TED SADLER

HEIDEGGER AND ARISTOTLE

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Although it is very difficult if not impossible in this life to achieve certainty about these questions, at the same time it is utterly feeble not to use every effort in testing the available theories, or to leave off before we have considered them in every way, and come to the end of our resources.
(Plato, *Phaedo* 84d)

Preface

There is a marked tendency in contemporary commentary to downplay, or altogether explain away, what could be called the 'absolutist' dimension in the thought of leading modern philosophers. We see this is the case of Kant, where his philosophy is purged of the 'noumenal' realm to become a mere analytic of scientific knowledge; in the case of Hegel, where his 'metaphysical theology' is dismissed in favour of a 'dialectic of the finite'; in the case of Nietzsche, where his 'Dionysian life-affirmation' is subordinated to an allegedly pluralistic 'perspectival' epistemology. And we see this also in the case of Heidegger, where his 'question of Being' is regarded as a kind of nostalgic overlay to what is an otherwise useful 'hermeneutical philosophy'. It would seem that these great thinkers share the same peculiar weakness, the same peculiar predilection for an 'absolute' standard of being, truth, value, human existence etc., which it is the task of we moderns, coming along in their trail and to a large extent thinking *off* them, to admonish and correct. Perhaps, however, one need not have an attitude of slavish servility to traditional canons of greatness to make pause, and to wonder how precisely those thinkers who have so much to offer us could not only fall into error on elementary points, but could make these 'errors' the very foundation of their philosophies. One might wonder whether the challenges represented by

these philosophers are really met when what they themselves regarded as most important is ruled out from the beginning as 'unmodern' or 'epistemologically inadmissible', so that attention may focus on topics which they saw as subsidiary and dependent. One might also wonder whether the oft-heard desideratum of 'relevance' is misapplied when we measure these philosophers against the self-evidencies of today, or whether, on the contrary, it is much more a matter of own own ability to be relevant, of our own preparedness to enter into questions which are intrinsically relevant. In any case, it is a presupposition of the present study that Heidegger's question of Being, however elusive it may be, however unmodern and jarring to the sensibilities of those for whom nihilism and relativism have become second nature, however resistant to 'practical application', is the living centre of his philosophy and as such the point from which all other aspects of his thought must be comprehended. Since Heidegger develops this leading motif in sustained controversy with Aristotelian metaphysics, I have attempted to indicate the basic issues which belong to the question 'Heidegger and Aristotle'. Whether this question signifies a true 'battle of the giants', to be reformulated as the question 'Heidegger *or* Aristotle?' remains, in the end, unresolved. Heidegger himself did not think otherwise: what he wanted was to reopen the problem of the Aristotelian foundations of metaphysics, to demonstrate a new path for thinking this problem through. It is not a matter of 'keeping to' Heidegger's path, but of what might be gained by exploring it.

It is my hope that this book will interest readers coming from two directions. On the one hand, those who already have some familiarity with Heidegger, but who wish to know more of his relation to Aristotle, will find here (for the first time in English, as far as I know) a relatively systematic and comprehensive laying out of the terrain of this problem. On the other hand, those whose knowledge of Heidegger is only scanty, but who possess a more solid background in Aristotle and Greek philosophy, may find in this text a convenient

mode of access, a kind of 'introduction' as it were, to the German philosopher.

For their comments on earlier versions of this work, I would like to thank Dr. Eugenio Benitez and Prof. Gyorgy Markus of the School of Philosophy at the University of Sydney. I have also benefited from many discussions with Matthew Del Nevo, Goetz Richter, and Martin McAvoy.

Ted Sadler
April 1996

Note on References and Method of Citation

For Aristotle I have used the Oxford University Press translations in the revised edition of Jonathon Barnes, *The Complete Works of Aristotle* (2 Vols.). In a small number of cases I have preferred the unrevised translations (edited by W. D. Ross) as they appear in Richard McKeon (ed.), *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (Random House, New York, 1941). The reference system is the standard one, according to the Bekker edition of the Greek text. For Heidegger, although all titles are translated in the text itself, references are to German editions. Where English translations exist, I have often quoted from these, sometimes with modifications, while on other occasions I have given my own translations. Many texts of Heidegger are still untranslated into English, and in quoting from these the translations are my own. Details of English translations consulted can be found in the Bibliography. Translations from other German sources (titles again translated in the text) are generally my own; where this is not the case, the translation can be found in the Bibliography together with the German original.

ABBREVIATIONS

Aristotle:

Cat.	Categories
De Int.	On Interpretation
Po. An.	Posterior Analytics
Top.	Topics
Phys.	Physics
De Cae.	On the Heavens
Gen. Corr.	On Generation and Corruption
De An.	On the Soul
P. A.	Parts of Animals
Meta.	Metaphysics
E. N.	Nichomachean Ethics

Heidegger

References to the *Gesamtausgabe* are indicated by GA with volume number. Other abbreviations are as follows:

ED	Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung
EM	Einführung in die Metaphysik
G	Gelassenheit
HW	Holzwege
ID	Identität und Differenz
KPM	Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik
N I, N II	Nietzsche Vols. I & II
PIA	Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles
SD	Zur Sache des Denkens
SG	Der Satz vom Grund
SZ	Sein und Zeit
US	Unterwegs zur Sprache
VA	Vorträge und Aufsätze
WM	Wegmarken

Full details can be found in the Bibliography.

Introduction

1 METAPHYSICS AND THE QUESTION OF BEING

In *Being and Time* and other writings, Heidegger attempts to inaugurate a new 'battle of the giants over being'. All the previous terms of philosophical controversy – the disputes between materialism and idealism, realism and nominalism, rationalism and empiricism, atheism and theism, and much more – all these are suddenly swept aside as subsidiary and derivative matters compared with the fundamental question, as Heidegger sees it, of whether 'Being' (*Sein*) is thought in its difference from 'beings' (*das Seiende*), something which in his view has not occurred in the metaphysical tradition from Plato to Nietzsche. The ongoing publication of his *Gesamtausgabe* has provided us with many new materials from Heidegger of great value, but nothing to change the judgement that his abiding and overiding preoccupation always remained the 'question of being' (*Seinsfrage*).[1] On the other hand, Heidegger's unyielding pursuit of this one question is often lost sight of in contemporary commentary. So great has Heidegger's influence been on twentieth century thought, so many-sided and wide-ranging, that his original question, the question with which he began his philosophical endeavours and which remains at the end just as 'questionable' as ever, is often sidelined or altogether ignored. It is perhaps an irony that, after himself tirelessly stressing

the 'forgetfulness of Being' (*Seinsvergessenheit*) of Western metaphysics, Heidegger's own question of Being is itself so frequently 'forgotten'. Or perhaps it is confirmation of Heidegger's thesis of the peculiarly elusive character of this question, of the peculiar manner in which Being 'withdraws' in the face of questioning. In any case, it seems to many critics that Heidegger breaks down the *Seinsfrage* into a number of special, more comprehensible, more manageable, more discussable questions – about language, logic, understanding, human existence, technology, the work of art – and that his insights in these areas can be more readily appreciated than can the enigmatic question (perhaps even pseudo-question, non-question) which lies behind them.

What does Heidegger really seek with his question of Being? What does a thinker who wants to overcome metaphysics need from this, to all appearances most traditional of metaphysical questions? How does Heidegger counter post-Kantian scepticism about this question? How can he still feel entitled to this question, and especially to his claim that, with just this and no other question, he becomes for the first time a philosopher? The materials now available from the early Freiburg period show that Heidegger first came to his *Seinsfrage*, though not under this name, between 1917 and 1919.[2] These are the years of Heidegger's transition from Catholic theologian to philosopher. On one side of this transition there stood the question of being as formulated in modern Thomism, a thoroughly 'theological' question. Why, on the other side, do we not find what we should expect? Why do we not find that Heidegger, in accordance with a secular philosophical attitude, has rejected or minimized this question? Does Heidegger perhaps carry his Catholicism across into philosophy? Does the *Seinsfrage* stand, in the end, for a disguised theology, for a theology which must remain disguised in order not to reveal itself as a case of pre-Kantian 'speculative metaphysics'? It was, Heidegger testifies, a book on Aristotle by the Catholic philosopher Franz Brentano which in 1907 first set him on the path to

his *Seinsfrage*. For some ten years, this path remained within the terrain of that Catholic theology which, since Aquinas, had defended Aristotle's equation of first philosophy and theology. Was Heidegger's thought perhaps already too much in the Catholic mould for him to free himself, even when he explicitly renounces Catholic doctrine, from residual theological 'nostalgia'? The question is legitimate, but we should not be too hasty in answering. In the first place, Heidegger intends his own *Seinsfrage* as directed precisely against the universal 'onto-theological constitution of metaphysics' of which Catholicism partakes.

At Freiburg, the early Heidegger was confronted with a philosophical tendency, Neo-Kantianism, reluctant to entertain any new 'question of being'. True to the spirit of their mentor, the Neo-Kantians were on guard against any re-awakened pretentions from metaphysical rationalism on the one hand, and against new versions of irrationalism on the other. Indeed, the two became much the same thing for Kantianism, which saw metaphysical rationalism as actually irrational in its efforts to conceptualize beyond sensory experience. Kant himself regarded the Aristotelian enterprise of 'first philosophy', the site of the question of 'being *qua* being', as null and void. To be sure, Kant took his idea of 'categorial' understanding from Aristotle, but this, as the Neo-Kantian Paul Natorp was anxious to stress, did not indicate a profound affinity between them. Natorp's influential *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas* (1902) confirmed Kant's adverse judgement on Aristotle, at the same time vindicating Plato as the incipient Kantian whose 'theory of ideas', properly pertaining to transcendental ideality, was misunderstood by Aristotle along naive realist lines.[3] For Kant himself, for Natorp, for Neo-Kantianism in general, Aristotle's question of being *qua* being was a 'theological' question, a question, therefore, without a future: this applied to every 'philosophy' or 'theory' of being which did not adopt the standpoint of transcendental idealism. But Heidegger criticizes this standpoint and marks off his own *Seinsfrage* decisively against

it. The Neo-Kantians could not see this otherwise than as a return to metaphysics.

The Neo-Kantians, though they wished to reform Kant, and broaden the scope of transcendental reflection to include the realities considered by the cultural-historical sciences alongside those of the natural sciences, claimed to be the authentic Kantians, the true disciples of Kant. Within this type of Kantianism, primarily oriented to epistemological and scientific-methodological problems, the only 'question of being' was the question of knowability: being could be nothing but objective knowable being, the being of 'appearance' and not at all the being of an unknowable Thing-in-itself. It is noteworthy, however, that even the earlier unorthodox Kantianism of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche was likewise hostile to the being-question. Schopenhauer proposes Will and nothingness (*Nirvana*) as the most significant realities, dismissing 'being' as the misapplication of categorial-schematic thought for purposes of philosophical understanding. Nietzsche, influenced by Schopenhauer and Friedrich Albert Lange, directed Kantian epistemological criticisms at Parmenides, then at the whole metaphysical tradition established by Parmenides' faithful disciple Plato. For Nietzsche, the concept 'being' was an expression of ontological *ressentiment*, of fear and insecurity in the face of the primal reality of 'becoming'.

It is characteristic of all Kantianism, from Neo-Kantian objectivism through to the intuitionism of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, that it is unsympathetic to, and suspicious of, any attempt to reinstall 'being' as the supreme philosophical problem. This is Kant's own attitude. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* he comes to his well-known conclusion: 'Being (*Sein*) is clearly no real predicate, ie. a concept of anything at all which could lead to the concept of a thing. It is simply the position of a thing, or of certain determinations in themselves. In logical usage it is just the copula of a judgement'.[4] For Kant, because 'being' cannot be the content or concept of anything, the 'question of being' can only be

the question of what particular beings there are: 'being' can mean nothing more than the objects recognized through the *a priori* structures of intuition and understanding, objects which make up a 'reality' which is not at all Being-in-itself, not at all a 'transcendent' Being.

Of course, Kant did not give up metaphysics and the whole realm of 'the transcendent' without certain qualifications. With the 'transcendental ideas' or 'concepts of pure reason', Kant allowed the metaphysical spirit to enjoy a kind of diminished after-life.[5] In the 'transcendental dialectic' of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, God is acknowledged as an indispensable 'concept of pure reason'. Kant went on to develop a practical philosophy in which, again through pure reason, the existence of God could be established as a 'practical' postulate. In the end it turned out that pure reason sanctioned the 'faith' (*Glaube*) which Kant had wanted to mark off from intellectual cognition, all the better to preserve. What is significant, however, is that although Kant kept the moral-religious side of metaphysics he dispensed not only with rational theology as developed by the influential Leibnizian-Wolffian school, but more fundamentally with the Aristotelian question of being *qua* being. This was his great advantage as far as the vast majority of Kantians were concerned. For it was widely felt, among those seeking to overcome metaphysics in the manner of enlightenment, that Kant's 'transcendental ideas' of God, world, and freedom were less harmful than the Aristotelian *theos* and the question of being *qua* being. Modern Kantianism could regard the hypothesis of God as having been struck a mortal blow by Kant's critique of metaphysical theology, for it was no longer permissable to say that God 'is'. Alongside the fundamental ontological significance of Kant's scepticism (the distinction between appearance and Thing-in-itself) everything connected with the transcendental ideas seemed optional. When the Neo-Kantianisms broadened the meaning of 'appearance' to accommodate the realities of historico-cultural (including religious) experience, it seemed that, as long as there was no

mention of being *qua* being, everything that one wanted in philosophy could be had.

The transcendental ideas, or at least 'the other' of Kantian theoretical reason, this ambiguous sanctioning of particular kinds of 'non-objective' thinking, provided an opening to say many things. Schopenhauer could feel himself an ascetic, 'Eastern' Kantian, Nietzsche could feel himself a 'tragic' Kantian, while Karl Jaspers, a contemporary of Heidegger, makes explicit appeal to the transcendental ideas for his 'existential' Kantianism.[6] Further, what was revealed through the transcendental ideas (Kant's specific account of these drops into the background, the vital point being that there is a 'knowing' beyond the range of categorial understanding) was invariably of such pressing significance and the object of such philosophical *eros*, that the claimed freedom from metaphysics could in the end be questioned. From Nietzsche's point of view, Kant remained a metaphysician through his affirmation of God and absolute morality. For the Neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert on the other hand, Nietzsche's notion of 'life' or 'becoming' was itself metaphysical, at any event 'irrational' and 'speculative', inadmissible as 'knowledge' of any kind. Yet all these types of Kantianism have in common an avoidance of and dislike for the concept 'being'. Whatever speculative excesses various types of Kantianism allow themselves (concerning God, immortality, morality, Will, becoming etc.) 'being' remains in a definite sense taboo.

Along with the loss of status suffered by 'being' in all versions of Kantianism goes a lower status for 'truth'. Again, this is already quite clear in Kant himself, where truth, lest the concept not be lost to speculation on the Thing-in-itself, is brought firmly under the discipline of objective knowledge. Kant finds that, like being, 'truth is not in the object', but 'in the relation of the object to our understanding'.[7] One cannot speak of truth in relation to the Thing-in-itself, nor in relation to the transcendental ideas. Because Kantian truth is always objective truth, the truth of appearance (*Erscheinung*) and not of the Thing-in-itself, of Being-for-us and not of

Being-in-itself, it can easily seem like 'relative' truth, so it only remains for the *a priori* character of the theoretical categories to be doubted, and relativism stands at the door. Whether or not this is taken to the extremes of the present day, where a 'radicalized Kantianism' proclaims the end of 'logocentrism', it is clear that truth, and the 'question of truth', suffer a loss of dignity in Kantianism. Ever since Kant, the expression 'absolute truth' has been regarded with suspicion. Heidegger, on the other hand, with the elevation of the question of Being to the highest status, claims an equal rank for the question of truth: these become, in fact, just different aspects of one and the same question.

Let us return to Heidegger's situation in the years 1917-1919, to the theologian in transition to philosophy. Why did Heidegger still find it necessary, in the face of prevailing Kantian conviction, to raise a new and highly significant 'question of being'? Apart from Catholicism, from which at this time Heidegger was feeling progressively more alienated, two sources must be considered. They are the two other major philosophical tendencies of the period, the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, and the *Lebensphilosophie* ('life-philosophy') of which Wilhelm Dilthey (who died in 1911) had been the leading representative. Heidegger was intimately familiar with, and profoundly influenced by, both tendencies, but on his own testimony he did not find his *Seinsfrage* in either of them. Already in Heidegger's 1919 lectures it is clear that he sees orthodox Husserlianism as too close to Neo-Kantianism, and that he wishes to employ 'phenomenological method' to quite different purposes than Husserl himself. Heidegger could find much in Husserl's method of 'presuppositionless seeing' to aid him in his own ontological endeavours, but the *Seinsfrage* itself was absent from Husserl's philosophy.[8] Nor, owing to its epistemological orientation to the historico-cultural sciences, could Dilthey's *Lebensphilosophie* cultivate and articulate the *Seinsfrage*. Although Dilthey broke from Neo-Kantianism with his ideas of *Leben* and *Erlebnis* (experience), both of

which pertain to 'non-objective being', he associated 'being *qua* being' with the speculations of Scholasticism.[9] Around 1919, Heidegger began, with his reflections on 'factical life-experience', to articulate what will shortly develop into the *Seinsfrage*. But in these early texts Heidegger is already quite convinced that in *Lebensphilosophie* the required new direction for ontology cannot be found.

Once Kantianism, Husserlian phenomenology, and *Lebensphilosophie* are ruled out as possible sources of the Heideggerian *Seinsfrage* or possible avenues for its expression and development, once all these tendencies are recognized as part of Heidegger's problem, the question of Hegel can properly arise. For some time, true metaphysical Hegelianism, the Hegelianism of the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopedia*, had been unpopular in Germany. It had been assailed by the late Schelling, by the 'young Hegelians', by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, by positivists and materialists of every description, by Kantianism old and new, while by Husserl it was simply ignored. There was, to be sure, an important reception of Hegel in Dilthey's *Lebensphilosophie*, but this focused on 'the young Hegel', the 'pre-metaphysical' Hegel rediscovered by Dilthey. By contrast, what Hegel had wanted in the *Science of Logic* seemed anachronistic in modern philosophy.

Hegel had stated his intentions clearly enough in the Preface to the first edition: it was a matter of metaphysics reacquiring the dignity it had lost through the criticisms of Kantian philosophy. In Kant, metaphysical truths had become nothing more than those 'phantoms of the brain' vouchsafed by the concepts of pure reason.[10] For Hegel, this had only been regarded as a satisfactory status for what was previously philosophy's 'holy of holies' because the metaphysical instinct, the spiritual need for metaphysics, had been weakened in modern culture. In the Preface to the second edition, Hegel quotes with approval from Book I of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: 'In many respects man is in bondage, but this science, which is not sought for the sake of advantage, is the only truly free science, and for this reason appears not

to be a human possession'.[11] In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle identifies this 'science of free men' as 'first philosophy' (*prote philosophia*), the chief subject of which is being *qua* being. Aristotle investigates being *qua* being as substance (*ousia*), eventually concluding that the 'first substance' is the non-sensible *theos*, 'self-thinking thought' (*noesis noeseos*).

The *Science of Logic* develops an 'objective logic' which steps into the place formerly occupied by ontology.[12] Hegelian 'logic' becomes ontological by no longer confining itself to the rules of thinking but determining the nature of being, by again taking up being *qua* being as the first of all questions. For Hegel, this was a question not to be conjured away by the at bottom lax and popular Kantianism of his day.[13] As he pursued this question, Hegel became more attracted to Aristotle'e supremely 'speculative' thoughts on the *noesis noeseos*. In the *Encyclopedia*, Hegel equates the 'Absolute Idea' (his own highest reality and truth), with 'the *noesis noeseos* which Aristotle long ago termed the supreme form of the idea'.[14] The *Encyclopedia* itself closes on a Aristotelian note. Hegel's last words read: 'The eternal Idea, in full fruition of its essence, eternally sets itself to work, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind', and the book ends with a quotation in Greek, from *Metaphysics* XII, where Aristotle equates the *noesis noeseos* with *theos*.[15] For Hegel, not only was this Aristotle's most profound answer to the question of being *qua* being, but it was his own answer to essentially the same question. Hegel had not, so he considered, answered this question differently, but had clarified both question and answer at a higher level of consciousness, more 'dialectically' than had been possible for Aristotle.

Was Hegel an untimely philosopher to whom Heidegger could have recourse in his own untimely *Seinsfrage*? Was Hegel one philosopher who had not 'forgotten' this question? In any case, Hegel himself had not been forgotten in Heidegger's spiritual home, Catholicism. Many years later, Heidegger testifies to the decisive influence on his career exerted by 'Karl Braig, professor of systematic theology, and

the last in the tradition of the speculative school of Tübingen which gave signifiance and scope to Catholic Theology through its dialogue with Hegel and Schelling'.[16] Heidegger had already known Braig's 1896 book *Of Being: An Outline of Ontology* at the gymnasium, and was still occupied with it after taking up theological studies at Freiburg, where he attended (around 1911) Braig's lectures: 'My interest in speculative theology led me to do this . . . . On a few walks when I was allowed to accompany him, I first heard of Schelling's and Hegel's significance for speculative theology as distinguished from the dogmatic system of Scholasticism'.[17] Heidegger was certainly not untouched by Hegelianism during his theological years. But although, like Braig, Heidegger saw Hegelianism as a way of modernizing Catholic theology and of making it more philosophically rigorous, there is no sign that Heidegger found in Hegel the germ of his own *Seinsfrage*. By the mid-1920's it was already clear to Heidegger that Hegel too, along with Kantianism, Husserlianism and *Lebensphilosophie*, along with Catholicism, was part of the problem.

2 THE QUESTION OF ARISTOTLE

It was natural that Catholicism, which since the thirteenth century had never ceased to study Aristotle and had never, accordingly, stopped asking about 'being', should learn from Hegel, 'the modern Aristotle'. But by attempting to reform itself through Hegel, Catholicism only reinforced its dependence on Aquinas, who had considered Aristotle authoritative on philosophical matters and had transmitted to modern Catholicism a theology and metaphysics which were significantly Aristotelian. Heidegger, from his schooldays a particularly philosophical Catholic, had never slavishingly accepted the official Thomist account of Aristotle, but, at first guided by Brentano, made his way to the original Aristotelian texts and studied them intensively. No doubt he was also guided by Hegel, who himself had been the first to return to the Greek texts and think about them independently. But

Heidegger wanted more than an Hegelian interpretation of Aristotle, and under the increasing influence of Husserl's phenomenological methodology, he made his way to a fresh appreciation of the fundamental significance of Aristotle for the whole history of Western metaphysics. By 1921 he was ready to teach the first of a long series of courses on Aristotle at the universities of Freiburg and Marburg, courses which, attracting students from all over Germany, would quickly establish his academic reputation.

During these years (1921-26) Heidegger published nothing, and was known principally through his teaching, partly also through unpublished manuscripts of small circulation. One such manuscript, 'Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle', written in 1922 while Heidegger was still in Freiburg and sent to Paul Natorp at Marburg, led to Heidegger being called to a Marburg teaching post a year or so later. This text (long thought lost) was first published in 1989, with an introductory essay by Hans-Georg Gadamer. In this and other essays, Gadamer, who was also at Freiburg and Marburg in the early 1920's, testifies to the revolutionary impact of Heidegger's new 'phenomenological' approach to Aristotle. This was the period when Werner Jaeger's *Origins and Development of Aristotle's Metaphysics* (1912) and *Aristotle* (1923) were beginning to have a major influence on scholars. The second edition of Natorp's *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, presenting the most elaborated Neo-Kantian perspective on Aristotle, appeared in 1921. Heidegger was familiar with these works and with other contemporary literature on Aristotle, but in his own writings and lectures his attitude to other commentators was generally dismissive: Jaeger remains a 'philologist', while Natorp's Neo-Kantianism distorts his view of Greek philosophy as a whole. Gadamer reports that, within the small circle of Heidegger's audience, these uncompromising judgements seemed convincing.[18]

None of Heidegger's courses on Aristotle from this period have so far been published, although summaries have recently become available from Theodore Kisiel.[19] As far as published

materials are concerned, we have, in addition to the above-mentioned 1922 manuscript, the 1924/25 Marburg lecture-course *Plato: The Sophist*, published in the *Gesamtausgabe* in 1992. This important text of well over six hundred pages contains two hundred pages of 'preparatory' discussion devoted to Aristotle, mainly on *Nichomachean Ethics* VI, but also touching on other parts of the *corpus* relevant to first philosophy and dialectic. There is only one other book-length study of Aristotle presently in the Collected Works, from 1931, after Heidegger's return to Freiburg. This is the lecture-course *Aristotle, Metaphysics Theta 1-3: On the Nature and Reality of Force*, a commentary of over two hundred pages on some half-dozen pages of Aristotelian text. There are numerous discussions, often of considerable length, on particular topics from Aristotle in Heidegger's published lecture-courses from 1925 onwards, as well as in *Being and Time*.[20] There is also one long article, 'On the Nature and Concept of *phusis*. Aristotle, *Physics* B, 1' dating from 1939, but first published in 1958.

In none of these texts does Heidegger present an extended and systematic overview of the Aristotelian philosophy. There are many succinct summaries of what Aristotle did or did not achieve, but when these are not left hanging amidst more characteristically 'Heideggerian' concerns, they immediately go over to close consideration of particular concepts or particular passages of text. There is nothing to compare, for example, with the unified account of Aristotle given by Hegel in his Berlin lectures on the history of philosophy, by Jaeger in his 1923 *Aristotle*, or more recently in well-known works by Ross and Guthrie. Heidegger understands his method of painstaking exegesis as the only satisfactory way of dealing with philosophical texts, and it was undoubtedly this method which made such an impact on his early audience. Instead of being 'explained' by reference to contemporary philosophical categories, Aristotle's texts came to life. At the same time, this method meant that it was often difficult to distinguish

between Heidegger and Aristotle: the interpreter, so concerned to avoid pre-judgements, tended to disappear into texts which spoke for themselves. Gadamer reports that, as a consequence, the basic intentions of Heidegger's Aristotle interpretations were not clearly understood. Did Heidegger stand for a new Aristotelianism? So it seemed to many, for Heidegger everywhere spoke scathingly of the hackneyed portrayal of Aristotle (eg. as the realist opposed to Plato the idealist) passed down by tradition, and in general contrasted Aristotle favourably with his (Heidegger's) own philosophical contemporaries. In Gadamer's words, 'We in Marburg were at that time so fascinated by Heidegger that he appeared to us as an Aristotle *redivivus* who brought metaphysics on to new paths . . . . At that time we were all too naive and took Heidegger's concretizations of Aristotle for his philosophy'.[21]

What then, in this early period, was the relevance of Aristotle for Heidegger's emerging *Seinsfrage*? Is it possible that Heidegger rediscovered in Aristotle the genuine question of Being, the question which had been 'forgotten' by Scholasticism as well as by modern philosophy? This can hardly be so, for by 1924-25 (the Marburg *Sophist* lectures) Heidegger is already *opposing* his *Seinsfrage* to Aristotle's leading question of 'being *qua* being'. Furthermore, it well-known that in virtually all his writings from *Being and Time* onwards, Heidegger sees Aristotelian ontology as precisely the foundation of the whole metaphysical tradition of *Seinsvergessenheit*. These circumstances have led a whole line of commentators, beginning with Gadamer, to ask whether Heidegger was perhaps attracted to 'another side' of Aristotle's thought, to something quite different to the doctrines on 'being *qua* being', and whether he used this for his own purposes, playing it off against the 'metaphysical' Aristotle. On this matter there has lately developed (Gadamer, Taminiaux, Volpi, Caputo, van Buren) something of a consensus, to the effect that it was actually Aristotle's 'practical philosophy' which Heidegger found so fruitful, and which, with various

modifications, he 'appropriated' for himself. The recently available early texts have been taken to support this view, for they show Heidegger translating concepts from Aristotle's *Ethics* into German expressions which turn out to fulfill important positive functions in the 'existential analytic' of *Being and Time*.

One of the basic objectives of the present study is to show that this view of Heidegger's relation to Aristotle is in fact a misconception, and that his opposition to Aristotle is, on the contrary, far more totalistic. On the other hand, to speak of opposition or appropriation, of rejection or assent, can easily cloud over the issues. It is obvious that Heidegger, in his early period and thereafter, found Aristotle supremely worthy of study. It is a matter, therefore, of understanding why and in what respect. Such an understanding cannot be gained solely from Heidegger's writings specifically on Aristotle, but must take into account his broader philosophical orientation, particularly in the formative years 1917-21, just prior to the beginning of the Aristotle courses. The publication over the last ten years of Heidegger's Freiburg lectures from 1919-21, the long-known testimonies of such Freiburg contemporaries as Gadamer and Löwith, and the recent researches of Pöggeler, Sheehan, Ott, Kisiel, and van Buren, now provide a sufficient body of evidence to reconstruct Heidegger's philosophical-spiritual trajectory during this period. From all these materials, one particular influence stands out. This is Heidegger's study of *Protestant* writers, particularly of *Luther*.

For the Heidegger of this time, however, it was not just a matter of the detached scientific study of Luther. Rather, the evidence shows that, to a considerable degree at least, Heidegger embraced the 'spirit of Luther', and, having just broken with Catholicism, made undogmatic Protestantism his new spiritual home.[22] In this situation, it is logical that Heidegger would have come under the influence of Luther's vehement condemnation of Aristotle, as evidenced in the following passage from a well-known 1520 tract:

> The universities need a sound and thorough reformation . . . . In my view, Aristotle's writings on *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, *On the Soul*, and *Ethics*, hitherto regarded as the most important, should be set aside along with all others that boast they treat of natural objects, for in fact they have nothing to teach about things natural or spiritual . . . . It pains me to the heart that this damnable, arrogant, pagan rascal has seduced and fooled so many of the best Christians with his misleading writings. God has made him a plague to us on account of our sins.[23]

In the years of transition after the First World War, Heidegger did not want to become a Protestant in any doctrinal sense. What he wanted was the same as what Luther had wanted: to become 'more authentically Christian'. Following Luther's example, Heidegger went back to the New Testament to rediscover an original Pauline Christianity, uncontaminated by Greek metaphysics. By 1920/21 he had results to report in a Freiburg lecture-course entitled 'Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion'.[24] Through an interpretation of passages from Galatians and I & II Thessalonians, Heidegger discovered a non-Greek, non-metaphysical, non-Aristotelian, 'kairological' experience of time behind the Pauline understanding of God.[25] It is especially significant that Heidegger not only attributes an understanding of this 'primordial Christian' temporality to Luther, but links it with Luther's condemnation of Aristotelianism.[26] For likewise, through a non-Aristotelian conception of time, will Heidegger go on to define his own distinctive *Seinsfrage*.

Of course, when Heidegger in this period opposed not 'Christian faith', but 'primordial Christian life-experience' and 'factical life', to Greek metaphysics, this was problematic from a Christian theological point of view, whether Catholic or Protestant. Was Heidegger giving up theology in favour of a philosophical kind of Lutheranism? Did the philosophy of factical life have any theological presuppositions or implications? Or was Heidegger pursuing ontological questions

which remained neutral in respect of theology? In the 1920/21 lectures, the ontologization of Pauline theology was plain: to the question 'What is the Pauline experience of life?', Heidegger replied 'kairological temporality'. From a strict theological standpoint, the substitution of 'life' for 'God' in Heidegger's question was unacceptable. But not only did the theology of this time, which through Rudolf Bultmann was becoming aware of Heidegger's biblical interpretations, tolerate Heidegger's philosophical (though idiosyncratic) vocabulary and his stated independence from theology, but, after the publication of *Being and Time*, it adopted much from both his existential analyses and his criticisms of metaphysical ontology. During the years 1922-25, the *Seinsfrage* (which takes this title only around 1924) is progressively removed from any explicit association with Christianity. Why then could the theologians not resist *Being and Time*? Did this indicate that Heidegger, like Kant, like Hegel, was a 'disguised theologian'? Or did Heidegger vindicate theology by ridding it of Aristotelian prejudices? Could Heidegger's ontologization of Pauline experience at last overcome the gulf between 'faith' and 'knowledge'?

These questions will receive fuller discussion later in this book. The theological dimension of Heidegger's *Seinsfrage* raises very difficult and complex problems which should not, at this point, be summarily dealt with. However, it is a guiding thesis of the present study that Heidegger's *Seinsfrage*, in its confrontation with Aristotelian metaphysics, can only be understood within a context of 'Wittenbergian' proportions. Without an appreciation of the role of Luther it is inevitable that Heidegger's fundamentally *polemical* relation to Aristotle will be obscured. As indicated, however, it is not just a matter of recognizing *that* Luther influenced Heidegger. Above all, it is necessary to bring into view the fundamental 'stance' towards life and world which is common to Heidegger and Luther, and to see its difference from the Aristotelian 'stance'. If, as suggested, these are really opposite stances, then it stands to reason that they must illuminate each other and can only be

comprehended together. As we shall see, precisely this is the reason for Heidegger's intensive engagement with Aristotle: at bottom, he was following the dictum 'know thy enemy'.

With the benefit of hindsight, and the recent availability of a good number of early Freiburg lecture-courses, the implicit non-Aristotelian orientation of Heidegger's philosophy can be discerned from at least 1919. In this year, in a course entitled 'The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of World-View', he was already developing the groundwork of *Being and Time*.[27] At the centre of Heidegger's concern is the idea of philosophy as 'primordial science', which he sees as diametrically opposed to the objectivistic Neo-Kantianism holding sway at Freiburg and other leading German universities. What Heidegger wants is a science *of* the primordial which would be genuinely 'pre-theoretical' and therefore not bound by the epistemological strictures of Neo-Kantianism. Now of course, Neo-Kantianism did not necessarily think of itself as Aristotelian, nor does Heidegger in 1919 explicitly identify Neo-Kantianism with Aristotelianism. However, the criticisms which he at this time directs at Neo-Kantianism, particularly in respect of its prioritization of 'thing-experience' over pre-theoretical experience of 'self' and 'life', clearly anticipate his later diagnosis of Aristotelian ontology as oriented to 'beings' rather than to 'Being' and 'human existence'. For Heidegger, it is not a question of doctrines self-consciously espoused, but of the presuppositional structure of thought. On this score, Natorp and others, even when they are vigorously contradicting the 'realism' of Aristotle, are Aristotelian in a more profound sense. In later years Heidegger came to see Neo-Kantianism's overt oppositional attitude to Aristotle as based on an epistemological interpretation of Kant which overlooks the latter's own dependencies on Aristotelian ontology, to be found, among other places, in the role of 'judgement' and 'the categories' in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[28]

During the decade of the 1920's, Heidegger works out

his approach to Aristotle in tandem with that new 'existential' (Luther-inspired) conception of philosophy which he eventually made public in *Being and Time*. It is not possible to isolate these from each other: they form one unified development. The existential analyses contained in the lecture-courses of this period are, despite vacillating terminology, essentially repetitive, going experimentally over the same ground in an attempt to work out an appropriate mode of access to the primordial phenomenon of 'life'. Implicitly, it is Aristotelian ontology which must be overcome for this project to succeed, but it is also these same existential analyses which are used to illuminate Aristotle. Furthermore, Heidegger's writings, from this period and later, on other major figures in the history of philosophy – Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, among others – may also be regarded as belonging to his Aristotle interpretation. When, for instance, beginning in the mid-1920's, Heidegger undertakes a renewed study of Hegel, it is only the Aristotelianism of Hegel which occupies him; the 'young Hegel' of *Lebensphilosophie*, Hegel the 'authentic Christian' and Protestant, is hardly noticed.[29] Heidegger's writings and lectures on Hegel after 1925 are therefore as much about Aristotle as about Hegel. Heidegger analyses Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel in order to show their intrinsic Aristotelianism, to better understand the underlying nature of Aristotelianism, its true scope and possibilities. This dogged focus on Aristotle governs Heidegger's treatment of practically everyone he discusses, it is the grid through which he views the whole 'fallen' history of Western philosophy.

3 METHOD AND OUTLOOK OF THE PRESENT STUDY

What I attempt in the present work is to highlight and illuminate the basic terms of Heidegger's engagement with Aristotle. However, my fundamental problem is not 'Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle', but the relation of the philosophy of Aristotle to the philosophy of Heidegger. Because it is necessary to bring Aristotle independently into view, a good deal of space will be devoted to analysing key

Aristotelian concepts. While these discussions are certainly oriented to pertinent differences with Heidegger, I would not acknowledge them as 'softening up' Aristotle on behalf of Heidegger; they are, in my view, verifiable from the texts.[30] Does this mean that I am nevertheless 'in agreement' with Heidegger, or have taken up the standpoint of Heidegger, or have already decided the debate in favour of Heidegger? It is, one may suppose, already 'Heideggerian' to see a debate between Heidegger and Aristotle, especially a 'battle of the giants'. On the other hand, as Heidegger often remarks, it is not a matter of being 'Heideggerian', but of returning to the 'matter of thinking' (*Sache des Denkens*). What I hope to show is not that Heidegger 'resolves' the problem of Aristotelian metaphysics, certainly not that he 'refutes' Aristotle, nor that he 'establishes' an alternative philosophical standpoint, but merely (though this is no small thing) that he discloses new and significant dimensions to the problem of Aristotelianism. This is something very different to 'agreeing with' the writings, utterances and acts of Martin Heidegger, the man born in Messkirsch, Baden-Württemburg, on September 26th, 1889, who in 1927 published *Being and Time*, in 1933 became rector at the University of Freiburg, after the Second World War was temporarily barred from teaching but went on to become the most controversial (and some would say 'influential') philosopher of our time, dying in Freiburg on May 26th, 1976.

As to my handling of Heidegger's texts, obviously the whole *corpus* is relevant, but I shall concentrate on those parts of it which best bring Heidegger's *Seinsfrage* into relief against Aristotelian being *qua* being. Those texts where Heidegger explicitly discusses Aristotle will be considered in varying degrees of detail, but I shall not be recapitulating his commentaries, which can only be properly understood from Heidegger's central ontological motifs. Further, Heidegger's writings are distributed over a good many years, and do not present an entirely consistent view of Aristotle, nor do the texts always possess the clarity one desires. It would

undermine the purpose of the present study were I to take account of everything Heidegger says on Aristotle, to try to resolve every discrepancy of interpretation and extract the meaning from every unclear utterance. Nor do I thematize the development of Heidegger's views on Aristotle, something which could hardly be done without entering into the general controversy concerning the early versus the late Heidegger. As more texts from Heidegger's early period become available, the fundamental continuity of his thought is becoming increasingly acknowledged by scholars, and it seems to me that talk of a radical 'turning' during the 1930's is more likely to obscure than to illuminate substantive philosophical issues. Heidegger is a thinker of unusual complexity, so that within each phase of his career there are unresolved tensions as well as significant differences of style and method. But, following Heidegger's dictum that a philosopher always thinks 'one single thought', I attempt to uncover the underlying unity in Heidegger's attitude to Aristotle. In general, texts from Heidegger's early period (until the early 1930's) receive greater prominence, because this is the time of his most intensive occupation with Aristotle. But later texts will also be referred to where relevant.

Needless to say, my discussions of Aristotelian texts are not intended as a comprehensive summary of Aristotle's philosophy, but have the specific aim of falicitating a comparison with Heidegger and an understanding of his main lines of critique. Only those parts of Aristotle which are relevant for these purposes are considered, and only in the degree necessary in order that a 'battle of the giants' should become plausible. It would, it seems to me, be an unconvincing procedure to simply set Heidegger over against Heidegger's Aristotle, for this would mean having to constantly check on Heidegger's interpretations. Nor would it be altogether convenient to make, throughout the text, a point-by-point comparison of the two philosophers, for this would detract from a unitary understanding of their respective standpoints. What I attempt, therefore, is a combination of independent

presentation, and, at strategic points, polemical juxtaposition and comparison. If this results in a useful preliminary orientation to the problem 'Heidegger and Aristotle', my aim will have been achieved.

Chapter I focuses on the leading ontological question of how 'being' is to be understood. After indicating the basic parameters of Heidegger's approach to this question, including his main theses on Greek metaphysical ontology, I go over to an elucidation of Aristotle's 'ousiological reduction', that is, his reduction of the question of 'being *qua* being' to the question of *ousia* (substance). These discussions prepare the ground for the final two sections of the chapter, which explain Heidegger's interpretation of *ousia* as 'presence' and his own project of supra-ousiological philosophy as 'thinking of Being' (*Seinsdenken*). The topic of Chapter II is the difference between Aristotle's ousiological and Heidegger's supra-ousiological conception of *truth*. After an exposition of Aristotle's view of the structure and method of scientific philosophy, the discussion concentrates on the crucial question of the *logos*, that is, on the relation between truth and language, particularly the *proposition* in which 'something is said of something'. Again, this prepares the way for an examination of Heidegger's thesis of a more 'primordial' (non-propositional) kind of truth, the self-revealing of Being. The final section of this chapter attempts a further clarification of this idea by considering Heidegger's attitude to Plato's notion of 'the Good', and, in connection with this, Heidgger's possible affinities with Neo-Platonism. Chapter III is really the polemical heart of the book, for it is here that I directly address the above-mentioned misconception that Heidegger 'appropriates' the Aristotelian practical philosophy. To show that this cannot be so, the differences between Aristotelian *phronesis* and Heideggerian *Existenz* are brought into sharp relief. The discussion then turns to the different kinds of 'religiosity' of Aristotle and Heidegger. Since, as already indicated, Heidegger founds an 'un-Greek' type of religiosity, seemingly consonant with

his own *Seinsdenken*, upon a non-Aristotelian 'kairological' experience of time, the study ends by examining Heidegger's articulation of this idea.

4 HEIDEGGER'S ARISTOTLE-INTERPRETATION IN CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT

Despite Heidegger's pre-eminent position in twentieth-century philosophy, his reputation in professional Aristotelian studies is not yet securely established. Of course, this has much to do with the unavailability of many relevant texts. Although there are brief considerations of Aristotle in long-known works by Heidegger (eg. *Being and Time*), his detailed commentaries (with the exception of his article on the concept of *phusis*) have only become available in the *Gesamtausgabe*, in some cases very recently. The writings on Aristotle of the German scholars Hans-Georg Gadamer, Walter Bröcker, Eugen Fink, Ernst Tugendhat, Wolfgang Wieland and Werner Marx, all display a profound indebtedness to Heidegger's more generally known philosophy and methodology, but in each case they did not have the benefit of the *Gesamtausgabe*. To some extent they are all reliant on an 'oral tradition', going back to Gadamer and others who had direct experience of the early lectures. Whether the more recently available texts will change things, and secure a place for Heidegger 'in the discussion', is yet to be seen. Meanwhile, there is almost complete silence on Heidegger amongst Anglo-American Aristotle scholars.

But there are difficulties with 'Heidegger's Aristotle' which go beyond considerations about the availability of texts and the peculiarities of scholarly backgrounds. For clearly it is quite a different thing to read Heidegger on Aristotle than it is to read the studies of, say, David Ross, W. K. C. Guthrie, or even Werner Jaeger. From a Heideggerian perspective, these authors, and the 'Aristotle profession' generally, work within an already Aristotelian problematic. This means that, however philologically valuable their studies might be, they do not engage with Aristotle at a philosophically fundamental

level. Of course, these authors see the matter very differently. In many cases, they would not admit to being Aristotelians at all, or would insist on being 'critical' Aristotelians concerned to show the pros and cons of various Aristotelian doctrines. They take their philosophical orientation from one or another contemporary tendency, eg. in the case of Ross and Guthrie it is a version of scientific empiricism, in the case of Jaeger it is Neo-Kantianism. This is not in itself a criticism, for one could reply that in the case of Heidegger it is 'Heideggerianism'. It is a question, rather, of whether the philosophical position 'adopted' is itself submitted to fundamental interrogation, or is taken over unproblematically as a convenient 'basis of research'.

Prior to Heidegger, one must go back to Hegel to find the last great philosophical interpretation of Aristotle.[31] Like Heidegger, Hegel sought to redefine the basic concepts of philosophy from their origins in the Greeks. Also like the situation in respect of Heidegger, the scholar is confronted by the 'Hegelianism' of Hegel's interpetation, something which often deters serious engagement. There has been a common opinion, itself the result of unconscious metaphysical presuppositions, that Hegel is a speculative and at bottom 'theological' thinker, who can make little contribution to understanding such a common-sense and empirical philosopher as Aristotle. Heidegger has an entirely different attitude. In his view, there are no sources superior for understanding Aristotle than Hegel's *Science of Logic*, the *Encyclopedia* in its three parts, and the Berlin lectures on the history of philosophy. Hegel puts the philosophy of Aristotle in a new framework. After being reduced by Kant to the status of 'master of abstractions', Aristotle comes to life again in Hegel, as the Greek world's supreme expression of that 'absolute spirit' which is achieving fulfillment in our own age. But by the early 1850's, two decades after Hegel's death, his system was in disrepute, studied by few scholars. Further, it was difficult to separate Hegel's interpretation of Aristotle from Hegel's own 'controversial' philosophical position.

Hegel was neglected and underestimated by an academic philosophy which saw itself a post-metaphysical.[32] Now for Heidegger, this neglect of Hegel could only be symptomatic of a failure to seriously confront the questions Hegel had himself put to Kantianism.[33] The more Heidegger understood Aristotle, the more he appreciated the decisive position of Hegel in the history of philosophy, the more, therefore, he was unable to find inspiration and partners for dialogue in the prevailing Neo-Kantian, or at least pre-Hegelian, academic milieu. Hegel had not been content to go along with Kant in reducing 'being' to 'absolute position' and 'the copula', and he could not accept Kant's reasons for the unknowability of Being-in-itself. For Heidegger, Hegel was the one thinker who had preserved the Aristotelian question of 'being *qua* being' by showing that it does not succumb to Kantianism. When he then found the most reputable Aristotle scholars repeating standard Neo-Kantian arguments against Hegel, the conditions for a genuine dialogue seemed missing.

The one relatively contemporary commentator on Aristotle found relevant by Heidegger was the Catholic philosopher Franz Brentano, above all in his early (1862) *On the Manifold Meaning of Being in Aristotle*.[34] Brentano set out from Aristotle's well-known but neglected statement 'being is said in many ways'. Although Heidegger did not follow Brentano is his solution to the problem of the unitary meaning of 'being', he became conscious of the problem through Brentano. In addition, Heidegger admired Brentano's method of dealing with the Aristotelian texts, a method which allowed the 'phenomena themselves' to come into view.[35] The question of method assumed ever more importance with the increasing influence on Heidegger of Husserl, himself a student of Brentano. Heidegger went to Husserl's *Logical Investigations* hoping to find 'decisive aid in the questions stimulated by Brentano's dissertation'.[36] He did not find this directly (as noted, Heidegger will confirm that the *Seinsfrage* is missing in Husserl), but with the 'phenomenological method' he found an indispensable tool

for his own inquiries into Aristotle. Having rejected all the major philosophical tendencies of his time, and not wishing to be prejudiced by any philosophical 'systems' including the Hegelian, Heidegger needed to establish the possibility of an independent reading of Aristotle. The step-by-step training in 'phenomenological seeing' which Husserl provided in the *Logical Investigations* and, after arriving in Freiburg in 1916, in workshops attended by Heidegger (he became Husserl's assistant in 1919) had a great impact on Heidegger's Aristotle-interpretations, which he invariably called 'phenomenological'.[37] But this still left Heidegger alone as far as the profession of Aristotle scholarship was concerned. In the years 1919-1925, when professional Aristotelian circles were abuzz with the new chronological and philological hypotheses of Jaeger, Heidegger stood aloof, unable to empathize.

The Italian scholar Giovanni Reale, in his monumental *The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the 'Metaphysics' of Aristotle*, goes so far as to say that Jaeger's 1923 *Aristotle* is 'probably the most significant work on Aristotle that has been published in our century'.[38] However, Reale himself acknowledges that the 'new direction to Aristotelian studies' imposed by Jaeger's book is almost totally restricted to an enhanced philological appreciation of the *corpus*. The particular chronological hypotheses advanced by Jaeger are now rejected by the majority of scholars, but their refutation has led, in Reale's opinion, to a more nuanced understanding of the Aristotelian texts. Now philological results are not nothing, but when a work which does not go beyond philology (in the broad, German sense of this word) is heralded, by one of the leading scholars in the field, as the twentieth century's 'most significant work on Aristotle', there is reason for pause. How should one judge, for example, the Aristotle commentaries of Thomas Aquinas, in which philological considerations are wholly absent? Or indeed the interpretations of Hegel, who, although one of the first modern philosophers to read Aristotle in the original

Greek, possessed, compared with Jaeger, only rudimentary philological knowledge? For his part, Reale, in the work mentioned, ignores Hegel entirely, and makes a few passing (and disparaging) remarks about Heidegger in the bibliographical appendix. In his Introduction, Reale explains that he has 'consciously wished to avoid any theoretical conclusions that would go beyond what Aristotle has said' and that his book 'intends to be a contribution to the historical comprehension of the *Metaphysics* and tries to return formulas which have become too elastic and ambiguous to their original conceptual content'.[39] This latter intention is shared by Heidegger, who like Reale resists the premature imposition on Aristotle of contemporary philosophical frames of reference. The value of Reale's book (which supersedes Jaeger's, philologically speaking) is to have shown that the 'first philosophy' of the *Metaphysics* is consistently 'ousiological' (this term will be explained in Chapter I). To be noted, however, is that Reale's project ends more or less where Heidegger's begins. Reale is content to establish *that* Aristotle frames the question of being in ousiological terms. He does not ask *why* this is so, nor does he question the legitimacy of this initial decision: as a consequence his understanding of ousiology does not make the ascent from a philological to a philosophical level.[40]

One of the most well-known English-language discussions of Aristotelian first philosophy is that of Joseph Owens, in *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics*. In this work too neither Hegel nor Heidegger warrant a mention, while ample space is given to Jaeger and the controversies engendered by his work. Like Jaeger and Reale, Owens is concerned to establish *what* Aristotle said (or meant), and this, for all practical purposes, he reduces to the problem of reconciling the 'theological' and 'ontological' definitions of first philosophy. The problem was originally highlighted in an 1888 article by Natorp, who argued that these two definitions, which claim that the subject matter of first philosophy is the divine entity (or entities) and being

qua being respectively, are mutually inconsistent.[41] It is an important problem to resolve, because many of the concepts of the *Metaphysics* – form, matter, potency, actuality et al – are relevant to contemporary philosophers as ontological concepts, and they would not wish to see them as inseparable from theology, which not only seems the most speculative aspect of Aristotle's thought, but plays an apparently minor role in the central ontological Books VII-IX. In addition, the theological dimension of first philosophy would appear to involve Aristotle in (an inferior version of) Platonism, something which could compromise his reputation as a realist and scientific philosopher. Natorp, as a Platonist of Kantian provenance, took the realism of Aristotelian ontology as an objection, and, claiming this as Aristotle's characteristic position, declared the theological definitions of first philosophy to be spurious, striking them altogether out of the text: in his view the whole of Aristotelian philosophy represents a major retrogression from Plato. Other authors have been concerned to vindicate Aristotle. Jaeger's idea was to distinguish an early Platonic stage in Aristotle's development from a later genuinely Aristotelian stage, and to show, through detailed philological analysis, that texts from both stages are intermingled in the *Metaphysics*. When this project proved dubious, later critics returned to a reconciliation of theology and ontology. Owens gives an historical review of the whole controversy, followed by a commentary on each book of the *Metaphysics*. He concludes in the end that first philosophy is irredeemably theological (though in a non-Platonic sense), ie. that Aristotelian ontology everywhere presupposes the divinity of the first substance. On the other hand, Owens acknowledges that Aristotle gives no concrete account of the dependency of the 'properly real' things of sensible experience on the divine element: 'In Aristotle the proper reality of sensible natures is respected and safeguarded. But the *Being* of sensible things was divine. The restless seeking of the divine, the imitation of the divine, was the way of final causality that brought

Being into the sensible world. But that causality was of an *extrinsic* type'.[42]

Owens makes no attempt to conceal the unwelcome nature of his conclusion. In the Foreword to the second edition of his book, he remarks that some critics have found it 'anomalous' and 'amusing' that his interpretation of the *Metaphysics* does not allow for the derivation of the sensible entities from Being.[43] He goes on to repeat that Aristotle provides no basis whatsoever for understanding how sensible things know and desire (through final causality) the divine entities. Yet Owens continues to value Aristotelian Being as an explanation for 'intellectual discourse' and 'communication among men'. This explanation is not to be found in Owens' book. Instead, Owens is content to allude (in this same Foreword) to the Platonic thesis that, unless there were changeless Being, there could not be knowledge, and that philosophy would have to make way for sophistry.[44] But this thesis, also maintained by Aristotle, can itself be substantiated only through the missing derivation of the sensible entities from being *qua* being, ie. from *theos*, the first *ousia*: otherwise it is a mere postulate. The upshot is that Owens' study leaves Aristotelian being *qua* being as a hazy and ill-defined notion, perhaps as altogether dispensable compared with the ontological concepts of form, matter etc. This is indeed the general state of affairs in Aristotelian scholarship today: while there is much discussion of the ontological constitution of sensible things (in the physical treatises as well as in the *Metaphysics*), the whole issue of being *qua* being hovers awkwardly in the background.

Where can Heidegger be located within this problem-situation? To briefly recapitulate: what we have in Aristotle's treatises on first philosophy is on the one hand a set of ontological determinations having to do with sensible entities, on the other hand a set of apparently speculative ideas having to do with non-sensible divine entities. Although Aristotle maintains that the two belong together, it is the first ontological dimension which has proved most relevant

to modern philosophers, because it is arguably the ground of the scientific ontology of our own era. The concepts of form, matter, substratum, composite, potentiality, actuality, the ten categories, together with such logical notions as sameness and difference, all these can find a place within modern discussions, and do not seem to involve any extravagently speculative assumptions. Now in this situation one might ask whether the theological dimension of first philosophy cannot be altogether deleted, and in practice many modern commentators do take this option. Is there really any additional question of being after one has given the ontological determinations of everything there is? If this additional dimension of first philosophy is a mere postulate, about which Aristotle can develop no concrete demonstrations, is it not better to dispense with it, perhaps as a Platonic incursion of no practical relevance? Heidegger's answer is no. This is not because he wishes to embrace Aristotelian theology. Like many other critics, Heidegger believes that Aristotle's theological constructions are misconceived. Where he differs is that, in his view, these constructions are not too dissimilar, but rather too similar, to the sub-theological 'ontological' level of analysis.

Lest there be any misunderstanding here, it must be stressed that Heidegger has no objection in principle to the kind of ontological analyses to be found in *Metaphysics* VII-IX or in the *Physics*, if these are understood as belonging to the 'regional ontology' of nature (the physical world). What he rejects is the interpretation of these analyses as answers (or partial answers) to the question of being *qua* being. Now Aristotle himself says (*Meta* 1026a, 28-31) that 'if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy'. Obviously, this statement can be called upon by those critics who wish to delete theology from Aristotle to arrive at a physicalist philosophy. For Heidegger, however, Aristotle's statement

does not hold: the deletion of theology would result in regional ontology and nothing more, ie. the being-question would remain unaddressed. Now in fact Aristotle realizes that physics cannot be first philosophy, but the 'meta-physical' reality which he posits as the true subject matter of first philosophy is - and this is Heidegger's essential point – *also* a substance, an entity, a thing, a 'being'. The being-question is answered in terms of a being (*on*) of a particular kind (*theos*): it is answered 'onto-theologically'. Heidegger seeks to answer the being-question in a fundamentally different manner, by insisting on the radical difference between 'Being' and 'beings'.

The reason that Heidegger's writings on Aristotle present a foreign and puzzling appearance alongside more conventional Aristotelian scholarship is that, as remarked in respect of Reale, Heidegger begins where the others leave off. Whereas the majority of commentators, like Aristotle himself, unproblematically assume that being *qua* being is the 'things that are', and are therefore interested in the determinations of thinghood, Heidegger focuses on this original assumption and its own presuppositions. This does not mean that he ignores those ontological determinations of interest to other writers, but he examines them with different intent, with a view to revealing a more fundamental presuppositional structure. As we shall see in due course, this is the structure which takes the 'Being of beings' (*das Sein des Seienden*) as equivalent to 'presence' (*Anwesenheit*). On the other hand, although Heidegger stands aloof and monological amidst the controversies of his day, although he is reluctant to recognize predecessors or affinities with other contemporary thinkers, he does not, as a variety of commentators have shown, lack roots in certain influential tendencies of Western philosophico-theological thought. Above all, Heidegger's concern to deny the universality of categorial being (the being of 'things'), and his associated rejection of the intellectual luminosity of transcendent Being, confirm his close relation to the Neoplatonic tradition of category

criticism and negative theology. However, further discussion of these matters will be held over until Chapter III.

5 PLATO AND THE PRESOCRATICS

The suggested links with Neoplatonism give added urgency to the question, in any case unavoidable, of Heidegger's relation to Plato. It is well known, however, that Heidegger does not really develop an independent attitude to Plato and is content with a retrospective interpretation from his own version of Aristotle. This approach, which is at odds with Heidegger's oft-repeated dictum that one should not read back later into earlier philosophies (as eg. Aristotle does in his treatment of the Presocratics) results in the Aristotelianization not only of Plato, but of Platonism and Neoplatonism quite generally. The whole metaphysical tradition, including what some would regard as Neoplatonic counter-currents, then takes on a decidedly monolithic appearance, everywhere governed by the *Seinsvergessenheit* classically expressed in Aristotle. If Heidegger says on occasions that 'all metaphysics is Platonism', it is an Aristotelianized Plato he has in mind, with '*idea*' meaning the same as '*ousia*' in Aristotle.[45] Never, it seems, does Heidegger approach Plato in a fresh and unprejudiced manner, and in the end, he understands 'Platonism' and 'Aristotelianism' as synonymous terms.

Heidegger is hardly the first to have minimized the differences between Plato and Aristotle. Hegel, in his Berlin lectures, had presented Aristotle as a purified Plato, where 'the concept' is freed from the dramatic setting of Plato's dialogues.[46] Nietzsche saw Aristotle in similar fashion, as continuing the 'idealism' of Plato without the latter's artistic sensibility. Of course, the overt attitudes to Plato of Nietzsche and Hegel were diametrically opposite, but on one essential matter they did not differ: they both saw him as a theologian. It was thus logical that Nietzsche, who wanted to overcome metaphysical theology, should find grievious fault with Plato, while Hegel, who wanted to bring metaphysics to its glorious and definitively theological fulfillment, should laud him.

Kant had directed similar criticisms at Plato as at Aristotle: fundamentally, the problem with Plato was that 'the ideas are for him original models of the things themselves, and not, like the categories [ie. Kant's categories of theoretical understanding], just keys for possible experience', thus Plato was a 'speculative' philosopher.[47] Neo-Kantianism, especially Natorp, thought that Kant was mistaken on this point. Had Kant been more familiar with Plato, Natorp argued, he would have seen him as the founder of transcendental idealism, for the Platonic ideas were not ontologically 'super-sensible' at all (the characteristic Aristotelian error of interpretation), but akin in their status to the Kantian categories.

Natorp's *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas* rehabiliated Plato for Kantianism, and by 1923, the most sophisticated of all Neo-Kantians, the second generation Marburgian Ernst Cassirer, showed, in the first volume of his *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, that he had learnt from Hegel about Plato. From Hegel, Cassirer and others had learnt to see Plato's '*eidos*' and '*idea*' as meaning 'concept', and thereby to better understand not only the Kantian categories but the nature of transcendental ideality itself. It is not possible to mistake the influence of Hegel when Cassirer writes that 'for Plato, the concept of representation assumed for the first time a truly central importance, since it is precisely in this concept that the problem fundamental to the doctrine of ideas is ultimately epitomized, and through it the relation between "idea" and "phenomenon" is expressed'.[48] How far Kantianism had come from Kant's own picture of Plato as a speculative philosopher, on a par with the 'master of abstractions' himself. Hegel, by understanding Plato as the discoverer (albeit still in quasi-mythological garb) of 'the concept', had made it possible, through the equation concept = *eidos* = category, to understand Plato as a 'Kantian' philosopher. Once this position had been reached, it was a short step to see Aristotle as a confused realist who did not grasp the true transcendental character of the Platonic ideas. On this score, Natorp made a particularly harsh judgement. Cassirer, giving Aristotle his

due, recognized him as a 'great scientist': 'Aristotelian physics is the first example of a natural science in the strict sense'.[49] More fundamentally, however, Cassirer was in agreement with Natorp's view of Aristotle's philosophical limitations, particularly his failure to understand the transcendental standpoint. Ironically, it was already an Aristotelianized Plato with which Aristotle was compared: this stemmed from Hegel, who had stressed the Aristotelian aspects of Plato (the birth of 'the concept' in the late dialogues).[50]

Where could Heidegger have found something different to the Aristotelianized Plato of Hegel and the Neo-Kantians? It is worth recalling that the founder of modern Plato studies is Friedrich Schleiermacher, also the 'father of modern Protestant theology'. Theology had never forgotten about Plato, and it is significant that it took a Protestant theologian to put Plato studies, for the first time, on a firm philological footing. Between 1804 and 1828, Schleiermacher put out editions and translations of Plato which are still in use today, with interpretative introductions to all dialogues. At a time (1799) when he was already undertaking these translations, and constantly reading Plato for inspiration, Schleiermacher wrote *On Religion*, a work with which Heidegger was intensively occupied in his crucial transitional year of 1917. From 1810 at the University of Berlin, Schleiermacher went on to lay the groundwork of a 'hermeneutical' approach to the New Testament texts which at the present time is still (it has passed through a number of phases) a major force in Protestant theology. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, it was really only Dilthey who appreciated the full power and scope of Schleiermacher's philosophical thought. Through his acquaintance with Dilthey, Heidegger had access to Schleiermacher, and to his independent approach to Plato which applied the same hermeneutical method as for the scriptural interpretations. Why Heidegger's view of Plato remained so stubbornly Hegelian (the 'predecessor of Aristotle'), and why he did not learn more about Plato from Schleiermacher, is unclear. Perhaps by this time, Heidegger

had already fixed on the idea that the metaphysical tradition was in essence Aristotelian. There were in any case undeniable resemblances between Plato and Aristotle, and many problems with Neoplatonic and mystical interpretations of Plato. In the final event, Heidegger did not consider that Plato could complicate his sweeping verdict on a metaphysical tradition defined through Aristotle.

Could it be that Heidegger's 'dogmatism' on Plato conceals a much closer relation to genuine Platonism that Heidegger himself admits? On this score, Hans-Georg Gadamer comments that 'One could have thought that just the Platonic philosophy would have appeared as a possible means for going back behind the position of Aristotelian and post-Aristotelian metaphysics, and, in Plato's idea-dialectic, to recognize the dimension of self-manifesting Being, of the Being of *aletheia* which articulates itself in the *logos*'.[51] Gadamer, whose *Truth and Method* (1960) has contributed much to Schleiermacher's widening reputation, drew from Heidegger in his early (1931) work *Plato's Dialectical Ethics*.[52] In *Truth and Method* and later works, Gadamer brings together Plato, the practical philosophy of Aristotle, the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher, the *Lebensphilosophie* of Dilthey, and the existential analytic of Heidegger, all as contributions to 'philosophical hermeneutics'. For Gadamer, the importance of Plato is that he understands the 'dialogical' as well as the 'dialectical' dimension of philosophy: it is thus possible to learn much from Plato for a 'philosophy of practice'.[53] In the case of Aristotle, Gadamer separates the practical from the theoretical philosophy, regarding the latter as the foundation of that objectivism which in the modern period has sought to absolutize technologico-scientific definitions of reality. Gadamer believes that had Heidegger's approach to philosophy been more 'dialogical' he would have gone beyond his narrowly Aristotelian interpretation of Plato. Nevertheless, he still sees in Heidegger's existential analytic the seeds of a 'practical philosophy'.

The implications of this way of understanding Heidegger

will be dealt with in Chapter III. In the present context it is enough to point out that Heidegger always emphasized that he was not concerned with the distinction between theory and practice. For Heidegger, this distinction is Kantian, and impermissible in view of the unanswered questions from the *Science of Logic*. The ticklish question concerns the whereabouts of 'being *qua* being' in any 'philosophy of practice'. Heidegger remained in full agreement with Hegel that Kant did not succeed in disposing of the leading question of Aristotle's first philosophy, and fully sympathized with Hegel's view that precisely this question is the 'holy of holies', the first and last question of philosophy. Because Heidegger could not accept 'dialogue' as a substitute for Aristotelian theology, because, like the latter, Heideggerian 'thinking of Being' (*Seinsdenken*) is meant as 'higher' and thus 'more practical' than practice, he could not accept Gadamerian hermeneutical philosophy. Evidently, Heidegger was not at all attracted to the thoroughly demythologized, aestheticized, 'Schleiermachianized' Plato advocated by Gadamer from the early 1930's onwards: Heidegger's later statements on Plato show no sign of being modified by either Gadamer or Schleiermacher.

Heidegger's interpretation of Plato will be touched on at a few points in the present study, but will not be the object of thematic focus.[54] This is not because the topic is unimportant. On the contrary, if handled properly it immediately leads to the very important question of the relation between the philosophies of Heidegger and Plato. Conclusions in this area have great relevance for understanding Heidegger and thus for our present concerns. That Heidegger's interpretation of Plato is one-sidely Aristotelian cannot be doubted. But the question is not so much whether Heidegger 'got Plato right' as whether Heidegger overlooked, in Plato, a kindred spirit in his *Seinsfrage*. This means assessing Heidegger's possible Platonic and Neoplatonic affinities, the nature of Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy, and in addition, the relation between Platonic Gnosticism (or Middle-Platonism)

and Christianity. For after all, the New Testament is not entirely innocent of Platonism: Paul, who Heidegger saw in 1920/21 as articulating the 'factical life-experience' of the early Christians, was an educated Greek. If there are Greek and thus 'metaphysical' ideas in the Pauline letters (to say nothing of the fourth Gospel), if 'primordial Christianity' was promptly Hellenized and a metaphysical outlook transmitted to the Fathers (eventually even to Luther), and if Platonism never offered anything, in Christianity or elsewhere, other than metaphysics, this would certainly make Heidegger's *Seinsfrage* more difficult to situate and, in all probability, more obscure. On these matters I have certain views which from time to time will come to the surface in the following chapters. The reason they are developed very incompletely is that, as a matter of logic, Heidegger's relation to Aristotle must be understood first of all.

While scholars have not generally regarded Heidegger's interpretation of Plato as fertile soil, his discussions of the Presocratic philosophers Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides have proved more influential.[55] Paradoxically, no twentieth century commentator has contributed more than Heidegger to loosening up the long-entrenched Aristotelian approach to the Presocratics as primitive physicists, as well as to combatting the prejudice that they are of mainly 'historical' interest.[56] At the same time, Heidegger's approach to the three central Presocratics is curiously double-edged. For although on the one hand maintaining that they think Being in more 'primordial' a fashion than either Plato or Aristotle, he is still unwilling to concede that they break through to genuine *Seinsdenken*. Heidegger devotes much attention to etymological matters. In his view, the way in which pre-philosophical Greek is taken up into and modified in the philosophical discourse of the Presocratics can reveal the proximity of the *Seinsfrage*, but the latter gets covered over again by the explicit doctrines: with Parmenides' thesis that *to einai* = *to on* (being = what is), the threshold of metaphysics has been reached.[57] Heidegger's position seems

to be that the earliest Greek thinking furnishes a 'clue' to what gets covered up in metaphysics. Although in extracting this clue, in 'wrenching' from what was explicitly thought the decisive matter which remains unthought, one necessarily does violence to the texts themselves, for Heidegger this is unavoidable if one is to establish authentic dialogue, if one is to get back behind the 'first beginning' to make way for 'another beginning' of thinking. In Heidegger's later period, Heraclitus in particular assumes a seminal role, somewhat akin to that of Hölderlin, for the critique of metaphysical thought. Once again, however, Heidegger's attitude to the Presocratics is fundamentally determined by his view of metaphysics proper, and this means Aristotle. Accordingly, his interpretations of Presocratic philosophy only intrude marginally in the present study.

I
Being and the Ousiological Reduction

1 *SEINSVERGESSENHEIT* AND EVERYDAYNESS

We have already encountered two basic theses of Heidegger: 1. Aristotle's onto-theological response to the being-question testifies to the 'forgetting of Being' (*Seinsvergessenheit*); and 2. the genuine *Seinsfrage* depends on the forgotten difference between Being on the one hand, and beings on the other. The two theses belong together, for what 'onto-theological' means, and how this can amount to a *Vergessenheit*, depends on the meaning of 'ontological difference'. The strong charge of *Vergessenheit* indicates that Heidegger wishes to pose the being-question at a new level. Indeed for Heidegger, an ontology which proceeds out of but also towards the ontological difference is as different as can be from an ontology, like the Aristotelian, which 'forgets' this difference, ie. *Seinsdenken* and onto-theological (metaphysical) thought differ from each other in a far more radical way than do competing schools (eg. Platonism and empiricism) within metaphysics. To have some preliminary grasp of this difference, to have, in other words, some initial access to the *Seinsfrage*, is a presupposition for understanding what Heidegger says on Aristotle. But from where are we to gain this precursory comprehension? How is it possible, in regard to something (*Sein*) which is, on Heidegger's own admission, well-nigh unsayable, to avoid falling into vague speculations

or images? The situation would indeed be deplorable were it not for the fact that Heidegger sets the *Seinsfrage* over against *Seinsvergessenheit*.[1] If we can understand *Seinsvergessenheit* then presumably we can understand *Sein* und *Seinsdenken* and the ontological difference and much more in Heidegger. But what is *Seinsvergessenheit*? Is this question not just as difficult as all the others? Difficult it is, but we can attain an initial and indispensable orientation to *Seinsvergessenheit* through an equation often made by Heidegger, between *Seinsvergessenheit* and 'everydayness' (*Alltäglichkeit*). Heidegger proposes that Aristotelian ontology (and Aristotelian philosophy generally) is an articulation of the 'everyday' ('vulgar', 'average', 'natural' are other words used) understanding of Being.

A first response to this proposition might be to point out that Aristotle himself distinguishes between philosophy and the everyday, among other places in *Nichomachean Ethics* X, 5-9, where the pleasures of the contemplative life are compared with the non-philosophical pleasures (sensuous enjoyment, money, power and reputation) of the majority of human beings. Now if Heidegger, knowing this, nevertheless associates Aristotle with everydayness, what can this mean? Either Heidegger is accusing Aristotle of not surpassing what he (Aristotle) understands as the everyday, or he thinks of everydayness in an entirely different way to Aristotle, from a vantage point in fact, where even the Aristotelian contemplative life remains in the everyday. The latter is clearly Heidegger's hypothesis. The redefinition of philosophy through the *Seinsfrage* is equally a redefinition of everydayness.

An interest in everydayness goes back a long way in the history of philosophy, right back to the Presocratics. Heraclitus charged the majority of human beings with a kind of 'forgetting' of the *logos*, while Parmenides included in his philosophical poem some teachings on common opinion as the 'way of falsity'.[2] Plato then saw everydayness as the life within the cave, unilluminated by the ideas, governed by the exigencies of the sensuous realm. For Aristotle,

everydayness was a life deficient in philosophical intuition (*nous*), thus ignorant of the true being of things. But to speak of everydayness as 'deficient' and 'ignorant' can also be misleading. For all these philosophers, everydayness is not just the absence of truth, it is a positive orientation to untruth, a 'way' of untruth. A major problem in Greek philosophy was how untruth could in some sense have 'being': this had to be so if it could be expounded alongside truth in Parmenides' poem. But Parmenides had also said that 'non-being' cannot be thought, cannot 'be' in any sense. Faced with this apparent impasse, ie. the falsity in everydayness together with the non-thinkability of this within the accepted (Parmenidean) terms of Greek ontology, Plato, in the *Sophist*, takes the bold step of crediting the realm of *eidola* (images) with a sense of 'being'. In this dialogue and elsewhere (particularly the *Republic* 487b–497a) sophistry is associated with the unphilosophical nature of the everyday. There is a symbiotic relation between sophistry and the everyday non-philosophical life, for it is everyday untruth which the sophist 'juggles' to give the illusion of truth, and it is the sophist who is needed to protect the everyday from the criticism of philosophy. The untruth of sophistry is the untruth of everydayness in general, the untruth of all life outside of philosophy. But the 'content' or 'object' of this untruth is neither absolute non-being nor absolute being (the ideas, the Good). In this way everydayness is given a positive ontological meaning and becomes the site of a problem: how to account for the 'mixture' of truth and untruth to be found in everydayness, how to account for the 'two-headedness' of the 'way of untruth'.

In modern times, everydayness in this ontological sense has been eliminated by a philosophy which recognizes only correctness and incorrectness (the law of the excluded middle), while a less interesting substitute has been installed as the subject matter of the 'sociology of knowledge'. The fundamental transformation which thus occurs to the concept of everydayness is indicated by the fact that this and related disciplines deny the subordination (to be found, eg., in Plato

and Aristotle) of everydayness and everyday knowledge to the contemplative life and philosophical knowledge. Never before has the everyday been the object of so much research, but this has only occurred by wiping out any 'absolute' difference between truth and untruth. Meanwhile, more traditional (eg. 'realist') philosophers who do not reject 'true being' regard everydayness as unworthy of serious discussion, because it is 'false', has 'no being' etc. What Plato attempted in the *Sophist* is disallowed, on the one side by a sophistical Parmenideanism which says that 'everything is true', on the other side by an orthodox Parmenideanism which says that falsity can have 'no being'.

A first step towards understanding what Heidegger means by '*Seinsvergessenheit*' is taken when one comprehends it by analogy with the middle realm of truth in Plato's *Sophist*. It is not just the concept of *eidolon* which is relevant here. More fundamentally, this middle realm of truth is the realm of *doxa* and *endoxa*, of opinions and common conceptions. As such it has its own ontological integrity, its own sense of 'being' which cannot be narrowed down to epistemological incorrectness. To be sure, Heidegger considers that in Plato and Aristotle the grounds for this narrowing down were already present, through intellectual definitions of being and truth. When truth is understood as correct judgement, the otherness of the *eidola/doxa* tends to disappear back into non-being: does not Plato's *Sophist* in the end do away with a 'realm' of *eidola* through an explanation of negation and false propositions? An intellectually abstracted conception of falsity attains its extreme expression in positivist philosophy, the 'objectivity' of which prohibits any concessions to 'the false'. For Heidegger, this is all the consequence of *Seinsvergessenheit*. The terms of Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy ultimately lead back to the fundamental Parmenidean dichotomy of being and non-being. Such a development can be thwarted only by going behind this dichotomy to attempt new definitions of truth and being. This means that everydayness must also be understood differently.

We could say that, for Plato, everydayness is the 'forgetting' of the difference between the *eidola* and the ideas. When Heidegger charges the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies with *Seinsvergessenheit*, it is a more primordial forgetfulness he is alluding to, the Parmenidean forgetfulness of the difference between Being and beings. The Parmenidean formula was *to on* = *to einai*, *das Seiende* = *das Sein*, that-which-is (the being) = Being.[3] Plato gave 'plurality' to being, and Aristotle insisted on the difference between a principle and the thing of which it is the principle. Both thus rejected Parmenidean 'monism', but in their own philosophies they did not doubt the more fundamental Parmenidean thesis that Being is the simple self-identity of what is.[4] The everydayness of *Seinsvergessenheit* goes deeper than the reach of Parmenidean ontology, because it is the presupposition of the latter which is called into question by Heidegger: the assumption that Being is the 'things that are' and nothing else besides. Of course, it remains a question whether in fact there is anything to be forgotten about Being when one neglects this ontological difference purported by Heidegger. This is the question before us in the present inquiry, and to which, at this point, we are still seeking access. How does the equation of *Seinsvergessenheit* and everydayness aid us in this task?

This equation can aid us if we remain aware that everydayness is more a way of being than a way of knowing. The ordinary connotations of the word 'everyday' go beyond intellectual views of the world, and so does Heidegger understand the concept in a fundamentally 'existential' sense. In *Being and Time*, everydayness is one of the structures which make up the ontological constitution of man (*Dasein*). Heidegger gives a highly differentiated analysis of everydayness in the 'existential analytic' of this book. One of the most well-known aspects of his analysis concerns *Angst*, that peculiar 'anxiety' in the face of Being which – Heidegger contends – causes human beings to flee back into beings and thus more firmly into *Seinsvergessenheit*. While I do not at this stage wish to pursue the more precise significance of

anxiety in Heidegger's philosophy, it illustrates the nature of everydayness as an 'attitude' of a particular sort. Anxiety is not a cognitive state, nor does Heidegger wish it to be understood as a mere 'emotion'. It is a particular *Haltung*, a particular 'stance' towards Being. So more generally is the everydayness of *Seinsvergessenheit* more a matter of stance than of belief. It is a 'false' stance, but in a sense quite different to incorrectness. One of Heidegger's favoured expressions is 'attunement' (*Stimmung*): *Seinsvergessenheit* is attuned (*gestimmt*) to the world in a particular manner, *Seinsdenken* likewise. The idea of an attunement being 'true' or 'false' rings strange in the ears of modern thinkers, but it is the very essence of Heidegger's thought. Only if this is firmly borne in mind can Heidegger's engagement with Aristotle be comprehended.[5]

2 ONTOLOGY AND TEMPORALITY: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 'PRESENCE'

Speaking in the 'Introduction' to *Being and Time* of the need to 'destroy' the tradition of Western ontology, Heidegger asserts:

> When this is done, it will be manifest that the ancient way of interpreting the Being of entities is oriented to the 'world' or 'nature' in the widest sense, and that it is indeed in terms of 'time' that its understanding of Being is obtained. The outward evidence for this . . . is the treatment of the meaning of Being as *parousia* or *ousia*, which signifies, in ontologico-temporal terms, 'presence' (*Anwesenheit*). Entities are grasped in their Being as 'presence'; this means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time – the '*present*' (*Gegenwart*).[6]

This statement encapsulates many basic features of Heidegger's Aristotle-interpretation. What is normally taken as the most important ontological concept in Aristotle, *ousia*, is for Heidegger 'outward evidence' for the priority of 'presence'.

In Heidegger's usage, this latter concept has no exact equivalent in Greek, for precisely as the most fundamental determinant of Greek ontology it remains 'unthought'. The various 'levels' of being which the Greeks explicitly distinguish, most pertinently unchangeable and changeable being, are 'modifications' of presence: as we shall see in more detail later, unchangeable being is for Heidegger 'constant presence' (*beständige Anwesenheit*), while changeable being is the kind of presence which passes over into absence. Since Heidegger's own terminology varies and can be confusing, it is of utmost importance that this complex structure of presence be kept in mind. Sometimes '*Anwesenheit*' refers to presence in its universal ontological meaning, sometimes it can mean 'constant presence', on other occasions it can mean the temporary presence of a changeable entity. On Heidegger's analysis, the Greek word '*parousia*' (normally translated as 'presence') is restricted to the latter meaning, while '*ousia*' (especially in Aristotle) implicitly means 'constant presence'. On the other hand, because the Greeks did not have a universal ontological concept of presence, the mere *parousia* of changeable things, by virtue of the contrast with unchangeable *ousia*, tended to sink back into non-being. For Heidegger, only through a clarification of presence as the unitary but hidden determinant of Greek ontology can the overt ontological distinctions of the Greeks, and the manifold problems contained therein, be properly understood. His commentaries on the texts of Aristotle are largely devoted to showing this priority of presence.

But what precisely is presence? What difference does it make to learn that the whole gamut of Aristotelian ontology is governed by presence? For Heidegger, this difference can only be comprehended from a standpoint which is not so governed, from a standpoint which sees even presence as a particular, ontologically derivative, way of being. Now presence, Heidegger contends, is actually a *temporal* category: it corresponds to 'the present' which, along with 'the past' and 'the future', are the three parts

of time. Heidegger's thesis, then, is that the ontological priority of presence is reflected in, and ultimately grounded by, the priority of the 'now' in Aristotle's conception of durational (measurable) time. This means that, strictly speaking, the essence of Aristotelian ontology can be found in the analysis of time in *Physics* IV, Chs. 10-14, ie. in a work purportedly devoted to 'second philosophy'. Again strictly speaking, Heidegger's commentaries (in *Being and Time*, but particularly in the 1927 Marburg lectures) on these sections of *Physics* IV are the systematic centre of his whole interpretation of Aristotle. In these commentaries, Heidegger asserts the 'vulgarity' (everydayness) of Aristotelian time in its dependency on primordial 'ecstatic' temporality: once the derivative nature of 'now-time' is comprehended, so will be the derivative character of presence and of all the explicit categories of Aristotelian ontology. It will be recalled that, in his 1920/21 lectures on the phenomeology of religion, Heidegger interprets 'factical life-experience' in terms of a Pauline, non-Aristotelian, 'kairological' temporality, which Luther had also understood.

On the other hand, Heidegger's project of articulating the *Seinsfrage* through a new concept of temporality is by his own admission incomplete, perhaps radically deficient. For it turns out that the 'ecstatic' temporality from which the *Seinsfrage* is to be thought is the time of human existence, which itself can be thought only through the *Seinsfrage*. There is a circularity here which is unobjectionable in itself, but which is at odds with Heidegger's repeated assurances, especially in the early period, that the time problematic is the ontological master-key. As we shall see in Chapter III, Heidegger promises more than he delivers as far as a pure time-analysis is concerned, and in the end he seems unsure about the ontological status of time. This hardly puts Heidegger in a category by himself in the history of philosophy. Like many other thinkers, Heidegger arrives, with the phenomenon of temporality, at the limits of comprehensibility. More precisely, the possibilities of

comprehension are indirect. Heidegger's method is the *via negativa*: *Seinsdenken* and primordial temporality cannot have anything positively 'predicated' of them, but are intelligible through negation of *Seinsvergessenheit* and vulgar temporality. We thus have the equation *Seinsvergessenheit* = everydayness = vulgar temporality = presence = an attunement (stance) of a certain kind. If Heidegger, through an analysis of Aristotle's ontological concepts, can show their implicit meaning as presence, he will also bring the other terms of the equation into view. By the same token, a comprehension of these other terms will aid in understanding presence.

As mentioned, Aristotle treats the topic of temporality in the context of his *Physics*. Heidegger, on the other hand, elucidates ecstatic temporality within his existential analytic of *Dasein*. The significance of this difference would be misunderstood were one to think, as a number of commentators have suggested, that Heidegger in some way transfers the *Seinsfrage* out of physics (or metaphysics) into a new kind of ethics or 'practical philosophy'. Although it is not altogether inaccurate to see Aristotle's philosophy as rooted in 'physics', and Heidegger's philosophy as rooted in 'human existence', great care must be taken with the meaning of these terms. I shall be coming back to these matters at a later stage.[7] It should be noted, however, that the different systematic locations of the time-problem in Aristotle and Heidegger are reflected, in the present study, by separate discussions of Aristotle and Heidegger on time. Later in this chapter it will be shown how Aristotelian time is governed by the 'ousiological reduction' of the being-question. Heidegger's notion of 'ecstatic' temporality is treated in the context of 'human existence', in Chapter III.

3 THE QUESTION OF BEING AS THE QUESTION OF *OUSIA*

Discussing the English translation of Aristotelian terms, Joseph Owens points to the problem that 'A merely secondary or faulty meaning may become irrevocably associated with the translating word. Yet unless the fundamental and primary

meaning of the term is first isolated and made clearly recognizable in the English equivalent, the implications and the direction of the Stagirite's thought may become irretrievably lost'.[8] As Owens notes, the morphologically correct English rendition of the Aristotelian word *'ousia'*, which is formed by the nominalization of the present participle *'ousa'* (being) of the infinitive *'einai'* (to be), would be 'beingness'. However, Owens rejects this as a satisfactory translation, because 'beingness' has connotations of something abstract and universal, while the Aristotelian *'ousia'* means something concrete (a 'this', a particular thing). Owens also disallows the common English rendition 'substance', derived from the Latin *'substantia'*, which, via the commentaries of Boethius, became the standard Scholastic translation of *'ousia'*. This is because 'substance' has connotations (eg. in Locke) of something 'standing under' or 'underlying', whereas in Aristotle's usage this is only a secondary meaning of *'ousia'*. Owens finally settles on 'entity' as the most satisfactory translation, because it implies something concrete while still retaining the core connection with 'being'.[9]

I have not adopted Owens' suggestion in the present study, but have followed the custom and used 'substance' to translate *'ousia'*, or otherwise left the Greek term untranslated. However, the difficulties and pitfalls pointed out by Owens should be constantly borne in mind.[10] For example, consider Aristotle's statement in *Metaphysics* VII (Ross/Barnes translation) that 'the question which, both now and of old, has always been raised, and always been the subject of doubt, is just the question, what is substance? (*tis he ousia*)' (1028b,2-4). Now Aristotle is quite aware that his predecessors did not explicitly pose the question of 'what being is' as the question of *ousia*: this is his own innovation, although Plato had also used *'ousia'*, in a less precise way, to connote 'being' in the sense of real thing (*to on* or *to einai*).[11] Aristotle means that the original question 'what is being?' is scientifically unrigorous, that it is a question rooted in conceptions of pre-philosophical life belonging to the initial stage of inquiry, that it is a question

the terms of which remain dialectically unexamined, and that, when properly clarified, it turns out to be the question 'what is *ousia*?'. Let us leave aside the relationship of Aristotle and his predecessors, and consider only the relation between the first (unclarified) question 'what is being?', and the second (scientifically accurate) question 'what is *ousia*?'. Aristotle does not reject the initial question. On the contrary, he adopts very similar formulations when in Books IV (1003a,21) and VI (1026a,32) of the *Metaphysics*, he explains his desired *prote philosophia* as the science of 'being *qua* being' (*on he on*). In these books as well, Aristotle reformulates the imprecise question of 'being *qua* being' as the question of *ousia*, but his discussion has a clear preliminary character. With Book VII, preliminaries are briefly recapitulated, then Aristotle begins his classical discussion of *ousia* in terms of the concepts of form, matter, universal, essence etc.

Although there may be some doubt as to whether the question 'what is *ousia*?' can without difficulty be substituted for 'what is being?', the connection between the two questions is unlikely to be lost in the Greek language, where '*ousia*' and '*on*' both derive from the infinitive '*einai*' (to be). But as Owens points out, this connection can easily be overlooked when '*ousia*' is translated as '*substantia*' or 'substance', words which have no etymological connection whatsoever with 'being'.[12] In this case, the general question 'what is being?' may be entirely forgotten in the preoccupation with '*ousia*'. According to Heidegger, this is exactly what has happened in the history of metaphysics: the problems in carrying through the 'ousiological reduction' are simply ignored, and it is taken as an accomplished fact.

Are we therefore permitted to add another term to our equation, to say now that, for Heidegger, Aristotelian *Seinsvergessenheit* = the ousiological reduction? This is a legitimate equivalence, but only if '*ousia*' is itself understood in the terms indicated by Heidegger, which are quite different to the standard connotations of 'substance'. It is these latter which Heidegger has in mind when he says, in

his 1931 lectures on *Metaphysics* IX, that the accepted view of Aristotle's doctrine of being as a doctrine of substance is an error resulting from an 'inadequate interpretation of *pollachos*'.[13] In this particular context, Heidegger is criticizing the assimilation of the Aristotelian concepts *dunamis* and *energeia* to 'categorial' being (which includes *ousia* as the first category), thus ignoring the fact that the former pair of concepts are recognized by Aristotle as an independent 'way of saying being'. Elsewhere, Heidegger does not doubt what the texts show clearly, viz., that *ousia* is in some sense the primary meaning of being for Aristotle. Although in his preliminary discussion (*Meta.*1003b,5-19) Aristotle points out that 'there are many senses in which a thing is said to be', these are all referred to one principle which without further ado is identified as *ousia*: 'some things are said to be because they are *ousiai*, others because they are affections of *ousia*, others because they are a process toward *ousia*, or destructions or privations or qualities of *ousia*, or productive or generative of *ousia*, or of things which are relative to *ousia*, or negations of some of these things or of *ousia* itself' (1003b,6-10). This is not, be it noted, an enumeration of the categories. At *Meta.*1026,a33-1026b,3 (also 1071a,7-b,9), a fourfold classification of ways of saying being is given: accidental being (*kata sumbebekos*), being as truth (*alethes*) together with non-being as falsity (*pseudos*), being according to the categories (*ta schemata tes kategorias*) and finally, being in the modes of potentiality (*dunamis*) and actuality (*energeia*). These four senses of being are then reviewed at 1027b,16-1028a,5, with the result that accidental being, and being (non-being) as truth (falsity) are dismissed. There remains being according to the categories and being in the modes of potentiality and actuality, and here the preliminary discussion breaks off.

At the beginning of Book VII, which immediately follows this latter passage in logic as well as in the edition of Andronicus of Rhodes, there comes the above quoted statement where Aristotle reduces the question 'what is being?' to the question 'what is *ousia*?'. It is easy to see

that being according to the categories should reduce to *ousia* because *ousia* is itself the first category, upon which all the others depend. As for being in the modes of potentiality and actuality, it seems at the beginning of Book VII to have been dismissed, but returns as a major topic of Book IX. This book itself begins with a restatement of the priority of *ousia* as a way of saying being, then passes over to a discussion of potentiality and actuality. The last chapter of the book is a discussion of the previously dismissed being as truth/non-being as falsity. Accidental being has been ruled out as a candidate for the primary way of saying being, for it lacks the necessity (determination by principles) which is the presupposition of all scientific knowledge. So while Aristotle reduces the question 'what is being?' to the question 'what is *ousia*?', he does so in such a manner that independent discussions of being as truth/non-being as falsity, and of being in the modes of potentiality and actuality, are still regarded as necessary.

Heidegger grounds the primacy of *ousia* as an Aristotelian ontological concept in its meaning as presence, a meaning which is not encompassed by 'the categories' properly so-called, which are just one way of saying being. It is Heidegger's contention that, when *ousia* is understood as presence, it will also become clear why Aristotle was led to distinguish categorial being from the other ways of saying being, ie. what is behind the characteristic Aristotelian thesis of being as *pollachos*. Aristotle does not, Heidegger considers, attain complete clarity on this question. But he saw it as a question: the problem of the 'many ways of saying being' was still alive for him. When, on the other hand, Aristotelian ontology is narrowed down to a doctrine of substance the full dimensions of the underlying question 'what is being?' are no longer in view. As used in the present study, the expression 'ousiological reduction' presupposes Heidegger's broad sense of *ousia* as presence, the fundamental determinant of every way of saying being admitted by Aristotle. The equation of *Seinsvergessenheit* with the ousiological reduction is in these terms justified. However, this is still uninformative unless

we know more precisely what the ousiological reduction consists in.

4 *OUSIA* AND CATEGORIAL BEING

Of Aristotle's four ways of saying being, the way of the categories has traditionally been regarded as the essence of Aristotelian ontology. This is so even where the *Categories* text and the explicit 'theory of categories' developed therein is treated as of subordinate interest to, eg., *Metaphysics* VII-VIII, which treats the ontological constitution of *ousia*. For not only is *ousia* the first category, upon which all the others depend, but these central *Metaphysics* books (as well as much of the *Physics*) presuppose the kind of ontology (particularly *ousia* as the 'subject' of 'predication' of all the other categories) sketched out in the *Categories*. While Heidegger does not disagree with the priority traditionally accorded to the categorial way of saying being, he considers that Aristotle's other ways have been neglected, with the consequence that *ousia* is too narrowly understood. For Heidegger, the ontological meaning of 'categoriality' (ultimately, as presence) can become clear only if 'being (non-being) as truth (falsity)' and 'being as *dunamis* and *energeia*' are also clarified and justified – thus Heidegger's great interest in *Metaphysics* IX, in his commentaries on which he attempts to rehabilitate *energeia* and *aletheia* as ontological concepts on a par with *ousia*. It is an extended sense of categoriality, which includes these other two ways of saying being, which Heidegger takes as equivalent to the presence of *ousia*.

The significance of categorial being is most easily seen not from Aristotle's systematic treatment, in the *Categories* text, of the structure of categoriality, but from the *role* of categorial being (for variation I call this the 'doctrine of categories') in Aristotle's ontological discussions, particularly in the *Metaphysics* and the *Physics*. For example, at the beginning of Book VII of the *Metaphysics*, after giving an abbreviated list of the categories, Aristotle says: 'While being (*on*) has all these senses, obviously that which "is" primarily

(*proton on*) is the "what" (*to ti esti*) which indicates the *ousia* of the thing' (1028a,13-15). There are various senses of 'what', but a fundamental sense which indicates what a thing is: for example, when we say that Socrates is a man, we use the fundamental sense, but when we say that Socrates is white we use one of the secondary senses. It is in virtue of the fundamental kind of what-ness that all the other kinds of what-ness have application (1028a,28). The what-ness of a thing in the fundamental sense is that in virtue of which 'we know (*eidenai*) each thing most fully' (1028a,37). This kind of what-ness is the *ousia* of a thing: as the first category it is the condition of the possibility of all the others. The categories other than *ousia* are *predicables*: 'all the other things are either said of the primary *ousiai* as subjects or are in them as subjects. So if the primary *ousiai* did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist' (*Cat.* 2b,5-7). Although it is utterly different from the others, *ousia* is included in the list of ten categories because it is the universally required subject of predication. In predication, something is said of something, and this something must first of all exist for anything to be predicated of it. Accordingly, the question 'what is *ousia*?' is a question about the basic subjects of predication.

In *Metaphysics* VII, Aristotle proceeds from what is more 'intelligible to us' to what is more 'intelligible by nature'. The task is 'to start from what is more intelligible to oneself and make what is intelligible by nature intelligible to oneself' (*Meta.*1029b,7-9). At the beginning of the treatise, Aristotle brings to mind those things which are intelligible to us. Included here is the knowledge that *ousia* is a this, that it is a subject of predication, that it is responsible for what a thing primarily is (a man, a horse etc.), that it has the primary role in the definition of a thing, that it is a universal, a genus, a unity etc. Not all items of this precursory knowledge are of equal worth, for Aristotle goes on to argue that *ousia* cannot be a universal or a genus. The initial condition of inquiry is a totality of conceptions and opinions which are clear to us but by nature unclear.

Our initial clarity, though the indispensable starting point of reflection, is faulty, it is a subjective rather than an objective clarity. By analysis, the difficulties (inherent obscurities) of our initial concepts emerge, and we press forward towards what is clear by nature.

The procedure is well illustrated in *Metaphysics* VII.3, where Aristotle, after having already stated many times that *ousia* is a subject (substratum) for predication, urges 'but we must not merely state the matter thus; for this is not enough. The statement itself is obscure, and further, on this view, *matter* becomes *ousia*' (1029a,7-10). After explaining that matter is never a this or separable unity, Aristotle concludes that matter cannot possibly be *ousia* 'for both separability and this-ness are thought to belong chiefly to *ousia*' (1029a,27-29). As a matter of fact, Aristotle does not himself think that 'separability' (except in a notional sense, and in respect of the first *ousia* as *theos*) belongs to *ousia*: this is his well-known objection to Plato. He mentions 'separability' because he recognizes that this-ness goes together with a what-ness which ontologically transcends any particular: eg. Socrates, this entity here, is a man, Socrates 'is', *qua* 'this', only in so far as his 'what-ness' is manhood. This-ness and what-ness, the basic terms of categorial being, are the basic criteria of *ousia*. They are the criteria employed by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* VII when concluding that matter is *ousia* only in a secondary sense. The other two candidates for *ousia*, form and the composite, are similarly assessed in terms of this-ness and what-ness, and unlike matter, they pass the test. In the end, it emerges that form is best qualified of all to be *ousia*, because form allows a composite to be a 'this/what'. Unlike matter, form is determinate, eg. the form of man is different to that of horse, and can be spoken of as something definite. However, Aristotle still does not reduce *ousia* to form. *Ousia* does not reduce to a single principle but to that ordered set of principles which define categorial being, the way of being which is 'clear by nature'.

In the *Physics* as well, the doctrine of categories regularly

appears at vital points of Aristotle's ontological discussions. In, eg. the review of his predecessors in Book I, Melissus' doctrine of the Infinite and One meets with Aristotle's abrupt rejoinder that infinity belongs to the 'category of quantity' and cannot pertain to *ousia* itself 'except through a concomitant attribute' (185a,34-b,1). The monism of Parmenides gets the same reception a little later in the text, Aristotle concluding his considerations with the words: 'To say that all things will be one, if there is nothing besides what is itself, is absurd. For who understands "what is itself" to be anything but some particular thing? But if this is so, there is still nothing to prevent there being many beings' (187a,7-9). The discussion of becoming (*geneseos*) in I.7 is also, as Wieland has shown, governed by the doctrine of categories.[14] Other examples of ousiological-categorial determination in Aristotelian 'physics' will be given in the next section below.

The everyday meaning of *kategorein* as 'accuse' is an important clue to the philosophical meaning of the doctrine of categories. *Kategorein* occurs in, among other contexts, the law courts, where a decision is made on the what-ness of a this, eg. whether this man is a thief. In English, to 'categorize' something is to attach a predicate to it, to give a what-ness for a particular thing. Now the idea of 'what-ness' is not distinctive to Aristotle: although he adopts novel terminology ('*to ti en einai*' = 'essence'), Aristotle obviously leans heavily on Plato for his insight that beings always possess a what-content. The classically Aristotelian criterion of *ousia*, inseparable from what-ness (predication) in the doctrine of categories, is this-ness, more precisely 'the this/what', the *tode ti* (*Meta.* 1028a,12, 1029a,28, *Cat.* 3b,10).[15] The *tode ti* is the 'subject' or 'substratum' (*hupokeimenon*) of all the categories after *ousia*, but (unlike matter) it is a particular (eg. Socrates) possessing a particular what-ness (eg. manhood). This concept of *tode ti* functions to refute the Platonic thesis of 'separable' forms, for according to Aristotle all what-ness is either 'in' the *tode ti* (eg. whiteness) or *is* the *tode ti* itself (eg. the man Socrates). When

Aristotle, in *Metaphysics* VII, gives form priority over matter and the composite in the definition of *ousia*, it seems he has given ground to Platonism. Nevertheless, Aristotle remains emphatic that form has no real being apart from the *tode ti*: 'Is there, then, a sphere apart from the individual spheres or a house apart from the bricks? Rather we may say that no "this" (*tode ti*) would ever have been coming to be, if this had not been so. The "form" however means the "such", and is not a "this" – a definite thing' (*Meta.* 1033b,19-22).

Whence comes this priority of the *tode ti* in Aristotelian ontology? This question should be distinguished from that concerning the origin of the ten specific categories. Aristotle does not raise this latter question, and since ancient times the debate as to whether the categories are 'linguistic' or 'real' classifications has not subsided. However, as Heidegger, Wieland, and many others have pointed out, the distinction between language and reality in Aristotle is problematic.[16] Whatever the origin of the various categories might be (and it is easy to see that there is no straightforward correspondence to grammatical classifications), the fundamental question concerns the structure of categoriality, ie. the relation between the first category *ousia* (as *tode ti* and *hupokeimenon*) and all the other categories. At this level, the determining role of 'predicative structure' is plain to see: all the categories after *ousia* are 'predicables'. The thesis that being itself has the structure of predication was first advanced by Plato (or the Eleatic stranger) in the *Sophist*. In this late dialogue, which many regard as the inspirational source of Aristotle's doctrine of categories, Plato's problem is to determine whether the 'falsity' of the sophists can possibly be, for it is supposedly an 'image' of non-being, which is impossible on Parmenidean grounds. To solve this problem, Plato attacks the roots of Parmenidean ontology, coming to the conclusion that non-being can in a sense have being, namely as 'otherness'. Plato's argument depends on the structural correspondence between the *logos* and being: 'otherness' as a way of being is read off from the fact that, in the proposition, 'something

is said of something'. The doctrine of categories in Aristotle results from the same manner of reasoning. Common to the proposition and being is the structure 'something as something', for in the first case a linguistic subject has a linguistic predicate attached to it, in the second case a real thing (*tode ti*) has a property (one or other of the non-*ousia* categories) ascribed to it. In other words, the 'linguistic' determination of the categories has to do with the *deep-structure* of language, which is nothing else but the *logos*, the order governing all being. It can easily be verified that Aristotle, when he comes to address ontological issues, seeks clarity not only about what is said, but above all about what *can* be said. Only what is sayable is knowable, and what is knowable – Aristotle does not differ from Plato on this fundamental point – certainly has being.[17]

The doctrine of categorial being in Aristotle cannot be conveniently resolved into either 'realism' or 'idealism' but has elements of both. On the one hand the *tode ti* is the sensible particular, which would seem to indicate a realist ontology, but on the other hand the *tode ti* is also a 'what' accessible only through its *eidos*, which seems to involve idealism of the Platonic kind. This is not an inconsistency, but indicates Aristotle's awareness that realism and idealism are not the basic alternatives in philosophy. Nor, as we shall see in the next chapter, does Aristotle think that the *eidos* of a *tode ti* is any kind of theoretical construction emerging from empirical induction. The *eidos* is *a priori* and as such is the condition of the possibility of the *tode ti*. Whether Aristotle, in criticizing the separability of the forms, fell into a misunderstanding of Plato (as alleged by Natorp) makes no difference to the fact that for Aristotle himself the *eidos* has a transcendental status vis-a-vis sensible reality. Nor can it be overlooked that, in the end and after much consideration, Aristotle does admit separable and non-sensible *ousia*, indeed as the crown of his whole philosophy (*Meta.* 1073a,3). This highest *ousia*, this *theos* which as self-thinking thought gives being to everything else, is not identical with the Platonic

forms, but in its intellectual-transcendent character it is not unlike them.

How does this divine *ousia* fit into the doctrine of categories? The difficulty here is that, because all the non-*ousia* categories are determinations of sensible things, the *theos* itself appears to be a 'subject' which is not susceptible to any predicates whatever. But if this is so, Aristotle's doctrine of categories, since it does not apply to the first principle of being, is radically deficient. Such at least was the conclusion of the Neoplatonic commentators, including Plotinus himself, who although willing to acknowledge the approximate validity of the categories in the sensory realm, insisted that the most important part of philosophy (theology) required a quite different treatment, proceeding from (as they considered) orthodox Platonism, particularly from the supreme Platonic principle of 'the Good'. When philosophy, in the early centuries of the Christian era, became more overtly theological, Neoplatonism became the accepted frame of reference, with the 'critique of the categories' as the standard way of demonstrating the limitations of Aristotelianism. This tradition of category-criticism is important to bear in mind for situating Heidegger's attitude to Aristotle. Of course, for those who (in the heyday of Christianity they were few, nowadays they are much more numerous) are content to delete theology from philosophy, the indicated limitation of the categories is no objection, indeed it is just one more reason for thinking that the *theos* is unnecessary. On the other hand, those who persisted with more mystical or religious ways of thought were often led (with or without explicit reference to Aristotle) to a critique of the categories.[18] Also to be noted is that, for such thinkers (in the first place, Plotinus), what is beyond the reach of the categories is not at all a *theos* of the Aristotelian kind, ie. not a first *ousia*, not a possible subject of any predicates, but is beyond *ousia* altogether: '*huper-ousia*' (Plotinus, Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysius, Eriugena). Such is also the basic position of Heidegger. Like the physicalists, Heidegger does not want

the Aristotelian *theos*, but he also rejects the doctrine of categories as an answer to the question 'what is being?'. In short, Heidegger resists the reduction of Being to categorially determined beings, even of the highest order.

So far we have observed that the Aristotelian ousiological reduction (which for Heidegger = *Seinsvergessenheit* = everydayness = presence) resolves into the doctrine of categorial being. Since the categories are limited to sensible reality, this abstract ontological doctrine only acquires flesh and blood when Aristotle puts it to work in his characteristic project of 'physics'. This is not to say that Aristotelian physics is an 'application' of the doctrine of categories. In the order of research, it would seem more likely that Aristotle came to the categories by way of his physical inquiries, even if, in the *Physics* text itself, the broad features of the category doctrine are already in place. The symbiotic relation between categorial being and 'physicalism' is evident throughout the history of philosophy. In Kant, for example, the categories of the 'understanding' (*Verstand*) give the ontological constitution of the phenomenal world investigated by natural science. The positivism of the last two centuries, although imagining itself free of metaphysical presuppositions, is similarly beholden to categorial being and the physicalism which inevitably accompanies it. To see these connections, however, requires that the 'categorial' or 'ousiological' character of Aristotelian physics be more concretely demonstrated.

5 THE CONCEPT OF *PHUSIS* AND ARISTOTLE'S OUSIOLOGICAL PHYSICS

The leading question of Aristotle's first philosophy is 'what is being *qua* being?' (*ti to on he on*). This question abstracts from all special properties of entities and asks after just those determinations in virtue of which they 'are'. Proceeding from his doctrine of categorial being, Aristotle reformulates the question as 'what is *ousia*?', with this-ness (thingliness) as the criterion of *ousia*. In *Metaphysics* VII-VIII he explores various answers, and while not coming to any final and

unambiguous conclusion, develops his characteristic concepts of form, matter, and the composite, which provide a general frame of reference for dealing with the problem. The inquiry in these books is oriented to sensible *ousia*, whose existence is taken for granted at the outset. Aristotle raises the question of whether supersensible *ousia* exists, but does not deal with it systematically until *Metaphysics* XII. When, in this latter book, he finally establishes that supersensible *ousia* does indeed exist, his argument depends on a basic characteristic of sensible *ousia*: its *movability* (1071b,2-7). So Aristotle does not establish the existence of supersensible *ousia* from independent considerations but from the ontological incompleteness of sensible *ousia*, whose movability requires an unmoved mover.[19] Since this highest *ousia* (*theos*), and the necessity of its existence, can be understood only through knowledge of movable *ousia*, 'metaphysics', as the name suggests, is dependent on physics.[20]

As Wieland emphasizes in *Die aristotelische Physik*, physics is not only the starting point of Aristotle's philosophy but is also, ontologically speaking, its essential nature.[21] Although physical reality is not the highest reality, it is 'more intelligible to us', and as such is the necessary starting point of inquiry. But physics is not just a preliminary discipline which, once its metaphysical implications are understood, can be dispensed with. The bulk of the Aristotelian *corpus* consists of physical works, while those parts directly concerned with first philosophy (theology) are by comparison very limited. It is arguable that, strictly speaking, Aristotle's metaphysics, if by this is understood the doctrine of the *theos*, is entirely confined to the latter half of *Metaphysics* XII, together with a few sections from *Physics* VIII. This corresponds to what Aristotle says in *Parts of Animals* about our knowledge of divine things being limited to 'scanty conceptions', compared with which 'in certitude and in completeness our knowledge of terrestial things has the advantage' (644b,32-645a,2). On the other hand, if metaphysics is understood as ontology rather than as theology, the whole *corpus* could be regarded

as metaphysical, for even in Aristotle's more specialized treatises, discussion of first (ontological) principles is never entirely absent. The Aristotelian enterprise of physics is itself an answer to the question 'what is being?'. Whatever may be subsequently concluded in respect of supersensible immovable *ousia*, reality is for Aristotle in the first place physical reality. This, understood not as an epistemological but as an ontological thesis, is his distinctive philosophical position vis-a-vis Plato and the Eleatic tradition.

To understand what Aristotle means by '*phusis*', we must beware of reading back into it our modern concept of 'nature'. There is obviously a connection between the two ('*phusis*' was translated into Latin as '*natura*') but as we shall presently observe, there are also important differences. What common-sense nowadays understands by 'nature' is to a great degree influenced by the mathematical natural sciences since Galileo. It is widely thought that the Galilean scientific revolution has superseded Aristotelian physics. In one respect this is obviously true, because Aristotle's physical writings go beyond pure ontology to give positive (ontic) theories about the workings of nature (eg. concerning the movement of the elements and of the heavenly bodies) which have been refuted by modern physics. But this does not mean that Aristotle's basic physical ontology has been likewise superseded. The highly differentiated concepts of modern mathematical physics did not proceed from an ontological vacuum, but involve deep-rooted presuppositions about the structure of sensible reality, presuppositions articulated in the Aristotelian doctrine of categorial being. At the same time, the relevance of Aristotelian physics is not limited to the modern sciences of nature. In many ways like Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Aristotelian physics presents an analysis of sensible experience in general, a delineation of the horizon of all possible experience. But let us turn to Aristotle's own definition of '*phusis*'.

According to Aristotle, sensible *ousiai* are of two basic kinds: perishable and imperishable, corresponding respectively to the sublunary and celestial regions of the cosmos.

Imperishable *ousiai* are exempt from all the kinds of change to which perishable *ousiai* are subject, with the single exception of change of place: while the heavenly bodies are eternal and do not suffer qualitative change, they move in perfectly regular circular orbits. If, as Aristotle maintains, these heavenly bodies together with all sublunary things make up physical reality, *phusis* must be defined accordingly, ie. not in terms of the changeability which characterizes sensible *ousiai* only, but strictly as change of place. The key principle of Aristotelian physics is movement (*kinesis*) in this specific sense. In Book II of the *Physics*, we read that *phusis* is 'a principle or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily' (192b,22-23). Similarly in Book V (1015a,13-15) of the *Metaphysics*, '*phusis* in the primary and strict sense is the substance of things which have in themselves, as such, a source of movement'.

Aristotle explains his definition by contrasting physical things with the products of art (*techne*), eg. a bed or a coat (*Phys.*192b,17). These latter things do not, *qua* the particular artefacts that they are, possess an inherent principle of movement. Since such artefacts are themselves made from physical substances, they have an impulse to movement which derives from their constituting materials, but this is not an *inherent* impulse. The bed does not, *qua* bed, possess any principle of movement, but in so far as it is made of wood, it will partake of the inherent tendency of earth (one of the four elements) to move downwards. Fire, by contrast, has an inherent tendency to move upwards. All complex physical things have an inherent impulse to movement, with the particular direction of the motion being in each case dependent on the combination of elements in the complex thing. The simple heavenly bodies move eternally and unchangeably in their proper place, while the movement of complex physical bodies resolves itself, due to the characteristic movements of the four elements each towards its respective proper place, into an eternal cycle of formation and dissolution. Physical things have the source of

their own reproduction in themselves (192b,27). The celestial bodies remain eternally what they are in their perfect circular motion, while in the sublunary realm, the cycle of origination and destruction occurs in and of itself, preserving the forms of all things.

Antiphon had asserted that were the rotting wood of a bed, planted in the ground, to send off shoots, what would grow would be wood and not a bed. This was meant to show that the physicality of the bed (considered as its real nature) is the material substratum which perists throughout all changes, whether effected by human beings or other agents. Aristotle points out that what would grow is not simply wood but a tree: it is not just the material substratum of the world which is constantly replenished, but the forms of nature. This does not mean that forms exist separately and are from time to time instantiated, but simply that the *principle* of physical things (*phusis*) differs from physical things themselves. *Phusis* is the physicality of physical things, their way of being: it is an ontological principle, an ontological concept. A thing (eg. a man) is not *phusis* itself but 'physical' (193b,6). *Phusis* is the total *process* of nature, it is the constant actualization of the material substratum's potentialities. Physical things have their being (are what they are) only in this self-moving process. Perishable things have their origin in this process and disappear into it. Since there can be no coming-into-being from absolute nothingness, and no passing away into absolute nothingness, *phusis* is in a sense the reservoir from which the stock of perishable physical reality is constantly replenished. But in another sense, *phusis* is not a reservoir at all, if by this is meant some 'thing' which exists separately from particular physical things. The forms of physical things are not preserved because they are taken from some separate supply-house, but because 'man is born of man'.

It is now possible to see in what sense Aristotle's conception of *phusis* is itself governed by the ousiological reduction. Just as the question 'what is being?' is reduced to the question 'what is the thingliness of things?', so the question 'what is

phusis?' is reduced to the question 'what is the physicality of physical things?'.[22] Since physicality is defined in terms of an inherent impulse to movement, Aristotle's main concern in the *Physics* is to investigate the principles of movement to which all bodies are subject. These principles are 'in' the things themselves: the sublunary elements themselves possess the tendency to move towards their natural places, while the heavenly bodies themselves possess the impulse to circular motion. Movement is not something which happens to bodies whose ontological status can be independently defined. The being of physical bodies is being-in-movement, with rest understood as a phase of movement, eg. the chair rests as a movable thing, whereas numbers, which are not physical things, neither move nor rest. The ousiological parameters of Aristotle's whole project are already evident in *Physics* I.2, where Parmenides and Melissus are criticized in terms of the doctrine of categories: the idea that Being is one, Aristotle argues, implies that 'there is a principle no longer, since a principle must be a principle of some thing or things' (185a,2-4). Unless Being is understood as the being of beings, physics cannot get started, and so Aristotle deals with the views of the Parmenideans not as rival physical doctrines but as conceptual confusions. In *Physics* III.1, the ousiological reduction is fully in force: 'There is no such thing as motion over and above the things. It is always with respect to *ousia* or to quantity or to quality or to place that what changes changes . . . neither will motion and change have reference to something over and above the things mentioned, for there *is* nothing over and above them' (200b,33-201a,3). Since movement is always the movement of things, there are precisely as many types of movement as there are categories, ie. fundamental aspects of thingliness (201a,8).

The ousiological structure of Aristotelian physics is reflected particularly clearly in the discussion of 'the Infinite' (*Phys.* III. 4-8). In *De Caelo*, where Aristotle treats this in a more restricted context than in the *Physics*, it is called the 'problem which practically always has been and may be expected to be

the source of the differences of those who have written about nature as a whole' (271b,6-8). Aristotle inherits the problem from his predecessors, particularly Anaximander, who refers to 'the Infinite' (*to apeiron*) as a the fundamental principle (*arche*) of all reality. As Aristotle explains (*Phys.* 203b,3-14), for Anaximander and the majority of the other early physicists the Infinite is the source of all coming-to-be and the terminus of all passing away: it is eternal, uncreatable and indestructible, without quality or quantity, and without limits of any kind; because of these characteristics it is commonly identified with 'the divine'. For Aristotle, however, the basic question is whether the Infinite can function as a principle in his own specific sense. This means that, from the beginning of his critical considerations, the problem of the Infinite is ousiologically reduced, ie. reduced to the problem of whether an infinite thing or body can exist: 'Our inquiry is limited to our special subject-matter, the objects of sense, and we have to ask whether there is or is not among them a body which is infinite' (204b,1-3). The supposition that this is possible is refuted by arguments which depend on the doctrine of categorial being.[23] Aristotle points out, eg. that an infinite body could not be bounded by a surface, and is therefore inconsistent with the definition of body. Similarly, an infinite body, whether this be simple or complex, could not be at any particular place, and this again contradicts the concept of body. Aristotle does not dismiss the idea of infinity, but reformulates it within ousiologically acceptable terms, as the infinity of the continuum: 'Being is spoken of in many ways, and we say that the infinite is in the sense in which we say it is day or it is the games, because one thing after another is always coming into existence' (206a21-22). Infinity in the sense of the continuum is needed by ousiology because physical things are in motion and time, both of which are infinite in this sense (one thing after another without end). Although 'the infinite cannot be an actual thing and an *ousia* and principle' (204a,20) the continuum is a presupposition of thingliness in general, and thus of ousiology itself.

Either it does not occur to Aristotle that Anaximander might have attached a *non*-ousiological meaning to 'the Infinite', or if it does, he rejects such an idea as conceptually confused. In the *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, and other works, Anaximander, along with Heraclitus, Empedocles and Anaxagoras, are treated as physicists who are hampered by an unclear understanding of principles. For example, in *Metaphysics* I.7 we read that 'of those who speak about principle and cause no one has mentioned any principle except those which have been distinguished in our work on nature, but all evidently have some inkling of them, though only vaguely' (988a,21-23). The causes here alluded to are those explicated in *Physics* II. 3&7: the material, formal, efficient and final causes. Aristotle ascribes the limitations of previous physicists to their unclarity about the nature and number of causes (*Meta.* 983b,19). Because of this unclarity, 'these thinkers do not seem to know what they say; for it is evident that, as a rule, they make no use of their causes except to a small extent' (985a,16-18). Further, with their predilection for the material cause, they overlook the defining question of physics, the question of movement. If, as seems the case, Aristotle intends these criticisms to apply to Anaximander's conception of the Infinite, then he is interpreting the Milesian philosopher according to his (Aristotle's) own ousiological frame of reference. From this perspective, if Anaximander had indeed 'made use' of his cause he would have discovered the contradictions referred to above, and would have seen that 'the Infinite' can mean only the continuum, not an infinite body. That ousiology (the doctrine of categories) has taken on the character of self-evidence for Aristotle is indicated by his view that the earlier physicists, in their neglect of supersensible *ousia*, thereby neglect the divine (*Meta.* 988b,24-26 & 989b,21-27). Anaximander views the Infinite as divine, but this makes no sense within ousiology: there cannot be a divine infinite body because there cannot be an infinite body at all, and no one would maintain that the continuum is divine. Aristotle

concludes that the divine, which exists only as supersensible *ousia*, is lacking in the philosophies of Anaximander and other 'materialists'. The possibility that the divine could be thought non-ousiologically, and that Anaximander's conception of the Infinite might be one way of doing this, is not considered.

In *Physics* III.1 Aristotle states that 'place, void, and time are thought to be necessary conditions of motion' (200b20). Since 'there is no such thing as motion over and above the things' (200b33), and since movability is the way of being of physical things, the inquiries which follow concern the necessary conditions of physical thingliness as such. The concept of void is struck out (for this would mean that non-being could be), so that place and time remain as the essential determinants. I shall be dealing with the topic of time at some length in the next section, but let me now briefly consider the Aristotelian concept of place. In *Physics* IV. 4 there occurs the statement: 'We say that a thing is in the world, in the sense of in place, because it is in the air, and the air is in the world; and when we say it is in the air, we do not mean that it is in every part of the air, but that it is in the air because of the surface of the air which surrounds it' (211a, 24-27). Aristotle explains that, in one sense, 'being-in' means to be part of a whole, eg. the apple core is 'in' the apple as part of it. But when we say that a thing is 'in the world' we mean something else: the apple is itself 'in the world' in the sense of being in a *container or vessel.* More precisely (lest we think, eg. of the apple as the vessel of the apple-core) to be in the world (in the sense of place) is to be in a *motionless vessel* (212a,14-19). Place is not itself a physical thing and therefore does not move, while all physical things move from one place to another within the vessel. To be a physical something is to be somewhere and vice versa (212b,15). Does the world as a whole have a place? Aristotle answers in the negative: 'alongside the universe or the Whole there is nothing outside the universe, and for this reason all things are in the world; for the world, we may

say, is the universe' (212b,17-19). There is nothing outside the world because everything is bounded by it. 'Place is indeed somewhere' says Aristotle, though 'not in the sense of being in a place, but as the limit is in the limited' (212b,26-27). The world is the limit of all physical reality, so that, within the world, 'to be' means the same as 'to be in a place'.

The Aristotelian analyses of place, time, and infinity are meant to establish two basic theses, firstly that these are not themselves things, secondly that each refers to a particular determination of physical thingliness. Since the physical world is not, on Aristotle's view, the highest reality, these concepts could be considered as belonging to regional ontology. On the other hand, because the metaphysico-theological reality of supersensible *ousia* (the unmoved mover) is validated entirely through physical arguments, the concepts of physical ontology have a *fundamental* status. The ousiological nature of Aristotelian metaphysical theology is dependent on the ousiological nature of Aristotelian physics: the question 'what is being?' is answered first by an ousiologically purified physics wherein the metaphysical pretentions of place, time, and infinity are disposed of, and then by arguments linking movable and unmovable reality. Unless this connection between physics and metaphysics is firmly borne in mind, the statement that Aristotelian physics is ousiological will appear a triviality. What could be more obvious, it might be asked, than that physics deals with physical things? But in the *Physics* and related writings, Aristotle is concerned not so much with explaining physical phenomena (though this also occurs) as with determining what counts as physical in the first place. His discussion of Anaximander's 'the Infinite' (as also his treatment of place and time) shows that the identity of physicality and the physical thing is not intrinsically obvious, but depends on certain decisions on what is conceptually admissible. These decisions are made in Aristotle's doctrine of categories: as such they are *ontological* decisions.

6 TIME AND OUSIOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY

Of the various reductions carried out within the Aristotelian physics, it is the reduction of time which has paramount significance for Heidegger, because, in his view, the *Seinsvergessenheit* of Aristotelian ontology is based on the reduction of 'primordial' temporality to the physical temporality of everydayness. It is this *Vergessenheit der Zeit* which, as earlier indicated, Heidegger holds responsible for the unreflected primacy of 'presence' (*ousia*) within Greek ontology in general. The present section limits itself to just those features of Aristotle's time-analysis which are relevant to Heidegger's argument, and which serve to further illustrate the ousiological reduction.

Aristotle's discussion of time occurs in *Physics* IV, Chs. 10-14, following his treatment of infinity, place, and the void. This context is significant, for it indicates Aristotle's view that all these topics are amenable to the same method of analysis: in each case the phenomenon is to be demystified through application of an ousiological frame of reference. We have observed in the previous section how this occurs in respect of infinity, ie., Aristotle argues that this cannot be a kind of 'super-thing' over and above particular physical things, but, conceived as the continuum, is merely a condition (of the possibility) of physical things, more specifically, of their being-in-motion. The discussion of time proceeds according to the same principles. After a brief review of the *aporiai* connected with time, and of traditional accounts of the subject, Aristotle focuses on the relation between time and the movement of bodies, and pursues this line of inquiry till the end of Book IV. As usual, he begins from what is more intelligible to us, and proceeds by analysis to what is more intelligible by nature. There are ongoing references to what we ordinarily realize about time and to our ordinary use of temporal terms. The upshot of his deliberations is that time is simply 'the measure of movement in respect of before and after', a conclusion which on the one hand excludes mythologico-mystical accounts, and on the other

hand prepares for the genuinely theologico-metaphysical ascent to the unmoved mover in Book VIII.[24]

The correspondence between the before and after of movement and the before and after of time is indicated by the fact that we measure movement by time, which leads Aristotle to his well-known definition (219b,1): 'For time is just this – number of motion in respect of "before" and "after"' (*arithmos kineseos kata to proteron kai husteron*). Time admits of enumeration and in this sense is a 'kind of number' (219b,3-5), but it cannot exist without that which it measures, the movement of bodies. Like movement, time has the structure of the continuum: the nows of time are comparable to the points on a line, in that both mark divisions into finite segments which are themselves divisible *ad infinitum*. We have seen that, in accordance with ousiological principles, Aristotle will not grant any reality to motion over and above that of the moving body itself. Therefore, when he says that 'the now corresponds to the body that is carried along, as time corresponds to the motion' (219b,23-24) he means that the now is the reality of time in the same way as the moving body is the reality of motion. Just as motion can exist only as the motion of a body, so time can exist only as a now. The succession of nows in time is analogous to the succession of points in a movement because 'there corresponds to the point the body which is carried along, and by which we are aware of the motion and of the before and after involved in it' (219b,16-18). This explains Aristotle's statement that the now is in one sense always the same and in another sense always different. For the moving body is also in one sense always the same, ie. as the thing which it is, the substratum of the movement, and in another sense is always different, ie. occupies a different spatial position. Phases of movement are also phases of time. At any particular phase of a movement, not only will there be a before and after of spatial position, but also a past and a future. A moving body moves through these phases, but its reality is given only in the constant presence of the now. The ontological priority of the now consists in the

fact that bodies, the only ousiologically admissible physical realities, can never be found in the past or future, but always in the present. In one sense the now is ever different, because it is always at a different point of time, but in another sense it is always the same, for it has the ontological function of 'presenting' the real thing itself. Despite Aristotle's repeated analogies between the now and the moving body, he does not say that the now itself moves. Instead, the basic analogy is between the now as ensuring temporal continuity and separating the before and after of time, and the moving body (considered as a point on a line) as ensuring the continuity of movement, and dividing movement into before and after. Rather than the now itself moving, it is simply that different nows exist at different points of time.

The priority of the now faces the difficulty, mentioned by Aristotle at the beginning of his discussion, that the now is no part of time (218a,7). If the past and the future are excluded from the now, as times which exist no longer and not yet respectively, then the now is a vanishing instant with no determinable magnitude. This consideration, Aristotle remarks, could make one think that time 'either does not exist at all or barely, and in an obscure way' (217b,35). However, such a conclusion would follow only if time were held to exist in the manner of physical things, and Aristotle's whole analyis is meant to demonstrate the contrary. Time is not an obscure physical thing (eg. the container of Plato's *Timaeus*) but a *condition* of physical thingliness. Time is a 'kind of number', ie. its ontological status is analogous to that of number. Just as Aristotle rejects Platonic realism in respect of numbers (they are not separable entities, as he says) so also he rejects a realist (obscurantist) account of time. Numbers do not exist apart from the activity of counting, and the same applies to time. In this sense, Aristotle's account of time can be considered as a theory of *duration*: the measurement of duration requires that nows exist as limit points of temporal stretches, from this now to that now. Of course, it is not the nows which are counted or measured; because they are

of vanishing magnitude the nows are strictly uncountable and unmeasurable. What are counted are time-units or time-spans, of any arbitrary magnitude: seconds, minutes, hours, days. The nows are just the condition of the possibility of temporal measuring units. While Aristotle says that 'it is in so far as the before and after is numerable that we get the now' (219b,29), the converse also applies: only in so far as the now determines a before and after, is time at all numerable.

Time, on Aristotle's definition, is the measure of movement in general, of all movements of every variety: 'it is simply the number of continuous movement, not of any particular kind of it' (223a,35). The times of different movements which are simultaneous and equal will be the same time, in the sense that 'if there were dogs and horses and seven of each, it would be the same number' (223b,5). But the universality of time depends on one particular movement being taken as standard, and all other movements being measured against this. The regular circular motion of the heavens provides this standard, 'because the number of this is the best known' (223b,20). For example, we can give the time between sunrise and sunrise the number one, and then we can count off the time it takes for a tree to grow, or for a house to be constructed. Aristotle considers the philosophical (physical-ontological) problem of time to have been adequately dealt with when the measurability of duration has been established: this is the positive side of his enterprise, which emerges only at the end of his discussion, when he has cleared away the obstacles to a pure ousiological treatment of the subject. His intentions are well illustrated by remarks, towards the close of his discussion in Book IV, of the 'common saying that human affairs form a circle' (223b,25). Aristotle demystifies this saying by explaining that the circularity of time means nothing more than that time is measured by circular movement, and in particular that 'apart from the measure nothing else is observed in what is measured' (223b,35). Time is not something which exists independently waiting to be measured, but the circular

movement of the heavens measures time in the sense that it is itself the measure of time. There is nothing mysterious in the 'circularity' of human affairs, but just the obvious truth that these are temporally measurable.

The same demystificatory intention governs Aristotle's treatment of the expression 'to be in time' (221a,3-222a,9). Something is in time when its being is measurable by time, and this is the case for all physical things in so far as they are movable. A thing at rest can be considered a limiting case of movement: it too is in time because it 'can be in the number of motion' (221b,12), ie. the duration of its rest can be counted off according to measures derived from the circular motion of the heavens. Things are in time not in the sense of being in an (ousiologically inadmissible) container, but in the sense of being 'in number' (221a,11). More precisely, 'time is not number with which we count, but the number of things which are counted' (220b,8). In one sense, odd, even and unity are in number, for it with these that we count, and in the same sense, before, now, and after are in time, for it is these which allow time-units to be counted (221a,14-15). But in another sense it is the counted things which are in number and in time respectively: eg. four horses and their movements. To be in time in this second, fundamental sense, is simply to be measurable by the activity of counting off time-units.

If time does not exist independently of the operation of counting, does this mean that time is 'in the soul'? Aristotle raises this problem in the final chapter of Book IV, but treats it with dissatisfying brevity. He suggests that, if the soul alone is able to count, then movement could still exist without soul, but not as something numerable: the before and after of movement could not be counted off (223a,25-28). Therefore, although the substratum of time could exist without soul, time itself could not. In what sense time is subjective or objective is a question to be taken up later (Ch. III), in connection with Heidegger. However, Aristotle does point out that time is the same everywhere

and for everybody, so in this sense the being-in-the-soul of time is analogous to the being-in-the-soul of number. Again, this explanation has a demystificatory function, against those who would see time as an obscure psychological experience or entity.

I have stressed the limits of Aristotle's analysis of time as a theory of temporal duration or time-measurement. Whether Aristotle in this way succeeds in demystifying time, or, on the contrary, thereby avoids the basic issue of the reality of time, is a question upon which commentators have disagreed. Plotinus charged Aristotle's definition of time as the measure of the 'before' and 'after' of motion with circularity, on the grounds that these terms must already be understood temporally if time rather than space is to be measured.[25] In the modern period, Franz Brentano similarly states that 'to believe that the Aristotelian definition gives us insight into the nature of time would be just as ridiculous as if someone were to say that the essence of warmth consists in the thermometer in so far as this provides the measure of the before and after of temperature'.[26] At the conclusion of his detailed study of the subject, Paul Conen concedes that 'what Aristotle gives as the essence of time is insufficently unambiguous to communicate a clear concept, and too formless to be more sharply conceived'.[27] But Conen goes on to suggest that Aristotle should not necessarily be criticized for the shortcomings of his analysis, because time as we experience it may well be intrinsically recalcitrant to human reason; in this case, Aristotle can be credited with identifying what is truly knowable about time. Generally speaking, those philosophers who are more influenced by the mathematical sciences of nature have tended to be sympathetic to Aristotle's account of time, while those who are more moved by religious or spiritual concerns have tended to be critical. From the perspective of the former, the onus must be on the latter to show what time is over and above duration. This is a challenge which Heidegger takes up in *Being and Time* and other early writings.

7 *OUSIA* AND PRESENCE

We are now ready to compare Heidegger's *Seinsfrage* with the Aristotelian question 'what is *ousia*?'. The normal formulation of the Heideggerian question is simply 'what is Being (*das Sein*)?'. Heidegger formulates the Aristotelian (ousiologically reduced) question as 'what is the being-ness of beings? (*die Seiendheit des Seienden*)'.[28] We noticed earlier, in connection with remarks by Joseph Owens, that although the English expression 'being-ness' is the morphologically accurate translation of the Greek word '*ousia*', its abstract connotations could make it misleading as a philosophical term. Heidegger's translation '*die Seiendheit*' does not suffer from this difficulty. The German expression '*das Seiende*' is formed by the nominalization of the present participle (*seiend*) of the infinitive (*sein*). But unlike the English term 'the being', '*das Seiende*' has clear connotations of a concrete thing: this is its difference from '*das Sein*', which is a direct nominalization of the infinitive, corresponding to the English 'being'. Heidegger's expression '*die Seiendheit*' is not an ordinary German word, but its meaning is unambiguous. By adding '*heit*' (equivalent to the English 'ness') to the word '*Seiende*', what is conveyed is the quality of 'being-ness' in the sense of concrete thingliness. Heidegger's formulation of the Aristotelian question as '*Was ist die Seiendheit des Seienden?*' could thus be rendered into English as 'What is the thingliness of things?'. From the considerations thus far, it should be evident that this is faithful to Aristotle, for whom *ousia* is above all a this (*tode ti*). But by putting the ousiological question in this way, we can also better appreciate why Heidegger speaks of the *Seinsvergessenheit* of Aristotelian metaphysics, ie. of the forgetting of *Sein* (Being) itself in favour of things in their thingliness (*das Seiende*, beings).

However, the meaning of *ousia* as thingliness must be considered more closely. It is a characteristic procedure of Heidegger to return to the pre-philosophical meaning of words, which in the case of '*ousia*' is roughly equivalent to 'possessions' or 'estate', in the sense of what belongs to

a person, of what one has disposal over. Why should precisely this word, with just these pre-philosophical connotations, have been taken over to mean 'being' as such? In his 1930 lectures *On the Essence of Human Freedom*, referring also to the connection in the German language between '*Anwesenheit*' (presence) and '*Anwesen*' (estate), Heidegger says the following:

> Because it is in an exemplary sense present and at hand, we call estate, house and home etc. (ie. what the Greeks call *ousia*) *das Anwesen*. In fact, by *ousia* nothing else is meant but *constant presence* (*ständige Anwesenheit*) and this is simply what is understood by being-ness (*Seiendheit*). By 'Being' (*Sein*) we mean just this, constant presence, enduring constancy (*anwesende Ständigkeit*) . . . . We asked: how does it come about that this particular being – house and home – becomes the basic word for beings (*das Seiende*), for being-ness (*Seiendheit*)? When we so asked, it first of all appeared as if we meant that the word '*ousia*' with its indicated fundamental meaning was simply there, and then the Greeks asked which among the many beings best deserved this as description and name. The situation is the reverse: the word '*ousia*' in its linguistic connections with *on-onta* first of all arises in the experience of these beings.[29]

Heidegger does not intend this as an etymological argument. He is not trying to prove that '*ousia*' means 'presence' in the philosophy of Aristotle because this is what it means in everyday Greek usage. Rather, Heidegger claims that, when the Greeks (predominantly Plato and Aristotle) took over '*ousia*' as the philosophical word for being, they relied on their precursory understanding of the exemplary status of just these beings (house and home, estate etc.) for being in general. The Greeks possessed a pre-conceptual, pre-ontological understanding of being as presence and for this reason introduced '*ousia*' into their philosophical vocabulary.

However, what has just been called 'being in general' is in fact the 'exemplary being' of *ousia*, ie. 'real' or 'true' being, just as one's estate is what one 'really' and 'truly' possesses, what one 'constantly' has disposal over. The constant presence of *ousia* is an exemplary presence, but, as noticed in Section 2 above, it is not the only kind of presence. For Heidegger, every kind of being admitted in Greek ontology is a modality of presence, eg. the 'relative non-being' of Platonic appearances just as surely as the 'true reality' of Platonic ideas.

After all, appearances are not nothing, not 'absolute non-being', for we know, in fact, quite a lot about them. The minimal claim that can be made about appearances is simply that they are 'there', that they are 'present' in the sense that they 'present themselves' to us. 'True reality', on the other hand, is the 'constant presence' without which appearances could not present themselves, eg. in Plato's ontology the core meaning of 'participation' is that sensible reality is present (changeable things become present or absent) only because of the higher (constant) presence of the ideas.[30]

In these same 1930 lectures, Heidegger focuses on Aristotle's discussion, in *Physics* I.7, of the different senses of coming-to-be.[31] Aristotle draws a distinction between qualified and unqualified coming-to-be. The first case is qualitative alteration, as when a man comes-to-be musical from a prior condition of unmusicality. This kind of change is a coming-to-be-such-and-such from a state of privation of precisely this such-and-such. Further, it is a change which depends on the existence of an *ousia* as the underlying subject, eg. the man who becomes musical. Unqualified coming-to-be pertains to *ousia* itself, as when a man, horse, or tree comes-to-be. Aristotle's question at this stage is whether the coming-to-be of *ousia*, in contrast to the case of qualitative alteration, proceeds *from nothing*. His answer, in line with the Parmenidean principle that being cannot come from non-being, is negative: 'But that *ousiai* too, and anything that can be said to be without qualification, come to be from some underlying thing, will appear on

examination. For we find in every case something that underlies from which proceeds that which comes to be' (190b,1-4). Aristotle goes on to conclude that the principles of coming-to-be are in a sense three and in another sense two. They are three in the sense that the contraries of qualitative change are themselves two (eg. musicality and unmusicality), with the substratum as the third principle. But they can also be considered as two in number if the contraries are bracketed together as one principle with the substratum as the second principle. The two contraries need not be considered as separate principles because, as Aristotle says in the passage singled out for special attention by Heidegger, 'one of the contraries will serve to effect the change by its absence (*apousia*) and presence (*parousia*)' (191a,6-7).

Aristotle accounts for change of sensible *ousia* by the presence or absence of a particular quality together with the substratum as subject of such change. Does this account accord with Heidegger's basic thesis that '*ousia*' means 'presence'? At first sight, as Heidegger points out, it does not. For presence and absence (of the quality) are coupled together and referred back to an ontologically more fundamental substratum. What is present is, for example, the quality of musicality, or the composite musical man, and of course both may also be absent. If *ousia* is that which somehow (taking our clue from the words themselves) underlies both *parousia* and *apousia*, what justification is there for equating it specifically with *parousia*? Heidegger's answer is that the *parousia/apousia* opposition as explicitly posited by Aristotle depends on the more primordial presence of the substratum itself.[32] In other words, Heidegger considers that the everyday meaning of '*ousia*' is adequately reflected as '*parousia*' in its opposition to '*apousia*', but that its ontological meaning must be sought in the kind of presence which Aristotle implicitly attributes to the substratum. While contraries change into one another, and while (sublunary) *ousiai* in the sense of composite things come into being and pass away, the substratum is what persists

and is present throughout all change. The coming-into-being of changeable *ousia* is a coming-into-presence, whereas the substratum, as itself constantly present, can never come-into-presence, nor can it pass away into absence. As Heidegger stresses, it is not simply that the presence of changeable *ousia* breaks off at some point in time, while the presence of the substratum endures for eternity. Both kinds of presence could be either limited or unlimited in duration. The point is that the substratum 'presences from itself' (*von ihm selbst her anwest*) and thus is always encountered as already present, whereas changeable *ousia* does not itself 'presence' (*anwesen*) but either comes-to-presence (whereupon it 'is present', as distinct from 'presencing') or passes over into absence.[33]

How does this analysis gell with Heidegger's other thesis that Being is reduced by Aristotle to the 'being-ness of beings'? Is the substratum a being? Aristotle plainly states the contrary: the substratum, he says (*Phys.* 191a,13) 'is not one or existent in the same sense as the "this" (*tode ti*)'. Further, Aristotle asserts that the substratum is knowable only 'by analogy', ie., (191a,9-11) 'as the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, or the matter and the formless before receiving form to any thing which has form, so is the underlying nature to *ousia*, ie. the "this" or existent (*tode ti kai to on*)'. Given the unknowability of the substratum, it is not surprising that Aristotle has great difficulty speaking about it. What is clear is that its nature is logically dependent on the thingliness of that which arises from it: this is why it is knowable 'by analogy' with the relation between matter and the composite. The substratum is in this sense the condition of the possibility of things which themselves 'are' in the mode of presence/absence. That the substratum is not a thing in the sense of *tode ti* does not in the least detract from the ousiological character of Aristotelian ontology, for the substratum is itself defined by reference to thingliness. In short, the presencing of the substratum is no less ousiological than the being present/absent of particular things.

As Heidegger points out, it is not difficult to see this

same relation between substratum and thing in a philosopher who lived two thousand years after Aristotle, namely Kant, who in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* distinguishes between the 'thing-in-itself' and 'appearance'.[34] Expressed in Heideggerian terms, the thing-in-itself is the realm of 'presencing', while appearance is the realm of 'presence/absence'. For Kant, appearance is always of things possessing categorial determinations, which as such constitute the reality susceptible of scientific investigation. The thing-in-itself, on the other hand, is an 'unknowable X', which is posited as the condition of the possibility of appearance. Why then does Kant call this X a 'thing' (*Ding-an-sich*) when it does not possess any of the determinations of thingliness? Clearly, because like the Aristotelian substratum it is the condition of thingliness, the condition of the possibility of the presence or absence of particular knowable things. Exactly like Aristotle, Kant has difficulty when speaking about this thing-in-itself, particularly about its relation to knowable reality. This cannot be a causal relation, because causation pertains only to categorial being, to things which can appear or be present, indeed it cannot be a 'real' relation of any kind. The thing-in-itself is shrouded in obscurity, for which reason many have sought to delete it altogether from the Kantian philosophy. But then, what becomes of the 'subsistence' of reality? Is there not, behind all the variegated things which appear (become present/become absent) something (albeit a non-thing) which remains the same? Apart from all the things-in-the-world, is not the world always 'there', always 'presencing' behind the vicissitudes of present and absent things? For Heidegger at any rate, neither Kant's retention of the thing-in-itself, nor Aristotle's retention of the substratum, for all the obscurity of these notions, represent a weakness or deficiency in their respective ontologies. On the contrary, and notwithstanding the fact that Heidegger seeks to understanding the underlying 'thereness' of the world quite differently, he takes Aristotle and Kant to have thereby demonstrated their profound grasp of the parameters of ousiology, ie. the need for the thingliness

of things (the being-ness of beings) to be grounded and not just assumed. At the same time it is quite understandable that *ousia* (Aristotle) and appearance (Kant) remain the operative and in a sense the leading concepts of their respective ontologies, for they define the level of reality which is knowable and discussable.[35]

Heidegger does not see the determining role of presence in the formation of Aristotelian ontology as limited to the concepts *ousia* and *hupokeimenon* (substratum): it is effective at all levels, in respect of all 'ways of saying being'. For example, when Aristotle says (193b,6-8) that 'the form indeed is *phusis* rather than the matter; for a thing is more properly said to be what it is when it exists in actuality than when it exists potentially', Heidegger takes this to show the meaning of 'fulfillment' (*entelecheia*) and 'actuality' (*energeia*) as presence: matter exists only in the mode of potentiality, it cannot 'be present' except through the actualization of a form.[36] This is why *energeia* is one of the basic senses of being.[37] Something (eg. a man, a house) can be present only when its *telos* is realized (*en telei echei* = having-itself-in-the-end). In the case of physical things (eg. a man, rather than a house) this *telos* does not originate externally, in the mind of a producer, but is internal: the priority of the *phusei onta* consists in the fact that they are self-actualizing, ie. come into presence in and of themselves. To be noted is that Aristotle does not equate the physical with the 'sensible', which is the epistemological definition one would expect within the framework of Platonic dualism. A bedstead, for example, is a sensible thing, but for Aristotle it is a product of art (*techne*) rather than of *phusis*. On Heidegger's account, *phusis* and *techne* are distinguished by Aristotle as different modes of presence or 'there-ness'. The reason for the ontological priority of *phusis* is that the principle of the presence of physical things is internal to them, that they are in this sense 'self-standing'. If '*ousia*', as Heidegger maintains, means 'constant presence', then it is easy to see that the products of art are not best qualified to be *ousiai*, for their

presence is dependent. Because physical things, on the other hand, are not so dependent, because they 'are' (present or absent) on their own account, the Aristotelian philosophy takes the form of 'physics'. This is not contradicted by the fact that the highest or first *ousia* is the *theos*, which as 'self-thinking thought' is a non-sensible entity. For, as previously observed, Aristotle only finds the *theos* (whose being is the most exemplary presence of all, the ultimate presence and 'actuality') necessary to accommodate the fact of movement, ie. the self-standing presence of physical things. Indeed, since the *theos* is the 'prime mover', to this extent it is itself 'physical', and it is treated in the context of physics both in *Physics* VIII and *Metaphysics* XII (Aristotle's two major discussions of the topic).

8 OUSIOLOGICAL AND SUPRA-OUSIOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY

Heidegger does not himself use the expression 'ousiology', but directs his critique at what he calls the Aristotelian 'onto-theological consititution of metaphysics'.[38] Since Heidegger claims that even modern positivism, which forthrightly denies the existence of divinity, is nonetheless 'onto-theological', his use of this term requires explanation. As earlier noted, Aristotle (*Meta.*1026a,28-32) raises the question of whether first philosophy is universal or deals with a particular genus of being, answering that: 'if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being *qua* being'. Unlike some other commentators, Heidegger finds no inconsistency with the indicated unity between ontology (the science of being *qua* being) and theology (the science of the *theos*), but what is essential to understand, as far as Heidegger's use of 'onto-theological' is concerned, is that he interprets *theos* simply as 'highest being' (*das höchste Seiende*).[39] This means that, for Heidegger, Aristotle's identification of the *theos*

with non-sensible substance is a secondary, merely contingent matter. The dispute between atheistic materialism and theistic idealism is irrelevant to Heidegger, for both in their own ways answer the question 'what is being?' in terms of a first substance. In other words, were the doctrine of the *theos* as non-sensible *noesis noeseos* to be deleted from the Aristotelian philosophy, and the prime mover conceived as thoroughly physical, the result would be still onto-theology.

This dual character of ousiological philosophy as both ontology and (in Heidegger's idiosyncratic sense) 'theology' is comprehensible, for it is only a 'first being' which can provide the principles for the study of being *qua* being. In physicalist philosophies, nature (the physical) is this first being, and it is the 'nature of nature' which is the key to all being whatsoever; in non-physicalist philosophies, spirit, will, intelligence and the like take over this role. On the other hand, if a pluralist position is adopted, wherein no first being is recognized, then ontology (as the inquiry into being *qua* being) must be altogether given up. This is the situation in respect of the special sciences, which as such do not advance general ontological theses: whether physical, biological, psychological, sociological and historical realities are one or many is a question they do not address.[40] The special sciences are neither 'onto-theological' nor otherwise; they are ousiological, but because they do not perform the ousiological *reduction*, they are not the object of Heidegger's critique.

As Heidegger understands it, 'onto-theological' philosophy seeks the causes and principles of things (beings): it is things which are to be grounded and it is things which do the grounding. Only beings are susceptible of explanation and grounding: Being itself, although everywhere presupposed where things are spoken of and explanations sought, has no ground, cause, principle or explanation. Within onto-theological thinking, Being as such is occluded, in such a way that beings, which in their being-ness are mistaken for Being, present themselves (become present/absent) as entities to be

grounded.[41] Knowledge of entities in their groundedness Heidegger calls 're-presentation' (*Vor-stellung*), and in his view the whole history of metaphysics has been oriented to this kind of knowledge, to such an extent that the concepts 'knowledge' and 'representation' have become identical. Nothing which cannot be represented is acknowledged by metaphysics as real, but then, only what has presence (*ousia*) as its way of being can be re-presented. The most fundamental ontological decisions are made in one and the same act as the mode of access to 'true reality' is established.

How then does Heidegger propose to bring onto-theology (ousiologically reduced philosophy in all its forms) into question? To do this he must show that there are 'realities' which are not ousiologically reducible, and that foremost among these is Being itself. Such a project is faced with formidable difficulties of conceptuality and language. The term 'reality' bears the imprint of the ousiologically determined metaphysical tradition: to say that there is a 'reality' which is in no way a 'thing' seems a contradiction in terms. Does Heidegger believe that Being is one or many? Is Being supposed to be a whole, and does it have parts? These ways of speaking seem to make sense only in respect of things, which Heidegger says that Being is not (Being is not a being, as we are constantly told). At the beginning of *Being and Time*, Heidegger prepares the reader for the unusual language of the book by remarking that 'it is one thing to give a report in which we tell of *entities*, but another to grasp entities in their *Being*. For the latter task task we lack not only most of the words, but above all, the "grammar"'.[42] Since it is not possible simply to cast off ousiological language, Heidegger uses it in a new way. Rather than invoking technical terminology, he uses existing words according to a new 'grammar', taking full advantage of the inventive possibilities of his native German.

Realities which are not ousiologically reducible: what are these? In the first division of *Being and Time*, it seems that the relevant opposition is between 'presence-at-hand' (*Vorhandenheit*) and 'readiness-to-hand' (*Zuhandenheit*). What

human beings proximally encounter in the world are entities ready-to-hand in a pragmatic sense, entities whose being is defined by their role within various contexts of human concerns and dealings:

> The Greeks had an appropriate term for 'things': *pragmata* - that is to say, that which one has to do with in one's concernful dealings (*praxis*). But ontologically, the specific 'pragmatic' character of the *pragmata* is just what the Greeks left in obscurity; they thought of these 'proximally' as 'mere things'. We shall call those entities which we encounter in concern 'equipment'. In our dealings we come across equipment for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement. The kind of Being which equipment possesses must be exhibited.[43]

As Heidegger explains, the being of an item of equipment is not grasped in its mere presence as a thing, but in the work-world to which it belongs. Only when this functional role is disturbed, when, for example, the handle of a hammer is broken, do we 'look' at a tool as a 'thing' which lies before us conspicuously as present-at-hand. The world is already disclosed to us pragmatically before we become theoretical and ask about the 'in-itself', the 'objective' nature of things.

At this point one might reply that the order of encounterability is not necessarily the order of being. Granted that we first come across entities in a pragmatic context, is not the objective being of these entities the condition of their practical utility? Must not the hammer be a physical thing of such and such characteristics before it can be used for hammering? This objection would be quite valid were it Heidegger's intention, in sections 15-18 of *Being and Time*, to present a 'pragmatic philosophy'. However, as Heidegger explains in several texts composed shortly thereafter, this is not the case.[44] Instead, the point of his analysis of human practical dealings is to show the implicit reference of all items

of equipment to an 'environment' (*Umwelt*) or total context of meaning. The hammer belongs to the work-world of carpentary, the violin to that of music, the pen to that of writing, and in general the 'being' of any individual thing depends on its position within an ordered whole. This dependency of thing on whole emerges with particular clarity in respect of tools and the various work-worlds to which they belong, but its significance goes further. What essentially occupies Heidegger is the 'phenomenon of world' as such. It is precisely this, he declares in his 1927 Marburg lectures, which 'has hitherto not yet been recognized in philosophy'.[45]

Telling against a pragmatist understanding of the *Seinsfrage* is the circumstance that particular items of equipment implicitly refer not just to other such items within a work-world, but to the all-embracing totality which we call '*the* world'. What is the nature of this totality?

> Is it the sum of what is within the world? By no means. Our calling nature, as well as the things which surround us most closely, the intraworldly and our understanding them in that way already presuppose that we understand world. World is not something subsequent that we calculate as a result of the sum of all beings. The world comes not afterward but beforehand, in the strict sense of the word . . . . The world as already unveiled in advance is such that we do not in fact specifically occupy ourselves with it, or apprehend it, but instead it is so self-evident, so much a matter of course, that we are completely oblivious of it.[46]

Let us compare this relation of 'being-in' to what Aristotle says in a passage previously quoted from *Physics* IV:

> We say that a thing is in the world (*en to ourano*), in the sense of in place, because it is in the air, and the air is in the world; and when we say it is in the air, we do not

> mean that it is in every part of the air, but that it is in the air because of the surface of the air which surrounds it. (*Phys.* 211a,24-27)

In *De Caelo*, Aristotle points out that '*ouranos*' ('world', 'heaven') has several meanings, of which the one relevant to the above passage is obviously 'all body included within the extreme circumference, since we habitually call the whole or totality "the heaven"' (278b,20-21). The context of the *Physics* passage is a discussion of 'place' (*topos*), which is one of the determinants (along with movement and time) of the 'physical thing'. What Aristotle asserts is the equivalence of being-in-the-world to being-in-the-totality-of-places, something entirely different to being in every place whatsoever. The world as such simply is place, the 'place of places' so to speak; what is outside the world, namely the *theos*, occupies no place (*De Cae* 279a,18).

Heidegger does not (to my knowledge) anywhere explicitly address these Aristotelian statements on being-in-the-world. However, in *Being and Time* he does contrast his own analysis of 'world' with that of Descartes, in terms which are also (indeed most fundamentally of all) relevant to Aristotle. In defining 'world' as *res extensa*, Heidegger says, Descartes 'is not primarily determined by his leaning towards mathematics, a science which he happens to esteem very highly, but rather by his ontological orientation in principle towards Being as constant presence-at-hand'.[47] Like Aristotle, Descartes equates being with being-in-place, where place (*extensio*) is capable of mathematically precise definition. The fact that Descartes rejects Aristotle's doctrine of the 'regions' of place makes no difference at this level, for Heidegger's point is that in both cases Being is ousiologically reduced, ie. that a certain kind of being (presence-at-hand) is unproblematically identified with the being of world (worldhood) as such. To bring out the *Dasein*-ish character of the primordial phenomenon of world, Heidegger contrasts physical spatiality (Aristotle, Descartes) with the existential spatiality of circumspective concern:

> When equipment for something or other has its place, this place defines itself as the place of this equipment – as one place out of a whole totality of places directionally lined up with each other and belonging to the context of equipment which is environmentally ready-to-hand. Such a place and such a multiplicity of places are not to be interpreted as the 'where' of some random being-present-at-hand of things. In each case the place is the definite 'there' or 'yonder' of an item of equipment which belongs somewhere.[48]

The closeness and remoteness of existential spatiality are quite different to physical distance. One does not become 'close' to a violin by sitting next to it, one can be 'far' from the city of Paris while living in its centre. Closeness and remoteness in this sense are functions of what Heidegger calls the 'care-structure' (*Sorge-Struktur*) of human existence. Now one could no doubt extend the concept 'pragmatic' to cover the relation of human beings to things like musical instruments and cities. But is this also possible in respect of their totality? Is the 'phenomenon of world' the sum of all *pragmata* and pragmatic contexts? This is what Heidegger most emphatically denies.

At the most general level, Heidegger's claim is that things (be they *pragmata* or simply *onta*) cannot be ontologically primary because they presuppose world as their 'in-which': world is the condition of the possibility of things in their presence and as such is co-intended as prior whenever we address particular things. World is not something which arises subsequently, as if we notice that things exist in a plurality and alongside one another, but their being is originally worldly. Heidegger's idea bears a close resemblance to Husserl's notion of the 'fringe' or 'horizon' of consciousness. In *Ideas* and elsewhere, Husserl proposes that the 'intentional object' always refers beyond itself to other (co-intended) objects and ultimately to an all-inclusive horizon, the 'natural world about me'.[49] These other objects, rather than being added

on to the given object, are contained within this as a necessary constituent of its meaning; the same applies in respect of the horizon itself, which is not at all a summation (however ordered) but a moment of meaning. Heidegger does not follow Husserl into a philosophy of transcendental consciousness, but seeks to define 'horizon' (worldhood) in strict ontological terms: not just the meaning of a thing for consciousness, but the very being of a thing, refers beyond itself to world. In this way, the Husserlian analysis of the transcendental structure of consciousness gives way to the Heideggerian analysis of the transcendental structure of existence, viz., the existential analytic of *Being and Time*.

But here arises a difficulty, stated often enough by Husserl himself along with many other critics. For is not the move from transcendental consciousness to existence a move from the 'in-itself' to the 'for-us', and as such tantamount to subjectivism? Within Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, worldhood is still a structure of the 'in-itself' as the correlate of consciousness, whereas in *Being and Time* it is plainly stated that world has the way of being of *Dasein*, the human being.[50] Even if it be granted that Heidegger shows the priority of worldhood in the sphere of human dealings, why does this count as anything more than regional ontology? In what manner does it qualify as a response to the 'question of being' as such? Many readers of *Being and Time* have understood the book to offer an account of historical existence, of everyday 'being-in-an-historical world'. And is history really 'being'? Is not history set against the background of the 'in-itself' of nature? And is nature not just the totality of physical things, spread out in space (place)?

For Heidegger, however, nature is not 'the world' but an 'intra-worldly entity'.[51] What could it mean to say that nature (*qua* physical things) is objective whereas worldhood is subjective? Does 'intra-worldliness' mean simply 'in consciousness'? Is it something we add to present entities when we think of them? To speak in this way, Heidegger urges, is contrary to the phenomenological evidence. If worldhood

were such an addition, we would be forced back into scepticism, where we could not be sure that any world existed outside of consciousness. Evidently, in respect of all particular things it is possible to be deceived not only as to their nature but as to their very existence; why then, should such deception not be possible in respect of world considered as the totality of things? As long as the ousiological reduction is in place, as long as worldhood is regarded as an addition of consciousness, the question is unanswerable. But once worldhood is recognized as ontologically primordial, the problem dissolves: although it is possible to doubt the veracity of every judgement concerning things, the prior 'thereness' of the world is immediately evident as the 'therein' of every individual thing. Heidegger answers Cartesian doubt by proposing that 'I think', 'I doubt', and 'I am' implicity presuppose worldhood as transcending everything 'in' the world.[52] Human beings do not first of all encounter the world through knowing, but 'have' the world, their being is an original 'being-in-the-world'. The philosophical problem of knowledge changes from a problem about how humans in the first place secure reality into the problem of 'the phenomenon of knowing as such and the kind of being which belongs to the knower'.[53] Knowing is a founded mode of human being-in-the-world presupposing this pre-cognitive 'having', but the latter is also an understanding in which something (that un-thing called 'world') is revealed or disclosed. The ousiological reduction of worldhood to thinghood is a reduction of all disclosure to categorial knowing, of all revealing to determinations of what-ness. For Heidegger, on the other hand, although the world is not a 'what', it is not nothing at all, nor does it fail to show itself.

Can this non-ousiological reality of worldhood actually be made thematic in philosophy? Not only is the phenomenon in question particularly elusive, withdrawing always from our direct gaze, but we might easily think that, once having recognized and acknowledged it, we may in good conscience forget it again. However, Heidegger does not maintain that

worldhood can be addressed independently of things-within-the-world. What he claims is that *Weltvergessenheit* leads to a misunderstanding of the being of things, particularly of the 'thing' which we are ourselves. In *Being and Time*, worldhood does not become the autonomous subject matter of inquiry but undergirds the entire existential analytic. Heidegger would admit that every study of human beings, his own included, possesses an irreducibly ousiological dimension; behaviouristic psychology, perhaps, comes closest to a full reductionism. The existential analytic, while not denying the inevitability of objectification, is concerned to highlight its limits, to show that precisely the supra-ousiological dimension of human existence is ontologically fundamental: to 'exist' is to 'have a world', but this 'world' does not have the character of an object-totality, nor does this 'having' amount to a 'knowing' of 'present' objects.

The purpose of Heidegger's existential analyses, in *Being and Time* and elsewhere, is not simply to 'describe' the structures of existence, but to exert a counter-force to that inauthentic (ousiologically-oriented, everyday) attunement within which *Dasein* is proximally entrapped. The renowned difficulty of philosophy receives an ontological explanation: it is not a mere theoretical difficulty, the psychological difficulty of abstract thought, but the difficulty of resistance to a tendency immanent in life. What moves *Dasein* into the counter-movement of philosophy is the question of its own being-in-the-world. Philosophy, Heidegger says in lectures from 1923, springs from a 'fundamental experience' which is nothing else but the human being's 'wakefulness' (*Wachsein*) for itself.[54] It is not, at least not primarily, a matter of theorizing about this experience and bringing it into the sphere of 'public discussion', but of actually entering into it. On the other hand, to the extent that philosophical thought is also expressed as written (or spoken) text, not only does it take on the external appearance of theory, but it has an ambiguous status as such. While theory can (and to a certain extent must) be a medium for philosophy, it can degenerate

into the reification of words and concepts, to the point where the underlying fundamental experience is lost. This, in Heidegger's opinion, is what happened in the first wave of reception of *Being and Time*, when the work was interpreted as a new kind of philosophical anthropology. Already by the early thirties, Heidegger came to see that he himself, by setting out the existential analytic in an overly systematic way, had contributed to this misunderstanding. Especially when *Being and Time* is read in isolation from the preceding lecture-courses at Freiburg and Marburg, the impression can arise that Heidegger is laying the foundations for a new research program. From the mid-thirties, Heidegger becomes more wary of objectifying language, and, in the eyes of many, much more obscure, much less useful to the scientific disciplines. This is not, as it is often taken to be, a basic change of standpoint, but reflects his more profound awareness of the dangers of reification. Heidegger's later writings provide the reader with precious few props, precious few concepts or terms which can play a role within the project of theory-construction. This is precisely the intention. By refusing to fix language in the manner appropriate to ousiological inquiry, Heidegger wants, while proximally addressing 'things' like technology and the work of art, to 'awaken' us to what is beyond thingliness as such.

So far in the present section, the focus has been on worldhood as the reality overlooked by ousiological philosophy. But what of Being (*Sein*)? Is this different from worldhood, or is it just a different way of indicating the same un-thing? Consider the various ways Heidegger speaks of Being. For instance, Being 'is' not, but rather 'it gives Being' (*es gibt Sein*).[55] Being is a 'clearing' or 'open space' (*Lichtung*) in which beings can be.[56] Being is an 'event' (*Ereignis*) which allows beings to 'be present'.[57] Being is not 'the present thing' but an original 'letting presence' (*Anwesenlassen*).[58] Being 'essences' (*west*) in the mode of a 'going over' (*Übergang*) to beings.[59] Being is the 'sending' (*Geschick*) of beings.[60] Being has the character of 'withdrawl' (*Entzug*) in relation

to beings.[61]. Being is the 'abyss' (*Abgrund*) of beings.[62] Being is the 'most empty but also the fullest', the 'most common but also the most singular', the 'most obvious but also the most hidden', the 'most uttered but also the most un-uttered', the 'most forgotten but also the most remembered'.[63] From these ways of speaking, there is nothing to suggest that the equation of Being and worldhood is not perfectly justifiable: the world also 'is' not, but rather 'worlds' (*'die Welt weltet'* was one of Heidegger's early sayings), and 'world' can be substituted without difficulty in all the above contexts. Something 'is' when it is 'in the world'; the latter phrase adds nothing to 'is-ness'. The question 'why is there something rather than nothing?', with which Heidegger seeks to bring Being into view, can be rephrased as 'why is there a world rather than nothing?'. It is precisely the ousiological reduction which accounts for the fact that the phenomenon of worldhood 'has hitherto not yet been recognized in philosophy', and it is precisely the novelty of Heidegger's ontology to conceive Being and worldhood together. The traditional problem of world (eg. in Aristotle and Kant) which has to do with the harmony of the *cosmos*, with the unity of 'beings', is not dismissed, but is now regarded as a problem of 'regional ontology'. No matter how much we understand of the laws of nature, and no matter how comprehensive our knowledge of the things which are, this does not give us an understanding of the phenomenon *that* they are, and that they are only in so as 'it worlds', only in so far as 'it gives Being', ie. only by virtue of the ousiologically indefinable 'event' of Being.

If it is difficult to think of Being and worldhood as 'realities' to be addressed and spoken of, how much more so does this apply to Heidegger's notorious 'the Nothing' (*das Nichts*). The identity of pure Being and pure Nothing had already been argued by Hegel in the *Science of Logic*.[64] But Heidegger regards this Hegelian identity as merely formal: 'Being and Nothingness belong together' says Heidegger, 'not because [as in Hegel] they agree with each other in their indefiniteness and immediacy, but because Being itself is in

its essence finite, and reveals itself only in the transcendence of Dasein's holding itself out into the Nothing (*sich nur in der Transzendenz des in das Nichts hinausgehaltenen Daseins offenbart*)'.[65] The Nothing has been abhored by philosophy from the very beginning of its history. Parmenides was the first to warn against the way of non-being: 'for you could not know what is not – that cannot be done – nor indicate it'.[66] The Eleatic Stanger in Plato's *Sophist* (238c) declares that absolute non-being is inexpressible and irrational, going on to endorse a harmless concept of relative non-being as 'otherness'. Aristotle himself frequently expresses his uncompromising Parmenidean attitude to absolute non-being (it simply 'is not', so nothing can come out of it or go into it), but also admits relative non-being, as 'privation' (*steresis*) in 'unformed matter'. Heidegger is aware of the difficulties of speaking about non-being, yet in his view the following questions must be faced. If we try to think of non-being (the Nothing) do we find that our minds go blank? Do our thoughts buzz around in confusion? If not, do we think of 'otherness', 'privation', or the 'operation of negation'? Heidegger answers no on all counts. But what does this mean? What is 'it' which we are thinking of when we think the Nothing?

For Heidegger, the Nothing is, first and foremost, not 'nothing at all'. But neither can it be the same as Being, for if this were so, how could 'Why are there beings and not rather nothing?' be the 'first of all questions'?[67] In respect of Being and the Nothing, it unclear what 'same' and 'different' can mean, but at a purely phenomenological level, to think of Nothing seems something else than to think of Being, both in Heidegger's sense and in Hegel's sense of absolute indeterminateness. Like Being, the Nothing 'is' not, yet the impossibility of the 'is' seems different in the two cases. Heidegger does not say 'it gives Nothing' (*es gibt Nichts*), but on the other hand, the Nothing does not do nothing: it 'nihilates' or 'noths' (*nichtet*).[68] Being and the Nothing belong together and interpenetrate each other: this is what

Heidegger intends with his above-quoted reference to the *finitude* of Being. If there were not Nothing there would not be Being, so the Nothing holds Being 'in place'. As Heidegger puts it, 'human existence can only relate to beings because it holds itself out into the Nothing'.[69] It is the *equiprimordiality of Being and the Nothing* which allows the finitude of Being, and thus the finitude of human existence, to be comprehended. By the same token, the 'forgetting' of the Nothing, the ousiologically determined inability to think the Nothing in positive fashion, goes together with *Seinsvergessenheit*. The forgetting of this equiprimordiality of Being and the Nothing is also a forgetting of their difference in favour of the simple 'presence' or 'absence' of beings. In the condition of *Nichtsvergessenheit*, human beings understand themselves a 'present' and as destined one day to be 'absent', but they are not 'awake' to their situation within the 'clearing' of Being.

The Nothing may be regarded as Heidegger's supreme supra-ousiological thought. Ever since Carnap's criticisms of the 1930's, however, many have seen it as Heidegger's supreme illogical thought. It is not difficult to say that the Nothing is the hypostatization of a logical operator, and as such makes no more sense than to treat the Or, the And, or the If/Then as superior realities. Carnap and other positivists can thus know better than Heidegger, can correct him on elementary points and prove themselves disciplined thinkers by refusing to enter into vague and unverifiable speculations. Yet, Heidegger would reply, what is more disciplined than to attend to the phenomena as they show themselves? For Heidegger does not 'figure out' his idea of the Nothing, nor does he jump to conclusions by staring at the word 'not' in logical sentences. In Heidegger's view, the Nothing can be encountered, and indeed is constantly encountered in human existence. If the *phenomenon of the Nothing* cannot be thought by logic, does this refute the Nothing itself, or does this say something about logic? If the Nothing is that with which 'we can do nothing', does this indicate its insignificance, or

does this point to the necessity of a kind of thinking which is not 'doing'? In any case, if we are to take Heidegger at all seriously, these questions must not be prematurely foreclosed. We need to understand more precisely how Heidegger thinks of the 'truth' of the Nothing, Being, and worldhood. What does Heidegger mean by 'phenomenon' and 'showing'? What criticisms does he have of the 'logical' use of language? In what sense does the *Seinsfrage* open up a field of 'understanding'? How does *Seinsdenken* qualify as 'philosophy'?

II
Truth, Language, and Logic

1 THE TRUE AND THE SEEABLE

In the writings of Plato and Aristotle, philosophers are distinguished from the *hoi polloi*, as well as from mythologists, rhapsodes, old-style theologians and sophists, by virtue of their faithfulness to the 'things themselves' in their self-revealing. Philosophers attend to the things themselves, bringing their beliefs, acts and lives into conformity with these, rather than slavishly submitting to traditional ideas or popular opinions. On the other hand, the self-revealing of the things is a very complicated business. For what proximally appears are not the things in their true being, not reality itself, but 'images' which conceal and distort. An arduous training in what both Plato and Aristotle call 'dialectic' is necessary in order that true being may be recognized and distinguished from its semblance. Further, the philosopher discovers not only a difference between appearance and reality, but, within reality itself, a kind of hierarchy (degrees of being): not just 'the true', but that which is 'most true' and has 'most being' then becomes the supreme object of philosophical reflection. For Plato this is *to agathon* (the Good), for Aristotle it is the *theos* as *noesis noeseos* (self-thinking thought), while in the subsequent history of philosophy this highest reality has received many names and been conceived in many different ways. It is invariably the case that, the higher one goes in the hierarchy of being and truth, the more difficult comprehension becomes, to the extent that, at the very

summit, the powers of thought are stretched to their utmost capacity. However, even here, in respect of this highest reality, the claim of philosophy is that this reveals itself, and that if only sufficient rigour and discipline are applied, it can be brought into view. This is why philosophers, while they may listen to the opinions and theories of others, will always insist on seeing for themselves. An opinion or theory will not be valued because it is elevating, edifying, entertaining, novel, or in any other way attractive, but only in so far as it aids in this seeing.

As far as this basic philosophical attitude is concerned, Heidegger does not differ from Plato and Aristotle. This means that, for Heidegger, the supreme supra-ousiological reality which he calls 'Being' actually shows itself and can be seen. On the other hand, Heidegger considers that the seeing of Plato and Aristotle, indeed of the whole metaphysical tradition, acute though it may be in its proper sphere, is in fact a certain kind of blindness and non-seeing. Plato directed a similar charge at the 'seeing' of the cave-dwellers who, because they did not venture into the light (of which they were afraid and contemptuous) took shadows for true realities. Now Plato did not deny that the affairs of the cave could be satisfactorily conducted through the kind of shadowy knowledge which ruled down there, nor, more generally, that the affairs of everyday life could be managed through the pseudo-knowledge provided by the *eidola*, the mere images of true being. Because it was perfectly possible to 'make a name for oneself in the city' (*Protagoras* 316c) without philosophical knowledge, the necessity of the particular kind of seeing spoken of by Plato was rather problematic from the point of view of ordinary human aims and desires. Aristotle makes the same point in *Nichomachean Ethics* X (1179a), where he acknowledges that, to the vast majority, the philosopher seems an odd bird. The philosopher claims to see things which others not only do not see, but which, apparently, they do not need to see.

The question of just why it is necessary to exit from the

cave and see I shall not take up directly until Chapter III. In the present chapter I focus on the structure of seeing itself. This could also be regarded as the problem of philosophical method. It is, of course, somewhat artificial to separate method from doctrine or results. Since, as indicated, philosophers are only interested in doctrines which can be certified through a process of seeing, the latter itself takes on a doctrinal status. Just what seeing is, the various modes of seeing, what is capable of being seen, the relation between seeing and thinking, and the communicability of seeing, are all controversial matters. Above all, it is the seeability of the various supreme realities postulated in the history of philosophy which has provoked disputation. This applies to the Aristotelian *noesis noeseos* as much as to Heidegger's Being. Many critics have insisted that neither is in any sense seeable, and that therefore, neither is philosophically believable. Such judgements depend on certain assumptions about seeability which must themselves be subjected to critical scutiny, ie. to the discipline of seeing. We shall find that, for both Aristotle and Heidegger, the supreme reality is actually the most seeable of all realities, but in a sense not to be confused with easily seeable. However, Heidegger considers that Aristotelian seeing still does not go far enough, and in particular, does not see primordial 'seeability' itself, therefore does not see truth itself, nor Being itself, does not see the 'truth of Being' (*die Wahrheit des Seins*) as the 'event' (*Ereignis*) of seeability.

2 THE STRUCTURE AND METHOD OF ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY

In the standard edition of Aristotle dating back to Andronicus of Rhodes, materials on related subjects are grouped together, even when they do not mesh with one another as a continuous argument and date from different periods of Aristotle's career. Over time, the titles of the various works included in this edition, in some cases taken over from previous editors or reflecting remarks from Aristotle himself, became

recognized as the basic subdivisions of human knowledge. First there are the logical treatises, which deal with the rules of clear thinking and argument. Then come the works on natural philosophy, with separate treatments of the celestial and sublunary spheres, together with various biological treatises. *De Anima* may be considered as belonging to this group, although it also contains Aristotle's 'psychology'. The books on first philosophy, given the name 'metaphysics' by Andronicus, are followed by a number of ethical treatises and a work on political philosophy, while the *corpus* is rounded off with contributions to rhetoric and aesthetics.

On a number of occasions Aristotle gives a tripartition of theoretical philosophy (*philosophiai theoretikai*) into physics, mathematics, and theology (*Meta.*1026a,6-19, 1064b,1-3). While this corresponds to the Platonic division of beings into sensible things, mathematical objects, and ideas (*Meta.* 987b,14-16), Aristotle expresses some doubt as to whether mathematics should be recognized as a separate division, because mathematical objects 'presumably do not exist separately, but as embodied in matter' (1026a,14-15). At *Meta.*1004a,2 he says that 'there are as many parts of philosophy as there are kinds of substance', while at *Meta.*1069a,30-34 three kinds of substance are identified: 'one that is sensible (of which one subdivision is eternal and another is perishable) . . . and another that is immovable'. Aristotle goes on to explain (1069b,1-2) that 'the former two kinds of substance are the subject of physics (for they imply movement); but the third kind belongs to another science, if there is no principle common to it and to the other kinds'. Proceeding from these passages we could say that, in the *Physics*, Aristotle investigates the principles of both subdivisions of sensible things, while the first subdivision (perishable sensibles) is dealt with specifically in *De Generatione et Corruptione* and the biological treatises, the second subdivision (imperishable sensibles) specifically in *De Caelo*. The other major division then, that of imperishable immovables (insensibles), would be the subject matter of the *Metaphysics*. But the situation is not so simple as this. Not only

is there physical material in the *Metaphysics* and theological material in the *Physics*, there is also the difficulty of seeing the *Metaphysics* as concerned with theology when it seems, at least in its recognized central books, to be more 'ontological'. Further, although Aristotle recognizes (*Meta.*1069b,1-2) that the twofold division between physics and theology renders his basic position more accurately than does the Platonic tripartition, there is some doubt as to the real independence of theology.

Did Aristotle contemplate a thoroughgoing physicalism? This is suggested by a passage in the *Topics* (105b,20-21) where he says 'Of propositions and problems there are . . . three divisions; for some are ethical propositions, some are on natural science, while some are logical'. It seems here that physics encompasses the whole domain of theoretical philosophy, as distinct from the formal-dialectical study of logic and the practical study of ethics (see also *Po. An.* 89b,6-9). This is confirmed by the fact that both Aristotelian 'ontology' (*Metaphysics* VII-IX) and 'theology' (*Metaphysics* XII, *Physics* VIII) proceed from the analysis of sensible (physical) substances, in a sense as 'boundary questions' of physics.[1] Aristotle's position seems to be that the existence of movable/sensible substances can be taken for granted (eg. *Phys.*185a,13, 193a,4), while the existence of immovable/insensible substance(s) only emerges in the course of physical inquiry (eg. *Meta.*1064a,30-35). This priority of the *phusei onta* means that the principles of physical inquiry have priority in any discussion of Aristotelian method.

As presented in the *Analytics*, syllogistic logic concerns the principles of demonstration; it is the science of valid reasoning from known truths. The initial premises of a demonstration cannot themselves be demonstrated (*Po. An.*100b,13), but must be established through intuition (*nous*) and induction (*epagoge*). Syllogistic logic is not a method of research but of presentation and – provided the initial premises are established – proof. Intuition and induction provide the

pre-existent knowledge in every field of research, guaranteeing the scientificity of whatever is deduced through syllogism. Two kinds of pre-existent knowledge are distinguished by Aristotle: knowledge of factual existence and comprehension of meaning (*Po. An.* 71a,11-12, 71b,32-33). It is primarily the second which is of interest here, because this is ontological knowledge (giving the what-ness, the 'being-ness of beings' as Heidegger puts it) whereas factual existence relates to empirical-ontical investigations. Through intuition and induction we come to know what we are dealing with in a given domain of science.

The relation between intuition and induction can be expressed as follows. Intuition, as the 'principle of understanding by which we become familiar with the definitions' (*Po. An.* 72b,24) is ontological knowledge itself: the result and content. Induction, on the other hand, is the method through which this ontological knowledge is acquired. What then is the originative source for induction itself? In considering this question, it is necessary to guard against assimilating Aristotelian intuition to the 'immediate self-evidence' of empiricism. Intuition is knowledge of meaning, and although this comes about factually through experience, it is *a priori*, providing the conditions of the possibility of empirical knowledge. When Aristotle denies, at the end of the *Posterior Analytics*, that intuitive knowledge is innate, his point is that experience provides the impetus or occasion for calling it forth: in a formulation reminiscent of Kant, he states simply that 'the soul is such as to be capable of undergoing this' (100a,13). From sense-perception the universal becomes stabilized within the soul and there arise the skill (*techne*) of the craftsman and the knowledge (*episteme*) of the scientist (100a,6-8). This means that knowledge cannot actually be 'realized' independently of experience. If intuitive knowledge were innate, ontological research (ie. inquiry into principles) would be unnecessary. Such research, however, is precisely Aristotle's major interest, and its difficulty is plain to see.

We may speak, then, of the 'ground' or 'originative source' of Aristotelian induction, as long as we realize that this does not refer to some domain of knowledge which is more evident or certain than that which issues from it. What Aristotle intends is indicated at the beginning of the *Physics*, where he makes his celebrated distinction between that which is 'more knowable and clear to us' and that which is 'clearer and more knowable by nature' (184a,18-19). Induction proceeds from the former to the latter. The starting point of inquiry is 'confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis' (a,22-23). These 'confused masses' constitute a kind of 'whole', which is 'more knowable to sense-perception' (a,25-26).[2] Although the knowledge we possess of this undifferentiated whole may be pragmatically adequate in varying degrees, it is not knowledge of principles, ie. not the ontological knowledge which philosophy seeks. However, it is by no means dispensable, by no means is it refuted when we proceed to what is more knowable by nature. On the contrary, whenever anything is spoken of in whatever way, ontological knowledge is implicitly operative, for which reason 'everyone says something true about the nature of things' (*Meta.* 993b,2). It is just that ontological knowledge is hidden, that it must be unearthed, uncovered, drawn out, as Aristotle says, 'by analysis'.[3]

To forstall obstructions to understanding which may arise from empiricist models of scientific research, it is necessary to underline the fact that ontological knowledge is concerned totally and exclusively with meaning. Only if this is firmly borne in mind can the relation between knowability for us and knowability by nature be comprehended as Aristotle intends.[4] The passage from the former to the latter is a process of clarification of what we already know, or more precisely, of what we already mean, albeit implicitly. Thus, when Aristotle says, in a parallel passage in the *Metaphysics*, that 'it is our task to start from what is more intelligible to oneself and make what is intelligible by nature intelligible to oneself', adding that 'what is intelligible and primary for

particular sets of people is often intelligible to a very small extent, and has little or nothing of reality' (1029b,7-10) he means that what is initially known (the undifferentiated whole) has little or nothing of clarity (thus of ontological reality) about it. Obviously, Aristotle also believes that people who are scientifically uneducated are often mistaken about matters of empirical fact. This circumstance, however, does not require correction from philosophy. Assertions about empirical reality are of interest to Aristotle *qua* empirical scientist, but *qua* philosopher he is only concerned with the ontological presuppositions of such assertions. Philosophers too may be in error about empirical facts, but it is in ontology that they possess true and certain wisdom.

How then can analysis reveal the hidden ontological meaning of what is knowable to us? Let us approach this question by first recalling the results of Aristotle's ontological analyses. As we saw in Chapter I, at the most general level Aristotle responds to the question 'what is being?' by saying that being is 'things'; the doctrine of substance (*ousia*), accordingly, addresses the thingliness of things. In the central books of the *Metaphysics*, thingliness is elucidated in terms of matter, form, the composite etc. Now if one is told that in speaking about being one is implicitly speaking about things, and that in speaking of things one is implicitly speaking about matter, form etc., one is unlikely to take this as a revelation. But as Aristotle shows, it is by no means easy to understand how all these concepts coalesce. The point of Aristotle's ontological investigations is to show how complex and difficult is that which we normally take for granted. It is one thing to implicitly employ the concept of matter, eg. when we direct our attention to the wood of which a bedstead is made, in isolation from its design and principles of construction. To understand how the concept of matter functions to hold our discourse together is something quite different, and unnecessary for practical purposes. The concept of matter is something knowable by nature, the concept of wood knowable to us. It is only possible to use and work with

wood if we comprehend it, in however inarticulate a way, as matter. We could not build a bedstead if we did not 'know' the difference between form and matter, and yet, we do not know this with ontological clarity. What Aristotle uncovers with his concepts of form and matter is something 'close' to us, so close that we cannot think and speak without it, but in another sense it is something 'distant' from our ordinary understanding. One might conjecture that this relation of closeness and distance has a general significance, that what is close by nature is distant for us precisely because of its closeness. A parallel case from outside the sphere of ontology can illustrate this, namely the relation between the linguistic competence of a native speaker and formal grammatical knowledge.

The main results of Aristotle's physical investigations are of the same kind. It does not come as a revelation to learn that nature consists of physical things which are movable, in time, having a place etc. What is surprising is how difficult and complex these everyday concepts turn out to be when probed in the Aristotelian way. We 'know' what eg. time is as long as we do not think about what it is. After Aristotle's elucidations on the subject, we feel we have an improved understanding of time, but in another sense, because we have discovered the difficulties, we are more likely to be hesitant in claiming to 'know'. This general method of problematizing presuppositions is not peculiar to Aristotle. It is just as characteristic of Plato's dialogues, where Socrates is always showing that what a thing is (justice, piety, knowledge) is far from easy to specify. At the end of the *Theaetetus*, we are likely to be in a similar state of mind as at the end of Aristotle's treatise on time: although we have a more profound understanding of knowledge (*episteme*), we are more hesitant than ever in claiming to 'know' what knowledge is. We have made what is more knowable by nature more knowable to us, but the intrinsic difficulty of what is knowable by nature is thereby revealed to us.

Let us return to the context of *Physics* 1. Two questions can

be distinguished. Firstly, what precisely is analysed? Secondly, how is the analysis carried through? As observed, the starting point for induction, the 'subject' of analysis so to speak, is the undifferentiated whole. Now it would clearly be wrong were one, in an empiricist spirit, to take this as a conglomeration of uninterpreted sensory materials (sense-data). Aristotle makes no reference to anything of this kind, and for good reason. Far from sense-data being immediately given to human understanding, it requires a sophisticated process of abstraction to perceive them, if one believes, that is, that such perception is at all possible. To be sure, Aristotle does say (*Phys.* 184a,25) that the undifferentiated whole is 'more knowable to sense-perception', but this in no way implies an empiricism. By definition, physics is concerned with sensible substances, and it would indeed be peculiar if its inductive basis did not reflect this. However, although sense-perception is a vital ingredient of the inductive basis of physics (and also of first philosophy, as we shall see) it is by no means sufficient. The original materials given for inductive analysis must already be interpreted (this is implied by their *knowability* for us), whereas the mere sensory content of perception is not. These already interpreted materials can be nothing other than the 'common conceptions' (*endoxa*) of pre-scientific life, as exhibited in the 'things said' (*legomena*) within pre-scientific discourse.

Aristotle initially orients himself in a given domain of investigation not by accumulating 'empirical evidence', but by surveying the *legomena*. This is true in his physical inquiries no less than in his practical philosophy. Two types of *legomena* may be distinguished. Firstly, Aristotle surveys the views of his predecessors, ie. the things said by 'the wise'. Secondly, he examines what is commonly said in everyday speech, more precisely, what it is possible to say. The relation of priority between these two types of *legomena* is of particular importance. One might think that the former should be able to criticize the latter, but for Aristotle the situation is the reverse. An exemplary illustration is provided in Book I.8

of the *Physics*, where Aristotle criticizes the Parmenidean doctrine that 'none of the things that are either comes to be or passes out of existence, because what comes to be must do so either from what is or from what is not, both of which are impossible' (191a,26-30). Aristotle explains that the errors of Parmenides can be seen by attending to the way in which 'we use words most appropriately' (191b,7), and goes on to give examples of how ordinary speech distinguishes between qualified and unqualified becoming. It was their 'failure to make this distinction' (191b,10) which entangled the Parmenideans in difficulties, and which led them to give up the whole project of natural philosophy. More generally, Aristotle does not simply give alternative answers to the same questions as his predecessors, but reinterprets the whole problematic of their questioning. He tends to dismiss frames of reference, often not addressing more detailed aspects of a theory. Elsewhere, Aristotle criticizes earlier philosophers for their lack of clarity: 'these thinkers do not seem to know what they say' (*Meta.* 985a,16). Of Hesiod and other 'theologians', he comments that 'clearly they are using words which are familiar to themselves, yet what they have said . . . is above our comprehension' (*Meta.*1000a,9-14); he then proceeds to contrast these mythologists with 'those who use the language of proof' (1000a,19).

It would be wrong to interpret this Aristotelian method as criticizing the 'opinions' of the wise in terms of the 'opinions' of the common man. For in respect of ontological questions, the common man has no opinions at all: the domain of ontology is not even visible to him. When Aristotle focuses (*Physics* 1.7) on the statement 'the man becomes musical', obviously he is not interested in this as an opinion, but in what this ordinary way of speaking reveals about the concept of becoming. Nor, when Aristotle discusses his predecessors, is he concerned to replace their opinions with his own. Rather, his method is the same as when he examines the things said in ordinary language, ie. he is interested in the conceptual structures which are implicitly present when

they talk about being, becoming, movement, truth etc.[5] The structures which he seeks are in language itself, but they lie concealed. They are knowable by nature, but as Aristotle points out, 'as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all' (*Meta.* 993b,9). These structures must therefore be teased out carefully by analysis. Although first principles are obtainable exclusively through intuitive insight (*nous*), this is not tantamount to a mystical flash of the mind. To ascend from what is knowable for us to what is knowable by nature requires a rigorous and exacting training, guided by the very insights which it seeks. What is intrinsically knowable 'attracts' the inquiring mind to itself, but this involves many intermediate stages of partial clarity.[6]

The method which Aristotle follows in moving from unreflected pre-ontological knowledge to reflected ontological knowledge also bears the technical title 'dialectic'. It is to be distinguished from syllogistic-deductive reasoning, which is in order when first principles are already established and we wish to know their consequences (*Top.*110a,25-b,21).[7] Dialectic is 'a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries' (*Top.*101b,4). As a quite general method, it cannot itself be clarifed by any of the special sciences, since these all presuppose it.[8] Dialectic is conceptual analysis: dialecticians inquire 'with regard to the same and other and like and unlike and contrariety, and with regard to prior and posterior and all other such terms' (*Meta.* 995b,20-22). An overestimation of syllogistic reasoning, often in combination with an empiricism which wants knowledge to begin with the 'immediate certainties' of sense perception, has led many commentators to misunderstand Aristotelian dialectic as a technique of persuasion, or as limited to the realm of 'the probable'. For how, it is asked, can scientific knowledge arise from the mere 'probabilities' which Aristotle explicitly identifies as the source materials of dialectic? Once it is understood that these 'probabilities' are not at all 'opinions', but the *endoxa/legomena* which implicitly

contain the 'certainties' of ontology, the problem disappears. For this reason, the frequently heard assertion that dialectic in Aristotle is diminished from the status it enjoys in Plato, is quite erroneous. The basic difference between Plato and Aristotle is simply that the former sees dialectic as guided by knowledge of the ideas, while the latter sees it as guided by knowledge (albeit implicit) of principles. It is true that Plato does not extract ontological knowledge from ordinary language in the same way as Aristotle (although in the *Sophist* he comes close to doing this). But it is equally true that Plato, just as much as Aristotle, begins with the *endoxa*. Where else could he begin? What else is the meaning of the Platonic 'dialogue'?[9]

How then does Aristotle analyse the *legomena*? Through what principles is the presuppositional structure of ordinary discourse to be revealed? It is clear that, in the central ontological texts, a particular linguistic structure plays the central role: the *proposition*. This is comprehensible, for only in so far as the proposition 'says something of something' can some 'thought' be put forward as 'true'. In his treatise *On Interpretation*, Aristotle distinguishes propositions from prayers, requests, and the like: 'Not every sentence is a proposition; only such are propositions as have in them either truth or falsity. Thus a prayer is a sentence, but is neither true nor false' (17a,3-5). More precisely, 'A simple proposition is a statement, with meaning, as to the presence of something in a subject or its absence, in the present, past, or future' (17a,23-24). The proposition is central to Aristotle *qua* ontologist because it is only propositions which purport to 'reveal' beings by saying something about them which is true; in the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*, by contrast, where ontological questions are not at the centre of Aristotle's interest, other features of language are more important.

The ontological significance of propositional structure is also evident in the *Categories* text. For two millennia commentators have debated whether the categories amount to a linguistic classification or a classification of ways of being.

However, if Aristotle sees the most general ontological structures as immanent in language, they are both at once. Just as the proposition is not merely the combination of different linguistic items, but involves the complex relation of predication wherein 'something is said of something', so categorial being is not merely the combination of various categories, but the 'being present in' *ousia* of the other categories: 'it is because the primary substances are subjects for all the other things and all the other things are predicated of them or are in them, that they are called substances most of all' (*Cat.* 2b,15-17). The various categories other than substance all 'say something' about reality and in this sense are 'ways of saying being', but they all presuppose the being of substance. In this text, Aristotle identifies substance 'most strictly, primarily, and most of all' with the individual, eg. this man or this horse (*Cat.* 2a,11-12). Specific things have various qualities, but these latter can have no separate existence. It is possible that Aristotle intended his theory of categories as a critique of the hypostatization of qualities in the Platonic doctrine of separate forms. In any case, the ontology of categoriality is extracted from our ordinary way of speaking whenever we seek to 'reveal' something of reality.

The indicated correspondence between linguistic and ontological structures remains abstract (as in the *Categories* text itself) unless it can serve to elucidate particular ontological problems. Wieland draws attention to the way this occurs in *Physics* 1.7, where Aristotle is concerned with the nature of 'becoming' (*gignesthai*). This problem had long been central in Greek ontology, with the Parmenideans maintaining on the one hand that becoming must be assimilated with non-being, and the Heracliteans declaring on the other hand that there is simply nothing other than becoming. Since one of these 'speculative' metaphysical doctrines can always be opposed to the other, how can the issue be decided? As Wieland indicates, Aristotle does not enter into the dispute at a speculative level at all, but is content to analyse ordinary ways of speaking. The dangers of an hypostatization of

becoming are avoided when it is noticed that, in ordinary speech, becoming always pertains to 'things which become'. After distinguishing a number of ways in which we speak of things becoming such and such, Aristotle concludes that 'there must always be an underlying something, namely that which becomes' (190a,14). The existence of an underlying substratum is not a 'theoretical posit' on Aristotle's part, nor is it an empirical observation, but emerges from the analysis of the various *legomena*. If it be objected that these *legomena* simply recognize the extra-linguistic ontological realities with which Aristotle is concerned, the question must be raised as to how in the first place he identifies these. For he provides no other line of argumentation: the various ways of speaking are assembled, analysed, and the results are then stated.

Aristotle does not set his own ontological principles (substratum, form etc.) over against the ideas of his predecessors, but lets ordinary language itself do the criticism. In this sense the Aristotelian method is intended as presuppositionless: it is not a 'standpoint', but lets the things reveal themselves. For Aristotle as for Plato, standpoints or points of view are of no interest in philosophy, where thinking must carry conviction. Dialectical argument is not mere disputation, it is does consist of arbitrary assertion and counter-assertion, but makes contact with what is implicitly recognized by all participants. The technique of the Platonic dialogue, where at every point agreement must be established before proceeding, makes this obvious. Aristotle finds the dramatic accentuation of this technique unnecessary, but his analyses of ordinary language employ the same basic procedure. Whatever may be the explicit doctrines of the Parmenideans, Heracliteans, and others, they cannot refuse to recognize what shows itself in discourse. This is all that Aristotle needs. The result is a less colourful and less extraordinary philosophy than those of his speculative predecessors, a philosophy which, as noted, can easily take on the appearance of triviality. On the other hand, the historical influence of Aristotle, even among those who regret the absence of a 'sublime' dimension in his thought,

testifies to the force of his 'phenomenological' method.[10] When, for example, beginning in the ninth century, the Arabs became enthusiastic students of Aristotle, this was not because they found in his writings a 'point of view' with which they were 'in agreement', but because they rightly recognized a logic which went beyond all standpoints, doctrines and perspectives. The same applies to the Scholastic appreciation of Aristotle in the middle-ages.

It should now be clear that one does not have to adopt the strong Heideggerian thesis of the *Seinsvergessenheit* of Aristotelianism in order to appreciate its character as a philosophy of 'everydayness'. The latter is not equivalent to the vulgarity of the non-reflective thinker, but refers to the 'natural attitude' of the speaker who reveals the world through propositions. If ontology is concerned with the truth about beings, it is natural to assume that it is derivable from and expressible in propositions, for only this form of speech is capable, so it seems, of truth or falsity. We have also noted Aristotle's claim that it is intuition (*nous*) which enables us to recognize the definitions contained in propositions. Indeed, in ontological research it is precisely these definitions which are sought: although they are already there implicitly in our common conceptions, they must be uncovered and clarified by analysis. In the course of inductive-dialectical research, the definitions gradually emerge into clarity by being exemplified in propositions, and because the *results* of research are formulated in this same way, it may seem that the definitions are themselves propositions, ie. that ontological truth is a kind of propositional truth.[11] However, even within Aristotle's own terms, it is not hard to see the difficulty of this view.

The difficulty alluded to can be illustrated by a passage from *De Anima* (430b,26-28): 'Assertion is the saying of something concerning something, as too is denial, and is in every case either true or false: this is not always the case with intuition (*nous*): the thinking of the definition in the sense of the constitutive essence is always true (*alethes*) nor is

it the assertion of something concerning something'. In this section of the text, Aristotle is considering that part of the soul 'capable of receiving the form of an object' (429a,15). Slightly earlier he discusses sensation (*aisthesis*), which is likewise 'always true' (428a,11). Here we have two species of truth which are non-propositional on Aristotle's own admission; they may be regarded as the 'aletheological' sources appealed to by the philosophical tendencies of idealism and empiricism respectively. If we permit ourselves the naive question of what side of this division Aristotle comes down on, the answer is clear: notwithstanding Aristotle's reputation as an empiricist, there can be no doubt that he accords intuition (thus the 'idea') the primary role vis-a-vis sensation. All animals have the faculty of sensation (427b,13) and possess truth in so far as, eg. they cannot be mistaken that they now have a sensation of white, but the realities of being are given in the forms (definitions) accessible through intuition. Now it is true that, for Aristotle, intuition is only to be found where there is discursive reason, ie. the *logos* (427b,14), therefore the proposition. Nevertheless, the particular kind of truth attaching to the proposition (affirmation/denial) is dependent on the truth of the definitions of its constituent terms. This circumstance may be overlooked in examples like 'the horse stands', where the definitions are unproblematic. But take the kind of ontological statements which one finds in Aristotle himself, eg. 'Each primary and self-subsistent thing is one and the same as its essence' (*Meta.* 1032a,5). It goes without saying that the difficulty in assessing such propositions consists in comprehending the definitions. The definitions are knowable by nature in the sense that they are intrinsically clear and evident, but only with difficulty do they become knowable to us. In Aristotle's ontological works, we find few statements which conform to the structure enunciated in the *Categories*. Instead, we find mostly identity-statements, elucidations of meaning, statements about forms or definitions. To repeat, all this holds true only at the level of ontology. As soon as Aristotle passes over to ontic-factual investigations, the

situation is different. But ontology is Aristotle's main interest, it is the authentic sense of his inquiry into 'principles'.

The import of these considerations becomes clearer if we ask about the ontological status of Aristotelian definitions vis-a-vis the ousiological reduction. Aristotle grounds this reduction on that particular revealing structure of discourse which is the proposition, where 'something is said of something'. But because Aristotle recognizes that we can only pick something out if we have access, implicitly or explicitly, to its definition, an ambiguity enters into his ontology, as illustrated by the well-known difference between the *Categories* text, where the individual thing is credited with primal being, and *Metaphysics* VII, where form has this status. In the *Categories*, we could say, being is taken as 'real' (items of reality), whereas in the *Metaphysics* it is taken as 'ideal'. These two solutions are complementary, for this-ness (*Categories*) and what-ness (*Metaphysics*) belong together in ousiological ontology. The hackneyed opposition between Aristotle the realist and Plato the idealist is thus highly misleading: realism and idealism are not alternatives but emphasize different sides of ousiological being.[12] The idea as accessible through intuition provides the definition of the real existing thing, allowing it to be picked out in the proposition and to have something predicated of it. But both thing and idea have 'being'. This must be borne in mind if Heidegger's critique of the *logos* is to be comprehended as he intends, ie. as integral to his over-arching critique of the ousiological reduction.

3 TRUTH AND *LOGOS*

In talking about 'truth' in the previous section, I used, without any explicit attempt at justification, the expressions 'revealing' and 'reveals'. This seemed quite natural, for in the three contexts in which Aristotle speaks of truth (sensation, intuition, the proposition) something is indeed revealed: a specific sensation (eg. of white), a meaning or definition (eg. of man, time, movement), a state of affairs (eg. that Socrates sits). But I have also spoken in this way because

Heidegger wants to re-establish 'revealing' as the authentic meaning of 'truth', a meaning which, in his opinion, the primacy of propositional truth in the metaphysical tradition has kept hidden. To what degree Heidegger holds Aristotle responsible for this development is not entirely clear. On the one hand he points out that the prevalent doctrine that the 'locus of truth' is the proposition cannot be strictly attributed to Aristotle, who, in *On Interpretation* (17a,3-4), defines the proposition in terms of truth and not vice-versa.[13] Further, not only is Heidegger aware that Aristotle recognizes sensation and intuition as non-propositional revealings, but he claims that, in *Metaphysics* IX. 10, Aristotle gives truth an ontological meaning, indeed that 'being *qua* truth' (*on hos alethes*) is for Aristotle the strictest of all 'ways of saying being'. On the other hand, Heidegger also charges that Aristotle, by narrowing down the meaning of '*logos*' from that primordial 'collecting' (*Sammlung*) which is the 'event of unconcealment' (*Geschehen der Unverborgenheit*) to the proposition which can be true or false, thereby lays the foundation for the whole tradition of truth as correctness, ie. correspondence with reality, or in the Scholastic formula, *adequatio intellectus et rei*.[14]

Although Heidegger's interpretation of truth as 'revealing' has the reputation of being extraordinarily recondite, its fundamental motivation is simple: he wants philosophy to be 'phenomenological', ie. to bring the things themselves, and not just statements about these things, into view. Heidegger is not the first to realize that people can often 'babble on' without any genuine relation to the things of which they speak. The tendency of discourse to degenerate into babble was well-known to Plato and Aristotle, particularly in connection with the phenomenon of sophistry. In order to create the semblance of wisdom, the sophists relied upon their audience's lack of any original relation to the subject matter spoken of; through skill with words they were able to make an impression on gullible people and with those who wished to gain a reputation among the gullible. More

mundanely, however, babble (or 'chatter', Heidegger calls it '*Gerede*') occurs whenever people simply pick up opinions (or concepts, ways of speaking) and pass them along.[15] In the *Theaetetus*, Plato is concerned to show that such opinions do not amount to knowledge even where they happen to be true: genuine knowledge depends on direct acquaintance with the 'ideas'. Aristotle considers that someone who does not know the originative sources of a scientific demonstration only possesses knowledge 'in the accidental way in which the sophist knows' (*Po. An.* 71b,10) and can make no claim to wisdom.[16] This insistence on originative sources of knowledge, whether they be taken as ideas, principles, or causes, is the founding act of Western metaphysics: only thus could traditional beliefs be held to account and critically scrutinized. There needed to be, behind the myriad of opinions and common conceptions, some way in which the thing itself could be viewed. It is also clear that, of the three modes of revealing indicated by Aristotle, only the proposition can 'preserve' an original revealing, and just for this reason only it can be a vehicle for dissimulation and concealment.

Of course, all this can be acknowledged without being a 'Heideggerian'. Since Descartes, modern philosophy has given particular attention to the problem of authenticating purported knowledge. It is necessary, if one is to avoid the accusation of mere babbling, to follow the objective-scientific method for the verification or falsification of propositions. Someone does not qualify as a physicist by uttering '$e=mc^2$' or as an ecologist by uttering 'the depleted ozone layer is contributing to global warming', but one must know how these propositions can be established or refuted. Scientific experts are those who, in however mediated a fashion (eg. through instrumentation), not only come into contact with the things themselves, but are 'familiar' with them, who 'know their way around' within them. The essential empiricism of scientific inquiry, thus the revealing which alone can authenticate assertions, is not effected by the circumstance (treated by some modern writers as a recent and astonishing discovery,

although it was already well known to the Presocratics) that all experience is 'theory-laden'. While the semantic content of experience is pre-structured, an object must first of all be available (revealable) in experience before it can be the subject of a correct assertion: thus Heidegger's example from *Being and Time*, the proposition 'the picture on the wall is hanging askew' can be correct only if 'the picture' is first of all revealable 'as picture'.[17]

If, as stated, all this is neither new nor particularly controversial, what does Heidegger intend with his claim that metaphysics takes the proposition as the 'locus of truth'? Is it just a question of definition? Does Heidegger merely want the scientist to acknowledge that the revealings through which propositions are established also deserve to be called 'true'? If so, the request can easily be granted. For the scientific expert is not only someone who can appropriately assess such propositions as '$e=mc^2$' but who knows that 'm' stands for something 'real' which can be revealed in experience. Knowledge of meaning, of experimental-observational procedures, and of propositions, are closely interlinked, and it would cost the scientist nothing to acknowledge that 'truth' pertains to all of them together. But this still falls short of what Heidegger wants us to see. In his view, the fundamental problem with the propositional definition of truth is that it makes truth a property of 'thought' or 'knowledge' (whether the meaning of 'm' or the full proposition '$e=mc^2$' makes no difference) and thus obscures the significance of the prior revealability of the things themselves. Once truth is understood as a property of thoughts, or as a relation between thoughts and independently existing things, there arises the classical problem of epistemology: how can a relation (correspondence) between such diverse spheres be conceived and ascertained? As long as the things themselves are taken to be independent in the sense of 'free of truth', dogmatism and relativism will remain the basic alternatives in philosophy. Heidegger's solution could be called the 'ontologization of truth'.

It is Heidegger's custom to go back to the Greek word for truth, '*aletheia*'. He puts particular emphasis on the 'negativity' of the word:

> For truth the Greeks have a characteristic expression: *aletheia*. The alpha is a privative alpha. Therefore they have a negative expression for that which we understand positively . . . *aletheia* means: no longer to be hidden, to be uncovered. This privative expression indicates that the Greeks had an understanding that the uncoveredness of the world must first be wrested, that it is something which is not proximally and for the most part available.[18]

Notwithstanding the considerable comment it has attracted, the etymological side of this argument is actually its least important aspect.[19] In substance, Heidegger's claim of the proximal hiddenness (*Verdecktheit*) of truth is, at the level of beings, only a restatement of Aristotle's point that what is knowable by nature is intrinsically difficult. In *De Anima* Aristotle says that sense-perception is 'always true' because here the thing revealed (the sensation) is given in immediate self-evidence. But Aristotle regards this as a limiting case of truth. Elsewhere, his characteristic position is that because sense-perception is 'easy' and 'common to all', it has 'nothing to do with wisdom' (*Meta.* 982a,11-13).[20] The philosopher, by contrast, is one who 'can learn things which are difficult' (982a,11-12). Again, there is nothing particularly remarkable about this: everyone knows that, eg. the 'secrets of the atom' can be 'unlocked' only at an advanced stage of scientific understanding, and must even be 'wrenched' from the phenomena with the aid of sophisticated technical equipment. However, the decisive question concerns the nature of this wrenching. Is it the case, as nowadays so often asserted, that we force the phenomena into our own subjective categories? Or is it much more than the phenomena, albeit with difficulty and presupposing the appropriate training on the part of

the inquirer, force themselves upon us, open themselves up to us?

Although Heidegger claims that Aristotle gives priority to propositional truth, he also finds a conception of ontological truth in Aristotle. When in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle describes his predecessors as people who 'philosophized about truth' (*philosophein peri tes aletheias*, 983b,2) or who 'theorized about truth' (*apophainesthai peri tes aletheias*, 993b,17), and when he defines philosophy as 'knowledge of the truth' (*episteme tes aletheias*, 993b20), he does not mean, Heidegger rightly points out, that philosophy is the theory of knowledge.[21] Rather, 'truth' refers to the things themselves in their capacity to reveal themselves. The things are indeed thinkable, but thought does not bring about the original revealing, which consists in the fact that things are already 'there and present for thought'. For Heidegger, the Aristotelian 'truth of beings', 'the being-ness of beings *qua* truth', consists in the original 'encounterability' (*Begegnischarakter*) of beings.[22]

Despite the employments of '*aletheia*' just indicated, the possibility that truth belongs to the beings themselves seems to be denied by Aristotle, when in *Metaphysics* VI. 4 (1027b,25f) 'being *qua* truth' is dismissed from the realm of ontological inquiry, precisely for the reason that 'falsity and truth are not in things but in thought (*en dianoia*)'. Many commentators have been perplexed by the fact that truth nevertheless turns up as the the principal theme of *Metaphysics* IX. 10, where Aristotle introduces his discussion by saying (1051a,34f) that the terms 'being' (*to on*) and 'not-being' (*to me on*) taken in 'the strictest sense' (*kuriotata*) denote 'truth' (*alethes*) and 'falsity' (*pseudos*) respectively. To overcome the apparent conflict with VI. 4, some scholars have argued that '*kuriotata*' should be translated non-standardly, as 'in the commonest sense', and have suggested in addition that IX. 10 does not belong organically to the *Metaphysics*, but, as concerned with epistemological and logical matters, must be an editorial insertion, belonging properly elsewhere in the Aristotelian *corpus*.[23] Heidegger refuses to entertain such suggestions, maintaining instead that

if the text is read literally and as it stands then not only is there no contradiction with VI. 4, but that IX. 10 as a whole can be seen as the 'keystone of Aristotelian metaphysics in general'.[24] For Heidegger, IX. 10 is not principally about knowledge, but as Aristotle straightforwardly indicates in the opening lines, about 'being *qua* truth', one of the four 'ways of saying being' earlier identified, indeed the 'most strict' way of them all.

Rather than recapitulating Heidegger's commentaries on IX. 10, the main lines of his analysis can be summarized in their relevance for the present inquiry.[25] Aristotle begins by considering the case of contingent facts, where 'the same statement comes to be false and true' (1051b,14). For example, it may be true at one time that Socrates is pale, but this will become false when Socrates blushes. This kind of truth and falsehood depends on the kinds of beings involved, ie. those which admit of contrary states. Now as Heidegger puts it – this is the key to his whole analysis – such beings (eg. the pale Socrates) cannot be 'constantly present' but are sometimes present, sometimes absent. Because of this contingency, such beings are revealed in propositions, where 'something is said of something' (eg. that Socrates is pale). In the case of incomposite things, on the other hand, whose truth Aristotle specifies (1051b,23-24) as 'contact' (*thigein*) and 'addressing' (*phanai*), it is precisely constant presence – according to Heidegger – which is implied.[26] These incomposites, which are 'essences' (1051b,31) in the sense of definitions, do not admit of truth or falsity in the manner of propositions: one either knows them 'intuitively' (*noein*, 1051b,32, 1052a,2) or one does not, their truth consists in their pure presence before the mind. Essences are true in the strictest sense because they have being in the strictest sense: as Aristotle says elsewhere (*Meta.* 993b,30) 'as each thing is in respect of being, so it is in respect of truth'. Of course, the constant presence of the essences does not mean that they are factually (psychologically) present before every individual mind. Rather, the essences are constantly present as the implicit intelligibility of the world, implicit because

knowability by nature does not translate without further ado into knowability for us. What is constantly present, and thus true in the strictest sense, is a field of pure intelligibility.

It was observed that the self-showing of Aristotelian essences occurs through *nous*. But the expression 'through' is problematic: how can something that shows itself become known through something else? For Aristotle in fact, at the level of being (therefore of truth) in 'the strictest sense', the self-showing essences and *nous* are one and the same: the 'self-thinking thought' (*noesis noeseos*) of *Metaphysics* XII. 9 (1074b,35). Now if being, considered in this way as pure thought, can only be thought by itself, what is the situation of the fragile and fallible human thinker? As Aristotle says in the *Nichomachean Ethics* (1177b,28), the human being is a 'composite' creature. The life in pure *nous* 'would be too high for man, for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him' (1177b,26-27). This composite character of human beings means that they think not through pure *nous* (whereby they would become identical with this) but through *dianoia*, discursive reason, ie. through the *logos*, more particularly, through the *logos as proposition*. The apparent contradiction between *Metaphysics* VI. 4 and IX. 10 disappears as soon as one notices that the kind of truth which the former dismisses from ontology is that which is *en dianoia*.[27] As Heidegger points out, because this kind of truth is derivative, in the sense of mediated by the finite capacities of human thought, it is naturally excluded from Aristotle's ontological discussion. But the fact that Aristotle does not restrict himself to this epistemological conception of truth is clear from IX. 10, where the truth of *nous* is identified as in 'the strictest sense' being itself.[28]

It is necessary to take stock of the position now arrived at. On the basis of the indicated texts, Heidegger claims to show that, for Aristotle, truth is primarily the self-revealing of the things themselves. At the most general level, Heidegger takes over this view of truth in his own philosophy. This does not

mean that he accepts the theory of essences as it is found in Aristotle. For Heidegger, the fundamental insight of both Plato and Aristotle is that the world is encountered through pre-given self-showing structures. But he differs from these thinkers on the nature of the said structures: whereas Plato and Aristotle both see them as *intellectual* structures which show themselves to *nous*, Heidegger interprets them as *existential* structures which show themselves to the *existing human being*. It is particularly important here that the term 'intellectual' is correctly understood. Heidegger's existential structures are certainly structures of 'understanding', but they are not on this account structures of 'intellectuality' in the Platonic-Aristotelian sense. For Plato and Aristotle the structures which define primal reality are 'eternal' and are known by the 'eternal element' in man (they are 'divine' and are known by the 'divine element'). This eternity of the Platonic ideas as of the Aristotelian essences is what Heidegger understands ontologically with the notion of 'constant presence'. One might think, on a superficial inspection of *Being and Time*, that Heidegger's 'existentials' are likewise eternal: they are 'always there' for *Dasein*. But Heidegger's point is that the precise manner in which they are 'always there' is quite different to the 'constant presence' of the Platonic-Aristotelian structures. Although the universality of the existential structures is determined ultimately by Being, the latter is (for Heidegger) not constantly present at all, nor indeed absent, but prior to the structure of presence/absence, thus prior to the eternal in the Platonic-Aristotelian sense. In short, the self-revealing of Being is quite different to the self-showing of ideas or essences. What Heidegger extracts from the Aristotelian texts, phenomenologically essential though it is, gives but a preliminary indication of how his own 'truth of Being' can be thought.

Heidegger does not dispute that human thinking only occurs in language, but he considers that the precise nature of this 'in' is much more difficult to comprehend than Aristotle assumes. Aristotle's assumption that the revealing

function of language is rooted in the proposition has the limitation that '*legein* is always *legein ti kata tinos*. In so far as the *logos* characterizes something as something, it is fundamentally unable to grasp that which by its own nature cannot be characterized as something else but only as itself'.[29] When ontology is guided in this way by the *logos*, it becomes ousiological, ie. thing-oriented in the sense discussed earlier. Being is understood as the thingliness of things, as given implicitly in what is 'said of' things. The fundamental structure of being is given by the structure of the proposition, especially by the primacy of the 'subject' as that about which 'something is said'. In Heidegger's words:

> The basic determination of the *on*, *ousia*, has the character of *hupokeimenon*, that which already lies before as primary presence; that is the formal determination of whatever is in general . . . . This breaking in of the *logos*, of the logical in this strict Greek sense, into the whole question about the *on*, is explained by the circumstance that the *on*, the being of beings itself, is primarily interpreted as presence, and that the *logos* is the way in which I primarily present (*vergegenwärtige*) something to myself.[30]

Aristotle does not identify the *logos* as the 'locus of truth', but his derivation of the most general categories of being from the structure of the *logos* as proposition has had - according to Heidegger – the most fateful consequences for the whole metaphysical tradition. The 'content' of thought – and thus truth itself – becomes understood in terms of the 'something as something' structure of the proposition: truth then becomes 'objective' and 'theoretical'.

What is it which 'by its own nature cannot be characterized as something else but only as itself'? A preliminary indication has already been given in terms of Aristotelian essences, which can only show themselves in the mode of *thigein/phanai*. If these essences constitute a total field

of intelligibility, then a philosophy which restricts itself to them alone might resemble the Husserlian project of phenomenology, an 'eidetic science' of the phenomena themselves as they give themselves, a science which brackets out the whole question of 'reality'. Like Husserl, Heidegger wants to get back to the things themselves and let these show themselves independently of any theorizing, but he does not consider that Husserl actually accomplishes this; in his view, the Husserlian focus on 'whatness' already makes operative that theoretical stance which genuine phenomenology – as the 'primordial science' which Heidegger wants it to be – is supposed to supersede. Husserl takes perception as the model of eidetic intuition, but it is really theoretical perception which he has in mind, just as it is really theoretical consciousness which he treats as transcendental consciousness.[31] The same could be said – from Heidegger's standpoint - of the Aristotelian essences or even of the Platonic ideas: in each case the essence has a thingly character in so far as it shows itself in the mode of presence, in a mode, that is, which is not the originary mode of the givenness of the world.[32]

Husserl assumes that, in order that essences should show themselves with no admixture of theory, their claim on factual reality be left out of account. But may it not be, Heidegger asks, that facticity itself, the original givenness of Being, is insusceptible of such bracketing? More particularly, may not the originary content or 'what-ness' of experience be precisely 'existence'?[33] And may it not be that Husserl, by bracketing out existence, has abandoned the sphere of proper phenomenological given-ness for that theoretical stance which defines reality as 'presence'? If this is so, then the same ontological error can be attributed to Aristotle. For Aristotle, in taking the propositional structure as determinative for ontology, likewise crystallizes things (that which can be present) out of primordial givenness, more precisely, he overlooks the sphere of primordial givenness entirely. Although the truth of Aristotelian essences is, as noted, prior to propositional truth, they have meaning and application

only in the context of the proposition, as the condition of the possibility of 'saying something about something'. Aristotle too brackets the phenomenon of existence, ie. his ontology presents the 'truth of beings' while overlooking the 'truth of Being'.

For Heidegger, the genuine value of Husserlian phenomenology as of the Kantian critique of knowledge is that certain 'ideal realities' come into view as the condition of theoretical discourse. It is easy to understand that the 'truth' of the Husserlian and Kantian philosophies does not consist in any factical propositions they make but in the degree to which they clarify the ontological presuppositions of such propositions. This clarification cannot itself be encapsulated in a set of propositions which 'say something about something', but consists in a complex interconnection of conceptual elucidations and phenomenological showings: in the end it is a matter of 'seeing' what is meant. Yet, and this for Heidegger is the decisive matter, the context of this seeing remains thingly experience as embodied in theoretical propositions. Kant distinguishes his own transcendental method of metaphysics from speculation precisely in these terms: his critique of knowledge 'says something' because it explains how 'something is said of something' in theoretical discourse. Aristotle, although mixing ontic-factical inquiry in with ontology, proceeds in the same way. His ontology gives conceptual 'conditions of the possibility', but it is always the possibility of categorially defined reality, thus of propositions, which he seeks to ground. When Heidegger, on the other hand, in *Being and Time* and elsewhere, also gives conditions of the possibility, something very different is at stake. If one asks 'what Heidegger says', expecting that, in a manner analogous to Kant, he must be showing the possibility of certain theoretical-categorial propositions, then one is bound to be disappointed, and one may come to the conclusion (as many positivists have done, proceeding unknowingly from Aristotelian assumptions) that 'Heidegger says nothing'. For Heidegger himself, on the other hand, the truth of his

writings does not pertain (except derivatively) to what 'he says' in them, but in what 'shows itself' through them.

Beginning in the mid-thirties, Heidegger's critique of the *logos* takes on a new dimension which will remain central in all his subsequent reflections on the topic, indeed which will become (along with 'poetical thinking') the major preoccupation of his later writings. This is his claim that the scientific interpretation of the world which binds itself to the theoretical proposition amounts to a 'technological' reduction of truth.[34] It is a long and indirect route from Aristotle to the modern definition of nature as a 'standing reserve of energy', but according to Heidegger, the inner meaning of ontological presuppositions is revealed only in the course of millennia.[35] In fact, Heidegger maintains that the underlying subjectivism of Aristotelian ontology did not become explicit until Descartes insisted that the being of something could be securely established only through clear and distinct ideas. The technological meaning of subjectivity is the securing and fixing of the object through thought-determinations: the subject knows the object when the latter is 'grasped' (*Begriff* = *Griff* = handle) in its what-ness. A thing is real if in this way we have disposal over it, if it can take its place in the total stock of energy available for use. It is wrong, Heidegger insists, to see technology simply as an application of science, for the very structure of science, the very project of scientific knowledge, is already in essence technological. As reality becomes more and more objective, man becomes more and more subjective, a mere manager of that 'ordering' and 'challenging forth' which is technological revealing:

> Man sets up the world toward himself, and he delivers Nature over to himself . . . . Where Nature is not satisfactory to man's representation, he reframes or redisposes it . . . . Man exposes things (*stellt die Dinge aus*) when he boosts them for sale and use. Man exposes when he sets forth his own achievement and plays up his own profession. By multifarious producing, the world is

> brought to stand and into position. The Open becomes an object, and is thus twisted around toward the human being. Over against the world as an object, man stations himself and sets himself up as the one who deliberately pushes through all this producing.[36]

For Heidegger, this whole development reflects the circumstance that all revealing has come under the rule of the *logos*, as 'saying *qua organon*':

> The objectness, the standing over against, of production stands in the assertion of calculating propositions and of the theorems of the reason that proceeds from proposition to proposition . . . . Not only has reason established a special system of rules for its saying, for the *logos* as explanatory predication; the logic of reason is itself the organization of the dominion of purposeful self-assertion in the objective. . . . This is why the *logos*, saying *qua organon*, requires organization by logic. Only within metaphysics does logic exist.[37]

In many ways, Heidegger's writings on technological revealing, together with his advocacy of a '*Gelassenheit*' (releasement) which 'lets Being be', provide a more intelligible explanation of his critical attitude to Aristotelianism than anything to be found in his earlier works. The difference between ousiologically reduced philosophy and *Seinsdenken* can now be interpreted existentially, as the difference between the unlimited self-assertion in which man, through his possession of the *logos*, is the 'measure of all things', and a more 'receptive' mode of human existence.[38] On the other hand, because in these later writings Heidegger sees the rule of technological subjectivity in speculative fashion as a 'destining' (*Geschick*) of Being, the conditions for such an existential interpretation are also obstructed. It seems that Heidegger is so much afraid of subjectivism, of making man himself responsible for his modes of revealing, that humans become little more than puppets of

Being in its mysterious destinings.[39] Consequently, although Heidegger asserts that technological revealing represents the most comprehensive *Seinsvergessenheit* yet reached, to the degree that the 'essence of man' is in danger, the link between *Seinsvergessenheit* and everydayness is obscured. Within the framework of *Being and Time*, Heidegger would have been able to say that technological self-assertion belongs to the ontological consitution of *Dasein*, as an aspect of fallen or inauthentic existence. For the later Heidegger, it seems, Aristotle can only be registering an external destining, in fact the first primitive manifestations of that *Geschick* which will reveal its inner-most meaning in the age of technology. Just what, under these circumstances, the essence of man amounts to, just how this can be in danger, and just how any response to this danger is possible – these are questions the very permissibility of which is now unclear.

The task of unravelling the obscurities of the later Heidegger, even if this in principle can be done (a doubtful proposition) falls outside the scope of the present study. But leaving the whole doctrine of destining aside, and from the point of view of a systematic understanding of Heidegger's attitude to Aristotelianism, it is not implausible to see the critique of technological subjectivity as implicit in Heidegger's early writings. The links between *Being and Time* and such essays as 'The Question Concerning Technology' are not hard to see, for in both cases it is an ontology of presence-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*) or objectivity (*Gegenständigkeit*) which is criticized. What Heidegger means, in the technology essay, by the 'standing reserve' (*Bestand*), is a kind of presence or thinghood.[40] As the modern positive sciences have progressively released themselves from metaphysical definitions of the 'thing', what remains? Heidegger's answer is that the 'being' of the thing, the objectivity of the object, reduces to its disposability within a total process of energy transference. In itself this is no great novelty in the philosophy of science, having obvious affinities with instrumentalist interpretations of scientific terms. What is specific to Heidegger is the general

ontological context wherein this analysis is located, a context which makes it possible to distinguish between the 'being' of the standing reserve as 'reality', and 'Being' as such, thus to see the absolutization of technological revealing as *Seinsvergessenheit*.

4 *SEINSDENKEN* AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

As early as the Freiburg lectures of 1919-20, Heidegger contrasts the idea of phenomenology as primordial science with the Neo-Kantian epistemological conception of philosophy.[41] Taking over Kant's axiom that reality 'in itself' cannot be conceptually represented, the Neo-Kantians referred the whole domain of objective knowledge to valuational acts of the transcendental subject. As Rickert maintained, the primordial 'life' to which the *Lebensphilosophen* aspired could be admitted as real, but only in the sense of an irrational, unknowable, undiscussable 'heterogeneous continuum'. For Heidegger on the other hand, this Neo-Kantian choice between reality as either irrational substratum or field of objectivity amounts to an 'unjustified absolutization of the theoretical'.[42] Although at this early date Heidegger does not yet explicitly associate Neo-Kantianism with Aristotelian ousiological ontology, with hindsight the connection is clear: theoretical knowledge becomes privileged because a decision has already been made about the ontological priority of 'things' and 'thingliness'.[43] Against this and other pre-judgements, Heidegger urges that the primordially real reveals itself phenomenologically as pre-objective, but without being 'chaotic' or 'heterogeneous' in Rickert's sense. Already in these early lectures, Heidegger illustrates this by reference to the 'there is' (*es gibt*) of experience. At the most basic level, what is given to the human subject is that 'there is something' (*es gibt etwas*), but this 'something' is not an object of any sort, nor is it known in the sense of theoretical cognition.[44] Primordial experience is not a relation between cognitive subject and cognizable object but is rather an 'event' (*Ereignis*): 'Experience does not pass in front of me

like a thing, like an object which I place before myself, but I appropriate it to myself (*ich selbst er-eigne es mir*) and it appropriates itself (*es er-eignet sich*) according to its nature'.[45]

In the years 1919-24, Heidegger's idea of philosophy does not yet crystallize out into the *Seinsfrage*, at least not in the explicit terms of *Being and Time*. Instead, the realm of primordial givenness is referred to as 'life' or 'factical life', and what later becomes the 'existential analytic' remains the 'hermeneutic of factical life-experience'.[46] At this time in German philosophy, the major counter-tendency to Neo-Kantianism was not Husserlian phenomenology (the anti-psychologism of which was received with some sympathy by Rickert and Natorp) but the *Lebensphilosophie* of Nietzsche, Dilthey, and the early Jaspers. For both Rickert and Husserl, Heidegger too seemed to be straying into the fashionable irrationalism of *Lebensphilosophie*. But Heidegger's attitude is complex. On the one hand, because he recognizes in the *Lebensphilosophen* a genuine attempt to press into the realm of primordiality, he sides with them against the Neo-Kantians and orthodox Husserlians, but on the other hand, he is strongly critical of the absence of rigour among the *Lebensphilosophen*. Thus his 1919/21 review (first published 1973) of Jaspers' *Psychology of Worldviews* (1919) bears many resemblances to the 1920/21 review of the same book by Rickert.[47] Of course, these resemblances are limited to the criticisms of Jaspers: what Heidegger proffers as his own existential rigour could not be recognized by Rickert, nor could Rickert's objectifying methodology be approved by Heidegger. While Heidegger admits that *Lebensphilosophie* also appeals to the dilettante anxious to avoid the exertions of disciplined thought, in lectures from 1920 he rejects Rickert's charge that this movement expresses the 'pathos of laziness', insisting instead that 'it is more difficult to enter into an interrogation of life than it is to round off the world with a system'.[48] In general, the early Heidegger shows a critical sympathy with the *Lebensphilosophen*, particularly with Dilthey.[49] Yet even Dilthey is criticized for his

quasi-objectifying method which fails to break decisively enough from epistemological problematics. Heidegger, it seems, wants a 'rigour' all his own.

Although in *Being and Time* Heidegger no longer speaks explicitly of 'primordial science', the concept is implicitly operative in the idea of phenomenology as the method of scientific ontology.[50] Of course, from the point of view of Rickert (indeed, of every kind of Kantianism) 'primordial science' can be nothing other than a self-contradictory expression, because the conceptuality of scientific knowledge presupposes that the 'heterogeneous continuum' is given form, ie. *altered* from its original ir-rationality, a-logicality and un-intelligibility. From this perspective, the unusual language of *Being and Time* cannot hide the fact that it contains theoretical propositions laying out universal ontological structures in their systematic interconnection. It is not hard to understand that many readers of *Being and Time*, from its first publication through to the present day, see a 'theory' therein, sometimes a philosophical anthropology, sometimes an extension of Husserlian phenomenology to human existence, sometimes a 'theory of the pre-theoretical'. It seems that a certain technical terminology is laid down and a certain structured domain of intelligibility is opened up for methodical investigation. The objection can then be brought against Heidegger that the concepts of the analytic of existence attempt to re-present that which by its own nature can never have presence as its way of being. As the methodological preamble to *Being and Time* testifies, Heidegger was acutely aware of this difficulty. A few years after the publication of the work, he began to have serious reservations about its employment of the 'language of metaphysics'. Already by the early 1930's the analytic of existence has been given up: not disavowed, not rejected, but now seen as a stage on the way.[51] In the course of the decade, under the deepening influence of his Hölderlin studies, Heidegger progressively adopts an ostensibly more primordial 'poetic' mode of expression, a form of language, that is, in which

the function of re-presentation gives way (to what degree, is never settled) to a genuine self-showing of Being.[52]

On the other hand, in Heidegger's later writings the impression of theory never entirely disappears, nor does the ideal of rigour diminish in its significance. If the *Seinsfrage* is no longer explicated in the context of phenomenology and scientific ontology, this is because Heidegger becomes increasingly conscious of the 'grammatical' difficulties of *Seinsdenken*. There was an almost irresistible tendency for readers to fixate on the surface conceptuality and technical vocabulary of *Being and Time*, and, in the business of theory, to lose sight of the phenomena themselves. It was also difficult, Heidegger found, to free the term 'phenomenology' from its Husserlian connotations as a philosophy of consciousness, while the terms 'science' and 'ontology' were liable to be invested with Aristotelian assumptions, particularly as regards the propositional (therefore theoretical) character of truth. The 'language of metaphysics' of *Being and Time* consisted above all in the systematic format and structure of this work, which suggested that the *Seinsfrage* could be articulated as a kind of research program. For Heidegger, however, if the 'grammar' of the *Seinsfrage* does not allow it to be approached through a series of repeatable, learnable, and intersubjectively negotiable theoretical propositions, this does not mean that *Seinsdenken* is speculative thinking, undisciplined by the phenomena. It is not a matter of release from discipline, but of the distinctive kind of discipline called for by Being. At the same time, Heidegger does not see *Seinsdenken* as without consequences for a range of theoretical disciplines, such that Being can under certain circumstances find an 'ambiguous' expression in the latter.[53]

Although Heidegger does not downplay the relevance of *Seinsdenken* especially for the 'human sciences', he warns against any ontic narrowing-down of his intended ontological level of questioning. There has always been plenty of scope, especially in respect of his earlier works, for 'applying' Heidegger in the sciences. Heidegger has been put to use

in psychology, psychiatry, sociology, anthropology, political theory, historiography, theology, literary theory and many other areas of specialized research. Yet for Heidegger himself all these are but contexts in which the *Seinsfrage* may be revealed and are not the *Seinsfrage* itself. The methodological employment of the *Seinsfrage*, so it seems, can only go so far without destroying it own ground and motivation; there is a constant danger that the theorist will stray into some particular field of application and 'forget' the fundamental question. Some contemporary commentators see Heidegger's unwillingness to anchor the *Seinsfrage* in genuinely methodological (ie. intersubjectively norm-governed) discourse as a basic weakness of his thought. Paul Ricoeur, for example, views Heidegger's development as a regrettably progressive movement away from dialogue with the sciences, something which 'hermeneutical philosophy', informed by the original 'ontologization of hermeneutics' of *Being and Time*, can re-establish. The methodological employment of Heidegger is for Ricoeur, as for many others, the only alternative to a curious and repetitious pondering of the *Seinsfrage* which stands aloof from all application.[54] But again, Heidegger would reply that the particular kind of 'application' most relevant to *Seinsdenken* is of a nature all its own, not to be confused with the ability to generate theoretical knowledge.

In some respects, the early Heidegger's attitude towards science resembles that of the mature Hegel; both want something *more scientific* than that which ordinarily counts as science, but both have been condemned as unscientific by theoretical philosophy. Neo-Kantianism, for instance, criticizes Hegel in much the same terms (fundamentally for mysticism) as it criticizes Heidegger, while Heidegger's charge that Neo-Kantianism shrinks back from the realm of primordiality parallels Hegel's charge that Kantianism doggedly adheres to the level of 'finite' understanding. Of course, Hegel's science of speculative dialectic seeks to ground itself in that same Greek metaphysics which Heidegger associates with *Seinsvergessenheit*, but to Neo-Kantianism the

Hegelian Absolute Idea and Heideggerian Being, as equally unamenable to objective validation, are equally unacceptable. On the other hand, whereas for Hegel the fulfillment of speculative philosophy includes a system of the ontic sciences, the manner in which Heidegger sees the *Seinsfrage* as foundational is very different. For the earlier no less than the later Heidegger, *Seinsdenken* functions to situate the ontic sciences, thus to indicate their ultimate significance, but, unlike Hegelian dialectic it does not determine their specific conceptual content. The development of the various ontic sciences is by no means integral to the task of *Seinsdenken*, and indeed the later Heidegger sees the historical progress of the sciences as having gone hand in hand with an ever deepening *Seinsvergessenheit*. However, it is not the sciences themselves but the scientization of truth which Heidegger sees as the chief obstacle to *Seinsdenken*. Only to the extent that this absolutization of scientific-theoretical cognition has become part of the self-understanding of the sciences can Heidegger be justly regarded as an anti-scientific philosopher. As he sees the matter himself, he stands for the primordial scientificity of phenomenological truth, for an openness to that which shows itself prior to theoretical cognition, thus prior to all objective validity.

5 THE TRUTH OF BEING: HEIDEGGER AND THE PLATONIC *TO AGATHON*

It appears that, if we attempt to think Being in an 'abiding' rather than a 'methodological' manner, we run up against some kind of limit. Heidegger acknowledges this, for, as earlier observed, he maintains that Being must be thought equiprimordially with the Nothing. Similar ideas are not hard to find in the history of philosophy's more mystical currents. That primordial reality is to be found only at the outer limits of thought, that it is 'beyond being', 'beyond truth', beyond 'rational' comprehension, is unfathomably 'other' etc., all this is quite familiar from the influential Neoplatonic tradition as well as other sources. Heidegger's affinities with Neoplatonic

figures from Plotinus to Eckhart have received attention by recent scholars, confirming doubts that *Seinsvergessenheit* is as all-pervasive as Heidegger suggests.[55] While Heidegger does not discuss the Neoplatonists at any length, his attitude to their fundamental theme of 'transcendence' can be at least partly gauged from his treatment, in various texts going back to 1927, of the passages in Plato's *Republic* concerning 'the Good' (*to agathon*). It is precisely in this context, in connection with the most pivotal 'Neoplatonic' passages in the whole of Plato, that Heidegger provides some essential clues as to what the 'truth of Being' means in its difference from the 'truth of beings'.[56]

It will be useful, in order that Heidegger's analysis be more readily understood, to give a few quotations from these *Republic* passages. In every case the speaker is Socrates:

> Then what gives the objects of knowledge their truth and the knower's mind the power of knowing them is the form of the Good. It is the cause of knowledge and truth, and you will be right to think of it as being known, and yet as being something other than, and even more spendid than, knowledge and truth. And just as it was right to think of light and sight as being like the sun, but wrong to think of them as being the sun itself, so here again it is right to think of knowledge and truth as being like the Good, but wrong to think of either of them as being the Good, whose position must be ranked still higher. (508e- 509a)

> The Good may be said to be the source not only of the intelligibility of the objects of knowledge, but also of their being and reality; yet it is not itself that reality, but is beyond it (*epekeina tes ousias*), and superior to it in dignity and power. (509b)

> The final thing to be perceived in the intelligible region, and perceived only with difficulty, is the form

> of the Good; once seen, it is inferred to be responsible for what is right and valuable in anything, producing in the visible region light and the source of light, and being in the intelligible region itself controlling source of truth and intelligence. (517bc)

In his 1931 lectures on the *Republic*, Heidegger explains Plato's reasoning in a manner which suggests that *to agathon* could be a model for understanding the primordial truth of *aletheia* (the 'truth of Being') as distinct from the 'truth of beings' given by the *logos*:

> It is a matter, on the basis of the clarification of the relation (of the 'yoke') between seeing and the visible, to carry this over to the region of genuine knowledge, of the understanding of *Being*. We know this already as the comprehending seeing of the ideas. Also here there must be a yoke between this higher seeing (*noein*) and that which is seen (*nooumenon*), a yoke which gives *dunamis* to both the seeing and the seen. And what permits the seen to actually become seeable? The *aletheia*![57]

At first sight, Heidegger's conclusion seems dubious. Does not Plato say (508e, see above) that the Good is that which 'gives the objects of knowledge their truth and the knower's mind the power of knowing'? How can that from which truth originates be truth itself? But as Heidegger points out, what Plato means by the 'truth' of objects is nothing else than their 'reality' or 'true being', which he (Plato) clearly distinguishes from the 'power of knowing'. In this sense (ontological truth), the ideas are knowable because they are true and not the other way around: truth does not come about through the act of knowing, but only 'true beings' are knowable. Now Plato says that knowledge and truth (ie. beings, the ideas themselves) are *like* the Good without actually being the Good, in a similar way as sight

and light are like the sun without actually being the sun. The sun produces the light as the yoke between acts of sensible perception and visible objects, but this light is only 'like' the sun. Similarly, explains Heidegger, true beings are only 'like' the Good, the intelligible realities are only 'like' that which confers intelligibility upon them. The Good creates and holds permanently in place the whole region of intelligibility, just as the sun, through the medium of light, creates the region of visibility. Further, just as the sun can be looked into only with difficulty, so can the Good be comprehended only partially and imperfectly. In so far as the sun is actually a visible object, the simile breaks down, but Plato's meaning is clear: the Good is not itself an intelligible reality, it is not an 'idea' but something 'superior in dignity and power'. In Heidegger's language, the truth of sensible beings is their 'being-ness' (*Seiendheit*), but this being-ness, this whole region of intelligible realities, is dependent upon the Good (Being, truth, *aletheia*) as the source of its 'illumination'.

The relevance of the Platonic *to agathon* to Heidegger's own *Seinsfrage* seems confirmed by parallel discussions in lecture-courses from 1927 and 1928, as well as in the essay 'The Essence of Reasons' (1929).[58] Just like Heidegger's 'Being', 'world', and 'truth of Being', *to agathon* is the 'open space in which beings can be', the original 'giving' of beings, the condition of the possibility of the 'revealing' of beings. When Heidegger says that *to agathon* is 'this empowering (*Ermächtigende*), the empowerment (*Ermächtigung*) for Being, the empowerment for unhiddenness (*Unverborgenheit*) which as such *occurs* (*geschieht*)', this is certainly reminiscent of his own way of speaking about truth and Being as 'event'.[59] On the other hand, in all the texts mentioned, Heidegger ultimately refuses to accept that, with this notion of *to agathon*, Plato was reaching beyond the 'truth of beings' to a more primordial *aletheia*. In the 1927 lectures, he closes his discussion with the abrupt and unsubstantiated remark that the '*idea agathou* is nothing but the *demiourgos*, the producer pure and simple', a claim which runs counter not only to

Neoplatonic interpretations (where the Good = the One = *huperousia*, explicitly distinguished from the demiurge of the *Timaeus*), but also to the views of most contemporary commentators.[60] While in 'The Essence of Reasons' he distinguishes the transcendence of *to agathon* from that of a *huperouranios topos* ('another world'), claiming that the former presses towards 'the primordial-unitary ground of the possibility of the truth of the understanding of Being', he is still unwilling to identify this with the 'transcendence of *Dasein*', this time because the context of Plato's discussion is 'existence in the *polis*'.[61] In 'Plato's Doctrine of Truth', Heidegger sees the Platonic Good explicitly as 'under the yoke of the idea'.[62] As the empowering of unhiddenness, the Good is still governed by the basic ontological determination of that which is empowered, namely the 'presence' of the ideas. *Aletheia* remains ambiguous in Plato as between the original 'occurrence' of unhiddenness on the one hand, and the 'correctness' of 'seeing' on the other. Heidegger's basic attitude is best summed up in a passage from the 1931 lectures:

> The ancient understanding of Being prevents the emerging fundamental experience of the *unhiddenness* of beings *in* their origin [ie. the experience underlying Plato's *to agathon*] from being unfolded in its authentic depth. The Greek understanding of Being (Being = presence) brings it about that *aletheia* immediately forfeits its basic meaning . . . . On the other hand the weakened meaning of *aletheia* rebounds on the concept of Being. Truth gets understood as being correct in the sense of correct assertion (correctness or validity), therefore Being is now understood as the being of assertion (*on* = *on legomenon*): what is correctly asserted, *is*, and *only* what is so asserted is. Being is therefore oriented to the assertion. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that since Aristotle the basic traits of Being are called 'categories'.[63]

The rather arbitrary appearance of Heidegger's Plato interpretation, which insists on reading back Aristotelianism into the Platonic texts, has been noticed by many commentators, and is particularly puzzling in the light of Heidegger's widely recognized Neoplatonic affinities.[64] The way that Heidegger skirts around Plato's *to agathon*, together with his silence on Neoplatonic developments of this idea, suggests a dogmatism which is unwilling to concede any predecessors in the *Seinsfrage*. Not only *to agathon*, but the doctrine of the 'unsayability' of truth in Plato's *Seventh Letter*, poses a problem for Heidegger's Aristotelian reading. In the 1931 lectures, he reviews this doctrine with approval, distinguishing it from vulgar mysticism by virtue of the fact that (for Plato, and apparently for himself as well) 'only through the rigour of questioning can we come close to the unsayable'.[65] But then, inexplicably, he seems to forget this side of Plato, passing over to the charge that Platonic truth is essentially 'correctness'. Again, in the 1940 Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger asserts that 'all theological and pseudo-theological tricks of interpretation [presumably of Neoplatonism] shatter' against the fact that Plato's *to agathon* is the 'idea of ideas', and that 'idea' means being-ness, *ousia*.[66] But although it is true that Plato speaks of '*idea tou agathon*' (508e), his other claim that this is *epekeina tes ousia*, which as such is 'other than, and even more splendid than, knowledge and truth', counts against Heidegger's reading. As several critics have pointed out, there are still other aspects of the Platonic philosophy, ignored by Heidegger, which cast further doubt on the alleged equation of 'truth' and 'correctness': formost among these is the doctrine of *eros*, the 'longing' for an essentially unattainable transcendent truth.[67]

Yet notwithstanding Heidegger's somewhat telling avoidance of the issue in respect of *to agathon* and related Neoplatonic doctrines of transcendence, it would be wrong to simply Platonize Heidegger on the basis of the above-indicated analogies. For one thing, the notion of *to agathon* is itself unclear, for another, Neoplatonism is far from a homogeneous tendency of

thought. There is undoubtedly a formal analogy between the Platonic *to agathon* and the Heideggerian truth of Being, but the intellectualist character of the Platonic philosophy in general must, from the standpoint of Heidegger, place strict limits on this. While Heidegger is surely wrong to equate *to agathon* with *ousia*, it is logical to assume that the particular form of transcendence of *to agathon* is organically connected with that from which it transcends, namely the intellectual realities of the ideas. In this sense *to agathon* is indeed, as Plato's terminology indicates, an 'idea', though of a peculiar sort.[68] If we can say of *to agathon* that it is 'unintelligible', then it is so in a way which is integrally tied to the intelligibility of the ideas. Since, for Heidegger, the way of being of the ideas is presence, this would mean that *to agathon*, despite its transcendence, despite the fact that it is not itself present, does not imply a departure from Greek ontology. If the path of philosophical progress, as Plato suggests in the *Republic* and *Seventh Letter*, culminates in a vision of *to agathon*, this, for Heidegger, is still an intellectual path, strictly a path of intellectual purification, which as such is quite different to the path of existential purification guided by the *Seinsfrage*. The difference between *to agathon* and the truth of Being would be the difference between the intellectual and existential encounterability (unconcealment) of the world, between the original givenness of the world as a project for cognition on the one hand, and as a project for existence (in Heidegger's specific sense) on the other.

Already in ancient times, Platonism proved a very pliable framework, amenable to employment by diverse tendencies of thought from the Mosaic philosophy of Philo through Gnostic mysticism to the Christian Platonism of Augustine and the Greek Church Fathers. Particularly in this latter category (eg. Gregory of Nyssa, Pseudo-Dionysius) do we find an existentialized Platonism, with *eros* (desire) being made to approximate the Christian *agape* (love). The negative theology of the Greek Christian Platonists, in so far as it is oriented to an ultimate reality which is equiprimordially self-revealing and self-concealing (expressed as a mutually

conditioning brightness and darkness), has distinct resemblances to Heidegger, and given the theological motivations which Heidegger stressed were central to his own development, it is not implausible to see his critique of Plato, biased as it is by an Aristotelian reading, as partaking of the same suspicion of intellectualism which one finds not only in the Greek Fathers, but in Neoplatonism generally. From this point of view, Plato's *to agathon*, notwithstanding its status as *epekeina tes ousias*, would not do justice to the existential unfathomability of Being, to the fact that the mystery of Being makes a claim on man and puts a challenge to man in a way which transcends the project of cognition. Because this claim and challenge are not derived, reasoned through, constructed, argued out, but simply 'given' by the primordial event of Being, simply 'revealed' to man, in this sense it is the truest of all truth, the 'truth of Being' itself. If the majority fail to recognize it, and persist in the everydayness of *Seinsvergessenheit*, this does not, for Heidegger, detract from its phenomenological evidence. The supreme reality (Being) is the most seeable, but this does not imply that it is actually seen and acknowledged as such. Indeed, in the case of the 'truth of Being' no less than in the case of Plato's *to agathon*, the majority do not *want* to see.

III
Human Existence

1 THE QUESTION OF PRACTICE

It was mentioned in the Introduction to this book that Heidegger's audience in his early lectures on Aristotle could not always accurately distinguish between his interpretation of Aristotle on the one hand, and the presentation of his own philosophical position on the other. This problem was particularly acute in respect of Aristotle's practical philosophy. As far as Aristotelian theoretical philosophy (especially the metaphysics) was concerned, Heidegger's overall critical intention was more or less clear. But Heidegger continually came back in his lectures to the *Nichomachean Ethics*, and here, it seemed, he found something of positive significance for his own concerns. Did Heidegger's project of a 'hermeneutics of factical life-experience', which he was developing in other lecture-courses of this period and which would eventually issue in the existential analytic of *Being and Time*, involve some kind of 'appropriation' of Aristotle's practical philosophy? And was his ubiquitous critique of objectivist philosophy effected by playing off the practical against the theoretical side of Aristotle?

Until recently, most of the textual evidence relevant to these questions has not been generally accessible, and it has been necessary to rely on the reports of those who attended Heidegger's early lectures. Hans-Georg Gadamer has been an especially influential witness, not only because of his close association with Heidegger in the early period at Freiburg

and Marburg, but due to his subsequent development of a 'hermeneutical philosophy of practice' drawing from Aristotle and Heidegger. It was Heidegger who first made Gadamer aware of the hermeneutical dimension of the *Nichomachean Ethics*, especially Aristotle's concept of *phronesis* (practical wisdom) as a mode of knowledge irreducible to the *episteme* of theoretical science. Further, Gadamer saw Heidegger's investigations of factical life as affirming the entitlements of *phronesis* over against the absolutist pretentions of *episteme*, and thus as directly relevant to his own interest in the ontological articulation of historico-cultural practice. To be sure, Gadamer has always acknowledged that Heidegger's chief interest lay in another direction (the *Seinsfrage*), but since the 1930's he has repeatedly brought Heidegger and Aristotle together within the context of a philosophy of practice, and has repeatedly emphasized Heidegger's indebtedness to the *Nichomachean Ethics*.[1]

Only in 1992 were Heidegger's lectures on Aristotle's practical philosophy finally published in the *Gesamtausgabe*, nearly seventy years after they were delivered at the University of Marburg.[2] In the meantime, however, Gadamer's account of the Aristotle-Heidegger nexus had become so familiar, and his program of philosophical hermeneutics had become so influential (by now splintering into numerous currents), that there was an almost inevitable tendency to read these lectures 'through Gadamerian spectacles'.[3] For the old problem, the one which confronted Heidegger's original listeners, once again asserted itself, namely how to distinguish Heidegger's Aristotle from Heidegger himself. What we find in these lectures is a very close examination of particular passages from Aristotle, with detailed attention to the linkages between leading concepts. As for the relation between Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle and his own independent philosophical direction there are, at best, only hints, in part consisting of the way Heidegger translates Aristotelian concepts into German. It is these translational hints which recent commentators have seized upon in order

to 'confirm' a relation between Heidegger and Aristotle which is in broad agreement with Gadamer's view. Jacques Taminiaux finds that 'the constellation of the German notions by means of which the structure of *phronesis* is clarified turns out to be parallel to [Heidegger's] analysis of care and the specific mode of seeing of care, ie., resoluteness'.[4] In similar vein, Franco Volpi maintains that 'the understanding of the practical structure of human life, which Heidegger claims to be the ontological constitution of *Dasein*, originates from a type of speculative sedimentation – in the starting point and indeed in the terminology of *Being and Time* – of the substantial determination of the moral life and being of human being carried out in the *Nichomachean Ethics*'.[5] Another case is John van Buren, who in his recent comprehensive study of the early Heidegger asserts that 'Heidegger actually modelled his destruction of Aristotle's metaphysics on Aristotle's own attempt in the *Nichomachean Ethics* to destroy Plato's science of a separate, universal, and timeless idea of the Good'. As van Buren sees the matter, Heidegger in his own philosophy takes up 'the vantage point of the practical Aristotle' and 'plays the practical Aristotle off against the metaphysical Aristotle'.[6]

Admittedly, these writers are not unaware of significant incongruities between the Heideggerian and Aristotelian models of human existence. Taminiaux points to a 'Platonic bias' in Heidegger, as evidenced by the 'ontological privilege of *bios theoretikos*, meaning the philosophical existence dedicated to grasping the sight of Being'.[7] This, Taminiaux indicates, is a deficiency which must be remedied before Heideggerian ideas can be employed in a socially 'liberating' philosophy of practice. Volpi too refers to Heidegger's 'decisive transformation' of Aristotelian concepts, above all through an 'ontologization' of what in Aristotle are 'ontic' determinations.[8] However, Volpi does not say whether he considers this 'ontologization' as regrettable or otherwise, and does not clearly indicate its significance in relation to the wholistic philosophical positions of Heidegger and Aristotle. For his part, van Buren stresses that Heidegger's view of

human existence was determined not only by Aristotle, but also by Luther's reading of the New Testament. *Prima facie*, this poses a difficulty, for Heidegger commonly refers to Greek philosophy and 'authentic' Christianity as incompatible modes of thought. But van Buren considers that, at least in respect of Aristotle's practical philosophy, no conflict exists, and indeed that Heidegger was anticipated in his 'appropriation' of the *Nichomachean Ethics* by none other than Luther himself. For van Buren, then, the relevant philosophical opposition is between Heidegger, Aristotelian ethics and Luther on the one side, and Aristotelian metaphysics, together with the theoretical-scientific tradition deriving therefrom, on the other side.

Notwithstanding the various qualifications surrounding Heidegger's alleged 'appropriation' of Aristotle's practical philosophy, the thesis faces certain systematic difficulties which are not addressed by the authors mentioned, difficulties which relate to the unity of Aristotle's thought and thus also to the unity of Heidegger's critique. Is it the case that Aristotle runs two philosophies side by side, one metaphysical (theoretical) and the other practical? Or is it much more that Aristotle's philosophy is a unitary whole, such that one of these 'sides' is dependent on the other? And how does Heidegger see the situation? Does he judge that the implications of Aristotle's onto-theological constitution of metaphysics are exhausted in the *philosophiai theoretikai* strictly so-called? Or, on the contrary, does he view the *Seinsvergessenheit* of Aristotle's basic ontological decisions, of the decisions *einai* = *to on* = *ousia*, *phusis* = *phusei onta*, *ouranos* = *topos*, among others, as effecting every area of the *corpus*? In this connection it is noteworthy that Heidegger consistently denies that the distinction between theory and practice has any fundamental philosophical status, and especially that it is the key to his own thought.

The 1924/25 Marburg lectures are Heidegger's solitary (as far as available texts are concerned) extended discussion of the Aristotle's practical philosophy. Even here, however, where

nearly one hundred pages are devoted to the *Nichomachean Ethics*, *phronesis* is just one item of discussion. Heidegger is interested in the modes of 'revealing' (*aletheuein*, Ross translates 'possessing truth', Heidegger translates '*aufdeckendsein*') indicated by Aristotle at the beginning of VI.3 (1139b,15-17): along with *phronesis*, there are *techne*, *episteme*, *sophia*, and *nous*. Heidegger's whole discussion of Aristotle is meant, in these lectures, as preliminary to an analysis of Plato's *Sophist*, especially of the problem of being as treated in that dialogue. Departing from the five modes of *aletheuein*, Heidegger goes on to survey the structure and presuppositions of the entire Aristotelian philosophy. Not only the *Nichomachean Ethics*, but parts of the *Metaphysics*, *Physics*, *Topics* and other texts, come in for close scrutiny. Especially significant is the fact that, from the *Ethics* itself, besides VI. 3-13 on the modes of *aletheuein*, only X. 6-7, where Aristotle establishes the priority of *sophia* in the 'happiness' (*eudaimonia*) of the philosophical life, receives close attention from Heidegger. As Heidegger verifies, Aristotle (1176a,32) defines *eudaimonia* as 'the end (*telos*) of human nature', thus confirming the explicit elevation of *sophia* above *phronesis* in VI.3 (1141a,20-33). *Sophia*, in other words, is realized in the *eudaimonia* of a *bios theoretikos* which is more authentically 'practical' than *phronesis*.

Consequently, in assessing Heidegger's attitude to Aristotle's practical philosophy, it is not enough to notice only the methodological affinities, as highlighted originally by Gadamer and more recently by Taminiaux et. al., between Aristotelian *phronesis* and Heideggerian existential understanding. It is necessary, in addition, to take account of the structural position of these within the respective total philosophies of Aristotle and Heidegger. The chief difference here is that Aristotelian *phronesis* defines a *branch* of philosophy and by no means a wholistic philosophy of practice, whereas Heideggerian existential understanding, since it has nothing above it (such as *sophia*, or metaphysical knowledge), seems identical with philosophy as Heidegger wants it. At first sight, it may appear possible for Heidegger to appropriate *phronesis*

by simply deleting *sophia*. This cannot be so, however, if the concept of *phronesis* is integrally tied to that of *sophia*. In that case, either Heidegger would have to appropriate *sophia* along with *phronesis*, or he would have to somehow disconnect the two, in which case it would no longer strictly be *phronesis* that he was appropriating. Nor can this difficulty be resolved by speaking (with Volpi) of Heidegger's 'ontologization' of *phronesis*. For if, as can be reasonably assumed, ontologization results in the determination of 'being', it can be pointed out that Aristotle explicitly exludes *phronesis* from this function ('being' is determined exclusively by *sophia*). It follows that any ontologization of *phronesis* on the part of Heidegger would simply *destroy* this concept in its Aristotelian meaning.

It is as well to bear in mind the fundamental motivations of those who, with or without recourse to Heidegger and Aristotle, advocate a philosophy of practice in the broad Gadamerian mould. Gadamer's own program of a 'hermeneutical' philosophy of practice seeks to secure the integrity of the humanistic-historical disciplines against the tyranny of scientism. Now scientism, although it characteristically abjures all recourse to metaphysics, nevertheless has an important feature in common with the latter, namely its affirmation of a single objective standpoint (in this case scientific method) against which all truth claims must be judged. And it precisely this presumption that Gadamer and related authors reject. What Gadamer calls 'hermeneutical understanding' does not correspond to any privileged or authoritative standpoint, but reflects the situation of human beings within specific historico-cultural contexts. It is not a matter of arriving at objective knowledge, whether scientific or metaphysical, but of 'coming to an understanding' against the background of pre-existing frameworks of intersubjectivity. Of course, the cognitive claims of the theoretical sciences must be acknowledged, but these sciences do not represent 'truth' in any 'absolute' sense. As for metaphysics, its claim to supra-hermeneutical cognition, independent of historico-cultural perspectivity, is dismissed.

It is not hard to understand that thinkers with these broad convictions would view Heidegger's philosophy with a certain degree of ambivalence. For on the one hand Heidegger is similarly critical of the metaphysical ambition for a grand system of truth, and he is similarly concerned to bring philosophy back to the practical situation of man, but on the other hand there looms over the whole of Heidegger's thought this mysterious *Seinsfrage*, which, in so far as it serves to distinguish 'authentic' from 'inauthentic' existence, has some kind of authoritative status. Under these circumstances, it is comprehensible that the philosophers of practice might wish to appropriate that aspect of Heidegger which is useful for their own purposes (the existential analyses, together with the critique of traditional metaphysics) and discard the rest. And there is nothing wrong with doing this, provided only that it is not mistaken for an 'interpretation of Heidegger'. If it is so mistaken, then the error is analogous to that indicated above in respect of Aristotelian *phronesis* and *sophia*, namely that by negelecting the dependency of existential understanding on the *Seinsfrage*, one ends up with something which is not existential understanding in Heidegger's sense at all.

That Gadamer et. al. show a suspicion of Heidegger which increases with the proximity of the *Seinsfrage*, should be enough to indicate that their philosophies of practice have little to do with what Heidegger wants in his existential analytic. The crucial difference is that Heidegger does not take offence at the higher authority of *sophia*, he does proceed from an epistemological criticism of the 'dogmatism' of *sophia* (which criticism goes back at least as far as Protagoras, and remains determinative for much contemporary philosophy), but rather considers that *sophia* is not best qualified to be high, is still 'not high enough' for the *Seinsfrage*. For Heidegger, the priority of *sophia* signifies a 'forgetting' of that which is truly high: it is *Seinsvergessenheit*. In other words, Heidegger does not reject, but rather reformulates, the supreme question addressed by *sophia*, viz., the question of 'being *qua* being'. The philosophers of practice do not want any holy of

holies in the house of *praxis*, but Heidegger's attitude is different. Indeed, one can easily surmise that, confronted by contemporary philosophies of practice, Heidegger would react similarly to Hegel, who in the Preface to the first edition of *Science of Logic*, referring to the initial wave of post-Kantian 'anti-metaphysical' philosophy, remarks that, after having banished the dark force of dogma, 'existence appears transformed into the colourful world of flowers, among which, as is well-known, there are none that are black'.[9] For Hegel, a philosophy without a metaphysical Absolute is no philosophy at all, and must degenerate into a mish-mash of positivism and common opinion. Notwithstanding the different 'supra-metaphysical' manner in which Heidegger conceives the Absolute, he takes the same essential attitude. This is confirmed by the criticisms he directs at *Lebensphilosophie* during the 1920's. The *Lebensphilosophen*, in ways not dissimilar to contemporary philosophers of practice, also sought to exchange *sophia* for the colourful world of 'life', but in Heidegger's view, by not finding a substitute for *sophia* they inevitably fell into psychology and anthropology. Above all, the *Lebensphilosophen* found it difficult to define what they wanted from philosophy, and for Heidegger this indicated the lack of a genuine 'challenge' behind their thought. The more recent philosophers of practice are not very different: apart from a resolute insistence that there are no 'black flowers' (unless this be metaphysics itself), they do not seem to have any definite aim in view. Of course, the claim is frequently encountered that the philosophy of practice serves the purpose of 'self-realization' or 'liberation of subjectivity'. But the fact that, as a matter of principle, authoritative definitions of self and subjectivity are not regarded as permissible, must cast doubt on whether this idea has any genuine content.

Returning now to the relation between Heidegger and Aristotle, it is clear, first of all, that the circumstance that both these thinkers give a philosophical explication of human practical life proves nothing whatsoever about systematic affinities. But further, to acknowledge that Heidegger finds

certain aspects of Aristotelian practical philosophy to be enlightening, and useful for his own purposes, is a far cry from saying that Heidegger 'appropriates Aristotle's practical philosophy'. Heidegger's lectures and writings from 1919 through to the publication of *Being and Time* show that his interpretation of human existence draws not only from Aristotle, but also from (among others) Dilthey, Luther, and Kierkegaard. Depending on the particular Heidegger text chosen, one could with equal plausibility say that Heidegger 'appropriates' any of these thinkers (as has in fact been maintained in the history of Heidegger scholarship). However, as Heidegger often comments himself, the study of influences is not necessarily productive in philosophy, and especially not when insufficient regard is given to the systematic intentions of the thinker concerned. In the present case, Heidegger's overarching critique of Aristotelian *sophia* (with its ousiological determination of being) means not only that strict limits apply to any appropriation on his part of Aristotelian practical philosophy, but that, in the end, he must reject the latter.

This does not exclude the possibility that Heidegger learnt lessons from Aristotle's practical philosophy. Undoubtedly he did. But these lessons, as the proponents of the 'appropriation' thesis themselves make clear, were largely in the area of methodology. What Heidegger learnt from Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* (and the *Rhetoric*) was a better appreciation of the formal-methodological features of a mode of knowledge oriented to 'action for its own sake'. Like Heideggerian existential understanding, *phronesis* does not conceive reality in detached objective fashion, but in relation to the *project of existence*. But the fact that Heidegger found Aristotle's hermeneutical methodology suggestive does not show that the two philosophers have a common substantive conception of this project. Nor do translational correspondences suffice to establish anything of the sort. If, for example, Heidegger sometimes translates *phronesis* as '*Umsicht*' (circumspection), a term which also has an important function

in the existential analytic of *Being and Time*, this proves nothing of systematic significance. Heidegger's terminology in *Being and Time* is comprehensible only in the context of his fundamental philosophical intentions, and of course, the same applies to Aristotle's terminology in the *Nichomachean Ethics*. The translational considerations upon which Volpi et. al. put so much weight are ultimately irrelevant in the face of the glaring substantive differences between the Aristotelian and Heideggerian interpretations of human existence. It is now a matter of demonstrating these differences more concretely.[10]

2 *PHRONESIS, SOPHIA*, AND EXISTENTIAL UNDERSTANDING

Now that a good number of Heidegger's early courses from Freiburg and Marburg have been published, it it possible to obtain a relatively complete picture of his developing philosophy of 'human existence' over this period. Despite terminological changes (Heidegger was, like Aristotle, a lover of terminological innovations, and would often experiment with them for a time, then let them drop, to be superseded by or absorbed in new concepts) a coherent line of development can be traced from 1919 to *Being and Time* in 1927. A survey of the available material confirms not only Heidegger's intensive occupation with Aristotle, but his loanings from Aristotle as indicated above, loanings in relation to a phenomenological-hermeneutical method for investigating 'factical life'. On the other hand, the unprejudiced reader will have to admit that, on the whole and especially considering the end result (if *Being and Time* can be so regarded) Heidegger's philosophy does not have an Aristotelian 'flavour'. There are simply too many other elements in it, elements, moreover, which are not just *non*-Aristotelian but actually *anti*-Aristotelian. Above all, it is the decidely 'Lutheran-Christian' dimension of Heidegger's thought which seems incongruous with any kind of Aristotelianism.

As earlier mentioned, John van Buren has tried to resolve this difficulty by saying that Luther too had 'appropriated'

Aristotelian practical philosophy, and that there is really no inconsistency between a Lutheran reading of the New Testament and a Lutheran/Heideggerian reading of Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*. Now while Luther's relation to Aristotle is too large a topic for detailed consideration here, it may be noted that van Buren does not support his thesis by any comprehensive and systematic comparison between Aristotle and Luther, but by reference to passages of text where Luther, in connection with various conceptual problems to do with morality, calls upon the assistance of Aristotle. To be sure, van Buren quotes Luther's statement that 'Aristotle is the best teacher one can have in moral philosophy'.[11] To which, however, one may counter-quote with the passage given in the Introduction to the present work, where Luther says that Aristotle's writings 'have nothing to teach about things natural or spiritual'. Indeed, immediately following this latter passage, Luther goes on to say that 'his [Aristotle's] book on *Ethics* is worse than any other book'. Such quotation and counter-quotation does not establish much of systematic consequence. But neither, of course, does the fact that Luther found Aristotle useful in various ways establish that 'Luther appropriated Aristotle's practical philosophy'. Luther boasted that he had studied Aristotle's works more intensively than had those Scholastic theologians who, unlike Luther himself, wished to effect a reconciliation between Aristotle and Christianity. But that Luther knew how to learn from Aristotle, and perhaps knew this better than those who were professed Aristotelians, is not inconsistent with his possible wholistic opposition to Aristotelianism. It cannot be demonstrated here that Luther's theology is in fact systematically opposed to Aristotelian philosophy. But if we assume this to be so (such is the received opinion, and was Luther's own opinion), Heidegger's attitude to Aristotle, in so far as he followed Luther's example, may be better understood, and so also may the basic tendencies of Heidegger's existential analytic come more clearly to expression.

Among recent commentators, John Caputo has most vigorously insisted on the incompatibility between Heidegger's Christian and Aristotelian sources. Curiously, however, this does not prevent Caputo too from maintaining that Heidegger 'appropriated' ('retrieved') Aristotle's practical philosophy. In Caputo's view, Heidegger's early thought is governed by a 'twofold retrieval, of Aristotle on the one hand, and of New Testament life on the other'. Although these two retrievals objectively conflict with one another, Caputo proposes 'that Heidegger thought that these two tasks were one, that the deconstructive retrieval of the categories of factical life would achieve the same results whether this was a matter of retrieving Greek or early Christian life, whether one were reading Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics* or the New Testament'.[12] It is perhaps surprising that Heidegger should be guilty of such a startling oversight, but Caputo supports his thesis by referring to the early Heidegger's apparent goal of a neutral existential ontology, which would give the structures of factical life everywhere and at all times, irrespective of 'ontic' self-interpretations. As Caputo indicates, Heidegger explicitly prohibits existential ontology from incorporating elements of Christian faith, and presumably this applies also to elements of the Greek world-view. The trouble is, however, that this does not explain how Heidegger could have 'failed to notice' the difference between the New Testament and the *Nichomachean Ethics*, which are not simply 'life' but *interpretations* of life, and, like Heidegger's existential analytic, claim universal validity. It may be suggested that Heidegger selects out just those elements from the Christian and Aristotelian texts which give 'ontological' rather than 'ontic' determinations. But this can hardly be so. For when one looks at *Being and Time*, it is precisely the concepts (eg. anxiety, being-towards-death, falling) suggestive of specifically Christian (ie. ontic) motifs which play the most significant systematic (ie. purportedly ontological) role. Especially considering his immersion in Luther, it cannot have been lost on Heidegger that the

New Testament and the *Nichomachean Ethics* are alternative interpretations of human existence between which one *must choose* (one may, of course, reject them both, but they cannot both be true).

In defense of Caputo, it must be acknowledged that an explicit and unambiguous contraposition between Aristotle and Christianity is nowhere to be found in Heidegger's early writings. Instead, Heidegger sometimes speaks of the 'Greek-Christian interpretation of human existence', as if there were no need to distinguish the two traditions.[13] However, Heidegger often means by 'Christian' something different to what is found in New Testament 'primordial' Christianity, namely 'Hellenized' Christianity as this became official from the time of the Church Fathers. In fact, Heidegger typically claims that Christian theology right up to the present day continues to borrow 'alien categories' from Greek philosophy, including Aristotle, and that to combat this procedure is one of the 'innermost tendencies' of his own phenomenology.[14] Taken together with his positive treatment of 'primordial Christian life experience' in the lectures of 1920-21, this can only mean that Heidegger wants to rescue essential elements of Christianity from Greek philosophical contamination, a project also at the centre of Luther's concerns. Caputo is correct about the presence in *Being and Time* of a strange juxtaposition of Aristotelian and Christian motifs. But this can be accounted for by Heidegger's methodological loanings from Aristotle. It is Aristotle's 'hermeneutical-phenomenological' methodology, and not his substantive ontological categories (including those connected with *praxis* and *phronesis*) which Heidegger sees as neutral and thus as of possible service for a 'retrieval' of primal Christianity. Moreover, even if Heidegger's borrowings from Aristotle sometimes extend beyond their proper methodological limits, resulting in internal deformations at the substantive level of existential ontology, this does not alter the systematic anti-Aristotelian tendency of Heidegger's thought.

Further, although Caputo thematizes the difference between the *Nichomachean Ethics* and the New Testament, his faulty account of this difference results in a failure to appreciate the nature of Heidegger's Christian affinities and a consequent exaggeration of the internal difficulties of *Being and Time*. Under the evident influence of Derrida, Caputo presents the New Testament as 'directed to everyone who has been marginalized by the mainstream, to everyone who is out of power, out of luck, out of money, out of luck, uneducated, and despised'.[15] By contrast, Aristotelian morality is presented as essentially bourgeois, relating to the smug existence of those who are well-off and respected. Now of course, the New Testament can be read in the manner suggested by Caputo, but this is neither the most compelling nor the most influential reading. Once again, this is clearly too large a topic for detailed discussion here, but it seems that Caputo's Derridean allegiances lead him to associate the New Testament with a kind of 'zealotry' (Christian zealotry is a known phenomenon, with roots in the Jewish tradition) motivated principally by resentment at a disadvantageous socio-economic position.[16] It can be argued, however, that the fact that early Christianity found its converts mainly among 'the oppressed' is a minor matter compared to the 'universality' of its claims. In any case, it is clear from Heidegger's 1920-21 lectures that he understands the New Testament in a very different manner to Caputo, in a manner, that is, which highlights 'kairological' experience (wakefulness, anxiety, rejection of the search for security etc., all as *ontological* phenomena with no intrinsic relation to the condition of oppression or marginalization). Caputo's tendentious interpretation of the New Testament experience of life means that he misses what are in fact Christian parallels in *Being and Time*, and instead accuses Heidegger of a kind of bourgeois-aristocratic indifference to the underprivileged in writing into the existential analytic the upper-class virtues of Aristotelian morality, where everything relates to 'success' and 'know-how'.

Broadly speaking, one can agree with Caputo's diagnosis of Aristotelian morality as bourgeois, for it is primarily oriented to honour and material well-being (Aristotle is talking about the citizen and not about the slave). The man of *phronesis* is the moderate man who knows what is fitting in every situation, who falls into neither apathy nor fanaticism, who can enjoy the refinements of higher culture, who can forge genuine friendships, who is courageous but not foolhardy, generous but not lavish, proud but not vain, respectful but not obsequious etc.; in short, the man of *phronesis* knows the nature and limits of the distinctively *human* kind of happiness. On the other hand, it is difficult to see that this model of wisdom plays any role in Heidegger's account of 'authentic' existence. By the same token, Heidegger's parallels with Luther are obvious. For Luther, since genuine happiness could be obtained in no other way than through faith, the Greek noble life was just as wretched as any other form of existence outside faith. It is similar with Heidegger, for whom 'authenticity', as the overcoming of existential alienation (*Seinsvergessenheit*), has nothing to do with the noble virtues. The early sections of *Being and Time* dealing with the human 'work-world' should not be allowed to mislead, for these are preliminary considerations designed to undercut Cartesian epistemological preconceptions as to the meaning of 'world' and 'environment'. *Being and Time* is no more about 'the craftsman' than about the 'man of honour'; its true existential content first becomes prominent in the latter part of Division One, and especially in Division Two with its analyses of guilt, conscience and death, topics which are distinctly un-Aristotelian. An exemplary illustration of the difference between Aristotle and Heidegger is the significance which the latter attaches to 'anxiety'. While the word '*Angst*' only becomes prominent around 1925, the concept itself is present as early as the 'Phenomenology of Religion' lectures of 1920-21. These lectures, which were written under the impact of Kierkegaard, present Christian existence as a life in 'fear and trembling', a life of constant

anticipation of the *kairos*, the breaking in of the event of God. Unlike the Aristotelian man of *phronesis*, the primordial Christian does not feel master of himself and his world, but 'submits' to life. A few years later in *Being and Time*, *Angst* is described as that peculiar kind of concern which is oriented to the bare facticity of existence, particularly to death as the 'end' of life, the ultimate 'towards which'. Authentic existence is distinguished by a resolute holding-onto this anxiety, as distinct from the 'fleeing' which consoles itself with the 'not-now', the 'not-being-present', of death. There are no parallels in Aristotle, for whom death is hardly a topic: the noble man is courageous in the face of death as in the face of all misfortunes, and that is all.

Luther was hostile to Greek philosophy (more precisely, to its grandiose pretentions, to its overstepping of its proper sphere of competence) only because of its great influence on Christianity. The employment of Aristotle within Scholastic theology, which by Luther's time had resulted in Aristotelian studies dominating the universities, was just the most recent example of this. However, what drew Christian thinkers to Greek philosophy had more to do with *sophia* and the *bios theoretikos* than with *phronesis* and the *bios praktikos*. For the Scholastics, Aristotle's most important text was the *Metaphysics*. The *Nichomachean Ethics* was also valued highly, but not because of any perceived equation between *phronesis* and Christian morality. On the contrary, the relevance of the *Nichomachean Ethics* was seen in the fact that Aristotle here emphatically subordinates *phronesis* to *sophia*. *Phronesis* is wisdom about human existence which man possesses *qua* man, therefore the happiness which it secures is specifically human, the interests and advantages of the species (at *NE*.1141a,28 Aristotle indicates an analogue among the lower animals). The happiness of *sophia*, on the other hand, because it is due to the divine element in man, is the only authentic and worthy happiness. As Aristotle says, 'it would be strange to think that the art of politics, or practical wisdom (*phronesis*) is the best knowledge, since man is not the best thing in the world'

(1141a,20-22). *Phronesis* can provide only *relative* knowledge, so that 'if the state of mind concerned with a man's own interests is to be called philosophical wisdom (*sophia*), there will be many philosophical wisdoms' (1141a,29-31), which Aristotle takes as absurd. As knowledge of being *qua* being and the *theos*, as expressing the authoritative part of the soul, as the most god-like of human activities, *sophia* was naturally of greater interest to Christian thinkers than was *phronesis*, the mere 'wisdom of this world'. So too is *sophia* of greater interest to Heidegger, despite the fact that he rejects it as 'onto-theological'. For as earlier indicated, Heidegger wants to preserve the 'rank' of *sophia* in his own existential ontology. To be sure, the revealing of the *theos* in *sophia*, and the revealing of the 'event of Being' in authentic existential understanding (eg. in anxiety) are very different. But for Heidegger (not so for the philosophers of practice) the whole point of distinguishing these revealings is that they take place at comparable 'levels'.

This is not to say that the difference between Heidegger and Aristotle on human existence can be equated with the difference between Christianity and Aristotle on the same subject. For one thing, Christianity, including the New Testament, is not a homogeneous entity. For another, what the early Heidegger found attractive in 'primordial Christianity' may well be certain 'ontological' ideas which are not specifically Christian, and which may even have come to superior expression in non-Christian thinkers, eg. the Presocratics or Nietzsche. A more detailed discussion of the Christian or more broadly 'religious' dimension of Heidegger will be given in Section 5 below. In the meantime, however, a topic must be addressed which has been held over since it was first mentioned at the beginning of Chapter One, namely the significance of what Heidegger calls 'attunement' (*Stimmung*). It was suggested above that the philosophies of Heidegger and Aristotle have distinctly different 'flavours'. Now this latter expression may well appear to be overly subjective and thus to be of little value in comparative analysis

where stress should be laid on theses or doctrines. On the other hand, it can hardly be denied that the 'flavour' of a philosophy is precisely what is most immediately noticeable about it and in some considerable measure determines its influence and reputation. May it therefore be that 'flavour' is *not* merely subjective, not just an additive or colouring, but actually contributes something to the intrinsic worth of a philosophy, indeed to its intrinsic *truth*? And may we get closer to the real difference between Heidegger and Aristotle if we follow this clue of 'flavour' and see what lies at the bottom of it? Are the different 'flavours' of the Aristotelian and Heideggerian philosophies to be accounted for in some more profound way than as different doctrines wrapped up in different 'styles'? Do they perhaps reflect different 'attitudes', different 'fundamental stances', different 'moods', different ways of being '*attuned*' to reality?

3 EXISTENCE, BEING, AND ATTUNEMENT

The origin of philosophy in a certain kind of 'mood' or 'emotion' is asserted by Aristotle himself in the first Book of the *Metaphysics*, where he says that 'it is owing to their wonder (*thaumazein*) that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize' (982b,11). This wonder is not governed by utilitarian ends but, seeking knowledge for its own sake, presupposes a relative freedom from external necessity, a certain leisure for pure contemplation. As cosmologist and biologist, Aristotle was struck by the 'wondrous' order of nature at the macro and micro levels. Such has also been the experience of natural scientists right up to the present day. The regular movements of the celestial bodies on the one hand, and the intricate organization of the tiniest living things on the other, provokes wonder and admiration, which only increase the further knowledge progresses. Moreover, the wondrous order of nature has often been invested with religious significance, as in the 'argument from design', versions of which can be found among modern scientists including Einstein. Aristotle too understood the

deity not just as prime mover but as grand designer of the universe, whose 'artistic spirit' can be discerned in every part of nature, however lowly (*PA.* 645a,9). In the present context, however, it is significant that Aristotle links wonder with *sophia* (*episteme*) and not at all with *phronesis*, not at all with the self-reflection of human existence. This is already apparent in the first Book of the *Metaphysics*, where Aristotle discusses the origins of philosophy exclusively by reference to the problems which occupy him in the *Physics* and later Books of the *Metaphysics*. In *Metaphysics* XII it becomes evident that the highest object of wonder is none other than the highest *ousia*, the *theos* as 'self-thinking thought', the contemplation of which in *sophia* provides the highest happiness attainable to human beings. The sphere of *praxis* and *phronesis*, on the other hand, is no sphere of wonder, and whoever is restricted to this sphere, whoever fails to transcend from the noble life to the contemplative life, knows neither wonder nor true wisdom.

It is clear, therefore, that if Heidegger were to 'delete' Aristotelian *sophia* and 'appropriate' Aristotelian *phronesis*, he would also have to deny wonder any significant role in his own philosophy. But although discarding the 'romantic' emotion of wonder may be regarded as a salutory measure by the philosophers of practice, Heidegger himself does not take this attitude. Instead, he considers that the phenomenon of human existence does not even become visible and accessible to philosophical reflection except through wonder, or at least, through a certain kind of 'attunement' analogous to it. Whereas Aristotelian *sophia* is prompted by wonder at the 'nature of things', Heideggerian *Seinsdenken* is prompted by wonder at the very 'fact' that 'there is something'. This is the way Heidegger puts it in the opening paragraphs of *An Introduction to Metaphysics*:

> Why is there something rather than nothing? That is the question. Clearly it is no ordinary question. 'Why is there something, why is there anything at all, rather than nothing?' – obviously this is the first of all questions,

> though not in a chronological sense . . . yet each of us is grazed at least once, perhaps more than once, by the hidden power of this question, even if he is not aware of what is happening to him. The question looms in moments of great despair, when things tend to lose all their weight and all meaning becomes obscured . . . . It is present in moments of rejoicing, when all things around us are transfigured and seem to be there for the first time, as if it might be easier to think they are not than to understand that they are and as they are. The question is upon us in boredom, when we are equally removed from despair and joy, and everything about us seems so hopelessly commonplace that we no longer care whether anything is or is not.[17]

As Heidegger says, the question 'why is there something and not nothing?' is no ordinary question. It is not a question which can be understood merely by verbal articulation. There are certain presuppositions for understanding this question which are lacking when eg. the logical positivists declare that within strict scientific terms it is unanswerable or meaningless. The question 'why is there something and not nothing?' does not belong in either Aristotelian *sophia* or Aristotelian *phronesis*. It is no ordinary question not in the sense that it is in any way obscure, recondite, paradoxical, technical, sophisticated, clever or ingenious, but in the sense that it is inaccessible within the 'attunement' (*Stimmung*) to the world which Heidegger calls 'everydayness'. So Heidegger refers, in the passage quoted, to despair, joy, and boredom. In what sense are these attunements? In what sense do they differ from everydayness? Is Heidegger after all falling back into 'psychology'?

Let us begin by considering what is normally regarded as the 'scientific attitude' to the world. Does any kind of attunement come into play here? Do Aristotle's writings, for example, evince anything of this nature? Aristotle is certainly known for the dryness of his style, for his

terseness and brevity, for his relentlessly analytical frame of mind. Already in antiquity this was taken by many as an objection to him, at least as a limitation of his thought. Aristotle did not achieve the 'sublimity' of Plato, and for those of a more religio-mystical inclination this was a serious deficiency. Plotinus could respect Aristotle, but could not love him as he did 'the divine Plato'. This was the attitude of Neoplatonism generally, as of the Christian Fathers. When Christian Scholasticism rediscovered Aristotle in the middle ages, and came to refer to him habitually as 'the Philosopher', this was with conscious recognition of his religious inadequacy. For Aquinas, Aristotelian philosophy was useful precisely because it did not harbour ambitions outside the sphere of 'natural reason', but on the other hand it was only one side of the truth. Similar views can also be found in modern times. Arthur Schopenhauer, for example, whose thought attempts a curious blending of Platonism, Kantianism, and Eastern mysticism, declares that 'the basic character of Aristotle can be indicated as the greatest possible astuteness, together with circumspection, talent for observation, many-sidedness, and deficiency of depth'.[18]

Some would say that these alleged shortcomings of Aristotelian philosophy are just the resolve of rationality to forbid itself any 'attunements' or religio-mystical 'colourings'. However, let us ask, as Heidegger insists we must, whether the supposed neutrality of the theoretical attitude, ie. of that attitude which has come to be known as 'objectivity' and which abhors all forms of 'emotionalism', can really be maintained. Scientific inquiry is held to be neutral in so far as it depends on nothing more than the operations of pure reason. Is this itself an attunement or not? Certainly the theoretical attitude does not arise spontaneously. It must be put into effect, there must be a decision to adopt it, a decision moreover, which is not itself grounded in the theoretical attitude but in pre-theoretical life. Many do not make this decision, many, it seems, are incapable of making it. If it be maintained nevertheless that the scientific attitude

is an attunement only in the limiting sense that it is moved by nothing but reality and truth, the question may be put as to the measure of reality and truth. Are these themselves determined through the scientific attitude? If so, the problem of the necessity of this attitude arises once again, and there seems no way out of the circle. On the other hand, if the necessity of some kind of attunement is acknowledged, is this the same as saying that all thought, including all philosophy, is unavoidably subjective?

For Heidegger, the threat of relativism/subjectivism is obviated by the recognition that despair, joy, and boredom, in the sense intended by him, are not just any attunements, but rather 'fundamental attunements' (*Grundstimmungen*). This means that they (he does not see these as an exhaustive list) have an *ontological* function. What the quoted passage asserts is that through despair, joy, and boredom, the bare Being of the world comes into view, and just because the things-within-the-world recede in their significance.[19] The question 'why is there something and not nothing?' does not have an *answer*, but merely *registers the phenomenon*, for the most part only fleetingly and until the attunements of everydayness once again assert themselves. Since the bare phenomenon of Being is not something with which one can be 'occupied' in the usual sense, everydayness turns back to actually existing 'beings'. It is the task of *Seinsdenken* to resist this tendency to 'fall' back from Being into beings, thus to remain attuned to the unfathomable facticity of existence. In a sense, *Seinsdenken* is a submission to, or an entering into, the 'mystery' of Being, against the drive of theoretical philosophy to make everything intelligible through 'clear and distinct ideas'. For Heidegger, however, this 'mystery' (*Geheimnis*) must be understood in a positive sense rather than as any kind of gap or deficiency of comprehension:

> Ever since the mysterious has been 'explained' (*erklärt*) as the unexplainable (*das Unerklärliche*), its nature has become alienated from man. The mysterious becomes

> the 'remainder' which is left over for explanation . . . . The [genuine] mystery of the mysterious is a kind of hiddenness characterized by an inconspicuousness (*Unscheinbarkeit*) which makes it open . . . . The 'open mystery' (*offene Geheimnis*) reigns where the hiddenness of the mysterious is simply experienced as such and preserved in an historically evolved reticence.[20]

It is no use trying to make the mystery of Being intelligible through the intellective processes of Aristotelian *sophia* or modern scientific rationality: these are precisely the means for dismissing it as unreal. It is only necessary to 'open one's eyes'. This sounds easy, but is really the most difficult thing of all, because the seeing of everydayness is dominated by *Seinsvergessenheit*. The eyes which must be opened are not those of the intellect but of *Existenz*, of that human being-in-the-world which is constituted not through knowing but through 'care' (*Sorge*). Whereas intellective cognition grasps and secures its object through intersubjectively negotiable concepts, and in this sense involves a challenging and commanding stance towards the world, *Seinsdenken* is a 'stepping back from Being'.[21] In the face of the mystery of Being, the attitude of rational intellection is just not fitting: Being simply does not show itself to such an attitude.

In Heidegger's view, what human beings proximally understand by their own 'existence' is determined by their dis-attunement to Being: they understand themselves as 'present' in the world along with other entities. This dis-attuned comprehension of existence is taken over into philosophy by Aristotle, governing not only the practical life of *phronesis*, but also the contemplative life of *sophia*. The *bios theoretikos* remains in *Seinsvergessenheit* because the highest reality it recognizes, the *theos*, is still a 'presence', an *ousia* of a particular sort. Existence is still covered up in the *bios theoretikos* because the 'divine element' of the soul is an essentially cognitive and thus aletheologically derivative faculty. Since reality shows itself to Aristotle as

something to be known, the challenge it poses is that of making one's intellectual faculty assume dominance over the lower parts of the soul. This is not just a 'view' (thought, theory, belief etc.) on the part of Aristotle, but an 'attitude' (*Einstellung*, a question of how one 'places oneself in') or 'stance' (*Haltung*, a question of how one 'holds oneself') or 'attunement' (*Stimmung*, a question of how one is *ge-stimmt*, 'tuned into'). Strictly speaking, it is not intellectual reason *qua* 'faculty' but *qua* 'stance' which Heidegger claims to be aletheologically derivative. This stance is overtly absolutized by Aristotle in his *prote philosophia* and subsequently by the whole metaphysical tradition. At the same time, this absolutization is not a whim on the part of Aristotle and others, but reflects the ousiological reduction at the level of everydayness. The intellectual stance towards reality is grounded in 'sound common sense': this is Aristotle's insight. But because Aristotle could not get back behind this stance, because he could not recognize its derivative character, because in this he was not only Greek but essentially 'mundane', his philosophy does not rise to the challenge and claim of Being. In the end, the legacy he leaves is one of equiprimordial *Seinsvergessenheit* and *Existenzvergessenheit*.

Heidegger indicates something of the claim which Being makes on man by reference to the Greek '*daimonion*'. For want of any exact English (or German) equivalent, this is often translated as 'the divine' or 'supernatural presence', eg. Ross's translation of the *Nichomachean Ethics* has Aristotle say (1141b,7) that philosophers know things which are 'remarkable (*peritta*), admirable (*thaumasta*), difficult (*kalepa*), and divine (*daimonia*)'. Taking his clue from these other expressions with which it is here associated, Heidegger translates '*daimonion*' as 'the Uncanny' (*das Un-geheure*). In ordinary German the noun '*das Ungeheure*' means 'monster' or 'ogre', while the adjective '*geheuer*' is used mainly in the negative, eg. '*es ist mir nicht ganz geheuer*' means something like 'it is eerie' or 'it gives me the creeps'. The noun '*das Geheure*' is not normal German, but Heidegger adopts it to mean

'the un-eerie', the 'un-creepy', the 'un-uncanny': hence his non-standard hyphenation 'das *Un-geheure*' means literally the 'un-un-eerie', the 'un-un-uncanny' etc.[22] Heidegger says (dispensing with double hyphenation):

> To latecomers and to us to whom the original experience of Being of the Greeks remains occluded, the Uncanny must be the in principle explicable exception to the Un-uncanny; we place the Uncanny next to the Un-uncanny, admittedly as the Unusual. Only with difficulty do we find our way to the fundamental Greek experience that the Un-uncanny, and precisely in so far as it is, is the Uncanny, that the Uncanny appears 'only' in the form of the Un-uncanny.[23]

To be sure, given that Heidegger maintains that *Seinsvergessenheit* sets in as early as Anaximander, it is not clear how 'Greek' this experience of the Uncanny can be: the Aristotelian *cosmos* and *theos* seem more 'wondrous' than actually 'uncanny'. Presumably Heidegger would say that Aristotle's use of '*daimonia*' indicates some inkling of the said phenomenon, which has rapidly faded from view in the subsequent tradition. Be that as it may, Heidegger considers that the Uncanny has been occluded in a metaphysical tradition which does not think the essence of truth as *aletheia*. The Uncanny cannot become the object of theoretical assertions because its self-revealing does not occur in the mode of 'presence'. Instead, the Uncanny reveals itself in the mode of 'withdrawl' (*Entzug*), at the same time as the Un-uncanny reveals itself ousiologically through the causes and principles of present entities.[24] For Heidegger, all this is capable of phenomenological verification: the Uncanny is simply 'there' (as 'withdrawing'), but is only accessible on condition that the human being is appropriately attuned.

The attunement to Being characteristic of *Seinsdenken* expresses itself neither in the garrulousness of everydayness nor in the verbosity of theoretical activity, but first and

foremost in silence. In the face of the Uncanny, one feels uncanny oneself, more precisely, one feels one's existence to be uncanny. The Uncanny (eg. in anxiety) effects a radical individualization in which the publicness of reality, and thus its amenability to 'discussion', collapses.[25] What the public world of *das Man* takes as real, what *das Man* busies itself with in talk and action, is rather the Un-uncanny: indeed the un-uncanniness of reality is even 'the issue' for *das Man*, which continually confirms that, in its familiar world, everything is 'in order' and that the Uncanny is 'nothing at all'.[26] The discourse of everydayness has an average intelligibility, the function of which is not just to 'pass the word along', but to consolidate the 'mood' of *das Man*.[27] By contrast, the Uncanny tends to silence all chatter and to still all busy-ness: because one is now dis-attuned to the everyday, it can seem there is nothing to say and nothing to do.[28] This is not an admission of defeat, not a failure of any kind, but what Heidegger calls an 'active silence' (*Erschweigen*). As he puts it in his 1937 Nietzsche lectures:

> Wherever that sphere is not incessantly called by name, called aloud, wherever it is held silently in the most interior questioning, it is thought most purely and profoundly. For what is held in silence is genuinely preserved; as preserved it is most intimate and actual . . . . Supremely thoughtful utterance does not consist simply in growing taciturn when it is a matter of saying what is properly to be said; it consists in saying the matter in such a way that it is named in nonsaying. The utterance of thinking is an active silence.[29]

This reserved and detached stance of *Seinsdenken* resembles the tranquillity of Aristotelian *sophia* more than the practical busy-ness of *phronesis*. Yet *Seinsdenken* is different from *sophia*, because the supreme reality it recognizes, the Uncanny, far from being the guarantor of universal intellectual luminosity, far from validating the cognitive self-assertion of man, forces

man to 'step back', and to empty out from himself the hubris of his knowing and doing.

Although Heidegger highlights the ontological/aletheological significance of attunement perhaps more than any other Western philosopher, his position is by no means so unique as it is often taken to be, or as Heidegger himself sometimes represents it. Even a thinker with such a reputation for sobriety as Immanuel Kant cannot dispense with something very similar in his moral theory, where he makes an unresearchable 'feeling of respect' the only mode of access to the 'categorical imperative'. In the philosophy of Hegel the originary disclosure of 'the Absolute' as the awareness of a presence transcending all finite entities has the character of attunement. The same can be said of Nietzsche's 'Dionysian life-affirmation' as the disclosure of a theoretically unconceptualizable 'power' at the ground of all reality. Among the Greeks, Plato holds that the 'intelligible world' is only accessible through the stance/attunement of philosophical *eros*, while Aristotle, as we have seen, founds philosophy upon 'wonder' of a particular sort. In all these cases primal reality is disclosed not to the abstracted intellect but to a wholistic attitude or orientation. This stance, orientation, attunement etc., is not a mere psychological phenomenon, not an ontical-factual state of affairs in the brain of the individual, but is irreducibly aletheological, a 'correspondence' to be sure, but in an existential rather than epistemological sense.[30]

What then of the particular attunement which Heidegger associates with *Seinsdenken*? Is this the attunement of 'mystical' religiosity? Is Heidegger's *Seinsfrage* directed towards something analogous to the supra-metaphysical 'absolutely other' God of Neoplatonism and related traditions of negative theology? Heidegger himself does not admit this, because in his view the concept of theology, including that of Neoplatonism, is laden with metaphysical presuppositions. As we shall observe in Section 5, Heidegger's disclaimers in this area are not entirely convincing. However, before passing

over to this delicate topic, a brief review of Aristotelian religiosity will be in order. For presumably, if Heidegger's critique of Aristotle is fundamentally governed by religious motivations, Aristotle's alleged *Seinsvergessenheit* will also be expressed as *Gottesvergessenheit.*

4 THE ARISTOTELIAN GOD

It was earlier observed that, in the view of many commentators, Aristotle lacks the religious dimension of Plato. This difference can be over-stated because, as also noted, Aristotle remains true to the Platonic conception of the divine element of the soul. Aristotle is by no means an impious or atheistic thinker, and in fact frequently inveighs against such tendencies in his own time. Instead, Aristotle's attitude to religion broadly parallels his attitude to such topics as being, time and the infinite: above all he is concerned with demystification and demythologization. In comparison with Plato, what drops away in the thought of Aristotle is not religion as such, but the faith and pathos of Orphism.[31] At the same time, Aristotle retains a reverential attitude to his theological forefathers, because what they cloaked in mythical form 'with a view to the persuasion of the multitude' was the profound insight that 'the divine encloses the whole of nature' (1074b,3-5). We can already discern in Aristotle that thesis of the 'double-truth' of religion defended by later philosophers like Hegel and Schopenhauer: on the one hand the truth of simple piety, on the other hand the higher truth of philosophical religion, which extracts the rational kernel from the former's mythological shell. Even when the inner truth of religion is revealed as that of *prote philosophia,* an austere kind of sublimity remains, as when Aristotle remarks, in a famous passage from *Parts of Animals,* that 'the scanty conceptions to which we can attain of celestial things give us, from their excellence, more pleasure than all the knowledge of the world in which we live, just as a half-glimpse of persons that we love is more delightful than an accurate view of other things' (644b,32-34).

Those aspects of Aristotelian theology which provide a basis for comparison with Heidegger relate to the fundamentally *physical* relevance of the *theos*. In both *Physics* VIII and *Metaphysics* XII, the existence of a supreme being is argued on physical premises, from the datum of movement and the principle that everything which moves must be moved by something. Against the atomists, who denied that any supreme being was needed to account for natural phenomena, Aristotle sides with the Ionian tradition. But the failure of the Ionians to understand *principles* meant that they too misunderstood the nature of divinity. For example, those who gave primacy to the material cause in natural philosophy also saw the *theos* in material terms, whereas Aristotle, in conformity with his own physical principles, makes the *theos* the supreme 'final' cause. The *theos* is the 'prime mover', the guarantor of the constant movement of all physical things. This can only be an adequate definition of divinity if the *phusei onta* themselves enjoy a privileged ontological status, but as we have seen, such is indeed the case for Aristotle. The necessity of the *theos* arises from the ontological incompleteness of the *phusei onta*: without the *theos* these latter would not be what they are, would not be thoroughly physical at all. This means that, in function at least, the *theos* is itself physical. Of course, unlike the *phusei onta*, the *theos* is non-sensible and immovable: it is thus better described as 'meta-physical'.

The prime mover exerts a 'final' or 'teleological' causality: it does not give an initial shove to physical things but moves them by unceasing 'attraction' or 'desire' (*Meta.* 1072b,3). Causality of this type can be exercised only by something which is self-moving and untouchable by efficient causality. The principle of motion possessed by the unmoved mover must be constantly actualized; it cannot be mere potency, for in that case it would be possible that the world might remain unmoved. Aristotle concludes (1074b,34) that the prime mover must be pure 'thought' (*nous*) in action, 'thinking on thinking' (*noesis noeseos*). Lacking all external dependency,

the divine being abides in unwearied contemplation of itself, achieving therein the best and most pleasurable of states: 'On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world of nature. And its life is such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy but for a short time. For it is ever in this state (which we cannot be), since its actuality is also pleasure . . . . We say therefore that God (*theos*) is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this *is* God' (1072b,13-29).

Commentators have had great difficulty extracting a comprehensible doctrine of divinity from Aristotle. There are many perplexing questions here which do not seem capable of definitive resolution. Is the Aristotelian God in any sense 'personal'? In comparison with Judeo-Christian conceptions of God, the Aristotelian deity seems remarkably detached, unconcerned with the vicissitudes of human affairs. There is certainly no suggestion that the prime mover can be an object of worship, supplications and prayers, yet acknowledgement of a supreme being is connected, in a rather intangible fashion, with piety towards the world. In the *Magna Moralia* (1208b,26-32), Aristotle remarks that friendship with God is not possible, for friendship implies the return of affection, to which the deity, limited as it is to contemplation of what is highest and most precious (itself), could not condescend. On the other hand, because of the intellectual nature of the *theos*, some kind of 'participation' in godliness is possible, and in this sense God is not unknowable or foreign to human beings. The supreme being does not intervene in the world, nor does it exercise any kind of providence which would be recognizable to a Christian, but it guarantees an order to the world with which human beings, through their own intellectuality, can identify. The most difficult problems concern the nature of 'self-thinking thought' in its teleological causality. It seems (*Meta.* 1072b,4) that the *phusei onta*, in striving to actualize themselves (to realize their forms, be it man, horse, flower) are 'attracted' by the *theos*. This is puzzling enough in itself, but there is the further

difficulty of assimilating the movements of self-actualization with those of locomotion (change of place) and alteration (qualitative change), such that all movement whatsoever, through the mediation of the highest celestial sphere, owes its being to the *theos*. It is not surprising that, in the history of philosophical theology, the Aristotelian doctrine of the prime mover has been employed mostly in *ad hoc* fashion, without too much attention to the precise nature of the *noesis noeseos*. Commentators have attempted to breathe life into this notion through Neoplatonic, Christian, and other conceptions of divine being. But a tradition of strict Aristotelian religiosity has never developed.

An important difference between the Aristotelian deity and that of the Judeo-Christian tradition is that the former has no power of creation *ex nihilo*. The latter idea was foreign to the Greeks, receiving its most profound philosophical repudiation in the Parmenidean principle that, since nothingness is not, no existing thing can come out of it. For Aristotle, *theos* and world are co-eternal, the former's unchangeability ('constant presence') as the guarantee of the latter's ceaseless change and movement (the becoming present and becoming absent of the *phusei onta*). Nor does the *theos*, in the manner of Plato's demiurge, fashion the world from pre-existing matter; there is no indication in Aristotle that there was ever a time when the forms of nature did not exist. However, although the *theos* is no creator-god, and despite the obscurities of its nature as *noesis noeseos*, its functional role vis-a-vis the physical world gives it a definite ousiological status: as the highest *ousia*, it exerts a thingly influence on everything else in the world, and in this sense is itself a thing, a 'being' of a particular sort. For the Neoplatonists and other mystical theologians, this meant that it was still not high enough, not transcendent enough, to be the truly 'divine god'. As we shall see, Heidegger takes a not dissimilar attitude.

5 RELIGION AND THE *SEINSFRAGE*

After beginning his career as a Catholic philosopher, Heidegger broke all official ties with the Catholic Church in 1919. As indicated in the Introduction, this was a decision which Heidegger came to only after much inner struggle, for Catholicism had been his spiritual home and intellectual universe. It is evident, however, that what Heidegger wanted was not at all a clean break with Christianity, but a reorientation within it. No longer could Heidegger accept the 'system' of Catholic doctrinal theology with its intellectual restrictions imposed by Papal authority. But he remained convinced of the authenticity of the Christian 'fundamental experience', for which he now sought a deeper understanding with the assistance of Protestant theologians such as Luther and Schleiermacher. His new researches came to fruition with two courses at Freiburg in 1921, on 'Phenomenology of Religion', and 'Augustine and Neoplatonism', which remain unpublished but have been summarized by Otto Pöggeler, Thomas Sheehan, and Theodore Kisiel.[32] What emerges from these reports is the degree to which the ideas which later went into *Being and Time* were originally worked out by reference to 'primordial Christian experience of life'. In relation to Heidegger's critique of Aristotelian ontology, which was also being developed in lectures at this time, Karl Lehmann's judgement is noteworthy. 'Primordial Christian experience', Lehmann writes, 'is perhaps the only possible "standpoint" from which the limitation and rigidification of previous ontology in its understanding of the sense of Being could stand out'.[33] In other words, the experience of 'life' in the early Christian communities provided Heidegger with an historical counter-example (perhaps the only one) to what he will later call '*Seinsvergessenheit*'.[34]

After 1921, Heidegger no longer placed any emphasis on Christian links with the *Seinsfrage*. He came to think of this as too restrictive a context in which to situate his ontological inquiries, and as too susceptible to misinterpretations along traditional doctrinal lines. However, the possible theological

significance of Heidegger's developing existential analytic was not lost on the Protestant theologians - above all Rudolf Bultmann – of the University of Marburg after Heidegger took up a post there in 1923. Although Heidegger himself maintained a reserved attitude on the theological implications of his work, Bultmann was quick to appropriate the analytic of *Dasein* for his own 'hermeneutical' theology.[35] Bultmann was not alone in his enthusiasm, and for some years Heidegger's writings were the most important philosophical impetus for foundational work in German Protestant theology generally. Then came, after Heidegger's 'turning' of the mid-1930s, a new wave, or succession of waves, of theological Heidegger-reception, which continue to the present day. Nor has Heidegger's influence been restricted to Protestant circles: no less a Catholic theologian than Karl Rahner learnt much from him. To this may be added the influence of Heidegger on more mystical tendencies of religious thought, often outside the established churches. This includes the Eastern religions, particularly Buddhism.[36]

Amidst all this discussion, Heidegger remained aloof and ambivalent. His only sustained position-statement on contemporary theology is the 1927 lecture 'Phenomenology and Theology', where he distinguishes between philosophical ontology, which proceeds entirely without theological presuppositions, and the subsequent appropriation of ontological concepts for the 'positive science' of theology, about which, *qua* philosopher, he can make no comment.[37] It is not surprising that, to critics of the time, this seemed an evasion of the problem. If *Being and Time* was not itself theology, then it seemed to many that it was at least an ontology ready-made for theology, an ontology which, precisely in its break from Aristotelianism, could provide theology with new foundations. At the same time, since theology is naturally loathe to admit philosophy as a discipline superior to itself, there was a tendency to read a basic theological meaning back into *Being and Time*, to suggest that the book was a disguised or unacknowledged theology. While Heidegger

remained adamant that philosophy is to be distinguished from faith and thus from every historical religion, his existential ontology was widely seen as a new kind of 'natural' theology, drawing on structures of human understanding which had been overlooked by the Aristotelian tradition.[38]

The discussion around 'the later Heidegger and theology' has been governed not so much by Heidegger's over-publicized 'turning' as by a more comprehensive assimilation of his critique of metaphysics.[39] It became clear that, if the existential analytic of *Being and Time* were to be admitted as an interpretative tool for theology, this implied a more thorough understanding of its difference from traditional ontology. Once this was achieved, however, the importance of the specific conceptuality of *Being and Time* was diminished: what had previously been regarded as a self-enclosed problematic could now be seen as a stage on the way towards thinking a 'non-metaphysical God'. The idea of existential theology, or the equation of this with Heidegger's early analytic of *Dasein*, now seemed too simple. What was needed, as Heidegger himself maintained in 1964, was a more generalized reflection on the difference between objectifying and non-objectifying thought.[40] If this led, in Heidegger's own writings, to the problem of God, the route was indirect, and made little contact with conventional theological discussions. Heidegger's later works, although replete with allusions to the 'divine god' and 'the holy', are not guided by any explicit theological intentions.[41] In his interpretations of the Presocratic philosophers, as well as of Nietzsche, Hölderlin and Schelling, Heidegger comes into contact with forms of pre-metaphysical religiosity, which, if not identical with *Seinsdenken*, are anticipations of it, sparks and flashes of the *Seinsfrage* within the metaphysical night of *Seinsvergessenheit*. But the point, for Heidegger, is never to confirm a prior theological or religious standpoint.[42]

Heidegger's attitude to Christian religiosity is complex and difficult to reconstruct. Broadly speaking, his view can be seen as an instance of the popular nineteenth

century 'corruption' theory that original Christianity did not survive the establishment of the Church and doctrinal theology, together with a novel interpretation of what was corrupted ('factical life-experience'). On the other hand, Heidegger does not see the historical tradition of Christianity as completely monolithic: figures such as Augustine, Eckhart, Tauler, Luther and Schleiermacher, although removed in time from primitive Christianity, preserve something of the original experience. As mentioned, it is difficult to be precise here, for Heidegger's remarks on Christianity are, at least in respect of available materials, brief, dispersed, and not always easy to reconcile. What is clear is that, for Heidegger, historical Christianity is in the main not an alternative to Aristotelianism, but more a specific adaptation of the latter. From the earliest times, in Heidegger's view, the metaphysical God of Aristotle was substituted for factical life-experience, the genuine 'divine god' was displaced by the *god of philosophy*: 'and that is the cause as *causa sui*. This is the right name for the god of philosophy. Man can neither pray nor sacrifice to this god. Before the *causa sui*, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music and dance before this god'.[43] Of course, as a matter of historical fact, Christians have fallen to their knees in worship of their God. But Heidegger thinks that this is only apparent worship and apparent awe: the bankrupcy of contemporary Christianity was testimony to the fact that god as *causa sui* cannot sustain a genuinely religious attitude.

Why was it so easy for Christianity to fall into Aristotelian conceptions of divinity? As their great debates with Greek philosophy attest, the early Fathers certainly did not think of themselves as doing this ('What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?' etc.) In Heidegger's terms, however, the explanation is to be sought in the nature of Aristotelian philosophy as articulating the everydayness of *Seinsvergessenheit*. It was not so much that Christian theologians explicitly embraced the thought of Aristotle (though to some extent this did occur, especially during the thirteenth century), but more that, in

failing to break from 'vulgar' conceptions of being and time, they remained implicit Aristotelians. For Heidegger, the tendency of human beings to gravitate ('fall') into everydayness is so strong as to be almost irresistible. It is not a matter here of conflicting points of view or theories of the world, but of opposing existential forces: on the one hand that of authentic *Seinsverständnis*, on the other hand that of *Seinsvergessenheit*. The latter is the path of least resistance, and as such the natural medium of human life. The former is the difficult and strenuous path, not just intellectually but existentially, it is the path whereby the individual is placed radically 'in question' before the mystery of Being. By associating Aristotelianism in this way with everydayness, Heidegger does not mean to belittle the intellectual power of Aristotle, but makes an existential judgement not dissimilar to that of the Neoplatonists and mystics. Aristotle is indeed the 'shrewdest of the Greeks' (Eriugena), but because his wisdom is 'of this world' (ousiological wisdom, concerning things-within-the-world), it is ultimately a kind of 'foolishness'.

It was earlier noticed that Heidegger shows a certain obstinacy in refusing to concede predecessors in *Seinsdenken*. This is particularly true in relation to the theological tradition, more especially that counter-tradition of negative theology which proceeds in conscious opposition to Aristotelianism. Heidegger's stiff-necked insistence that God has always been conceived as *ousia* and *causa prima* simply does not ring true in respect of these theologians: one may mention, among others, Philo, Origen, Plotinus, Gregory of Nyssa, Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus the Confessor, Eriugena, and Eckhart. Moreover, this line of theological thought has not remained external to 'orthodox' Christianity but has been assimilated (albeit with certain tensions) into it, especially through Pseudo-Dionysius, whose historical influence is second only to Augustine (himself not untouched by the negative theology of Neoplatonism). The ideas that God is unknowable or hidden, that theological thought is not theory but remembrance, that God is heard rather than viewed, that

God 'is' not in the same way as other beings, indeed that God is not even a 'being' but a kind of 'nothingness': these can all be found among the negative theologians, and have clear resemblances to what Heidegger says of *Sein* and *Seinsdenken*.[44] Similarly, Heidegger's claim that Being is what is simultaneously nearest and farthest from man sounds like a statement from Christian theology, if only the word 'God' is substituted for 'Being'.[45] The list of such parallels could easily be extended.

The theological resonances of *Seinsdenken* are particularly evident in respect of what Heidegger calls 'attunement'. Notwithstanding the importance that doctrine has assumed, Christian theologians have always considered that a genuine relation to God is a matter of being 'tuned in', of a specific stance or attitude. Schleiermacher calls this the attitude of 'piety' (*Frömmigkeit*), which he significantly describes as an 'existential relation' (*Existenzialverhältnis*).[46] It is a basic thesis of Schleiermacher's *The Christian Faith* that religious truth is not a matter of any cognitive relation: the statements of Christian belief, he says, are 'expressions of Christian pious sensibility (*fromme Gemütszustände*) put into speech'.[47] Schleiermacher was a major influence on Dilthey's project of *Lebensphilosophie*, which in turn was important for the early Heidegger's critique of Neo-Kantian objectivism; in addition, Heidegger's Marburg colleague and collaborator Rudolf Bultmann was a keen student of Schleiermacher.[48] Another admirer of Schleiermacher was Rudolf Otto, also at Marburg with Heidegger in the 1920's. Otto's well-known *The Idea of the Holy*, which presents a theology of the 'absolutely Other', of God as the '*Mysterium tremendum*' and '*das Ungeheure*', was recommended to Husserl by Heidegger in 1918.[49]

Schleiermacher had himself defined the 'existential relation' of Christian piety as 'the feeling of absolute dependency'. Is this very different to what Heidegger means, when he says in the 'Brief über den "Humanismus"' (1947), that man is not 'the master of beings' (*Herr des Seienden*) but

'the shepherd of Being' (*Hirt des Seins*)?[50] In any case, the idea of a receptive, tending, 'pastoral' relation to Being is ubiquitous in Heidegger's later writings, and is explicitly opposed to the challenging and domineering stance of technologico-metaphysical man.[51] As Caputo and others have shown, connections can be demonstrated here with the medieval Christian Neoplatonist Meister Eckhart, whose idea of the authentically religious life as one of 'detachment' (*Abgeschiedenheit*) bears a close resemblance to Heidegger's late motif of 'letting be' (*Gelassenheit*).[52] Like the pious soul of Eckhart's theology, the Heideggerian *Seinsdenker* exists in an untouchable removedness from the 'things of this world': only thus can that which is 'beyond beings', which in fact is 'nothing', become manifest in its fullness and richness.[53] *Seinsdenken* is a stance of serenity and composure, but also of supreme alertness and sobriety. There is surely an echo of Schleiermacher when Heidegger calls this stance 'the piety of thought' (*die Frömmigkeit des Denkens*).[54]

But it is not only in Christian religiosity that similarities with Heidegger can be observed. In 1934, another of Heidegger's eminent students, Hans Jonas, published the first volume of his *Gnosis and the Spirit of Late Antiquity*, making liberal use of Heidegger's existential analyses for the interpretation of the Mandean Gnostic scriptures. Jonas, nowadays acknowledged as the founding father of modern Gnostic studies, goes beyond a mere methodological employment of Heidegger, or rather, his employment presupposes that, in Heidegger and Gnosticism, the same universal characteristics of the human condition come to light. Among the Gnostic motifs of special interest to Jonas are the unknown or hidden God, the situation of man as a stranger in this world (as having been 'thrown' into it), the forlornness and homesickness of man, the drunkenness and oblivion of earthly existence, the 'noise' of the world, and the 'call' from some place beyond the world: in each case parallels are not difficult to find in Heidegger.[55] By using Heidegger's existential categories for the neutralization of ontic belief-systems,

Jonas believed he could comprehend Gnosticism in philosophical rather than in just historico-philological terms.[56] The same fundamental assumption governs Heidegger's attitude to Christianity. Although the belief-systems of Christianity and other traditions of religiosity go beyond the strict ontological level in attributing special significance to historical personalities, Heidegger thinks it possible to re-ontologize (de-mythologize) these beliefs to bring them back to what is 'phenomenologically' evident.[57]

While Heidegger takes no particular notice of Gnosticism, there is a turn, in his later period, towards the similarly 'pagan' religiosity of Nietzsche and Hölderlin. Heidegger is aware that Nietzsche's thesis of the death of God refers only to the Christian-metaphysical God (the supreme being) and does not signify an atheism which eschews all religious attunements.[58] In opposition to the Christian-Platonic tradition, Nietzsche returned to the pathos of the Greek mystery religions, especially the radical life-affirmation of Dionysianism, understood as a stance of reverential thankfulness for a reality (Nietzsche calls it 'life', 'earth', and in his early writings 'the primal One') beyond all objectification and theorization. Like Heideggerian *Gelassenheit*, Nietzschean life-affirmation is an attitude of remoteness and detachment from the 'things of this world', but at the same time an alertness and wakefulness to the 'event' of life. In Hölderlin (also much admired by Nietzsche), Heidegger finds a 'naming of the holy'.[59] As the exemplary 'poet in a destitute time' Hölderlin 'sings and attends on the trace of the fugitive gods'.[60] In his poems the holy comes into view as that which is 'unapproachable' (*das Un-nahbare*) and 'dreadful' (*das Entsetzliche*), but which is also the 'original healing' or 'redemptive' power (*das ursprüngliche Heile*).[61] What could be called the poet's 'homiletic' relation to the holy is a model for the *Seinsdenker*, who similarly wishes to 'testify' to Being. Like the poet, the *Seinsdenker* seeks to 'dwell' in the world: 'to dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free, the preserve, the free sphere

that safeguards each thing in its nature. The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving'.[62] Again, this sounds like a description of *Gelassenheit*, the existential stance of releasement and letting- be.[63]

Whether the attunement of *Seinsdenken* is expressed through the 'factical life-experience' of early Christianity, through the quasi-poetical philosophy of Nietzsche, the quasi-philosophical poetry of Hölderlin, or in still other ways, everything points to a contrast with Aristotelian *sophia* (*theoria*).[64] Notwithstanding the unwearied detachment which Aristotle attributes to the *bios theoretikos*, this does not seem the same thing as *Gelassenheit*: Aristotle does not seem concerned to preserve the 'mystery of Being', and there is little room, within either *sophia* or *phronesis*, for such existentially significant motifs as anxiety, watchfulness and wakefulness.[65] The Aristotelian *theos* does not seem to be the Uncanny, but more the guarantor of order, security, and stability, something wondrous to be sure, but not threatening, not such as to require a 'stepping back from Being'. If Heidegger wants to validate this contrast in ontological terms, then whether *Seinsdenken* is a kind of 'religiosity', and whether Christian theology has been so thoroughly 'onto-theological' as he indicates, are subsidiary questions. While Heidegger does not conceal the fact that his critique of Aristotelian ontology draws from sources conventionally regarded as 'religious', he sees labels as less important than the concrete character of thought, and this means, above all, whether the attunement appropriate to *Seinsdenken* is in place. However, not only is the contrast between Aristotelian self-assertion and *Gelassenheit* not entirely original to Heidegger, but it remains unclear whether and in what sense this is a genuinely ontological distinction. Can Heidegger offer us more? Can he demonstrate a tenable path between theology and anthropology?

From the available summaries of his 1920-21 lectures on the phenomenology of religion, it is evident that, during this early period, Heidegger already saw the *problem of time* as the

key to his whole ontological project. Primordial Christian life-experience is based on a 'kairological' understanding of time such as can be found in I Thessalonians, where Paul speaks of the 'suddenness' of the Second Coming, refusing to give a date. Whereas calendar dating reflects a chronological conception of time, a measuring of and reckoning with time, the expectation of Christian temporality is oriented to a *parousia* which is more than a mere event-in-time. As Pöggeler explains, 'If man tries by means of chronological computations or content-oriented characterizations to define the inaccessible event which suddenly bursts upon the scene, the event upon which his life is based, he then eliminates that which should determine his life as the always inaccessible and replaces it with the secured, the accessible'.[66] Sheehan reports that, on Heidegger's reading, 'Paul concretizes the question of the temporality of the *parousia* by delineating two groups of people. The first are those who urge peace and security. They are . . . absorbed in and totally dependent on the world in which they live. Their "waiting" is all for this world. They cannot be saved because they do not possess themselves, they have forgotten the authentic self'.[67] Lehmann suggests that the existential analytic of *Being and Time* is nothing else but the 'formalization' of the temporal structures which Heidegger found in the Pauline writings.[68] This seems too simplistic, but it is clear that Heidegger discovered in these texts at least certain 'clues' for the philosophical expression of that attunement to Being which at this stage he still calls 'factical life-experience' and which will shortly become the 'authentic' *Existenz* of *Being and Time*. Foremost among these clues was the kairological experience of time. It was Heidegger's ambition, in the years 1921-27, to develop a new philosophical understanding of temporality, and, on the basis of this, a new understanding not only of human existence, but of Being itself. How far did he succeed in this? To what extent did he develop these original clues to the level of an alternative ontology?

6 TIME AND BEING

Aristotle, so we read in Heidegger's 1927 lectures *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 'expressed in clear conceptual form, for the first time and for a long time after, the common understanding of time, so that his view of time corresponds to the natural concept of time'.[69] In these lectures, which contain Heidegger's most extensive discussion of *Physics* IV and of time and temporality in general, phenomenology is understood as the method of ontology. As in *Being and Time*, the various regional ontologies work out the principles of their respective regions, and are distinguished from that fundamental ontology which addresses, not any specific region of beings, nor even the totality of beings of every region, but Being as such. It would seem that, on this account, Aristotle's theory of time would belong to the regional ontology of physics: it would be a theory of the temporality of physical things. But this is only part of Heidegger's meaning when he associates Aristotle with the 'natural concept of time'. By attributing to Aristotle the 'vulgar' or 'common' understanding of time, and by contrasting this with 'primordial time' as revealed in fundamental ontology, Heidegger alludes to his own thesis of the *Seinsvergessenheit* of Aristotelian ousiological metaphysics as also of 'natural experience'. So for Heidegger, although Aristotle has 'the energy and tenacity to continue to force inquiry back to the phenomena and to the seen and to mistrust from the ground up all wild and windy speculation', he fails to recognize the dependency of physical/durational time on primordial 'ecstatic' temporality.[70] Aristotelian physical time is the time of average everydayness: 'The covering up of the specific structural moments of world-time, the covering up of their origination in temporality, and the covering up of temporality itself – all have their ground in that mode of being of *Dasein* which we call falling (*Verfallen*)'.[71] The natural tendency of human beings is to interpret their own existence on the model of things, thus to ascribe to themselves a thingly temporality, while the primordial temporality which is truly

the condition for *Dasein's* own existence and for Being as such, is occluded.

For Heidegger, what Aristotle presents in *Physics* IV is a theory of *now-time* corresponding to the natural experience of time. As observed in Chapter One, Aristotle takes the now as the real substratum of time: the now is to time as the moving body is to movement. The now is conceived as the point of transition from before to after, in one direction into the past, in the other direction into the future. Heidegger insists that the before and after of time should be understood not through spatial analogies, but according to the formal structure of all movement and change in the broad sense, namely the structure 'from something to something'.[72] This expresses the dimensional character of time as a stretch or span, of which spatial extension is one instance, qualitative change another. Although the now is strictly speaking durationless and therefore, as Aristotle says, is no 'part' of time, Heidegger stresses that the now is itself unthinkable without dimensionality, ie. without implicit reference to a no-longer-now and a not-yet-now.[73] While in one sense the now is the vanishing instant of change, its intrinsic dimensional character allows it to be identified with any arbitrary time-unit: now in this century, on this day, in this hour etc. Aristotelian time is a succession of nows which are countable *qua* time-units of arbitrary magnitude: 'Time measures motion as the thing moving: *pose tis*, *how great* the transition is, that is, *how many nows* there are in a particular transition from something to something'.[74]

This emphasis on the priority of dimensionality over spatial extensionality is intended to clarify the *ontological* nature of Aristotle's analysis of time: movement is ontologically dependent on time because movement presupposes dimensionality and countability.[75] Because time as the dimensionality of movement is an *a priori* principle, it cannot be identified with any ontic reality such as spatial extension. Qualitative changes and changes of spatial position are ontic instantiations of the ontological structure 'from something to something',

but these levels must not be confused with one another. Such confusion, Heidegger maintains, was the mistake of Bergson when he reduced the Aristotelian concept of time to that of space: Bergson was misled by Aristotle's analogies between the now and the moving body, but these show the dimensionality (countability) of time rather than its spatiality.[76] The statement that vulgar time is a succession of nows holds only if succession is understood in an ontological (dimensional) sense. This is also the condition for the derivation of vulgar from primordial temporality.

Heidegger identifies the everyday concept of time with Aristotelian physical time because 'something can be defined as temporal in terms of now-time only in so far as it has presence-at-hand (*Vorhandensein*) as its way of being'.[77] Only physical (changeable) things are capable of passing through a succession of nows because only these can be present-at-hand in each successive now. Presence-at-hand is the way of being of those things which in ordinary experience are taken as 'real'. Like the time of physics (whether Aristotelian or modern) everyday time is the medium in which events take place, always as a sequence of events. In physical theory and in ordinary experience, time is something to be counted and reckoned with. But clearly, although Aristotle could assent to Heidegger's claim that physical time is the natural or ordinary concept of time, he could not accept the stronger thesis that this kind of temporality is 'vulgar' or 'fallen'. Because there is only one level of temporality in Aristotle, and because he sees the highest reality (the prime mover) as extra-temporal, he would be unable to admit a distinction between vulgar and primordial time. For Heidegger, on the other hand, 'it is only *after* we have found a solution for the question of Being that the Aristotelian analysis of time can be interpreted thematically'.[78] Only in the context of the *Seinsfrage* can primordial temporality become visible, and only from the perspective of primordial temporality can physical, durational time be understood in its ontological 'vulgarity'.

Let us recall the major ontological problem with the

Aristotelian conception of time. It is the one mentioned by Aristotle himself at the beginning of his discussion and left apparently unresolved at the end, namely that if time consists of the past, present, and future, and if the past and future exist no-longer and not-yet respectively, while the present is a vanishing (divisible *ad infinitum*) moment, then it seems that time 'either does not exist at all, or barely, and in an obscure way' (*Phys.* 218a,1). Aristotle may think that, in his subsequent exposition, this difficulty is dissolved and revealed as a pseudo-problem, for time does not exist in the manner of things and events, and it is these, rather than time itself, which exist no-longer and not-yet. If this is Aristotle's point, it seems reasonable enough, but it is still not clear that the problem of the reality of time is disposed of. Time, as the measure of motion, is still a succession of nows, and the ontological status of these is still obscure; they are durationless, but in another sense the singular now is ever-present, and appears to move through time. This problem could simply be dismissed if time were to be spatialized, the nows identified with points on a line, and the apparently privileged reality of the now rejected as a matter of subjective experience. But Heidegger's point is that, however adequate this may be for mathematical physics, it cannot explicate time in its phenomenological evidence: it eliminates the problem by fiat, by declaring that only what can be appropriated within mathematical science is real.

Heidegger approaches the problem of the now through the phenomena of clock usage. I look at the clock to see what time it is now, and in so doing, I establish how much time is left until a certain 'then', eg. how much time remains until the end of my lecture. When I say 'now' my attention is not directed at the now itself as this present point of time, but at some event or sequence of events which 'takes time'. In time-telling and time measuring, *Dasein* expresses the temporal nature of its projects and concerns. As Heidegger puts it:

> Saying 'now' has a different character from saying 'this window'. In the latter expression I intend thematically

> that window over there, the object itself . . . *Dasein*, which always exists so that it takes time for itself, *expresses itself*. Taking time for itself, it utters itself in such a way that *it is always saying time*. When I say 'now' I do not mean the now as such, but in my now saying I am transient. I am *in motion in* the understanding of now, and in a strict sense, I am really with that *whereto* the time is and *wherefore* I determine the time.[79]

When I say 'now' it is in *expectation* of a 'then', eg. it is now twenty minutes till the end of the lecture, whereupon I expect the students to leave the classroom and myself to attend to other matters. At the end of the lecture, I may attend to the window which let through an annoying draught, but it would hardly be meaningful to attend to the past now when, twenty minutes before, I looked at my watch. Of course, I may remember looking at my watch, and noticing that, with twenty minutes remaining, the lecture was behind schedule, but this is something altogether different from focusing on the now as an object analogous to the window: I am not remembering the now as such but the temporality of my projects. Further, when I say 'now' I retain or remember something which has already happened, eg. I retain that part of the lecture which has already been completed, and retain it as belonging together with that part which is still to come. Finally, when I say 'now' I do indeed relate myself to something which is present-at-hand, but not the now as such, rather that constellation of entities which my project requires me to *deal with now*, eg. what is written down at a certain point in my lecture notes, on the blackboard etc. These three determinations of the now – expectation, 'enpresenting' (*Gegenwärtigen*) and retention – are the three temporal modifications of human comportment, and it is their unitary structure which Heidegger understands as primordial time.[80]

Corresponding to these three temporal modifications are the three 'ecstases' of primordial time, namely future,

present, and past (*Gewesenheit*).[81] These ecstases are not to be understood according to the vulgar conception of time as later-than-now, now, and earlier-than-now, but in an existential sense, according to the temporality of *Dasein*.[82] Considered as an ecstasis of primordial temporality, the future is not simply an awaited now which has not yet arrived, but is the mode in which *Dasein* is 'ahead of itself'.[83] Similarly, the ecstatic past is the mode in which *Dasein* comes back to itself, appropriating itself in its character as having-been, and the ecstatic present is the mode in which *Dasein* occupies itself with the present-at-hand. Each ecstasis is what it is only in the unitary structure which Heidegger calls the 'horizon' of primordial temporality. *Dasein* projects itself into the future, holding itself out into its possibilities, only by simultaneously occupying itself with present-at-hand entities and by appropriating its historical facticity (having-beenness). Primordial temporality 'is itself *the original outside-itself, the ekstatikon*' in the sense that each of the three ecstases is 'removed' (*entrückt*) from itself to each of the other two.[84] The ecstatic structure of time is what accounts for '*Dasein's* specific overstepping character, transcendence'.[85] *Dasein* only exists in its temporalizing, in throwing itself forward towards its possibilities and by coming back upon itself in its having-beenness. The ecstases of primordial time remove *Dasein* 'beyond itself' in such a way that its existence cannot be ontologically determined in the now of vulgar time. Transcendence, conceived as a temporalizing 'act', belongs to *Dasein* itself in its basic ontological constitution.

In *Being and Time* and the 1927 lectures, Heidegger explains primordial time in terms of the 'care-structure' of *Dasein's* existence. The existence of *Dasein* is not a present-at-hand fact like the existence of a stone, but a project: *Dasein* exists only in so far as it 'projects itself' according to the horizon of primordial temporality. However, there is a privative mode of projection which Heidegger calls 'inauthenticity', wherein *Dasein* falls away from its own ecstatic structure towards the mere presence-at-hand of

things. While *Dasein* can never fully become a thing in this latter sense, it can become more thing-*like* and in this way lose itself. Since the direction of projection is the future, Heidegger pays particular attention in *Being and Time* to the difference between authentic and inauthentic futurity. Authentic futurity is a resolute being-towards-death as *Dasein's* ownmost possibility, its completion or wholeness, whereas inauthentic futurity is an awaiting of death in the mode of vulgar temporality, as an event in a series of events, an event which is 'not now' and therefore 'not yet real'.[86] An analogous account could obviously be given of the difference between authentic and inauthentic having-beenness: the former as a bringing of one's past into oneself, the latter as a relation to one's past as something 'finished', 'not now', and therefore 'no longer real'. Inauthenticity is *Dasein* becoming lost among present-at-hand things and interpreting its own being according to the being of things. For Heidegger, Aristotle's conception of time as now-time is inauthentic in this sense.[87]

Why should the time of *Dasein* be regarded as primordial? Is this not simply to privilege 'subjective' over 'objective' time? Why should the human experience of time be relevant to what time is 'in-itself'? Heidegger's reaction to such questions is to point out that terms such as 'subjective', 'objective', and 'in-itself' are themselves ontologically unclear:

> The time 'in which' the present-at-hand is in motion or at rest is not 'objective', if what is meant by that is the presence-at-hand-in-itself of entities encountered within the world. But just as little is time 'subjective', if by this we understand being present-at-hand and occurring in a 'subject'. World-time is more 'objective' than any possible object because, with the disclosedness of the world, it already becomes 'objectified' in an ecstatico-horizontal manner as the condition for the possibility of entities within the world. Thus, contrary

> to Kant's opinion, one comes across world-time just as immediately in the physical as in the psychical . . . . World-time, moreover, is also more 'subjective' than any possible subject; for it is what first makes possible the being of the factical self . . . . Time is present at hand neither in the 'subject' nor in the 'object', neither 'inside' nor 'outside'; and it is 'earlier' than any subjectivity or objectivity.[88]

As Aristotle recognizes, time is not in the things themselves, but is a condition of (physical) thingliness. Is time then an 'objective' condition of thingliness? Does it in some sense borrow its objectivity from that of things? Then again, can the objectivity of things be explicated in such a way as to make no essential reference to *Dasein*? When Heidegger defines the objectivity of things as presence-at-hand, he points to the temporal conditionedness of what is ordinarily taken as real: something is real or objective when it is capable of being present in a now. In this way the problem is pushed further back, so that we must ask whether presence is itself objective or subjective. However, on Heidegger's conception of ecstatic temporality, it is neither. As the ecstasis of time given in the act of enpresenting, the present is already 'outside itself' through anticipation and retention, and therefore cannot 'in itself' be taken as ontologically definitive for objective things. Presence-at-hand is nothing 'in itself' but has its being through the three ecstases of primordial temporality in their unitary structure: it is not the present-at-hand thing itself, but the being (ontological status) of the thing. Neither is Heidegger's primordial time subjective in the sense that it is just the way time is experienced. The ecstases of time are not events of *Dasein's* mental life, they are not states of consciousness but 'objective' structures which make time possible in the first place. Psychological events are themselves already serialized into past, present, and future: they are 'in time' just as much as physical events and in no way determine the temporality of the latter.

Although in *Being and Time* Heidegger sets himself the task of thinking Being from primordial temporality, the bulk of the book is given over to what he calls a 'preliminary' inquiry into the structure of *Dasein's* existence. At first sight it seems that, in departing from and remaining within the perspective of *Dasein*, Heidegger has already opted by a subjective approach to ontology. It soon becomes clear, however, that both subjectivity and objectivity are to be relativized to *Dasein* and superseded by the more phenomenologically evident categories of existential ontology. Heidegger's analytic of *Dasein* seeks to destroy the entrenched self-evidence of the tradition and lead back to phenomena which ontology must articulate afresh. The prejudices of the tradition are all inter-related and reinforce each other, eg. the prejudice that Being is the same thing as objective presence-at-hand is reinforced by the idea that the now (the present) is the basic reality of time, and vice-versa. For this reason, the critique of traditional ontology as undertaken by Heidegger is a wholistic project. One can enter the 'hermeneutical circle' of Heidegger's phenomenological ontology at a variety of points, eg. where he criticizes the vulgar conception of time, or where he criticizes 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' as traditionally conceived. But to stand outside this circle and make the charge that primordial time is 'subjective' is to beg the question.

Heidegger considers that traditional ontology, following the initial direction taken by Aristotle, expresses the *Seinsvergessenheit* of average everydayness, ie. of *Dasein's* 'natural' understanding of itself in relation to the world. If Being, as Heidegger also maintains, is to be thought from primordial time, this means that *Seinsvergessenheit* is *Vergessenheit der Zeit*. In *Being and Time*, the inauthenticity of average everydayness is grounded in the forgetting of the finitude of primordial time and *Dasein's* misinterpretation of itself in terms of infinite, vulgar temporality. The finitude of primordial time is phenomenologically evident in *Dasein's* being-towards-death:

> In such being-towards-its-end, *Dasein* exists in a way which is authentically whole as that entity which it can be when 'thrown into death'. This entity does not have an end at which it just stops, but it *exists finitely*. . . . In our thesis that temporality is primordially finite, we are not disputing that 'time goes on'; we are simply holding fast to the phenomenal character of primordial temporality – a character which shows itself in what is projected in *Dasein's* primordial existential projecting.[89]

In its average everydayness *Dasein* understands death not as belonging to its own being but as a future event-in-time; in its orientation to the objective futurity of things, it forgets its authentic futurity. Similarly, *Dasein* forgets its authentic having-beenness:

> When in our commerce with things we lose ourselves in and with them, we are expectant of our ability-to-be (*Seinkönnen*) in the way it is determined via the feasibility and unfeasibility of the things with which we are concerned. We do not expressly come back to ourselves in an authentic projection upon our ownmost ability-to-be. What we are – and what we have been is already contained in this – lies in some way behind us, forgotten. . . . But this shows that the past, in the sense of having-beenness, must not be defined in terms of the common concept of the bygone. The bygone is that of which we say that it no longer is. Having beenness, however, is a mode of being, the determination of the way in which *Dasein* is as existent. . . . Only what is intrinsically futural can have-been; things, at best, are over and done with.[90]

The future as the not-yet, and the past as the bygone, as the earlier-than, pertain to things-in-time and not to the primordial time of *Dasein*. But because *Dasein* has fallen in

and lost itself amongst things, because it understands itself in terms of its own thingly involvements, it imagines that 'time itself' is infinite, it forgets its own 'ecstatic' finitude in favour of the durational infinitude of vulgar time.

Is primordial time, as the unity of the temporal ecstases future, having-beenness and the present, really *time* at all, or is it so different from our natural understanding of time as not to deserve the name? Heidegger raises this question himself, and replies that the genuine temporality of primordial time can be seen from the fact that vulgar time originates from it.[91] In particular, the dimensional stretchedness of durational now-time derives from the ecstatic stretchedness of primordial time. As Heidegger explains:

> A stretchedness which enters into expressed time [now-time] is already originally present in the ecstatic character of temporality. Since every expecting has the character of coming-toward-self and every retaining the character of back-to, even in the mode of forgetting, and every coming-toward-self is intrinsically a back-to, temporality *qua* ecstatic is *stretched out within its own self.* As the primary outside itself, temporality is stretch itself. Stretch does not first result from the fact that I shove the moments of time together but just the reverse: the character of the continuity and spannedness of time in the common sense has its origin in the original stretch of temporality itself as ecstatic.[92]

The stretchedness given in the 'beyond itself' of ecstatic time is the origin of the stretchedness given in the transitionary character of the now as the link of time, as that which ensures the continuity of time.[93] Similarly, the measurability of vulgar time in terms of earlier and later is grounded in the unitary structure of *Dasein's* expectation, retention and enpresenting. Corresponding to the three ecstases of primordial temporality are the worldly things to which *Dasein* comports itself, a sequence of things stretched through the past, present and

future. This sequence is something with which *Dasein* must reckon. To show the derivation of vulgar from primordial time, it is necessary to 'show how *Dasein* as temporality temporalizes a kind of behaviour which relates itself to time by taking it into its reckoning'.[94] In circumspective common sense, *Dasein* thinks in terms of 'now', 'then' and 'when', it confers on the sequence of worldly events the structure of 'datability'.[95] This very structure, however, is truly temporal (as opposed, for example, to spatial dimensionality) when its moments derive their meaning from the ecstases of primordial time: 'the horizons which belong to the "now", the "then", and the "on that former occasion", all have their source of *ecstatical* temporality; by reason of this, these horizons too have the character of datability, as "today, when . . . ", "later on, when . . . ", and "earlier, when . . . "'.[96] Heidegger's claim, in other words, is that the quantitative, mathematical relations of purely durational temporality have their origin in an ecstatic temporality governed by the projective character of *Dasein*-oriented concern.

To be sure, what Heidegger offers falls short of a fully persuasive derivation of durational from ecstatical temporality. The Aristotelian ontologist can still dismiss the latter as subjective, claiming that the 'psychological experience' of time is explicable, at least in principle, from the physico-mathematical characteristics of objective time. Moreover, since modern physics teaches that the reality of time is to a large degree counter-intuitive, the imposition of a *Dasein*-centred frame of reference may easily appear as an untutored anthropomorphism. But Heidegger would reply that the structure of ecstatic temporality is strictly irreducible, because it is given equiprimordially with *Dasein* itself, thus with *Seinsverständnis*: if the Aristotelian does not understand anything under '*Dasein*' or '*Sein*' - as Heidegger uses these terms – this is simply *Seinsvergessenheit*. At this level, Heidegger would admit, there can be no such thing as apodictic demonstration. There can be no 'chain of reasoning' which leads from vulgar to ecstatic temporality,

but once the latter is 'phenomenologically' sighted, the derivative character of durational time will also become evident.

While the text of *Being and Time* is itself difficult enough to understand, the confusion and darkness surrounding the work has been added to by its apparent incompleteness. At the end of the Introduction, Heidegger indicates that the treatise is to have two parts: firstly, 'the interpretation of *Dasein* in terms of temporality, and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being'; secondly, 'basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology, with the problematic of temporality as our clue'. Heidegger further tells us that each part has three divisions. Part One consists of 1. the preparatory fundamental analysis of *Dasein*, 2. *Dasein* and temporality, and 3. time and Being; Part Two is to treat 1. Kant's doctrine of schematism and time, 2. the Cartesian *cogito sum*, and 3. Aristotle's conception of time. Although the treatise actually gets no further than the first two divisions of Part One, the topics indicated for Part Two are touched upon in various sections of the text, and receive more extensive treatment in lecture-courses of the same period. This leaves us with the problem of the projected third division of Part One. What precisely is this meant to be, and what systematic significance does it have for Heidegger's overall ontological project? Further, what is the significance of the fact that this topic alone remains outstanding?

The difficulty of these questions is exacerbated by the uncertainties surrounding Heidegger's subsequent 'turning' from *Dasein* to Being. Some commentators have been tempted to see the projected SZ I.3 from the perspective of Heidegger's later attempts to think Being 'out of itself' rather than from the 'subjective' standpoint of *Dasein*. Thomas Sheehan, for example, quoting Heidegger's 1962 comment to Father Richardson that the temporal analysis of *Dasein* does not reach 'the most proper element of time that must be sought in answer to the being-question', concludes that 'in SZ I.2, Heidegger did make a stab at showing how

Zeitlichkeit forms the horizonal schema for understanding *man's* being, but he did not spell out how it shapes the horizon for understanding other modes of being. That task was reserved for SZ I.3'.[97] Sheehan's position would mean that Heidegger assumes a *third* concept of time beyond vulgar time and the ecstatic time of *Dasein*, a kind of supra-*Dasein* as well as supra-thingly temporality which would define every mode of being. However, it is not clear that this is an intelligible possibility, either within the problematic of *Being and Time* or that of the later Heidegger. Admittedly, in *Being and Time* the *Dasein* analysis is supposed to be preparatory to the *Seinsfrage*, and in the later works it is apparently superseded. On the other hand, given Heidegger's definition of the *Seinsfrage* in *Being and Time*, and given the fact that even after the 'turning', man remains the privileged site of Being's self-revealing, it is difficult to see that a new level of ontological analysis is attained, or is indeed attainable. The suspicion arises that Heidegger's initial explanation of the status of the *Dasein* analysis vis-a-vis the *Seinsfrage* is confused and misleading, perhaps prompted by exaggerated fears of subjectivism. If this is so, it would stand to reason that the topic foreshadowed for SZ I.3 is never treated, for there can, in fact, be no topic here at all. The 'most proper element of time that must be sought in answer to the being-question' would still be, in some sense, the time of *Dasein*.

Heidegger is characteristically reluctant to recognize, from the history of philosophy, any genuine parallels to his critique of Aristotelian physical time. Although Plotinus (*Enneads* 3. 7) criticizes the Aristotelian definition of time, he provides, according to Heidegger, 'more of a theological speculation about time than an interpretation adhering strictly to the phenomenon itself'.[98] The famous discussion in Augustine's *Confessions*, as well as the investigations by such modern philosophers as Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel, are all assimilated in principle to the Aristotelian conception – which is exactly the attitude one expects given Heidegger's thesis of universal *Seinsvergessenheit*.[99] It is interesting, however, that Heidegger

makes a partial exception (seemingly the only one) in the case of Henri Bergson, whose considerations on time he calls 'by far the most independent' and 'a philosophical effort to surpass the traditional concept of time'.[100] But although Bergson sets out to criticize Aristotelian time, and explicitly contrasts his own concept of 'duration' (*Durée*) to the quantitative time of Aristotle, he is unable, Heidegger maintains, to arrive at an adequate alternative view because he misinterprets Aristotelian time according to spatial analogies.[101] Heidegger's critique of Bergson is extremely compressed, and I shall not attempt to analyse it here. But what is significant about Bergson, as far as his relation to Heidegger's *Seinsfrage* is concerned, is that *Durée* is intended as in some sense Being itself, more precisely, it is primordial Becoming, different from metaphysical Being not as less absolute (it is, one could say, 'absolute primordiality'), but simply as unconceptualizable (therefore unquantifiable), and as such accessible only through what Bergson calls 'intuition'.

In the early part of this century, Bergson was one of those philosophers who criticized metaphysical definitions of truth and sought a new primordiality under the rubric 'life'. As previously observed, Heidegger was to a certain degree attracted to this movement, but was also critical of it, particularly of the undifferentiated character of its 'life' concept. Presumably, the same doubts are behind Heidegger's unaccepting attitude to Bergson's *Durée*. Significantly, however, Heidegger does not produce anything concrete against Bergson apart from an extremely abbreviated argument to the effect that he spatializes Aristotelian time. As for the 'rigour' of Heidegger's own analyses of primordial temporality in comparison with Bergson's, this remains a moot point, because although Heidegger makes the general charge that Bergson reduces time to a psychological phenomenon, Heidegger's own ecstatic temporality is likewise *Dasein*-centred. For both Heidegger and Bergson, the Primordial, the 'originary given' of reality, is time, but in a sense prior to measurablity, ie.,

prior to the thingly (Aristotelian) relation of 'before and after'. A similar view is evident in Nietzsche, who proclaims the 'flux' of Becoming as the only true reality. All these thinkers turn the charge (coming from objectivistic-rationalistic quarters) of the illegitimate humanization of time back on their accusers: the real humanization becomes that abstractive operation whereby the Primordial is distilled out into concrete things comprehensible through concepts, whereby time is reduced to a succession of thingly events (a succession of present-at-hand nows).

If we abstract from the differences between Heidegger, Bergson, and Nietzsche, one common feature of their philosophies stands out. Each installs as the Absolute (Heidegger and Nietzsche dislike this Hegelian expression, but we may understand it to mean 'primordiality') something which in traditional metaphysics is not at all qualified for this status: as the supreme object of philosophical contemplation they install *the finite*. From the point of view of classical Greek philosophy this can only be an absurdity, for the metaphysical *eros* is directed precisely towards the eternal, ie. that which, however conceived, is 'constantly present'. Indeed, metaphysical definitions of the Absolute have subsequently become so entrenched that the 'critique of theology' to be found in these three authors has been widely understood as a kind of relativism: a monarch, apparently, has been dethroned, and banners proclaiming 'freedom' are in the air. When one looks closely, however, it is plain that, for all three, the authority of the metaphysical monarch is not dispersed downwards but referred upwards. Yet there is no other monarch in these upper regions, no *to agathon*, no *theos*, no 'highest being', but rather – and this is what is so difficult to understand - Becoming, time, *Durée*, life, the vital etc. Nietzsche expresses the tensions of this situation with characteristic poignancy at the dramatic climax of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, where Zarathustra, having risen to the supreme challenge of affirming finitude itself, breaks out into an ecstatic Dionysian song to eternity. What a strange

transfiguration does the finite undergo when, taken up in an act of ultimate reverence, thankfulness, and affirmation, it shows itself as the eternal, as a kind of god. As for Heidegger, we may recall that he too understands primordial temporality in terms of an kairological moment: 'That Present (*Gegenwart*) which is held in authentic temporality and which thus is authentic itself, we call the "moment of vision" (*Augenblick*)'.[102] This *Augenblick* is irreducible to the now of physical, chronological, quantitative temporality, because it is the entering into the event of Being, not at all as a cancellation or overcoming of finitude, but as the only genuine *reconciliation* with finitude. In Nietzsche, quite explicitly, this is the moment of 'redemption' (*Erlösung*), and although Heidegger avoids this particular word, his meaning is not different.

Conclusion

The present study has highlighted Heidegger's diagnosis of the Aristotelian philosophy as an articulation of that everydayness wherein the primordial meaning of being (as of truth and human existence) is forgotten in favour of what is at hand and present. As we saw in Chapter III, in coming to this judgement Heidegger was expressing his conviction that the 'wisdom of this world' is ultimately *hubris* in the face of the primal 'mystery of Being'. We could call this a 'religious' conviction on the part of Heidegger, especially in view of his Catholic background and the influence of Luther and other Protestant theologians during his formative period. However, Heidegger did not understand his thought to be founded on 'faith', if by this is meant any kind of dependency on historical revelation or authoritative scripture-based doctrine. On the contrary, he considered that pure phenomenological 'seeing' was sufficient to bring the derivative, non-primordial, 'fallen' status of the Aristotelian ontological categories into view. He sought to show that the canons of being and truth presupposed by the Aristotelian tradition, ie. categorial-ousiological being and propositional truth, do not possess the self-evidence commonly attributed to them, and that a genuinely presuppositionless 'seeing' can only come to a halt before Being as 'event' (*Ereignis*) and truth as 'revealing' (*aletheia*). Heidegger was aware that, at this level, there is no

longer any possibility of debate with the tradition and that it is rather a matter of different 'attunements'. But while there are no argumentative procedures which can compel the Aristotelian ontologist to acknowledge attunements as authentically disclosive, this, for Heidegger, does not change the fact that attunements, including a slumbering attunement to Being, are constantly operative in human beings, and that, under certain circumstances, the desired awakening may occur. What has been 'forgotten' is not necessarily ineffective, especially not in the historical situation where Heidegger began his career, in the immediate aftermath of the First World War and in the presence of that 'uncanniest of all guests', the spectre of nihilism.

The preceeding chapters have not attempted to portray the Aristotelian and Heideggerian philosophies as two streamlined and comprehensive alternatives. If the conflict between these two thinkers amounts to a 'battle of the giants', this cannot be understood through a comparison of systems or individual doctrines. Instead, the conflict turns on fundamentally different evaluations of the philosophical ideal of wisdom. In the writings of Aristotle there comes to expression, arguably for the first time and certainly with unprecedented power, an uninhibited self-affirmation of the human intellect. It is this attitude of Aristotle's, with the definitions of truth and being belonging to it, which Heidegger sees as determinative for the whole Western metaphysical tradition and its outcome in technico-scientific civilization. Yet – and this is Heidegger's essential insight - Aristotle could not have had such an enduring influence if his philosophy did not reflect a deeply rooted 'natural attitude' on the part of human beings, the attitude which wants to master the world and take it in hand. In calling this a 'fallen' attitude, Heidegger does not mean to allude to any dogmatic theological postulate, nor to oppose one existential preference to another, but to point to what is phenomenologically evident, namely a realm of Being and truth which simply cannot be mastered or taken in hand.

As to what, in the face of such a realm of primordiality, human beings are to do, Heidegger finds it difficult to say. Caught between metaphysical *Seinsvergessenheit* and the equally inadmissable leap into faith, the Heideggerian *Seinsdenker* inhabits a peculiarly featureless terrain, detached from the things of this world, released from the bonds of affirmative will, wakeful and watchful for a Being which can never come to presence. Human beings must make decisions and act, but it seems that Heidegger offers precious few guidelines in this area, or else guidelines which are so indeterminate that they can justify anything from National Socialist politics to extreme forms of asceticism. On the other hand, Heidegger would say that action must be preceded by reflection on what human beings in essence are, and that precisely this reflection is both absent and needful in contemporary intellectual culture. It would indeed be a grave mistake were we to assume that Heidegger provides us with a 'world-view' in which the answers to our most vital practical questions are somehow implicit. Despite the externally grandiose appearance of Heidegger's philosophical project, its aim is extremely modest by conventional standards, namely to bring thought back to the beginning, to a state not unlike Socratic ignorance. Whether we wish to make this experiment, whether we wish to thus 'go back into the ground of metaphysics', will depend on our level of satisfaction with where we are now. The influence of Heidegger in contemporary thought, however ill-defined, obscure, contradictory and misconceived this may at times be, is testimony to a felt need for a re-examination of the fundamental determinations of our cultural and intellectual values. If Heidegger's confrontation with Aristotle contributes to this overarching task of re-examination, if it opens up problems and lays bare a range of hidden presuppositions, this is enough. Heidegger is certainly not our saviour, but if we take him seriously, he might stimulate us to think in precisely those areas which are most thought-worthy.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1 As Aristotle points out, 'being' is said in many ways. Since this study is concerned *to discover* what 'being' means, especially in Aristotle and Heidegger, the term must initially, and indeed for some time to come, retain a certain ambiguity. I shall speak of 'being', the 'question of being', 'being *qua* being' (Aristotle's expression), sometimes also of 'Being', the capitalization indicating that Heidegger's distinction between Being and 'beings' is in view. When alluding to Heidegger's specific way of understanding the question, I shall frequently leave '*Seinsfrage*' untranslated.

2 This textual evidence will be drawn from freely in what follows. In recent years, this period of Heidegger's career has been opened up by a number of studies, the most important of which are Hugo Ott, *Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie* (Campus Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1988), Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time'* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993), and John van Buren, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994). See also Thomas Sheehan, 'Reading a Life: Heidegger and Hard Times', in Charles Guignon (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993), 70–96, and Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'Erinnerungen an Heideggers Anfänge', *Dilthey Jahrbuch* **4** (1986–87), 13–26.

3 Paul Natorp, *Platons Ideenlehre*, (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1961), 384ff., esp. 462–3.

4 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kemp Smith trans.), B626.

5 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B383–4.

6 The peculiar brand of Karl Jaspers' Kantianism (which is set off very sharply against Neo-Kantianism) can be seen in his *Kant: Leben, Werk, Wirkung* (Piper, Munich, 1975).
7 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B350.
8 By 1923/24 Husserl had himself become vividly conscious of his original affinities with Kantianism. In the supplementary essay on Kant attached to *Erste Philosophie (1923/24)*, he writes: 'Even though the circle of phenomenological investigators may originally have felt itself to be in sharp opposition to Kant's and the post-Kantian school's methods, even though it may with good reasons have rejected the attempts to continue and merely improve Kant in the manner of a renascence . . . nonetheless, now that we see ourselves in broad lines at one with Kant in the essential results of our work, which is systematically arising from the absolutely ultimate sources of all knowledge, we must honor him as the great pre-shaper of scientific transcendental philosophy' (English trans. 'Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy', by Ted Klein and William Pohl, *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* **Vol. 5** (1974), 9-56; the quoted passage is on 13). On the question of being there is, in fact, no mistaking Husserl's resemblances with Kant: 'The being-in-itself of the world is for us nothing other, and can be nothing other, than a sense taking shape subjectively or intersubjectively in our own cognitive achievement' (ibid., 23). In essence, the same view can be found in *Logische Untersuchungen* (Max Niemeyer, Halle, 2nd edition, 1913), Investigation VI, Section 43.
9 Wilhelm Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften* 1 (Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1959), 201-8.
10 G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik* I (Suhrkamp), 13-14.
11 Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik* I, 23. Cf. Aristotle, *Meta.* 982b24-30.
12 Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik* I, 61.
13 Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik* I, 31-33.
14 Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* I, Section 236 (Zusatz).
15 Hegel, *Enzyklopädie* III, Section 577.
16 On Heidegger and Braig, see John Caputo, *Heidegger and Aquinas* (Fordham University Press, New York, 1982), 45-57; Thomas Rentsch, *Martin Heidegger: Das Sein und der Tod* (Piper, Munich, 1989), 32-5.
17 SD 82.
18 Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'Heideggers "theologische" Jugendschrift', 228-31.

19 Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*, 227 ff. The 1921/22 course published in the *Gesamtausgabe* (GA61) as *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles* in fact contains only a few pages directly on Aristotle.

20 The 1926 Marburg lecture-course *Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie* (GA22), published in 1993, covers the Presocratics, Plato and Aristotle. This is also a valuable source, but much of the text is fragmentary (lists of concepts, note-form of presentation etc.).

21 Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'Erinnerungen an Heideggers Anfänge', 21.

22 In his letter of January 9th, 1919, to Engelbert Krebs, the Catholic professor of theology at Freiburg University, Heidegger confessed his abandonment of doctrinal Catholicism. In part, his words were: 'Epistemological insights that pass over into the theory of historical knowledge have made the *system* of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable to me – but not Christianity and metaphysics, although I take the latter in a new sense. . . . It is hard to live as a philosopher -inner truthfulness towards oneself and those one is supposed to teach, demands sacrifice, renunciation and struggles that remain forever foreign to the academic "tradesman"'. Only a few weeks earlier, Heidegger's wife Elfride Petri had written to Krebs: 'My husband has lost his church faith, and I have not found mine . . . . We have read, spoken, thought, and prayed a great deal together, and the result is that both of us now think of ourselves as Protestants - that is: we believe in a personal God and pray to Him, but without any dogmatic ties and apart from Protestant or Catholic theology' (letters translated by Thomas Sheehan, 'Reading a Life: Heidegger and Hard Times', 70 & 72). Thomas Rentsch reports (via Löwith): 'At this time, in his [Heidegger's] cell-like room at the University of Freiburg, an expressionistic painting of the crucifixation hung on the wall. On the writing-desk there stood pictures of Pascal and Dostoyevsky; also on the desk an edition of Luther' (*Martin Heidegger: Das Sein und der Tod*, 74).

23 English translation by Bertram Lee Woolf, 'An Appeal to the Ruling Class of German Nationality as to the Amelioration of the State of Christendom', in John Dillenberger (ed.), *Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings* (Doubleday, New York, 1961), 470. Hans-Georg Gadamer states: 'Luther and Aristotle – this connection is in fact constitutive for Heidegger's thought' ('Erinnerungen an Heideggers Anfänge', 22); see also John van Buren, 'Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther', in Theodore Kisiel

and John van Buren (eds.) *Reading Heidegger from the Start* (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1994), 159-74, and the many references to the Luther-nexus in van Buren's *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King.*

24 The lecture-course has not been published, but has been summarized from original manuscripts by Thomas Sheehan, 'Heidegger's "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion", 1920-21', *Personalist* **60** (1979), 312-24, as well as by Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*, 151-91.

25 Sheehan's summary, 322.

26 Sheehan's summary, 322-3.

27 GA56/57.

28 See the short section 'Die Rezeption der aristotelischen Philosophie' in GA61: 4-9.

29 The scope of the present work does not permit a detailed analysis of Heidegger's relation to Hegel. But it seems to me that, as is also the case with Plato (see Section 5 of this Introduction), Heidegger imposes an unacceptably wholistic Aristotelianism on Hegel, ignoring the latter's Lutheran (and more generally Christian) dimension. When one takes account not only of their common background in theology, but also of their common rejection of 'positivity' (doctrinal dogmatism) in religion, together with Hegel's affinites with such mystical figures as Böhme and Hamann, and his criticism of 'abstract' reason (*Verstand*), there are obviously close resemblances between the two thinkers.

30 This is a convenient place to make some clarificatory remarks on the importance for the present study of Wolfgang Wieland's *Die aristotelische Physik* (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1962). In my view, this is one of the most philosophically challenging books on Aristotle to have appeared in the twentieth century. Although the book has in fact achieved much recognition by scholars, its full significance only emerges when set in a broadly 'Heideggerian' frame of reference. Wieland shows the possibility of a phenomenological reading of the Aristotelian texts, and calls Aristotelian ontology itself 'phenomenology'. Although there are few explicit references to Heidegger in Wieland's book, it is significant that, in the Foreword (9), he thanks Hans-Georg Gadamer and Karl Löwith, both students of Heidegger, for his philosophical education. The value of his interpretation of the *Physics*, however, is that, by holding broader metaphysical questions at a distance, his phenomenological elucidations become more relevant. I see Wieland as providing phenomenological

evidence supporting Heidegger's thesis that Aristotelian ontology is oriented to 'the being of beings' as 'presence'. This does not mean I am taking over Wieland's 'point of view'. While in my own analyses of Aristotelian concepts I make reference to Wieland, and try to proceed in the spirit of Wieland, I regard this not as a 'dependency on Wieland', but as a recognition, with Wieland, that a phenomenological reading of the texts is possible. A valuable discussion of Wieland's book is Ernst Tugendhat's 1963 review article 'Wolfgang Wieland: Die aristotelische Physik', in Tugendhat's *Philosophische Aufsätze* (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1992), 385-401.

31 Wieland (*Die aristotelische Physik*, 34) declares that 'the Aristotle chapter in his [Hegel's] *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* is to this day the best presentation of the Aristotelian philosophy which we possess'. In essence, Hegel considers Aristotle to be the first thinker (working from Plato's prior achievements in dialectic) to have uncovered 'the concept' in its true 'speculative' significance (see *Vorlesungen* II, 147).

32 On the fate of Hegel's philosophy during this period (also in relation to Heidegger), see Gadamer's two essays 'Hegel's Philosophy and its Aftereffects until Today', and 'The Heritage of Hegel', in Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science* (MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1981), 21-68.

33 Hegel's explicit critique of Kantianism is to be found in the Introduction to *Wissenschaft der Logik*, in the first part (*Logik*) of the *Enzyklopädie*, Sections 40-60, and in the chapter on Kant in the *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*. While a summary discussion of Hegel's criticism of Kant cannot be attempted here, the matter can be put in an extremely abbreviated way as follows. Kant restricted knowledge to 'appearance', which then became, simultaneously and in different senses, 'subjective' and 'objective'. Kant claimed to 'know' that the Thing-in-itself is unknowable, but how, asks Hegel, can he 'know' this, and how can he 'know' about the faculties of the understanding, if this gulf between Being and appearance is maintained? Kantianism (the same applies to later Neo-Kantianism) was uncritical and lax in constantly equivocating in respect of 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity', ie. in treating the latter as the former, but all the while insisting that Being-in-itself can in no way be comprehended. Again, the laxity of Kantianism could be seen from the laughably non-commital character of the 'concepts of pure reason'. As Hegel put it in *Wissenschaft der Logik* (39): 'If one credited a man with genuine insight, but added that he was

capable only of seeing untruths, not truths, this would be just as perverse as true knowledge which does not know the object as it is in itself'. For Hegel's conviction that philosophical thinking must start from and remain with Being, see Section 86 (Zusatz) of the *Enzyklopädie*.

34 The book was a gift (around 1907) from Heidegger's 'fatherly friend' Conrad Gröber, later Catholic archbishop of Freiburg (US 92).

35 On the signifiance of Brentano's book for Heidegger's approach to Aristotle, see Franco Volpi, 'Heideggers Verhältnis zu Brentanos Aristoteles-Interpretation: Die Frage nach dem Sein des Seienden', *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* **21** (1978), 254-65.

36 SD 82.

37 SD 86-7.

38 Giovanni Reale, *The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the 'Metaphysics' of Aristotle* (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1980), 456.

39 Reale, *The Concept of First Philosophy*, 16.

40 For a discussion of philology versus philosophy in the interpretation of Aristotle, see Wieland, *Die aristotelische Physik*, 27-8.

41 Paul Natorp, 'Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen Metaphysik', *Philosophische Monatsheft* **24** (1888), 37-65, 540-74.

42 Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1963), 469.

43 Owens, *The Doctrine of Being*, xxii.

44 Owens, *The Doctrine of Being*, xxiii.

45 Eg. N II 222 & 225.

46 Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* **II**, 133, 147-48.

47 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B370.

48 Ernst Cassirer, *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* I (Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 1955), 125.

49 Cassirer, *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* III (Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 1957), 453.

50 Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* **II**, 62-86.

51 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Heideggers Wege* (J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1983), 134-5.

52 *Plato's Dialectical Ethics: Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to the Philebus* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1991).

53 See Gadamer's essay 'Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task', in *Reason and the Age of Science*, 113-38.

54 The only exception is my discussion of Heidegger's treatment of

the Platonic *to agathon*, in Ch. II. 5.

55 The most important texts are 'Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)', 'Moira (Parmenides, Fragment VIII, 34-41)', 'Aletheia (Heraklit, Fragment 16)', all in VA 199-274; 'Der Spruch des Anaximander', HW 317-68; GA51 94-123 (on Anaximander); GA54 (Parmenides); GA55 (Heraclitus); EM 71-157 (Heraclitus and Parmenides).

56 Inspired by Heidegger is Eugen Fink's *Grundfragen der antiken Philosophie*, edited by Franz-A. Schwarz (Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg, 1985). Wolfgang Schadewaldt's unsurpassed *Die Anfänge der Philosophie bei den Griechen* (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1978) is significantly indebted to Heidegger.

57 GA33: 18-19.

CHAPTER I

1 The first sentence of *Sein und Zeit* reads 'This question [*die Frage nach dem Sein*] has today been forgotten (*ist in Vergessenheit gekommen*)'. Cf. GA31: 42: 'We begin our existence with such a forgetfulness of the understanding of Being (*Vergessenheit des Seinsverständnisses*), and the more we open ourselves to beings, the deeper becomes the forgetfulness of this one thing, that we in all openness to beings understand Being (*daß wir in aller Offenheit für Seiendes Sein verstehen*)'; EM 15: 'Being as such is precisely hidden from metaphysics, and remains forgotten (*in der Vergessenheit bleibt*) and so radically that the forgetfulness of Being, which itself falls into forgetfulness, is the unknown but enduring impetus to metaphysical questioning'.

2 Heraclitus, from Fr. 1: 'Of the *logos* which is as I describe it men always prove to be uncomprehending, both before they have heard it and when once they have heard it . . . men fail to notice what they do after they wake up just as they forget what they do when asleep'; from Fr. 2: 'Although the *logos* is common the many (*hoi polloi*) live as though they had a private understanding'; Parmenides, from Fr. 6: 'Mortals wander knowing nothing, two-headed; for helplessness guides the wandering thought in their breasts, and they are carried along, deaf and blind at once, dazed, undiscriminating hordes, who believe that to be and not to be are the same; and the path taken by them all is backward turning' (all in G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983).

3 GA33: 20. The first part (3-48) of these 1931 Freiburg lectures provides in many ways the best introduction to and overview of Heidegger's Aristotle interpretation.

4 For the most part, this is not doubted to the present day. W. V. O. Quine, the most influential neo-positivist of recent times, sees ontology as the study of 'what there is'. See the essay 'On What There Is', in his collection *From a Logical Point of View: 9 Logico-Philosophical Essays* (Harper & Row, New York, 1963).
5 What Heidegger means by 'attunement' is discussed at greater length in Ch. III. 3 below.
6 SZ 25.; cf. GA21: 190.
7 Ch. III. 1-2.
8 Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian 'Metaphysics'* (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1951), 137.
9 Owens, *The Doctrine of Being*, 148-9.
10 As Giovanni Reale pertinently remarks, *Plato and Aristotle* (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1990), 277: 'Substance is the most delicate, the most complex, and in a certain sense, also the most enigmatic problem – all who wish to understand Aristotelian metaphysics must reject summary solutions to which the systematizing text books have habituated them.' See the comments on the translation of '*ousia*' (with reference to Owens) by Mary Louise Gill, *Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ., 1989), 13, n. 2.
11 Owens, *The Doctrine of Being*, 151 & n. 62. A valuable discussion of Plato's use of '*ousia*' can be found in Christopher Stead, *Divine Substance* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977), 25-54.
12 Owens, *The Doctrine of Being*, 144-6.
13 GA33: 45.
14 Wolfgand Wieland, *Die aristotelische Physik* (Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1962), 110-40.
15 On the centrality of the *tode ti*, see Werner Marx, *The Meaning of Aristotle's 'Ontology'* (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1954), 39-45; Mary Louise Gill, *Aristotle on Substance*, 31-4.
16 See in particular Wieland, *Die aristotelische Physik*, 141-61.
17 See eg. *Gen. Corr.* 318b,23; cf. Plato, *Republic* 477a.
18 Nietzsche, for example, can profitably be read in this way. Though not under this name, he undertakes a 'critique of the categories' in respect of the primordial phenomenon of 'life' ('the Dionysian').
19 *Meta.*1037a,10-14: 'Whether there is, apart from the matter of such [sensible] *ousiai*, any other substance, and one should look for some *ousia* other than these, eg. numbers or something of the sort, must be considered later. For it is for the sake of this that we are trying to determine the nature of perceptible *ousiai*'.
20 Giovanni Reale, *The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of*

the 'Metaphysics' of Aristotle (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1980), 301: 'Book VII, therefore, aims to speak first of substance in general just in order to resolve the problem of transcendence'.

21 Wieland, *Die aristotelische Physik*, 13–14.

22 Wieland, *Die aristotelische Physik*, 245: 'To a great degree, the specificity and meaning of Aristotelian physics consists in the fact that here for the first time there is an attempt to provide a theory not of nature in general (*phusis*) but of the natural thing (*phusei on*). The idea of a universal context of nature is, to be sure, not completely eliminated. But it is very significant that where this context becomes relevant, above all in *Phys.* VIII, it is developed strictly on the basis of the *phusei on*'. Heidegger frequently alludes to a 'more primordial *phusis*' which shows itself in Presocratic philosophy. Eg. EM 11: 'What does the word "*phusis*" denote? It denotes self-blossoming emergence (eg. the blossoming of a rose), opening up, unfolding, that which manifests itself in such unfolding and preserves and endures in it . . . . According to the dictionary *phuein* means to make and grow . . . *Phusis* is Being itself (*das Sein selbst*) by virtue of which beings become and remain observable . . . . The Greeks did not learn what *phusis* is through natural phenomena, but the other way around: it was through a fundamental poetic and thinking experience of Being that they discovered what they had to call *phusis*'; 'Vom Wesen und Begriff der *Phusis*', WM 240: 'This first thoughtful and unified conceptualization of *phusis* [Aristotle's *Physics*] is already the last echo of the original (and thus supreme) thoughtful projection of the Being of *phusis* as this is still preserved for us in the fragments of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides'.

23 See Wieland, *Die aristotelische Physik*, 292f.

24 Francis Conford, in the 'Introduction' to his (Loeb) translation of the *Physics*, comments (xxii): 'Aristotle attempts to give precision to the plain man's conceptions, to release him from confusions into which the ambiguities and imperfections of language may have betrayed him, to teach him to hold the thread of a continuous argument, to grapple with familiar but baffling concepts such as "time", "cause", "infinity", until he sees them steadily'.

25 Plotinus, *The Enneads*, III. 7. 9.

26 Franz Brenano, *Philosophical Investigations of Space, Time, and the Continuum* (Croom Helm, London, 1988), 50.

27 Paul Conen, *Die Zeittheorie des Aristoteles* (C. H. Beck Verlag, Munich, 1964), 172.

28 WM 258: 'This expression "being-ness" (*Seiendheit*), which hardly sounds elegant in ordinary language, is the only adequate translation for *ousia*'; see also WM 373; N I 459; N II 211; GA31: 50, 61-2.

29 GA31: 52.

30 It is interesting to note the criterion Plato gives, at one point of the *Sophist* dialogue, for the being not just of sensible things, but of qualities like 'justice': in the words of the Eleatic Stranger (247a) 'that which is capable of becoming present or absent exists (*paragignesthai kai apogignesthai pantos einai*)'. At this stage the Stranger is arguing against the materialists, who 'maintain that nothing which they cannot squeeze with their hands has any existence at all' (247c). If the materialists can be brought to admit that the capacity for presence or absence is the criterion of being, they will have to give up their materialism, for 'do they not say that each soul becomes just by the possession and presence of justice, and the opposite by the possession and presence of the opposite?' (247a). But the argument also works the other way around: the idealists will likewise have to admit that sensible things, in so far as they can become present or absent, have a kind of being.

31 GA31: 58 ff.

32 GA31: 61.

33 'Vom Wesen und Begriff der *Phusis*', WM 267.

34 GA31: 71.

35 According to Heidegger, the basic achievement of Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* is that 'therein ontology as *metaphysica generalis* . . . is provided with a foundation and, for the first time, revealed for what it is in itself' (KPM 25-6). Within the pre-Kantian school concept of metaphysics, *metaphysica generalis* had tried to abstract the nature of Being from the various particular types of beings dealt with by *metaphysica specialis* in its three branches theology, cosmology, and psychology. In Heidegger's view, Kant reformed *metaphysica generalis* through his insight into the priority of ontological (transcendental) vis-a-vis ontical (factual-empirical) knowledge.

36 WM 284-85.

37 In *Metaphysics* VII and VIII Aristotle resolves the composite into matter and form. The relevance of the potentiality/actuality (*dunamis/energeia*) couplet emerges in Book IX when he comes to consider in what senses matter and form can be said 'to be'. Bronze, for example, may be the matter of a statue, and in this sense bronze is potentially a statue, ie. it has the positive capacity

to receive the form of a statue. Different kinds of matter have different capacities to receive forms (eg. coins cannot be made out of earth or wood) but every kind of matter, *qua* matter, 'is' in this mode of potentiality. The composite thing, on the other hand, is the actualization of the potentiality inherent in the matter, through the determination of a specific form. Now of course, it may seem unreasonable to say that the statue exists 'actually' whereas the bronze exists in the manner of mere 'potentiality': after all, the statue is potentially a melted down lump of bronze, and the original bronze is itself a tangible entity. Further, a lump of bronze partakes of the form bronzehood and in this sense is already 'actual'. Aristotle indicates (1049a,24-25) that if there is a matter which is not so pre-formed it could be called 'prime matter' (*prote hule*), but it is doubtful whether he believes in such a thing (see Mary Louise Gill, *Aristotle on Substance*, 42-6). The 'unknowability' of matter, asserted on several occasions (eg. *Meta.* 1036a,9), would seem to support the notion (for bronze, wood, and the like are certainly knowable via their forms), but on the other hand, Aristotle also maintains that the four elements (earth, fire, water, air) are the irreducible constituents of physical reality, a view which is more consistent with the ontological primacy of the *tode ti*. In any case, 'proximate' matter (wood, bronze etc.) still 'has being' in the mode of potentiality, whereas the composite (the bedstead, the statue), in so far as the form is actualized within it, is what Aristotle calls (1047a,30) 'fulfillment' (*entelechia*). The composite is in this sense the unity of potentiality and actuality: the former as the source, the latter as the goal of a process of actualization (coming into being).

It is clear why Aristotle considers this as a distinct sense of being alongside the categories. For these latter, limited as they are to the what-ness of a thing, do not account for its nature as energy and efficacy, they do not reach the 'real-ness' of a thing as result of a *process*. The concepts of potentiality and actuality reflect the dynamism of Aristotelian ontology over against the simple self-identity of the Platonic ideas, indicating that, for Aristotle, being is fulfillment, coming-into-being, activity. There can be no equivalent in Platonism because there the ideas, as eternal self-abiding entities, are the only vehicles through which sensible reality can be known. When Aristotle, on the other hand, grounds his ontology precisely in this sensible realm, it is not enough to make the analytical distinction between form and matter; he must show how these combine to produce a real

– not just a conceptual – outcome. Nevertheless, potentiality and actuality do not represent any departure by Aristotle from his fundamental ousiological approach to ontology, for what possesses 'fulfillment' in actualization is still a 'thing' (*tode ti*) specifiable through a definite what-content. In this sense the general structure of categoriality is also maintained: a 'subject' (*ousia*) has various 'predicates' (qualities in the broad sense), but the being of these latter must now be understood dynamically, in accordance with the changeability definitive of the physical world.

38 Eg. ID 107ff.; WM 373.

39 See eg. N II 347-49; ID 128, 139; GA26: 11.

40 A physicist does not need to be a 'physicalist', and may, philosophically speaking, be 'theological'; similarly a biologist does not need to develop a 'biologistic' approach to philosophy, nor a psychologist a 'psychologistic' approach etc.

41 SG 90.

42 SZ 38-9. Heidegger continues: 'If we may allude to some earlier researches on the analysis of Being, incomparable on their own level, we may compare the ontological sections of Plato's *Parmenides* or the fourth chapter of the seventh book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* with a narrative section from Thucydides; we can see the altogether unprecedented character of those formulations which were imposed upon the Greeks by their philosophers. And where our powers are essentially weaker, and where moreover the area of Being to be disclosed is ontologically far more difficult than that which was presented to the Greeks, the harshness of our expression will be enhanced'.

43 SZ 68

44 GA29/30: 262-3: 'In *Sein und Zeit* I attempted an initial characterization of the *world-phenomenon* through an interpretation of the way in which we *daily, proximally and for the most part, move in our world* . . . . From and through this first characterization of the world-phenomenon it was a matter of pressing forward to the demonstration of the world-phenomenon as a problem. But through this interpretation it never occurred to me to maintain and prove that the nature of man consists in using a spoon and fork and travelling on the street-car'; 'Vom Wesen des Grundes', WM 153-4 (note 55): 'If one identifies the ontical contexture of tools, of equipment, with the world, and interprets being-in-the-world as the employment of tools, then any understanding of transcendence as being-in-the-world in the sense of a "basic constitution of *Dasein*" is forfeited. To be sure,

the ontological structure of "environmental" (*umweltlich*) beings – in so far as they are uncovered as equipment – has the advantage of preparing for and leading into the transcendental problem of the world'.

45 GA24: 234.

46 GA24: 235.

47 SZ 96

48 SZ 102-3.

49 Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* (Max Niemeyer Verlag, Halle, 1922), Sections 27 & 28.

50 Husserl does not himself call the intentional object the 'in-itself', preferring to say that with the 'phenomenological reduction' the question of 'reality' is 'bracketed'. However, as indicated in the Introduction, Husserl eventually came to recognize his position as essentially Kantian: the *Ding-an-sich* is indeed 'bracketed', but then 'appearance' or 'transcendental ideality' comes to mean 'objectivity' in that peculiar sense criticized by Hegel. As far as Husserl is concerned, Heidegger's *Existenzanalytik*, by abandoning the 'objectivities' of transcendental ideality, becomes 'subjective' and 'anthropological'. See Husserl's essay 'Phenomenology and Anthropology', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 2 (1941), 1-14 (1931 Berlin lecture, reprinted in Peter McCormick and Frederick Elliston, eds., *Husserl: Shorter Works*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1981, 315-23). Husserl says on the one hand that '*The* world and its existence is always obvious, is always an unexpressed presupposition', but adds that 'As an ego I am not this man in the existing world, but the [transcendental] ego which questions the existence of the world . . . the ego which still has its universal experience but has bracketed its existential validity' (McCormick & Elliston, 318). For Heidegger, on the other hand, such 'bracketing' means that 'world' is occluded. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology wants to get back to the pure 'look' (*eidos*) of the world, whereas Heidegger considers that the 'reality' of the world is not at all given in its 'look', but rather in its existential significance, in the 'project' of being-in-the-world.

51 SZ 63; GA24: 240.

52 SZ 46. For Heidegger's response to the charge of subjectivism, see in particular GA49: 67-75. Section 11 (26-75) of these lectures is especially interesting for its general defense and explanation of the problematic of SZ.

53 SZ 61

54 GA63: 16-19.
55 SD 5-6.
56 SZ 133.
57 SD 32.
58 SD 5.
59 ID 132-3.
60 SD 10.
61 SD 8-9.
62 SG 185.
63 GA51: 49ff.
64 Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, 82-115.
65 'Was ist Metaphysik?', WM 119.
66 Parmenides Fr. 2, in G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983).
67 EM 1.
68 'Was ist Metaphysik?', HW 113.
69 'Was ist Metaphysik?', HW 120.

CHAPTER II

1 Wolfgang Wieland, *Die Aristotelische Physik* (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1962), 14. For Heidegger (GA65: 423) 'Meta-physics is the justification of the "physics" of beings'.
2 The translation of '*ta sugkechumena*' as 'confused masses' is from Hardie and Gaye (in Mckeon). Wieland (*Die aristotelische Physik*, 86) translates the term as '*das Zusammengegossene*', Heidegger (GA19: 87) as '*das Zusammengeschüttete*', both of which could be approximately rendered in English as 'the thrown together'.
3 *Meta.* 993a12-15: 'All men seem to seek the causes named in the *Physics* . . . but they seek them vaguely; and although in a sense they have all been described before, in a sense they have not been described at all'.
4 Heidegger (GA19: 88) explains the matter thus: 'When we encounter a body in immediate perception, its *archai* are not actually given, but they are there, still covered up, in the *aisthesis*. That confirms what we have seen in *Meta.* VII. 3 [1029b8ff]: beings, in so far as they are given in *aisthesis*, where they are most proximally knowable, have little or nothing of being . . . . Presence is not yet uncovered and grasped.'
5 Wieland, *Die Aristotelische Physik*, 143.
6 *Eudemian Ethics* 1216b33-35: 'For by advancing from true but obscure judgements we will arrive at clear ones, always exchanging the usual confused statements for more real knowledge'.

7 On the widespread tendency to exaggerate the 'deductivist' side of Aristotle, see Wieland, *Die Aristotelische Physik*, 41-3. As Hegel notes in his *Enzyklopädie* Section 183 (Zusatz), 'Aristotle was the first to observe and describe the different forms, or, as they are called, figures of syllogism, in their subjective meaning: and he performed this work so exactly and surely, that no essential addition has ever been required. But while sensible of the value of what he has thus done, we must not forget that the forms of the syllogism of understanding, and of finite thought altogether, are not what Aristotle has made use of in his proper philosophical investigations'.

8 W. D. Ross (*Aristotle*, Methuen, London, 1964, 57) remarks that 'Aristotle does little to show how it [dialectic] can aid us in the study of the sciences' and that 'the statement that the first principles of a science are approached by way of dialectic is nowhere brought into relation with the other statement that they are approached by induction'. Referring to Aristotle's claim in the *Posterior Analytics* (100b4) that 'the method by which sense perception implants the universal is inductive', Ross concludes that perception is the most important way through which first principles are established, though he also acknowledges that in all sciences 'unanalysable universals' are required which cannot be arrived at in this way. The inadequacy of such an empiricist interpretation of Aristotelian induction is shown in G. E. L. Owen's essay '*Tithenai ta Phainomena*', in Jonathon Barnes et. al. (eds.), *Articles on Aristotle*, Vol. I, *Science* (Duckworth, London, 1975), 113-26. Owen's judgement (116) that 'the *Physics* ranks itself not with physics, in our sense of the word, but with philosophy. Its data are for the most part the materials not of natural history but of dialectic, and its problems are accordingly not questions of empirical fact but conceptual puzzles' is entirely in line with Wieland, as with the present study. At bottom, the defects of Ross's position can be put down to his failure, characteristic of empiricism, to observe a distinction between ontological and ontico-factual inquiry. This distinction is also missed by Terence Irwin, who claims (*Aristotle's First Principles*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, 16-18) that Aristotle has no satisfactory reply to the objection that the *endoxa* to which dialectical reasoning is confined could give way to 'better theories'; at most, Irwin contends, dialectic can bring common-sense 'beliefs' into a coherent whole, but coherence does not imply 'correspondence with reality'. By ignoring the conceptual limits on the possibility of theory-construction, Irwin

misses the ontological dimension of the Aristotelian philosophy. The idea that one can cheerfully 'theorize' in whatever way one wishes seems to be endemic in contemporary philosophy, and is linked either to a conception of truth as 'correspondence with reality' or else relativism (not infrequently both, when correspondence is held to be epistemologically unascertainable). One then has to say that there are no *a priori* (ontological) principles which guarantee that 'the man becomes musical' is a sensible proposition, whereas 'musical becomes the man' is not: these would just be different 'theories' about the world. This way of thinking provides a quick exit from philosophy, as can be seen in the work of the American neo-positivist W. V. O. Quine. He begins with an *act of faith* which he calls 'taking science seriously' and ends up with what is in essence an ousiological ontology, only now it has become, as a 'theoretical posit', philosophically undiscussable.

9 In the entry for 'dialectic' in his *Greek Philosophical Terms* (New York University Press, New York, 1967), F. E. Peters says (37): 'Aristotle abandons the central ontological role given to dialectic in Plato's *Republic*; he is concerned,instead, with the operations of the mind that culminate in demonstration (*apodeixis*). Dialectic is not strict demonstration in that it does not begin with premises that are true and primary, but from opinions (*endoxa*) that are accepted by the majority or the wise. The irony of this distinction is, of course, that Aristotle's own procedure is most frequently what he has described as "dialectical"'. Peters can only find this situation ironic because he understands *endoxa* in the propositional mode, as 'opinions' or 'beliefs'. Peters and many others cannot get away from the idea that philosophical thinking must proceed from premises/propositions, and for this reason he overestimates the role of 'apodictic' reasoning.

10 Wieland, *Die aristotelische Physik*, 145, in profound (though unstated) agreement with Heidegger, calls Aristotelian research into principles a 'phenomenological illumination of the natural attitude'. At the same time, Wieland stresses (148) that Aristotle does not undertake a 'philosophy of language'. In the *Physics*, as in the central books of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle proceeds from our pre-ontological knowledge of sensible things. It would be impossible, merely from the structure of language itself, to arrive at the concepts of form, matter, the composite, the movable thing, time, place, the continuum etc. The formal structure of language must be filled with content to bring forth specific ontological concepts. It remains true, however, that this formal

structure defines the limits of possible content. The mere appeal to experiential content does not suffice to acquit a thinker of obscurantism; on the contrary, the obscurantists are often the ones who make this appeal most vociferously. What distinguishes the clear thinker (the philosopher) from the obscurantist is the recognition that realities conform to certain laws of sayability. Aristotle sees these laws as embodied first and foremost in the structure of the proposition. For Heidegger, on the other hand, this is too narrow an interpretation of sayability.

11 This is characteristic of the Quinean school with its denial of the 'analtyic/synthetic' distinction, ie. definitions are understood as items of 'theory'.

12 In the *Enzyklopädie*, Section 142 (Zusatz), Hegel comments: 'In that vulgar conception of actuality which mistakes for it what is palpable and directly obvious to the senses, we must seek the ground of a widespread prejudice about the relation of the philosophy of Aristotle to that of Plato. Popular opinion takes the difference to be as follows. While Plato recognizes the idea and only the idea as the truth, Aristotle, rejecting the idea, keeps to what is actual, and is on that account to be considered the founder and chief of empiricism. On this it may be remarked; that although actuality certainly is the principle of the Aristotelian philosophy, it is not the vulgar actuality of what is immediately at hand, but the idea as actuality'.

13 Eg. GA21: 135; SZ 33.

14 EM 142.

15 SZ 36: 'Whenever a phenomenological concept is drawn from primordial sources, there is a possibility that it may degenerate if communicated in the form of an assertion. It gets understood in an empty way and is thus passed on, losing its indigenous character, and becoming a free-floating thesis'.

16 See also *Meta.* 1026b,15 and *NE.* 1139b,34.

17 SZ 217-18.

18 GA19: 15-16; see also SZ 222.

19 For a review of the etymological controversy, see Robert Bernasconi, *The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being*, Humanities Press International, Atlantic Highlands, NJ., 1985, 19-26.

20 *Po An.* 87b,28-32: ' Nor can one understand through perception. For even if perception is of what is such and such, and not of individuals, still one necessarily perceives an individual and at a place and at a time, and it is impossible to perceive what is universal and holds in every case'.

21 SZ 213. The same ontological usage of *aletheia* and its cognates can be found in Plato; eg. *Sophist* 240b, 246b.

22 GA19: 186-7.

23 See Heidegger's criticism of the philological procedures of Jaeger and Ross in GA31 82-91. In Ross's English translation, '*kuriotata*' is simply struck out of the text, which now reads: 'The terms "being" and "non-being" are employed firstly with reference to the categories, and secondly with reference to the potency or actuality of these or their non-potency or non-actuality, and thirdly [instead of "most strictly"] in the sense of true and false' (*Meta.* 1051a,34-b,2). The Loeb translation by Hugh Tredennick has 'also' instead of 'thirdly', but puts 'in the strictest sense' in parentheses, with the note 'This appears to contradict VI. iv. 3. But it is just possible to interpret "*kuriotata*" (with Jaeger) as "in the commonest sense"'.

24 GA31: 106.

25 GA31: 87-108; GA21: 170-190.

26 GA31: 102.

27 GA31: 105.

28 That 'truth' has an ontological as well as an epistemological meaning in Aristotle is noted by Giovanni Reale, *The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the Metaphysics of Aristotle* (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1980). Referring to *Meta.* 993b20, he comments (40): 'The "truth" of things coincides with the being of things; the supreme truth is the supreme reason or the primary cause of things. It is evident that the *aletheia* which Aristotle is here considering is "ontological truth"'. See also Reale's note 114 (58-9). However, the difficulty of distinguishing ontological and epistemological truth is already apparent in such an ancient commentator as Alexander of Aphrodisias. Commenting on *Metaphysics* 2, Alexander says at one point that 'one who philosophizes about the truth must know the things that are true in the greatest degree, for they are the causes of the things that exist because of them. Now that which is cause of the fact that other things too are true is true in the greatest degree . . . . For each of the things that exist participates in truth to the extent that it participates in being, for what is false is certainly non-being' (147, 6-12). Yet a little later he says 'Truth does not have reference to things in themselves (for the truth is not in things), but is the knowledge of the way in which each thing has being' (148, 16-17). This inconsistency is noted by the editor and translator William Dooley (Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle Metaphysics 2 & 3*, Duckworth, London, 1992), who

points out (note 49) that Alexander 'might have recalled his own statement in his commentary of Book I, where, combining two texts from Aristotle, he says "as if things themselves and the truth in them were showing men the way"'. This latter statement provides a good way of understanding Aristotle's notion of 'knowability by nature': ontological truth (true being, knowable and clear by nature) 'shows the way', but does not deliver itself over to human comprehension without arduous training and concentration; indeed it is true being which 'does the training'.

29 GA19: 206.

30 GA19: 224-5.

31 GA20: 155-6. Elsewhere in the same lectures (139) Heidegger says: 'In this way, and notwithstanding his constant warnings against "psychologism", Husserl links phenomenology with the "psychical" or "mental": the *a priori* structures of intentionality are taken as structures of transcendental consciousness, ultimately of the Cartesian *res cogitans*'. And in his 1928 Marburg lectures: 'every act of directing oneself toward something receives the characteristic of knowing', so that 'all intentionality is first a cognitive intending, upon which all other modes of active relation to beings are later built' (GA26: 169).

32 To be noted is that Heidegger's critique of the ousiological character of the Aristotelian *logos* has nothing to do with what contemporary postmodernist writers intend with their attack on 'logocentrism'. What the postmodernists understand under this heading is really essentialism, which they criticize on account of its alleged 'totalization' and 'closure' of discourse. That the reality or being of a thing should be given by its essence, accessible through an epistemologically privileged intuition, is taken as dogmatic, for, it is said, a thing can be described in many ways. A superficial resemblance to Heidegger arises when these same authors say that a thing cannot, through its purported essence, be brought to pure 'presence', divested of otherness or difference. But this is an epistemological definition of 'presence', quite unlike its ontological meaning in Heidegger as the way of being of the *tode ti*, the 'subject' (*hupokeimenon*) of the proposition. Heidegger has no objection to Platonic-Aristotelian essentialism at the level of 'beings': in his view, all ontic-factual inquiry presupposes the ontological clarification of its region of beings (regional ontology) and to this extent is essentialist. This does not, as the postmodernists think, amount to dogmatism, but is only to recognize that the things themselves have a certain logic, which, if thought is not to degenerate into babbling, must be respected.

At bottom, the postmodernists criticize 'logocentrism' because of their resentment of philosophical authority; not surprisingly, these writers have little taste for Heidegger's *Seinsfrage*, the 'obligatory' character of which offends and provokes them.

33 GA20: 152.

34 See in particular 'Die Frage nach dem Technik', VA 9-40.

35 'Wozu Dichter', HW 285: 'The unconditioned establishment of the unconditional self-assertion by which the world is purposely made over according to the frame of mind of man's command is a process that emerges from the hidden nature of technology. Only in modern times does this nature begin to unfold as a destiny of the truth of all beings as a whole; until now, its scattered appearances and attempts had remained incorporated within the embracing structure of the realm of culture and civilization'.

36 'Wozu Dichter?', HW 283-4.

37 'Wozu Dichter?', HW 307.

38 In view of the Christian significance of 'factical life-experience' for the early Heidegger, it is noteworthy that the Church Fathers frequently charged Aristotelianism and Greek metaphysics in general with arrogance and hubris. Further to this, see Ch. III. 5.

39 Eg. 'Die Frage nach dem Technik', VA 21: 'Man does not dispose over the unhiddenness wherein the real shows itself or withdraws. That since Plato the real has shown itself in the light of the ideas, Plato himself has not brought about. The thinker has only brought himself into correspondence with that which spoke to him'.

40 'Die Frage nach dem Technik', VA 20.

41 The 1919 lectures (GA56/57), as well as the lectures from 1919/20 (GA58) and 1920 (GA59), are in their entirety a critique of the Neo-Kantianism of Natorp, Rickert, and Windelband. To related purposes are the two *Anhänge* of the 1921/22 lectures (GA61: 157-99). These recently published materials are of the greatest importance for understanding the original motivations of Heidegger's philosophical activity. Nowhere else does Heidegger deal in such detail with the epistemological problematics of modern philosophy, and nowhere else does he discuss his contemporaries at comparable length. It is clear that at no stage was Heidegger an orthodox Husserlian, but that his distinctive existential appropriation of phenomenology was already in force by 1919.

42 GA56/57: 87

43 GA56/57: 89-94.

44 GA56/57: 69. Against the Neo-Kantians, Heidegger maintains that the world's 'givenness' does not reduce to its status as an 'object of valuation': the world does not first of all become 'accessible' in acts of valuation, but instead these latter are subsequent to the 'having' of the world through 'care' (*Sorge*).

45 GA56/57: 75.

46 The concept 'factical life' is developed in the lectures GA58: 25-128; GA61: 79-155; GA63: 67-104. For discussion, see Carl Friedrich Gethmann, 'Philosophie als Vollzug und als Begriff: Heideggers Identitätsphilosophie des Lebens in der Vorlesung vom Wintersemester 1921/22 und ihr Verhältnis zu *Sein und Zeit*', and Theodore Kisiel, 'Das Entstehen des Begriffsfeldes "Faktzität" im Frühwerk Heideggers', both in *Dilthey Jahrbuch* 4 (1986-87), 27-53, 91-120. The *Seinsfrage*, though as yet unformulated, is never far from the surface; eg. GA63: 2: 'Although traditional ontology claims to be occupied with the universal determinations of Being, it has a particular region of beings (*Seinsbezirk*) in view. In modern terminology ontology means a theory of objects (*Gegendstandstheorie*)'.

47 'Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers "Psychologie der Weltanschauungen"', WM 1-44; Heinrich Rickert, 'Psychologie der Weltanschauungen und Philosophie der Werte', *Logos* IX (1920/21), 1-42.

48 GA59: 165. See comments to similar effect in GA61: 80-1 and GA63: 108.

49 At the beginning of his analysis of *Dasein*'s historicity in SZ (377), Heidegger remarks: 'The researches of Dilthey were, for the most part, pioneering work; but today's generation has not yet made them its own. In the following analysis the issue is solely one of furthering their adoption'. See also the appreciative discussion of Dilthey in GA59: 155-68.

50 SZ 38

51 Against the common exaggeration of the 'turning', Heidegger's words in the 'Brief über den Humanismus' (WM 325) should be noted: 'This turning is not a change of standpoint from *Sein und Zeit*, but through it the attempted thought first of all arrives in the region of the dimension out of which *Sein und Zeit* is experienced'.

52 It seems that, for the later Heidegger, poetry takes over what in *Sein und Zeit* (220) is described as the 'ultimate business of philosophy', which is 'to preserve the force of the most elemental words in which *Dasein* expresses itself'. Heidegger sets off poetry against that propositional form of speech to

which Aristotelian philosophy binds itself. The *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* deal with what Aristotle sees as secondary dimensions of language, dependent on the revealing which has already occurred in the categorial proposition. For Heidegger, this shows that language is reduced by Aristotle (then by the whole tradition of scientific-theoretical philosophy) to its role in communicating information about beings already known and named. Poetry, on the other hand, or at least the 'primordial' kind of poetry Heidegger has in mind (the main example is Hölderlin, others are Goethe, Rilke, Trakl), is the original 'naming' (*Nennen*) and 'saying' (*Sagen*) of beings. What is unclear, however, and what makes this side of Heidegger's thought so questionable, is the purported *essential* link between poetry and the *Seinsfrage*. *Prima facie*, the 'naming' of beings is not the same as thinking of Being, moreover, this 'naming' occurs in science as much as in poetry. It is noteworthy that Heidegger's writings on poetry have been most enthusiastically received by those (the postmodernists) who want nothing to do with the *Seinsfrage* and who value poetry primarily as 'non-dogmatic' discourse. While Heidegger would certainly not approve the underlying relativistic intentions of these authors, it is unclear, just from his writings on poetry, how the primordial saying of the poet is to be distinguished from non-primordial saying, or indeed, from babble. For poetry to be relevant to the *Seinsfrage*, it would presumably be necessary that not only 'beings' get named and come into view as what they are, but that 'Being' ('worldhood') itself gets illuminated. It is one thing to say that a painting by Van Gogh of a pair of old shoes discloses the 'world of the peasant' or that a Greek temple discloses the 'world of the Greeks', quite another to say that these works disclose 'worldhood' as such, in the sense this term has in *Sein und Zeit*. In the essay 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes', where these examples appear, 'world' (*Welt*) seems to mean what in *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger calls 'environment' (*Umwelt*), and this, as noted in the previous chapter, gives only a precursory notion of the fully ontological 'worldhood of the world' (*Weltlichkeit der Welt*). Every art critic is aware that the 'being' of a Greek statue is not given by its outward appearance as it stands in the corner of some museum. But if this is so, if this is the way that works of art are 'world-disclosive', then Heidegger's thesis of universal *Weltvergessenheit* would be unsustainable. Walter Benjamin did not need Heidegger's *Seinsfrage* in order to argue that, in the 'age of mechanical reproduction', the 'aura' of the work of art can easily be lost. Presumably also, the contemporary concern to

recontextualize art, to capture some inkling of the 'aura' of works of art, is not necessarily an awakening to the *Seinsfrage*. It seems that we must already have some understanding of Heidegger's 'truth of Being', in order then to recognize it in a poem by Hölderlin or a painting by Van Gogh. In any case, it is the assumption of the present study that Heidegger's writings on poetry can only be adequately assessed subsequent to a clarification of his attitude towards traditional ontological problematics.

53 On the 'ambiguity in the essence of philosophy' see GA29/30: 14-35. It is this ambiguity, Heidegger maintains (23-5), which lets philosophy, which is the 'most final and highest' (*ein Letztes und Höchstes*) activity of human beings, present itself as 'absolutely certain truth' (*absolut gewisse Wahrheit*). Although Heidegger rejects 'certainty' as an epistemological interpretation of truth, he does not doubt the 'higher' claim of philosophy.

54 Ricoeur writes (*Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, 59): 'With Heidegger's philosophy, we are always engaged in going back to the foundations, but we are left incapable of beginning the movement of return which would lead from the fundamental ontology to the properly epistemological question of the status of the human sciences. Now a philosophy which breaks the dialogue with the sciences is no longer addressed to anything but itself . . . . Have we not learnt from Plato that the ascending dialectic is the easiest, and that it is along the path of the descending dialectic that the true philosopher stands out?'. Given Heidegger's tremendous influence on the sciences, it is odd that Ricoeur accuses him of 'breaking the dialogue'. Nor are the sciences necessarily the only site in which Heidegger can demonstrate a 'descending dialectic': his studies of technology, the work of art, language, as well as his interpretations of particular philosophers, are nothing but this. It is true that Heidegger does not want his *Seinsfrage* dispersed and swallowed up by its methodological applications; indeed he considers that only by not being so dispersed can its genuine 'relevance' show itself.

55 For references, see the notes to Chapter III. 5 below.

56 The most important text is GA34: 95-116; see also the essay 'Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit', WM 201-236.

57 GA34: 103.

58 GA24: 404-5; GA26: 144-5, 236-7, 246-7, 284; 'Vom Wesen des Grundes', WM 158-9. These passages are discussed by Robert Dostal, 'Beyond Being: Heidegger's Plato', in Christopher

Macann (ed.) *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments* II (Routledge, London & New York, 1992), 61-89.

59 GA34: 99.
60 GA24: 405.
61 WM 158-9.
62 WM 228.
63 GA34: 143-4.
64 See eg. Stanley Rosen, 'Is Metaphysics Possible?', *Review of Metaphysics* **XLV** (1991), 235-57; Robert Dostal, 'Beyond Being: Heidegger's Plato'.
65 GA34: 98. On the *Seventh Letter*, see GA19: 346-7.
66 N II 225.
67 Robert Dostal, 'Beyond Being: Heidegger's Plato', comments (78): 'The absence of any attention to *eros* in Heidegger's comments on Plato is perhaps the most remarkable feature of his Plato interpretation. It is remarkable not only in that it is an important central theme in Plato or that the notion played an important role in the contemporary debate on Plato (Natorp, for example) but rather in the fact that this notion is very like Heidegger's own notion of transcendence'.
68 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 1986, 27: 'That Plato uses only the word *idea* and never *eidos*, for the *agathon*, surely has something to do with that transcendence. There is no denying, of course, that these words, *idea* and *eidos*, were interchangeable in the Greek of that time and in the language usage of the philosophers too. Still, that Plato never speaks of the *eidos tou agathon* (form of the good) indicates that the good has a character all its own'.

CHAPTER III

1 See eg. *Truth and Method* (Sheed and Ward, London, 1975), 225-40, 278-89, and *Reason in the Age of Science* (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 88-138.
2 GA 19 (Marburg lecture course 1924/25).
3 Since 1975 nearly all Gadamer's important works have been translated into English, and he has also spent considerable time in the United States. Among his many published reminiscences of his early years with Heidegger are 'Martin Heidegger and Marburg Theology', in Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1976) 198-212, and 'Martin Heidegger's One Path', in Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (eds.) *Reading Heidegger From the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought* (State University of

New York Press, Albany, 1994) 19-34. Despite his debt to Heidegger, Gadamer has never had any fundamental sympathy with Heidegger's *Seinsfrage*. His philosophical affinities are more with Dilthey and the hermeneutical (though not the theological) side of Schleiermacher.

4 Jacques Taminiaux, *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology* (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1991) 141. Taminiaux evidently had access to the 1924/25 lectures prior to their publication.

5 Franco Volpi, '*Being and Time*: A "Translation" of the *Nichomachean Ethics*?', in Kisiel and Van Buren (eds.) *Reading Heidegger From the Start*, 204.

6 John van Buren, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994) 225-6.

7 Taminiaux, *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, 143.

8 Volpi, '*Being and Time*: A "Translation" of the *Nichomachean Ethics*?', 201-2.

9 G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, 14.

10 It is of some importance to distinguish *phronesis* from the *endoxa*, for confusion on this point can lead to an over-hasty assimilation of Heidegger's existential analyses to *phronesis*. The *endoxa* are the pre-theoretical materials which are 'worked up' into properly ontological knowledge; they are the resource and starting point for the *episteme* of *sophia*. But it is by no means universally the case that human beings thus work up and supersede the *endoxa*: for the most part they are content to remain at this level of mere 'opinion'. In so doing, in failing to take up the *bios theoretikos* wherein all *endoxa* are only provisional, the common man suffers from a radical cognitive deficiency which is not paralleled in the case of the similarly pre-theoretical *phronesis*. The *endoxa* (*doxa*) do not qualify as a mode of *aletheuein*, but are preliminary to, and dependent on, the genuine *aletheuein* of *sophia*. By contrast, *phronesis* is *aletheuein* in the full and proper sense, but is still inferior to *sophia* because only in the latter does the divine element come into play. One could put the difference this way: *phronesis* knows clearly its own sphere of inferior realities, whereas the *endoxa* know unclearly the superior realities of *sophia*. It is not possible for the pre-theoretical knowledge of *phronesis* to be worked up into *sophia*: this would be to fall into the error indicated by Aristotle in the *Nichomachean Ethics* (1094b,25) when he comments that it is a mark of education 'to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits'. It must not be forgotten that, for Aristotle, precision is

a normative concept, hence that things which admit of precise knowledge are 'more true' than things (like those dealt with in the *Ethics*) which do not. *Phronesis* is thus excluded from Aristotle's theoretical inquiries, but the *endoxa* are included, always at the initial stage and by way of heuristic, for it is by beginning with them that one can make one's way towards the highest realities of all.

11 John van Buren, 'Martin Heidegger, Martin Luther', in Kisiel and van Buren (eds.) *Reading Heidegger From the Start*, 169.

12 John Caputo, 'Heidegger and Theology', in Charles Guignon (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993), 274. See also Caputo's article '*Sorge* and *Kardia*: The Hermeneutics of Factical Life and the Categories of the Heart', in Kisiel and Van Buren (eds.) *Reading Heidegger From the Start*, 327-43.

13 PIA 240.

14 Eg. PIA 263, GA 58: 61.

15 Caputo, '*Sorge* and *Kardia*', 329.

16 'The biblical favour is bestowed not on the *aristos* or *archon* – on the prudent man, on the rulers, or the wealthy, or the ones who have the power – but on those who drop through the cracks, whose who are cast out and ground under, on the remnants and the left-overs, the disenfranchised and different, on everyone an-archical, outside the *arche*' (Caputo, '*Sorge* and *Kardia*', 330).

17 EM 1.

18 Arthur Schopenhauer, *Parerga und Paralipomena* I (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1986), 163. The French historian of ancient philosophy, L. Robin, puts it this way: 'It would, perhaps, be a fair description of Aristotle to say that he was too much and too little a philosopher. He was a skilful and tricky dialectician, but was neither deep nor original. The invention which is most clearly his consists in well-coined formulas, verbal distinctions which are easy to handle. He set up a machine whose works, once set in motion, give the illusion of penetrating reflection and real knowledge' (*Greek Thought and the Origins of the Scientific Spirit*, Russell & Russell, New York, 1928, 308, quoted by Reale, *Plato and Aristotle*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1990, 386).

19 Heidegger's most sustained discussion of attunement occurs in the 1929/30 Freiburg lecture course *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* (GA 29/30), 89-249, where the emphasis is on 'boredom' (*Langeweile*). See also SZ 134-9.

20 GA54: 92-3.

21 GA54: 5 &10.
22 GA54: 150-5.
23 GA54: 151.
24 SG 183, 185.
25 See SZ 186-9. The normal German word for 'uncanny' is '*unheimlich*', thus 'the Uncanny' would normally be '*das Unheimliche*'. Heidegger's expression '*das Un-geheure*' incorporates the connotations of 'tremendous' and 'overwhelming'. The connection between '*unheimlich*' and '*Heimweh*' (homesickness) should be noted. As Heidegger explains in these pages of SZ, in feeling 'uncanny' one feels 'not-at-home': anxiety (*Angst*) propels one back into the place where one feels at home, namely the familiar world, the Un-uncanny. For more on the Uncanny, see EM 114-17.
26 On the concept *Das Man* (the 'anonymous one', the 'they'), see SZ Sections 25-7.
27 Provided one is wary of psychological connotations, 'mood' is in some contexts a good way of translating Heidegger's '*Stimmung*'. This is the way it is rendered in Macquarrie and Robinson's standard English translation of *Sein und Zeit* (see the translators' note 3, 172 of the English text).
28 WM 111-12.
29 N I 471.
30 Heidegger's notion of attunement is not very far from the more ontological definitions of 'feeling' among the romantics (eg. Schleiermacher). But then, romanticism is too narrow a context for understanding what is here in question, whether it be called 'feeling', 'attunement' or something else. The wakefulness of Heraclitus, the *eros* of Plato, the unwearied detachment of the Aristotelian *bios theoretikos*, the piety of the Christian, the pity of the Schopenhauerian ascetic, the cheerfulness of Nietzsche's Dionysian spirit, are all *disclosive* attunements in some sense, and as such have *aletheological* significance.
31 Giovanni Reale writes: 'The mystical and religious spirit is missing in Aristotle through which Plato's poetic genius took wing in specific flights and sorties. In Aristotle, the connection to the eschatological dimension and its tension is missing but all this estrangement, in great part, of the mystical and religious from the sphere of the properly metaphysical and philosophical is conceived in Aristotle as something that is added to the properly philosophical . . . . Consequently, it is precisely the mystical, religious, eschatological component that is dropped in the evolution of Aristotle's thought; but, we have seen, it is a

Platonic component that has its source in the Orphic religion and has its source more in a faith than in a metaphysics and dialectic. Aristotle undoubtedly intended by dropping this component from his esoteric works to continue his thinking by making the purely theoretical argument more rigorous, thus to distinguish what is based only on *logos* from what is based on religious belief' (*Plato and Aristotle*, 259-60).

32 Otto Pöggeler, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking* (Humanities Press International, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, 1987) 24-31; Thomas Sheehan, 'Heidegger's "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion", 1920-21', *Personalist* **60** (1979), 312-24, Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time'* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993) 149-219.

33 Karl Lehmann, 'Christliche Geschichtserfahrung und ontologische Frage beim jungen Heidegger', in Otto Pöggeler (ed.), *Heidegger: Perspectiven zur Deutung seines Werkes* (Athenäum, Königstein, 1984), 154.

34 It is interesting to discover (Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*, 170-3) that Heidegger only took up the topic of 'primordial Christianity' in his 1920-21 lectures after students had complained to the Dean of the Philosophical Faculty that his course, advertised as on the philosophy of religion, had so far had no concrete religious content. One may be grateful to these students, who forced Heidegger to reveal himself a little more explicitly, instead of continuing with his characteristic seemingly unending preliminary-methodological discussion of 'factical life-experience'.

35 The early Heidegger remained the greatest philosophical influence on Bultmann for the rest of his career. Bultmann's two volume *Theology of the New Testament* (SCM Press, London, 1952 & 1955) is still, among philosophers, a largely untapped resource for understanding the early Heidegger. It remains the most impressive attempt to apply Heidegger for the interpretation of biblical concepts.

36 Heidegger became conscious of his affinities with Eastern philosophy (especially Japanese Buddhism) only after the Second World War. There is already a large literature on Heidegger and Eastern thought; see eg. Graham Parkes (ed.), *Heidegger and Asian Thought*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1987.

37 The lecture was first delivered in 1927 at Tübingen, and repeated at Marburg in 1928, but remained unpublished until 1969 (now in WM 45-67). Heidegger provides an example of the postulated ontological dependency of theology on philosophy: the relation

between sin (theological concept) and guilt (ontological concept). 'Sin is manifest only through faith, and only the believer can factually exist as a sinner. But if sin, which is . . . a phenomenon of existence, is to be interpreted in theological concepts, then the content itself of the concept . . . calls for a return to the concept of guilt. And guilt is an ontological determination of human existence' (63-4). Heidegger is referring to the concept of guilt developed in the second chapter of Division II of SZ: this is *Dasein's* fleeing from its own authentic possibility of being-itself, a fleeing from the uncanniness of anxiety into the thingly involvements of *Das Man*.

38 From around the same time as the 'Phänomenologie und Theologie' lecture, we find the following revealing note in Heidegger's Marburg lectures GA26: 211: 'The point is not to prove the divine ontically, in its "existence", but to clarify the origin of this understanding-of-being by means of the transcendence of *Dasein* . . . the above is purposely not dealt with in the lectures, because precisely here and now, with the enormously phony religiosity, the dialectical illusion is especially great. It is preferable to put up with the cheap accusation of atheism, which, if it is intended ontically, is in fact completely correct. But might not the presumably ontic faith in God be at bottom godlessness? And might the genuine metaphysician be more religious than the usual faithful, than the members of a "church" or even than "theologians" of every confession?'.

39 *The Later Heidegger and Theology*, ed. James Robinson and John Cobb (Harper & Row, New York, Evanston, and London, 1963). A comprehensive study of Heidegger's attitude and relation to theology throughout his career is Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert's *Das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Theologie im Denken Martin Heideggers* (Karl Alber Verlag, Munich, 1974).

40 WM 68-78.

41 Eg. 'Brief über den "Humanismus"', WM 347-8: 'Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy (*das Wesen des Heiligen*) be thought. Only from the essence of the holy is the essence of divinity (*Gottheit*) to be thought'.

42 'Brief über den "Humanismus"', WM 347: 'With the existential determination of the essence of man nothing, therefore, has yet been decided about the "existence" or "non-existence" of God, nor about the possibility or impossibility of gods. It is thus not only precipitate but erroneous to assert that the interpretation of the essence of man in its relation to the truth of Being is atheism. This arbitrary classification, besides everything else, lacks

carefulness of reading. One ignores the fact that since 1929 the following statement is found in the work *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (WM 157, n. 56): "Through the ontological interpretation of *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world there is neither a positive nor a negative resolution of a possible Being-towards-God. However, through the elucidation of transcendence there is first obtained *an adequate concept of Dasein*, in consideration of which one may ask more precisely what the God-relationship of *Dasein* is, ontologically."'

43 ID 72.

44 In an important article, 'Zur ontologischen Differenz: Plotin und Heidegger', *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 43 (1989), 673-94, Klaus Kremer demonstrates a series of correspondences between Heidegger's 'Being' and Plotinus' 'the One'. It is also the opinion of the Plato scholar Hans Joachim Krämer that 'the univocal concept of being of Heidegger is . . . Neoplatonic. Also the ontological difference between Being and the existent stems from the Neoplatonic tradition' (*Plato and the Foundations of Metaphysics*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1990, 171).

45 WM 328.

46 Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Sendschreiben über seine Glaubenslehre an Lücke*, edited by Herman Mulert (Alfred Cöpelmann Verlag, Gie–en, 1908), 15.

47 Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Der christliche Glaube: nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zumammenhang dargestellt*, edited by Martin Redeker (Walter de Gruyter Verlag, Berlin, 1960); see the leading statement of #15.

48 There are few references to Schleiermacher in Heidegger's writings, but the following passage from US (96) is noteworthy: 'The term "hermeneutics" was familiar to me from my theological studies. At that time, I was particularly agitated over the question of the relation between the word of Holy Scripture and theological-speculative thinking . . . . Later on, I met the term "hermeneutic" again in Wilhelm Dilthey, in his theory of the History of Ideas. Dilthey's familiarity with hermeneutics came from that *same* source, his theological studies and especially his work on Schleiermacher'. Heidegger also came into contact with hermeneutics (and so with Schleiermacher) through Bultmann. In the 1920s Schleiermacher was in fact more controversial than ever, due to the campaign (which Bultmann did not join) against his theological influence led by Karl Barth and Emil Brunner. In general, the Heidegger-Bultmann relationship is better understood in theological than in philosophical circles.

The most thorough treatment thus far is Anthony Thiselton, *The Two Horizons* (Paternoster Press, Exeter, 1980). An illuminating discussion by Bultmann of his own relation to Heidegger is 'Bultmann replies to his Critics', in Hans Werner Bartsch (ed.) *Kerygma and Myth* (S. P. C. K., London, 1953).

49 Thomas Sheehan, 'Heidegger's "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion", 1920-21', 314.

50 WM 338. Affinities between Schleiermacher and Heidegger are discussed by Robert Roberts, 'The Feeling of Absolute Dependency', *Journal of Religion* **57** (1977), 252-66.

51 For Heidegger, technological man is obsessed with his own needs and his own power to meet them: he is (VA 87) the 'man who is keen on himself' (*der auf sich selbst erpichte Mensch*).

52 See 'On Detachment', in *Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense*, Paulist Press, New York, 1981, 285-94. John Caputo writes (*The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought*, Fordham University Press, New York, 1986, 8): 'In Heidegger and Eckhart we will meet the most startling and provocative similarities. We will see how each thinker appeals to man to open himself up to the presence of something which surpasses man, yet from which alone man receives his essence as man. For each thinker, access to this presence is gained not by any human accomplishment, but by "letting" something be accomplished "in" man. They are each spokesmen of "*Gelassenheit*", of letting be – of letting God be God, of letting Being be in its truth . . . . For neither thinker is man adequately accounted for as the "rational animal": both call upon man to lay aside conceptual reasoning and representational thinking in order to enter into either the abyss of the Godhead, or the abyss of Being. In the end, there will be no doubt whatever about the proximity of these two thinkers'. In SG 71 Heidegger says that 'one might easily come to the idea that the most extreme sharpness and depth of thinking belongs to the mystic. This is moreover the truth. Meister Eckhart testifies to it'. See also Heidegger's acknowledgement of the Eckhartian provenance of his own 'Gelassenheit' in G 35-7.

53 The equation of God with 'nothingness' is central for Eckhart; see Caputo's discussion, *The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought*, 21-2.

54 'Die Frage nach dem Technik', VA 40.

55 See Jonas, *Gnosis und spätantiker Geist* I, Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1934, 94-140, as well as Jonas' later (1958) *The Gnostic Religion* (Routledge, London, 1963), 48-91.

In the 'Epilogue' ('Gnosticism, Nihilism, and Existentialism') to the latter work, Jonas writes (320): 'When, many years ago, I turned to the study of Gnosticism, I found that the viewpoints, the optics as it were, which I had acquired in the school of Heidegger, enabled me to see aspects of Gnostic thought that had been missed before. And I was increasingly struck by the familiarity of the seemingly utterly strange.'

56 See also Susan Taubes, 'The Gnostic Foundations of Heidegger's Nihilism', *The Journal of Religion* XXXIV (1954), 155-72.

57 GA21: 232: 'This characteristic ontological connection which obtains between the authenticity of the Being of *Dasein* and falling concern (*verfallenden Besorgen*) has been conceived in a particular way in Christendom and in the Christian interpretation of existence. But this may not be understood as if it belonged to a specifically Christian consciousness of existence. The situation is the reverse: in so far as *Dasein* in itself *qua* care (*Sorge*) has this structure, there is the possibility of a specifically Christian interpretation of existence'.

58 N I 321-2: 'The God of "morality", the Christian God is dead – the "Father" in whom we seek sanctuary, the "Personality" with whom we negotiate and bare our hearts, the "Judge" with whom we adjudicate, the "Paymaster" from whom we receive our virtues' rewards, that God with whom we "do business" . . . . The God who is viewed in terms of morality, this God alone is meant when Nietzsche says "God is dead" . . . . Nietzsche must be liberated from the dubious society of those supercilious atheists who deny God when they fail to find him in their reagent glass, those who replace the renounced God with their "God" of "Progress". We dare not confuse Nietzsche with such "godless" ones, who cannot really even be "godless" because they have never struggled to find a god, and never can'. Of Nietzsche's ('mystical') idea of 'eternal return', Heidegger writes: 'The thought itself defines the essence of religion anew on its own terms. The thought itself is to say what kind of religion shall exist for what kind of human being in the future. The thought itself is to define the relationship to God – and to define God himself' (N I 385). Heidegger calls Nietzsche a 'negative theologian' in N I 353.

59 ED 56.

60 'Wozu Dichter', HW 268

61 ED 61-2.

62 'Bauen, Wohnen, Denken', VA 143. See also the essay ' . . . dichterisch wohnet der Mensch', VA 181-98.

63 Cf. VA 94: 'It is one thing to make use of the earth; another to receive the blessings of the earth and to become at home within the law of this receptivity, to protect (*hüten*) the mystery of Being and to watch over the inviolability of the possible'.

64 John Caputo writes ('Heidegger and Theology', 282) that 'the god that emerges in Heidegger's later writings is a profoundly poetic god, a poetic experience of the world as something sacred and deserving of reverence. This god is a much more pagan-poetic god and much less Judeo-Christian, ethico-religious God. It has virtually nothing to do with the God whom Jesus called *abba* or with the religion of the cross that Heidegger found in Luther'. However, the difference between 'pagan-poetic' and 'ethico-religious' conceptions of divinity is not so clear cut as Caputo suggests, indeed, this is largely a myth developed by the Christian Church in its struggles against 'heresy'. It is nowadays increasingly recognized that Christianity/paganism is an ecclesiastical and not a philosophico-religious distinction. In this connection it may be noted that, as late as 1949, ie. well into the period of his Hölderlin studies, Heidegger is prepared to quote from I Corinthians against Greek metaphysics ('Rückgang in den Grund der Metaphysik', WM 374).

65 Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (Allen and Unwin, London, 1946), 195: 'There is an emotional poverty in the *Ethics*, which is not found in the earlier philosophers. There is something unduly smug and comfortable about Aristotle's speculations on human affairs; everything which makes men feel a passionate interest in each other seems to be forgotten. Even his account of friendship is tepid. He shows no sign of having had any of those experiences which make it difficult to preserve sanity; all the more profound aspects of the moral life are apparently unknown to him. He leaves out, one may say, the whole sphere of human experience with which religion is concerned. What he has to say is what will be useful to comfortable men of weak passions; but he has nothing to say to those who are possessed by a god or a devil'. This judgement is especially interesting from someone like Russell, who is by no means well-disposed to religion and mystical thought.

66 Pöggeler, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*, 25.

67 Sheehan, 'Heidegger's "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion"', 324. See also Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*, 178-91.

68 Lehmann, 'Christliche Geschichtserfahrung und ontologische Frage beim jungen Heidegger', 147.

69 GA24: 329.
70 GA24: 329.
71 GA24: 384.
72 GA24: 343.
73 GA24: 351; see also GA24: 343.
74 GA24: 357.
75 GA24: 344.
76 GA24: 343-44; GA21: 250.
77 GA21: 244.
78 SZ 421.
79 GA24: 366.
80 GA24: 367.
81 GA24: 376; SZ 329.
82 GA24: 375; SZ 335-72.
83 GA24: 375.
84 GA24: 377; SZ 329.
85 GA24: 428.
86 SZ 258; GA24: 406-7.
87 GA24: 386.
88 SZ 419.
89 SZ 329-330.
90 GA24: 411-12.
91 GA24: 380.
92 GA24: 382.
93 GA24: 387-8.
94 SZ 405.
95 SZ 407.
96 SZ 408-9.
97 Thomas Sheehan, '"Time and Being", 1925-27', in Robert Shahan & J. N. Mohanty (eds.), *Thinking About Being: Aspects of Heidegger's Thought* (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1984), p. 192-4.
98 GA24: 328.
99 Heidegger criticizes Kant on time in GA21: 269-415, Hegel on time in SZ 428-36 and GA21: 251-62. In both cases he finds a dependency on Aristotelian time.
100 GA24: 328-9.
101 To be noted is that '*Durée*' in Bergson means something very different (in particular, something essentially non-quantitative) to what I have called 'duration' in respect of Aristotelian time. Bergson's theory of *Durée* is presented in a number of works, the best known of which are *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, Allen & Unwin,

London, 1910, and *Creative Evolution* (Random House, New York, 1911).

102 SZ 338; see also SZ 328.

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