. This yields the most strict, normal concept of

⁷⁷ Editor: See Appendix 7: <Belief and Intention> p. 449ff.

intending⁷⁸, more precisely, of doxic intending, of intending being, extending far beyond the sphere of simple presenting. But there is more here if the directedness should have the shape of that intention that terminates in confirmation.⁷⁹ The presentation now has the form of a striving issuing from the ego, of an *intention* that intends the true self. As such *intention* is initially characterized by everything that we have described; it is then a presenting endeavor that wants to realize itself in the continuous acquisition of knowledge, in a fulfilling grasping of the self that is constantly in the process of determining more closely, that is, not just in a mere grasping of the self in general, but rather, being interfused with an endeavor to foray into the moments of the object and to see to what extent they are not yet intuitively realized as grasping the self, in order to bring them to this realization. Through all of this, the ego is the center as the wakeful radiating center of active striving. [85]

But perhaps one will have to say that at root the character of the specific intending and even of this intention can already be without the participation of the ego. Accordingly, when the expression "intentional lived-experience" is employed for any type of consciousness (and this is still very often explicated by saying that every consciousness is a meaning-something, but also often as a mere intending that has not reached the goal of truth), it is only correct to do so when it is correctly understood in accordance with our analyses. One cannot say without further ado that inherent in every consciousness is a striving, an intending toward its object to possess the self [of the object], namely, that there is already a directedness. This has been shown with decisive clarity where original retentions are concerned. Still, it is certainly a general, essential possibility that every consciousness, no matter through what kind of motivation (we mentioned associative awakening in the passive sphere), takes on an orientation, and in this connection takes on the intending directedness toward the very self of a being. At most, there is the possibility that every consciousness become a

consciousness that intends being, that it become a striving after knowledge, an endeavoring meaning that is satiated in a synthesis of confirmation. Striving after knowledge in the very broadest sense is precisely a striving directed toward being itself, and already belonging here is the most primitive presenting that has the structure of aiming-at. To be sure, we must not take this striving as an isolated intending, but rather, if we want to have the normal concept of knowing in the logical sense, we must conceive of the epistemic striving in connection with a habitual consistency that does not break off and is not arrested in a single act, and does not break off when the knower sleeps. So much for a preliminary exposition.

Retention and protention, which we have contrasted in our analyses, are brought closer together in certain respects through our radical clarification of the concept and phenomenon of intention. By virtue of its origin, protention, unlike retention, is essentially a meaning-intention. More precisely, protention is to be interpreted accordingly as a "fore-" namely, as an *intention* directed into the future, as an intending and a striving that is directed forward—whether the ego itself is an ego that intends-ahead, and whether the striving is the striving of an ego, or whether it concerns an egoless tendency that is precisely a presenting tending-toward what is arriving from the future. We also call protention an anticipatory, expectant meaning. In positionality, and specifically in non-modalized positionality, we have a certain belief in this or that presentational content; it does not believe within the present what is given impressionally in the present, but rather anticipates in belief, as an intending into the future concerning what a futural perception itself will indicate.

Let us compare with this a retention that has taken on the form of an intending, for instance, that has the shape of a memory of the past (even if non-intuitive), and has the shape of a tendentially directed memory of the past. Thus, in it is the intention toward the past that is made available in an intuitive remembering in the mode of self-giveness. It is clear that even this intention is intending-ahead in a certain respect, although the "fore" or "ahead" does not have the temporal sense of future. The present lived-experience of the empty memory means, intends beyond

⁷⁸ *Meinung*.

⁷⁹ Translator: Husserl should either speak here of egotic verification [*Bewährung*] and not confirmation [*Bewahrheitung*], or he should articulate a passive striving that is not yet egotically directed. See above, footnote 62.

itself in an anticipatory manner, only now it intends something that lies in the past and that would come to fulfilling givenness in the memorial-intuition that gives the past itself. Generally, and without further ado, we see that every intention whatsoever is anticipatory, and this feature is due precisely to the striving that, as such, is directed toward something that can only first be achieved through a realization. Intention anticipates either the effective realization of the self in the future and likewise the effective realization of the self of something that is co-present through perception, or the realization of the self of what is past through remembering.

Yet, we find ourselves in a paradox here. The past has surely long since been realized and can no longer be realized—this does not make any sense. On the other hand, when the protentional striving or tending is directed toward what is futural, it is of course not actually a striving whose fulfillment realizes or makes actual what is futural. Such a realization can take place now as deliberate, as active, or it can take place now non-deliberately in passivity, like when we pull our hand back involuntarily because of an insect bite (while being perhaps quite occupied with something else entirely). With this, a spatial course of events is realized in the perceptual enviroing-world.

But all this becomes clear when we focus strictly upon the phenomenological situation itself. In particular, it is worth considering what kind of a striving functions in this intending, and what kind of sought after goal this intending has.

§21 Epistemic Striving and Striving after the Effective Realization of the Presented Object⁸⁰

Naturally, we are not speaking here of a wishing, a desiring, or a willing with the expectation that the intended element should be actual, should become actual, or should have been actual. Thus, even with respect to confirming fulfillment we are not speaking of a corresponding satisfaction of a wish or of a willing that occurs in

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the joy of something that has become a reality with certainty: in the joy that it actually is, that it has become actual, etc., while previously we had felt within us a sorrow at the lack of this certainty, at a doubt in being, or at the certainty of its non-being. As we said, we are not speaking of this at all. For example, the continual protentional intention in connection with a perception actually taking place harbors, at every moment, the anticipatory certainty of what is to come, the certainty of its futural occurrence (and it does this completely without our help). While listening to a melody as it runs-off, we are certain at every moment that further tonal rhythms will arrive and fit in, and when we hear a melody that is long familiar we are even certain of its completely determined contents. For its part, new strivings may be triggered, fulfilled, or disappointed depending upon whether we like the sounds or not. But this does not have anything to do with the anticipatory intention as such. The aesthetic pleasure or displeasure does not imply a fulfillment or a disappointment for the expectation *qua* protention within the merely tonal perception. Since we are certain from the outset that something is going to arrive in the living perception, there is no room at all for a wishing that it should be, or even for a willing that it should become by realizing it in our actions.

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On the other hand, we cannot deviate from our descriptions that we have obtained phenomenologically [which show] that every process of meaning that intends and wants to know is precisely a tendency-toward, a striving. We must only note that it is a differently directed striving, and that on occasion manifold strivings may very well become intertwined without disturbing each other. If the striving that intends and wants to know is not directed toward being, in the expectation toward what is to come, or in the memory toward a past being, then it is a directedness toward the experiential seeing of the self of what is taken for being, or rather it is a directedness toward the experiencing itself so that what is already meant from the outset as being with certainty is or will be actual in the subjective mode of experiencing the self. Specifically, the anticipatory intention bears

⁸⁰ Translator: Paragraph heading modified. Given here is Husserl's complete heading for this paragraph.

on a situation in which what is meant in the anticipation⁸¹ as certain will come in the future, as it were, in grasping the self⁸²; that is, it is directed toward the actual object in the mode of being presented in the flesh. Furthermore, the memorial intention is directed toward a situation where what is anticipatorily certain as past will become a past that is self-given. Here, then, the aim bears on the modified mode of being presented in the flesh that is provided by the intuitive remembering as a modal modification of perception.

The unique and new acquisition of the synthesis of confirmation is, *first*, the coinciding that results at the end of the synthetic transition, a coinciding of the presentation functioning as an intention with the corresponding experience of the self, whereby the emptiness gets its fullness of the self. In the coinciding, which is given to consciousness as a resultant one, the meant object is identified as a sense that now shows the dual mode of the unfulfilled self and the full self as united; and it does this specifically with the character of "verified intending," namely, with the character of saturation resulting from this process. *Second*, however, what was already uniquely characterized in this lower level has in addition its peculiar character that stems from the higher level, the level pertaining to striving. The striving becomes satisfied, what is experienced in the mode of the self is characterized as an achieved goal that, as achieved, i.e., as resulting from the synthesis, *eo ipso* has the character of the resultant coinciding of an anticipatory intending and an intending in the mode of grasping the self; it therefore has the character of a double-layered fulfillment.

Displacements in striving are not only essentially possible here, but *de facto* occur quite often. The result-character in the synthesis, the character of "true," can become the sought after goal, and likewise the verifying synthesis as the process of accomplishing [the result] can become the sought after goal, and finally, even the sense of well-being that occurs as a result of the tension endemic to striving being relaxed, as a result of a striving

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being satisfied, can become the conscious motive and sought after goal, i.e., the willed goal.

Our analyses have made clear the essential distinction between doxic intending in the lowest sphere of presentation, that is, presenting meaning, a striving prevailing in it, and every other striving and being satisfied that is possible on the basis of presentations that are similar with respect to content. In every presenting we have the presentational content as the material of belief and the belief itself; that is, in the full sense of presenting, we have the sense-material and the modal moment "being with certainty," or its modifications. If the presenting has the normal form of an intending intention in certainty, then it can also be the case that there ensues a valuing determined by the particular moments of the presentational content and a striving motivated by valuing. We are interested in the being and the modes of being peculiar to the presented matter: We wish that it were, we find it a practical possibility for us, and then we strive, possibly through our actions, to realize it. If such a striving aims at the actuality of the matter as such, which is of value to us by virtue of these or those features, if it is fulfilled in the production of the certainty of its being, and in a superior manner in grasping the self through experience, it nevertheless does not drive at grasping the self to verify it, but rather, to realize its value, to fulfill the valuing intentions, which for their part are precisely founded in the presentations and the effective realization of their presented objects.

We are occupied with the analysis of the synthesis of fulfillment that corresponds on the level of passivity to that higher synthesis that we call in the level of thought verification, in the normal sense of the term (we spoke directly of confirmation in the passive sphere). This analysis led us to the strict concept of a passive intention as a special shape that a consciousness of something must assume in order for it to be able to function in syntheses of fulfillment. We distinguished two things under the rubric of intention:

First, a consciousness of something does not necessarily need, in itself, to have the distinguishing trait of a directedness toward this something, toward its objectlike formation. This was seen in

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⁸¹ *Vorgriff*
⁸² *Selbstgriff*

the case of retentions that originally link up with every perception. Only when an associative ray, when an "awakening" radiates in this consciousness from elsewhere, from another presentation, and directs this consciousness toward its object, does it have in itself precisely a directedness. A different orientation can go hand in hand with this, namely, the ego's attentive orientation. But this is not at issue here. Such awakenings have the character of tendencies, and hence also gradations of intensity; like forces, they can become stronger and potentially weaker. This can be seen, for example, in the intensification that perceptions impart to the periodic terms in retention where something is repeatedly perceived, an intensification that animates them and at the same time secures them as intentional objects. Let us note here that only through these and similar syntheses can the element, which has passed over into a retention together with the new perceptual objects, actually be an object, that is, an intentional object. In perceiving a series of repetitions, but also a melody for instance, the newly appearing objects within pure passivity are not the only objects of the intention (although they are this) toward which the *primary directedness* aims. To the extent that they retain their force, the objects that have faded away in retention are not given to consciousness in the same way that something new [is given to consciousness when it] arises, and the previous object fades off as something that does not have any connection with the new and does not concern it. The unity of a successive multiplicity, of a diversely articulated process, presupposes that forces issue from something new, or again, that from something new, syntheses interweave as they move back; through this, a unity of intention is instituted, a unity of intention that transports back (or "awakens") the objects fading away in the form of the living intention and uniformly binds this latter intention with the intention of the new object.

Second, as a further moment of the specific *intention*, we emphasize the tendency toward a terminating in the self, that is, the tendency of the presentations already directed toward self-giving insofar as they are not already self-givens. The self-giving presentations, intuitions, which give the presented object in the mode of self, are necessarily intending presentations, namely,

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directed toward this self [of the object]. But insofar as this directedness terminates precisely in the goal of this orientation itself, the intention is fulfilled.

On the other hand, concretely self-giving presentations are always at the same time intending (in the special sense of intending, namely, as pointing toward fulfillment) insofar as they contain anticipatory intentions, namely, protentional intentions that become fulfilled in the continual progression of self-giving. In other words, concrete perception and self-giving in general are only possible as a continual synthesis of fulfillment. Thus a presentation can only be fulfilled when it is either a *straightforward anticipatory intention* or when it is intertwined with an anticipatory intention in its complex structure.

Let me note the following here: I have repeatedly wavered, and I do not feel entirely confident about the question [concerning] how the merely tendentious directedness, for instance, of an empty anticipatory presentation toward its objectlike formation (that is, what makes it the "intending" of its objectlike formation), would make it to the further tendency toward fulfillment in the corresponding self (that is, to the tendency of verification). When I gave my lectures a few years ago on transcendental logic,⁸³ I conceived of both tendencies as basically one and the same, distinguished only by the kinds of effects they have. Namely, the orientation toward the empty intended⁸⁴ object is that mode of presentational tendency toward its object in which the presenting consciousness is not yet intentional. Only as intentional is the tendency precisely a goal-directed tendency which, relaxed and unfrustrated, and operating intentionally, leads to fulfillment, to the goal itself. This goal is thus already its goal in the mode of a frustrated tendency, but precisely in the mode of not being reached. Perhaps this is entirely correct if all involvement of ego-activity is actually left out of play.

If it is a matter of empty memories then the intentional tendency prevailing in them would accordingly be characterized as a

⁸³ Translator: Husserl is writing this version of his lecture in 1925/26 and is undoubtedly referring to his earlier version from 1920/21 (cf. "Translator's Introduction, Section 1.")

⁸⁴ *leer vorstellig*

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reproductive tendency. Associative awakening would thus also be a tendency toward a corresponding reproduction, that is, toward the transition to an intuitive remembering that brings the past as such to self-giveness. Potentially, this tendency can be at work in an uninhibited manner. The empty awakened memory continually passes over into a memorial intuition and, as it were, in a completely awakening manner. The precise analogy for this would be, then, the continual efficacy of anticipations, protentional tendencies as the process of perceiving progresses. Where the intention remains inhibited, and where a fulfillment only occurs subsequently, there the synthesis of fulfillment becomes a discrete one. But naturally—and we must never forget this—all the talk of verification applying to such fulfillments in mere passivity is inaccurate. Indeed, we are not speaking here at all of an active striving and accomplishing that is directed toward a true being which normatively regulates⁸⁵ or measures its intending according to what is given as true in the self-giving; although, however, it surely does concern the presuppositions, and in a certain manner, the analogies of passivity, without which that activity could not function.

<§22. The Different Relationships of Intention and the Intended Self. Secondary Verification>⁸⁶

Viewed precisely, our previous considerations have still not yielded any ultimate and pure results. We have clearly discerned that intuitions are essentially distinguished according to whether they are self-giving or not self-giving, and thus that a synthesis is characterized quite differently according to whether it passes over into a self-giving intuition or into a non-self-giving intuition, and then as we also put it, merely pictures. Now, however, what unifies such a synthesis where this synthesis is conceived concordantly is not as a mere accord, as coinciding in the objective sense, but rather, as an accord of the *intention* (in our sharply defined sense) prevailing in the synthesis in question and

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in its components. The intention running through the empty expectant consciousness is fulfilled in the transition to self-giving, to perception; it is a satisfied intention, so to speak, in the self-giving intuition, being characterized here as a confirmed intention. And likewise in all similar cases. Even when we have a synthetic unity of a perception with a perception, i.e., an original self-giving with an original self-giving (as the process of perceiving progresses), we have the rays of intending aroused by the kinaestheses in the appearances, and these intendings into the future, anticipations that are aroused, become satisfied as it were in the continuously emerging new appearance. But if we keep the phenomena sharply in view, then we discern a distinction here between the intentional ray and the intuition into which the intentional ray enters, and then in general a distinction between the *particular consciousness* of (even if it is an *empty consciousness*) and the *intention*, which traverses this consciousness as a goal directedness or an aiming. For example, the subsequent retention in strict passivity is an empty consciousness into which (as we have shown) the associative intentions issuing from the living present can sink, intentions radiating-back into what has just been. If, then, reproductive awakening ensues from the emergence of a corresponding remembering, then this intuition has taken over into itself the intending ray, and the latter has here the mode of the fulfillment terminating in the self-given past.

With respect to the presentation of what is expected, the presentation that pictures, we will likewise distinguish the intuition itself (which functions as picturing) from the intention that enters into it; but here the intention is not fulfilled and does not terminate in its sense that has become intuitively given. This objective sense has here just the character of what the intended object is, the character of clarifying, of bringing to intuition, picturing; but as unfulfilled, the *intention* still goes clean through this "image." It is only when the corresponding experience takes place, that is, [the experience of] self-giving, that the intention is satisfied, that it takes on the character of a goal directed intention, of a seeing into the *terminus ad quem*.

But now we must take one step further. Just as we have distinguished between empty consciousness and intention with

⁸⁵ *normativ*
⁸⁶ Editor: See Appendix 27 to §45.

respect to the empty retention, so too do we make a distinction with respect to the empty anticipation, and this is significant. When perceiving, I move my eyes this way and that, the intentional rays radiate out from these determinately running kinaestheses. But they are not merely rays that radiate out, which by themselves are nothing, for they are only orientations in presentations; empty presentations are awakened, and running throughout them are the anticipatory rays directed toward the empty presented objective sense. The emptiness is the potentiality of what is actualized in corresponding intuitions and syntheses of disclosure.

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But now we see that corresponding exactly to the fundamental distinction between intuitions as self-giving and non-self-giving is the distinction between the corresponding empty presentations, retention and protention (and to be sure, purely as empty presentations, irrespective of the intending rays belonging to them). Then we see, however, that the empty consciousness of retention is of a fundamentally different kind than the empty consciousness of the empty memory of the future. The uncovering of the one leads to self-giving; to a certain extent, it already has the self in advance, it already has it potentially within itself. But this is not so with the empty expectation. What lies in it as potentiality is nothing other than that intuition which pictures, which does not have any self given within itself. We can express it in this way: Just as remembering brings the past self to givenness more or less clearly, and in the ideal limit-case in a completely clear manner, so does the empty retention have this self in a completely unclear, empty manner within itself; the retention has the self as an originally held, safe-guarded self, as still conscious of the self, and still with a hold on it. When the originally giving impression is over, the self is not lost, despite its emptiness. On the other hand, just as the intuitive expectation only offers a pre-presentation, a pre-view of what is to come instead of the matter itself, so too is the empty consciousness of what is to come an empty pre-presentation of what is to come, but not an empty presentation of the self.

We can also say that whether the expectation is empty or intuitive, it is an anticipatory presentation, only that by the

expression "anticipation" we simultaneously mean to suggest that the *intention* is directed toward what is anticipated.

Elucidating this situation has enabled us to understand that a possible level of ratification lies prior to verifying the self, for example, that presentations radiating-back into the past, that is, into the realm of memories already have a certain character of fulfillment, a ratified one, as soon as the past attains even an empty awakening. Illustrated more precisely, when we have anticipating presentations that refer to our past, as we so often do when for instance we hold an old letter in our hands that we had ourselves written, we initially have an empty pensive presentation, intentionally referring to our own past, but which is at first entirely indeterminate and general. Now, the moment a determinate memory flashes forth we are conscious of a ratified fulfillment, and even before a reproductive remembering occurs. To be sure, that is not a genuine and ultimate fulfillment; it first requires an actualization whereby the past itself is actually and genuinely there for the first time. Still, it is entirely different from the anticipating consciousness that precisely cannot fulfill, even when it becomes intuitive.⁸⁷

There would be still more to study here. In a certain way, anticipating presentations are also involved in the functioning of fulfillment; they are constantly involved, as it were. This was indicated by the fact that every perception in itself, every experience in itself, draws in its wake such presentations as horizons, and more precisely, as intentionally awakened horizons. The moment a conflict between the anticipating intentions breaks out here, the self-giving is also inhibited. The self-giving of the whole, what makes up for example the entire perception as a perception, is not only determined by what in it is genuinely a perception; rather, it is also determined by the anticipatory intentions that are concordantly harmonizing and also sense-giving. Where the realm of anticipation in general is concerned, one realizes that there is something like a one-sided and a

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⁸⁷ Ratifying the empty empathies [*Empfindungen*] <through> one another in the development of expression. On the other hand: How does it stand with intuitive empathy? And viewed precisely, how does it stand with fulfillment in the development of expression?

reciprocal corroboration, a ratification in a certain respect, even though no actual verification can take place here. And in contrast to this, abrogation, namely, inhibition, doubt, annulment: We already see that we run up against modalization as related back to the specific element in intention.

Our analyses still need to be completed somewhat. Let me say a few words about the opposition within the realm of positional intuitions, about the opposition between self-giving and non-self-giving, an opposition that has become increasingly significant for us. We have seen that not all intuitions can function as fulfilling-confirming; we have seen that it is a prerogative of certain intuitions to be self-giving, among which we counted perceptions and memories, while on the other hand there are intuitions like the intuitive anticipations or presentifications that are similar to them such as presentifications of an unfamiliar co-present, and so forth. Here we introduce the term "experiencing intuitions" and note that with it the Humeian concept of impression (in its broader sense) is clarified. That perceptions are self-giving is quite familiar to you and should not give you any difficulties. Phenomenologically, "self-giving" means here that every perception within itself is not only, in general, a consciousness of its object, but that it gives its object to consciousness in a distinctive manner. Perception is that mode of consciousness that sees and has its object itself in the flesh. To put it negatively, the object is not given like a mere sign or a likeness, it is not grasped mediately as if the object were merely indicated by signs⁸⁸ or appearing in a reproduced copy, etc. Rather, it is given as itself just like it is meant, and it stands there in person, so to speak.

You could have reservations in allowing rememberings to count as self-giving, however. But as you think more deeply about this mode of consciousness, you will see for yourselves that we also have to speak about self-giving here, only in a modified way; this self-giving shares a common structure with other self-givings, elucidating similar functionings within confirmations. Remembering does not offer the present in the flesh, but in a good sense, a "past in the flesh." For that surely means nothing else than

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a direct return to the past as having-been perceived for us, and as possessing the self of this having-been as such in an original re-execution, as memory. We can also say that perception is characterized as an original acquisition of the object, and remembering as originally going back "in thought"⁸⁹ to what is already acquired, as originally having it once again at our disposal.

Referring back to our earlier exposition, let us also note that *both* functions are mutually related in knowledge, and that this relation first makes knowledge possible. The analogy of acquisition and the acquisition being at our disposal once again (which is basically more than an analogy) rightly indicates this. An acquisition that we cannot have at our disposal again is not an acquisition. An object that has been grasped in the flesh can only be there as existent for the subject (having abiding validity in its knowledge and cognition) and can only be an actual object in its surroundings when it is "the identical" to which the subject can return in iterable rememberings. Or [when it is] "the identical" that the subject can mean through rememberings as the same, time and again, or that it can possibly verify in new perceptions, but also as what it can recognize, "the identical" that it has remembered at this time, has perceived at another—which, once more, presupposes remembering.

In contrast to these are the non-self-giving intuitions. Using the expression, "picturing," like we did with respect to intuitive anticipations could tempt us here to oppose such intuitions to self-giving intuitions, regarding the former as mere acts of phantasy. But such a facile characterization of these kinds of intuitions will not do; they are in fact in need of a much deeper analysis. Mere phantasies are not positional lived-experiences, whereas intuitive expectations are precisely expectations; something is believed in and through them, posited as being in the future. The futural thing that is intuitively contrived is thereby not the futural thing itself; it does not appear any differently than a pre-view or projected image through which runs the intention as unfulfilled, so to speak, being directed ahead merely expectantly toward the corresponding self.

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⁸⁸ *angewandter*

⁸⁹ *"geringtes"*

But the structure of the function of such a projected image and of its genesis requires further analysis.

It is clear without further ado that the fundamental distinctions of intentions requiring fulfillment correspond to the fundamental distinctions within self-giving intuitions as such, which are capable of being fulfilling confirmations: since, obviously, not every intention is capable of being fulfilled by just any kind of self-giving in any manner. For example, an expectation can only be fulfilled by a perception, and an intention that is directed back can only be fulfilled as remembering.

Up to this point we have focused exclusively on the syntheses of fulfillment and have not considered the opposing occurrences affiliated with them, namely, disappointment, the synthesis in which a different self appears in place of the intended self, appearing likewise in the mode of the self, whereby, so to speak, the negative of a coinciding results. The intended self overlaps with a different self in the transition to intuition. It does not achieve the unity of an identifying coinciding, but rather the unity of being otherwise whereby what was intended gets crossed out.

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Obviously, we return to the doctrine of passive modalization; but through the deeper clarification of the concepts of intention and fulfillment it opens up new insights and a deeper understanding of its essence. Above all it is important to connect up a phenomenological consideration of association with the doctrine of intention. This will open up the possibility of a genetic elucidation of modalities, initially in the sphere of immanently given matters, and then in the sphere of transcendent, externally given matters.

Going back further and further enables a gradual elucidation of how the unity of the life of consciousness itself is constituted as the field of being on another level of being within the immanence of the life of consciousness, how this unity is constituted in the syntheses of fulfillment and in the syntheses of the concordance of other doxic intentions that are further intertwined with the fulfillment; moreover, it enables an elucidation of how things existent in themselves are constituted as a higher level of being in the unity of this life, and the highest level of all, the universe, an entire universe of objective being, of our objective world in its

open infinity. But all of this is constituted in concordant syntheses, even though there are always discordances, semblances of appearance, illusions. In a certain respect, the untrue, the non-being is already eliminated in passivity. A thoroughgoing consciousness of one and the same world comes into being through revisions and corrections in the form of consciousness's restoration of the disrupted concordance. I will shortly give a idea of the great problems and the extremely extensive investigations that they demand by confronting the primitive concept of "verification" that we have obtained with the traditional logical principle of contradiction and of the excluded middle. Through this, we will make clear the very special concept of being and the special concept proper to it, normative regulation⁹⁰ which, quite understandably, is presupposed by this principle and thus by logic.

But before I pass over to this, I must first still speak about those secondary verifications within the primitive level I just mentioned, the secondary verifications that exist alongside the verification through the self that we treated as the lowest level of the phenomena of evidence. We are considering the realm of intendings, of doxic intentions. Normally, straightforward belief always characterizes intending such that our clarification of intention obviously presents a fundamental portion of the theory of judgment. Intendings can accord with intendings, even where they are not fulfilled. Through the arrival of intendings that accord with

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a given intending, the latter can get the character of a ratifying intention, and of a stronger and stronger ratifying one without having to speak of an original confirmation or of a process of making evident. Likewise, empty intendings can contend with other intendings and can give rise to an irresolvable doubt, then the conflict can be resolved in the form of reawakened certainties that negate one of the horns of the dilemma and ratify the other. But all of this takes place in the realm of mere empty intentions of belief, while earlier we had studied the parallel occurrences of possible modalization in the originality of perception. For example, if we hold an old letter in our hands it will refer to a person in an indeterminate generality, but we do not know which

⁹⁰ *Normierung*

person it is. We recognize the handwriting as familiar, and several people come to mind in our memories, but we are not sure who it is. In reading the first lines of the letter a determinate memory arises concerning the occasion we first received it, but it is a memory that is in no way intuitive, and as we continue to read the letter, the person is immediately specified, the decision is there, ratified.

It is important to note that such ratifying and corroborating functions, which are in accord in manifold ways, actually play a role everywhere and even in self-givings. They are involved in every self-giving, in every perception, and in an entirely originary manner. Their accord belongs to the functions of self-giving fulfillment, just as their discordance can awaken modalizations in them. The "horizons" of perceptions are another name for empty intentions (intentions in our clarified and precise sense) that are integrally cohesive and that are actualized in the progression of perception in and through different orientations. All of these intentions must accord with one another should the perception be normal, that is, continuously self-giving. If they come into conflict with one another then the belief proper to self-giving is inhibited in its fulfillment. For example, as the process of external perceiving progresses optically, the thing is not only intended optically. Intentions of other sense spheres are continually co-awakened and must continually accord in the unity of a synthesis with the genuine impressional ones of the optical sphere. They must do this because they are co-constitutive of the objective sense. However, the moment something does not accord in the tactile sphere, even though it is not impressionally realized, fulfillment of belief is inhibited; the unity of perception as it accords with all intentions in forming the unity of a whole intention is inhibited. But here we must actually go beyond the individual perception and go to the encompassing nexus of external perception in general which makes up a unitary consciousness of the envioning-world and an original consciousness in a universal synthesis of all empty intentions, even of the empty intentions co-determining sense. We can see a thing, and everything in the thing jibes; in themselves the tactile features that are co-indicated would assurdly conform. But we

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look through a stereoscope for example, our hand resting atop the table; through this and also through the continuous preceding perceptual nexus as a whole, we know ourselves to be in a small room, even though the stereoscopic object is a waterfall located on larger isolated rock cliffs. Something does not jibe, and the perception is now broken, modalized; it takes on the character of an illusion, and in this case it simultaneously takes on the character of an impressional likeness of a Swiss waterfall. Now running through the likeness is the intention directed further toward a fulfilling self-giveness that is to be produced some other way.

Thus, we see that in each and every case it is a matter of intentional systems that go together to form the unity of a synthesis and a whole intention arising through it. These unities must be thoroughly in accord so that on the whole the particular intention can have the character of unbroken belief. Modalization belongs to the intention and is carried out in intentions; it is however not carried out in an isolated manner in elementary intentions, but rather in the intentions that are integrated concretely into the synthetic intentions as a whole. Special forms of this, then, are the self-giving intentions which, by constituting a self, are able to fulfill and to confirm non-self-giving intentions.

<Chapter 3:

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THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITIVENESS IN EXPERIENCE>

<§23. The Problematic Character of a Verification that is Possible for All Intentions and Its Consequence for Belief in Experience>

That we have a consciousness of our own life as a life endlessly streaming along; that we continually have an experiencing consciousness in this life, but in connection to this in the widest parameters, an empty presenting consciousness of an envioning-world—this is the accomplishment of unity out of manifold, multifariously changing intentions, intuitive and non-intuitive intentions that are nonetheless concordant with one another.

intentions that in their particularity coalesce to form concrete syntheses again and again. But these complex syntheses cannot remain isolated. All particular syntheses, through which things in perception, in memory, etc., are given, are surrounded by a general milieu of empty intentions being ever newly awakened; and they do not float there in an isolated manner, but rather, are themselves synthetically intertwined with one another. For us the universal synthesis of harmonizing intentional syntheses corresponds to "the" world, and belonging to it is a universal belief-certainty.

Yet as we already mentioned, there are breaks here and there, discordances; many a partial belief is crossed out and becomes a disbelief, many a doubt arises and remains unsolved for a time, and so forth. But ultimately, proper to every disbelief is a positive belief of a new materially relevant sense, to every doubt a materially relevant solution; and now if the world gets an altered sense through many particular changes, there is a unity of synthesis in spite of such alterations running through the successive sequence of universal intendings of world—it is one and the same world, an enduring world, only, as we say, corrected in its particular details, which is to say, freed from "false apprehensions"; it is in itself the same world. All of this seems very simple, and yet it is full of marvelous enigmas and gives rise to profound considerations.

Let us reflect on the following. We have made clear that doxic life on the level of pure passivity takes on the shape of the passive intention again and again, of a directedness, which, as a tendency operating in an uninhibited manner, passes over to self-givennesses. Thus, running through passive life are ever newly interweaving syntheses of fulfillment. A continual striving after intuition that realizes the meant self, a continual—we couldn't help thinking of the term—confirmation. The fulfilling self as that at which the intention was driving, has indeed the character of truth and henceforth abiding validity for the subject. This seems to be exactly what active cognition, and in the highest level, predicative and theoretical cognition accomplishes. Even it is initially a mere, only active process of *intending*, even it is a tendentious believing, only now it is a believing that is actively striving, set on fulfillment, becoming operative in evidence. But what is evidence

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other than seeing the self of what is meant, that is, the fulfilling effective realization in possessing the self; what is it other than the synthesis of coinciding that forms an identity, a coinciding of a merely anticipatory intending with the fulfilling self? Showing-as-true, showing the correctness of the intending takes place precisely through this. It is directed toward the self that is realized in consciousness; accordingly, an evidence that verifies is thus nothing other than the consciousness of the *adaequatio rei et intellectus* carried out in the originality of possessing the self.

No matter how elucidating and even in a certain respect how indubitable our presentation may be, the accomplishment of a genuine confirmation, which strives toward knowledge in the strict sense, surely cannot be exhausted by what activity and passivity have in common here.

Does evidence, does the immediately seen *adaequatio* already yield truth in the full sense? Truth is surely definitiveness. But possessing the self, experience, can come into conflict with another experience; modalizations can occur. Can this not go on *in infinitum* such that definitiveness is never reached? And if there should be such a definitiveness, how would we know it? All knowledge as the grounding of judgment begins with experience. Doubtlessly, it is an initial phase of grounding. But its grounding already accomplished with mere experience? An analysis of experiencing passivity is surely fundamental for the elucidation of this initial phase. But we cannot expect to have come very far with this so soon. From what we have already said, it has already become questionable if behind every judgment there is a definitive truth: because of the relativity of experience. Doubt receives a new sense if we initially recognize experience as being definitively correct. Does every question have to be able to have a response? A definitive response, and in advance? Put differently, in our view, every judgment has its norm in a truth that is valid in itself, whether we know it now or not and are ever able to reach it or not. Normative regulation, measuring up to the norm, is carried out subjectively in evident verification, since to our mind the true that regulates in a normative manner,⁹¹ precisely as the seen self,

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⁹¹ *das normierende Wahre*

comes into our grasp immediately precisely in the experiencing, self-giving intuition.

But are there not many profound difficulties to be found in this in-itself, difficulties that lie in yet a different direction than the one of which we have already spoken? For example, must every judgment that is directed toward the future have a definitive truth or falsity? Must it be decided in advance, only that we do not know how it is decided? Let us follow the matter in [the sphere of] passivity and discern what is missing here. Only from this [sphere] can one grasp the most fundamental of all the shortcomings in the groundings of traditional logic, a shortcoming that concerns the ultimate principle of all logical norms in the most astounding way, namely, the principle of contradiction and of the excluded middle.

To be sure, we think of this principle above all when we speak of logical norms; all knowledge must be logically shaped, a truthful logical knowledge is referred back to the principle of contradiction.

But when we articulate and think through such principles, we notice first of all that we have not yet acquired concepts like truth and falsity here in the full sense, and that speaking of the norm, of a norm of correctness and incorrectness had an incomplete sense. In immanent time-consciousness we have the stream of givennesses in lived-experience, givennesses that are strung together temporally with their anticipations which have the character of an anticipatory believing that is directed-ahead. A spatio-temporal world is given in the stream that is contained in immanent time-consciousness, in the stream of transcendent experiences,⁹² the intuitive and non-intuitive. And constantly referring to this spatio-temporal world are manifold lived-experiences of a transcendent believing that is in need of fulfillment. In both respects, belief is not only directed toward the present, but also toward the anticipated future and toward the memorial past; manifold memory-beliefs and expectant-beliefs emerge that can be verified or rejected.

What happens now with the verifiability or refutability of experiential belief in all these respects? What is to be meant by the

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axiom we tested that every such belief is either positively or negatively verifiable? To be sure, it does not just mean that the mere possibility of one or the other belongs to the essence of such a believing, and that when the one possibility is taken up as realized, the other would thereby be annulled. It is certainly evident from the principle of contradiction that positive and negative verification, fulfillment and disappointment, are mutually exclusive. But if we want to say that every belief is verifiable in the sense that it is valid or invalid in the usual sense, as it is in the view of the traditional principle of the excluded middle, then quite a bit more is being said here.

Let us get clear about this by drawing a parallel to mathematical judgment, to a judicative believing that bears on what is mathematical. Either it is valid, it is verifiable, or it is not valid, it is verifiable in a negative manner. This certainly implies that whether we ever will or are even able to carry out a verification or not, even without thinking about whether it may ever become a decision of the positive or negative sort, it is surely decided in itself whether the judgment is verifiable or whether it is refutable, already in advance and thus for all actual and possible consciousness in the future. Only we do not know in advance how it is decided; we only first know this in the actual, intuitive verification as the current decision. It is determined in advance, as it were, how the die is cast, whether on the positive or the negative side. If we actually and positively confirm the judgment, then we will know that it was already established beforehand that only a positive confirmation could take place and that the opposite was excluded (and for every conceivable ego).

Let us now turn to the spheres of our external experience as they had been constituted in passivity, and so far as we are able to understand them from there up to this point. We ask with respect to these spheres: Is it an actually intuitable, essential law to be drawn from the structure of the intentionality of experience that every belief, no matter how it arises in the stream of consciousness and its motivations, is decided in advance according to the possibilities of verification and refutation? How can this "in advance" be understood? Certainly, if a fulfillment occurs, then belief is decided as valid; a prehension of the self has emerged

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from mere anticipating, the anticipation has been ratified. But as long as the verification has not taken place, both of the open possibilities do exist. Must it be determined in itself and in advance what alone can occur there, if it is ever to be decided at all and regardless of whether a decision takes place or not? To elucidate the structure of truth or validity is to elucidate this "in itself," and perhaps there are fundamental differences there. In fact, truths of the mathematical kind and other essential truths are fundamentally different from truths like experiential truths. This in-itself is divided according to the correlations: As correctness in itself it belongs to believing, as truth in itself, truth in the strict sense of the word, it belongs to sense or rather to a proposition. The object in itself corresponds to the truth in itself. Now the in-itself belongs to the object.

Thus, we have brought the problem of the empirical in-itself clearly into relief by drawing a parallel to the mathematical in-itself where it is easiest to detect the peculiar trait of validity in itself. And we were able to understand that we are in no way in the position of fashioning in an original manner the axioms of the sort that we previously tested relating to the empirical in-itself. This concerns no less the immanent sphere despite its privilege through the evidence of the ego. In fact, if we conceive of a consciousness that has sounds, colors, and similar hyletic data given in passivity in immanent time-consciousness, and these data are being constituted in the process of becoming, then it is not clear in the least how it should be decided *in itself*, in advance, whether precisely this new tone, or whether a new tone at all should follow a previous tone. And even if an anticipatory belief in a new determinate tone were motivated by the preceding immanent experience, we cannot tell in advance that it should be decided in itself, whether it will actually occur, or instead will fail to appear, or will take place in an entirely arbitrary and altered manner.

What happens with respect to transcendence, that is, the spatio-material world, at least when we conceive of it constituted purely passively in a consciousness? Naturally, proper to the constitution of a spatio-material envioning-world is not only a superabundance of prefigurings of inner horizons for every thing that is actually experienced, but also of outer horizons—which are

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reciprocally interwoven with one another, and ultimately all things of experience are connected in the unity of an envioning-world with a unitary outer horizon—and thus a superabundance of prefigurings for the path of further possible experiences. But there are precisely prefigurings, there is motivated experiential belief, superabundantly corroborated and ratified through innumerable accordances; but in the final analysis is it not possible for the further experience with its ever new self-givings to continue as it will? Contrary to each and every expectation, contrary to all the overwhelming preconvictions and probabilities? Can it not continue such that everything becomes a confused muddle, such that the entire perceptual world-order is destroyed, such that this world as the unity of experience is no longer even maintained, such that it becomes unstable for consciousness, such that all sense-data lose their apperceptive apprehensions, which themselves only actually grasp appearances in concordant believing? But we have held that there would be the world in itself, and every experiential belief would be valid in itself, would be in itself true and false.

If it is a matter of the future, for example, then it is decided, even where I lack a decision. To our mind, every belief directed toward the future has its truth or its falsity prefigured in advance, once and for all.

However, if we remain in the framework of pure consciousness and consider the immanent and transcendent given matters that are constituted within it in passivity, then as I said, what we have shown has not yet accounted for the clarification of the idea of that in-itself. Where the immanent given matters are concerned, and especially the sense-data, every Now brings with it new ones. But in spite of all aroused anticipations, it cannot be foreseen why it must necessarily be decided which data will occur in the future. And this also holds no differently where the transcendently constituted spatio-temporal world is concerned.

Perhaps some clarification is still required here. This world is given to us originally through external perceptions. Generally speaking, they cohere with one another in continual concordance, and they are likewise intertwined concordantly with self-giving remembrings that potentially span gaps like those of sleep. To be

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sure, occasionally discordances do also occur. We speak of illusions, experiential belief being ruptured, passing over into doubt; but in the progression of experience, which never undergoes breaks in each and every respect, a thoroughgoing concordance is indeed restored through the changes in meaning and the crossings out just described; that is, running through our consciousness is a sustained unity of world-certainty that is produced again and again over against the disturbances. "The" one world is constantly there, only it is determined more closely and occasionally determined somewhat differently.

The first problem arises here, however: Must it then remain just as it was up to this point, according to the testimonies of our memory? Must an external experience be continually adjoined to another external experience in this way? Can it not be that an external experience is the last one, while consciousness endures? An external experience is assuredly a complex structure of consciousness that emerges in the nexus of consciousness as naturally motivated. Still, must the motivations proceed in such a way that a perception has to be connected up with another perception? We have kinaesthetic courses with which the appearances of things are connected in accordance with associative motivation: thus, certain exhibiting sense-data (in the case of the visual appearance, that is, visual data) along with their apprehensions. By motivation we mean that certain data and their potential horizons are demanded as co-emerging along with the emergence of other data in our lived-experience. But such associative demands can be annulled in the course of present experiencing. The series of sensation must actually arrive in a certain way in order for the apprehension of a thing to be experienced according to the kinaesthetically aroused pre-demands, and in order for the consciousness of an existing thing to be maintained. If the sense-data were suddenly to begin appearing in a muddle, if our visual field were suddenly to be filled with a confused muddle of colors, the kinaesthetic motivations would lose their force. What was formerly linked up to the kinaesthetic courses in an expectant manner would no longer be able to occur in the otherwise firmly regulated manner in anticipatory believing, and it would therefore be an end to the play of external

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perceptions. Their emergence means precisely a regulated functioning and a continuous further development of cultivated motivations, and this essentially depends upon the actual course of sensations. Yet this is always conceivable as an entirely different course, and as a completely unregulated one. That it is not an unregulated course, but is such a course that makes a continual perceptual flow possible, that is simply a fact. However, if we inquire into the truth of this fact and more precisely, if we ask why what was previously so must still be or will be so, this truth will obviously not be such that it could be decided by recourse to one of those passive confirmations of which we were alone able to speak.

Secondly, even if we do presuppose the truth of this fact, and thus assume that for us, that for the particular experiencing pure ego, external experiences will continually be adjoined in its stream of consciousness and will also issue in concordance every time, this would only be to say that for this ego the unity of a true world will be continually maintained in ratifying judicative intendings. But this is not to say that this world, beyond our present experience of it, is a world determined in advance, determined in itself, such that the decision of true or false would be univocally prefigured for every believing that is directed toward any temporal situation, or for a corresponding believing that is produced hypothetically.

This is illustrated most simply by referring to the difference between the world-view of that part of humanity that is influenced by modern natural science, and alternately, the world-view of the rest of humanity. This world is constantly and self-evidently there for all human beings, and they believe that it will also continue to endure. In their conscious lives they live into a world-future. But by far most human beings do believe that what will come depends to a large extent upon accidents that cannot be ascertained, or that gods decide the world's course according to a momentary whim. Only roughly is there an order that can be foreseen, according to which one can be practically directed, but only roughly. A conviction was indeed forged quite late in a causality that lawfully and absolutely determines each and every thing occurring in the world: and the sense of this conviction is none other than precisely

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this: that each and every temporal being (and in the natural attitude this means all beings in the world) is determined in itself, determined as truths in themselves. From the very beginning, nothing is open in order to have to wait and see first how the Fates of destiny will decide.

Our question rested in this consideration, namely, whether we already attain definitiveness (in the mode of experiential ratification) should an intending into the future actually be ratified by experience. Here, then, the other, last mentioned difficulty comes into play, and in a way that is very touchy where external experience is concerned. Does not external experience evidently lead *eo ipso* into infinity? Each experience is still itself an open intention; it has dimensions that are unfulfilled. Must, indeed, can a synthetically progressing acquisition of knowledge come to an end?

<§24. Development of the Problem of the In-itself for the Immanent Sphere>⁹³

Let us turn back to the immanent sphere. Let us directly pose the question with respect to immanence whether self-giveness here cannot be something that is entirely relative, that does not contain any definitive self at all or that does not have this definitive self supporting it as a persistent norm. Can it not be that every self-giving is to be rendered invalid through a conflict with other self-givings, and these again in conflict with others, and so on *in infinitum*? More explicitly, can it not be the case, when any kind of presentation is verified by a corresponding self-giving, that the latter is forthwith annulled through negation, whereby now what is presented would also be given as not actual; that then, however, the self-giving functioning as norm is also negated once again, and so the actual and the non-actual are always only something momentary, something belonging arbitrarily to the process of fulfillment? Or when we take any kind of presentation, is it decided in itself that corresponding to its meant being, to what

is given in it in the mode of belief-certainty, is a definitive being of the self as true and as incapable of being crossed out for all time?

To be sure, at first we see that immanently constituted being in its living present is not only self-giving as being, but that this being is essentially incapable of being crossed out. The moment we assert that it is not, like we can do at any time, we see that apodictically this assertion is annulled with respect to what is given. Here the indubitable, the indefeasible validity is clear. But what good is it, since its validity is only momentary? What is immanent flows-off and is gone. But where we speak of a true self and of a presentation that is verified definitively, there we reach beyond the momentary consciousness through rememberings in which we repeatedly come back to the same presentation and to its same meant object; and in which, on the other hand, we can repeatedly secure for ourselves and potentially do secure for ourselves the verified self as an identical self, and one that is not capable of being crossed out. Surely, we do have the momentary lived-experiencing (e.g., of an immanent sense-datum that we see in its present becoming) in a certainty that is not capable of being crossed out. But the being that we grasp there is only meant as being in itself when we not only take it as a momentary datum in the mode of the present, but also as the identical *daß* that could be given in arbitrarily iterated rememberings—that is, when we take it as a temporal datum, for instance, as the tonal datum in its temporality, a temporality that is identically one as opposed to possible orientations like those that are given through variable rememberings.⁹⁴

We see that the temporal form is the form of objects which, as objects, pretend to have their in-itself. All talk of objects thus leads back to remembering. Thus, this does not only hold for immanent objects. Even when we consider a noema, even when we consider that which is momentarily present as sense in the mode of the present and make an objective assertion about it, we

⁹³ Editor: See Appendix 8: <The Apodicticity of Remembering> pp. 451ff. Translator: See also Division 4.

⁹⁴ I am not entirely satisfied with this. The object is surely constituted from the very beginning as something temporal, and the momentary phase is an abstraction that we must first construct. The incapability of being crossed out [*Udurchschießbarkeit*] peculiar to the moment is thus not primary.

grasp it as such a [noema or present object] that can be
presentified to us and identified in iterated memories, namely,
with this reproductively presentified character, "momentary
present." We learn from this consideration that the question
concerning how an objectlike formation, an objectlike formation
in itself, is constituted, how it can show itself as such originally,
leads overall and from the very start initially to the problem of the
constitution of an in-itself of remembering, thus, to the question
concerning how remembering can be justified and to what extent it
can become a source for definitiveness. We must first of all
become clear about it. [111]

Indeed, seen more precisely, we are still lacking an intermediate
term for a completely systematic exposition. The living present
which is structured immanently is as we said not capable of being
crossed out so long as it unfolds in constitution; doubt is not
possible here. This also concerns, therefore, the span of the living
retention proper to it. To make ourselves explicitly clear: Every
progressing retention that continues to exist in a living fading-
away cannot be modalized. But once again we must add that we
still cannot identify an in-itself here. I can keep a hold on a sound
fading away attentively, yes even hold onto it more tightly. Here is
something of the most primitive activity. But it can also be the
case that I am not even attentively aware of it, that I do not
actively turn toward it and toward the series of sounds, and yet it
exercises a special allure. By virtue of an associative awakening, it
gets the character of an intention. In both cases, and in an entirely
spontaneous⁹⁵ fashion this provocation (this affection) is possibly
discharged in a remembering that not only arises in general, but
arises as the fulfillment of the intention.

Note that this remembering is something essentially different
from a retention, and is not for instance a mere reanimation of it in
the sense of an increase in the level of clarity. A clear retention
whose essence we grasp in the retentional levels lying most
closely to the primordial impression always remains a retention.
Every retention is what it is and has its intentional mode only at
the place of the streaming perceiving at which it stands. But

remembering is a kind of re-perception, that is, it is not a
perception to be sure, but a being constituted anew, a beginning
anew with the primordial-Now, and a retentional fading-away, but
precisely in the mode of reproduction. Thus, in remembering all
retentional levels emerge "once again," reproductively modified.
If such a remembering now occurs in connection with a retention
harboring an allure that is just past, it necessarily occurs in a
coinciding of sense and in a coinciding of being with the retention.
The same sound that has just sunk back and just faded away
appears once more on the scene, and I live through its being once
more. This can be repeated: I either deliberately or involuntarily
reproduce the tone or an entire tonal phrase once more, even an
entire melody. What happens here to the incapability of being
crossed out peculiar to remembering? Is it to be rejected out of
hand? Are we speaking in epistemology from time immemorial
about the general possibility of deception in remembering? And
does this not hold as well for the immanent sphere? [112]

<§25. Rememberings as the Source for an In-Itself of Objects>⁹⁶

We will obviously have to make distinctions here between close
memories and distant memories, (1) between rememberings that
are awakened through the retention that is still primordially living,
still articulated in itself and found in constitutive flux, and (2)
between rememberings that reach into the distant horizon of
retention, like with those of an entire piece of music.

25 1) *Rememberings as Arisen from the Awakening of Primordially Living Retention*

Where the first are concerned we will say: For what has just
past and is still sinking back, which remembering intuitively
grasps once again, we have what is absolutely incapable of being
crossed out—and we have this even if remembering is repeated,

⁹⁵ *unwillkürlich*

⁹⁶ Translator: See Appendix 9: Both Variations <of Modes of Givenness> pp. 474ff.,
and Appendix 10: <Possession of the Self and Concealment in Remembering>:
Reproduction and Retention> pp. 475ff.

whereby the second now creates its evidence from the first and no longer from the retention that has, in the meantime, completely faded away. In spite of all that, we certainly do not grasp the self and the identity of the self in such a repeated coinciding of the self without incompleteness and degrees of completeness. For we know indeed that remembering can essentially waver in its clarity, and can even be intermittent. The different moments of content are more or less veiled, as it were, as if by a fog of unclarity. And yet, it is not one of those concealments in the usual sense, namely, of objects by other objects. The fog of unclarity does not blacken out objects, it is not a real⁹⁷ fog. And yet it does conceal, renders the self-giving incomplete. And yet, what is just past as past is absolutely secure, it is incapable of being crossed out, indubitable, and it is absolutely secure with respect to everything that is given from it according to quality, intensity, timbre. It is itself there passing through the fog of unclarity, in all relative unclarity, but just not in an entirely obvious manner, just not as realized ultimately. Accordingly, something is lacking with respect to this incapability of being crossed out. Essentially belonging to this situation is the necessary coinciding that forms identity, the coinciding of given matters throughout the alteration of different levels of clarity, and a certain enhancement in the direction toward an ultimate, most genuine self, the self that is completely evident in its appearance⁹⁸ but which is only an idea to be discerned intuitively, an ideal *limes*.

But what is peculiar here is that it does not first require something like approaching this ideal limit in order first of all to confirm a less clear reproduction. In this connection with the living present, it has its original justification in itself, continually. And "original justification" means that it contains a self that is inviolable, although it only stands in a gradation of degrees against a *limes* which in its very nature would alone completely exhibit the "self." The less clear remembering is less saturated, the clearer one is more saturated, it is a "more intensive" self-giveness, but if it is an intuitive remembering at all, it will give just one self and

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not give any other self, or any of its moments.⁹⁹ However, empty remembering is not actually a remembering, but an awakening or an affective allure of a retentional sedimentation that is emerging as prominent from the immersion of memory.¹⁰⁰ In a certain sense there are also gradual differences of proximity and distance here.

One must say then that we still have another gradation, namely, with respect to reproductions that reach into the outermost horizon of immersion, even with respect to those reproductions that draw near to it. Namely: Self-givenesses arise here that are indeed actual self-givenesses and are incontestable in this connection, while it is left gradually undetermined how far the actual self-giveness reaches, and what can yet actually be ascribed to it with respect to determinate moments.

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2)¹⁰¹ <Rememberings of a Submerged Past of Consciousness>

The systematic path leads then further to rememberings that do not have their retentional connection to the immediate realm of the present, but rather, that revive a distant, long submerged past of consciousness. We speak here of distant memories as opposed to close memories. Even here, for distant memories, I hold that every remembering has its original justification, and this means that we are to understand essentially that corresponding to every remembering, even to this group, is a necessary idea, the idea of a self that is incapable of being crossed out. My guiding thought here is the following: An intuitive distant memory, when it is not one that fleetingly flashes forth, but is a steady one and is

⁹⁹ During the course of our lectures the following was added: The justification of close memory does not yield any elucidation of the possibility of the knowledge of an immanent object as being in itself. For we are still bound here to the chain of rememberings, rememberings which adhere to a living retention, which had a departure from it, and were carried by its self-giving evidence. Only when we have first justified the distant memory do we have the possibility of recognizing at any time an immanent temporal object as existing.

¹⁰⁰ *Gedächtnis*.

Editor: See Appendix 9: Both Variations <of Modes of Givenness> (1) of Proximity and Distance within Clarity, (2) of Obscurity as Veiledness, Nebulousness, and Appendix 10: <Possession of the Self and Concealment in Remembering: Reproduction and Retention>.

¹⁰¹ Translator: Husserl's enumeration.

⁹⁷ Translator: reading *redet* for *redler*.

⁹⁸ *das der vollen Augenscheinlichkeit*.

synthetically iterable and identifiable, has with respect to its objectlike formation essentially only one possible way of passing over into doubt and then turning out to be null, namely, as a confused muddle of rememberings. Thus, becoming discordant, inhibition, and annulment of the belief that is initially unbroken in the self-given past, necessarily leads to the phenomena of bifurcation in which the distant memory in question splits into several distant memories. And it does so in such a way that the unitary objectlike formation of an undivided memory is disclosed as the fusion of single objects, single features and events that belong to the separated memories and are self-given there with partially different objectlike determinations. In the same way it could now happen that every one of the *splintered memories* lose their character of unbroken concordance, and undergo a crossing out by splitting into yet other memories that are in themselves concordant.

But on the one hand it is still the case that the content of every memory that is characterized as false is only false with respect to the unity of the combined whole, but it remains correct with respect to its parts. What is crossed out is always the whole that has arisen through a comingling, but the elements that issued in the comingling remain self-given, only they belong to different nexuses. On the other hand, however, this process of splitting cannot continue *in infinitum*; it is a muddling up of discrete matters, and thus it must come to an end. Indeed, it suffices that what appears in a memory, essentially, cannot as remembered be completely empty, that its self-giving cannot be an empty title, but rather that it has its source in actual self-givings such that we are necessarily referred back to the idea of a chain of pure self-givennesses that are no longer capable of being crossed out, but are only identifiable with respect to their content and repeatable in complete identity and concordance. Naturally, even here we have degrees of clarity for every portion of genuine self-givenness, and in this respect the idea of the most complete self-givenness as *lines*. Thus even this type of saturation <has> differences of evidence. In both relations we are certainly referred to the active ego and its free activity in which it is guided, precisely, by the experience that memory can turn out to be deceptive, and that, in

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particular, clouds of unclarity can conceal the cominglings. Accordingly, the ego strives to check its memories thoroughly, to clarify them deliberately, to investigate the intentional nexuses with respect to memories' parts, to disclose the illusion by analyzing, and thus to advance to the true self.

But still necessary for our further understanding is the elucidation of the origins of error in passivity, and in particular of error in its most original shape of comingling. This problem leads us to a radical portion of the analysis of passive consciousness, namely, as genetic analysis: to the phenomenology of association.

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 <DIVISION 3:
 ASSOCIATION>

<Chapter 1.
 PRIMORDIAL PHENOMENA AND FORMS OF ORDER
 WITHIN PASSIVE SYNTHESIS>

5 <§26. The Position and the Delimitation of Themes Concerning a
 Phenomenological Doctrine of Association>¹⁰²

The rubric "association" characterizes for us a form and a
 lawful regularity of immanent genesis that constantly belongs to
 10 consciousness in general; but it does not characterize, as it does
 for psychologists, a form of objective, psychophysical causality; it
 does not characterize a regulated manner in which the emergence
 of reproductions, of rememberings, is causally determined in
 human and animal psychic life. For we are working within the
 15 framework of the phenomenological reduction in which all
 objective reality and objective causality is "bracketed." What is
 there for us is not the world taken as reality with its
 psychophysical¹⁰³ beings and its causalities, but only the
 phenomena of them, thing-phenomena, human-phenomena, etc., in
 20 their intentionality. In this framework of pure consciousness, we
 find the streaming present of consciousness, we find constituted in
 every case a perceptual reality constituted as in the flesh. But pasts
 can also enter into present consciousness through remembering.
 Put more precisely, in the unity of a consciousness that is
 25 streaming in the present, we find concrete¹⁰⁴ perceptions with their
 retentional components, as well as concrete retentions—all of that

in the flow of retention fading away into the distant horizon of
 retention. But in addition to this, emergent rememberings as well.
 Between the noematic components of something present and
 something remembered we find a phenomenologically peculiar
 5 connective trait that can be expressed in the following way:
 Something present recalls something past. Likewise, a second
 remembering can occur while a remembering runs-off; the second
 remembering can occur along with the first one in a nexus that is
 characterized noematically by the fact that the first recalled event
 10 recalls the second recalled event. A perceptual consciousness, that
 is, a consciousness that is constituted originally can accordingly
 be characterized as a consciousness that awakens, awakening a
 reproductive consciousness, and this consciousness can function
 as awakening in its turn as fetching a past of consciousness, as it
 15 were.

It follows from the exposition of our previous lectures that
 association is a possible theme of purely phenomenological
 research. For instance, there is still something that remains of the
 Modern, customary psychology of association after the
 20 phenomenological reduction; if one goes back to its immediate
 experiential material, the phenomenological reduction will initially
 yield a core of phenomenological facts that also remain within the
 pure inner attitude and that will shape the preliminary point of
 departure for further research. If we pursue this more deeply, we
 25 will realize that the path is cleared from here toward a universal
 theory of the genesis of a pure subjectivity, and in particular,
 initially in relation to its lower level of pure passivity.
 Phenomenological eidetic analyses of consciousness constituting a
 temporal objectlike formation already led to the beginnings of a
 30 lawful regularity of genesis prevailing in subjective life. We see
 very quickly that the phenomenology of association is, so to
 speak, a higher continuation of the doctrine of original time-
 constitution. Through association, the constitutive accomplish-
 ment is extended to all levels of apperception. That the specific
 35 intentions arise through it is already clear to us. Actually, Kant
 already saw that in phenomenological contexts, which we first
 come across in the natural departure from objective-psychological
 observations under the rubric of association, not mere accidental

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Kant

¹⁰² Editor: See Appendix 11: <The Concept of Associative Causality> pp. 477ff.

¹⁰³ *antiförmlich*

¹⁰⁴ Translator: See below footnote 120.

facts, but rather, an absolutely necessary lawful regularity is manifest without which a subjectivity could not be. But his brilliant doctrine of the transcendental necessity of association is not supported by a phenomenological eidetic analysis. It does not attempt to show what is actually at issue under the rubric of association with respect to elementary facts and essential laws, and thereby making comprehensible the genetic unitary structure of pure subjective life. On the other hand, I do not want to say that the development of phenomenology has already progressed so far that it would have neatly solved the genetic problems existing here. But it is far enough along to be able to specify these problems and to sketch the method for their solution.

A first group of pure phenomena and nexuses to which the traditional doctrine of association leads us concerns facts of actual and possible reproduction, or more clearly, of actual and possible rememberings. When we practice the phenomenological reduction, they are initially given as transcendental facts. Accordingly, this is still prior to eidetic, essential insight that would intuitively obtain essential necessity and essential laws. Right in the midst of these facts are the phenomena that interest us: the splitting of rememberings into rememberings. These rememberings have been muddled, as we say, such that the memorial images of separate pasts have blended to form a unity of an illusory image. This problem of the fusion of rememberings leads us a step further, then, to the problem concerning the extent to which mere phantasies lead back, through intentional analyses, to rememberings, that is, the extent to which they are products of the fusion of rememberings with respect to their intuitive content.

The doctrine of the genesis of reproductions and of their formations is the doctrine of association in the first and more genuine sense. But inseparably connected to this, or rather, grounded upon this is a higher level of association and doctrine of association, namely, a doctrine of the genesis of expectations, and closely related to it, the genesis of apperceptions to which belong the horizons of actual and possible expectations. All in all, it concerns the genesis of the phenomena of expectation, that is, of those specific intentions that are anticipatory. We could also call this association inductive association. For it is a matter here of the

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founding level proper to passivity, the founding level of all the active-logical processes that are treated under the rubric of inductive proofs.

Taking them in order, let us now first of all observe reproductive association, naturally, as a purely phenomenological occurrence. We can <call to mind> here the Aristotelian distinction between what is in itself first and what is for us first, namely, what is first from the standpoint of explanatory knowledge (knowledge that makes comprehensible). The associative facts and essential insights of the reproductive sphere that are accessible to us as first (for essential reasons and not accidentally) concern reproductively awakening intentional lived-experiences and awakened reproductions in which we are conscious or become conscious of objects as objects for ourselves. It does not initially occur to us that this is something special; therefore, wherever we speak of a consciousness, of an intentional lived-experience, we think without further ado of a consciousness of something offering itself as something for itself, a consciousness of something prominent, existing in a singular manner.

But it is precisely the analysis of associative phenomena that draws our attention to the fact that consciousness must not necessarily be a consciousness of a single object for itself, and accordingly, we touch on a new problem here: how a consciousness of something particular and how a consciousness of explicit particulars becomes possible as a consciousness of a multiplicity and a consciousness of wholeness; namely, a comparative analysis also shows the opposing possibility of many [elements], indeed, a multiplicity being continually fused into a unity within one consciousness, *implicite*, such that consciousness is not a consciousness of a multiplicity, a consciousness that becomes aware of separated particulars in a unitary and yet separate manner. The following example can clarify roughly what that "*implicite*" should mean. A white square, which is in itself completely and homogeneously white without any specks and so forth, becomes prominent as a single square, and many like squares as a multiplicity of particular ones. But however much every square is given as a unity, and given as a unity that is

undifferentiated in itself, it is indeed our view that each one can be divided in a number of ways; to our mind each one is in itself a continuum of white whose phases are just not prominent for themselves. Naturally, that is not an arbitrary interpretation but one that has a phenomenological basis. [121]

Let us now set aside the problem of prominent particulars and their implicit multiplicities and only point to the fact that for the time being we can only catch sight of associations, and only of direct ones, by having particular objects given to us phenomenologically or by having in consciousness closely consolidated multiplicities forming unities for themselves or by having articulated wholes, in short, if we have unitary, prominent objectlike formations which, as such unities, recall other unities as past ones; naturally, recalling them as past for us. Remaining within the phenomenological reduction, the associative relation concerns exclusively the *given*¹⁰⁵ objects *as such* in their respective noematic mode, that is, correlatively it concerns the corresponding modes of consciousness. We are not saying that we see this "recalling something" everywhere, but only that we see it in certain cases, that is, that we have grasped it in originary prehension. For example, if winding down a path we catch sight of a cirque, we are reminded of another cirque, one that emerges reproductively. We can note that the reproduced one is not only altogether reproduced, and is not only an altogether reproduced, similar object, but that there exists a certain relation between them both beyond the mere relation of similarity. Something present recalls something reproductively presented, which is to say, there is a tendency that is directed from the former to the latter and a tendency that is fulfilled by intuitive reproduction. It follows from this that we, as attentive egos, look from this to that by being referred from the one to the other, and we can also say: The one points to the other—even though there is still not an actual relation of indication by signs and designation. Further, the phenomenon gives itself as a genesis, with the one term as awakening, the other as awakened. The reproduction of the latter gives itself as aroused through the awakening.

Within the purely phenomenological framework, then, there are further distinctions falling between immediate and mediate association, and we observe that both are always intertwined with one another. First, we frequently and easily observe that an *a* recalls a *b* and then this again recalls *c*, and thus that we are not immediately reminded of *c*, but rather, precisely on the way through *b*. But associations can also run their course without being noticed. Just as we fail to notice so many different things that are in our field of consciousness, so too, we fail to notice the connections of association. As usual, we also want to become aware here of our past consciousness and its content by looking back retrospectively, that is, in the manner of reflection. Our interest skims right over the terms when a certain and often very mediate final term especially appeals to us, and in this way, this final term dawns on us like a sudden thought for itself, while the entire associative nexus runs its course in consciousness, it is not noticed in any special manner. For instance, the thought of a magnificent seascape occurs to us during a talk. If we reflect upon how it came to us, we will find for instance that a turn of phrase immediately reminded us of something similar that was uttered during a conversation last summer at the sea. The beautiful image of the seascape, however, completely monopolized our interest.

If we think of intuitive examples in this way, we will then find the similarity of something awakened with something that is immediately awakening as proper to immediate association, as proper to immediate awakening.

At any rate, we find that the awakening does not often lead to an intuitive memory, but instead to an empty presentation. This empty presentation is directed in a determinate manner and as such has a determinate (just not always efficacious) tendency to turn into a remembering, and then through immediate association, to turn necessarily into a memory of something that is similar. We notice, however, that this "something similar" does not remain isolated; in a certain way, the entire past-consciousness is co-awakened; it is from this that the particular thing, which is especially awakened and reproduced, becomes prominent. It is then that something else, another particular thing can still be preferred in a special way in the manner of awakening in the

framework of this entire past, and thereby be predestined to a possible intuitive reproduction. The memory of a painting by Titian transports me into the Uffuzzi Gallery; but only special traces from that present become especially awakened and appear: certain other paintings hanging there, or more prosaically, the image of the yawning museum attendant, etc.

Certainly, we can quickly skip over this entire past present insofar as the more effective awakening of this past goes back into another, deeper past, or following the outline of the future, pursues the incidents that followed there. [123]

These are of course familiar occurrences; we can all find them in ourselves and take note of them. That every memory is open to the question concerning how we arrived at it, a question that arises even in everyday discourse already shows that it concerns matters of fact that must have arisen in everyone's experience. For phenomenology, it forms a point of departure for a treatment and description in the reduction, and then above all, for the method of eidetic research, of research into essential necessities. Proceeding from examples we consider, for instance, whether immediate association as such is possible, is conceivable, if we were to give up the relation of similarity between what awakens and what is awakened, or again, whether the awakening of something through association, of something whose content is alien, is possible in a way that is different from the transmission occurring by means of an awakening through similarity.

One sees then that essential laws surely prevail here. Every awakening goes from an impressional present or a present that is already non-intuitively or intuitively reproduced toward another reproduced present. This relationship, or as we can say forthwith, this synthesis presupposes a "bridging term," something similar: from here the bridge arches across as a special synthesis by means of similarity. Transmitted in this way, a present enters into a universal synthesis with another past present, correlatively a full consciousness of the present enters into a universal synthesis with another submerged consciousness of the present, a synthesis which serves as the framework for special syntheses of awakening and for special reproductions.

This gives us a rough and ready beginning; and now it is a question of first making comprehensible in a more precise manner how certain awakenings come about, namely, how a similarity among a variety of similarities becomes privileged to build a bridge, and how each present can ultimately enter into a relation with all pasts, how—extending beyond the living retention—it can enter into a relation with the entire realm of things forgotten. It is obvious that only through this can we completely solve the problem concerning how the pure ego is able to become conscious of the fact that it has behind itself an endless field of past lived-experiences as its own, a unity of past life in the form of time, as a life that is in principle everywhere accessible to it through rememberings, or, what amounts to the same thing, is capable of being reawakened in the core of its being. [124]

But could subjectivity in truth have its own past, could we speak meaningfully of this "having" if in principle every possibility of remembering were lacking, and further, if the genetic conditions of this possibility (the conditions of possible awakening) that are to be disclosed through essential insight remain unfulfilled? We realize, then, that it really concerns nothing else than clarifying the fundamental problem, the basic, essential conditions of the possibility of a subjectivity itself. What must belong to it so that a subjectivity can have the essential sense without which it could not be subjectivity, [namely,] the sense of an existing¹⁰⁶ subjectivity being for itself, and precisely thereby of a subjectivity constituting itself as being for itself? Certainly, a complete phenomenology of reproductive awakening concerns and exhausts this problem only with respect to the one side, namely, with respect to the constitution of one's own past, or rather, the constitution of the self-having-been in endless immanent time. But we will see that the supplementary part, the other half of the problem, is the realm of the phenomenology of inductive, anticipatory association. Here we will make clear the essential conditions of the possibility of a subjectivity that can know itself as identically one, having its inherent endless future life. Can know: through the possibility that is demanded here of a

¹⁰⁶ *seiendend*

verification that is not to be grounded initially by the self-giving of something futural in the future current life, but rather through a novel verification [that takes place] constantly in the determination of anticipations that are to be made possible and that are already being prefigured in an indubitable manner in the particular present.

The problems that we have formulated are not entirely new to us; they are only new formulations of the problem of validity-in-itself that had set this entire Division of lectures in motion.

10 <§27. The Presuppositions of Associative Synthesis. The
Syntheses of Original Time-Consciousness>¹⁰⁷ [125]

Let us now turn back to association, and let us consider how this new field is to be taken into a deep mining phenomenological investigation, and naturally into a systematic investigation that begins with what is elementary, which every association presupposes. We do not need to seek the very first beginning. Clearly, what is presupposed is the synthesis that is continually accomplished in original time-consciousness. In the concretely full, streaming living present¹⁰⁸ we have present, past, and future already united in a certain mode of givenness. But this manner in which subjectivity becomes conscious of its past and future life along with its inherent intentional contents is an incomplete one. The aforementioned manner would be meaningless for the ego if there were no awakening, for the retentions are empty and even sink into the undifferentiated retentional background. Our consciousness of the protentional future is especially empty. On the other hand, there would be no progress without this beginning. In the ABCs of the constitution of all objectivity given to consciousness and of subjectivity as existing for itself, here is the 30 "A." It consists, as we might say, in a universal, formal

framework, in a synthetically constituted form in which all other possible syntheses must participate.
Still many other types of syntheses are transcendental in the special sense, as apodictically necessary for the genesis of a subjectivity (which is indeed only conceivable in genesis). As we said, these syntheses run their course together with the synthesis constituting the temporal form of all objects, and thus must co-relate to the temporal content, the temporally formed content of the object. In his nearly overwhelming genius (overwhelming precisely because he did not have at his disposal the phenomenological problematic and method), Kant has already sketched out an initial system of transcendental syntheses in the transcendental deduction of the first edition of the *Critique*. But unfortunately, he only had in mind there the higher lying problem of the constitution of a spatio-worldly object¹⁰⁹, of an object that transcends consciousness. Thus, his question is only this: What kinds of syntheses must be carried out subjectively in order for things of nature to be able to appear, and thus a nature in general. But lying deeper and essentially preceding this is the problem of the inner, the purely immanent objectlike formation and the constitution, as it were, of the inner-world, that is, precisely the constitution of the subject's stream of lived-experience as being for itself, as the field of all being proper to it as its very own. Since the spatial world is constituted through consciousness, since it can only be there for us as existing and can only be conceived at all by virtue of certain syntheses carried out in immanence, it is clear that the constitutive problems of the world presuppose the doctrine of the necessary, most general structures and the synthetic shapes of immanence that are possible in general. Hence, we are to seek here in immanence what are in principle the most general syntheses, especially, as we said, the syntheses concerning content that extend beyond the transcendental synthesis of time, and which as such, according to their general character, are discernible as transcendentially necessary. Our task, therefore, will be to seek precisely these syntheses.¹¹⁰

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107 Editor: See §29 and Appendix 12; <Note on the Fundamental Founding of the Doctrine of Original Time-Consciousness> p. 479, Appendix 13; <Primordial Present and Retentions> p. 479ff., Appendix 14; <The Accomplishment of the Association of Simultaneity> p. 482ff., and Appendix 15; <Unitary Consciousness and Its Correlate: the Identical Object> pp. 486ff.

108 *Lebensgegenwart*

109 *Gegenständlichkeit*

110 Editor: See Appendix 15; <Unitary Consciousness and Its Correlate: the Identical Object>.

It is extremely important to note that under the rubric of time-constituting syntheses, we consider not only the syntheses of the temporal object's retention and protention that belong on the whole and for itself to some kind of temporal object, but also that the concrete, full living present is a unity arising from a synthesis encompassing it. And further that in the continuous process of streaming from living-moment to living-moment, a synthesis, particularly a higher level synthesis is carried out once more. What is constituted universally through these syntheses is known under the rubric of coexistence and succession of all immanent objects in relation to one another. In every living-moment various kinds of temporal objectlike formations are constituted, each one has a momentary Now together with the momentary horizon of retentional having-been and the momentary protentional horizon. [127]

This momentary structure is continually in the process of streaming and is synthetically united, precisely thereby constituting this temporal object as identical with itself, e.g., a lasting sound. But still other objects can be constituted in the same concretion¹¹¹ of life, now and again in the same living-moment and in its continuous process of streaming: each object can be constituted through a parallel constitutive structure, for example, another sound, a color, etc. Simultaneity is necessarily constituted here; the temporality of one such datum would not be constituted for itself and yet have nothing to do with the temporality of another. A single Now is constituted that brings the Now of the one datum into a unity of identity with the Now of the other. And likewise, the entire formal structure of the subjective temporal modes for both data, and thus for all data constituted from the same Now, is in a coinciding that forms identity—the diverse primordial impressions are connected to a primordial impression, inseparably: a primordial impression streams as one such that all special impressions must run off at an absolutely identical pace. This provides for the fact that there are not many times corresponding to many objects; rather, the proposition goes: There is only one time in which all temporal courses of objects run their course.

Accordingly, corresponding to every Now is a universal synthesis. Through this synthesis, a universal concrete present is constituted, a present into which all particulars that are set off from one another are integrated. Further, the fact that the Now streams in and through temporal orientations implies at the same time another universal synthesis in constituting life whereby we are conscious of the presents coursing as a sequential unity. What is given to consciousness originally as existing simultaneously and sequentially is thus constituted from an originally synthetic unity as existing simultaneously and successively.

This is the most general and the most primary synthesis that necessarily connects all particular objects of which we become conscious originally in passivity as being, no matter what their content may be and however else they may be constituted as unitary objects with respect to content. We had directed our attention to what necessarily gives temporal unity to all distinguished and distinguishable objects: being with-one-another.¹¹² But naturally, the synthesis of time-consciousness also contains (and already as a presupposition for possible coexistences and succession) that synthesis in which one object is constituted as identically one or (what amounts to the same thing) as enduringly one in streaming manifolds. [128]

If, now, time-consciousness is the primordial place of the constitution of the unity of identity or of an objectlike formation, and then of the forms of connection of coexistence and succession of all objectlike formations being given to consciousness, then we are still only talking about that consciousness which produces a general form. Mere form is admittedly an abstraction, and thus from the very beginning the analysis of the intentionality of time-consciousness and its accomplishment is an analysis that works on [the level of] abstractions. It grasps, it is only interested in the necessary temporal form of all singular objects and pluralities of objects, or rather, correlatively it is only interested in the form of manifolds that constitute the temporal object. An object is something enduring, as constituted this way and that in consciousness. But it is something enduring with respect to its

¹¹¹ Translator: See footnote 120.

¹¹² *miteinander*.

content, and that this is the case, that it has this content for this object, that content for that object, all this is constituted in consciousness itself, or otherwise we would not even be conscious of it. The extent to which several objects are differentiated with respect to content, or the extent to which an object is divided or divisible with respect to content, is the extent to which we have (or rather, the extent to which there emerge for us) particular objects that are with one another in relationships of coexistence and succession. But what gives unity to the particular object with respect to content, what makes up the differences between each of them with respect to content (and specifically for consciousness and from its own constitutive accomplishment), what makes division possible and the relation between parts in consciousness, and so forth—the analysis of time alone cannot tell us, for it abstracts precisely from content. Thus, it does not give us any idea of the necessary synthetic structures of the streaming present and of the unitary stream of the presents—which in some way concerns the particularity of content.

20 <§28. Syntheses of Homogeneity in the Unity of a Streaming Present>¹¹³

Let us remain in the continual synthetic unity of a streaming present; let us initially not draw upon any of the functions of remembering that we should only take into account later regarding their genesis and new accomplishment, and let us make just as little use of the functions of bringing the future to intuition,¹¹⁴ the expectations that spring ahead beyond continual protention. We even leave out of play all types of phantasy, all types of conceptual acts, valuing and willing activities, without prejudicing the case concerning their indispensability or dispensability for subjectivity. We presuppose that objects are constituted, immanent objects already prominent, singularities or unitarily closed groups

or wholes, as articulated in explicit parts. Standing as we are here before the questions concerning association we must obviously forge a beginning with this in order to set our eyes on new primordial syntheses. But we can only set our eyes on something, grasp something directly where we have something prominent for itself.

The most general connections of prominent objects that are determined with respect to content are obviously similarity or uniformity and non-similarity; or let us say more concisely: connections of homogeneity and connections of heterogeneity. Connection as constituted by consciousness is an accomplishment of syntheses of consciousness, and here we encounter something new, consciousness' synthesis of homogeneity. Where real objects are concerned, there are surely good reasons for contending that mere similarity does not create any kind of connection, any real connection between them. That two people are similar to one another, for example, with respect to their noses, does not produce any real bond between them. However, we are speaking about immanent data, for example, about concrete color-data in the unity of a streaming present, thus, that are given to consciousness in immanent coexistence under some longer constituting duration. But these necessarily have a unity through consciousness, a unity of kinship, as similar to one another or uniform with one another. Several discrete color-data in the visual field are grouped together; they are especially united by virtue of their similarity; [and they are united in] different ways as well. This kinship has its degrees and according to them it unites them now more strongly, now more weakly. The most complete kinship or similarity is uniformity, that is, it makes the strongest connection of homogeneity. What is given there as coexistent in one consciousness with regard to the particulars that are uniform does not remain for itself indifferent to the other ones; rather, it is united into a special group that is now a multiplicity as unity; in the broadest sense of the word it is already a whole that has bound the particulars together purely through kinship. But similarity accomplishes the same thing, only to a lesser degree, remaining behind uniformity.

¹¹³ Editor: See Appendix 16: <On the Connection of Similarity> pp. 491ff., Appendix 17: <Sensible Connection of Similarity, Sensible Uniformity and Endos> pp. 495ff., Appendix 18: <Association and Syntheses> pp. 505ff., and Appendix 19: <On the Phenomenology of Association> pp. 512ff.

¹¹⁴ *Vorveranschaulichung*

Let us regard statically the coexistence of two or more objects that are related with respect to content; although their unity through homogeneity already emerges in this case, and although the differences in the intimacy of this connection emerges if we regard a variety of such cases together, the deeper characteristic among the combinations will be disclosed in a kinetic regard, as it were, in a comparative transition from one component of the relation to the other. The new uniform characteristic is given in such a transition as a "repetition" of the same thing. This is not so with something that is merely similar, though in a certain respect a sameness does come to the fore in the relation of similarity. When we compare the components of the relation, we find that a kind of *overlapping of one consciousness over the other takes place*; in spite of the modification that it undergoes, the one consciousness is preserved through the transition as a consciousness of the same first object and coincides with the second consciousness, with the consciousness of the second object, and in the case of uniformity, are congruent. That is to say, in spite of the consciousness of duality that is maintained, an identity-consciousness results, the consciousness of a same content, a same what-content. The repeated uniform characteristic is completely the same with respect to content, completely congruent. In comparing matters with similar characteristics we find two things that stand out, (i) the synthetic coinciding in a commonality, that is, in a sameness, and yet (ii) the synthetic conflict of particular matters of this commonality that repress one another reciprocally in the process of overlapping. Repressing means that the one conceals the other, that the concealed element tends toward unconcealment, then breaking through conceals the previously unconcealed element, etc. Thus, when a red square overlaps with a blue one. Visually there is similarity, but there is not uniformity. Red and blue clash.

We can also observe this: Where there has been a coinciding through overlapping, the coinciding without conflict (the coinciding of uniformity) does not yield at that moment anything more of duality, of splitting in two with respect to content. A fusion with respect to content is carried out in the synthesis of the two respective consciousnesses, specifically, the fusion forming a singularity of community with regard to content. But while there

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is also something of fusion here in the overlapping of similarity, there is not a pure fusion and formation of unity; rather, there is unity as presupposition, as the ground of a concealment, and thereby of repression and eruption. Accordingly, we will say:

5 What is present statically as the uniform connection of discrete contents (or as the merely similar connection of discrete contents) is itself already a mode of the two respective syntheses as coinciding. It is coinciding *par distance*. And obviously, an affective tendency simultaneously belongs to it; for something that is prominent for itself functions affectively. And a connection of something prominent stemming from homogeneity exercises a unitary and augmented affective force or tendency upon the ego, whether it gives into it or not; and this affection relaxes, becomes fulfilled in a turning toward, which when completely at work

15 simultaneously produces the kinetic form of a transition from one term to another and the kinetic form of an overlapping, thus producing the results we described. All of this takes place, however, prior to the occurrences of the higher lying activities of cognitively fixing the common element as something concretely general or as a generic generality proper to a higher level.

20 What we have expounded upon also holds where successions of discrete objects have been constituted in the unity of the streaming living present, and in particular, as successions of uniform or similar objects or processes. Thus, pure sounds follow one another, and among them for instance a series of repetitions of uniform sounds, where we say that it is "the same sound" being repeated.

When¹¹⁵ we use overlapping as a way of disclosing what is present in the phenomena of uniformity and similarity of discrete data, we see, as the previous lecture showed, that a fusion in distance is at work in every synthesis through homogeneity; in the case of mere similarity this fusion is inhibited by a distinguishing, a contrasting. If we employ the same method of disclosure, we notice further that these types of connections through homogeneity can be connected differently by bridging terms, thus forming different groups of homogeneity that have the single terms in common. For example, a red triangle is in a unity with other differently colored

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¹¹⁵ Editor: Beginning of a new lecture.

triangles, and if we pass through them and compare them explicitly in pairs, this will mean that they are similar to one another as triangles, indeed, they will be completely uniform. The same red triangle, however, can form a uniform group with other figures that are not uniform but that are all red—uniformity with respect to red, difference or (what amounts to the same thing) similarity merely varying with respect to figure. For ultimately, all figures are similar on the one hand, all colors are similar on the other. Thus, formally speaking, we distinguish “the uniform element with respect to *a*” from “the uniform element with respect to *b*,” and likewise for everything similar. We notice that already prior to making a comparison, but by virtue of such intertwining syntheses of homogeneity, red distinguishes itself from figure, that the two respective moments in the red triangle come into relief as moments and therefore exercise an affective force for itself.

Let us look more closely at this situation by simplifying our examples. Within a streaming present, the distant affinity of the red triangle with another red triangle grounds fusion, a kindred unification forming a pair. The fusion or unification of the same triangle with another triangle yields a pair again: Both pairs are now linked by a binding term, namely, by a term of identity. We realize in this case that each respective pair has also moved into a relation of homogeneity. And in fact, speaking in an entirely general manner: Even groups of similarity, even homogeneous pairs as groups become united purely through homogeneity. Two coexistent pairs that are paired by being red coincide as pairs; they form a pair of pairs such that at the same time the corresponding terms coincide in a red-congruity. If, instead, we take pairs that have one term that is not uniform, more precisely, pairs that have one term that is similar in distance, there will be a less integral unity of pairs produced between the pairs as such. They are not completely unified as pairs; they do in fact form a pair of pairs, and the terms that correspond to one another by being paired as red for themselves are, for example, more intimately connected with each other, but because there is a difference with respect to the other terms, both pairs diverge as if each one were going its own way. Now, if we allow the one term to become identical as before, we will then have two relationships diverging from it that

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will nevertheless still have something of a materially relevant community, but in relief. Precisely by this, moments come into relief through the bridging term, namely, as different moments, as moments grounding the two similarities. Obviously, here lies the beginning of the internal particularization and division within passivity, and thus the presupposition for explicating the internal features and parts within activity, and ultimately within judicative activity.

New relationships, i.e., forms of unity also come to the fore here in the framework of homogeneity—the relationships of the object and of the inner, dependent feature, and of the object as a whole and as a part in the special sense of a part that is possible for itself. Certainly, they only come to the fore in the strict sense through active explication and a corresponding identification; but it becomes clear that the syntheses in question are being prepared in passivity already in the lower level. An example of the process of being divided into parts within passivity would be, for instance, a unified succession of a short tone and a long lasting tone. Here a sustained piece of the longer lasting tone, which does not really come into relief that sharply, is already distinguished from the rest through coinciding.

Other special syntheses arising from homogeneity that have just as much fundamental importance concern the gradations of similarity leading up to uniformity, according to which the pairings and connections of groups are themselves fused more or less intimately, more tightly or more loosely. Namely, the stronger similarity among terms also determines the intimacy with which the pairs themselves are fused together into a unity, into the unity of a group and into the unity of a group of groups.

<§29. Primordial Forms of Order. Supplementing the Previous:
The Phenomenon of Contrast>¹¹⁶

Here, however, we encounter the problem of the unity of order and other fundamental problems in connection with this, the

¹¹⁶ Editor: See Appendix 19: <On the Phenomenology of Association>

problem of continuity as continuous order in undivided fusion. What are the primordial phenomena here?

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Up until now we had presupposed, as primordial phenomena, the unity of a prominent object, the multiplicities of prominent objects as the mere multiplicities of coexistence and succession, but then also multiplicities as connected multiplicities with respect to content, that is, connected through homogeneity. Now, what characterizes the order that is obviously a phenomenon in the sphere of homogeneity, and the disorder opposing it? One primordial phenomenon is the disorder, for instance, in the form of a bunch of spots in a visual field that is otherwise uniform. As uniform spots, they can also be thought of as an order in the visual field; we may be able to give them an order *idealtier*, or we may be able to parcel them out in any ordered manner, so that we would see order and then would have order given as a phenomenon of passivity. Thus, even this is initially a primordial phenomenon.

Primordial phenomena especially include the phenomenon of uniformity and the phenomenon of a series of gradation: [in the first instance] a unity of similarities, of sheer color-data, namely, in coexistence, but [in the second] a graduating from red to blue as the unity of an ordered sequence. Or a series of triangles as an order of size consistently getting larger. We can take as a parallel primordial phenomenon, however, a temporal ordering of just such data that follow one another and are unified according to an order through similarity, through uniformity, or through a gradation according to color or according to the size of the shape. On both sides we can describe the concrete unity of order as already being at hand: Proper to it is not merely a general formation of a pair through similarity, but a special similarity that we call here gradation. Then the connection of pairs with one another such that the graduated term, the final term of a pair, is the beginning term of the next pair, the term as a point of departure for a new gradation, etc. Let us note that coinciding in a gradation still has a special intimacy, even though it is not a uniformity. The lesser one is not simply repeated in that which is graduated, and yet it is the same, but still more than that. Obviously, a special binding force in the ascending concatenation, however, is inherent

in the increase, in the gradation; for every pair of data that is relatively graduated is itself again an increased gradation in contrast to a previous pair of data that is relatively decreased. Just as a single graduated pair more strongly exercises an affection than just any similar pair, so too is a concatenation of graduated pairs, in the unity of a gradation that is being augmented in the repetition, a stronger affective unity than a different unity of similar pairs. [135]

Indeed, now the question arises: What brings about the concatenation, the process of joining together? How do concatenations (as opposed to mere collections) come about in mere passivity, as opposed to mere collections in which everything forms a bond with everything else, singularities and connections, in a disordered manner?

We are led here above all to the primordial phenomenon of succession, that is, to a primordially ordering accomplished by time-constituting consciousness. What is already prominently accentuated in it going from one present to the next and is constituted in the train of presents as a lasting unity of identity is linked together temporally; that is to say, the temporal relations are from the very beginning and by essential necessity linked together in being constituted. If we pay attention purely to the formal aspect of time, we can even discern here relationships of gradation that are built up as the most original relationship within necessary concatenation. All temporal relations among temporal objectlike formations are constituted in subjective modes of orientation, and thus there is, in consciousness, the concatenation of past element with what is more past, then with what is still more past, but whereby a unity of identification runs clean through the flux of this relativity, a unity that constantly produces a concatenation of order between the identical, successive data themselves. Now, if this primordial order has produced a necessary concatenation between data, however they are determined with respect to content, then the gradations determined with respect to content can now link up as such in a temporal sequence and thus form unitary series of consistent gradation. Likewise unitary series can also arise with pure uniformity and similarity with respect to content. We should recognize that the

source of succession must give the series a higher force than they would possess if they were not to operate from this source. For succession introduces a new moment, to be sure, a necessary moment of uniformity; it introduces the uniformity of the sequence as sequence, and if they are enduring uniformly, then possibly in addition to this, it introduces the duration of single data of sequence as a uniform duration.

But what happens now in the coexistence that is still not ordered in itself by the order of succession? Let us consider the visual field and the special data that occur in it. They have a unity of homogeneity, but that is not yet order. Nevertheless, there are orders here, and as in time, independent from the content that is ordered there. In the visual field, taken in a purely immanent manner, there are possible series that, admittedly, we can characterize in language only by borrowing from the language of the perceptions of [transcendent] objects. Thus, an order of coexistence of random specks of color or sharply delimited figures in the order of right-left and in the order of above-below, or in a certain path going right and then up, etc. [This holds] likewise in any other possible direction of being ordered.

We realize that within the visual field there are multifarious orders that are related to one another, relations that are not clearly understood prior to analysis. We see that there is also a field of ordered loci here that prefigure concatenation in coexistence just like there is an original field of order with varying temporal loci that prefigures the field of succession. Even here form and content are distinguished in a new way: [a] the form of positional¹¹⁷ order, and [b] as content, the thing ordered (as we will see) what stands at this or that visual locality¹¹⁸ occupying it.

But surely there is a great difference here: Succession is a singular, a "linear" concatenation that is always uniform. In the visual field, however, we do not always have all data in a concatenation, in an identical linear order; rather, various series of concatenation can be formed, and these various series of concatenation can be formed simultaneously, originally, such that

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many lines are contained within the field as systems of local positions; they appear filled out, now with this content of the object, and another time with a different content of the object, making order possible for it in advance, and all of these linear local systems go together to form this one field-form, just as a detailed analysis teaches us. Nevertheless, similar to the form of succession, we have a prefigured form of order and in it, now these and now those contents as ordered, forming a unity.

But a problem immediately arises here: Insofar as every order necessarily becomes an allure to progress through local laws of order if the order comes into relief as a unity through a special affinity with respect to content, do not the local lines of order that are distinguished in experience bring along their layers of temporal apperception? But progressing through it also immediately fashions a temporal order which, however, can also be freely carried out in an inverse order by identifying the ordered data.

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What holds for the visual field holds for the tactile field—for all authentic fields as such that are unities of locality. Not for the auditory field: it is not an authentic field. For here we lack every possibility of ordering the coexistent.

Let us now pass over at once to new primordial phenomena, still keeping with phenomena of unique syntheses. We had considered similarity, uniformity, and gradation, connection through uniformity and connection through gradation but we had only done this in a rough manner. We also encountered sequences and naturally the intertwining of sequences as well which form an encompassing sequence, and likewise the intertwining of orders of coexistence. All of that for *prominent* data.

But if we consider one such datum, then features can become prominent within the datum itself, and among these features, the feature of inner evenness, like an evenly colored white square, and again the feature of an inner non-evenness, of an inner self-dissociation of indeterminate specks, which pass over into one another and flow into one another in an undifferentiated manner. Or also, and especially striking, a continuous process of gradation and thereby flowing, continually in the process of gradation, for instance, in the sense of something becoming redder-and-redder,

¹¹⁷ *ortliche*.¹¹⁸ *Lokalität*.

or in the sense of a colorful ribbon whose colors lead into one another as in a prism. This problem immediately comes to the fore, namely, of relating these and similar occurrences of inner continuity (each one of which initially makes up an undifferentiated global character of a content) back to the phenomena of discrete matters that are prominent.

How far have we come in our previous lecture?¹¹⁹ Let's take a look back for a moment. In order to sketch a natural way toward a phenomenology of genesis and, in passivity, toward a phenomenology of association, we considered the structure of a living immanent present which is itself indeed the most universal genetic phenomenon. We find in every such present essentially a hyletic core; a unified multiplicity of sensible data (visual data, sound data, etc.)—unified in the most loose manner—is essentially and constantly constituted in simultaneity and living succession. In this respect, we take impressional consciousness to reach as far as the retention that is still living reaches. Multiple data that are prominent for themselves must emerge in wakeful conscious life; we have now described what gives unity to such sensibly impressional data in the living present, to all data as a whole, and to singular groups, and to entire sense-fields for themselves. We found special unifications arising from homogeneity within the all-encompassing forms of coexistence and succession. Everything in a present that is prominent and at the same time homogeneous is connected. Accordingly, every sense-field is a unitary field for itself. Everything visual is connected through visual homogeneity, everything tactile through tactile homogeneity, everything acoustic through acoustic homogeneity, etc. We speak of unitary sense-fields in the broadest sense. They are heterogeneous, and accordingly are only united by the temporality of the living present. In addition to this formal unity, every field has in itself a materially relevant unanimity, a unanimity with respect to content, which is precisely the unanimity of homogeneity with respect to content.

If we consider a field for itself and disregard the general homogeneity, we will have special connections arising from

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homogeneity, especially multiplicities that become prominent in a unity, like a group of red figures and a group of blue figures. The greater the "similarity," the homogeneity, the narrower is such a unity of groups, the more it is a unity of prominence.

I still have to add an important supplement here, for I had unfortunately forgotten the other day to discuss beforehand the phenomenon of contrast as a primordial phenomenon. Everything that is in relief for itself within a field comes into relief from something precisely in this field. This yields a specific, fundamental concept of differentiation. We could also contrapose concretion and discretion, whereby we now understand concretion in a more or less literal sense.¹²⁰ Uniform things and things that are very similar grow together as it were. Here, things that are very similar are so similar that they do not break apart in the separating conflict that creates distance when coinciding occurs, but rather blend, even if not purely.

We still have another especially useful expression for the relationship involving the unity of a prominent datum and that datum from which it is set in relief: contrast; but it is not used only for extreme cases, like the contrast between a loud bang and a soft background noise or tonal background. Both concrete fusion and contrast belong to a homogeneous multiplicity of groups: Each term of the multiplicity is a term for itself through contrast, but they are not opposed to each other; indeed, they are especially united with one another by a fusion without contrast, for example, red specks on a white ground. Alternately, inherent in every contrast that remains a phenomenon of homogeneity, there is

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¹²⁰ Translator: The German term "*Konkretion*," like the English term, "*concretion*" comes from the Latin "*concrevisse*," meaning "growing together." It derives its meaning from the roots, *crevere* "to grow" and *con* "with or together." In this case, what is abstract is not what is less specific or less particular, but what is not joined together, not connected. In fact, Husserl uses the German term, "*Konkreterez*," in place of "*Konkretion*" on occasion and in order to emphasize this "more or less literal sense" of *Konkretion*. Although I will render *Konkretion* as "concretion," and will use the English term "concrete" for *konkret*, one should not forget its resonance with its root sense as "concretescence" and "concruescent." To maintain this connection, moreover, I translate the German term "*Discretion*" as "discretion" and its cognates as "discrete." Likewise, these terms have the sense of not being jolted together, not being connected, and hence are to be understood as "discreetant."

¹¹⁹ Editor: The beginning of a new lecture.

something of fusion, there is something that unites the concrete data homogeneously and at the same time disturbs concretion by rupturing its continuity. To be sure, in order to understand this we already need the more detailed expositions of the previous lecture.

5 In any case, any deeper clarification presupposes a clarification of primordial phenomena: prominence under contrast, on the other hand, fusion, concretion of prominent data in similarity without distance. Since data that are prominent for themselves become united in a discontinuous fashion, fusion here is a fusion at-a-distance; we will soon get to know fusion at-close-proximity.

10 We then turned to the forms of order of prominent data and of multiplicity of data, and we distinguished the universal order of succession from the special forms of coexistence proper to particular sense-fields, if not to all fields. The universal form of coexistence that is accomplished by time-constitution itself is not a form of order. For that we need special forms such as visual locality or the local order of tactile data proper to the tactile field.

The universality of successive forms of order means that all coexistences together form a single order of succession in every living, streaming field of present. If we take any sense-field, that is, a field of coexistent homogeneity, then its stock of data will be a stock of concretely existing data: concrete, not only with respect to momentary coexistence, which cannot be anything for itself, but rather also with respect to succession. Something constituted as an existing datum and as prominent for itself is constituted as enduring, possibly beginning now, lasting awhile, and ceasing. Before any closer analysis, we discern here the distinction pertaining to primordial phenomena, the distinction between the longer or shorter duration of such a temporal datum that is concretely self-contained, just like the phenomenon of something being in a shorter or longer "state" of duration, enduring, becoming. Likewise within becoming as a primordial phenomenon, we can distinguish something that has already become in the shape of invariability from something that has become in the shape of variability. Everything that has already become, in one mode or another, has its firm place of order in the universal form of succession. This is a form of unity, namely, a form of order into whose movement everything that is still in the

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process of becoming is simultaneously integrated insofar as it has become. Distinguished from the concrete groups that have formed a special unity in each coexistence are the groups as concretions of succession that are being formed in a special intertwining in succession, (e.g., a configuration of black colored specks in the visual field, on the other hand, a sequence of light signals or a sequence of sounds). Both groups as concretions will simultaneously prevail here because this or that particular datum within one field will begin anew and something else will cease, thus belonging within the living past and to its materially relevant fusions. In both of these inseparable relations, concretion is only possible as fusion in the form of order, that is, as the fusion of something that is ordered temporally.

We already know (and a closer analysis will immediately show), that this order of all discrete matters is in itself a continual one which, in its continuity, runs through everything that is prominent for itself as a unity. In other words, every prominent datum is not merely juxtaposed with other data in the living relations of succession. Rather, it has in itself an inner synthetic structure and in particular is in itself a continuity of sequence. This inner continuity is the foundation of a continual fusion with respect to content, fusion at-close-proximity. The duration of a content, of a color in the visual field, of a sound in the acoustic field—whether they are data giving themselves now as unvaried or as variable—does not have the character of an unanalysable quality; rather, as a phenomenological analysis immediately shows, it has the feature of continuing, of stretching from phase to phase; in what has become, it is the finished temporal extension, expansion. In the living process of temporal extension, the contents that are extended in it normally fluctuate; delimited partial domains come into relief more or less sharply; but whatever becomes prominent in it is necessarily seen in the form of an internal succession, conveyed by a flowing that is unexplicated and undifferentiated.

Now, we easily see that in this inner continuity of the temporal extension of a temporally extended content, the material content is not there in a juxtaposed manner, but rather, that the materially relevant unity is only conceivable as continually ordered, as

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temporally extended. A concrete unity, the unity of an immanent datum, is only conceivable as the continuity of content in and by virtue of the continuity of an extension as the continuity of a duration. I said, "in and by virtue of." For it also becomes clear that what provides the material content precisely with a materially relevant, inner continuity and thus unity, is in the first place rooted in the most original continuity of temporal extension. All continuity with respect to content (e.g., the continuity with respect to the content of a sound from a violin) is the unity of a continual fusion passing from phase to phase; but the content can only meld together continually in the continual process of becoming in the order of time. Even what we call a continuous graduation according to quality or intensity in coexistence, e.g., in the visual field, is only imaginable as a steady continuity of similarity in temporal continuity. Only in temporal continuity is there an intimately inherent unity in which two things that are similar to one another can become a "real" datum, a datum existing for itself.

But certainly, other essential laws hold here. We must not think that temporal continuity can be filled with just any content: We cannot mix color data together with sound data to form a unity of an immanent temporal datum; homogeneity in continuity belongs to a self-contained datum. But we are bound even further. A certain materially relevant continuity must be held with respect to content. The unity of the tone is dissolvable *ideally* into a tonal phases. These phases have unity through successive fusion in accordance with temporal continuity; this fusion can only be made possible as unitary in the flux of continual temporal becoming if the data meld together in a materially relevant manner without distance, continuously from phase to phase. Thus there can be no break at any point, that is, a distance in content occurring abruptly. To be sure, there are various possibilities here. Continuity need not prevail in all moments with respect to their content. For example, if the continuity in the tonal quality is maintained, e.g., as a continuous uniformity with respect to the quality *c*, then a break in intensity can take place, a sudden change from loud to soft. Every such contrast makes divisions, is a breaking up into sections. In addition, every section is then in itself a unity. But a sound cannot consist of sheer discontinuities; it can only be one

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sound with particular discontinuities. And actually then it is already a multiplicity. On the other hand, however, it is indeed a unity for itself if for its part, in its being divided, it sets itself off in prominence from something else by means of an encompassing contrast, for instance, from a general background of sound.

The unity of the impressional present can offer diverse successive unities and multiplicities as unities of continuity that, in the unity of a continual, temporal fusion under contrast, have turned into concrete special unities within passivity in the manner we have described. Thus, there are a variety of successive data that are respectively real bonds.

<§30. Individuation in Succession and Coexistence>¹²¹

But the successive form of the field of the present is a unique one. Something that is concretely simultaneous, and likewise, something that is simultaneous as an abstract phase has its identical temporal duration, or rather, its identical temporal locus. Fundamental here is the distinction between temporal uniformity and temporal identity. For example, several successive sounds can all have a uniform length of duration. But the uniform element in this duration is the uniformity of the temporal shape, but it is not the identity of the temporal expanse, the expanse of an order of temporal loci.

We are standing here before the problem of individuation, indeed, before the problem of the most original individuation within immanent time-consciousness. Every immanent temporal object has its temporal shape, that is, its temporal length: if, in a special sense, it is a "singular" and not a multiplicity. If it is a "multiple" object like a melody, then not only does the duration of the melody as a whole, as its temporal length, belong to the temporal shape, but also the special ways of filling out and not filling out this temporal length, i.e., not only the temporal lengths of the single sounds, but the pauses, too. In the repetition of the melody, this temporal shape is completely uniform. However, an

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¹²¹ Editor: See Appendix 20: Time as the Form of Individuality and Subjective Transformation, pp 519f.

individually new temporal object is thereby constituted—new, but completely uniform. The temporal shape (like every quality that makes the temporal shape concrete) belongs to the temporal object as its “essential” character. We distinguish from the temporal shape the place of this temporal shape in time, or better, this temporal shape itself in its individuality through which it is an element of universal time itself, as a local system built up out of single temporal loci. In the same measure that we repeat a sound, say, in full uniformity, we will have a full uniformity not only with respect to content, but also with respect to duration. Every point of time here corresponds to a point of time there. But the points of time themselves as temporal loci in the unique temporal order are irreplaceably different; they are in principle incapable of being repeated. All the objects take part in this unrepeatability. Each one is itself and singularly unique as the object of its system of temporal loci that belongs to the universal system of temporal loci, to the system of singularly unique time. But the temporal shape and the fullness of the temporal shape are repeatable and yield, through comparison and through induction, the general essence that is individuated here.

We need to carry out similar expositions with respect to locality. Locality is what orders the coexistences peculiar to a homogeneous region (of course, not necessarily each one of them), and it is locality that can individuate something uniform and simultaneous within a homogeneous region. Just like every successive unity (formed from fusion and prominence) has its temporal shape and individual location, so too does every unity of coexistence of a local field belonging here have a field-shape that is potentially repeatable in uniformity within the same field, and it has its process of individuation through the individual location that is unique and cannot be repeated. The elementary analysis as the analysis of phases of a local field, as the analysis of phases of a continuity of coexistence, leads again to the fact that it (e.g., like the visual field) has the form of a continually ordered local system analogous to time. Only it is a two-dimensional local system that in itself accordingly allows more diverse and more intricate local shapes. Repeated here is the set of laws (and everything else that belongs to it) that the qualitative filling-out of local continuity

must continually obey for a leap in quality not to be able to take place at each point of the phase of the local order. Only that the unity running along a local continuity is not a unity of continual becoming, which would be precisely succession. [144]

We must note well that the temporal and local locus as that which individuates a concrete temporal objectlike formation in succession and coexistence is not something like a distinguishing trait or even something like a hallmark, an index whereby every individual thing is distinguished from every possible thing like it. The traditional discourse of individual difference in contrast to specific differences might easily suggest this. The latter refer to something specific, to something that is generally uniform with respect to content according to temporal shape or size, and according to qualification; something specific, something that is generally uniform as such, is to be grasped generally and conceptually by induction as a concrete essence, divided according to *genus* and *species*.

In any case, something that is originally constituted in consciousness as an object, that is, such that the object is grasped as it is itself *originaliter* in consciousness, is constituted in essential necessity within original time-consciousness as continually identical and enduringly identifiable—and therefore also as identifiable beyond the sphere of the living present by means of the concatenation of remembering. The ever new continual, synthetic identification that has a varying content is necessarily maintained in the continual constitution of immanence, and then within the constitution of immanence, the constitution of transcendence in an unmixed manner; it thereby necessarily forms the system of successively ordered coexistences. The uniqueness of the temporal locus is accordingly nothing other than the correlate of the form of the respective process of identification that is carried out in its unique nexus, that of constituting life in which this object is constituted as this object and is only identifiable as this object precisely because consciousness can go back to its original process of constituting, can reawaken it, and can find it as this same process of constituting, as this object that is recognizable at any time.

On the other hand, insofar as the constituted object and the reawakened object, and many other objects besides that have been respectively constituted, exist in relations of homogeneity and are connected according to uniformity and similarity in syntheses of homogeneity while they have become prominent through contrast—insofar as this is the case, interconnections of comparability will then arise, common and distinct features become prominent, and thus, the possibility of logically conceptual predication. Accordingly, every object necessarily not only has its *totum*, its comparable or its specific essence, whereby it can become linked with other objects generally and conceptually according to genus and species; as the presupposition of all such syntheses of homogeneity and comparisons grounded in them, it also already has its individuality, its thisness constituted beforehand. That is, it is the same, constantly recognizable, and as such it belongs to the determinate nexus of originally constituting life. Even this life has its unity of identity in each phase, and is constituted in original time-consciousness. No matter how much this may look like it leads to a precarious *regressus in infinitum*. I believe that a reflective analysis can overcome this difficulty perfectly well.

With this crisp differentiation (in which modes of constituting the object as an identical object are necessarily intertwined with the constitution of the temporal form of order and with the formation of syntheses of homogeneity made possible by the constitution of temporal forms of order), it is clear why identity, on the one hand, and (predicatively) uniformity and diversity, [on the other.] are so closely related and yet remain distinct in principle. Correlatively, syntheses of coinciding are distinguished as syntheses of coinciding that form identities and syntheses of coinciding [that form] non-identities.

<§31. Problems of a Phenomenology of Sense-Fields>¹²²

From here we could proceed further toward a systematic phenomenology of the universal temporal field and of sense-fields, toward a typification of occurrences grounded in the essence of these fields, a typification that is carried out from the perspective of eidetic analyses. For the fields as systems of order, and with respect to the mere form of these fields, at issue is the formation of essential concepts and axioms that lead to a grounding of a geometry and a topology of these fields: figure, line, point, distance, segment, direction, size, straight line, etc. On the other hand, at issue is the typicality of possible qualified structures, and temporally, the typicality of the forms of becoming peculiar to variability and invariability, to overlapping, to rivalry (rivalry of the visual fields), to covering-over, etc.

Now would be the place to allude to problems in the phenomenology of sense-fields that have localization: [1] the possible types of the disintegration of the unity of a sense-field or [2] the possible types of concrete occurrences. [a] Occurrences under the rubric of concrete independent contents that could subsist for themselves, which is another way of saying that the sense-field can be conceived as being contracted to those contents. [b] But also occurrences of the typicality of possible change that would be a change of shape and a change in quality corresponding to the distinction of shape and coloring of the shape as its qualification. Where changes in shape are concerned there are distinct types of an expanding extension whereby the shape continuously expands to encompass the new pieces; these elements now become prominent or they do not (in accordance with their qualifications), or they become diminished. There is especially a contraction of shape that produces both the intuitive *times* forms, line and point, from the typicality of a plane, whereby every line for its part also admits of a kind of contraction transforming it into a point. The point is a punctual plane if it approaches the type, pure point as a *times*, while still admitting of

¹²² Editor: With respect to §§ 31-36 see Appendix 19, <On a Phenomenology of Associations> pp. 512ff.

a kind of contraction. Likewise the line that is a plane which has a linear form. The *lines*-shapes still have a sense if we remain within sensibility and do not import any notions of which we are not in possession, like a mathematical *lines* formation. These *lines*-forms within sensibility function like those of quality, for instance, pure red, pure white, which are also not mathematical *lines*. We evidently arrive at the same *lines* in another way, namely, by division for which we let one part (in a sharp contrast) change from one qualification into another. A border, indeed, a line results from the leap in quality that occurs by dividing one plane into two planes, for instance, when both parts having been evenly colored, a color completely uniform in itself, are set off in relief from one another through sharply contrasting colors. A "gradual" transition through a gradually changing qualitative graduation yields a border only if the transition first goes very slowly and then proceeds very quickly, and then very slowly again. Separate bands with a velocity have a linear form, and should they become a pure line, we would have to modify the velocity so that through a sudden increase in velocity, it would finally spring over into a line.

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Certain formally similar concepts need to be formed for the continuous temporal order and for each local order as well, especially for the visual one. Thus, the concept of point, of segment with segment-length and segment-orientation, the concept of series as "straight" series. With respect to its form, time is a mono-dimensional continual "straight" series ("homogeneous"); likewise, the visual field with respect to form is a two dimensional manifold that is to be grasped as a continuous double series (a series of series).

In abstraction from any qualification (which is to be thought of now as freely variable), two points within the visual field form a punctual pair that is connected by means of fusion. Every such unity of a pair can be uniform and non-uniform from two different perspectives: according to size (the size of the distance) and orientation. The unity of a pair regarded according to orientation forms a connection that is not uniform whereby two correlative relations are determined: $a > b$ and $b < a$, with the axiom: if $a > b$, etc. A manifold of points is prefigured through two points, a

manifold whose entire distances lie "in the same direction." All the points of this point-manifold form a mono-dimensional, continuous manifold that is called a straight line. Time is a straight line. Departing from each point there are many straight lines in the visual manifold; every new, second point that has been added to the first determines such a new manifold.

Accordingly, the following axioms are valid: If a is in direct vicinity to b , and b is in direct vicinity to c , then a is in the direct vicinity to c . With respect to orientations: If $a > b > c$ then $a > c$. And every segment has a length, segments are comparable according to length (size). For each segment there is the same segment, etc. in each direction. All of these are axioms that are exactly expressed for the *lines* and which hold approximately for the approximations to the *lines*.

Let us bear in mind here that the fields are themselves limited and that the expansion *ideally* of the fields into infinity is a kind of idealization that one can entertain, but which, however, does not imply any necessity. But however the *lines* may arise here, it would not make any sense to infer that straight lines meet (somewhere in the far distance). Of course, the homogeneity of a field is an idealization. For sharply defined lines, and even lines that approach being sharply defined, do not run through the actual visual field everywhere in the same way, etc. Still, constructing an idealization does sketch the field of possibilities.

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Problems of a phenomenology of sense-fields (to be carried out systematically): A theme that is missing includes the overlappings that arise spontaneously in passivity under fusion through affinity, or under conflict. Affinity especially is to be defined as unifying prominent elements; undifferentiated fusion as a counterpart to contrast. For example, an overlapping occurs when an "image" is suddenly superseded by another at some point in the visual field, or when maintaining the shape, the coloring suddenly changes over into another.

An important phenomenon that belongs here is the rivalry of the visual fields and potentially also the phenomenon of the concealment of a visual content through another, like when one eclipses another. Objective apperceptions should surely not be included here, and bracketing them takes some effort.

<Chapter 2:
THE PHENOMENON OF AFFECTION>

<§32. Affection as Effecting an Allure on the Ego. Contrast as its
Fundamental Condition>

5 We must not get embroiled in a phenomenology of the sense-
fields here. It must suffice to have pointed to it. There is still
another direction of research bringing us much closer to questions
of association, a direction characterized under the familiar rubric
of affection, and even though we are familiar with it, we especially
10 want to focus on it now. By affection we understand the allure
given to consciousness,¹²³ the peculiar pull that an object given to
consciousness exercises on the ego; it is a pull that is relaxed when
the ego turns toward it attentively, and progresses from here,
striving toward self-giving intuition, disclosing more and more of
15 the self of the object, thus, striving toward an acquisition of
knowledge, toward a more precise view of the object.

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Consciousness constitutes partly explicit objects, that is,
prominent and actually affecting, and partly implicit (parts and
moments) that have not come or have not yet come into relief, but
20 which, however, insofar as they can be brought into relief under
"favorable conditions," are still taken into account under the
standpoint of affection. In this respect we must distinguish
between the actual affection and the tendency toward affection,
the potentiality of affection that is not empty, but that is rooted
25 materially in essential conditions. Sensible data (and thus data in
general) send, as it were, affective rays of force toward the ego
pole, but in their weakness do not reach the ego pole, they do not
actually become for it an allure that awakens.

Affection presupposes prominence above all else, and within
30 the impressional sphere it presupposes that prominence which we
could find in it alone, namely, when as before we left out of play
every consideration of the distant horizon of forgetfulness and
likewise, of course, the realm of rememberings. Thus, prominence
was for us a prominence that takes place through fusion under

contrast with respect to content. In a certain way, affection is now
a function of contrast, although not of contrast alone. Insofar as
the most original affection is to be seen as the affection generated
in the impressional present, contrast is then to be characterized as
5 the most original condition of affection. Connected to the
gradation of contrast is a gradation of affection, but also already a
tendency toward affection. The same contrast can, for instance,
actually exercise an allure on the ego, another time it can be that
the ego will not be reached by the affective tendency. Extremes of
10 contrast are so strong, make such a forcefully efficacious
prominence that they drown out, so to speak, all competing
contrasts. Thus, there is something like a possible competition and
a kind of concealment of active tendencies by especially strong
ones. For example, particular colored figures becoming quite
15 prominent affect us; affecting us at the same time are noises like
the sound of a passing car, the notes of a song, prominent odors,
etc. All of this takes place at the same time, and insofar as we turn
to it alone, listening to it, the song wins out. But the rest still
exercises an allure. But when a violent blast breaks in, like the
20 blast of an explosion, it drowns out not only the affective
particularities of the acoustic field, but also the particularities of
all other fields. What otherwise spoke to us, no matter how little
we paid attention to it, can no longer make it through to us.

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If we rule out such extremes, then diverse objects can be
25 prominent for themselves through contrasts insofar as each one
fulfills the essential conditions of unity from a specific affinity of
concerning fusion and contrast. But for this not all of them need
to become prominent for the ego, to say nothing of actually
forming groups, configurations, which as such are actually there
30 for the ego—that is, which as such syntheses actually affect the
ego.

What gives a single prominent datum the priority of affection?
Yet in its interconnection, the single datum is dependent upon the
others for its affective force, as these are dependent upon it. We
35 stand in a relativism of affective tendencies, and the question is,
what kind of laws and ultimately essential laws can prevail here?

In our considerations of the lowest genetic level we formulate
the problem in an abstract manner that is necessary for a

¹²³ *bewußtseinsmäßiger Reiz*

systematic [phenomenology of] genesis: We do so as if the world of the ego were only the impressional present and as if transcending apperceptions arising from further reaching subjective lawful regularities did not play any role at all, as if there were no modes of knowledge acquired in the life of the world, aesthetic and practical interests, values, and the like. Thus, we consider functions of affectivity that are founded purely in the impressional sphere. Accordingly, we may only take from the sphere of the heart¹²⁴ some feelings¹²⁵ that are co-original with the sensible data, and say: On the one hand, the emergent affection is functionally co-dependent upon the relative size of the contrast, on the other hand, also upon privileged sensible feelings like a passionate desire founded by a prominence in its unity. We may even allow originally instinctive, drive related preferences, 15 Naturally, these would be unique themes of investigation whereby a suitable experimentation (not an inductive-objectively oriented one) would be quite possible: It would have the task of producing favorable conditions for the production of pure cases of the kind in question. [151]

20 <§33. Laws of the Propagation of Affection>¹²⁶

But let us pay more attention to another direction. Suffice it to say that in the relativism of affective tendencies something, at some point, has necessarily become affective as such. Now, are there not laws concerning the propagation of this first affection? 25 Where the object is concerned, we can also characterize affection as the awakening of an intention directed toward it [i.e., the object]. Put differently, are there laws of propagation of intentional awakening? The most privileged case here is where affection results in attentiveness, grasping, the acquisition of knowledge, explication. Then this lawful regularity would of itself pass over into the lawful regularity of awakening or again would lead the attentiveness further, or which is to say, would lead 30

¹²⁴ *Gemüts-sphäre*

¹²⁵ *Gefühle*

¹²⁶ Editor: See Appendix 21: Sensible, Multi-Radiating Affection, Sensible Group—Genuine Collective Objective Formation, pp. 520ff.

thematic interest further, and would even possibly lead the grasplings and acquisitions of knowledge further. Naturally, introducing the language of awakening already alludes to the fact that we are dealing here with something that is so closely related to associations in the common sense that we could already speak of associations in a broader sense, of primordial associations, where there is not yet any question of reproduction. Now, there is a law here saying that every original awakening in propagation, that is, in the associative transference of awakening to new data, is 10 bound through homogeneity. Original association is carried out in our sphere of hyletic sensibility exclusively within each one of the sense-fields for itself. In other words, every sense-field forms for itself a unique, self-contained realm of affective tendencies, capable of forming organizing unities by means of association.

15 How does the lawful functionality of this formation of unity look now? We spoke of the structure of the entire impressional field and, running parallel to this within the form of time, we spoke of its division into the impressional special-fields, the visual field, etc. As a whole, and with respect to its special prominent characteristics and special groups, each impressional special-field 20 is a unity of temporal becoming, coming into being and passing away, whereby relatively enduring coexistences are formed as groups, into which possibly new terms enter, excluding others. On the other hand, in this process of becoming, integrally cohesive unities for themselves, unities of temporal sequences that are homogeneous and connected with respect to content are formed for each sense-field: melodies, successions of color, and the like. But when is what we view in abstraction from the questions of affection, like something existing and becoming, which arises 25 purely through concreteness and contrast—when is that there as actually affective on the ego? When does a group, a configuration of the visual field or tactile field, when does an acoustical series like a melody actually become prominent for me?

35 Where successions are concerned, it would seem that only when they have been formed affectively, only when the affection beginning with one or more points is propagated as an actual affection under the conditions of concreteness and of contrast, and

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potentially under the conditions of affect¹²⁷—only then does a new formation of unity first come about.

Accordingly, in our analyses of possible immanent objectlike formations and, precisely speaking, of possible hyletic objectlike formations, we would have disclosed the temporal and local form as essential necessities (as well, the mere significance of the conditions of the possibility of hyletic formations of unity as the essential necessities of filling these forms with respect to content), while the formation of unity itself, the actual formation of hyletic groups and particular data existing for themselves would still depend upon the remaining factor of affection that is not taken into account.

Naturally, what we said about consciousness, namely, that essential functions of affective forces are disclosed here, can be applied immediately to the elementary components, to continuities through which objects of sense are structured with an order. If a datum that has just begun is awakened, the awakening will continue to proceed further; the awakening accompanies the datum that is continually unfolding, but will lose the datum in this unfolding; for example, through a diminution of intensity, through an effacement of contours and the like with respect to affectively significant conditions, so that in the case of a datum that has an unfavorable beginning and that would otherwise not come into relief, the continual transference of affective force will exercise a steady awakening upon what is less favorable, consequently working against the affective diminution, halting it. In its transition to *pianissimo*, the beginning loud tone carries the tone in affective force to the softest *piano* that would otherwise remain unnoticeable. [153]

The forms of order obviously have a special affective significance. The universal, successive order [has a special affective significance] insofar as everything is constituted as in the process of becoming, and affection primarily follows the constitutive process of becoming. But not, for instance, as if succession as such would be a principle of association. Association does not function as the association of succession

from one field to another. What is essential is not succession, but rather a nexus that is akin in its own order.

In the final analysis, do not the essential, lawful regularities of the immanent formation of unity that we have described—those of the formation of particular, self-contained objects, wholes, groups, configurations—do they not express the mere conditions of the possibility of such unities, while the actual emergence of these unities itself is dependent upon affection and association? Let us consider the following in relation to this question. Everything that we expounded upon earlier concerning the formation of unity through the coalescing of matters that are kindred and coming into relief through contrast had to be tied to the instances of unities and connected multiplicities. These unities could only be there for us either as given directly in the scope of attentiveness, or through the fact that we grabbed hold of unities subsequently by reaching back into the past horizons of a sphere of attentiveness; these unities were given to us without and prior to our becoming attentive, and yet, they had at least affected us to some degree. Thus, affection (and obviously the awakening transference of affection as well, hence, association) played its role overall.

Accordingly, the question arises: In their regulated dependency of those essential conditions of the formation of unity, but also codetermined by novel essential laws, do affection and association not first make possible the constitution of objects that exist for themselves? Are there not regulated inhibiting, weakening counter-potencies which, by not letting affection arise any longer, also make the emergence of self-subsistent unities impossible, unities in other words that would not emerge at all without affection? These questions are difficult to answer, and they are especially difficult if we wish to make our way from the sphere of the living present into the sphere of forgetfulness and to comprehend reproductive awakening, as will be necessary to do later. I do not need to say that the entirety of these observations that we are undertaking can also be given the famed title of the “unconscious.” Thus, our considerations concern a phenomenology of the so-called unconscious. [154]

¹²⁷ *Gemütsbewegungen*

In order to shed some phenomenological light in this darkness, let us begin with clear examples that will enable us to catch direct

sight of awakening in its propagation and the motivation determining it. We assume that something prominent is already constituted, it may even already be affective. It is evident that not every affection can have arisen through the awakening of another affection. Every instance of affection through an isolated extreme contrast, like an explosion, illustrates this essential possibility. Certainly, we do not need such extremes. While taking an evening stroll on the Loreto Heights a string of lights in the Rhine valley suddenly flashes in our horizon: it immediately becomes prominent affectively and unitarily without, incidentally, the allure having therefore to lead to an attentive turning toward. That in one stroke the string of lights is affective as a whole is obviously due to the pre-affective lawful regularities of the formation of unity; because of them possibly other groups of lights in the visual field will also simultaneously be there affectively as prominent special unities, and this *ceteris paribus*. Indeed, the straight string of lights can have an affective priority, that is, can have the affective priority of a stronger affective allure, of a stronger prominence for us. In these examples, we are conscious of an articulated unity (however much it, as articulated, has within itself special prominences that are materially relevant) in an unarticulated affection. On the other hand, we are not conscious of them through an awakening from the outside, from the part of other unities. We are quite comfortable in characterizing such cases of unawakened affection as awakenings if we characterize them as the zero-point of awakening, similar to the way in which the arithmetician counts zero, the negation of number, among numbers.

Let us now revise our example and suit it to the case where a propagation of affection takes place, that is, where an awakening radiates from an affection and is directed outwards. The string of lights is already in the process of awakening, even if it only be in a zero-awakening. One of the lights suddenly changes its coloring from white to red with sufficient intensity. Or we only alter its intensity; it becomes especially luminous. It now becomes especially affective for itself, but at the same time this accentuation obviously benefits the entire string, which in other respects remains affectively unarticulated. We will have to say that a new affection has ensued and that an awakening ray issues

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from it (or that with respect to both string segments a double ray of awakening issues from the light situated in the middle); this ray becomes unified with the awakening force of the string that is already affectively at work, forming a unity of an awakening that is stronger. Obviously, we will also be able to say that a type of propagation of affection takes place with respect to every articulated whole that was directly affective as a whole: namely, the propagation of affection to its members. Insofar as this is the case we did not need to alter the original example. We could have said at the outset that the awakening of the entire string is distributed among the members from the very beginning, apportioning to them mediately a special affection, doing it within the entire affection of the whole. Also needing to be studied here is a certain opposition of fusion and contrast insofar as when the radiating single light obtrudes too strongly, it can also inhibit the spread [of affection] to the accompanying interconnected lights.

Here is a different example from the sphere of successive objects that are in the process of forming a unity: A melody sounds without exercising any considerable affective force, or if this should even be possible, without exercising any affective allure on us at all. We are occupied with something else, and the melody does not affect us for instance as a "disturbance." Now comes an especially mellifluous sound, a phrase that especially arouses sensible pleasure or even displeasure. This particularly does not merely become affective for itself in a living manner; rather, the entire melody is accentuated in one stroke to the extent that it is still living within the field of the present; thus, the affection radiates back into the retentional phases; it is initially at work by accentuating [the retentional phases] in a unitary manner, and at the same time it has an effect on the special matters that are prominent, on the particular sounds, fostering special affections. With this, the motivational causality is completely and immediately evident. The particularity of the sound has made me attentive. And through this I became attentive to the entire melody, and, understandably, the particularities thus became alive to me.

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We also see from these examples an important distinction regarding the objects' mode of givenness for the subject of

consciousness. Sometimes the givenness of the wholes, their affective prominence and therefore the possibility of grasping them, precedes the parts, sometimes the givenness of parts the whole. That depends upon the varying conditions of affection and fundamentally upon the conditions determining the materially relevant unity in a materially relevant manner. Insofar as this is the case the distinction can be relativized. If the lights in the string of lights were to radiate in a temporal succession, then the string as a whole in its givenness would naturally follow upon the givenness of the particular parts. But in the final analysis, we do arrive at original singularities, that is, at objects that must be given beforehand as a whole in all circumstances and for essential reasons in order for their parts to be given.

Let us now attempt to tease apart the elementary relations of affection. In the living present the primordially impressional emergence has *ceteris paribus* a stronger affective tendency than what is already retentional. For that very reason, affection has a unitary tendency toward the future where the orientation of the propagation is concerned, intentionality is predominantly oriented toward the future. Naturally, this should not mean that the progressive fading away of retentions is merely a weakening of affection; rather, it is the nature of retentional modification not to alter the affinities and contrasts with respect to content in the same way that a materially relevant modification takes place within clarity; rather it produces a new dimension of blurred distinctions, a growing cloudiness, a murkiness that essentially decreases the affective force. However, this does not preclude the fact that an awakening emanating from the more luminous sphere of the affection that is still in full force works upon this penumbra, thus, a backward working affection in contrast to the affection that is constantly making its effect forward. If, for example, an acoustical object is awakened right when the entire field of acoustical data had been dormant, as it were, then the neighboring past is co-awakened insofar as it has an acoustical affinity to what was especially awakened; as one can easily see, it points to a respective affective past-horizon. Every object structured in a completely undivided continuity would belong here, like a completely even tone, and similarly in the visual field, an even

color. This does not preclude parts from subsequently coming to the fore precisely in and through an awakening—for example, when something that becomes a particular part by being set off through internal differentiation is placed next to uniform elements in similarity, or in another kind of uniformity, and when in overlapping or mere coinciding at-a-distance, this particular part carries out a kind of internal division of something continuous right within the consciousness of the absence of internal distinctions within the impressional sphere.

In our examples we had our eye on awakenings that are maintained in the line of enduring coexistence, like when brighter rays of a light are transferred to the string of lights, or that are maintained in the line of successions that are sinking back into the successive series: like the awakening radiating back from the mellifluous tone toward the series of tones given to consciousness in a living retention.

Obviously, however, the associative awakening also goes forward in the direction of the future. Even the new tones of the melody, the entire futural series that is intertwined along with the new becoming profits from the first awakening. Tonal formations, which perhaps would not have fulfilled the conditions of affection, become noticeable now, indeed they even become the objects of thematic interest. Thus starting from the place of awakening, the awakening also expands in a forward direction, following the path of the fusion of objects.

In the other example, since we are already attentive to this one row of lights, we would likewise be especially prone now to become attentive to a newly radiating row of lights, even a relatively weak one, and so forth.

We obviously have something analogous here in primordial association to the two different kinds of association in the customary sense that we distinguished earlier: associations turned toward the past (and as we will add, potentially reaching into the present by means of reproduction) and associations as awakening anticipations.

The analysis of these kinds of examples and observations of them carried out within an eidetic attitude show without further ado that within every living present (and restricted initially to the

sense-data that are being unified within it), affections are constantly at work beyond themselves; we always find affective awakenings, that is, associations. The principles of the constitution of hyletic objectlike formations, namely, as connected coexistences and successions, the principles of local systems that constantly function to individualize and their fillings, the principles according to which contrasts and inner fusions (conrescence) take place, are constantly operative. They constantly form essential conditions of affection and the transference of affection as awakening. [158]

If we thus presuppose the structure of the present according to primordial impression, retention, and protention, then with regard to it there are, on the one hand, associations, awakenings that radiate into the co-present and the retentional pasts, and on the other hand, associations that head in the direction of the future. Heretofore we have substantiated only the former with examples, for they are, as we see, the more original. In other words, the distinction we made at the outset in our initial, rough consideration of association in the customary sense of the term (namely, between the backward turning and first association, on the other hand, the forward turning, anticipatory, secondary association), also holds here when we deal with primordial modes of association with respect to the living sphere of presence, and when the concept of association is expanded.

Let us therefore investigate more closely now the immediate awakenings that are directed nearby and that are turned backward. In accordance with the lawful regularities of the structure of the concretely living sphere of the present, the entire primordial impression belonging to it can only have the form of an articulated coexistence, articulated according to the sense-domains and according to the data for themselves, objects for themselves that are connected and separated within the sense-domains. So far as succession is concerned, it has the form of articulated succession such that homogenous orders and nexuses of succession must be formed, that is, for every sense-sphere in itself. Every primordial-impressionally constituted object belongs within an order that is homogenous and successive with it.

<§34. The Problem of the Relationship between Affection and the Formation of Unity>¹²⁸ [159]

Yet, in accordance with what we have already suggested in our previous lecture the essential conditions of affection can now mean two things. Either it means this: If we presuppose this objectlike structure of the field of living presence, then all affection is, or again, all emergent awakenings of one objectlike formation by another are subsequently bound to this regulated structure. And in particular, they are bound in such a way that all associative awakening can only accompany the regulated forms of connection according to which multiple unified objects of a higher level arise from single objects. Our examples belong here. Objects were already given to us, and we left it open whether they are already there for us through affection; our only object of consideration was the progression of affection. We saw this progression, i.e., association, fundamentally bound by the kind of higher object formation that arises through affinity and contrast. For this reason, association could not pass over from the objects of one sense-domain into those of another, and had to follow persistently the unifying affinity of prominent objects within a specific domain. It also had to be determined through the contrasts of such objects by their "background" objects.

[Or] secondly, one could also understand the essential conditions differently according to the other interpretation of the constitution of the typical structure of objects peculiar to every living present, an interpretation that was suggested previously in our last lecture. One can tentatively say that affinity, continuity, contrast are relations that need not yet be viewed as an actual fusion-in-itself, as actually producing a unity in and through prominence. Only what keeps to certain forms of such relations can actually be fused. But perhaps we must distinguish here between (a) unconditionally necessary fusions that are carried out in a fixed lawfully regulated manner under all circumstances, namely, in such a way that we would have to consider that even if

¹²⁸ Editor: See Appendix 21: Sensible Multi-radiating Affection, Sensible Group—Genuine Collective Objectlike Formation, pp. 520ff.

affection were to be everywhere functional, no matter to what degree, it could not exercise any special accomplishment on the formation of unity; and (b) fusions, formations of unity that are owing first to affection. Let us see if such a theory is tenable.

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5 Among the first, the unconditionally necessary fusions, we would obviously have to rank those fusions that constitutively bring about the fixed form of the field of living presence: the temporal form and the form of the local field, but also what should manifest itself as the firm form of unity of another sense-field. This would mean that just as the original process of streaming within immanence cannot at all be a special accomplishment of an affection, but rather is an original continuous fusion that necessarily takes place, and yet has the conditions of its structural possibility in order for the necessary continuity to be precisely fulfilled continuity; this must likewise be the case with respect to the streaming *hyle*. That is, hyletic fusion must be carried out in the fixed necessity of temporal constitution, a hyletic fusion arising from original continuity as successive fusion, and again without any accomplishment from affection. Furthermore, there must likewise be able to be unities of coexistence; and the most original unity is the unity arising from coexistent continuity. Every sense-field for itself is such a unity, constituted without any affection.

Now, however, every sense-field also has special unities that are constituted—here we are approaching the realm of affection. The wakeful life of the ego is such that the ego is explicitly affected, affected by special unities that are, precisely through this affection, given to, graspable or grasped by the ego. But does affection not also presuppose here the work that is accomplished, to wit, the special fusion that necessarily ensues when the formal and the material conditions are fulfilled? In fact, if we examine these conditions, then we must certainly admit that continuity can be a more or less complete continuity, a multi-layered or a single-layered continuity; this is a matter concerning the contents themselves and does not as yet concern affection at all, initially. Thus, for example, that on the underlying basis of the local continuity of positions, as the fixed form of the visual field, the colors occupying it continually extend and thereby continually fuse as the coloring of the extension; that the colors do this in a

continuous uniform fusion or qualitative graduation in and through the continuity of intensity; and again, that such a continuity with respect to content is only maintained for a time, that it makes a leap at a certain point and produces a contrast—all that is a matter of the fixed formation of unity. It is evident that affection has nothing to do with it.

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What happens now when we pass over to the higher level of objectification, that is, when we take into consideration the varying homogeneous syntheses of multiplicities, spatial and temporal configurations? When we carry out overlappings there, and then speak of a coinciding and fusion *par distance* independently of an actual overlapping, when we speak of a kind of attraction of prominent, uniform, and very similar <contents>, when we speak of a kind of synthesis at-a-distance, then it already looks like an associative awakening at-a-distance and suggests that the latter is responsible for the emergence of a fusion at-a-distance here. Naturally, affection does not make the relationships that are grounding in the particularity of the contents.

But perhaps it is so that initially every concrete, particular constituted thing, everything that is constituted in relief for itself and not constituted first through affection, necessarily exercises an affection to some degree or other. This degree would then depend upon the particular conditions. But then it can be the case that among simultaneous special objects, things that are similar to one another emerge, and by simultaneously affecting the ego, take on a peculiar unity. Initially [it is] a unitary point of prominence for the ego, but later it becomes a materially relevant connection to a higher articulated unity. On this interpretation, it is first through the synthetic unity of affection that the synthesis of fusion at-a-distance, of the unity arising from affinity, would come about.

One could attempt to interpret this situation likewise in the case of succession and its configurations, like melodies, and so forth.

However, upon a closer inspection of the possible interpretations we find what we have just uttered to be untenable. The division that is made here between the constitution of objects of a higher level as opposed to the objects that are constituted in an original singularity is unjustified because it is incomprehensible that fusion should first be generated through the unity of affection.

If it is understandable on the lower level that continuity necessarily implies fusion, and if the conditions upon which such a fusion depends are also self-evident, then the formation of unity, fusion at-a-distance, is also certainly no less self-evident here as soon as we look deeper into the formation of homogeneous multiplicities. Conversely, it would obviously be wholly incomprehensible to attribute the accomplishment of fusion to affection in the lower level, but not to do so in the higher level.¹²⁹

But how do we arrive at a comprehensible unification, and once clarified, at an evident unification of both these motives, affection and the formation of unity?

I would like to respond to this question by stating that it is the accomplishment of passivity, and as the lowest level within passivity, the accomplishment of hyletic passivity, that fashions a constant field of pre-given objectlike formations for the ego, and subsequently, potentially a field of objectlike formations given to the ego. What is constituted is constituted for the ego, and ultimately, an environment-world that is completely actual is to be constituted in which the ego lives, acts, and which, on the other hand, constantly motivates the ego. What is constituted for consciousness exists for the ego only insofar as it affects me, the ego. Any kind of constituted sense is pre-given insofar as it exercises an affective allure, it is given insofar as the ego complies with the allure and has turned toward it attentively, laying hold of it. These are fundamental forms of the way in which something becomes an object.¹³⁰

To be sure, this does not yet completely characterize what an object as object means for any ego and for subjectivity in general; but it certainly does designate a fundamental form. Affective unities must be constituted in order for a world of objects to be constituted in subjectivity at all. But for this to be possible, affective hyletic unities must become and must intertwine with one another homogeneously in essential necessity, initially in the hyletic sphere, that is, again, initially in the living present.

¹²⁹ But under the assumption that we have been moving precisely within the living present and that we have constituted concrete objects in it! See the new lecture and the clear results there.

¹³⁰ *Vergegenständlichung*

Of course, for themselves unities are constituted according to the principles of concrescence and contrast that we have demonstrated—as unities for themselves they are *eo ipso* also for the ego, affecting it. At first glance, the generality of this [163]

statement seems risky. Certainly, we do not always have an affection that is actually noticeable. But if we reflect upon the essential character of affection which is obviously relative, whereby something noticeable can become unnoticeable, and something unnoticeable can become noticeable, then we will hesitate in interpreting something unnoticeable as something that does not exercise an affection at all. Further, once we have examined the phenomenon of the propagation of affection, we will say that we encounter it in evidence as the phenomenon of the modification of a current affection. An affection that is currently weak will become strong by means of a radiating affection that awakens. Conversely, a strong affection can become weak when the conditions upon which this strong affection depends are accordingly altered. This becomes quite clear, especially when we take into account the type of these conditions. But that something should gain an affective force at all where nothing of the sort was available; that something which was not there at all for the ego—a pure affective nothing—should become an active something for the first time, precisely that is incomprehensible. If we follow the gradation inherent in the nature of affection, we will remain within the realm of intelligibility and of insight into essences, and then we will have no occasion to make up incomprehensible substructions that would *eo ipso* take us beyond the sphere of essences.

According to this methodological principle, we thus ascribe to every constituted, prominent datum that is for itself an affective allure [acting] on the ego.

We can secure decisive insights into the essence of association when we comprehend the lawful structure pertaining to the function of affection, its peculiarity, and its dependence upon its essential conditions. But this must first be done within the scope of the living present, and only then do we consider the realm of the non-living past of consciousness that is still capable of being awakened affectively—the realm of forgetfulness, as we also said.

though by importing in a certain way the natural manner of speaking about forgetfulness.

We had studied the indivisible objectlike structure of the impressional living present without taking into consideration the differences of affection. Then, as we passed over to affection, we saw at once that the way in which affection is distributed among immanently constituted objects and propagated (and with this how the entire living present, as it were, takes on a constantly varying affective relief) is in a certain way dependent upon the general structural lawfulness of the sphere of the present with respect to the typicality of its temporal and local configuration (organization of objects). The objects are grouped as enduring unities of coexistence, segregated according to sense-fields, and they form connected configurations in the local fields. On the other hand, they are grouped as connected successions, they form configurations of temporal sequences that are in process, like melodies, etc. This extensional formation according to the temporal shape and local shape should not be anything different than what Kant had in mind under the rubric of figurative synthesis.¹³ On the other hand, the filling of these forms, which makes the concrete formed unities possible, is subject to the special conditions of concrescence and contrast. Affection accompanies the connections; only insofar as the conditions of materially relevant or figurative homogeneity are fulfilled such that syntheses of coinciding can be formed in being adjoined or at a distance, can the affective framework exist and can the affections propagate, can the current affective force be augmented, etc.

While it is quite correct to say that the path of affection and the change in the entire affective relief within the living present is

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dependent upon the types of interconnection and ways in which objectlike formations run their course (objectlike formations that in each case have been constituted within the living present), this does not mean that these objectlike formations for their part already exist prior to all affection. Rather, it is not ruled out, and it is even quite probable that affection already plays its essential role in the constitution of all objectlike formations such that without it there would be no objects at all and no present articulated with objects. We have said and we have shown that hyletic objects are constituted, they are in the constitutive process of becoming; in every phase of this becoming we have phase-contents that are not yet themselves objects and yet are not nothing. What belongs to one and the same object being constituted in the unity of a momentary phase, e.g., to a speck of color in the visual field, must have some kind of integrally cohesive unity opposing it to what constitutively belongs to another object in the same point of time. The content of one momentary now and of another momentary now must, in the transition from the one moment to the next, be connected in an integral togetherness—in this example, precisely so that the one and very same speck of color, be it changing or unchanging, can be constituted. The constitutive unification, the fusion into one object, the separation from every other object is thus subject to the elementary essential conditions according to form and filling of form. Concrete objects are not what is elementary here, but rather object phases, sensible points, so to speak. If we already presuppose objects, we can then inquire into the essential conditions of the structure of new objects arising from objects and the essential conditions of the structure of the entire impressional sphere arising from objects simpler. But if we go back to what is constitutively elementary, then the analogous question returns once more.

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Accordingly, the problem of affection returns once more with respect to what is elementary, and in particular it returns as the problem of whether affection is not already an essential condition for the emergence of every constitutive synthesis, and whether both of these must not go together: a pre-affective characteristic of the elements, with the essential presuppositions for the formation of unity proper to the pre-affective character, and the affection

¹³ Translator: Husserl refers here to a type of synthesis that Kant describes in the second version of his "Transcendental Deduction" (the "B Deduction") in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (see B 151 and B 154). Whereas the "intellectual synthesis" concerns the functioning of the pure concepts of the understanding in general and universally, allowing us "to think" an object without contradiction, the "figurative synthesis" is the concrete work of "transcendental imagination" relating the pure concepts of the understanding to the manifold of sensible intuition that is ultimately temporal. In the chapter entitled "The Schematism," Kant will describe this process in slightly differently terms as the work of the "schemata" (see B 186–B 187 and B 308).