
# DEATH AND DESIRE IN HEGEL, HEIDEGGER AND DELEUZE

## **BRENT ADKINS**



Death and Desire in Hegel, Heidegger and Deleuze

# DEATH AND DESIRE IN HEGEL, HEIDEGGER AND DELEUZE

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Brent Adkins

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### Introduction

### Like a Painful Wound

My wound existed before me; I was born to embody it.

Joë Bousquet<sup>1</sup>

In his seminal essay 'Mourning and Melancholia' Freud is grappling with the problem of loss. What happens when a loved object is lost? The loss of a loved object is obviously traumatic, but what is the source of this trauma and how does it manifest itself? For Freud the loss of a loved object creates trauma; the ego is attached to what it loves. These attachments are called cathexes. When these attachments are severed, however, the process of anticathexis, of withdrawing the attachments, is very painful. This is the source of trauma created by the loss of a loved object.

This trauma can manifest itself in one of two ways according to Freud, in 'mourning' or in 'melancholia'. Mourning is the healthy and appropriate way to deal with grief. The characteristics of mourning are 'profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, and, inhibition of all activity'.<sup>2</sup> To avoid the dejection of grief it would seem that the ego would naturally attach itself to a new love object and forgo the pain of mourning. Freud's topology of the psyche, however, precludes this. '[I]t is a matter of general observation that people never willingly abandon a libidinal position, not even, when a substitute is already beckoning to them.'3 Freud argues that in the case of a loss reality-testing shows that the love object no longer exists and demands that all libidinal investments be withdrawn from it. This withdrawal cannot be done immediately. The interval between the loss and the withdrawal of all cathexes from the lost object is the period in which the work of mourning is done. Or, more precisely, the work of mourning is the painful task of withdrawing libidinal investments from a lost loved object.

In melancholia one finds the same withdrawal from the world and dejection as in mourning, but one also finds 'a lowering of

the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in selfreproaches and self-revilings, and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment'.<sup>4</sup> How can the same precipitating cause lead to two different effects, one healthy and one pathological? And, why does the pathological result of melancholia manifest itself in the same withdrawal as mourning, but also produce a lowering in self-regard? Freud's answer is that while loss is the precipitating cause in instances of both mourning and melancholia, in melancholia the loss remains unconscious. The melancholic displays the same symptoms of mourning, but is unaware that any loss has occurred. The melancholic's inhibitions thus become a puzzle to him or her. In addition to these characteristic inhibitions the melancholic incessantly verbalises selfreproach. Rather than the shame one might expect to find in someone who actually feels that these reproaches are justified. Freud notes a 'trait of insistent communicativeness which finds satisfaction in selfexposure'.5

Freud's analysis suggests that what is in fact happening with the melancholic with regard to the increase in self-reproach is that the self-reproaches are actually directed at the lost love object. For Freud this solves the problem of the melancholic's 'insistent communicativeness'. The melancholic is not ashamed of his or her shortcomings because unconsciously the melancholic knows that these reproaches are directed at someone else. The resolution of the problem in this way, however, creates a much more complex problem in terms of the topology of the psyche. For melancholia to display the characteristics that it does Freud concludes that there must be an identity of ego and lost object in the melancholic. He writes,

There is no difficulty in reconstructing the process. An object-choice, an attachment of the libido to a particular person, had at one time existed; then, owing to a real slight or disappointment coming from this loved person, the object-relationship was shattered. The result was not the normal one of a withdrawal of the libido from this object and a displacement of it on to a new one, but something different, for whose comingabout various conditions seem to be necessary. The object-cathexis proved to have little power of resistance and was brought to an end. But the free libido was not displaced on to another object; it was withdrawn into the ego. There, however, it was not employed in any unspecified way, but served to establish an *identification* of the ego with the abandoned object. Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the latter could henceforth be judged by a special agency, as though it were an object, the forsaken object. In this way an object-loss was transformed into an

ego-loss and the conflict between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage between the critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by identification.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, the crucial difference between mourning and melancholia for Freud lies in the status of the object after it is lost. In the case of mourning the lost object is mourned and then ultimately replaced by another object. The work of mourning is the painful process of removing libidinal investments from one object so that they might be free to attach to another. During this process the subject appears withdrawn and inhibited. In melancholia, however, the lost object is not replaced; it is identified with the ego. The work of mourning cannot be completed because the libidinal investments that would normally detach to become free for other investments are turned inward and attach to the ego itself. On one level the ego knows it has lost something, but this knowledge cannot become conscious because the same cathexes are still operative.

In an enlightening commentary on Freud's essay, Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok introduce some helpful terminological distinctions with regard to mourning and melancholia. Their essay, 'Mourning or Melancholia: Introjection versus Incorporation',7 furthers Freud's analysis of the lost object by noting that in the case of mourning, where the object is lost and known as lost, the object is 'introjected'. In the case of melancholia, where the lost object is identified with the ego, the lost object is 'incorporated'. Initially, both words seem to suggest the same thing; namely, something external is made internal. Certainly, in both cases an internalisation takes place, but in the case of introjection a topographical reorganisation takes place in keeping with the loss. Just as Freud notes that mourning occurs on the basis of reality-testing that shows that the loved object no longer exists, what Abraham and Torok speculate is happening in the case of introjection is that the status quo or economy of libidinal investments is shaken by the loss of an object in which the ego is heavily invested. This forces the ego to reorganise its economy. This process of reorganisation is painful as cathexes are withdrawn and ultimately transferred to another object. The introjected loss thus becomes a part of the psychic topology, but it becomes so as a loss; that is, the loss is conscious. Sandor Ferenczi, who coined the term 'introjection', used it to refer to a broadening of the ego. As the ego accepts loss it broadens. Its topology becomes more complex as it reorganises its libidinal investments to deal with loss. Introjection is thus transformative.<sup>8</sup>

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By contrast, incorporation is a refusal of introjection. The difficult process of withdrawing libidinal investments is circumvented in favour of a fantasy in which the lost object is kept alive within the ego. Incorporation for Abraham and Torok necessitates the construction of a crypt within the psyche which serves two purposes. First, it keeps the lost object alive. Abraham and Torok relate a case in which the dominant symptom of the patient was kleptomania. The boy had lost his older sister when he was eight. For reasons that became clear in analysis, the boy was 'seduced' by his sister, so the loss could not be acknowledged. Mourning could not take place. As a result the boy kept his sister alive and stole things for her. The apparent randomness of the items taken, a bra, for example, becomes purposeful. He is stealing for a sister who, if still alive, would have needed a bra at that time. The second purpose that the crypt serves is to maintain the status quo. If the sister is not really dead, there is no need to reorganise one's libidinal investments. The fantasy of the living sister is maintained at the expense of mourning.

The 'intrapsychic tomb', which Abraham and Torok suggest is built during cases of melancholia, has several features worth noting. First, it is a means of avoiding mourning, or a way to circumvent loss without going through anticathexis. Second, and as a result, the crypt represents the space of fantasy in which the surrounding topology remains undisturbed. Third, and crucial for the analysis that follows,

It should be remarked that as long as the crypt holds, there is no melancholia. It erupts when the walls are shaken, often as a result of the loss of some secondary love-object who had buttressed them. Faced with the danger of seeing the crypt crumble, the whole of the ego becomes one with the crypt, showing the concealed object of love in its own guise. Threatened with the imminent loss of its internal support – the kernel of its being – the ego will fuse with the included object, imagining that the object is bereft of its partner. Consequently, the ego begins the public display of an interminable process of mourning.<sup>9</sup>

The melancholic thus does not know he or she is melancholic, until the fantasy built around the crypt is threatened by additional trauma. When this happens the ego identifies with the lost object making mourning interminable, pathological and thus melancholic. This also explains why the melancholic loses so much self-regard. The ego is reproaching itself as the lost object for having harmed the ego in the first place. The more the ego makes itself suffer, the more the lost object atones for its misdeeds. Abraham and Torok, following Freud, call this struggle of the ego with itself 'a painful wound'. This wound is, of course, extraordinarily difficult to heal since its existence remains unacknowledged by the ego. Furthermore, what the crypt conceals on Abraham's and Torok's reading is precisely the wound as wound. Psychic topography circumvents the wound, remains unchanged and builds a crypt around the wound to preserve its secret.

In addition to the inherent interest in this type of psychoanalytic inquiry, it seems that Freud, Abraham and Torok also provide a powerful tool for thinking about loss in general. Loss may be introjected or accepted after a period of adjustment called mourning. Or loss may be incorporated, 'swallowed whole' as Abraham and Torok would say, and undigested. In the case of incorporation, the loss is unacknowledged and the work of mourning circumvented. This gives rise to melancholia.

My interest in mourning and melancholia is ontological rather than psychoanalytical. In particular I am interested in the way in which the distinction between mourning and melancholia can be mapped onto ways of thinking about death. While recent philosophical history abounds with ontologies that attempt to take death into account in some way, my focus will be on the thought of Hegel and Heidegger. Even though numerous other thinkers could have been chosen. I do not believe that this choice is entirely arbitrary. As Jacques Derrida never tires of pointing out, we are continually working through our debt to both of these thinkers. Additionally, it seems as though Hegel and Heidegger represent limit cases for thinking about death in terms of mourning and melancholia. As I will argue below, Heidegger's account of human existence as being towards death and his analyses of the nothing all suggest a profound affinity with melancholia. On the other hand, the movement of Hegel's thought, particularly in the Phenomenology of Spirit, suggests a close connection with mourning.<sup>10</sup>

A problem arises, however, in the conversion of these psychoanalytic categories to ontological ones, at least with regard to Hegel and Heidegger. As Slavoj Žižek correctly points out, there is a profound difference between a lost object that precipitates mourning or melancholia and the constitutive lack that drives both Hegel's and Heidegger's thought.<sup>11</sup> This difference cannot simply be elided. For example, if I lose my favourite book, it will be a painful experience. That pain is the result of becoming libidinally invested in an object. This libidinal investment remaps my psychic topography. When the object is lost, my libidinal investments must be withdrawn and my psychic topography redrawn. This process is not the same as being constituted as the type of entity that always already has something missing. How can I mourn or become melancholic over something I never had? Mourning and melancholia presuppose an object that appears, becomes loved and then disappears. Neither Hegel nor Heidegger presupposes this type of object relation. Rather, both claim that we are constituted as a lack we are continually trying to overcome. For Hegel this lack is called negation, for Heidegger the nothing.

I think Žižek's point here is absolutely correct. In strictly psychoanalytical terms loss and lack are not convertible. However, it still seems that one could ask concerning the way in which Hegel and Heidegger differ with regard to their treatment of this constitutive lack. Is Heidegger melancholic with regard to this lack? Could one say that he incorporates this lack? By the same token, is Hegel mournful with regard to negation? Could one say that he introjects this lack? Even granting Žižek's point, I still think that all of these questions can be answered affirmatively.

In addition to the distinction between loss and lack that Žižek articulates, there is another way in which the distinction between mourning and melancholia used here lies outside the traditional psychoanalytic register. Clearly in Heidegger's account of being towards death the lost object is only lost proleptically. In Heidegger's account, for example, Dasein looks ahead to its own death, and this projection of the totality of its existence is incorporated within it. Heidegger is explicit, however, that Dasein cannot experience its own death. Insofar as Heidegger's account is melancholic, it is melancholic to the degree that Dasein anticipates the loss of itself.

Žižek, following Agamben, supports this understanding of melancholia. He argues that melancholia is always proleptic. One grieves for the loss that one anticipates. This reading of melancholia separates Žižek from Freud, Abraham and Torok, who claim that the loss occurs first, and either mourning or melancholia follows depending on factors within the individual psyche. I do not want to resolve this tension between Žižek and traditional psychoanalysis. I am trying to negotiate a shift in discourse from psychoanalysis and ontology, and more from a lost object that is other than me to a lack that is constitutive of me. In order to effect this both readings will need to be operative.<sup>12</sup>

My concern is not to simply show that Hegel's and Heidegger's accounts of death can be read fruitfully alongside Freud's 'Mourning

and Melancholia'. Nor do I wish to assert that if melancholia remains pathological and mourning remains healthy, then *mutatis mutandis* Heidegger's account of death is pathological while Hegel's is healthy. Rather, having shown the parallels between Hegel's and Heidegger's accounts of death and their affinity with psychoanalysis, I want to ask how this affinity is possible at all. Is there something that accounts for the interrelation of all three and suggests a way of thinking about death that is not caught in the oscillation between mourning and melancholia?

Derrida argues in *Aporias* that the experience of death in the West is fundamentally aporetic. The question of 'my death' seems to be encompassed by an ontological analysis of the Heideggerian type. This analysis does not so much dismiss an anthropological account of death as subordinate it to the level of ontic accretion. For Heidegger an anthropology of death always presupposes the type of fundamental ontological analysis done in *Being and Time*. To privilege an anthropological account of death would be to mistake the ontic for the ontological. On the other hand, the type of anthropological analysis proposed by Philippe Ariès in *Essais sur l'histoire de la mort en Occident: Du Moyen-Age à nos jours* would argue that Heidegger's analysis of death is only possible on the basis of rather recent cultural shifts. There is no underlying authentic relation to mortality that all cultural engagements presuppose. Rather, these different cultural engagements change what death is. Derrida writes,

*On the one hand*, no matter how rich or new it may be, one can read a history of death in the Christian West, like that of Ariès for example, as a small monograph that illustrates like a footnote the extent to which it relies, in its presuppositions, upon the powerful and universal delimitation that the existential analysis of death in *Being and Time* is. The existential analysis exceeds and therefore includes beforehand the work of the historian, not to mention the biologist, the psychologist, and the theologian of death. It also conditions their work; it is constantly presupposed there.

However, on the other hand, conversely but just as legitimately, one can also be tempted to read *Being and Time* as a small, late document, among many others *within* the huge archive where the memory of death in Christian Europe is being accumulated. Each of these two discourses on death is much more comprehensive than the other, bigger and smaller than what it tends to include or exclude, more and less originary, more and less ancient, young or old.<sup>13</sup>

From Heidegger's perspective Ariès' anthropological analysis would merely be a footnote to his fundamental ontology. And, by the same token, from Ariès' perspective Heidegger's ontology is one more example of shifting cultural attitudes towards death. What concerns Derrida is the way in which any account of death oscillates between these two determinate possibilities. Heidegger's analysis of death, according to Derrida, is haunted by the continual contamination of the ontological by the ontic. This is manifest most clearly in the distinction between *Eigentlichkeit* and *Uneigentlichkeit* which Heidegger 'crucially needs' but cannot maintain. By the same token, a history of death like Ariès' always seems to beg the question concerning the structures of human existence that make *any response whatsoever* to death possible.<sup>14</sup>

Derrida does not resolve this aporia by siding with Heidegger or Ariès. Rather, his analysis could be understood as Kantian in several respects. First, the structure of Derrida's text can be seen as an antinomy. Each side of the argument can present a rational account of why death should be thought of as universal, or why it should be thought of as determined by the culture within which it arises. The second way in which Derrida's analysis of death in *Aporias* is Kantian is that it is transcendental. Derrida does not show simply that there are two mutually encompassing ways of thinking about death and that each one haunts the other. From this initial step Derrida wants to ask the transcendental question: What are the conditions for the possibility of thinking about death such that this aporia arises?

The twist that Derrida puts on this Kantian line of thinking is that conditions for the possibility are always at the same time conditions for the impossibility. Thus, the conditions for the possibility of thinking about death from the viewpoint of fundamental ontology include the necessity of thinking about death anthropologically which it attempts to exclude but cannot. Of course, the same is true vice versa for thinking about death from the viewpoint of anthropology.

The (quasi)-transcendental structure that Derrida proposes can account for this aporia and the way each side of the aporia both excludes and is implicated in the other. Derrida refers to this (quasi)transcendental structure as the 'Marrano'. He writes,

Let us figuratively call Marrano anyone who remains faithful to a secret that he has not chosen, in the very place where he lives, in the home of the inhabitant or of the occupant, in the home of the first or of the second *arrivant*, in the very place where he stays without saying no but without identifying himself as belonging to. In the unchallenged night where the radical absence of any historical witness keeps him or her, in the dominant culture that by definition has calendars, this secret keeps the Marrano even

before the Marrano keeps it. Is it not possible to think that such a secret eludes history, age, and aging?<sup>15</sup>

The term 'Marrano' was originally an epithet applied to Jews in Spain during the Middle Ages. It literally means 'swine'. Under persecution by the Inquisition many Jews accepted Christianity rather than face death or banishment. As a sign of true conversion many were forced to eat pork. More traumatic, however, was the forced separation from all Jewish contacts. The Catholic authorities were particularly concerned that communication with the Jewish community would lead to 'backsliding'. Even though these newly converted Jews were not allowed contact with the Jewish community, many maintained Jewish traditions in secret, until the impetus behind the tradition was lost.

For Derrida these are the beginnings of an immemorial secret, a secret that is shaped by the dominant culture but also places one outside the dominant culture. A secret without memory cannot have a history. A secret without memory keeps the secret-holder, rather than the secret-holder keeping it. The Marrano is the determinate oscillation between the dominant culture that makes the secret both possible and impossible and the secret that lies outside of and delimits the dominant culture. Both the secret and the dominant culture are bigger and smaller than the other. We are all Marranos being kept by the secret of our death. This secret is contaminated by the dominant culture and delimits it.

Perhaps Derrida's response to the aporia that he presents can be put more clearly in Kantian terms. Earlier we saw that Derrida's account of death could be explained in terms of Kant's antinomies. For Kant, though, there are two kinds of antinomies, mathematical and dynamic, each requiring a different kind of solution. In the case of the mathematical antinomies, those dealing with quantity and quality, Kant concludes that both the thesis and antithesis are false. In the case of the dynamic antinomies, those dealing with relation and modality, Kant concludes that both the thesis and antithesis are true. While one could make many qualifications concerning Derrida's understanding of truth, it seems that the aporia of death is a dynamic antinomy for Derrida. The figure of the Marrano is the affirmation of both the thesis and the antithesis of the aporia.

In the solution to the antinomies, the determining factor for Kant is whether the premises of each antinomy take into account the ideality of space and time. The premises of the mathematical antinomies presuppose the reality of space and time, and it is precisely at this point that they are led astray. The premises of the dynamic antinomies, however, presuppose the ideality of space and time and are thus both true. Suppose that we press this analogy between Kant and Derrida a little further along these lines. Insofar as Derrida is proposing that both sides of the aporia of death are true, might we also say that he too presupposes the ideality of space and time?

Let us return briefly to the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' to see if any additional conclusions can be drawn from the connection between Derrida and Kant. Kant argues that space and time are the forms of intuition. Space is the intuition of outer sense. That is, any object we experience or imagine we imagine as located in space. Furthermore, while it is easy to imagine space as empty, we cannot imagine our outer sense as being absent of space. Kant concludes from this that space is not an object that exists apart from our experience, but is the shape of our experience: 'We assert, then, the empirical reality of space, as regards all possible outer experience; and yet at the same time we assert its transcendental ideality – in other words, that *it is* nothing at all . . .<sup>'16</sup> Kant makes a parallel argument for the ideality of time. The difference for time is that it is not the form only of outer experience, but the form of all experience. Thus, our inner sense is temporal as well as objects experienced by outer sense. 'This, then, is what constitutes the transcendental ideality of time. What we mean by this phrase is that if we abstract from the subjective conditions of sensible intuition, time is nothing . . . '17

Both space and time are nothing for Kant, and this nothing is essential to the way in which we relate to ourselves and the external world. What this suggests, and this seems borne out in Kant's later discussion of the transcendental unity of apperception, is that for Kant the subject is constituted around a fundamental lack that cannot be overcome and in fact makes experience possible. I would argue that Derrida is suggesting something similar in his analysis of death in *Aporias*. The Marrano is constituted by a secret that cannot be appropriated by the dominant culture. The Marrano arrives as the stranger who stands outside and delimits the dominant culture. But, precisely that which makes the Marrano a stranger, an *arrivant*, is a secret. This secret cannot be revealed because it is essentially unknown. The secret possesses the Marrano rather than the Marrano possessing it.<sup>18</sup>

In keeping with the Kantian theme I would like to propose another reading of the aporia of death, a reading of the antinomy as mathematical, in which both sides are false. In Kantian terms this means not presupposing the ideality of space and time, and in Derridean terms this means not presupposing a lack around which experience is organised. A reading of this type not only goes against Kant and Derrida, but against the tenor of Western thought in general. Beginning with Plato's conception of *Eros* in which the soul longs to be reunited with what it does not have, Western thought seems determined to articulate human experience as fundamentally lacking and striving to overcome that lack. Of course, the nature of that lack and the ways in which it may or may not be overcome vary from thinker to thinker, but it remains a dominant organising principle in thinkers as diverse as Hegel, Freud and Heidegger, to name the three of greatest concern here.

Deleuze articulates a different line of thinking, though, which does not organise itself around a constitutive lack. This line of thought would include such thinkers as Lucretius, Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche, Bergson, Klossowski and, of course, Deleuze, who was the first to tell this alternative history of philosophy. It is my hope that in following this alternative line, particularly Deleuze, we can begin to think about death differently.

In order to illustrate what is at stake in Deleuze's history of philosophy, let's look at Spinoza's conception of desire. Desire is one of the three fundamental emotions for Spinoza, the other two being pleasure and pain. All other emotions are combinations of these three and differing external objects. These three fundamental emotions are also grouped according to activity and passivity. Both pleasure and pain are passive emotions, while desire is an active emotion. This distinction between active and passive rests on whether one is the adequate cause of the emotion. Thus, even though pleasure is an increase in a mode's power of acting, it is dependent for that increase on something outside of it. Take love, for example. For Spinoza, 'love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause'.<sup>19</sup> Insofar as the cause is external, the mode is passive with regard to it.

Desire, on the other hand, is active, or those modifications of which we are the adequate cause. It is 'the endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its own being, [and] is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question'.<sup>20</sup> Desire for Spinoza, then, is the way in which we seek to be the adequate cause of our own preservation and expansion. It is because Spinoza defines desire in this way that he can equate virtue and power. 'By virtue and power I mean the same thing; that is virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a

man's nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature'.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, desire, virtue and power are all equivalent terms for Spinoza. What he imagines is the complex interactions of the modes of a singular substance each of which seeks to increase its power or its ability to preserve its existence. The best way to achieve this increase in power is to join with other like-minded individuals. Spinoza writes,

Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than man – nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being can be wished for by men, than that all should so in all points agree, that the minds and bodies of all should form as it were, one single mind and one single body, and that all should, with one consent, as far as they are able, endeavour to preserve their being, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all. Hence, men who are governed by reason – that is, who seek what is useful to them in accordance with reason – desire for themselves nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind, and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their conduct.<sup>22</sup>

Note that Spinoza's argument for a social contract is neither predicated nor maintained by fear, as it is in most other social contract theorists. Rather, the joining together of modes is a means by which each can increase its power and endeavour to persevere. More importantly, the desire that drives this joining together does not arise from a lack in any of the modes. Each mode is finite, but in joining together with other like-minded modes, each is not seeking to re-form a lost unity or correct an imperfection. Rather, desire is the means by which we continually make new connections in an attempt to produce something new, something more powerful than we were before – in short, something that works.

This conception of desire that does not seek to overcome a lack, but is itself productive, continually producing new forms, is what Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* call 'desiring-production'. Deleuze's and Guattari's argument in both *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus* is that our current psychic and social organisation wildly restricts most forms of desiring-production. Desire is normalised within the confines of Oedipal sexuality, on the one hand, and capitalist consumption on the other.

Using Deleuze's and Guattari's analyses I would like to examine anew the question of death, particularly as it is articulated by Heidegger and Hegel. For all of their differences and opposition in articulating death, each presupposes a constitutive lack that desire seeks to overcome. The type of desire that underlies both philosophies and leads to their conceptions of death is beholden to a particular type of psychic and social organisation. It is for this reason that I will argue that both sides of the Hegel/Heidegger antinomy are false with regard to death.

Furthermore, insofar as the type of psychic organisation that restricts both Hegel and Heidegger in their accounts of death is precisely the one that Freud articulates so compellingly, it is no accident that the way in which each accounts for the constitutive lack at the heart of their philosophies can be captured in the Freudian categories of mourning and melancholia. This is not to say that Freud invented the dominant type of psychic organisation in the West; rather he discovered and described it.

The book thus has three main parts. In the first part, 'Melancholia', I examine Heidegger's account of death and his dependence on the constitutive lack that grounds experience. I argue that Heidegger's conception of death is fundamentally melancholic and as such leads Heidegger into insuperable difficulties in accounting for community. As Freud notes, melancholia is fundamentally narcissistic. In the second part, 'Mourning', I examine Hegel's account of death from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the connection between the development of consciousness and negation. I argue that Hegel's dependence on negation as the engine of consciousness' development is fundamentally mournful. This conception of death leads to Hegel's notorious difficulty in accounting for the singular. In the final part, 'Beatitude', I examine Deleuze's account of desire as productive in an effort to propose a new way of thinking about death.

### Notes

- 1. Joë Bousquet, *Les Capitales* (Paris: Le Cercle, 1955), 103. Quoted in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy*?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 159.
- 2. Sigmund Freud, 'Mourning and Melancholia', *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, XIV, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1962): 244. Hereafter, SE, followed by volume: page.
- 3. SE XIV: 244.
- 4. SE XIV: 244.
- 5. SE XIV: 247.
- 6. SE XIV: 249, Freud's emphasis.
- 7. Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, 'Mourning or Melancholia: Introjection versus Incorporation', The Shell and the Kernel, vol. 1,

trans. Nicholas T. Rand (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994): 125–38. Hereafter, AT.

- 8. AT, 127.
- 9. AT, 136.
- 10. Unlike the connection between Heidegger and melancholia, the connection between Hegel and mourning is well documented. For example, Catharine Malabou's 'History and the Process of Mourning in Hegel and Freud', *Radical Philosophy* 106 (2001): 15–20; and Andrew Cutrofello's 'The Blessed Gods Mourn: What is Living-Dead in the Legacy of Hegel', *The Owl of Minerva* 28 (1996): 25–38, both argue that the psychoanalytic category of mourning provides a key to understanding Hegel. One could argue that much of Derrida's work concerns the relation between Hegel and mourning from early works such as 'The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology' and *Glas* to later works such as *Aporias* and *Spectres of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*.
- 11. Slavoj Žižek, Did Somebody say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)Use of a Notion (New York: Verso, 2001), 142–52.
- 12. Žižek, 146.
- 13. Jacques Derrida, *Aporias*, trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 80–1.
- 14. Derrida, Aporias, 72ff.
- 15. Derrida, Aporias, 81.
- 16. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), A28/B44, emphasis added.
- 17. A36/B52, emphasis added.
- 18. Gillian Rose, in *Mourning Becomes the Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), argues that Derrida's commitment to mourning remains an 'aberrant mourning' which can in principle never be overcome. This, of course, is melancholia in Freud's terms. As a result, Rose sees a structure similar to the one I am seeing here. One may deal with loss through mourning or melancholia, and contemporary thinkers following Heidegger, particularly Derrida, have articulated a fundamentally melancholic position. The solution according to Rose is to restore mourning to its proper place. This solution is also in line with my analysis, insofar as Rose sees mourning as a fundamentally Hegelian position. Where Rose and I differ is that Rose does not see the relation between mourning and melancholia as antinomical. Thus, she does not ask why this antinomy arises in the first place.
- 19. Benedict de Spinoza, *Ethics*, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1989), III.xiii, n.
- 20. III.vii.
- 21. IV.Def.viii.
- 22. IV.xviii.n.

# Part I Melancholia

Death and what's hidden therein await unveiling

Rilke<sup>1</sup>

It is well known that *Being and Time* is an unfinished work, or at least the completion of the goals that it sets for itself were not accomplished within the confines of the book. What we have is two divisions of a proposed six in which Heidegger articulates the basic structure of human existence and argues that this structure is founded on a particular type of temporality. Heidegger provides a rigorous analysis of death at the beginning of Division Two. We thus find death at the centre of *Being and Time*. Death allows Heidegger to grasp human existence in its totality and points the way towards his discussion of temporality, which occupies the remainder of Division Two.

That death is at the centre of Being and Time is not merely fortuitous, however. I will argue that death plays a transcendental role in Being and Time, and this role is highlighted by its placement. I read Being and Time as a profoundly (but not solely) Kantian text in which Heidegger articulates the conditions for the possibility of human existence. I will argue below that the conditions for the possibility of human experience are predicated on a lack. This lack is manifested in Being and Time as being towards death but arises in other guises in other texts. For example, in the texts immediately surrounding Being and Time this constitutive lack appears as 'the nothing' or 'transcendence'. In later texts it appears as 'Ereignis' or 'presencing'. What is crucial to Heidegger's analysis, however, is not that human existence is predicated on a lack. This simply places him in the long tradition of philosophy which stretches back to Plato. What is crucial is the way that Heidegger articulates Dasein's relation to this lack. I will argue that Dasein relates to its own constitutive lack melancholically. Or, to use Abraham's and Torok's language, Dasein is constituted as loss that is always already incorporated.

In the first chapter of the Introduction to *Being and Time* Heidegger calls into question the shaky foundations of other traditional attempts

to grasp the meaning of being. He needs a method that is not beholden to these traditional ontologies. In order to circumvent these traditional ontologies Heidegger proposes a method that allows being to show itself: phenomenology. To explicate what he means by 'phenomenology' Heidegger breaks the word into its constitutive parts ('phenomenon' and 'logos') and proceeds to give an etymology of these terms in order that he might clarify what it means to put these terms together in a single term.<sup>2</sup>

Heidegger begins with 'phenomenon' and notes that it comes from the Greek  $\varphi \alpha i \nu \delta \mu \epsilon \nu \delta \nu$ , which is derived from the verb  $\varphi \alpha i \nu \epsilon \sigma \theta \alpha i$ , 'to show itself'. A phenomenon is merely that which shows itself in itself, or a phenomenon is that which appears: so much so that the Greeks would sometimes refer to φαινόμενα as τα ὄντα (entities). At this point we can clearly see why Heidegger thinks that phenomenology is the only appropriate method to carry out this investigation. If being is always the being of an entity, and we must therefore grasp the meaning of being through an entity without imposing any dogmatic assertions about it, what we need is for the entity to show itself in itself so that it can be grasped in its being. If entities are this kind of phenomenon, as Heidegger clearly thinks they are, then the investigation is well under way. A difficulty arises, however, when Heidegger notes that there is another sense of oavouevov that becomes clear when we begin to press its meaning as 'semblance'. Entities do not always seem as they really are. In fact, Heidegger's project is predicated on the fact that Dasein's ontical way of being obscures its ontological way of being. Dasein does not always show itself as it really is. In order for Heidegger's project to be successful, he must show that an entity can show itself in itself and it can also show itself as something else, or something it is not. Heidegger must show the structural interconnection between these senses of phenomenon.<sup>3</sup>

For the primary sense of phenomenon (that which shows itself in itself) Heidegger reserves the term 'phenomenon' (*Phänomenon*). For the secondary sense of phenomenon (that which shows itself as something else) he uses the term 'semblance' (*Schein*). In order to clarify the relation between phenomenon and semblance Heidegger must also clarify what is meant by some other related terms: 'appearance' (*Erscheinung*) and 'mere appearance' (*blosse Erscheinung*). While Heidegger initially claims that 'appearance' and 'mere appearance' have nothing to do with 'phenomenon' or 'semblance', he later modifies this by noting that all of these terms presuppose a notion of 'phenomenon' as that which shows itself in itself. What, then, is the relation between 'phenomenon' and 'semblance', and how are these to be distinguished from 'appearance' and 'mere appearance'? To begin with, a phenomenon is that which shows itself in itself, and a semblance is that which shows itself as something it is not. For Heidegger, the fact that something can show itself as something it is not presupposes that it can show itself in itself. There is a privative relation between phenomenon and semblance, or a semblance is a deficient mode of a phenomenon. A semblance seems by not showing itself as what it is. Dasein's ontical mode of seeming is a deficient way of manifesting its ontological being. It is because of this interrelation between phenomenon and semblance that Heidegger is able to pursue his project at all. Heidegger can begin with the ontical mode of Dasein fully confident that it conceals Dasein's ontological nature.<sup>4</sup> For example. Dasein's ontical mode of dealing with death is to treat it as if it were a specific point in time. Heidegger will ultimately argue that this misconstrues Dasein's ontological relation with death, which is not a relation to a specific point in time in the indefinite future, but Dasein's relation to its own finitude that continually stretches it ahead of itself to the impossibility of its possibilities.

The difference between semblance and appearance and mere appearance turns on the distinction between the privative 'not' of the relation between semblance and phenomenon and the 'not' which relates appearance and mere appearance to phenomenon. The 'not' which characterises appearance and mere appearance is indicative of a 'reference-relationship' within the entity itself. As an example of the reference-relationship Heidegger has in mind here, he discusses the relationship between a symptom and a disease (although he broadens the list to include all types of reference relations, 'all indications, presentations, symptoms, and symbols'). Take the symptoms of a cold, for example. Stuffy head, runny nose, aching body, cough, etc., are all indications that one has a cold. These symptoms are the appearances of a cold. In this appearing of the cold, however, the cold itself never appears. The cold indicates its presence through these symptoms, but it never shows itself. There is, then, a reference-relationship between the cold and its symptoms. The cold announces itself through the symptoms, and the symptoms refer back to the cold, but the symptoms themselves neither show nor conceal the cold. A semblance, on the other hand, seems to be one thing when it is in fact another. Its seeming conceals the phenomenon, which makes the 'not showing' of the semblance a privation. Thus, we see that 'not showing' of an appearance is not the same kind of 'not showing' as a semblance.<sup>5</sup>

Heidegger points to a further complication in the taxonomy of 'phenomenon' in his discussion of 'mere appearance'. Mere appearance is the further radicalisation of appearance. A mere appearance is a reference relation in which what is referred to can never be made manifest. What Heidegger has in mind here is the relation between an appearance and a thing-in-itself of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. According to Kant, from the fact of the appearance we must deduce the existence of a thing-in-itself that makes the appearance possible. The thing-in-itself, however, never appears and can never appear. Heidegger does not return to this notion of 'mere appearance', but he does want to indicate the difference between his use of *Erscheinung* and Kant's use of *Erscheinung*, in order to show that he will not be performing a transcendental deduction of Dasein's ontological way of being, but allowing it to show itself.<sup>6</sup>

A phenomenon is thus a very complex notion for Heidegger. Its primary meaning is that which shows itself as itself. At the same time, however, a phenomenon can show itself as something that it is not. This 'not showing' that Heidegger calls a semblance is a deficient way in which an entity can show itself. Related to these main senses of phenomenon are other ways of 'not showing' that Heidegger designates as 'appearance' and 'mere appearance'. What distinguishes these ways of 'not showing' is that they are not deficient or privative ways of 'not showing'. Rather, they are ways of 'not showing' in which what shows itself through this appearing either does not appear (as in the case of 'appearance') or can never appear (as in the case of 'mere appearance'). What is most important for the progress of phenomenology as a method in all these instances, however, is that all of them are dependent on an understanding of 'phenomenon' as that which shows itself. Without this primary understanding of phenomenon the other derivative meanings as privative and negative manifestations of that which shows itself would be impossible.7

After presenting what he means by 'phenomenon' Heidegger turns to the other half of the word 'phenomenology' to explore ' $\lambda \dot{0} \gamma o \zeta$ '.  $\Lambda \dot{0} \gamma o \zeta$  is translated in an unusually broad number of ways, such as 'reason, judgement, concept, definition, ground, or relationship'. If we return to Plato and Aristotle in order to bring this word under control, give it more strictly defined parameters, we find that there is no one clear sense of the word in these texts. This confusion about  $\lambda \dot{0} \gamma o \zeta$ , however, is a 'semblance' according to Heidegger, who is here employing a distinction from his discussion of 'phenomenon'. The basic signification of  $\lambda \dot{0} \gamma o \zeta$  is 'discourse' (*Rede*) for Heidegger. If, however, we do not understand why  $\lambda \delta \gamma o \zeta$  is to be interpreted as 'discourse', then we are no closer to understanding what it is. Heidegger accordingly indicates that 'discourse' here means the same as  $\delta n \lambda o \hat{v}$ , 'to make clear'. To explicate this further Heidegger cites Aristotle's De Interpretatione approvingly, that the function of discourse is  $\dot{\alpha}\pi\sigma\sigma\sigma$  iver  $\sigma$  between Heidegger's understanding of 'phenomenon', which comes from  $\varphi \alpha i \nu \epsilon \sigma \theta \alpha i$  'that which shows itself', and 'discourse', which has the function of  $\dot{\alpha}\pi \dot{0}$  +  $\omega\alpha$  ive  $\sigma\theta\alpha$ . 'that from which that which shows itself shows itself'. The function of discourse is thus the means that allows that which the discourse is about ('phenomenon') to be made clear or manifest. For example, the phenomenon to be discussed in the first half of *Being* and Time is Dasein. As a phenomenon Dasein will show itself from itself. The discourse about this phenomenon is the means by which this phenomenon shows itself. Heidegger allows Dasein to show itself by his discourse about it in Being and Time.<sup>8</sup>

Above Heidegger noted that all the other determinations of  $\lambda \dot{0} \gamma o \zeta$ were a semblance. If that is the case, then what Heidegger must show is how all of the other determinations of  $\lambda \dot{0} \gamma 0 \zeta$  are privations of this foundational sense. In order to show this Heidegger states that the apophantic *function* of discourse is made possible by its *structure* as σύνθεσις. What Heidegger means by 'synthesis' here is the binding of two things when something is seen as something. Thus, when the fourlegged, furry animal in the backyard is seen as a dog, a binding occurs which links together the phenomenon of the animal and my pointing to the animal by saying, 'This is a dog'. This synthetic structure of discourse that binds one thing to another by virtue of a 'taking as' may either reveal the phenomenon for what it really is or conceal its true nature. For example, throughout the history of philosophy,  $\lambda \dot{0} \gamma o \zeta$  has been bound to determinations such as 'reason, judgement, concept, definition, ground, or relationship'. All of these determinations are semblances of the proper interpretation of  $\lambda \dot{0} \gamma 0 \zeta$ , discourse. In these prior cases the binding that occurred was a covering up of the true nature of  $\lambda \dot{0} \gamma 0 \zeta$ . This possibility of covering or uncovering a phenomenon is the primary meaning of  $\dot{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ , or truth.<sup>9</sup>

Now that Heidegger has clearly indicated what he means by 'phenomenon' as that which shows itself in itself, and 'logos' as that from which that which shows itself shows itself, he is prepared to place these terms together in a preliminary conception of 'phenomenology' as the method most appropriate to this investigation. He begins by noting (as we saw above) the connection between 'phenomenon' and 'apophansis' in Greek. One could convert 'phenomenology' into the phrase  $\dot{\alpha}\pi\sigma\phi\alpha$ ive $\sigma\theta\alpha$ i tà  $\phi\alpha$ iv $\dot{\mu}$ evov which Heidegger translates as 'to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself'.<sup>10</sup> For Heidegger this understanding of phenomenology is nothing more than the simple maxim, 'To the things themselves!'<sup>11</sup>

Heidegger's brief description of method in the Introduction to *Being* and Time is perhaps not altogether satisfying. I would like to supplement the rather cumbersome description of phenomenology as letting 'that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself' with a brief discussion from some of his works from the same period. Heidegger is attempting to do two things in the dense passage from the Introduction. He is trying to work with the concept of 'intentionality' as articulated by his mentor, Husserl, and he is trying to connect this notion of intentionality with the thought of Aristotle. Heidegger explicitly addresses the notion of intentionality and its history in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. For both Husserl and Heidegger humans exist as 'intending an object'. That is, to put it in classical Husserlian terms - and terms that Heideger ultimately finds unsatisfying - consciousness is always consciousness of .... It is at this point that Heidegger begins to work through Aristotle as a means of clarifying what intentionality or 'consciousness of . . .' might mean. Heidegger takes 'intentionality' to be equivalent to Aristotle's notion of 'truth' ( $\dot{\alpha}\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ ). As we saw above, Heidegger understands this Greek conception of truth to mean 'showing as', or 'letting be seen as'. The fundamental difficulty that Heidegger raises with regard to this conception of intentionality is that it remains ungrounded. What must the structure of human existence be if it is fundamentally intentional? Ultimately, Heidegger will respond that intentionality must be grounded in 'transcendence'.

What, though, does Heidegger mean by 'transcendence'? He notes that both Aristotle and Husserl rightly indicate the intentional nature of human existence, but both fail to ground it. Thus Heidegger distinguishes between the openness that Dasein has towards entities in the world (that is, intentionality) and the fundamental structure of Dasein as openness (that is, transcendence) that grounds intentionality. For Heidegger an entity can be intentional only to the degree that it ex-ists; that is, only to the degree that it has the structure of standing outside of itself, or extending beyond itself. Dasein is such an entity. Dasein exists. It exists as that entity that continually stretches ahead of itself into its future. We will see below that in *Being* and *Time* Heidegger calls this existence of Dasein 'being towards death'.

Heidegger calls this stretching beyond itself 'transcendence'. 'Self and world belong together; they belong to the unity of the constitution of Dasein and, with equal originality, they determine the "subject".'<sup>12</sup> Because Dasein is that entity that transcends, it is possible for Dasein to have an intentional relation to the world, or 'intentionality is founded in Dasein's transcendence'.<sup>13</sup> Thus Heidegger understands phenomenology as that which allows us to 'let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself', but more importantly Heidegger shows that phenomenology can only be a method if it presupposes the transcendence of Dasein. It is this articulation of the structure of Dasein as 'standing outside of itself', as 'being towards death' as 'transcendence' as that which grounds intentionality that is Heidegger's primary concern in *Being and Time*.

In this summary of phenomenology Heidegger sees a significant difference from other sciences which appear similar insofar as their names have a similar construction (for example, theology, biology, anthropology, etc.). In the case of the other sciences the first half of the name indicates the object (or *what*) to be studied. In the case of phenomenology, on the other hand, the name only proposes a method (or how).<sup>14</sup> This is not to say that phenomenology has no unique subject matter, however. Heidegger's overall objective in Being and Time is to uncover the meaning of being, but our objective here is to articulate the methodological role that death plays. Heidegger argues that the true phenomenon of death is concealed by everyday practices and rituals that surround death. A careful phenomenological analysis of these practices can dig through this sedimentation and reveal the true phenomenon of death. For example, the avoidance of death is an indication of anxiety about one's finitude, and anxiety, for Heidegger, reveals not the fear of a future event, but the fact that our daily existence is founded on this basic relation to death.<sup>15</sup>

Since it is the task of phenomenology to uncover phenomena, Heidegger briefly explores the ways in which a phenomenon might be covered. A phenomenon might be hidden simply because it has never been discovered. Also, a phenomenon might have been discovered at some point, but then hidden again through the accumulation of semblances on top of it. This second possibility is what Heidegger thinks has happened with being. We can also place the hiddenness of phenomena on a continuum. It is not necessary to think of phenomena as simply hidden or unhidden. A phenomenon may be more or less hidden, leaving semblances of itself here or there. Again, Heidegger sees this as the case with death. A proper understanding of death is mostly hidden, and what manifests itself does so through a system of semblances that have been bound to it through a history of ontologies and practices. Finally, why a phenomenon becomes hidden may be either accidental or structurally necessary. As an example of the hiddenness of a phenomenon being structurally necessary, we can look at the way Heidegger understands death. When, through the everyday practices surrounding death, it was conceived as a future event to be feared, the very structure of this understanding of death necessitated its hiddenness. These semblances that attached to death precluded the possibility that the primary meaning of death would reveal itself.<sup>16</sup>

As we will see below, Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of everyday experience reveals death as something fundamentally hidden from experience. The image that suggests itself is of a palaeontologist who painstakingly removes layer upon layer of sediment finally to uncover what lies buried underneath. In this case, however, the sediment that has accrued is the layers of practice and common ways of speaking about death that conceal more than they reveal. Heidegger burrows through the accretions of common practice to find a death that not only must be embraced, but is, in fact, constitutive of who we are.

In his conceptual analysis of death Heidegger presents the reader of Being and Time with a phalanx of distinctions designed carefully to delimit what he means by the term 'death' and how that differs from other related terms, such as 'perishing' and 'demising'.<sup>17</sup> As we saw briefly above, Heidegger's death analytic occupies the centre of Being and Time and represents a transition from his analysis of human existence to his analysis of human existence as explicitly temporal. In order to make this transition, the purpose of the death analytic is to show that he has grasped human existence in its totality. In order to grasp something in its totality, one must be able to see its limits, determine where it begins and ends. This concern with totality, however, immediately raises a problem. Heidegger concludes in Division One of Being and Time that the kind of being that Dasein has is 'care' (Sorge).<sup>18</sup> Care is defined as the way in which Dasein lives ahead of itself into its possibilities. For Dasein to be constituted as possibility means that something always remains outstanding for

Dasein. For example, if a biochemist is constituted by her possibilities, then in the tasks she is pursuing something always remains undone until the task is complete. That which remains undone stretches the biochemist ahead of herself into her possibilities. Even if the biochemist were to complete all of her tasks, this does not mean that she no longer lives ahead of herself into her possibilities. Dasein exists as possibility such that there is a fundamental lack in its constitution. If something always remains undone, though, how is it possible to grasp Dasein in its totality? There never seems to be a point at which Dasein is complete so that it can be grasped in its totality. It is with these difficulties in mind that Heidegger examines Dasein's relation to death as a possible way of grasping Dasein in its totality.<sup>19</sup>

While the kind of being that Dasein has is care, which makes it seem impossible to grasp it in its totality. Dasein is also with others. Perhaps the fact that its world includes others like it provides a means to grasp Dasein as a whole. While death marks the end of our being a possibility in the world and as such marks the end of our being Dasein, while we are in the world, we continually see those around us dving. Heidegger raises the possibility that the death of others might provide a means to grasp Dasein in its totality. What exactly do we experience in the death of others? The first thing we experience is the recognition that Dasein is no longer in the world. To say that Dasein is no longer in the world, however, is not to say that at death Dasein vanishes. Rather, when Dasein dies, it no longer has a world, that is, it is no longer surrounded by its equipment or with others like it, and it no longer has the possibility of being itself. No longer having a world certainly means that the deceased is no longer Dasein, but the deceased is not without being. The deceased moves from having the being of Dasein to having the being of a corpse. A corpse is somewhat like a thing in that it is an entity we encounter that is not related to our tasks. A corpse, however, differs from a thing in many important ways. In a corpse we do not encounter a lifeless thing, but something that was alive but lost that life. We mourn for the deceased. We have funeral rites. We remember the deceased. This indicates that the corpse is also not equipment that we relate to concernfully. We relate to the corpse as something that is still with us. Our relation to the deceased remains one of solicitude, the way we relate to others like us.<sup>20</sup>

Regardless of the numerous ways in which we are with the dead, none of these entails experiencing what the deceased experienced. In all of the mourning and commemoration we never experience the end of Dasein. We certainly experience loss, and the way in which our being with the deceased changes because of death, but we never experience the death of another Dasein. Initially, this seems to run counter to the way in which we normally relate to others like us. For the most part the fact that there are others like us entails the possibility that they can represent us in one facet or another of our world. For example, if one day I am too ill to teach my philosophy class, I can contact a colleague and ask if he can lecture to my class about Plato. If he is available, there is no reason why he cannot represent me before my class and lecture about Plato. This is not to say that my colleague will do the lecture as I would. He may do it better. Or he may do it worse. What is important is that he can stand in for me with almost no disruption to the class. The class will notice (one would hope) that it is not me in front of them. At the same time, however, they will treat my substitute much in the same way they treat me.21

This ability to represent others, however, does not extend to death. What would it mean for someone to represent me in my death? How is this possible? In the case of my colleague taking over a lecture from me, his representation means that I do not have to give that particular lecture. If in a particular situation someone were to die on my behalf, however, the situation is not analogous. Somebody dying on my behalf does not mean that I never die. At best it only postpones it. My death, then, is something that only I can do for myself. No one else can do it for me. Thus, even though being with others is essential to Dasein and in most cases others can represent Dasein, death is not one of those cases.<sup>22</sup>

Since the death of others does not provide us with an understanding of Dasein as a totality, Heidegger moves to an examination of different modes of ending to understand death better. In order to talk about what it means for Dasein to end, Heidegger first discusses what it means for Dasein to have something still outstanding. If Dasein is constituted as a possibility, then there always remains something which Dasein is not yet, but what is the nature of this? If the moon is only half-full tonight, then in a couple of weeks it will be full again. Tonight, though, the moon is not yet full, and the other half of it remains outstanding. Is it possible that Dasein relates to that which it is not yet in the same way that we relate to a half-full moon? For Heidegger this is clearly not the case for Dasein. The moon in its totality always exists. What we see when we see the moon not yet full is a failure of our ability to grasp the moon in its totality when part of it is obscured by the earth's shadow. This 'not yet' is an epistemological problem. The 'not yet' of Dasein is an ontological problem. Grasping Dasein in its totality is a matter of grasping the kind of being that Dasein has.<sup>23</sup>

As we have seen, Dasein is possibility, but to grasp that possibility as a totality Heidegger must understand the type of ending Dasein has. The first mode of ending he examines is fulfilling. In order to illustrate fulfilment Heidegger uses an example of fruit ripening. What is the relation between a fruit that is unripe and the fruit that it will be when it achieves ripeness? How does the fruit become ripe? Can anything be added to the fruit to make it ripe? The fruit does not become ripe by the addition of any *thing* to it. The fruit becomes ripe by itself. When the fruit does become ripe we say that the fruit has fulfilled itself. That which was not yet ripe is now ripe. The fruit has actualised itself. It has brought itself to completion. It has fulfilled itself. In this sense the fruit is already its ripeness, even though it is not yet ripe. However the fruit becomes ripe it becomes it within itself.<sup>24</sup>

Insofar as the fruit is already its not yet, it is like Dasein. The analogy breaks down, however, when we compare the ripeness of the fruit with the death of Dasein. Even though the fruit is already its not yet, when the fruit finally achieves its ripeness it is said to be fulfilled. In ripeness the fruit actualises its possibilities. When Dasein reaches its end in death, however, it is not considered the fulfilment of Dasein. Death is not the actualisation of Dasein's possibilities; it is merely the cessation of those possibilities. Dasein can die regardless of whether its possibilities are completed or not. Thus, even though an unripe fruit and Dasein are alike in that they are both already their not yet, more importantly Dasein is not like an unripe fruit because in death Dasein does not achieve anything like fulfilment. Rather, it only loses its possibilities.<sup>25</sup>

The next mode of ending that Heidegger examines is stopping. If Dasein does not actualise any of its possibilities in its death, perhaps stopping is the mode of ending which is more appropriate to it. Stopping can, according to Heidegger, have several senses depending on whether one is talking about equipment or a thing. One may speak of equipment like a road as stopping, for example. One may also speak of a thing like a rainstorm stopping. This type of ending may or may not include fulfilment. One can imagine a road that is not yet completed which simply stops. In this case it seems that ending includes those things which stop before their fulfilment and things which are completed in their fulfilment.<sup>26</sup> The final mode of ending which Heidegger discusses is disappearing. When the rain ends, it disappears, unlike the road which remains, even though it ends prematurely. When food is at an end it too disappears. None of these modes of ending (fulfilment, stopping, disappearing) is adequate to Dasein. The problem with each of these modes of ending is that to understand the type of ending appropriate to Dasein in this way would be to understand Dasein as either a thing or equipment. Dasein is not fulfilled in death. Dasein neither simply stops nor disappears at its end. What, then, is the type of ending which is appropriate to Dasein? The type of end that is appropriate to Dasein is the ending that is a part of its way of being from the very beginning. Just as Dasein is always its not yet, it is also its end.<sup>27</sup>

In this examination of ending Heidegger has only accomplished a negative understanding of the kind of ending that is appropriate to Dasein. Whatever Dasein's ending is it is inseparable from Dasein's being and it is not the type of ending that is appropriate to equipment or things. Dasein has a unique kind of being and thus a unique kind of ending. This negative investigation of ending, however, does prepare Heidegger to distinguish further his ontological conception of ending from other possible conceptions of ending.<sup>28</sup>

Other conceptions of death have tended to treat death as a phenomenon of life. This way of understanding death confuses several important issues. In order to clarify these Heidegger makes a distinction among 'perishing', 'demising' and 'dying'. Since Heidegger is so adamant about the distinction between Dasein and other kinds of entities, he labels the ending of anything that lives other than Dasein as perishing. Dasein never perishes. What Dasein does do, however, is demise. Demising marks the end of Dasein's being in the world. Dying, in contrast to both perishing and demising, is Dasein's way of being in the world. As we saw above, Dasein has a unique relation to its end which it already is. This way in which Dasein projects itself towards its ultimate demise Heidegger calls dying.<sup>29</sup>

In Division One of *Being and Time*, Heidegger's analysis of everyday Dasein culminated in the uncovering of care as its defining structure. In Heidegger's analysis of death we have seen that death is certainly the end of Dasein's being in the world, but that conceiving of the distinctive nature of this end has proved elusive. Whatever this end is it cannot be conceived of in the same way that we conceive of either equipment or things ending. Furthermore, this conception of ending must take into account not only the distinction between

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perishing and demising, but in order for it to be complete it must take into account the distinction between demising and dying. Since dying is the unique way in which Dasein is already its end, Heidegger moves to analyse the relation between Dasein's unique way of ending and its unique way of being, care.

Care is a complex term that encompasses the structure of Dasein's existence. Care covers the fact that Dasein has a world, that it flees from itself into the world of its concern, and that Dasein is always ahead of itself. This structure is best summarised by saying that Dasein is possibility. Above, we saw that in trying to grasp Dasein as possibility in its totality this is one instance in which Dasein cannot be represented by another (at least according to Heidegger). From this there are several things that can be concluded about death. First, death is Dasein's ownmost (*eigenste*) possibility. Regardless of the specific possibilities that Dasein pursues in the world, Dasein is always pursuing its own death. This is not to say that Dasein always thinks about death, or has an unconscious death wish, or is suicidal. Rather, the fact that Dasein is already dying says that given the kind of being Dasein is, as long as it lives, death is always its possibility.<sup>30</sup>

The second thing that can be concluded about the relation between death and the type of ending that is appropriate to Dasein is that death is unsurpassable. In saying this Heidegger is not making any claims about life after death. All he is saying is that death is something that Dasein cannot circumvent. When Dasein dies, regardless of whether there is anything like life after death or an immortal soul, it passes from a Dasein which is in the world to something which is no longer in the world. A Dasein without a world is a Dasein without equipment to be concerned about or tasks to accomplish. In short, death is the end of Dasein as possibility. Whether another kind of entity exists beyond this is not Heidegger's concern here. Death marks the end of Dasein as Dasein and is thus unsurpassable.<sup>31</sup>

The final thing that can be concluded at this point about the relation between death and care is that death is non-relational. When we saw that in death Dasein could not be represented by another Dasein, we saw the non-relational character of death. Death is profoundly individuating for Dasein. No relation to equipment or others can remove Dasein's encounter with its own death. It is important to note that just like the individualisation that occurs with anxiety, this is not a reduction to a kind of transcendental ego. It is rather the recognition that death as the ending that is appropriate to Dasein is not something that can be experienced or represented on behalf of others. If death is the fundamental possibility that Heidegger claims it is, then according to his phenomenological method it must manifest itself, however obliquely, as a semblance in familiar ways of speaking and acting. In order to show the way in which death is manifest in common parlance, Heidegger analyses what is commonly said about death. Usually they (*das 'Man'*) say, 'everybody dies, but not right now'. Initially it seems that this recognition that everybody dies is an acknowledgement of dying as fundamental to Dasein's existence. When we further analyse the statement we see that this is not the case. Take the first part of the phrase 'everybody dies'. For Heidegger, this is a way of avoiding death. Who exactly do they have in mind when they say, 'everybody dies'? It is not me. It is not you. It is not they. It seems that it is in fact always somebody else who dies.<sup>32</sup>

Furthermore, it seems that death is all around us. Our friends and family die. We hear reports of strangers dying. It seems that death is the most common thing one can encounter. Trying to understanding death through the death of others is in strict opposition to Heidegger's earlier analysis of death. Death, as my most fundamental possibility that is unsurpassable and non-relational, is simply not the sort of thing I can encounter in the death of others. What is commonly said about death treats death as if it were a thing one could encounter within the world, rather than as Dasein's ultimate possibility. Treating death in this way results in an ambiguous relation towards it. On the one hand, death is the most common thing imaginable. As is commonly said, 'only death and taxes are certain'. On the other hand, death is something to be avoided or covered up. When we talk to someone who is dying, our first impulse is to reassure him that he will not die. This constant reassurance that everybody dies but everybody is not me tranquillises everyday Dasein into avoiding any real confrontation with death, a confrontation that would include the recognition that Dasein is always dying, that death is its ultimate possibility. At the same time any attempt to think about one's death as profoundly unique and certain is met with approbation by everyone else. Thinking this way is considered morbid, or even cowardly. As a result of this, Dasein is continually tranquillised and brought back into the comfort of what they say about death. This tranquillisation makes anxiety in the face of death impossible.<sup>33</sup>

In the analysis of 'everybody dies' we saw that they acknowledge something like a certainty about death. It would be foolish to deny our mortality when it is so plainly demonstrated every day. This certainty, however, gets covered up in the ambiguity with which they

speak about death. Certainly everybody dies, but not me, not right now anyway. The other problem with this kind of certainty about death is that it is only an empirical certainty. The obviousness that everybody dies only stems from our acquaintance with the death of others. While this empirical certainty is of such a high degree that no one doubts it, it still falls short of the certainty that Heidegger is articulating here. Dasein is Dasein only because one of its possibilities is the end of its possibilities. The fact that it is said that 'everybody dies, but not right now' indicates that death does not have the kind of certainty about death that is appropriate to Dasein. This certainty is covered by the second half of the phrase, 'but not right now'. The certainty that is appropriate to Dasein concerning its own death recognises that death could come at any time, even right now. This certainty is also coupled with an indefiniteness concerning when Dasein might die. Death may come at any time, even right now. Since everyday Dasein has neither the appropriate certainty nor the appropriate indefiniteness concerning its death, what is the nature of the definiteness that it has concerning its death? The definiteness it has regarding its death is certainly not anything like a calculation of the date of its demise. Everyday Dasein would certainly flee from this knowledge in the same way that it flees from the knowledge that it is constituted as already dving. Rather, everyday Dasein has definiteness in its absorption in everyday tasks. The price everyday Dasein pays for this definiteness, however, is the covering up of the fact that it is already handed over to death and that death may come at any time.<sup>34</sup>

With the addition of certainty and indefiniteness to his analysis of death Heidegger adds the final pieces to his picture of death and its relation to Dasein. Death is Dasein's most fundamental possibility that cannot be surpassed, is non-relational, certain and indefinite. All of these characteristics comprise the complex phenomenon of death which Dasein continually encounters as long as it is Dasein.<sup>35</sup>

At this point Heidegger turns from his mining of our usual way of speaking about and acting towards death to articulate what he considers appropriate relation to one's own dying. We have already seen that death is characterised as Dasein's ownmost possibility that is unsurpassable, non-relational, certain and indefinite. What remains to be seen, however, is Dasein's appropriate relation to death. Death is Dasein's possibility, and if it is to comport itself appropriately towards it, Dasein must relate to it as it does a possibility. Dasein normally comports itself to a possibility by expecting the actualisation of it. For example, completing this book is contained within the possibility of writing it. The mere fact that I begin this book means that I reach ahead to a point at which it will be completed. The actualisation of the book is contained within its possibility.

Death, however, is not like any other possibility. Dasein cannot expect it in the way that it expects its other possibilities. In writing this book, for example, I continually approach its completion until it is completed. Death by contrast is not a possibility that can be actualised. While Dasein certainly dies, the moment that it dies it is no longer Dasein, and while death is Dasein's ownmost possibility, it is a possibility that Dasein cannot actualise. Dasein may continually expect death, but there is nothing that it can do to bring it any closer. Death is the limit of Dasein's possibilities. It is 'the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein'.<sup>36</sup> Heidegger calls this peculiar way that Dasein expects death 'anticipation'. Dasein anticipates its death not by making it actual but by recognising that death marks the end of Dasein as possibility. Paradoxically, the more that Dasein understands this possibility the more Dasein understands the impossibility of it being actualised. In anticipation death reveals itself to be immeasurable. There is no approximation of death by degrees. One does not sneak up on death and seize it. Rather, death is something that may come at any time, and Dasein is always already directed towards it.37

At this point Heidegger is ready to take all of the facets of death that he previously discussed and show what it would be for Dasein to relate to death appropriately, that is to anticipate its death. Death is Dasein's most fundamental possibility. When it understands this in keeping with the kind of entity that it is, it means that it can extract itself from common ways of speaking about and acting towards death. Insofar as anticipating death is a possibility, it is possible that Dasein is no longer under the sway of these usual practices. For the most part, however, the possibility of authentically anticipating its death reveals that Dasein is already beholden to these common modes of dealing with death.<sup>38</sup>

As we saw above, death is also non-relational. To relate to this aspect of death authentically means that Dasein understands that no one can represent it in its death. Death takes hold of Dasein in a way that none of its other possibilities can. Death profoundly individualises Dasein. When Dasein's own existence is at issue in anticipation, it recognises that neither its equipment nor others will be able to help or circumvent death. Anticipation forces Dasein to face death squarely, without the support of anyone but itself. Facing death appropriately means that Dasein must do so without recourse to expected actions.<sup>39</sup>

Death is also unsurpassable. To face the unsurpassable character of death in keeping with the kind of entity Dasein is, is to recognise that death cannot be circumvented. Regardless of how deeply Dasein becomes involved in its concerns as a means of forgetting death, death can still come at any moment. Facing death appropriately means that all of one's tasks are bounded by death. There is no escape from death. Dasein is ineluctably mortal. Understanding the unsurpassable character of death is freeing for Dasein. If instead of listening to what is said about death, which forces one to escape into the world of one's concern to avoid death, one accepts the already dying character of human existence, then one is free for one's possibilities. If Dasein is driven to its absorption in the world by an avoidance of death, it is not really free to choose its possibilities. It is rather chained to its possibilities. Authentic Dasein, on the other hand, since it is not driven to its possibilities to avoid death but faces death, can choose its possibilities not out of avoidance but freedom.<sup>40</sup>

To illustrate how facing the unsurpassability of death frees Dasein for its possibilities, we can imagine a group of people living in a field on top of a cliff. The edge of the cliff is, for all intents and purposes, the boundaries of that group's world. Since falling off the cliff represents certain death, the group begins to avoid the edge of the cliff. Eventually, the area around the edge of the cliff becomes overgrown until it is no longer clear that the field lies on the edge of a cliff at all. Now it is no longer the edge of the cliff that forms the boundary for this group of people but the beginning of the overgrowth. We can imagine that stories arise about what lies in and beyond the overgrowth, but that entering it is taboo. The possibilities for living in this community are thus determined by the avoidance of the edge of the cliff, not by the edge of the cliff itself. It is only when someone recognises that the edge of the cliff represents the limits of possibility on the cliff that he or she is free for the possibilities of living on the cliff. For Heidegger living in fear of death limits Dasein's possibilities. Only by accepting its finitude can Dasein see all of its possibilities as possibilities.

Not only is death Dasein's most fundamental, non-relational possibility that is unsurpassable. Death is also certain. We have seen that Dasein usually avoids the certainty of its death by saying, 'everybody dies, but not right now'. While this lends a kind of certainty to Dasein's understanding of death, it is merely empirical certainty. As an empirical certainty death remains for Dasein a thing in the world that continually approaches but never quite arrives. By contrast, Dasein that is acting appropriately treats death as a fundamental possibility of existence. Dying is simply the way Dasein is. The way to relate to oneself as a possibility appropriately is anticipation. The certainty of anticipation outstrips any kind of empirical certainty and recognises that Dasein only is as dying.<sup>41</sup>

The final characteristic of death is indefiniteness. Dasein, for the most part, avoids the fact that death may come at any time by absorbing itself in its tasks. To face the indefiniteness of death appropriately would require Dasein constantly to face the fact that it is already dying. We saw above how Dasein can face this fact only through anticipation. Only in anticipation does Dasein recognise itself as a possibility. This recognition of Dasein as possibility forces Dasein to open itself up to the constant threat of death. This constant threat of death, however, is nothing more than Dasein's way of being. Dasein itself is the constant threat of death, since that is the way its being is constituted.<sup>42</sup>

Given the way that death impinges on every aspect of existence for Dasein, its importance for understanding *Being and Time* is undeniable. It is important for Heidegger that the death of Dasein be distinguished from the death of any other kind of entity. In order to set Dasein apart, Heidegger makes the distinction between perishing, demising and dying. Only Dasein dies. By this Heidegger means that only Dasein is constituted as continually threatened with its own death. Furthermore, Dasein properly relates to its death as its ownmost possibility, that is non-relational, unsurpassable, certain and indefinite.

At this point we can see in a preliminary way what sets Heidegger's account of death apart. For Heidegger death is an internal self-relation. Heidegger's account of death focuses on the individual's relation to death and the way in which Dasein is *individualised* by death. For Heidegger death is what Dasein can never have done with. Death is incorporated as the very condition around which Dasein acts. Dasein's energy for the most part is taken up with avoiding its own death. As we will see in the next chapter, however, there are points at which cracks appear in the crypt within which Dasein has entombed itself. The mood of anxiety, in particular, is a point at which Dasein is forced to face the way in which its experience is organised around its own death. In the language of Abraham and Torok, Dasein is a classic case of melancholia. Rather than reorganising the economy of

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experience upon the loss of a libidinal object, Dasein incorporates the lost object. As a result, the melancholic is fundamentally focused on himself, narcissistic, individualised. The crucial difference that Heidegger argues for in *Being and Time* is that this is the way that Dasein is constituted. Melancholia is not an acquired state, but a constitutive state. The conditions for the possibility of experience lie in Dasein's transcendental melancholia. Melancholia is not a psychological reaction to empirical loss, but the metaphysical ground of any possible experience. Heidegger pursues this transcendental melancholia rigorously, as we will see in the next two chapters, in his analysis of Dasein in its average everydayness and temporality.

## Notes

- 1. Rainer Maria Rilke, *The Sonnets to Orpheus* in *Prose and Poetry* (New York: Continuum, 1984).
- 2. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 17<sup>th</sup> edn (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1993), 1. All English translations will be from *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1962) unless otherwise noted. Subsequent references will use the German pagination preceded by 'SZ' since this is available in the English translation as well. See SZ, 28.
- 3. SZ, 28–9.
- 4. SZ, 29.
- 5. SZ, 29–30.
- 6. SZ, 30. See Jean-François Courtine's excellent discussion of this passage in his 'The Preliminary Conception of Phenomenology and of the Problematic of Truth in *Being and Time*', *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments*, vol. 1, ed. Christopher Macann (New York: Routledge, 1992), 75.
- 7. SZ, 31.
- 8. SZ, 32.
- 9. SZ, 33.
- 10. SZ, 34.
- 11. This was Husserl's battle-cry in his phenomenological revolution. See Courtine, 'The Preliminary Conception of Phenomenology', 80.
- 12. Martin Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1985), 298.
- 13. Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 162.
- 14. See Courtine, 73–5; and William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), 46–7.
- 15. SZ, 35–6.

- 16. SZ, 36.
- 17. There is no shortage of commentary on the death analytic. The commentary divides into roughly two camps: expository and critical. The best exposition of Heidegger's death analytic is Françoise Dastur, Death: An Essay on Finitude, trans. John Llewelyn (London: Athlone, 1996). Richardson's Through Phenomenology to Thought (74-6) also presents an incisive exposition. See also Hervé Pasqua, Introduction à la lecture de Être et Temps du Martin Heidegger, (Lausanne: Éditions L'Age d'Homme, 1993), 103-6. Criticism of Heidegger's position on death are also quite prevalent. Jean-Paul Sartre presents an early, wellknown criticism of the death analytic in Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1956), 680-707. Emmanuel Levinas in Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 56-7 and 232-5, attacks Heidegger for his conflation of death and end. My task in this section is to present Heidegger's argument in the death analytic as clearly as possible. I will reserve my criticisms of it until Chapters 3, 6 and 9.
- 18. SZ, 193-6.
- 19. SZ, 233–6.
- 20. SZ, 237–9.
- 21. SZ, 239.
- 22. SZ, 240. Jean Paul Sartre argues in *Being and Nothingness* (Trans. Hagel Barnes, New York: Washington Square Press, 683–6) that, given the way that Heidegger describes death as 'in every case mine', this is not a sufficient condition to separate it from other things that are in every case mine. As a result, Heidegger's substitution thesis fails to distinguish death in the way that he intends it to. I am sympathetic with Sartre's reading here, and I will argue in Chapter 3 that Heidegger excludes being with others much too quickly as a result of a failure in the substitution thesis.
- 23. SZ, 243.
- 24. SZ, 243-4.
- 25. SZ, 244.
- 26. SZ, 244–5.
- 27. SZ, 245.
- 28. SZ, 246. In *Totality and Infinity* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969, 56–7) Emmanuel Levinas argues that Heidegger leaves the connection between ending and death unargued for.
- 29. SZ, 246-7.
- 30. SZ, 250.
- 31. SZ, 250–1.
- 32. SZ, 252–3.
- 33. SZ, 254–5.
- 34. SZ, 255-6.

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35. SZ, 259.
 36. SZ, 250.
 37. SZ, 262.
 38. SZ, 263.
 39. SZ, 263-4.
 40. SZ, 264.
 41. SZ, 264-5.
 42. SZ, 265-6.

# Projections of Death

If uneasiness comes over him and threatens to develop into melancholia . . . he asks himself whether his anxiety has an object.

Kant<sup>1</sup>

In order to argue that death is one of the conditions for the possibility of experience, we need first to examine the nature of Dasein's experience. Having established this, I will argue that Dasein's experience is made possible by death. In Division One of Being and Time Heidegger is attempting to articulate Dasein in what he calls its 'average everydayness'. Given the usual way we go about things, can we discern a structure which accounts for our particular way of being? Heidegger answers that we can, in fact, discern such a structure, and the name of that structure is 'care' (Sorge). Care, however, has many constituent parts, each of which points to a particular space that Dasein inhabits. Care, however, does not arise immediately in Being and Time. The analysis of care as Dasein's way of being is the result of the entirety of Heidegger's analysis in Division One. The first chapter of Division One simply introduces the analytic of Dasein and distinguishes it as more primordial than other analyses of human existence, such as anthropology, psychology or biology. In the second chapter Heidegger introduces the conception of 'being in the world' as Dasein's basic state. As we saw in the previous chapter, Dasein cannot be properly conceived as an isolated subject encountering isolated objects. Rather, Dasein must be thought of as that entity that has world, that is, an entity that simply is its relation to equipment (Zeug, a technical term I will clarify below) which it uses for accomplishing its tasks and its relation to other Dasein. Chapter 3 details Heidegger's analysis of world. It is here we discover the transcendental nature of melancholia for Heidegger. As we will see below, the world that Dasein inhabits is not the world of the geometer or the physicist, but simply the relations by which Dasein is surrounded by its equipment and other Dasein. In fact, Heidegger will go as far as to say that the abstract world of the geometer or the physicist is

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grounded in this more primordial notion of Dasein's world. The way in which Dasein is always already surrounded by its equipment and other Dasein Heidegger calls Dasein's environment (Umwelt). In Chapter 4 of Division One, Heidegger analyses the ways in which Dasein can relate to other Dasein. One of the ways that Dasein is in the world is with others (Mitsein). For the most part, according to Heidegger, the way in which Dasein is with others obscures the fundamental way that it relates to itself as being towards death. The way in which Heidegger argues for this comes in Chapter 5, 'Being-in as Such'. In this chapter Heidegger argues that what it means for Dasein to have a world is for Dasein always to find itself in a particular mood. In some cases – fear, for example – these moods keep Dasein absorbed in its environment. In other cases, such as boredom, these moods reveal Dasein's world to it as a whole. Occasionally, though, Dasein finds itself in a state of anxiety (Angst). In anxiety Dasein's very existence as being towards death is revealed to it. The reflexive nature of anxiety will be crucial for understanding the way in which Dasein is fundamentally melancholic. It is Heidegger's analysis of anxiety in distinction from all other moods that allows him to posit 'care' (Sorge) as the proper interpretation of Dasein's existence.

In the brief discussion of Heidegger's method above we saw that phenomenology is the method proper to philosophical analysis, because it is the only method that understands Dasein's existence as transcendence. If Being and Time interprets Dasein's existence as care, and other works from the same period articulate Dasein's existence as transcendence, what is the relation between care and transcendence? As we will see, care is defined by Heidegger as Dasein's being ahead of itself. Dasein is always stretched ahead of itself into its possibilities, into the various tasks that it is trying to accomplish, and ultimately to its own death. In the same way, transcendence is that structure of Dasein's existence that opens it up, that makes it not a solitary subject, but that entity that is its relation to the world. Dasein is that open structure that is always already in relation to its world. Thus, in both care and transcendence Heidegger is making the same point about Dasein: it is that entity that is always stepping beyond itself.

In order to articulate more fully Dasein as care, however, let us begin with Heidegger's account of everyday experience. Heidegger begins by making a distinction between equipment (*Zeug*) and things (*Dinge*).<sup>2</sup> Equipment is that which allows us to accomplish our purposes. In order to teach philosophy, for example, I need books, a

computer, paper, pens. All of these items are equipment that allows me to complete the task of teaching philosophy. Things, on the other hand, are how we look at something, not for the purpose of completing a task but to examine it, analyse it. If I take my computer keyboard, for example, and instead of typing on it, I pick it up and examine the kind of plastic it is made of and determine the height of the letters on the individual keys, this treats the keyboard as a thing and does not help me accomplish my task of teaching philosophy. It is Heidegger's contention that we are not surrounded by things but by equipment in our everyday experience.<sup>3</sup>

For Heidegger our relation to the equipment that surrounds us is one of 'concern' (Besorgen). By 'concern' Heidegger does not have in mind anything like 'worry' or 'distress'. 'Concern' is rather an ontological category indicating the way we are towards equipment. Thus, whether I use the keyboard to type an outline for a lecture or leave it untouched for several weeks in a row, both of these possibilities are ways of being concernful towards the keyboard. In the first case, I use the keyboard to help me accomplish a task. In the second, I am indifferent towards the keyboard, which Heidegger would consider a privative way of showing concern towards the keyboard.<sup>4</sup> Heidegger's claim at this point seems paradoxical. How can I be concerned with the keyboard, when I do not seem to be concerned with it at all? Concern for Heidegger is not an emotion or an action. It is an ontological possibility that partly constitutes what Dasein is. Dasein is that type of entity that can have concernful relations with its equipment. There is no content to these concernful relations. It is an ontological structure that makes any type of relation with equipment possible. One of the possible relations that I might have with my keyboard is to ignore it, or avoid it, because I do not want to work on any tasks that require its use. Even in this extreme case, insofar as being indifferent to my keyboard is one of the ways that I might be related to it, Heidegger considers this a manifestation of Dasein's ontological possibility of concern.

For Heidegger, then, part of what it means to be Dasein is to be concerned with equipment that it manipulates for the purpose of completing its tasks. Concern places Dasein in relation to something 'external' to itself. Dasein cannot complete its tasks without using the equipment that surrounds it. The way in which Heidegger describes Dasein's equipment as external to it and as surrounding it suggests a certain kind of experience. In a preliminary way we can note that this experience is dependent on Dasein's own projections. Given the way that, for Heidegger, Dasein organises the equipment that surrounds it for the purpose of completing its tasks, Dasein organises its experience according to its own designs. Dasein does not exist as a point in an absolute space. It *has* a world that is properly its own. I will argue below that death is one of the conditions for the possibility of this kind of world.<sup>5</sup>

In addition to being surrounded by equipment, we also find ourselves among entities like ourselves. We also find ourselves among other Dasein. Another facet of our everyday experience is being with others (Mitsein). We find other Dasein to have tasks and to be surrounded by equipment that allows them to complete those tasks. Their relation to their equipment is also one of concern, which may manifest itself in any number of ways. We do not relate to others for the most part, however, in the same way in which we relate to equipment. Or, Heidegger would say that to relate to others as equipment would be inappropriate insofar as it misrecognises the type of being that others have. Others exist as Dasein, not as equipment. The term that Heidegger chooses to designate our relation to others and to distinguish it from our relation to equipment is 'solicitude' (Fürsorge).<sup>6</sup> It is no accident that the terms that Heidegger uses to describe the relation to equipment (Besorgen) and others both have the same root in German, Sorge. The culmination of the analysis of Dasein's everyday experience is that it is rooted in 'care' (Sorge). The only way we can act concernfully towards equipment and solicitously towards others is that both of these relations are founded in Dasein's existence, which is best understood as 'care'.

In his discussion of solicitude Heidegger introduces an additional facet to the way in which Dasein relates to entities other than itself. Other Dasein confront Dasein as entities that cannot be properly treated as a thing or a piece of equipment. Other Dasein remain external to Dasein, and yet they do not surround Dasein as equipment for completing a task. Other Dasein have their own tasks and are surrounded by their own equipment. This facet of Dasein's world indicates that Dasein does not relate to its environment solely for the purpose of completing its projects. The world that Heidegger sees in Dasein's experience is grounded in a distinction between the type of being that Dasein has and the type of being that equipment has. The distinction in the type of being suggests two ways that Dasein relates to its environment. This suggests that Dasein has a world in which it is surrounded by its equipment but also an intersubjective world that it is irrupted by the worlds of other Dasein.<sup>7</sup>

Heidegger summarises Dasein's externality in his conception of 'world'. We have seen that Dasein's everyday experience is not constituted by an isolated subject engaging an object, but by a relation to others and equipment which allows it to accomplish its tasks. These two facets of everyday experience Heidegger calls 'world' (*Welt*). Dasein *is* only insofar as it is 'being in the world' (*In-der-Welt-sein*). What does it mean for Dasein to be in the world, though? Is not everything that Dasein encounters also 'in the world'? If they are not 'in' the world, where are they?

To answer these questions Heidegger is careful to point out that we are not to think of Dasein's being in the world in the same way that we think of biscuits in a biscuit tin. To treat Dasein in this way is to treat it merely as a thing among a totality of things. If we begin with this conception, we are already on the wrong track. Dasein (as Heidegger often reminds us) is not to be thought of as either equipment or a thing. Rather, Dasein's world is the world of equipment and other Dasein that surround it. We get much closer to the sense of world Heidegger has in mind when we think of phrases like 'the world of the biochemist'. This phrase seems to suggest a laboratory with test tubes and beakers, petri dishes, Bunsen burners, lab technicians working at benches with black surfaces. In the world of a biochemist, is the biochemist just another element, like another test tube or beaker? Clearly not. This world exists in order to help the biochemist complete her tasks. She is not one object in the totality of objects that make up the lab. The lab exists for her as the means by which she accomplishes her tasks. In addition to her equipment, however, the biochemist also encounters other scientists, maintenance workers, janitors, managers, subordinates and, perhaps, students. These entities she does not treat as a means to accomplishing her tasks. Some may assist her in accomplishing her tasks, but they do not surround her as tools in a state of readiness to serve her purposes. All of these relations taken as a whole make up the world of the biochemist. The world is the equipment that surrounds us and allows us to complete our tasks and the other Dasein we encounter.8

The conception of world that Heidegger outlines in *Being and Time* indicates that Dasein has a unique form of spatiality. Spatiality does not exhaust the concept of world for Heidegger, however. Dasein's world is also temporal, an aspect we will explore in the following chapter. When Heidegger thinks of Dasein as relating to entities external to it, he does not imagine an absolute space in which each of the totality of things may be given a spatial coordinate. Dasein's

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world has little to do with the fact of Dasein's existence on the third planet from a star in the Milky Way. An articulation of Dasein's spatiality can no more be given in terms of latitude and longitude than Dasein's temporality can be given in terms of the atomic clock at Greenwich. Dasein's spatiality is consonant with the type of being that it has. It is an entity that relates to equipment concernfully, and other Dasein solicitously. These relations constitute in part Dasein's spatiality. Thus, Dasein does not find itself in a pre-existing space, but rather as having space.

Dasein's relation to its world has an additional facet beyond its concernful and solicitous relations which can be found in Heidegger's discussion of mood. Some moods point to an external object in Dasein's world. Heidegger uses fear to illustrate this kind of mood. Some moods, however, turn Dasein inward and relate Dasein to itself. It is tempting in this structure to imagine Heidegger rethinking Kant's 'Transcendental Aesthetic' where the form of external relations is space and the form of internal relations is time. As we will see below, Heidegger rethinks time on the basis of anxiety, which is a mood that relates Dasein to itself. What is crucial for our argument, though, is the way in which Heidegger's analysis is dependent of the turning of Dasein inward on itself. The self-revelation that occurs in the fundamental mood of anxiety again points to the power of thinking Dasein as melancholic, constituted by the incorporation of its own death. Furthermore, the fact that, for Heidegger, anxiety does not refer to something outside of Dasein, but to Dasein itself, points the way towards the discussion of care, death and temporality in *Being* and Time.<sup>9</sup>

All moods have three components which Heidegger illustrates with fear: 1) 'that before which we fear', 2) fearing and 3) 'that about which we fear'. The first component is simply those things we find fearful (that is, the fearsome). Heidegger is not interested in giving a list of fearsome things, but he is interested in giving a structural account of what we might possibly fear. In order for something to be fearsome, it must first be part of Dasein's world. As we noted above, Dasein's world is populated with three kinds of entities: things, equipment and other Dasein. Whatever is fearsome must come from one of these three kinds of entities. Furthermore, detrimentality characterises the concern or solicitude that Dasein has towards the fearsome. The fearsome is also that which continually draws near, and its fearsomeness is directly proportional to its proximity. The closer that something fearsome is the more Dasein fears. Finally, because the fearsome is continually coming closer, but not yet here, it is possible that that which Dasein fears may pass by without harm. This possibility, however, exacerbates Dasein's fearfulness.<sup>10</sup> To illustrate this rather abstract structure of the fearsome we can imagine that a murderer has escaped from a nearby grison, and in his escape he has already killed two people. As another Dasein, the murderer is one of the entities we can possibly fear. Since our solicitude towards the escapee could be detrimental, our fear remains. The fact that the murderer escaped from a nearby prison heightens our fear, since the fearsome is near and could be coming closer. The fact that the escapee might not disturb us, however, does nothing to ease our fear.

After giving an account of what we fear. Heidegger moves to give an account of fearing itself. How is it that we come to fear anything at all? It is not the case that we conjure up future evils and then begin to fear them. For example, if one noted that a dangerous convict one day might escape from the nearby prison and pose a threat, one does not then conclude that in that situation it would be appropriate to fear. This is not how fearing works. It is also not the case that in fearing one analyses everything in one's world that is approaching and labels some of them as fearsome and others as not fearsome. Fearing is a fundamental way that Dasein can exist, a fundamental way of being in the world. As a particular state of mind in which Dasein can find itself, fearing is always prior to any kind of analysis of a situation, or generating possible scenarios. For example, walking down the street one night one is suddenly gripped by fear. This fearing precedes any analysis of the people approaching or examination of the dark spaces which lead to alleys intersecting the street. Neither did one, prior to the walk, generate possible fearful situations and then, finding oneself in such a situation, begin to fear. For Heidegger the fearing comes first, and it is only on the basis of that fundamental state of mind that an aspect of the world reveals itself as fearsome.<sup>11</sup>

When we ask the question 'What are you afraid of?' there are two kinds of answer that one can give. The first corresponds to what we have called the 'fearsome': I am afraid of the escaped murderer. The second kind corresponds to what the fear is about. If we ask: 'Why are you afraid of the escaped murderer?' The answer will be: 'I am afraid he will kill me.' In this instance that which we fear about is ourselves. In fearing Dasein fears the fearsome, but fears *for itself*. Someone might object, however, that one does not always fear for oneself. One can also fear for someone else, or for one's equipment (for example, a house). Heidegger is quick to point out though that fearing for someone else and fearing for one's equipment are both parts of Dasein's being in the world. Dasein cannot be without these relations, and fearing for them is a way in which Dasein fears for itself. If, for example, my wife were to take up skydiving, I would fear for her. What does it mean though for me to 'fear for her'? Does it mean that I fear on her behalf in some way so that her fear is reduced? Certainly not. In fact, she could be completely without fear jumping out of an plane protected only by a thin layer of silk. Her state of mind as fearless does not reduce my fear at all. It may even increase it as I watch her do something so dangerous so boldly. My fear in this case is of being separated from her. I fear that this action may diminish my world by cutting me off from another Dasein.<sup>12</sup> Even moods that relate Dasein to something other than itself, such as fear, manifest the narcissism of the melancholic. Dasein's world is organised around the lack that constitutes it.

Fear is thus a mood that relates Dasein to something external to it. Dasein is surrounded by its equipment and with others, and in some instances either that equipment or others may appear as fearsome, or detrimental, to Dasein. Dasein is continually in a mood whether it is busy at its tasks or not. This mood may change without regard to a change in activities. Dasein is thus that type of entity which has a world. Part of what it means for Dasein to have a world is for it to be related to other entities external to it. Dasein relates to some of these entities as equipment, other entities it relates to solicitously, and it always finds itself in a particular mood in relation to its world.<sup>13</sup>

Not all moods are like fear, however. Fear always fears something determinate within the world - either equipment or another Dasein. Anxiety, on the other hand, is not related to any entity within the world. As a result, anxiety reveals entities within the world as without significance. In the case of fear, Dasein discovers itself in a state of fearing and from that point clarifies to itself which of its involvements are detrimental to it. In doing so it discovers the fearsome. In the case of anxiety, Dasein finds itself in a state of being anxious. When it looks to see what it is anxious in the face of, it can find no definite thing. When it asks, 'Where is the threat coming from?' The answer is: 'Nowhere'.<sup>14</sup> It is interesting to note at this point that a distinction can already be made between the location of fear and anxiety. It is always possible to ask locative questions concerning fear. The question: 'Where is the threat coming from?' can always be given a definitive answer in the case of fear. It is precisely the impossibility of locating anxiety in the world that distinguishes it from fear. Anxiety does not have a place in Dasein's world. Anxiety is not external to Dasein, it is internal, and Heidegger, following Kant, does not characterise the internal as spatial, but as temporal.

In order to clarify this further, we can use the structure of a mood that Heidegger illustrated with fear. As we saw above a mood has three parts: 1) that before which we have a particular mood; 2) being in a particular mood; and 3) that about which we are in a particular mood. In the case of fear these three parts were the fearsome, fearing and Dasein, respectively. In the case of anxiety that in the face of which Dasein is anxious is not any entity in the world, so it cannot correspond to anything like the 'fearsome'. Dasein is in fact anxious about determining itself, and this anxiety has caused it to flee from itself and become absorbed in the involvements of its equipment and what they say. Heidegger discusses this in several ways. Since Dasein flees from itself to become absorbed in its equipment, and by becoming absorbed in its equipment it is no longer concerned with what makes equipment possible at all (that is being), Heidegger says that Dasein is anxious about the possibility of equipment as such. Along the same lines, since Dasein flees the possibility of equipment as such, we might also say that Dasein is fleeing the world. In becoming absorbed in the world of its involvements Dasein covers up the possibility of understanding the world as such. Finally, since Dasein is anxious about determining itself, Heidegger says that Dasein is actually anxious about itself. Thus far from being anxious about anything in the world like the 'fearsome', Dasein actually finds *itself* threatening to the point that it flees from itself and absorbs itself in the world of its equipment and what that says.<sup>15</sup> In the language of Abraham and Torok, we could imagine that anxiety represents the way in Dasein approaches its own crypt, the place where it conceals the loss of itself from itself.

Heidegger describes being anxious as 'uncanny' (*unheimlich*). By this, however, he means more than 'odd' or 'unusual'. The idea he is trying to express comes from the etymology of the word, which means something like 'unhomelike'. When Dasein is anxious, it has the feeling of not quite being at home, a stranger in its own skin. This description of anxiety fits well with Heidegger's discussion of that before which we are anxious. If Dasein is anxious before itself, if it has fled from itself, then the feeling of anxiety reveals to Dasein that it is not quite itself. By being absorbed in the world of its equipment and what the equipment says, Dasein has abandoned one of its possibilities for being for the sake of another. Dasein experiences the dissonance between these two ways of being as anxiety.<sup>16</sup>

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The third part of anxiety, that about which one is anxious, also happens to be Dasein itself. Anxiety reveals the world of Dasein's involvements as without significance. In anxiety Dasein sees, however briefly and inchoately, that its absorption in its equipment and what it says is only one of its possibilities, that it is free to choose its possibilities. This is a shattering experience for Dasein. Anxiety threatens to take away Dasein's world by showing it that its world is not the only possible world. This experience also 'individualises' Dasein. Without the comfort of its equipment or what is normally said or done. Dasein is both free for its possibilities but also alone in its possibilities. Heidegger is careful to point out, however, that this individualisation is not the isolated subject of traditional philosophy, but simply Dasein without the absorption in its everyday world. At the same time, however, Heidegger remains unclear about the relation between the way anxiety individualises Dasein and the fact that being with others is constitutive of its being. It is also important to note that this sameness of that before which Dasein is anxious and that about which Dasein is anxious is what separates it from fear. In fact, for Heidegger anxiety grounds fear. Dasein's fear of an entity in the world is possible only on Dasein's prior relation to the possibility of entities in general. Dasein cannot fear something in its world unless it is already related to the world as such. This relation to the world as such is disclosed in anxiety.<sup>17</sup>

Heidegger shows that our fundamental relation to entities within the world that are not like us is one of equipment to complete a task rather than a thing to be observed. More important for the purposes of this book, however, is Heidegger's discussion of mood, which led to his articulation of fear and anxiety. It must be noted at this point that Heidegger complicates his discussion of mood somewhat in 'What is Metaphysics?' and The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. In both works Heidegger discusses the role of boredom as one of Dasein's fundamental moods. In 'What is Metaphysics?' in particular, Heidegger discusses the relation between the mood of boredom and what he calls the 'fundamental mood' (Grundstimmung) of anxiety. Fundamental moods reveal the world as a whole to Dasein. In boredom, for example, Dasein is able to grasp its world in its totality. Thus, in distinction from fear, boredom does not focus Dasein on one particular entity in the world, but reveals the world as a whole. Anxiety, in distinction from both fear and boredom, however, reveals the world as nothing. The world in its totality is revealed as grounded in Dasein's being possible in anxiety:

All things and we ourselves sink into indifference. This, however, not in the sense of mere disappearance. Rather, in this very receding things turn toward us. The receding of beings as a whole that closes in on us in anxiety oppresses. We can get no hold on things. In the slipping away of beings only this 'no hold on things' comes over us and remains. Anxiety reveals the nothing.<sup>18</sup>

The question remains, though, whether these seemingly disparate phenomena which Heidegger finds exhibited in Dasein have any sort of unity. Is there something underlying all of these aspects of Dasein's everydayness that makes them possible?

To answer this question Heidegger returns to the analysis of anxiety to see what might be gleaned from it. In anxiety we saw that Dasein fled from itself. This is not to say, of course, that in fleeing from itself Dasein became something other than itself. Rather, Dasein fled from its possibilities and chose rather to be absorbed in the world of its tasks and what they say. In this absorption Dasein always remained itself. But what is Dasein that it could both flee from itself and still remain itself? Dasein is its possibilities. When it flees itself, it flees its possibilities. In fleeing its possibilities, however, it does not flee into a life without possibilities. Even in fleeing Dasein still finds itself in its possibilities. The difference between the Dasein that flees itself and the Dasein that does not is that the Dasein that flees itself finds its possibilities delimited by how people usually speak and act. What is appropriate or valuable or to be avoided Dasein already finds as determined by what everybody else is doing. Anxiety thus shows us that Dasein is its possibilities regardless of how they are determined.<sup>19</sup>

For Dasein to be structured as a possibility means that it is always running ahead of itself. If we look at our everyday expression 'it's possible', we begin to get an idea of what Heidegger has in mind. Imagine a rock perched precariously on the edge of a cliff. Upon looking at the rock we ask, 'Do you think the rock will fall?' Someone might answer, 'It's possible'. In that instance the 'it's possible' indicates more than simply making some calculations about the probability that the rock will fall. Rather, we compare the rock as it is now to the rock as it will be if it falls. In this instance there are not two rocks – the now rock and the fallen rock of the future. There is only one rock which contains the possibility that it might fall. What the rock is is determined by its possibility, and that possibility is what lies ahead of it. Dasein is also stretched ahead of itself into its possibilities. For example, right now I am working on this book on death in Hegel, Heidegger and Deleuze. In my aim to complete the book I am already running ahead

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of myself, comparing myself now to what I will be when I have completed this project. Similar to the rock example, there are not two of me – the now me working on the book and the future me who has completed the book – there is only one me, the me who has extended myself ahead of myself into the possibility of completing this task.

If we expand this notion of Dasein being ahead of itself further, we can begin to see why Heidegger thinks that all of the different aspects of Dasein can be unified in it. As we saw above, Dasein finds itself surrounded by equipment that helps it accomplish its tasks. Furthermore, we referred to this web of relations as Dasein's world. If Dasein's world is that which allows it to accomplish its tasks, then Dasein's world is nothing other than its possibilities. If we return to the world of the biochemist which we discussed earlier, we see that the biochemist is surrounded by the equipment that allows her to complete her tasks. But, what are her tasks? They are the possibilities that she has set for herself. For Dasein being in the world is just another way of being ahead of itself, or being its possibilities. All of the disparate parts of Heidegger's Dasein analysis are summarised in the understanding of Dasein as possibility.<sup>20</sup>

The term that Heidegger uses for understanding Dasein as possibility is care (Sorge). As always Heidegger is careful to point out that this is an ontological term and is prior to any discussion of ontical terms such as worry, desire, will, carefreeness, etc. As we noted above but could not fully elaborate until now, Dasein's relation to the equipment in its world is one of concern (Besorgen), and its relation to others in its world is one of solicitude (Fürsorgen). These fundamental ways of being alongside entities and being with others is founded in care, or founded in the fact that Dasein is always ahead of itself. The only way that Dasein can have a relation of concern towards the entities in its world is if it is already constituted as possibility. The entities with which Dasein concerns itself in the world are precisely those entities which allow it to complete a task. Dasein construes entities as useful for a particular task only insofar as Dasein is fundamentally the kind of entity that sets itself tasks. Dasein can only set itself tasks if it lives ahead of itself in the possibility of completing those tasks. Thus care summarises the unity of Dasein's everyday experience.21

For Heidegger, then, Dasein's experience is intimately bound up with possibility. Dasein may relate to its existence as possibility either appropriately or inappropriately. To relate to its existence inappropriately would be to fail to recognise its possibilities as possibilities, to treat the usual way of speaking and acting as the only way of speaking and acting. According to Heidegger's phenomenological method though, this usual way of speaking and acting must cover the appropriate way of treating one's possibilities. Heidegger uncovers this appropriate relation to one's possibilities in his analysis of anxiety. Anxiety reveals the world as Dasein's possibilities. For Heidegger this articulation of Dasein as possibility is summarised in the term 'care'.

Above I suggested that certain parallels could be drawn for illustrative purposes between *Being and Time* and Kant, particularly the first *Critique*. For example, for Kant space is the form of external intuition, while time is the form of internal intuition. We see Heidegger making a similar claim in his discussion of mood and in the transition from Division One to Division Two. The primary difference between fear and anxiety is that the object of fear can be located in the world, while anxiety has no location and its object is Dasein itself. Fear is external. Anxiety is internal. Fear confirms Dasein's absorption in its concerns. It reveals Dasein's world as a world in which its projects are threatened. Fear relates Dasein to something external to it. In contrast, anxiety does not relate Dasein to anything external. It pulls Dasein out of the externality of its world and reveals its world not as concerns and projects but as possibility.

The difference between fear and anxiety thus marks the boundary between what is external to Dasein and what is internal to it. If we return to the question of death in Being and Time, we see that Heidegger is at great pains to keep death as an internal phenomenon. Death cannot be properly treated as an approaching event. Death cannot be properly treated as a thing. In fact, we might go as far as to say that death cannot be properly treated as external. Because death is not external, it cannot properly be feared. In the same way that the question concerning the location of anxiety is answered 'Nowhere', so the question concerning the location of death is also answered 'Nowhere'. Death is not a relation that Dasein has to something outside of itself, but a relation that Dasein has to itself. This relation cannot be located within Dasein's world. We may further connect death and anxiety by noting that anxiety and being towards death are one and the same for Heidegger: 'Being towards death is essentially anxiety.'22

If death is essentially an internal relation that Dasein has with itself, what is the relation between world and death? How does the way that Dasein relates to itself affect the way that Dasein relates to external entities? I have suggested above that death plays a transcendental role with regard to Dasein's world. Death stretches Dasein ahead of itself. Dasein projects itself ahead of itself to the completion of its various tasks. The limit of this projection is Dasein's end. Dasein's end is the point beyond which Dasein can complete no tasks. The necessity of Dasein's end, according to Heidegger, imbues all of Dasein's tasks. In fact, if Dasein did not come to an end, if it were no longer finite, it would not think in terms of tasks to be completed. An infinite entity would not be a possibility, because possibility requires an endpoint. Without death there is no endpoint. Without an endpoint there can be no tasks. Without death there can be no Dasein.

The connection between Dasein's end and its ability to be taskoriented bears directly on the relation between death and melancholia. It is because Dasein is task-oriented that it sees itself as surrounded by equipment for the completion of its tasks. Dasein's unique form of existence is a result of its constitution as possibility. Dasein's world is thus given to it by its own finitude. If Dasein is not always already dying, then it cannot have a world of the type that Heidegger outlines in Division One of *Being and Time*. Death thus plays a transcendental role with regard to Dasein's experience.

Because death plays a transcendental role with regard to experience, according to Heidegger, we can see one point, at least, where he differentiates himself from Kant. Space and time are simply given as the forms of intuition. Kant does not deduce their existence, nor are they dependent on the categories of the understanding. For Heidegger space (we will see about time in the next chapter) is not simply given. That Dasein is spatial is a result of its dying. We thus see Dasein's world as organised around its being towards death. All external relations are a function of Dasein's internal relation to itself. Dasein's individualised relation to itself in its own finitude gives it the type of experience unique to it. This individualised relation can be seen as transcendental melancholia. Dasein relates to itself as lost. This lost object cannot be abandoned, so a crypt is formed that contains the lost object. Experience is then reorganised as if the lost object were not lost. This is inauthentic existence for Heidegger. Anxiety reveals to Dasein that it has incorporated itself as the very core of its being.

#### Notes

Immanuel Kant, *The Conflict of the Faculties*, in *Religion and Rational Theology*. Ed. and trans. Allen W. Wood and George DiGiovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 318.

- 2. SZ, 66ff. Zeug and Dinge, of course, correspond to Heidegger's distinction between Zuhandensein (usually translated as 'ready to hand') and Vorhandensein (usually translated as 'present at hand'). Since these are rather cumbersome phrases, however, I have chosen to refer to these concepts only through the use of the terms 'equipment' and 'things'.
- 3. Villela-Petit in 'Heidegger's Conception of Space' criticises Heidegger for his inability to account for objects that are not immediately connected to our tasks. Most of Heidegger's examples are drawn from the world of work, and there is little or no discussion of natural or artistic objects in *Being and Time*. For Villela-Petit, this is indicative of a larger difficulty in Heidegger's functionalism.
- 4. SZ, 57.
- 5. See Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 128–40.
- 6. SZ, 117ff.
- 7. See, Didier Franck, *Heidegger et le problème de l'espace* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1996), 81–90.
- 8. SZ, 65.
- 9. Franck, Heidegger et le problème de l'espace, 73-80.
- 10. SZ, 140–1.
- 11. SZ, 141: 'In fearing as such, what we have thus characterized as threatening is freed and allowed to matter to us. We do not first ascertain a future evil (*malum futurum*) and then fear it. But neither does fearing first take note of what is drawing close; it discovers it beforehand in its fearsomeness. And in fearing, fear can then look at the fearsome explicitly, and "make it clear" to itself. Circumspection sees the fearsome, because it has fear as its state-of-mind. Fearing, as a slumbering possibility of Being-in-the-world in a state-of-mind (we call this possibility "fearfulness"), has already disclosed the world, in that out of it something like the fearsome may come close. The potentiality for coming close is itself freed by the essential existential spatiality of Being-in-the-world.'
- 12. SZ, 141–2.
- 13. See Romano Pocai's study of mood in *Heideggers Theorie der Befindlichkeit* (München: Verlag Karl Alber, 1996), 65–72.
- 14. SZ, 186.
- 15. SZ, 187.
- 16. SZ, 188–9.
- 17. SZ, 188: 'Fear is anxiety, fallen into the "world," inauthentic, and, as such, hidden from itself.' See Pocai, *Heideggers Theorie der Befindlichkeit*, 73–89. Levinas argues in *Totality and Infinity* (233–5) that Heidegger is mistaken to articulate our relation to death as fundamentally interior. Death for Levinas is an 'absolutely alterior menace' and, as such, it produces fear (*peur*) rather than anxiety

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(angoisse). See also, Franck, Heidegger et la problème de l'espace, 73-80.

- 18. Basic Writings, 101.
- 19. SZ, 191ff.
- 20. SZ, 193.
- 21. SZ, 193–6.
- 22. SZ, 266.

The narcissistic disorders (dementia praecox, paranoia, melancholia) are characterized by a withdrawal of the libido from objects and they are therefore scarcely accessible to analytic therapy.

Freud<sup>1</sup>

Before pursuing further the analysis of Dasein as melancholic and the transcendental role that melancholia plays in *Being and Time*, we first need to examine Dasein's unique mode of temporality. Heidegger understands temporality in a way that is very different from both common conceptions of temporality and theoretical conceptions of temporality. Heidegger's task is thus twofold. The first task is a positive one in which he articulates Dasein's unique mode of temporality. In order to claim, though, that Dasein's unique mode of temporality is primordial, Heidegger's second task must be to show that both theoretical and everyday conceptions of temporality. Both tasks are in keeping with Heidegger's phenomenological method that what we most commonly say and do is a semblance that covers up the real phenomenon of temporality. An examination of temporality.

Above we saw that Dasein's space, or its interpretation as care, is structured as possibility. We also examined death as that which makes this space of possibility possible. Death is Dasein's ownmost possibility, the impossibility of possibility. Dying is the way in which Dasein stretches ahead of itself into its possibilities. It is this stretching ahead of itself in dying that Heidegger calls the *Zukunft*, but as we will see below, even though Heidegger uses the common German word for 'future', he intends something very different from the common meaning of the term. As possibility Dasein is always running ahead of itself to the actualisation of its possibilities and to the possibility that cannot be actualised, death.<sup>2</sup>

Another component of Dasein's space is being in the world. As we have seen, Dasein and world are mutually dependent. There is no

world without Dasein, and no Dasein without world. Dasein is the kind of entity that always has a world. Its world is constituted by the fact that as possibility it is also a lack. Dasein thus appropriately exists in this world, however, only when it understands itself as a lack. When Dasein understands that it is a lack, though, it does not thereby become a new entity. Rather, it exists as it already was. This acceptance only confirms Dasein in the kind of being that it always already was. In projecting itself into its possibilities Dasein returns from its possible future and returns to itself as already having a world, or in its alreadiness (*Gewesenheit*). Thus for Heidegger alreadiness arises from the future.<sup>3</sup>

The final component of Dasein's space that Heidegger examines here is being alongside equipment. It is only insofar as Dasein is stretched ahead into its ownmost possibility that it can return to itself in its alreadiness. Only then can it disclose the entities around it. This disclosure of entities around Dasein is the presence of the entities. Thus, bringing entities into the present is founded on Dasein's future and its alreadiness. The unity of these three components Heidegger calls 'temporality' (*Zeitlichkeit*).<sup>4</sup>

It is important to note in a preliminary way how this temporality differs from our usual conception of temporality. Our usual conception of temporality is dominated by the present. Things are either now, not yet now or no longer now. These modes of ordinary temporality are usually designated as present, future and past, respectively. By contrast, Heidegger's conception of temporality is dominated by the future. The most important component is the fact that Dasein is stretched ahead of itself into its possibilities. All the other modes take their cue from this fundamental way in which Dasein exists. In addition, while Heidegger does use the usual word for 'future' (Zukunft), he indicates that he is keen to bring out the kinship between Zukunft and zukommen, which means 'coming to'.5 Initially, this etymology does not seem to provide any insight, or a different conception of the future. Is not the future commonly understood as 'that which is "to come" ' or, the events that are not yet, but are coming to me? As Heidegger begins to fill in this notion of a 'coming to' it becomes clear that it is not events which come to me, but the fact that I project myself ahead of myself, and I come to my own projections of myself. The future is thus not events that come to me in the world, but the way that I relate to my own existence. I exist as continually 'coming to' myself. Given this, perhaps a better translation would be 'becoming'.

Temporality always manifests itself as a unity. One always finds in temporality the futural or becoming mode, the mode of alreadiness, and the mode of the present. This unity of temporality may manifest itself either appropriately or inappropriately. The fact that temporality always manifests itself as unity is what Heidegger calls 'the temporalising of the temporal'. Since this unity is dominated by the becoming mode, and that in becoming Dasein 'stands outside of itself' in order to go towards itself, Heidegger also calls the unity of temporality an 'ecstasis'. Depending on how Dasein exists, it will have a different temporality, or 'ecstatical unity'. By 'ecstatical unity' Heidegger means that, if Dasein is the kind of entity which exists as possibility, and possibility is shown to be necessarily temporal, then whether Dasein acts appropriately towards its equipment, its moods, even the way it acts towards its own finitude is a result of the kind of ecstatical unity that it has. Dasein for the most part inappropriately takes its ecstatical unity to lie in a temporality dominated by the now. The appropriate way for Dasein to understand its temporality, however, is to take its ecstatical unity as lying in its becoming.<sup>6</sup>

Temporality is not an option for Dasein. Insofar as it exists it is temporal. Dasein is that entity that has temporality as its kind of being. To say that Dasein exists as temporal says much more than Dasein is 'in time'. As we have already noted, it is what makes possible Dasein's existence as possibility. Beyond this, however, the fact that Dasein is dying indicates that its possibilities are finite. Dasein's finitude as dying can only mean that its temporality is also finite. The phrase 'finite temporality' may at first seem paradoxical. What could be more obvious than the fact that 'time goes on'? What Heidegger will have to show in order to maintain the finitude of temporality is that inauthentic time is derived from authentic time, and the possibility of conceiving of time as an infinite series is grounded in the finitude of time. Before we examine this possibility, however, we will first examine how temporality temporalises itself in everyday Dasein, particularly its mood.

The two examples of mood that Heidegger has used throughout *Being and Time* are fear and anxiety. As we saw above, fear is the fear of something in the world that Dasein is concerned with. Fear is one of the ways that Dasein may be concerned with its equipment, or solicitous towards other Dasein. Anxiety, on the other hand, is the way in which Dasein relates to itself as dying. For the most part Dasein flees itself as dying and falls into an inappropriate way of dying dictated by what is usually said and done about death. For most

people moods are indicative of the present. What could be more suggestive of the now than the fact that I am now in a particular mood? I was in a different mood earlier and I will be in a different mood later, but right now I am in this mood.

For Heidegger, however, moods are indicative of alreadiness. Take fear, for example. According to Heidegger's previous analysis of fear, it is the result of one's concernful engagement with equipment or solicitous engagement with other Dasein in the world. It is not the case that we analyse the equipment or other Dasein in our world and then decide which of these to fear, nor is it the case that we speculate about what might be fearful, and then when something matches that description, we decide to fear. Rather, being fearful always precedes the identification of the fearsome. Being in a mood always precedes the understanding of what it is in the world that precipitates that mood. If Dasein is always in a particular mood, and if that mood always precedes the identification of what is present in the world that is the source of the mood, then moods cannot be indicative of the present. Insofar as we always find ourselves already in a mood, regardless of how quickly this mood may change, it is indicative of the alreadiness mode of temporality.<sup>7</sup>

For Heidegger it is always inappropriate to fear death. When we fear death, we treat it as something in the world rather than as the fundamental way we exist. Fear reveals us as absorbed in our tasks rather than as dying. As a result, fear of death is indicative of an inappropriate temporality. We have already seen how a mood is indicative of the alreadiness mode of temporality, but we must also see how the fear of death covers up the alreadiness of authentic temporality. Fear of death leads to a kind of forgetfulness of the world. This forgetfulness, however, is to be sharply distinguished from Dasein's recognition in anxiety that its world is a world of possibility. In the panic to escape a burning building, for example, people often rescue the strangest things: plants, staplers, coats, etc. Sometimes, though, they rescue nothing at all. It is as if in the fear caused by the fire every possibility becomes possible, and everything becomes equipment with which one is concerned. In fear, then, not only does Dasein fail to grasp its most fundamental possibility as dying, but it seems to forget its own world and inhabit multiple worlds of concern indiscriminately. Dasein finds itself fearing and then recognises the source of that fear in the burning building. Dasein acts on this fear not by taking account of the world it inhabits and saving things appropriate to the world of its concern, but by forgetting the world of its concern and saving things at random or nothing at all. Thus while the mood of fear remains rooted in alreadiness, this is covered up by the way in which fear causes Dasein to forget the world of its concern.<sup>8</sup>

Anxiety, however, confronts Dasein with its own finitude. Anxiety thus reveals the mode of its temporality as alreadiness. In anxiety Dasein is confronted with itself as dying. Death as Dasein's ownmost possibility reveals the world to Dasein as based on a lack, since as a possibility Dasein is constituted as not yet itself. In anxiety Dasein does not become forgetful about its world. Rather, Dasein is revealed as in the world, but in the world as possibility. As a result, Dasein neither becomes forgetful of its world nor absorbed in its tasks. Dasein is revealed to itself as already in the world, but as handed over to its own death. Thus the temporality of anxiety is revealed as alreadiness and is not covered up by Dasein's everyday concerns.<sup>9</sup>

In *Being and Time* Heidegger proposes a radical rethinking of our notions of temporality. It is not enough, however, for him simply to propose an alternative model for temporality. Heidegger's claim is much more encompassing. Heidegger's notion of temporality is not merely an alternative mode of temporality. This mode of temporality makes all other modes of temporality possible. According to Heidegger, we think about time as a series of nows only on the basis of the more fundamental understanding of temporality outlined by Heidegger. Time as a series of nows is the semblance that covers up the true phenomenon of temporality. Thus, in keeping with his phenomenological method, Heidegger must show how the usual way of understanding time is derived from this more fundamental understanding of time.

To show that our everyday conception of temporality is based on an indefinite succession of nows Heidegger begins with our practice of measuring time. Heidegger speculates that measuring time began with our need to divide up the day into those times in which one could work and those in which one could not work. This division easily grafts onto the division between the rising and the setting of the sun. When the sun rises, one can see well enough to go about one's tasks. Daylight turns one's equipment from dark things lying about to something with which one can be absorbed. While our ability to reckon time became more sophisticated through the use of sundials and later clocks, and our dependence on the sun became less acute through various forms of artificial lighting, Heidegger maintains that the dominant mode of temporality in this everyday way of reckoning time is the present. The reason Heidegger thinks that the present is the

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dominant mode of temporality in this everyday way of reckoning time is its dependence on light. Light is that which makes things present. If one's understanding of temporality is based on the coming of light, then one's temporality is based on the present. Now it is light, and I can see my equipment. Soon it will be dark, and I will no longer be able to see my equipment. Last night it was dark, and I could not see my equipment. In this construal of time all modes of temporality are modulations of the present. The future is the now which has not yet come. The past is the now which is past and is no longer, and the present is the now which is. This way of thinking about temporality turns it into a thing, which is a misunderstanding of the nature of temporality. Temporality is Dasein's way of being in the world, the way it is stretched into its possibilities, and thus cannot be treated as a thing.<sup>10</sup>

The theoretical accounts of temporality do not fare any better according to Heidegger. They are all dependent on Aristotle's conception of time, which itself is dependent on the everyday way of thinking about time. Aristotle explicitly articulates time as a series of points that endlessly parade before us. It is as if we are on a number line stretching infinitely in both directions. The point on the number line we now occupy is the present. All those points that lie behind us are the past, and all the points that lie ahead of us are the future. Thus, even Aristotle is not immune from thinking of temporality as a succession of nows.<sup>11</sup>

Heidegger then discusses Hegel as the culmination of this theoretical way of thinking about temporality. Heidegger uses Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* as the key source for Hegel's thoughts on temporality. According to Heidegger's interpretation of Hegel, time is the supersession of space. Heidegger explains that spatiality arises as the division of space into discrete points for Hegel. Space is nothing other than punctuality. In superseding space, time does not eliminate the punctuality of space, but orders it into a succession. From this Heidegger concludes that Hegel remains in thrall to the traditional notion of temporality as a series of points.<sup>12</sup>

Having argued that both common and theoretical conceptions of time are dependent on the notion of time as a series of nows, Heidegger can now show that thinking of time as a series of nows is dependent on thinking of time as dependent on Dasein's existence as possibility. In order to think of time as a series of nows, we must think of time as anchored in the present. In the present, according to Heidegger's analysis, we find ourselves surrounded by our equipment. Heidegger's analysis has already shown, however, that the present is grounded in alreadiness (*Gewesenheit*). In order to be surrounded by equipment we must already be in a world. Alreadiness, however, is dependent on the future (*Zukunft*). The fact that Dasein has a world and is surrounded by its equipment is dependent on the fact that Dasein exists as projecting itself into its future possibilities. Thus, the understanding of time as oriented around the present is a semblance which covers up the fact that Dasein exists as already in a world and as projected ahead of itself into its possibilities.

Given what we have seen about the importance of death and the importance of temporality in *Being and Time*, we have yet to examine the relation between these two terms. Heidegger explicitly says that 'death is ontologically grounded in care' and that 'care is ontologically grounded in temporality'. The conclusion of this simple syllogism is that death must be grounded in temporality. I will argue, however, that another reading is possible. In keeping with my transcendental reading of *Being and Time*, I will argue that rather than grounding death in temporality, death grounds and is thus one of the conditions for the possibility of temporality.

While this reading directly opposes Heidegger's explicit claims about the structure of Being and Time, there are several points that recommend it. First, it is not clear that care grounds death, as Heidegger claims that it does. Heidegger introduces the topic of death in an attempt to confirm the interpretation of Dasein as care by 'grasping Dasein in its totality'. Care interprets Dasein as that which is fundamentally ahead of itself, and death confirms this interpretation by showing Dasein to be ahead of itself towards its own death. Death allows Dasein to be understood as a whole. In spite of Heidegger's claims to the contrary, the relation between care and death becomes clear in the following questions: Does Dasein die because it is structured as care? Or, is Dasein structured as care because it dies? Given what we have seen about the role of death in Being and Time, the most plausible answer is that Dasein is structured as care because it dies. Care does not ground death. Death grounds care or, to be more precise, death transcendentally grounds care.

Second, it is also not clear that the relation between care and temporality is a grounding relation. In Division Two of *Being and Time*, Heidegger does not introduce any new structures of Dasein's existence. Heidegger does *not* argue in Division Two that the structure known as care conceals an additional structure, temporality, that makes it possible. Rather, he argues that the very same structures of existence that made up the care structure are to be reinterpreted in temporal terms. Being ahead of itself is not grounded in Heidegger's conception of the future. It is the same structure reinterpreted as the future. Being in a mood is not grounded in alreadiness. Moodedness *is* alreadiness. Finally, the fact that equipment appears as useful is another name for the fact that entities are present. What Heidegger's analysis does provide beyond the care analysis is the way in which these modes of temporality are related. The modes of temporality are related as an ecstatic unity that is based in Dasein's futural projections. The fact that Heidegger speaks of temporality as unified in a way that he does not speak about care, however, is insufficient to claim that temporality grounds care. Temporality is a reinterpretation of care, not its ground.

Third, if care does not ground death and temporality is a reinterpretation of care, then temporality cannot ground death. If temporality is a reinterpretation of the care structure, then temporality should have the same relation to death that care does. I am arguing here that temporality is a redescription of the care structure. Heidegger's discussion of temporality does not introduce anything new into Dasein's existence, but describes the structures of Dasein's existence in a new way. Above I argued that given Heidegger's account of the relation between care and death, it is more plausible to suppose that death grounds care, rather than the other way around. In keeping with this interpretation of Heidegger it seems more likely that death, in fact, grounds temporality. Dasein does not die because it is temporal. Rather, Dasein is temporal because it dies. Death plays a transcendental role with regard to time.

What I mean by death's transcendental role with regard to time is that, in opposition to Heidegger's own account of the relation between care, temporality and death, *Being and Time* presents death as a transcendental condition for the possibility of Dasein's existence. Dasein exists as Dasein because it dies. If Dasein did not die, it would have a very different kind of existence. Death is thus the ground of Dasein's existence in *Being and Time*. While it is certainly possible to imagine other configurations of the relation between care, temporality and death, Heidegger's own claims about their relation seem to suggest that death, in fact, grounds both temporality and care. Everything that Dasein is thus flows from its finitude. The fact that it is structured as possibility, that it has a world, that it is able to encounter others, that it lives out of its futural projections, are all made possible by the transcendental role of death. Dasein can only be interpreted as care and as temporal because it dies.

Admittedly, this reading of *Being and Time* gives a much greater role to death than Heidegger explicitly allows. His original intention was to articulate the meaning of being with the horizon of time, but the fact that temporality is a result of the way in which Dasein relates to itself, and that this self-relation is summarised in Dasein's being towards death, brings death to the fore as the organising concept of the first two Divisions. While Heidegger privileges time over space in keeping with his privileging of the interior over the exterior, both time and space as Heidegger articulates them in *Being and Time* are made possible by death.

With the inclusion of time under the rubric of death my transcendental reading of Being and Time is complete. I am thus arguing that Being and Time is a fundamentally (but not solely) Kantian document, and that death is Heidegger's primary transcendental category, rather than the categories of the understanding. As fundamentally Kantian, it is my contention that Being and Time appropriates the same relation between the transcendental categories and that which they condition as the Critique of Pure Reason. The categories of the understanding for Kant are the a priori formal grounds for the appearance of objects of experience. As a priori formal grounds, the categories of the understanding are conditions for the possibility of the appearance of objects of experience, but themselves are not conditioned by the appearance of these objects. This, of course, is not the only reading of the relation between ground and grounded. It is possible to conceive of grounds that condition and are themselves conditioned by what they ground. Hegel argues this explicitly with regard to the relation between essence and appearance in the Logic, and this view is, of course, implicit throughout his writings as a result of his speculative methodology. For Kant, and also for Heidegger in Being and Time, grounds are not conditioned by what they ground.

The first implication of this reading is that death cannot have a history. Of course, Heidegger would not deny that different cultures have different conceptions of death, and that each culture relates to death through different rites of burial and mourning. For Heidegger, however, these differences are ontic accretions that for the most part conceal the true nature of death, which always remains that towards which Dasein stretches itself. This ontological interpretation of death must lie underneath any possible historical manifestation of death in order for Heidegger's analysis to hold. Death thus lies outside the bounds that make history possible. History, for Heidegger, is conceivable only on the basis of Dasein's primordial temporality. As the transcendental ground of temporality, and by extension history, death cannot be subject to the vicissitudes of history. For Kant and Heidegger, a transcendental category is transcendental only to the degree that it can remain outside of that which it conditions.

The second implication of this reading is that the transcendental nature of Heidegger's account of death makes Dasein's world possible, as well. Whether this world consists of equipment or other Dasein, these relations are grounded in Dasein's existence as being towards death. As a result, any account of death that a community might give is dependent on this prior articulation of death. The differences, for example, between an interment and cremation, or the length of time that one is expected to wear mourning dress, change from community to community and in some instances change within a community depending on social or political class. These differences, for Heidegger, do not suggest ontologically different deaths. Rather, these differences suggest the same death ontologically, and different ontical conceptions of death. These different ontical conceptions of death, for Heidegger, do not condition the ontological condition of death. It is precisely because for Heidegger the ontological conception of death is the primary phenomenon that it can appear in so many ways. The number of these appearances, however, does nothing to modify the fundamental ontological conception of death, according to Heidegger. Thus in the same way that death is not subject to history, it is also not subject to community. Any meaning that a community might bestow on death must spring from this fundamental understanding of death, and is, in fact, for the most part a covering up of the true nature of death. Death precedes Dasein's world and temporality in Being and Time to the degree that it is one of the conditions for their possibility and is not conditioned by either of them.

If we suppose with Heidegger that death is transcendental, what implications does that have for theorising about human experience? The transcendentality of death allows Heidegger to describe the experience of Dasein in great detail. The fact that Dasein is finite opens the world as possibility for Dasein. Dasein actualises these possibilities by taking on tasks and fulfilling them by means of the equipment that surrounds it. Heidegger's distinction between equipment and things is key in this description and marks an important advance in describing much of human activity. The fact that I primarily relate to this keyboard as equipment to help me accomplish the task of writing this book is a much more helpful way of looking at the world, for the most part, than treating the keyboard as an object that stands over and against me as a knowing subject, making the goal of philosophy to discern the nature of this relationship.

Heidegger is at his best in Being and Time when he is discussing equipment; or better, the fact that Dasein stretches itself ahead of itself into its tasks requires it to take some things as equipment. Human existence, however, cannot be summarised in its tasks, or the equipment used to complete those tasks. Humans do many things which are unrelated to tasks. Humans play. They worship. They fall in love. They go to museums. And, although one might never guess this from reading Being and Time, humans eat, drink and sleep.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, the objects one encounters in these non-task-oriented activities do not seem to be equipment either. I agree with Heidegger that these objects are not things, insofar as we have a specific comportment to them in regard to the activity, but insofar as the activities are not tasks, it is difficult to see how these objects could be equipment for completing a task. Is a painting in a museum equipment for completing a task? Is the architecture of a church equipment for completing a task? There is a relation here that in some respects might be considered functional, but it cannot be captured in the relation between one's projects and one's equipment. It is conceivable that we might be able to articulate all of these activities in terms of them. These activities might not be directly related to task, but we could suppose that they are indirectly related to them. People sleep, not to complete a particular task, but to be rested so that they might perform other tasks. At this point, however, the clarity with which Heidegger describes our task-oriented activities begins to fade. If all activities are to be forced into the mould of projects, then the analysis loses its explanatory power.

Heidegger's description of the world, however, is not limited to Dasein's relation to its equipment. Dasein is also fundamentally related to other Dasein. Heidegger is adamant throughout *Being and Time* that it is a mistake to treat other Dasein like equipment or things. As a result, Dasein relates to other Dasein solicitously rather than concernfully. Initially one could draw parallels here with Kant's 'kingdom of ends'. Dasein is different from other entities, so we should treat them in accordance with that difference, and we should never treat them as equipment, that is, as a means to accomplish our tasks. It is here that Heidegger comes closest to suggesting an ethical

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dimension to his work, but he continually pulls back from these implications to note that he is only writing about ontology.

There are two difficulties with Heidegger's discussion of Dasein's relation to others. The first is brevity. Most of Heidegger's discussion of being with others is focused on the ways in which our relation to others obscures an appropriate relation to our own existence. 'They', through idle chatter and expectation of conformity, continually occlude Dasein's access to its most fundamental way of being. They teach Dasein to fear death and flee it. They teach Dasein to anaesthetise itself against the certainty of death. They teach Dasein to treat death as if it were an approaching event, rather than the finitude that imbues all of its existence. Heidegger briefly discusses what an authentic being with others might be in section 74:

But if fateful Dasein as being in the world, exists essentially in being with others, its historising is a co-historising and is determinative for it as destiny. This is how we designate the historising of the community, of a people. Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than being with one another can be conceived as the occurring together of several subjects. Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historising of Dasein.<sup>14</sup>

Fateful Dasein is Dasein that has grasped its authentic temporality as ahead of itself and being towards death. Dasein is also essentially with others, and insofar as this is the case, Dasein does not exist futurally alone, but projects itself ahead of itself with others. Dasein only creates history in community, and it is in creating this history together that a community has a destiny and is a people.

In his use of the terms *Volk* and *Geschick* it is difficult not to hear the later echoes of Nazi rhetoric. My goal here, however, is not to excoriate Heidegger for his later involvements with the National Socialist Party, or to claim that there is a direct connection between his philosophy and fascism. Rather, I would like to argue that there is a tension between Dasein as essentially with others and death as a transcendental category that makes possible the space within which Dasein is related to others. In the preceding quote Heidegger readily calls on the nature of Dasein as with others to bolster his claims to community, or at least what community might be. In the death analytic, however, Heidegger explicitly rejects being with others as a possible point from which to grasp Dasein in its totality.

As we saw in the first chapter, Heidegger wonders aloud if it is possible to grasp Dasein in its totality. As an entity that is constituted as possibility something always remains outstanding for Dasein. Whatever remains outstanding, however, comes to an end in death. Thus, the totality of Dasein must be related to death. How can we understand death so that Dasein might be grasped in its totality? Heidegger's initial impulse is to examine the death of others as a means to grasping Dasein in its totality. Initially this seems a plausible way to proceed. Dasein is essentially with others. As essentially with others, there must be some connection between my death and the death of the other. This line of reasoning fails on two accounts, according to Heidegger. First, if we pursue the ways in which Dasein is with the deceased, it becomes clear that nothing like an experience of death can arise out of this. To be sure, the living remain with the dead in solicitude. Heidegger's notion of being with others is even broad enough to encapsulate mourning and burial rites as one of the ways we can encounter others, even if the other is dead. Heidegger maintains, however, that this being with the dead does not allow us to experience death. Second, one of the consequences of being with others is that in most situations one Dasein can substitute for another. This is not the case with death, however. Even if one person volunteers to die for another, this does not prevent Dasein from dying; it merely delays it. As a result of this impossibility of representing another in the case of death Heidegger concludes that death is in every case essentially mine. The remainder of Heidegger's analysis of death constitutes the movement from the death which is essentially mine to dving as my ownmost possibility. Thus, both being with others and dving are my possibilities.

Here, I think, Heidegger again falls prey to the shortcomings of viewing Dasein as predominantly a task-oriented entity. For the most part we can perform tasks on behalf of one another. A colleague can teach for me. My wife and I take turns washing the dishes, doing the laundry, cooking dinner. Most tasks are not so specialised that they cannot be completed by another. Heidegger's claim seems to be much broader than this. Ultimately he wants to claim that death is the only situation where another cannot substitute for me. Is this really the case, though? Can another sleep for me? Can another look at a painting for me? It is true that another could fill the space that I might have filled, but would the result be the same? In the end, would I feel well-rested if another sleeps in my place? The substitution thesis is problematic from the outset, but even if we suppose that death is unique in that another cannot take our place, problems still remain.<sup>15</sup>

If we return to the first reason that being with others fails to allow Dasein to be grasped in its totality because we do not experience death in the death of others, a problem arises. Heidegger writes, 'we have no way of access to the loss-of-being as such which the dying man "suffers". The dying of others is not something that we experience in a genuine sense; at most we are always just "there along-side".'<sup>16</sup> But does Heidegger's later analysis of Dasein give us access to the 'loss-of-being as such'? When we replace the death of the other with the death of Dasein, are we any closer to experiencing this change in the way of being? Certainly not, and the remainder of Heidegger's analysis does not even pretend to give this kind of information. Rather, it shows that we are constituted as always already dying, or as being towards death, but it does not give us access to the 'loss-of-being as such'.

The second reason that Heidegger gives for dismissing the death of others as a means for understanding death is that while one Dasein is in many instances interchangeable with another, this does not apply to death. No one could deny that if someone dies for me in a specific situation, the death of the other does not thereby make me immortal. Does the death of the other have to accomplish so much, however, in order for it to be adequate to the goal of Heidegger's analysis? Heidegger's goal is not the removal of death from Dasein, but an attempt to grasp Dasein in its totality, which he thinks is in some way related to death. Heidegger initially suggests that since being with others is an ontological structure of Dasein, it may provide a means for grasping Dasein in its totality. The two arguments with which he seeks to overcome this initial thought, however, are inadequate to the task. Thus, far from removing the death of others as a possible means for grasping Dasein in its totality, it remains an open question.

I am not suggesting here that Heidegger is unconcerned with the death of others as a possible theme of analysis. Heidegger could easily expand his brief discussion of burial rites and mourning, and argue for its grounding in an authentic being towards death. The death of others remains an open question because Heidegger introduces it as a possible means for understanding Dasein in its totality, but does not clearly refute it as a means for understanding Dasein in its totality. We could put the question this way: What is the relation between the co-historising community and death? Heidegger seems to indicate this relation in several ways. First, he notes that Dasein is essentially being with others. This essentiality is key for understanding Dasein's destiny, but unnecessary for understanding Dasein as dying. How is it possible that an essential component of Dasein's existence is necessary for understanding one aspect of Dasein's existence, but unnecessary for understanding Dasein in its totality? Heidegger would respond that death is always Dasein's ownmost, non-relational possibility. Death is always *jemeinig* for Dasein. How is it possible, though, that being with others is not *jemeinig* in this sense? Is not being with others also one of Dasein's essential possibilities? Dasein cannot be Dasein and not have the possibility of being with others any more than it can be Dasein and not be finite. Dasein is Dasein only insofar as it is dying *and* insofar as it is being with others.

Heidegger could respond to the above questions by saving that while both being with others and death are constitutive of Dasein, death is somehow more primordial than being with others for understanding Dasein in its totality. Both structures must be posited because Dasein's existence cannot be understood without them, but, Heidegger might say, being with others allows us to understand some aspects of Dasein's existence, such as its solicitous relations, while death allows us to understand other aspects of Dasein's existence. such as the type of ending that it has. A difficulty arises, however, when we continue to press Heidegger on the relation between these essential structures. Heidegger's explicit claim is that these structures are summarised in the care structure, which in turn can be grasped in its totality only in being towards death. Heidegger briefly gestures toward the death of others as a possible way that Dasein may be grasped in its totality, but ultimately claims that being with others is insufficient for grasping Dasein in its totality. I have argued, however, that death does not seem to be simply an essential structure that allows us to understand certain things about Dasein, while being with others allows us to understand other things about Dasein. Rather, it seems to me that death is the ground of these other structures, not one essential structure among several equiprimordial structures. If the relation is articulated as I have proposed, the relation between death and being with others becomes clearer, and death's principal role in Being and Time comes to the fore. I have argued throughout that, despite Heidegger's explicit claims to the contrary, death does play this transcendental role in Being and Time.

Thus, the source of the tension between being with others and death lies in Heidegger's treatment of death as one of the conditions for the possibility of Dasein's existence. For him, as for Kant, time's

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fundamental referent is internal, while space's fundamental referent is external. Since Heidegger's goal is the articulation of Dasein's existence as temporal, he assumes the priority of time over space throughout Being and Time, and explicitly argues for the grounding of spatiality in temporality in section 70: 'Temporality is the meaning of the being of care. Dasein's constitution and its ways to be are possible ontologically only on the basis of temporality, regardless of whether this entity occurs "in time" or not. Hence Dasein's specific spatiality must be grounded in temporality.<sup>17</sup> Insofar as encountering others in the world happens within the context of Dasein's spatiality, it must be grounded in Dasein's temporality as being towards death. It is interesting to note that in Heidegger's grounding of spatiality in temporality he returns to discussing the relation between Dasein and equipment and does not explicitly mention being with others. Because death is an internal relation for Heidegger, he articulates it in temporal terms. Because being with others is an external relation, Heidegger understands it spatially. Even though Heidegger considers being with others as essential to Dasein's being, insofar as it is spatial, it must be seen as grounded in temporality. The internal self-relation of death must ground spatial relations, such as being with others.

Furthermore, when Heidegger seeks to articulate an authentic being with others, he does so in temporal terms. The authentic community comes together as a destiny. Dasein must be seen as co-historising with the people of its generation. Even at this point, when Heidegger is trying to articulate being with others in light of its essentiality, he does so in a derivative mode of temporality. Only on the basis of Dasein's own authentic temporality as resolutely grasping its fate as being towards death is authentic community possible. Authentic community is then articulated temporally on the basis of destiny, rather than spatially on the basis of the relation among the members of the community. This is not to say that community should be articulated solely as spatial, but that a full account of community must include both its spatial and temporal aspects without privileging one over the other. Because Heidegger has posited death as a transcendental category, and because death is articulated as an internal self-relation, death grounds time, and time grounds space. Heidegger is thus forced into a position where he must privilege time over space. This privileging creates a tension whereby he wants to argue for the essentiality of being with others, but must mitigate the role of being with others, because it is an external relation. Heidegger himself, in On Time and Being, admits that the 'attempt in *Being and Time*, section 70, to derive human spatiality from temporality is untenable'. Because Heidegger considers his attempt in *Being and Time* to derive human spatiality from temporality untenable, we must not think that he thus considered the thrust and method of the whole of the *Being and Time* to be untenable, but that the relation between human spatiality and temporality must be rethought. I am not arguing here that *Being and Time* has irresolvable tensions and must thus be abandoned. *Being and Time* presents an unavoidable moment in the history of philosophy for thinking about death in general, and its relation to space and time. I do, however, find that the way in which Heidegger has articulated the relation between space, time and death does not satisfactorily explore the relation between the community and death.

Heidegger's problem here can also be recast in terms of melancholia and its concomitant narcissism. Heidegger has argued strenuously, though problematically, that Dasein is essentially being towards death. On this basis Heidegger pursues a primordial temporality on which all other temporalities are based and at the same time distort this primordial temporality. The logic of the crypt is at work here, although not in the psychoanalytic register, but in the metaphysical register. Dasein's own death, its own absence, its own lack constitutes its existence and propels Dasein into its future with a task that can never be completed. Dasein is ontologically structured around this lack, this possibility that can never become actual. Dasein is the keeper of its own tomb, the 'lieutenant of the nothing', as Heidegger puts it in 'What is Metaphysics?' In Heidegger's fundamental ontology we find desire predicated on a lack and the incorporation of that lack into Dasein's very existence. This is the lack that one can never overcome, the cathexis that one can never withdraw. This is melancholia.

#### Notes

- 1. Sigmund Freud, 'Two Encyclopaedia Articles', SE XVIII: 249.
- 2. SZ, 325.
- 3. SZ, 328.
- 4. SZ, 329.
- 5. SZ, 325.
- 6. SZ, 365. See Thomas Sheehan, 'How (Not) to Read Heidegger', *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 69, 1995: 275–94 (especially 282–3), for an excellent discussion of the translation of these key

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Heideggerian terms. Sheehan argues that the key to understanding Heidegger lies in his reappropriation of Aristotelian  $\kappa i \nu \eta \sigma \iota \varsigma$ , and that Heidegger should always be interpreted with this in mind.

- 7. SZ, 341.
- 8. SZ, 342.
- 9. SZ, 342–4.
- 10. SZ, 413–16.
- 11. SZ, 420–1.
- 12. SZ, 428–32. Jacques Derrida, 'Ousia and Grammê: Note on a Note from Being and Time', Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 63–7, argues that Heidegger cannot as easily extricate himself from the metaphysical concept of time. One cannot simply oppose an authentic conception of time to an inauthentic conception of time, since they both occur within the history of metaphysics. Derrida also takes issue with the brevity with which Heidegger subsumes Hegel and Aristotle under the rubric of 'vulgar conception of time'.
- 13. In contrast to Heidegger see Levinas's phenomenological analysis of insomnia in 'There Is: Existence without Existents', in *The Levinas Reader*, ed. Seán Hand (New York: Routledge, 1989), 29–36.
- 14. SZ, 384–5.
- 15. Heidegger's claim is that 'Dasein can and must, *within certain limits*, "be" another Dasein' (SZ, 240, my emphasis). The only limit that he discusses, however, with regard to the possibility of representing another Dasein is death. It seems, though, that we could make a broader claim that suggests Dasein's activity cannot be defined completely by its tasks. It seems that any non-task-oriented activity performed by Dasein cannot be represented by another. Thus, rather than death being a special case, or the limit within which Dasein is representable by another, there seems to be a large range of activities where the substitution thesis fails.
- 16. SZ, 239.
- 17. Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972), 23.

Part II

# Mourning

But if there is still something prophetic in Hegel's insistence on the fundamental identity of the particular and the universal . . . it is certainly psychoanalysis that provides it with its paradigm . . .

Lacan<sup>1</sup>

In contrast to Heidegger's fastidious placement of death in Being and Time, Hegel stages several encounters with death throughout the Phenomenology of Spirit. This textual dispersion of death, along with the complexity of Hegel's text, makes understanding the role of death in the *Phenomenology* difficult. Death can be found in every section except consciousness, which I will argue below is a significant exception.<sup>2</sup> The encounters with death that we will examine in this section occur in 1) the 'struggle for recognition' and 2) the 'master and servant' sections of the chapter on self-consciousness, 3) the 'ethical order' and 4) 'terror' sections of spirit, 5) the 'revealed religion' section of the chapter on religion, and 6) 'absolute knowing'. In each of these encounters death takes on a different shape according to the type of community<sup>3</sup> that encounters it. Thus, rather than the single account of death that we find articulated in Being and Time, Hegel presents death as being continually transformed throughout the Phenomenology.

I will argue that the continual transformation of death throughout the *Phenomenology* is indicative of a fundamentally different relation to death. As we saw in Heidegger's account of death, the individuating relation that Dasein has with its own death and the existence of Dasein as always being towards death suggest the structure of melancholia. Dasein is thus structured around an incorporated lack. As we will see in the following chapters, the development of consciousness is not structured around an incorporated lack, but an introjected one. Initially, it is difficult to see the difference between incorporation and introjection as their etymologies suggest more similarities than differences. What is crucial in distinguishing them is their orientation. Incorporation refers to the internalisation of loss, a loss that one can never have done with. Introjection refers to the painful process of removing libidinal attachments from a lost object and reattaching them to a new one. This is the process of mourning, and it precisely characterises the method that Hegel uses to describe 'the education of consciousness to the standpoint of spirit'.

Hegel's method, rather than suggesting a palaeontologist removing layers of sediment, suggests a historian recounting the ways in which past communities have dealt with death. Hegel even characterises the project of the Phenomenology as 'the detailed history of the education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of science'. Because Hegel describes the *Phenomenology* as an 'education of consciousness' it is sometimes compared to the Bildungsroman popular at the time he was writing.<sup>4</sup> Within this framework the *Phenomenology* is interpreted as the coming of age of natural consciousness. It slowly works through the layers and complexity of experience. It matures through history and in relation to others around it, until it achieves the standpoint of science. We might say that the consciousness under observation in the Phenomenology grows up to become a philosopher. The image of the *Phenomenology* as propadeutic, however, is complicated by the fact that Hegel refers to the method of the Phenomenology as already scientific.<sup>5</sup> Thus while the consciousness under observation has not achieved the standpoint of science, the way in which Hegel articulates the development of consciousness is scientific. It is beyond the scope of this book to address all the issues at stake between understanding the *Phenomenology* as history and as science. I tend to think, however, taking explicit account of the scientific method that Hegel employs in the *Phenomenology* leads to a clearer, fuller reading.

The key difference in Hegel's method from a historian's method is that for the *Phenomenology* to be successful each stage in the education of consciousness must *necessarily* follow the previous one. If the shapes are not related necessarily, then there can be no conclusive force behind the project of the *Phenomenology*. One is left with a series of unrelated or contingently related positions. In this event all that would be left is a series of 'bare assertions' that would be unable to demonstrate the validity of science. The necessity required to constitute Hegel's project as philosophical precipitates his method of determinate negation. On the one hand, in order for consciousness to progress towards its goal, it must in some way go beyond its previous position, that is, it must negate its previous position. On the other hand, each new position must follow necessarily from the position

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that preceded it, which means that the negation of the previous position cannot be an absolute negation. Each new shape of consciousness cannot treat the previous shape of consciousness from which it emerged as nothing. It must see itself as the negation and result of the previous shape of consciousness. Hegel calls this type of negation determinate negation.<sup>6</sup> Insofar as consciousness sees itself as the result of the shape of consciousness which preceded it, it takes up the previous form as its content. This content, however, is now a superseded content, a content that is inadequate to the concept of the new shape of consciousness. By continually seeking to close the gap between its concept of itself and what it is in itself, consciousness educates itself to the standpoint of science.<sup>7</sup> My purpose in briefly outlining Hegel's method here is to show that if for Hegel there is a necessary connection between the shapes of consciousness, then we may suppose that the subsequent appearances of death in the *Phenomenology* are in some way related, and that the *Phenomenology* presents a *develop*ment of death, as opposed to the random appearance of death in several situations. What I cannot explore here, though, are the numerous ways that the necessity of Hegel's method can be interpreted.<sup>8</sup>

One might ask at this point why consciousness would seek to take such an arduous journey that entails continually losing itself through the inadequacies of its concepts of itself. The answer that Hegel gives is that consciousness remains unsatisfied as long as it remains in an inadequate state of consciousness. This continual striving for a unity with itself drives consciousness beyond any limited satisfaction that it might have at a particular stage along the way. Consciousness does violence to itself rather than remain incomplete. It might for a short time shrink from this violence and seek to remain in thoughtless inertia or sink back into a sentimentality that assures consciousness of the goodness of its particular position. Eventually, however, consciousness is driven out of this complacency to seek its full satisfaction by becoming adequate to its concept of itself, even if this 'uprooting entails its death'.9 Despite the fundamental differences between Hegel and Heidegger, what they share is a conception of desire as acquisition. What drives Dasein in Heidegger and spirit in Hegel is a structural incompleteness, desire predicated on a lack.

This characterisation of the movement of consciousness as continually facing its own death and the fact that in order for consciousness to move to the next shape it must kill its previous shape demonstrate in a preliminary way the importance Hegel places on death in the *Phenomenology*. As we follow these encounters with death, we will see how each shape of consciousness attempts to introject death within itself. I will argue that these attempts at introjection are attempts by Hegel to overcome death through mourning. The result of this subordination is that death cannot play a transcendental role in the *Phenomenology* as it does in *Being and Time*. Or, to return to the psychoanalytic register, we could say that there is no crypt formation in Hegel's *Phenomenology*, no loss that cannot be compensated for.

What Hegel is staging in the *Phenomenology* is a series of encounters with death. Each builds on the previous encounter and presents a new way of dealing with death. The way that this is achieved depends on numerous variables, as we will see in the following chapters. Chief among these is the complexity of the relation within which death arises. Thus, the way death is dealt with in the struggle for recognition is profoundly different from the way that the community of revealed religion handles death. For Hegel the differences among these ways of dealing with death indicate progress. It is not simply that revealed religion is different from the struggle for recognition. Revealed religion is better. That is, in the progress of spirit revealed religion is a more complete expression of spirit's fullness. This progress can be characterised in several ways: understanding death as spiritual negation instead of natural negation; the improvement in techniques of introjection; or a more efficient mourning.

Hegel's account of death in the *Phenomenology* is different on two counts. First, Hegel does not employ as many conceptual distinctions with regard to death in the *Phenomenology* as Heidegger does in *Being and Time*. Second, the concept of death is under constant development throughout the *Phenomenology*. In order to introduce the concept of death we will begin by looking at a brief discussion of death which Hegel places between the first two encounters with death in the *Phenomenology*, the struggle for recognition and the dialectic of lordship and bondage, and then move on to discuss those encounters in detail.<sup>10</sup>

Hegel first introduces death in the *Phenomenology* as a 'natural negation'. 'For just as life is the *natural* setting [*natürliche Position*] of consciousness, independence without absolute negativity, so death is the *natural* negation [*natürliche Negation*] of consciousness, negation without independence.'<sup>11</sup> In this early discussion of death, Hegel contrasts it with life. Life is 'independence without absolute negativity'; death is 'negation without independence'. To these characterisations of life and death Hegel attaches the adjective 'natural'. Life is

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the 'natural setting of consciousness' and death is the 'natural negation of consciousness'. What is at stake for Hegel, then, in these initial encounters with death is a relation between independence, negativity and the characterisation of this relation as 'natural'. What does Hegel mean by these terms at this point? What is independence? What is negativity? What does it mean for these terms to be 'natural'?

The term 'natural' is opposed to the term 'spiritual'. Hegel sees his task in the *Phenomenology* as following the development of consciousness from its natural setting to its spiritual setting. As consciousness develops it becomes less natural and more spiritual. What characterises this conversion from natural to spiritual is an introjection of consciousness's external relations to internal relations. The introjection that concerns us here is the introjection of death. As we will see below, consciousness discovers that it cannot introject death within itself as consciousness. Consciousness must become a community in order to convert its external relation with death into an internal one. Death first appears to consciousness as something wholly outside of its power. It is that which destroys consciousness, rather than developing it. At the same time, however, death is unavoidable. Consciousness cannot circumvent death. It must find a way of dealing with this natural negation.

The first attempt of consciousness to deal with death in the *Phenomenology* is the struggle for recognition. In this struggle, Hegel vividly pictures two combatants locked in a life-and-death struggle. Each combatant risks his life and seeks the death of the other. The language is so descriptive that it is easy to forget that Hegel does not have in mind a conflict between two individuals. We are still much too early in the development of consciousness to have anything like fully formed persons. The participants in the struggle do not have a will, ethics, families, jobs, homes or anything of the sort. At this point consciousness is merely a living that is conscious of itself as a living thing. The struggle is a thought experiment in which Hegel works out the development of consciousness in the language of conflict. What, then, is at stake in this conflict? What must be achieved in this encounter for the argument of the *Phenomenology* to advance, and what do we learn about death in this encounter?

The struggle arises as a result of the movement from consciousness to self-consciousness. The most important development in this movement is a shift in the object of consciousness. In the chapter on consciousness, consciousness took what it was conscious of to be its truth, that is, what is true for consciousness lies in something other

than itself. Presupposing that the truth lies in something other than itself, however, leads consciousness to the conclusion that it experiences only itself. It is this contradiction, that experience of something other than itself is, in fact, an experience of itself, that consciousness posits as its starting point in self-consciousness. To say that consciousness as self-consciousness experiences only itself, however, is not to say that self-consciousness is engaged in solipsistic navelgazing. Rather, self-consciousness sees itself as the culmination of the life-system developed in the chapter on consciousness but still part of that system. The life-system, or nature, is seen as existing solely for consciousness. To the degree that self-consciousness understands itself as that which nature is for, it experiences only itself, but to the degree that it recognises itself as belonging to this life-system in experiencing itself, it experiences nature. Self-consciousness, then, begins with the certainty of itself as the truth, rather than something other than itself, or the object exists for self-consciousness, rather than in itself.<sup>12</sup> To say that the object of consciousness exists for selfconsciousness is not to say that the object of consciousness now becomes dependent on self-consciousness. Throughout the chapter on self-consciousness Hegel is careful to acknowledge that the object of consciousness remains independent. As we will see below, it is not until the servant is forced to work for the master that the independence of the object begins to be subdued. And, it is not until the chapter on reason that both consciousness and its object are posited as part of a larger whole. In this case the world is seen as reasonable and accessible to observation precisely because both the world and consciousness belong to reason.

What is this object that now exists for self-consciousness rather than in itself? Hegel calls it life, or the life-system. Just as consciousness has undergone a transformation in the course of the *Phenomenology*, the object of consciousness has also undergone a transformation. The object begins as the immediate 'this' of consciousness and develops as a result of its interaction with consciousness. By the end of the chapter on consciousness its object is now a system of movement in which individual entities arise and are reabsorbed into the system. No entities within the system are independent of the system or are capable of enduring. Only the system itself endures. This system is the cycle of life and death of all things in the natural world.<sup>13</sup>

Against this backdrop of a never-ending cycle of life and death, consciousness posits itself as essential and the life-system as for it. In

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order to maintain itself in this position, however, consciousness must demonstrate that it is independent of the life-system. It is this attempt to demonstrate its independence of the life-system that leads to the struggle for recognition and the first encounter with death. The first attempt of consciousness to demonstrate its independence is by positing itself as an immediate identity. Consciousness posits itself as the simple I = I. Self-consciousness, however, can maintain itself in this immediacy only by overcoming the life-system. This necessity by which self-consciousness must overcome the life-system Hegel calls desire. Desire seeks to appropriate the life-system for its own needs. It seeks to destroy the independence of the life-system insofar as the life-system seems to exist in itself, so that it can demonstrate the lifesystem is only insofar as it is for consciousness.<sup>14</sup>

The relation of desire between self-consciousness and the lifesystem is short-lived as self-consciousness realises that the satisfaction of desire is dependent on the independence of the object. Self-consciousness is not independent at all in desire. Rather, it is dependent on the object of desire. 'It is in fact something other than self-consciousness that is the essence of desire.'15 Self-consciousness needs a way to maintain its identity, while at the same time treating the life-system as something of which it is independent. The solution to this problem is for another self-consciousness independent of nature to recognise it, in order that identity may be established without reference to the life-system. Self-consciousness relates to the way in which the other is conscious of it. Self-consciousness is acknowledged in the independence of the other. Once this recognition takes place there is only one way to demonstrate that each self-conscious is fully independent of the life-system. Each self-consciousness must risk life in order to prove that each is truly independent of life. This confrontation is a struggle to the death, not for the sake of any need or desire, but simply for the prestige of being recognised as self-conscious, as independent of life.<sup>16</sup>

The role of death itself at this stage in the development of consciousness is difficult to see. As we saw above in Hegel's discussion of death at this stage, death is simply the natural negation of consciousness. If self-consciousness is killed in the struggle for recognition, then that self-consciousness is no longer a consciousness at all, but a corpse which is reabsorbed into the life-system that it was trying to demonstrate its independence of in the first place. What this encounter with death does demonstrate, however, is the power of death. Death has the power to stop the development of consciousness, to prevent consciousness from achieving the standpoint of science. Hegel cannot simply disregard death. He considers it to be as uncircumventable as Heidegger does in *Being and Time*. Yet Hegel must find a way for consciousness to develop and at the same time to account for death. This accounting for death is a slow process and involves the remainder of the *Phenomenology*. As consciousness becomes more complex, it is able to introject more of the work of death, more of the negating power of death within itself. This movement of introjection will not be fully accomplished until absolute knowing, when consciousness is not a singular entity but a complex community that is able to see the negating power of death as its own work.

Consciousness begins this movement of introjection in the stage that results from the failure of recognition. In order to progress from this point, self-consciousness needs another self-consciousness that will recognise it as independent of the life-system, and yet be unwilling to risk its own life to demonstrate its independence of the lifesystem. We thus have one self-consciousness that is independent of the life-system and willing to risk its life and one self-consciousness that is independent of the life-system insofar as it is self-conscious and dependent on the life-system insofar as it is unwilling to risk its life. The two self-consciousnesses previously locked in mortal combat have now become the familiar figures of master and servant through the acquiescence of the one self-consciousness unwilling to risk its life.<sup>17</sup>

Within this relationship between master and servant death again arises. In this context death remains the alien power of natural negation which we saw above in the struggle for recognition, but the master is able to use this alien power to his own ends. The master uses the threat of death to force the servant to work for him. The servant chooses to preserve his life and work for the master, rather than face the possibility of annihilation. Hegel is explicit that the fear under which the servant labours must be the fear of death. He even goes as far as to say that because it is fear of death that motivates the servant, fear of death is the absolute master.<sup>18</sup> The servant takes his fear and begins to work on nature on behalf of the master. Through work, the natural negativity of death is transformed into the negating power of the servant. The servant works not to destroy nature, as in desire, but to transform nature into an object for the master. Through work the servant comes to see himself as fully independent of the nature that he shapes for the enjoyment of the master. At the same time the master, insofar as he does not work on nature but enjoys it, loses his independence from nature. The master is now dependent on the

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servant to exercise independence over nature on his behalf. By risking his life the master demonstrated his independence from life. This risk gave him power over the servant by threatening the servant with death if he did not serve. In the service of the servant, however, the master becomes dependent on the servant for his independence from nature.<sup>19</sup>

The development of consciousness from the struggle for recognition to master and servant also represents a development in the concept of death. Since death arises as a necessary condition of the relation between two self-consciousnesses, it must be introjected into the relation in some way. The two combatants in the struggle are unable to introject death in any way. It remains the power of natural negation that returns consciousness to the life-system. As long as one self-consciousness dies, consciousness cannot develop. Selfconsciousness cannot incorporate death by becoming an instrument of death. Self-consciousness does make some inroads at introjection in its manifestation as master and servant, however. The master is still aware that he cannot be an instrument of death. If the master kills the servant, then the recognition he seeks will be lost. What the master can do, however, is threaten death. The master is the master because he is willing to risk his life. The servant is the servant because he refuses to do so. The master maintains his position by forcing the servant to choose between life and servitude. It is this very choice, precipitated by the fear of death, that ultimately undermines the master's independence. This stage of consciousness's development is unable to introject death itself into its movement. Death remains an alien power of natural negation. What consciousness is able to do, however, is introject the fear of death into its movement. The way in which the fear of death is introjected into the movement of consciousness is that it becomes an organising principle for the relation between two selfconsciousnesses. Neither the master nor the slave is able to wield death as its own work, but the fear of death is that which organises the relation between master and servant and that which necessitates the servant's work on nature. As we will see in the following chapters, successive manifestations of consciousness will be able to incorporate death within it, and ultimately transform death into its own power of negation.

In examining the context, logic and concept of death in *Being and Time* and the *Phenomenology* we have seen that death plays an important role in both works, but by radically different textual, logical and conceptual means. Heidegger is primarily concerned with retrieving the foundational meaning of death by carefully examining our common way of speaking about and acting towards death. In this examination he discovers that for the most part we avoid our own mortality by becoming absorbed in our usual tasks. The primary meaning of death that has become covered by the excrescence of daily life is that Dasein must be conceived of as always already dying. Death is not a future event which will eventually come. Dasein exists such that it is constantly stretched ahead of itself to the limit of its possibilities, its death. Death is Dasein's ownmost, non-relational, unsurpassable, certain and indefinite possibility. The space that Heidegger creates for death is profoundly singular. Only Dasein may inhabit its own death. No one may represent our death to us. The best we can hope for in the death of others is an empirical certainty about death.

Hegel begins with a conception of death as natural negation. Death is the means by which consciousness is reabsorbed into the infinite natural cycle of life and death. Consciousness seeks to demonstrate its independence from this natural negation. In order to do that it must make death a part of its own movement rather than something that nature imposes on it. One may thus read the *Phenomenology* as a series of attempts to introject death. In the two encounters with death that we examined from the Phenomenology, consciousness made the first halting steps towards this goal. The encounter with death in the struggle for recognition revealed death as an alien power that consciousness could not subdue. The struggle for recognition resulted in an impasse which could be resolved only by the subjugation of one self-consciousness to the other. The dialectic of master and servant succeeded to a small degree in taking the alien power of death and making it its own. The master consciousness did this by using the fear of death to force another consciousness to do the master's work.

At this point we can see in a preliminary way the differences that begin to develop between Hegel's and Heidegger's accounts of death. For Heidegger death is an internal self-relation. His account of death focuses on the individual's relation to death and the way in which Dasein is *individualised* by death, and is thus melancholic. By contrast, Hegel's account of death focuses on the way death affects relations between people. Hegel is quite explicit that both the struggle for recognition and the relation between master and servant require death to be in some degree necessary for the relationship. While it is premature to refer to the relations of the struggle or master and servant as communities, Hegel will continue to focus on the *social* 

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aspect of death. Hegel will be concerned with the way the concept of death changes depending on the community in which it arises.

By drawing out this distinction between a communal relation to death and an individual relation to death, I am not claiming that either would deny what the other affirms. Hegel would not deny that one must face death alone. Heidegger, by the same token, would not deny the importance of the communal aspect of death. What concerns me here, however, is a question of priority. Does Heidegger's ontology necessitate the priority of death as individualising? Does Hegel's metaphysics require him to posit the community as preceding death? These questions broach the larger issues that were touched on in the Introduction. What is the relation between death and desire? Even if both Hegel and Heidegger conceive of desire as predicated on a lack, how does the relation to this lack affect their respective conceptions of death?

# Notes

- 1. Jacques Lacan, 'The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis', *Écrits*, trans. Bruce Pink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 242.
- 2. Pierre-Jean Labarrière, Structure et mouvement dialectique dans la Phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel (Paris: Editions Aubier-Montaigne, 1968), 69-70, offers a much more complex analysis of the structural unity of the Phenomenology in terms of successive totalisations in which spirit (l'Esprit dans sa conscience) is the unity of consciousness, selfconsciousness and reason. Religion (l'Esprit dans sa conscience de soi) is the unity of the different forms of religion, and absolute knowing is the 'unité conceptualisée de ces diverses totalités'. While there is some disagreement about the role of reason here, Labarrière's characterisation of spirit as consciousness and religion as self-consciousness fits well with the structure proposed above. He additionally supports it when he says, 'Si la problématique générale de la Phénoménologie peut être exprimée comme la réduction de la distance originelle entre la conscience et la conscience de soi (ou entre la substance et le sujet), il est évident que la première et la dernière d'entre elles sont les seules à présenter le schéma global qui aboutit à l'unité de deux termes'.
- 3. I am using the term 'community' here and throughout this work to refer to a constitutive relation between people. To say that a constitutive relation between people is a community overstates the case in Hegel's terms. A community for Hegel is a group of people organised around a specific set of laws. Community in this technical sense does not exist for Hegel prior to 'spirit'. The reason that I use the term here, however, is not to

elide the differences between the different moments in the movement of spirit, but to indicate a similarity that makes communities in general possible, namely, that consciousness cannot exist except insofar as it is constituted in relation to another consciousness.

- 4. See, for example, Jean Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's* Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 11.
- 5. All references to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* refer to the volume and page number in parentheses from G. W. F. Hegel, *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969), followed by the paragraph number from the translation by A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). All direct quotes will be from this translation unless otherwise noted. See 3:47/§48.
- 6. 3:73–4 /§79.
- 7. 3:73-4/§79.
- 8. Most commentators insist that the movement of the *Phenomenology* is a 'necessary' one. They disagree profoundly, however, concerning the nature of that necessity. See, for example, Kenneth Westphal, *Hegel's Epistemological Realism*; William Maker, *Philosophy without Foundations*; Joseph C. Flay, *Hegel's Quest for Certainty*; Ardis Collins, 'Hegel's Unresolved Contradiction: Experience, Philosophy, and the Irrationality of Nature', *Dialogue 39*, 2000: 774–6. All these works acknowledge the importance of necessity to Hegel's project in the *Phenomenology*, but each articulates that necessity in different ways (for example, *reductio ad absurdum*, pragmatic argument, conceptual implication). While my sympathies lie with those commentators, such as Westphal and Collins, who articulate a strong form of necessity, entering into this debate would take me far beyond the scope of this work.
- 9. 3:74-5/§80.
- 10. 3:149/§188. The literature on the role of death in the *Phenomenology* is extensive. Much of the interest stems from Alexandre Kojève's 'The Idea of Death in the Philosophy of Hegel', in *G. W. F. Hegel: Critical Assessments*, Vol. II, trans. J. Carpino (London: Routledge, 1993), 311–58; originally published as Appendix II, 'L'Idée de la mort dans la philosophie de Hegel', in his *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel* (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), 527–73. While Kojève's focus is much broader than the *Phenomenology*, his position remains that the negativity of human nature, particularly in the power of death, remains in irreconcilable contrast to the positivity of God's existence. As a result, the conclusion of Hegel's position on death, according to Kojève, must be that God and humanity remain forever alienated from one another. Georges Bataille, in 'Hegel, Death and Sacrifice', *G. W. F. Hegel: Critical Assessments*, Vol. II, trans. J. Strauss (London: Routledge, 1993), 383–99, is in

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fundamental agreement with Kojève. John Burbidge, in 'Man, God, and Death in Hegel's Phenomenology', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42, 1981: 183, argues for a position very similar to mine in a survey of the same texts. He also explicitly opposes himself to Kojève (and implicitly Bataille) by saving that death is the necessary precondition for a reconciliation between God and humanity. Also explicitly opposed to Kojève is M. J. Inwood, in 'Hegel on Death', International Journal of Moral and Social Studies 1, 1986: 109-22. Additionally, in an article that does not explicitly engage Kojève's interpretation of Hegel, Philibert Secretan's 'Le thème de la mort dans la "Phénoménologie de l'Esprit" de Hegel', Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 23, 1976: 269-85, uses the master/slave dialectic, the terror and the death of God to articulate Hegel as a philosopher of life, progress and the evolution of reason, rather than a philosopher of death. It is not my intention here to engage in a point by point refutation of Kojève. However, given the close association between Hegel, death and Kojève, I feel I would be remiss if I did not at least indicate what is at stake in Kojève's reading and how I distinguish myself. In sharp contrast to Kojève, the negativity of death does not mark an unbridgeable gulf between humanity and God, but precisely the point where each is reconciled to the other.

- 11. 3:149/§188.
- 12. 3:137-8; 142-3/§§166; 172-3.
- 13. 3:139-40/§§168-9.
- 14. 3:143/§174.
- 15. 3:143/§175.
- 16. 3:147-9/§§184-7.
- 17. 3:150/§189. In this regard Hyppolite, *Genesis and Structure*, 173, notes that the slave is the slave of life. Secretan in 'Le thème de la mort', 275, is also helpful on the relation between slave, master, and death when he notes 'Le maître n'est que le substitut d'un autre maître: la mort'.
- 18. 3:153/§194.
- 19. 3:150-2/§190-3.

# Family Values and Culture Wars

Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part.

Aristotle<sup>1</sup>

Viewed through the psychoanalytic lens of mourning, we saw in the previous chapter that the movement of consciousness is characterised by a process of introjection. Consciousness is forced at each stage to remove its libidinal investments from an object and reattach them to a new object. Insofar as this process progresses, that is, insofar as in each case a new cathexis is formed, consciousness is introjecting its lost object. At each stage the loss is overcome and new attachments are made. This is the process of mourning.

In this chapter we will see how this process develops and the Phenomenology moves from examining abstract consciousness to communities in history. I will argue that mourning still characterises this movement, but that the ways in which the lost object is introjected changes depending on the community within which the death occurs. For the *Phenomenology* to be successful. Hegel must show how neither death nor others are external to the movement of consciousness. Both must be introjected into the movement of consciousness so that all of its negations are contained within it. We examined the initial attempts of consciousness to effect this type of introjection in the struggle for recognition and the master/servant dialectic. The struggle for recognition was unsuccessful in converting death into a spiritual negation. The dialectic of master and servant was partly successful in this project of introjection insofar as the master subjugated the servant through the threat of death. Death itself, however, remained the power of natural negation rather than the power of consciousness, insofar as the master wields the threat of death rather than death itself. It is not until the section on the Terror that the community sees death as fully its work.

Prior to examining the ethical order, however, two important developments must be noted. The *Phenomenology*, of course, does not move directly from self-consciousness to the ethical order. The ethical order follows the 'reason' section and begins the section called 'spirit'. In the reason section, self-consciousness initially posits itself as the unity (Einheit) of itself and its object, an immediate idealism. The nature of this unity lies in the grounding of both self-consciousness and its object in reason. Self-consciousness and its object are now seen as parts of a larger whole called 'reason'. While the unity of self and object is properly called 'reason', the subject does not fully comprehend this unity. In the movement from reason to spirit the subject develops the comprehension of this unity. The singular subject quickly discovers that as an individual it cannot comprehend the unity of itself and its object. The subject only comprehends itself as reason within a community. For Hegel, one can only have reason as a member of a community. As a result, Hegel's analyses in the Phenomenology of those stages that follow reason are analyses of communities rather than analyses of an individual consciousness or self-consciousness. Furthermore, each community seeks to articulate in some way the identity of itself with its object. That is, each community manifests reason.<sup>2</sup>

The second important development that arises in the move from consciousness to spirit is that for Hegel the communities examined are those that have been actualised in history.<sup>3</sup> Up to this point in the Phenomenology, there have been allusions to history: Stoicism, medieval Christianity, etc., but Hegel never claimed to be giving an analysis of the movement of history, only the necessary development of consciousness. Beginning with the ethical order, however, Hegel attempts to understand the logic underlying the Greek city-states. He understands the Greek city-states through the lens of Sophocles' play the Antigone. He reads the play as a conflict between duty to one's family and duty to the state. This conflict, according to Hegel, ultimately leads to the downfall of Greece and to the rise of the Roman Empire. Hegel's analysis of the Greek city-states must show how the relation between the family and the state in the Greek world, initially functioning in relative harmony with itself, necessarily brings about its own downfall.

The harmony of the ethical order is predicated on the complementary relationship between the state and the family. The family produces men to be citizens in the state and fight for the preservation of the state, so that the family itself might be protected in the state's preservation. The state is, of course, dependent on the family for the production of its citizens. The state cannot function without the family, and the family cannot function without the state. In addition to producing the citizenry of the state, the task of burying the dead also falls on the family. Of particular concern for Hegel is the solemnity with which those men killed in war are buried by the family of the dead soldier. What I would like to examine in Hegel's analysis of the Greek city-states is the power of the state to expose its citizenry to death in war, and the concomitant necessity of families to bury their members killed in war.<sup>4</sup>

Insofar as each of these spheres of the ethical order (that is, the state and the family) has a different task, each is governed by a different set of principles. The principles that govern the state Hegel calls 'human law', and those that govern the family Hegel calls 'divine law'. The connection between the governing of a state and human law is straightforward. The Greek city-state is constituted by the unity of its individual members who are freely seeking the good of the community. The good of the community is established through the promulgation of laws best thought to promote this good. Chief among the laws designed to promote the good of the community are laws of conscription that require military service to the community in its time of need. To be a citizen in a Greek city-state is to be wholly bound to it. One's identity is found only in relation to the state. As a result, one willingly risks death in order to preserve the state. The converse is also true: a state that is unable to conscript its members cannot cohere as a state.

Of course, a state does not spend all of its time at war. The everyday life of a state is occasionally punctuated by war. Hegel seems to be saying that the interruption of everyday life by war is necessary to maintaining the unity of the state (. . . *hat die Regierung sie in ihrem Innern von Zeit zu Zeit durch die Kriege zu erschüttern*). Without the occasional intrusion of war into the lives of the citizenry, the members of the community risk forgetting their free relation to one another and being consumed with their own particular ends. If this occurs, the unity of the state dissolves. The solution to this problem for the Greek city-states, according to Hegel, is war. 'By this means [war] the government upsets their [citizens'] established order, and violates their right to independence . . .'. In war each citizen is reminded of his duty to the community. Each member forgoes pursuing his particular ends in order to protect the community.<sup>5</sup>

In the prospect of war the spectre of death resurfaces in the *Phenomenology*. '...[T]he individuals who, absorbed in their own way of life, break loose from the whole and strive after the inviolable

independence and security of the person are made to feel in the task laid on them their lord and master, death.' The tendency of individuals within the community to become absorbed in their own concerns is checked by war. The practice of warfare, or strategy, or even battle, however, does not solidify the community. Rather, the fact that individuals are 'made to feel death' (. . .*den Tod, zu fühlen*. . .) in their wartime service is what unifies the community. The phrase 'made to feel death' is difficult to understand. How is one made to feel death? Is Hegel simply referring to the carnage of the battlefield that the survivors of a war experience? Or, is he referring to those who actually die in battle? Given what Hegel says about the importance of burial rites within the community of the ethical order, I think he is referring to those who actually die in battle. Through the death of those who die in battle, the community as a whole is preserved.<sup>6</sup>

Regardless of whether 'made to feel death' refers to those who witness the death of others or to those who die, the appearance of death marks an important advance in the introjection of death. Hegel alludes to his argument from the master/servant dialectic by calling death 'lord', but he also goes beyond that argument. In the master/servant dialectic, the fear of death spurred the servant to work for the master. The movement of the dialectic, however, required that the servant could not be killed. If the master were to kill the servant. he would be left without any kind of recognition and would have to begin the movement of self-consciousness all over again. It is only if the servant remains alive but in fear of death that the dialectic of master and servant can proceed. There are no such stipulations on death in the ethical order. Not only is it *possible* for some members of the community to die without interrupting the movement of spirit, but Hegel claims that it is now necessary for some members of the community to die in order to preserve the community. From the master/servant dialectic to the ethical order we have progressed from a point where death is a complete disruption to the point where death is a requirement for maintaining community. 'Spirit, by thus throwing into the melting-pot the stable existence of these systems, checks their tendency to fall away from the ethical order, and to be submerged in a natural existence; and it preserves and raises consciousness into freedom and its own power.' By being made to feel death, rather than simply fearing it, the unity of the ethical order is maintained.7

The harmonious relation between the family and the state is thus dependent upon its citizens' willingness to go into battle and die for the state. Understanding the unity of the state from the side of the state is a one-sided account of the ethical order. We must also understand the functioning of the ethical order from the side of the community that produces individuals to be citizens of the state, the family. Hegel has already indicated that the family does not function according to the same laws as the state. Whereas the state operates according to human laws, the family operates according to divine laws. Presumably, Hegel's model for describing the workings of the state and family as a relation between human and divine laws is taken from the *Antigone*. Antigone says to Creon in a well-known passage: 'Nor did I think your edict has such force / that you, a mere mortal, could override the gods, / the great unwritten, unshakable traditions.'<sup>8</sup> What are these divine laws, these 'great unwritten, unshakable traditions.'<sup>8</sup> How do they characterise the working of the family? And how do they relate to the functioning of the state?

For Hegel the family is no less ethical than the state. Both the state and the family contain the entire ethical substance. The difference between the family and the state thus lies not in the opposition between ethical and unethical but between the 'substance conscious of what it actually does' and 'substance that simply is'.<sup>9</sup> The family is the deep, subterranean root system out of which the state grows and which the state presupposes. One might say that the family is the 'nature' that the self-conscious state takes as an historical given.<sup>10</sup> States do not appear fully formed; they grow out of the geographical interrelations of pre-existing family groups. However, neither 'of the two [family and state] is by itself absolutely valid (an und für sich); human law proceeds in its living process from the divine, the law valid on earth from that of the netherworld, the conscious from the unconscious, mediation from immediacy - and equally returns whence it came. The power of the netherworld, on the other hand, has its actual existence on earth; through consciousness, it becomes existence and activity.'11

Hegel's task with regard to the family is to show how, in its complex interrelation with the state, it is able to actualise its ethical substance. The family is 'immediately determined as an ethical being'.<sup>12</sup> The family is given as immediately ethical. It is the ethical ground out of which the state grows and on which the state is dependent. What Hegel thus describes in the sections on the family in the ethical order is the way in which the family overcomes its ethical immediacy. This type of relation is distinctly different from the way that citizens relate to one another in the political community, in actual, ethical activity.

The family transcends the naturalness of its relations, though, because it is only insofar as it transcends the limits of these natural relations that it actualises its ethical substance. The family 'is within itself an ethical entity only so far as it is not the natural relationship of its members . . .'.<sup>13</sup> This is not to say that the family is dissolved in the workings of the state, but that the family as family can actualise itself only by producing an individual who acts. In so doing, the family as family actualises its ethical substance, and its relations become ethical relations.<sup>14</sup> Thus, throughout the ethical order Hegel opposes natural relations to ethical relations, or more precisely, sees the actualisation of the family's ethical substance as the overcoming of its natural relations. This is not to say that nature itself is alien to the ethical order. As we saw above, a community is reasonable to the degree that it posits itself in unity with nature. What is at stake here for Hegel's argument is the means by which the community achieves this unity. In the case of the Greek city-states this unity is an ethical unity founded on the free activity of its members. Insofar as the members of the community do not act freely, they demonstrate their naturalness. That is, they demonstrate the degree to which they are not free, subject to inclinations.

The family begins this process of actualising itself in the production of citizens. Of course, in the Greek city-states only males were eligible to be citizens and fight on behalf of the state. The family's task, then, is to produce males who are willing to put the good of the state above their individual and natural good and even the good of their family. Or, to be more precise, by pursuing the good of the community the preservation of the individual, the family and the state is assured. The production of this type of citizen begins through education. The education of the citizen consists in 'subduing the natural aspect and separateness of his existence, and training him to be virtuous, to a life in and for the universal [i.e. the state]'.<sup>15</sup> One's natural inclination is to labour on behalf of one's blood relations, rather than the state. The family's task is to train the individual to moderate his appetites and inclinations and serve the state.<sup>16</sup> Thus, the family does not train its members merely to be soldiers, but to be good citizens, virtuous citizens, in service to the state.

By raising family members to become good citizens of the state, the family, however, does not achieve its goal of superseding its blood relations, of actualising its ethical substance. The education of family members, in fact, only tends towards the dissolution of the family. Insofar as the family succeeds in making good citizens, it succeeds in

producing family members who no longer see the well-being of the family as their immediate task. The well-being of the family is subordinated to the well-being of the state. In the face of the family's explicit task of producing good citizens, how can the family maintain its integrity and at the same time make its relations ethical rather than natural? In order to meet these conditions the family must produce a citizen who acts universally and freely and at the same time returns to the family in that universal and free act. For Hegel, death in service to the state is the only act that meets all these criteria. While birth is a universal act performed by the whole of the family member, it is a natural and thus not a free act. Education, to the extent that it is freely undertaken, comes much closer to meeting the conditions required to raise the family to an ethical relation. But, for Hegel, one must not imagine 'that service in the form of education, i.e. in a series of efforts, really has [the family member] in his entirety for object, and produces him as a "work" '.<sup>17</sup> Rather, the 'content of the ethical action must be substantial or whole and universal; therefore it can only be related to the whole individual or to the individual qua universal'.<sup>18</sup> From the perspective of the family member death is the only act in which the individual acts freely and universally:

The deed, then, which embraces the entire existence of the blood-relation, does not concern the citizen, for he does not belong to the family . . . it has as its object and content this particular individual who belongs to the family, but is taken as a universal being freed from his sensuous, i.e. individual, reality. The deed no longer concerns the living but the dead, the individual who, after a long succession of separate disconnected experiences, concentrates himself into a single completed shape, and has raised himself out of the unrest of the accidents of life into the calm of simple universality.<sup>19</sup>

The fact that a citizen dies in war in itself is not sufficient to actualise the family as ethical. 'But because it is only as a citizen that he is actual and substantial, the individual, so far as he is not a citizen but belongs to the family, is only an unreal impotent shadow.'<sup>20</sup> It is only in *burying* the dead that the family supersedes its blood relations and becomes actually ethical.

The family acts freely and reasonably in the burial of its members. The family consummates the individual's final act in burial and thus actualises its ethical being. Insofar as the family is constituted by its blood relations, it is natural but immediately ethical. In order to become actually ethical it must freely act for the good of the community. The family accomplishes this through the production of citizens who freely act for the good of the community. Individual virtuous acts by the citizen are insufficient to actualise his family's ethical being. These individual acts are insufficient, because they do not involve the whole of the individual. Only in death in service to the state does the individual achieve the wholeness necessary to actualise the ethical being of his family. The family produces the individual for the good of the state, and it is only when the individual acts wholly for the state, that is, when he willingly sacrifices himself on the battlefield, that the family transcends its blood relations.<sup>21</sup>

The family's task does not end with the death of its member. The key to the constitution of the state is the free relation of its members. When the citizen is dead, of course, he can no longer act at all, freely or otherwise. His being has been separated from his action. In order not to let his body be abandoned to nature and in order to realise the ethical meaning of its member's death, it is the responsibility of the family to rescue him from the natural negativity of death, the decomposition from the elements and scavenging from wild animals, and celebrate his death through burial rites. Through proper burial the family rescues its member's final act of self-sacrifice from death, and thus converts what was something solely belonging to nature and thus irrational into an ethical act and the work of the whole, free individual. 'The family thereby makes him a member of a community which prevails over and holds under control the forces of particular material elements and the lower forms of life, which sought to unloose themselves against him and to destroy him.'22 Notice here that it is only to the degree that death remains solely the work of nature that it is irrational. When in burial rites the family takes the work of destruction on to itself, it works in keeping with itself as rational, which includes an understanding of nature as rational.23

The reason, then, that Hegel focuses on the duty of the family to bury its dead, rather than the state's relation to its fallen soldiers, is that the family burial rites are necessary for the development of the family's ethical substance. Certainly, the state honoured its fallen in victory parades and elaborate ceremonies after a war, but these celebrations are not essential to the development of the state as ethical. In contrast, the family would remain immediately ethical, unless it was able to actualise itself within the ethical order through its members and then incorporate the universality of those members through burial rites. The family of the Greek city-states mirrors the process of externalisation and internalisation that Hegel sees as the general movement of spirit throughout the *Phenomenology*.

Hegel's analysis of the Greek city-states thus lays the groundwork for the tension explored in the *Antigone*. The relation between the family and the state remains harmonious as long as the family keeps producing individuals willing to sacrifice themselves for the good of the state. In the sacrifice and subsequent burial of the family member, the family overcomes the immediacy of its relations and acts ethically (that is, freely acts for the good of the state). The *Antigone*, on Hegel's reading, presupposes this harmonious interaction between family and state then proceeds to disrupt the harmony by introducing a citizen (Polynices) who is willing to sacrifice himself not for the good of the state but to overthrow the state. The ensuing conflict pits Creon's upholding of human law (conscription) against Antigone's upholding of divine law (burial rites). As Sophocles and Hegel assure us, the conflict between the abstract right of the family and the abstract right of the state can only end in tragedy.

From the master/servant dialectic to the ethical order we have seen an important development in the conception of death in the *Phenomenology*. In the ethical order the community is capable of progressing beyond the natural death of some of its members. In fact, the unity of the community is dependent on the willingness of some of its members to die in war. Death at this stage does more than unify the community, though. The family, which produces the citizenry of the state, is able through burial rites to make the death of its member an ethical act and thereby introject the negativity of death into itself. Both spheres of the ethical order, family and state, work to transform the natural negativity of death and introject it into the life of the community.

As we will see below, what separates the community of the Terror from the community of the ethical order in their relation to death is the recognition that the work of death is, on the one hand, the work of the community as a whole for the Terror. On the other hand, the work of death in the ethical order is split between the family and the state. The state achieves its wholeness through the sacrifice of some of its members, and the family takes the work of death on itself in burial rites. The fact that each sphere of the ethical order works according to its own laws in relation to death makes the relative harmony of the Greek city-states possible, but it is an incomplete introjection of death within the community insofar as the community as a whole does not see death as its work.

#### Family Values and Culture Wars

The next key text in the *Phenomenology* in which death arises is known as the Terror. The Terror examines the period immediately following the French Revolution. Some 2,000 years thus separate the ethical order from the Terror. During this intervening period spirit continues to develop in complexity as each historical shape of spirit manifests different aspects of spirit that are only fully realised in absolute knowing. To the degree that the Terror manifests spirit at all, it manifests a particular truth of spirit. However, to the degree that the Terror does not manifest spirit fully, it necessarily distorts the truth of spirit. The truth that the Terror manifests and distorts at the same time is the universality of the will. In absolute knowing the universality of the will is fully manifest in its freedom as the concrete realisation of the members of the community in their particularity working as a whole. In the Terror the universality of the will is conceived abstractly and immediately so that universality is seen as the absolute manifestation of individuality. In the upheaval of the French Revolution the fact that the community conceives of itself as an abstract universal will leads to the carnage of the Terror.

Hegel's analysis of the Terror falls into two main sections: the period immediately preceding and including the French Revolution. and the Terror itself. In the first section Hegel analyses the shift from the Enlightenment which conceives of spirit as utility to the French Revolution, the point where 'absolute freedom ascends the throne of the world'. For Hegel this period is characterised by the instantiation of an abstract universal will as the solution to the alienation on which the Enlightenment community was predicated. Why does the French Revolution view previous forms of community as alienated? Furthermore, why is the enthronement of an abstract universal will a solution to this alienation? The answer to the first question lies in the way in which the community of the French Revolution understood the social and political divisions of previous communities. As we saw in the ethical order, spirit necessarily divided itself into different spheres in order to actualise its ethical being. While spirit did not continue to divide itself into the spheres of family and state following the ethical order, spirit none the less did continue to divide itself into distinct social and political spheres. Each sphere contributed to a part of the functioning of spirit, but no sphere was responsible for the whole of spirit's functioning. Each member of a community was thus relegated to his or her specific task within the community, but the actions of individual members did not immediately affect the whole. As a result, from the point of view of the French Revolution, individual

members of the community were alienated from the workings of the whole of the community. The French Revolution was an effort to remove the alienation from individual members of the community and give them an immediate voice in the governing of the whole community.<sup>24</sup> Accomplishing this task required the installation of an immediate, universal will. Members of this community were no longer to be alienated from the community as a whole and relegated to tasks that only serve the community in an indirect way. Rather, members of this community now take the universal purpose for their purpose, universal law for their language and universal work for their work (sein [das einzelne Bewußtsein] Zweck ist der allgemeine Zweck, seine Sprache das allgemeine Gesetz, sein Werk das allgemeine Werk).<sup>25</sup> The French Revolution installed universal will in such a way that the only conceivable work was universal work, that is, work done directly for the entire community. The division of society into different classes and spheres would no longer be tolerated. These divisions were considered an affront to reason insofar as they were seen as precluding direct activity on behalf of the whole community.

The reason that the enthronement of an abstract universal will is seen as a solution to the problem of alienation is that it makes direct, individual action on behalf of the community possible. Society can no longer be founded on the silent assent of those governed. It must be founded on the direct action of the individual. The laws of the French Revolution will not be grounded on the arbitrary whims of a monarch or the traditions of the Church. Reason, manifest in the inalienable, sovereign will of the people, is the only possible means of governing a state. For the community of the French Revolution this means that no one is to be relegated to a social sphere or task in which his or her participation is not directly manifest in the governing of the state. Each member of the state is to be free and equal not only under the law, but also in producing the laws that govern the state. Only by meeting these conditions, according to the revolutionaries, can the alienation manifest in previous forms of government be overcome.

As history records, this solution to the alienation inherent in previous forms of government has the most horrific consequences. According to Hegel, the Terror is the direct result of articulating spirit as immediate, abstract universal will. The reason that this particular manifestation of the universal will leads to the Terror lies in its very immediacy and abstractness. The abstract universal will seeks to overcome the spheres of society *immediately* and give each individual the work of the whole. The universal will of the Terror is universal

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only to the degree that it seeks to overcome the differences of the individual wills. Or, to be more precise, each individual sees the whole community as for it, much as we saw in the initial stages of selfconsciousness. As a result, each individual expects to see his or her will manifest in the workings of the whole community. Reason is here conceived as a unanimous chorus in which all speak with the same voice at the same time. The difficulty with this conception of reason, according to Hegel, arises when the universal will attempts to act. In order to act the universal will must actualise itself as an individual. 'Before the universal can perform a deed it must concentrate itself into the one of individuality and put at the head an individual selfconsciousness: for the universal will is only an actual will in a self. which is a one.'26 Thus, while the revolution successfully removed an arbitrary monarchy based on heredity and installed freedom and equality in its place, this new community of freedom cannot act unless the decisions of the universal will are embodied in a person. 'But thereby all other individuals are excluded from the entirety of this deed and have only a limited share in it, so that the deed would not be a deed of the actual universal self-consciousness.<sup>27</sup> The alienation that the French Revolution sought to solve thus becomes repeated on another level. While it is certainly possible to remove the social and political divisions that constituted society prior to this and thereby give each member of society an immediate and equal share in the governing of that society, the moment that this absolutely equal and free society seeks to enact its decisions it must do so through the particular activity of an individual. The act of an individual, however, cannot possibly be the act of the whole. Or, the degree that the work of the community is done by the action of an individual is the degree that the rest of the community is excluded from that act. At this point the community is no longer the manifestation of the universal will but the will of an individual.

According to Hegel, because the universal will can only act as an individual will, the universal will itself is not capable of positive action: 'there is left for it only negative action; it is merely the fury of destruction'.<sup>28</sup> Hegel makes explicit what he means by 'negative action' and 'fury of destruction' when he says, 'The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore death'.<sup>29</sup> Why, though, is it that this particular appearance of universal will can only kill and destroy? Hegel paints a picture of a vicious circle of suspicion and accusation that haunted the Terror. We have already seen that the government can only govern, that is, enact its decrees, by embodying itself as a

particular person. This embodiment in turn distances the government from its source insofar as each individual cannot see his or her will directly manifest in the work of the community. 'On the one hand [the government] excludes all other individuals from its act, and on the other hand, it thereby constitutes itself a government that is a specific will, and so stand opposed to the universal will.<sup>30</sup> Because the universal will stands opposed to the government, 'it is absolutely impossible for [the government] to exhibit itself as anything else but a faction'.<sup>31</sup> If the government is nothing but a faction, it cannot possibly be an expression of the universal will, and 'in the very fact of its being a faction lies the direct necessity of its overthrow'.<sup>32</sup> At the same time that the government is continually under suspicion for not representing the views of the people, the people are also suspect for not mirroring the government. The conception of the community as immediate and abstract universal will leads to an interminable cycle of continuous revolution, whereby individuals continually present themselves as the manifestation of the universal will, but by their very individuality cannot possibly act on behalf of the universal will. The universal will by itself is thus unable to act positively and can succeed only in killing those who claim to represent it. This killing can take the form of an individual in a leadership role destroying the members of the community who disagree with the leader's decisions, or it can take the form of the members of the community assassinating a leader who does not represent their views.

Hegel is trying to account for the carnage of the Terror in philosophical terms. The Terror is troublesome for him because the French Revolution is a community explicitly attempting to ground itself on the freedom and reason of humanity. The French Revolution is the fruition of the Enlightenment. How can a movement that takes liberty, equality and fraternity as its principles devolve into the irrationality of the Terror? Hegel's response is that the liberty that the French Revolution posits is an abstract liberty. That is, it takes itself to be immediately free. In this respect the community of the French Revolution is not unlike the self-consciousness that takes itself to be a totalitarian desire. In both cases, the abstractly free community and desire do not recognise the existence of any differentiation within it. The world is nothing other than a manifestation of this immediate freedom. To the degree that spirit conceives of itself as absolutely free, the only work that it can accomplish is a work on itself. Spirit at this point has no object, or better, spirit is its only object. The Enlightenment saw the systematic removal of everything that might be opposed to the community, whether it be  $L^{i}$ *Etre suprême*, nature or even the individual wills of its members.<sup>33</sup> The Terror is brutal negation of the individual wills of its members as the last vestiges of something that might be opposed to the community. The result of conceiving of itself in this way, according to Hegel, is a continual work of negation. In the same way that self-consciousness conceived exclusively as desire could only negate that which is not it, absolutely free spirit can only negate that which is not it. Spirit at this point conceives of itself as abstract universal will. In conceiving of itself in this way – onesidedly free, abstractly sovereign – the only work that spirit can perform is the exclusion of that which is not part of it. The Terror is a developing spirit's work on itself to constitute itself as nothing other than universal will. Insofar as the individual will appears to the community of the Terror as at odds with the universal will, it must be eliminated.

The result of the realisation, that spirit contains its own negativity within it, is the return of individuals to their delimited tasks of class and social structure. The reason for this return lies in the introjection of negativity within the community. Insofar as the community contains negation within it, 'it contains difference in general, and this again it develops as an actual difference'. Hegel describes this return, however, in terms we have seen in the previous two sections. 'These individuals who have felt the fear of death, of their absolute master (die Furcht ihres absoluten Herrn, des Todes) again submit to negation and distinctions, arrange themselves in the various spheres, and return to an apportioned and limited task, but thereby to substantial reality.'34 In the case of the Terror, however, death is not imposed from the outside but is, in fact, the realisation that self-consciousness itself is this negativity. Though this realisation is extreme and onesided, this is a crucial step in the development of death in the Phenomenology. For the first time consciousness sees death as its own work. Death is a negation precipitated by the work of the community, rather than the alien work of nature.<sup>35</sup> In the struggle for recognition and dialectic of master and servant, death was opposed to and the negation of consciousness. As such, death had the power to arrest the development of consciousness. If either consciousness died, the development of consciousness could not continue. In the ethical order the relation between consciousness and death is much more complex. The relation is more complex, because it is the relation between a community and death rather than a singular consciousness and death. The relation is also more complex, because the ethical order conceives of nature differently from the early stages of the *Phenomenology*. Both nature and community are grounded in reason, and the community thus sees nature as a part of it rather than opposed to it. As a result, death cannot be simply opposed to the community in the way that death was opposed to consciousness in the struggle for recognition. Rather, insofar as nature is in principle unified with the community, the natural negation of death can be recuperated through burial rites, and in order to make the individual a part of the community the family *must* take the destruction of death onto itself through death rituals and not abandon its members to scavengers and decomposition, what Hegel might call the irrational elements of nature. In contrast to the harmonious unity of community and nature in the ethical order, the Terror conceives of all reality as the manifestation of the universal will. Not only is nature not now opposed to consciousness as in the struggle for recognition, but there is also no work of nature to be interrupted through burial rites as in the ethical order. In the Terror death is solely the work of the community. No recuperation is necessary or possible. The community conceives everything as for it and destroys anything that seems opposed to it, even the individual members of the community. In this instance death is the only work that can be accomplished. The transformation of death is not complete, however. Insofar as the negativity of the community is not fully introjected into its everyday life, death is not a spiritual negation. To put it another way, as long as death remains the absolute master, the development of consciousness is incomplete. As we will see in revealed religion, when spirit develops to the point that death is solely its work, but not its only work, death will no longer be the absolute master.<sup>36</sup>

Let us briefly return to the notion of lack as it figures in Hegel's analysis here. The process of the education of consciousness in its relation to death has been slowly converting death from a natural negation. There are numerous ways that this movement can be characterised. Thus, I have argued for understanding this movement as a type of mourning. Note, however, that the way Hegel characterises this movement is by the progressive subsumption of negation within itself. What is at stake in this move is the process of mediation that characterises every shape of spirit. Each shape always begins in abstract immediacy but must abandon this moment of self-certainty for a mediated truth. The result of such a mediation is the introduction of lack within the movement of spirit. That is, spirit moves from an immediacy without negation to a mediation that introjects negation within it. Lack is thus introduced in the historic movement of spirit, and far from being something to overcome, is cultivated as the life of spirit. As Hegel explains in the 'Preface', the life of spirit is a 'tarrying with the negative'.

In distinction from Heidegger's account of death in *Being and Time*, which posits a conception of death that is the same for all Dasein at all times, Hegel is proposing an account of death that changes depending on the community that encounters it. In the two passages we have examined in this chapter, for example, the community of the ethical order has a very different conception of death from that which is shown in the Terror. I am not claiming here that death is a constant and that each community simply conceives of the same death differently. Rather, I am claiming that, for Hegel, death itself changes, that it is something different for each of these communities. One of the reasons for the transformation in the conception of death, as well as the difference between Hegel's and Heidegger's accounts of death, is that Heidegger incorporates death, while Hegel introjects death.

I have argued above that death plays a transcendental role for Heidegger, and it is one of the conditions for the experience of Dasein. For Hegel it is the movement of spirit which precedes and conditions death. As I noted above, for Hegel consciousness progresses only insofar as there is an intersubjective relation among members of a community and seeks to overcome the initially alien character of death. A community is constituted as a group of people who are bound together by certain rules. Sometimes there is more than one set of rules, and these two sets are complementary. This is the case in the ethical order. Regardless of the content of the rules or the way they relate to one another, the rules indicate bonds that bring some people closer together than others. Hegel points out the obvious fact that one is closer to one's family than to citizens of a state. In order to ensure the harmony of the state, though, the family in the ethical order educates its sons to be virtuous, that is, to seek the good of the state ahead of one's own or the family's. Whom one is close to or not close to in a community is to a large degree determined by the rules of that community. This type of intersubjectivity is built into the way members of a community are constituted in relation to one another.

Given this form of intersubjectivity, it seems that for Hegel community precedes death. In the *Phenomenology* we do not find a unique conception of death that manifests itself in differing ways depending on the community. Rather, we find that the way the members of a community relate to one another determines what death is for that community. It is because the ethical order is divided into human and divine laws that the state maintains its unity by going to war and the family acts consciously within the community through burial rites. It is because the community of the Terror conceives of itself as universal will that it views death as its own work. The community of the ethical order could no more have conceived death as its own work than the Terror could have recuperated death through burial rites. This is not a question of stripping away the layers of culture and history that surround death to get to its true kernel, as it is in *Being and Time*. Death is completely determined by the community in which it appears in the *Phenomenology*.

# Notes

- 1. Aristotle, Politics, 1253b18-9.
- 2. 3:178-80; 324-6/§§231-3; §§438-441.
- 3. 3:326/§441.
- 4. Daniel O. Dahlstrom argues that the ethical order is rooted in sexual roles based on Hegel's interpretations of *Oedipus* and the *Antigone*, 'The Sexual Basis of Moral Life', *Proceedings of the Catholic Philosophical Association*, 62, 1988: 202–11. While these gender roles certainly play an important part in Hegel's articulation of the ethical order, I think it overstates the case to say that they are the basis of the ethical order. Rather, the ethical order seems to be based on the production of the citizen by the family and the citizen's subsequent return to the family in death. It is only after Hegel explicates this basic structure that he introduces gender roles.
- 5. 3:334-5/§455.
- 6. 3:334–5/§455.
- 7. 3:334–5/§455.
- 8. Sophocles, *The Three Theban Plays*, trans. Robert Fagles (London: Penguin Books, 1987): 499–507.
- 9. 3:330/§450.
- 10. See Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure, 334-7.
- 11. 3:339/§460.
- 12. 3:330/§451.
- 13. 3:330/§451.
- 14. 3:330-2/\$451.
- 15. 3:330-1/\$451.
- 16. 3:330-2/\$451.
- 17. 3:330–1/§451.
- 18. 3:330-1/\$451.
- 19. 3:332/§451.

### Family Values and Culture Wars

- 20. 3:332/§451; Hyppolite writes, 'The citizen thus brings his work to fruition in the service of the community that he builds. The labor of his life is his death, his universal becoming, yet that death appears as a contingency, as a fact of nature the spiritual signification of which is not evident. The role of the family, of *divine law*, is to rescue death from nature and make of it essentially "an action of spirit". As Hegel envisages it here, the ethical function of the family is to assume responsibility for death.' *Genesis and Structure*, 341–2.
- 21. 3:330-2/§451.
- 22. 3:333-4/§452; Hyppolite writes, 'The family replaces the act of nature with its own; it unites its member with the bosom of the earth, transforming him into a  $\delta\alpha'\mu\omega\nu$ . The family community, as it appears in the ethical world, gives meaning to death. The specific self is raised to universality; it is the late this-one but a late this-one who qua spirit, continues to be . . . The family here substitutes itself for nature and raises the dead to the universality of spirit.' *Genesis and Structure*, 343-4.
- 23. 3:332-4/§452.
- 24. 3:432-3/§§584-5.
- 25. 3:433/§585.
- 26. 3:435/§589.
- 27. 3:435/§589.
- 28. 3:436/§589.
- 29. 3:436/§590.
- 30. 3:437/§591.
- 31. 3:437/§591.
- 32. 3:437/§591.
- 33. 3:433-4/§586.
- 34. 3:438/§593.
- 35. See Burbidge, 'Man, God, and Death', 189.
- 36. Pierre-Jean Labarrière, 'Histoire et liberté', *Archives de philosophie*, 33, 1970: 701–18, argues that the movement of the *Phenomenology* is a movement of reduction whereby the exteriority of space is reduced. In a similar vein, I am arguing that the exteriority of death is reduced as consciousness advances in the *Phenomenology*.

No one finds the mental energy required to kill himself unless, in the first place, in doing so he is at the same time killing an object with whom he has identified himself.

Freud<sup>1</sup>

In contrast to Heidegger's transcendental account of death, we have been reading the *Phenomenology* as a history of death, a history of death's transformation. Not only can death have a history, but according to Hegel's method, it must have a history. Part of the 'detailed history of the education of consciousness' is an account of how consciousness relates to what it is not. Initially, consciousness finds death as its complete negation, the incomprehensibility of natural negation. Slowly, as consciousness becomes community, it is able to introject death within itself and transform it from natural negation to spiritual negation, as we saw in the section on the Terror. It is insufficient, however, for death merely to be introjected within the community. The community must introject death in such a way that the negativity of death becomes part of the community's everyday life. The community must master death rather than be mastered by it. The final stages in spirit's mastery over death is found in the 'revealed religion' and 'absolute knowing' sections of the Phenomenology.

In every section we have examined prior to revealed religion, death has been characterised as 'master'. In what respect, though, is death the master of the previous forms of consciousness and community we have examined? Death's mastery takes different forms depending on the consciousness or community that is trying to introject it. As I argued in the previous chapter, community precedes and structures death. As a result, the form of mastery that death takes on within each community is dependent on the community within which it arises. Death remains master in the ethical order, then, for two reasons. First, to the degree that death is characterised as an alien force of natural negation, it holds mastery over a community. The community was able to effect a partial introjection of death through the burial rites of the family, but not a complete introjection. Second, the community structures death in such a way that it becomes the organising principle for the ethical order. Not only is the family organised by the necessity of transforming death into a conscious act, but the state also maintains its organisation by reasserting the mastery of death in war.

I argued in the previous chapter, however, that the community of the Terror is able to see death as solely its work. How, then, is death still seen as master within that community? Death is no longer alien. Death is seen as the work of the community. In fact, the terror of the Terror arises precisely from the recognition of the community that death *is* its work. Death remains master in the Terror because death is constituted as the organising principle of the community. Death is not one work among many, or even the highest work accomplished by the community. It is the *sole* work of the community. The Terror is nothing other than the work of death. As such, death remains master.

Revealed religion, as we will see below, fully introjects death within the community, but the community does not constitute death as its organising principle. As a result, in revealed religion death is no longer the absolute master. Death is seen as part of the work and everyday life of the community. It is introjected as overcome. Or, to put it another way, only the community of revealed religion is able to mourn fully, to recognise the loss of death as part of itself. In order to demonstrate this overcoming of death, Hegel begins with the way in which the community of revealed religion understands its origins and development in history. How does it understand itself at this point? It understands itself as having an origin in God the creator. It understands itself as having fallen from a state of innocence into a state of sin in which it remains separated from God. Insofar as the religious community believes that it is at fault in its separation from God, it also believes that this separation can only be overcome by an action of God. Nothing the community does will reconcile it to God. God must be the impetus behind reconciliation. The way in which the community of revealed religion pictures this reconciliation as taking place precipitates another encounter with death.

As far as the religious community is concerned, there is no possibility of returning to a state of innocence that immediately unifies God with the religious community. God must act within the religious community. In order for God to act, though, God must act within history. God can no longer remain the distant 'creator of heaven and earth', but must be revealed. Thus in order to overcome this split

between God and itself, the religious community pictures God as becoming present in the world as an actual man. This coming down of God allows the religious community to see, hear and touch God. God becomes sensuously present to the religious community. In this movement we see that the religious community returns to the relation of sense-certainty to God. It knows God because it can see, hear and touch God in the form of a man. However, this relation is unable to reconcile God and the religious community because in this relation the godman remains merely a sensuous object. God has come down. but God remains identified with a particular individual. The communitv does not see itself in the godman.<sup>2</sup> This becoming man is the externalisation of God that makes action possible and thus makes a mediated reconciliation possible. This reconciliation cannot occur, however, as long as God remains in sensuous form, and insofar as God remains external. This requires that the godman lose his sensuous form in death and return to God.

In order for the religious community to see itself in the godman, the godman must take a form other than a sensuous object. It is here that death arises for the final time in the *Phenomenology*. As we saw in the ethical order, death is precisely that which allows the individual to cast off his sensuous being and become universal. Death, in this respect, remains the same. In dving, the godman will cast off his sensuous being and become universal. This death, however, differs in three respects from the previous encounters with death in the Phenomenology. First, it is not simply an individual who is dving here, but God, the universal, who is dving. By this Hegel means that God considered as an abstraction, something wholly separate from the community, is no longer conceivable. The community of revealed religion now pictures itself as reconciled to God, but this reconciliation entails not only a change in the community but a change in God. God is no longer the abstract, divine being, but the self-conscious spirit of the community. In the incarnation and death of the godman. God as transcendent is pictured as dying.<sup>3</sup> Second, the godman is pictured by the religious community as rising from the dead and taking on the form of the holy spirit. Third, the community of revealed religion does not structure death as an organising principle, as it has in previous communities. Through the death and resurrection of the godman this community now sees itself as free from the mastery of death. Death is conquered through the death and resurrection of God made flesh. In his resurrection the godman overcomes not only his sensuousness but also his individuality. The community can identify

itself with the godman. The community is free to act without the shadow of death hanging over it. In the community's own terms, it would say that it is finally free to live, that it has found true life. These three differences make possible not only the reconciliation of the universal and the individual, but also the transfiguration of death itself.<sup>4</sup>

In his life, death and resurrection the godman is pictured as God acting in the world in order to reconcile the religious community. This cycle of externalisation and return has a twofold effect. First, it completes the religious community's relation to God in the sense that God is now no longer seen as only universal being, the separate, distant creator of heaven and earth. Second, this revealing of God to the religious community allows the religious community to comprehend its completion, even though it pictures this completion as occurring in the distant future.<sup>5</sup>

The incarnation, death and resurrection of God makes the reconciliation of God with the religious community possible. What, then, becomes of death in the religious community? Traditionally, the death of Christ in some way signals the death of death for his followers.<sup>6</sup> The resurrection indicates the defeat of death for those in the religious community, but in what sense? It is obviously not the case that Christians no longer die. Their lifespans are no longer, and they do not seem immune to accidental death or anything that would indicate that death has been conquered. Christians traditionally respond to the question by making a distinction between two kinds of death: natural death and spiritual death. Natural death must be faced by everyone Christians and non-Christians alike. Spiritual death, on the other hand, is pictured as the death of the soul, which is reserved for those who are not followers of Christ.<sup>7</sup>

The account that Hegel gives of death after the resurrection of the godman has many parallels with the traditional account. Death is no longer the same for the religious community after the resurrection of the godman. Death is transfigured. With this transfiguration we can see the full arc of the role of death in the *Phenomenology*; since, as Hegel says, 'death becomes transfigured from its immediate meaning, viz. the non-being of this *particular* individual (*Nichtsein* dieses Einzelnen), into the universality of . . . spirit'. Hegel makes two important shifts in this dense text. First, death is no longer the subsumption of the individual back into abstract being of nature, no longer the process by which nature intrudes into the community. Every stage of the *Phenomenology* that we have examined has been an attempt to overcome this alien intrusion of nature. Each stage

makes certain inroads in this regard. The servant converts the negative power of death into work. The ethical order recuperates meaning by converting the apparent conscious action of nature into the conscious action of the family in burial rites. The Terror, which sees nature as an expression of the general will of the community, makes death its sole work. The Terror, which succeeds in identifying itself with nature and thus with the work of nature, is able immediately to identify death with the community. The identity of nature and community in the Terror, however, is an immediate identity and cannot be sustained. What revealed religion does beyond this is picture itself as reconciled with nature through the death and resurrection of the godman. As a result, the death of the individual can no longer be articulated as an encroachment of nature on the community. The cycle of life and death that was first revealed to consciousness as that which it must be separated from is finally fully introjected within the community. Life and death are now part of the movement of the community.

Second, death shifts from the 'non-being of the individual' to the universality of spirit, and this is, in fact, a double shift. Death is no longer solely particular: it is also universal. Additionally, death is no longer natural; it is spiritual.8 How does calling death universal and spiritual help us understand what death is? Here Hegel seems to be in a predicament similar to the traditional Christian account of death. The becoming universal and spiritual of death does not mean that nobody dies, so how is this situation any different from the previous encounters with death in the *Phenomenology*? The answer lies in a profound difference from previous encounters. When death first arose in the self-consciousness section of the *Phenomenology* it was the result of self-consciousness trying to demonstrate its independence from life. In order to demonstrate that life meant nothing to it, selfconsciousness was willing to risk its life in a life and death struggle with another self-consciousness. One of the possible results of this encounter was death. In order for the struggle to achieve what it was intended to achieve it must have been possible for one of the selfconsciousnesses to die. What would death have been in this situation? If one of the self-consciousnesses had died, it would have simply returned to the life-system, no longer as a consciousness but as a corpse. Thus, Hegel referred to death as the 'natural negation' of consciousness. If negation is natural, there is no return from it. Consciousness is merely reabsorbed into nature and never returns to itself. In the other encounters with death in the Phenomenology we

## To Hold Fast What is Dead

see attempts to mitigate this natural negation in the work of the servant for the lord and in the burial rites of the family in the ethical order. Ultimately, while these encounters with death do begin to mitigate the effects of death as a natural negation, the community is never fully able to overcome the intrusion of nature in death. We see the first suggestion of this overcoming in the Terror. In the Terror, the community, which is characterised as general will, sees itself as completely independent of nature, or more precisely as general will it sees the natural world as an extension of it. The result of conceiving of itself in this way precipitates a conflict between the will of the community and the inability of any one person to express that will. The only solution available to the community is to kill anyone who does not express the will of the community. Because death here is a result of the community's action rather than the action of nature, the natural negativity of death is for the first time internalised as part of the community's conception of itself. At this point death is 'spiritual', in the sense that it is seen as the work of the community rather than the work of nature, but as the sole work of the community death is still seen as master. It is only in revealed religion that death is the work of the community but not the sole work of the community. This mitigation of the mastery of death allows Hegel to say that death has been transfigured.

Revealed religion seems like the completion of Hegel's project in the Phenomenology. Death is now a spiritual negation introjected within the community but not its sole work. There is one way, however, in which revealed religion only implicitly completes Hegel's project, and that is in the community's knowledge of itself. The religious community is already implicitly the unity of itself and its object, but in order for this knowledge to be self-conscious it must explicitly posit itself as this unity. Here, in the shift from revealed religion to absolute knowing, we see a shift parallel to the one made between selfconsciousness and reason. Consciousness entered the realm of spirit for the first time in self-consciousness. In crossing the threshold the important shift was that the I was just as much object as it was I. The chapter on self-consciousness explores the implications of this relation, but consciousness itself only explicitly acknowledges and posits this unity of I and object in the section on reason. In the same way revealed religion is the unity of itself and God, and we find the community exploring the implications of this relation. When the community explicitly posits itself as this unity, however, this precipitates a shift to the final form of community in the Phenomenology, absolute knowing.

Hegel articulates this shift, not as a shift in content, however, but as a shift in form. What Hegel means by content in this case is the selfconscious unity of the religious community and God. What Hegel means by form in this case is the way this unity is expressed in thought. The characteristic mode of expression in the religious community is representation (*Vorstellung*). In a representative mode of thought the community uses images and relations that are familiar to it in order to express the complex unity that has arisen between itself and God. Thus, God is pictured as a father who creates the world and lives in heaven. The earth is God's creation and thus separate. The community is fallen and must be redeemed in order to reunite with God. God is reunited with the community through incarnation and death. Resurrection allows the whole community to participate in this redemption.

For Hegel all of these images point to a religious community that has finally become advanced enough to recognise its unity with God. The difficulty, however, is that the form in which revealed religion expresses this unity is not self-conscious and thus the community misconceives itself. This misconception is seen most clearly in the temporal distance that the community places between itself and its reconciliation. The community acknowledges that it is implicitly reconciled with God, but that this reconciliation will not become actual until some time in the distant future. The actual reconciliation of the community with God is relegated to a beyond.9 Similarly, the act that precipitated this reconciliation, the death of the godman, is pictured as happening in the distant past. Thus, the religious community is left pointing back to the past to the origin of its reconciliation and to the future where the reconciliation of the community will be made actual. The result of the religious community thinking representationally, then, is a temporal disjunction which suspends the religious community halfway between the origin of its reconciliation in the distant past and the consummation of its reconciliation in the distant future. It is precisely this representational mode of thinking that is overcome in the shift to absolute knowing. When the community is no longer hindered by a representational mode of thought, it will no longer be forced to postpone its reconciliation until the distant future. The community will still understand itself as reconciled but this reconciliation will be present and actual.

Before we explore the community of absolute knowing, however, a few things should be said about Hegel's use of 'absolute' here. Absolute knowing is sometimes characterised as a kind of omniscience or completion of knowledge. One could see Hegel's absolute as somehow indicating that all knowledge is already present. What else might 'absolute knowing' mean? If this is contrasted with the more methodical movement of science from experiment to discovery, absolute knowing seems very odd indeed. How can we already know everything when it is clear that scientific discovery continually leads to new knowledge?<sup>10</sup>

If we reject this connection between omniscience and absolute knowing, however, and replace it with a notion of absolute that carries the connotations of 'not relative' or 'unconditioned', we end up with a very different Hegel. This conception of absolute knowing allows us to read the final chapter of the Phenomenology as indicating a knowing that is not conditioned by anything else, or a knowing that is not dependent on anything outside of it. A knowing that is not dependent on anything outside of it would require a knowing in which the community sees itself as the condition for knowledge and the object of knowledge. Absolute knowing is not wishful thinking on Hegel's part about an omniscient community, but the culmination of his argument in the *Phenomenology*. The community of revealed religion possessed the content of this identity between knowers and objects of knowledge, but because it could only articulate this identity representationally, the community was unable to posit this identity in its proper form. The proper form in which to express this identity is philosophy. In philosophy this identity can be seen as occurring now, rather than being placed in the distant future. The community of absolute knowing is the community that knows that knower and known are identical, and the locus of that identity is the community itself.<sup>11</sup>

What is the relation of this community of absolute knowing to death? Death only arises obliquely in the final chapter of the *Phenomenology*, when Hegel, in the closing lines, refers to the 'Calvary of absolute spirit'. This is an odd phrase, to say the least, for two reasons. First, 'Calvary' is a representational way of speaking, borrowed directly from revealed religion, yet the distinction between revealed religion and absolute knowing is supposed to lie precisely at this point. Second, while there is a clear reference to death here, the death of Christ, it is not at all clear how death should be applied to absolute knowing. Prior to this it was easy to picture death as the natural negation of the individual, whether this took place on the small scale of the ethical order, or the large scale of the Terror. Even in the case of the death of Christ, where the universal is pictured as dying, he dies as an individual man. What would it mean, though, to say that absolute spirit dies?<sup>12</sup>

This question can be answered if we continue the analogy with revealed religion. In revealed religion the death of Christ was not only the death of a man but also the death of death. Of course, the death of death in revealed religion did not mean that the members of that community were now immortal. What it did mean is that the members of that community need no longer fear death, and can truly live, because the death of Christ guaranteed the reconciliation of the community with God. As we saw above, however, this reconciliation is postponed to some event in the distant future. Analogously, what Hegel wants in absolute knowing is a community which is reconciled but that reconciliation takes place now, and that reconciliation is the reconciliation of the community with itself. Remember, for Hegel, 'absolute' means that there is nothing outside of it. With regard to death, the community of absolute knowing is in a similar situation to revealed religion. It is not the case that being a member of the community of absolute knowing means that no one dies. What is the case, however, is that the community is now complex enough to introject death without death becoming the community's sole work. The community is thus organised by reason rather than organised around death. The community is thus able truly to mourn.

In the encounters with death in the Phenomenology prior to revealed religion death was constituted in such a way that it became an organising principle for the community. In the struggle for recognition death arises and is constituted by the particular relation that self-consciousness has with life. In the lordship and bondage section the relation between these two self-consciousnesses determines the form that death takes. In this case the natural negation of death becomes the work of the servant on nature. The relation between the state and the family centres on death. The family produces citizens who are willing to die for the protection of the state, and the family then buries these soldiers in an attempt to recover meaning from the irrationality of death. The Terror that follows the French Revolution is precisely the terror unleashed by the fear of death that has gripped the entire community. In each case death is constituted differently. and in each case the community is organised differently around death. Beginning with revealed religion, however, the community is finally able to constitute death in such a way that it does not organise society. What remains lacking in revealed religion, however, is the form in which it articulates this overcoming of death. By articulating the

overcoming of death in a representational form, revealed religion postpones the fruits of its reconciliation to the distant future.

When discussing the introjection of death in absolute knowing Hegel returns to the images of revealed religion to speak of the Calvary of absolute spirit. In doing so he suggests that the community of absolute knowing remains in the same position with regard to death as the community of revealed religion, insofar as death is part of the work of the community. Hegel uses the image of Calvary to suggest that death is conquered, and that death is only conquered through death. For the community of revealed religion death is conquered through the death of Christ. For the community of absolute knowing death is conquered through the death of absolute spirit. In what sense, though, does absolute spirit die? Absolute spirit dies in the externalisation (Entäußerung) of itself as nature on the one hand, and as history on the other. Spirit can only be itself by actualising itself. If spirit does not actualise itself it remains identical with itself, to be sure, but it remains the lifeless identity of immediate substance. In order for spirit to become the living community of absolute knowing it must exteriorise itself into the particular spirits of history and the nature which those spirits encounter. This exteriorisation of itself is the Calvary of absolute spirit.<sup>13</sup>

Christ did not conquer death, however, simply in his crucifixion. Death was only conquered for the community of revealed religion in his resurrection and subsequent return to God. In the same way absolute spirit does not conquer death simply in its externalisation. It must first externalise itself, but it must then return to (or recollect) itself. It is only in the returning that absolute spirit conquers death. The returning of absolute spirit to itself is the re-collection (*Er-innerung*) of both nature and the particular shapes of spirit back into itself, or history. With this recollection we have the identity of the community with its knowledge of itself. The community of absolute knowing is thus goal and ground of all that preceded it in the *Phenomenology*.

This process of externalisation and return is, of course, very abstract as Hegel speaks of it in the final chapter of the *Phenomenology*. If we return to the movement of the whole work, however, his claims become more concrete. The development of consciousness can be seen as either contingent or necessary. If Hegel were to give an account of the development of consciousness as contingent, he would merely be giving a history, in the usual sense of the term. On this model, the stages of consciousness's development neither lead

to a particular point, nor are deducible from previous points. Hegel's philosophy, however, is predicated on the claim that history is guided by reason, that if one examines the movement of history carefully enough, one can see patterns begin to emerge. More than patterns emerge, however. Hegel would say that one begins to see necessity emerge. I have argued throughout that without this necessity Hegel's project fails. Consciousness cannot be led to the standpoint of science without the necessary connection between the stages of development. This necessity can only be seen, however, in retrospect. The owl of Minerva takes flight at dusk, so to speak. The nature of this necessity works according to the process of externalisation and return (or reinteriorisation). As we have seen, consciousness continually seeks to articulate its object according to its own principles. This attempt at articulation is an attempt by consciousness to be adequate to its object. This process of adequation is consciousness externalising itself, actualising itself, going beyond itself to understand itself as the relation between itself and its object. The object of consciousness continually resists appropriation in this manner, and consciousness is forced to re-evaluate its principles in light of this inadequation. Consciousness thus returns to itself as changed by the object it wished to appropriate. This cycle of externalisation and return progresses throughout the *Phenomenology* as both consciousness and its object become more complex, and at the same time more similar to one another. In each successive externalisation and return consciousness gets closer to its goal of appropriating its object. This goal is finally achieved in absolute knowing when consciousness and its object are identical, that is, when the community of absolute knowing takes itself as its object and the principles by which it understands itself are adequate. In this case consciousness completely empties itself into its object and returns to itself as the self-conscious knowledge of that object.

The *Phenomenology* is thus the history of consciousness and the concomitant history of death. In successive encounters consciousness attempts to comprehend death. Initially, consciousness finds death alien because the power of death is opposed to and negates consciousness. Consciousness slowly mitigates the power of natural negation by taking on some of the work of death within itself. The servant takes on the negativity of death in work. The family introjects the negativity of death through burial rites. Only in the Terror does the community see death as its sole work. Death is no longer external, but internal. If this were Hegel's only goal, this history of death

could have ended at this point. Hegel is concerned to show not only how each community constitutes death, but how a community can constitute death but not organise itself according to death. It is only in the revealed religion and absolute knowing sections that the community is able to organise itself by a principle other than death. Revealed religion, however, is only partly successful in this attempt. Since it articulates the overcoming of death representationally, it pictures the full realisation of this introjection at some point in the future. Absolute knowing, on the other hand, is finally able to organise itself in relation to death in such a way that death is presently introjected and overcome. The community of absolute knowing is not governed by death, or by hope in the future, but by the freedom of reason, which all its members enjoy.

This analysis of death points to another sharp division between Being and Time and the Phenomenology. I have argued that death plays a transcendental role with regard to human experience in *Being* and Time. In keeping with the fundamental Kantianism of that book, as a transcendental category death must precede and make possible Dasein's experience, but not be conditioned by that which it makes possible. In contrast to Heidegger's account, death does not play a transcendental role in Hegel's Phenomenology. In the Phenomenology community precedes and conditions death. Each community constitutes death differently. The organisation of a community determines the role that death can play within that community. Death also has a history in the *Phenomenology*. Death develops from natural negation to spiritual negation, and it also develops from the organising principle of self-consciousness and the communities of the ethical order and the Terror to being superseded by reason as the organising principle of both revealed religion and absolute knowing.

What is at issue between Hegel and Heidegger on the question of death in the *Phenomenology* and *Being and Time*? Is death best understood as one of the conditions for the possibility of human experience, or is death best understood as conditioned by community and history? Must all changes in the history of death be understood as ontical determinations of an unchanging ontological conception of death, or is the conception of death itself fundamentally conditioned by the historical and communal circumstances within which one finds it? As we saw in the Introduction these possibilities can be conceived as an antinomy that proposes a melancholic account of death in Heidegger's case, and a mournful account of death in Hegel's case. The problem could also be posed speculatively: What stage of development must a community occupy in order that its conception of death oscillates between a transcendental and a speculative account? Does Heidegger perform a successful transcendental deduction of death in *Being and Time*? Finally, even if we suppose (along with Hegel) that no transcendental deduction of death can be given, must we give a speculative account of death?

Hegel, in the *Phenomenology*, does not have the same tension between experience and that which conditions experience that Heidegger does in *Being and Time*. Hegel's method does not result in transcendental categories that lie outside of time and space, nor does he privilege time or space. As a result, he does not have to ground communal relations in temporal relations. Nor is death constitutive of human experience or history. Rather, death is structured by community and history in the *Phenomenology*. The advantage of this conception of community is that it avoids privileging internal selfrelations (that is, temporal relations), as Heidegger does, and makes it possible for internal and external relations to be equiprimordial. In fact, as we have seen throughout the *Phenomenology*, one's selfrelation is always mediated through another person. Hegel is not forced to prioritise death over community as Heidegger is in *Being and Time*.

In addition, the communities that Hegel describes in the *Phenomenology* are not forced into the same task-oriented mode that Dasein is in *Being and Time*. Hegel presents human activity in all its splendour. Humans certainly have tasks to accomplish in the *Phenomenology*, but that is not all that they do. They participate in politics. They worship. They create art. They philosophise. Since community is ontologically prior to any other relations that a person might have, Hegel has far less difficulty presenting humans with a myriad of activities, not all of which are goal-oriented. Community seems more essential for Hegel. His discussions of community are central, rather than seeming merely an afterthought, something to be discussed after our primary relation to ourselves and our equipment has been addressed. Concerning the breadth of human experience as communal, it seems that Hegel provides a much fuller and more consistent account than Heidegger in *Being and Time*.

The difficulty with Hegel arises, however, when we begin to ask what sort of account Hegel gives of the relation between the individual and death. Heidegger, of course, excels on this point, perhaps to the exclusion of other aspects of human existence. Hegel, on the other hand, in his careful and complex analysis of human social relations, does not present the same patient examination of the individual's relation to his or her death. Perhaps, though, one might find an implicit account of the relation between death and the individual in the Phenomenology. As we saw above, it was Heidegger's analysis of mood in Being and Time, particularly the difference between fear and anxiety, that led him to the care structure and the confirmation of the care structure in being towards death. In the course of that analysis Heidegger argued that fear is always fear of something in the world, while anxiety is always indicative of an internal relation. Death, for Heidegger, can never be properly feared, because death is Dasein's ownmost, non-relational possibility. Thus, Heidegger concludes that being towards death is essentially anxiety. If we suppose that the difference between fear and anxiety is the difference between fearing something in the world, in particular fearing death as a coming event, and recognising that death is Dasein's ownmost, non-relational possibility, it seems that a parallel can be drawn with the *Phenomenology*. I have argued throughout that in the *Phenomenology* each community attempts to introject death within it, or see death as the work of the community. Death is not seen as the work of the community until the Terror, and death is not 'mastered' by the community until revealed religion. In Heidegger's terms, then, we could see the movement of the *Phenomenology* as the development of the proper relation to death. What remains radically different in the *Phenomenology*, however, is that it is the community that has this relation to death. Even if we suppose that the structural distinction between fear and anxiety can be found in the *Phenomenology*, it is the community as a whole that would be anxious. Hegel does not seem to provide a way in which one might understand the relation between the individual and death apart from his or her relation to the community.

Hegel thus seems to have a difficulty that is conversely related to Heidegger. While Heidegger spends most of his energy articulating the relation between an individual Dasein and its death, Hegel spends most of his energy articulating the relation between whole communities and death. The converse relation between Hegel and Heidegger on this issue, of course, does not preclude structural convergences as in the relation between fear and anxiety indicated above. My interpretation of the *Phenomenology*, however, shows that for Hegel death arises only within the context of a community. Even in the initial encounters with death, Hegel pictures the encounter as the result of a prior encounter between two self-consciousnesses. Articulating death as dependent on community allows Hegel, on the one hand, to avoid the difficulties presented in Being and Time concerning the relation between being with others as essential and being towards death as essential, but non-relational. On the other hand, the Phenomenology, precisely because community precedes death, does not provide any account of the relation between the individual and death. I am not claiming here that Hegel would deny that there is a profound relation between the individual and his or her death. He might even agree with Heidegger that an individual exists as being towards death, and that this relation is *jemeinig*. I am claiming, however, that given the relation that Hegel articulates between community and death, there seems to be no point at which such an analysis could occur. Consciousness is constituted in its relation to the community. One cannot simply abstract an individual out of his or her community and then ask, how does this abstract individual relate to its own death? This question can only be answered for Hegel within the context of a particular community.

Both Hegel and Heidegger are heirs to the Western philosophical tradition, and as such there are many similarities in their respective projects. To the degree that both Hegel and Heidegger eschew relativism and scepticism, both seek to give an account of that which is enduring in human thought and experience. The means by which each presents this account, however, leads to profound differences in the subsequent philosophies. The primary difference we have examined is the role that death plays in each philosophy. Heidegger in Being and Time, I have argued, presents a Kantian account of death in which death plays a transcendental role with regard to human experience. Hegel, in the *Phenomenology*, on the other hand, does not articulate death as a transcendental structure, but as subordinate to and determined by the community and history within which it appears. To say that death develops historically within the *Phenomenology*, is not to say, however, that Hegel is a historicist. Hegel's project is bounded by a conception of reason and history in which development occurs.

These competing conceptions, however, seem to lead us into an impasse. How can we decide? If we suppose that there is an antinomy at work here, Kant provides us with two possible ways of resolving an antinomy. If an antinomy is dynamic, then both sides are affirmed as true. If an antinomy is mathematical, then both sides are denied as false. The truth of the dynamic antinomies lies in the acceptance of the phenomenal/noumenal distinction. The falsity of the mathematical antinomies lies in their affirmation of the reality of space and time. The ideality of space and time, however, does not seem to be a point of contention with Hegel and Heidegger. There is something, however, that both affirm: the predication of desire on a lack. The antinomy is the result of affirming this type of desire, and the two sides of the antinomy are the result of the way Hegel and Heidegger deal with this affirmation. Thus, Hegel and Heidegger deal with death in the way that they do for two reasons: 1) Both see desire as predicated on a lack. 2) Heidegger incorporates this lack as constitutive of human existence. Hegel introjects this lack as continually overcome and reproduced. This nexus of death, desire and lack produces a melancholic and a mournful account of death.

What I would like to pursue in the next part is a mathematical solution to this antinomy. That is, I would like to present an account of desire not predicated on a lack. Such an account would have to do two things. First, it must be able to account for the complexity and variety of human experience. Second, such an account would have to show how desire came to be predicated on a lack. If desire does not spring from a lack in some fundamental or essential way, how did it come to be construed in this way? What are the historical conditions that produce desire as a lack? Once it can be shown that desire does not have to be conceived as filling a lack, a new conception of death can be formulated, one that is neither transcendental nor speculative. This conception of death will not be anchored in either mourning or melancholia. Along with Spinoza, we might say that this conception of death springs from beatitude.

# Notes

- 1. Sigmund Freud, 'A Case of Homosexuality in a Woman', SE XVIII: 162.
- 2. 3:551-2/§758.
- 3. 3:571-2/§785.
- 4. 3:555-6/§763.
- 5. 3:573-4/§787.
- 6. See, for example, First Corinthians 15: 54–5, 'But when this perishable will have put on the imperishable, and this mortal will have put on immortality, then will come about the saying that is written, "Death is swallowed up in victory. O Death, where is your victory? O Death, where is your sting?"' What is key for Hegel here in the transition from revealed religion to absolute knowing is that this victory over death occurs 'at the last trumpet' (15: 52), at some time in the distant future.
- 7. See, for example, Luke 12: 4–5, 'And I say to you, "My friends, do not be afraid of those who kill the body, and after that have no more that

they can do. But I will warn you whom to fear: fear the One who after He has killed has authority to cast into hell; yes, I tell you, fear Him".'

- 8. 3:570–1/§784.
- 9. 3:573-4/§787.
- 10. Peter Hylton, 'Hegel and Analytic Philosophy', *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, 445–85, argues that Russell's and Moore's shift to what he calls Platonic Atomism in which there is a sharp distinction between knower and known was precipitated by a conscious and decisive break with the British Idealism in which they had been schooled.
- 11. John W. Burbidge, 'Hegel's Absolutes', *The Owl of Minerva* 29, 1997: 223–37, makes an important distinction between Hegel's use of the word 'absolute' as a noun and his use of it as an adjective. According to Burbidge, 'absolute' is used as a noun in three strictly delimited contexts: 1) in a Schellingian context, 2) in reference to religion, or 3) to refer to Spinoza's substance. The adjectival form of 'absolute', however, is ubiquitous. The upshot of this distinction is to argue that Hegel is uninterested in *the* absolute, and his interest in absolute knowing indicates a dynamic process rather than a point of completion. This leads Burbidge to conclude that absolute knowing is a knowing that realises all knowing is relative and conditioned.
- 12. 3:591/§808. See, Stephen Crites, 'The Golgotha of Absolute Spirit', *Method and Speculation in Hegel's* Phenomenology, ed. Merold Westphal (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1982), 47–56.
- 13. 3:591/§808.

# Part III

# Beatitude

All our present-day philosophers, possibly without knowing it, look through glasses that Baruch Spinoza ground.

Heine<sup>1</sup>

As we saw in Parts I and II Hegel and Heidegger are forced into the antinomy of mourning and melancholia because each conceives of desire as flowing from a lack. In order to solve this antinomy I would like to propose a model of desire that is not predicated on a lack. In the Introduction we looked briefly at Spinoza's conception of desire as a model of desire not predicated on a constitutive lack. I would like to return to Spinoza now in order to elucidate further this conception of desire as it relates to Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*.<sup>2</sup> The full elucidation of this concept of desire entails the discussion of two additional topics, both of which are closely related. The first is bodies, or objects that may affect and be affected by other objects. The discussion of bodies will allow us to examine the troublesome and obscure 'body without organs'.

What is the best way to understand a body? According to Deleuze and Guattari, the best way to understand a body is to ask what it is capable of. This is of course an immensely difficult question if one is talking about a human body. Deleuze and Guattari often quote Spinoza's claim in this regard: 'no one has yet been taught by experience what the body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature'.<sup>3</sup>

So let us begin with a rather more simple body, a tick. In *Mondes* animaux et monde humain Jakob von Uexküll describes the relation of a tick to its environment. According to Uexküll a tick is capable of only three things: it can climb, fall and dig. A tick is capable of being affected by sunlight, so it climbs up a tree to the end of a branch. A tick is also capable of sensing warm-blooded animals. When it does, the tick drops to the animal. At this point, the tick begins to search for a suitable place to burrow. When it finds a place it burrows its head under the skin and begins to draw blood from the animal. The effects that this tick is capable of are the result of the relations of its various parts. Thus, for example, if the relation between the tick's legs and torso is very different it may become incapable of climbing trees. The tick's body must also be dense enough to fall relatively straight. If the tick's body caught too much air as it fell, it might fall too slowly to land on the passing animal. If the tick were too heavy its landing on another animal might be noticed. If it moved too quickly once on the animal, again its movements might be noticed. If the tick's body were too broad it might not be able to move through the thick fur of some animals to get to a place where it might dig. The same thing might occur if the tick's body were rough instead of smooth. The tick's body is thus the particular relation of motion and rest peculiar to it and its place in its environment and the powers granted to it by this relation to affect or be affected by its environment.

The total number of affects that the tick is capable of is limited in two ways. First, and most obviously, the tick cannot be affected in ways that are precluded by the particular relation of motion and rest of its parts. The tick cannot fly to its target, it can only fall. The tick cannot climb to an appropriate jumping point in the dark because it does not have the ability to orient itself without light. Second, the affects themselves are limited by two thresholds: a maximal and a minimal. Deleuze and Guattari speak of this range between maximal and minimal thresholds in terms of intensity. The minimal threshold of a tick would have an intensity of degree zero. Suppose a tick finds itself in a particularly desolate segment of forest, or at least no animals appear within its drop zone. During these times the tick sleeps. It cannot exercise any of its affects so it enters a period of stasis. This is the tick's minimal threshold of intensity. The tick achieves its maximal threshold of intensity when it is full. That is, when the tick has exercised all three of its affects to their fullest extent, the tick can suck no more blood, and it dies.

For Deleuze and Guattari an analysis of the tick's affects, what sort of body could produce such affects, and the limits of those affects is the best way to understand the tick. Contrast understanding a body according to its affects with the Linnaean taxonomy which categorises a tick with spiders and scorpions because all are 'usually with four pairs of legs, either lungs or tracheae, a liquid diet, no attennae, simple eyes, terrestrial environment, sensory pedipalps, and a body divided into cephalothorax and abdomen'. Do we understand a tick or spider any better if we know that both usually have eight legs? Deleuze and Guattari would maintain that the number of legs is relevant only insofar as it makes some affects possible but precludes

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others. By the same token the fact that ticks, spiders and scorpions all eat a liquid diet tells us very little until we learn that a spider's liquid diet is produced by injecting venom into the body of its prey, which then dissolves the prey's internal organs for the spider to suck out. This seems profoundly different from the way in which the tick procures its liquid diet of blood.

Disjunctions such as these lead Deleuze and Guattari to suggest even more radical distinctions within a species: 'A racehorse is more different from a workhorse than a workhorse is from an ox.'<sup>4</sup> If the defining characteristic of a body is what affects it is capable of, then those animals suitable for pulling carts, but not for racing, have more in common with one another than animals bred for racing. Notice, though, why this is the case. A workhorse is a workhorse by virtue of having those capabilities that *preclude* it from being a racehorse. A racehorse is a racehorse only insofar as it lacks the capabilities of a workhorse.

Deleuze and Guattari take their cue from Spinoza in conceiving of a body in this way. For Spinoza a body is an infinity of parts (or modes) with a fixed relation of motion and rest among its various parts, and this relation of motion and rest allows one body to be distinguished from another. 'Bodies are distinguished from one another in respect of motion and rest, quickness and slowness, and not in respect of substance.'5 Thus for Spinoza (and mutatis mutandis for Deleuze and Guattari) identifying a body is not a matter of identifying its substance and then asking what sort of attributes might inhere in such a substance. This is the case for Spinoza because all bodies are composed of modifications of an infinite substance. A body is identified by the unique relation of its parts to one another. The identity of a body is the result of a unique intersection of modes that relate to one another in a peculiar and limited way. If this relation among the parts is changed, the specificity of the body is lost. For example, upon returning from a walk through the woods with my dog I discover a tick attached to the dog's ear. If I take a lighter and burn the tick so that its hard outer shell melts and its legs shrivel and curl under its body, the tick no longer maintains the same relation of motion and rest among its parts. As a result it is no longer capable of the same affects as it was prior to its burning. This new relation of motion and rest among its various parts create a new body. This new body would still be referred to the original tick, but the unmistakable change would also be registered by calling the new body 'burned tick' or even 'dead tick'. This extensional relation of parts Deleuze and Guattari call a body's longitude. The affects that extensional relations make possible are called a body's latitude. A body's individuality is determined by its longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates.

On Spinoza's account bodies may be combined with other bodies to form even more complex bodies. As long as the natures of the bodies combined are not in conflict with one another the affects of the complex body are increased.

We thus see, how a composite individual may be affected in many different ways, and preserve its nature notwithstanding. Thus far we have conceived an individual as composed of bodies only distinguished one from the other in respect of motion and rest, speed and slowness; that is, of bodies of the most simple character. If, however, we now conceive another individual composed of several individuals of diverse natures, we shall find that the number of ways in which it can be affected without losing its nature, will be greatly multiplied. Each of its parts would consist of several bodies, and therefore each part would admit, without change to its nature, of quicker or slower motion, and would consequently be able to transmit its motions more quickly or more slowly to the remaining parts. If we further conceive a third kind of individuals composed of individuals of this second kind, we shall find that they may be affected in a still greater number of ways without changing their actuality. We may easily proceed thus to infinity, and conceive the whole of nature as one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change in the individual as a whole.6

The human body for Spinoza is an individual of the third kind. 'The human body is composed of a number of individual parts, of diverse nature, each one of which is in itself extremely complex.'7 Human bodies can be differentiated from other human bodies and other bodies in general, but this does not lead Spinoza to posit that a human body represents a different order of existence that is capable of operating according to its own rules. Human bodies do not compose 'a kingdom within a kingdom'. They are distinct only with respect to their unique relations of motion and rest and not according to any unique substance that they possess. Thus, for Spinoza one understands a body in the same way regardless of whether it is the simple body of a tick or the more complex human body. To understand a body is to know what affects it is capable of. For a human body this understanding can only be achieved through experimentation. This same way of understanding also applies to politics and economics. One can always ask, what affects is this political organisation of human bodies capable of? Does this economic arrangement of human

bodies increase power or decrease it? Does this political economy increase the number of affects its members are capable of or decrease them? These are the questions the drive Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of capitalism in *Anti-Oedipus*.

Neither for Spinoza nor for Deleuze and Guattari can bodies, whether human or otherwise, be spoken of in the abstract. All bodies have limits. The limits of any body are produced by that body. In other words, for a body to have particular affects it must be organised in a particular way. The affects that a tick is capable of result from its being organised in its tickish way. This organisation produces a limit beyond which the tick is not capable of affecting or being affected. Thus, given the tick's organisation, it cannot, for example, fly, or spin a web, or inject venom into its host to liquefy it. This limit that is, on the one hand, produced by the organisation of a body, and, on the other hand, precludes the body from exceeding it, Deleuze and Guattari call the 'body without organs'. As we saw above, the tick's body has a minimal and a maximal limit. Sometimes Deleuze and Guattari use the term 'full body without organs' to refer to the maximal limit, but more often 'body without organs' is used to refer to both the minimal and maximal limit. 'Desiring-machines make us an organism; but at the very heart of this production, within the very production of this production, the body suffers from being organised in this way, from not having some other sort of organisation, or no organisation at all.'8

What, precisely, constitutes the parts of a body? For Spinoza, the answer is easy: a body is composed of an infinite number of modes, or the modifications of the one, all-encompassing substance. For Deleuze and Guattari the answer is somewhat more complicated, but Spinoza still remains an important touchstone. For Spinoza everything seeks to preserve itself, or everything seeks to maintain its particular relation of motion and rest among its parts. This drive toward self-preservation Spinoza calls 'desire'. Deleuze and Guattari take over the language of desire not simply in fidelity to Spinoza but also as a means of criticising Western philosophy in general and Freud in particular. Deleuze and Guattari do not call the parts that make up a body 'modes' but 'desiring-machines'.<sup>9</sup> In order to see how this delimits the Freudian theory of desire, especially as it relates to the Oedipus complex, let us look at some key Freudian texts.

With the publication of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* a major shift occurs in Freud's topology of the psyche. This topology replaces the theory of libidinal and egoistic drives with the life and death drives of

Eros and Thanatos.<sup>10</sup> The formulation of these drives is provisional and speculative in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, but becomes fully articulated in *The Ego and the Id*. Key to this articulation is Freud's appropriation of the Oedipus myth. What I would like to explore here is Freud's mature account of the psyche and the peculiar way that it is bound up with the Oedipus myth. Then, by way of contrast (following Deleuze and Guattari), I would like to pose the possibility that Oedipus may not represent a universal account of desire.

Even the most cursory account of psychoanalysis recognises the importance of the unconscious. The typical account runs something like this: the dark urges of the unconscious, or id, are held in check by the reality-testing ego, which continually refers to its ego-ideal or superego for moral guidance. Difficulties arise when the ego cannot properly sublimate the desires of the id. This can result in any number of maladies, ranging from neurosis to psychosis.

While this account gets all the pieces in the right place, it fails to do justice to the complexity of Freud's theory. To begin with, the relation among the various aspects of the psyche remains unexplored. Freud notes that if we suppose that consciousness is simply a descriptive term for what we are aware of, there remains a vast landscape of material that by contrast is unconscious, that is, what we are not aware of. What we are not aware of, however, may itself be divided into two distinct categories, namely, what we *may* become aware of, and what we *may not* become aware of. Freud calls the former preconscious and the latter unconscious.<sup>11</sup>

Freud notes that while these terms are perhaps sufficient for descriptive purposes they lack explanatory power. The conscious, preconscious, unconscious model can only locate perceptions in one of these three categories. What this model cannot do, however, is explain why a perception is manifest, latent or unconscious. For this Freud has recourse to the ego and the id. 'We have formed the idea that in each individual there is a coherent organisation of mental processes; and we call this his ego. It is to this ego that consciousness is attached.'12 Furthermore, the conscious, preconscious, unconscious distinction cannot account for Freud's clinical experience that ego itself can be the site of resistance. That is, something in the ego produces effects of which the subject is not conscious. This experience forces Freud to acknowledge two things. First of all, the ego is not transparent to itself, that is, part of the ego also can be unconscious. Second, psychic dysfunction cannot be articulated as a simple conflict between the conscious and unconscious. These two acknowledgements suggest to

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Freud that the conflict lies in 'the antithesis between the coherent ego and the repressed which is split off from it'.<sup>13</sup>

These difficulties in maintaining a rigorous distinction between the conscious and the unconscious lead Freud to postulate a new topography of the psyche. Freud imagines the

individual as a psychical id, unknown and unconscious, upon whose surface rests the ego, developed from its nucleus in the [perception] system. If we make an effort to represent this pictorially, we may add that the ego does not completely envelop the id, but only does so to the extent to which the system [perception] forms its [the ego's] surface, more or less as the germinal disc rests upon the ovum. The ego is not sharply separated from the id; its lower portion merges into it.<sup>14</sup>

The ego and the id are not rigorously separated from one another on Freud's model. 'It is easy to see that the ego is that part of the id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world through the medium of [perception-conscious]; in a sense it is an extension of the surface-differentiation.'<sup>15</sup> For Freud the ego is an effect of the id's interaction with the external world.

Freud pictures the superficiality of the ego even more dramatically in a short essay written after *The Ego and the Id* entitled, 'A Note upon the Mystic Writing-Pad'.<sup>16</sup> Freud imagines the apparatus of perception to be very much like the child's toy that consists of a slab of wax covered by a thin layer of wax paper which in turn is covered by a sheet of celluloid. One presses with a stylus on the celluloid, and this pressure in turn scores the underlying wax and results in a mark appearing on the wax paper. By lifting the two sheets the marks disappear and the pad is cleared for new writing. At the same time, however, the scores made in the wax remain. For Freud this process is analogous to the relation between the unconscious which retains the traces of past experience and consciousness which is the surface between the protective outer layer of the perceptive system and the unconscious.

What is crucial in both these accounts for Deleuze and Guattari is that the ego is nothing more than the effect of the interrelation between the id and perception. This account is largely in keeping with Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of the subject as a residuum of the interaction between desire and the body without organs. Freud makes this explicit when he says:

the ego is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface entity, but is itself the projection of a surface. [That is, the ego is ultimately

derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those springing from the surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body, besides, as we have seen above, representing the superficies of the mental apparatus.]<sup>17</sup>

Freud reinforces this idea of the ego as the product of intersecting forces by referring to Georg Groddeck:

Now I think we shall gain a great deal by following the suggestion of a writer who, from personal motives, vainly asserts that he has nothing to do with the rigours of pure science. I am speaking of Georg Groddeck, who is never tired of insisting that what we call our ego behaves essentially passively in life, and that, as he expresses it, we are 'lived' by unknown and uncontrollable forces.<sup>18</sup>

Strachey notes the close connection between Groddeck and Nietzsche on this claim, and the connection with Nietzsche strengthens the connection between Freud and Deleuze and Guattari.

If Freud is so close to Deleuze and Guattari on the production of the ego, what precisely do they object to in Freud's theory? The objection comes at the point where Freud becomes concerned with the way in which the ego controls the id. Freud writes:

the functional importance of the ego is manifested in the fact that normally control over the approaches to motility devolves upon it. Thus in its relation to the id it is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse; with this difference, that the rider tries to do so with his own strength while the ego uses borrowed forces. The analogy may be carried a little further. Often a rider, if he is not to be parted from is horse, is obliged to guide it where it wants to go; so in the same way the ego is in the habit of transforming the id's will into action as if it were its own.<sup>19</sup>

The ego thus rides atop the id like a person on horseback. What interests Deleuze and Guattari, however, is the 'borrowed forces' that the ego uses to direct the id. It is at this crucial point that Freud introduces the Oedipus complex. The form that the ego takes, or perhaps the contours of its surface, are shaped, according to Freud by the way in which the ego either resolves or does not resolve its Oedipus complex. The resolution of the Oedipus complex requires the development of particular object-cathexes and the disavowal of others. This process of developing acceptable object-cathexes results not only in an ego that is capable on most occasions of deferring the id, but also the construction of a superego that continually goads the ego by presenting a model for it to follow.

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Deleuze and Guattari do not disagree with Freud that oedipalisation is in fact the dominant form of normalising desire in modern society. What they object to is the way in which Oedipus is presented as a transcendental and universal. One of the many tasks of *Anti-Oedipus* is to give an account of why oedipalisation is the dominant form of normalisation and the limits of this form of normalisation. In order to accomplish this task they must first present an alternative account of desire, one that accounts not only for the possibility of constraining desire within an Oedipal framework, but also for the ways in which desire properly thought exceeds the Oedipal framework.

Deleuze and Guattari begin their critique of Freud by noting that he does not see the radical implications of his own account of the relation between the ego and the id. In the first place Freud's account presupposes the unity of the id. According to this account, however, unity is only provided retrospectively by the ego, 'coherent organisation of mental processes'. Strictly speaking there can be no 'the' id – 'What a mistake to have ever said *the* id.'<sup>20</sup> 'The' id is only constituted retrospectively on the basis of the ego's presumed unity.

In order to avoid this difficulty Deleuze and Guattari instead begin with 'syntheses of desire', or what Freud would call 'cathexes'. Unlike Freud's cathexes, however, desire neither conceives of nor attaches itself to whole objects. Rather, following Melanie Klein, Deleuze and Guattari argue that desire attaches itself to part-objects. Deleuze and Guattari's typical example of this relation is a baby sucking at her mother's breast. For Deleuze and Guattari the connection made here is not a connection between mother and child. Rather, it is a connection between mouth and breast. Moreover, this connection is not a connection born out of a lack in either the mother or the baby. On the face of it this claim seems absurd. What could be more obvious than the child is at the mother's breast because she is hungry? Or, that the desire behind the mouth-breast connection is predicated on a lack in the child? Surely, it is the traditional account of desire that stretches from Plato to Freud that is operative in this case. Deleuze and Guattari's claim here is not that no desires spring from lack, but that the relation between desire and lack is secondary and presupposes this productive account of desire. How, then, does an account of desire predicated on lack presuppose a productive account of desire?

In order to answer this question we need to examine the relation between desire and its limit in the body without organs. Insofar as the body without organs is the limit to the connective syntheses that are possible for any body, the body without organs breaks these connections. In the case of the child at her mother's breast, not only is a connection made that allows the flow of milk from breast to mouth, but also this flow is periodically broken as the child stops sucking and swallows. This break is the result of the relation of motion and rest among the parts of the child's body. The child's body is such that it cannot suck indefinitely. It must break the connection in order to swallow. Swallowing, of course, is another connection that also must be broken as a result of the limits of the child's body. This oscillating cycle of making and breaking connections Deleuze and Guattari call a 'desiring-machine'. The breaking of connections is the second synthesis of desire, the disjunctive synthesis. The particular relation between desire and its limit in the body without organs Deleuze and Guattari call the 'paranoiac machine'.

The relation between desire and its limit, however, does not remain one of repulsion. Desire begins to colonise its limit and spread across the surface of the body without organs. At this point, it appears as if the body without organs is magically producing the connections that are made along its surface. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari call this relation between desire and its limit the 'miraculating machine'. The example they have in mind to illustrate this process is capitalism. From Adam Smith to Milton Friedman it has been commonplace to speak of the wonders of the market. Each person pursues his or her needs exclusively, and magically the needs of all are met. One could point to a building like the Sears Tower and call it a miracle of capitalism. What such exuberance obscures is that the miracles of capitalism are the result of the limits placed on the exchange of goods by a particular monetary system and the concomitant demands of private property.

The third synthesis of desire is the 'conjunctive synthesis of desire'. This is the point at which the relation between desire and its limits becomes reflexive. Desiring-production organises itself across the surface of the body without organs through the tension between connection and disjunction. The residual energy created by this tension produces a point of reconciliation that Deleuze and Guattari call a subject. The subject is thus a residuum of desiring-production rather than an agent of desiring-production. The subject is the point of retrospection from which one can affirm, 'It's me'. In a clear parallel to Kant's transcendental unity of apperception Deleuze and Guattari see the conjunctive synthesis of desire as the 'I feel' that accompanies all of our affects. They call this relation between desire and its limit the 'celibate machine'. It is celibate because it is the product of desiring-production, or what it produces is consumption.

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In order to illustrate further the abstract relations between desire and its limits let us look at the process of heating water.<sup>21</sup> Suppose a saucepan is placed on a stove. At this point the water is a fluid, continuous medium. It has a zero degree of intensity. It is the body without organs. As heat is introduced to the water the relations of motion and rest among the particles of water begins to change, and the water begins to act according to those affects that it is capable of, namely approaching its upper limit. In the case of heated water this upper limit happens to be steam. The water does not approach this limit in a linear fashion, however. The interaction between the heat of the water and the inertial resistance created in the state of the water prior to heating produces something new. Conduction becomes convection. In the move from conduction to convection we see the relation between the paranoiac machine and the miraculating machine. The paranoiac machine is the resistance of the body without organs to the connective synthesis of desire. This relation takes on a new shape as the same forces, in this case heat and gravity, begin to organise themselves across the surface of the water. Heat causes the water to rise, and as it cools gravity returns it to the bottom of the pan to be reheated. This interaction circulates the water: the linear becomes circular.

Prior to the pioneering work of Ilva Prigogine in dissipative structures it was thought that one of two things would happen to the water at this point. Having achieved a state of stable equilibrium in convection in which the forces of gravity and heat are in balance, the water can maintain this state assuming the amount of heat applied remains constant, or upon increase or decrease of the heat equilibrium is lost and according to the second law of thermodynamics the water seeks a new, less organised form of equilibrium. Prigogine discovered, however, that it is possible to achieve new states of even higher complexity when a system is pushed beyond the point of equilibrium. If we imagine the temperature of the water being gradually increased, the result is not disorder as the rate of conduction overcomes the rate of convection, but a new level of order. As the temperature increases the singular convection current that circulates throughout the whole saucepan breaks up into a series of vortices. These vortices are the result of excess energy within the system. The excess heat is consumed in the form of a series of multiple vortices throughout the saucepan. In the language of Deleuze and Guattari this is the celibate machine. The residual machine produced by the interaction of the other desiring machines.

Having given an account of desire that explains its fundamentally productive nature, Deleuze and Guattari move to their critique of psychoanalysis. This critique centres on the problems that follow from the misconstrual of desire by psychoanalysis. Following Kant, Deleuze and Guattari refer to these problems as 'paralogisms'. A paralogism for Kant is the transcendental illusion that arises when one supposes 'the absolute unity of the subject itself'. There are two points of connection with Kant here. First, paralogisms are systematic. That is, they are the necessary result of taking a particular metaphysical stance with regard to the subject, namely, a unified, substantial object of experience. This results in a concatenation of related illusions. Second, the very nature of a paralogism follows from supposing the unity of the subject. Deleuze and Guattari argue that insofar as the subject is not constituted by desire that is predicated on a lack, it cannot be unitary. The subject is a retrospective account of the multiplicity of desire that precludes the possibility of a unitary subject.

Deleuze and Guattari adopt the Kantian language of 'paralogism' to indicate the systematic misuse of the syntheses of desire by psychoanalysis. They write:

In what he termed the critical revolution, Kant intended to discover criteria immanent to understanding so as to distinguish the legitimate and the illegitimate uses of the syntheses of consciousness. In the name of *transcendental* philosophy (immanence of criteria), he therefore denounced the transcendent use of syntheses such as appeared in metaphysics. In like fashion we are compelled to say that psychoanalysis has its metaphysics – its name is Oedipus. And that a revolution – this time materialist – can proceed only by way of a critique of Oedipus, by denouncing the illegitimate use of the syntheses of the unconscious as found in Oedipal psychoanalysis, so as to rediscover a transcendental unconscious defined by the immanence of its criteria, and a corresponding practice we shall call schizoanalysis.<sup>22</sup>

According to Deleuze and Guattari there are five paralogisms of psychoanalysis. The shift from immanent use of criteria to transcendent use of criteria is evident in the first paralogism. The formula for Oedipus is 3 + 1, where the 3 is the triangulated relation of 'mummy-daddy-me' and the 1 is the transcendent phallus that governs the relations between and constitution of these three terms. As a result, the promiscuous connections among part-objects generated by the connective synthesis of desire are organised into 'complete objects, global images, and specific egos'.<sup>23</sup> The specificity of the ego is created by a massive repression of desiring-production required by

Oedipal sexuality. The images of the Oedipal story force all objects and actions to signify within its parameters, and signification only occurs among complete objects. In short, the first paralogism of psychoanalysis is that it always converts the unconscious to Oedipus.

In order to illustrate this paralogism further, I would like to look briefly at the popular television series Law & Order. The Law & Order franchise is composed of three shows: Law & Order, Law & Order: Special Victims Unit, and Law & Order: Criminal Intent. The difference between the original Law & Order and its two spin-offs is striking. The original is almost exclusively concerned with procedure police procedure and legal procedure. It is long on investigative minutiae and short on explanation. Or, any explanation that is given for a crime is always couched within a legal argument for the purpose of persuading a jury. Special Victims Unit (SVU) deals with 'sexually based offences' which as a result are 'particularly heinous', as the narrator portentously intones. Two things happen as a result of this shift in content. First, the heinousness of the crime increases the need for explanation, 'real' explanation, not simply a plausible, legal account. Second, the explanation almost invariably takes an Oedipal form. Unlike the original show, SVU has a psychiatrist as a recurring character. In short, the only way in which a heinous crime can be explained is by recourse to Oedipus.

The most recent iteration of *Law* & Order is Criminal Intent (CI). CI makes clear from its title that it will be concerned with explaining criminal behaviour. The show purports to follow two detectives from the 'major case squad'. Thus, any crime can be investigated as long as it is 'major'. CI has no need to employ a psychiatrist, since the lead detective has advanced psychological training. Unlike the other two shows, episodes of CI rarely end in the courtroom. Rather, each criminal is compelled to confess as the Oedipal underpinnings of his or her crime are revealed: 'Your mother abandoned you'; 'Your father didn't give you enough attention as a child'. What other explanation can be given for a crime of such magnitude? Something must have gone wrong during the process of oedipalisation. For the properly normalised, crime is impossible. Even on the most mundane level on a TV show, when one is concerned to account for behaviour, the recourse to Oedipus is almost unavoidable. Criminal behaviour is motivated improper oedipalisation. Everything must be explained in terms of Oedipus. This is the first paralogism of psychoanalysis.

While the first paralogism of psychoanalysis concerned the transcendent use of the connective synthesis of desire, the second paralogism concerns the disjunctive synthesis of desire. The disjunctive synthesis of desire may also be deployed immanently or transcendently, corresponding to an inclusive or an exclusive disjunction, respectively. Oedipus revolves around three sets of exclusive disjunctions that differentiate the ego according to 'generation, sex, and vital state'.<sup>24</sup> According to Oedipus one must be parent or child, and being one excludes the other. One must be man or woman, and being one excludes the other. And one must be exclusively dead or alive. Failure to negotiate these disjunctions exclusively results in one of the familial neuroses. Thus, 'the phobic person can no longer be sure whether he is parent or child; the obsessed person, whether he is dead or alive; the hysterical person, whether he is man or woman'.<sup>25</sup>

Whereas psychoanalysis is characterised by 'an exclusive, restrictive, and negative use of the disjunctive synthesis', another use is possible, an inclusive and affirmative use.<sup>26</sup> At first blush, it might seem as if Deleuze and Guattari are trying to reinstate the Hegelian dialectic. What is an inclusive disjunction except one that maintains the possibility of affirming two opposed poles at the same time? Is this not the identity of identity and difference? Deleuze and Guattari maintain that this is not the case.

It would be a total misunderstanding of this order of thought if we concluded that the schizophrenic substituted vague syntheses of identification of contradictory elements for disjunctions, like the last of the Hegelian philosophers. He does not substitute syntheses of contradictory elements for disjunctive syntheses; rather, for the exclusive and restrictive use of the disjunctive synthesis, he substitutes an affirmative use. He is and remains in disjunction: he does not abolish disjunction by identifying the contradictory elements by means of elaboration; instead, he affirms it through a continuous overflight spanning an indivisible distance. He is not simply bisexual, or between the two, or intersexual. He is transsexual. He is trans-alivedead, trans-parentchild. He does not reduce to contraries to an identity of the same; he affirms their distance as that which relates the two as different.<sup>27</sup>

The crucial break with Hegel concerns two points. First, Hegel's method works through contradiction. Second, these contradictions are reconciled in an identity. Granted this identity is complex and mediated, nevertheless, it is an identity. Inclusive disjunctions are not contradictory. As we saw above, what Deleuze and Guattari have in mind by an inclusive disjunction is the fact that in order to answer the phone I must take my hand off the keyboard. There is no

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contradiction between the phone and the keyboard, it is just that in order to make the new phone-hand connection the keyboard-hand connection must be disjoined. Also, there is no greater whole in which the phone and the keyboard can be reconciled. There are only series of connections and disjunctions. It is not Hegel, then, but Schreber who provides the crucial illustration:

Schreber is man and woman, parent and child, dead and alive: which is to say, he is situated wherever there is a singularity, in all the series and in all the branches marked by a singular point, because he is himself this distance that transforms him into a woman, and at its terminal point he is already the mother of a new humanity and can finally die.<sup>28</sup>

Oedipus reduces its subjects to universal subjects in which a particular role, or particular destiny, has already been laid out on the basis of these exclusive disjunctions. One may play one's role well in the case of normalised subjects, or poorly, as in the case of the neurotic. The schizo is the refusal of this transcendental repression of the inclusive disjunctive synthesis of desire. Rather than universal subjects, the inclusive disjunctive synthesis produces singular subjects, or better singularities, singularities that are the interstices of the affirmed poles of disjunction.

The third paralogism of psychoanalysis involves the misuse of the conjunctive synthesis of desire. As we saw above, the conjunctive synthesis is where Deleuze and Guattari locate the production of the subject. The subject is produced as a residuum of the interaction among the other syntheses and the body without organs, like vortices created in warm water when the heat is slowly increased. Deleuze and Guattari imagine the subjects created in this interaction to be 'nomadic and polyvocal'. As a subject occupies a different point on the vortex that constitutes its subjectivity, the subject becomes a different subject for each point. It is Klossowski who demonstrates this point decisively for Deleuze and Guattari in his reading of Nietzsche and the Eternal Return:

The subject spreads itself out along the entire circumference of the circle, the center of which has been abandoned by the ego. At the center is the desiring-machine, the celibate machine of the Eternal Return. A residual subject of the machine, Nietzsche-as-subject garners a euphoric reward (Voluptas) from everything that this machine turns out, a product that the reader had thought to be no more than the fragmented *oeuvre* by Nietzsche . . . . It is not a matter of identifying with various historical personages, but rather identifying the names of history with zones of

intensity on the body without organs; and each time Nietzsche-as-subject exclaims: 'They're me! So it's me!'<sup>29</sup>

The interactions of desire with its limits do not produce a stable or unitary subject. Rather, this interaction produces nomadic and polyvocal subjects.

Psychoanalysis interrupts this interaction in two ways. First, it supposes that desire is fundamentally Oedipal and that social structures reproduce the Oedipal unconscious. Thus, all figures of authority – bosses, police officers, judges – become one's father, and objects of desire are *actually* one's mother. Not only is the unconscious colonised by Oedipus, but also society as a whole. This rigid correspondence between society and the unconscious Deleuze and Guattari call the bi-univocal use of the conjunctive synthesis of desire, and the explanation of society in terms of Oedipus is termed 'application'.

The second way in which psychoanalysis diverts the revolutionary potential of desire is through its dependence on the segregative use of the conjunctive synthesis of desire. A social field organises or territorialises itself, according to segregations. A society is defined on the most fundamental level by the distinction between 'one of us' and 'not one of us'. Throughout history these segregations have taken a myriad of forms and may be densely layered on top of one another. Segregations can be based on race, nationality, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, class, religion. These segregations produce stable forms of identity that allow a particular social structure to reproduce itself. Oedipus facilitates this social reproduction by producing subjects amenable to this type of repression.

If it is true that Oedipus is obtained by reduction or application, it presupposes in itself a certain kind of libidinal investment of the social field, of the production and the formation of this field. There is no more an individual Oedipus than there is an individual fantasy. Oedipus is a means of integration into the group, in both the adaptive form of its own reproduction that makes it pass from one generation to the next, and in its unpadded neurotic stases that block desire at prearranged impasses. Oedipus also flourishes in subjugated groups, where an established order is invested through the group's own repressive forms. And it is not the forms of the subjugated group that depend on Oedipal projections and identifications, but the reverse: it is Oedipal applications that depend on the determinations of the subjugated group as an aggregate of departure and on their libidinal investment (from the age of thirteen I've worked hard, rising on the social ladder, getting promotions, being a part of the exploiters). There is therefore a *segregative use* of the conjunctive

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syntheses of the unconscious, a use that does not coincide with divisions between classes, although it is an incomparable weapon in the service of a dominating class: it is this use that brings about the feeling of 'indeed being one of us', of being part of a superior race threatened by enemies from outside.<sup>30</sup>

Note that for Deleuze and Guattari organisation of the social field is prior to Oedipus. Segregation organises the social field, and then Oedipus makes use of the segregations in order to reproduce them. The priority of social production will be crucial in the chapters that follow. Note also that while the segregative use of the conjunctive synthesis produces a dominating and dominated group, both groups might share the same unconscious libidinal investments. Thus, a woman might consciously seek the equality of men and women in the workplace; she may also believe that the only way to do so is by appropriating some of the distinguishing characteristics of contemporary male behaviour. In this case, the segregation remains intact and the woman works against her own interests. It is here that we begin to see Deleuze and Guattari's answer to Wilhelm Reich's question: Why do we desire our own subjection?

The fourth paralogism of psychoanalysis is displacement. Desire is displaced by Oedipus in order to control it better. The incest taboo illustrates this displacement perfectly. According to psychoanalysis the family is organised around a prohibition that precludes incestuous relations between parents and children, and forbids the killing of the parents by the children. Psychoanalysis argues that what is forbidden is forbidden because it is desired. If it were not desired, there would be no need to forbid it. Oedipus proves to be so insightful and so cathartic because these desires, are revealed to us. This misses the point on two levels, however. First, one cannot deduce desire from what is forbidden. This presupposes that there are only two terms in the equation that fully exhaust the possibilities. Thus, if marrying my mother is forbidden, it must be the case that I secretly desire to do so. As we have seen, though, desire is multifaceted and affirmative. It pursues connections with part-objects, and to analyse it only in relation to whole objects (like mothers) is to restrict it unduly. This means that the Oedipal interpretation of the incest taboo is performing another function in the organisation of the family than simply revealing the subterranean desires of its members. Oedipus is the trap of desire that diverts it from its true intention.

The second level on which the Oedipal interpretation of incest misses the point is with regard to subjects. We saw above that the subject is constituted as a residuum in an act of retrospective identification. Psychoanalysis requires that these identifications conform to the Oedipal model. Thus, the subject is continually forced to identify himself with desires that are not his. 'Oh, so that's what I am.' And, guilt is introduced into the unconscious by way of this interpretation. In this way the subject's desire is normalised and universalised.

The fifth and final paralogism again concerns the relation between Oedipus and the subject. Psychoanalysis takes Oedipus as the starting point for understanding the subject. One can be pre-Oedipal, more or less poorly oedipalised (that is, neurotic) or oedipalisation may fail (that is, psychotic). In any case psychoanalysis requires that Oedipus be the centre around which these possible modes of subjectivity turn. Oedipus is the 'now' that makes all other instances of temporality modes of itself. Deleuze and Guattari argue to the contrary that Oedipus is a reaction formation and not foundational in any sense. As we have seen, desire is fundamentally an-Oedipal.

If desire is an-Oedipal, how does one explain the ubiquity of Oedipus? Does it refer to nothing? Is it a myth? Deleuze and Guattari do not deny the existence of Oedipus or its ability to explain a great deal of human behaviour. What they do deny is the universal and transcendental application of Oedipus to any possible subject whatsoever. In order to understand why this is so, one must look beyond the family to the social conditions that make the nuclear family the normalising model for the production of subjects:

*Undecidable, virtual, reactive*, or *reactional*, such is Oedipus. It is only a reactional formation, a formation that results from a reaction to desiring-production. It is a serious mistake to consider this formation in isolation, abstractly, independently of the actual factor that coexists with it and to which it reacts. Yet this is precisely what psychoanalysis does when it closets itself in Oedipus, and determines its progressions and regressions in terms of Oedipus, or even in relationship to it: thus the idea of pre-oedipal regression, by means of which one sometimes attempts to characterise psychosis. It is like a Cartesian devil; the regressions and progressions are made only with the artificially closed vessel of Oedipus, and in reality depend on a state of forces that is changing, yet always actual and contemporary, within *anoedipal* desiring-production. Desiring-production has solely an actual existence; progressions and regressions are merely the effectuations of a virtuality that is always fulfilled as perfectly as it can be by virtue of the states of desire.<sup>31</sup>

#### Paralogisms of Desire

What Deleuze and Guattari imagine is a system of desire (connection and disjunction) that produces its own limits (body without organs). Desire and its limits produce an additional level of complexity (miraculating machine), which appears to be produced solely by the limit. It is at this point that Oedipus becomes a possible explanation. Given the way that desire and its limits produce a particular social arrangement, the one we call currently capitalism, there is an optimal distribution of desiring-production. In a capitalist society this optimal distribution is the nuclear family. Since for most of the people most of the time desire is contained within this optimal distribution, it is unremarkable that desire is directed to the members of the nuclear family. If my primary interactions are with my mother and father during the initial years of my life, why is it surprising that my desire is often channelled in that direction? Where else could it go? Psychoanalysis makes the mistake of assuming these connections are primary and necessary. The moment the child is born he is already pre-Oedipal. His upbringing will necessarily present his mother as a prohibited object of desire, and the way in which he deals with that conflict will determine the type of ego he has. Deleuze and Guattari object that taking Oedipus in isolation like this is bound to produce distortions, bound to miss the nature of desire. Rather, 'parents only intervene here as partial objects, flows, signs and agents of a process that outflanks them on all sides. At most, the child innocently "relates" to his parents some part of the astonishing productive experience he is undergoing with his desire; but this experience is not related to them as such.'32

By placing Oedipus at its centre, psychoanalysis has systematically distorted desire. Desire is seen as the product of Oedipus rather than the other way around. Deleuze and Guattari argue for an affirmative conception of desire that is fundamentally anoedipal. As we will see in the chapters that follow, this affirmative conception of desire not only reinscribes Oedipus within a larger historical framework, but also allows us to think about death outside of the mournful and melancholic traditions of negativity exemplified by Hegel and Heidegger.

#### Notes

1. Heinrich Heine, 'The Romantic School', trans. Helen Mustard, in *The Romantic School and Other Essays*, ed. Jost Hermand and Robert C. Holub (New York: Continuum, 1985), 70.

2. One could choose many points of incursion into *Anti-Oedipus*. Eugene Holland in his *Introduction to Schizoanalysis* uses Nietzsche, Marx and Freud, and shows as I do that Nietzsche fares best of the three. I would argue that this is related to Nietzsche's similarity to Spinoza, particularly on the concept of desire. Todd May in his *Deleuze: An Introduction* argues that Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson are Deleuze's 'holy trinity'. What these works have in common is their use of Deleuze's historical works to elucidate his philosophical and political works. I am pursuing a similar strategy here, although I am restricting myself to Deleuze's works on Spinoza: *Expressionism in Philosophy* and *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*.

The other common strategy is to use the philosophical works, particularly *Difference and Repetition*, to elucidate Deleuze's corpus as a whole. If I were to recast my argument in these terms, I would say that what is at stake in *Anti-Oedipus* is the 'image of thought' in which the subject who lacks truth seeks to fill this lack by producing adequate representations. *Anti-Oedipus* argues that predicating thought on a lack as well as the representational model of thought are misguided. Deleuze and Guattari replace both of these 'images' with productive and machinic accounts of thought.

The relation of Anti-Oedipus to Deleuze's other works is of some debate. Some would like to separate Deleuze from his work with Guattari. Others see A Thousand Plateaus as supplanting the work done in Anti-Oedipus. Recent publication of a series of interviews, however, sheds new light on what Deleuze saw as the role of Anti-Oedipus. For example, he articulates the difference between Difference and Repetition, The Logic of Sense and Anti-Oedipus in two ways. First, Deleuze claims that the earlier works are infected with a naïveté towards psychoanalysis. This deficiency is surely corrected in Anti-Oedipus. Second, he describes Difference and Repetition in terms of depth and The Logic of Sense in terms of surfaces. By contrast Anti-Oedipus has neither depth nor surface but intensities. See Two Regimes of Madness, 65–6.

Deleuze describes the relation between Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus in Kantian terms. Anti-Oedipus is a 'Critique of Pure Reason for the unconscious', while 'A Thousand Plateaus . . . is post-Kantian in spirit (though still resolutely anti-Hegelian)'. Thus, while Anti-Oedipus is still of necessity tied to psychoanalytic terms, particularly the unconscious, A Thousand Plateaus begins taking philosophy forward by creating concepts not bound to the psychoanalytic image of thought. See Two Regimes of Madness, 309–10.

- 3. III.ii.Note.
- 4. A Thousand Plateaus, 257.
- 5. II.Lemma i.

- 6. II.Lemma vii.Note.
- 7. II.Postulate i.
- 8. *Anti-Oedipus*, 8. Hereafter, AO. The term 'body without organs' comes from the French playwright Antonin Artaud. Artaud writes, 'The body is the body / it is all by itself / and has no need of the organs / the body is never an organism / organisms are the enemies of the body' (AO, 9). Deleuze begins using it in his theorising three years earlier in *The Logic of Sense*.
- 9. In the language of *Difference and Repetition*, 'modes' and 'desiringmachines' would be the difference that precedes any unity. Unity is thus shown to be an effect of difference, as the body without organs is the effect of desiring production. Herein lies Deleuze's radical interpretation of Spinoza. On Deleuze's reading modes precede and constitute substance. Thus, substance becomes an effect of the totality of modal interaction.
- 10. Chapter 9 discusses Freud's formulation of the death drive in detail. See also Richard Boothby, *Death and Desire: Psychoanalytic Theory in Lacan's Return to Freud* (New York: Routledge, 1991).
- 11. SE XIX: 14–15.
- 12. SE XIX: 17.
- 13. SE XIX: 17.
- 14. SE XIX: 24.
- 15. SE XIX: 25.
- 16. SE XIX: 227–32.
- 17. SE XIX: 26, fn 1.
- 18. SE XIX: 23.
- 19. SE XIX: 25.
- 20. AO, 1.
- 21. Brian Massumi, A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991).
- 22. AO, 75.
- 23. AO, 74.
- 24. AO, 75.
- 25. AO, 75.
- 26. AO, 76.
- 27. AO, 76-7.
- 28. AO, 77.
- 29. AO, 21.
- 30. AO, 103.
- 31. AO, 129.
- 32. AO, 120.

# The Investments of Desire

This choice of an object, in conjunction with a corresponding attitude of rivalry and hostility towards the father, provides the content of what is known as the Oedipus complex, which in *every* human being is of the greatest importance in determining the final shape of his erotic life.

Freud<sup>1</sup>

In the previous chapter we saw the way in which Deleuze and Guattari's conception of desire provided a means by which the dominance of Oedipus might be criticised. In this chapter I would like to broaden the scope of analysis to show the necessary interrelation between desiring-production and social production. This analysis will allow us to reinscribe Oedipus within the larger history of capitalism and thus show the limits of Oedipus.

In pursuing the relation between Oedipus and capitalism Deleuze and Guattari place themselves at the nexus of psychoanalysis and Marxism. What they want to avoid in their account, however, is either the reduction of psychoanalysis to Marxism - desire is the manifestation of the forces of economic production – or the reduction of economic production to psychoanalysis – social structures are psychic structures writ large. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari write, 'There is no such thing as the social production of reality on the one hand, and a desiring production that is mere fantasy on the other',<sup>2</sup> and 'desiringproduction is one and the same thing as social production'.<sup>3</sup> As we saw in the previous chapter it is desiring-machines that are real, and both the social and the psychic are manifestations of the same processes of connection, disjunction and conjunction. On the one hand, the psychic and the social are in principle separate, in the way that an individual is separable from a group. On the other hand, insofar as both the psychic and the social are the result of the same machinic connections, both refer to the same reality: 'There is only desire and the social, and nothing else.'4

In order to explain the relation between the psychic and the social more clearly, I would like to return to Spinoza and his conception of the relation between mind and body. Working within the parameters and vocabulary established by Descartes, Spinoza turns Descartes' own arguments against him to show that given his understanding of substance, there cannot be two distinct substances of thought and extension, but only one substance, which Spinoza calls 'nature' or 'God' interchangeably (*deus sive natura*). The simple reason for this, Spinoza argues, is that if there were more than one substance, each would limit the other. This would make substance finite and dependent on something other than itself. In this case substance is no longer substance, but a modification of something else. The only way for substance to be wholly independent and wholly infinite is if there is only one substance. Spinoza identifies this one substance with the totality of all that exists. Substance is thus actually infinite (that is, it contains all that exists) rather than potentially infinite (that is, it extends indefinitely in every direction).<sup>5</sup>

While Spinoza argues that, properly speaking, there can be only one substance, he is still left with the experience that led Descartes to suppose that there must be two substances, namely that the content of the 'I' seems to be the mind rather than the body. Spinoza solves this problem by arguing that an infinite substance will necessarily contain all essences within it. These essences Spinoza refers to as 'attributes'. Each essence or attribute is infinite after its kind, rather than absolutely infinite in the way that substance is. The intellect perceives substance from the perspective of its attributes. Human intellect, however, is finite and can perceive substance only from the perspective of two attributes: thought and extension. Thus, from the human perspective any event can be seen from the perspectives of thought or extension. For example, let's say while hammering a nail into a board I strike my thumb. Two stories can be told about this event. I can tell a purely physical story about muscles and gravity, about two solid objects not being able to occupy the same place at the same time, and about nerve endings and C-fibres firing. Or, I can tell a purely mental story about the series of ideas that led me to think about hammering a nail into a board, about mental states such as pain and anger that follow the idea of my thumb getting struck by a hammer.

Several things can be said about Spinoza's point here in its distinction from Descartes'. To begin with, the problem of mind-body interaction is solved on several levels. There is no longer any need to explain how two substances with nothing in common can communicate with one another, since there is only one substance. The experience of the distinction between mind and body is solved by noting that for any event two accounts may be given, one from the perspective of extension, the other from the perspective of thought. Thought and extension are not separate substances but separate essences of the same substance by which any event may be understood. On the one hand, since thought and extension refer to distinct attributes, the accounts given from each perspective will be distinct. Hence Spinoza writes:

Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind determine body to motion or rest or any state different from these, if such there be.

All modes of thinking have for their cause God, by virtue of his being a thinking thing, and not by virtue of his being displayed under any other attribute (II.vi.). That, therefore, which determines the mind to thought is a mode of thought, and not a mode of extension; that is (II. Def. i.) not body. This was our first point. Again, the motion and rest of a body must arise from another body, which has also been determined to a state of motion or rest by a third body, and absolutely everything which takes place in a body must spring from God, in so far as he is regarded as affected by some mode of extension, and not by some mode of thought (II.vi.); that is, it cannot spring from the mind, which is a mode of thought. This was our second point. Therefore body cannot determine mind, etc. Q.E.D.<sup>6</sup>

On the other hand, since any object is a collection of modes, which are finite expressions of substance, each mode will display all the attributes of substance. Spinoza continues:

This is made more clear by what was said in the note to II. vii., namely, that mind and body are one and the same thing conceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly, under the attribute of extension. Thus it follows that the order or concatenation of things is identical, whether nature be conceived under the one attribute or the other; consequently the order of states of activity and passivity in our body is simultaneous in nature with the order of states of activity and passivity in the mind.<sup>7</sup>

Mind and body are identical, not because one can be reduced to the other as in reductive materialism, but because they are the same set of causes understood from two different perspectives. Humans are both mind and body, not as separate substances, or as folk psychology to science, but as a finite expression of substance understood under two of its infinite attributes.

Deleuze and Guattari are saying something analogous to this with regard to the social and the psychic. The social and the psychic are two attributes of the syntheses of desire. Thus, any event can be described in two ways, from two perspectives. One can describe an event in terms of the psychic. In the case of contemporary society psychic explanations are dominated by Oedipus. Deleuze and Guattari are trying to account for why Oedipus has become the dominant model for explaining events from the psychic perspective, and why this model fails to account for experience. In order to do this they have articulated a complex model of desire's connections, disjunctions and consumptions. One can also describe an event in terms of the social. In the case of contemporary society Deleuze and Guattari argue that social structures are the result of capital, and that capital can also be explained in terms of the same connections, disjunctions and consumptions of desire.

I would now like to take up the same syntheses of desire that we saw in the previous chapter and show how they can account for social structures as well. Deleuze and Guattari take up the problem of social organisation historically, or better, genealogically. Their concern is to show why capitalism is the dominant force in organising contemporary society, and how it came to be so through an appropriation and channelling of desire peculiar to it.

Following Bataille, Deleuze and Guattari reject the notion that society functions on exchange. 'We see no reason in fact for accepting the postulate that underlies exchangist notions of society; society is not first of all a milieu for exchange where the essential would be to circulate or to cause to circulate, but rather a socius of inscription where the essential thing is to mark and be marked.'8 This redescription of society as one that essentially inscribes or codes its elements results in the positing of three fundamentally different types of society: the primitive society that codes its elements in relation to the earth, the despotic society that codes its elements in relation to a ruler, and the capitalist society, which functions by decoding all of the previous social codings. By giving a genealogy of social structures in terms of coding, Deleuze and Guattari are able to rein in the pretensions of psychoanalytic discourse, which posits Oedipus as transcendental and universal. Oedipus is a rather late arrival in human history, and the conditions for its possibility are the social structures peculiar to capitalism.

In order to unpack this genealogy, let us look at the process that Deleuze and Guattari refer to as 'coding' or 'inscription'. 'Flows of women and children, flows of herds and of seed, sperm flows, flows of shit, menstrual flows: nothing must escape coding.'<sup>9</sup> This coding is what Nietzsche refers to as the 'morality of mores'. The vast labour of taking the productive forces of the earth and ensuring that they sustain human life are expressed in codes. All of the traditions that govern planting and harvesting, the breeding of livestock, the rituals that accompany birth, marriage and death, who may be married to whom, whether one inters or cremates the dead, are all inscribed on the society as a whole. These traditions and rituals, however, do not concern whole persons; they concern particular organs that are marked by the socius for its continued functioning. One must not imagine an anachronistic situation in which free subjects submit to the functioning of society for the greater good. Rather, one must imagine that social production functions according to the coupling of partial objects, in the same way that, as we saw above, desiringmachines are the coupling of partial objects. 'There is circulation only if inscription requires or permits it. The method of the primitive territorial machine is in this sense the collective investment of the organs: for flows are coded only to the extent that the organs capable respectively of producing and breaking them are themselves encircled, instituted as partial objects, distributed on the socius and attached to it.'10 Thus, the reproductive powers of any member of society are the result of the organs that control reproduction. In order to control the time and place of reproduction, the society institutes rituals of inscription that mark these organs as belonging to society and the appropriate time for them to be put in circulation. In the case of primitive societies this inscription is physical and intentionally painful, as in both male and female circumcision. It often marks a rite of passage from childhood to adulthood and in some cases marks the passage into gender. 'Child' is linguistically neuter, and one only properly becomes male or female after undergoing this inscription. Because of this insistence by primitive societies to write their rules in the flesh of their members, Deleuze and Guattari call this method of coding, a 'system of cruelty'.

All of the flows within a primitive society are coded to ensure the continuance of that society. The organs of the members of society, all of the land, livestock and possessions, belong to the society as a whole, and the rituals and traditions (codes) are in place to facilitate the continued production and reproduction of the society. Without these codes desire threatens to make connections that are detrimental to society, desire threatens to make machines that would destroy it. As a result, the socius codes desire to channel its energy into production and reproduction. 'For it is a founding act – that the organs be hewn into the socius, and that the flows run over its surface – through

which man ceases to be a biological organism and becomes a full body, an earth, to which his organs become attached, where they are attracted repelled, miraculated, following the requirements of a socius.'<sup>11</sup> In the ancient practice of female circumcision, for example, the goal is to mark the girl as a member of a particular society, transform her from a child into a woman, and make her available for marriage and child-bearing. This practice, although brutal, ensures symbolically (or, in the case of infibulation, physically) that her reproductive organs have been preserved for a suitable mate. Thus, the community secures its survival by coding the appropriate use of particular organs, and preventing the circulation of organs outside their prescribed limits.

In structuralist accounts of primitive societies kinship relations take centre stage. All other types of relation are reduced to or seen as dependent on these fundamental filiative relations. Deleuze and Guattari argue that while kinship relations are crucial to the functioning of the primitive socius, relations of alliance are just as crucial and are not reducible to filiation. 'At no time, therefore, does alliance derive from filiation, but both form an essentially open cycle where the socius acts on production, but also where production reacts on the socius.<sup>12</sup> The primitive socius reproduces itself not only through a set of traditions that govern descent and who may be married to whom, but also through strategic alliances among associated groups that arrange marriages among these associated groups. Of course, a marriage is not simply a reproductive arrangement whereby a member of one group becomes associated with another group, but an economic arrangement that necessitates the flow of goods from one group to another. 'There are no productive connections without disjunctions of filiation that appropriate them, but there are no disjunctions of filiation that do not reconstitute lateral connections across the alliances and pairings of persons.'13 The same relation between connection and disjunction that we saw above in the case of desiringmachines is also at work on a social level in the relation between alliance and filiation.

This oscillation between connection and disjunction, between alliance and filiation, produces what Deleuze and Guattari call a 'surplus value of code'. This surplus value is the axis around which the primitive economy rotates. '[E]ach detachment from the chain produces, on one side or the other in the flows of production, phenomena of excess and deficiency, phenomena of lack and accumulation, which will be compensated for by nonexchangeable elements of

the acquired-prestige or distributed-consumption type.<sup>14</sup> Marcel Mauss's landmark study of exchange in primitive societies informs the analysis here. According to Mauss, alliances are strengthened by indebting one party to another. This is made possible through the practice of potlatch whereby a gift or feast of overwhelming extravagance is given in honour of the other party. The potlatch not only repays whatever debt precipitated it – a marriage, for example – but in fact obliges the receiving party to repay the gift with interest. Until the gift is repaid, the giving party receives prestige in its place. Relations of filiation and alliance combine to produce this cycle of surplus and debt that drives the primitive economy. 'Far from being a pathological consequence, the disequilibrium is functional and fundamental. Far from being the extension of a system that is at first closed, the opening is primary, founded in the heterogeneity of the elements that compose the prestations and that compensate for the disequilibrium by displacing it.'15 Thus, rather than a system of exchange that maintains an equilibrium within a closed system, the system as a whole functions by being out of balance. The nature of the interaction between filiation and alliance is such that both debt and surplus is constantly being produced and expended.

It is tempting to think at this point that all of this is simply another way of describing the incest taboo, that despite all protestations to the contrary Oedipus is already to be found in primitive societies. Deleuze and Guattari freely admit that the spectre of Oedipus haunts the primitive society, but only as its impossible limit. As we saw above, it is highly dubious to deduce desire from prohibition. The desire for incest does not follow from the prohibition of incest. While the relations between alliance and filiation function to prohibit incest, this is not their formal goal. Relations of filiation serve to distribute what Deleuze and Guattari call 'germinal intensities', that is, the affects that the socius is capable of through a particular combination of parts.<sup>16</sup> The parts that Deleuze and Guattari have in mind here are the genetic material distributed throughout society. The way in which this material is distributed is through alliances between groups, that is by arranging marriages, ensuring the productive relation of some members and blocking relations between others. In the same way that any particular body is defined by its intensional and extensional relations, so the social body is also defined by its intensional (filiative) and extensional (alliative) relations.

Let us look more closely, however, at the way that Oedipus haunts the primitive society as its impossible limit. There is no question that

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the incest taboo functions in primitive societies. Deleuze and Guattari insist that the incest taboo at work here is not Oedipal, though, and is strictly speaking impossible. 'The possibility of incest would require both persons and names – son, sister, mother, brother, father,'<sup>17</sup> 'Person' here is opposed to 'prepersonal', and by this distinction Deleuze and Guattari point to the difference between the molar and the molecular, respectively. The molecular, or prepersonal, refers to the infinite connection and disjunction of desiring machines, the coupling and uncoupling of partial objects. When partial objects become habitually joined to one another so as to form an organism, the relation of partial objects becomes molar and the connections and disjunctions become exclusive. It is only at this point that one may speak of a 'person'. Analogously, a 'name' may or may not be connected to a person. In the first place, a name may refer simply to a series of affective states. Thus, 'mother' is the name given to a particular way of affecting and being affected, and this name may be attached *inclu*sively to several possible molecular series.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, 'mother' may be attached *exclusively* to a particular molar organisation, that is, a 'person'. What this distinction allows Deleuze and Guattari to do is to argue that the incest taboo is precisely the exclusive disjunction that moves one from the prepersonal to persons and attaches a name to the person exclusively, rather than attaching it to a series of affects. 'The reason is that persons, with the names that now designate them, do not exist prior to the prohibitions that constitute them as such'.<sup>19</sup> Deleuze and Guattari write:

But what does it mean to say that incest is impossible? Isn't it possible to go to bed with one's sister or mother? And how do we dispense with the old argument: it must be possible since it is prohibited? The problem lies elsewhere. The possibility if incest would require *both persons and names* – son, sister, mother, brother, father. Now in the incestuous act we can have persons at our disposal, but they lose their names inasmuch as these names are inseparable from the prohibition that proscribes them as partners; or else the names subsist, and designate nothing more than prepersonal intensive states that could just as well 'extend' to other persons, as when one calls his legitimate wife 'mama', or one's sister his wife . . . Our mothers and our sisters melt in our arms; their names slide on their person and the name at the same time – yet this would the condition for incest.<sup>20</sup>

One might argue at this point that Oedipus can still account for all of this. Doesn't Freud state in a very similar vein that the child moves from polymorphous perversity to genital sexuality only by way of the Oedipus complex, that Oedipus is in some way constitutive of personhood? Or, to put the point more simply, one may grant that the incest taboo functions in precisely the way the Deleuze and Guattari suggest, but this still leaves open the possibility that the reason behind such a prohibition is fundamentally Oedipal. In response to this objection Deleuze and Guattari write:

Incest is a pure limit. Provided that two false beliefs concerning the limit are avoided: one that makes the limit a matrix or an origin, as though the prohibition proved that the thing was 'first' desired as such; another that makes the limit a structural function, as though the supposedly 'fundamental' relationship between desire and law were manifested in transgression. It is necessary to recall once more that the law proves nothing about an original reality of desire because it essentially disfigures the desired.<sup>21</sup>

For Deleuze and Guattari, Oedipus cannot account for the primitive incest taboo for two reasons. First, as we have seen all along, Oedipus only functions when it presupposes that desire is predicated on a lack. Something is missing, and the missing object can never be retrieved because it is prohibited. Deleuze and Guattari argue that desire is in fact not predicated on a lack but is productive. In the case of primitive societies what the incest taboo produces and reproduces is the system of inscription by which the society functions. The incest taboo urges that certain connections be made for the purpose of spreading germinal intensities (filiations) and strengthening social extensivities (alliances). The result of this production is that some connections are excluded, but this exclusion is secondary and strategic, rather than primary and constitutive. The secondary nature of the exclusion is evidenced by the fact that different societies construe the incest taboo in different ways. We can even see these differing construals today with regard to whether first cousins are appropriate marriage partners. The second reason Oedipus cannot account for the primitive incest taboo is that it presupposes too much – the removal not only of persons and names, but also of familial reproduction from the process of social inscription. The family does not become privatised in a way necessary for Oedipus to function until the rise of capitalism.

For Oedipus to be occupied, a certain number of conditions are indispensable: the field of social production and reproduction must become independent of familial reproduction, that is, independent of the territorial machine that declines alliances and filiations; the detachable fragments of the chain must be converted, by virtue of this independence, into a transcendent detached object that crushes their polyvocal character; the detached object (phallus) must perform a kind of folding operation – a kind of application or reduction: a reduction of the social field, defined as the aggregate of departure, to the familial field, now defined as the aggregate of destination – and it must establish a network of one-to-one relations between the two. For Oedipus to be occupied, it is not enough that it be a limit or a displaced represented in the system of representation; it must *migrate* to the heart of the system and itself come to occupy the position of the representative of desire. These conditions, inseparable from the paralogisms of the unconscious, are realised in the capitalist formation; furthermore, they imply certain archaisms borrowed from the imperial barbarian formations – in particular, the position of the transcendent object.<sup>22</sup>

What is at issue for Deleuze and Guattari is not the existence of Oedipus but its universality. How did the fear that haunts all societies, decoded flows of desire, come to be represented by Oedipus?

To answer this Deleuze and Guattari move from an analysis of primitive societies to an analysis of despotic societies. While Bataille reorients thinking about primitive societies from exchange to expenditure, Nietzsche provides Deleuze and Guattari with the framework for thinking about the shift from one type of society to another. While Nietzsche sees the coding of desire found in primitive societies as 'the labour performed by man upon himself during the greater part of the existence of the human race, his entire *prehistoric* labour, finds in this its meaning, its great justification, notwithstanding the severity, tyranny, stupidity, and idiocy involved in it: with the aid of the morality of mores and the social straitjacket, man was actually *made* calculable',<sup>23</sup> the shift to a despotic society comes suddenly from without. Conquerors invade and institute the state by force:

Among the presuppositions of this hypothesis concerning the origin of bad conscience is, first, that the change referred to was not a gradual or voluntary one and did not represent an organic adaptation to new conditions but a break, a leap, a compulsion, an ineluctable disaster which precluded all struggle and even all *ressentiment*. Secondly, however, that the welding of a hitherto unchecked and shapeless populace into a firm form was not only instituted by an act of violence but also carried to its conclusion by nothing but acts of violence – that the oldest 'state' thus appeared as a fearful tyranny, as an oppressive and remorseless machine and went on working until this raw material of people and semi-animals was at last not only thoroughly kneaded and pliant but also *formed*.<sup>24</sup>

This realignment of power radically and forever alters social and desiring production. In a centralised state the despot becomes a transcendent object around which all production is organised. If the primitive society is characterised by perversity, insofar as the coding of desire prevents the immediate consumption of one's production, then the despotic society is characterised by paranoia, insofar as any unauthorised flows of desire threaten the person of the despot directly.

For Deleuze and Guattari the shift from savagery to despotism can be characterised in terms of the shift in both alliance and filiation. Whereas in primitive society both alliance and filiation formed a network of decentralised connections for social and familial production and reproduction, the despot centralises both of these relations in his person. The despot 'imposes a new alliance system and places himself in direct filiation with the deity: the people must follow'.<sup>25</sup> The new system of alliance takes the form of those bureaucrats following in the despot's train who proclaim the new order and promulgate its laws. Thus, rather than a system whereby the men of several tribes gather to arrange marriages according to the system of inscription written on the flesh of its members, under the despot people are told that they and all their possessions now belong to the despot to dispose of as he sees fit. This arrangement is codified not in corporeal inscription but in a written code of laws, which requires the continual mediation of scribes, priests and officials. The power of these new bureaucrats does not lie in their position according to the old system of filiation and alliance, but in their ability to exercise the law of the king. 'It is perhaps here that the question "What does it mean?" begins to be heard, and the problems of exegesis prevail over problems of use and efficacy. The emperor, the god - what did he mean?'26 The old system of coding that writes on the bodies of a society is overcoded so that desires are organised by written laws and flow through the body of the despot. 'It is the social machine that has profoundly changed: in place of the territorial machine, there is the "megamachine" of the State, a functional pyramid that has the despot at its apex, an immobile motor, with the bureaucratic apparatus as its lateral surface and its transmission gear, and the villagers at its base, serving as its working parts.'27

The shift from savagery to despotism also produces a shift in all of the syntheses of desire. The connective synthesis in primitive societies sought to produce and reproduce itself through alliances and filiation. In the despotic state this productive energy is now used to maintain the state as an organism. Just as any organism needs both food and

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water, so the state organises itself through massive hydraulic projects for drinking and irrigation, and seeks to increase its size through the increase of wealth. Crucially, wealth is something to be accumulated infinitely, not ritually expended. Thus, mining projects are instituted. The disjunctive synthesis that, in the primitive society, was manifested in the marking of bodies in a system of exclusive disjunction that made incest impossible now becomes a system of writing that organises all production on a ledger, promulgates laws and memorialises the exploits of the king. Finally, the synthesis of consumption that sought in primitive societies to expend surplus through the mutual exchange of debt and prestige among tribes now becomes a system of infinite debt in which everything is owed to the despot through tribute. It is the despot, his court, and his ministers that consume in the state.<sup>28</sup>

It is important to note at this point that Deleuze and Guattari do not imagine that the ancient practices of primitive societies are replaced by those of the conquerors. Rather, these ancient practices are *overcoded*, or reinscribed, within a different system:

What is produced on the body of the despot is a connective synthesis of the old alliances with the new, and a disjunctive synthesis that entails an overflowing of the old filiations into the direct filiation, gathering all the subjects into the new machine. The essential action of the State, therefore, is the creation of a second inscription by which the new full body – immobile, monumental, immutable – appropriates all the forces and agents of production; but this inscription of the State allows the old territorial inscriptions to subsist, as 'bricks' on the new surface. And finally, from this appropriation there results the way in which the conjunction of the two parts is implemented and the respective portions are distributed to the higher proprietary unity and to the propertied communities, to the overcoding process and to the intrinsic codes, to the appropriated surplus value and to the usufruct put into use, to the State machine and to the territorial machines.<sup>29</sup>

One imagines that after the conquest the conquered peoples continue marrying and burying in much the same way that they did before the conquest. One can even imagine that the same bodily inscriptions and rites of passage remain in existence. What changes is the use to which these rituals are put. Deleuze and Guattari's analysis here is reminiscent of Nietzsche's analysis of punishment in the *Genealogy*, where he argues that the purpose of punishment has been construed only recently as producing guilt in the convicted. Rather, Nietzsche imagines that an entire range of practices used for innumerable purposes exists prior to their being put to use in punishment, and it is those in power that determine the use to which they are put.<sup>30</sup> The state is then a palimpsest of practices, a set of old practices that organised primitive society in a particular way and a set of new practices that do not eliminate the old practices but reorient them so that they are now in service to the new regime. In both cases the goal is to eliminate the decoded flow of desire. In the case of the despotic state, though, the coding of desire is overcoded to circulate through the body of the despot.

The overcoding of desire to circulate through the body of the despot also appears in the reformulation of language and a shift in the understanding of incest ever closer to Oedipus. The reformulation of language is predicated on the relation that the despot has to his subjects. In a primitive society every member is part of and immanently related to every other member of the society. With the institution of the state, however, one member transcends all others. All meaning passes through the despot. The emperor is the 'master signifier'. Deleuze and Guattari see linguistics as reproducing this structure as the structure of language. 'Even when it speaks Swiss or American, linguistics manipulates the shadow of Oriental despotism.'<sup>31</sup> Even Lacan is 'barbaric' on Deleuze and Guattari's reading:

But such a [linguistic] field remains defined by transcendence, even when one considers this transcendence as an absence or an empty locus, performing the necessary foldings, levelings, and subordinations . . . Lacan accompanies the signifier back to its source, to its veritable origin, the despotic age, and erects an infernal machine that welds desire to the Law, because, everything considered – so Lacan thinks – this is indeed the form in which the signifier is in agreement with the unconscious, and socius. The signifier as the repressing representation, and the new displaced represented that it induces, the famous metaphors and metonymy – all of that constitutes the overcoding and deterritorialised machine.<sup>32</sup>

It is at this point that Deleuze and Guattari connect their discussion of language and the shift that occurs under despotism to a shift in the role played by incest. When the despot installs a new system of alliance, claims direct filiation and sets himself in the transcendent position around which these alliances and filiations are organised, he becomes the locus and possibility of incest. 'Incest is the very operation of overcoding at the two ends of the chain in all the territory ruled by the despot, from the borders to the center: all debts of alliance are converted into the infinite debt of the new alliance, and

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all the extended filiations are subsumed by direct filiation.<sup>33</sup> As we saw above, incest is impossible in the primitive society because it requires both persons and names, and since it is the incest prohibition itself that inaugurates persons and names, the result is that access to one excludes access to the other. The very exteriority and transcendence of the despot, however, give him access to both. This can be seen in the material organisation of conquered to conqueror and in the way in which this is represented in language. The despot in his direct filiation to God is the 'father of all'. At the same time he assumes reproductive responsibility for the state as a whole. Thus, despotism is inherently incestuous. The king is the progenitor of the state, while maintaining reproductive authority over any of those in his kingdom. This authority existed until the Middle Ages in the *jus primae noctis*.<sup>34</sup>

This shift in language, which is also a shift in the understanding of incest, brings us one step closer to Oedipus. In the primitive society filiative relations were the representative of desire. The limit of this desire would be to let this germinal influx remain uncoded and produce connections unrestrainedly. In order to check desire at this point lateral alliances repress desire in order to ensure that some connections are made and some are not made. It is only at this point that incest comes to the fore in primitive societies:

Incest is only the retroactive effect of the repressing representation [alliance] on the repressed representative [filiation]: the representation disfigures or displaces this representative against which it is directed; it projects onto the representative, categories, rendered discernible, that it has itself established; it applies to the representative terms that did not exist before the alliance organised the positive and the negative into a system in extension – the representation reduces the representative to what is blocked in this system. Hence Oedipus is indeed the limit, but the displaced limit that now passes into the interior of the socius.<sup>35</sup>

Oedipus as the 'displaced represented' of desire in primitive societies becomes the 'repressing representation' of desire in despotism.

It is true that Oedipus begins its cellular, ovular migration in the system of imperial representation: from being at first the displaced represented of desire, it becomes the repressing representation itself. The impossible has become possible; the unoccupied limit now finds itself occupied by the despot. Oedipus has received its name, the clubfooted despot committing double incest through overcoding, with his sister and his mother as body representations subjected to verbal representation. Moreover, Oedipus is in the process of establishing each of the formal operations that will make it all possible: the extrapolation of a detached object; the double bind of overcoding or royal incest; the biunivocalisation, application, and linearisation of the chain between masters and slaves; the introduction of the law into desire, and of desire into the law; the terrible latency with its afterward or its after-the-event. All the parts of the five paralogisms thus seem to be ready.<sup>36</sup>

The way in which the despot makes Oedipus the repressing representation of desire is by overcoding the primitive system of representation. Now both filiation and alliance flow through the despot; he is their limit. The emperor occupies the place of the master signifier that engenders all of its signifieds in a subordinate relation. One step remains, however. According to Deleuze and Guattari it is capitalism that completes the internalisation of Oedipus and makes it the representative of desire.

In the same way that despotism overcoded primitive society and reoriented its practice to revolve around the despot, capitalism overcodes, or better axiomatises, despotism. The crucial difference is that capitalism, according to Deleuze and Guattari, requires a massive decoding of desire. That which both savagery and despotism feared most, decoded flows of desire, is the very nature of capitalism. Thus, capitalism is the limit that haunts every society. Returning to Bataille, the problem of any system is excess. A system always produces more than it can consume, so it develops increasingly complex mechanisms to expend this excess. In primitive societies the excess was expended in extravagant feasts in which all parties sought to outgive the others. This means of expenditure creates 'mobile blocs of debt' taken on by whoever receives the gift or the most generosity. In despotism a reorganisation and centralisation of production overcode desire and make possible great public works such as cities, roads and aqueducts. This intensification of desire produces more, but also (necessarily) creates excess. In the case of despotism, however, the excess is expended by the king and his court in lavish displays of wealth. The mobile blocs of debt now become unidirectional as everything is owed to the despot. The transcendence of the despot, however, makes possible the decoding of some flows, those that do not directly affect the king's power. As long as the despotic machine functions smoothly with power radiating from its centre, no concern is given to new practices of commerce, labour or technology that might arise on the periphery. Everyone lives in terror of the despot's gaze, but there is much that

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escapes it. It is not the case, however, that whenever a pre-capitalist state has decoded flows capitalism will result.

Decoded desires and desires for decoding have always existed; history is full of them. But we have just seen that only through their encounter in a place, and their conjunction in a space that takes time, do decoded flows constitute a desire – a desire that, instead of just dreaming or lacking it, actually produces a desiring-machine that is at the same time social and technical. That is why capitalism and its break are defined not solely by decoded flows, but by the generalised decoding of flows, the new massive deterritorialisation, the conjunction of deterritorialised flows. It is the singular nature of this conjunction that ensured the universality of capitalism.<sup>37</sup>

The conjunction of decoded desires that was necessary for capitalist organisation included the decoding of land in the disintegration of the feudal system. The ownership of land at this point ceases to be hereditary and is sold to the highest bidder. The accumulation of capital that results from this sale allows the purchase of industrial equipment that has been invented recently to increase production capacities. The dissolution of feudalism also decodes those bound to the land. Without a hereditary anchoring to the land the peasant becomes unmoored from it. He has only his labour, which is both decoded and deterritorialised. The peasant's labour is decoded in the sense that the meaning of labour is no longer determined by the fact that he labours for the lord. The peasant's labour is deterritorialised in the sense that the transcendent coding of the despot placed the serf on a designated piece of land that he was required to work. The despotic code oriented the serf's labour with regard to both time and space. The decoding of capital in the form of industrial capital and the decoding of the worker during industrialisation conjoin uniquely at this point to effect the capitalist formation.<sup>38</sup>

As Deleuze and Guattari point out, since capitalism functions by organising decoded flows (flows of labour and capital), it cannot properly be said to overcode the existing codes of despotism and savagery. Rather, what capitalism produces is an axiomatic, 'which takes the place of the old codings and organises all the decoded flows, including the flows of scientific and technical code, for the benefit of the capitalist system and in the service of its ends'.<sup>39</sup> On the one hand, the decoding of desire on which the capitalist formation functions appears to be much less repressive than either of the preceding formations. Capitalism does not require that one's body be marked in a particular way, nor does it require fealty to a particular person or land. Workers are 'free' to pursue whatever connections their labour can make possible. Capitalists are 'free' to develop any industry they see fit, and scientists are 'free' to pursue any technical innovations they wish. This apparent freedom, however, obscures the market forces that drive these pursuits. The axiomatic of capitalism is the production of surplus value. The value of any pursuit is utterly determined by its ability to introduce a surplus into the system. This surplus is, of course, immediately consumed in an effort to produce more surplus, and thus the system consumes itself. Deleuze and Guattari point to the implementation of technical advances as an example of the way that market forces constrain desire:

In general, the introduction of innovations always tends to be delayed beyond the time scientifically necessary, until the moment when the market forecasts justify their exploitation on a large scale . . . . In brief, there where the flows are decoded, the specific flows of code that have taken a technical and scientific form are subjected to a properly social axiomatic that is much severer than all the scientific axiomatics, much severer too than all the old codes and overcodes that have disappeared: the axiomatic of the world capitalist market.<sup>40</sup>

At this point it appears that capitalism is simply another code that overcodes the existing codes of the despotic state. Deleuze and Guattari are insistent, however, that the axiomatic of capitalism is fundamentally different from the type of coding seen in the previous configurations of the socius. In the primitive socius, for instance, the relations of alliance and filiation were two types of flow regulated through a system of inscription on the bodies of the members of a given society. Alliance and filiation were not equivalent to one another. Thus, any exchange between them produced debt in one flow and surplus in the other. These 'movable blocs of debt' were periodically discharged through prescribed rituals. In the despotic socius, relations of alliance and filiation remain, and remain inequivalent, but are now mediated through the despot. What changes in capitalism is the replacement of these systems of inequivalence with a monetary system in which everything has an equivalence in money, 'which makes it possible to begin and end with money, therefore never to end at all'. This system of equivalence 'is enough to disturb the circuits of qualified flows, to decompose the finite blocks of debt, and to destroy the very basis of codes'.<sup>41</sup> Introducing money as an abstract system of exchange makes it possible to discharge relations of alliance and filiation through a common medium. This possibility in turn eliminates

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the need to regulate these relations through coding. The advent of capitalism thus marks the decoding of all previously coded flows.

One of the crucial results of this massive decoding is what Deleuze and Guattari, following Henri Lefebvre, call the 'privatisation of the public'.<sup>42</sup> The public becomes privatised because systems of coding that previously forced one to participate in society through rituals have been dissolved. One no longer needs to be presented before the elders of the community for circumcision. One no longer has to pledge one's lovalty publicly to the king. Alliances proliferate, but they are no longer between groups specifically marked to make such alliances. Rather, these alliances are between different forms of capital. I am my ability to invest or be invested in. I am my labour capacity. In the shift to capitalism, it 'is these quantities that are marked, no longer the persons themselves: your capital or your labour capacity, the rest is not important, we'll always find a place for you within the expanded limits of the system, even if an axiom has to be created just for you.<sup>'43</sup> Thus, the individual as such no longer has a public role in society. Only the capacities of the individual have a role, whether this be labour or capital. The individual as such is relegated utterly to the private sphere, and his or her capacities are applied to the public sphere. 'This gives private persons a very special role in the system: a role of application, and no longer of implication, in a code.'44

Deleuze and Guattari's point here can be illustrated by the film Fight Club. One could view the progress of the film as the becomingrevolutionary of decoded desires. The main character, whose name is not revealed until late in the film, works as a recall assessor for a major car manufacturer. He finds himself regurgitating businessspeak phrases like 'reprioritising action items', shuttling between unnamed airports, ordering 'authentic' glassware that looks 'handmade' from a catalogue, and suffering chronic insomnia. He is only seen at work or at home. He does not participate as himself in any public way. At work he is his labour capacity, the one with a particular set of 'action items'. At home he can presumably 'be' himself, but this existence is completely separated from the role he occupies at work. Furthermore, being himself is simply the result of what he consumes. When his apartment explodes due to a gas leak, he is most upset at the loss of his couch and his wardrobe. His wardrobe was finally getting 'respectable' and he never thought he would have to buy another couch again. A society that exists only to consume will necessarily make all of its members private.

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For Deleuze and Guattari the privatisation of the public that occurs in capitalism is the birthplace of Oedipus. Oedipus requires a privatised, nuclear family, and this is only possible when social reproduction and biological reproduction are separated from one another. In both primitive and despotic societies social and biological reproduction are intimately connected to one another. One of the chief effects of capitalism, however, is the decoding of the codes that once regulated the relation between social and biological reproduction. In capitalism, capital can reproduce itself interminably. That, in fact, is the axiomatic by which it functions, the continual production and consumption of surplus. Insofar as it functions in this way, capitalism also does not require the intervention of codes to regulate noneconomic activity. All activity of the capitalist socius is economic. All other activity is relegated to the private sphere. It is here that we find the family. This family, however, cannot function as families in other societies do:

Capital has taken upon itself the relations of alliance and filiation. There ensues a privatisation of the family according to which the family ceases to give its social form to economic reproduction: it is as though disinvested, placed outside the field; in the language of Aristotle, the family is now simply the form of human matter or material that finds itself subordinated to the autonomous social form of economic reproduction, and that comes to take the place assigned it by the latter.<sup>45</sup>

In capitalist production all of the desires that were previously coded have been decoded. These decoded desires have been reterritorialised (but not recoded) on the socius of capitalism. All desires are thus organised around the axiomatic of capitalism. That is, desire is focused on the production and consumption of surplus within the system. In order for this system to stay in motion, both lack and negation must be incorporated into it. Even better, lack must be introduced into the very heart of desire in order for capitalism to keep functioning. Fashion is the obvious example of the way in which capital introduces need where none existed before. Even more to the point is the widely acknowledged fact that shopping is therapeutic. It feels good to buy things whether they are needed or not. Shopping seems to correct an imbalance, make us complete. This would be possible, of course, only if shopping fulfilled a need. Deleuze and Guattari's point, however, is not to argue that this need is somehow unreal. The need is real, and it is the organising principle of capitalist society. Rather, Deleuze and Guattari are concerned to show the conditions for the possibility of such a desire. They argue that this lack, while constitutive, is historically produced, the singular result of our genealogy that flows from savagery through despotism to capitalism.

It is precisely this constitutive lack coupled with the decoded flows of capitalism that make Oedipus possible. 'The Oedipal triangle is the personal and private territoriality that corresponds to all of capitalism's efforts at social reterritorialisation.'<sup>46</sup> On this reading private persons are not the ground of social personae but the reflection of their social image. '[P]rivate persons are therefore images of the second order, images of images – that is, *simulacra* that are thus endowed with an aptitude for representing the first-order images of social persons.'<sup>47</sup> This corralling of desire within the family results in a profound shift in the organisation of society as a whole. In previous manifestations of society biological reproduction was completely invested in social reproduction. Neither could function without the other, whether these investments were distributed over the whole territoriality of primitive societies or mediated through the transcendent figure of the despot. Now, these

private persons are formally delimited in the locus of the restricted family as father, mother, child. But instead of being a strategy that, through the action of alliances and filiations, opens onto the entire social field, is coextensive with it, and countersects its co-ordinates, it would appear that the family is now merely a simple tactic around which the social field recloses, to which it applies its autonomous requirements of reproduction, and that it counteracts with all its dimensions. The alliances and filiations no longer pass through people but through money; so the family becomes a microcosm, suited to expressing what it no longer dominates . . . The familial determinations become the application of the social axiomatic.<sup>48</sup>

While Deleuze and Guattari argue that the family is merely a strategy of the capitalist axiomatic, paradoxically the family takes itself to be primary in its very separation from social reproduction. The privatisation of persons and their reproductive unit, the family, forces the privatised persons *as privatised* to take that as his or her starting point for reflection. The result of this reflection is Oedipus. The privatised person discovers that his or her desires seem to be uniquely connected to other family members. These desires are for the most part frustrated, of course, and so desire is construed universally as flowing from an unfullfillable lack. Desire construed in this way is projected back on society so that every relation is somehow reflective of primordial, filial relations:

When the family ceases to be a unit of production and of reproduction, when the conjunction again finds in the family the meaning of a simple unit of consumption, it is father-mother that we consume. In the aggregate of departure there is the boss, the foreman, the priest the tax collector, the cop, the soldier, the worker, all the machines and territorialities, all the social images of our society; but in the aggregate of destination, in the end, there is no longer anyone but daddy, mummy, and me, the despotic sign inherited by daddy, the residual territoriality assumed by mummy, and the divided, split, castrated ego.<sup>49</sup>

Every person in authority is 'father'; every object of desire is 'mother', and the subject is constituted in its relation to these. Thus, Oedipus is born as the master key that unlocks every relation, explains every desire. Oedipus is the representative of desire. As Deleuze and Guattari insist, however, 'psychoanalysis does not invent Oedipus'; it discovers it.<sup>50</sup>

Deleuze and Guattari respond to the primacy of Oedipus as the representative of desire by noting that it is unsurprising that children become cathected on their parents. As a privatised unit separated from larger social investments, family members have no other objects to cathect on. Furthermore, the crucial point that Deleuze and Guattari want to make here is that this arrangement is historically produced. Oedipus is only possible given the particular genealogy of the West that results in the massive decoding and reterritorialisation of the barbarian state:

The family becomes the subaggregate to which the whole of the social field is applied. Since *each person* has his own private father and mother, it is a distributive subaggregate that simulates for each person the collective whole of social persons and that closes off his domain scrambles his images. Everything is reduced to the father–mother–child triangle, which reverberates the answer 'daddy-mummy' every time it is stimulated by the images of capital. In short, Oedipus arrives: it is born in the capitalist system of the application of first-order social images to the private familial images of the second order. It is the aggregate of destination that corresponds to an aggregate of departure that is socially determined. It is our intimate colonial formation that corresponds to the form of social sovereignty. We are all little colonies and it is Oedipus that colonises us.<sup>51</sup>

Oedipus is not universal. Oedipus is not transcendent. Castration is not universal. Lack and negation are not integral to desire. Desire has been captured by Oedipus. The genealogy that Deleuze and Guattari present in *Anti-Oedipus* shows the slow migration of Oedipus from the limits of the primitive society to its transcendent representative in the despot to its internalisation in capitalism. Oedipus is not the driving force of society; it is the result of the privatisation of persons that follows the decoding of desire in capitalism. Only then can Oedipus capture desire so that it becomes desire's representative. Only then can every relation be represented by Oedipus.

In the next chapter I turn to the way that the colonising power of Oedipus has affected the way we think about death. In particular I argue that in the same way that capitalism makes Oedipus possible, so it also creates the antinomy between mournful and melancholic accounts of death that we saw in Parts I and II. Treating this antinomy as mathematical, I would like to argue, along with Deleuze and Guattari, that both sides of the antinomy are false, and that a productive account of desire makes a new way of thinking about death possible.

## Notes

- 1. Sigmund Freud, 'Two Encyclopaedia Articles', SE XVIII: 245.
- 2. AO, 28.
- 3. AO, 30.
- 4. AO, 29.
- 5. Hegel notes that one of Spinoza's virtues is his identification of a philosophical infinity rather than a mathematical or bad infinity. See *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* 3: 261–2.
- 6. III.ii. and Proof.
- 7. III.ii.Note.
- 8. AO, 142.
- 9. AO, 142.
- 10. AO, 142.
- 11. AO, 144.
- 12. AO, 147.
- 13. AO, 149.
- 14. AO, 150.
- 15. AO, 150.
- 16. See Ansell Pearson's *Germinal Life*, especially his discussion of Weismann's importance for Deleuze.
- 17. AO, 161.
- 18. Duns Scotus and Spinoza hang heavily over Deleuze and Guattari's analysis here.
- 19. AO, 160.

- 20. AO, 161-2.
- 21. AO, 161.
- 22. AO, 177.
- 23. Genealogy of Morals, 59.
- 24. Genealogy of Morals, 86.
- 25. AO, 192.
- 26. AO, 206.
- 27. AO, 194.
- 28. AO, 195.
- 29. AO, 198.
- 30. Nietzsche writes: 'To return to our subject, namely *punishment*, one must distinguish two aspects: on the one hand, that in it which is relatively *enduring*, the custom, the act, the "drama", a certain strict sequence of procedures; on the other, that in it which is *fluid*, the meaning, the purpose, the expectation associated with the performance of such procedures. In accordance with the previously developed major point of historical method, it is assumed without further ado that the procedure itself will be something older, earlier than its employment in punishment, that the latter is *projected* and interpreted *into* the procedure (which has long existed but been employed in another sense), in short, that the case is *not* as has hitherto been assumed by our naive genealogists of law and morals, who have one and all thought of the procedure as *invented* for the purpose of punishing, just as one formerly thought of the hand as invented for the purpose of grasping' (*Genealogy of Morals* 79).
- 31. AO, 207.
- 32. AO, 207 . . . 209.
- 33. AO, 209.
- 34. There is some debate about the actual existence, or at the very least practice of this law. It is sufficient for my purposes here to note that even if it were not practiced it was commonly believed to be well within the rights of any ruler.
- 35. AO, 165-6.
- 36. AO, 215.
- 37. AO, 224.
- 38. Deleuze and Guattari here rely on Maurice Dobb's analysis from *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (AO, 225–6).
- 39. AO, 233.
- 40. AO, 234.
- 41. AO, 248-9.
- 42. AO, 251.
- 43. AO, 251.
- 44. AO, 251.
- 45. AO, 263.

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46. AO, 266.
47. AO, 264.
48. AO, 264.
49. AO, 265.
50. AO, 269.
51. AO, 265.

## A Mortuary Axiomatic

Even when the ascetic wounds himself – the very wound itself compels him to live.

Nietzsche<sup>1</sup>

Throughout our analysis of *Anti-Oedipus*, Freud has played a pivotal role in highlighting what is unique in Deleuze and Guattari's argument. Deleuze and Guattari have consistently argued that psychoanalysis gives accurate assessments of the unconscious and desire. They also argue that the recoding of desire that takes place within the family under Oedipal constraints, and within society as a whole under capitalist constraints, is what makes Freud's theory so powerful. Where Deleuze and Guattari disagree with psychoanalysis, however, is the extent to which the recodings described by Freud are universal. Deleuze and Guattari argue that Oedipus is not universal, but the specific result of a historical process. What I would like to do in this chapter is show that the same argument applies to the death instinct as Freud describes it in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. This reinscription of the death instinct within history will allow us to re-examine Hegel's and Heidegger's conceptions of death.

Freud begins *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* by examining an assumption of psychoanalysis, 'that the course taken by mental events is automatically regulated by the pleasure principle'.<sup>2</sup> This assumption, however, is flatly contradicted by an even cursory examination of experience. 'The most that can be said, therefore, is that there exists in the mind a strong *tendency* towards the pleasure principle, but that that tendency is opposed by certain other forces or circumstances, so that the final outcome cannot always be in harmony with the tendency toward pleasure.'<sup>3</sup> The obvious example is the reality principle, which postpones pleasure for the sake of preservation. It does not seem to Freud, however, that even if one supposes that the reality principle is finally distinct from the pleasure able experiences.

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In an attempt to discover the source of experiences that are not governed by the pleasure principle Freud turns to children's play. He is particularly interested in the game played by a toddler who lived in the same house as Freud for several weeks. In this game the child would continually throw his toys into a corner or under the bed while 'he gave vent to a loud, long-drawn-out "o-o-o-o", accompanied by an expression of interest and satisfaction'.<sup>4</sup> Freud and the child's mother eventually surmised that rather than being a mere interjection, the child was uttering the German word for 'gone' [*fort*]. It was only much later that Freud witnessed the completion of the game. When the child was playing with a reel with a string attached to it, he would throw the reel away with the characteristic "o-o-o-o" and the retrieve it with the string. Upon the reel's return the child would exclaim happily '*da*' [there].

In order to explain this game, Freud must do two things. First he must explain the meaning of the game as a whole. Second, he must explain why the 'fort' part of the game was repeated so much more often than the 'da' part, even though the return clearly brought the child more pleasure:

The interpretation of the game then became obvious. It was related to the child's great cultural achievement – the instinctual renunciation (that is, the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction) which he had made in allowing his mother to go away without protesting. He compensated himself for this, as it were, by himself staging the disappearance and return of the objects within his reach.<sup>5</sup>

As to why the 'fort' part of the game was repeated so much more often, Freud proposes two possibilities. Perhaps the motivation behind making the toys disappear lies in allowing the child to master the situation. Previously, the child had always been passive in regard to his mother's disappearance. Now, within the confines of the game, he becomes an active participant in the disappearance of his toys. The other possibility for understanding the primacy of the 'fort' part of the game could lie in revenge. Perhaps the child is exacting revenge on the mother by the ritual expulsion of his toys.

Freud is unwilling to decide between these possibilities on the basis of one case. Regardless of the interpretation, however, he notes that one sees illustrated here a compulsion to repeat that lies outside the dominance of the pleasure principle. The child is continually re-enacting the disappearance of his mother, which, given his attachment to her, can only be painful. The repetition of painful experiences in children's play is too common to be ignored. What lies behind this repetition-compulsion? What does it tell us about the workings of the unconscious?

In order to answer the above questions Freud devises a thought experiment that ultimately leads to the death instinct. The thought experiment tries to imagine the simplest possible organism with perception and consciousness. Freud reasons that, for such an organism, the perceptive apparatus must form the border between inside and outside. Furthermore, the perceptive apparatus must have two functions: 1) to provide pathways for stimuli to be received by consciousness, and 2) to shield consciousness from excess stimuli. To complete this dual task Freud imagines that the organism will form a crust around itself.

[I]ts outermost surface ceases to have the structure proper to living matter, becomes to some degree inorganic and thenceforward functions as a special envelope or membrane resistant to stimuli . . . . By its death, the outer layer has saved all the deeper ones from a similar fate – unless, that is to say, the stimuli reach it which are so strong that they break through the protective shield.<sup>6</sup>

The protective shield can only guard against external stimuli, however. The organism is still subject to internal stimuli, which can be just as traumatic as external stimuli. Given their potential to traumatise the organism and the fact that there seems to be no means of protecting the organism, Freud concludes that these internal stimuli must be crucial to the working of the organism.

The fact that the cortical layer which receives stimuli is without any protective shield against excitations from within must have as its result that these latter transmissions of stimulus have a preponderance in economic importance and often occasion economic disturbances comparable with traumatic neuroses.<sup>7</sup>

It is within this context that Freud first raises the idea of instincts, which will be crucial for his development of the life and death instincts. 'The most abundant sources of this internal excitation are what are described as the organism's "instincts" – the representatives of all the forces originating in the interior of the body and transmitted to the mental apparatus . . .'<sup>8</sup> Freud reasons that any trauma, whether external or internal, can be the cause of a repetition-compulsion. However, if the instincts themselves are traumatic, then the compulsion to repeat moves from being occasional to systematic. The compulsion to repeat shifts from the sporadic traumatic events throughout

an organism's life to being constitutive of the organism itself. Only in this latter instance can Freud move beyond the pleasure principle. Freud continues:

But how is the predicate of being 'instinctual' related to the compulsion to repeat? At this point we cannot escape a suspicion that we may have come upon the track of a universal attribute of instincts and perhaps of organic life in general which has not hitherto been clearly recognised or at least not explicitly stressed. *It seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things* which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is it is a kind organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life.<sup>9</sup>

Freud argues that the earlier state of things that the organism is trying to restore is a return to the inorganic. In this initial formulation, then, all instincts are death instincts. The organism is driven by internal impulses to seek a state where it has neither internal nor external impulses, death.<sup>10</sup>

Freud ultimately qualifies the dominance of the death instinct by introducing or, more precisely, reintroducing the sexual instincts. These, according to Freud, while still fundamentally conservative, do not seek a return to the inorganic but a return to a previous state of union with another organism. In this connection he cites Aristophanes' account of sexual differentiation from Plato's *Symposium* as indicative of this impulse. The sexual instincts 'bring back earlier states of living substance; but they are conservative to a higher degree in that they are peculiarly resistant to external influences; and they are conservative too in another sense in that they preserve life itself for a comparatively long period. They are the true life instincts.'<sup>11</sup>

Freud now has two sets of instincts. Both are conservative but in different ways: 'One group of instincts rushes forward so as to reach the final aim of life as swiftly as possible; but when a particular stage in the advance has been reached, the other group jerks back to a certain point to make a fresh start and so prolong the journey.'<sup>12</sup> The two groups are also thus opposed to one another, and Freud imagines that the organism moves 'with a vacillating rhythm' as it is driven alternately by the two sets.

It would be difficult to overstate the radicality of Freud's claim here. In contrast to the entire tenor of philosophical thought in the West, Freud is arguing that pleasure is not the primary determinant for the motivation of an organism. Even thinkers like Plato, Aristotle and Kant, who would radically delimit the role that pleasure plays in determining the good, acknowledge the crucial role that pleasure plays in motivating behaviour. Furthermore, nowhere in the Western tradition is there a suggestion that an organism might instinctually seek its own death. Kant comes close to suggesting that such an instinct would be self-contradictory in the *Groundwork*, where he is testing the maxim that one might reasonably end one's life when it promises more pain that pleasure. Kant argues that this maxim cannot be universalised because a world in which the same instinct both promotes life and destroys it is inconceivable. Freud could, of course, respond that there are two sets of instincts at work here not one, so there is no contradiction. However, the very idea that any living organism might possess an instinct that seeks its own destruction runs counter the very idea of an instinct, which is always thought to tend toward the preservation of an organism.

Freud even engages in a polemic against August Weismann to pursue the most radical version of his claim possible. Weismann argues that single-celled organisms are immortal. When a singlecelled organism reproduces by division, the two cells are indistinguishable from one another. As long as the organism keeps dividing, the same cell remains in existence, and barring external intervention there is no reason why the same cell would not continue indefinitely. Death for Weismann is only possible in multicellular organisms. In this regard he makes a distinction between the 'germ-plasm', which we would call 'genetic material', and the 'soma', the organism that houses this material and is capable of passing it on. The germ-plasm is potentially immortal, in that there is no limit to the number of generations genetic material may be passed to. On the other hand, the soma that houses the genetic material is limited in its duration, since its primary purpose is to house and spread the germ-plasm.<sup>13</sup>

If we convert Weismann's language into Freud's theory of instincts we at once see the problem. On Weismann's model the sexual instincts are primary and form the very essence of any organism, but the death instincts are a late acquisition, a function of the peculiar adaptations of multicellular organisms. 'It is true that this death of the higher organisms is a natural one, a death from internal causes; but it is not founded on any primal characteristic of living substance and cannot be regarded as an absolute necessity with its basis in the very nature of life.'<sup>14</sup> On Weismann's model all life is not seeking a return to the inorganic. There is no fundamental death instinct that is opposed and punctuated by an equally fundamental life instinct. For Weismann

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there is only a life instinct which is contingently opposed in some instances by a death instinct.

Freud's theory hangs in the balance here, so he turns to biology to see if the immortality of the germ-plasm can be verified experimentally. Some experiments do seem to verify Weismann's thesis. In one an isolated single-celled organism reproduced for over 3,000 generations with no appreciable decline in its vitality. The crucial flaw in the experiment for Freud is that each new generation was placed in fresh water with additional nutrients. Other experiments show that when the offspring is not given fresh water and additional nutrients the organism quickly dies. Freud reasons from this that the germ-plasm is not, in fact, immortal, but possesses the same death instinct as all other organisms. Or, to put it another way, the death instinct is constitutive of all living organisms. In an interesting twist that supports Freud's binary model of instincts, one experiment showed that singlecelled organism where able to reproduce indefinitely when mixed with other single-celled organisms. Freud surmises that the byproducts are toxic only to the originating organism but act as a nutrient to other organism. For Freud this need for interaction is indicative of the sexual instincts.

Freud's polemic against Weismann raises an interesting conceptual possibility. Weismann's account of the relation between the life and death instincts raises the possibility that the life instincts might exist without the death instincts. In fact, for Weismann it is more than a possibility, since he supposes that this is precisely the case for singlecelled organisms. And, as one might expect for an organism possessing only life instincts, these organisms are immortal. Freud argues strenuously, though, that the death instincts are every bit as foundational as the life instincts. Indeed, in his preliminary formulations Freud comes to the brink of arguing that *only* the death instincts are foundational. He backs away from this possibility, however, with the reintroduction of the sexual instincts. But, even Freud's final formulation raises the possibility of conceiving of an organism driven solely by the death instinct. This organism would be the conceptual converse of Weismann's immortal germ-plasm. If we return to the thought experiment that originally led Freud to posit the death instinct, we can begin to get a hint of what an organism driven only by the death instinct, might be. First, Freud notes that, of necessity. an organism needs to shield itself from external excitations. In order to do so, he supposes that a crust develops around the organism. '[I]ts outermost surface ceases to have the structure proper to living matter, becomes to some degree inorganic and thenceforward functions as special envelope or membrane resistant to stimuli.<sup>15</sup> Thus, for Freud any organism, in order to be an organism, must already be dead to a certain degree. What if we conceive of an organism in which this inorganic crust achieves a depth that consumes the organism? Such an organism would be immune to external stimuli and driven only by its death instinct. Such an organism would also be entirely inorganic. Such an organism is not only conceivable but representations of such an organism are common fare in film. The constitutive nature of the death instinct in Freud's model makes the zombie conceivable.

While there are antecedents, the *locus classicus* for zombie lore is George Romero's *Night of the Living Dead*, which is the first in what is now a tetralogy of zombie films.<sup>16</sup> The opening scene sets the tone. A man and woman arrive by car at a secluded spot, and they are bickering. Upon their arrival the man turns off the radio halfway through a news bulletin. If this were a typical horror film, the man and woman would be a couple and the secluded spot would the location of a romantic encounter, which would be interrupted by whatever monster is intended to chase them for the remainder of the film, where they will at last be able to continue their embrace. This film is different. The man and woman are brother and sister and they have arrived at a cemetery to tend their father's grave. It is Memorial Day. Any sexual tension that might be anticipated is thus dissolved and along with it the traditional arc of most horror films.

If this film is not about sex, then what is it about? Death. The gravevard gives an indication, but the film itself does not fully explain what is going on until very late. Once the brother and sister are at their father's grave, the film cuts between two shots. A tight shot of the brother teasing the sister about her fear of gravevards and a wide shot of the graveyard with a man in a suit walking through it. There is something uncanny about the man's movements, which is made additionally unnerving by the brother's taunts - 'They're coming to take you away.' As the brother and sister prepare to leave the gravevard their paths cross the man in the suit. The sister approaches the man in order to apologise for her brother's lack of respect, when without warning the man attacks her. It appears as if he's trying to bite her. The brother rushes to his sister's aid only to be knocked unconscious, when in grappling with the man he stumbles and strikes his head on a gravestone. The man resumes his pursuit of the sister, who runs as quickly as she can to the car. Once inside, however, she discovers that the keys remain with the brother. Meanwhile, the man has caught up and is attempting to break into the car, but is having difficulty breaking the glass. Just as he succeeds the woman releases the handbrake and the car rolls down hill away from her attacker.

In this opening scene Romero has broken numerous conventions of the horror genre. First, as noted above, he dissolves the sexual tension that normally drives films of this type. Second, he reveals the monster in the opening scene. Generally, suspense is heightened by keeping the monster in the shadows until its final showdown with the hero or heroine. Third, the man chasing the girl does not seem to have any extraordinary powers that would make him particularly scary. He does not seem to be exceptionally fast or strong, and he does not seem to possess any kind of cunning. Usually monsters possess all of these traits, but especially the third, since it allows the monster to appear unexpectedly throughout the film for additional scares.

Given that Romero has discarded all the conventions that usually support the horror genre, how is the film able to achieve its affects? It is the simple relentlessness of the zombies. They cannot be reasoned with or distracted from their purpose. They move unerringly towards death. By moving in slow but straight lines, the zombies eventually cut off every avenue of escape. In the case of the Night of the Living Dead, the woman in the opening scene makes her way to an isolated farmhouse. Once there she is once again attacked by more people who seem to be moving in the same halting manner as the man in the cemetery. She is saved by someone looking for shelter, and they manage to barricade themselves in the house. As they work to make the house safe more and more of these strange creatures arrive, pressing on every entrance into the house. The barricades hold through most of the night, because the creatures are unorganised, and only gain entrance when a door is opened in an escape attempt. In a grim irony the sole survivor of the onslaught is killed by a roving band of vigilantes, when he is mistaken for one of the hapless creatures.

In the Night of the Living Dead these creatures are never called 'zombies'. Information about them is slowly accumulated throughout the film when the occupants of the house under siege begin listening first to radio then television reports. At first, the reports speak of 'an epidemic of mass murder'. Then, with a mixture of shock and incredulity, the newscasters begin reporting that the murderers are consuming the flesh of those they kill. Finally, it is reported that the recently dead are walking and in fact the source of the mass murder plaguing the eastern seaboard. The living are directed to do two things. First, get to a shelter protected by the National Guard. Second,

if anyone dies that body is to be burned immediately. For purposes of self-defence in the meantime, the newscasters report that the walking dead can be stopped by a bullet or sharp blow to the head. With these brief news reports *Night of the Living Dead* codifies almost everything we know about zombies. They are dead. They consume the flesh of the living. They can be stopped with a bullet to the head, but other injuries have no effect. The last piece of the puzzle comes from the cellar of the besieged farmhouse, where a family has barricaded itself. They have a little girl who is feverish. In their escape to the farmhouse she was bitten by a zombie, and in a chilling climax she becomes a zombie. To be precise, the bite is deadly, and once dead the person rises again.

The zombie is thus the perfect representation of the death instinct. The zombie is relentless in the pursuit of life. Wherever it finds life, it destroys it. Nothing interrupts or deflects the zombie's pursuit. There are no intervening life instincts to slow the zombie's advance. The zombies do not engage in tactics or consequentialist reasoning. They do not use tools or communicate with other zombies. They do not reflect or demonstrate self-consciousness. They are dead and seek only to spread death.

It is the mindlessness of zombies in particular that separates them from other undead creatures. Vampires or werewolves are generally displayed as self-conscious. They know what they are. They use strategy to capture their prey. Their only goal is not the destruction of life. They seek not only self-preservation but also some manner of reproduction. Thus the life instincts reassert themselves in other representations of the undead in a way that they do not in zombies. Zombies seem to be pure death instinct.

The connection between Freud's theory of the death instinct and zombies sheds light on a curious claim from *Anti-Oedipus*, where Deleuze and Guattari maintain that 'The only modern myth is the myth of zombies'.<sup>17</sup> It is precisely here that Deleuze and Guattari part company with Freud. Freud has consistently argued that myths are indicative of underlying instincts that are sublimated through the process of maturation. The chief example of this process is, of course, the Oedipal story. What Freud would argue, though, is that these instincts are universal, and that if there is a zombie myth it cannot be a modern myth. Deleuze and Guattari, however, are arguing that the death instinct is a recent invention, the result of the way capitalism constrains desire. Thus, the rise of zombies is concomitant with the rise of the death instinct.<sup>18</sup>

For Deleuze and Guattari the death instinct is a function of Oedipus. As Oedipus slowly migrates from the limit of the socius in the primitive society, to residing in the person of the sovereign in the despotic society, and finally to representing desire in an Oedipal complex in capitalist society, the death instinct migrates along with it. Or better, death can only become an 'instinct' where the subject is constituted around a lack.

What is at issue in Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of capitalism is the distinction between death and a death instinct. As we will see below in an analysis of the positive account that *Anti-Oedipus* gives of death, death is nothing more than the anti-production required for a system to function. Above we identified this moment of antiproduction as the body without organs, the limit of desiring production. As a result, death cannot be eliminated from any system, but the position that it takes up within a system can be more or less repressive. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the position that death has taken up within capitalism is much more repressive than either primitivism or despotism. The reason for this claim is that in capitalism anti-production is not localised at the limits of society as it is in primitivism, nor is it contained in the person of the despot. Rather, in capitalism anti-production is defused throughout the system:

The State, its police, and its army form a gigantic enterprise of antiproduction, but at the heart of production itself, and conditioning this production. Here we discover a new determination of the properly capitalist field of immanence: not only the interplay of the relations and differential coefficients of decoded flows, not only the nature of the limits that capitalism reproduces on an ever wider scale as interior limits, but the presence of anti-production within production itself. The apparatus of anti-production is no longer a transcendent instance that opposes production, limits it, or checks it; on the contrary, it insinuates itself everywhere in the productive machine and becomes firmly wedded to it in order to regulate its productivity and realise surplus value - which explains, for example, the difference between the despotic bureaucracy and the capitalist bureaucracy. This effusion from the apparatus of anti-production is characteristic of the entire capitalist system; the capitalist effusion is that of antiproduction within production at all levels of the process . . . . [I]t alone is capable of realising capitalism's supreme goal, which is to produce lack in the large aggregates, to introduce lack where there is always too much, by effecting the absorption of overabundant resources.<sup>19</sup>

In this analysis of capitalism Deleuze and Guattari argue for an inversion of the law of supply and demand. Rather than demand preceding

supply and production attempting to keep up with demand by increasing production, supply actually precedes demand. When the codes of despotism are replaced by the axiomatics of capitalism, the forces of production are unleashed. In previous systems what constrained the forces of production was the difference between alliance and filiation. The connections of alliance and filiation were never equivalent and strictly regulated by the forces of antiproduction. Even given this strict regulation, however, surplus was created, and mechanisms of antiproduction were there to consume it. In the case of the primitive society this took the form of potlatch, or ritualised giving. In the case of the despotic society the excess was consumed by the despot and his entourage through lavish living or public works. The reason that capitalism is an axiomatic and not simply another recoding is that in capitalism the connections of alliance and filiation are no longer regulated. 'Capital has taken upon itself the relations of alliance and filiation.'20 The result of identifying relations of alliance and filiation in capitalism is that anti-production no longer stands between these relations as a discreet ritual or person, but regulates production directly and internally.

Suppose, though, that capitalism represents the internalisation of anti-production, why is this equivalent for Deleuze and Guattari to a death instinct? As we saw above in our analysis of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the death instinct for Freud is the internal drive for an organism to return to a previous state of existence, namely, the inorganic. What the organism is trying to achieve in this return to the inorganic is an escape from excitations. It is the life instincts that prevent a direct return to the inorganic and thus mediate the death instincts. The difficulty with Deleuze and Guattari's position here is that they never argue that anti-production is a return to the inorganic. They speak about anti-production as 'latency', but what they seem to have in mind is not so much Freud's conception of latency from his stages of psychosexual development, but Nietzsche's. In the second essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche speaks of the 'instinct for freedom forcibly made latent'. This is said in the context of the profound change that the human species underwent as it moved from primitive society to a despotic society. At that point, one could no longer discharge one's instincts outwardly and was forced to internalise them. For Nietzsche this internalisation of the instincts is an interruption of the life instinct. and in the third essay he goes on to argue that this period of dormancy is ultimately an effort by life to preserve itself. On Nietzsche's model, then, it is the life instinct that is primary, and under extraordinary

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circumstances it might be interrupted, made latent or denied. If a society were to seize on this latency and make it definitive for human existence, then one could see how the primacy of the life instinct might be subordinated to the very latency that interrupts it. This is precisely what Deleuze and Guattari see is happening in capitalism. Freud as an acute interpreter of capitalism recognises and describes this inversion, but makes the mistake of universalising it.

One might take the presentation of the death instinct in Anti-Oedipus as a Weismannian response to Beyond the Pleasure Principle.<sup>21</sup> Deleuze and Guattari agree with Weismann that the life instinct is primary and that it is only under certain conditions that death arises. For Weismann this condition is that an organism become multicellular. For Deleuze and Guattari the problem is more complex. Not only must they account for death but also for how death migrates to the interior of an organism to become a death instinct. The first part is relatively simple. Whenever desire is interrupted, that is death. This is anti-production. Deleuze and Guattari would thus see Freud's discussion of the repetition compulsion as anti-production, and interruption of libido. What Freud fails to do, though, is ask if there are any social conditions that account for libido being captured in this way. Rather, he assumes that this internal channelling of libido is universal. What Deleuze and Guattari argue is that libido is certainly captured in the way that Freud describes it, but that this latency, this anti-production, is the result of the peculiar way that capitalism channels the life instinct for its own purposes. Thus, at the level of desire, what Deleuze and Guattari would call the real, there is death, but no death instinct. However, at the level of representation, the way desire is represented in capitalism, there is a death instinct.

In order to illustrate this connection further, let us return to 'the only modern myth', zombies. In Romero's second great zombie film, *Dawn of the Dead*, the situation is considerably grimmer. Despite the fact that ten years have intervened between the production of *Night of the Living Dead* and *Dawn of the Dead*, the film continues the narrative of the first film as if only a few weeks have elapsed. The roving bands of vigilantes hunting down zombies at the end of the first film were not able to contain their relentless advance across the countryside. The scope of this film broadens considerably as it becomes clear that zombies now control most of the country. Opening in the chaos of a major metropolitan newsroom, the film shows those who remain alive struggling with the twin impulses to flee and maintain some sense of order. The impulse to flee slowly takes over as the newsroom

becomes progressively deserted. The film follows two of the deserters as they commandeer the news helicopter and take it to meet two other refugees. These refugees, as we discover in a scene that parallels the opening scene, are members of an elite National Guard unit sent to kill zombies.

While all the members of the party are certain of their need to escape, they have not thought clearly about where they might escape to. After several close calls, the group lands on top of a shopping mall. Both the car park and the shopping mall are full of zombies, but the roof and a connected civil defence shelter remain unoccupied. The escapees set up camp in the shelter.

At this point, despite the much more lavish set, it is difficult to see how this film will differ significantly from the first film. The protagonists barricade themselves in a secure place and seemingly await the inevitable siege of zombies. It is precisely in the set, however, that we see the first significant difference. The living have barricaded themselves not in a house, but in a mall. Furthermore, they were not forced into the mall as the only accessible shelter but chose it, despite the fact that it was already overrun by zombies. It seems like a much more reasonable choice for people in the fortunate position of having a helicopter at their disposal would be a place free of zombies.

Given this choice by the living, the entire film can be seen as revolving around the question, 'Why is everyone at the mall?' The answer is given by one of the protagonists. As two of the living stare down at the zombies from the second level, one asks, 'Why do they come here?' The response is given matter of factly, 'Instinct. Memory. This was an important place in their lives.' This response is important for two reasons. First, not only can it be seen as giving a reason for the zombies' presence, but it also gives a reason for the living to choose the mall in the first place. The mall promises unlimited abundance. It promises to meet every need. If the subject of capitalism is constituted as a lack that it seeks to fill by constant consumption, then the mall must seem like paradise, even if it does have a slight zombie problem. The living immediately seek to secure the mall so that no more zombies can enter it. Once this is accomplished they systematically exterminate all the zombies remaining inside. The living then begin to gorge themselves on the inexhaustible surplus of the mall. They decorate their living guarters with the latest furniture, biggest TV and most powerful stereo. They dress in the latest fashion and begin eating in the restaurants. They are on the verge of living happily ever after.

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The second reason the response of 'instinct' is so important for our analysis here is that it illustrates the connection between zombies as a representation of the death instinct and capitalism as productive of the death instinct. The zombies are the unfettered manifestation of the internalised forces of anti-production that characterise capitalism. Romero reinforces this connection visually in two ways. First, as the zombies shuffle around the mall they appear indistinguishable from the way that the living might shuffle around the mall. The zombies stroll in and out of shops. They pick up merchandise and put it down, then they rejoin the greater flow in the mall itself. If one didn't know that these were zombies, one might assume that it's stock footage from any mall in America. There is no difference between the way a zombie consumes and the way we consume. The death instinct lies at the bottom of both. The second way that Romero reinforces the connection between capitalism and the death instinct is in a series of match cuts. The match cuts switch between zombies and mannequins, as each appear to gaze at the other. The zombies do not mistake the mannequins for the living. There is no attempt to eat them. It seems that it is precisely in the deadness of the mannequins that the zombies identify with them. Of course, the mannequins are not merely dead. They are there to display products for consumption. The zombies see themselves, or better we see both zombies and mannequins, in their deadness and in their connection to capitalism.

There where the codes are undone, the death instinct lays hold of the repressive apparatus and begins to direct the circulation of the libido. A mortuary axiomatic. One might then believe in liberated desires, but ones that, like cadavers, feed on images. Death is not desired, but what is desired is dead, already dead: images.<sup>22</sup>

The dead circulate through the mall still trying to consume in keeping with their instinct.

Given the claustrophobic setting of *Night of the Living Dead*, Romero was not able explore the line dividing the living and the dead. In *Dawn of the Dead* this line is continually transgressed. The living and the dead are united in their desire to consume. They are united in instinct. They even find the same place comforting. Another point of transgression arises when a motorcycle gang breaks into the mall. Rather than waiting out the siege, though, the protagonists seek to defend the mall against the encroachment of the living. The film puts the audience in the disconcerting position of rooting for the zombies to devour the bikers. The protagonists defend the mall like homesteaders. They kill the bikers or put them in a position to be killed by zombies. In this final battle the living kill the living as indiscriminately as do the zombies. The identity in instinct between the living and the dead unites them more than their differences.

The film ends as the defences of the protagonists are breached and they are forced once again to flee by helicopter. With little fuel and little hope, perhaps there is another mall nearby.

If the zombies are the only modern myth because of the inextricable relation between capitalism and the death instinct, and even if capitalism in fact produces the death instinct, the question remains, what exactly is death for Deleuze and Guattari? In chapter 4 of *Anti-Oedipus* they return to the positive task of spelling out the implications of their reconceptualisation of desire and along with it a positive account of death. The crucial distinction that Deleuze and Guattari introduce is between the 'model of death' and the 'experience of death'.

The body without organs is the model of death. As the authors of horror stories have understood so well, it is not death that serves as the model for catatonia, it is catatonic schizophrenia that gives its model to death. Zero intensity. The death model appears when the body without organs repels the organs and lays them aside: no mouth, no tongue, no teeth – to the point of self-mutilation, to the point of suicide. Yet there is no real opposition between the body without organs and the organs as partial objects; the only real opposition is to the molar organism that is their common enemy.<sup>23</sup>

The model of death is the body without organs. This claim returns us to the beginning of *Anti-Oedipus*. Death is modelled on the zero intensity of one's affects. It is the limit of any ratio of motion and rest among a body's parts. The model of death is the tick hibernating on a branch, unable to find something warm to drop on to, unable to exercise any of its affects. Notice the inversion that takes place here. Zero intensity states are not explained in terms of death. The tick does not enter a 'death-like' state when it hibernates for lack of food. Rather, when we speak about death, we are saying that a body has reached the limit of its affects. The affects supported by a particular ratio of motion and rest cannot be exercised.

What Deleuze and Guattari gain by this inversion is a way to speak about the relation between life and death without resorting to a death instinct.

In the desiring-machine, one sees the same catatonic inspired by the immobile motor that forces him to put aside his organs, to immobilise them, to

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silence them, but also impelled by the working parts that work in an autonomous or stereotyped fashion to reactivate the organs, to reanimate them with local movements. It is a question of different parts of the machine, different and coexisting, different in their very coexistence.<sup>24</sup>

There is no need to posit a fundamental, universal instinct that functions at the cellular level in order to account for the death of an organism. One need only argue that desire contains both attraction and repulsion. The point of repulsion then becomes the model of death. As we saw above, Deleuze and Guattari speak of this interaction between desiring production and its limit, or the point of repulsion, or anti-production, or the body without organs as the paranoiac machine. What is crucial in this characterisation is that this point of repulsion is not external to desiring production, but is integral to it. The limits of desire are not imposed externally but produced internally as the natural functioning of desire:

Hence it is absurd to speak of a death desire that would presumably be in qualitative opposition to the life desires. Death is not desired, there is only death that desires, by virtue of the body without organs or the immobile motor, and there is also life that desires, by virtue of the working organs. There we do not have two desires but two parts, two kinds of desiring-machine parts, in the dispersion of the machine itself.<sup>25</sup>

In the shift from the Freudian model of 'desiring death' to a 'death that desires', Deleuze and Guattari reaffirm the fundamental productivity of desire. Desire is not predicated on a lack. It is not trying to achieve some lost unity. Nor is desire trying to recapture the real. Desire *produces* the real.

If the body without organs is the model of death, what is the experience of death? 'One is then able to say what this running or this functioning consists of: in the cycle of the desiring-machine it is a matter of constantly translating, constantly converting the death model into something else altogether, which is the experience of death.'<sup>26</sup> Deleuze and Guattari imagine that, although the body without organs is the *model* of death insofar as it is the zero degree of intensity for desiring production, the *experience* of death is the passing through this zero degree of intensity to another affective state. They have already articulated this movement in their discussion of the celibate machine from the first chapter.

As we saw above, the celibate machine is the final way that the energy of desiring production is consumed. This process can be seen in the way that water reacts to being heated. The energy is first dissipated through conduction, then convection, and finally through the creation of vortices that dissipate the heat most efficiently. If we examine these vortices more closely, we see additionally that each point on the circuit described by a vortex is a different degree of intensity. Furthermore, every degree of intensity is an affective state, a function of the particular relation of motion and rest that constitute a given body. Deleuze and Guattari are arguing that the passage from one state of intensity to another is the experience of death. 'But in themselves, these intensive emotions are closest to the matter whose zero degree they invest in itself. They control the unconscious experience of death, insofar as death is what is felt in every feeling, what never ceases and never finishes happening in every becoming ... forming zones of intensity on the body without organs.<sup>27</sup> The relations of attraction and repulsion organise themselves across the surface of the limits of attraction. This is the process of recording that spreads out on the body without organs and appears to be produced (miraculated) by the body without organs 'in the apparent objective movement'.<sup>28</sup> At this point the relations of attraction are captured by this recording process and channelled into zones of intensity. These are the celibate machines. The subject is the nomadic tracing of the circuit of libido captured by the process of recording.

We have attempted to show in this respect how the relations of attraction and repulsion produced such states, sensations, and emotions, which imply a new energetic conversion and form the third kind of synthesis, the synthesis of conjunction. One might say that the unconscious as a real subject has scattered an apparent residual and nomadic subject around the entire compass of its cycle, a subject that passes by way of all the becomings corresponding to the included disjunctions: the last part of the desiring-machine, the adjacent part.<sup>29</sup>

Deleuze and Guattari are deeply indebted to Klossowski's reading of Nietzsche on this point. In *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, Klossowski argues that Nietzsche's Eternal Return is the cycle of affective states through which Nietzsche passes and identifies with. Or better, in Nietzsche's refusal to be identified with any particular state, in his acceptance of the whole cycle, he affirms the eternal return of the same.

Such is the world as it appeared to Nietzsche under the monumental aspect Turin: a *discontinuity of intensities* that are given *names* only through the *interpretation of those who receive his messages*; the latter still represent the *fixity of signs*, whereas in Nietzsche *this fixity no longer exists*. That

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the fluctuations of *intensities were able to assume the opposite name* to designate themselves – such is the miraculous irony. We must believe that this *coincidence* of the phantasm and the sign has existed for all time, and that the strength required to follow the *detour* through the intellect was 'superhuman'. Now that the agent 'Nietzsche' is destroyed, there is a festival for a few days, a few hours, or a few instants – but it is a sacrificial festival.<sup>30</sup>

Neither Klossowski nor Deleuze and Guattari would deny that Nietzsche saw more deeply than most. However, Deleuze and Guattari do see in Nietzsche's experience what is common to all experience. 'The Eternal Return as experience, and as the deterritorialised circuit of all the cycles of desire.'<sup>31</sup> The subject is simply the retrospective gathering of affective states into a unity, that point at which one looks back over a feeling and says, 'So that's what it was . . .'. And the experience of death is the transition between these affective states.

Death is thus radically circumscribed for Deleuze and Guattari. It is certainly integral, but small, almost nothing. 'The experience of death is the most common of occurrences in the unconscious, precisely because it occurs in life and for life, in every passage or becoming, in every intensity as passage or becoming.'<sup>32</sup> One of the reasons that Deleuze and Guattari can rein in death is that there is no subject at stake here. 'And that subject as an adjacent part is always a "one" who conducts the experience, not an I who receives the model.<sup>33</sup> Death occurs in the unconscious as the continual oscillation between attraction and repulsion, cycling between the model of death and the experience of death. '[T]here is a return from the experience of death to the model of death, in the cycle of the desiring-machines. The cycle is closed . . . . Always going from the model to the experience, and starting out again, returning from the model to the experience, is what schizophrenising death amounts to, the exercise of the desiringmachines . . .<sup>34</sup> A schizophrenised death is a moment of desire, a shift in intensity, the movement from one affective state to another.

What exactly have we gained in this new account of death? Is this really an advance over Freud, Hegel or Heidegger? Is it even distinguishable from Freud, Hegel and Heidegger? Deleuze and Guattari anticipate these concerns and even reference Freud, Hegel and Heidegger at this crucial point. 'But it seems that things are becoming very obscure, for what is this distinction between the experience of death and the model of death? Here again, is it a death desire? A being-for-death? Or rather an investment of death, even if speculative? None of the above.'<sup>35</sup> Death desire unquestionably refers to

Freud.<sup>36</sup> 'Being-for-death' is a translation of '*un être pour la mort*', which is the standard French translation of *Sein zum Tode* from *Being and Time*. While not as explicit as the first two, the speculative investment of death can easily be seen as a reference to Hegel, insofar as in the Hegelian dialectic everything, even death, returns to strengthen and advance the progress of spirit.

In order to explore the way in which the distinction between the model of death and the experience of death represents an advance, let us return to the way that the problem was posed in the Introduction. There I argued that the relation between Hegel's account of death and Heidegger's account of death could be articulated as an antinomy, and that the terms of the antinomy could be provided by Freud's account of mourning and melancholia.<sup>37</sup> In Part I we saw how Heidegger's account of being towards death in Being and Time could be seen as melancholic, and in Part II how Hegel's introjection of death into the development of spirit in the Phenomenology could be seen as the work of mourning.<sup>38</sup> The purpose of reinscribing Hegel and Heidegger within the discourse of psychoanalysis was to show through Deleuze and Guattari's critique of psychoanalysis the limits of these two accounts of death. As we saw above, the crux of the critique of psychoanalysis found in Anti-Oedipus is that it treats the libidinal organisation of capitalism as if it were universal. In particular, the death instinct, which Freud argues is constitutive of all life down to the cellular level, is shown to be the internalisation of antiproduction necessitated by the capitalist axiomatic. In opposition to this. Deleuze and Guattari argue in their positive account of death that there is a model of death, which they identify with the body without organs, and an experience of death, which they identify as the movement from one intensive state to another.

It is Freud's refusal of both the model and experience of death that leads him to posit the death instinct. 'The death instinct is pure silence, pure transcendence, not givable and not given in experience. This very point is remarkable: it is because death, according to Freud, has neither a model nor an experience, that he makes of it a transcendent principle.'<sup>39</sup> In his refusal to acknowledge the real existence of the model and experience of death, Freud's position is analogous to Kant's regarding space and time. If we look at the antinomy of mourning and melancholia, Freud would say that each side of the antinomy takes something to be real that is not in fact real. Melancholia takes the model of death to be real, and mourning takes the experience of death to be real. Conversely, melancholia takes the experience of death to be unreal, and mourning takes the model of death to be unreal. Deleuze and Guattari argue that this solution to the antinomy fundamentally misconstrues the nature of desire and, along with it, the nature of death. Both sides of the antinomy are still false, but their falsity lies in denying the reality of the model and experience of death.

Let us look at each side of the antinomy in a little more detail, starting with melancholia, Heidegger's position. As we saw in Part I, death for Heidegger is Dasein's ownmost, non-relational possibility that is not to be outstripped. Key to Heidegger's analysis is that while Dasein exists as being towards death, Dasein can never experience its own death. At the outset, then, Heidegger denies the experience of death, and it is precisely this denial of the experience of death that leads to his melancholic position. Death radically individualises Dasein, but individualises Dasein in such a way that it is faced with a task that it cannot complete. Dasein is stretched ahead of itself into its possibilities and these are limited by the totality of Dasein's experience, which ends in its death. Dasein is thus left to avoid its ownmost possibility out of fear, or face its ownmost possibility in anxiety. But it must face this possibility as absolute impossibility, as a profound inability to experience. This distention towards death but inability to experience it leads to the 'incorporation' of death, to use Abraham and Torok's terminology. That is, Dasein's relation to death represents a refusal to mourn and a narcissistic maintenance of the ego's topography at the expense of its external relations. Dasein swallows itself whole in order to avoid the work of mourning, and thus becomes melancholic.

At the same time that Dasein incorporates itself in order to avoid the experience of death, it produces the model of death, the zero degree of intensity that lies at the bottom of every affective state. Heidegger seems to acknowledge as much in the fundamental mood of anxiety. Anxiety is that mood that extracts Dasein from its absorption in its tasks, and shows these tasks as mere possibilities among numerous possibilities. Or, to use the language of 'What is Metaphysics?' anxiety reveals the nothing. Anxiety reveals to Dasein the point at which all of its projects are possibilities, that is the point at which its affects exist as a ratio of motion and rest among its parts, but remain unaffected, at their zero degree of intensity. Heidegger invests Dasein with the model of death, a zero degree of intensity around which the experience of Dasein is oriented, but never allowed to convert into an experience of death. Ironically, this means that Dasein can be understood as kinetic in the Aristotelian sense, but it is a catatonic kinesis, a kinesis that cannot go anywhere, a kinesis with no speed, an Eleatic kinesis.

The reason that Heidegger's analysis of death leads him to posit a model of death but not an experience of death lies in his individualising account of Dasein. Heidegger has taken the privatised individual of capitalism and abstracted the structure of that existence. As Deleuze and Guattari have argued capitalist production is marked by the interiorisation of anti-production. Heidegger's error lies not in his discovery of the nothing at the heart of Dasein, but in assuming that this existence is foundational and universal. When Heidegger takes Dasein as his starting point, he precludes the possibility of pursuing the forces that make such an entity possible. Deleuze and Guattari would say that Heidegger has mistaken the celibate machine unique to capitalism for Dasein. Furthermore, in pursuing the transcendental conditions for Dasein's experience, Heidegger has located the zero degree of intensity that conditions all of Dasein's affective states and argued that this is the authentic Dasein. What Heidegger has missed in this analysis is the desiring production that underlies not only the affective states through which Dasein circulates, but also the zero degree of intensity that limits every affective state. Production is more fundamental than anti-production. Desire grounds the nothing.

Now, let us look at Hegel's side of the antinomy, mourning. As we saw in Part II, Hegel argues in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that consciousness comes to terms with death by converting death from a natural negation to a spiritual negation. This process of conversion traverses the entire education of consciousness and is completed first in terms of content in 'Revealed Religion', and then in terms of form in 'Absolute Knowing'. To return to Abraham and Torok's terminology, Hegel 'introjects' death, rather than incorporates it as Heidegger does.<sup>40</sup> That is, the movement of consciousness in the *Phenomenology* is the movement of replacing a lost object with a new one. The interior topography of consciousness is not organised around a refusal to mourn. Consciousness is continually reshaping itself as it loses one object and replaces it with another. The movement of consciousness is the unceasing work of mourning.

The unceasing work of mourning in the *Phenomenology* certainly affirms an experience of death. One might say that the *Phenomenology* presents nothing but an experience of death. Each shape of consciousness or moment of spirit is the overcoming of a previous shape. Each

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new shape is possible only by the death of the previous shape. 'But the life of spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when in utter dismemberment, it finds itself.'<sup>41</sup> Of course, Hegel would never speak about the succession of the shape of consciousness as a series of affective states. For Hegel this is the work of the understanding, 'the absolute power'. It is not the work of self-enclosed and immediate substance but the work of the subject. Deleuze and Guattari would argue that, in a way analogous to Heidegger, Hegel has taken that which is produced as a residuum as foundational. The subject is the product of a series of affective states, not their driving force.

In contrast to Heidegger, however, the reason that Hegel makes this inversion is because there is no model of death in the *Phenomenology*. only an experience of death. There is no zero degree of intensity in Hegel's dialectic. There is only a steadily increasing intensity as each stage builds on the previous one. As Hegel is careful to point out, the process of negation is determinate negation, not absolute negation. Each stage is taken up and preserved by the stage that follows it. Each stage builds on the previous one, like compound interest. Hegel's economy is frictionless, without entropy, only inertia. Hegel's economy is ideal: every investment pays a return, even an investment in death. Hegel's dialectic is capital producing capital. The Entaüßerung/Erinnerung respiration of spirit is the breathing of capital as it produces and consumes. Thus, this is the experience of death insofar as consciousness moves from one stage to another, but there is no model of death, no point of absolute loss, no limit to the system. It is absolute.

Thus, while Heidegger captures perfectly the relation towards death of the atomised individual in capitalism, Hegel captures perfectly the axiomatised flows of capital as they capture desire and force it to produce more capital. Freud would agree with Heidegger that there is no experience of death and with Hegel that there is no model of death. In doing so, he posits a universal and transcendent death instinct that annihilates the life instinct. 'Psychoanalysis ought to be a song of life, or else be worth nothing at all. It ought, *practically*, to teach us to sing life. And see how the most defeated, sad song of death emanates from it . . .'<sup>42</sup> Hegel and Heidegger would add additional verses to Freud's lament. Hegel sings a mournful song of death introjected, and Heidegger sings a melancholy song of death incorporated.

## Notes

- 1. Friedrich Nietzsche On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 121.
- 2. SE XVIII: 7.
- 3. SE XVIII: 9–10.
- 4. SE XVIII: 14.
- 5. SE XVIII: 15.
- 6. SE XVIII: 27.
- 7. SE XVIII: 34.
- 8. SE XVIII: 34.
- 9. SE XVIII: 36.
- 10. Richard Boothby, in *Death and Desire: Psychoanalytic Theory in Lacan's Return to Freud*, argues that while Freud may have demonstrated that the instincts are conservative, it does not follow that the earlier state sought by the organism is the inorganic or death. In an attempt to save Freud from his critics, Boothby shows that Lacan's reappropriation of the death drive in terms of energetics does not fall prey to the same difficulties. I am sympathetic with Boothby's reading of Freud and think his Lacanian reading of the death drive is fruitful. What is at issue here, though, is whether the experience that both Freud and Lacan are trying to account for the internalisation of anti-production within the subject is universal or the result of specific historical circumstances. Deleuze and Guattari are arguing that the death instinct is produced by the unique way in which capitalism captures desire.
- 11. SE XVIII: 40.
- 12. SE XVIII: 41.
- 13. Georges Bataille, in *The Accursed Share*, Vol. 1, takes up Weismann's position in arguing that the kind of destructive expenditure that dominates human culture is possible in higher organisms only.
- 14. SE XVIII: 46.
- 15. SE XVIII: 27.
- 16. Night of the Living Dead (1968), Dawn of the Dead (1978), Day of the Dead (1985) and Land of the Dead (2005). The first two are particularly interesting with regard to the argument of Anti-Oedipus. In Night of the Living Dead, while it certainly has precursors, all the basics about zombies are codified. Zombies are the dead come back to life. Zombies feed on the living. Anyone bitten by a zombie becomes a zombie. The only way to kill a zombie is to shoot it in the head. All other zombie films obey these conventions. What Romero portrays so powerfully is the personification of the death instinct. The second film does the added service of connecting capitalism and zombies. Dawn of the Dead takes place almost entirely within a shopping mall and is replete with comparisons between zombies and consumers.
- 17. AO, 335.

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- 18. While Keith Ansell-Pearson discusses Deleuze's critique of the death instinct in Freud at length, and in particular Deleuze's debt to Weismann, in *Germinal Life*, Ansell-Pearson does not explore the positive account of death presented by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus*. Françoise Proust, in 'The Line of Resistance', *Hypatia* 15 (2000): 23–37, demonstrates clearly Deleuze's debt to Blanchot in his conception of death, particularly the distinction between personal and impersonal death, but she does not address the full explication of this from *Anti-Oedipus*. Nick Land, in 'Making it with Death: Remarks on Thanatos and Desiring-Production', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 24 (1993): 66–76, does explore the connection between zombies and capitalist production, but is not interested in the positive account of death from *Anti-Oedipus*.
- 19. AO, 235.
- 20. AO, 263.
- 21. See Ansell-Pearson, Germinal Life.
- 22. AO, 337.
- 23. AO, 329.
- 24. AO, 329.
- 25. AO, 329.
- 26. AO, 330.
- 27. AO, 330.
- 28. AO, 329.
- 29. AO, 330.
- Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998), 252-3; Emphasis in original.
- 31. AO, 331.
- 32. AO, 330.
- 33. AO, 331. As Proust rightly points out, Blanchot is crucial to this distinction. See, 'The Line of Resistance', 31–2. Blanchot's articulation of the double death from *The Space of Literature* appears in both *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*. Blanchot's concept plays a recurring role because it is crucial to Deleuze's thinking of the 'event', and in the case of *Anti-Oedipus* thinking death as an event. What is at stake here is a non-metaphysical account of death. Death is not a thing. It is not the negation that drives life, nor is it the transcendental conditions for experience. Death is a part of life (the experience of death) and an effect of life (the model of death). In my Conclusion I deal at length with the 'double death', particularly in Blanchot's reading of Rilke.
- 34. AO, 331.
- 35. AO, 330.
- 36. One can see all of *Anti-Oedipus* as a critique and reinscription of Freud's *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* where the death instinct is first

articulated, and *The Ego and the Id*, where the repressive role of Oedipus in forming the ego is explored.

- 37. Freud's 'Mourning and Melancholia' is crucial here, but so is 'Mourning *or* Melancholia: Introjection *versus* Incorporation' by Abraham and Torok.
- 38. That this conception of death is a criticism of Heidegger is clear not only from the language used, but also Proust's analysis of death in Deleuze. See 'The Line of Resistance', 24. What strikes me as original in this reading, however, is the connection between Heidegger's conception of death and melancholia. Other analyses of melancholia in Heidegger are connected with his conception of boredom, but not death. See, for example, Espen Hammer, 'Being Bored: Heidegger on Melancholy and Patience', *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 12 (2004): 277–95, and Livio Bottani's 'Noia, acedia, ed epoche', *Sapienza* (1991): 113–91.

Unlike the connection between Heidegger and melancholia, the connection between Hegel and mourning is well documented. See for example, Catharine Malabou's 'History and the Process of Mourning in Hegel and Freud', *Radical Philosophy* 106 (2001): 15–20 and Andrew Cutrofello's 'The Blessed Gods Mourn: What is Living-Dead in the Legacy of Hegel', *The Owl of Minerva* 28 (1996): 25–38. Both argue that the psychoanalytic category of mourning provides a key to understanding Hegel. One could argue that much of Derrida's work concerns the relation between Hegel and mourning from early works such as 'The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology' and *Glas*, to later works such as *Aporias* and *Spectres of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International.* 

- 39. AO, 332.
- 40. In addition to 'Mourning *or* Melancholia', see also Torok's, 'The Illness of Mourning and the Fantasy of the Exquisite Corpse', 115–23.
- 41. Phenomenology of Spirit, 3:36/§32.
- 42. AO, 331. In a note to Chapter 7, I discussed the general relation between *Anti-Oedipus* and Deleuze's other works. There I suggested that while there is certainly development and shifts in emphasis, an overall continuity dominates. The crucial exception I see is in the abandonment of psychoanalysis between *The Logic of Sense* and *Anti-Oedipus*. In terms of Deleuze's view of death, the advances made on the basis of Blanchot's 'double death' are not abandoned but rearticulated in terms of assemblages: 'there is no desire but assembling, assembled, desire' (*A Thousand Plateaus*, 399). Since death in *Anti-Oedipus* is reduced to a way of talking about certain intensities, either zero degree intensity or the transition between intensities, none of this need be abandoned when talking about assemblages. Any assemblage is going to be a ratio of motion and rest among its parts. The limit of these ratios is

the zero degree of intensity, catatonia, the model of death. Transition between any intensity within the ratio, assembling desire, is the experience of death. As we will see in the Conclusion, the trajectory of Deleuze and Guattari's thought continually reduces the importance of death. It plays a crucial role in *Anti-Oedipus* because of their argument with Freud. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, however, it is barely mentioned. Death becomes something not worth thinking about.

#### Conclusion

# The Free Think of Death Least

I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things, then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful.

Nietzsche<sup>1</sup>

According to Deleuze and Guattari the fundamental failure of both psychoanalysis and philosophy lies in the fact that neither is a song of life. Both sing an unrelenting dirge. I have argued, following Deleuze and Guattari, that this failure is the result of the way that desire is construed as precipitating from a lack. Hegel and Heidegger both accept this fundamental presupposition of a foundational lack, but organise their thought in antinomical ways with regard to this lack. I have argued that the antinomy between Hegel and Heidegger can be understood in terms of mourning and melancholia. I have also argued that this antinomy should be solved mathematically, that is each side of the antinomy should be rejected as false. Or, better, the underlying assumption of desire predicated on a lack that generates the antinomy should be rejected as false. Philosophy remains a sad song, though, What I would like to do by way of conclusion is build on the resources provided by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus and discuss the way that the practice of philosophy might be characterised by joy rather than by sadness. In order to do this I shall look at four crucial engagements with death in the history of philosophy that do not fall into either mourning or melancholia: Epicurus, Spinoza, Blanchot and Nietzsche.

## **Epicurus**

In the 'Letter to Menoeceus' Epicurus outlines the practical implications of his philosophy. Since we are often led down the wrong path by the fear of death, one of Epicurus' chief concerns is our relation to it. Is it something that should be feared? Epicurus concludes emphatically that death is not to be feared. In death there is no sensation, and, if there is no sensation, there can be no pleasure or pain. If death can cause neither pleasure nor pain, then according to Epicurus' metaphysics, death cannot be a 'thing' at all. This leads him to the succinct formula, 'Death, therefore – the most dreadful of evils – is nothing to us, since while we exist, death is not present, and whenever death is present, we do not exist. It is nothing either to the living or the dead, since it does not exist for the living, and the dead no longer are.'<sup>2</sup>

Removed from the larger context of Epicurus' thought, it is tempting to move directly to the question of whether he is right.<sup>3</sup> To ask solelv about the truth value of Epicurus' proposition, however, is to remove it from the practices in which it is embedded. As Foucault argues in Hermeneutics of the Subject, what is at stake in Ancient Greek and Hellenic thought such as Epicurus' is not a set of propositions that may be true or false, but a set of practices through which one prepares oneself for the truth. Epicurus' philosophy is most emphatically not about death at all; it is concerned with life, and above all how one might live well. According to Epicurus, one lives well not by assenting to a series of true propositions, but by training the body and mind in such a way that these truths become embodied and self-evident. He says a great deal more about diet than he does about death. Frequent fasting and a Spartan diet will have numerous beneficial effects. First, one learns not to be ruled by hunger. Second, one learns to take pleasure in simple foods that are readily found bread and water, for example. And, third, as a corollary to the second, one is not consumed by the thought of foods that are difficult to come by and rarely had. On Foucault's reading, practices such as these are indicative of a principle more fundamental than 'know yourself'. namely 'care of the self'.

For Epicurus care of the self involves a series of bodily techniques with regard to the types and intensities of pleasures and pain one experiences. The goal of these techniques is the reduction of pain, which often requires paradoxically the elimination of some pleasures. Not every pleasure is to be pursued, and not every pain avoided.<sup>4</sup> Concomitant with these bodily techniques, and in fact impossible without them, is the development of prudence as the pre-eminent philosophical virtue. Prudence properly developed is what allows one to choose among pleasures and pains and achieve tranquillity (*ataraxia*). Notice that the goal of Epicurean philosophy is not understanding or enlightenment, but an affective state achieved through bodily techniques.

In order to maximise the affective state of tranquillity, chief among the affects that must be mitigated is fear. Fear leads one into all sorts of unhealthy practices that are detrimental to living well. Death is one of the things that people fear most, and so for Epicurus to articulate properly a care of the self he must show how one comes to terms with death. Unlike his discussions of diet, however, Epicurus does not provide a set of bodily techniques, nor does he provide a set of mental practices as Marcus Aurelius does in the *Mediations*. One does not act in the shadow of death. One does not begin each day but putting one's affairs in order and assuming that one will die today. Rather, Epicurus argues that death is not something that casts a shadow on life at all. Death is not something that one can be related to, and cannot properly be an object of mental exercise or bodily discipline. It is clear that both Aurelius and Epicurus have the same end in mind. Both want to reduce the hold that the fear of death has on life. Each proposes a different means of achieving this end, however.<sup>5</sup>

The means that Epicurus proposes for reducing the painful affects associated with the fear of death is not the desensitisation proposed by the Stoics. For Epicurus this is quite impossible as there only is pleasure and pain, and Stoic apathy is incomprehensible in his metaphysics. Perhaps, one could compare these two models with an example: a child's fear of the dark. On the Stoic model the child would overcome her fear of the dark by continually facing darkness, by undergoing the mental discipline of preparing to live without light everyday. Eventually, the child would become inured to whether it was light or dark and would fear neither. On the Epicurean model, one would explain that there is in fact nothing to fear in the dark. It may take numerous nights of checking in cupboards and under the bed for monsters, but eventually the child will learn that darkness is the absence of light. It is not a thing and it has no effect on things. There is a bodily technique going on here, but it seeks to replace the painful affects associated with darkness and replace them with pleasurable affects. This shift produces a series of virtuous consequences: bedtime is no longer avoided (at least out of fear); sleep improves: and, the child's mood throughout the day is more stable. Analogously, Epicurus is arguing that death (like darkness) is not a thing and has no effect on things. One could go further in this vein and say that since one dies only once, death is less to be feared than darkness, which must be faced innumerable times. The result is the same. One might have to be reminded many times that death is not a thing to be feared. Eventually, however, this will result in a change in affect. One will rarely be led to think about death, and when one is, the result will not be painful.

## Spinoza

In many respects Spinoza's position is identical to Epicurus'. Both are concerned with the reduction of painful affects, and one could argue for the homology of Epicurus' 'tranquillity' (*ataraxia*) and Spinoza's 'acquiesence' (*mentis acquiescentia*) as the end of living well. However, Spinoza's position seems to share much in common with the Stoics too. In particular, his emphasis on the understanding seems more acute than Epicurus', and at first blush there seems to be little interest in bodily practices that might prepare one for the truth. I do not think, however, that Spinoza can be completely subsumed under Epicurus or the Stoics. To begin with he explicitly criticises the Stoics for relying too much on the will, as if freedom were the result of resolute exertion of one's will.<sup>6</sup>

What differentiates Spinoza from Epicurus is the addition of a third affect. For Epicurus there is only pleasure and pain, while Spinoza, as we have seen, wants to introduce 'desire' as a primary way of affecting and being affected. Insofar as this is still an affect, rather than a non-affective will or universal reason, Spinoza remains much closer to Epicurus than to the Stoics. For Spinoza one is always in some affective state related to pain, pleasure or desire. Stoic indifference is a metaphysical impossibility for Spinoza as it was for Epicurus, but Spinoza's goal is not the replacement of pain with pleasure, but the replacement of both pain and pleasure with desire. The reason is that pain and pleasure are both passive affects indicative of bondage to external causes. Freedom lies in replacing passive affects with the active affects of desire. Herein lies freedom for Spinoza.

Thus, while Spinoza seems to have little interest in bodily practices, what he is proposing is in fact a taxonomy of bodily practices, and the ways in which some bodily practices lead to bondage, while others lead to freedom. This is why Deleuze's reading of Spinoza provides such an important corrective to traditional readings of Spinoza by focusing on his insistence that no one knows what a body can do until its ways of affecting and being affected are put into practice. What practices increase the power of a body to act, and what practices diminish the power of a body to act? This is the question of ethics for Spinoza.

Spinoza's focus on bodily practices relegates his discussion of death to an afterthought. He writes: 'A free man thinks of death least of all things; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.'<sup>7</sup> Spinoza comes to the same conclusion as Epicurus: one should not waste one's time thinking about death. The arguments leading to these conclusions, however, are different. Epicurus argues that death is nothing, but it does not seem that Spinoza goes that far. In the proof to the above proposition, Spinoza returns to the problem of fear and the kind of bodily practices that result from being led by fear. The problem is not the fear of death, but fear in general, regardless of its object.

The reason that fear of any kind leads to powerlessness is its connection to pain. Affects arising from pain are always bad for Spinoza; that is, they always result in the reduction of one's power. For Spinoza fear is nothing but 'an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something which we are in doubt'.<sup>8</sup> The doubt about death arises not so much in the 'if' but in the 'when, where and how'. Furthermore, Spinoza presents no argument for diminishing the pain of death. He assumes that whenever we dwell on death, the result will be painful. The question for Spinoza then becomes, what sorts of bodily practices can we engage in so that we think about death or fearful things very little?

The source of fear lies in doubt. If doubt can be removed (or better, replaced with understanding), then fear will be removed along with it. The bodily practice that Spinoza proposes for the replacement of doubt (and all other bad affects) is to live as a conscious expression of nature. As we saw in Chapter 7, Spinoza imagines everything in the universe as composed of finite parts of that universe. Humans are not solitary monads set against the order of nature. In every respect they reflect the order of nature. However, one can live in such a way as to disturb the ratio of motion and rest that makes up one's body and thus live 'as it were unwitting of [one]self, and of God, and of things, and as soon as [one] ceases to suffer, ceases also to be'.<sup>9</sup> The alternative is the replacement of ignorance and passivity with knowledge and activity, or the replacement of bad affects with good affects.

If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion, from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to the other thoughts, then will the love or hatred toward that external cause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these emotions, be destroyed.<sup>10</sup>

What makes this replacement possible is our relation to the universe. Everything in the universe is necessarily connected to every other thing. Whatever happens, happens of necessity. Our freedom does not, indeed cannot, consist in stepping outside this causality. However, understanding the necessity of all things frees us from their power to affect us negatively. If I know why something is the case, I do not become consumed by hypothetical questions that drain my power rather than increase it. If I understand that everything follows by necessity from the nature of the universe, even death, I 'will not find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or contempt . . . but . . . will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to rejoice'.<sup>11</sup> Spinoza does not broach the ontological status of death as Epicurus does, nor does he need to. It is sufficient to show that fear, regardless of its object, is bad, and outline the practices by which one might replace fear with desire.

# Blanchot

The practice that concerns Blanchot in *The Space of Literature* is writing. In particular Blanchot seeks to articulate the relation between the author and the work. However, Blanchot thinks that this cannot be done without first thinking about death. 'Not that the artist makes death his work of art, but it can be said that he is linked to the work in the same strange way in which the man who takes death for a goal is linked to death.'<sup>12</sup> To say that the person who seeks his own death is linked to death, however, is already to obscure an ambiguity in death itself. Death is never singular for Blanchot but always doubled:

There is one death which circulates in the language of possibility, of liberty, which has for its furthest horizon the freedom to die and the capacity to take mortal risks; and there is its double, which is ungraspable. It is what I cannot grasp, what is not linked to *me* by any relation of any sort. It is that which never comes and toward which I do not direct myself.<sup>13</sup>

The person who seeks her own death thinks that both deaths are at her disposal, that grasping the first death will bring the other within reach. The problem with this way of thinking is that it overlooks what Epicurus saw so clearly. *I* cannot meet death. Wherever death is, *I* am not. The subject that so carefully plans the moment of death, trying to tame death by connecting it to a moment, fails to realise that the subject can only exist until the moment of death after which it can no longer be a subject. The subject is lost in an impersonal death that cannot be appropriated, to which no 'I' can attach itself.

Where Blanchot exceeds Epicurus, however, is in thinking the relation between these two deaths. He agrees with Epicurus that there is impersonal death that can never be mine, regardless of my resoluteness. There is at the same time, however, a death that is properly mine, one towards which I might be directed, the possibility of *my* death. As we saw above, this distinction between my death and the death that can never be mine is taken up by Deleuze and Guattari as the experience of death and the model of death.

In order to make the connection clearer between Blanchot and Deleuze and Guattari, I would like to pursue Blanchot's reading of Rilke. Blanchot traces the development of Rilke's relation to death in his poetry. This development can be seen as the move from 'dying faithful to oneself' to 'dying faithful to death'. Dying one's own death, a proper death in the first case is opposed to an anonymous, impersonal death, the death of big cities and trench warfare. In order to ward off this nameless death one strives for the 'well-wrought death'. Blanchot is suspicious, though, that Rilke trades the difficult work of contemplating anonymous death for the facile comfort of the death in which one sees only oneself, the proper death. Blanchot characterises Rilke's career as the gradual abandonment of this comfort.

The search for comfort is replaced by openness. The image that guides Rilke is of an anemone that he saw in Rome that 'had opened so wide during the day that it could not close up again at night'.<sup>14</sup> It is an openness that can neither exclude nor place limits. Only in this openness can Rilke begin with death. But, it is not the well-wrought death that he is open to at this point. It is the nameless, unbidden death that can never be proper to him, that death towards which he can never be. Rilke describes this openness as 'A being with no shell, open to pain / Tormented by light, shaken by every sound'.<sup>15</sup> This being with no shell sounds remarkably similar to the body without organs as Deleuze and Guattari describe it. As we saw above, the body without organs is that zero degree of intensity on which zones of intensity circulate. As Rilke points out, these zones might be the place where pain, light or sound circulates.<sup>16</sup> A body without organs is the site for the circulation of any intensity. The body without organs is that which precedes every event, what every experience presupposes. It is prepersonal, impersonal, ungraspable, unnamable. It refuses to be organised, molarised. It is the tick at the limit of its affects, engorged or hibernating. It is the anemone that cannot close, open to light and darkness, heat and cold. It is what the 'I' can never meet nor become, but what the 'I' presupposes. It is the model of death.

Writing as a being with no shell leads Rilke, according to Blanchot, to a new relation with language. 'To speak is no longer to tell or to name.'<sup>17</sup> In this openness Rilke discovers that the primary function of

language is not representational. For Deleuze and Guattari, as we saw above, the representational nature of language is replaced with a machinic account of language. I do not think that Rilke goes as far, but the move away from representation is significant in itself. What Rilke replaces representation with is praise: 'But the mortal and monstrous, / how do you endure it, welcome it? / – I praise.'<sup>18</sup> Even though Rilke's abandonment of representational language does not lead to a machinic account of language, it does lead to beatitude. Life is affirmed in all its monstrosity and impersonality: 'But the nameless and anonymous, / how, poet, do you invoke it? / – I praise.'<sup>19</sup>

Rilke's beatitude results from the distinction he makes between personal and impersonal death. This, of course, becomes the distinction between the experience of death and the model of death in *Anti-Oedipus*. What this distinction allows Blanchot and Deleuze and Guattari to do is talk about death in a way that accounts for its multiple facets. Or, better, this distinction shows that death, whether experience or model, is a manifestation of a more fundamental phenomenon, namely life. Impersonal death is modelled on the body without organs. It is simply another way of talking about the zero degree of intensity for the circulation of desire. Personal death is the experience of moving between degrees of intensity. It is the series of connections and disjunctions of desire that is life. The song of philosophy is the affirmation of life in all of its complexity and monstrosity.

# Nietzsche

In *The Gay Science* Nietzsche takes aim at the division that runs through Western culture between the frivolous and the serious. The history of Western thought has been the history of seriousness. Science can only be science if its object is serious. Things that must be taken seriously are reason, God and order. Philosophy, theology and the natural sciences each have these as their object. Nietzsche will further argue that reason and order are the result of the Western conception of God. Nietzsche's project in *The Gay Science* is twofold. First, he wants to show the limits of 'serious' science. Second, he wants to provide an alternative conception of science, namely, gay science. His task is complicated by the fact that he cannot simply take the 'serious' as a serious object of study. To do so would result in being recaptured by what he was trying to escape. One way of looking at Nietzsche's solution to this difficulty is to look at *The Gay Science* 

as proposing a set of bodily practices for overcoming serious science. These practices are aesthetic. They seek laughter but not comfort. Instead of certainty, they seek struggle and pain, while recognising that these are not inimical to laughter. We can see Nietzsche's call to a new set of bodily practices in the Preface: 'I have often asked myself whether, taking a large view, philosophy has not been merely an interpretation of the body and a *misunderstanding of the body*.'<sup>20</sup> The misunderstanding lies in the confusion of cause and effect, and taking the primary for secondary. For Nietzsche the body is not an appendage of the soul, or an intransigent materiality that gets in the way of thinking. The body is the ground of all thought. All thoughts arise in and through the body.

The revaluation of the body that Nietzsche undertakes provides an aesthetic grounding for all thought. 'Thoughts are the shadows of our feelings - always darker, emptier, and simpler.'21 Given this revaluation, Nietzsche cannot simply argue that we should think differently. To argue in this way would again be to grant too much to what he is trying to delimit. On the contrary Nietzsche must present a new way of acting, a new set of bodily exercises. It is only by creating new kinds of bodies that one is able to create new philosophies. 'A philosopher who has traversed many kinds of health, and keeps traversing them, has passed through and equal number of philosophies . . .: this art of transfiguration is philosophy.<sup>22</sup> This art of traversal does not have truth as its goal, but health. Truth as a goal presupposes a very particular kind of body, one that is for the most part ignorant of its bodily underpinnings. What Nietzsche is proposing is an experimental philosophy of the body, a technique of the body that continually tests its limits knowing that the result will not always be pleasure, but wisdom.

Nietzsche sums up these bodily practices in the eternal return. How should one orient one's actions? How can one make an experiment of one's existence? The eternal return seeks to answer these questions and does so by proposing a thought experiment: What if a demon came and said that this moment in all of its aspects, joy and suffering, would be repeated endlessly? Would such a proclamation be a curse or a blessing? Nietzsche argues that if we can organise our practices such that this becomes a blessing rather than a curse, we will be irrevocably changed. 'Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life *to crave nothing more fervently* than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?'<sup>23</sup> Notice that the outcome of this experiment is a particular disposition. One becomes well disposed to self and life. Insight is gained here, but one would be hard-pressed to call it 'truth' in any traditional sense. Nietzsche is not making an ontological or even cosmological claim here. Rather, this is an aesthetic claim, a bodily claim that follows from a particular practice. In many respects the practice that Nietzsche proposes here is reminiscent of the exercises that Marcus Aurelius proposes for dealing with death. The crucial difference, and the reason that Nietzsche is closer to Epicurus and Spinoza than to Aurelius, is that the exercise Nietzsche proposes here orients one toward life instead of death.

Within the context of the eternal return, Nietzsche's claims about death become clear. The first thing to note is that Nietzsche rarely talks about death. This should come as no surprise, since the purpose of philosophy is to teach one how to live, not how to die. In this respect he mirrors Epicurus and Spinoza. Second, his conclusion about death is also quite similar to Epicurus and Spinoza. Although, as we have seen, the reasoning that leads to this conclusion is markedly different. Nietzsche writes, 'It makes me happy that men do not want at all to think the thought of death',<sup>24</sup> and says this in spite of the recognition that death is certain for all, and all are equal in death. This understanding does not lead Nietzsche into the kind of theorising that we saw in Heidegger. For Nietzsche the fact that something is common to all is not an indication of its importance. In fact, for Nietzsche the opposite is more often the case. As a result, Nietzsche concludes, 'I should like very much to do something that would make the thought of life even a hundred times more appealing to them'.<sup>25</sup>

It is at this point that we see the importance of Nietzsche's scathing critique of the Beyond, on the one hand, and the eternal return on the other. Both are attempts to make life more appealing. The elimination of the Beyond as an object of thought returns one's focus to this life in all of its suffering and joy. The eternal return in particular becomes a way to affirm life, not primarily by changing the way one thinks but by changing the way one feels. It is a way of experimenting with one's affects so that joy might be one's dominant affect, so that one might see the beauty in life in order to make it more beautiful.

Deleuze and Guattari too can be seen as proposing a set of bodily practices, an experimentation with life. This experimentation treats life not as an appendage of death as we saw in Heidegger, Hegel and Freud, but as the primary object. We are not driven by death, negation, or lack but by life itself in all its productive effulgence. This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialisation, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times.<sup>26</sup>

We are not constituted by death but by desire, and it is only by misconstruing desire that we have organized life around a lack. This type of organisation leads to the Freudian antinomy of mourning and melancholia. In Deleuze and Guattari we see a refusal of this antinomy, an argument that both sides are false. The denial of the antinomy arises from rethinking life experimentally, joyfully. Here we have philosophy as a song of life.

# Notes

- 1. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), §276.
- 2. Essential Epicurus, 'Letter to Menoeceus,' 63.
- For further comment, see William Grey, 'Epicurus and the Harm of Death', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77, 1999: 358-64; Frederik Kaufman, 'Pre-vital and Post-mortem Non-existence', American Philosophical Quarterly, 36, 1999: 1-19; John Martin Fischer, 'Death, Badness, and Impossibility of Experience', Journal of Ethics, 1, 1997: 341-53; Stephen Rosenbaum, 'Epicurus and Annihilation', Philosophical Quarterly, 39, 1989: 81-90; Steven Luper-Foy, 'Annihilation', Philosophical Quarterly, 37, 1987: 233-52; O. Harvey Green, 'Fear of Death', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 43, 1982, 43: 99-105; Walter Glannon, 'Epicureanism and Death', Monist, 76, 1993: 222-34.
- 4. Letter to Menoeceus, 65.
- 5. See, Aurelius, *Meditations* 7:69, and Michel Foucault, *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 1995), 504–5.
- 6. Ethics V.Intro.
- 7. IV.lxvii.
- 8. III.xviii.Note ii.
- 9. V.xlii.Note.
- 10. IV.ii.
- 11. III.l.Note.
- 12. Space of Literature, 105.
- 13. Space of Literature, 104; italics in original.
- 14. Space of Literature, 153.
- 15. quoted in Space of Literature, 153.

- 16. See *A Thousand Plateaus*, 'How to make yourself a body without organs.' Pain is mentioned explicitly here as one of the intensities that could be made to circulate on the body without organs.
- 17. Space of Literature, 159.
- 18. quoted in Space of Literature, 159.
- 19. quoted in Space of Literature, 159.
- 20. The Gay Science, §2.
- 21. The Gay Science, §179.
- 22. The Gay Science, §3.
- 23. The Gay Science, §341.
- 24. The Gay Science, §278.
- 25. The Gay Science, §278.
- 26. A Thousand Plateaus, 161.

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