PSYCHOTHERAPY
AND
PHENOMENOLOGY

On Freud, Husserl and Heidegger

Ian Rory Owen Ph.D.,

Psychotherapy and Phenomenology

Psychotherapy and Phenomenology

✦

On Freud, Husserl and Heidegger

Ian Rory Owen Ph.D.

Psychotherapy and Phenomenology
On Freud, Husserl and Heidegger

This book is in-part based on my experiences in practice. No individuals are intended for the cases mentioned. Steps have been taken to make anonymous the identities of people who were considered for the cases mentioned. Any resemblance between persons mentioned here and real persons is entirely coincidental.

This work is dedicated in loving memory of my mother, Elizabeth Van Loo (née Owen), born 25 April, 1923, died 12 May, 2001. This work is in celebration of all she taught me. We did not always see eye to eye but she was always there for me.

Contents

Part I   The problem of the naturalistic attitude

Part II   On the received wisdom of psychodynamics

Part III   The challenge of Husserl

Part IV   *A Husserlian critique of Freud*

Part V   *Developing a hermeneutic pure psychology*

List of Illustrations

Key to abbreviations and original German works

The following abbreviations and translated works have been used. They are noted here with respect to the first time they were published. The numbers in brackets refer to the date of the original year in which the books or papers were published or when the lectures were given:

§—Section.

Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis, Husserl, 2001, translation of Husserl, 1966b and parts of Husserl, 1973c, 1974a and 2000.

The Amsterdam Lectures <on> phenomenological psychology (OWW 1928), Husserl, 1997d, a translation of part of Husserl, 1968.

"Phenomenology," the Encyclopaedia Britannica article, Draft B, ("attempt at a second draft") (OWW 1927), Heidegger, 1997a.

The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (OWW 1927), Heidegger, 1982.

Being and Time (OWP 1927), Heidegger, 1996.

Cartesian Meditations (OWP 1929), Husserl, 1977a, a translation of Husserl, 1950.

Critique of Pure Reason, (first edition version A published in 1781, the second edition, version B published in 1787), translated and republished as Kant, 1993.

Crisis—The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1935–1937), Husserl, 1970b, a translation of Husserl, 1956a.

Experience and Judgement (OWP 1948), Husserl, 1973f, a translation of Husserl, 1948.

fn—Footnote.

Formal and Transcendental Logic (OWP 1929), Husserl, 1969, a translation of Husserl 1974a.

Ibid—In the same place.

Ideas I—Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book, (OWP 1913), Husserl, 1982, a translation of Husserl, 1976a and 1976b.

Ideas II—Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Second Book (written between 1912–1916 mainly, but annotated until 1928), Husserl, 1989b, a translation of Husserl, 1952a.

Ideas III—Phenomenology and the Foundation of the Sciences (OWW 1912), Husserl, 1980, a translation of Husserl, 1952b.

The Idea of Phenomenology, Husserl, 1999, translation of Husserl, 1973a.

Introduction to the Logical Introductions, (OWP 1913), Husserl, 1975b, translation of part of Husserl, 1975a.

Logical Investigations, (first edition published 1900 & 1901, the 1913 second edition is the one translated), Husserl, 1970a, translation of Husserl, 1975a and 1984.

Kant and The Idea of Transcendental Philosophy (OWW 1924), translation of part of Husserl, 1959, Husserl, 1974b.

Husserl's marginal remarks in Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Husserl, 1997e, translation of part of Husserl, 1968.

Ms.—*Nachlass,* unpublished research manuscripts in the *Husserl Archives*.

The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Husserl, 2006, translation of *Text Number Six* of Husserl, 1973b.

OWP—Original work published.

OWW—Original work written.

"Phenomenology," the Encyclopaedia Britannica article, Draft A, (OWW 1927), Husserl 1997b, a translation of part of Husserl, 1968.

"Phenomenology," Encyclopaedia Britannica article, Draft D (OWW 1927), Husserl, 1997c, translation of part of Husserl, 1968.

Phenomenological Psychology (OWW 1925), Husserl, 1977b, translation of part of Husserl, 1968.

Philosophy as Rigorous Science (OWP 1911), Husserl, 1981, translation of part of Husserl, 1987.

Pure phenomenology, its method and its field of investigation (1917), Husserl, 1972, translation of a part of Husserl, 1989a.

Time—On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917), (part of which was first published in 1928), Husserl, 1991, translation of part of Husserl, 1966a.

Thing and Space (OWW 1907), Husserl, 1997a, translation of Husserl, 1973e.

Preface

The ideas of Sigmund Freud, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger have been influential in psychology and psychotherapy. Although there is a whole school of psychotherapy that has grown around Martin Heidegger's critique of Sigmund Freud, there is no encounter between Freud's talking therapy with the philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, the two most central contributors to the branch of philosophy called phenomenology. After some research there appears to be no scholarly book-length appraisal of Husserl and Heidegger's contributions to therapy.

The three men had views on how the mind relates to what does and does not exist. What is interesting for therapists is how the ideas and practice of Freud can be developed by a more precise view of what appears. There is criticism of Freud from the position of Husserl and then an encounter between Husserl and Heidegger in order to bring out some of the commonalities and differences, so that the perspective from which Freud is criticised becomes clearer.

This book is not directly about practice but about theory for it. This text focuses on the mind of others and oneself. It aims to understand consciousness. Consciousness is the means through which we live our connection with other people, our connection with ideas, music and—in every sense, the world. Although one will never see a consciousness by itself, it is an everyday occurrence to make sense of people and oneself as having a mind and interpreting actions as, very often, purposefully sought-after, rather than as random or inadvertent. Where this work ends is in an argument for the appreciation of the intellectual, affective and social processes that combine to make psychological sense. These investigations of the theory of mind focus on conscious psychological meanings.

This book is a development of my doctoral thesis (Owen, 2003). The book and the thesis are unusual in being philosophy from a practising psychotherapist. Whilst this is not only unusual, like a bus driver suddenly becoming a brain surgeon for a week, it could even be damaging, if the bus driver is completely unable to do the work of surgery. To extend the simile further, not even the most hardy patient of the simplest surgery could withstand the damage done by a bus driver who was completely inept at surgery. Because the bus driver had never trained in surgery, was self-taught and had only read surgery books and never practised it.

However, I acknowledge my limitations as a philosopher and make no claim to have mastered this discipline. What I aspire to is building a bridge between the disciplines of applied philosophy and mental health. In some places, where commentaries on the manner of argument could have been included, they may have been omitted to state a conclusion quickly and without stating how it has been made. This is a philosophical omission for the sake of clarity and to reduce the length of the text overall.

So dear reader, I am in the position of having a PhD on Freud and two little-known twentieth century German language philosophers who are being recommended by a worker in a mysterious profession allied to medicine. However, let me reassure you of my 17 years of post-graduate study in the area of Freud, Husserl and Heidegger including 11 years of reading them whilst being doctoral student in counselling and psychotherapy. This has led me to understand intentionality, privately and publicly. My doctoral studies were aided by the following two German speaking philosophers. I would like to thank Eduard Marbach, at the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Berne, Switzerland, for reading previous drafts of chapters 7 to 10 in June 2006 and giving me editorial advice. I also thank him for his hospitality in inviting me to his home in August 1997 and for explaining some of the finer points about Husserl's work at that time that have steered me in a suitable direction ever since. Thanks are also due to Rainer Thurnher of the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Innsbruck, Austria, for the inspiration of his paper on the links between Husserl and Heidegger and their versions of phenomenology (1995). Closer to home, thanks are also due to Jenny Arthern of Leeds Mental Health Trust for commenting on some chapters of an earlier draft. Thanks are due to James Robertson of Leeds Mental Health Trust for help with making the diagrams.

The need that this work satisfies is to understand how phenomenology can play a major role in making theory refer to conscious mental phenomena. Terms like transference, resistance and processes of unconscious communication can result in a discourse that has no referent. This work is dedicated to the necessity for theory to be about phenomena that are clearly capable of identification. Accordingly, a return to Freud is made that appraises the strengths and weaknesses of his system and brings out its connections with Husserl's ideas of empathy and intersubjectivity. Iso Kern has concluded on Husserl's behalf that there is no "absolute starting point" for philosophy (Kern, 1977, p 133). This comment is taken as a warrant not to defend Husserl against his decontructionist critics. It could be possible to argue against transcendental philosophy itself, but that is omitted, while it is noted that Husserl (1982, §1, p 5) and Heidegger (1996,

§83, p 397) agreed that philosophy starts and ends with the everyday. The specific case considered is how human bodies of all kinds signify otherness and meaning. As Husserl put it in 1929: "Human beings … can only exist for me by virtue … [of] their bodies", (1982, §44, p 95, fn 195).

The result is finding the common strengths between Freud, Husserl and Heidegger for philosophers and philosophically-oriented mental health professionals. The basic method of talking therapy should not always be the basic rule of free association. Positive reasons for this are provided. The consequences of this work are appreciating meaning in its social context that crosses times and social contexts. The aim is not to change practice directly but to argue for a change of understanding. The overall aim, which cannot be created from words alone, is to encourage precision about what happens when psychotherapists make sense of clients' problems and their personal development. There is much detailed argument towards the necessity of self-justification and accountability. The work targets a lack of theoretical justification and coherence with respect to lived experience and the skills for practice.

For this work, it is insufficient to pull formulations of psychological meaning, of any event or process, out of the air without justification. Particularly, when there is no consensus on the biopsychosocial whole overall. Pure psychology, a theory-first approach seeks to avoid specific pitfalls that might obscure or misrepresent the meaningful phenomena. An adequate referent for therapy is one that can be discussed between its participants. It is argued that transference, counter-transference and unconscious communication do not have adequate referents. Nor is what appears to perception alone ever sufficient to understand psychological events. Even explanatory words and phrases by themselves mean little. In order to grasp a psychological meaning requires interpreting what can be seen, heard, emotionally-felt and bodily-felt. The meaning of what is said is far in excess of what is heard as mere sounds. Such meanings are donated to what appears perceptually, to make a complex whole that is usually taken for granted.

This analysis raises the question of what should be the style of relating to clients. What is supported is that therapists should be friendly and engaging, yet not talk about their personal lives or themselves. Therapy is the calm and rational voice that alleviates distress and increases psychological well-being. However, difficult it is to specify what these things are. This work finds free association and free floating attention invaluable as ways of practising talking therapy in some circumstances, but not applicable to all situations. It doubts the validity and usefulness of Freud's metapsychology, similarly to other writers (e.g. Schafer, 1976).

In this work the term "psychotherapy" refers to individual talking and action therapies. Those made in the shadows of Sigmund Freud and Albert Ellis. The terms "patient" and "analysand" are included in the term "client". Similarly, all variations such as "doctor," "counsellor," "clinical psychologist," "psychotherapist" and "analyst" are included when using the word "therapist". The term "psychotherapy" refers to all forms of therapy including counselling. The term "psychodynamic" is used to refer to all forms of therapy that are derived from Freud such as "psychoanalysis," "psychoanalytic psychotherapy" and "psychodynamic counselling". The term "psychodynamic" first arose in the work of Edoardo Weiss as far as I can ascertain. "Psychodynamics is the science which describes and explains the manifestations and the consequences of the interaction of mental forces within the human being", (Weiss, 1950, p 3). For Weiss as for Freud, these forces are both inner and outer, spurring on action and inhibiting it, and are found in wishes, meaning and emotions of all kinds.

Because a major tradition of referencing already exists for referring to Freud, this tradition is maintained. The volumes of Freud's *Standard Edition* are referred to according to the standardised list of the order of their publication in Volume 24. Page numbers from Husserl have the section number included because there are multiple English translations available in some cases as well as multiple German original publications. References are placed in the chronological order of their writing or original publication and not alphabetical order or the order of their translation and re-publication.

The text is a slow bicycle race in the style of a philosophical attention to phenomena. This book is not for hasty readers. In a slow bicycle race, the winner is the one who takes the longest time to cover the same distance as the other participants.

PART I
The problem of the naturalistic attitude

1

Introduction

Aim: This chapter states a case for the work as a whole.

§1 The importance of meaning

Despite the use of "hermeneutics," "intentionality," "empathy" and "intersubjectivity" in some areas of psychotherapy and psychological research, there has been no in-depth explanation from the original source in philosophy about what these ideas mean. In order to show what these terms mean, and how they could be useful, a good deal has to be explained to show the problem and its answer. The ultimate aim of this work is to show the importance and ubiquity of making sense of the psychological world but there are many necessary steps to be trod before the ultimate aim can be achieved.

The first part of the book makes links between Freud and Husserl and states a commonality between philosophy and the empirical branch of psychology called theory of mind. Theory of mind is noteworthy because it has reinvented a philosophical wheel. Specifically, the wheel is the necessity of reading psychological meaning. However, such a topic is problematic for a great deal of the traditional empirical view of natural psychological science. However, the very same situation of how to understand people, face to face or otherwise, is emblematic for the phenomenological view provided by Husserl and Heidegger. Because natural psychological science is quantificatory and prefers to understand through measurement. It places faith in the techniques of natural science and it is impossible for such techniques to grasp the immediacy of how meaningful experience is present, as a phenomenon, for more than one person.

For the view of Husserl, the brute fact that wholes of meaning appear is the starting point for a qualitative analysis. What this means for the structure of the book is that part two presents and begins an appraisal of two concepts of Freud. Part three defines Husserl's theorising system. The concepts are appraised by an encounter between Freud and Husserl in part four. A hermeneutic phenomenol-

ogy is created by an encounter between Husserl and Heidegger in part five. What this means is that the end-point of the book is not just the realisation of what hermeneutics is, and what it should mean to psychologists and psychotherapists, but that the method of a hermeneutic phenomenology needs further development and application to specific situations.

Husserl's answer concerns relating conscious phenomena to the sharing of intentionality between people (intersubjective intentional implication, co-intentionality or co-empathy), with respect to the everyday psychological world. Husserl's ideas are not wholly accepted without criticism, but are used as a first sketch for creating a future project of a hermeneutics of the therapeutic situation. Such a project would take into account the manifold of perspectives on any cultural object discussed in the relationship. A cultural object is any conscious public object such as a person, an emotion, a type of relationship, an idea or a thing.

The answers of parts four and five are sufficient because the concepts adequately model the way in which time is apportioned to the interests and values that satisfy current needs. People do not make friends because they want to have specific chemicals in their bloodstream. They make friends because they want company and value it sufficiently to make the finding and maintenance of friendships a priority that brings a reward.

§2 Problems addressed

It is insufficient to sideline intentionality, empathy and intersubjectivity merely because they are part of everyday experience. They are genuine phenomena to be theorised, understood and explained in the human sciences. Phenomenology is part of a struggle to understand meaning without the naturalistic attitude. This struggle is to protect the public phenomena of meaning from approaches that would render conscious meaning as worthless, irrelevant or falling outside any proper means of study.

The major distinctions forwarded concern understanding intentionality in its proper context of being capable of sharing and mutual interest. Intentionality is an introductory watchword though. It gives way to a focus on a specific type of intentionality: empathy. Specifically, the version of empathy argued for is the socially learned experiencing of another's perspective on the common shared world. Literally, knowing what other people are talking about. It is argued that the best name for this intentionality is empathic presentation or co-empathy. This is because empathic presentation is a more precise designation of the sort of indication that empathy is. Furthermore, to rename empathy as "co-empathy" is not pedantic or semantic but an emphasis on the inter-active nature of being able

to express ourselves in relation to how we understand ourselves being received by others, simultaneously as we relate to those others.

Specifically, the naturalistic attitude is not and cannot focus on meaning. Only a genuinely public phenomenon like meaning can be properly approached by a view of psychology that accounts for lived experiences and relates them to the biopsychosocial whole. Whatever natural psychological science finds out about the brain, genetics and the chemical substrate of being human, will never fully justify the psychosocial interventions of psychotherapy. Similarly, measurement, statistics and all methods of quantification cannot explain how consciousness works. Therefore, it is meaning that needs to be the major focus for psychotherapy.

The naturalistic attitude of natural psychological science acts as though all understanding is gained through real, empirical means. The problem is that it believes intellectual work is absent from the creation of empirical results. The consequence of the problem is a difficulty in creating a justified position for understanding psychological life, specifically as psychological, and not solely concerning natural-material being. "Psychological" here means emotional, relational and concerning intentionalities about conscious lived experiences such as thoughts, feelings and beliefs. The naturalistic attitude believes that only natural-material cause is worthy of attention. The naturalistic attitude rules out the complex connection among all three aspects of the biopsychosocial whole. The naturalistic attitude contradicts the as-yet-unknown overall interaction between each aspect. At some point in the future, it may be possible to specify precisely how inherited material developments interact with culture and personal choice. Until then, there is uncertainty about how to proceed.

The problem of therapy is that the biopsychosocial whole is irreducible to any one of its parts. The first and foremost problem of therapy is the hasty focus on one third of the causal factors involved. In philosophy, clear thinking prior to action, this is called *the problem of the naturalistic attitude*. In psychology, the same problem is known by a series of equivalent terms. It has been referred to as Scientism, physical reductivism, materialism, material reductionism and psychologism. Briefly, the problem of the naturalistic attitude is a philosophical position that believes that empirical psychology is a sufficient procedure to provide all types of understanding including ideal knowledge, like mathematics and logic. Husserl answered this problem in the *Logical Investigations,* first published in 1900 (Husserl, 1970a) by pointing out that there are real and ideal types of knowledge. He furthered an appreciation of an ideal theory of meaning: This means that speech and writing, for instance, work because people know in an

ideal way what is being referred to. A referent is the same in metaphor and sarcasm, in Mandarin or French. Similarly, ideals need to be found and understood in philosophy and psychology, to create a preliminary theoretical overview to coordinate action. Accordingly, phenomenology exists to find the ideals of consciousness in relation to other consciousness and the world of meaning, with objects of all types in it. Phenomenology does not replace empiricism but is preparatory for it.

In short, natural psychology measures and tests very specific hypotheses through statistics and associated means. For this work, the intentionality of consciousness has to be understood. *Consciousness is the organ of manifestation of all experience and understanding*: Be that of self and others in the psychological life or in politics, play or work. Consciousness has the evolutionary purpose of being part of control and free will in relating with others and achieving the aims of life. Psychological problems imply that control and free will have not worked and require external help.

Husserl has been incorrectly criticised for over 40 years for a variety of reasons. Part of the necessary work is to dispel widely held views about his stance that are plain wrong. Let us consider one such falsehood and remove it. Husserl's view of his stance, from about 1917 onwards, was that what he thought he was doing was using the technique of reduction to remove "all Cartesian aims", (Husserl, 1972, p 13). Similarly, Elisabeth Ströker (1980) has called pure psychology in *The Crisis* "non-Cartesian", (p 84). A good number of non-Cartesian features were also present in 1928 as the *Amsterdam Lectures* show (Husserl, 1997c). René Descartes was criticised in the opening lines of the *Cartesian Meditations*. Husserl claimed he had rejected "nearly all the well-known doctrinal content of the Cartesian philosophy", (1977a, §1, p 1). When these remarks are connected with the insights Husserl had already attained, it becomes clear that by 1924, "transcendental subjectivity is not exhausted by the "present actuality" … and that all constituted "sense" and "meaning" cannot be traced back to this aspect of consciousness", (Landgrebe, 1981, p 90). Furthermore, evidence always includes the possibility of error because the refined data of essence remain alongside "illusions, phantasies, "pure" possibilities, and eidetic objectivities", (Husserl, 1977a, §47, p 105). Therefore, by 1929, "Cartesian" exists in the title of the *Meditations* but not within the content of its pages. His stance is non-Cartesian in the sense that it does not wholly follow the distinction *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. Husserl's position was complex and placed living bodiliness *Leib* (pronounced "libe") between spirit (*Geistes*, consciousness) and nature, its material form (1989b, §62, p 297). The German word for the material body is *Körper* (pronounced "koorpah").

Husserl's writings after 1924 repel a number of wildly inaccurate criticisms from the positions of analytic philosophy, deconstruction and Heidegger. The anti-Cartesian presence of remarks such as the wish to expunge the naïvety of apodicticity is a conclusion that was hoped to turn phenomenology on itself to make meta-phenomenological criticisms. But that project never came to a satisfactory conclusion (Fink, 1995). It is clear that Husserl disapproved of claims of indubitability in the *Meditations* first published in 1931. The "first stage of phenomenology … is itself *still infected with a certain naïveté* (*the naïveté of apodicticity*)" where apodicticity means absolute certainty (Husserl, 1977a, §63, p 151). This phrase means error is always possible: "How far can the transcendental ego be deceived about himself? And how far do those components extend that are absolutely indubitable, in spite of such possible deception?" (§9, p 22–3). This latter unanswered question means that there is no metaphysics of presence in the mature thought of Husserl (see also 1991, App IX, p 122–3). The precise date of the conclusion on the lack of an absolute starting point has been placed in the year 1911 by Rudolf Bernet because of the "impossibility … of ever realizing" the ideal of finding self-givenness, a "perceptual presence of the flow to itself," meaning the flow of conscious experience (1982, p 110–111). The intention is that there is a wish for apodicticity concerning philosophy and all rational principles. So when Husserl wrote that "perfection is "*apodicticity*"", (Husserl, 1977a, §6, p 15), he meant that he wanted it, but certainty was no longer in view.

The manner of addressing the problem is transcendental philosophy in the manner first began by Kant and pursued by Husserl and Heidegger. Such a style of thinking about how concepts are found from experience is not new to psychotherapy and is the first thought that Wilhelm Reich gave his readers in 1933 who commented that the practitioner:

> … is confronted every day by problems which he is unable to solve either by his theoretical knowledge alone or by his practical experience alone. All problems of technique converge in the one basic question whether and how an unequivocal technique of analytic therapy can be derived from the theory of the neuroses … In reality, it is analytic practice which, by the problems it presents, leads to a theory of psychic processes; thus we have to explore the paths which lead from purely empirical practice, over theoretical considerations, to a theoretically well-grounded practice.
>
> Reich, 1970, p 3.

The same problem confronts therapists of all kinds today. The answer of a philosophical approach to therapy means justification of one's stance in detail. Ther-

apy makes client and therapist contemplate what a human life should be. The answer to such a question is far from simple. There are many viable frameworks for trying to structure a life. Here, the framework for getting an answer to these questions is to consider what philosophy can offer for understanding the commonalities between psychodynamic and cognitive behavioural therapy—understood more broadly as talk and action. Currently, there is a stand-off between talk and action. Some therapists only train in one model, so all clients get what the therapist has trained in. Integrative therapy values flexibility in tailoring the treatment to fit specific client needs. This work values Freud's focus on the therapeutic relationship and meaning. It wishes to improve on that and bring it to the best of what other models, including cognitive behavioural therapy, have to offer.

§3 Answers provided

The work as a whole introduces the relevance of hermeneutics to psychotherapy. Insodoing, it is a self-reflexive perspective because hermeneutics means of showing accurate interpretations over inaccurate ones. It is insufficient to claim an answer and necessary to demonstrate to others why and how the answer works. The need is to appraise ideas themselves.

The chapters below show how Husserl's ideas of intentionality, the intentional implication in empathy, and the topics of intersubjectivity—are accurate descriptions of universal phenomena. The consequence is that what is championed as an answer to the problems of therapy is called the biopsychosocial perspective. The biopsychosocial perspective demands a future consensus about *precisely* how the biological, psychological and social dimensions of human being mutually influence each other. The *biological* refers to all that is material, physical and genetically-inherited. The *psychological* refers to the dimension of free will, choice and the intentionality of being related to what is believed to exist. (Belief occurs through forms of intentionality such as perceiving, anticipating and recollecting). The *social* refers to the influence of intersubjectivity culture, society and history as they are handed down through the medium of the family and those around us. There is mutual influence between each of these three aspects as several different writers have noted (Engel, 1980, Kern, 1986, Gabbard, 2000, Plomin et al, 2000).

The appraisal below makes no attempt at a neutral comparison of Freud and Husserl. Explicitly, Freud's stance is appraised through the psychological version of Husserl's phenomenological philosophy, a development of Kant's exploration of the conditions of possibility concerning genuine understanding of a referent in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1993) and other works. The genre of the philosophy

of considering theoretical conditions and possibilities, prior to action, includes Paul Ricoeur on Freud and Husserl in *Freud and Philosophy*, (1970), Sebastian Gardner on Immanuel Kant (1999) and Eduard Marbach (1993) on the intentional analysis of mental processes (intentionality) as part of a representational theory of mind. All of these works consider the conditions for meaning and could be called "transcendental philosophy" as they are Kantian to greater and lesser degrees.

The means of argument adopted is laying out Freud's position by breathing some life into his practice. This is because the great majority of works on Freud, psychoanalysis and psychodynamic therapy assume that the reader understands practice and, in particular, Freud's practice. Because a return to Freud is being made, his concepts are appraised in the light of his practice as it applies not only to the specific situation of Freud's psycho-analysis but also in regarding therapy as part of social contact as a whole. A similar attention to practice is made in explaining Husserl's method of theorising and providing details of an approach to psychological meaning. Thus, the means of argument with respect to the concepts of Freud are to understand abstractions with respect to the specific situations to which they refer.

The type of answer provided is that a modified form of Husserl's phenomenology called pure psychology does have relevance to contemporary problems in psychotherapy and theorising about psychological topics. Specifically, intentionality is sufficient in that it refers to the many different ways in which people can be conscious-of the same referent. Intentionality is shared through empathy so that two or more people inter-relate with respect to their senses of the same referent. Hence the social phenomena of meaning are adequately recognised for what they are: They are social.

In relation to the original central phenomena that Freud sought, amnesia, unconscious processes in relation to unconscious objects and understanding new people in relation to those already known, do not by themselves constitute the whole of consciousness and are not central to the operation of consciousness. On the contrary, what is central is understanding empathy as a part of intersubjectivity. This enables better quality thinking. Such thinking is better because it is more accurate in connection with the different types of psychological 'cause' and it recognises different types of the on-set and maintenance of lived meaning.

Below, the argument is complex and divided into five stages. This first part sets the scene and explains the approach taken. The problem of the naturalistic attitude for understanding human relations is introduced and hermeneutics is explained. Part two sets up Freud's position as the leading model for the therapies.

Part three supplies Husserl's answer to create an empathic and intersubjective view of psychological reality. Part four concludes on Freud for all talking therapies. Psychodynamics unclearly addresses conscious objects and unclearly relates to conscious meaning because of its preoccupation with the unconscious and natural science. Part five expands Husserl's pure psychology to include hermeneutics by appraising the contribution of his junior colleague Heidegger. Although the greatest focus is on the psychological function of talk and relating in the type of talking therapy that makes reference to Freud. Talking and relating within other forms of therapy are also addressed by this focus.

Although the terminology of intentionality, hermeneutics and intersubjectivity are not central concerns in some areas of psychotherapy and psychology. The difference between a sense and a referent is that there can be a manifold of senses about the same referent. Accordingly, to consider only one sense is to mis-represent the phenomenon of the object that is given across the manifold of experiences of it. Just such an appreciation of this centrality is argued for. Indeed, once their scope is understood, it makes it hard to identify what is personal any more. What only belongs to oneself has shrunk.

2

Setting the scene

Aim: This chapter further sets the scene for parts one to four. It focuses on what it means to talk, relate and be conscious of any psychological object, in relation to the psychodynamic tradition. But these remarks also apply to any talk and action therapy.

Instead of a misplaced attention to material being and natural science, and a jump to the sphere of psychosocial justifications for practice, what should be happening is an attention to meaning, relationship and the interpretation of qualitative experience, in order to create justifications that are pertinent to the psychosocial skills and aims of practice.

Whatever their cause, psychological problems have a profound influence on the course of people's lives, particularly in the case of the early acquisition of trauma in childhood. The consequences of childhood disorders can last for decades or be potentially lifelong influences. Because of the fundamental importance of the therapeutic relationship, the first four parts of this work are devoted to assessing and providing a new answer for understanding human relationships. To offset an excessive focus on the natural, and the lack of an account of the link between the natural-material part of human being and the psychosocial part, what is given priority here is the psychosocial. The order of appraisal for this chapter is to sketch the commonalities between Freud and Husserl in a way that refers not just to psychodynamics but also to any use of speech in psychotherapy.

§4 Why Freud and Husserl?

Explaining why Freud and Husserl have been chosen as an introductory focus sets the scene. Freud is chosen because all types of therapy involve making and working with the therapeutic relationship. Later chapters appraise and revise Freud's concepts. The majority of psychotherapists have not heard of Husserl. He was a German philosopher of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Only the most relevant aspects of Husserl's stance are mentioned.

Between the two men, a number of tensions and similarities arise that are used to create a synthesis about how to understand talk and action. What Freud and Husserl share is an attention to intentionality, the different forms of mental processes. Intentionalities cannot be directly perceived in others. Yet a great deal of psychological life is about understanding, correctly or incorrectly, the intentionalities and conscious mental objects of others. The conscious products of intentionality can be experienced first- or second-hand. To experience something first-hand is to be involved in feeling and thinking something, for instance. It is also possible to be aware of *how* one feels and thinks. To be aware of what another person is thinking or feeling can only ever be empathised and appear for oneself second-hand, although such an experience is first-hand for them.

Sigmund Freud's brief sketches and provisional conclusions are appraised to develop theory and practice about what it is to relate. Freud is selected because his stance can be used to establish an authoritative position on what therapy used to be—and show how it could be. Therefore, Freud is selected over others who have forwarded an interest in meaning, empathy and intersubjectivity. It is Freud who has been most influential in creating the ideas of transference, counter-transference and unconscious communication for interpreting the therapeutic relationship.

However, it is argued that Freud's account of these key ideas was incoherent. The problem identified in chapter 1 was that there is an excessive reliance on the naturalistic attitude. However, Freud confused the matter further by focusing on an unconscious realm of non-appearing objects. Husserl is selected as a protagonist to challenge Freud and assert an improved attention to intentionality, empathy and intersubjectivity.

The preferred psychodynamic interpretation is to employ the concept of the unconscious to infer objects that are never conscious. Namely, that unconscious communication is occurring from clients, who influence the unconscious of therapists. But how is this route reasoned to exist? It is achieved because Freud made a demarcation between unconscious and conscious, but cut himself off from making clear *how* he can make rational conclusions about his preferred 'object'. Therefore, it is unclear as to how the conscious senses of others can be distinguished in relation to the 'unconscious' senses they allegedly have also.

Explicitly, this work is *against* discrediting conscious experience and *for* a priori thinking (following Kant, Husserl and Heidegger). What a priori thinking means will become clearer in the next chapter and chapter 7. Specifically, this work examines the constraints and freedoms of the phenomena of meeting with other persons. The central phenomenon is the situation where two (or more)

people meet and discuss mutual topics of interest. Such discussions make sense to varying degrees and from different perspectives.

An entirely qualitative analysis of experience is being suggested as helpful. One that takes into account the attitude taken towards an object of attention and teases apart theory and practice. Practice creates theory and vice versa. It was Husserl's aim to create pure theory for thinking through the conditions for any academic study and finding its most fundamental qualities. It was Heidegger's aim to create a hermeneutic approach to understand how theory and practice inter-relate. So it becomes possible to understand the practice of theory and theory-in-practice. For this work, it is necessary to consider fundamental qualities. Specifically, two matters that are most fundamental to psychology and therapy are: *meaning*, and, *how people relate with respect to each other's viewpoint*.

§5 Freud's legacy as a problem in attending to clients

The intellectual legacy of Freud is not a historical novelty on the way to current truths. In beginning a talking and relating treatment, that dealt with a person's past and the minutiae of their lives, he took a radical turn. There are a number of ways of reading Freud: as therapist influenced by biology, neurology, linguistics, a map-maker of the unconscious, as developmental psychologist, and theoretician of society, to name a few. Rather than debate all these possibilities and make a scholarly recap of the literature so far, the first thing to note in mentioning Freud is to make a clear statement on the purpose of mentioning his work. Specifically, this is to understand theory and practice in relation to their proper referents. In order to do this, something needs to be stated about the overall model of therapy that is being preferred. What is preferred is a two-stage model of *how to understand* that guides *how to act*. When it comes to talking and relating, just citing the name of Freud is not enough to get justification. The value of an attempt at the ideal of free association, and free floating attention for talking therapy, is to help clients set their own agenda and help them tell their story in their own way. The actions that they take in life are their business, with some influence from therapists. The return to Freud in this work is a return to the power of speech to help clients find their own resources, wherever that is possible. Discussions with therapists are best understood within the context of co-empathy and intersubjectivity, as part three will argue.

However, Freud is well known for his focus on the unconscious. This concept could have benefits or drawbacks depending on how it is understood. In these pages, it is seen as viable to speak to clients in a manner that therapists understand how they are making sense of clients and that addresses the conscious con-

cerns of clients in each session. On the one hand, there is a limitation set on the sense of the unconscious, which is the major topic of chapters 4, 5 and 12. On the other hand, and in a completely different sense, the unknown can be invoked in a way of appealing to the limitations of therapeutic and empirical findings within the whole of the biopsychosocial knowledge of cause and developmental effect. Furthermore, it is often the case that clients understand themselves well. But something stops them effecting change, even when they know precisely what it is that would bring them pleasure and satisfaction. For some *unknown* reason, they cannot or will not look after their needs. This sense of the unknown or inexplicable is a useful sense but it is not the one that Freud invoked.

So when there is difficulty for clients in looking after themselves, difficulty or unwillingness in putting in the effort to make changes and get control of well-understood issues—there a concept of the unknown can help. This employment of the unknown is far from Freud's usage but does refer to a genuine lack of certainty about cause. The problems of personality, attachment style and sexuality, plus the effects of long-distant childhood abuse and neglect, are retained and remembered lifelong: These all act on self-esteem and empathy. In the biopsychosocial perspective, such matters are close to inherited influence through the accident of birth and the material effects created by decades of fear, violence and social isolation. The empirical findings on causation and epidemiology can be summed up as being that there are unidentifiable, specific causes for specific clients. There is no authoritative understanding of the unique pattern of a person's life and the interaction between personality, social context and psychological disorders. And that includes the views expressed below.

Freud's stance is problematic and illuminating for a number of reasons. The problems of his hermeneutic legacy are representative of similar confusions in cognitive behavioural therapy and other schools of practice. Let us consider a specific example in order to make the psychodynamic terminology clear. A young man enters therapy in order to deal with feeling disappointed in other people and himself. The general pattern that is identified, with the help of the assessor for brief individual therapy, is that he has high hopes in trying to help others. Yet when others do not accept his help, he feels utterly crushed and worthless as a result. One part of this pattern is that there are unrealistically high anticipations of what will happen. Such high anticipations do not meet the actuality of the situation and cannot be sustained. Each disappointment is evidence to the client that he is useless in his own eyes and those of others.

Within the assessment appointment, the assessor tries to make some test of the client's ability to focus on the relationship with the therapist, to think psycholog-

ical events through and discuss them. The therapist asks him what he would do if he were to feel that his therapist was letting him down, just like all the rest. In response to this request, the young man comes to a startled halt. He stares open-mouthed at the therapist, because such a possibility has never crossed his mind before. After a long pause, "I guess I would talk about it," he says. This indicates that this client is able to reflect on his experiences and relationships. A talking therapy is suitable for him.

This simple occurrence contains some key aspects of any two people meeting and talking. This cameo is a pertinent example of how people interact intersubjectively. One person speaks about a problem they have with others. What the other understands is handed back in speech, identifying some possible factors about what is 'causing' the client to feel repeatedly disappointed. Each non-verbal and verbal expression is a possible 'cause' for conscious experiences. As clients recall their past experiences, there will be thoughts, emotions and visual memories that appear for them. Often, clients interpret their own worth in a specifically harsh way. Therapists interpret what they empathise with an eye to naming and distinguishing the intentionalities with respect to the conscious objects of others.

Despite the focus on interpreting what appears to consciousness in psychodynamic therapy, Freud wanted his psycho-analysis to be a natural scientific psychology: A version of natural science applied to human being. This has been noted by a number of writers including Paul Ricoeur, who wrote *Freud and Philosophy* on hermeneutics, that was translated in to English in 1970, and in definitive comments by David Smith in *It Sounds Like an Excellent Idea* (1995). One of the problems with Freud's writing is that he conflated observable phenomena with theory concerning the nature of the phenomena and ideas of cause and effect. Later writers have made a number of differentiations between the most basic phenomena of therapy. For instance, attachment is the differentiation of a style of relating and its vicissitudes—from the libido that refers to sexuality.

However, Smith has made useful definitive statements about the Freudian picture of human nature, relationships and consciousness. He concluded by writing that it was his "impression that existential practitioners sometimes feel that the validity of their philosophical concepts and their psychotherapeutic interventions are directly underwritten by the authority of their guiding philosophy", (p 158). The specific metatheoretical position Smith defined, on behalf of Freud and psychodynamics, is "that Freud was a dyed-in-the-wool physicalist from 1895 until his demise in 1939", (p 151). The stance of physicalism is the naturalistic attitude of natural scientific psychology. Smith credits Kim Sterelny (1990) as making

clear the 'correct' inter-relation between meaning and relating—and unconscious-material cause:

> The level of physical implementation refers to the wetware of the nervous system, and is concerned with the physical basis of mental events. This level is the province of neuroscience.
>   The second level in Sterelny's model is the computational level. The computational level refers to how the mind carries out its inner operations. Computational analyses are typically expressed by descriptions interaction between modules operating in linear sequence … or in a complex network … a computational model, as is Freud's topography.
>   The third level in Sterelny's taxonomy is the ecological level. The ecological level pertains to the relationship between the mind and the world around and encompasses the proper function or meaning of mental events.
>
> Smith, 1994, p 149.

Sterelny is correct in classifying Freud's account as a natural science of the relations between the brain, unconscious intentionalities and consciousness. The above is held to be accurate concerning what Freud believed and how contemporary psychodynamic therapy construes these same relations, particularly in the branch called neuro-psychoanalysis.

The focus for contemporary psychodynamics is the computational level and that means theorising about cause and effect within a surrounding interpretative context of anticipating that biological and material causes predominate. For natural science, the conscious mind cannot be trusted to reveal anything of worth because it is an epiphenomenal effect and not the causative substrate. Smith terms the natural science stance a "metatheory" by which he means a position within which it is possible to create hypotheses that are capable of falsification. This is because only specific predictions can survive a process of empirical testing in sessions. Smith asks rhetorically that he "would be pleased to hear of any non-trivial, falsifiable predictions that can be deduced in a principled fashion from any of the other insight-oriented psychotherapies", (1995, p 156). This work responds to this challenge by providing alternative accounts of transference, counter-transference and unconscious communication by reasons for focusing on the relation to conscious senses. What demands explanations are empathy and meanings of a co-intentional sort that are experienced and understood as intellectual, fleeting imaginings or clear felt-senses.

On the contrary to psychodynamics, it is here believed that people act according to conscious meanings. Through their free will they choose one outcome over

another. There certainly are natural-material influences and constraints. But these are not the whole of human being and only a part. On the contrary to Freud and the naturalistic attitude; hermeneutics, meaning and the perspective of others must be treated suitably. Such qualitative experience falls outside the scope of natural science. Freud had his own interpretation of meaning and the nature of the therapeutic relationship. It involved the naturalistic attitude that is a potential problem for all types of therapy. Freud analysed intentionality when he focussed on the interplay of the economic, topographic and dynamic aspects of his metapsychology. By positing a number of theoretical forces and energies that are in opposition, he explained the changing phenomena of clients who he asked to speak what comes to mind, in free association. Freud's writings concern recognisable therapeutic occurrences. But the phenomena were given an overlay of theory immediately.

In the critique that ensues, the following aspects of Freud's gift to therapy are accepted as valuable without doubt: The basic method of the free association of clients and the free floating attention of therapists are acceptable as a means to an end. Like hermeneutics though, the attempt at free-floating attention ends in a decision: In some way, making sense of the situation occurs. This is where Freud's theories of transference, counter-transference and his metapsychology of consciousness obscure the phenomena of communication and consciousness. They hamper making sense of conscious phenomena by failing to establish the conditions for understanding. The following is a quotation from Smith that states Freud's hermeneutic legacy to those who accept the orthodoxy of his theorising and its consequences for practice:

> Psychoanalytic therapy presupposes the existence of latent, unconscious meanings. The therapist discovers latent meaning through suspending the belief that the patient's communications are best understood within their generally assumed and consciously intended context. The psychoanalytic therapist opts instead for the strategy of situating the patient's discourse within one or more alternative contexts. I call this the process of *recontextualising*. Some commonly employed alternative contexts are those of transference (monitoring information with reference to the patient's fantasies and illusions about the therapist), non-transference (monitoring in terms of veridical unconscious perceptions of the therapist), genetics (monitoring in terms of developmental theory), dynamics (monitoring in terms of the interactions between hypothetical 'psychical forces') and economics (monitoring in terms of the processes of tension and discharge).

> Smith, 1987, p 314.

The above means that the method for understanding clients involves rejecting the consciously indicated content and context told to therapists. Psychodynamic therapists gain their understanding by recontextualising the conscious communication, of the speech and non-verbal communication of clients, in one or more of the contexts supplied by theory.

Inevitably, having therapy means making sense of clients through supplying contexts of understanding. For psychodynamics, allegedly unconscious causes create conscious meaning and experience. As Smith points out, psychodynamic interpretations are hypotheses concerning the following six types of cause.

i. The transference of clients is understood as being causative of their conscious imaginings and felt-senses about therapists. Unconscious energies and forces, the drives, aims and wishes of childhood cause conscious psychological derivatives.

ii. Resistance causes limits to free association and hence limits having therapy and recovering from psychological problems.

iii. Non-transferential experiences of clients are understood as comments on the real relationship.

iv. Developmental delays and fixations, developed in childhood or previously, cause specific sensitivities in the adult.

v. Changes in the dynamics of opposing forces and the psychological energy of individual clients cause changes across time, in sessions and current life.

vi. 'Economic' changes are causes concerning increases of frustration and the desire to discharge psychological energy.

For any therapist who follows the above, interpreting means that clients never know their own unconscious causes and that therapists should know them. Furthermore, Freud did once mention that it is possible to have hypotheses concerning cause indirectly validated or falsified by clients. In relation to the similarities between communications made in disparate contexts, he concluded that others could communicate in ways that were indirect. Apparently such unconscious communication is "an exact parallel to the indirect confirmations that we obtain in analysis from associations", (Freud, 1937d, p 264).

Freud's interpretation is the naming of causes. It assumes that human being is caused by unconscious psychological forces and natural-material cause. Clients do not have accurate self-knowledge of their own motivations. Interpretation in

Freud's sense is telling clients what therapists infer. It concerns helping clients, through telling them about their own motivations. Therapy provides fuller accounts of what clients should know but do not. Although clients do not understand themselves, allegedly psychodynamics can successfully diagnose the cause of their problems. However, this same process occurs for all therapeutic schools and is part of everyday life in understanding other people generally.

Usually, no consideration is given to the case that hermeneutic processes are at work in supplying and re-supplying new contexts for understanding. For instance, amongst the six causes above, one interpretation concerns wish fulfilment as means of understanding the 'irrationality' of the emotions and human relationships, through the creation of an expanded context for understanding.

Despite these critical remarks, Freud's gift to therapy in general is an emphasis on understanding clients and relationships with them, as occurring in an expanded context of listening, whilst a free-floating attention is maintained. But that stage is methodologically prior to the theoretical and hermeneutic stage that follows. The 'pure' attention to clients precedes the interpretation of unconscious causes, in the quest to interpret the drives or contemporary versions of what is believed to be unconscious and causative. In this respect, some writers believe that it is the context of an occurrence that defines whether any conscious mental object can be shown to be a sign of the conscious ego or whether it is due to the 'unconscious mind' (Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein, 1946, Gill, 1963, pp 145–147, Schafer, 1976, p 218). Such aims occur with respect to understanding other persons and making tangible the nature of the influence of the past, or the nature of the emotional contact between the parties involved.

The relationship is interpreted to have 'unconscious' aspects from a position that is neither the lived experience of clients' nor the therapists' instantaneous sense of the interaction as it unfolds. Theory imposes its influence on psychodynamic therapy because theory shapes any therapeutic approach. The core activity of psychodynamic talking therapy is a hermeneutics of 'unconscious experience' and interpreting forms of 'intentionality'. The unconscious allegedly appears through the medium of 'unconscious communication,' transference and countertransference enactments by therapists. These terms are scrutinised in detail.

§6 First introduction to phenomenology

Husserl's phenomenology attended to many topics in ways that are helpful for therapy, psychology and the human sciences. Phenomenology can be described as a philosophical approach to conscious experience that theorises all types of social experience. Two central terms are *empathy* and *intersubjectivity*. Empathy is the

perspective of others and intersubjectivity is how people interact. The other major term is *intentionality* that has an adjectival form, "intentional," in a specific sense that does not mean purposeful but 'concerning consciousness'. Husserl's stance is subtly nuanced and enormously complex. The way of introducing it is to do so in stages, across a number of chapters.

Husserl spent over thirty years theorising intentionality, empathy and intersubjectivity (1973b, 1973c, 1973d). To cut a long story short, empathy and intersubjectivity are *co-intentional* in that intentionality gets shared between people. People are open to each other. What this means is that the pleasures and fears of others are capable of being understood but only ever in a manner that is "second-hand" sharing. Husserl believed that the first-hand experiences of others can become learned and perspectives of our own. But there are social limits to understanding other cultures that shape the universe of what makes sense. What Husserl offered is a theoretical model for finding the necessary conditions of possibility for any actual occurrence of self, other and a meaningful cultural object. The point is that an accurate theoretical understanding of empathy and intersubjectivity are required. For instance, through understanding intersubjectivity ideally it is possible to understand actual instances of it. This is a fancy way of asking people to think before they act. The point is that practice and empirical research assume theoretical ideals. In order to become a better practitioner of any sort, one needs to be a better theoretician. Theory and practice are not separate realms. What phenomenology offers is a means of creating ideal models of the social world. This attention does not replace practice and research but sharpens it.

Identifying the problem of the naturalistic attitude and working to rectify it ultimately means there can be a single model for talk and action in therapy. But due to the complexity and difficulty of Husserl's original texts, a large number of spurious readings have arisen. Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty are noted as being two key interpreters of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. The work of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty is called existential phenomenology or existentialism for short (Owen, 2004). However, it is Merleau-Ponty who was closest to the original thinkers, Husserl and Heidegger. Some writers believe that Heidegger was the better philosopher. Yet nowhere in Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty's work is the same attention to detail found as in Edmund Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*, a notoriously difficult text. In many areas of contemporary thought in therapy and attachment research, the words "empathy" and "intersubjectivity" are used—but with no relation to their meaning as defined in Husserl.

This work corrects this deficit by presenting an overview of Husserl's conclusions on empathy and intersubjectivity.

Phenomenology is about consciousness and its lived experiences. Yet how one's own consciousness works never fully appears to oneself and many of its objects are preconscious, in Freud's sense, at any specific moment. Freud was right, and Husserl would have agreed, that the objects of awareness can be *descriptively unconscious*. There is nothing wrong with the use of the word "unconscious" to mean objects that are not currently conscious. But to believe that something unconscious 'causes' a new conscious awareness for clients does not mean that unconscious senses exist in anything other than the descriptive sense that has just been defined. Nor does it permit interpretation of a wholly unconscious realm in Freud's manner.

For Husserl, intentional implication between persons (or appresentation) is what happens when consciousness adds new intentional references to what appears perceptually. For in perception "every appearance that arises in it implies an entire system of appearance, specifically in the form of intentional inner and outer horizons", (Husserl, 2001, §3, p 48). Furthermore, when Husserl used the term "consciousness," at some points this means only what appears to awareness, whilst at others it includes processes and senses that are quasi-present and quasi-absent. For instance, if we know about trees because we read a book about them as a child and we talk about trees now, we awaken the long dormant but still accessible knowledge we acquired at the earlier time. The thoughts become present but the original words and distinctions about trees they refer to are not present. Husserl had a theory of how to interpret unconscious presence and the function of retained and remembering generally that is highly complex. In over-view, it can be summed up as a qualitative analysis of the implicit or tacit 'intentionality,' where the single inverted commas denote an involuntary mental process, a passive involuntary process at a distance from the ego. But "retention of an unconscious content is impossible", (Husserl, 1991, App IX, p 123).

The problem of the naturalistic attitude in chapter 1 can now be better understood. There is a conflation of two types of cause. The answer provided by phenomenology is that an explicit interpretive stance is required so that therapists can be clear to themselves, clients and the public about how they make sense of any psychological situation prior to action.

It is accepted that there is a permanent psychosocial influence between human beings. What is at stake is finding the genuine nature of this influence. Below, it is called 'cause,' although the terms "motivation," "association" or "influence" and "belief" would also be sufficient to describe it. The same word, cause when

written without the inverted commas, refers to the type of cause that exists in inanimate matter: Between things there are causes. Between people and psychological outcomes, there are the 'causes' of meaning, belief, influence, relationships and understanding.

What phenomenology reveals are problems that cannot be tackled by natural science and its quantifying naturalistic attitude. Natural science can only misrepresent the role of conscious meaning in communities. Right from the start of this enterprise, there appear several parameters that are not capable of being addressed by natural science.

Human beings have free will to a degree and in some areas. They have conscious experiences and can understand any topic in a myriad of possible ways. Phenomenology provides a specific type of theorising about conscious experiences and how intentionalities are related to mental objects. Intentionality has explanatory power and is clearly understandable in discussions between therapists and clients. Therapeutic relationships are in some ways no different from any other meetings between two or more people. The nature of the relationship is intersubjective—each micro-movement of one person becomes a possible 'cause' to be responded to by the other—and vice versa. Additionally, meaning itself is intersubjective, in that speech is open to understanding from a large number of possible perspectives.

The first step is arguing for a preferred interpretive stance on the intentionalities because they never appear themselves. What clients and therapists actually experience are conscious objects of various sorts. Intentionalities and mental objects appear through comparisons. Conscious senses are potentially public in that more than one person can experience them. For instance, people watch the same film and discuss their experience of it. Or a potentially communal experience will remain potential, if it remains unspoken. Phenomenology is a form of theorising that relates mental objects to interpreted intentionalities and distinguishes their connection. Phenomenology is a means of generating theory about qualitative experience and meaning, in order to create concepts for the practice of psychosocial skills for therapeutic aims. This is towards the ultimate end-point of making a biopsychosocial perspective in therapy. For Husserl, the consciousness of the other never appears first-hand. It only ever appears second hand in its mediated occurrence in the living body of others. Consciousness is a medium for the presentation of what is believed to be real, what is planned, remembered, wished, played with, loved and hated … Consciousness has many simple and compound types of intentional relation to all that is believed and disbelieved.

The next chapter introduces the interpretation of the consciousness of others and how to think about intentionalities.

3

Towards a formal hermeneutics for psychological understanding

Aim: This chapter explains hermeneutics as the formal interpretation of conscious meaning between persons—where meaning is available to all—but from different perspectives. The aim is to grasp the scope of what it is to be an interpreting creature. In these pages, interpreting refers to specific instances of understanding specific senses, as being one way or another usually. Although there are cases of ambiguity and multiple senses.

    The order of tackling the inter-related topics below begins with appreciating the scope of hermeneutics and interpreting, making sense of all manners of evidence in various contexts in everyday life. Once the ubiquity of interpreting psychological situations is grasped, then it is possible to understand how hermeneutics applies to therapy and how psychological meaning relates people together. Next, the position of theory of mind is explained as interpreting consciousness. Then it is possible to understand what it is to interpret intentionality. Finally, the consequences of hermeneutics are noted before concluding on the being of psychological meaning, its manner of existence. Psychological 'cause' is really a co-constitution between the parts of the biopsychosocial whole.

§7 The importance of hermeneutics

Hermeneutics is interpreting how anything appears and implies taking a self-reflexive turn. It becomes necessary to show how some evidence has been chosen and how a context to understand it has been supplied. Theoretically for professionals, and in practice with clients, things mean what they mean because some belief or value is held as being important, relevant or true. Less formally, hermeneutics can be introduced by mentioning a milk bottle that is half-filled and asking, "is it half full or half empty?" "It depends on how you look at it," is the reply. This informal introduction contains a grain of truth.

Hermeneutics is the self-understanding of what happens in instances of interpreting: Hermeneutics is the study of interpreting in a formal way, in an academic discipline or a school of thought. Hermeneutics in therapy concerns how to determine psychological meaningfulness across the lifespan or what is happening currently. Currently, the formal means of specifying how to understand a situation goes under a variety of names such as interpretation in psychodynamics, appraisal, evaluation, formulation, conceptualisation and judging evidence in cognitive behavioural therapy. In the ordinary life, it is making sense of anyone in any situation. Its not just being or becoming aware of other persons' intentions or how they refer themselves to us, but making sense of them altogether. Rudolf Bernet (1979, p 129) makes an important distinction about perception generally that holds for what Husserl held of the relation between senses about a referent. That "on the one hand, in the fact that adequate givenness of a thing can essentially never be realized; and, on the other hand, in the fact that nonetheless every appearance, every continuous multiplicity of appearances teleologically anticipates this adequate givenness" of an anticipated idea of knowing it perfectly, that could only be achieved after an infinite number of experiences of it (Ibid). In-line with this remark, an empathic and intersubjective account of psychological meaningfulness is argued for (chapter 10) to unite the talking and action therapies. The commonality between Freud, Husserl, cognitive behavioural therapy and ordinary persons is that they all interpret intentionality through formal explicit theoretical systems or through tacit common sense.

In the psychological life of relationships, beliefs, emotions and thought—interpretation is a specific act of making sense of any event. One case of interpretation by clients occurs when they make sense of their lives and themselves in relation to others. They interpret what appears in some way. For example, interpreting themselves as depressed and others as uninterested in them. People who are depressed may have had significant successes and struggled heroically with problems that would have lead others to despair much earlier. For the person who interprets self, other and world from a position of depression, then success turns to nothingness. Another case of interpretation is that an action could be understood as the outcome of a purposeful intention to achieve it. However, the same action could be interpreted as an inadvertent outcome of an intention to achieve something else altogether.

Hermeneutics formally studies the ways of interpreting that clients and therapists have. Hermeneutics produces specific interpretations that are fundamental to everyday life and therapy. There is only one human race. Psychological theories are in conflict with each other to explain the one psychological world. At

heart, therapy is understanding then action of some sort. Even if that action is only acceptance of what has happened. Hermeneutics is relevant because: "There is nothing more practical as a good theory", (Lewin, 1951, p 169). Hermeneutics is the result of many instances of interpretation subjected to formal scrutiny. Hermeneutics shows itself in specific instances when what any therapist believes results in specific interpretations of formal clinical reasoning.

Interpretation is where self chooses or passively accepts one reasoned or experienced sense over another. Interpretation also provides understanding that leads to action. Specifically, interpretation makes explanations about psychological situations of all kinds. Inadequate acts of interpretation occur through an ad hoc belief system that selects evidence and contexts through unjustified types of reasoning. Interpretations can be concluded as being better or worse. The malaise of not being able to understand others accurately needs to be lessened. Lack of coherence, and senses that clearly do not apply to the phenomena, should be rectified by showing the case for good ideas over false ones. Ultimately, there is no omniscient view. All views are rationalisations of experience.

§8 The basics of practice in relation to making sense

Therapy means focusing on the generalised senses that clients have. All of which are interpreted and can be re-interpreted. This includes affective states, manners of relating and forms of belief. It means that practice operates through understanding the type of activities that create problems. It means understanding psychological objects and intentionality with clients and working with them to create changes. If there were inaccurate understanding of psychological problems, there could be no hope of successful treatment.

Talking is the medium for relating to clients in all therapy. Talk will be given the major attention in this work. The talking therapies have a considerable attention on relating as well, in a twofold sense. (1) Relating is important in terms of the specific psychosocial skills of therapists that are manifest in each meeting with clients. (2) Relating is important for understanding the relationships of clients with other people generally. Freud is selected as being a true innovator in this type of practice in a way that is still relevant. By way of brushing the cobwebs off psychodynamic practice, this chapter further explains the core work of talking and action therapy as being a psychological hermeneutics. What this means is that the means of making sense of clients are discussed with them. Freud began this focus on making sense and while his psychodynamic system will be criticised and revised below, it is necessary to state how hermeneutics is important in practice.

Although it may not always be appropriate to use free association, there are times when open-ended discussions are fruitful particularly after assessment in the first session. Free association is an ideal occurrence. What is more often the case is that clients meet their therapist and begin to evaluate what they can say about themselves. Hermeneutics comes into play when clients make sense of themselves. Hermeneutics occurs when therapists respond in speech to what clients present. It is claimed that what Freud got right is the ubiquity of the *conscious phenomena* of transference, resistance and the possibility of mutual understanding. Let me explain.

The dynamic of a human relationship (particularly evident in talking therapy, but in action therapy also) is the possibility of self-disclosure; that is opposed by a reticence towards it. Specifically, in any therapy, clients have to self-disclose if they are going to get help and inevitably therapists are going to make sense of what they say. It is quite impossible to rob the client of a response. Even when therapists choose not to say anything—that is still a response. What Freud discovered is a specific dynamic that can only be properly glimpsed in the details of his actual practice rather than in his theoretical writing. Thanks to Beate Lohser and Peter Newton, it is possible to understand this dynamic. What Lohser and Newton clearly state is that talking and relating concern making the overall experience in each session worthwhile for clients. For them, there is an expenditure of effort towards the goals of being understood and helped. This is what resistance means and indicates the importance of handling it well in any approach.

Lohser and Newton have researched Freud's actual work and concluded on what he did and the manner in which he did it. They note that he was never neutral (1996, p 175). The proper meaning of abstinence in Freud's work was that it should impel clients forward to make changes in their own lives. Freud noted this, but it has been obscured: "The treatment must be carried out in abstinence … in order that they [the needs of clients] may serve as forces impelling her to work and to make changes", (1915a, p 165). Overall, Freud advocated "the necessity of friendliness and sympathy", (Lohser and Newton, 1996, p 191). He was not indifferent to clients, which could be understood as being dismissive (p 193). Nor was he aloof (p 185). He did attend to their conscious experiences and that means that he used empathy (p 194). Also he provided care in a spontaneous and intuitive way. In fact he concluded that an excessive focus on boundaries was wrong (p 199) and advocated that therapists be disciplined and self-controlled, but not to the extent that they hide behind a false facade (p 204). Furthermore, hate, aggression and passive aggression should not be expressed because they have no place within the therapist role (pp. 188, 208, 210).

The key technical terms of Freud demand co-operation and the allocation of roles. There should not be intransigent rules and the therapist should not dominate clients in a hierarchical stance (p 180). Nor should the interventions be rigid (p 193). The major dynamic of the work was to handle the resistance skilfully. Resistance means that free association is being avoided. More generally, and for any therapy whatsoever, resistance is an unwillingness to self-disclose the nature and extent of a psychological problem, in order to understand through receiving feedback and help (p 168). One of the most basic skills of practice is keeping clients sufficiently motivated on a therapeutic aim so that they keep attending (p 176). The skill is to decrease resistance by a variety of means to ensure that clients experience a positive benefit. Accordingly, resistance should be found and understood, in order for clients to avoid it (p 165). The purpose of resistance interpretations is to comment on the inability to free associate (p 172) in order to decrease resistance and maintain free association (p 166). More broadly in any therapy, lessening resistance ensures self-disclosure so that clients are employed on a therapeutic task, despite the difficulties involved, rather than quitting the sessions prematurely. Therapists should work with what clients present and start with conscious experience (p 151).

Overall, therapy is a mutual task, requiring co-operation (p 209). The aims include helping clients have a better quality of life (p 206) and helping them increase ego constancy (p 204). To achieve these ends, a wide range of therapeutic responses are required (p 203). Freud advocated practice and exposure to fear in order to overcome it, as in his recommendations to Gustav Mahler. Mahler had had some difficulty in conducting an orchestra and Freud recommended him to start conducting again and get some practice at it. The role of transference was not central to Freud's practice (p 171). What transference is was a repetition of an interpersonal difficulty (p 169) that might be current, but not necessarily enacted with the therapist. With these basic remarks in place, it should now be possible to realise how talking, understanding and relating are the medium of treatment in talking therapy and crucial to an action therapy, like cognitive behavioural therapy, where talk and relating enable self-care interventions. The work of therapy is primarily to create dependable understanding and secondarily to speak in such a way that creates a positive outcome for clients.

Specifically, but not exclusively, the following mutual tasks occur in talking therapy and in setting up an action therapy:

• Links are made between events, thoughts and feelings in ways that have not occurred for clients but are apparent for therapists. Discussion serves the role of

helping clients understand what they feel and think in a more dependable way. Sometimes therapists create a new means of understanding. At other times, the outcome is working on a shared means of understanding.

What therapists do is:

• Suggest 'causes' that are possible influences or motivating factors in the lives of clients.

• Relate past occurrences to the problematic sensitivities of clients in the present.

• Help clients to appreciate their own strengths rather than fixating on themselves as weak, under attack, unlovable, bad or useless.

• Help clients to undo conscious reifications of their self-image and discuss their understanding of other people.

• What is involved is entering into non-dogmatic dialogue about any topics relevant to the problems of clients and analysing emotional and relational situations.

• Action therapy like the cognitive behavioural approach includes identifying classically conditioned experiences, operant conditioning and using behaviour therapy and other interventions to break these connections.

Practice is fundamentally hermeneutic. It suggests various styles of re-interpreting what clients have interpreted. All persons interpret in the general sense. Schools of therapeutic practice create theory in a specific hermeneutic style, often in connection with ideas of cause. For instance, when the apple fell on Isaac Newton's head, he inferred that something he could not see, gravity, had caused the apple to fall. Similarly, when we meet other people we interpret their speech, behaviour and emotions as psychologically 'caused'. Their speech and actions have meaning because of the intentionality of consciousness. Let us further consider what these novel terms entail.

In psychodynamic and cognitive behavioural therapy, terms such as "cognitive distortions," "faulty thinking" and are used to refer to the work of hermeneutics in the general processes of the creation and resolution of psychological problems. But these terms specify nothing about the most basic changes between the forms of attention that occur in relation to their objects. For this work, the answer is to offset this lack of understanding by showing how making sense of any psychological situation is ubiquitous and involves the qualitative experience of intentional-

ity. Thinking, reasoning and evaluating in internalised speech all involve interpreting some object of experience.

§9 The research question about psychological meaning

The first point to mention about psychological meaning is that it comprises a complex set of phenomena, a universe of sense that is available to more than one person. Accordingly, the research question of this work concerns understanding how meaning is public for more than one person. In the sections below, it is shown that the manner of hermeneutics approved here is interpreting the human situation in terms of intentionality for more than one person. Therapists should do better than natural scientists or clients in knowing how to interpret meaning in relation to intentionality. Indeed, the senses that therapists have about clients are the material for working with them.

What is being urged is hermeneutics for a theory of consciousness that can distinguish accurate understanding from mis-understanding. It concerns creating a formal position on how psychological understanding is made. What is crucial here is that *human relating entails the fact that human beings never have a personal experience of any other person's consciousness, as they experience their own*. One never experiences the thoughts, affects and intentions of others 'first-hand'. Yet sometimes we have the impression that we do 'second-hand'. Whether our impressions turn out to be accurate or not, can only be discerned after discussion with them.

If there is no explicit reason to disbelieve what others tell us, then we do trust their explanations and actions. However, if their actions and speech are incongruent, that might indicate that their true intentions, thoughts and feelings are not being expressed. The incongruence between speech, actions and non-verbal presence might indicate an attempt to hide their intentions, for instance.

The means of answering the research question is to create an abstract and general interpretation of the meeting between self and other in chapter 10. This is because there are necessary entailments in the human experience of meaning and thought that show what counts. The following sections touch on these necessities in the following order. Firstly, there is a self and another. Secondly, experimental psychology reinvents a philosophical wheel when it insists on the necessity of psychological interpretations in the branch called "theory of mind". Thirdly, interpreting consciousness means defining types of intentionality and differentiating them.

§10 Empathy and intersubjectivity

What this work asserts is the necessity of recognising that empathy is a complex whole that enables access to the psychological world that includes the desires, beliefs, intentions and emotions of others. It is wrong to conflate the *perception of a human being* with the *empathised psychological meaning* that their voice, face and bodiliness carries. Precisely this point is the major distinction of this chapter and it can be approached from a number of directions.

If we could *only* understand perception and the intellectual meaning of speech, the psychological world would not appear properly. Specific psychological meanings rest in wider implied contexts and do not appear like logical meanings. Without the ability to empathise, there would be no theatre, film or mime as it would be impossible to understand what is suggested by bodiliness, speech and action. Psychological experiences are not a part of a logical whole. The difference can be seen in comparing communications with others in various ways: face-to-face meetings, video with the sound turned off, email and telephone, for instance. In face-to-face meetings, there is the possibility of mis-understanding. But mis-understanding is much more likely on the phone and more likely still in email. When watching video of human interaction with the sound missing, it is possible to understand something of what is going on but without detail. Face-to-face meetings are most open, whereas written communications are most likely to lead to a wrong conclusion.

The words "empathy" and "intersubjectivity" are correctly used in understanding how any two persons share meaning, particularly when they meet face-to-face. What is carried out in part three below is a clarification of what these terms mean. This is not to say that empathy and intersubjectivity are ignored in all experimental approaches to psychology. In connection with making sense of actual empathic senses, in the world of therapy, Donnel Stern is one who has urged that there should be a scrutiny of the "adequacy of … arguments" concerning the nature of empathy.

> No longer can we believe … that one theory is right and the others are wrong … The only way we can decide which theory is best, or which is best under what circumstances, is to evaluate the coherence and internal consistency of the theories. One of the primary ways we do this is to take a hard look at the adequacy of whatever arguments are marshalled in favor of each school of thought.
>
> Stern, 1994, p 468.

The last sentence concerns the hermeneutics of psychological reality. It begs a comparison between rival senses of what is there-for-all, its *Objectivity*. Stern cites Heinz Kohut to argue that a singular reality is unprovable. In a different but supportive usage of the word, "Objective reality, facts" are outside the province of therapy (Kohut, 1984, p 36). This is agreed. The question is then how to account for different perspectives on the same item.

Here Kohut's statement is taken to suggest that what is involved in empathy is a requirement to think about differing perspectives on what appears to be psychologically real. There arise requirements to define the phenomena properly, to sort between adequate and inadequate accounts, and decide how there are multiple perspectives within psychosocial reality. Changming Duan and Clara Hill list various aspects of empathy, as it is believed to exist: It is a "personality trait. Or general ability … a situation-specific cognitive-affective state … a multiphased experiential process … an affective phenomenon … a cognitive construct … both cognitive and affective … [or] … either cognitive or affective depending on the situation", (1996, p 262–3). Therefore, there is a role for a philosophically-oriented investigation of how concepts relate to the phenomena of empathy, meaning and the perspectives of others. This is particularly pertinent to therapy.

To call oneself a therapist is to extend the possibility of psychological help and understanding. Just the fact of offering sessions raises the promise of help in a non-specific way. Accordingly, concepts should work. They should serve their function and indicate something that can be distinguished. But a comparison of the many perspectives on empathy, transference, counter-transference and unconscious communication is not attempted, as it would be too vague. Such a comparison is not attempted because it does not achieve the desired point of defining fundamental concerns. The following remarks introduce Husserl's perspective as having value for therapy.

The terms "empathy" and "intersubjectivity" are used to describe two major aspects of being in a sensitive relationship with another. *Empathy is the ability to understand the perspectives of other persons to some degree*. Fundamentally, it is recognising the emotional state of others, even if only inaccurately. Empathising includes understanding others intellectually and occasionally, will include understanding them through imagining what they might be experiencing. The medium of gaining such understanding is through a complex process of social learning. Husserl sometimes used the terms "analogue" and "mirroring" to explain what he meant. The word "analogue" was used in relation to visual art: "Operative in an empirical pictorial consciousness … is the appearing of an object … a picture-object … which is the bearer of the analogizing relation to the

"subject" … of the picture", (Husserl, 2006, §37, p 83). This means that the analogue of a picture is not perceptually present in it, but is depicted by it. Husserl also noted that: "Any possible empathy is the "mirroring" of each monad in the other", (App IX, p 156), in the sense that he was discussing a potential ability of embodied consciousness to be in connection with other embodied consciousness.

Intersubjectivity literally means between subjectivities, between people. Intersubjectivity is not just about responsiveness but concerns how meanings are public and conscious. What Husserl focused on in studying intersubjectivity is creating a theoretical exactitude to aid empirical work. The ideal concept of intersubjectivity provides grounding for understanding parts and wholes. Specifically, *intersubjectivity concerns the form of all public meaning* not just relationships in which it exists. It is a universal a priori. What are being forwarded as answers are the following considerations: What is necessary is understanding that when two persons are turned towards each other, a world of meaning appears that is publicly accessible. Additionally, other people are implied as being present. There is not only ""*my" phenomenological I*" but "*other I's,* posited in empathy", (§39, p 86). Intersubjectivity refers to what is accessible: "A piece of knowledge is intersubjective, if in grasping the same thing in principally the same manner it is accessible to many, no matter how many subjects", (App VI, p 137). Intersubjectivity is a basic principle of the openness and accessibility of knowledge and understanding for a community of people who are interconnected.

§11 Living a theory of mind

The consciousness of others appears through their bodies, actions and speech and needs to be identified properly. Husserl worked to understand consciousness, in the context of its conditions of possibility. It is the context of ideal conditions for something that he preferred for understanding emotion, thought and action in relationships. This is preparatory to actual practice and research. However, it needs to be further specified which intentionalities of consciousness are occurring. Let us further develop the topic of hermeneutics: of formally interpreting the intentionalities of consciousness but in a way that builds a bridge to a branch of experimental psychology.

In a similar way to Kant, Husserl and Heidegger; David Premack and Guy Woodruff share the basic idea that what appears perceptually *is insufficient to make sense by itself*. In the psychological sphere, what is required is something entirely different to what is perceptually present. In relation to hermeneutics, Premack and Woodruff are two experimental psychologists who presented a seminal work in what is called the "theory of mind". The opening words of their

1978 paper are: "An individual has a theory of mind if he imputes mental states to himself and others", (p 515). For philosophy, the term *apperception* means the hermeneutics of self by self, and *empathy* is the hermeneutics of others, their perspective and their intentionality. What Premack and Woodruff meant by a theory of mind was the necessity of a hermeneutics, concerning what appears perceptually, by mental concepts that explain observable behaviour. The original problem they were trying to solve concerned what makes a sufficient explanation of the behaviour of chimpanzees that were shown a film of human behaviour, and were then given various means of expressing what they understood. Premack and Woodruff noted that the lack of social learning of understanding human behaviour limited the chimpanzees in their ability to understand human behaviour (p 525).

The point is that in observable behaviour, what appears *only to perception* is psychologically meaningless. If persons were only to attend to perception, they would only see colours and movements and hear sounds. By itself, the perceptual sense of human or animal behaviour is insufficient (p 525). It is necessary to hold psychological concepts of purposeful intention, beliefs, desire and rationalisation in order to understand the meaningful whole of interacting with sentient creatures. To cut a long story short, this is the rediscovery of Kant's a priori categories by experimental psychology (§69 below). Insomuch that psychological concepts are necessary to interpret what we perceive, it is the case that common sense and therapy have theories of mind.

The point of the theory of mind is counterintuitive. No one understands mere behaviour. In a sense, 'mere behaviour does not exist'. What is understood is meaningful behaviour, for instance, someone trying to do something and succeeding. What appears is a complex whole. What appears to perception connects with what is psychologically learned to comprise a meaningful whole. The point of a theory of consciousness is explaining animal and human behaviour in a formal discourse.

Coming from an entirely different background to Kant, what Premack and Woodruff argue is that mental states can only be psychologically interpreted from what appears perceptually and that this form of interpretation organises what is perceived into a meaningful whole (p 515). Making interpretations of intentionality is postulating the existence of psychological work that creates psychological outcomes (p 516). The point of theory of mind is explaining the other's intentionality and that includes accounting for the other's perspective (p 518).

The commonality between German philosophy and theory of mind experimentalism is that Husserl believed that relations between any two people follow a

specific format: "I apperceive him as having spatial modes of appearance like those I should have if I should go over there and be where he is … the other is appresentatively apperceived as the "Ego" of a primordial world, and of a monad," an embodied consciousness (1977a, §53, p 117). It follows that the psychological phenomenon of empathy is quasi-'experiencing' the other's point of view in affective, relational and intellectual ways. In short, what Husserl claimed is that a learned vicarious experience of other people is the phenomenon that is the gateway to all higher forms of understanding. It is for these reasons that the commonality between interpreting what appears as necessary for Kant, Husserl and Heidegger can be spotted in the work of Premack and Woodruff and the theory of mind.

§12 Distinguishing forms of intentionality

Understanding the intentionality of consciousness is a way of developing a formal hermeneutics of human experiences and meanings. The rubric *intentionality-sense-referent* is simple enough to be memorable and applies flexibly to enough situations as to be useful in making distinctions.

But before going any further, let us note that the term "intentionality" can be used in a completely incorrect manner. Intentionality is not about purpose or intentions as such. Intentionality refers to the number of ways in which consciousness can be conscious of people, ideas and things and includes behaviour and emotion.

Some forms of intentionality can be listed as follows. Conceptual intentionality occurs in reading and writing, speaking and thinking in internal dialogue. Perception in the five senses is about the current objects of awareness. Anticipation is about what is coming to pass. Recollection is about what is believed to have occurred. Some people have vivid memories and anticipations whilst others can create a feeling about the future. All these are forms of intentionality that involve the choosing ego in varying degrees. Empathy is a specific form of intentionality that is more complex than simply looking at someone or listening to them. Consciousness is aware of objects of experience such as people, self, things and ideas and itself in being able to grasp how it is aware. Some of the forms of intentionality are:

Perceiving real events in the here and now.

Imagining that something might happen at an unspecified time without believing it is real.

Behaviour is (often) a purposeful practical intentionality towards some desired outcome.

Affect can be about values but most often represents how self is towards others and others are towards self.

Empathy is the socially learned appreciation of the perspective of actual others. Empathy can be connected to visual imagining of what self and others can do in the sense of creating an imaginary world and feeling emotion in relation to the scenes imagined.

Higher conceptual intentionality occurs in language in a specific style and type of representation. Concepts about meaning have a general manner of referentiality: They point to first-hand (unmediated) and second-hand (empathised) specific occurrences. Concepts themselves employ an abstract manner of giving their meaning. Similarly, believing that something is the case can also be expressed in speech or internal dialogue.

There are also nested types of intentionality in conjunction with temporality, the many facets of the experience of time:

Remembering what a visual scene was. Remembering what was said by another or thought by self.

Anticipating what will be seen. Anticipating what will be said.

Imagining what someone might think or feel at some unspecified point in time.

What these cases show are some of the forms of intentionality. The term "meta-representation" within the theory of mind means the "ability to represent the *representing relation* itself", (Pylyshyn, 1978, p 593). Zenon Pylyshyn's comments are in support of Premack and Woodruff's 1978 paper on the understanding of problem-solving skills of chimpanzees. However, it is the case that meta-representation is part of Husserl's interpretation of intentionality. For instance, child's play requires children to know that an object is being represented playfully, in more than one way. For instance, a banana can be used as a gun. The banana is a double object. Outside of play, it is a fruit for eating. Inside of play, it is a gun to be used in mock threat. As a perceived object, it is a banana. As an object of play, it is a vehicle for trying out roles, the development of social skills and understanding the adult world.

The point is that psychological mindedness (psychological rationality, emotional intelligence) is explaining the actions of others through understanding their intentional relations and perspective. Such states of affairs are embedded in a complex whole. They need to be identified and interpreted as being significant. An account is "*meta-representational,*" for instance, when it compares how different persons come to understand each other in relation to intentionality and what appears from each perspective. Such thinking distinguishes the map from the ter-

ritory that the map is about, to use Husserl's distinction from the year 1900 (Husserl, 1970a, VI, §20, p 727–8).

Although meta-representational thinking was present for Husserl and Heidegger, the term has come to occupy the area that the term "*meta-intentionality*" could have covered. The point is that the hermeneutics of intentionality means that different types of representational form are being discussed. Making comparisons between them is necessary (1989b, §18f, p 87, 1970b, §47, p 164).

For instance, a person's views of self and others can be very faulty and lead to negative consequences that may not be corrected, despite the problems that the views create. The full extent of different abilities can be seen in comparing exemplary and problematic types. For instance, in comparing young children, autism, psychopathy and low self-esteem—to the interpretations of secure and confident adults—the pertinent distinctions show themselves: The different types of psychological disorder misconstrue the same event in telling ways. It is also noticeable that what people tell themselves in the conceptual intentionality of inner dialogue might be entirely spurious (on occasion) in comparison to their practical intentionality. To express the same thought in ordinary language, "they do not know what they are doing". Or again in a different phrasing, their beliefs about themselves and their situation do not tally with their actions. Precisely this identification of incongruence is about intentionality and could be called meta-intentional or meta-representational.

Pylyshyn's point is that empathising the existence of intentionality in others explains observable behaviour (1978, p 592). Such interpretation of human behaviour is necessary, ubiquitous and fully justifiable. For Pylyshyn and the theory of mind, psychological interpretations are necessary for gaining psychological understanding of human and animal behaviour. Pylyshyn is further correct to note that there is no one-to-one causality between conceptual intentionality and behaviour for human beings. Therefore, it is acceptable to posit belief and desire, for instance, in order to make behaviour meaningful. The upshot of Pylyshyn's paper is that in human behaviour, the intentionality of belief links a believed- and sought-after outcome, to an initiating believing act.

It should now be clearer how useful intentionality is in a basic way of accounting for thoughts, feelings, memories and other experiences. People can be fully conscious of what they believe and disbelieve. It is also possible to act and feel without adequate reflection and self-understanding occurring and this is called having tacit or implicit belief, because overall the observable outcome is regular and purposeful.

Effectively, as a conceptual tool within an overall theory of consciousness, intentionality relates the objects of awareness to postulates about mental processes. For instance, in looking at a desk we use vision and experience the desktop as a real item, here and now. Although only a part of it comes to consciousness, we assume that the edges of the desktop are in place. Because of the specific, past manner of knowing this item, there are a number of associations of sense about it and the past experience of desks in general, that could come to mind when perceiving '*this desk*'.

Finally, whilst introducing intentionality, another new term needs to be defined. For Husserl, the creation of the sense of the consciousness of another person is through empathic *presentation*. Husserl called this type of intentionality a "presentation" because it provides a sense through non-perceptual means. The details of presentation are given in section 38 below. This type of intentionality connects past, social learning to create the impression of other-consciousness in relation to their cognised being.

What appear in experience are *cultural objects*. This is the set of public objects of awareness that includes people, human bodies, things, ideas and all else that has meaning. Consciousness is related to cultural objects. Thoughts, beliefs and feelings about cultural objects come into consciousness and move out of it. When the objects are not currently conscious, the referents still exist. What appear to reflection are already assembled wholes of sense. Phenomenology breaks them apart into their components. It notes the specific senses of a referent and interprets that it has been created, perceptually and temporally, and recognised or identified (if that is the case) through one or more of a number of intentionalities that are connected to the ego to some degree. Accurate understanding of a referent can only be approximated through dedicated attention, discussion and a great deal of time spent on it. All senses are part of consciousness, *inside* it, in that we are conscious-of them and relate to what is outside consciousness. In itself, this is a necessary and universal starting point in making sense of what appears to consciousness.

§13 Consequences of hermeneutic strategies as an answer

Without an attention to empathy and intersubjectivity, there could be a turn away from the therapist's participation in the therapeutic relationship. So putting therapy on a wrong track because the changes that therapy makes are changes in meaning delivered through a relationship. However, the initial focus for this work is the appraisal of Freud from Husserl's perspective. The consequence is that the contemporary dominance of the naturalistic attitude is challenged. Rela-

tionships and conscious senses are interactive. Potentially, the slightest moment-to-moment changes in one person's affective state could influence the other.

What this work provides is not a specific means of interpreting all psychological problems and how to spot precise connections between the past and present. *What is hoped for is a means of opening up dialogue with clients to ask them to understand and respond to what therapists are trying to do, by engaging them in thinking about the past and what sort of impact that it continues to have on the present.* This sort of conversation leads clients to become aware of themselves and their meanings in new ways and re-interpret themselves. Therefore, actual interpretation in sessions means involving clients in the process of making sense. Two key topics for interpreting are the emotional and cognitive processes that (1) might have been causative of the unique experience of clients, and (2), might maintain the problem in the present. For instance, disorders interact with mood and motivation, so the way in which bulimia and depression are maintained, for instance, interact and can exacerbate as well as diminish each other.

For this work, the answer concerns creating adequate justification for psychological hermeneutics. The manner of answering the research question is to occupy a hermeneutic perspective that compares differing interpretations. Husserl was interested in what conscious phenomena, necessarily and universally, are involved in sharing meaning between two or more persons. Such analysis of any object "refers us to infinities of evidences relating to the same object, wherever they make their object itself-given with an essentially necessary one-sidedness", (Husserl, 1977a, §28, p 61). What this means is that any object incurs a manifold of perspectives on it, yet it is possible to recognise it as the self-same object, more often than not.

Husserl's pure psychology is a theoretical answer to Smith's request to provide information on some of the difficulties concerning "a need for supplementary theories", (1994, p 154). Contrary to Smith, it is argued that natural psychological science is wholly appropriate to material being because of the constancy of that being and its causal relations. But, to not distinguish the different types of 'cause' appropriate to human being and natural being is a mistake. The natural science way of exploring and interpreting the human situation of meaningfulness and intersubjective relationship, can never address theoretical ideals and qualitative phenomena adequately. This is because the naturalistic attitude assumes that only what is measurable can lead to understanding the relations between what is conscious and its material substrate. On the contrary, what is required is a novel study of the fundamentals of qualitative meaning and experience.

§14 The necessity of justifying a psychological hermeneutics

By means of a recapitulation and clarification: The consequence of hermeneutics is the necessity of creating a self-reflexive turn to increase the amount of attention paid to justifications for practice. The need is to compare theoretical concerns and decide on hermeneutics. The hermeneutic positions of the schools of therapy and psychology interpret individuals, to produce abstract ontologically-dependent meanings, in relation to what appears to vision and hearing. An abstract psychological meaning is one that "cannot be put in a wheelbarrow". A material object or person can be put in a wheelbarrow. But abstract meanings, for instance, concerning theory, the qualities of secure relating and emotions cannot. A more philosophical way of stating this relation is to say that abstract meanings, such as psychological ones, are ontologically-dependent on the material existence of the living body. Psychological meanings do not have an independent existence. Psychological meanings are not just there for all to see. They are not like things. Specifically, to understand oneself or another or any position in the world is a more complex task. The greatest part of client and therapist interaction is tacit or preconscious and requires interpretation from what appears. The beliefs of both parties need to be made explicit and acknowledged.

In short, the answer provided is that empathy is the intentionality whereby one person understands another's perspective and gains access to communal meanings. The argument is that psychological theory fails if it cannot inter-relate the perspectives of self and other on the same object. Theory succeeds if it can account for the inter-relationship of conscious perspectives on the same cultural object, any discussible item. A slow roundabout approach is taken to these matters that explains the background before coming to the foreground. The aim is to capture the meanings of clients and lead therapists to a vantage point that can unite talk and action through understanding intentionality. There is a need to treat peoples' individual and communal lives as a complex whole and make explicit how to judge psychological evidence. There is a focus on the role of beliefs as 'causative' of the psychosocial component of the biopsychosocial whole. They are not responsible for heritable material cause although they will contribute to material changes over a period of time.

The main assumption is that ignoring conscious meaning, and the perspective of the other in psychology and therapy, will lead to faulty clinical reasoning. It is also assumed that meaning is a public phenomenon, open to a manifold of interpretations. Changes in meaning re-attribute 'cause' and provide new understanding of others—and self in relation to others. What happens to Freud in the next

part is revision and not ridicule or annihilation. The history of psychotherapy is the revision of Freud. The attention to intersubjectivity in the following pages is an attempt to unite the separate discourses of internal working models, object relations and cognitive schema. All these are different interpretations of the same situation: a pervasive and repetitive difficulty in human relationships that is difficult to overcome unaided.

PART II

On the received wisdom of psychodynamics

This part serves the purpose of addressing the dominant paradigm of transference, counter-transference and unconscious communication as a means of interpreting human relations. For Freud, the power of the speech of clients and the spoken interpretation of therapists combined to lift repression and enable the repressed representations of the drives become understood. For him, the importance of transference was that it showed repressed memories. Transference should be manipulated because it is a tool to overcome resistance to remembering and speaking in free association: Psycho-analysis "only deserves the latter name if the intensity of the transference has been utilized for the overcoming of resistances. Only then has being ill become impossible", (Freud, 1913c, p 143). Freud believed that clients must correctly understand themselves and gain rational self-control (Breuer and Freud, 1895d, p 6).

Talking practice is still dominated by Freud's model of transference and counter-transference and quite rightly so because these ideas refer to both sides of the relationship. But overall, the phenomena called transference, counter-transference and unconscious communication are understood as interpretations of attachment as intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is the name given to what lies between persons. Understanding a relationship and the same referents of speech is an intersubjective experience. Freud's model of therapy has been admirably summed up as a four stage process: 1 regression, 2 transference neurosis, 3 working through, and 4, cure by facilitating remembering that leads to self-understanding and self-management (Strupp, 1973, p 274). With this in mind let us consider psychodynamics.

4

Freud's understanding of transference

Aim: This chapter defines Freud's understanding of others and their perspectives. Although the remarks below are critical, the aim is not to destroy psychodynamic talking therapy but to make it more accountable and better understood by its practitioners. This chapter makes clear the range of phenomena that can be interpreted as transference. It points out a major problem associated with distinguishing transference.

Transference is a concept that maps the lived understanding of clients by therapists. Transference's necessary characteristic is scrutinised (§17), leading to the identification of problematic aspects of the concept and its manner of reference. Hence there is uncertainty concerning its role. For contemporary psychodynamic thought, the relation between clients and therapists is formed by transference, counter-transference and unconscious communication. Each of these topics will be explored.

§15 Introduction

Freud's metapsychology is still influential in contemporary therapy and this is why it is selected. Thanks to Beate Lohser and Peter Newton, (1996), *Unorthodox Freud*, it can be understood how the classical reading of Sigmund Freud as authoritarian, hierarchical and strict, is false. Lohser and Newton draw on the experiences of Freud's clients in order to show the nature of his therapeutic relationships plus the original deployment of his principles. Once the difference between his practice and the classical image of him is clear, then the classical corruptions can be removed to reveal Freud as wholly focused on the mutual task of the psycho-analysis of clients through free association—to make the unconscious conscious. To repeat: the 'classical' reading of Freud argues for a non-Freudian practice. The proper stance from which to read Freud is the details of how he

worked. Freud's comments on strictness, abstinence, aloofness, neutrality and the centrality of transference have been mis-represented. Freud disliked rule-bound practice and did not "consider it at all desirable for psycho-analysis to be swallowed up by medicine and to find its last resting-place in a text-book of psychiatry under the heading 'Methods of Treatment'", (1926e, p 248). In this vein, Anthony Stadlen has correctly pointed out that Freud's "practice didn't depend on his theories," (cited in Oakley, 2002, p 20). The way of reading Freud in these pages is influenced by John Forrester's *Language and the Origins of Psychoanalysis* (1980), a work that brings to light the role of speech and making sense of memories in psychodynamic therapy.

Freud's own practice was to side-step resistance and transference and maintain free association. Freud used positive transference and kept clients motivated on the mutual task. He focused on the major theme of each session that clients brought and the potential reasons for them not free-associating. All that mattered was helping. Freud believed he could judge the difference between the real relationship and the transference relationship. He employed a number of responses in the aim of increasing ego constancy, security of relating and improving quality of life. Freud wanted to find 'the head of the Nile,' in Latin, "*caput Nili*"—the source of the problems of clients in their infancy—and he thought that this source was particularly evident in the compulsion to repeat seen in transference.

The concepts of transference, counter-transference and the unconscious are decisive in contemporary talking therapy. These concepts are used to interpret the therapeutic relationship and judge the influence of past and current relationships, and define what can and cannot take place in therapy. Few people question the phenomena to which these terms refer. Benjamin Rubinstein (1974) is one who insists that the domain of psychodynamic therapy is the unconscious. The nature of the unconscious is that people are, allegedly, profoundly influenced by the events of earliest infancy. Yet findings in neuroscience, for instance (Gedo, 1993, p 174), show that contrary to the assumption of Sandor Ferenczi in 1913, the source of adult psychological problems cannot occur in infancy (Ferenczi, 1952). Neuroscience shows that early infancy cannot possibly be the source of wishes that persist into adulthood. Therefore, it is not possible to hypothesise that adult troubles are due to long-lasting wishes that first arose in infancy. Generally, the earliest experiences cannot be the most influential developmental trends for the path of later life. Immediately, what is under discussion is how to interpret (1) a contemporary relationship and its meanings, and (2), how to interpret cause and effect. Assumptions about cause, effect and meaning structure all forms of practice. This is why it is necessary to investigate Freud's position.

§16 On transference

What is being challenged should be made clear. This work challenges Freud on the grounds that he did not present a full conclusion about what it means to understand another person and relate with them. I am not disagreeing with the conscious phenomena that are felt when clients meet therapists. This acceptance includes those cases where clients thoroughly mis-understand the intentions and attitudes of therapists and vice versa. This work disagrees with a type of interpretation of conscious experience because of the network of ideas that exists in psychodynamics. Of course, people understand new persons on the basis of previous ones.

The experience that is called transference is problematic because the definition of it is insufficiently precise. What passes for transference is a general learning about attachment figures and how new persons might be mistakenly felt and treated as similar to past ones. Specifically, the nature of the link is retained empathic understanding of the intentions and actions of others towards self (as a child or previously). Such retained material gets re-evoked in relation to the possibility of new attachment relationships. It is less strong with friendships but stronger in sexual relationships and finding a partner. It is a very wide range of anticipations and actual relating that may also encourage specific negative responses.

'Transference' feelings are most often current negative expectations and fears that are associated with new relationships and come from past attachment relationships. They are conscious and are felt even in the prospect of forming new attachment relationships, for instance, and do not necessarily have to be related to an actual relationship. The phenomenon is one driven by associations, anticipations and beliefs. It is a re-awakening of the past in the present. It is not hallucination but a form of anticipation of empathic understanding in a way that is negative and inaccurate. The psychodynamic manner of treating transference is acceptable to the extent that it is necessary to become aware of the thoughts and feelings in order to understand self in relation to others and to compensate for the inaccuracy. But transference is a poor descriptor as the feelings may not be directed to the therapist at all, nor are they underneath the relation to the therapist, nor are they ubiquitous in relation to other people, nor are they omnipresent when they are active with respect to a specific person.

There are five further distinctions between the phenomena and the orthodox psychodynamic understanding of it.

1. Freud used the distinction true or false to mark the difference between client and therapist perspectives. On the contrary, the experience of clients is never false but actually felt. Contrary to Freud, the use of the words "false," "illusory" or "hallucinatory" are misleading when applied to relationships and conscious experiences. It is better to express the situation like this: Emotions, thoughts and actions are conscious experiences even if the object of attention does not exist, never has or never will exist. For instance, many people fear that something may happen. To regard fear as false, illusory, wrong or a hallucination wholly refuses their fear as real for them. The understanding of their fear as "inaccurate" instead of "false," does not save the concept of transference either but works to further mis-understand the experiences of clients. Only if there were a detailed account of how people move from inaccurate emotional and relational experience, to establish a fuller understanding of specific others and people in general, would there be an accurate account of the changes to which Freud's concepts point.

Similarly, transference is appraised in the following ways:

2. There is an unclear relation to the past that can never be originally re-experienced. All learning is transferred from past contexts into present ones. But this is not an endorsement of transference nor is it Freud's definition of his term. Although Freud used "transference" to mean a transfer of emotion or image, from a family figure to therapists, it is his overall understanding that renders the term unsupportable.

3. There is an unclear relation to conscious, preconscious and unconscious senses due to Freud's contradictory definitions (§56 below). Importantly, transferences are "for the most part unconscious", (Freud, 1905e, p 116).

4. There is no relation to the meaningful whole of conscious life in general. The problem with Freud's definition of transference is that it is part of a misleading understanding of the influences concerning empathy, meaning and relating over-all.

5. Transference, counter-transference and unconscious communication are nested within the naturalistic attitude. But qualitative distinctions cannot be grounded on natural science (§60 below).

The issue with transference is that it is part of a network of complex commitments to objects that can never appear and natural science. There are a number of

criticisms. The introductory criticisms of this chapter and the next work to defeat the assertion that psychodynamic therapists can distinguish real from false, appropriate from inappropriate, in therapeutic relationships and the lives of clients. This is because psychodynamic theory has only ever distinguished parts of the whole, then confused the role of these parts by relating them to an unfeasible account overall. Such a way of regarding human relationships generally is shown to be inaccurate. The corrective measure is to take into account empathy and intersubjectivity.

The historical precedent set by Freud in understanding transference has created an influential tradition for contemporary psychodynamic practitioners. For the tradition, the proper focus is re-interpreting the relational and cognitive-affective experiences of clients who mis-empathise and mis-interpret other people. This is because Freud believed that infantile unconscious currents cause adults to re-experience their parents or family in false ways. What counts is ascertaining how Freud discerned the presence of transference within the conscious experience of relating with clients. His style of working was to be silent for long periods of time, yet he was not utterly aloof and wanted to work with the current state of the relationship, in order generally to keep a positive transference, a positive co-operative relationship.

For psychodynamics, a central therapeutic task is to handle transference skilfully by pointing out the mis-understandings of clients and explaining their occurrence. "It is the analyst's task constantly to tear the patient out of his menacing illusion and to show him again and again that what he takes to be new real life is a reflection of the past. And lest he should fall into a state in which he is inaccessible to all evidence, the analyst takes care that neither the love nor the hostility reach an extreme height … Careful handling of the transference is as a rule richly rewarded", (Freud, 1940a, p 177). Freud is clear in requesting that clients be turned toward some evidence so that they may come to alter their beliefs and have their empathies become less illusory. Clients should be given the opportunity to make sense of themselves. When they cannot do so, their difficulties should be interpreted to them by stating what their causes are (p 178). Interpretations of unconscious causes are curative: "If we 'remove' the transference by making it conscious, we are detaching only these two components of the emotional act from the person of the doctor; the other component, which is admissible to consciousness and unobjectionable, persists and is the vehicle of success in psycho-analysis exactly as it is in other methods of treatment", (1912b, p 105). What he wanted readers to do is to understand their own relationship with the therapist and others around them in ways that show their unconscious at work. This is

why free association is such an unstructured and un-structuring procedure. It is purposefully minimalistic in its groundrules so as to lessen the conventions of secondary process rational thought and to free the spirit of primary process unconscious processes that are genuine representations of the full nature of human being (Forrester, 1980, p 163). Freud held that the unconscious automatically stores all experience permanently (Freud, 1900a, p 577).

Psychodynamic therapy encourages proper remembering and self-understanding. On the other hand, transference shows itself in the therapeutic relationship as a "way of remembering", (Freud, 1914g, p 150), that is "only a piece of repetition", (p 151). Freud made it clear what he wanted to achieve.

> For the ideal remembering of what has been forgotten which occurs in hypnosis corresponds to a state in which resistance has been put completely on one side. If the patient starts his treatment under the auspices of a mild and unpronounced positive transference it makes it possible at first for him to unearth his memories just as he would under hypnosis, and during this time his pathological symptoms themselves are quiescent. But if, as the analysis proceeds, the transference becomes hostile or unduly intense and therefore need repression, remembering at once gives way to acting out. From then onwards the resistances determine the sequence of the material, which is to be repeated.
>
> Ibid.

The above assumes that past thoughts, feelings and non-verbal actions cause current ones.

The skill of providing psychodynamic therapy is influencing the relationship and avoiding adulation and hate, in order to understand clients truthfully (Freud, 1925d, p 42). Negative transference, hate or rejection of the therapist, should be minimised because they both endanger acceptance of the interpretations that therapists provide for clients. An excessive positive transference could be a similar debility and possibly even a resistance to accepting interpretations also.

It is necessary to understand that Freud's cure was to increase self-understanding, particularly of the role of the unconscious, and so increase free will in the direction of gaining greater satisfactions in work, love and sex. Freud's aim was to provide direction by sifting through the "mass of material—thoughts, ideas, recollections—which are already subject to the influence of the unconscious, which are often its direct derivatives, and which thus put us in a position to conjecture his repressed unconscious material and to extend, by the information we give him, his ego's knowledge of his unconscious", (1940a, p 174). This was a repetition of a previous commitment: "If the attachment through transference has

grown into something at all serviceable, the treatment is able to prevent the patient from executing any of the more important repetitive actions and to utilize his intention to do so *in statu nascendi* as material for the therapeutic work", (Freud, 1914g, p 153). This means providing clients with an ordered process for increasing understanding, a *psychological rationality,* in being able to explain the sense of others and our relations with them. Relationships, memories, thoughts and feelings need to be re-experienced and spoken about—rather than acting on them without understanding. Freud held that the unconscious of therapists makes better sense in explaining the motivations and experiences of clients because it is an expanded form of understanding. Irrationality in the psychological sphere is defined as not being able to understand emotions, relationships and psychological events. This latter point is fully agreed but is seen here as a general hermeneutic task. The topic of psychological understanding will be returned to many times in the pages below.

The orthodox means of providing the cure is through understanding transference that can lead to its control. The received wisdom for psychodynamics is that two senses about others can be distinguished. There are both a "transference experience and a real-life experience. In analysis, as in real life, all relationships have a subtly dual nature", (Guntrip, 1975, p 67). Franz Alexander and Thomas French noted in agreement with Freud that the key distinction of transference is helping clients "distinguish neurotic transference reactions (that are based upon a repetition of earlier stereotyped patterns) from normal reactions to the analyst and to the therapeutic situation as a present reality", (1946, p 72). This comment by Alexander and French identifies the definitive aspect of transference: To employ it requires judging between appropriate and inappropriate, among specific conscious events in the therapeutic relationship.

Transference is linked to the compulsion to repeat in *Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through* (Freud, 1914g). One writer has expressed the sense of repetition as: "Resistance, in conformity with the Pleasure Principle, is also a repetition", (Lagache, 1953, p 9). What this means is that resistance, in a more contemporary language, is an inhibiting anxiety about self-disclosure. It is necessary in therapy of any kind to self-disclose and speak the truth, in order to get help. However, there may be much reluctance to do this often for fear of negative evaluation and the heightened anxiety and shame that speaking the truth may bring. The pleasure principle is about the value of short-term relief as opposed to the reality principle value of gaining long-term satisfactions in life through delayed gratification. Daniel Lagache is stating that psychological problems keep recurring because of the preference to avoid painful experiences and decrease neg-

ative affect in the short-term that gets worse through multiple repetitions. Behaviour therapy calls this same phenomenon negative reinforcement. Freud recognised that clients avoid their own negative feelings and try not to express them (1894a, p 52–3). The power of speaking the truth is regaining repressed memories and the details of other events at that time in order to understand that event (Freud, 1896c, p 193). This is what Freud was referring to when he wrote that: "For instance, the patient does not say that he remembers that he used to be defiant and critical towards his parents' authority; instead, he behaves in that way to his doctor … As long as the patient is in the treatment he cannot escape from his compulsion to repeat; and in the end we understand that this is his way of remembering", (1914g, p 150). What he meant is that non-verbal communication and inexplicit forms of signification are expressions of transference.

In practice, the understanding of current events as transference is close to how he interpreted the unconscious. What appears is the real relationship that is impeded by a 'false' transference-resistance, a defence, the transferring of false or "hallucinatory" emotions that obscure the clients' most causative wishes and feelings.

When the practical dimension of the function of transference in the psychodynamic cure is understood, then it is easier to understand the concept. Freud believed that transference is an inappropriate transfer of senses that belong to past others. For him, transference was never the central concern of therapy (Lohser and Newton, 1996, p 174). What Freud saw was the infantile presence of the past as causative. The conscious relationship is to be influenced as necessary, in order to help clients know themselves. What clients are conscious of are illusions created by the past (Freud, 1915a, p 168). Clients lack free will and have a dysregulated emotional response to what is truly happening. There is a necessary revival of infancy (Freud, 1920g). This is the repetition of misplaced libidinal or aggressive emotion, the compulsion to repeat the past (Freud, 1914g, p 154). Freud concluded that a transference neurosis should be established in order to become a vehicle for the unconscious to show its presence and for therapists to provide a cure. The transference neurosis comprises symptoms that occur in therapy that are a manifest content, indicating an earlier meaning or psychological cause, that needs to be identified. The transference neurosis is cured when clients understand themselves and can take proper actions, rather than acting out their past without self-awareness.

What transference refers to is clients inaccurately empathising therapists, thereby missing the conscious sense of others and their perspectives on objects in the world. To this extent, it points to conscious phenomena of mis-understand-

ing. Transference concerns inferring how clients incorrectly understand therapists and incorrectly generalise other people. The difference between the real and the false in a relationship is that Freud's view was the real one and the client's view was false.

But this is not just a problem of true and false. It is something altogether different. It is a problem of how to relate the abilities of two persons who are able to understand the same event—and how to reconcile the different senses they have. This is a problem of the justifications for interpreting any situation and being able to relate the perspectives of any two persons: Both of whom are capable of discussing the same event from two entirely different, valid perspectives. What is required is a means of transcending the simplistic real-false, me-them, appropriate-inappropriate distinction and embracing a much wider view of the situation of psychological meaningfulness altogether. On average, rather than promoting the accurate reference of concepts to emotions and relationships, what psychodynamic concepts do is promote inaccuracy of reference. Practically, the outcome is as follows: Freud believed that the "unconscious proper" of "mental processes or mental material" could only be understood as the product of inference (1940a, p 160). On the one hand, intellectual inference produces intellectual end-products. Whilst on the other hand, there is the conscious interaction in which client and therapist participate. What are at stake are the justifications for beliefs concerning psychological reality.

The concept of transference began in Freud's early attempts to understand how clients become attached to their therapists. He concluded that feelings for parents and family get transferred to therapists. The history of the concept of transference begins in the years 1880 to 1882 when Freud's senior colleague at the time, Joseph Breuer, saw a young woman referred to as "Anna O". Anna suffered some hallucinations with further dissociative, phobic and hysterical symptoms. An important context for understanding the development of transference is Anna and Breuer's therapeutic relationship. Breuer took Anna to meet his family. But when Breuer's wife became pregnant, Anna too claimed that she was in love with Breuer and was also carrying a child of his. This caused an acute rejection of Anna by Breuer. He suddenly broke off the therapy and left town for a holiday with his wife, leaving Anna dismissed.

The breakdown of this relationship is also significant because, after all, it was meant to be therapeutic for Anna (Ellenberger, 1970, pp 480–486). In Freud's early work, transference was used to define a hypothesised process within one person's unconscious, of movements of psychological energy. Allegedly, a faulty "connection" is made between a distressing affect and meaning that comes from

childhood and is mistakenly added to others. The nature of this causal connection operates from the source domain of the past—and is maintained in the unconscious—from whence it contributes to the target domain of present relationships. This causation of meaning, affect and behaviour, operates from a source that cannot be experienced and can only be identified through concepts that relate conscious products to their inferred source.

In *Studies on Hysteria*, Freud wrote: "In cases in which true causation evades conscious perception one does not hesitate to make another connection, which one believes although it is false. It is clear that a split in the content of consciousness must greatly facilitate the occurrence of 'false connections' of this kind", (Breuer and Freud, 1895d, p 67, fn 1). This is a conclusion where unconscious cause is argued as providing false, conscious senses. The "false connections" of transference are apparent to Freud but not to his clients. Transference is the result of a "*mésalliance*—which I describe as a 'false connection'—the same affect was provoked which had forced the patient long before to repudiate this forbidden wish. Since I have discovered this, I have been able … to presume that transference and a false connection have once more taken place. Strangely enough, the patient is deceived afresh every time this is repeated", (p 303). Freud understood the perspectives of clients as a "compulsion and an illusion which melted away with the conclusion of the analysis", (p 304). Transference is an alleged intentionality that concerns alterations of psychic energy between conscious and currently unconscious aspects.

> … an unconscious idea is as such quite incapable of entering the preconscious and it can only exercise any effect there by establishing a connection with an idea which already belongs to the preconscious, by transferring its intensity onto it and getting itself 'covered' by it … The preconscious idea, which thus acquires an undeserved degree of intensity, may either be left unaltered by the transference, or it may have a modification forced upon it, derived from the idea which effects the transference.
>
> Freud, 1900a, p 562–3.

This is a passage where Freud provided a theory of disguise and censorship. The phrase to remember is "incapable of entering the preconscious" in relation to the true meaning of what is unconscious: The truth of others is permanently out of awareness. But unconscious mental causes push "ideas," *Vorstellungen*, representations or objects, into contact with the 'superficial' constitutions of consciousness. In short, Freud saw his clients as suffering irrational, childlike feelings of

love or hostility. The careful handling of these feelings, and the ability to distinguish and extinguish them, was a component of his therapeutic technique.

Because of the conclusion that clients prefer "hallucinatory" or imaginary satisfactions to real ones, clients are believed to mis-empathise therapists in significant ways, related to the cause of their problems in childhood. Therefore, the 'hallucinatory' force of transference leads to misfortune. Transference "is provoked by the analytic situation; secondly, it is greatly intensified by the resistance, which dominates the situation; and thirdly, it occurs when it is lacking to a high degree in a regard for reality", (Freud, 1915a, p 168–9). Freud explained himself with a metaphor of printing to make his point: "What are transferences? They are new editions or facsimiles of the impulses and phantasies which are aroused and made conscious during the progress of the analysis; but they have this peculiarity, which is characteristic for their species, that they replace some earlier person by the person of the physician", (Freud, 1905e, p 116). Secondly, transference "produces what might be described as a stereotype plate (or several such), which is constantly repeated—constantly reprinted afresh—in the course of the person's life, so far as external circumstances and the nature of the love-objects accessible to him permit, and which is certainly not entirely insusceptible to change in the face of recent experiences," (Freud, 1912b, p 100). Freud conflated sexuality and relating but we shall let that pass. The point is that it is agreed that the therapeutic relationship is the medium to deliver care to clients and it needs to be handled well. If there were inaccurate understanding, therapy would be impeded rather than enabled.

Finally, let us also understand something of how Freud thought there could be a cure. Transference neurosis is an "artificial neurosis into which the manifestations of the transference tend to become organised. It is built around the relationship with the analyst and it is a new edition of the clinical neurosis; its elucidation leads to the uncovering of the infantile neurosis," (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1985, p 462). Paradoxically, the establishment of transference enables the cure of clients. The gaining of intellectual and emotional insight for clients is curative because the therapist's transference interpretations, stated as hypotheses of cause and effect, enable there to be a cure in understanding and hence in emotion, thought and relating. Psycho-analysis concerns a "struggle" about "intellect and instinctual life, between understanding and seeking to act, [that] is played out almost exclusively in the phenomenon of transference … the victory whose expression is the permanent cure of the neurosis", (Freud, 1905e, p 108). So the whole of psychodynamic therapy as providing understanding and cure rests on the validity of transference.

§17 The necessary distinction of transference as problematic

After the above, a single necessity of transference becomes clear. The necessary distinction is to specify how clients mis-empathise therapists. The single necessity of transference is to show clients how the "aims," "imago" and "libidinal impulses" can be discerned within a *re-creation* of childhood, purely in terms of the difference between true and false understanding. Immediately problems arise. Obviously, the past can never be re-created in the present. Nor can any such hypotheses of cause and effect ever be empirically tested. So there is a problem about finding the "stereotype plate (or several such), which is constantly repeated—constantly reprinted afresh," and demonstrably showing how it is inaccurate with respect to the reality that Freud discerned (1912b, p 100). If transference is permanently unconscious, then it is unclear how to fulfil the aim of finding the "stereotype" plates of the past.

Part of the definition of transference is transferring imagos to others. Understanding transference provides help through explanations of cause and effect. Several writers have noted this key distinction, yet it has never been taken up as something that is crucial to the employment of the concept. The practice of interpreting transference demands naming the current way in which therapists are being mistaken. Psychodynamics provides help through transference interpretations that diagnose the cause of intersubjective maladies, so that clients can find their own direction in life. Let us consider some remarks from the psychodynamic literature on transference.

Maxwell Gitelson noted the aims of the therapist's actions are those that "foster and support the patient's discovery of the reality of the actual interpersonal situation as contrasted with the transference-counter-transference situation", (1952, p 7). Gitelson meant that transference requires the demarcation of reality, 'here and now,' due to the influence of the 'there and then'. By necessity, transference is apportioning causation to past influence—and showing the lack of this cause in the current relationship. What is at stake is the claimed ability to judge superficial conscious beliefs, intentions, affects and understanding (etcetera) from what is allegedly causative and belonging to the unconscious register. If transference occurs, the present relationship is not its cause. The true cause is that the traumatic influence of past events is still operating. Freud's concept judges between the false representation of others—and discerning the true representation, which is one that they do not experience.

Two more therapists have formulated the problem of transference as identifying a mistaken understanding in relation to a true one. Ralph Greenson wrote

that the "main characteristic" of a relationship that is contaminated by transference is "the experience of feelings to a person which do not befit that person and which actually apply to another. Essentially, a person in the present is reacted to as though he were a person in the past … All human relations contain a mixture of realistic and transference reactions … Transference reactions are always inappropriate", (1967, p 151–2). This comment demands therapists to show how a feeling or occurrence does or does not apply to the present—and how it reflects the influence of the past. Similarly, Louis Chertok concluded that Freud …

> … found a method of defence, which consisted in the false belief that the patient was establishing a "false connection," and that her emotional demands were not directed to him personally, but to some person belonging to the patient's more remote past … This interpretation of his patient's feelings was in fact quite possibly erroneous: to this day, we are still lacking in reliable criteria which would enable us to distinguish between "genuine love" and "transference-love;" but it none the less put Freud on the right track.
>
> Chertok, 1968, p 575.

What Chertok is referring to is the requirement to distinguish appropriate 'here and now' behaviour in the session, as opposed to inappropriate behaviour, thoughts and feelings that belong to the past and are formative of the client's difficulties. Chertok noted the difference but did nothing to answer the question. Handling and interpreting transference, demands the ability to distinguish the genuine phenomena of the other (potentially conscious and even preconscious aspects)—as opposed to clients treating themselves and their therapists in incorrect, child-like, maladaptive, traumatised, ambivalent or conflictual ways. Therefore, Gitelson, Greenson and Chertok agree. Something crucial is missing and psychodynamic theory and practice require it, in order to function.

The hermeneutic problem in distinguishing definitive senses of transference is compounded by the definitive assertions above. When a full assessment occurs, there is the question of how to compare current events to personal development with respect to Freud's clusters of conceptual oppositions and the return of repeating themes. For instance, transference could be contextualised with respect to the comments on the overlapping and co-occurring themes of the economic, topographic and dynamic perspectives that comprise metapsychology. Or transference could be contextualised within the metaphysical commitment to natural science. There are three further important contexts for understanding transference. (1) Developmentally; (2) within the structural reformulation sometimes called the 'second topography,' (*The Ego and the Id*, 1923b); and (3), the relation of Freud's

theory to his actual practice. All three are important perspectives in Freud studies. The conclusion is clear that therapists are empathised according to the image of an earlier person in the client's life but the problem is how to understand this phenomenon in detail and how to work with it to resolve its problematic effects.

The consequence is that clients are not treated according to their *real* person, expressed intentions and contributions to the relationship. Rather, clients are incorrectly interpreted according to persisting unconscious memory and the imagined events of childhood: Allegedly, they act on unconscious representations ("ideas") about their parents and others. Yet their mistakes must be shown to them, so they can correct the distortion and learn to empathise 'more accurately' in the present. And hence live their life without the shadows cast by past others when encountering current others and their true intentions.

The task is to scrutinise how well a concept meets its phenomenon. This section has shown that a specific type of judgement needs to be made, if transference is to be employed. Yet the referent of the past situation is forever absent to both parties.

§18 The conscious sense of the other

Freud's translators, including James Strachey the translator in chief, were not always consistent in using specific words to convey the manner in which Freud believed that therapists should interpret their experiences. There is a major focus on interpreting the unconscious. For psychodynamics generally, the conscious sense cannot be anything but a deceit or a disguised truth. Yet in other places, Freud is obviously mentioning the conscious sense that clients have of therapists and vice versa:

> When are we to begin making our communications to the patient? …
> … Not until an effective transference has been established in the patient, a proper *rapport* with him. It remains the first aim of the treatment to attach him to it and to the person of the doctor. To ensure this, nothing need be done but to give him time. If one exhibits a serious interest in him, carefully clears away the resistances that crop up at the beginning and avoids certain mistakes, he will of himself form such an attachment and link the doctor up with one of the imagos of the people by whom he was accustomed to be treated with affection. It is certainly possible to forfeit this first success if from the start one takes up any standpoint other than one of sympathetic understanding [*Einfühlung*, empathy], such as a moralizing one, or if one behaves like a representative or advocate of some contending party—of the other member of a married couple, for instance.
>
> 1913c, p 139–140.

This is a clear piece of advice to take time in empathising and understand the perspectives of clients. Freud recommended that such effort would help clients value the sessions and their therapist. The term "imago" means an unconscious "prototypical figure which orientates the subject's way of apprehending others; it is built up on the basis of the first real and phantasied relationships within the family environment", (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1985, p 211). Freud's inclusion of "imago" means that he was looking out for the generalised senses of other people 'below' or 'outside' of awareness, that arises from infancy or childhood. For Freud, empathy overlaps with the topic of transference, where the latter is a general but unconscious intentionality that constitutes the conscious sense of others.

Attention to the correspondence between Freud and Ferenczi shows how Freud acknowledged that conscious senses of empathic understanding did play a role. In 1928, Sandor Ferenczi had a paper published that had been read by Freud who had given it his full approval. Ferenczi wrote to Freud: "I have come to the conclusion that it is above all a question of psychological tact when and how one should tell the patient some particular thing … As you see, using the word 'tact' has enabled me only to reduce the uncertainty to a simple and appropriate formula. But what is 'tact'? The answer is not very difficult. It is the capacity for empathy", (Ferenczi, 1955, p 89, cited in Pigman, 1995, p 246). Freud's letter to Ferenczi of 4 January 1928, prior to publication of Ferenczi's paper, commented on his own series of papers on how to practice. Freud explained, "my recommendations on technique … were essentially negative. I thought it most important to stress what one should not do … Almost everything one should do in a positive sense, I left to the 'tact' that you have introduced. What I achieved thereby was that the Obedient submitted to those admonitions as if they were taboos and did not notice their elasticity", (cited in Grubrich-Simitis, 1986, p 271). The "Obedient" are the American trainee therapists who Freud had been treating.

Ferenczi's further reply to Freud of 15 January was that "I only mean that one must first put oneself in [*hineinversetzen*], 'empathise' with, the patient's situation … The analyst's empathy dare not take place in his unconscious, but in his preconscious", (p 272). In comparison to Freud's comments on transference being unconscious, and of the urge to judge between real and false, this aim of exploring the preconscious seems much more attainable. When something is preconscious it is capable of being brought to consciousness, discussed and interpreted.

For Freud, empathy concerns a "path" that "leads from identification by way of imitation to empathy, that is, to the comprehension of the mechanism by means of which we are enabled to take up any attitude at all towards another

mental life", (1921c, p 110, fn 2). Also, in describing the phenomenon of the identification of a group with its leader, Freud claimed that apart from appreciating the inferred intentionality of identification, what is required to understand (*Verständnis*) others is "the process which psychology calls 'empathy [*Einfühlung*]'", (p 107). Freud did note that conscious empathy "plays the largest part in our understanding of what is inherently foreign to our ego in other people", (p 108). From the above, it is clear that *Einfühlung* "plays the largest part" and concerns a first requirement to "attach" clients to therapists and the therapy: Empathy is a conscious or preconscious understanding that enables clients to trust therapists and encourages an "attachment" to take place in it (1913c, p 139–140).

The citation above contains the word *Einfühlung* that has been rendered as "sympathetic understanding", (Shaughnessy, 1995, p 228). Peter Shaughnessy concludes that James Strachey "and his associates felt it necessary to characterise Freud's discussion of the therapeutic relationship as purely objective (i.e., scientific) and thus free from the potentially subjective bias associated with *empathy*", (p 229). This disavowal of empathy through its mistranslation has served to alter the therapeutic relationship, the understanding and use of feelings and impressions that therapists have about clients. This is because such experiences are interpreted through a network of concepts that believe in advance that the causes of problematic relationships and emotions are repressed material in the unconscious. Shaughnessy concludes that Freud did not entirely ignore the conscious sense of the other:

> *Einfühlen* was used through Freud's writings in a consistent manner (in accordance with its etymological structure); specifically, it was used to connote a deeply felt experience in which one person attempts (a) to fully apprehend, both cognitively and affectively, the inner experiences of another; and (b) to then compare the experience of the other with his or her own.
>
> p 227.

What Shaughnessy is pointing out is that there are two parallel aims for psychodynamic therapy. There are both a *conscious attention* to the perspectives of clients and an alleged *'unconscious' attention* to what they more genuinely mean and evoke. Psychodynamic therapy works from an intellectual position that was adopted in order to make an interpretation of the phenomena, in the hermeneutic sense of providing understanding. Psychodynamic therapy preferred to interpret the conscious in terms of unconscious processes. This has specific

consequences in discounting the conscious experiences that therapists have about clients and, in some cases, results in ignoring or mis-interpreting the conscious experiences that are evoked. All intentionality as process is out of awareness. For the phenomenological perspective, it is not feasible to interpret unconscious intentionality in relation to objects that can never be experienced.

§19 Questioning transference

This work challenges the interpretations of transference, counter-transference and unconscious communication by clarifying the relation of one consciousness to another. The point is that for therapy, there should be a clear account of the empathic process through which one person bestows the sense they have of the other and their perspective. Or better, there should be an account of the co-empathic process through which people mutually bestow the senses they have of each other.

Freud compared his interpretation of the current situation of clients with an intellectual interpretation of what must have happened in their past. The following formulations express the necessary distinction of transference and define the range of observable events to which it refers. It has to be noted that transference is not a specific behaviour, affect or mistaken intersubjective understanding of others. Rather, it is a set of experiences that concern generalisation and alleged inappropriate experience and action, with respect to the current situation, because of the histories of clients.

1. Within the present situation there is some observable element of clients' presence (behaviour, affect, thought, speech, relating) that permits the interpretation that there was a past situation where there was an event that initiated, and continues to cause, current problems in relating. The problem is that whilst this may be true, there is no way of carrying out Freud's demand to distinguish between true and false, appropriate and inappropriate within his theory.

The general form of this distinction is:

2. The reaction to the past was appropriate at that time. But because of its fixity and retention across the years, it continues to be played out in contemporary situations where it is inappropriate.

There is a specific vantage point from which to make such inferences. The problem is a lack of means of being able to make such a judgement. Of course, there is the presence of the past. The problem is how to recognise it in a reliable

manner, particularly when an ultimate faith is placed in natural psychological science (chapter 12).

3. People who have not had psychodynamic therapy do not realise that their current experiences with others (at certain times) depict past trauma and the influence of the past. Because of this lack of understanding, they cannot over-rule their own mis-understanding, so they tend to repeat the same mistakes without knowing why.

If the phenomena of conscious experience had received more attention over the last century, there would not be a problem. The perspective of clients and therapists would be inter-related and types of relationship between clients and therapists would be capable of being adequately contextualised. But therapy and the humanities have always had trouble in defining their terms and quite rightly too, due to the complex nature of the task. This task is partly exacerbated by the difficulty in taking a perspective on oneself. There should be a clearer means of stating the extent of *psyche-logic* in the context of limits, difficulties and errors in the rationality involved in understanding others and human relationships.

For Freud, the diagnosis is that the presence of the past persists in an 'unconscious influence' on adulthood. Wishes and repressed material from infancy, childhood and adolescence become generalised. For Freud, "when we come near to a pathogenic complex, the portion of that complex which is capable of transference is first pushed forward into consciousness and defended with greatest obstinacy … finally every conflict has to be fought out in the sphere of transference … the intensity and persistence of the transference are an effect and an expression of the resistance", (1912b, p 104). The cure is to provide the ego the freedom to choose one way or the other. Therapy cannot prevent the possibility of morbid reactions to therapeutic attempts. But it believes it can promote free will.

§20 Close

This chapter has made the point that empathy, the conscious phenomena of the other and their perspective on the meaningful world, was not the sole focus of Freud's practice and thought. Consequently, the conscious experience of others is not the explicit focus for those who accept the concept of transference and structure the therapeutic relationship around interpretations about the *transferential relations* of clients. Chapter 2 showed that psychodynamic therapists interpret phenomena through occupying a hermeneutic vantage point. What is argued for

is understanding transference as an interpretative belief concerning the habits of empathic style. There is a need to be sure about what and how therapy claims its justifications, before it interprets the senses of clients. Let us look closely at the inheritance passed down to those who believe in interpreting transference. This chapter has argued contrary to Freud, that transference as inference about what might have occurred with respect to the region of evidence of current conscious experience, is unworkable. The concept is unworkable because of the definition of the entirely unconscious object of the unconscious proper. For Freud, it is impossible to have a conscious referent against which the current conscious senses of therapist or client can be compared in order to judge true from false, appropriate from inappropriate, according to his definition of the term unconscious. Chapters 12 and 13 supply the details of this argument.

Part of the problem is that the domain of the unconscious is insufficiently delineated with respect to the conscious. Failures in the identification of conscious and unconscious contexts, causes and effects, senses and referents, lead to confusion about helpful and unhelpful therapeutic interventions. Following the biopsychosocial perspective, the presence of the past is part of a complex multifactorial mixture of psychosocial 'causes' and material-biological natural cause. As we shall see, cause and meaningfulness are much more complex than Freud considered.

A strong focus on transference, and its role in the therapeutic relationship, is the case for psychodynamic therapists today. But to accept transference is to accept philosophical and hermeneutic problems. Hence, practical problems are created and not solved. The point is that clients and therapists are coming to the same phenomena from different perspectives. Clients have their understanding of themselves and therapists have theirs. If we do not presuppose the truth of the perspectives of therapists, then in self-reflexive understanding, what is required is a perspective to understand how there are these differences. It is agreed that clients who have different backgrounds to therapists will empathise their therapists in different ways. The views of therapists in the eyes of clients may never truthfully enter the room because they are not always voiced. But what is voiced can never be established against some thing-in-itself. The empathisings of psychodynamic therapists are usually not discussed with clients. If there is no justified way of interpreting unconscious processes, in and between self and other, then cause and effect cannot be related to the conscious senses that the pair has of each other. Just because clients see therapists in their own way, and this image differs to how therapists think they are behaving, it does not mean that clients are automatically wrong in their estimations.

The next chapter further considers the sense of the other and the relations between self and other in Freud's thought. The task of understanding how a concept meets its phenomenon is the work of theory. It eventually transpires that psychodynamics involves a form of idealism and realism. The idealism is one of the unconscious that is obtained by intellectual interpretation. It cohabits with a natural realism that places its faith in neurology, evolutionary psychology, biology and psychophysics. The answer to this problem is eventually provided through an attention to interpreting emotion and belief.

5

Freud's understanding of intersubjectivity

Aim: It is necessary to explore the way in which psychodynamic therapy has understood intersubjectivity. This chapter contextualises relationships with others with respect to Freud's understanding of the unconscious and unconscious communication. The guiding thread is noting that the conscious senses of others are prior to interpreting any preconscious senses that they could have. This chapter makes clear some contradictions in Freud.

The first context is to understand the practice that is demanded by the fundamental rule (§21). The second context is counter-transference (§§22, 23). The psychodynamic model for talking therapy is made explicit to show how it frames the experience of clients and therapists. What is commonly called counter-transference is a major part of working out how to respond to clients. Current conscious affective and spoken communication is not what Freud wanted therapists to focus on.

§21 The context for understanding relationships

Freud's terms should be understood within the context of his practice. It is always possible to supply further contexts to interpret how clients understand their experiences. The aim of this section is to show how Freud interpreted his clients. He did so within a specific type of therapeutic relationship and hermeneutic strategy. In chapter 12, it is shown that Freud grounded his stance in material being and natural science. Below, definitions are made of some major tenets of Freud's practice with conscious, preconscious and unconscious psychological senses.

Generally, psychodynamic therapy projects its knowledge in pursuance of its view of humanity as formed by unconscious psychic causality or "determination". The most important intervention is creative silence in conjunction with the fundamental (or basic) rule. The fundamental rule defines therapist and client roles

in sessions. Clients are requested to free associate—to say anything and everything that comes to mind. To enable clients to speak, therapists offer creative silence that occurs when they maintain long periods without speaking, to enable clients to free associate whilst lying on a couch or sitting in a chair. Clients are requested and expected to free associate. Therapists listen with free-floating attention and free associate to the free associations of clients.

At some point, therapists analytically 'interpret'. They speak in terms of causal inferences about transference, resistance and unconscious motivations that are derived from making sense of clients and their own emotions, thoughts, images and memories that are relevant to them. This has the aim of increasing clients' self-knowledge and restoring the free flow of the free associations that indicate good mental health. Freud used the word resistance in a variety of senses. The one used here refers to what happens in sessions where clients have difficulty in speaking, cease to speak, quickly change topics to avoid something, or say something and then run away from the topic or the consequences of what they have said. The more general sense of the term resistance is to achieving the work of analysis (Breuer and Freud, 1895d, p 278). It is noted that resistance is close to repression (1920g, p 19).

From the perspective of clients, what resistance feels like is a desire to talk about something that the therapist does not know and is relevant for getting help yet clients fear disapproval, rejection or would feel humiliation or shame by having to speak about it. Resistance occurs when the desire to speak the truth is topped by negative anticipations of the consequences of making it public. Resistance co-exists with what client and therapist can freely discuss and what the therapists experience but do not express. It is a necessary part of the therapeutic role to only focus on the business of understanding and helping clients. Self-disclosure of the therapists own life has no useful function as it takes away attention from the purpose of the meetings. People can be resistant in one area and completely open with respect to other topics. So the phenomenon of resistance is specific to the nature of the object of speech and with respect to how clients anticipate they will be received. Thus there is a link to anticipating what the therapist will think and do.

The point of interpretation of blockages to free association is to lift repression and regain defensively lost, repressed memories (Freud, 1963a, p 188). The outcome of Freud's therapeutic work is requesting an abandonment of a restricted understanding of self, to understand oneself in a much wider emotional, psychological and sexual context. To state this point in a slightly different way, what Freud was urging was a rejection of the conventional identification of what peo-

ple should be and urging clients to realise that their own true nature was much wider than early twentieth century society permitted. In doing this, Freud followed Friedrich Nietzsche and Georg Groddeck (Ellenberger, 1970, p 516).

The quotation below sets an ideal of hermeneutic neutrality. It is promised that it will be possible to grasp the meanings of clients that they need to know, to correct themselves. Yet they cannot find these meanings without help. Therapy progresses with the interpretation of speech and non-verbal communication according to psychodynamic lore. But it begins as follows:

> The *'Fundamental Technical Rule'* of this procedure of 'free association' … is begun by the patient being required to put himself into the position of an attentive and dispassionate self-observer, merely to read off all the time the surface of his consciousness, and on the one hand to make a duty of the most complete honesty while on the other not to hold back any idea from communication …
>
> *Psycho-Analysis as an Interpretative Art* … Experience soon showed that the attitude which the analytic physician could most advantageously adopt was to surrender himself to his own unconscious mental activity, in a state of *evenly suspended attention*, to avoid so far as possible reflection and the construction of conscious expectations, not to try to fix anything he heard particularly in his memory, and by these means to catch the drift of the patient's unconscious with his own unconscious … the patient's associations emerged like allusions, as it were, to one particular theme and that it was only necessary for the physician to go a step further in order to guess the material which was concealed from the patient himself and to be able to communicate that to him.
>
> Freud, 1923a, pp 238–239.

For Freud, *reading off the surface* of consciousness is merely introductory. It is *uncovering allusions* that is the work of interpreting clients. Hence the importance of hermeneutics: It is the central activity of therapeutic work. Listening to complex experiences that often do not make immediate sense involves thinking and feeling how they may be better contextualised with respect to the emotional and relational lives of clients and their life-choices. It is assumed that therapists can supply better meanings. Often, childhood traumas, attachment phenomena and the accumulated effects of past precursors are the context in which current problems make psychological sense. The free-floating interpretative attention of therapists occurs in the manner of listening to a new piece of music. This is because therapists do not know what is important in the discourse of clients until some time into a session or after several sessions.

Precisely what it means to "to catch the drift of the patient's unconscious with his own unconscious", (Ibid) is not immediately clear and is the topic of discussion below. It is clear that clients should be self-observers and therapists should focus on their "own unconscious mental activity", (Ibid). The precise sense of what Freud intended is easy to miss, so time is spent below in gauging how Freud interpreted the manifold of senses that clients have.

Freud's account of how to interpret presents readers with difficulties not answers. The following citation may at first glance seem straightforward.

> … when conscious purposive ideas are abandoned, concealed purposive ideas assume control of the current ideas, and that superficial associations are only substitutes by displacement for suppressed deeper ones … When I instruct a patient to abandon reflection of any kind and to tell me whatever comes into his head, I am relying firmly on the presumption that he will not be able to abandon the purposive ideas inherent in the treatment and I feel justified in inferring that what seem to be the most innocent and arbitrary things which he tells me are in fact related to his illness. There is another purposive idea of which the patient has no suspicion—one relating to myself.
>
> 1900a, pp 531–2.

If Freud meant that the problematic emotional, intersubjective and interpretative stance of clients, outside of sessions, are repeated in a session, and that therapists can spot them, then the quotation passes the test of practice. But it is the last comment concerning the "purposive idea" of transference being related to therapists that requires further consideration. It means there is an important difference between conscious and unconscious functioning. The belief in a structuralist interpretation of human experience above is not challenged. However, the passage above is read as meaning that there is the possibility of both intersubjective and hermeneutic freedom and constraint. Let us return to the psychodynamic relationship in order to understand.

Therapist and client roles are subject to a division of labour. Mainly, clients speak and therapists listen. Free-floating attention is the therapist's form of free association. Free-floating attention is a temporary attempt at a suspension of everything that usually focuses the attention of therapists, but it is superseded. The skilful handling of transference is obtained through making sense of clients in the six ways defined by David Smith (1987, p 314) in chapter 2. What is 'temporarily suspended' in listening to clients, allegedly includes personal inclinations, prejudices and theoretical assumptions. An ideal of hermeneutic neutrality is portrayed in the following remarks.

> Just as the patient must relate everything that his self-observation can detect, and keep back all the logical and affective objections that seek to induce him to make a selection from among them, so the doctor must put himself in a position to make use of everything he is told for the purposes of interpretation and of recognizing the concealed unconscious material without substituting a censorship of his own for the selection that the patient has foregone … [The therapist] must turn his own unconscious like a receptive organ towards the transmitting unconscious of the patient … the doctor's unconscious is able, from the derivatives of the unconscious which are communicated to him, to reconstruct that unconscious, which has determined the patient's free associations.
>
> Freud, 1912e, pp 115–6.

What the above expresses is that therapists should be open in their ability to understand the complex links between the presence of the past, the affect, relationships and senses of self and other, for clients. The phrase concerning turning one's "own unconscious like a receptive organ towards the transmitting unconscious of the patient" is deceptive and fits unclearly with Freud's own statements on the relation between conscious and unconscious. The problem is that it gives a specific character to unconscious communication. The belief that guides therapists is foreknowledge that the unconscious is causative. The last sentence above has been used as a justification for therapists to provide creative silence and remain utterly focused on the business of interpreting unconscious processes: that there are allegedly conflicts between conscious and unconscious parts that occur in sessions.

Freud's practice of free association and free-floating attention were being aware of the conscious experiences of clients and self, yet looking past them for some more reliable truth. For Freud's dream analysis, conscious experience is "manifest content" that is caused and indicates, is a guiding clue for, the "latent unconscious", (1900a, p 85). That which Freud classed as unconscious includes wishes (desires, motives, intentions), beliefs, thoughts and memories about infantile trauma, real and imagined, and the conflicts of infancy and childhood that are believed to be formative of adult problematic relationships. The point is that the same or similar distinctions appear in Freud's work repeatedly. When something is descriptively unconscious, it is classifiable as being pre-conscious in that it can be brought to consciousness and become an object of attention and discussion. There is nothing wrong with the use of the word "unconscious" to mean something that is not currently conscious. Freud used the word "preconscious" to mean representations that are tied to speech and thought, in that they are capable

of being spoken about (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1985, p 325–7). Something that is preconscious is either a system of consciousness that is subject to censorship so that what appears is not "unconscious contents and processes", (p 326). But the realm of the unconscious itself is an attempt to identify objects and intentional forms that never appear themselves (the latent unconscious in the dream terminology). Manifest content is either conscious or preconscious. Chapter 12 returns in detail to the unconscious in Freud's model.

On the contrary to psychodynamics, there is something fundamentally problematic about mental stuff that never appears. An intellectual illusion is created through the use of terms that are self-contradictory. It would be acceptable to claim to build theory on conscious and preconscious experiences. Or make explicit implicit beliefs concerning non-verbal experience. But this is not what Freud urged nor claimed to have achieved. Confusingly, Freud also held that the key definitive aspect of conscious experience is that its referents can be made explicit in speech (1915e, p 201–2). What is preconscious is as yet unreflected, implicit and non-verbal experience of emotion and relationships. What is truly unconscious remains so.

Psychodynamic practice also focuses on the subtle self-awareness in understanding the thoughts, memories and images evoked in the awareness of therapists as they refer to clients. One definitive paper, concerning a broad view of unconscious communication concludes that it is confirmed to have happened when therapists' free floating attention precedes or coincides with clients' free association (Beres and Arlow, 1974, p 47). The conscious phenomenon of the sense of the other is not disputed. Others are apparently separate yet we can feel for them and understand them.

The purpose of the psychodynamic, minimalist form of interaction is the promotion and expression of feelings, memories and thoughts, as they happen. Clients self-report and explore their perspective in speech. The focus of therapy is being attuned to, and interpreting the transference, counter-transference and unconscious communication, which relate to the spoken account of clients, plus what therapists think and feel.

§22 On counter-transference

Not all the story of Freud's influence on the contemporary understanding of counter-transference has been told. One last piece needs to be made explicit. Let us be clear about what is at stake. The conscious intersubjective relation between two people (of emotions, thoughts, impressions, beliefs) is being portrayed by the obscuring experience of transference from clients—and counter-transference, an

obscuring experience from therapists. Freud defined counter-transference in an introductory way. Its development in the literature further lacked consensus on what counter-transference is and how it should be worked with. In order to appraise this lack of consensus, a short historical overview will follow.

A Freudian tenet is that it is possible for therapists to interpret causes through becoming momentarily caught up in the relationship with clients and becoming influenced *unconsciously* to act in a manner that is out of character or telling in some other way. This may happen even to the extent of enacting the wishes and desires of clients. "We have become aware of the 'counter-transference,' which arises as a result of the patient's influence on his [the therapists'] unconscious feelings", (Freud, 1910d, p 144). The original problem that Freud identified, in creating the idea of counter-transference, was that the unresolved complexes, problems and resistances of therapists intrude and spoil their ability to treat clients. Freud warned that these therapists who cannot or will not understand themselves would be unable to carry out a talking treatment. Counter-transference is an undesirable reaction to the transference of clients. The way to deal with this reaction is for each therapist to "begin his activity with a self-analysis and continually carry it deeper while he is making his observations on his patients", (p 145).

Currently, the unwitting actions of therapists are called counter-transference enactments. Those who came after Freud developed the understanding and use of them. However, because counter-transference is both conscious and unconscious, and is related to unconscious communication and the unconscious of therapists, some help is required in delineating the unconscious and how it influences the conscious. Both of these are problematic due to the inability to be aware of unconscious end-products themselves.

The history of counter-transference after Freud is confused. An overview of its history is required to compare the many ways in which Freud's comments have been furthered. There are disparate views on counter-transference because of his lack of definition about how to relate the conscious and unconscious registers. What follows is an account of the orthodox manner of hermeneutic interpretation of the dynamics of a therapeutic relationship. In brief, counter-transference, the influence of clients on therapists, should not damage the therapy. But in what light is it understood? If counter-transference is real and unreal, conscious and unconscious, then it is ambiguous. It is difficult to determine the unconscious aspects from the manifest conscious parts, particularly when the conscious ones are not of central significance.

Freud noted two opposites with respect to communication. Firstly, "the possibility of the attribute of unconsciousness would be completely excluded as far as emotions, feelings and affects are concerned", (1915e, p 177). In other words, emotions are always conscious between people. Secondly, there is the statement concerning the effect of "the patient's influence on" the "unconscious feelings" of the therapist (1910d, p 144). In effect, this is an instruction to disregard the conscious. For this work, it is not acceptable to make an appeal to unconscious feelings because it brings together two contradictory terms: It makes an *oxymoron*, a self-contradiction. It is an intellectual wrong turn to interpret in this way. Simply put, it is impossible to have unconscious feeling. This argument against oxymorons will be returned to below. Let us look at the many ways in which later therapists have made sense of counter-transference.

Douglass Orr concluded that when it comes to counter-transference, the literature is divided in three ways about how to react to what is felt about clients: "(1) the analyst as "mirror" vs. the analyst as "human being;" (2) the question of whether the analyst stays out of the analysis as much as is humanly possible … (3) when inevitable countertransference feelings or situations develop, whether or not to communicate these to the patient, together with a partial or complete analysis of them in order to mitigate or undo their effects", (1954, p 662–3). There are conflicting aims that need to be balanced. Therapists need to stay focused on client material and not be aloof; they are involved in the work and use their feelings and presence to influence clients. Yet therapists are not the focus of the meetings. Generally, therapists should not talk about their personal material. Yet some form of self-disclosure is inevitable due to being in the same room as clients. How honest therapists should be without hurting clients, or taking the focus of the meetings away from the concerns of clients, has been a matter of debate since Freud. It is not standard practice in any school to tell clients what therapists feel about them. There can be the place for structured feedback and discussion of the relationship in a non-destructive way that strengthens the relationship. But that was not part of Freud's practice. Let us take note of some of the disparate comments on counter-transference as the concept matured during the twentieth century.

Edward Glover argued for flexibility on the part of therapists with respect to clients: "We cannot go far wrong if we always know not only why we intervene or are silent, but also what effect we hope to produce by so doing … These considerations allow us ample latitude to alter our procedure in difficult or exceptional cases, the criterion being that we are fully aware of the significance of our change in technique and the effects it may produce", (1927, p 513). In other words, it is

therapists who should justify themselves and alter their approach to meet specific clients.

In 1933 Wilhelm Reich encouraged therapists to deal with their problems with clients in a therapy of their own. His advice was: "It should be clear that one approaches an aggressive patient unlike a masochistic one, a hyperactive hysteric unlike a depressive one, that one changes one's attitude in one and the same patient according to the situation, that, in brief, one does not behave neurotically oneself, even though one may have to deal with some neurotic difficulties in oneself", (1970, p 139). For Reich, counter-transference only comes from the shortcomings of therapists.

Ella Sharpe wrote that: "'Counter-transference' is often spoken of as if it implied a love-attitude. The counter-transference that is likely to cause trouble is the unconscious one on the analyst's side … We deceive ourselves if we think we have no counter-transference. It is its nature that matters. We can hardly hope to carry on an analysis unless our own counter-transference is healthy, and that healthiness depends upon the nature of the satisfactions we obtain from the work", (1947, p 4). Sharpe was pointing out that therapists should understand their own motives. But there was no comment on how to identify the difference between the effects on therapists of conscious and unconscious feelings and actions towards clients. It is not clear what an unconscious attitude is or how it might be interpreted. It cannot be an attitude of which clients are currently aware. It could be something that therapists would find difficulty in admitting to themselves, but then it would be preconscious. Perhaps it could be something that therapists do not think or feel but can interpret from their own relationships and actions. She noted quite clearly that practice clearly relies on therapists knowing themselves (p 2). She believed that "unconscious anxiety" causes fore-closures and premature interpretation.

Maxwell Gitelson wanted therapists to distinguish between responses with respect to a part, or the whole, of the client. On the one hand, "total reactions to a patient are *transferences* of the analyst to his patients … These may be manifested in the over-all attitude towards patients as a class or may exacerbate in the 'whole response' to particular patients … They … determine the tendency of the analyst towards the whole case", (Gitelson, 1952, p 6). For him, transference is all that which is repeated from childhood (p 2). But without an account of the contributions of self and other, and how the two contribute to the whole, it is not possible to identify one's own contribution to the relationship as a whole.

On the other hand, Gitelson believed that counter-transference is comprised of three things, "the analyst's reaction to (1) the patient's transference, (2) the

material that the patient brings in, and (3) the reactions of the patient to the analyst as a person", (p 6). For Gitelson, counter-transference is a reaction in part or whole to clients and includes the unresolved problems of therapists. But his paper did not offer answers to how to distinguish these contributions.

In a different vein, Paula Heimann repeated the general directive to use counter-transference positively. But her thesis is that the therapist's "unconscious perception of the patient's unconscious is more accurate and in advance of his [the therapist's] conscious perception of the situation", (1950, p 82). What she claimed is that 'unconscious perceptions' are more accurate than conscious empathy, reasoning and conscious access to the meaningful world. But note the reification of the unconscious and the mistaking of an interpretation about a cause, for an oxymoronical 'perception' of a completely unavailable sense.

For Heimann, the unconscious has the ability to know spontaneously the meaning of others and the consequences of their intentions. For her, all aspects of counter-transference are creations of the influence of clients. It is they who make therapists express conflicts and unconscious wishes of clients. It is testament to the accuracy of therapists that they are able to be sensitive to such nuances. She wrote that:

> Freud's demand that the analyst must 'recognize and master' his counter-transference does not lead to the conclusion that the counter-transference is a disturbing factor and that the analyst should become unfeeling and detached, but that he must use his emotional response as a key to the patient's unconscious. This will protect him from entering as a co-actor on the scene, which the patient re-enacts, in the analytic relationship and from exploiting it for his own needs … the ensuing changes in the patient's ego include the strengthening of his reality sense so that he sees his analyst as a human being, not a god or demon …
>
> pp 83–4.

Heimann's perspective is representative of the general advice that therapists should use their responses to create new, corrective experiences and not re-traumatise clients. A conclusion is that doing therapy occurs by varying one's focus on clients, and the distance or closeness to them and their meanings. Such advice is acceptable. But the precise means by which the unconscious of clients reacts on the unconscious of therapists is not defined.

To dispel the confusion noted above, one writer is selected. Counter-transference enactments are rendered as the evocation of certain feelings, thoughts and intersubjective responses in therapists, as a result of meeting with clients. For this

work, the "compromise formations" of Joseph Sandler are an acceptable interpretation. Let us note what Sandler wrote concerning the nature of counter-transference.

Whatever terms are used, it is agreed that the immediate meaningfulness and responsiveness of human encounters are due to a "complicated system of unconscious cues, both given and received … This is the same sort of process that occurs not only in the aspects of transference and countertransference … but in normal object relationships", (Sandler, 1976, p 47). What he is referring to is how people interact so that a person may inadvertently and momentarily act against their own wish in order to please another, for instance. Or in other ways, people respond through the conventions of politeness when they would rather not do so. This work concurs. Telling mistakes do occur and clients are influenced by the past. But what is being rejected is the idea that anything can be claimed by merely invoking the word "unconscious" to hypothesise oxymoronic 'intentionalities,' 'objects' and 'experiences' that can never be experienced but only intellectually accepted, if the hermeneutic position of Freud is accepted.

Sandler claims that counter-transference enactments are "compromise formations" (p 46) between the personality and aims of therapists—and an unwitting enactment of specific roles and reactions that clients evoke in them. What he means is that unconscious intentionalities cause inadvertent, momentary lapses in the social skills and therapeutic stance of therapists. Such a lapse is a telling mistake where the therapy or therapist 'goes wrong,' to put it bluntly, and leaves their usual helpful stance. The compromise formations referred to are between therapists' personalities and their aims. Counter-transference occurs when therapists respond in some non-therapeutic way. For Sandler, counter-transference enactments are not irrational, nor entirely due to the unconscious causes of clients acting on therapists. But rather, they are understandable from the psychodynamic perspective. Counter-transference enactments are not entirely due to the weakness or neuroticism of therapists. But therapists do become caught in clients' negative games, in complementary and telling ways, and feel what clients might evoke in others, outside the therapeutic relationship. Therapists can prevent such counter-transference enactments if they are aware of how they think and feel. Such thoughts and feelings may not be openly discussed in the therapy, but they are interpreted in relation to clients. Some counter-transference enactments are less obvious and may only be spotted after the event (p 47).

Sandler believes the action and reaction of transference and counter-transference are due to a complex "system of unconscious cues, both given and received", (Ibid). For this work, it is not clear what "unconscious cues" can be. In writing

about counter-transference enactments, the therapist "may only become aware of it through observing his own behaviour, responses and attitudes, *after these have been carried over into action* … [that] could more usefully be seen as a compromise between his own tendencies or propensities and the role-relationship which the patient is unconsciously seeking to establish", (Ibid). The worth of this definition is to state one half of the overall situation plainly: Clients cast themselves in some role or stance and succeed in influencing therapists into an enactment that is characteristic of themselves—and the specific therapist. Sandler takes this as proof that unconscious communication has taken place and he holds that the concept is causative (Ibid).

Overall, the grain of truth in Freud's idea of counter-transference is that therapists should understand how they came to feel and act the way they do. And perhaps more importantly, they should not act on any strong feelings even if these feelings are overwhelmingly positive ones. The two-step process of working with counter-transference is to understand the conscious emotional response and to take that understanding to help clients themselves. A good deal of the contemporary means of understanding conscious emotion about clients is perfectly acceptable to any mature school of therapy. Indeed, the absence of an account of conscious emotions about clients would be worrisome. However, the next section provides a short critique.

§23 Critique of counter-transference

As the previous section noted, the most well-developed terminology for understanding the pushes and pulls of intersubjectivity is the style of thinking originated by Freud and developed by psychodynamic theorists. But, the means of appraising counter-transference is to attend to conscious experience as a mixture of perceptual and empathic givenness in an instance—and relate it to the conceivable, thinkable, whole. A short reminder is in order to put together the pieces that have been laid out so far.

In sum, transference is the alleged re-actualisation of the past in the session. It allegedly results in displacing unconscious senses of the past and other persons 'on to' therapists. The original definition of counter-transference is "a result of the patient's influence on his unconscious feelings, and we are almost inclined to insist that he shall recognize this counter-transference in himself and overcome it", (Freud, 1910d, p 144). The quotation means that counter-transference should not be acted on by therapists but used to help clients. To a degree, counter-transference is a hindrance, in that it may confuse therapists and elicit a non-therapeutic enactment (a comment that is a mistake, hurtful or derisory, for

instance). But when understood in the light of it being a manifestation of problematic past influences from clients, such an enactment can be understood as a useful guide for what needs to happen in therapy. The enactment should not be understood 'personally' but professionally and therapeutically. This end-point is fully accepted. However, in Freud's original definition, counter-transference is linked to an oxymoron "unconscious feelings".

Counter-transference is a necessary problem that must be dealt with. For Lucia Tower (1956, p 238), counter-transference feelings are "reality-based" and proper handling of them bring "a resolution to the countertransference problem" when they are therapeutically understood. One strategy with counter-transference is that the "therapist must be close enough to the client's experience to taste some of it and to react experientially, but maintain enough distance so as to not confuse his or her experience with that of the client", (Bohart and Greenberg, 1997, p 429).

However, understanding Freud's original practice is the key to understanding what these terms mean. For Freud, counter-transference is both conscious and unconscious and a reaction to transference and unconscious communication. Lohser and Newton (1996) show that what Freud wanted to achieve was to interpret unconscious communication (p 175). Freud calmed down emotionally dysregulated clients (p 191). He was abstemious and uncompromising at times (p 193). He did not want therapists to fall in love with clients (p 192). Let us be clear about what possibilities are being asserted in Freud's original conception of unconscious communication—and what that means for the senses of self and other that are being considered. What is required is a clear statement of guidelines about how to make rules for justifying interpretations. There are three possibilities for the modes of cause in communication. See Figure 1 below, for an illustration of Freud's understanding of intersubjectivity applied to the contemporary seating arrangement in therapy.

Figure 1—Freud's understanding of intersubjectivity.

(a) Conscious communication is speech between two or more persons (Freud, 1915e, p 201–2). Item (a) is unimportant because Freud believed there is a medium of unconscious communication between clients and therapists. Higher speech and any observable actions by the pair are caused. It is held that although the unconscious never appears itself, it is made manifest in conscious and preconscious experience (p 159, p 166, p 177, 1923b, p 21).

(b) Conscious senses for clients are 'caused' by the store of unconscious influences from their past that impinge on clients in ways that are not understood by them. Item (b) is of interest as it promotes transference (and resistance, counter-transference, etc). Memories, repressed representations ("ideas") and past relating are causative.

(c) Conscious senses for therapists are 'caused' by unconscious influences from clients that enter the consciousness of therapists in that they promote counter-transference enactments and other conscious senses. The belief in unconscious communication can be applied to tell clients of the causes inherent in any relationship. Unconscious communication is most important and only interpretable by therapists.

   Item (a) is discounted as a guiding clue. Items (b) and (c) are preferred and re-interpreted (as Smith noted, 1987, p 314). The situation above entails four outcomes in the way that conscious and unconscious senses are understood.

1) Conscious communication is discounted. Conscious understanding is corrupted because of transference. Clients are not able to understand their deficiency.

2) There is the conscious transferentially-interpreted other of clients. In sessions, this means determining how therapists interpret they are being treated and understood.

3) Following (c), there is the unconscious sense of therapists and their unconscious transferential others in the 'unconscious understanding' of clients. When clients become influenced by such senses, and therapists are able to infer how they are being inappropriately empathised, it is assumed to be not according to the current mutual task of understanding the unconscious of clients, but with respect to the influence of cause from the past. This should be identified by therapists and may result in transference and resistance being named in order for clients to understand themselves.

4) Following item (c), there is the unconscious sense of clients and their transferential others, in the unconscious of therapists. Such senses are interpreted from the consciousness of therapists by applying psychodynamic concepts and paying attention to how images, memories, feelings of therapists and counter-transference enactments occur. These senses are conscious and preconscious phenomena that show that unconscious experiences are occurring (Bernet, 1996, p 83). Such inferences become a basis for interpretations.

So with reference to figure 1, there is a lack of clarity concerning the difference between what is conscious and what is not. Specifically, there are two elements concerning unconscious causes because there is the inexact influence of the past and the inexact influence of current influences.

To summarise the problem that is entailed by Freud's definition of counter-transference is to state that he rested it on 'unconscious experiences' in an unspecified relation to preconscious and conscious ones. This is problematic because his authority is such that it condones belief in intentionalities and products that can never appear. Freud alleged that such senses exist and can be identified. The fine detail of what Freud believed, on the two registers of conscious and unconscious, and the underpinning belief in natural being and natural cause, are investigated in detail in chapter 12. After chapter 12, it becomes more problematic to practise a talking therapy in the Freudian manner of formal hermeneutics.

§24 Close

Unconscious communication is not indirect conscious communication or the indirect and spontaneous modelling of behaviour and attitudes that can be observed and learned. Any such communication could only ever be transmitted through some conscious means such as speech, emotion, bodily presence or gesture. The conclusion so far on transference, counter-transference and unconscious communication is that oxymorons are unacceptable. If therapists hold such inaccurate beliefs, then interactions started by them will lead to problems in understanding clients and the therapeutic relationship: The possibility of conflict, not co-operation, looms.

On the other hand, a philosophical analysis of the conditions for theory can only be made about conscious experience and communication. It is nonsense to believe that what can never appear to the senses is of a similar form to what does appear. 'Unconscious emotions,' 'unconscious communication,' 'unconscious rationalisations' about emotional consequences—are all misleading metaphors. For the most part, the emotions of others, and what they are trying to communicate of their perspective, are capable of being understood and discussed with them, so that therapists can find if their understanding is accurate.

The phase of understanding after free-floating attention is where Freud showed his hermeneutic preferences. A hermeneutic stance and a specific view of causality are used in "interpreting" the unconscious. Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis define "*interpretation*," (*Deutung*) as what is "*made known to the patient*", (1985, p 228). The aim of interpretation is to help clients understand themselves by furthering their understanding of the causes of their conscious lives. Interpretation "brings out the latent meaning … [and] reveals the modes of defensive conflict and … the wish that is expressed by every product of the unconscious", (p 227). Somehow, the act of interpretation enables clients to "reach this latent meaning", (Ibid), which is unconscious.

However, *The Unconscious* (1915e) can also be read as Freud supplying an explicitly conscious and hermeneutic theory of how talking therapy works. Specifically, Freud was asserting a recombinatory theory of psychological change that can be wholly spontaneous. What free association or general discussion of a psychological problem achieves is that it provides clients a chance to remember and understand the past, in the context of the present. Because therapists accept clients and work to understand them, this lessens the anger and shame clients feel, for instance. The current tolerant and accepting relationship shows positive esteem towards clients and their experiences, and that raises the esteem and abil-

ity for clients to understand their original emotions and actions. The recombinatory role of the speaking ego is re-contextualising long-held negative senses, and alters their meaning by speaking them, often for the first time. Such a positive effect can occur spontaneously. What is certain is that a psychological means of influence will only be effective when it alters conscious senses for the better.

As chapter 12 will show, the bad inheritance of psychodynamic therapy is the readiness to rely on unworkable theory about unconscious senses in relation to the material-natural aspect of the biopsychosocial whole. It is genuinely impossible that an unconscious referent can be considered, without entailing links to conscious or preconscious theory of the conditions of possibility. Freud admitted something of the sort himself when he concluded that primary process associations "make cognition possible" (1950a, p 365) in the sense of creating secondary process rationality.

It has to be noted that Wilhelm Reich believed that free association was impossible and that whatever clients say and do, they always occupy some stance. By the same token, this applies to therapists. In relation to Freud's hermeneutic stance, Reich asserted a paradoxical position in place of Freud's practice of supplying psycho-analytic contexts. In 1933, Reich believed that there is a fundamental inability to follow the fundamental rule (1970, p 40). For him, free association can never be free, because all that clients show and communicate is identifiable according to preconceived notions. Free association is an ideal whereas free conversation is the actuality. It is inevitable that both parties can only show each other how they are reacting to the current situation of creative silence from therapists and the faltering monologue of clients. This same situation is returned to under the heading of the hermeneutic circle in therapy (chapter 15). There are other situations where there should not be free association and it is better to set aside a specific number of sessions on an agreed topic for an agreed purpose.

Because a meeting is occurring, there is a question of justifying the ability to distinguish the contribution of each party. Empathy as a felt-sense is neither a logical interpretation nor a projection of meaning onto clients. Clients behave in some way. The observable occurrence gets given meaning through empathy, as a form of lived interpretation of the other and cultural objects for them. Let us consider two conditions for understanding intersubjectivity:

• The phenomenon of specific non-verbal meanings of the other are constituted according to speech and specific, consciously observable gestures and movements of their body, as Ernest Jones noted (1955, p 200). It is almost always immedi-

ately apparent that the overall state of the other is understandable in some way. Sometimes only a basic sense might appear and it could be ambiguous. For instance, a client cries. The specific sense of this could be joy, relief, sorrow, frustration or anger.

• There are times though, that not even our closest companions, parents and children make sense to us. In this case, there are limits to empathic understanding: The other remains other (Husserl, 1977a, §§51, 52, 54).

From the phenomenological perspective, psychodynamics has a reliance on unsupportable theory. The next part of the book works to make clear what happens in two-person relationships with a view to asserting conclusions about human relating generally.

PART III

The challenge of Husserl

This part provides a perspective for countering the naturalistic attitude in psycho-therapy and providing a model for it. Husserl's help in theorising is used to find the commonalities between psychodynamics and cognitive behavioural therapy. Phenomenology also functions as a glue to bond these two systems into a common perspective. The purpose of this part is to develop clinical reasoning and practice through Husserl's philosophical psychology that focuses on meaning and the psychosocial. This is theorising about different types of relation to conscious objects in experience. Husserl held a complex account of conceptual and percep-tual meaning, presentation and other forms of sense. What is presented in this part is not a definitive overview of Husserl's stance. Rather, it introduces some of the most salient details in a way that supports psychotherapy theory and practice.

6

An experiential introduction to phenomenology

Aim: This chapter defines the most fundamental aspects of phenomenology. Phenomenology devotes itself to theorising how intentionalities cognise being. It is an unashamedly qualitative analysis of meaning that differentiates the manner of its production. The first section defines some key terms without detailed references, to introduce the whole. It is important to show the manner of argument not just the conclusions, so that others can follow, repeat and understand how the conclusions are obtained.

The first distinction to make is to state that, of course, there are real people and real things as material objects. But the ego and its consciousness make different and varying senses of what exists. What is *in* consciousness are senses that are changeable, comparable and may concern the same referent-object. In the year 1900, phenomenology began by wanting to avoid psychologism, the tendency to ground philosophy, the "pure logic" of thought about theoretical ideals, by basing it on empirical findings without a prior clarification of meaning. For phenomenology, this is an unacceptable confusion of guiding ideas and pure theory—with applied results and entirely different investigations of the real world. "*Logical psychologism* is nothing other than the failure to recognize" the fault of "assigning to the domain of psychological research the most universal, pure-logical laws of possible thinking", (Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p 30). This is a definitive statement urging the importance of theoretical clarity about how consciousness works prior to action and empirical research. The need to understand the relation between the pure and the applied, the ideal and the real, continues today. Contrary to the picture that the human sciences and empirical psychology have of themselves, these disciplines are not wholly empirical. Experiments do not exist by themselves. Rather, experiments are part of a much wider context that includes aims, values and a whole way of acting towards the world

that focuses excessively on natural causes. Because of that the attention to the psychological world is lessened. The important work of representing the biopsychosocial whole is hampered by not having an accurate portrait of meaning in the psychosocial world.

§25 Overview of Husserl's phenomenology

Consciousness is capable of understanding itself. Consciousness has intentionalities towards other consciousness, ideas, things, itself and contexts. Consciousness reaches out to make sense of the world, in "constituting" the manifold meanings of specific beings. It is indisputable that there is a world of meaning. The term "constituting" really means co-constituting or enabling sense to exist with other people (Husserl, 1982, §§49, 151, Ströker, 1993, p 149). Accordingly, meanings of all kinds are not wholly one's own. They are ubiquitously public and communally accessible. "The sense is not found next to the matter which expresses it; rather, both are experienced concretely together … Therefore, there is an analogy between the way these objects are experienced and the way in which, in experiencing a fellow-man, we experience a unity of body and psyche", (Husserl, 1977b, §16, p 84). Interpreting is social.

What consciousness experiences is cognised being. It is possible to attend to the senses of beings in various ways. The phenomenological way is to regard any experiencing in an a priori, idealised way. An a priori perspective is a "Copernican" or "transcendental" turn away from a mere attention to objects—to considering the theoretical conditions of their possibility (Kant, 1993, p 15/B xvi, Gardner, 1999, p 40). Paradoxically, this statement is both vague and precise. It precisely defines what is being urged yet the referent of *what to regard* and *how to regard it* is not yet in sight.

Let us go right to the heart of the matter of what phenomenology does. Here is another precise definition: *Any sense of what might exist in the world is studied as a non-actual, non-believed sense that leads phenomenologists to interpret co-constituting processes of consciousness generally*. The focus is the inter-relation between mental co-constituting processes and the objects made. Phenomenology begins with observing one's own mental processes. It proceeds by considering them on behalf of anybody.

Husserl believed that interpreting in this manner was taking an "absolute" perspective. For him an "absolute" perspective meant that other forms of understanding are more derivative. Such manners of making sense can be differentiated with respect to the absolute, fundamental processes of consciousness doing its work. Phenomenology is theoretical interpretation within the philosopher's arm-

chair. It does not propose empirical investigations of any kind. Nor does this mean that thought experiments replace actual experiments or investigations. Phenomenology proposes methods of reflection and conclusion on raw qualitative data, in being aware of how we are aware. One way of expressing its position is to state that *sense and meaning are on the 'inside' of consciousness.* Real objects and people *as matter* are 'outside' of consciousness.

What phenomenology proposes can be expressed in an equivalent way with different terminology: If there is no consideration of intentionality in its psychosocial context in a qualitative way, then it remains a mystery as to how senses appear. Similarly for therapy, if there is no language to represent the discussion of complex psychological processes, then the projects of psychological understanding and change are hampered.

Although sitting in the armchair of thought, phenomenology comprises a number of methods of the clarification of experience that begin with reflection from an interpretative position concerning *what appears* and *what must be occurring in one's own or others' lived experience*. It tries to find invariant structures of experience. It demands that its technical language attends to discernible differences in experience.

Husserl championed a qualitative perspective as an utterly necessary starting point in all philosophy, science and academia. He employed interpretative practices to differentiate the forms of intending meaning, experientially and linguistically. He applied rational principles and a novel set of interpretations. With respect to contemporary psychology, it is possible to characterise Husserl's approach as a qualitative cognitivism or theory of mind. Philosophically, its stance is post-Neo-Kantian. The latter remark is a short and pithy statement but it says nothing of his methods. And Husserl did urge his readers to adopt specific methods.

From 1907 to his death in 1938, he proposed a number of methods that apply to all forms of intentionality. The primary aim is to categorise each species of intentionality. Firstly, there is higher conceptual intentionality that actively relates to the ego. Secondly, there are the non-egoic, non-intentional passive processes that are involuntary and give their perceptual senses of colour and body feeling, for instance, and last for a duration of time. These methods for finding the elements of intentionality fly in the face of our normal lack of a reflective attention to *how* we are conscious, nevermind identifying any invariant structures of it.

Despite the abstract wording and the numerous re-presentations of the methods, sometimes with new terminology that might have slightly altered the

method, or emphasised different aspects of it, or mentioned different areas of its scope. The basic method was remarkably constant after reaching a degree of maturity in the lectures of 1907 published as *The Idea of Phenomenology* (1999) and *Thing and Space* (1997a). At this point, Husserl sometimes characterised phenomenology as a challenge to turn all abstract questions into the 'personal' ones of understanding how one understands: The aim is to conclude on what is constant in any intentionality, as opposed to what is variable. Although precisely what he meant by "I can represent a perception to myself in imagination or in memory and turn my regard to its givenness within imagination" (1999, p 24) is not entirely clear at first glance. Such a phrase is definitive and its meaning will become clearer in this chapter.

In 1913 Husserl repeated that what is required is a comparison of the different types of objective givenness in order to distinguish the being of consciousness and sort between inherently more fundamental types of intentionality, such as perception and temporality (1982, §§130–2, 150–1). The point is to find how more dependent, modified and implied forms are related to more fundamental ones. In the years 1925 to 1929, Husserl made it clear that there were two specific methods of attending to the inherent distinctions in the givenness of objects, of comparing them and concluding through "eidetic variation," with the same intent of finding *how* conscious experience functions. The work of eidetic imaginative variation is a disciplined process of imagining, with a view to finding relations of dependence between qualitative experiences.

The comments of 1917 are also definitive. Phenomenology investigates the realm of pure consciousness as "pure possibilities with their pure laws … in *precisely* the same way" as geometry (1972, pp 16–17). The sense gets repeated in 1925 as the demand for a "mathematics of the mind", (1977b, §4, p 36). The final conclusions of eidetic variations are ontological in Husserl's sense of sorting between dependent superficialities and more independent grounds and wholes (§15, p 83).

However, due to the novelty of his approach and the very general manner of what is being urged, Husserl could be accused of failing to communicate *what* he wanted his readers to be aware of, and *how* he wanted them to find inherent distinctions in experience. Furthermore, his attempts to explain himself by distancing himself from problems and providing subtle clarifications and explanations of precisely what he wanted readers to do, might leave the most diligent reader nonplussed, if not downright confused.

Thanks to Eduard Marbach though it is possible to find some concrete instructions that enable readers to grasp the promise of what Husserl did enthuse

about for such a long time. Indeed, a long list of eminent scholars have taken inspiration from Husserl and made something interesting from what he wrote—although perhaps with the clarifications of Marbach (1982, 1984, 1988, 1992, 2005), it can now be understood how much some writers have completely mis-understood the original project. Indeed, Marbach has put forward a number of strong arguments in favour of Husserl's approach. For instance, it is desirable to link theory to "observable … behaviour and action", (1996, p 138). And within the area of psychology, the point is to create theory that directly refers to first-person experience.

Again, the practice that Husserl intended is best summed up as *comparing how we are aware of objects of different sorts, with an eye to distinguishing the innate differences between the intentionalities.* The model for this practice of theorising is the relationship between pure mathematics and applied science and technology. Phenomenology works to create a pure mathematics of consciousness before starting any actual projects with that knowledge. What this means is that the occurrence of any intentionality is related to the present context of perceiving one's own body and the current environment.

Already this explanation is in danger of not showing the reader the type of evidence and procedure that is necessary in order to have the technical language make sense. Therefore, in order to have you properly understand, what I am going to do is to ask you to put this book down for a minute and permit yourself to become aware of what comes to mind. If you choose not to follow this exercise, then Husserl's work will remain obscure and you will fail to appreciate what is being discussed. Firstly, choose a physical object that you know well, such as your house keys, your bed or some such item.

-§-

Allow yourself to be aware of the experiential details that come to mind in answering the question below. For instance, in the sense of noting what you are aware of in recollecting and anticipating your chosen object. Perhaps you will get clear visual memories and clear visual anticipations. Or perhaps the images, if any, go in and out of focus. Some people are aware of words rather than pictures and others are aware of feelings in the sense of emotions or bodily feelings. Can you notice what perspective in space you have towards the item? Is it close or far? Does the visualised distance vary when you remember it—as opposed to anticipate it? Or otherwise, become aware of any other details that come to mind in answering the question: *What do you notice as the differences between remembering your object at one time and place in the past—and anticipating what it will be like at*

another time and place in the future? With your eyes open or closed, experience what it is to remember your chosen object and then anticipate it.

Whatever you have just been conscious-of in answer to this question is the subject matter of phenomenology, its raw data. The refining process is trying to understand what happens in memory and anticipation, for instance, in relation to a perceptual object. The abstract terminology is about finding the panhuman aspects of what qualitatively happens in these forms of presentation. Further contrasts happen when becoming aware of other forms of intentionality. The natural attitude is the common sense discourse or folk psychology about intentionality. This is sufficient evidence for this work to conclude that people can successfully reflect on their own intentionality and be aware of how they are thinking, feeling and relating, for instance, even if the ordinary understanding of intentionality is unclear. Clearly, it is possible to talk to anyone about what it is to see, be worried, be in love, anticipate or be disappointed.

It should now be clear what Husserl meant by "I can represent a perception to myself in imagination or in memory and turn my regard to its givenness within imagination," (1999, p 24). Marbach explains that Husserl interpreted the givenness of what appears in the following ways. Husserl unfolded each species of intentionality. The most fundamental species of 'intentionality' is the passive occurrence of the duration of time. The next most fundamental form of intentionality is perception that includes the felt-sense of bodiliness, *leiblichkeit*. Perception is defined as the species in which people and inanimate things are perceived as being bodily present in a current moment. Perceptions can occur "with identity" or "without identity", (Marbach, 1993, p 178).

The next species of intentionality is presentational representation of two types. First, purely mental representations occur. The first type is imagination, recollection and anticipation: These are "forms that just intentionally imply or modify perception", (p 108). The second, more complex type, involves an association between what appears and what is meant. For instance, these occur in pictorial representation in visual art where what is actually perceived, paint on a canvas, stands for the depicted object, a landscape perhaps. This second species of pictorial presentation contains an overlapping of sense between the signifying item and its signified content. Pictorial presentation is a member of the species of "double intentionality" that points to a "double object:" the canvas *and* its depiction (p 128). Or more precisely, a depiction x is "intuitively representing x" in "an activity where the intentionally implied perceiving in the mode of non-actuality is taken to be of *the x as it appears in the picture* y which, at the same time, is

actually perceived; this kind of activity obtains in pictorially representing x that entails intentional reference to a double object", (p 179). In a different wording, y represents x. Intentionality does the work of linking y to x.

The point is that in visual art there are two types of object and two types of intentionality. For instance, what appears perceptually is a canvas with paint on it. It is a signifying vehicle that is not treated as merely daubs of paint though. What occurs in visual art, particularly of the "traditional" or "representational" kind, is that through a process of an initial learning of the signifying traditions of art, a second intentionality of a semiotic sort points to an altogether different object. In representational art, paint suggests a previous time and place and the depicted object is signified: It is not perceptually present, although the scene may well be believed, or is otherwise credible in figurative art. The scene itself is definitely not believed to be extent in the paint.

In Husserl's writing the details of the pictorial presentation of visual art are referred to by the mention of "object-pairs" that occur in perceiving a picture and understanding it as a picture of something (Husserl, 1982, §99, p 245). The case of pictorial presentation is a telling one for empathy, for it too perceives the other's body and understands it as being mutually interested in the same basic world as ourselves. In visual art, there are two objects distinguishable in what appears in "the realities presented "in the picture"", (§111, p 262). As we shall see, the similarity with empathy is that the consciousness and perspective of the other appears 'in' or 'through' their body. Husserl's account concerns teasing apart gradations of sense in relation to forms of intentionality.

The generality of these statements needs some concrete cases to show what they mean. For instance, intellectual objects such as words, sentences, ideas and numbers are forms of higher, conceptual intentionality. Photographs and visual art depict something to be present when it is not. In the case of the photograph, the person or event did occur (more often than not). The actuality of the photograph suggests something of the scene by means of our mental work in understanding what the photographed scene must have been. In the case of visual art, the daubs of colour on a canvas depict something that is not perceptually present. What are perceptually present are the daubs of colour. What is depicted in representational art is John Constable's Hay Wane or Vincent Van Gogh as he saw himself in his self-portrait. The depicted object in visual art is given in a style that adds to reality and shows its object in some way.

Finally, let us consider some of the types of statements that are conclusions in phenomenology. The simplest cases to grasp initially are those of perceptual objects such as inanimate things, but these cases are by no means the only ones

that can be considered. Perception of things can be concluded as "x is given by means of actually perceiving x", (Marbach, 2005, p 155). Visually imagining an object at unspecified time and place is concluded as "I (the subject of the experience), while grounded in the presentation of my actual surroundings s, am re-presenting some fictional or real object x by means of re-presenting a neutralised perceiving of x", (p 156).

Looking at a drawing or photograph y of the same thing x can be expressed as "I, while grounded in the presentation of my actual surroundings s, am re-presenting a real or fictional x by means of re-presenting a neutralized perceiving of x in so far as it appears in the picture y that I actually perceive", (Ibid). And finally, a more complex possibility of imaging that one is viewing a drawing or photograph can be concluded on in the following way:

> I, while grounded in the presentation of my actual surroundings s, am re-presenting a real or fictional x by means of neutrally re-presenting another activity of re-presenting x, such that, while quasi-grounded in the neutrally represented presentation of my surroundings s, a perceiving of x is re-presented to be a neutrally re-presented perceiving of x in so far as it appears in the picture y that is re-presented by means of neutrally re-presenting a perceiving of y.
>
> Ibid.

The conclusions above are claimed to be the case for all persons. What Husserl was inventing was an approach to dealing with unities or wholes of meaning in a parallel way to gestalt psychology (Husserl, 1989b, §32, p 138). On the one hand this view notes that bare sensation in the five senses and bodily feeling carries meaning. For instance, perceptual "apprehension presupposes sensation contents", (§18a, p 61). On the other hand these meanings are often open to and inextricably connected to the views of others in a conclusion concerning increasing levels of higher less fundamental meaning that are predicated on the existence of lower more fundamental sorts. The lower "levels become pregivenness for the relevant higher syntheses; and so do the fully constituted intuitive Objects of nature for the theoretical-scientific activity, for valuing and practical behavior, etc", (§54, p 226).

§26 Summary of the basic method

What Husserl meant by a "mathematics of the mind," (1977b, §4, p 36), is a theory about consciousness in its social habitat of co-consciousness, for use in any applied psychology, for instance. It is for the purpose of providing a theoretical

grounding for empirical work. In summary of this overview, there are five essential steps to phenomenology.

1. There is a need to become self-reflexive about the forms of intentionality that create different types of sensation, meaning and temporal givenness in relation to meaningful objects in the world of human consciousness. What Husserl actually did was to interpret the implicit, after considering explicit objective appearances of different types. Reflected-on experience is raw data.

2. "Reductions" are methodical steps to create "attitudes" towards a referent and make regions of raw data for study. There is a *manner* of looking for finding constancies in relation to a *what*. The *what* is how any object is experienced as perceptual, imagined, remembered, empathised, empathised as someone else remembering, so on and so forth. Reductions and attitudes are detailed in sections 29 and 30 below.

3. What is found is that the different senses of meaning-objects, for instance, appear with added sense, often as a result of previous learning and past contexts. The past meanings get added to sensation in the current context. The past meanings need distinguishing through reflection on their source. In some cases, anticipated meanings are added and they may also have a relation to the past.

4. Raw data is refined through eidetic imaginative variations, thought experiments for the purpose of theorising, to determine variables and constancies of sense and intentional relation. This is a means of finding the inherent structure of consciousness generally. For instance, one such structure is the relation of co-constituting intentionality to constituted sense of a specific referent-object. Another is the relationship between a self, another and a cultural object (any public object be it a thing, an idea, a piece of music, another person, a social event or anything that is conceivable).

5. Phenomenology concludes by finding ontologically more independent qualities and relations, in relation to varieties of less fundamental, more dependent sorts of objects and intentionality. Phenomenological concepts have a direct mode of referring to what everybody can acknowledge in first-hand experience for themselves and in the second-hand empathy of others.

Phenomenology is a *re-interpretation of the everyday experience of being involved in all intentionalities with the cultural objects of attention in a reflective and interpre-*

tive manner. The experience of the world and the meaning of others within consciousness are considered as "explicit and implicit intentionality", (Husserl, 1977a, §42, p 90). This is because many types of intentionality are only observable by working out how and from where a meaning has arisen. Psychological meanings, like other types, are abstract in the sense that they are not perceptual. But they occur in relation to the perception of the physical bodies and speech of other people in a variety of contexts. As we shall see like Kant, Husserl judged between the conceivable and the inconceivable.

What this means for practice is that if a school of therapy had no formal account of how we understand the other's view, then it would be insufficiently self-reflexive. Phenomenology in the human sciences is an attempt to make a coherent response to more than a century of naturalistic empirical psychology. Husserl made several approaches to empathy and intersubjectivity during thirty years of writing and lecturing. We shall see that in a similar way to which a scene is represented by paint and the viewer of it responds to the signified or depicted object—the human body depicts the consciousness of the other.

The comments above are a succinct overview. The next chapter adds more detail by repeating the content of the above, but this time relating it more to the philosophical background. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 provide detail of the specific approach for understanding the text of the *Cartesian Meditations*. Chapter 10 is an abstract argument that sums up the type of thinking that Husserl implied. The attention below is detailed because of the attention to detail in Husserl.

7

Some basic points of reference

Aim: This chapter supplies the basic philosophical background that justifies Husserl's practice as defined in the previous chapter.

The order of approach is as follows. The first topic is the acceptance of Kant's approach that has been turned from a logical interpretation to an exploration of experience. For Kant, any move towards empiricism occurs by rational consideration of the possible and the impossible. Husserl accepted Kant's requirement that philosophy should be *a priori: prior to the empirical*. The second topic is the relation between the attitude taken towards an object and what then appears, because there are eight attitudes in phenomenology. Next, the term reduction is introduced and followed by a section on how to interpret what appears. Another more detailed summary of phenomenology is provided. This time one that sums up the philosophical position as a claim of metaphysical neutrality (Ströker, 1993, p 60, fn 34).

§27 Husserl's version of Kant

Let us start afresh and embellish the overview of chapter 6 with some philosophical background material so it is possible to understand the key issues. In order to understand Husserl's approach, it is necessary to understand Kant. Kant believed it is possible to spot necessary and universal relations within experience by the power of thought alone. The initial starting point for Kant was to find out how "all our knowledge begins with experience" even though "it by no means follows, that all arises out of experience", (1993, p 30/B 1). What Husserl took from Kant was the impetus to find how consciousness makes meaning, rather than applying logic to infer how it might do so. In Husserl's words: "Plainly we are here concerned with *a priori* conditions of knowledge … The ideal conditions of knowledge which we have called 'noetic' as opposed to those which are logically objective", (1970a, §65, p 233).

Transcendental philosophy for Kant was the ability to interpret human being in a specific way that considers the conditions of possibility in order to conclude on how consciousness meets other consciousness and the world and how there can be rationality. "I apply the term *transcendental* to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the modes of our knowledge of objects, so far as this mode of knowledge is possible *a priori*", (Kant, 1993, p 43/B 25). Kant's transcendental philosophy shows logically how there are aprioris concerning what appears. Thus, necessary limits are determined a priori, before beginning any actual endeavour.

The words "a priori" and "transcendental" work together. A philosophy is transcendental if it reflects on the whole of experiences and interprets what makes that whole possible or extent. A priori knowledge is that which is claimed through interpretation, prior to any investigative procedure of a non-intellectual sort. When "transcendental" is placed before words such as consciousness, subjectivity and intersubjectivity, it means that what is being considered are their conditions of possibility. Furthermore, when Husserl discussed consciousness what is at stake is embodied subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

An example will help establish what a priori knowledge is. Let us take the example of natural cause. For instance, a transcendental claim is that there is no fire without smoke. A priori categories are part of an interpretative predisposition that enables conscious experience to make sense: Fire causes smoke. This type of hermeneutic stance takes everyday meaningful experience and states the necessities of intentionality for it being as it is. For example: natural being is caused. Such understanding is one a number of basic "categories," in Kant's terminology. The a priori category of natural cause is required to make sense of events. The interpretation of cause enables natural science to exist. The point is that events in the inanimate world do not happen without causal reason. The point for psychology and therapy is to state the necessary and universal interpretations that make the psychological world of thought, emotions and relationships understandable: Hence the concordance between Kant, Husserl, theory of mind and therapy, noted in chapter 3.

Husserl was confident that he could identify the necessary and universal aspects of the inter-relationship of one consciousness with another, as they create a shared world. Husserl agreed with Kant. Kant's transcendental philosophy and Husserl's transcendental phenomenology concern the elucidation of universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of knowledge and understanding. This became the experientially-based practice demonstrated in chapter 6. As Husserl put it:

> We do not ask how experience arises … but what "resides" in it, what there is
> to draw out of it … What resides in it essentially … can be infringed by no
> theoretical assumption, nor can it be violated by any putative self-evidence of
> empirical psychology or of metaphysical judgement, for every such violation
> signifies counter-sense … The conditions of the "possibility of experience"
> [*Erfahrung*] are the first. Conditions for the possibility of experience signify …
> nothing else other than all that resides immanently in the essence of experi-
> ence … and thereby belongs to it irrevocably. The essence of experience,
> which is what is investigated in the phenomenological analysis of experience,
> is the same as the possibility of experience, and … is *eo ipso* a condition of the
> possibility of experience.
>
> 1997a, §40, p 118–9.

The quotation above defines phenomenology as the unfolding of a correlation
between any intentionality and any sense. It is a development of Kant's transcen-
dental philosophy concerning the processes common to any understanding.

What is also included is the role of the body as part of being oriented in space.
As early as 1907, Husserl concluded that the "constitution of the Objective loca-
tion and of Objective spatiality is essentially mediated by the movement of the
Body … by the kinaesthetic sensations", (§50, p 148). What this means is that
what appears to consciousness involves embodied human experience in space.
This is perhaps something of a truism, once it is made explicit. But the point here
is that philosophical knowledge is underpinned by everyday experience. Such
comments are a precursor to the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation*.

Kant had identified a tendency for an over-ambitiousness of theoretical claims.
Husserl did something similar with respect to the conditions of there being inter-
subjectively different senses about any cultural object. The point of theorising is
to make action applicable to its aims and objects. Speculation, falsehood, mis-
takes and over-ambition are all problems to be circumvented. For Kant, reason
must overcome the tendency to ignore its own limits. Self-reflexively, it should
identify its ability to take wrong turns. Kant demanded a standardised protocol
for answering such questions. Sometimes he made a metaphor of court hearings
to explain himself. At other points he phrased his critique like this:

> A cursory view of the present work will lead to the supposition that its use is
> merely *negative*, that it only serves to warn us against venturing, with specula-
> tive reason, beyond the limits of experience … But this, at once, assumes a
> *positive* value, when we observe that the principles with which speculative rea-
> son endeavours to transcend its limits, lead inevitably, not to the *extension*, but
> to the *contraction* of the use of reason, inasmuch as they threaten to extend the

limits of sensibility, which is their proper sphere, over the entire realm of thought, and thus to supplant the pure (practical) use of reason.

1993, p 18–19/B xxii-iii.

Transcendental philosophy has the function of correcting inadequate manners of knowing in two ways. It provides discipline: "The *restraint* which is employed to repress, and finally to extirpate the constant inclination to depart from certain rules, is termed *discipline*", (p 468/B 736). It provides censorship: "This procedure, of subjecting the *facta* of reason to examination, and, if necessary, to disapproval, maybe termed the *censura* of reason", (p 495/B 788). Kant requested coherence between scientific and philosophical practices as they refer to ideas and phenomena that are publicly observable. "If truth consists in the accordance of knowledge with its object, this object must be, *ipso facto*, distinguished from all others; for knowledge is false if it does not accord with the object to which it relates, although it contains something which may be true of other objects", (p 73/B 82).

What phenomenology advocates is a specific sort of theorising practice that stands like geometry in relation to real shapes. Husserl's idealism is one that concerns universal and intellectually-derived ideas. It concerns a method for reflection and interpretation of actual experience. It is not wholly a logically-derived idealism like Kant's, but an idealist-realist position that states a series of transcendental propositions and serves its purpose as a theoretical prelude to further empirical contact with the real: Thus, philosophy has its introductory role in aiding empiricism in psychology, the sciences, academia or therapy practice.

Husserl accepted Kant's dictum that the "*a priori* conditions of possible experience in general are at the same time conditions for the possibility of the objects of experience", (p 128/A 110). For Husserl, this meant using *imaginative variation of essences* to tease apart the conditions of possibility for there being an intersubjective world—of others, selves and meaningful cultural objects. The imaginative variations of essences are thought experiments that determine constancy but do not replace experiments with the real. As chapters 8 and 9 show, this type of wholism inter-relates cultural objects, the perspectives that can be taken on them, to more than one consciousness who empathises that there are other consciousnesses.

In brief, Husserl radicalised Kant's work by focusing on lived experience and exploring the conditions of possibility through the imagination. For Kant, rationalising could include transposing oneself into the shoes of the other. "It is clear that if one wants to imagine a thinking being, one has to place oneself in its posi-

tion. Thus one has to lend one's own subject to the object that one wants to consider", (p 279/A 353). What this became in Husserl was the need to theorise about achieving congruence between concepts about empathy and the object of the meaning. A special type of eidetic variation is necessary to consider raw data.

Now that some idea of how Kant influenced Husserl has been established, the remainder of this chapter explains some of the most basic points in phenomenological philosophy.

§28 The importance of attitudes

In order to emphasise the large number of applications that phenomenology can apply itself to, this section brings out some detail of the sort of areas that it can cover. Firstly, let us appreciate the emphasis placed on the word "attitude". The term "attitude" is pivotal. "Attitude" is a translation of "*einstellung*" that could also be expressed as "focus," "stance" or "mode of thought". An attitude is a comportment or "standpoint", (Kern and Marbach, 2001, p 76). The term "attitude" has a major role in the manifesto of 1911, *Philosophy as Rigorous Science* (Husserl, 1981). As a mission statement, this early definitive paper explains that phenomenology has a number of interconnecting strands. Phenomenology is both an approach to consciousness for philosophy and it could be a philosophical psychology. The whole tenor of the paper is that phenomenology is ontological, hermeneutic and epistemological.

First of all, the basic stance of phenomenology is hermeneutic in that it fully acknowledges the importance of any initial understanding towards any object, or the region of objects adopted by an academic discipline. Actions and outcomes are relative to the starting point, values and historical time and place. The prior understanding of a "discipline contains the scientific character not only of its foundations but also of the aim-providing problems" that lead inevitably to specific outcomes because there is a "certain logical harmony between the guiding problems on the one hand and, on the other, precisely such foundations and methods", (p 189). Specifically, phenomenology is hermeneutic because theory and practice are not clearly separate (p 192). Each perspective has its own attitude, its own "dominant habit of interpretation", (p 169). Phenomenology aims to stop the repetitious circle between *findings* and *what has already been assumed* (p 195). The hermeneutic problem to be avoided is the addition of inaccurate understanding to areas of interest. The problem concerns acting on what has been inaccurately understood, which leads to "theoretical absurdities" that "are inevitably followed by absurdities (evident inconsistencies) in actual theoretical, axiological, and ethical ways of acting", (p 169).

Second, phenomenology is epistemological in that it is focused on the means of knowing in such a way that what is being demanded is a self-reflexive approach to understanding the conditions of possibility for any academic discipline. Phenomenology is against arbitrary relativism and inaccurate understanding because such positions are not grounded in fundamental concerns. Theories assume values that guide practice and this motivation is not realised by theory-users. "Prejudices blind, and one who sees only empirical facts and grants intrinsic validity only to empirical science will not be particularly disturbed by absurd consequences that cannot be proved empirically to contradict the facts of nature", (p 170). For instance, natural science naturalizes both consciousness and ideas (p 171). It has no right to commit these sins. The answer is that phenomenology will ground all forms of knowledge in an a priori analysis of the fundamentals of knowing the intentionalities (p 178). It should remove "depressing absurdities in the interpretation of the world" and instead help genuine knowledge in "rising up from below", (p 194). In particular, the "impulse to research must proceed not from philosophies but from things and from the problems connected with them", (p 196).

Third, phenomenology is ontological in that it wants to sort the wheat from the chaff concerning what and how objects, or regions of objects, genuinely exist. Ontology in Husserl's sense is finding the categories of what exists afresh, as though for the first time. For instance, it means specifying the relationships between inanimate being, people and animals, the properties and qualities of each and demonstrating the relationships between what genuinely exists. The ontological purpose of phenomenology is to prevent the mistaking of a part of a whole, for the whole (p 191).

Consequently, true learning should rise above history and not take part in ephemera and intellectual fashions. What exists are senses of being for consciousness (p 179). This fundamentalism concerns itself with knowable being inside consciousness. Intentionalities are the links between consciousness and cognised being. Fundamental a priori analysis should find the relation between consciousness and being and thus retrieve being (p 183). This approach to ontology follows an experiential method also: a "true method follows the nature of the things to be investigated and not our prejudices and preconceptions", (p 178). Furthermore, in this text Husserl believed that it is unacceptable to hold a relativistic standpoint. What should be adopted is an absolute viewpoint of understanding meaning for consciousness. This is because Husserl believed that non-phenomenological stances fall into the hermeneutic circle (p 188). In this context, the hermeneutic circle is to prove what one assumes. For instance, the conclusions to

a piece of research are an inevitability springing from the initial conceptualisations of what needs researching and how the research should be conducted.

§29 Eight attitudes

This section and the next form a pair. By way of introduction to Husserl's method, the first term to be understood is "attitude". The next section deals with closely associated term "reduction".

   With these initial thoughts in mind, let us consider the role of attitudes. The following eight attitudes are a progression. Firstly, there is the importance of the ego, for it is able to be aware of what stand it takes: The "Ego is a "position-taking" subject: a subject of willing, of acting, and also of thinking … it is a "representing" subject, and that is the foundation for its "comportment" toward the objects", (Husserl, 1989b, §61, p 290). What is being asserted is that *how one approaches objects of various sorts gives rise to what is experienced about them*.

1. Husserl identified the *natural attitude* of common sense realism in the everyday belief of the ordinary citizen who (1) understands consciousness as part of the body, and (2) understands that people, ideas and things exist as they are assumed to be 'by everyone'. In "the attitude of natural life we are living functioning subjects together in an open circle of other functioning subjects. Everything Objective about the life-world is subjective givenness, our possession, mine, the other's, and everyone's together … The theoretical interest can be directed to subjectivity itself as the subject of its surrounding world … and to the accomplishments as such", (Supp XIII, p 385). The surrounding context of realism is: "All positive questions move within the framework of the world's unquestionable pregivenness in living experience and of the further unquestioned matters built upon it", (Husserl, 1974b, p 21). The natural attitude is a presumption of the straightforward factual existence of meanings, objects and the world. The natural attitude is an interpretative stance. For the natural attitude, objects are outside consciousness whilst knowledge of them is inside (Husserl, 1999, p 63). This is because intentionality is mis-understood. On the contrary for phenomenology, knowledge and understanding are recognised as belonging to consciousness.

2. The *naturalistic attitude* is when the natural part of the whole of human being is mistaken as entirely representative of the biopsychosocial whole. Kern and Marbach define the naturalistic attitude as exclusively "focusing on Nature," non-mental being (2001, p 76). But naturalistic psychological science is just one way of interpreting and acting.

The topic of attitudes was a keen interest to Husserl during the years 1912 to 1916. For example, the major point of *Ideas II* is that the realm of consciousness is not the same as that of inanimate natural being. Several times over, Husserl marked the difference between consciousness and nature. For instance, there is a "certain tension between the nature which stood at the beginning and the nature which has now arisen for us out of the context of the community", (Husserl, 1989b, §53, p 219). The conclusion is that: "Nature is the X and in principle nothing but the X which is determined through universal determinations. The spirit, however, is no X but is that which is itself given in spiritual experience", (§64, p 316).

The major difference between the two aspects of the biological and the psychosocial are that they exhibit two utterly different types of cause. Material cause is repeatable but "it pertains to the essence of *psychic reality* that as a matter of principle it *cannot* return to the same total state: psychic realities have precisely a *history*", (§33, p 145). This could be called the principle of the hysteresis of consciousness, a type of overall irreversibility of the lifespan. Between consciousness and natural objects there is an "*intentional relation,*" while between natural objects and oneself there is a "real-causal relationship to me", (§55, p 227). The word "naturalistic" conveys a number of senses. In the main, it is an interpretation that produces a naturalised form of objectivity. The scientific reification is created by any "researcher" who "wears the blinders of habit … all he sees is "nature"", (§49e, p 193).

3. The *personalistic attitude* is the precursor to the phenomenological attitude of reflecting on consciousness. The personalistic attitude is linked to the natural attitude in trying to appreciate people. The personalistic attitude is close to the psychological attitude that still regards consciousness, as a part of the physical body, but is an attempt to understand consciousness as consciousness. The personalistic attitude is "the attitude we are always in when we live with another, talk to one another, shake hands with one another in greeting, or are related to one another in love and aversion", (p 192). It is the folk psychological or common sense way of understanding people.

4. The *phenomenological attitude* is a general reflective way of understanding consciousness as comprised of many intentionalities. In this attitude, consciousness is not understood as part of the natural world of inanimate being. The phenomenological attitude is a necessary reflection on what is taken for granted, concerning the work of consciousness in cognising meanings of all kinds. The phenomenological attitude is attending to consciousness, sense and intentionality: "being free

of all that is psychophysical", (Husserl, 1997c, §4, p 218). It requires comparisons of senses about the same referent. The point is that qualitative experience itself is ontologically fundamental in understanding anything. Simply, the phenomenological attitude is the "*ontological privilege of experience over the natural object*", (2006, §14, p 35). The phenomenological attitude is an embarkation point for different types of study. One is preparatory work for empirical psychology, empirical research in the human sciences, or the practice and research of therapy. Husserl held that the ultimate and most fundamental endeavour is philosophy and that transcendental phenomenology would have a role there also.

The phenomenological attitude is developed in four major ways.

5. There is an intersubjective reduction to what Husserl called the "own world," "ownness" or an "original sphere" that shows how consciousness is turned outwards towards others. The resulting *intersubjective attitude* shows that all meaning lies between subjectivities in the world. Husserl concluded that meaning could never be less than intersubjective. *Intersubjective attunement and retained empathic and intersubjective senses cannot be removed even after the reduction to the own world.* The residuum of the own world shows the presence of the other with self, and that self is always oriented towards the other, in relation to any meaning. Furthermore, this discovery means that cultural objects are imbued with senses of their possible public function and a manifold of possible meanings—each differing according to the perspective taken towards them.

6. With regard to the human sciences, there is a psychological reduction to a *psychological attitude*. It is a specific version of the phenomenological attitude. Pure psychology compares different types of givenness to find a priori essences of consciousness with other consciousness in the world. It specifies psychological laws that are gained from a consideration of imagined possibility in worldly, psychological reality. It is implied that a future empirical psychology or therapy should follow this path, in a self-conscious way, cognisant of the map of pure psychology in relation to the territory of actual psychological instances.

7. There is the ultimate clarification of the *transcendental attitude*, which is a reflection on consciousness with other consciousness in any possible world. This is a more profound version of the phenomenological attitude. This attitude is more abstract than the basic phenomenological one. The transcendental attitude shares a good deal of the basic method outlined in the last chapter. The aim is to explore the conditions of possibility for all meaning.

For example, philosophical theory must be thought through prior to the philosophical action of using writing or lecturing to show how concepts fail or succeed in pointing to their referents. Phenomenology for philosophy is reflecting on what it is to communicate intellectually and to show how an idea is accurate or inaccurate. Phenomenological philosophy serves its purpose by showing what are the best contexts for the consideration of evidence. Usually, a proof or authoritative stance, evidence or a mode of reasoning are used as a measuring stick to evaluate the concept or practice in question. Sometimes this can be through the process of finding where a text contradicts itself or is ambiguous. At other times, the means of argumentation is to show contradictions and inconsistencies, or state sufficient criteria for knowing the difference between a problem and an answer. All such experiences could be subject to elucidation of the intentionalities necessary to carry out these decisive actions, generally or specifically.

8. Finally, there is an eidetic reduction that focuses on intentionality generally and opens up theoretical considerations. It has the purpose of deciding what is universal, necessary and constant in any region of meaning; as opposed to what varies and is merely a part of something less ontologically fundamental. For instance, the raw data for variation and conclusion can include imaginary, exemplary and historical examples, even the results of empirical science—all considered as mere possibility. The *eidetic attitude* begins the serious work of "eidetics" or "eidetic phenomenology" that is the road to justified theoretical conclusions. The eidetic attitude is achieved in purposeful eidetic variation thought experiments. The aim is to observe which relations and objects remain constant as in the example in chapter 6.

There are other attitudes, each revealing a relative view or profile of the world-whole. For instance, market traders have their own view of truth (Husserl, 1969, §105, p 278). There is the practical attitude of manipulating tools such as a hammer (1996, p 19) and the attitude of valuing something. Specific attitudes are concerned with the value of cultural objects (1989b, §11, p 29) and dealing with physical objects and people (2001, §4, p 61).

§30 Methods of reduction

Husserl believed that the natural-realist context of the material world is so influential that it requires the effort of two or more *reductions* to overthrow the all too easy "presupposition" of the natural, naturalistic and personalistic attitudes. This section provides more detail than the last to further the explanation.

The term "reduction" is used in the sense of its Latin root. Reductions have the aim of *reducere*, a taking back to origins. Reduction means taking attention back to the lived experience of the referent, either historically to a first-ever occurrence of an experience, or generally, in order to be fully aware of an experience of a specific sort. Reductions of any sort serve the purpose of preventing mis-interpretations and force becoming experientially involved with the idealised *matters themselves*. The purpose is to think generally about what makes an exemplary or definitive type of intentionality—in relation to an object of a specific sort. In 1907 Husserl wrote: "The 'phenomenological reduction' signifies nothing other than the demand constantly to remain aware of the meaning of the investigation proper and not to confuse theory of knowledge with the (objectivistic) investigation of the natural scientist", (Ms B 2 1, p 14b, cited in Kern, 1977, p 139). The purpose is to create a clear awareness about how an object appears.

Accordingly, phenomenology involves a "reduction" away from corrupting and haphazard attitudes and the creation of a specific attitude of showing or exhibiting an object in a specific way, towards a specific end. As already noted, a "*transcendental reduction*" produces the state of a "transcendental attitude". The transcendental attitude is the contemplation of the conditions for meanings that appear that are devoid (allegedly) of any undue influence from prior matters of belief or disbelief. It studies possible objects and relations within an all-embracing context of non-actuality. Husserl believed that it is possible to create metaphysical neutrality and be 'devoid' of influences from history, philosophy, the everyday, academia, science and received wisdom. This latter claim has been challenged by hermeneutics and found to be unacceptable. Husserl assumed that what is universal for the transcendental attitude is the ground of all meaning, which is a finding of his research because his method of seeing universal essences does not distort the relation between consciousness and world. The challenge of hermeneutics is agreed in this work—but more of that in chapter 14. Husserl could not assume his findings or his starting point were true before seeing, because that would be the creation of a transcendental or phenomenological circle. So although he accepted transcendental philosophy as a suitable tradition to belong to, he believed that transcendental phenomenology prevented there being a circle in this respect (1997c §8, p 171, 1997d, §13, p 247).

In pure psychology, towards the outcome of a reformed applied psychology, there is a "*psychological reduction*" to a "psychological attitude" that is the contemplation of psychological senses that appear, but are devoid (allegedly) of any established empirical wisdom about 'cause' or psychological fact. Pure psychology

studies psychological senses as potentially real possibilities within the everyday, real world. More will be stated of this major focus in the next chapter.

Husserl began his career as a philosopher of mathematics. It is the precision and exactness of mathematics that is the model that he is promoting in the study of consciousness. Phenomenology employs an abstract theoretical gaze that is "a priori" or "eidetic". The guiding idea is to follow the role of mathematics in developing the sciences (Husserl, 1982, §9, p 19). Accordingly, the *eidetic reduction* is for the purpose of keeping the consideration of intentionality and object relationships open and preventing foreclosure on them. The aim is finding "what belongs to a "perception as such," … of possible perception in general", (Husserl, 1980, p 35). What Husserl is urging is imagining mental processes as though they were 'idealised shapes' rather than actual 'specific real shapes'. This is only for the purpose of concluding on theory and says nothing of experimentation, although the results of experimentation could be treated in this way.

For psychological and transcendental phenomenology, the eidetic reduction to an eidetic attitude serves the purpose of the contemplation of actual, scientific and historic possible experience. Through the contemplation of a series of merely possible inter-relations, Husserl claimed to find valid concepts for the grounding of theory, in a parallel manner to the way that mathematics grounds physics. For instance, pure mathematics concerns ideals that apply to real occurrences. Similarly, the contemplation of phenomenology finds the a priori of universal and necessary conditions through which meaning occurs. It involves identifying the similarities, differences, universals and necessities that occur in all forms of intentional sense.

Finally, in the *Meditations*, a special reduction is used. The *reduction to the own world* produces the contemplation of a contrast between what appears within an "own world" and the world-whole. This has the purpose of revealing what occurs in connection with others and intersubjectivity *in general* or *as such*. The phrases Husserl used to describe it are "a phenomenology of empathy … as a synthesis of phenomena in my mind … indicate a "foreign subjectivity"—all of that leads to the expansion of the phenomenological reduction into a *reduction to pure intersubjectivity*", (1997b, p 93–4). The self "constitutes in himself something "other," something "Objective," and thus constitutes everything without exception that ever has for him, in the Ego, existential status", (Husserl, 1977a, §44, p 85). It is called a reduction to an *Originalsphäre* in the original text. The experience for analysis is one's own empathising of others across the lifespan, taken in the very abstract view of finding the conditions of possibility about one's experience of others. It is concluded that the senses experienced are the result of learn-

ing that accrues over time. Section 40 argues that the own world is an irreducible experience. Husserl found it impossible to take away all intersubjective senses and the standard transcendental reduction could not remove them either.

§31 Method of inherent interpretation

This penultimate section of this chapter restates with more detail, what is being requested of those who wish to be clear about what consciousness does. This section considers how to interpret experience.

Psychological meanings are not at all contained in a one-to-one correlation with what appears perceptually. A smile could mean happiness or that the smiling person is smug or sarcastic, or laughing at the beholder. Just because one perceives another smiling, it is not at all clear what they are smiling about. The true intent in smiling is not at all obvious. The meaning of smiling is linked to the perception. But the true intent of the other is open to debate and discussion.

It should now be becoming clearer as to what Husserl meant when he defined the aim of phenomenology as attending to the *correlation* between the "subjective meaning processes, or correlatively the meant objects as meant", (1977a, §23, p 56). In a wider sphere, this is part of a claim not to create, but discover meaning in attending to others and the world: "I can only find them; I cannot create others that shall exist for me", (§60, p 141) in the sense that what we are capable of imagining is actually related to our personal histories that are situated and limited by our position in time and social place. It is in this light that interpreting empathy should be read, because the major emphasis of the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation* is working out how the presentation of empathy associates the visual perception of the bodies of others—with the type of senses that oneself has of the intersubjective world: "we must discover in what intentionalities, syntheses, motivations, the sense "other ego" becomes fashioned in me and, under the title, harmonious experience of someone else, becomes verified as existing and even as if there in its own manner", (§43, p 90). What Husserl was getting at is the difference between perceptual and presentational types of meaning. However, let us focus on what it means to immerse oneself in raw qualitative data of this sort.

The crux of the matter is not to argue that something is or is not the case but to see it for oneself in a 'revelation' of conscious experience, then work out how it is that way. In elucidation, an unfolding of senses and connections, what Husserl did was to interpret the various phenomena of intentionality with respect to the regions of phenomena that appear. He called this regarding consciousness in its "*own essentiality* [*Eigenwesentlichkeit*]", (Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p 62). This could be called attending to consciousness-in-itself. Husserl referred to this

as attending to intentionality as "intentionality as such" for "with care we must now take heed against attributing to the mental process anything which is not actually included in its essence, and <we must> "attribute" <what is included> exactly and just as it precisely is "inherent" in it", (1982, §90, p 221). The same sense is sometimes expressed as explicating the "meant objects as meant", (Husserl, 1977a, §23, p 56). This form of interpretation claims to be inherent to a region of objects and with respect to other regions. It is experience-immersed interpretation.

The term "inherent interpretation" is used to denote concluding on the being of consciousness in intentional relation to the cognised being of other consciousness and the meaning of cultural objects. Husserl claimed that his results suit specific portions of the universe of sense as a whole. He specified the differences between complex combinations of intentionalities. What is preferred, in interpreting in Husserl's way, is finding the relations between the current context of what is here and now and finding how the object of awareness appears within the current perceptions. For instance, in flashbacks from retained memory that are involuntarily reproduced in the current moment, these can be sometimes be so strong as to wipe out the current orientation in the here and now. Otherwise, what are being inter-related are the connections between the object that is re-created, in relation to the self-appearance of the person, here and now. Let us employ a therapeutic example. A small girl was raped by a family friend who was a chronic smoker. As an adult, she cannot bear cigarette smoke because it takes her back to the visceral experience of the rape.

Accordingly, intentional analysis is taking apart meaning that is straightforwardly accepted as there. It works by identifying the pieces that comprise the whole and stating the inter-relations between ego, intentionality and objective givenness. Thus, when Husserl 'argued' he did so by claiming he had elucidated the nature of intentional implication and modification of perception and time, concerning how the higher and more complex forms of intentionality are connected to more basic types of givenness. This should be taken in the sense that remembering one's grandfather, for instance, means seeing him as though one were seeing him again and empathising him again, like when one was actually with him at that time. It means seeing him sit by the fire in silence, watching the flames. It means trying to get a sense of how he felt, even though he said nothing.

Overall though, what is at stake is making theory through hermeneutics: making general conclusions that are relevant to a specified phenomenon or region of phenomena. What comes first is that objects appear, then they are interpreted in a particular way (Husserl, 1982, §§130–2, 150–151). Husserl analysed the

meaningful situation and related it to the universal necessity of there being over-lapping types of meaningfulness: necessary *moments* of the meaningful world-whole. "Moments" is a technical term that means necessary dependent parts, without which there would be no whole. Chapter 10 shows that a meaningful world is comprised of the necessary moments of self, other, associations from the past, the cultural object and the manifold of cultural senses about its Objectivity. The term "Objectivity" is used to designate the ideal meaning that appears about any public, cultural object. A cultural object is any meaning, sense, tool, work of art, the human body, cultural institutions and practices, etcetera. Objective means "there for everyone … in an intersubjective cognitive community", (1969, §96, p 240). The Objectivity of a cultural object is potentially there for anyone to understand, from any perspective. Another way of explaining this is to state that cultural objects are intersubjective.

The term "object," in lower case, means an object of conscious attention. It is not a reification of the referent or the intentionalities that represent or "give" that object. A sense is an instance or profile of any idea, person, event or view of a thing—whether it is accurate or inaccurate experience of that referent and even if the referent does not exist or never will exist. Mental senses are the many possible conscious senses of the same thing. Objects appear in perspectives and contexts. They transcend all specific instances of their appearing yet the phenomenon of recognition of the self-same occurs (Bernet, 1979, p 129). For Husserl, an object is an ideal that connects all the instances or profiles of it together.

One place where Husserl expressed his views on objects generally, and the sought-after eidetic object of ideals is *The Idea of Phenomenology*. He concluded that seeing an Object, a universal or the self-same relation, thing or idea—arises out of experience across many instances: Repeated acts of reflection or seeing can "pick out universalities … universals that, for their part, are not really [*reell*] contained in these acts", (1999, p 50). What this means is that an eidetic Object and the recognition of the self-same are what are genuinely intended. But they are not wholly contained in an instance, at a moment in time. They are found across many previous instances, up to the current moment. This is a statement concerning learning by experience. There is always the possibility that there can be another intellectual or sensual interpretation of the same object. The 'cause' of psychological meanings for consciousness, for instance, concerns how meanings are constituted and how they make sense as parts of a whole.

The lectures of 1925 say a good deal about some of Husserl's conclusions on the state of intersubjectivity as it appears in the meaning of cultural objects for us. Firstly, cultural objects are understandable by everyone and anyone from that

culture. The example that Husserl used to illustrate this point is that of an arrow. Arrows are understandable in the human world for the purpose of shooting (1977b, §16, p 87). The major inter-relationship that he was working on is understanding culture as the "work done" (Ibid) by "culture-creating subjectivity", (p 86). The major relations he was teasing apart were those between reference groups of people; the senses of objects; and the historical surroundings in which objects first gained their original sense and had it updated across the years. Cultural objects are very general. All objects of awareness are cultural objects (p 84). What Husserl concluded was that cultural objects have a "two-sided material-mental" type of Objectivity. They are signs that indicate a sense (p 84). What this means is that cultural objects imply other people, values, uses and meanings. They are publicly accessible and shared by groups and nations. Human bodies, roles and people can also appear as cultural objects: "Even human beings themselves, however much they function as subjects creating culture, are at the same time cultural objects for one another", (p 85). The senses portrayed are re-interpretable and have their meaning in contexts (p 85). Sometimes these meanings are in conflict (p 88).

The aim, method and phenomena for study are interpreting complex intentional connections of sense between things, persons and contexts. The general aim is to "explicate these motivational contexts, which are contexts of pure consciousness, and direct our gaze at them", (Husserl, 2006, §35, p 75). The word "motivational" means an ability to influence, in the way that a whole of a particular sort is experienced, when a number of component parts are put together, for instance. Explicating motivational contexts means breaking down the whole of a meaning that appears, to find out where each part comes from. These methods and aims are very general because they apply to all types of objective awareness. This method of identification of qualities of implicit sense has the purpose of not only understanding the objects of any awareness, but also understanding "this background," one that …

> … may be clear at one time, at another time dark, yet insofar as the memory becomes clear, it can elevate the formerly dark background to clarity and determinateness … i.e., expectation, which in general may be quite indeterminate. But what is absolutely certain is that a *temporal halo* (*zeitlicher Hof*) is always there and must be there … it is not arbitrarily and freely variable but determinable.
>
> §37, p 80.

The wording used is very general. It refers to how any object, of any sort of awareness, makes sense through having connections of sense across time. For instance, any object can be recognised according to what it means for oneself or others. Thus, identifying different contexts of sense includes noting different contexts of time, place and person in which an object got its first-sense, plus all further updates of sense. Understanding how an object 'points' to identifiable past contexts is part of reflecting on its overall meaning. Elucidation is making explicit the implicit. It is close to varying essences and its purpose is teasing apart wholes of sense.

The method ceases when it *identifies invariant co-occurrences between types of sense that appear within the whole of conscious life as shared events*. It has to be noted that finding a priori essences is not exempt from mistakes: "the purity of the phenomenological motivation in no way helps to confer on this motivation absolute givenness", (§27, p 59). It means focusing on exemplary specific cases and experiencing invariant a priori universal aspects of these cases. "A priori judgments are universally valid. A posteriori judgments are individually valid", (§32, p 70): The point Husserl was making is that a posteriori interpretations of how consciousness works are unique and empirical. Such conclusions are *after the fact* and related to the mere contingency of what happened. What Husserl was aiming at were universally valid, necessary interpretations of how consciousness works in creating meaning. This is what he called *seeing* a priori essences.

Phenomenology involves the build-up of a hermeneutic strategy that demands a "break with naïveté" concerning what is "completely hidden and inexpressible" involving a "newly revealed intentional background of constitutive achievements", (Husserl, 1970b, §59, p 210). Phenomenology forces theoreticians to attend to the evidence of the public world for themselves. It is the explication of intentionality that is inherent to the many types of conscious meaning (Husserl, 1977a, §41, p 84, §59, p 138, §61, p 141, §62, p 151). It concerns finding ontological relations of dependence and independence between parts and wholes. Such relations are proven or disproven according to their necessity, constancy and universality—or the absence of these qualities.

For instance, the *Third Logical Investigation* details a number of the simplest ontological distinctions that there can be. These findings are summarised in the opening to *Ideas I* and have been influential in more contemporary accounts of part and wholes (Sokolowski, 1968, Simons, 1987). In brief, moments are abstract parts that co-exist. They require the mediation of other moments in order to form a whole. For instance, brightness, colour, shape, length and surface roughness cannot exist without a physical object. These are interdependent

"moments" and cannot be considered alone except by a forced effort of abstraction.

"Pieces" are parts that co-occur and are equally-primordial with a whole such as fingers and a hand. Pieces can be imagined and considered in isolation from the wholes in which they appear.

The simplest objects are wholes that are comprised of no smaller parts. Complex higher objects are dependent on their being parts that create them.

The point for eidetic imaginative variation is that if one aspect can be varied, while another can be kept constant, then there are two parts in existence. Specifically, these thought experiments are the method of concluding on theory concerning the lawful regularities of consciousness. Even in the *Logical Investigations* there was a concern for how more than one person can agree about what appears (1970a, foreword to the first edition, p 41–3, introduction, p 435). In brief, and in relation to psychology, consciousness is a dependent part of the biopsychosocial whole (1982, §§49–51).

§32 Summary of the philosophical stance

After the experiential introduction of chapter 6, this has been a more philosophical explanation of what was proposed in *Philosophy as Rigorous Science.* The following analysis exists and can be expressed in three steps.

1. The initial ontological and hermeneutic attitude, the perspective of an academic discipline, exists prior, and relative, to the senses of the referent-objects that it studies. *The attitude of approach itself creates the senses of objects or a region of them* (Husserl, 1981, p 169). Husserl believed that there is no escape from this relativism for approaches that are not transcendental phenomenology (p 188). Phenomenology is a critique of such a lack of self-understanding in the building of theory. Specifically, Husserl made an ontological and hermeneutic claim: *theoretical beliefs are due to the attitude adopted*, the initial understanding held. The role of phenomenology is reforming academia and the sciences and aiding them in being more accurate and successful, whatever their region.

2. It is philosophically necessary to become self-reflexive about what any academic discipline assumes and how it creates its claims and reasoning. The ultimate discipline of transcendental phenomenology should ground and constrain all forms of understanding.

3. The objects of conscious awareness are understood within their contexts through the addition of retained, associated and presentiated senses that are not

perceptually present and co-constituted with past learning. Usually, the meaning of the object as a whole is that it is immediately recognisable for what it is, because of past learning. Therefore, the means of explication is comparison of appearances in order to experience differences concerning the necessary constitutions that have made the senses that are experienced. For this book, phenomenology involves a hermeneutic strategy. Although it has to be said that Husserl never saw it as such himself.

What phenomenology means for therapy can be explained as follows. There are first-person experiences of dreaming, hallucinating and the imaginary world of daydreaming. To an extent, each of these could be problematic or non-problematic depending on the nature of the content and the overall context of each intentionality. Hallucination occurs when a person believes what they personally imagine and has no control over the imagining. Of course, such experience is not available to anyone else. Dreaming may have a pertinent meaning to the self-understanding of clients. For survivors of rape, the imaginary world they might create may be preferable to the real world that can be interpreted as having more risk of attack. These distinctions are pertinent to how clients make sense of themselves and find their worth and satisfactions in life.

Four distinctions arise and need to be kept clear, whilst noting their inter-relation.

The instance of what happens in a therapy meeting, for instance, can be understood as one of many such possible profiles or possibilities.

The medium of the intentionalities involved is the means of representation and signification of different types of sense.

Perceptual referents are involved. For instance, what therapists did and how clients saw it. Or, how clients felt. Or what they were trying to communicate but could not.

There are the abstract referents of psychological theory to consider. "Psychotherapy should be …". "Paranoia is … and needs to be handled by …".

To sum up: Kant's transcendental philosophy was a first attempt at delineating justifiable rules for rationalising conscious experience. In this work, the role of philosophy after Kant is to understand the a priori conditions for the possibility of intentionalities in relation to mental objects. The terms "a priori" and "transcendental" mean making intellectual distinctions concerning what does and what does not work, or cannot work, in theory prior to action. What Kant and Husserl insisted must happen is that conditions of possibility for meaningfulness must be understood prior to deciding which actions are taken. Phenomenol-

ogy is a priori intellectual consideration of what is possible or impossible about consciousness, found through intellectual work. For Husserl, ideas of material cause and personal intersubjective motivation ('cause') should be set aside in order to consider how the manifold of possibility makes sense in a general and fundamental way. The aim is to understand consciousness and the conditions for meaning. The possibility of reflection begets reflection. Husserl's enlightenment comes from Kant yet Husserl took it further. The terminology is particularly abstract because it applies to all aspects of intentionality and all types of awareness.

Theory for practice must point to mental objects within qualitative experience and identify key aspects of the experience of oneself and others. If theory does not do this, it will lead to faulty actions and hamper psychological change. Phenomenology finds fundamental justifications in creating understanding, *Verstehen*. The natural science approach is acceptable for the region of natural being. There should be no "naturalizing of consciousness" or the "naturalizing of ideas" about consciousness in its context of other consciousness (Husserl, 1981, p 171, 1977b, §1, p 4). The role of philosophy is to constrain and contextualise any style of theorising. In order to find a sufficient interpretative position for understanding, it is necessary to think through the consequences and inter-relations of the parts that comprise the whole of meaning.

The following quotation from Husserl should make sense now. Phenomenology is theoretical research by intellectually and experientially exploring and deducing the "origins of objectivity [*Objektivität*] in transcendental subjectivity, the origins of the relative being of objects [Objekte] in the absolute being of consciousness", (Husserl, 1956b, p 382, cited in Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p 52). The sense of the term "absolute" means with respect to the being of consciousness because what has primacy are conscious meanings and the qualitative processes that create them.

The basic purpose of Husserl's adoption of consciousness as a topic is the selection of a single major problem. Effectively, he declared that the view of consciousness is an absolute relativism or a consciousness-relativism. The idea is that if it is possible to understand how meaning exists across the fields of time, person and history, then it is possible to make transcendental philosophy achieve its proper task. Because he concluded that consciousness is intersubjective and the source of and means of maintenance of meaning, then his introductory comments on the role of the ego in the *Meditations* (1977a, §13, p 30–31) must be understood as meaning that any self has only an apparent air of uniqueness, in this theoretical view. Theoretically, any self is inextricably caught up with others

to a very large extent. This does not contradict the empirical fact that people are unique. Because of the clear ontological preferences defined in the *Third Logical Investigation,* Husserl argued by trying to find wholes and then relate parts of various sorts to those wholes. This explains why meaning, intersubjectivity and consciousness are considered as whole, so that the moments of it can be understood. Section 49 of *Ideas I* was the first published attempt to make this case and it was repeated at various times thereafter in various ways (1977a, §41, p 84, 1969, §95, p 236, §103, p 271, 1970b, §43, p 155).

Husserl called the interpretation of intentionality "elucidation," "explication" or "intentional analysis". This begins with the experiential observation of differences and similarities in the givenness of objects of various kinds, and interprets the intentionality and the overlappings between senses of different sorts. For one consciousness considered in artificial isolation, there are "intentional implications" and "intentional modifications" of simpler forms of intentionality. I shall say something about it now to make the analysis more tangible. Again, what Husserl had in mind was the comparison of differences and how things make sense. Let us take our special case of empathising another person. The topic of hermeneutics and phenomenology will be tackled again in chapter 16, section 84 below where a compromise between Husserl and Heidegger will be argued for.

Ordinarily, people merely relate to each other. In a phenomenological interpretation, this becomes a self-reflexive understanding of the differences that appear on closer inspection. What Husserl meant was that when we meet a person we see their face and body, but empathising them is completely different. To empathise another is to make sense of them, their intentions and objects, their orientation or comportment to others and their psychological goals. If we focus on what the psychological world is, the contrast becomes stronger still. What phenomenology means for therapy is that some types of meaning are due to past events that are added to what appears perceptually. If an object is perceptually present, for instance, it might have links of sense back to previous recognition of it. And it could have links forward to future anticipations about it. The intentionality of consciousness comprises many ways of being aware and representing what might be actual or might not. A very great deal of what humans concern themselves with is not real and here and now. On the contrary, they are interested in planning, remembering and fending off what might happen. In Husserl's method of teasing apart wholes of meaning, there are several different reductions each producing its own attitude. What appears of any being is different according to the attitude taken towards it.

8

Understanding phenomenology

Aim: The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the background to the *Cartesian Meditations*.

The project of this part of the work is elucidating the perspectives of self and other in relation to common cultural objects and a meaningful world. Elucidating intentionality concerns objects that appear in different ways and the type of intentionality between them. Below, there are two initial conclusions on intentionality that are not shown in detail in the text of the *Meditations* but are reported in brief. Section 36 deals with first-ever learning, "primal institution," and 37 with "pairing by association," with its Humean and arguably Pavlovian connections.

§33 Introduction

Transcendental phenomenology considers the universe of sense, for if "transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense, then an outside is precisely—nonsense", (Husserl, 1977a, §41, p 84). These words refer to a suspension of natural and naturalistic belief in the general existence of the world and a focus on intentionality. But "no matter how much this world may lose its "actuality," may "withdraw from me," perceptively it is always there", (1973f, §42a, p 175–6). Transcendental phenomenology is a way of finding how worlds of meaning are created and shared. A world is a context of intentionality shared by a group of people.

For Husserl, the transcendental attitude is an alleged achievement of hermeneutic, ontological and metaphysical neutrality, free from naturalistic interpretations. The transcendental attitude is authoritatively defined by Elisabeth Ströker who tells us that it "leads beyond the world" to an "extramundane domain" (1993, p 60), of the consideration of theoretical consistency. According to Husserl, transcendental phenomenology is 'outside of the world': It is claimed to have overcome the network of worldly associations. The *Meditations* define the two

versions of phenomenology, pure psychology and transcendental phenomenology, as two "parallel" forms. The less radical, halfway step to this absolute perspective is a novel, theoretical pure psychology. Between 1927 and 1929, Husserl claimed this at least nine times (1997c, §9, p 173, 1997d, §13, p 247, §14, p 248–9, 1969, §99, p 255, 1977a, §14, p 32, §16, p 38, §20, p 49, §30, p 65, §57, p 131). Husserl frequently repeated his presentation of the two types of phenomenology but the emphases differed.

§34 The pure psychological reduction and attitude

The psychological form of phenomenology is based on "the psychological uncovering of myself, i.e., my purely psychic being and, first of all, my psychic life, apperceived in the natural manner, namely as a component of my psychophysical (animal) reality and thus as a component of the world I naturally accept", (Husserl, 1977a, §16, p 38). The sense of this quotation is twofold.

Firstly, the object of pure psychology is consciousness as a dependent moment of the biopsychosocial whole of human being. In order to begin any human science, one must abstract from the whole. The natural sciences make one abstraction or interpretation: "Physics *eliminates* the relation to the "*normal organization*". It says: normality is something accidental … and accordingly that Objectivity which is constituted out of such agreement is not any less a relative and accidental one", (Husserl, 1980, §11, p 54). The phrase "normal organization" refers to the norms that concepts create in terms of specific permissions and inhibitions. What is at stake is the attitude that pure psychology takes and how it produces its results. On the contrary to natural psychological science, it is possible to understand the human body as "a two sided reality precisely insofar that it is a Body [*Leib*], i.e., abstracting from the fact that it is a thing and consequently is determinable as physicalistic nature" also (Husserl, 1989b, §62, p 297). What is at stake is how to interpret the psychological when it is empathically signified by the physical body of others.

Secondly in Husserl's ontological dualism, the human sciences must not adopt the attitude and methods of the natural sciences that focus on the material substrate. The proper pure psychological attitude is meaningful and motivational in that it understands associations of sense.

The version of phenomenology that this book is interested in is "pure psychology:" a preparatory theoretical psychology, prior to action and empirical research. This a priori psychology for therapy involves a hermeneutic position that assumes that the human world of meaning is the result of consciousness in connection with other consciousness. The point is to explore what is possible and impossible through thought alone, prior to action (Husserl, 1977b, §4, p 35). The scope is

all that is intentional, relational, affective and motivational. Pure psychology is about our immersion in the everyday natural attitude of family, education, culture and society. It is remarkable how strong the influence of family is in the psychological implication of how to act and feel. No one may have explicitly insisted that children behave in the same way that their parents did, but the influence to copy them, and to make oneself in response to their image, is strong.

It also has to be noted that the higher sorts of psychological understanding are composed of more fundamental types so that it is better to speak of composite intentionalities in relation to composite objects. For instance, the affect of love is comprised of perception, retained empathic experiences, empathising about the loved one in the current moment, and the loving value found in relation to them that empirical psychology calls attachment. The more complex the situation, for this work, the more the role of interpretation comes into play. The topic of interpretation and its formal study is reserved until chapter 14 though.

The aim of pure psychology is to treat the psychological as psychological. This is not contrary to the biopsychosocial perspective. Pure psychology is a focus entirely on the psychological that is long overdue and requires a further integration with psychophysical a priori to enable an empirical biopsychosocial approach. Such work will take time and is not the focus of this book. For the time being, the imperative is to enable therapy to have a general psychological model that coordinates its medium of understanding with its interventions. The aim is to better understand first-person lived experience, empathy of others and psychological understanding in general. Pure psychology is finding invariants about psychological objects, processes and relations through contemplation of their possibility and impossibility. It requires integration with considerations of the physical substrate in order to model the biopsychosocial whole adequately. The natural sense of causation operates between inanimate material beings and involves necessity for these forces and effects. It cannot be otherwise. This is not the case for the 'causes' of meaning for human beings, within the spheres of free will, culture and history. Psychological 'cause' can be other than it is. Marbach sums up:

> Husserl speaks of the phenomenological-*psychological* reduction in which "*pure psychological* subjectivity" comes to be thematicized in phenomenological or pure psychology. This occurs without in any way drawing into question, suspending, or bracketing that belief in the being of the world of experience, which is self-evident for the natural attitude to which even pure psychology remains subjected.

> Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p 74.

The above confirms that pure psychology is a 'positive science'. What this means is that psychology is 'in the world,' contextualised in it and accepting of the ordinary belief in the world of things and people. What Husserl was asserting was that pure psychology remains tied to the surrounding context of the everyday natural attitude. Natural science and natural psychology do the opposite to pure psychology. They abstract from the human whole to focus on the naturalistic. Pure psychology, on the other hand, attends to the correlation between consciousness and meaning for two or more people.

The ontological dualism of pure psychology is a version of what is contemporarily called the biopsychosocial perspective. Consciousness, the material body and the social group are inter-related as "non-self-sufficient moments of concrete realities", (Husserl, 1977b, §13, p 76). "Corporeality [*körperlichkeit*—material bodiliness] has greater self-sufficiency … while the psyche can never become a real thing in the world in concrete self-sufficiency," (§15, p 83). Pure psychology investigates ""the psychic constitution of the Objective world,"" by which "we mean, for example, my actual and possible experience of the world, as an experience belonging to me, the Ego who experiences himself as a man", (Husserl, 1977a, §56, p 130–1).

What pure psychology means for therapy is the creation of clear propositions about the nature of psychological processes and objects. Once pure psychology is achieved, it will promote empirical work. Pure psychology considers contingent instances and specific occurrences of real relationships but in a general way as chapters 6 and 7 explained. This means that eidetic a priori findings can be used (synthetic a priori in Kant's sense of mathematics, geometry and metaphysics). Interpretation is prior to action for "*the idea of an empirical phenomenology … follows after the eidetic is understood and justified*", (Husserl, 1997b, §13, p 176). If Husserl's ideas were taken further towards creating an actual empirical psychology, then it would be a qualitative approach to meaning and be like Perner's (1991) developmental psychology, semiotics, grounded theory, symbolic interactionism, gestalt psychology or early neurolinguistic programming (Lewis and Pucelik, 1982). The style of this analysis is personal, in that it seeks to explain specific lives. Yet it is also all-embracing like social epistemology, the history of ideas, a social constructionism or a constructivism. Other systems of therapy that have come close to the intersubjective view are family systems and what was called the interactional approach (Watzlawick and Weakland, 1977). Both of these sorts strove to capture the interactive quality in human relationships where people interact with each other in exquisite detail so relationships are best understood as the sum total of contributions from two or more parties. There is also

the intersubjective approach to psychodynamic therapy (Atwood and Stolorow, 1984). But theoretical discourse is only higher intentionality and by itself not representative of the experience to which it points.

The outcome of refining raw data is the practice of varying essences, of intellectually understanding through the imagination, and so elucidating, correlations of sense and intentionality. The results concern "intentional intertwining, motivation, mutual implication by meaning … This designates … the radically strange character of every intentional inner psychology", (Husserl, 1977b, §3e, p 26). What this means is that types of intentionality co-occur. There are motivations of sense because when one type of object appears perceptually, consciousness tends to jump to a conclusion about it. Furthermore, meanings are shared between people in a variety of ways.

The next four sections form a whole. The phenomenology of the body concerns how apperception and empathy comprise an overall understanding of what it means to be an embodied consciousness in space with others. Section 36 discusses the role of retained involuntary memory that is added to perceptual presence and other types of meaning. Section 37 discusses pairing by association that has Humean and possibly Pavlovian connections. This is particularly pertinent to Husserl's analysis of empathy. The last section of this chapter comments on the overall whole that is comprised of perception and presentiated senses, again in relation to the human body and the analysis of empathy.

§35 Phenomenology of the body

The terms "phenomenology of the body" or "somatology" need explaining. One's experience of all meaning is from the viewpoint of embodied consciousness. Although it was the unpublished *Ideas II* that declared the fundamental transcendental role of the body, for "human consciousness requires an appearing Body [*Leib*] and an intersubjective Body—an intersubjective understanding", (Husserl, 1989b, §63, p 303), the *Cartesian Meditations* furthered such a position. In *Ideas I,* there is a clear statement that pure psychology is founded on "somatology." The elucidation of the appearance of the human body is intimately connected with empathy, semiotics and the world. "Thus, for example, "material thing" and "psyche" are different regions of being, and yet the latter is founded on the former; and out of that fact arises the fact that psychology is founded on somatology", (Husserl, 1982, §17, p 32). Although Husserl did not fully realise this aspect of his position, what he was doing was interpreting the intentionalities of people and animals from what appears perceptually. Husserl noted that each person has the visual perception of self, that means looking at

one's own body from the vantage-point of looking down on oneself: Seeing one's hands, body and legs, when one looks down on one's body. What appears of self to self is that: "I, as the primordial psychophysical Ego, am always prominent in my primordial field of perception, regardless of whether I pay attention to myself and turn toward myself with some activity or other. In particular, my live body [*Leibkörper*] is always there and sensuously prominent", (Husserl, 1977a, §51, p 113). Indeed, "certain of my corporeal parts can be seen by me only in a peculiar perspectival foreshortening, and others (e.g., the head) are altogether invisible to me", (Husserl, 1989b, §41b, p 167).

Furthermore, reflections on one's own body, from the perspective of the other, play a role in the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation*. What Husserl argued there concerned the "external presentation of oneself (presenting oneself as situated in external space)", (Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p 155). Dan Zahavi confirms that Husserl believed that the basic experience of one's own body was constituted perspectively, as structured and extended in space. "First of all, there is the immediate, nonarticulated, prereflective self-sensitivity. Second, there is the thematization and articulation of this experience, which localizes it in bodily organs … In this case we can speak of a *bodily reflection* taking place", (1999, p 108). The phenomenology of the body, as a moment of investigating world-constitution, concerns linking together senses of the special cultural object of the body. In this way the transcendental role that the body has is that it forms a bridge between separate but inter-related domains of sense. Chapter 10 reveals the full extent to which embodied consciousness plays a role in the social availability of meaning.

At first glance, the claim that the body has a role in creating meaning might appear unusual. The best way of illustrating the power of its implied participation and expressiveness is to take a case where the body organises meaning even in its absence. Let us consider a piece of film that is well-known and shows the learned effects of empathy and the human body as a signifier of the implications between self and other. The murder scene in Alfred Hitchcock's film of 1960, *Psycho* shows how associations between cultural objects can suggest learned, presentiated senses: Experiences that are implied and associated through non-specific learning. What appears perceptually on the film is the suggestion of a young woman getting into a shower cubicle and taking a shower. Some sharp discordant violins are heard next, in association with a brief view of a large, tapered kitchen knife that is raised, as if to strike. The next sound is an attempt at suggesting that flesh is being cut. (Although all that is seen is the knife striking the air, as if stabbing her). The last visual scene is a shot of a small amount of blood mixing into the

shower water and disappearing in a spiral, down the plughole. The scene is striking and visceral. The feelings evoked might well be of fear or horror at an apparently motiveless murder. The point for the phenomenology of the body is that—even in the complete absence of the body of the victim—the viewer's empathy is on her behalf. It is a powerful scene, even on repeated viewing.

The point is that empathy and its learned associations are at play in creating the overall meaning Hitchcock wished to evoke. He skilfully created a tie between the audience and the young woman prior to the murder scene. He then suggested a frenzied stabbing, without even showing her being attacked. The effect of horror produced is entirely by the association of paired senses. Hitchcock suggested that she was naked and defenceless. He suggested that an unknown person stabbed her to death. The audience put the pieces together to make a meaningful whole.

Such is the power of the intentional implications between self and other, and the role of the body in creating meaning through its expressiveness, due to social learning. Very little needs to be shown to the audience. It is consciousness that fills in the gaps and makes sense of the perceptual signifiers by adding presentiated senses that make the edited sequence psychologically understandable. A similar effect occurs in seeing people moving at a distance. The human body is particularly understandable in dance, mime and ordinary life. The role of the body is further explained in the next two chapters.

The next topic for consideration is an understanding of the way that learnings from the past cross a span of time into the present.

§36 Primal institution

A short introduction is necessary to prepare the way for understanding a key point in the *Fifth Meditation*. Primal institution, a first-ever learning, *Urstiftung*, is a part of all co-constitution, the making of sense by consciousness. "Even the circumstance that everything affecting me … is apperceived as an "object," … is an already familiar goal-form … understandable in advance as having arisen from a genesis. It itself points back to a "primal instituting" … Everything known to us points to an original becoming acquainted", (Husserl, 1977a, §38, p 79–80). The sense is that a primal institution cannot be re-experienced, as it was the first time of its interpreted occurrence. But by necessity, it must have occurred. Husserl concluded that: "With good reason it is said that in infancy we had to learn to see physical things, and that such modes of consciousness of them had to precede all others genetically", (p 79). The sense of the word "genetic" here is temporal in the sense of being prior developmentally. What is being discussed is a

first-ever acquisition of sense. The passive givenness of primal institution operates before reflection. The conclusion of primal institution is a necessary interpretation. But it is an argument by logic rather than experience. It is not possible to remember with certainty the first-ever acquisition of any understanding. Nor is it possible to remember the first time we empathised another person as a human being.

However, Husserl concluded that the first-ever understanding of an object is added automatically in the current moment. The *Urstiftung* is that which has been "acquired for us in earlier experiences", (Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p 160). It is out of awareness usually, and not observable by introspection, nor is it a higher intentionality of thought or speech. Primal institution is found to have operated because of a general case "coming about genetically (and by essential necessity) as soon as the data that undergo pairing have become prominent and simultaneously intended; we find, more particularly, a living mutual awakening and an overlaying of each with the objective sense of the other", (Husserl, 1977a, §51, p 112–3). Therefore, there must be a first-ever knowing or correct identification that spawns all future recognition: All Objectivity "points back to a "primal instituting", (§38, p 80). A small child who learns the purpose of a pair of scissors is the leading example: "The child who already sees physical things understands … for the first time the final sense of scissors; and from now on he sees scissors at the first glance *as* scissors—but naturally not in an explicit reproducing, comparing, and inferring", (§50, p 111). Such an 'intentionality,' properly a passive synthesis, is not close to the ego but does affect it. A passive synthesis is operating because the ego is affected pre-reflexively, prior to awareness.

What this means for empathy is that the co-constitution of the other "is not inference, not a thinking act", (Ibid). "Everything known to us points to an original becoming acquainted; what we call unknown has, nevertheless, a known structural form: the form "object" and, more particularly, the form "spatial thing," "cultural Object," "tool," and so forth", (§38, p 80). Each form of Objectivity, within each region of being, has its own first-ever occurrence. The eidetic necessity of the primal institution is highly non-specific. Husserl implied that intersubjectivity entails the co-constitution of a first-ever sense of the other—in relation to a first-ever sense of self. Despite the first-ever sense of any object no longer being available to consciousness, Husserl held that it can be legitimately inferred to have been present.

§37 Pairing by association

Another major term is pairing by association. It appears in Husserl's writing in a number of synonyms. Pairing is a "universal" phenomenon that operates across the span between the current moment and the retentional consciousness of what is automatically remembered without egoic effort. Pairing is an "*association,*" a "*universal principle of passive genesis*", (§39, p 80). Although no workings are provided in *Meditations*, what is being concluded on are a number of results concerning many years of work within the *Nachlass* (Ms), *Time* (1991), *Ideas II* (1989b) and *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis* (2001). In *Ideas II* (1989b, §§54–61), there is the unfolding of a perspective on motivations of meaning and association that is sometimes called "*motivational causality*" where it is clear that this 'causality' is "not real causality but" that which concerns objects "experienced in the surrounding world" that …

> … exercise a greater or lesser "stimulation" [*Reiz*, attraction]. The 'causality' under consideration is not a natural cause in material being but the 'causes' of consciousness. It concerns the learning of meanings in the overall context of the understandability of the region of all meaning. Perceptual signifiers and meanings of all kinds "arouse" an interest … All this is played out *between the Ego and the intentional Object.*
>
> §55, p 227–8.

What the above means is that the psychological life is active and egoic, concerning the use of the free will. It is also passively affected, involuntary and influenced by the outcome of habits and the productions of passive processes of consciousness that, say, make the sky blue for the ego. Husserl considered motivation among associated senses to be a "fundamental lawfulness of spiritual life," (§56, p 231). The word "spiritual" translates "*geistige*" although "mental" could have been used. Pairing also operates in imagination and the anticipation of the future:

> Pairing is a *primal form of that passive synthesis* which we designate as "*association*" … In a *pairing association* the characteristic feature is that, in the most primitive case, two data are given intuitionally, and with prominence, in the unity of a consciousness and that … as data appearing with mutual distinctness, they *found phenomenologically a unity of similarity* and thus are always constituted precisely as a pair.
>
> 1977a, §51, p 112.

What the above means is that pairing is an involuntary synthesis of the association of any perceptual object with a meaning of any sort. Specifically in the case of the *Fifth Meditation*, pairing is the association of the *Körper* of others with a modified form of the self's *Leib*. Pairing is similar to the pictorial presentation of visual art where a double intentionality interprets the current perceptual object as signifying a depicted object *in* the perceptual one.

Husserl's use of the word "pairing" seems to make a connection with a different body of work altogether: Namely, the pioneering research of behaviourism. It is not clear to what degree, if any, Husserl was simply accepting Ivan Pavlov's idea of classical conditioning. Perhaps Husserl mentioned it because he wanted to express an idea. However, the precise form in which he believed that social learning accrues is not discussed in detail in his published writings, although there is some similarity to the idea of *Reiz*, translated as "stimulus" in *Ideas II* (§55, p 227–8, noted above).

There are passages like the following that could be in some relation to Pavlov's conclusions on classical conditioning: ""Stimuli [*Reizen*]" are said to be emitted especially by the physical Objects of nature, and the sensitive nerves are said to be stimulated by physical excitations … [that] brings about its reaction, the sensation", (§50, p 198–9). This passage is a parallel to a natural psychological science view of the connection between consciousness and inanimate being. In other areas, Husserl is writing from his overall detailed account of what counts as 'cause': "Besides the tendencies which proceed from other individual persons, there are demands which arise in the intentional form of indeterminate generality, the demands of morality, of custom, of tradition, of the spiritual milieu", (§62, p 281). Anyhow as chapter 10 will show, it is clear that social learning is the topic under investigation and that associations, pairings of sense, are shared through empathy, and contribute to the intersubjective whole.

Motivations, that are both egoic and intersubjective, are felt but do not perceptually appear. For "all life of the spirit is permeated by the "blind" operation of associations, drives, feelings which are stimuli for drives and determining grounds for drives … according to "blind" rules", (§61, p 289). Husserl readily acknowledged that the presence of the past is influential, but his treatment of it was different to Freud's. "Affections can be there, i.e., progressing from the "unconscious," but suppressed", (2001, Appendix 19, p 519). Husserl's understanding of what is unconscious is not confusing an interpretation with a conscious experience. When Husserl argued for the presence of an intellectually-created object or intentionality by necessity, he did so with self-reflexive understanding of what he was doing.

§38 Presentation

Presentiated senses can be explained by stating 'that there is always more than meets the eye'. Presentiated senses are forms of non-perceptual sense that need perceptual objects in order to form a whole. "A non-originary making-present can" become co-present "only in combination with an originary presentation" of a perceptual object (Husserl, 1977a, §50, p 109). This also applies to cultural objects of all kinds. The outcome being that: "I *experience* the world (including others) … as an *intersubjective* world", (§43, p 91). The addition of meaning to perception had been a part of Husserl's investigations since the year 1900 (1970a, VI, App, §4, p 860). Throughout the early years of the analyses of temporality there were asides to how meanings become added. Presentiated meanings get added to perceived ones (1991, §16, p 41). There are both inner and outer additions of meaning both of which "must surely have some commonness of essence. For the impression of something immanent is a presenting … of something immanent; in the other, the presenting of something transcendent "through" appearances", (§43, p 96). Brief notes to this effect were made in *Ideas I* (§44, p 88).

Again the implication is that cultural objects, if they were merely considered as perceptual ones, could have no public meaning. The substantive fact that cultural objects imply the functions and styles of people who use them means that such meanings are added to the brute fact of objects along the way. Marketing departments and the fashion industry know this in offering added-value to the products. One could buy a basic car that is cheap, reliable and fuel efficient. Or one could show one's savvy, personal style and station in life by buying a vehicle that is more in-tune with one's aspirations and how one would like to be understood by others. Consumer products are made in a style and say something about the lifestyle of their users. Such additions of sense and value are being referred to by the terms "appresentation" that means additions of meaning to perceptual senses.

Husserl argued by considering possibilities and distinctions among complex overlapping senses. He stated propositions concerning intersubjective Objects in the world, at a universal and fundamental level of inter-relationship. The answer is that empathic presentation is "more as itself-there than it makes "actually" present at any time", (1977a, §55, p 122) where "*presentation*" is the general form of intentionality at play (p 128). These comments make sense when it is understood that presentation includes all forms of association of sense and social learning.

Something must be noted of the relation between the perceptible and non-perceptible seeing of ideas that is being advocated in finding the a priori roots of consciousness. Based on what appears of the sense of the other, there are the abstract presentiated meanings that are carried by the presence of the human body in relation to speech. Let us consider the following:

The qualities of relationships between people and each person's prior immersion in the world are influential.

The affect of therapists exists in relation to the expressed affect of clients, as non-verbal intersubjective communication.

The current state and capabilities of clients as angry, depressed, paranoid or anxious, for instance.

None of the above three cases is wholly perceptual. The text of 1911, *Philosophy as Rigorous Science,* reveals some interesting comments that further bolster the need to attend to the phenomena and be attuned to how consciousness co-constitutes the sense of others. Husserl noted that character and personality are not facts to be measured but phenomena to be understood as co-constituted meanings: "Only the basic substrate "human body," and not man himself, is a unity of real appearance; … personality, character, etc., are not such unities", (1981, p 184). This same text provides justifications for rejecting a naturalistic approach to empathy. In the empirical natural psychological approach, there is a:

> … fundamental error of psychology that should be brought out … It overlooks the specific character of certain analyses of consciousness that must have previously taken place, so that from naïve experiences (whether they are observational or non-observational, whether taking place in the framework of actual presence to consciousness or in that of memory or empathy) they can become experiences in a scientific sense.
>
> p 176.

This quotation argues for the priority of meaning over measuring, a cultural-hermeneutic qualitative analysis, over the natural scientific. This is taken as a mandate for an a priori exploration of essence that need not always be a phenomenology of the body, self and other in the cultural world. It is worthwhile to further consider the range of objective senses, as they relate to empathic bestowal generally. The point of the above is that the concepts that therapists use to interpret are abstract terms that belong to themselves and not clients (Owen, 1990, p 94). What this means for a hermeneutically-aware perspective is that the meanings of therapists, theoreticians and researchers should not be mistaken for those of clients.

In conclusion, things and people are not just perceptually present. People do perceptually appear as real. But perceptual givenness is not the whole that includes presentation. Rather, consciousness works to produce wholes that are not merely what appears perceptually but have added to perceptual presence: "improperly appearing moments of the object are in no way presented. *Perception* is … a complex of full and empty intentions", (Husserl, 1997a, §18, p 48). That means consciousness gathers together the appresented sides, profiles and retained, remembered and anticipated moments, that comprise a whole (§§16–18). Husserl interpreted perceptual givenness as inviting the beholder to add presentiated and associated meanings. What is added can be primal institution, or other pairings or motivated senses, according to the type of object present. The findings of the *Meditations* are used to create a pure theoretical psychology for the practice of therapy. Conclusions on possibilities and impossibilities are interpretation of what appears to the conscious mind. The method is drawing conclusions from conscious experience of any sort. The spirit of inquiry is an analysis of 'learning from experience' by drawing universal and necessary principles. Pure psychology is a form of analysing social learning to find what resides in it as a constant set of necessary a priori essences.

It could have been possible to rush into making critical remarks about Husserl's treatment of understanding, temporality, pairing by association and primal institution. But to do so at this stage in the exposition would have been premature and confusing. Critical remarks are made about these issues in chapter 16 only when it becomes easier to understand them, as their context for appreciating such remarks will be in place.

9

The phenomena of Cartesian Meditations

Aim: In order to understand how Husserl interpreted, it is necessary to have a grasp of what he interpreted. This chapter makes the analysis of the next chapter more tangible by providing concrete details.

Husserl's propositions are ubiquitous and concern general phenomena. Tips on how to interpret the *Meditations* come from the following asides in Husserl's published work. Husserl had made brief mentions of the openness of Objectivity for intersubjective audiences since *Ideas I* (1982, §29, §45, p 100, §151, p 363). The aim is to understand how in "this Objectivity we grasp everything that is experienced", (1980, Supp I, §5, p 112). Like Kant's transcendental arguments, they are hard to doubt. One of Kant's conclusions was that the conditions of the possibility of a conscious experience are identical to the deduced conditions for the possibility of any shared experience. "The *a priori* conditions of possible experience in general are at the same time conditions for the possibility of the objects of experience", (Kant, 1993, p 128/A 110). Husserl mirrored this as chapter 7 showed. The research question and its answer in the *Meditations* is an abbreviated one. In brief, the research question is a two-part one "what are the conditions for persons to experience each other and the public world of conscious meaning as they do?" Husserl had many ways of expressing this question (1977a, §42, p 90, §43, p 93, §46, p 102–3). He answered by analysing the presentiated senses that co-occur with perceptual ones.

The last three chapters have introduced the method. This chapter and the next form a pair. They concern the concrete phenomena of meaning in their intersubjective context. Husserl did not explain his thoughts in a linear manner in the text of *Cartesian Meditations* and many interpretations of it have been made. The details of the text and the reading made of it are not presented, as this would detract attention from the phenomena and their interpretation. What is discussed

here is very general and applies to other realms rather than just the intersubjective one. There are political and ethical consequences to these topics though. For instance, other persons experience and believe different perspectives to the ones of selves. Some of the perspectives taken to religion, say, are Christian or Muslim. When religion is discussed, the participants have some understanding of what other persons think and feel. Even though the position of the other is not the one held by self. Section 40 provides details of the reduction to the own world. Section 41 details how eight phenomena appear in the text of *Meditations* and are elucidated to understand empathy and intersubjectivity in chapter 10. Section 42 emphasises the theoretical ideals that are being produced.

§39 The research question of *Cartesian Meditations*

What is of concern below can be expressed in various ways. One of Husserl's preferred ways of describing his focus would be to call it *co-constitution*, *intersubjective intentionality* or *intentional implication between subjectivities*. It is equivalent to stating that there is a *sharing of intentional senses and referents*, a *joint referencing* according to being conscious. It is also equivalent to *interpreting the senses of being, for the being who understands*. Yet again, equivalently what is requested is finding *constant a priori that reside within the intentional being of consciousness, as it exists in its world*.

The specific research question that Husserl set himself is stated in over thirty different phrasings in the text of *Cartesian Meditations*. What is voiced in different ways is that mutual Objectivity, what the sense of an object must be for other persons, occurs through empathy. What is being stated is a wholistic perspective. Several "moments" (ontologically necessary dependent parts of a whole) together constitute one shared world at a fundamental level. The interpretation is a wholistic one between consciousnesses (as intersubjective, with empathised others and their perspectives) gained through everyday learning about cultural experience. The research question is portrayed …

> … as a special one, namely that of the "thereness-for-me" of others, and accordingly as the theme of a *transcendental theory of experiencing someone else*, a transcendental theory of so-called "empathy". But it soon becomes evident that the range of such a theory is much greater than at first it seems, that it contributes to the founding of a *transcendental theory of the Objective world* and, indeed, to the founding of such a theory in every respect, notably as regards Objective Nature … [that] includes … thereness-for-everyone. This is always cointended wherever we speak of Objective actuality.
>
> §43, p 92.

The quotation means that the research question posed can be expressed in the following ways: "How is Objective public meaning possible?" Or, "what are the conditions between self and other as they enable mutual Objectivity?" And equivalently, "how is there a world of meaning for all of us?" The type of answer provided focuses on the intentionalities of one consciousness interacting with other consciousness, with respect to common objects of all kinds. What is under consideration in the *Meditations* is the necessity of the way in which empathy, Objectivity and the world are inter-related.

In order to understand Husserl's view, let us bear in mind a mature conclusion from 1928 that is clear: "Transcendental intersubjectivity is the absolute and only self-sufficient ontological foundation [*Seinsboden*]. Out of it are created the meaning and validity of everything objective, the totality [*All*, cosmos] of objectively real existent entities, but also every ideal world as well", (1997c, §14, p 249). What Husserl was stating is that the whole social-historical world is the genuine universe of all belief in being and non-being. Some clues as to his perspective are provided by Dorion Cairns (1976, p 83) who related Husserl's discussion of the concept of a world as: "If it were not intersubjective, it would not be a world … Strictly it is an (open?) infinity of other subjects which is required". Let us consider the fine detail of what he considered as evidence in this chapter. Before we consider how he interpreted in the text.

§40 The reduction to the own world

The reduction to an "own world" (Husserl, 1977a, §44, p 99) is a "peculiar abstractive sense-exclusion of what is alien" that "leaves us a *kind of "world"* still … "a sequence of evidences that … seem paradoxical"", (p 98). The counterintuitive finding is that even after the own world reduction, a minimal world of being directed towards others remains as a residuum. The sense of this remark is that the reduction to own world is an appeal to attend to a wholly independent layer of experience that is *originally* one's own. It is a way of looking at what is a part of one's own, most fundamental experience that includes one's own experience of others and is *pointed towards* them. It contains one's own representations of others and one's own whole past history of experiences (of all types towards others)—but obviously, it does not include the first-hand experience of other people.

The point is that understanding this *fundamental layer is a referent for comparison to all forms of social experience that is not one's own*. While one person alone is obviously not an instance of intersubjectivity, what the reduction to the own world shows is that even a single consciousness is pro-social and able to be inter-

subjective. The sort of experience that a reduction to ownness produces is a focus on one's personal experience of being in relation with other people and sharing experiences of all kinds with them. The own world is explained as "the most primordial … self givenness imaginable, which is by no means a solipsistic sphere", (Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p 7). What it brings to mind are one's own experiences of being in relationship with others, one's own needs and longings in terms of looking back and looking forward to relating, for the purpose of theorising in Husserl's abstract sense. It is not looking at these experiences for the purpose of personal insight or as examples of reality. For these reasons, it is concluded that Husserl addressed himself to intersubjectivity in the strong sense. The mentions of the ego and egology in *Meditations* refer to the study of the irreducible own world or they make no sense whatsoever.

Elisabeth Ströker makes it clear what Husserl was urging. Direct experience of others that "immediately or mediately refer to other subjects are to be temporarily faded out … Otherwise an objective world, in which the other appears as an ego as I do, would already be presupposed", (1993, p 134). The ordinarily transcendentally-reduced intersubjective world comprises …

> … Objects with "spiritual" predicates belong to the experienced world. These Objects, in respect of their sense and origin, refer us to … other subjects, and their actively constituting intentionality. Thus it is in the case of all cultural Objects (books, tools, works of any kind, and so forth), which moreover carry with them at the same time the experiential sense of thereness-for-everyone …
>
> Husserl, 1977a, §43, p 92.

The purpose is to have experience of the "difference between my human Ego (my Ego in the usual sense) and the other human Ego (the other Ego <likewise in the usual sense>)", (Ibid, fn 1), and the perceptual awareness of one's *Leib* and experiences of self-with-other in retained consciousness. The ego also includes the experience of freewill and the ability to control oneself. Husserl concluded that ""*my animate organism*" and "*my psyche*," or myself as a *psychophysical unity*," (§44, p 97) are unable to have the most basic directedness towards others removed.

Iso Kern explains the reduction to the own world as bringing to "givenness a bare "nature" under the exclusion of all spiritual or cultural predicates", (Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p 158). The own world reduction makes a conscious experience for the purpose of comparison to the whole belief-neutralised world of intersubjective sense that appears for the usual transcendental attitude. This has

the purpose of showing the enormous influence that any individual receives from others and the ways in which self and other participate to create shared meanings and a world.

After the usual transcendental reduction, other, world and cultural objects have a non-originary, or non-immediate type of givenness that is not the same as the givenness of oneself to oneself. Husserl claimed that the senses of self and other ordinarily form a higher, dependent, constituted realm of awareness. As Husserl put it, the "abstraction" produces "the sense "Objective," which belongs to everything worldly—as constituted intersubjectively, as experienceable by everyone, and so forth"", (1977a, §44, p 96), that is experienced in comparison to ownness. This concerns reflection on one's own and other bodies from different perspectives, concerning their *leibliche* and *körperliche* aspects in relation to various perspectives attainable on any cultural object (§§50–54). What this means is that somatology, the phenomenology of the body, is put to work in a basic way of noting how the non-verbal presence of others to self, and self to others, show mutual interest in what is present at a basic level.

What is revealed as "own world" is a minimal subjectivity-towards-others, a "peculiar abstractive sense-exclusion of what is alien leaves us a *kind of "world"*" still, a Nature reduced to what is included in our ownness", (§44, p 98). The same "*world*" of the forty fourth section of the *Meditations* is close to the lifeworld as defined in the 1920s. It is a …

> … pre-conceptual (prelinguistic, pre-predicative) experience. The world of simple experience, in which all sciences are ultimately founded, "is prior to all empirical thinking" … [1977b, §7, p 51]; within this world, "every predicting, theorizing activity, like every other activity which ladens the object of experience with any novel sense whatsoever, remains disengaged" … [§6, p 43]. "Within the unity of experience itself, a thoroughly uniform, continuous, internally coherent world is experienced prior to all talking about, thinking over, founding, [and] theorizing", (*Ms. F I 32*, 39b, 40a). It is the world of bare preconceptual perception and memory ([1977b, p 42–3] …), the world of bare intuition. It is what Husserl calls in the *Cartesian Meditations* the "primordial world" or the "sphere of ownness," that is to say, the world which is itself experienced primordinally and which is able thus to be experienced by the individual subject in abstraction from the traditional, intersubjective system of communication ([1977a, §44 …]).
>
> Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p 220–1.

What the above means is that the absence of language brings to awareness what is shared prior to language.

The "own world" is what readers should contemplate if they follow the example of the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation*. The move to consider the own world is temporarily experiencing the sense of what is most originally one's own—so that such experience can be compared to the actuality of shared meaning and what people assume as social. During the 1920s, this pure world is pre-linguistic and pre-conceptual, devoid of theorizing, before speech or thought, and connected to personal retentional consciousness and the shared intersubjective life. But certainly *Ideas II* notes that speech is important, that a person is in "communicative relation toward his fellow men, speaks with them, writes them, reads about them in the papers, associates with them in communal activities, makes promises to them, etc", (Husserl, 1989b, §49e, p 191).

There are other passages where speech and language are included in empathy (Husserl, 2005, cited in Bernet, 1988, p 19–20). Just because speech is omitted in the *Meditations*, it does not mean that it has been excluded. This is because auditory perception of the other is one of the perceptual sense fields that appear with the bodily presence of the other. However, some account would have to be provided about the meaning of what is said and heard, which demand new detail that most likely could not be voiced in an "introduction to phenomenology," (Husserl, 1977a, title page). What can be drawn from this is that the level of non-verbal communication and what that conveys are important. In *Ideas II,* speech was present, but presumably for ease of presentation in *Meditations*, it was omitted. Husserl criticised himself for his reliance on the visual object of the other and remarked on the primacy of the voice in infancy and childhood: "the heard voice serves as the first bridge for the Objectification of the Ego or for the formation of the "*alter*"", (1989b, §21, p 101, fn). Section 51 also confirms that speech and communication are important. "Sociality is constituted by *specifically social, communicative acts*", for instance (p 204).

However, it is unacceptable to omit the higher conceptual intentionality of thought, speech and writing from intersubjectivity. But this point does not detract for Husserl's conclusions though. The ownness that Husserl referred to is pre-verbal or non-verbal. Anthony Steinbock agrees: "Transcendental experience of the other … is essentially transcendental silence", (1995, p 74). In the *Fifth Meditation,* speech and language are not included in the co-constitution of the sense of the other, Objectivity and the world. But people and language are noted as being inseparable in later years (Husserl, 1970b, App VI, p 359).

The reduction to the own world reveals one type of phenomena but Husserl interpreted others within it. In order to be clear, let us note all the conscious phenomena he interpreted.

§41 Eight phenomena

There are eight conscious Objective phenomena and a number of constituting processes interpreted that are overlappings of perceptual and presentiated senses. For ease of reference, the phenomena are numbered P1 to P8 and displayed over-all in figure 2. The figure is required in order to understand the inter-relations between phenomena. The first process that reveals the phenomena is reflection on self, other and the comparison of Objective senses. What appears is that the composite whole, of the inter-relation between self and other, can be observed. Reflection is the phenomenon of the comparison of instances of the sense of self, with instances of the sense of the other. Husserl concluded that self, other and the world, with its cultural objects, appear because of their inter-relation. Yet constant similarities and differences remain. "Consequently there belongs within my psychic being the whole constitution of the world existing for me and, in further consequence, the differentiation of that constitution into the systems that constitute what is included in my particular ownness and the systems that constitute what is other", (Husserl, 1977a, §44, p 98–9). Figure 2 portrays the inter-relation of the moments of the world of meaning in relation to a self and another.


Figure 2—Phenomena for elucidation, P1 to P8.

P1   The first phenomenon is the type of mixed givenness that occurs in a perceptual object, be it a thing or the higher form of a person. It is the observable

difference between the current moment of perceptual givenness (P1); as opposed to the presentiated addition of Objective understanding (P2a), as a specific meaningful something or someone.

A more concrete way of explaining this abstract generality is to note the difference between what it is like to look at another person merely as a visual presence—as opposed to interacting with someone in a way that demands a complex response from oneself, where one is carefully choosing how to respond. Just to look at someone is experiencing them as a perceptual object (P1). Whereas properly engaging with another in trying to understand them, requires a complex act in response to what we empathise about their non-verbal expressiveness (P2a).

When the *Körper* of the other person (P1) enters the visual field, it is interpreted (P2a—and subsequent senses, P2b, P2c, P2d) as entering an association of additions of sense, between current perceptions and past, that connect other and self, co-intentionally. But presentiated senses remain presentiated. They can never have the perceptual form of givenness. This difference between perception and presentation is discerned in an elucidation that claims not to go beyond the inherent nature of the phenomena. The recognition of this perceptual object is recognising the other as having a human body.

The lowest form of the recognition of an Identical object is the recognition of an inanimate perceptual object that is called either "thing constitution" or "transcendental aesthetics," where Husserl appropriated Kant's term and used it to refer to the passive syntheses of perception and temporality that constitute pre-reflective presence, prior to egoic attention. Husserl referred to thing constitution as based on a "vast complex of researches pertaining to the primordial world" that "makes up a whole discipline, which we may designate as "transcendental aesthetics" in a very much broadened sense", (§61, p 146). He continued:

> … thing-constitution, the appresentation of a cultural sense to a cultural object, is more fundamental than the empathic constitution of the senses "animal" or "human": "If, within this primordial "world," we abstract from the reduced psychophysical being, "I" the man," primordial bare Nature remains, as the Nature pertaining to my own "bare sensuousness". As an initial problem concerning the psychological origin of the experiential world, there emerges here the problem concerning the origin of the "thing-phantom," or "thing pertaining to the senses," with its strata (sight-thing, <touch thing,> and so forth) and their synthetic unity … Even in this sphere the "real thing" becomes constituted at a higher level, as a causal thing, an identical substrate of causal properties (a "substance").

> p 145.

The citation is an expression of Husserl's conclusion that there are layers to co-constitution. Sensation, perception, *leiblichkeit* and temporality are the lowest, the most fundamental (1969, §§4, 107c). Whereas as conceptual intentionality is the highest. The use of the word "Nature" above does not concern the natural attitude in this passage, but refers to the revealed phenomena found after the reductions employed.

The remarks above apply to the perceptual object of the other's body. "The theory of experiencing someone else, the theory of the so-called "empathy," belongs in the first storey above our "transcendental aesthetics"", (Husserl, 1977a, §61, p 146). Thus, "transcendental aesthetics" for Husserl meant perceptual constitution, temporality and recognition. Empathy and higher conceptual meaning are dependent on the lower intentional achievements and associations that are added, appresented, to all perceptual objects.

Let us now consider the four overlapping senses that Husserl believed are added to the mere perception of others.

P2a   The physical body (P1) indicates the non-verbal expressiveness of the other (P2a) who has a bodily orientation with respect to mutual Objectivity and self. The "body [*Körper*] over there is nevertheless apprehended as an animate organism [*Leib*]", (§50, p 110). This distinction is close to the previous example above. There is a difference in involvement that occurs when one looks at another merely as a person sitting at a table at a café in the street, for instance, as opposed to understanding how they express themselves through shrugging, and moving their flattened palms upwards, to suggest pushing up something while creasing their foreheads. The Mediterranean shrug is a gesture that says "I don't know" or "what do you want to do that for?" without needing speech. If the shrug is known, then the person does not have to say a word. Just the shrug will do.

The phenomenon P2a is the empathic presentiated type of givenness that has a number of extensions and is the carrier for different types of pairing. Empathic presentation is the specific form of givenness of the living other and is co-constituted by self. The "being there in person" of the other is always a quasi-givenness because "properly speaking, neither the other Ego himself, nor his subjective processes or his appearances themselves, nor anything else belonging to his own essence, becomes given originally" to any self (p 109). Perception of the human body indicates the consciousness of the other: "The character of the existent "other" has its basis in this kind of verifiable accessibility of what is not originally accessible … an experience that does not give something itself originally but that consistently verifies something indicated—is "other"", (§52, p 114–5). In partic-

ular, empathic presentational givenness covers a number of associated senses that occur with the identical referent of the givenness of others. For instance, when living bodies appear in ""*empathy* [*Einfühlung*]" or *interpretation* [*Eindeutung*] it is understood as animate organism [*Leib*] … as carrier of something psychic", (Husserl, 1980, Supp I, §1, p 94).

The visual perception of the other's *Körper* incurs a general phenomenon of human bodiliness as semiotic or signitive. Each body takes part in a signifying medium, a 'code,' in order to transmit a fundamental co-interest, or potential co-interest, in basic objects. A passage from *Ideas II* explains this point about the overall sense of the other's body. "It is just like reading a newspaper: the paper imprinted with sensory-intuitive marks is unified with the sense expressed and understood in the word-signs … It has … a sensuous Body for a spiritual meaning that is grasped by way of understanding; "Spirit" and "Body" are unified", (Husserl, 1989b, Supp VIII, p 333).

Overall, Husserl interpreted four pairings by association in generating the everyday sense of the other. P2a is the living expressiveness of the specific non-verbal bodily orientation of the other, with respect to self and mutual Objectivity. P2b is an extension of this to become the co-constitution of the visually perceived bodily expressiveness as another *Leib* and hence another "monad," an embodied consciousness in one world with self. P2c is the phenomenon that, underlying all difference of perspectives and beliefs, the other remains other and the inter-relation between self and other is constant. P2d is the quasi-givenness of the other's empathised perspective on the same cultural object as available to self. These extensions of P2a are explained in more detail below.

P2b   The perception of the other's body indicates their expression of living, bodily otherness. It indicates the non-verbal sense of the other is a *Leib* who is empathised as being in a world with self.

One example of understanding an individual as another is when one does not understand the other's mood because of how they express themselves non-verbally. On meeting a person for the first time, this can come across in a way that could result in thinking badly of the other or rejecting them. However, give them time and the strangeness will wear off. What the initial lack of understanding shows is the limit of one's own ability to understand another person, because their manner of non-verbal expression is not familiar to oneself.

In more general terms, each self co-constitutes the givenness of the other's *Leibliche* self. "In this combination … the Other's animate body [*Leibkörper*] and his governing Ego are given in the manner that characterises *a unitary transcend-*

ing experience … The character of the existent "other" has its basis in this kind of verifiable accessibility of what is not originally accessible", (Husserl, 1977a, §52, p 114). Where "what is not originally accessible" are a number of presentations of socially learned senses.

P2c   The perception of the other's body indicates that the phenomenon of the Identical other and their givenness "There" co-occurs with the Identical self and its givenness "Here". The ""other's" body, has the mode "There"", (§53, p 116). These remarks concern the constancy of inter-relation between any self and any other, with respect to all cultural objects. In face-to-face meetings between two persons, there is a specific constancy of oneself and the other. Certain aspects of two-person relationships are always the same.

P2d   The perception of the other's body overall indicates that the outcome of empathic presentation is a socially learned imaginative transposal to co-constitute a 'second-hand' quasi-appearance of the other's intentional object, a profile on common cultural objects and world. What occurs is a shift of perspective from the self's, through an overlapping, to an empathic-imagining of what the other's perspective must be, on the same referents that appear to self. Through spoken communication (and sometimes without it) it is possible to empathise what others think, feel, believe and intend. It is often possible to draw such conclusions through discussion in face-to-face meetings. Empathising is an outcome due to the work of consciousness and its manners of intentionality.

   The phenomenon of the other includes the empathised givenness of their perspective by imaginative transposal of self into the place of the other. "I apperceive him as having spatial modes of appearance like those I should have if I should go over there and be where he is", (Ibid). The other's perspective on the same cultural object to self exists within the same fundamental world of meaning. In overview:

> In changeable harmonious multiplicities of experience I experience others as actually existing and, on the one hand, as world Objects—not as mere physical things belonging to Nature, though indeed as such things in respect of one side of them. They are in fact experienced also as *governing psychically* in their respective natural organisms. Thus peculiarly involved with animate organisms, as "psychophysical" Objects, they *are "in" the world*. On the other hand, I experience them at the same time as *subjects for this world*, as experiencing it (this same world that I experience) and, in so doing, experiencing me too,

even as I experience the world and others in it. Continuing along this line, I can explicate a variety of other moments noematically.

… I *experience* the world (including others) … as other than mine alone [*mir fremde*], as an *intersubjective* world, actually there for everyone, accessible in respect of its Objects to everyone. And yet each has experiences, his appearances and appearance-unities, his world-phenomenon; whereas the experienced world exists in itself, over against all experiencing subjects and their world-phenomena.

§43, p 91.

What the quotation above records is the transcendental proposition of the universal necessity of there being Objectivity for all. It is empathy that brings intersubjective Objectivity into being. Husserl believed that intersubjective consciousness co-constitutes Objective cognition: "there is implicit *mutual being for one another*", (§56, p 129). Sections 43 and 49 of *Meditations* are overviews of Husserl's complex account.

The remainder of the explanation below notes six more conscious phenomena.

P3   The Identical referent sense of otherness has a first-ever occurrence: By necessity, there must have been a primal institution of the first sense of another human being for each self.

But it is impossible to make conscious the first-hand senses of others, nevermind what was the infant self's first-ever sense of another. However, whilst avoiding ideas of permanently unconscious objects, Husserl did permit the conclusion of a primal institution as a theoretical and explanatory necessity. What currently appears is the otherness of the other.

Husserl claimed that the re-awakening of the *Urstiftung* other is discernible among the passive syntheses concerning the sense of the other. It is the perceptual Object of another human body that elicits a re-awakening of the retained sense of a first-ever pairing that "comes about when the Other enters my field of perception", (§51, p 113). The "experience of someone else … effects a similar *connexion mediated by presentiation*: … a connexion between, on the one hand, the uninterruptedly living self-experience … and … the *alien sphere* presentiated therein", (§55, p 127–128). The primal institution of that sense concerns that which has been "acquired for us in earlier experiences", (Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p 160). In other words, all presentiated senses arise from passive 'intentionality' and have had an original *Urstiftung*. It is claimed that the first-ever co-constituted sense can be re-awakened when experiencing a current object

of the same sort. The referent of the many specific senses of self throughout the lifespan, concerns identity and subsuming personal change within this identity: "after all, I can also genuinely remember another mind's experiences, not only my own. The phenomenon of I being co-present as the I of re-presented originally experienced experiences would seem to be just this, a phenomenon", (Marbach, 2000, p 91).

What Husserl argued is that there is a minimal pre-intersubjective world that exists. This world has a number of constant features and inter-relations that underpin communal meaning. The sense of the other is co-constituted in such a way that the end-product is *separate and connected*: "none of the *appropriated* sense specific to an animate organism [*Leiblichkeit*] can become actualized originarily in my primordial sphere," (Husserl, 1977a, §51, p 113) meaning that the other remains other and, theoretically at least, never becomes confused with self.

P4   The senses self and other always co-occur. With the first-ever sense of the other, there is a first-ever sense of self that must have occurred in infancy. Because any understanding "itself points back to a "primal instituting"", (§38, p 80). Although it is impossible to identify the specific instance when one first understood oneself as an individual whole of conscious experience, Husserl permitted the conclusion that such an event must occur as a theoretical explanation. He also believed that people understand themselves as a unity, a whole of consciousness.

It must be noted that Husserl was discussing degrees and extents of exclusivity and mutual influence. To a degree, self and other are mutually exclusive. To a degree, both are in a co-empathic relation. Husserl was certain that the ego is co-present with the other: "Just as I am co-present in my past or in a fiction, just so in the mental life of another mind which I am re-presenting in the empathy", (1973b, p 319, cited in Marbach, 2000, p 90).

P5   The phenomenon of the whole of intersubjective involvement with others shows the work of the passive syntheses that operate in co-constituting the current meanings of self, other and world.

The actual intersubjective whole around each consciousness is different and varies due to a large number of factors. The whole varies with the social history, personal history, social place, physical place, family position and the actions of others plus the influences of habit, sexual orientation, gender, race, age and other such matters. However, there is a sum total of intersubjective experience to date and this forms a world-whole, a horizon or totality that relates what is already

known—to what is anticipated. Encounters with specific new individuals are related to the retained totality that oneself has had so far.

With the words: "The experienced animate organism of another continues to prove itself as actually an animate organism, solely in its changing but incessantly *harmonious "behavior"*", (1977a, §52, p 114), Husserl asked readers to consider the intersubjective processes of the verification and nullification of sense. P5 is social reality, the great expanse of human experience and the ultimate referent for each person's participation in civilization. Indeed, in order to make aspects of the whole identifiable, phenomenon P5 is the whole for inter-relating regular and identifiable aspects of self and other. Yet there is an overlap of sense that has accrued between self and other. Through life, the givenness of others remains a presentiated sense that is harmoniously verified in everyday intersubjective experience. Intersubjectivity is a reciprocal, mutual influence between persons.

P6   Although the ego bestows the sense otherness in co-constitution, it excludes that otherness from itself. The ego is itself and connected to others. "That which is primordially incompatible, in simultaneous coexistence, becomes compatible", (§54, p 119). Each self is unique. The "primal "I" … can never lose its uniqueness", (1970b, §54b, p 185).

The concrete experience of finding oneself a whole consciousness is the usual experience of being a human being. (There are cases of different states of self, amnesia and fugue states and dissociated identity, but Husserl did not consider these in the *Meditations*). A definite comment on the co-presence between self and other is "psychic being, which is co-given to the spectator along with Bodily movements in co-presence, and indeed as conforming to rules, movements which now for their part frequently becomes new signs", (1989b, §45, p 174). The specific reduction to the own world is unable to remove the most basic sense of intersubjective connection as section 40 above showed.

P7   Self remains Identical (P7) in relation an Identical specific other who remains identically other and in an Identical relation of mutual exclusion and inclusion (P2c) with self. This theoretical conclusion is a ubiquitous one. The concrete experience it points to is the constancy involved in being oneself in relation to others (in a two-person relationship or in families or other groups). The usual experience here is not to confuse one's self with the other and to have the on-going experience of being 'the same old me'.

In Husserl's estimation, self is always paired with "the other body … the coexisting ego … *in the mode There*", (1977a, §54, p 119). The Identical referent of

the ego refers to "all-embracing structural forms in which I exist as ego … identifiable again and again, in respect of all its parts and moments", (§46, p 103). Despite the observation of connection and universal similarity, self and other are not confused. "Consequently my entire primordial ownness … has the content of the Here … not the content belonging to that definite There", (§54, p 119).

The inter-relation of perspectives of possible and actual experience about a cultural object, first occurred in conclusions concerning Objectivity, where what "we experience of the thing … has reference to the experiencing subject. All these appear in changing aspects, in the change of which the things are present as sensibly changed also", (Husserl, 1989b, §18f, p 88). In *Ideas II*, the perspective of *Leib* with the givenness Here, is referred to in phrases like the "Body … has … the unique distinction of bearing in itself the *zero point* [*null punkt*] of all these orientations", (§41a, p 166).

Theoretically the Identity of the ego is that it is Identical with itself and maintains its uniformity. "The ego grasps himself not only as a flowing life but also as *I*, who live this and that subjective process, who live through this and that cogito, *as the same I*", (Husserl, 1977a, §31, p 66). What is being referred to is self-givenness and self-recognition. "Since, by his *own active generating*, the Ego constitutes himself as *identical substrata of Ego-properties,* he constitutes himself also as a "fixed and abiding*" personal Ego*—in a maximally broad sense …"", (§32, p 67). In other words, self and other are identical in their fundamental being and this is evident through a process of comparison. One aspect of the ego is that it brings itself into being. It is a phenomenon for people without a mental illness or brain damage that there is a conscious phenomenon of a persisting sense of self. Husserl debated this last point about how the ego is constituted in detail (Marbach, 2000, p 92).

P8   Finally the reduction to the own world concerns demonstrating the phenomenon of the independent irreducible own world (P8). The word "original" describes a sense of self in relationship that is independent. Whilst it belongs to self, it includes one's own experiences of others as retained, remembered, current and anticipated, imagined and possible representations of any kind. It indicates that within each self, consciousness is oriented towards others. So while not intersubjective itself, *what this irreducible experience shows is pre-intersubjectivity, an inherent readiness and ability to engage others and the social world*. Of course such experience is taken into every social and physical situation into which the ego goes across the lifespan. As time passes, this store of social experience increases. The phenomenon of the own world P8, requires an evident comparison.

> Thus we abstract first of all from what gives men and brutes their specific sense as, so to speak, Ego-like living beings and consequently from all determinations of the phenomenal world that refer by their sense to "others" as Ego-subjects and, accordingly, presuppose these. We can say also that we abstract from everything "*other-spiritual*," as that which makes possible, in the "alien" or "other" that is in question here, its specific sense.
>
> Husserl, 1977a, §44, p 95.

This means adopting an interpretative position concerning what is necessary, universal and must be the case. The own world, is an independent whole of pre-intersubjectivity. After the reduction to it "what is mine in my world-experience, pervading my world-experience through and through" is "my actual and possible experience of what is other, is wholly unaffected by screening off what is other", (p 98). Hasty readers miss this point and so find Husserl's text nonsensical and supportive of solipsism, which is entirely the opposite of what he intended to show.

What Husserl intended to show is that: "Within this "original sphere" … we also find a "transcendent world," which accrues on the basis of the intentional phenomenon, "Objective world," by reduction to what is peculiarly the ego's own", (§48, p 104–5). Meaning that it is impossible to remove the pre-intersubjective senses. If one were marooned on a desert island or made a prisoner in solitary confinement, there would still be all the past empathic experiences and imagined possible ones that would be created to fill the void. It is this concrete experience that is the evidence of the intersubjective being of consciousness. It cannot be taken away once a person has grown up in a family or other social institution.

This chapter ends by including a brief section on the concepts that are at stake.

§42 The focus on theoretical ideals

Husserl told his readers how to join him in concluding on a priori in the lived meanings between self and other by exploring the possible and the impossible, merely as such, not considering them as real possibilities in transcendental phenomenology. This methodology had been in-place since 1900 (1970a, VI, introduction, p 669).

The point of eidetic imaginative variation is, according to Marbach finding "moments which lie necessarily in the very possibility of such experiences and therefore must lie universally … in every *actually* occurring case", (1982, p 455).

Guidance from Eduard Marbach has to be included in order to understand the role of eidetic imaginative variation in exploring the a priori connections between self and others. Marbach cites a passage that emphasises the place of *leiblichkeit* and non-verbal communication: "Since empathy is indeed founded in the apprehension (*Auffassung*) of the animate organism, we can "legitimately" … only empathize in such a way … based on "the indications which we have"", (citing Husserl 1973c, p 116, Marbach, 1982, p 462). This means that the ability to find universal relations through imagination is limited by what is imaginable. It is necessary to follow eidetic imaginative variation in finding hidden limits and relations. The brief mentions of eidetic imaginative variation in *Meditations* must be spelled out as an attention to varying aspects of self and world in order to conclude on them. What Husserl did vary, in the case of empathy, was his experiences of others and animals in the habitat of their world. He repeated this methodological procedure several times over (1997c, §8, p 171, 1997d, §8, p 232, §11, p 240–1, 1977a, §34, p 72, §37, p 77, §41, p 84–5).

This method is also confirmed in *The Crisis* (1970b, §55, p 187). What Marbach makes clear is that the variation of self and world can be genetic. This means exploring the constituent elements of co-empathy and thinking its limits. Imagination is employable because it produces experiential data which Husserl was confident would unravel the history of associations and presentations that occur when co-empathising children, animals or people with a mental illness, for instance. But the problem is that detailed working with genetic eidetic variation is missing from the English language publications. For instance the only aside made on this procedure in *Meditations* is that "I phantasy only myself as if I were otherwise; I do not phantasy others", (1977a, §34, p 72). In other works, he used the imagination of empathy to create "fulfilled" examples of it (Marbach, 1982, p 466–7). It has to be understood that (1) he wanted transcendental phenomenology to occupy a position that was outside of the usual constrains of the natural and naturalistic world. And (2), all cases could be considered as equals and that Husserl believed there were no "*absolutely normal*" consciousness that "experiences the world in the ultimately perfect manner as absolutely true", (1973c, cited in Marbach, 1982, p 461). Empirical psychological findings and transcendental results can be used in pure psychological analyses. This interchangeability compromises neither stance. This is Husserl's distinction between actual exemplary instances; and his field of experiencing for theorising, eidetic imaginative variation.

Specifically, one clue is to realise "*how*, within the immanency of conscious life and in thus and so determined modes of consciousness belonging to this

incessant flux, anything like *fixed and abiding objective unities* can become intended and … how this marvellous work of "constituting" identical objects is done *in the case of each category of objects*", (1977a, §20, p 48). This means comparing manners of appearing, in order to interpret the intentionalities at work in their co-constitution. The being of consciousness and its development can be made clear through discovering differences between all its involvements. It is a recognisable phenomenon that referents can be the same. It is an important conclusion that one referent can be seen, across a number of profiles or instances, that comprise the sense of the whole gained so far. There are Identical referents of self and other, or the otherness of the other, as found in the own world. Eidetic or a priori universal objects are classed as ideal referents that have a constant, timeless meaning within the flow of specific senses that appear to consciousness (1991, §45, p 103).

The purpose of the consideration of a priori is to create a realm of theory that is relevant to meaningful lived experience. Husserl's research papers confirm the aim of explicating the essence of intersubjectivity of consciousness and its manifold forms of intentionality. What Husserl did was to tease apart complex additions of sense in order to find their constancies. Partly by argument and partly by attending to what reveals itself, he hoped to understand how consciousness works overall. The inherent interpretation of the being of consciousness is concluding on the ways in which perceptual intentionality is modified and linked to the non-perceptual givenness of other objects. There are involuted forms of *linking to the past*, and *anticipated invitations to add associated senses*, to the bare perceptual object, in order to create the presentiated givenness that does appear.

10

The moments of the meaningful whole

Aim: This chapter provides an interpretation of Husserl's *Fifth Cartesian Meditation*. The aim is to have a clear theoretical model of meaning in its social context in order to promote the psychosocial skills of practice and provide a basis for research.

The term "moments" means ontologically necessary parts of a whole. The success or failure of a theory of necessary conditions can be judged in relation to its function as a theory of understanding and inter-relationship. An adequate theory distinguishes senses of the same object, for at least two persons. It explains how each has their own perspective on the same referent, a mutual cultural object and inter-relates both perspectives. If this criterion of minimal adequacy is not met, then intersubjectivity has not been correctly understood. And in the negative, if there was an inadequate understanding of intersubjectivity, then there would be difficulty in practising therapy, for instance, because inaccurate understanding leads to faulty action. The guiding belief is the role of the expressiveness of the human body that demonstrates participation and interest in the shared world.

Below, the first section is the pinnacle of abstract argument towards which chapters 6 to 9 have been the foothills. After the pinnacle, there is a descent towards the more practical pastures of the valley of therapy. Figures also explain the referent phenomena. In short, the expressive human body is perceptually present: Through lifelong experience, it points to the point of view of other people: Their consciousness and intentionality appears through their living body which shows their intentions, beliefs, emotions, confusions and other key psychological states and processes.

The most concrete explanations that Husserl gave of empathy are found in a text from 1910. In order to orient the reader to what he was developing in detail, the introduction below cites Husserl's *Text Six* of the lectures of 1910 and 1911

in order to provide some detail. What is at stake in understanding empathy could be called the signifying effect of the human body or semiosis. Whatever the words used, the idea is that the living human bodiliness indicates or represents a second '*object*' that never appears by itself: "In empathy, the empathizing I experiences … the consciousness of the other I", (Husserl, 2006, §37, p 82). Where it is necessary to clarify that any self could only ever have second-hand experience what other people experience.

Empathy is a presentation of a specific sort that employs a double object similarly to how signs and art make sense. Namely, the perception of the body of the other is a cue for the addition of a learned version of the transposed sense of one's own living unity and consciousness. The living body-sense, *Leib* in German, is added to the visual perception of the other's physical body, their *Körper*, to generate the sense of their otherness overall.

§43 The elucidation of empathy

Even after the reduction to the own world, in an attempt to remove all intersubjective senses, Husserl found that he could not remove the most basic shared senses.

When empathised senses are retained as associations of sense, they are awakened when the *Körper* of the other is perceived (or otherwise represented or even suggested as in the example of Hitchcock's *Psycho*). Clearly, "if what belongs to the other's own essence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same", (Husserl, 1977a, §50, p 109), and that does not occur. In a different wording, the mutual exclusiveness of the *point of view* of self-Here separates self from the other-There.

The first major distinction, for understanding empathy and its role in the co-constitution of the world, is that a double intentionality is working to constitute two Objective senses. The phrase the "body [*Körper*] over there, which is nevertheless apprehended as an animate organism [*Leib*], must have derived this sense by an *apperceptive transfer from my animate organism* [*Leib*]", (p 110), means that there is a pairing by association, an associative overlapping of sense taking place.

Husserl claimed consciousness distinguishes the bodies of others in several ways. Perceptually, they are *Körperen* prior to being empathised. After empathising, each appears as an expressive *Leib* with its own perspective, a living other self. The own world reduction reveals the expressiveness of the other as *Körper*; that has the sense *Leib* that occurs when the first of its higher associations are considered. Right away, this means that the first elucidation of sense concerning the

Objectivity of the body (*LeibKörper*) is that the *Körper* indicates multiple senses of otherness and their perspectives (P2a, P2b, P2c, P2d). See figure 3 for a focus on self.

Figure 3—Focusing on self.

The *Körper* of the other carries multiple senses, some of which overlap and permit an addition to, or make a difference with, other meanings. Because of an assumption of homogeneity about human being, all that has been stated in this distinction for self applies to the other. The function of the living body is to amalgamate the own-*Leib* with the *Körper* of others and produce the sense of their *leiblichkeit*. The living body has associated, paired senses in a specific way. The Objectivity of the body and its basic commonality is a specific motivating similarity that invites a pairing by association. Husserl claimed that it triggers a number of associations of sense because the *LeibKörper* is primordially intersubjective: "It is clear from the very beginning that only a similarity connecting, within my primordial sphere, that body [*Körper*] over there with my body [*Körper*] can serve as the motivational basis for the "*analogizing*" *apprehension* of that body as another animate organism [*Leib*]", (p 111). This should be taken to mean that the associated sense of a human body is intersubjective. It is not just a perceptual presence.

The similarity between human bodies is understood to be a motivation for additions of sense that create a specific whole of meaning (Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p 164). It is not an inference by analogy. Such pairing (apperception

in this sentence, an addition to perception, a presentation) "is not inference, not a thinking act", (Husserl, 1977a, §50, p 111). It is due to a primal institution of the first-ever sense of the other (that must have occurred in infancy). Several types of pre-reflexive addition encourage and found other types of "pregivenness", (Ibid).

Specifically, in the case of the other person, it is claimed there always must have been a prior time when a first-ever co-constitution of another-as-other arose. It is concluded that the sense of the first-ever other is re-awakened each time a specific other person is encountered. A "body [*Körper*] within my primordial sphere, being similar to my own animate body [*Leib-Körper*], becomes *apprehended as likewise an animate organism* [*Leib*], we encounter: first, the … *primally instituitive original*", (§51, p 112). This specific sentence is the conclusion that when we meet another, there is the sense of them as a conscious other, yet such a sense must have been co-constituted for the first time in infancy. The view is that any other's sense to any self is an empathic presentation of associations of meaning. See figure 4 for a highlight on the relations and intentional implications concerning the other.

P1: P2d Other's perspective
P1: P2c Remains other there
P1: P2b Other's mind and body
P1: P2a Expressiveness

Other

Cultural Object

P5 Social Whole

Figure 4—Focusing on the other.

There is a visually perceptible separation and difference in givenness that promotes and enforces a distinction of sense between self and other. (Despite there being fundamental connection, between self and other). At higher levels of awareness, the knowledge of the source of co-constitutions is not directly accessible to self. What this means is that the shades of difference between self and other accrue, so that the presentations of otherness and their views of the world do not get confused yet are connected.

What selves co-constitute with others are two senses that are overlapped or associated: the "component of the Other which is not accessible originaliter is combined with an original presentation" of what appears visually, their bodily Objectivity (§52, p 114). There is an elision of sense, an extension or deepening of understanding amongst a number of paired associations. Because of the basic similarity between human bodies, the expressiveness of the body promotes further associations. Each self bestows its own sense of *LeibKörper* and ego, but finds that the sense of the other is always of the form *other*.

Next there is an important series of events. One's own learnings are re-created in a specific way in understanding the other. A vicarious verification of the otherness of the other occurs. The sense of the other is only ever presentiated and added to the perceptual object of the other's body. The sense of the other remains an intentional modification of the *leibliche* self. The sense of the other is derivative, co-constituted. The "transcendental clue" of the givenness of the other (§21, p 53) is that harmonious intersubjective experience verifies or nullifies what is the case concerning the relations of meaning between the perceptual signifier (their *Körper*) and presentiated senses of the other's *leiblichkeit*. This is the role of intersubjective bodiliness and cultural experience over time as the outcome of 'reality testing'. "The experienced animate organism [*Leib*] of another continues to prove itself as actually an animate organism [*Leib*], solely in its changing but incessantly *harmonious "behavior"*", (p 114). What Husserl meant was that there is an overall congruence between the senses that accrue. Some senses are impossible whilst others are utterly necessary for meaning and inter-relationships to exist as they do.

Iso Kern clarifies the situation: "other psychic determinations are proven or confirmed by the fact that they stand together with the originally perceived corporeality [*körperlichkeit*] in a nexus of continuous, *reciprocal* motivation", (Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p 162). Where "psychic" is used in a general sense of meaning-for-consciousness. Kern is stating that the conditions for the understandability of others and their views arise through one's own contributions and the motivations of others in reciprocity. However, to provide the sense that Hus-

serl wanted to convey that is most accurate, the wording of *Cartesian Meditations* is replaced by an earlier rendition:

> When I apprehend an external body [*Leibkörper*] similar to my bodily organism [*Körper*], as bodily organism [*Leib*], then, in virtue of its similarity, this [alien] bodily organism [*fremde Leibkörper*] exercises the functions of *appresentation in the mode of "expression"* [>*Ausdrucks*<]. This requires that a manifold inwardness also be posited that develops progressively in typical fashion, [an inwardness] that on its part demands a corresponding outwardness, which actually does then arise in accordance with the anticipation [*Vorerwartung*] from within. Wherever the appresenting apprehension thus ensues, and is confirmed in this manner within itself by means of the continuance of corresponding expressions, there the appresentation is maintained.
>
> Husserl, 1973c, p 249, cited in Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p 162, translation altered by reintroducing the original terms.

The quotation needs to be teased apart. Firstly, there is a statement of intent that is an emphasis on the manner of empathic presentation: "When I apprehend an external body [*Leibkörper*] similar to my bodily organism [*Körper*], as bodily organism [*Leib*], then, in virtue of its similarity, this [alien] bodily organism [*fremde Leibkörper*] exercises the functions of *appresentation in the mode of "expression"* [>*Ausdrucks*<]", (Ibid). This means that the recognition of the motivating similarity of the body (as expressive and primordially intersubjective *LeibKörper*) is verified through intersubjective experience in the world through time. The visual perception of the other's physical body is empathically presentiated with connections to the manifold senses of the other (and their perspective), and those senses are verified within the harmonious whole of similar experiences. Therefore, it is the case that "manifold inwardness also be posited that develops progressively in typical fashion, [an inwardness] that on its part demands a corresponding outwardness, which actually does then arise in accordance with the anticipation [*Vorerwartung*] from within", (Ibid). The manner of this is made clear in sections 52 to 54 of the *Meditations*. It is a basic lived congruence between past, present and future—due to good social learning. It is not directly stated but implied that social life as a whole, so far, is the teacher of how to empathise bodiliness to produce the perspectives of others.

Perceptions and presentations are overlapped: fused but not confused in that the otherness of the other is vicariously verified. The otherness of the other is part of primordial 'Nature' because it is retained by consciousness and is part of the sphere of ownness: People carry about with them the impressions that others have

made on them. This last claim is extended. In section 53 it is explained that the congruence and regularity of cultural life is the means of maintaining specific meanings across time, concerning the senses of past, present and future non-verbal behaviour. Husserl concluded that bodiliness, and pairings by association, are the a priori that create and maintain all forms of higher meaning (1977a, §§55–63). However, details of the extent of pairing by association are omitted.

What can be concluded are three things. (1) Cultural objects exist in a constant relation to the Identicality of self and other, for the overlapping of senses between self and other. (2) Through movement, self could occupy a manifold of perspectives with respect to the same object. (3) Cultural objects act in co-relating the manifold perspectives of self and other. These are conclusions that underline the reciprocity and mutuality of intersubjectivity. Reciprocal motivation exists for each self, and intersubjectively between selves. The mutual cultural object is visible to both self and other:

> … the "other's" body, has the mode "There". This orientation, "There," can be freely changed by virtue of my kinesthesias … By free modification of my kinesthesias … I can change my position in such a manner that I convert any There into a Here … I should see the same physical things, only in correspondingly different modes of appearance … my current perceiving "from here," but other quite determinate systems, corresponding to the change of position that puts me "there," belong constitutively to each physical thing. And the same in the case of every other "There" … these instances of belonging together … [are] quite essential to the clarification of the associative performance, experiencing someone else.
>
> §53, p 116–7.

What this means is that mutuality and reciprocity exist between any self-Here and any other-There perspectives. Others empathise selves as selves empathise others. Intersubjective intentionality is understood when the possibility of occupying different perspectives on the same cultural object is taken into account. Husserl could have added to the last sentence above that not only are "these instances of belonging together … essential to the clarification of the associative performance, experiencing someone else," (p 117) but also *that they are experiencing a manifold of perspectives about a cultural object*.

Because self has a potential accessibility to verify others' perspective, through its potential to move and fulfil its anticipations, any self could experience the perspectives on cultural objects that others can. "I should see the same physical things, only in correspondingly different modes of appearance, such as pertain to

my being there. It implies … that not only the systems of appearance that pertain to my current perceiving "from here," but other quite determinate systems, corresponding to the change of position that puts me "there," belong constitutively to each physical thing", (p 116–7). What this means is that reciprocity occurs around the publicness of the cultural object and its manifold of senses. The cultural object is co-associated through corresponding manifolds of self-Here, self-there, other-There and other-here. Similarly, these distinctions concerning Objectivity and the human body apply to all selves who co-constitute senses of others.

The co-relation of the perspectives of self and other, with respect to the mutual cultural object, is pertinent to the full phenomenon of the other. Because the potential overlappings of the multiple senses of self-Here and other-There *are sufficient to create the empathically-learned perspective of what the other can experience.* This is the case whether the perspective of the other has ever been apparent to self or not. Through the achievement of a series of pairings by association and empathic transposal so far, the sense of the other is co-constituted as the sense of an existent person:

> … as we find on closer examination, I apperceive him as having spatial modes of appearance like those I should have if I should go over there and be where he is. Furthermore the Other is appresentatively apperceived as the "Ego" of a primordial world [*Lebenswelt*], and of a monad, wherein his animate organism [*Leib*] is originally constituted and experienced in the mode of the absolute Here, precisely as the functional center for his governing. In this appresentation, therefore, the body in the mode *There*, which presents itself in *my* monadic sphere and is apperceived as another's live body (the animate organism [*Leib*] of the alter ego)—that body indicates "the same" body [*Körper*] in the mode *Here*, as the body experienced by the other ego in *his* monadic sphere. Moreover it indicates the "same" body [*Körper*] concretely, with all the constitutive intentionality pertaining to this mode of givenness in the other's experience.
>
> p 117.

What the above means is that the other is empathised with their perspective There. The conclusion above is deduced through a priori necessities about intentional implications between self and other. It is an assertion concerning intersubjective co-constitution. The quotation means that between any two instances of consciousness, there is an inter-relationship of perspective. The role of empathic presentation is quasi-presenting the perspectives of others. Kern explains that because of a tendency to empathise human contact as a whole in a specific way,

this tendency or motivation is what 'causes' selves to empathise what others may experience over there (Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p 164).

A third pairing by association occurs that verifies the on-going continuity of difference between one's own *Leib* and the visual object, other *Körper*. It can be expressed by stating that the self's *Leib* plus the visual object of the other's *Körper* comprise a phase in the overall presentiated sense of the other, that concludes in being able to empathise what other people experience. The self's Here co-appears with the other's There. Such an association expresses empathic transposal and "puts me "there" … And the same in the case of every other "There"", (Husserl, 1977a, §53, p 117). Empathy binds communities together. It is the primary medium through which understanding occurs and in which communication is enabled.

What follows the transposal is a fourth pairing of the sense that has been empathised. Empathic presentation extends further than empathising oneself into the perspective of the other. Husserl added an event that can be expressed metaphorically as 'looking into the eyes of the other and seeing oneself'. For the other *Körper* has an understanding of oneself-Here, which further emphasises reciprocity and mutuality because the self's-Here co-appears in the other's There. The other "body in the mode *There* … indicates "the same" body [*Körper*] in the mode *Here*, as the body experienced by the other ego in *his* monadic sphere", (Ibid). What is being discussed is mutuality with respect to understanding that the other empathises self.

Therefore, all selves are capable of empathising any other and their perspective. Empathy has a *transcendental* function because representing the other's perspective is a universal and necessary occurrence for intersubjective Objectivity for all and is a condition of the possibility of a meaningful world. The fourth pairing concerns how "my body would look "if I were there"":

> … *Thus the assimilative apperception becomes possible* and established, by which the external body over there receives analogically from mine the sense, animate organism, and consequently the sense, organism belonging to another "world," analogous to my primordial world.
>
> … With the associative overlapping of the data founding the apperception, there takes place an association at a higher level.
>
> §54, p 118.

The passage above concerns intersubjectively believable reality. The reciprocal relation between the self's empathy of the other and the other's empathy of self, together co-constitute a shared world. The other is empathised not just as a *Leib*

but also as a consciousness with a perspective in a surrounding world, in common with self. The overall inter-relation is required for shared experience and mutual Objectivity.

What Husserl meant when he wrote: "It brings to mind the way my body would look "if I were there" … *Thus the assimilative apperception becomes possible* … there takes place an association at a higher level", (Ibid), is that we do not immediately transfer our sense to others but they invoke in us the sense of our own retained, having been where they are empathised-to-be. We create freshly transposed senses of being where others are empathised-to-be because of the socially learned potential for mutuality. The phrase concerning how "my body would look "if I were there"" (Ibid) clarifies the initial perspective of the double object of the *Körper* indicating *Leiblichkeit* and the higher pairings by association. It emphasises the role of empathic transposal of how the self's experience would be if it were There. It means that one's own learnings are re-created in a specific anticipatory way in empathising others.

§44 Objectivity and world

Husserl's account has worth because it specifies the minimum number of elements that comprise the most fundamental situation of meeting with another, understanding them and their perspective. This is a theoretical model of a fundamental task that consciousness achieves. Empathy is the phenomenon of learning or otherwise 'knowing' the other's relation to some cultural object. The analysis emphasises the extent of bodiliness in the co-constitution of intersubjective Objectivity. So that it would be permissable to talk of bodiliness as inter-bodily in its function as a mainstay within the whole. Intersubjectivity also means *inter-perspectivity* in that a cultural object has the motivational potential to invoke what others experience by dint of our immersion in culture over time. Husserl used a number of synonyms to express himself but they confused the issue rather than clarifying it. These ideal terms refer to the actuality of everyday social learning, emotional felt-senses and the universe of meaning. The complexity of the account reflects the complex inter-relation between moments of the whole. Two more elucidations can be grasped as the consequences of empathy. See figure 5 concerning the cultural objects and the world.

P8 The overall inter-relation, the world

Self

Other and
appearance
of the other's
perspective

Cultural object

P5 Social Whole

P7 Identical
inter-relation

Figure 5—Focusing on cultural objects and world.

What follows is that through the reciprocity of self and other, there occurs a form of verification that is on-going across the lifespan. The outcome is the co-constitution of a world. The other is always in a world with self. Together we share a most fundamental world: "so far as incompatibilities do not interfere, an assimilation, an accommodation of the sense of the one member to that of the other" occurs (p 118). It becomes apparent that the other is also empathic and co-intentional within the fundamental situation. The "other body there enters into a pairing association with my body here and … becomes … *an ego coexisting in the mode There*", (§54, p 119). After section 52, and its clarification by Husserl (1973c, p 249) cited above, it would have been clearer to write that human beings are *co-empathic* and *co-intentional*. Although this choice of words was not used. It is argued that such a sense is being stated. Co-empathy is a little cumbersome and is not in widespread current usage in the English language literature, but for the sake of precision it is decided to use it consistently from now on.

It is the transposed senses of co-empathic learnings that are confirmed or disconfirmed through everyday life. There is a pairing by association so that the other is understood with self, as sharing the higher world of Objective sense, as well as the mere perceptual world. The elucidation of the Objectivity of the mutual world concerns the specific contents of the everyday world. All higher intellectual and psychological events are understood through the idealised "style

of my own life", (Husserl, 1977a, §54, p 120), which is held to be sufficiently common to indicate fundamental aspects of human being.

Intersubjectivity itself is a moment of the means of producing an overall congruence and regularity of what underpins the constancy of the Identical Object and the workings of consciousness. Husserl turned to the intersubjective accessibility of meaning as the object of his elucidations.

> It is quite comprehensible that, *as a further consequence*, an "empathizing" of definite contents belonging to the "*higher psychic sphere*" arises. Such contents too are indicated somatically and in the conduct of the organism toward the outside world—for example: as the outward conduct of someone who is angry or cheerful, which I easily understand from my own conduct under similar circumstances. Higher psychic occurrences, diverse as they are and familiar as they have become, have furthermore their style of synthetic interconnexions and take their course in forms of their own, which I can understand associatively on the basis of my empirical familiarity with the style of my own life, as exemplifying roughly differentiated typical forms. In this sphere, moreover, every successful understanding of what occurs in others has the effect of opening up new associations and new possibilities of understanding; and conversely, since every pairing association is reciprocal, every such understanding uncovers my own psychic life in its similarity and difference and, by bringing new features into prominence, makes it fruitful for new associations.
>
> §54, p 120.

Two things are of note. Firstly, specific contents of the ordinary world arise through the lower conditions of possibility noted above. When *körperlichkeit* indicates otherness and intersubjective sense, the world begins. The first sentence concerning the "*further consequence*, an "empathizing" of definite contents belonging to the "*higher psychic sphere*" arises … Higher psychic occurrences, diverse as they are … I can understand associatively," means that to an extent, non-verbal communication is the basis for verbal communications and conceptual intentionality.

Secondly, human beings are sufficiently similar to understand each other and their world of meaningful objects, due to the invariant a priori of intentionality and the regularity of intentional relations between all types of co-constituted objectivity. In a different wording, the sense seems similar to "I am a human being, I hold nothing human strange to me," a panhuman view (Terence, 1987, *Heauton Timorumenos*). The passage above is confirmation that there is interconnection between empathy, Objectivity, intersubjectivity and world. There is equivalence between a transcendental phenomenology of the co-constitution of

the "*intersubjective* world … in respect of its Object for everyone", (1977a, §43, p 91) and in relation to "so-called "empathy"", (p 92).

Husserl concluded that presentation is the intentional form to which all objectivity and conceptual intentionality must conform because "objective unity acquires sense and being for me through the medium of *presentations*", (§55, p 126). Intersubjectivity is necessary for a world, "in the sense of *a community of men* and in that of *man* … there is implicit a *mutual being for one another*, which entails an *Objectivating equalization* of my existence with that of all others", (§56, p 129). In other words, all moments of the whole of intersubjective meaningfulness are ontologically necessary.

§45 Conclusion

When Husserl reduced the everyday natural world to the own world, he reduced to a whole comprised of the interpretation of the form of empathic presentation with respect to the manifold of perspectives that can be occupied. He believed that the own world could not be reduced any further. In conclusion, the moments of the whole are necessary and universal conditions for the possibility of the senses self, other, Objectivity and shared world. The absolute consciousness or pure 'Ego' co-constitutes all types of Objective givenness. This can be understood as the ego containing intersubjectivity, through and through. As section 40 above, on the reduction to the felt-senses of the own world showed, there is a genuine attention to co-empathy and intersubjectivity in the *Fifth Meditation*. Understanding empathic presentation is a complex task concerning others who are able to occupy a manifold of perspectives on the same cultural object, and discern shades of difference and elisions of senses of specific types.

The order of Husserl's argument is altered below, by reformulating it in a simpler manner concerning specific inter-relations, constancies and differences between the phenomena. The following statements about inter-relations between perceptual and non-perceptual senses are not voiced in the first person nor do they form an explicit conditional transcendental argument. They are 'transcendental propositions' of an oblique sort. The research questions are 'what are co-empathy and intersubjectivity?' and 'what resides in intersubjectivity and Objectivity?' Senses appear as understood from different perspectives on the same referent. The conditions for Objectivity and intersubjectivity include empathic presentation and are defined below.

There is one part of the elucidation of intentional implication that comprises the sense of the other. A second part of the elucidation concerns the further consequence for all forms of higher Objectivity. A third part concerns the co-consti-

tution of the world as 'inter-perspectivity'. Specific assertions concerning the apperceived self are numbered AS1 to AS7, the empathised other, EO1 to EO5, then there is the Objectivity in the world, OW1 to OW4. Where "world" means a complex whole of inter-related persons, their intentionalities and the cultural objects of interest. Please permit a brief overview:

AS1 The self is empathic, or better co-empathic, in being able to share Objective sense in the world in a co-intentional way.

AS2 The physical body is intersubjective in that it expresses affective and intellectual participation in meaning non-verbally.

AS3 The most fundamental perceptual sphere contains the sense of self as a living bodiliness as well as the visual perceptions of the body of others.

AS4 The self maintains its identity. It is Identical with itself and with respect to others who occupy a separate place There. Self is cohesive throughout and contains its own sense. Although it also carries the first-ever sense of otherness and retained senses of specific others (and may hold beliefs about general others).

AS5 The self-Here is one perspective in that it is 'a window on the world' metaphorically, along with the other-There. It has verifiable and potentially verifiable perspectives on cultural objects in the world.

AS6 The *Körper* of the other is visible to self. Speech and thought are predicated on the prior achievement of mutual awareness and mutual referencing at a non-verbal co-empathic and intersubjective level.

AS7 The mutual cultural object is 'visible' to self and other.

EO1 The other appears non-verbally as having an expressive body. Others have their perspective on mutual cultural objects prior to speech. What this means is that co-empathy is at work in donating the meaning of the other's body. Despite self being involved in the co-constitution and donation of *Leib* senses to other *Körper*, these senses are always associated with the *Körperen* of others and are experienced as belonging to them. (This is an extension of AS2 and AS6 above).

EO2 It is further entailed that the first-ever sense of another human being is always quasi-present to self.

EO3 The other *Körper* is expressive of the sense of the other as a living body who is another self with its own perspective.

EO4 The body of the other has a basic similarity with the body of self (an extension of AS2 above).

EO5 Throughout experience, the co-empathised other remains other and There, as a pole of givenness (not self Here). The other is understood as another living body with a sense that is up-dated through vicarious verification, by virtue of life experience in the family, culture and society.

OW1 Then because of EO5, the other self is proven as co-empathic and co-intentional.

OW2 Then the perspective of the other person quasi-appears for self with respect to the mutual cultural object: All selves co-empathise that all others are co-empathising the same cultural object. There is the possibility of understanding how they might be co-empathising that object with the other (an extension of AS1).

OW3 Then the entailments of self, other and intersubjectivity are mutuality of perspective with respect to cultural objects. Intersubjectivity is 'inter-perspectivity' in that mutual awareness and referencing are necessities of any meaningful communication (an extension of OW2).

OW4 Then overall there is one fundamental meaningful world of intersubjective perspectives because of the interlacing of self, other, object and intentionalities between them.

The statements above need to be expressed in a form that relates co-empathy to its object for the conclusion to be complete. Following Eduard Marbach (1993, pp 91–92, p 130–131; 2000, pp 80–84), the empathic presentation creates the 'quasi-presence' or 'mediated presence' of the other's consciousness, for we never have a first-hand experience of other-consciousness, as those others experience it. The impressions that we do have of other persons are co-intentional or co-empathic. Following Husserl, an overlapping of senses takes place in providing the phenomena of meaning. In conclusion, co-empathy understands the other's body as expressing the consciousness of the other because of human being.

Marbach has set a standard for notation in phenomenological interpretation of intentionality. The way Marbach would express picturing presentation (the

cousin of empathy) is "I while grounded in the bodily presentation of my actual surroundings s am representing x by means of representing a neutralized perceiving of x as it appears in the picture y that I perceive", (1993, p 130). The semiotic connection is between the picture that is perceived that depicts or indicates an x; and the x itself that is not present 'in person' but pictorially represented. The point is that "the *objective identity* of the represented *x itself* is split into the *double object* of the *pictorial* object ... and the x itself qua depicted object", (Ibid). Co-empathy is a more complex version of the same.

In brief and in the first person, co-empathy involves the following: I, while grounded in the bodily perception of my actual surroundings, am co-empathically presentiating the perspective of the other, on the same cultural object as myself, by means of presentiating a series of associations of the cultural object as it would appear from the perspective of the other, that I co-empathise from their perceptual presence to me.

Or again, in more detail: Co-empathy may be defined as an intentionality in which I, a conscious separate person, whilst visually perceiving the other's physical body in my current perceptual horizon, am grounded in the sense of my own living body, *Leib*, and consciousness. My consciousness automatically re-constitutes the sense of the never fulfilled empathy of my first-ever lived sense of another human being—when I perceive another human body. The sense of the other is a presentation that occurs through a series of well-habituated associations, imaginative transposals and anticipations that are vicariously validated in cultural life through time. This is because the consciousness of the other, whilst producing cohesive meaningful worlds, is based on the repetition and vicarious verification of previous senses of the accurately understood behaviour of others. Thus, my experience that the other is somewhat like me, alive and in a meaningful world with me, is co-constituted through a number of pairings by association that are overlappings of empathised senses. Therefore, in a way that promotes belief, my consciousness and my sense of unity are appresented to others with the appropriate perspectival senses in the co-empathic presentation of their perspective on any cultural object. Consciousness automatically adds these senses. We each have an automatic recognition that we are both human beings because we both have human bodies. So, we find ourselves in a shared, believable and coherent meaningful world.

There are further important consequences to Husserl's analysis. Intersubjectivity concerns how common objects appear for more than one person. Meaning and human relationships are more complicated than just what appears to perception.

§46 The inter-relation of co-empathy, Objectivity, intersubjectivity and world

Co-empathy is not just the learned appreciation of the sense of the other and their perspective. It has further ramifications for the consideration of the conditions for the possibility of intersubjectivity and Objectivity in the world where "world" means a meaningful whole cultural context. Let us take stock of what intersubjectivity means in relation to co-empathy.

The conditions for intersubjectivity and the co-constitution of the world are co-occurring. Living in a meaningful world of common sense is both the means of verification and the object analysed. Husserl's position is often called "transcendental intersubjectivity" but it could well be called a phenomenology of the conditions for the occurrence of a meaningful world. The following are theses that can be explicitly stated about the Co-constitution of a meaningful World and are numbered CW1 to CW4. It also has to be noted that "world" is co-extensive with "intersubjectivity" and the transcendence of consciousness to all other consciousness. "What concerns us is … *an essential structure, which is part of the all-embracing constitution* in which the transcendental ego, as constituting an Objective world, lives his life", (Husserl, 1977a, §44, p 93–4). The following four conclusions can be drawn concerning what was claimed.

CW1. Objectivity for all exists because there is an intentional implication between two or more people and this means that self and other are enjoined in understanding all objects that appear. Thus, empathic presentation serves as a medium for conscious communication. And.…

> … just as his animate bodily organism lies in my field of perception, so my animate organism lies in his field of perception and that, in general, he experiences me forthwith as an Other for him just as I experience him as *my* Other … Openly endless Nature itself then becomes a Nature that includes an open plurality of men (conceived more generally: animalia), distributed one knows not how in infinite space, as subjects of possible intercommunion.

> §56, p 130.

When stated in the form of a transcendental statement expressed in the first person, the passage above can be expressed as two propositions: First, '*I co-empathise that others also understand a cultural object, and when I do that, I know that their view of it differs to mine*'. And second, '*more generally, anyone understands a cultural object in relation to others who understand it differently because of their differ-*

ent positions in culture, society and history'. The views of others are co-empathically and reciprocally presentiated with one's own. What this means is that we are each potentially capable of acknowledging the views of others, even if we do not agree with them.

Another way of expressing these propositions is to claim that mutual understanding has the condition of possibility that self and other recognise each other as fundamentally human: "The first thing constituted in the form of community, and the *foundation for all other intersubjectively common things*, is the *commonness of Nature*, along with that of the *Other's organism and his psychophysical Ego*, as paired with *my own psychophysical Ego*", (§55, p 120). The outcome is that different perspectives, including those of others, are recognisable as belonging to the same cultural object. Indeed, the perspectives of others are continually added throughout life.

CW2. Mutuality and reciprocity exist. The fundamental situation of co-empathy is a two-way universal, necessary and symmetrical communion—within Husserl's model. There is mutuality and a shared nature. "In the appresented other ego the synthetic systems are the same", (p 123). What this means is that the condition for cultural experience is the relation of consciousness in the world. Fundamentally, there is One World in Husserl's perspective for he stated that even two cultures that do not know each other belong to the same commonality of intersubjective world that he has been analysing: it is a "pure absurdity" that they inhabit different spaces and times for his theoretical view (§60, p 140). What he meant was that for all cultural worlds there are shared appresentations of cultural senses to their objects, at a pre-reflexive level. It is underpinned by the retained senses, self and other, their differences and inter-relationship.

In a transcendental formulation, '*any other person's views are potentially capable of being co-empathised*'. Or more generally still, '*any two person's views are capable of being co-empathised, simultaneously or sequentially*'. Two or more views are coordinated and jointly referenced. Different views can be amalgamated and kept separate.

Co-empathy is a condition of possibility for Objectivity: The "identity-sense of "my" primordial Nature and the presentiated other primordial Nature is necessarily produced by the appresentation and the unity that it … necessarily has by virtue of which an Other and … his concrete ego are there for me in the first place", (§55, p 124). The givenness of the other and their perspective occurs according to a certain manner of concluding that distinguishes content from the

form of intentionality and objects that comprise the meaningful situation. Husserl was preoccupied with the inter-relation of consciousness and the world.

CW3. All persons participate in the world, co-constituting its meanings. Consciousness and Objectivity are intersubjective. There is the possibility of taking up many perspectives. But the manifold is underpinned by "the actual perceptions and the modes of givenness actualized therein … are not the same; rather the objects perceived are precisely those from there, and as they are perceivable from there", (p 123). Again, to sum up the above sense in transcendental language: '*Any one person's view of a cultural object or the world is a moment, with respect to the views of others*'. It follows that the '*absolute whole of perspectives is comprised of necessary and universal moments gained by reasoning about the conditions of compossibility and incompossibility*'.

CW4. Finally, the research question concerning the co-constitution of the world and co-empathy's role in it, is addressed. An early reporting of the result was that the "*community of monads …* (in its communalized intentionality) constitutes the *one identical world*", (§49, p 107). Husserl concluded that people are enjoined in an all-embracing mutuality and intermixing that occurs through their common psychophysical 'Nature'.

Put in a transcendental form and in the negative: '*All individual views are inadequate for understanding the world and all its contents across time, place and difference in perspective*'. Such inadequacy emphasises points CW1, CW2 and CW3 above. What is important is to realise that '*co-empathising involves understanding the perspectives of others, visually, intellectually and emotionally, for instance. The commonality of our being enables us to inhabit the shared human world*'. His final explicit transcendental proposition can be summed up as '*if consciousness is fundamentally co-empathic, then intersubjectively accessible Objectivities and the manifold of real cultural instances and perspectives exist because of the primacy of co-empathy and intersubjectivity*'. The common form of knowing and the commonality of our bodily and intersubjective 'Nature' enable us to inhabit the shared human world. There is one whole of co-consciousness in this idealised view (§38, p 77, §49, p 107–8, §55, p 121). Accordingly, concepts are intersubjective, they are "cultural predicates" of a community (2001, App 28, p 544).

The mystery of communal meaning is over. There is the inter-relatedness of the world-whole: "*every* Natural Object experienced or experienceable by me in the lower stratum receives an appresentational stratum (though by no means one

that becomes explicitly intuited) a stratum united in an identifying synthesis with the stratum given to me in the mode of primordial originality: the same natural Object in its possible modes of givenness to the other Ego", (1977a, §55, p 125). The base is a temporal consideration for "the temporal community of the constitutively interrelated monads is indissoluble, because it is tied up essentially with the constitution of *a world and a world of time*", (p 128).

In everyday experience, each person has an illusion of separation from others because of their bodily separation from each other and objects in the world. This separation is revealed to be a false alienation because really there is connection between people. Husserl's last work, *The Crisis* repeated the conclusions of the *Cartesian Meditations*. Nothing new was added that was not already present in 1929 in *Cartesian Meditations*.

§47 Close

A number of eidetically necessary, common human capabilities are concluded on, which, it is alleged, must be occurring in order for us to experience meaning and others in an intersubjective context, in any way. What are interpreted are ideal conditions of intentionality that must be at work for all persons. The argument above shows that meaning is public and arrives with the other. Clearly, Husserl's stance was (1) post-positivist and that something like it is required the human sciences for therapy, and (2), the application of natural science must be monitored in order for therapy to attend to meaning. Husserl concluded that the "total world-view of modern man, in the second half of the nineteenth century, let itself be determined by the positive sciences and be blinded by the "prosperity" they produced, meant an indifferent turning-away from the questions which are decisive for a genuine humanity", (1970b, §2, p 6). And the same for therapy, to prevent it focusing excessively on concerns other than meaning, relationship, intentionality and intersubjectivity.

Co-empathising another person involves interpreting and representing them as having some intentional relation to an object. Non-verbally, the mere visual and spoken presence of the other is sufficiently expressive in an unclear, suggestive manner, to show imprecisely the nature of the relation of the person to oneself, to another and to him- or herself. Speech can also be unclear. The precise sense of what clients are referring to may need to be discussed with them in order to find it.

To repeat, there is a reciprocal and mutual relationship between self and other. So that all that applies for self to the other, applies for other to self. Husserl's analysis is an advance over the understanding of other consciousness and the

intentionality of others by Freud and psychodynamic therapy. Specifically, phenomenology is the explicit inclusion of the perspective of the other that qualifies Husserl's analysis as better than Freud's. It attends to lived senses. The psychological importance of the transcendental propositions is that developmentally, when infants are old enough to co-empathise, not only do they meta-represent their carers but they also enter the meaningful world.

The propositions CW1 to CW4 can be used as a guide to understand psychological events. What is created is a means of justifying the practice of psychotherapy that limits its theorising through an a priori account of meaningfulness, co-empathy and intersubjectivity. Co-empathy is an integral part of intersubjectivity and co-relates the perspective of selves to others, in relation to the object of mutual understanding in the same meaningful world. Husserl recognised that his stance of one fundamental world, and the work of co-empathy in presenting the perspectives of others to selves, lead to an all-embracing co-empathy within intersubjectivity that could be called intersubjective intentionality. Intersubjectivity, intentional awareness between subjects, is the means of communication, an intersubjective implication of intentionality between all persons. This understanding is asserted as a better means of understanding meaning and human relating than transference, counter-transference and unconscious communication.

Fundamentally, Husserl claimed that intentionalities create the sense that others are understandable and in a meaningful shared world with oneself. What we understand and experience of the shared world of meaning is conscious to us second-hand, through empathy. This is why there are limits to understanding the perspectives of others. Sometimes therapists understand and sometimes they do not or cannot.

All meaning is intersubjective. It lies between persons. Intersubjectivity is the watchword for public meaning. The type of answer offered is a pure, a priori or theoretical analysis. Husserl's answer to this is taken as a blueprint for understanding psychological life. There are a potentially infinite variety of unique combinations that contribute to the passage of a human life so that it is impossible to specify with certainty what causes what in the natural sense. However, it is possible to specify something ubiquitous and specific about the openness of belief in senses, values and meaning towards which people strive.

In sum, the phenomenon of specific, verbal and non-verbal expressive meaning of the other is constituted according to specific gestures of their body that make sense because of the inter-relation of the phenomena above. The final result is a whole-world and intersubjective intentional implication within it. The ""empathising" of definite contents belonging to the "*higher psychic sphere*" arises.

Such contents too are indicated somatically and in the conduct of the organism toward the outside world—for example: as the conduct of someone who is angry or cheerful", (Husserl, 1977a, §54, p 120). The immediate understanding of other persons and their perspective are the phenomena of co-empathy: "mentally representing another mind's point of view in an activity of empathy (*Einfühlung*) … for example, a perception that someone else has of the x that I see", (Marbach, 1993, p 91). Common objects that appear perceptually are a telling case for all types of Objectivity including the higher intentional forms of speech, writing, thought and reasoning.

Much more complex meanings and discourses obey the inter-relations that have been identified. The principles for understanding politics, religion and literature show the place of co-empathy filling in the gaps to make sense of the signifiers provided. In conclusion, "eidetic a priori analysis" is a theoretical account of human nature generally. Husserl urged eidetic variation as a *first hand* experiencing of eidetic compossibility and incompossibility about synthetic apriori. For him, rationality rests on the elucidation of the connections between interpreted intentionalities in relation to specific mental objects in specific contexts. Because of the generality of Husserl's stance, it is difficult to express his aims for this part of his project in anything but the most abstract language. Furthermore, "not all singly possible types are *compossible*, and not all compossible ones are compossible in just any order" refers to thinking about variants (Husserl, 1977a, §36, p 74) and how they fit together across an expanse of time, in a developmental view. Generally, it is implied that what is possible at any current moment is a function of what has been possible previously, although there may be some exceptions to this rule. What this means is that Husserl claimed that the theoretically understood expanse of imagined possibility is the ground for understanding specific formations, in the same way that pure geometry refers to the limited set of real specific shapes. Understanding the perspective of a real other person requires a theoretical statement about the views of others with respect to a cultural object.

In the next three chapters, the psychodynamic account of transference, counter-transference and unconscious communication will be reinterpreted as intersubjective intentional implication because of an immersion in the world where social learning delivers what others understand.

PART IV

A Husserlian critique of Freud

This part employs the ideal theory-creating position of phenomenology to become clearer about real psychosocial problems, tasks and the psychosocial skills of practice. This part completes the attention to Freud and psychodynamics. It begins an alternative account of psychotherapy according to Husserl.

Part five broadens the theoretical view to develop hermeneutics through considering the early work of another phenomenological philosopher, Martin Heidegger.

When criticising Freud, the baby will not be thrown out with the bath water. There is the need to understand what clients and therapists bring to meetings. Below, comments are made on the consequences of chapter 10 with respect to therapy. One aim is to challenge the interpretations of psychodynamics about unconscious objects and intentionalities. What is asserted is the usefulness of looking at human relationships and meaning from a perspective that acknowledges that these most basic experiences require specific types of interpretation. It is important to realise from what stance events are interpreted to mean something. Furthermore, therapists should have a self-reflexive account of how they make such interpretations. They need explicit justifications in order to be accountable to clients, colleagues and the public. A great deal of the remainder of this work is argument about better or worse positions from which to identify and make sense of key issues. An argument is forwarded to support the ability to understand and work with emotions and relationships by categorising the 'causes' of emotions. The ultimate aim is to integrate psychodynamics and cognitive behavioural therapy by attending to the basics of any relationship. It is argued that emotions of a 'primary' sort are those that are immediately felt. The objects of concern expressed in therapy are usually about attachment issues from the past that can be aided or impeded by the state of the current therapeutic relationship.

11

Introducing the consequences for interpretation and practice

Aim: The aim of this chapter is to take the ideal definitions of the last chapter and introduce them to the central problems of practice and explain how they clarify talk and action in therapy.

This chapter comments on what the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation* reveals as freedoms and constraints due to co-empathy and intersubjectivity. The comments below are an overview. A more detailed appraisal of Freud from the position of Husserl is provided in the next two chapters. The problems are laid out in chapter 12 and answers are supplied in chapter 13. The sequence of tackling issues below is to work from the centrality of shared meaning, through to practice and what it means to meet clients. An introduction to psychological hermeneutics is begun that is extended in the next part. No sustained criticisms of current positions on co-empathy, intersubjectivity and associated topics will be made. With respect to hermeneutics, a first point to note is that the theoretical beliefs create an interpretation and that needs to be understood. In the remainder of this work, the ideal interpretative ideas of co-empathy and intersubjectivity are shaped in to a hermeneutics.

A number of criticisms of Husserl's position could be made at this point but that has been judged too hasty. What needs to happen first is that the positive aspects of what Husserl was trying to achieve are noted, then hermeneutics is defined. So it is not until chapter 16 that hermeneutics will be used to criticise the position of Husserl. It has to be noted that Husserl was unhappy with *Meditations* a short time after sending it to the translators (Welton, 2000, p 127). Kern tells us that Husserl thought that his approach of "the external presentation of oneself … as situated in external space" was "too constructive", (Husserl 1973b, p 254, fn 3, OWW 1914 to 1915, cited in Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p

155). It would take further research to present and discuss the other approaches that Husserl had.

§48 Towards a psychological hermeneutics

In order to stay focused, first there should be a brief reminder that the research question is a qualitative analysis of how there is a human world and how we experience people in it. In answering this question it is never in doubt that there is a real world of others and that consciousness is related towards people, ideas and things in many ways. For the purposes of this work what is at stake are understanding real people and that means understanding developmental processes across the lifespan though spending time with them. What justifies Husserl's interpretation is being able to attend to matters of common interest. His ideas of intentionality in social context become communalisation of meaning and practice. Not only are there links of intentionalities of different sorts between objects for one person. There are also links between persons in all cultural worlds and all epochs. Shared meanings, beliefs and values are the major phenomena of the human sciences. Even in dispute and conflict there is a form of co-operation about what matters are in dispute. The term "world" can be explained as a shared context, a frame of understanding. Where conflict and dis-agreement arise is where there is a lack of common cultural senses and practices towards the same cultural objects. Let us take these thoughts to the region of therapy.

From the vantage point of chapter 10, what appears is that any therapist assumes a hermeneutic strategy that structures interactions with clients, its ABCs. He or she assumes:

A. *How consciousness works and what role it has.*

• The answer proffered is that consciousness provides meaning and enables the individual to be part of a larger whole of contemporary, historically-influenced and future-oriented, cultural life. What appears is a cognised other to a cognised self in a cognised world.

B. *How one person's consciousness relates to other consciousness in general.*

• The answer is that co-empathy achieves the relationship of psychological connection and the sharing of meaning, belief and social convention.

C. *How meaning exists in relation to more than one person.*

• The answer is that intersubjectivity co-occurs with all meaning. What this means is that meaning lies between persons. Co-empathy is an inherent part of intersubjectivity.

These ABC relations need to be made explicit in studying the schools of therapy or the ways in which clients develop and maintain problems. From such a position, it becomes possible to assert criticisms and develop interventions based on these ideas. Practice, supervision and research are achieved through having a theoretical model that guides activities. Theory is about everyday psychological life. Consequently, the abstract qualities and generalities of theory should not be split away from the objects and contexts that they are about. Meaning, emotions and styles of relationship between people are not material occurrences and need to be considered in a way that shows their proper substance.

The promise of a theory that results from a priori conceptual analysis is that it could help co-ordinate the disparate traditions of theory, practice, supervision and research. But without justified definitions, the ideas of co-empathy and intersubjectivity could not be used. How one consciousness works is through a manner of intentionality that relates a sense to a referent. Two or more instances of consciousness overlap their senses about referents. A theory should not be confused with its conscious phenomenon, however difficult it is to make that distinction. On the one hand, if a theory is not about a phenomenon, then psychological help could only ensue in a random manner. On the other hand, accurate representations of phenomena promote effective theory, practice, clinical reasoning, supervision and research. After chapter 10, there is conformity between what is interpreted and the manner of making the interpretation. The ideas of co-empathy and intersubjectivity support two-person psychological thinking that focuses on inter-relationship.

The phenomenological way of making sense of any outcome is to interpret a complex outcome as being due to a mixture of *explicit* and *implicit* or tacit understanding (Husserl, 1977a, §42, p 90, Polanyi, 1983, Argyris and Schön, 1974, Schön, 1983). Any type of complex action is not merely born of intellectual knowledge. Many abilities are about engaging tacit understanding in relation to a sought-after outcome. Some abilities may need to be made explicit, but making them so might decrease their competent achievement. It is a truism that one can show skill competently and fluently without being observed. But when one is observed, the observation itself interrupts the fluency of action. Similarly, for cli-

ents, what appears is a seamless way of experiencing others, themselves and the world and the discussions achieve the differentiation and change of sense.

Husserl's concepts refer to everyday experience. These concepts emphasise certain aspects as relevant. When co-empathy is defined as attaining the perspective of others, it brings together the cognitive and affective aspects of being human through the uniting perspective of the effect of socialisation through time. Co-empathy is more apt than just "empathy" because both people contribute simultaneously. Co-empathy could be intellectual, understanding affect or having affect for another. In other words, to be co-empathic means learning the lesson of communicative ability and socialisation with others. Co-empathy acknowledges the responsiveness that is at the heart of all relating. The consequence of these distinctions is to realise that the universe of psychological meaning occurs entirely through 'second hand,' co-empathised means. The personal experience of the universe of all that is believed or not, is socially learned. Culture is mediated through co-empathic experiences. All selves are open in this way as windows onto a common transpersonal world. There are complex ways in which we understand the first- and second-hand experiences of others.

It is easiest understood in two-person relationships. Previous co-empathic experience drives anticipations of how other people will relate to self. Such anticipations are related to past events. Powerful past experiences have the strength to influence current meetings. If one imagines what it would be like to meet another and feels something in relation to imagining, then the emotions felt are conscious and for some people such a response is sufficient evidence to judge their actions in the real world. There are many writers who have got close to understanding human relationships in terms of how co-empathy works. It is not possible to provide a scholarly overview of all their contributions but a notable similarity has been called the interpersonal view in couples therapy (Laing, Phillipson and Lee, 1966).

Intellectual understanding of other people achieves logical comprehension of what they say or do. Accurate intellectual understanding may well be built on accurate and emotional and social understanding. Although affect and the intellect can fit together, they also can be estranged from each other and be in opposition, so that emotions can push out rational thought and vice versa. Emotionally, it is possible to tune in to what others feel and to tune it out (as in the case of learning to be a torturer). Emotions are an expression of the relationship often at that moment. Sometimes they are present but refer to some past event. This gives the impression that they are fixed but according to phenomenology they only appear when the object comes to mind and the affect becomes conscious. Co-

empathy, whether accurate or not, is the result of both parties understanding each other at various levels, whether emotional and intellectual, through conjecture or imagination.

However, co-empathy is neither action nor reaction in behaviour or speech. Nor does co-empathy automatically include the sharing of affect, nor mean having concern or feeling the distress of others. Co-empathy, as understanding the perspective of others, does not mean that any observable or predictable outcome will follow because there is no necessitated cause as there is in the material sphere. To have accurate understanding of another's distress can occur, without being followed by helpful actions.

Intersubjectivity is the sharing of types of awareness between people. To make the theory more tangible is to emphasise how Husserl was right in identifying the most general aspects of how people live together. One way of emphasising this being-together would be to rename all aspects of the shared life as co-feeling, co-relating, co-thinking and such like.

When understood psychologically, intersubjectivity is a basic being open to, and part of, reciprocal influences in a two-way inter-connection. This is the psychological consequence of statements such as understanding another through being "related to Objectivities, ones to which we too are related", (Husserl, 1989b, §51, p 201), "interpreting the facial expressions, gestures, and spoken words as intimations of personal life," (p 202), and "one must first learn to see in the right way" in the sense of interpreting intentionality (Husserl, 1977b, §28, p 122). Intersubjectivity is part of all actual instances of people being-together in families, groups, institutions, cultures and societies. It is being at work and at play, in friendship and rivalry, parenting and therapy (Stern, 1977, 1985, 1995, 1998).

What co-empathy and intersubjectivity explain is how people of radically different backgrounds can understand each other through appreciating their commonality rather than counting their differences. What is referred to by co-empathy and intersubjectivity is inter-dependence between human beings. What is good are co-operation, negotiation and agreement. What co-empathy and intersubjectivity show as basic ideas can be put to work in a number of ways. First is the necessity of having psychological theories that inter-relate self and other for understanding and practising psychosocial skills. The first point to note is the ubiquity of co-empathy and intersubjectivity. There is a huge array of phenomena indicated by the ideas of co-empathy and intersubjectivity in relation to the meanings that abound in psychological the world. The answer is that any two or more people can understand others and their perspectives, and relate them to the

same object. The point is that all forms of meaning over and above perception and its duration are capable of being understood in public. When meaning is treated properly, it is understood as co-existing relating in culture, society and history.

But in using these ideas to guide practice, there is a major problem in recommending how to be in relation to clients. Specifically, the problem is one of an infinite set of possible positions that clients can occupy. It is not possible to spell out in detail all the requirements that a therapist should consider to meet the needs of clients. Therefore, it is impossible to provide a sufficient number of examples to cover all aspects of ubiquitous phenomena. Ultimately, it is down to the individual to get and maintain their own competence. Like learning to ride a bicycle or swim, competent achievement of skills can be achieved. All that can be done theoretically is to identify the parts. It is then up to each practitioners to make them happen with clients.

Three consequences of understanding intersubjectivity are that: (1) Intentional objects and interpreted processes are shared and involve mutual participation. (2) The therapists' conclusions, recommendations and reasoning need to be explained to clients. (3) It becomes possible to account for two or more perspectives in intersubjective situations. The way that Husserl's interpretation of the human situation helps is that it understands how awareness of different types between people become entrained in social interaction. From this view, so much of life is shared and communication is passing-on personal experience in making the private public.

§49 A counterpoint with behaviourism

This section compares the two-person co-empathic and intersubjective view with a one-person minimalist one. Experimental psychology and behaviourism assume that (1) classical conditioning supported by (2) negative reinforcement together account for a great deal of what initiates and maintains problems (Walker, 1984, 1987). This view is not challenged and is supported as an important hypothesis that can be put to good use in identifying precise targets for change. What classical conditioning is seems to be different types of learning over a period of time leading to different states of sympathetic nervous system arousal. Often these are fear of something specific or an anxiety about an unknown future event. Although classical conditioning could feature the sense of disgust, shame, embarrassment or guilt. In the process of classical conditioning, the connections are from the past into the future or present. The fear felt in the present is used as evidence to avoid actions in the present or future.

The drawback of the behavioural interpretation is that it is a one-person psychology is a simplification. It is congruent in that it posits psychological 'causes' and does not jump to natural ones, see figure 6. However, the behavioural interpretation omits consideration of belief, meaning, value, desire, intention, temporal influences and many other meaningful factors. It does this to focus solely on classical conditioning and negative reinforcement. The behavioural 'causal' hypothesis is that classical conditioning is the learning of an association between an unpleasant emotion and a behaviour, context, mental object or action. This learning is maintained by negative reinforcement in the avoidance of behaviour that would break the problematic classical conditioning. Negative reinforcement supports and rewards classical conditioning in a variety of ways. At base negative reinforcement is any action or mental avoidance that promotes short-term parasympathetic relief in getting away from the sympathetic nervous system state of unpleasure. Negative reinforcement is the choice of temporary relief over the possibility of meeting and solving problems, actually experienced or anticipated, and gaining long-term relief.

↓   Means associated with through a variety of
      means.

```
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│                                 │
│           Stimulus              │
│                                 │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
        ↓         ↑
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│                                 │
│       Negative emotion          │
│                                 │
└─────────────────────────────────┘

             ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────┐      ┌──────────────────┐
│        Avoidance of             │  →   │  Psychological    │
│      negative emotion           │      │  problem          │
└─────────────────────────────────┘      └──────────────────┘
        ↓         ↑
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│                                 │
│       Temporary relief          │
│                                 │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
```

Figure 6—The behavioural interpretation of classical conditioning and
negative reinforcement.

Despite the clarity and usefulness of the above, what comes first is the overall
context of meaningfulness. The most fundamental means of justification is the
analysis of intentionality.

It is convenient to read pairing by association as the same as classical condi-
tioning, no matter what Husserl actually thought about Ivan Pavlov's work. The
point of classical conditioning and negative reinforcement is that these processes
can be identified and self-care actions produced that reduce both of these inten-
tional processes and have a strong possibility of creating lasting improvement.

What classical conditioning and negative reinforcement mean is that unpleasant, strong emotions must be born and avoidance of unpleasant emotion is never useful in the long run. In a wider view, avoidance is not just behavioural intentionality but could also be affective or about suppressing thoughts, memories or other experiences that are felt as unbearable. However, many intentionalities could be at work in producing negative affect in relation to an object, so maintaining the classical conditioning and negative reinforcement.

Clearly, the behavioural interpretation has no place for meaning or the detail of what happens for clients when they have classical conditioning and negative reinforcement. What behavioural theory does is focus on the cumulative effect of fearfulness because people condition themselves. This is like judging the whole of a relationship between two people by studying a single photograph of them. One-person formulations are acceptable when it is explicitly understood that they are a focus on the individual, only for the purposes of helping clients select personal aims and working towards them. On the contrary to a one-person psychology, intersubjectivity concerns the form of the whole that resides in all communal experience, shared meanings and human relationships. The meaning of intersubjectivity for the originator of the term was that it concerns how meaning appears for more than one person.

Where behaviourism falls short is that it has no connection to the public meaning of cultural objects and the world. The stimulus is about the current referent but what appears currently has its meaning because of past repetitions of, say, fear and avoidance. The unbearable negative emotion is only one sense or perspective about the referent. It bears no connection to the senses that others have or those the client could have. Accordingly, in the model of classical conditioning, there is an insufficient account of how belief and biopsychosocial causes initiate and maintain the pairing between the referent and the unbearable sense. In negative reinforcement the self-regulatory control setting is fixed on short-term rather than long-term. What drives avoidance is a decision that gets repeated, to rid oneself of the unbearable sense or the anticipation of such by avoiding, say, or otherwise not engaging the referent. The lack of theoretical detail becomes more evident in comparison to what goes right. When people overcome classical conditioning and negative reinforcement, they become able to be self-regulating, and bear negativity that often lessens or is extinguished. They become flexible and have a number of choices about how to respond rather than the repetitive response. Negative reinforcement has no function when there is nothing to avoid. So whilst the behavioural model has a pragmatic usefulness, it is only a snapshot of the whole. Many unique combinations of intentionality

occur for one person and between two or more people that feature classical conditioning and negative reinforcement.

§50 Psychosocial skills for practice

Let me make some basic points concerning practice in relation to talking and relating and the necessities of practice.

A general business-like manner of being helpful should make each session sufficiently positive, to pull clients through their resistance-anxiety and help them to self-disclose sufficiently. Therapists should be direct but not tactless and destructive. To ignore important topics is dishonest and robs clients of help, even if it is painful to provide an opinion that differs radically from what clients would want to hear or like to believe. A need to be relaxed, open and interested and communicate this interest is helpful and the basic stance for doing the work. Any sense of fear and deviations away from a basic therapeutic stance of wanting to know and help are cause for personal inquiry by therapists. Such inquiry should be achieved through reflection or supervision.

The major problems of making, sustaining and ending therapeutic relationships, concern how to disagree, negotiate and assert oneself without prematurely ending the relationship or altering its quality. Therapists can discuss the therapeutic relationship so that the sessions come to a close without hurt, withdrawal or anger by clients. The phenomenon of impasse in therapeutic relationships can be understood as being similar to the problems of attachment and intimate relationships where counter-hostility, cold anger, withdrawal of support and the grasping of previously unseen aspects of the other person—are some of the problems that demand resolution, if the relationship is to regain its equilibrium. Like secure relating, therapists should model and provide security so that clients can explore their thoughts and feelings without recrimination, as they bring with them a number of negative anticipations.

What co-empathy and intersubjectivity mean are that it is impossible to be without influence when with another person. Saying nothing and sitting still is a communication with an ambiguous meaning. Maybe it does convey listening and openness, if it only lasts a minute or two. Maybe it does not. However, to be present in the relationship and emotionally available to a degree, in terms of being supportive, has never lost a client yet and could be powerful in providing a corrective emotional experience conducive to secure relating. But this is not to condone self-disclosure from therapists.

What sets the degree of rapport of meetings is the bodiliness of clients and therapists and each responds with their own bodily presence. A great deal is com-

municated without saying a word. The co-empathic understanding of how one is being received occurs prior to speech. What this means is that it may well be useful for therapists explain themselves and their intentions and ask for comments and disagreement. What this does is that it sows the seed that it is permissable to discuss the therapeutic relationship. This identifies and promotes the skill of talking about relationships generally. What Husserl's view promotes is a basic attention to joint referencing, the sharing of attention and emotional sensitivity particularly, towards the client. Although these processes work both ways. The expression of consciousness is bodily and through speech. A major part of implicit cultural learning concerns what gestures, eye contact and breathing convey as a language. Metaphorically, client and therapist could be speaking in different languages.

What intersubjectivity means in practice is that client and therapist share an overall responsibility to be co-operative but therapists need to take the lead. Overall, each person anticipates what the other might do, and adjusts self to fit with the current response of the other. Both people express themselves in their style of speaking, dressing and moving around. On occasion, small clues show how a person sees self and show how they see the other with whom they are speaking.

§51 At least two views of any meaning

One of the most important things about the inter-relation of the views of self and other is that in most situations, the views of the other are somewhat accessible through emotion or the intellect. Husserl had noted this most explicitly in his lectures of 1925 as the difference between: "1) the description of the … persons or personal communities in question, purely as it is theirs intentionally, according to their belief; 2) on the other hand, the attitude taken by the one who is exploring this … his attitude toward the true existence of all these objects", (Husserl, 1977b, §45, p 174). The difference between the views of clients and those of therapists is that if therapists inaccurately construe the problems of clients, then their speech and actions will be ineffective. This is not to believe that clients have an accurate understanding of themselves or that therapists are always wrong. Rather, it shows the need for discussion and openness on both sides of the relationship.

It is likely that clients do not understand themselves and have harshly interpreted their experiences and contributory factors. It is part of the task of therapists to re-interpret what clients experience in a way that takes into account textbook definitions of the psychological disorders. But that should not lose the

unique detail of how an individual thinks, feels and relates. The same difference is replicated in the large scale of culture: "my culture and I are primordial, over and against every alien culture. For those who share a culture, an alien culture is accessible only by a kind of "experience of someone else," a kind of "empathy,"" (Husserl, 1977a, §58, p 134–5). This should be read in the same way as section 45 of *Phenomenological Psychology* cited above, where the *emic* and the *etic* are key ideas.

There is a primary hermeneutic difference in the emic and the etic. For communication and understanding to exist there should be a move away from the *already known* parameters of *etic* interpretation. There should be a move towards the parameters of inherent or *emic* interpretation. An *etic view is what one has already understood about another in advance of meeting with them*. It is contrasted with the *emic views clients have of themselves*. This attention to the other sharpens the difference between: "authentic [*eigentlich*] and inauthentic [*uneigentlich*] empathy" …

> … our inauthentic experience of the other … is actually presented in intuition [perception], while that which pertains to his soul is but emptily awakened … in mere association … the subject in an authentic experience of the other … lives as if [he were] within the other, in that he intuitionally transposes himself into the motivations of the other's situation (fulfilled appresentation). This authentic experience of the other is the foundation for a consideration of the human being from the standpoint of the human sciences …
>
> Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p 165.

The implication for psychology and therapy is not to begin with a dispassionate natural scientific view but with a transposal into the shoes of the other, into their position for understanding the world. This means that clients and therapists understand the same event from at least two perspectives and that there will be negotiation about these views. Of course, therapists may not always be able to grasp the meanings of clients entirely and vice versa. But adequacy of empathising is possible through discussion. Theoretically-influenced manners of understanding can be so poor as to miss the perspective of clients and not account for the preference given to the views of therapists.

Insufficient understanding corrupts the mutual encounter through preferring theoretical illusions and delusions. Through Husserl's position, such tendencies can be identified and minimised. Yet there is no guarantee of accuracy. Etic and emic views interact and are part of the world as a whole. Accordingly, theory should not be held too tightly. What is important is creating achievable outcomes

with clients. Ideas that are accurate will be effective in producing good outcomes for clients. The corollary is also true: Inaccurate ideas are more likely to produce extra harm in addition to the pain that clients already have.

From the points above, the following remarks can be made concerning some preliminary conclusions for therapy. Practice is not about slotting clients into a pre-arranged view of the problem and techniques for helping them. Nor does this analysis mean lecturing clients or insisting they use a technical vocabulary. Talk and action begin in making psychological events understandable through open discussion. Despite the dense theoretical justifications of this work, therapists need to explain themselves and their interpretations in readily understandable ways.

§52 A single account of talk and action

The ideas of intentionality, co-empathy and intersubjectivity provide a single account of talk and action. Specifically, intentionality is the key. Human beings act, believe and are interested in what appears in their awareness. The compromise position between psychodynamics and cognitive behavioural therapy is that once the unconscious proper is dropped and a serious attention is provided to the therapeutic relationship, then the two become compatible. Specifically, both a theory of intersubjectivity and behaviourism are useful, each in its own way. Both can be expressed in terms of intentionality.

Husserl would have claimed that conscious communication between two persons is such that when A speaks, what is meant is immediately apparent because meaning is publicly accessible, but is constrained by social learning (given various qualifications). According to Husserl, what counts is being immersed in a common world—because of past learning—and thus being able to understand the referents of speech, emotion and non-verbal presence. The common sense of a culture provides the end-product: that A empathises B as B empathises A. It is easy to mis-understand ordinary situations nevermind complex ones. Mutual discussions of what each person's intentions are and checking with them, perhaps as frequently as every session, particularly at first, is necessary to avoid problems of mis-understanding due to insufficient communication. The phenomenon of any two people in intersubjectivity entails there being a meaningful world for them. No matter how little these people have in common. The culture includes traditions of thought and action. It teaches its participants the rules for speaking, listening and understanding in general. This is a whole situation that cannot be considered as comprised of independent parts, outside of meaning.

Lack of mutuality and reciprocity such as manipulation, violence, exploitation and being a hermit, do not get away from the influence of other people. The full extent of the influence of others is grasped in comparison to feral children who have never been socialised with other human beings. Such a comparison shows the full extent of what comes with human culture. Attempts at domination, exploitation and violence break cultural norms of implied conventions of ethical and acceptable behaviour. However, these events are still capable of being understood. The violent person destroys their links with others through attacking them. Exploitation, intransigence, dominance and the inability to accept differences are problematic. Ruthlessness, excessive self-interest and violence attack the connection between self and other. They concern the use of force or unilateral action without permission in a situation, rather than meeting the other with respect and an eye to making a fair deal. To put the same idea forward with a different wording, co-empathy and intersubjectivity are a medium of influence for better or worse. Just understanding clients and being nice is not enough. Therapy is about meaning and relationships that lead to action in an all-embracing sense. Meaning and relationships of all kinds are dependent, abstract senses about composite intentional objects and interpretable composite intentionalities. Such senses are presentiated and related to perceptual objects in various ways. Therapy works through therapists co-empathising clients and using that living sense in understanding, reasoning, communicating and relating with them. The phenomena of the co-empathic sense and intersubjective behaviour of other persons are potentially understandable. Phenomena are observable and demonstrable. The way to interpret them is according to the careful consideration of their inherent nature, in their region of being.

The ideas of co-empathy and intersubjectivity show how Asperger's syndrome and autistic spectrum disorders are problematic. For instance, people with these problems are unable to understand the nuances of speech and non-verbal interaction as they apply to the necessities of being married and raising children, for instance. For them, non-verbal language is a puzzle. Co-empathy and intersubjectivity concern aiming at adequate communication of each other's conscious perspective and mental state. Self and other are inter-responsive until death parts them.

Intersubjectivity has been investigated through empirical means by the research on secure and insecure attachment. Attachment is often framed in terms of the dynamics of two-person relationships. In informal language, secure attachment is to be 'club-able'. Secure attachment means being co-operative and able to take the strain of relating in terms of being neither over-nor under-assertive and

having the wherewithal to be in close emotional proximity to others. A person who is able to relate securely is more likely to be ego constant across time and this implies the ability to have a resilient self-esteem that is based on an accurate understanding of self and other. Intersubjective ability of the secure sort concerns being aware, and responsive to the needs of self and others. By definition, the secure self is able to connect with others. The outcome of being able to maintain intimacy over a long period of time necessitates the ability to dispel frustrations and overcome the inevitable problems of everyday living.

Part of the consequence of the focus on intentionality is to increase the usage of interventions that create changes through employing the ideas of intentionality and hermeneutics as later chapters show. For instance, in post-traumatic stress disorder a change of perspective on the traumatic memory, or a change of context, can be sufficient to alter the memory and the way that it is stored and replayed by consciousness. This is a general case that could specifically be a concern to interpret depression, fear, an eating disorder and intersubjective events in the everyday life of clients. It could include the specifics of a self's reaction with respect to others; and another's reaction with respect to self. The question of how it has any sense demands an answer.

Without an understanding of how to theorise, there is no account of how to conclude from experiments. When researchers from the tradition of natural psychological science interpret co-empathy and intersubjectivity, they focus strongly on neurological development. From the view of chapter 10 the occurrence of intersubjective meaning is more a result of the overall inter-relationship rather than a mere offshoot of neurological development. To see meaning and intersubjectivity as caused by neurology is to mistreat the lived experience of meaning and relating. For instance, Kenneth Aitken and Colwyn Trevarthen (1997) are in broad agreement with Husserl's view of intersubjectivity in the strong sense, and neurological developments may well be relevant to an extent, they are not as relevant as clearly stating what co-empathy and intersubjectivity are and what they mean for understanding past and current interactions understood as meaningful and not neurological. Trevarthen has done much to push back the encroachment of neurology into child development (1979). The topics of co-empathy and intersubjectivity in child development are returned to in chapter 17.

§53 Close

A charge arises against therapy theories that focus exclusively on individually-oriented thinking, about what happens in one person's consciousness, because that omits the focus on conscious perspectives between people. Therapy works

through changing meanings and therapists understanding themselves in relation to clients. All enculturated individuals are within a pool of common, socially learned experiences, manners of expression and intentional significations of different sorts. This is the basic position of interpreting tacit processes in relation to tangible experiences. Therapists reflect on their own actions that effect the therapeutic relationship and understand that what is 'psychologically real' is an open question, not a fact that is the sole territory of client or therapist. Rather, there is joint action to understand topics and what happens in therapy. It moves through confusion, and the discarding of illusion and delusion, on the way to more accurate understanding. Psychological experiences begin with appearances. Even if two or more people saw the same thing happen, it does not follow that other persons will have understood it or will remember it the same. Clients also have the right to disagree with what therapists say and will exercise this right.

Co-empathy is part of intersubjectivity as it presents the viewpoint of the other to self and vice versa. To speak of them separately is artificial. Co-empathy is used to reflect the inter-active nature of the views of self and other. Empathy is a focus on one half of the relationship whereas co-empathy emphasises the overall connection. Below, the ideas of co-empathy and intersubjectivity are used to understand talk and action interventions with clients and how people develop across the lifespan. The ideals of co-empathy and intersubjectivity are used in relation to neonate, child and adult development. At any point on the lifespan, it is impossible to be outside co-empathy and intersubjectivity.

Clearly, theoretical assumption of interchangeability between self and other is not the case in the political world where people want more than their fair share of influence and will apply force and seduction to make their influence predominate over the views of others. Husserl's statement that there is "*a single community of monads*, the community of *all* co-existing monads", (1977a, §60, p 140), emphasises the theoretical collapsing of the difference between the ego and the intersubjective mass. It is not self-contradictory that there is a private window onto an intersubjective world. Politically, Husserl's theoretical position is an egalitarianism, a college of equals. This is an ideal for the purpose of philosophical analysis. It makes a datum from which to observe politics and power plays in the real world. What intersubjectivity as ground really means is that theoretically, people have more in common with each other than they have differences—irrespective of culture, age, gender, sexuality, race, class and religion.

However, for this work, the transcendental view is an interpretation based on the everyday and must be accepted as a timeless truth and is merely a theoretical tool. What appears to one consciousness is a dependent moment. This takes the

focus away from the individual and turns phenomenologists towards the worlds of others. There is a further tension because the own world is the "founding stratum" from which both the worldly senses of self, other and the Objective world arise (§44, p 96). The own world contains within itself permanent associations to otherness (§50, p 109) and hence is influenced by the whole of which it is a part. To re-invoke the meaning of the writings on contextuality (1989b, §§50–52), it is consciousness, in its situation of the culture and society that determines what is conceivable and inconceivable about its world. Indeed, hermeneutics and intersubjective behaviour co-occur. If one holds a concept or belief too strongly without adequate attention to the evidence, one is likely to see it when one should not. There will be times when therapists are mistaken. Such mistakes influence the therapeutic relationship because the participation of one person in a relationship can be a comment on the participation of the other.

Because details are required, what follows immediately is a signpost to the next two chapters. Some of the consequences of co-empathy and intersubjectivity are that ideas and feelings, one's own memories and associations, pop into the conscious mind in relation to sitting with clients and listening to them. This is not the result of unconscious communication at all but due to social learning and could be better referred to as *mediated* conscious communication. Chapter 13 will deal with this point in detail and offer a much fuller response.

Many writers have claimed an interest in co-empathy and intersubjectivity but few have actually investigated Husserl's contribution as a way of interpreting the fundamental lived experience of the relation between self, other and object. The major philosophical impetus has been to "not ask how experience arises … but what "resides" in it" in terms of interpreting how intentionality works with its objects of awareness, its conscious senses about cultural objects (Husserl, 1997a, §40, p 118). Theory is finding rational principles that are necessary and cannot be doubted. If concepts do not fit their region of experience, then theory will guide action inaccurately. Co-empathy and intersubjectivity refer to all forms of observable meaning, relations and exchanges between people. These terms mean that between subjectivities there is a constraint around contexts of time, place and social context. These constraints shape the expression of meaning and relationships.

12

Criticisms of Freud

Aim: This chapter shows Freud's legacy as a hermeneutic problem that could create practical problems.

The hermeneutic problem concerns how to make sense of Freud's contradictory uses of the word "unconscious". The ambiguity in its definition could create a form of practice that would have an impossible aim. Specifically, from the phenomenological perspective, it is impossible to know an intellectually presupposed object that has no relation to conscious and preconscious objects. The treatment given to Freud below is one that rejects the possibility of permanently "inadmissible" unconscious objects (1900a, p 615). The fine print of what he believed does not tally with conscious experience. Freud worsened the problem because he believed that the naturalistic attitude was a solution and the proper ground for psychotherapy (§58 below). A problem arose between chapter 7, part (F), of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a) and *The Unconscious* (1915e) that has never been solved.

Because Freud's argument is phrased in terms of verbal and non-verbal communication, this wording is used throughout. Chapter 10 is used to constrain any account of talking and relating not just Freud's. Right away, it has to be noted that Freud had no unified theory of the unconscious and so the appraisal below needs to be charitable. Argument is provided that concludes that unconscious objects in spoken and non-verbal communication, without relation to conscious ones, are unacceptable.

§54 Overview and definitions

There needs to be an awareness of the type of argument that counts and the positions occupied. The last chapter used the *Cartesian Meditations* to develop theory away from natural science. The way in which Freud is being appraised criticises some of his key definitions as unworkable yet appreciates the basic methods of free association, free-floating attention and the potential openness to meaning

and being aware of the therapeutic relationship. For Freud and Husserl, unconscious processes are fundamental to all forms of conscious self-knowledge, co-empathy and intersubjectivity. Firstly, let me explain what is being criticised and what is not, with reference to the picture of Freud painted by Lohser and Newton (1996, p 204): Therapists should not be aloof, overbearing or excessively formal but a quiet presence who are not over-serious yet warm, encouraging and present will help make the meetings accessible and at the same time business-like. The following introductory remarks form a statement of what is possible in talking therapy that explores memories, emotions and relationships from the past and makes sense of current events. In order to facilitate a cure, Freud wanted proper remembering in order to understand and then aid proper forgetting (1900a, p 578). An incomplete memory stays in a painful remembered relation whereas a completed one can be forgotten.

What is not being criticised is the usefulness and the potential therapeutic benefit of allowing clients to set their own agenda. Free association is a vehicle for such a process. Free association is an ideal and is really better described as free conversation featuring self-disclosure. What gets expressed is conscious affect and manifest meaning, within the real co-empathic and intersubjective relationship with the therapist. If there are silences, or the free associations dry up, there could be resistance to free associate or it could be a response by clients to the type of response that they feel they are getting from a therapist who is silent and listens.

On the therapist side of the intersubjective whole, what is happening is the major work of listening and making sense. The conscious senses are interpreted from what clients say and what they imply. Most often, such senses are not hard to find. Although sometimes it is difficult to get the precise nuance of the sense that clients mean. Indisputably, the major activity in talking therapy is making conscious the preconscious through speech. What can occur are new senses, thoughts, values, beliefs and hence—new relationships with self and others. Freud's original phrase, at the end of lecture 31 in *The New Introductory Lectures*, "*Wo Es war, soll Ich werden*" is capable of translation as "where It was, so shall I be," (1916). It takes on the meaning of *making the preconscious conscious* in order to understand and come to terms with what has happened, and help clients act differently, no longer ruled by their sensitivities and abilities to mis-understand themselves and others.

One of the therapeutic effects this has is to lessen self-criticism and increase self-acceptance. What clients actually say is probably better regarded as an attempt at free association, rather than ideal free association itself. When therapists choose to speak, they inevitably select and make sense of what has been said

to them. Often therapists interpret clients in the general case. For instance, what a specific example might say about clients in general. The referents that are problematic are a very wide range of topics. One major topic would be the defences that maintain a problem. For instance, once it is understood that the identity of a client is not co-extensive with their mood, then that in itself could be a breakthrough. If clients believe that the outcome of their psychological problems are anxiety and depression states, the there is a confusion between who they are as person and what they feel and think as a result of their problems. It is the working assumption of therapy to believe that there is a structure to psychological problems and that these create anxiety or depression or employ avoidance of strong emotion to stay safe.

What happens generally is that if clients trust their therapists enough, they will reward them with more negative material. None of this is the latent content of the unconscious, nor is it split off affect or the permanently unconscious representations of words or images. Clients may never speak the whole truth even when there is no time-limited therapy. What they speak is some of the truth.

When therapists speak, they need to be direct but not destructive and add to the problems of clients presenting themselves in talking therapy. The overall purpose of therapists is to provide clients with sufficient benefits to ensure they return for more sessions, until they no longer need to come. Therapists minimise resistance in providing help and show themselves as caring in a specific and understandable way. Even if this means explaining how they understand something and why they are taking such as a stance. This is called meta-commenting (Bateson, 1972, p 178). It is not just commenting on something. But commenting if it is acceptable to discuss something and being clear to clients if therapists are in doubt.

Because of the familiarity with the terms "conscious" and "unconscious," readers may assume they know the original senses that Freud claimed. But the details of what he wrote are problematic on close inspection. There are passages in Freud that could be understood as claiming that people have two minds: An epiphenomenal conscious mind, with which the ordinary citizen identifies; and the unconscious, a more obscure but potentially more observant part that has a more reliable but opaque means of access to the true intentions and meanings of others. The "preconscious" refers to objects that are capable of becoming conscious, although they may not be so currently.

The sort of intentional links that are interpretable need an example to make them concrete. A woman who is not able to remember a great deal of her childhood suddenly becomes anxious in a session. She does not know what she is anx-

ious about. According to the view of the therapist, there is nothing in the present that is threatening except the prospect of the client self-disclosing some new material. The links that appear are the current anxiety state without any conscious object of thought; the years of anxiety-provoking treatment by both parents; and the need to make sense of what is happening. The best explanation is that it is the fear of self-disclosing that causes anxiety in the here and now. This person can feel continually anxious for weeks and has felt so for many years after her own anxiety-provoking childhood. This is because intimacy is threatening for her. Her behaviour in general is avoiding others and can feel safe only if people are non-threatening. Even though she sees her therapist as trustworthy, the prospect of speaking about herself is anxiety provoking.

The phenomena that Freud mentioned in support of the unconscious were unconscious processes that exist independently of consciousness and provide it with end-products of conscious sense. Novel experience, spontaneous problem-solving and free association support the phenomenon of there being rational answers created by oneself, to problems that conscious rationality and effort had previously been unable to resolve. Spontaneous problem-solving is sometimes called the phenomenon of perseverance. It can occur overnight when one wakes up to find the answer to something one had been thinking about. Or it can occur when concentrating on something for a long time and, without thinking, the answer comes unbidden. This is not the unconscious in play but rather human creativity generally. Although sleep intervenes, consciousness is still at work in a sort of soliloquy about the day's past events and in thinking about the future.

Another type of this same species of phenomenon is when Freud defined the role of free association after meeting with Elisabeth von R. He recounted the key point in this respect as: "Her feelings were not clear to her … they were cut off from any free-associative connection of thought with the rest of the ideational content of her mind", (Freud, 1950a, p 165). The point of the unconscious for Freud, within one person or between two, is that the ego receives passively what has been created for it by processes that are outside conscious volition and decision. This point about the processes themselves is not in doubt. What is rejected is an unconscious language of thought and unconscious objects that have no relation to their conscious end-products. In the example of remembering, the pathogenic ideas have to be inferred, interpreted intellectually. Allegedly, these are the genuine cognitive states. Allegedly, they are never capable of identification by the person who has them. They are only inferable by another or the natural science means of interpretation. On the contrary to Freud, there is such a thing as new behaviour and experience that is not the result of direct learning or the repetition

of the past but of the genuine production of the new. These examples are classed here as the production of preconscious and then conscious objects.

This chapter progresses through six steps. First, what is being discussed are the connections between the registers of the conscious, preconscious and unconscious proper—in relation to understanding current events between clients and therapists. Freud underscored a strict separation between them. Second, the 1915 paper, *The Unconscious* made a different and more plausible definition of the difference between preconscious and conscious: It is more plausible because it is a good description of a large number of phenomena whereby a memory, an attempt or feeling that had once been conscious, goes out of consciousness, only to return at some later point. However, this pragmatic definition concerns something being unconscious in the descriptive sense only. It is not the unconscious proper.

Third, a problem arises about how to understand the relation between consciousness and unconscious communication. In *The Unconscious,* Freud clearly favoured speech as the definitive quality of consciousness: making something conscious is discussing it with another. Face to face discussions are the most appropriate mode of communication where both can see the other's non-verbal reactions. Freud did not use such a seating arrangement however, preferring one where clients lie on a couch in order to see a blank ceiling, and get no view of the non-verbal response of therapists. This seating arrangement heightens the ability to find memories and obscures the therapist's actual response in order to 'elicit transference'. Various choices about what Freud meant are discussed. Fourth, a first answer is sought in the necessity of analysing speech and non-verbal presence. Fifth, Freud made a jump, a "*metabasis eis allo genos,*" (Kant, 1993, p 338/B 486), to natural science. But this is held in abeyance and not considered a genuine answer to the problem of how to understand speech and non-verbal presence. Sixth, a further answer is entertained by assessing Freud according to Kant: Freud's answer is deemed intellectually illegitimate. Finally, there is a conclusion.

§55 An interpretation of clients and intersubjectivity

The reader has to persist with *The Unconscious* in order to grasp its major conclusion. The registers of the descriptive unconscious (the preconscious) and consciousness form the substantial difference that is defined in its Appendix C which is a reprint of a section from his earlier work *On Aphasia* (1891b). The difference between the conscious and the preconscious is the presence or absence of the conceptual intentionality of speech, in relation to retained memory and the active recollection of successfully remembering. The difference that Freud asserted was

that when there is no expression of the lost representations, the objects of repression, psychological problems ensue. The purpose of creative silence is drawing out resistance and transference that are caused by repression. Free association encourages representations of retained and recollected memories to rise to consciousness. Freud mentioned this a number of times. The first time was in *On Aphasia* (Ibid, pp 72–79) and the conclusion was repeated in later years. Namely, the curative power of speech is speaking the truth in order to re-experience the original trauma and alter its associated emotion (Freud, 1893h, p 35). Specifically, John Forrester explains that free association establishes the semantic connection between signifier and signified memory of the original context of sense and events that did not happen after the original trauma (1980, p 36). In 1915 Freud referred to his theory concerning repression, the splitting of representation and affect, and the recombinatory role of speech, in providing cure. An alleged splitting between affect and representation by trauma has occurred when the repressed representation returns, through linking up with another conscious representation (1915e, p 177). The manifest representation signifies the split off, latent repressed representation (an idea, a thought or memory that has had its original affect dislodged).

In overview of the findings in Appendix C, the "difference" between a "conscious and an unconscious presentation," *vorstellung*, is …

> … The two are not, as we supposed, different registrations of the same content in different psychical localities, nor yet different functional states of cathexis in the same locality; but the conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the [remembered] thing plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone … Now, too, we are in a position to state precisely what it is that repression denies to the rejected presentation in the transference neuroses: what it denies to the presentation is translation into words which shall remain attached to the object. A presentation which is not put into words, or a psychical act which is not hypercathected, remains thereafter in the *Ucs.* in a state of repression.
>
> pp 201–202.

Note the use of "unconscious presentation" in the above. This must refer to preconscious objects because the overall phenomena being discussed are retrievable and understandable memories and connections of conscious sense in the current context. The sense of the above is that the act of speaking has the power to recombine conscious affect with its lost *vorstellung*, its repressed object (memory

and associations of sense and representation). The conversion of *preconscious* into *conscious* occurs in re-experiencing previously repressed memory traces of vision and speech. Their multiple intentionalities and object-links are spoken. Freud was clear that preconscious memories and meanings are capable of being brought into a genuine connection through speaking (1923b, p 20). Preconscious objects were once conscious and can become so again. The word-presentation of speech is the signifying act that can make proper reference to the signified of the preconscious object-presentations and associations. If this is accepted as a mandate to study preconscious presentiated psychological meaningfulness, it is fully coherent. But the picture of the unconscious in the *Interpretation of Dreams* and other remarks are not coherent with the above and disrupt the possibility of conscious meaningfulness, as we shall see.

What is acceptable is the term "preconscious" in relation to objects. It makes a difference in the type of answer that is acceptable in therapy. An object that is preconscious is capable of coming to consciousness and is easy to show clients what it is and why it is believed to be present. An object that is unconscious proper is never capable of coming to consciousness. The question concerns what is legitimate interpretation of co-empathic and intersubjective experience.

Ernest Jones recorded that Freud included non-verbal presence in conscious communication. This maintains the preconscious definition of the descriptive unconscious made in Appendix C of *The Unconscious*. "Freud had adumbrated this interesting theory before and he always adhered to it. Ferenczi asked him how it could be applied to congenital deaf-mutes who have no conception of words. His reply was that we must widen the connotation of 'words' in this context to include any gestures of communication", (Jones, 1955, p 200). What this means is that the non-verbal semiotics of sign language are conscious for Freud. It means that non-verbal communication is part of conscious and preconscious communication. The point is that speech is not the only significant medium of which Freud took note. How people appear to each other visually and non-verbally is equally as important.

If the co-empathic and intersubjective situation did contain a second form of two-way communication then, as a hypothesis, it is not fatal. There is such a thing as non-verbal communication that is studied by social psychology under the headings of "kinesics" and "proxemics". For instance, people from different cultures have different identifiable rules for their non-verbal behaviour and such rules are not taught officially. Rather, children copy how others behave and so non-verbal behaviour in gesture (kinesics) and intersubjective distance (proxemics) are maintained as cultural norms. The psychodynamic problem is positing

an out of awareness medium of communication and then specifying that unconscious objects always remain unconscious.

The next three sections debate the tradition of hermeneutics set by Freud. A further section provides details of Freud's ultimate faith in natural science. Finally, it is shown that objects that are unconscious proper are intellectual constructs.

§56 Confusions about objects that never appear

After the above, there is now confusion about what to interpret in order to believe in 'unconscious intentionality' and 'unconscious objects'. This leads to the core of the problem.

In previous works, precedents had been set down stating that the "unconscious is the true psychical reality", (Freud, 1900a, p 600). Or an "unconscious idea [*vorstellung*] is as such quite incapable of entering the preconscious", (p 562). Where *vorstellung* is adequately translated as "representation" or wholly "unconscious object". Definitively, the proper sense of "unconscious" is a level of consciousness that is never capable of being conscious.

Furthermore, Freud claimed that there is fully unconscious communication between therapists and clients. When A speaks, the true meaning of A's communication is not communicated through any conscious referent. According to Freud, what really counts is unconscious communication, allegedly made by derivatives of the unconscious that allude to what A really means. Therefore, for B to understand A, requires B to free associate to what A says and shows non-verbally, and listen 'in between the lines' of what appears. What appears in this way could only be preconscious and the result of interpretation. What is preconscious must disturb the waters of consciousness for it to be interpretable. Accordingly, aspects of transference, counter-transference and unconscious communication are unworkable because they are confused in the following way. Intellectually posited unconscious versions run parallel to conscious experiences. The result is confusion due to unnecessary and unjustifiable speculation.

Freud and Husserl agreed that unconscious intentionalities exist and that it is legitimate to interpret them. Freud concluded that he had "an unshakeable conviction that the most rational thought-processes, which can surely not be denied the name of psychical processes, can occur without exciting the subject's consciousness. It is true that the physician cannot learn of these unconscious processes until they have produced some effect upon consciousness which can be communicated or observed", (p 612). But between pages 614 and 615, a point was made that is challenged as unacceptable. If consciousness originally provides

the given, and what is preconscious can be given; Freud clearly stated that the unconscious proper is "*inadmissible to consciousness*", (p 615). From 1900 onwards, it is unclear what the means are of establishing theory about something that can never be given itself and can only appear through intellectual interpretation alone. A few pages later in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, the lack of appearance of the unconscious proper becomes even more apparent. Freud claimed that dreams and conscious imaginings could be correctly deciphered to show what must have happened in the past. The question is: How would anyone know if a dream or an imagining had been correctly understood, when the original cause of the dream itself can never reappear to self or others?

From a phenomenological perspective, it is acceptable to state that intentionalities of specified sorts are non-egoic and that their functioning is outside awareness and control. For instance, speaking itself does not usually occupy us with how to obey the rules of grammar. It is only after reflection or a mistake that draws the attention of the ego to how it is involved in such an automatic process, that we might become aware of speaking. (This is the sense and purpose evoked by Heidegger's use of the term reduction). Rather, Freud's belief concerning the unconscious proper is that it is incapable of access by one's own conscious introspection.

To interpret something intellectually is acceptable. But what is being discussed here is the specifics of how to interpret something that appears in a way that moves conscious and preconscious objects. Areas of empirical research such as findings in memory, neuroscience, the psychobiology of trauma and attachment research could be applied to client phenomena. The purpose in these pages is to establish what is legitimately interpretable in attending to communications as conscious.

If Freud meant that the unconscious is a descriptive term and that preconscious objects are acceptable, then such a definition does not include those understandings that have not yet formed. Nor does it include those new understandings that can be created from adopting a new interpretative position, on old experiences.

Therefore, the only potentially meaningful understanding of the unconscious is that it is a decipherable effect that shows itself through the mediation of conscious and preconscious experience. Then that makes psychodynamics a semiotics of the relationship between such experience and its true referents via here and now communication (Bernet, 1996). It can legitimately posit the experience of others, in specifying the effects of the past on the present. But client and therapist need to work together to make sense of feelings, thoughts and habitual problems

of relating in attachment relationships that may not make sense immediately. Such a theory would be theoretically possible but would need to specify its manner of hermeneutics and confirm the limit of the interpretations it could make. The validation of such statements could only be with the help of clients. In these pages, such an outcome could be achieved through repeated discussion and contemplation. The general means of achieving it in therapy sessions is to note the links of intentionality, to understand how hermeneutics works.

§57 Hermeneutic necessities

Freud must have interpreted what he perceived and empathised about a range of clinical experiences and reading material. For him, the phenomena that support the unconscious are the following: Freud favoured a series of unconscious causes across the years. These include the results of neurological and linguistic theorising in *On Aphasia* (18991b), traumatic memories in *Studies on Hysteria* (Breuer and Freud, 1895d), latent content of dreams in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), adolescent memories in *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious* (1905c), and universal sexual process and symbols in *Totem and Taboo* (1912–3). What Freud was asserting time and again, in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900a), *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901b), and *Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious* (1905c), is that the mere logical understandability of human beings needs to be extended by adopting a psychological position that includes conversion phenomena and amnestic barriers. He was urging the holding of beliefs and interpreting in the hermeneutic sense—as a means for helping people to know their own motivations, as strange as that may seem to common sense. It is acceptable to study these areas to look for clues about what might be preconscious and causative of psychopathology, as long as some guidelines are obeyed. The fact of the matter is that Freud's studies do not attend to intentionality, hermeneutics and others matters about how to draw conclusions from conscious experience. The way Freud construed the problem is ambiguous, if not self-contradictory. To ask readers to ignore conscious sense is to ask theory and practice to ignore their subject matter.

Comments such as "being conscious is the starting point," (Freud, 1915e, p 166) are incontestable and Sandler, for one agrees. For instance, Sandler writes that transference interpretations arise through therapists attending to "our perceptions", (1976, p 45) and, of course, through a specific way of making sense of clients. The point is that an interpretation about the unconscious of another or an unconscious communication with another—are inexplicitly related to the conscious senses (of the conscious communications). Again, by necessity, it must

be the case that Freud experienced such senses for him to be able to conclude on them. But that is in direct opposition to the problem of becoming aware of what we cannot be aware.

On the one hand, one reading of Freud is to set great store by interpreting "the utterances of the unconscious in other people" as meaning that the unconscious does not appear through perception or any other conscious or ego-related means (1913i, p 320). But this claim needs to be contemplated in the light of contrary advice he provided two years later: "How are we to arrive at a knowledge of the unconscious? It is of course only as something conscious that we know it, after it has undergone transformation or translation into something conscious", (1915e, p 166). The "transformation or translation" he was referring to is the work of speech. These definitions are self-contradictory.

Problem one: The activity of listening and understanding Freud described as "while I am listening to the patient, I, too, give myself over to the current of my unconscious thoughts", (1913c, p 134). It is not clear what a current of unconscious thought is. It is not a thought about something already known, that would be preconscious. Nor is it something that can only be interpreted from what is conscious. (Freud later clarified that unconscious thought could only be an intellectual inference not a conscious experience (1940a)).

Problem two: Major problems arise in reading Freud from the perspective of Husserl. Apart from the ambiguities noted above, this is because Freud sometimes wrote as though unconscious communication and unconscious senses are experiential. Statements such as the following need to be handled with care: "It is a very remarkable thing that the *Ucs.* of one human being can react upon that of another, without passing through the *Cs.* This deserves closer investigation, especially with a view to finding out whether preconscious activity can be excluded as playing a part in it; but, descriptively speaking, the fact is uncontestable", (Freud, 1915e, p 194). And "I have had good reason for asserting that everyone possesses in his own unconscious an instrument with which he can interpret the utterances of the unconscious in other people", (1913i, p 320). These statements mean that it is possible to know what others mean and feel, when they have not. On some occasions, it is possible to know what others feel or to feel some emotion on behalf of them. Given the instruction to ignore "the symptom of 'being conscious'," (1915e, p 193), it is difficult to know how we are meant to interpret the "utterances of the unconscious in other people", (1913i, p 320). It is hard to make sense of these recommendations.

Freud admonished readers to entertain the possibility of oxymorons concerning affect. Oxymorons are contradictions in terms. Oxymorons are confusing and

do not explicitly refer to the conscious or the unconscious. For Freud, "we are accustomed to speak of unconscious love, hate, anger, etc., and find it impossible to avoid even the strange conjunction, 'unconscious consciousness of guilt,' or a paradoxical 'unconscious anxiety'", (1915e, p 177).

Fully unconscious communication could not be conscious affective communication or any such influence. Freud could not be referring to emotional communication, because this is obviously not out of awareness. If nothing is explicitly communicated, there is still the non-verbal influence of clients on therapists which might not be fully in consciousness, yet could be classed as preconscious because it can be reflected-on and discussed. In relation to oxymorons of unconscious affect, it is hard to imagine how unconscious affect in one person crosses a gap to enter the unconscious of the other.

If unconscious communication were possible, there would have to be a means of telling if what was in one's own unconsciousness about the other, is the same as what they do not experience. This involves a double negative and it is unclear how this could ever be achieved. Particularly when there is no discussion in psychodynamic therapy. This literal understanding of what Freud claimed is wholly unworkable given his definition of unconscious and conscious as mutually exclusive.

Freud was committed to the idea of cause. There have been several contenders for the most favoured types of cause. In the view of the biopsychosocial perspective, there are three types of cause including the 'causes' that are psychosocial. But the way that Freud set up his definitions made it unclear if he was ultimately searching for material causes in relation to psychological unconscious ones. The problem for contemporary psychodynamics and therapy is that there is no agreed body of research or manners of how to conclude on the inter-relations between psychosocial 'cause' and material cause, in the general or specific case.

Freud had a tendency to propose an understanding of temporality and causation that is linear: Specifically, what comes first, controls and permits something to happen later, in human development. Whilst this might be true to some extent, or as a rule of thumb, when it is taken to its extreme, it contradicts other aspects of the biopsychosocial whole. Freud gave a name to this type of assumption. He called it looking for the head of the Nile. He believed that the origins of current problems are in specific relationships and processes in infancy. This line of reasoning states that there always must be some precursor to current adult problems. It explains current effects in terms of past causes. So it will argue that anything that is problematic now, originally had its roots in infantile relating to the mother or carers.

Michael Basch is one who has criticised this form of causal inference concerning the nature of stasis, repetition and deterioration, through reference to the findings of neuroscience. Basch points out that the brains of infants are insufficiently well-developed to support reflection and "hallucination" of the satisfaction of instinctual aims and wishes. Therefore, there cannot be developmental delay in the intentionality of infants that effects adults (Basch, 1976a, 1976b). Put bluntly, Freud and Ferenczi were wrong to initiate the trend to theorise about the intentionalities of infants. One person who has called such attempts to reconstruct the infant in this way "never feasible" is John Gedo (1993, p 185).

To sum up the story so far: Because Freud concluded that unconscious communication is the genuine 'cause' of what people feel or avoid and that it can be found through a hermeneutic position, then it is inadequately related to his conclusions on speech as the genuinely conscious means of communication and cure. In the closing pages of *The Interpretation of Dreams,* Freud wrote that inference, an intellectual act, determines the unconscious proper. (There is a parallel to Husserl's analysis of conceptual reference to what is not perceptually given). Husserl embarked on a fine attention to detail. What Freud meant by the unconscious proper is that it is a realm of unknowable disconnected experiences that are causative of conscious experience. If the unconscious proper never shows itself to consciousness, then there can be no means of ascertaining what it is. If an object is never registered in any part of consciousness, then it cannot exist.

The next two sections lay out the details of Freud's aspiration to wed his attention to the unconscious to natural science and its naturalistic attitude.

§58 Freud's natural science

This section defines the preference of Freud for natural science. It gathers together his most explicit comments that show his treatment of meaning is within the naturalistic attitude. Freud portrayed psychological 'cause' as psychic determinism. He believed that material being causes the present, in the mould of natural cause that inevitably and invariably forces effects, that cannot be otherwise than they are. As David Smith noted in chapter 2, despite some attention to meaning and relationships, "Freud was a dyed-in-the-wool physicalist from 1895 until his demise in 1939", (1995, p 151). Let us take note of Freud's stance because despite all his other efforts, it also ignores 'cause' within the psychological domain.

It is unchallenged that there are causes in the material substrate. But natural causes exist in an unknown connection to the dominion of speech and action, the domain of free will and habit that are influenced by the psychological 'causes' of

motivation and the association of meanings. What Freud was asserting in agreeing with natural science, was that natural causes are the true ones and predominate over the previous attention to conscious and preconscious ones. But in so doing, he moved the goal posts away from psychological explanation and jumped to a new foundation of the material: and that is not to create an answer in psychological terms.

It is the *Project for a Scientific Psychology* of 1895 where Freud first announced his metaphysical commitment concerning the nature of consciousness. It is these comments that shape how psychodynamic theorists have come to characterise meaning and human relationship. The opening sentence is: "The intention is to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science: that is, to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles, thus making those processes perspicuous and free from contradiction", (Freud, 1950a, p 295). His thesis was that consciousness and the unconscious are both emergent properties of the material brain. Furthermore, Freud concluded:

> We have been treating psychical processes as something that could dispense with this awareness through consciousness, as something that exists independently of such awareness. We are prepared to find that some of our assumptions are not confirmed through consciousness. If we do not let ourselves be confused on that account, it follows, from the postulate of consciousness providing neither complete nor trustworthy knowledge of the neuronal processes, that these are in the first instance to be regarded to their whole extent as unconscious and are to be inferred like other natural things.
>
> p 308.

The above is a declaration that even if there is insufficient conscious experience to support interpretations concerning intentionality, it is still possible to hypothesise about unconscious or neurological processes as causative, and that it is admissible to treat the unconscious in the same way as natural inanimate being. In 1895, Freud made his focus clear. He wanted to postulate unconscious neurological processes which, he claimed, can be treated as natural being.

What the above means is that the rules of natural science are being followed. Consciousness is sidelined as an epiphenomenal end-product. Explanatory zeal is applied to look past consciousness, for something that can never consciously appear. Freud confirmed these early intentions in expressing his hope to "replace the psychological terms by physiological or chemical ones", (1920g, p 60). Freud's hermeneutic stance in 1938 was:

> Reality will always remain 'unknowable'. What yield brought to light by sci-
> entific work from our primary sense perceptions will consist in an insight into
> connections and dependent relations which are present in our external world,
> which can somehow be reliably reproduced or reflected in the internal world
> of our thought and a knowledge of which enables us to 'understand' some-
> thing in the external world, to foresee it and possibly alter it … We have dis-
> covered technical methods of filling up the gaps in the phenomena of our
> consciousness, and we make use of those methods just as a physicist makes use
> of experiment … we infer a number of processes, which are in themselves
> 'unknowable' and interpolate them in those that are conscious to us. And if,
> for instance, we say: 'At this point an unconscious memory intervened,' what
> this means is: 'At this point something occurred of which we are totally unable
> to form a conception, but which, if it had entered our consciousness, could
> only have been described in such and such a way'.

> Freud, 1940a, p 196–7.

The quotation above is telling when it becomes clear what the referent is. Firstly,
the consciousness of clients can only ever be empathised or interpreted by thera-
pists. Secondly, unconscious intentionalities and referents are never apparent to
clients or therapists. Yet what Freud wished to understand is a putative object
that is capable of interpretation '*between the lines'* of the conscious experience of
therapists. It is only intellectually visible from the hermeneutic vantage point of
therapists in a way that is unfocused—partly attending to self, partly to clients
and partly to the telling mistakes of self and clients. The preference is to 'look
past' conscious experience and interpret causes of reality underneath the mere
manifest content. Freud's stance is that despite intentionalities being outside of
consciousness, the adequate means of interpreting them is to occupy an abstruse
and distant, intellectual perspective.

§59 Against inference about unconscious objects in communication

The aim of this penultimate section is to show that a naturalistic attitude towards
consciousness can never capture its being, and by itself, can only serve to miscon-
strue consciousness and the biopsychosocial whole. The problem with contempo-
rary psychodynamic therapy is that it makes interpretations of unconscious
intentionalities, without stating how it permits itself to make such interpreta-
tions. Freud's attitude was to support natural psychological science in favour of
client's conscious experiences from the start:

> … patients themselves accept the fact that they thought this or that, they often
> add: 'But I can't *remember* having thought it'. It is easy to come to terms with

> them by telling them that the thoughts were *unconscious* … It remains … a
> fact deserving serious consideration that in our analyses we can follow a train
> of thought from the conscious into the unconscious … that we can trace it
> from there for some distance through consciousness once more and that we
> can see it terminate in the unconscious again, without this alteration of 'psy-
> chical illumination' making any change in the train of thought itself, in its
> logical consistency and in the interconnection between its various parts.
>
> Breuer and Freud, 1895d, p 300.

What the above means is that when Freud insisted that clients must have thought
something, they came to accept it intellectually. They told Freud that they could
not remember having thought so. But this did not prevent Freud from support-
ing his hypothesis, when it should have achieved its rejection.

Forty-two years later Freud still noted that his clients did not always agree
with the interpretations of unconscious cause that he offered them: "It appears …
that the direct utterances of the patient … afford very little evidence upon the
question whether we have been right or wrong", (1937d, p 263). He was not dis-
suaded by the lack of conscious agreement from clients. Freud as natural scientist
might appear to be open to refutation because in the "speculative superstructure
of psycho-analysis, any portion of which can be abandoned or changed without
loss or regret the moment its inadequacy has been proved", (1925d, p 32–3).
This could be read as an invitation to empirical testing of hypotheses, if it were
not over-ruled by his metaphysical commitment to assumptions that prefer the
naturalistic attitude. Even worse, there is evidence of a blatant disregard for con-
scious phenomena.

> We seek not merely to describe and to classify phenomena, but to understand
> them as signs of an interplay of forces in the mind, as a manifestation of pur-
> poseful intentions working concurrently or in mutual opposition. We are con-
> cerned with a *dynamic view* of mental phenomena. On our view the
> phenomena that are perceived must yield in importance to trends which are
> only hypothetical.
>
> 1916, p 67.

Here Freud wrote from a position antithetical to that of Kant, Husserl and
Heidegger. When Freud commented on his own work, he described it in the fol-
lowing terms.

> In our science as in others the problem is the same: behind the attributes (qualities) of the object under examination which are presented directly to our perception, we have to discover something else which is more independent of the particular receptive capacity of our sense organs and which approximates more closely to what may be supposed to be the real state of affairs. We have no hope of being able to reach the latter itself, since it is evident that everything new that we have inferred must nevertheless be translated back into the language of our perceptions, from which it is simply impossible for us to free ourselves.

> 1940a, p 196.

Freud was in-part groping towards a hermeneutic-causative truth but the path he took was unclear in that it rejected conscious experience in favour of another position entirely, which is natural yet hermeneutic, unconscious yet conscious, individual yet situated in nineteenth and twentieth century repression in the large sense. It is clear that he rejected the conscious and insisted on inferring the relation between intentionalities to 'unconscious objects'. In fact, Freud believed in an oxymoron of a second sort, of "physiological mental process", (1950a, p 311).

Freud preferred to think about intentionality in a way that is far from conscious experience and its context of culture, society and history. Indeed, concerning the assumption of unconscious intentionality …

> … as an extension of the corrections undertaken by Kant of our views on external perception. Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perceptions are subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what is perceived though unknowable, so psycho-analysis warns us not to equate perceptions by means of consciousness with the unconscious mental processes which are their object. Like the physical, the psychical is not necessarily in reality what it appears to us to be … internal objects are less unknowable than the external world.

> 1915e, p 171.

The above portrays an attitude of certainty, concerning inferences about the other's unconscious that are only ever inferable after the adoption of a specific set of concepts. The demand is quite impossible and calling it up does not make it justifiable because it is precisely the sort of argument that Kant refused.

Emphasising the Kantian conditions of intentionality in reading Freud is to understand the unconscious as reference to an ontological or metaphysical commitment, to a thing-in-itself (Gardner, 1999, p 201). What Freud meant when he insisted on intellectual interpretation of the unconscious is that conceptual

intentionality is at work. Belief, rationality or a hermeneutic stance provide an intellectually-derived understanding of clients. If that were all that happened, then there would be nothing to complain about. But whilst speculation might be innocuous, taking inaccurate action with clients can lead to disaster. Unjustified speculation becomes inaccurate reification when there is no intellectual means of distinguishing justified from unjustified conclusions. There is the courtroom of transcendental philosophy to judge the evidence and pass sentence on the guilty.

Kant established the thing-in-itself as an intellectual object that can only be thought (Kant, 1993, p 19/B xxvi, Gardner, 1999, p 205, p 281, p 290). The supplementary term "noumenon" is a conceptual object that cannot appear to the senses and exists only as a rationalised product for an ego or group, such as the square root of minus one in mathematics and its uses in engineering and technology. Husserl called this sort of conceptual intentionality empty intending (1970a, VI, §8, p 695, fn 1). It further makes Freud's position unclear because he held that there are a whole set of most-formative processes and universal unconscious products that are causative of the semblances of conscious life.

Sebastian Gardner explains that there are two grades of the seriousness of offence according to Kantian law. The first minor offence is to establish non-sensually based inference. A second major offence occurs if the outcome is not adequately justified. Prosecution is due when the inference becomes detached from what is given and is allowed to float free, across any territory (Gardner, 1999, p 200, p 204). These are the two crimes that Freud committed in *The Interpretation of Dreams* and all subsequent works. It is a bad inheritance that needs to be expunged because it is still at play in the influence of psychodynamics and other forms of therapy.

For Husserl, the confusion began when Freud confused perceptual and presentiational types of givenness with what must exist according to belief and higher conceptuality. Eugen Fink's appendix in *The Crisis* states the phenomenological counter-argument well. The ""unconscious" can be grasped and adequately expounded upon in a methodical way only after the prior analysis of "being conscious"", (Husserl, 1970b, Appendix VIII, p 385). Without naming psycho-analysis specifically, the problem is that "it engrosses itself in interesting phenomena which are pregiven in everyday life, undertakes an inductive inquiry, proposes constructive "explanations," and is tacitly guided all along by a naïve and dogmatic implicit theory about consciousness", (p 387). Whenever felt-senses are mentioned as *Leib* and *LeibKörper*, this is an invitation to think about emotion, now understood as the felt-sense of the relation between self and other.

Freud did the opposite: "we fill in the omissions by plausible inferences and translate them into conscious material. In this way we construct … a sequence of conscious events complementary to the unconscious psychical processes … There is no need to characterize what we call 'conscious': it is the same as the consciousness of philosophers and of everyday opinion", (1940a, p 159). What is not capable of being brought to mind is that "there are other psychical processes and psychical material which have no such easy access to becoming conscious, but must be inferred, recognized and translated into conscious form", (p 160). Freud did not make sufficient distinctions between the types of intentionality he interpreted, with respect to conscious senses. This tendency has been passed on.

§60 The problems of the naturalistic attitude

What Freud should have established are the conditions of possibility for referring to conscious, preconscious and unconscious forms of meaning. Consequently, the charges brought against Freud are theoretical incoherence and lack of attention to conscious meaningfulness. Despite the critical comments about Freud's concepts, there is a good deal that is worthy of praise because of the psychological function that they permit. Specifically, what is being referred to is the potential of the basic rule as being capable of letting clients set their own agenda and presenting themselves, their problems and needs. This is not to exclude the possible requirement for therapists to focus those needs and negotiate an agreed topic for discussion for a number of sessions. The promise of Freud's technique is that it encourages therapists to listen in an open-ended way that helps to prevent premature foreclosure on what clients are trying to say.

The argument has drawn out confusions and coherent entailments. Specifically, there cannot be a natural science of the unconscious without a relation to the psychosocial reality of emotions and relationships. If there is to be an identification of preconscious objects, there should first be a pure psychology of the conscious. Any psychological stance is challenged to distinguish between different types of cause. As there is no explicit consensus, in the general case or the specific, to rely on natural cause exclusively is to pin explanation on only one type of cause. On the contrary, in the biopsychosocial perspective, three types of cause coincide. Without a consensus, there is no ability to decide if a specific client has problems that are caused by a specific type, or multiple types of cause interacting, one with the other.

Psychotherapy is psychosocial. All schools of therapy are rival justifications leading to different practices. To make a psychological hermeneutics requires discussion of the means of making sense. For clients and therapists to be able to

agree or disagree with an interpretation, and discuss their options, requires a consensus about the biopsychosocial whole. Following Husserl, the intellectually interpreted cannot be a more certain starting point for theory and practice than the conscious, for the reason that the conceptually-driven inference never adequately appears. "Unconscious experience," "unconscious communication" or an "unconscious transferential" sense of generalised other persons are oxymorons where conscious phenomena should be. Indeed, to use a concept to indicate 'anti-phenomena,' objects that never appear, is to use a concept to permit an interpretation of absence that is '*invention*' rather than '*discovery*'.

Intentionalities themselves are descriptively out of awareness. There could be conscious communications that are indirect, unintentional, metaphorical, confused, partly repressed or difficult to understand. But believing in oxymorons is a theoretical position that creates intellectual corollaries that have no clear relation to what is conscious.

I acknowledge that it is permissable to interpret how people behave according to an intellectual 'position' or belief. This is a resort that avoids the oxymorons of 'unconscious feelings,' 'unconscious objects' and 'unconscious communication'. The problem concerns how to interpret human being and relationships and it has practical consequences about how to conduct therapy. The problems of the psychodynamic approach are summed up in this definition from a psychodynamic dictionary: practice is allowing "oneself to be guided … by one's own counter-transference reactions, which in this perspective, are often not distinguished from emotions felt. This approach is based on the tenet that resonance 'from unconscious to unconscious' constitutes the only authentically psycho-analytic form of communication", (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1985, p 93). It has been made clear that there is confusion between conscious and unconscious. Nor is there any statement about how there might be different sources of the emotional senses we feel. In challenging the psychodynamic account, it is unclear how conscious emotions in therapists relate to unconscious communication as opposed to the conscious sort. In the fervour to understand human behaviour, care must be taken not to mistake the map (the concepts and practices that permit the inferences about conscious objects) for the territory, the actuality of the therapeutic instance and conscious experience of it.

If a natural psychological position is coherent, it should not lay claims to work with relationships and meaning but prefer medication, psychosurgery and other physical means of providing constancy for the material substrate of the human body. For the naturalistic attitude, all evidence concerns natural being. Natural approaches justify themselves according to a set of methods and preferences that

have no place for co-empathy, meaning, hermeneutics and relationship—and justify themselves through measurement, the falsification of hypotheses and the consequent reification of consciousness and human being. When taking the naturalistic route, consciousness is by-passed and the meaningful intersubjective world is lost. Natural psychology has no credible means of attending to the conscious experience of clients and therapists.

Naturalism sits with an attention to conscious phenomena in an uneasy way. Naturalistic accounts prefer the evolutionary, neurological, inherited, physical, statistical and experimental approaches. These devalue meaning, consciousness, the sense of the other and the intersubjective relation. Naturalism prefers theorising about the capabilities of the neonate and naturalising consciousness to discuss neurological maturation. Naturalistic interpretation ignores the observable phenomena in favour of what is naturally causative of conscious phenomena. If any naturalistic account were coherent throughout, then the consequence would be that natural justifications exist with respect to natural being and inferences about inanimate material. Therapists who follow the naturalistic attitude should ignore the unconscious, meaning and relationship altogether.

For phenomenology, on the contrary, natural justifications do not apply to the region of consciousness treated as lived experience. Any out of awareness intentionalities could only ever be interpreted from conscious mental contents. What this shows is that there are two sides to psychology and therapy currently: the natural-quantitative and the cultural-qualitative. There is a fundamental qualitative account that, through future work, might ease the tension between them and enable some sort of juxtaposition of these opposed traditions.

However, natural science predominates in that quantitative psychological research is the exemplar for all forms of therapy. But even empirical quantitative research into therapy outcomes requires interpretation. Qualitative research into therapeutic processes needs to be established in order to understand how lived meanings change and what psychological conditions facilitate those changes, for better or worse. The phenomenon of understanding the consciousness and perspective of the other is argued as being a more fundamental starting point.

§61 Close

The naturalistic emphasis needs to understand itself, its task and its scope adequately with respect to the work of therapy as a genuine attention to meaning and psychological influence between persons. For instance, a psychophysics of the ocular system can never come close to the meaning of what we see. In order to begin an adequate understanding of the psychological, a first attempt at under-

standing intersubjective relations and meaning need to be established. This assumes that there are identifiable structures of intentionality that are regular.

If a psychological problem is wholly caused materially, due to inherited deoxyribose nucleic acid (DNA), then there is little possibility of changing a psychological tendency born of physical material through brief psychotherapy. The problem becomes one of living with the tendency and aiming to manage any negative consequences. The question that needs answering is to provide a means of discussing with clients how their conscious mental senses relate to others and the intentionalities of themselves. Freud's legacy is a number of unclearly defined forms of practice with respect to conscious experience. But there is no adequate explanation of how the unconscious of clients becomes the conscious experience of therapists. There are three mysterious gaps: one between brain and consciousness; a second between self and other, and a third between conscious and unconscious proper. If talking therapy is to explore 'preconscious communication' and 'preconscious co-empathy' of the sense of others, they need to specify more details about the phenomena that show precisely how these forms of communication work. Unconscious communication should not be confused with inexplicit implied communication by non-verbal presence, mood, and subtle non-verbal interactions between two or more persons.

Freud's conclusion should not be read as meaning that there are 'unconscious empathy' and 'unconscious intersubjectivity' at play. However, it is something of a mystery, akin to the *Emperor's New Clothes,* (Hans Christian Andersen, 1977) to wonder what something that can never appear is like. To the criticisms of psychodynamic therapy must be added praise for Freud's focus on speaking, listening and interpreting. These are still worthy of further refinement. In the next chapter, an appraisal is being carried out that clarifies the problematic elements of Freud's definition and revises transference and counter-transference, keeping what is philosophically acceptable and therapeutically useful. The psychodynamic legacy of interpretation takes conscious phenomena as signposts to unconscious anti-phenomena or non-phenomena: Processes and objects that cannot appear and can only ever be interpreted. These beliefs exist without proper justification with respect to conscious objects. Whilst it is possible to have insight, the ego can choose not to act on its insight, its understanding. Accordingly, effort is required and commitment towards specific goals: Hence the viability of the cognitive behavioural and other action-oriented approaches.

13

A new interpretation of intersubjectivity

Aim: This chapter works to prevent theory losing sight of the phenomena of feeling and relating.

Alternative explanations are provided for what are currently called transference, counter-transference and unconscious communication. The word "unconscious" should not be used for realisations that have not yet been made. In this view, it should be noted that 'causes' that have not yet been established in the light of evidence, are not unconscious. There are 'causes' of client experience that have just not yet been given full consideration and brought to a conclusion. The therapist's hermeneutic view is wider than client's and informed by personal experience of therapy, recovery and research findings such as attachment. The alternative explanation is that people get emotional senses of each other through intentionality: social learning in everyday life. Such meanings do appear suddenly in conscious experience without volition. Social experience makes sense because we build up a retained context of understandings of various sorts. It is because of the own world that we each have that we make sense of the social world around us. How people co-empathise and get feelings about each other is due to the accumulated effect of living a shared life.

§62 Introduction

The propositions concerning the co-constitution of the psychological world in section 46 are general propositions that are hard to doubt. Contrary to natural psychological ideas, Husserl's elucidations are now taken to the psychological sphere to encourage greater accuracy concerning the distinctions between the types of intersubjectivity in particular circumstances. The felt, imagined or learned senses of the perspective of the other are the starting points for a pure psychology: something that is further developed in the next two chapters. Interactive

phenomena demand a prolonged justification of how to interpret intersubjective meaning. The phenomena of co-empathy include the ability to transpose one emotionally or intellectually into the perspectives of others, in creating their view on the same cultural object that appears to self. However for them, the object appears from a different perspective. The ability to change one's own perspective is a potential that therapy assumes. It occurs through a number of ways. One aspect is gaining new perspectives on the same object as oneself. Another aspect is including the perspectives of others. Either way, interpretation and co-empathy are the most basic means of understanding cultural objects and the psychological world.

First, some introductory remarks are required to explain some current terms in psychology and therapy that refer to the same situation. In developmental research, the terms "theory of mind," "folk psychology" and "mentalization" refer to children becoming able to co-empathise, interpret and explain the mental states of others, themselves and relations with others, in terms of the forms of intentionality that underlie or '*appear*' in observable and non-observable events. In a different but equivalent language, it is possible to state that psychological mindedness and emotional intelligence are due to accurate understanding that permits freedoms rather than promoting avoidance and fear. The social institutions of the family, culture and society as a whole enculturate children to have *common sense* in understanding themselves, others and psychological situations. The family is a site of influence for children who model themselves on their parents and in reaction to their parents. The peer group of adolescents and adults supersedes its influence. This is why therapy should account for everyday psychological understandings. Such understanding is co-empathic learning and subject to new learning in therapy.

In order to maintain a self-reflexive hermeneutic understanding, a certain alteration is made of Husserl's method of interpreting what appears (1982, §§130–2, 150–1). Namely, it is possible to work back from conscious emotions, relating, mood and behaviour as outcomes caused by a conscious or tacit belief. It is better to interpret current outcomes without postulating 'unconscious objects' that are added to current perceptual objects, that comprise a conscious whole. This is an improvement over Freud because it is better to be explicit that people can hold tacit beliefs that are evidenced in their conscious experience. In other words, fearful experiences can be caused by negative beliefs about psychological objects. It may then require further awareness, reflection and interpretation to formulate the beliefs explicitly in language. The interpretative context created by therapists concerns spotting the influences motivated by damage from the past,

and how that continues unabated, in contributing to the problems of the present. Therapy proceeds by providing understanding of the nature of the damage. It makes self and other understandable to clients, in order for change to occur. Another way of restating this need for interpretation is to state the necessity of understanding how psychological problems occur and how they can be resolved, if resolution is at all possible.

Although young adults may leave the family of origin, it is striking how influential the early experiences of being cared for can be, even many years after having left the nest. The point is that cultural objects (any observable and discussible events) require common sense psychology. They do not make sense by themselves. Such explicit or implicit theories concern intentionality and how that is shared between people. Let us take a concrete example. A girl is born into a family where her mother rules the roost. Her mother forces what she thinks is good on other people and takes no heed of their needs, preferences or protestations. When the daughter goes to school she realises that other families are different. The mothers of her friends ask their sons and daughters what they want and often give that to them. In other families, although there are temporary arguments, people get along. The point is that intentionality is at play between all the persons and there are different viewpoints. The daughter in this example comes to realise that her mother has no ability to appreciate that other people are different. Without some means of being able to compare the viewpoints involved, then there is no ability to understand this situation and how to act within it.

§63 Understanding emotions

This section employs the ideas of intersubjective intentional implication in a cultural world to argue that pairing by association in social learning creates co-empathic senses that are felt. Husserl was sufficiently bold in the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation* to create a position that can act as a basic model for psychological understanding. The emotions and behaviours currently called "transference" and "counter-transference" can be understood differently following the *Fifth Meditation*. The conscious emotions, thoughts and impressions that client and therapist have with each other and those that clients discuss about people in their lives form a starting point. As the last chapter showed, Freud's concepts are caught in a network of poor reasoning that has an unclear relation to conscious senses. Psychodynamic ideas cannot adequately account for what happens. The problem in the psychodynamic interpretation is that intersubjective intentional implication is insufficiently understood.

On the contrary to Freud, what are called "transference" feelings are conscious and easily capable of being explored, understood and interpreted back to clients. This new manner of making sense of them is to request clients to understand the similarity between their childhood or the past influential experience and what they anticipate will happen. Let us take the concrete case of a physically abusive parent's influence on their daughter. For the daughter who wants to date men and get married, a new boyfriend is not likely to be abusive like their father was. The problem here is an anticipation of a particular sort. The anticipated event is conscious. It might not be with respect to the therapist at all or about any particular person. The general form of anticipation is that the new boyfriend (or friend) will be as bad as the parent and that inhibitions of action and relation come into play. The variations of experience occur in that some people get anticipatory emotions that lead to thoughts that are followed by visual images. Whilst others may get visual images first that lead to thoughts that get repeated so that strong anxieties build up and that leads to a refusal to deepen an otherwise innocuous relationship. The precise order of intentionalities varies but the general outcome is the same. For some, there is a blanket belief that intimate relationships should not be established. For others, there is a non-specific fearful emotion that having a love affair will go wrong.

What passes for transference and counter-transference experiences are better construed as attachment in social learning in family, culture and society. It is acceptable to interpret how clients can, at times, mis-empathise others in a specific way. Like psychodynamic practice, such understanding can help prevent mis-understanding and mis-action. But that is not to agree with Freud's original definition. Rather, the method of making conscious the mis-empathic style of believing, thinking, feeling and relating, is better construed as interpreting explicit or implicit beliefs about others. This has the benefit of side-stepping the unacceptable entailments of Freud's position and its influence on the current manner of interpreting clients: It means staying clear of the entailments of impossible distinctions about the unconscious as a whole, unconscious communication and other unclear matters.

Specifically, a relationship includes a range of phenomena. There are thoughts and felt-emotions that arise spontaneously through a number of means. These are interpreted in internal thought or speech. Emotions and thoughts understood in this way can involve clear or unclear relations to the conscious empathic sense of the other. If there is an ensuing lack of clarity concerning the medium of communication between two or more instances of consciousness, then a difficult situa-

tion is made worse. These understandings of self and other occur rapidly and can be weak and easily dismissed when they need to be identified and understood.

The new account is that intentional implication co-constitutes meanings, intuitions, feelings, vague but insightful thoughts and hunches. There is an implication of intentionality between client and therapist. What this means is that any spoken sentence or non-verbal movement of the other, has no guarantee that what we immediately believe it means, is actually what the other person intended to say. Sometimes communications are clear. Sometimes there is more than one message being expressed at once or the overall message that is trying to be expressed is very complex. Overall, pairings of sense are at work. Whilst some emotions may be conditioned, not all of meaningfulness is conditioned in that new meanings can arise when the overall understanding changes.

Following Husserl, the experiences of client and therapist are learned capabilities. There have been a myriad of influences in life. However, self and other interact as two necessary moments, two halves of a co-empathic whole. Therefore, there is difficulty in naming specific 'causes' of clients' understanding of others. The way in which clients are behaving towards therapists and mis-understanding them, may well be significant. Both parties bring with them their values, defences, habits and attitudes. The resulting intersubjective occurrences may not all stem from the childhood of each but might easily occur due to more contemporary events in adulthood. On the client side, there will be the negative effects of relationship breakdown, stress, problems at work and other social influences. On the therapist side, there is the necessity of occupying a role of helper, listener and organiser of the sessions. It does not help clients to talk about one's own experiences or feelings in a tactless manner. Rather, the therapeutic role is in part to engage and prepare clients for interventions of talk and action.

Client experience is adequately understood as conscious emotions and thoughts due to learned beliefs and senses of the others that are part of a greater whole, where a manner of relating cannot be split from a specific style of living. The promise of a clear hermeneutic stance is that it opens up the possibility of discussing co-empathic and intersubjective 'cause' and effect, emotional sensitivities and fixations with respect to self and others. Specific aspects of client experience show good and problematic development in terms of equifinality and multifinality and the complexity of 'cause' (Richters, 1997). John Richters argues against specific and identifiable causality, between any early event and any contemporary occurrence. What is required is a consensus to create an explicit vantage point for understanding relationships and meaning.

Therapist experience will contain feelings, actions and non-therapeutic behaviours that are uncharacteristic of how therapists generally work or are outside of the therapeutic role. Therapists have a wide range of experiences in connection with the intense conscious communication with clients. "Co-empathy" is an adequate explanation. Reactions to clients are the result of co-implication. Co-empathy includes immediate responses that might be a telling mistake, a *faux pas*, an anxiety or fearfulness, a sudden tendency to be uncharacteristically patronising, for instance. All demand explanation. The explanation is that the manner of clients can be influential and 'counter-transference' occurs when therapists are influenced by a sense that is incompatible with their role overall. For instance, a client who talks in a deadpan manner about the death of his father 'causes' the therapist to ask an intellectually-influenced question "are you upset about your father's death?" The influence was such that it 'caused' the therapist to ask a stupid question. Of course, the client was upset at his father's death. The point is that the therapist was over-influenced by the deadpan manner of communication. Because the death was spoken about in a non-emotional manner, the therapist asked a question about the manner of communication rather than acknowledging the content of what was said.

Let us consider another example of expressed emotion and emotional response. A female client talks about her mother who is very elderly and frail and has Alzheimer's disease. The therapist listens and feels intensely sad. So sad, a single tear appears in one eye for him as he is reminded of the loss of his own mother—as there are some parallels between the client and himself in this respect. However, he says nothing and notes the feelings he has and attends to the client who is talking about her mother's mental and physical state of health. A few minutes later she uses the word "abandonment" to describe how she feels, in being the sole carer for her mother. The therapist inquires about this sense of abandonment. The client replies that she misses her parents' help altogether, as her father died some years ago. Twenty-five minutes later, the client returns to talking of how frail her mother is. At this point it seems obvious to her that her mother will die in the next few years. What the tear that appeared in the eye of the therapist meant was that he was co-empathising the client accurately. The sense that occurred for him and the memories of the loss of his mother became conscious because of the topic of communication as a whole: How to care for elderly parents, what it is like to lose a parent and missing them with respect to how they used to be.

The phenomenological explanation is that the emotional meaning of describing the mental and physical state of the mother, who is coming to the end of her

life, is sufficient to call up the overall psychological situation for any competent listener. It is logically and emotionally implied (amongst other things) that the client is losing her mother. The therapist was more open to this realisation in this session because the client, who was a nurse, had been explicitly trying to apply her professionalism to look after her own mother and had been suppressing her own feelings, in order to care for her. Rather than be overwhelmed by her own feelings. In open listening, it is possible that preconscious senses come into consciousness and then go out of it again. To interpret this exchange as an unconscious communication misses the point. If there were ten listeners of this same interchange, there could be ten accurate though different understandings. Most of these interpretations would get close to feeling the precise nuance of sense that the client was trying to communicate. The client felt "abandoned" because the mother she knew in the earlier part of her life has now gone, leaving a frail old woman with no memory of the past and who does not recognise her own daughter.

Care is required to be attuned to the felt-sense of others because such senses can be flimsy in their givenness to consciousness. To interpret the other of the client is to work with fleeting experiences. The senses of others are presentiated ones that clients may not have identified in their lives. Such senses are fragile presentiations on the edge of conscious awareness. They are easy to set aside, wipe away or ignore. These senses do not cause anything directly, but rather influence. With intersubjective events there is no naturally caused outcome that could be predicted and falsified. Karl Popper's falsificationism does not apply to the human sphere that encompasses free will and the adoption of societally endorsed roles and meanings (Popper, 1959).

An intentional formulation of the presence of the past is that when clients have been hurt, they may become fixated on their own pain and so reify and generalise the sense of the others who hurt them. Implicitly or explicitly, they come to hold beliefs that are inaccurate with respect to their current situation. With respect to themselves, clients may reify their sense of self at that time and so produce a quasi-fixed manner of relating: Moving between a fixed sense of self and a fixed sense of others. Because the problematic manner of relating is quasi-fixed, it will often be inappropriate to new situations. Consequently, empathic accuracy about new others is poor because of the fixation from the past self-other situation, the painful experience and its aftermath. The complex of anticipations, recollections, interpersonal behaviours and attitudes that are awry, can become retained and habituated over time. The still-painful thoughts and feelings from the traumatic past are used to interpret incorrectly current events and experiences. Specif-

ically, the problem is that the reified sense remains the same. In the fixation, senses of other persons are based more on memory, automatic retention of sense, and the imagined and anticipated senses of others, than on the immediate actuality of others. Accordingly, an accurate empathic understanding of current others does not occur for clients, particularly if they cannot make these distinctions concerning their own tendency to mis-empathise. *Original feelings from the past are not transferred to the present nor do people regress to the past.* Rather, feelings are re-created in the present situation and they are felt, but they may not at all accurately represent the current interaction, according to the viewpoint of the other person or an observer of the interaction.

An intentional formulation of therapeutic experience is that therapists are emotionally and cognitively open to the perspectives of clients. In intersubjectivity, there is conscious communication, mutuality, reciprocity and complementarity. If some aspects of the interaction are not in awareness then this does not warrant unconscious communication. A better way of interpreting is to recognise there is a common pool of experiences, of self-other interactions that make psychological and emotional situations generally understandable: call it *common sense* or *folk psychology*. Some of these emotional communications may be accurate portrayals of the referent intersubjective situation. Whilst others may be more influenced by the past or future, due to explicit beliefs expressed in language or implicit ones expressed in feeling and avoidance. To be able to make such distinctions is part of the work of therapy.

There could be therapeutically unhelpful client and therapist aims and inaccurate co-empathy on both sides of the relationship. This latter possibility is not transference or counter-transference but more likely the contribution of incomplete communication between both persons. (This is not to rule out all possible combinations. Nor is it to make a hypothesis about inevitable causes and effects. It is also possible for clients to work out how they feel they should be relating to therapists—but that is not the current focus). Mis-understanding could be remedied by further discussion on how to meet and discussion of what to work on. One remedy is negotiation and agreement on how to achieve better mutual understanding. The major difference between the perspectives of client and therapist is that clients may have no reliable means of interpreting themselves and their world. The therapist only has co-empathic understanding of what clients' experience.

The understanding of emotion and experience in two-person relationships is continued in section 65 after a clarification of emotion in the next section.

§64 Emotion in the lived experience of intersubjectivity

This section re-contextualises emotions, as they are felt in two-person relationships. The purpose is to promote exploration of feelings in sessions in a way that will aid self-disclosure and promote further reflection. There are many idiosyncratic 'causes' of emotions. Four key distinctions are made that require discussion in order to note the differences between emotional accuracy and inaccuracy about any situation or relationship. Attachment theory and research have been consulted in drawing up the comments below (Bowlby, 1969, Cassidy and Shaver, 1999, Owen, 2006a). So far, attachment research is unable to specify which outcomes are due to specific sorts of previous relationship, except in the most general manner. However, the terminology of attachment is used in order to make this analysis fit with its pre-existing manner of expression.

The term "attachment" refers to intimate two-person relationships as between infant and carer or between two adults. It is assumed that the quality of such relationships is highly influential. Particularly early socialisation can set the course of a person's life. Below, the words "secure" and "insecure" are used with the specific meanings they have in attachment theory. A secure relationship (or attachment process) is one where the psychological and material needs of one person are met by the other, more often than not. Insecure relationship processes, on the other hand, refer to all those types where the party who seeks caring cannot find it. This could be through a variety of forms. One party might withdraw from being cared for, because of some basic disappointment or in anticipation of such. Or when the one who provides care cannot satisfy the person who receives it. With infants and small children, the care-giving mainly moves from the adults towards the child. In relationships between two adults, there is more opportunity for the care-giving to flow both ways. It must be noted that intimate relationships can be intellectually interpreted by the findings of attachment research but this is an intellectual interpretation using hermeneutic beliefs from empirical research.

Two-person relationships are a special case of intersubjectivity where each person is turned to the other. The point is that relationships, particularly intimate ones, exist in discrete forms. More will be made of this in chapter 17. Intimate relationships are important in that they are the habitat in which we live as social beings. From the perspective of chapter 10, the details of what happens between two people are as follows. Emotions are relational, a basic form of non-verbal communication and an aspect of relating. They are a higher form of object than just mere bodily sensation. "Joy and sorrow are not in the heart as blood is in the heart. Sensations of touch are not in the skin as pieces of organic tissue are",

(Husserl, 2006, §3, p 5). Emotions represent the basic situation of co-empathy and intersubjectivity. Self expresses emotion, often about current relationship events or idealisations about it. Sometimes the emotion may last for days or years, if it is expressed or not in speech. Sometimes speaking about a previously unexpressed emotion brings with it a certain type of release that has been called catharsis.

Let us consider infant-adult relations as a model for adult ones. The infant self emotes. The object of what they are emoting is their need for care in relation to the other who provides it. The expression of that emotion is a call on the adult to respond with care-giving. In the secure version of events, the previously acquired good social learning of the carer regulates and satisfies the needs for food, attention and interaction of the child. Satisfactory caring introduces the infant to secure and co-operative interactions with family and culture. The carer co-empathises the infant self as relating-for-care in a valid way and expressing itself in understandable terms. The accumulations of experiences, theoretically predicted as P2a, P2b, P2c and P2d (chapters 9 and 10), become a fore-conception that is explanatory and helpful. In secure relating, confident anticipations form happy recollections for future experiences that will mostly likely meet their mark in the secure context. Through care-seeking and care-giving, the distress of the infant self is attenuated. When there is accurate co-empathy and responsiveness from caregivers, it promotes the accurate self-recognition of needs and expressiveness that deliver care for the child. Accordingly, the "birthright" of relationship security is achieved and becomes replicable in different social contexts (Yvonne Agazarian, personal communication, 2005). There is a fundamental similarity between the secure context, the intentionalities of care-seeking and giving, and the intersubjective style of a secure-enough ego. All felt-senses are part of a complex whole.

Therefore, the self who one feels oneself to be, becomes related to the sense that the other has of oneself, that one co-empathises. In the secure process, there is a congruence and validation of feelings in family and culture. Another equivalent way of stating this is to write that some emotions and emotional expressions are accurate senses of their referent. The senses of others are supported, satisfied and found accurate. If such feelings are acted on with skill, they are likely to lead to good actions and outcomes. If such feelings are trusted and used as a guide, they will probably lead to satisfying outcomes because various means of satisfying these needs can be chosen.

However, none of the above is believing that all feelings are veridical and worthy of being trusted and acted on. Just because a person feels one way or the other

about any situation, another or themselves, *does not mean that feelings should lead to specific actions nor that following one's feelings will lead to the good life.*

   The analysis below differentiates four types of accuracy of emotion with respect to referent and context. Four major examples are noted below. There might be further variations on the ones noted. See figure 7 on the emotions and distinctions between their different types of 'cause'. No feelings are wrong in an absolute sense. However, some feelings may be inaccurate with respect to the person, the object in question or the history of a person. Emotions are not entirely divorced from the intellect. However, it is a different issue altogether to consider what sort of action should be taken about a persistent negative emotion. Whether spoken or unspoken, emotions are felt in the reaction of self to co-empathised other. Clients are co-empathised as to their manner of being helped. Therapists are empathised in responding to being asked for help.


Figure 7—Emotions, their 'causes' or referents.

In overview, what figure 7 explains is a categorisation of the causes and contexts for understanding any conscious emotion. The emotions on either side of the therapeutic relationship are claimed to be best understood as attachment phenomena dependent on the topic of discussion and the current state of the therapeutic relationship (McCluskey, 2005). In the self-reflexive view of this work, a distinction is made between what belongs to client and therapist yet how the two are inter-related. Therapists hold concepts relating to the attachment types and have theories of how emotions make sense in various situations. The major difference of figure 7 is to distinguish between primary and secondary emotion. Primary emotion comes in two types, accurate (1) and inaccurate (2). These are immediate felt-senses but could be interpreted in any way by client or therapist. Secondary emotion is also classified into two types, accurate (3) or inaccurate (4). Secondary emotions differ to primary ones because they are created by explicit thoughts, beliefs and speech in language. Primary emotions can be interpreted as being 'caused' by an implicit belief, but that has to be understood as a theoretical explanation.

(1) *Good social learning providing accurate emotional representation*

primary emotion	$\rightarrow$	accurate sense of the other who is
learned in a	$\leftarrow$	turned to self and accurately co-empathised
secure context		about *how* they are turned to self

The type of emotions referred to above are lived senses of being attuned to others. If emotions are attended to without the baggage of inaccurate thought, these senses may *explain themselves* and are part of the psychological lived world, as accurate senses of others. However, their accuracy can only be found through contemplation, comparison and discussion. Psychological 'cause' in the past is accumulated social learning. In relation to the present, emotions of this sort are also partly influenced by accumulated beliefs that contribute to secure attachment processes.

Secure attachment as a lived experience is born of co-empathy between self and other. Each party only ever has second-hand senses concerning how the other is attending to self, whilst being aware to some extent of how oneself is responding. From the perspective of self, the other treats me according to how they co-empathise me; whilst I co-empathise them as they co-empathise and act towards me. There is empirical evidence to suggest that in child development accurate co-empathy exists with accurate self-understanding, apperception (Bischof-Köhler,

1988, cited in Perner, 1991, p 132). And the opposite is true: Inaccurate under-standing of others co-exists with inaccurate understanding of oneself—more about this later.

When a secure process is established, the infant's satisfaction becomes the carer's satisfaction. The emotions expressed by the child are validated and good social learning occurs. Altogether, secure children become co-operative and able to recognise themselves and how they are in relation to others. The emotions are based on tacit and implicit experiences from the past, as well as more explicit statements that accurately portray the self's own qualities and those of others. Such objects are conscious and preconscious.

For instance, fleeting, weak, easily ignored hunches about oneself in relation to another can prove to be true when looking back on the past from some vantage point in the future. For instance, a man who is caring towards others and a good friend, moves in with his girlfriend. On the occasion of their first argument, when they are not able to come to a conclusion, he makes a prediction to himself that if they are to ever break up, it will be because of their different ways of com-municating. Five years later, on the occasion of her leaving him for another man, he remembers the fleeting prediction that he made. At that moment, his feelings and thoughts expressing his doubts were completely right. If only he had trusted them and been more careful, either they might not have broken up or he might have been able to leave much sooner. He stayed because he was trying to help the girlfriend but his commitment did not pay off.

(2)   *Inaccurate emotions produced by understanding due to poor social learning*
The situation above (1), must not be confused with those where emotions are mis-representations of the current state of play with others and contribute to mis-apperceiving oneself. If inaccurate emotions are acted on, they may contribute to the establishment of insecure relating. These emotions are not lies or false, but inaccurate representations of the whole current situation between self and other, and may show the presence of past maladaptive learning. Such maladaptive learn-ing might be conditioned or generate strong negative emotions that require nega-tive reinforcement for the person to rid themselves of these unwanted consequences. The difference between the maladaptive case and the secure one is that the generalisations in the insecure form are defensively applied, or become implicit or explicit beliefs that operate in current social life. Experiences can be inaccurate representations with respect to the whole of the referent person or a particular situation.

Any emotion could contribute to insecure processes. One such example is fear, which, if accepted as a guide for action will only contribute to fearing the other. The fear does not portray the other's actual attitude to oneself. The point is that inaccurate emotions and their expression improperly stand for the other and their relation to self.

For instance, a man who was beaten as a boy on an irregular basis by his father, whilst being loved and taken care of by his mother, becomes an adult who wants to 'live in a fortress'. It is only with timidity that he enters into relations with men or women, yet he harbours the desire to be loved and in contact with others. The desire to 'live in a fortress' first began around six years of age in childhood images of enjoying social isolation. It is not until his early 20s that he could bear other people's company. His teenage years were spent alone. This does not mean that he was aloof either. On the contrary, in relationships with male friends or girlfriends he would cling on to them no matter what and be preoccupied with the quality of the relationship. Thirty years later, the influence of childhood reappears when a boss bullies the adult. The adult fears going into work so much so that he goes to his office at odd times of the day or night. He fears seeing the bullying boss in the corridor. Such emotions are to a degree the direct result of bullying, yet there is a contribution due to the influence of having triggered a fearful response. These problems are close to social phobia. A choice and a dilemma ensue: Is it wise to stand up to the boss? How should the problem be remedied?

In an insecure process, neither others nor self are accurately experienced across time. This might be as a result of a childhood, where certain emotions were suppressed and other emotions were encouraged. Fear, anger, hate, guilt and shame may be inaccurate feelings that need to be born in the present in order to know others and self more accurately. Such emotions may then be capable of change, to become more in-line with the actual qualities of clients and others in the present. Although formal behaviour therapy may not always be necessary, its basic principles may need to be used.

(3)   *Helpful explicit beliefs that promote security of relating and action*
A third accuracy-promoting stance is applying beliefs in a general way, in situations where previous beliefs were inaccurate and created a false consciousness. It is possible to create feelings from thoughts (Adler, 1931, 1964a, 1964b, Ellis, 1962). Accurate beliefs lead to social skills that have clear, conscious outcomes such as co-operation, being open to friendship or getting a new partner.

Either beliefs produce useful or accurate emotions that enable the person to be secure or act appropriately—or they do not, as in case (4) below. If the beliefs

concern an accurate understanding of types (1) or (2) above, then insecure relationships could be rectified and secure ones promoted. Case (3) is the position of those who have *earned security*. They have not always been secure but can think themselves into security. This is not the assertion of a theory of the linguistic construction of reality, but the acknowledgement that thought and belief play a formative role.

For instance, it is possible to feel fear but to set it aside and persevere because there are many unwanted consequences of siding with the fear, rather than opposing it. This is one of the basic principles of behavioural therapy.

(4)   *Improper interpretations of emotions due to inaccurate beliefs*

There is a fourth possibility where beliefs are improperly applied to cases (1) or (2), to produce mis-understandings of what emotions mean. This possibility is where mistaken concepts and contexts of thought are applied to the products of good or bad social learning, the lived emotions, and produce mistaken interpretations. If insecure relationships are already in play, then inaccurate representations in thought, belief and consequent action, will further compound a low quality of life. One key distinction is to note that the genuine 'causes' of an event are not the same as rival interpretations of what might be its cause.

For instance in some cases, internalised speech can contribute to emotion, behaviour and relationships. For others, emotion or mood has its rules that dictate, permit or encourage behaviour, internalised speech and relating. If this is done incorrectly with respect to relationships, then *the head wrongly dictates to the heart* and misleads the person away from the lived reality of what is actually happening with other people. Such feelings have no relation to the lived senses in (1) above, nor are they inaccurate in sense (2) above. The basic tenet is that higher concepts and contexts of thought, belief and hermeneutic stance can create inaccurate emotions. A major set of problems arise when emotions are due to conceptual intentionality (thought and belief) that are wholly mistaken understandings about other people's intentions and experiences of self. The problem of case (4) is that these intellectually-produced feelings are false with respect to the actual referents of self and other in the current context.

For instance, a man who is depressed and had a bad childhood is told by his therapist that he must be angry at his father for not loving him more than he did. The client has never felt this nor thought it and is amazed. The therapist continues saying what the client "must have felt" as a child. When the client does not agree, this is more evidence to the therapist to support his case that the client is indeed in trouble and must have more psychological damage than is usually the

case because the client has not begun to feel the certainties which the therapist knows to be the case, because his theoretical commitment tells him so. The client believes the therapist and enters therapy three times a week in order to express his feelings that he has allegedly "obliterated all these years".

A specific task of therapy is analysing and discussing psychological problems in contexts, to formulate action. The work of theory is to argue for a context of how to construct a means of judging between interpretations of the sort stated above. Judging between these instances requires description, comparison and interpretation. But primarily, paying attention to what is felt, and speaking about it, are fundamental. What is felt may be open to change and the inaccurate emotions of situations (2) and (4). It is possible to lessen existing or misleading consequences. For instance, to live through the false emotions of type (2), and find that they lessen and alter in-line with a wider experience of current events. This could increase the prevalence of type (1) emotions and emotional expressions. The hypothesis is that accurate emotions of type (1) and inaccurate ones of type (2) are both born of social learning and reality testing, inside and outside the family, and accrue across the years. Type (3) is about having clear aims in relation to others but where clients should force themselves towards good outcomes, contrary to their emotions. The problems of type (4) above are theoretically-induced problems in the main although it has to be said that lack of communication with clients can end up in therapists getting the wrong end of the stick.

The suggestion here is to focus on conscious emotions and senses in a move to greater emotional and intellectual awareness of what it is to relate. The purpose is to link emotional and intellectual awareness about relating and address the ego and its free will. It is agreed that the after-effects of childhood and previous relationships influence the ego in a non-egoic, involuntary, mood-altering and habitual way. The ego can accept these influences for better or worse. In the case of corrosive and unhelpful influences, choice and effort are required by the ego in identifying what the bad influences are, and then working towards long-term satisfactions. All therapies assume this capability. If there were no capability for egos to choose and be able to work towards aims of their own volition, then a major aspect of being human would be omitted.

§65 When emotions are conscious

In brief, something needs to be noted about Husserl's view of the unconscious. His work did extend to a "phenomenology of the so-called unconscious", (2001, §33, p 201). For him, this included "dreamless sleep, loss of consciousness, and whatever else of the same or similar nature may be included", (1970b, §55, p

188). The sense of the unconscious is that it exists in relation to the conscious. "Every concrete datum of the sphere of the living present is submerged … in the phenomenal past, succumbs to retentional transformation and thereby necessarily leads into the region of affective nullity into which it is incorporated and in which it is not nothing", (2001, §35, p 216). Yet what is not present exerts an affective influence.

To cut a long story short, for Husserl consciousness is a limited space in which presences vie for attention within any moment. What appears perceptually is not just the current environment of self, others, ideas and place. In a broadened sense, what can appear are the presentiated senses of recollection, anticipation and association that present fleeting visual and auditory images. Once-experienced objects can persevere in consciousness (App 19, p 519). What drives this and makes sense overall are passive involuntary processes that are not wholly under the control of the ego and exist at a remove from it. In overview, what is being referred to is the cumulative ability of retentional consciousness to record automatically and replay what has happened before. Insodoing, what retentional consciousness does is enable new sense in each moment. What retentional consciousness does is passively select pre-constituted meaning of various sorts (associations, past events, perceptions, social contexts, etc) and donate them to what perceptions appear now. (Whether that is perception or imagination, recollection or anticipation or empathy of another and their perspective).

What the ego is about is that it has choice and can attend to what appears. It can also choose to turn away from what does appear, in favour of something else altogether different. What happens in any present moment is that it has the personal history of what is potentially existent, for it to turn to. The presences that appear are due to factors including relevance, trauma and overall influential force. What the ego does is to make intellectual donations of sense. It can also make purposeful commitments to some end-points that will necessitate the expenditure of effort to overcome negative emotion and endure hardship in order to move towards its goal.

§66 Social skills for practice

The new interpretation of emotions and experience begun in section 64 above can now be completed in light of the clarification of the last section. Where the phrase "social skills" comes into play is that effort is made towards an aim. The model of relating is that *good understanding leads to effective action and satisfaction.* Specifically, the therapist's work is enabling clients to understand, look after themselves and lead satisfying lives. From the client's perspective, the work is

overcoming false beliefs, painful emotions and undoing long-standing habits, the 'automatic gear change' of consciousness. In overview, the four-way classification of emotion applies to both parties in therapy. First, let us take the case of clients.

For clients, the current emotion they feel might be veridical or not. Often clients choose not to express their feelings about the relationship with the therapist. The reasons for this have been empirically found as wanting to appease their therapist and maintain the contact, despite ensuing drawbacks (Rennie, 1994, more of this below). (There might be the material cause of emotion if a person has a lifelong tendency to be angry, anxious or depressed irrespective of circumstances).

There might be preconscious objects that are currently not in consciousness. If preconscious objects were to become conscious for clients, in thought, emotion or another form of intentionality, then they would become the topic of discussion. What is manifest for clients is their attempt at asking for help, mixed with their style of relating in the therapeutic relationship. Clients co-empathise various senses of therapists and their perspective. The outcomes are emotions and thoughts about how clients believe they are being understood and helped. The understanding that clients make can be inaccurate. Alternatively, they could think themselves into staying in the therapeutic relationship, despite any discomfort they may have about it and what they co-empathise of the therapist's manner. They could conclude that good possibilities will outweigh the negative feelings incurred in receiving help. Particularly for clients who have had traumatic experiences, there is a greater likelihood that their co-empathic understanding is skewed in some telling way.

For therapists, on the other hand, the current emotions they feel about being with clients in the moment might be veridical or not. Therapists generally choose not to express their emotions about clients, nor mention the effects that clients have on them. Therapists might have false feelings because of their own tendency to be fearful, for instance. Or they can confidently create a secure relation that aids being open and shows psychological availability. Such an attitude is demonstrable to clients in their demeanour and manner of treating and responding. It is open for explanation and responsive.

What therapists co-empathise of clients is their manner of asking for help and the psychological implications of their problems. Generally, some of the tasks are encouraging self-care, reducing a punitive self-relation or reducing impulsivity (increasing self-control). Where therapists are different to clients is that they supply new contexts of understanding and modes of explanation. Clinical reasoning becomes explicit when shared. Therapists interpret clients in the hermeneutic sense, when they consider the evidence, make sense of it through theory and

decide on its meaning, one way or another. The full range of therapeutic speech acts is large and cannot be presented here. Suffice to say for the moment that the therapeutic aims of a specific therapy are achieved through a variety of social skills, where therapists must choose how to act in the course of each 50-minute hour. Some of the intermediate aims are to prepare the way for future interventions, to allocate time to specific topics, to free the client's ego from impediments to less harsh understanding, to promote change, to make conscious specific objects that are currently preconscious, to ask for feedback and monitor progress and mental states. Some specific skills can be listed as knowing when to comment on feelings; as opposed to containing the feelings and not speaking about them, in order to find out more about what is happening: This involves taking some emotional discomfort, but not too much.

Formal hermeneutic understanding of emotion is conceptually higher than the emotions themselves: This means that the intellectual understanding about emotion is not emotional itself. It is possible for emotions to be overridden, ignored and mis-understood. For all persons, there can be poor *self-awareness*, which really means that the actor does not understand the effects that they are having on others. For therapists, to ignore one's feelings is as poor practice as impulsively acting on them because the overall aims of practice are being ignored.

An intersubjective way of understanding human relationships is one that captures more of the interaction between people. Clients will be sorely disappointed if they believe that all therapists are perfect, omniscient beings who will adore them forever. The therapeutic relationship is oddly impersonal and purposefully professional and not two-way intimacy as in social relationships. An intersubjective view of the therapeutic relationship understands it in the context of ordinary life. A good, intimate relationship in the everyday world is one in which if the other does something wrong, self can point it out and the other apologises and explains. "Kiss and make up" are a bad choice of words to describe this in therapy meetings but the sentiment is correct: It is necessary to resolve differences of opinion and appreciate the others' viewpoint. However different they are. Compromise, negotiation and explanation are the necessary social skills rather than just assertion.

The opposite is also true: bearing a grudge, the desire to hit back, the refusal of the other's perspective as being at all valid—are all corrosive of co-operation in therapy and are corrosive of security, love and intimacy in other types of relationship. A series of problems can be diagnosed as the assumptions that all and every contact with a therapist will feel positive, that there will be no negative consequences of changing, that no effort will be expended in making those changes

and that there will be no conflict or differences of opinion in therapy. What is being offered is a potential to understand the interplay between self and other, where both parties choose how to play their cards. Something should be stated about the basic principles that are being given credibility.

The stance presented in chapter 10 is a general one that, explains theoretically, actual instances co-empathy and intersubjectivity. What this philosophy of psychology perspective requires is something from therapy in general, in order to create a phenomenologically-informed practice. The work of Edward Bordin (1979) is sufficient to sketch principles that can supplement theory to create a forthright model that makes informed consent, agreement of focus and rationales for the talk and action that are being offered, central concerns. When such openness, accountability and the desire to explain the principles of treatment are offered, this may further increase the ability to create a secure therapeutic relationship.

In the light of David Rennie (1994), there are further parameters that need to be born in mind. Rennie researched the reasons why clients do not voice their dissatisfaction with therapy. A dissatisfaction that may lead to clients leaving the work half-done. The main finding was that clients, who leave or stay, all experience dissatisfaction. All clients who stay in therapy '*swallow*' their dissatisfaction in deference to their helper. Because of:

• a fear of criticising their therapist

• a desire to meet the expectations of the therapy

• acceptance that therapists have limitations to understand and help

• a fear of threatening the self-esteem of therapists

• feeling indebted to therapists, clients do not mention negative topics.

The point is that good relationships in therapy are similar to good relationships in ordinary life. For therapists to provide help, they need to pre-empt ruptures in the relationship and ensure its longevity through being open to criticism and different views of their helpfulness. In connection to co-empathy and intersubjectivity, a relationship is the on-going outcome of the contributions of two parties. This is obvious yet it does need emphasising in case it gets lost. Both parties 'cause' the relationship to be the way it is. With reference to Freud, meaning is not handed out to an inert recipient. Secondly, therapists should not act on their feelings, particularly angry indignance and hit back. The negative things left

unsaid on either side of the therapeutic relationship need to be brought out in a controlled way, to learn positively from them and move to a mutually positive place. If criticism and other negative feelings are stifled, then it will only impair the help requested and provided. What there should be is a tempering of the views of clients with the understanding of therapists that interprets the views of clients.

Freud also wanted clients to be able to interpret themselves. But, there is no excuse for therapists to rationalise their anger as "giving feedback" or "being honest," when all they are doing is wanting to get even. Yet therapists are ordinary human beings. They too can be lacking in co-empathy and bear a grudge. It is part of Freud's good legacy to make therapists reflect on what their feelings mean.

§67 Discussion

This chapter has argued that emotions can be interpreted most usefully in four different ways. They can be noted as intersubjective communication and inter-responsiveness that are socially learned and maintained. Emotions are either (1) accurate or (2) inaccurate. If an understanding is accurate, it is so with respect to a wide experience of a person or type of situation. Alternatively, following Adler, Ellis and cognitive behavioural therapy, emotions can be the products of belief and thought in language and internal dialogue. These too can also be (3) accurate or (4) inaccurate productions.

Human relationships are hardly ever based on the truth from both parties. If this were the case, then it would mean the capacity to receive negative feedback would have to be very high. Therapists have to be able to know how to interpret how they feel. If at assessment, and being with a person who is highly anxious, where the therapist wants to help but due to current crises and the client's coping style, and there is little if anything to recommend any form of help currently, then the strong emotional reaction of therapists needs to be understood as the result of intersubjective implication due to being with an agitated client. If a therapist were utterly calm and felt nothing throughout such a meeting, there would be a problem. It is only expectable to feel the plight of clients and want to help yet logically to know that help would have to be planned and agreed with clients and provided at a time when they can use it and only if clients have a good likelihood of being able to use it. Similarly, if therapists are agitated, then the quality of assessment provided will be low.

Any emotional experience is a sense of the actual relationship so far. It is in accord with the perspectives of the two parties involved. One's own experience of the relationship is never sufficient, when only taken by itself, for understanding

the whole. Clients' experiences must be sought and involved. How therapists are non-verbally is an inexplicit background communication that is co-empathised by clients.

Theory serves the purpose of making one's own position clear to oneself and capable of inspection, refutation, discussion and informed consent. The interpretative conditions for practice are conceptual intentionality about the experiences of distress and recovery, the provision of care and its receipt. Phenomenology is the originator of the idea of intersubjectivity and it is concordant with the empirical body of knowledge known as attachment research that champions this term to describe intimate relating. The perspectives of others are proven in everyday life in a secure setting. Co-empathy is part of human relating and a simultaneous occurrence. *Emotion is a basic understanding of the current attachment relation and an expression of self to other and about the other towards self.* Furthermore, to know someone is to predict accurately how he or she will respond in various situations.

A great part of therapeutic work is co-empathising the negative emotions of others. Understanding one's own similar experiences through the intellect, social learning, guesswork or other means, in knowing what they mean psychologically. At times, even very experienced therapists will be choked with negative emotion themselves. Potentially, the most professional thing to do is to suppress it. But if that is impossible, to express it in such a way as to not take the focus off clients but explain oneself as a fellow human being who is not made of steel.

Another way of looking at therapy is to understand part of the job as "taking out the rubbish". It is not possible to do the work without feeling some negativity with respect to what clients bring. There are the pleasures of seeing clients get better and that is a genuine satisfaction. However, part of the role of therapists is to "take out the rubbish" in that it is an occupational hazard and inevitable that therapists need to understand themselves and not be hypocritical with their clients. If therapists cannot process the negative emotion they feel, they should not be seeing clients who have that level of difficulty. For therapists, the skill is being tolerant of the negativity from clients 'caused' by merely being open to their plight and understanding the full impact of what they are saying. However, a model of therapy without some means of interpreting such emotions is not functional, as it has no account of the inevitable effects of doing the work. Such emotions are clues for how to work and need to be personally digested. It would be pointless and hypocritical if therapists felt uncomfortable with their jobs, when what they are trying to do is help clients be comfortable with themselves.

I offer another reading of the therapeutic relationship: the utility of the therapeutic relationship is that clients are attached to their therapists because of the

help they provide. When the quality of the therapeutic relationship is positive, clients anticipate they will be helped. Then therapists and the therapy are bestowed with value according to the hopefulness of clients and the help received. Clients may get some sort of resolution of their problems. A corollary is that if clients feel their needs are not being met, or doubt the ability of therapists to understand or help, then a negative valuation will occur (something similar to what John Shlien (1987) has suggested). In this latter situation, clients might be angry, critical and withdraw, if they interpret the therapeutic relationship negatively.

§68 Conclusion

The lack of an account of meaning and relating is odd as all of life is meaningful. It is difficult to have an absence of meaning. If there were to be an absence, ideas would rush in to fill the gap. On the contrary, there should be credible accounts of the ways in which social processes create, maintain, permit, destroy and alter psychological meaning. Husserl took conscious senses seriously and worked to find the freedoms and limitations of meaning for a community. Thus, informing what can and cannot be included in a view of human inter-relationship.

The problems with interpretations concerning the unconscious and preconscious communication are that (1) concepts, and (2), therapeutic procedures arising from these, occur in haste. Any epistemological, ontological and hermeneutic lack of clarity between theory and phenomena should be lessened, even though theory and practice are closely related. Imprecise concepts help define therapeutic practices that can, at best, only promote random occurrences. The lack of clarity about what is conscious as opposed to preconscious, and a means of consensual agreement about the relation between conscious and preconscious is required. An absence of clarity will inevitably lead to ethical blunders and poor practice. Everyone interprets intentionalities in the individual. Therapy must not miss the psychosocial reality of the phenomena. Therapists claim to be able to identify and cure psychological suffering. If we are without certainty in therapy and the psychological world, any amelioration through therapy is the result of happenstance and not skill.

In presenting the interim conclusions of this chapter, several topics have been assumed. The typology of emotions above was specifically expressed without mentioning to whom they belong. What is being suggested is that the 'causes' of emotions relate to past and current contexts. Emotions that are due to social learning are primary and need to be understood as a mutual task for discussion, by client and therapist. Secondary emotions are those that arise due to explicit

belief and most often, internal dialogue. Attachment is most instinctual in child-hood, but at all times it is intersubjective in that it relates self and others together. Previous attachment experiences accrue and are very influential. Adults can have several default positions according to the history of their specific and overall relations with others. What is sure is that natural psychological science is not properly equipped to capture these meta-representational differences (Owen, 2006b). The next two chapters deal with hermeneutics, the need to understand time and the way intentionality crosses contexts.

PART V

Developing a hermeneutic pure psychology

The next two chapters explore and present conclusions on temporality, hermeneutics and psychological meaningfulness. This is because such ideas are utterly necessary to understand ordinary experience or experimentation in psychology. No experimentalism in the usual sense can explain what it is to be influenced by one's past. These chapters are theoretical and take what is most useful from Husserl and Heidegger. This part explains the necessity of hermeneutics for all therapies and psychology. The attention to detail is necessary to justify how therapy makes sense.

Fundamental contexts are considered within the qualitative experience of living through the lifespan and being surrounded by others. What is presented below is not a logical rationality but a psyche-logic. In order to understand the psychological life, a second phenomenological philosopher, Martin Heidegger, is considered to add two necessary topics. Chapter 14 introduces *hermeneutics* and chapter 15 *temporality*. Both must be understood to gain the desired vantage point of what it means to understand the qualitative life. Details are provided so that differences between the approaches of Husserl and Heidegger can be grasped.

In the original works of Dilthey, Husserl and Heidegger, the level of argument remained abstract and never commented on psychotherapy or practice. For the purpose of this work, merely interpreting intentionality is insufficient. What is required is a self-reflexive understanding of what psychological interpretation concerns to understand its limits. It is accepted that co-empathy is the process that gives the perspective of others. It plays a major role in co-constituting the common sense of cultural objects in the meaningful life (Owen, 2004).

The point of hermeneutics below is for the purpose of psychological interpretation. The early work of Heidegger is relevant to broadening the perspective espoused so far. The points below are a rationalisation and contextualisation. The point is passing on *how* to interpret, so that matters can be discussed with clients themselves. Hermeneutics in therapeutic practice requires a jump into the unknown as a way of arguing what problematic phenomena make sense with respect to which specified processes of the on-set and maintenance of problems.

14

Heidegger on hermeneutics

Aim: This chapter considers how to attend to psychological objects and processes in a hermeneutic way. It sketches some aspects of hermeneutics as they apply to psychological meaning. It does this by making a contrast with Husserl's view of how to use reductions to create attitudes. The purpose of this focus on hermeneutics is to understand formulation, psychopathology and the role of belief in action.

The promise of Martin Heidegger for therapy is mostly acknowledged within the German language literature and existential therapy. The contribution of Heidegger concerns applying a hermeneutic phenomenology to ontology. What this means is that the being of the human being, our manner of existing and understanding, should be considered prior to more complex facets like gender, sexuality, race or culture. Heidegger's approach avoids taking the natural and naturalistic attitudes. This chapter makes explicit some points that will enable understanding later on. This chapter moves from a priori preparations towards the psychological reality of the therapy situation—where there are two sentient beings who live in a shared, conscious meaningful world. The expectation is that the therapy profession should go further than the public in being able to show how accurate interpretation can be demonstrated.

Husserl and Heidegger worked within the same branch of philosophy and both were in broad agreement about the role of phenomenology for psychology. Heidegger's hermeneutic position understands through comparison and revelation. He argued that an immersion in an experience or topic will inevitably refine understanding. How it refines is that it provides a more accurate understanding with respect to the referent that supersedes any understanding from an earlier time. This could be called the *revelation of insight in comparison to hindsight*. The understanding of the present is more accurate than that of the past, if and only if the object under consideration has been attended to more fully. What concerns us is how to attend to psychological objects, events and processes. Heidegger did

not concentrate on consciousness or intentionality, nor did he create a detailed a priori analysis of empathy in *Being and Time,* his most famous and influential work, first published in 1927.

However, the way to begin understanding Heidegger is to return to the work of Kant. Rather than avoid details and difficulties, they are tackled with reference to both.

§69 A Kantian introduction

Kant, Husserl and Heidegger agreed that philosophical purposes must be satisfied prior to any practice of psychology (and the same for psychotherapy). Theory and practice co-exist and practice is the ground for theory. Because theory guides practice, any lack of understanding of meaning implies there will be unclear practice. The word "*Da-sein*" means human being and it is kept here to reflect the flavour of Heidegger's way of expressing himself.

Heidegger made an allusion to Kant in section nine of *Being and Time* that is most telling and a good way of explaining how Heidegger's version of phenomenology. Heidegger wrote that: "All explications arising from an analytic of Dasein are gained with a view toward its structure of existence. Because these explications are defined in terms of existentiality, we shall call the characteristics of being of Da-sein existentials. They are to be sharply delimited from the determinations of being of those beings unlike Da-sein which we call categories", (1996, §9, p 42). This explanatory note refers to "*categories*," and implies the term "*schemata*". Both are part of Kant's overall approach to interpreting consciousness and its faculties. The statement from Heidegger makes a parallel between the existentials of Da-sein and the categories of Kant. Some explanation is required to grasp the allusion. Let us start with the term "schema" (plural schemata) as it is portrayed in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. "Schematism" means the process of creating schemata.

Kant argued that temporality is most fundamental in unifying perception in the present moment and that this is also the case for all higher understanding in language (Gardner, 1999, p 169). What Kant called the "transcendental unity of apperception," (1993, p 142/B 175) is the unity of the ego across time, a most fundamental condition of possibility for self-consciousness, for knowing, acting and all forms of intentionality: Namely, that experiences are experienced as one's own and not someone else's. If this were not the case, there would be confusion about who had experienced what and in what order these experiences had occurred. The connection between *category* and *schematism* is that the categories need to be understood as temporal.

Kant argued that there is a mediating principle in consciousness that connects concepts to rough sensual and perceptual experience: This mediating principle is his use of the word "imagination". The imagination for Kant exists in time and is a structuring intentionality that follows identifiable rules and produces specific instances of sense and image, in the unity of space and time. The imagination is an a priori ability of consciousness to create any understanding and structure conscious experience. The imagination connects linguistic concepts in understanding, through schemata as pre-conceptual essences, to produce specific conscious sense-images of a referent, perceptual object.

Once Kant is understood in this respect, it becomes possible to grasp how Husserl and Heidegger followed. Firstly, let us understand how Heidegger followed Kant's lead. Heidegger agreed that a priori Being-structures in Da-sein's understanding and temporality are capable of projecting their fore-conceptions on to the world, to create specific senses of beings in space and time, out of that world. Heidegger's interpretation is Kantian in that it identified fundamental pre-conceptual ordering and structuring schemata, in division two of *Being and Time,* that are equivalent to Kant's definition of the imagination. Heidegger worked to find non-propositional existential schemata that are part of Da-sein's temporalizing and practical abilities. This did not commit Heidegger to the idea that there are pictures in the head. What it did commit him to is the idea of projecting understanding onto the world and finding meaningful objects within it. Thus, we begin to understand what Heidegger meant by "existential," "category" and "authentic" and how he made reference to *schema* and *imagination* in Kant. (Husserl also argued for the existence of an intentional means of generating specific objects that fit concepts in language yet are themselves preconceptual 'rules' in consciousness). The explanation could get very detailed here and only the simplest remarks can be made.

Heidegger's interpretative stance concerned finding an "unequivocal and ontologically adequate answer to the question of the *kind of being* of this being that we ourselves are", (1996, §10, p 46). He wrote: ""*A priorism*" is the method" that "has nothing to do with construction, the investigation of the a priori requires the proper preparation of the phenomenal foundation. The nearest horizon which must be prepared for the analytic of Da-sein lies in its average everydayness", (note 10, p 401). This means that philosophy must understand the a priori principles and dimensions, the limits, of human understanding itself, for it to be self-reflexive in its ability to understand any topic. Hence for Heidegger, psychology and the attention to consciousness are superficialities. For him they assume an understanding of the manners of existence of Da-sein and beings gen-

erally, in order to be understood adequately. This is why *Being and Time* must not be read as a psychology text for therapy, as a replacement for empirical psychology or as learning from the practice of therapy. It is a priori analysis of what resides in human being in its context, a hermeneutics of the actuality of living, called Being-in-the-world, where "world" means the totality of references of understanding.

Nothing will be made of Heidegger's development of the concept of the world from Husserl, apart from noting that it was Husserl who had begun thinking about the relation of consciousness to the meaningful world in 1913 (Husserl, 1982, §27), and to the myriad cultural objects within it, prior to Heidegger borrowing a copy of *Ideas II* in 1925 (1989b, §§50–52). For instance, the residuum of the world is mentioned in Husserl's *Ideas I* (1982, §50, p 113).

However, the term "category" in Kant is linked to his understanding of schema as a go-between, in the middle of understanding and base experience. The categories are 12 concepts of pre-understanding that Kant believed are employed in all understanding. What Kant, Husserl and Heidegger share is the assertion that all understanding appears within human experience overall. In this sense there is no outside to human experience and understanding. All that is believed to exist or not, lies within a shared human whole (Kant, 1993, p 13/B xi, p 125/A 105).

Let us consider Heidegger's use of the terms "existential" and "authentic". Let us take existential first. The a priori interpretation of everyday conscious experience is a transcendental form of constraining the proper mode of philosophical argument, rationality and hermeneutics, concerning what is revealed. Heidegger produced a new form of transcendental argument of the sort that existentials can be revealed and that reductions can be used, but only to a limited extent. The conclusion is Kantian: any resulting rationality can only ever be contextually-bound (historically and culturally situated). First, philosophy must be constrained by acknowledgement of the existentials. Hence science, psychology and therapy would also need to be constrained in that way. Secondly and in brief, "authentic" means interpreting Da-sein in the right way. Da-sein is temporal and in a world because of its temporality: namely *Zeit* (the "three ecstases" of past, present and future) is what creates a meaningful world. The claim is that this is the genuine means of understanding Da-sein in an a priori fashion. It is the assertion that making sense of a situation has to be concluded one way or another.

In criticism of Heidegger, with the exception of section 69 in division two of *Being and Time*, there is no reason to recommend expressing the ontological a priori, (the existentials of the being of Da-sein, §9, p 42), solely in relation to

temporality without any connection to intentionality and conscious senses. The problem is that the clear statement about Da-sein's temporality, as the "Interpretation of Da-sein in Terms of Temporality and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon of the Question of Being," (p viii) is not clearly communicated in division two of the book. Despite the clear statement that "we need an *original explication of time as the horizon of the understanding of being, in terms of temporality as the being of Da-sein which understands being*", (§4, p 15). Overall, the assertion that temporality makes all meaning of being possible, is inadequately expressed. Nor is it any improvement over Husserl's assertions of the fundamentality of temporality in *Time* that date from the year 1900 (Husserl, 1991). Furthermore, there is some confusion about what is the most basic a priori of Da-sein. Assertions about the most fundamental temporal ecstasis (sic temporality in conjunction with intentionality that is not egoic but passive and automatic) are confused. This is because Heidegger's most frequent manner of argumentation is not simply temporal but also historical. Section 83 shows his dismay at what he had produced (Heidegger, 1996).

The next section turns attention to a paper where Heidegger did give credibility to intentionality in psychology to some degree, although he did argue for an attention to being, hence interpreting temporality and history according to *Being and Time*. It is important to take the positives from Heidegger and use them to understand the therapy situation.

§70 Heidegger's stance on pure psychology

Although there is no specific mention of hermeneutics in Heidegger's draft of the definition of phenomenology for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* in 1927, ("draft B," Heidegger, 1997a), the following remarks show how he did agree with a good deal of what Husserl thought. The section below also mentions how the two men differed and states one conclusion on these differences.

Although the manner of expression is different, a great deal of the object, method and function of a pure psychology is the same for Husserl and Heidegger. Indeed, Heidegger's presentation is clearer and more succinct in relation to *Phenomenology* (Husserl, 1997c) and the *Amsterdam Lectures* (Husserl, 1997d). The content of Heidegger's paper shows that both men focused on understanding consciousness and that everyday lived experiences of self and other, in culture and society, are intentional. What is most apparent in the unpublished paper for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* is that Heidegger made meta-representational distinctions about the different types of intentionality that can be interpreted to exist, in relation to different senses of a referent.

For instance, the following passage marks the central distinction between a sense and its referent. "Whether or not what-is-perceived in the perception is itself truly present at hand, the perception's intentional act-of-meaning … is nonetheless directed to the entity as bodily present. Any perceptual illusion makes this plain. Only because the perceiving as intentional essentially has its *intentum*, can it be modified into a deception about something", (Heidegger, 1997a, p 113). Contemporarily, this distinction is called meta-representation and is defined in section 79. For Heidegger, the pure psychology method of psychological reduction is a "reflection," (strictly an interpretation) of how it is to have lived experiences of different sorts.

Heidegger noted that reflecting on intentionalities is itself intentional and that the means of coming to a conclusion is to apply eidetic imaginative variation of possibilities, in order to find the invariant and necessary forms of the link between intentionality and sense, about the same referent. Clearly, his remarks were not on behalf of Husserl's position. Indeed, Heidegger clarified the situation that a "phenomenology of *empathy*" leads to understanding actual others and our co-existence with them (p 115). Specifically, it is the eidetic reduction of finding a priori that shows meta-representational differences between different types of intentionality, similarly, to Husserl's position in *Philosophy as Rigorous Science* (1981), *Phenomenology and the Foundation of the Sciences* (1980), *Study in the Phenomenology of Constitution* (1989b) and *Phenomenological Psychology* (1977b). For Heidegger, pure psychology is a pure a priori discipline that stands with respect to empirical psychology in the same way that maths grounds natural science. What this means is that Heidegger repeated Husserl's basic points in his definition of pure psychology (1997a, p 116). Heidegger's letter of 22 October 1927 to Husserl, that accompanied his draft of the paper that he was trying to co-author with Husserl for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* also provides some insights into what Heidegger agreed with Husserl on the character of pure psychology. Although Heidegger argued for an attention to being he agreed that the study of the body, somatology and pure psychology "are possible only on the basis of the concrete wholeness of the human being, and this wholeness as such is what primarily determines the human being's mode of being", (1997b, p 138). This is interesting because the body is entirely absent from *Being and Time*.

The way in which Heidegger's stance differed from Husserl's is the focus on the being of human being: how we understand and live. Heidegger insisted that it should be treated by reaching "back beyond the region of the pure psychic", (1997a, p 109), in an a priori analysis of Da-sein in its various contexts. In a repetition of his previous criticisms, the alleged problem with pure psychology is that

it is epistemologically-driven; whereas the being of consciousness should be understood. For Heidegger, psychology should be ontologically-driven.

Focusing on the commonalities rather than the differences between Husserl and Heidegger resolves their differences. In the final analysis, the two men were too heavily invested, each in his own manner of argument, to agree that consciousness is intentional and whether it is referred to as pure consciousness or the being of Da-sein, makes no difference. The problem is that they talked at cross-purposes. Husserl should have adopted hermeneutics more explicitly—and Heidegger should have acknowledged how Husserl had made valuable distinctions about the being of consciousness. The promise and the challenge of phenomenology that is shared by both is to produce clear assertions about how a common world of meaningfulness occurs, so that meta-representational distinctions can be made, concerning concrete instances of everyday experience. Only then does it become possible to compare and contrast beliefs and the typical forms of intentionality involved.

The upshot for therapy is to help people identify what are the key issues in their experiences and help them reconsider their perspective on those experiences. For instance, away from the conclusion that their lives and themselves are futile. The nature of the change for the future is that clients can become more optimistic and gain real satisfaction. The outcome for therapy should be some readily accessible means to help clients and therapists discuss and interpret the key features of psychological distress, on the way to an increase in quality of life—if such an increase is at all possible.

By way of sidling up to one of Heidegger's major themes of reference in the world (sic intentionality in context) let us consider his novel approach to understand our intentional embededness in a meaningful world.

§71 Five reductions in *Being and Time*

There are five reductions in *Being and Time,* each revealing a region of being and Da-sein's transcending towards the world in a different way. Thus, re-presenting Husserl's starting point (§28 above). For Heidegger, reductions are hermeneutic and only ever partially remove concealments of meaning. What Heidegger was implying in *Being and Time* is that Husserl's reduction is *insufficient to break all currently existing references, everyday conceptualisations and the overall historical weight of interpretative influence that permeates interpreting and living.* For Heidegger, the attempt at philosophical reduction needs to keep within achievable limits. For him, retained personal learning and the current influence of the immediate surrounding world are sufficient to render any attempt at reduction

incomplete. Any attempt at a reduction cannot entirely break associations with history, language and the natural attitude—although it should strive to do so. Therefore, Husserl's interpretation for instance, is only partially effective and never loses the influence from history and others.

The first and most explicit reduction in *Being and Time* is a philosophical and historical one that is the same as the one defined by Husserl in 1913 (1982, §18, p 34). Heidegger appropriated this without reference to *Ideas I*, as a freeing act of violence towards naturalizing beliefs and tendencies. This philosophical reduction aims to open out any instance of hermeneutic circularity and projection and satisfy the requirement to understand manners of being or existence (1996, §6, p 22). This could be called a philosophical reduction or a "destructive retrieve", (Kocklemans, 1977). Heidegger explained it this way: "Construction in philosophy is necessarily destruction, that is to say, a de-constructing of traditional concepts carried out in a historical recursion to the tradition", (Heidegger, 1982, §6, p 23). This sentence expresses Heidegger's main philosophical thrust: There should be a return to original experience of what being is, in order to ground ontology. Some sort of revolution and revelation are necessary to create philosophical rationality. However, all meanings are bound to a context of culture, person and history. It is quite impossible to break entirely free of them. Thus a certain sort of relativism is created that rests within an absolute belief in ontology.

For Heidegger, consciousness, for instance, cannot be known prior to analysis of human being. Analyses of the "fore-structures" and "as-structures" of any form of being in various contexts, contemporary and historical, must be carried out before phenomenological philosophy, or a reformed science of psychology, can proceed. In agreement with Husserl, the aim of the philosophical reduction and disclosure is that a necessary destruction of belief in established wisdom should take place. But only with the positive intention of keeping philosophy and the natural sciences within their true limits, so producing a reformed and philosophically-grounded understanding of their objects.

However, satisfying this philosophical intention is not the only reduction present in the text of *Being and Time*. Other situations are put to use in showing how we can have direct access to good information. For instance, an immediate stripping away of the usual assumptions and meaning occurs when a tool goes missing. This is a second reduction through the interruption of everyday tacit, preconscious or unthematized experience. What could be called a mistake reduction (1996, §16, Bernet, 1994). This is a species of reduction by the interruption of the *Umsicht,* circumspect everyday natural attitude towards the ordinary matters of our dealings in the world (Heidegger, 1996, §16, p 68, p 69). This is a

reduction by the accidental disclosure of a mistaken assumption, quite different from the latter, formal and purposeful abandoning of the history of philosophy. For instance, only when our car does not start do we realise our full dependence on it, breakdown trucks and motor mechanics. Emotionally, it would be possible to express this same distinction as "you don't know what you've got 'til its gone" with reference to broken relationships, bereavement and other losses. Although these latter psychological cases are not the ones that Heidegger mentioned in *Being and Time*.

A third reduction of natural attitude meaning occurs through the experience of *Angst* in which the assumptions of having a home, in a safe and well-known world, are temporarily eradicated (§40, p 174–8). In the *Angst* reduction, the world loses its previous significance (p 174) and it is forcibly revealed to each one of us how we are, how we exist (p 176). Da-sein's real home is not the one it thought it had (Ibid). The experience of *Angst* is a violent and sporadic reduction that forces Da-sein to understand itself (p 178). What Heidegger was claiming was that the experience of *Angst* could be called panic or an unknown dread. It is not a fear of a specific something or someone. What this panic reveals is that we are only ever in 'temporary housing'. We are individuals and ultimately alone (p 176).

Fourth, there is the reduction to temporality: to understand the role of time in human experience and what that reveals of the genuine ground of the being of Da-sein and its understanding. One specific comment is that the "existential-temporal analysis of Da-sein requires in its turn a new retrieve in the context of a fundamental discussion of the concept of being", (§66, p 306). This comment refers to the aim of section 66, to find the *"Temporality of Da-sein and the Tasks Arising from It of a More Primordial Retrieve of the Existential Analysis"*, (p 304). The specific aim of finding the "primordial phenomenon of temporality will be made secure by demonstrating that all the fundamental structures of Da-sein exposed up to now are to be basically conceived "temporally"", (§61, p 281). This aim is carried out in section 69. The temporal reduction itself is in force in remarks such as:

> The mode in which time "allowed" "elapses," … [it] can be phenomenally explicated only if, on the one hand, we avoid the theoretical "representation" of a continuous stream of nows, and if on the other hand, the possible modes in which Da-sein gives and allows itself time are to be conceived of as primarily determined in terms of how it "has" its time in a manner corresponding to its actual existence.

§79, p 276–7.

The above is nothing more than a repetition of Husserl's intention to explicate the synthesis of temporality and its eidetic structure, without imposing meanings and fitting "experiences into any reality", (1991, §2, p 9, written in 1904 or 1905).

Heidegger's conclusion on time was that: "Time is primordial as the temporalizing of temporality, and makes possible the constitution of the structure of care. Temporality is essentially ecstatic. Temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future. Primordial time is finite … the meaning of Da-sein is temporality", (1996, §65, p 304). What Heidegger meant was that Da-sein is temporal throughout. This is the authentic interpretation of human being that he argued for. For Heidegger, the authentic understanding of human beings is that they are temporal.

In making sense of the quotations from Heidegger above, the remarks need to be related to the overall movement of the second division. There are a couple of asides to the reader which state that the analysis is moving to focus on the being of *Zeit* and its implications (§78, p 371–2). This particular comment occurs sometime after a reminder that the general stance of Heidegger's phenomenology is using reductions to minimise the effect of the everyday understanding of time. "We must now keep the terminological use of this expression at a distance from all of the meanings of "future," "past," and "present" initially urging themselves upon us from the vulgar concept of time", (§65, p 300).

But Heidegger did not make detailed connections between *Zeit*, the future and hermeneutics. Generally, the precise effect of the temporal reduction is not clear. In section 69b, there is a brief return to the pragmatism of understanding what it means to use a hammer: "In our circumspect use of tools, we can say that the hammer is too heavy or too light. Even the sentence that the hammer is heavy can express a heedful deliberation …", (p 330–1). This is a brief return to the prior importance of being involved in a network of pre-reflexive understanding of *Umgang*, references, associations and dealings with tools. These topics are new versions of intentional implication and cultural objects. But the hammer example is the original property of Husserl from 1919: The …

> … vast manifold of meaning-objectivities … levels of meaning in physical things and subjectivities, are understandable … objectivities, and their scientific explanation is nothing else than just engendering understanding, clarifying motivations. I understand the significational unity that the word "hammer" expresses by relating it back to that which posits the end, to the subject creating at any time useful means for purposeful productions of a definite type. Means and end is a motivational relation and every more precise

investigation into the objective sense of tools is an explication of motivations … The hammer "is-to-be-useful," but it can be a good or a bad hammer … The "is-to-be" expresses the pretention, it expresses that it stands under the ideas of reason.

Husserl, 1996, pp 9–10.

The original sense of Husserl's remark is the same as *Being and Time,* section 15 (Heidegger, 1996, p 65). In Husserl's original lecture, he was arguing that the meaningful senses of cultural objects are found in their usage as a tool for something: "*Every explanation is directed towards a "because," causal explanation towards the unambiguous derivation of a factual existent from a previous factual existent*", (1996, p 9). The point is that cultural objects such as tools perform according to pre-set human intentions, as his summer lectures of 1925 showed so well (1977b, §16).

However, let us return to Heidegger. Fifth and finally, there is the theme of critical history and the necessity of making a decisive retrieve or *Wiederholung* that entails a historical comparison (Heidegger, 1996, §76, p 361–2, Thurnher, 1995). Heidegger argued for a return to the source of current references, meaning and the fundamental temporal constitution of being. Such an understanding of human being allegedly has its roots in pre-metaphysical, ancient Greek philosophy.

Consequently, all forms of Heideggerian reduction are philosophical and historical, and work to eradicate twenty-five centuries of the mis-interpretation of being. Its method is to side-step these allegedly erroneous traditions by a method based on comparison, etymology, empathising and imagining the historical past. Through this semantic and philological archaeology, Heidegger claimed it is possible to reactivate or make a reprise, a *Wiederholung*—a rediscovery of the original meaning. Heidegger urged ontology to begin a de-constructive comparison, where the contemporary ties of meaning are first violated, then checked with respect to the original meanings, practices and worldviews of the ancients. Through this comparative method, it is hoped to reveal more of the current phenomena and understand them, and explain them more accurately. He claimed that only through such a procedure of ontological investigation is it possible to reform philosophy and the empirical sciences.

Heidegger's five reductions are present in other areas of *Being and Time* for they are at root of all those places where being is revealed through one means or another. What this means for those who would care to follow, or even replicate Heidegger's phenomenology, is that phenomenologists are required to be violent

to assumptions and pay attention to what appears through the course of time. The significance of living in a world of meaning is that for the most part, a totality of meaning in the overall context of everyday life is assumed, ignored and not contemplated or made conscious.

Insomuch that Heidegger used reductions and made claims about what appears, his early work entailed distinguishing between false and accurate interpretations. However, the hermeneutic circle has to be made more flexible and the difference between accurate and inaccurate needs to be evaluated according to rationality about revealed experience.

§72 Hermeneutics in *Being and Time* and other works

The next thing to understand about Heidegger's phenomenology of being, its manners of existence, is that he claimed his work to be more fundamental than Husserl's in attending to being-in-the-world because the latter is the "foundation of intentionality", (Heidegger, 1982, §15c, p 161). His fundamentalism concerns understanding the modes of being generally, starting with the *being who understands*: Da-sein and its modes of being. In brief, he held that we already tacitly understand being a priori, in an indeterminate manner, in a context or horizon (a development of Husserl from *Ideas I,* 1982, §27, p 52). Heidegger: "If we did not understand, even though at first roughly and without conceptual comprehension, what actually signifies, then the actual would remain hidden from us … We must understand actuality, reality, vitality, existentiality, constancy in order to be able to comport ourselves positively toward specifically actual, real, living, existing, constant beings", (1982, §2, p 10–11). What this means is that interpretation of being, in the world of its beings, needs to happen (§15b). This should be formalised for philosophy to understand how human beings understand anything. Heidegger argued that philosophers and academics must be able to know what existence is before writing ontological propositions about what exists (1996, §1). Because all forms of knowing are part of human being, he urged finding the conditions of possibility of philosophy and science, as a starting point for a hermeneutic phenomenology (§4, p 10).

This general aim came from Husserl's *Ideas II* that Heidegger had borrowed, and from which he had found inspiration for his own project. The aim is agreed as a general one that requires a synthesis between an intentional analysis of context and the inter-relation between persons in Husserl's style, with an attention to tacit, preconscious understanding of referents that guide action, similarly to what Heidegger stated. What is adopted from Heidegger is his approach to hermeneutics that can be applied to the being of intentional intersubjective consciousness.

Officially, the perspective that is occupied in interpreting Da-sein's being is temporality as the ultimate horizon. This means that temporality is the most fundamental context for understanding human being. Heidegger's project of research of the being who understands includes a focus on the temporal ability to understand that Da-sein has or is: "we must show … *that—and in what way—the central range of problems of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time correctly viewed and correctly explained*", (Heidegger, 1996, §4, p 16). But, it has to be noted that history is a second proper horizon or context in which Da-sein's being should be interpreted.

Heidegger argued in a historical manner throughout his life's work, in comparing the contemporary with ancient understanding. An early rendition is: "The question of being attains true concreteness only when we carry out the destructuring of the ontological tradition. By so doing we can thoroughly demonstrate the inescapability of the question of the meaning of being and so demonstrate the meaning of our talk about a "retrieve" of this question", (§6, p 23). The meaning of the intention is clear—a comparative historical approach is being urged: One that clearly shows how being has been understood differently across the centuries. Heidegger's intention is to revitalise contemporary hermeneutics through connecting it with historically original interpretations. This is his reading of the historical and philosophical reductions in Husserl's *Ideas I* (1982, §18). Heidegger's comments on the need to show phenomena are crucial because "everything about them to be discussed must be directly indicated and directly demonstrated", (1996, §7c, p 30). But the phenomena of the temporal differences and their meanings for human being are apparent in their absence because Heidegger argued and did not show.

What this means is that when it comes to philosophical analysis prior to practising a therapy, historical comparisons of reference are the most important topic: It is necessary to show contemporary inadequacies by making evident the ancient Greek meanings of current words and actions (Cushman, 1995). But Heidegger always privileged the ancient over the contemporary and did not explore meanings with phenomenological openness. Nor did he generally attend to intentionality and relations between people except occasionally (Heidegger, 1996, §26).

Heidegger supported something like the hermeneutic circle in the traditional sense as have Wilhelm Dilthey, Emilio Betti (Palmer, 1969), Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975) and Hans Peter Rickman (1979, 1981, 1988, 1990, 1995, 1997, 2004). What is initially at stake is the nature of hermeneutics, the fundamental vantage point. For instance, in the case of there being a context of useful things, of tools, "with this totality the world makes itself known", (Heidegger, 1996,

§16, p 70). Heidegger applauded Wilhelm Dilthey and Count Yorck's approach to *Lebensphilosophie*. A hermeneutics of facticity for Heidegger should be an inherent interpretation of life following its contours: "one goal is to understand "life" philosophically and to secure for this understanding a hermeneutical foundation in terms of "life itself"", (§77, p 363). Put simply, an inherent understanding of life is demanded by living.

The major assertion by Heidegger about hermeneutics is that nothing is given outside the web of practical and conceptual references (§17). Rather, everything is interpreted from a specific position within a pre-existing order of referentiality (§18, p 78). These comments are entirely compatible with Husserl's position when it is realised that intentional implication between subjectivities, and between contexts of reference, is what is under consideration by Heidegger.

For Heidegger, even pre-predicative or pre-reflexive 'understanding' or presence is already interpreted in some way, as something. Being is understood in a pre-reflexive way: "The essential feature in every science, academia and philosophy included, is that it constitutes itself in the objectification of something already in some way unveiled, antecedently given. What is given can be a being that lies present before us, but it can also be being itself in the pre-ontological understanding of being", (Heidegger, 1982, §20b, p 281). What this means is that such pre-understanding is non-objective, unreflected, pre-conceptual and pre-ontological—in that it is unrefined and implicit; rather than explicit sets of statements. What Heidegger was urging was simplicity in order to avoid false problems (p 282). The answer is that it is an acceptable principle to reflect on prior understanding that shapes current interpretations of what appears. This remark is asserted as a guiding principle (Heidegger, 1996, §32, p 140–1, p 143, §69b, p 327–8). The right way to deal with understanding is to enter the hermeneutic circle and *rationally show how one understanding is more accurate than another*. One upshot for therapy is that talking will promote spontaneous changes in understanding for clients, perhaps without formal interventions and techniques.

As an aside, Husserl would have fully agreed with these comments about the importance of pre-reflexive syntheses. He had been working on them since at least 1905 (1991, App V). There are many ways in which Heidegger cites Husserl's working and conclusions. Chapter 15 will state a small number of the sources of Heidegger's conclusions in Husserl.

Let us return to the role of temporality in hermeneutics. Assumptions from the past occur in all types of understanding: "what is initially "there" is nothing else than the self-evident, undisputed prejudice of the interpreter", (Heidegger,

1996, §32, p 141). "Interpretation is never a presuppositionless grasping of something previously given", (Ibid). The purpose of a reduction is to take away concealment and show the being of phenomena and meanings of all kinds (§7c, p 31, cf Husserl, 1982, §55, p 129). Even the action of hammering is interpreted as a pre-reflexive form of understanding: "The primordial act of interpretation lies not in a theoretical sentence, but in circumspectly and heedfully putting away or changing the inappropriate tool "without wasting words". From the fact that words are absent, we may not conclude that the interpretation is absent", (Heidegger, 1996, §33, p 147). Such understanding is a revelation.

When Heidegger wrote that using a hammer involves pre-reflexive understanding of being, ""without wasting words"," what he meant was that human being is primarily practically involved in all that exists, even prior to thought and speech. What needs to happen is reflection in the optical sense of mirroring: "Dasein gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world itself, its own self is reflected to it from things", (Heidegger, 1982, §15b, p 159). (The same sense of reflection had already appeared in *Ideas I* (Husserl, 1982, §§130–132, 150–2)). Heidegger's point is that everyday un-reflected activities and preconceptions (beliefs) about being, ground its higher understanding in language (1996, §§33, 34). The consequence is that the omission of awareness, reflection and hermeneutics must not happen in philosophy or an ontologically-inspired therapy.

Being and Time urges a hermeneutics of manners of existence, starting with human existence and ideas. Being is always interpreted in some way and the hermeneutic circle must not be avoided but entered "in the right way", (§32, p 143). Heidegger adopted the idea of the hermeneutic circle from Johannes Chladenius, Friedrich Ast, Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey. For Dilthey, the first epistemological problem is differentiating between significant understanding and background experience. Hermeneutics is the answer demanded by this conundrum:

> The whole must be understood in terms of its individual parts, individual parts in terms of the whole. To understand the whole of a work we must refer to its author and to related literature. Such a comparative procedure allows one to understand every individual work … more profoundly … So understanding of the whole and of the individual parts are interdependent.
>
> Dilthey, 1976, p 262.

As an aside, Husserl knew and fully accepted Dilthey's idea of the parts and the whole as the *Third Logical Investigation* testifies (1970a, pp 433–489). The way in which Husserl presented parts and wholes was with respect to ontology: As noted previously, Husserl initiated the consideration of dependence and independence between two beings, or qualities of a being, to determine which are constant (and hence definitive) and which are variable (and hence not necessary).

Although Heidegger eventually rejected the idea of a circle in hermeneutics, he did not replace it with anything (1996, §63, p 290–291). Therefore, the hermeneutics of Da-sein means a repetition of interpretations that cannot settle on first impressions. The most definitive comment on the relation between reality and theory, the experienced whole and ideas about it, are as follows: "And just as praxis has its own specific sight ("theory"), theoretical investigation is not without its own praxis … it is by no means obvious where the ontological boundary between "theoretical" and "atheoretical behavior" really lies!", (§69b, p 327–8). With this comment, Heidegger sought to break down a fixed distinction between a priori and a posteriori empirical investigations and it does nothing to remove the idea of the circle and the need to deepen understanding by anything other than a sustained determination to understand. See figure 8 for a visual explanation.

Figure 8—Hermeneutics in early Heidegger.

There is the part and the whole or context, the appearing perception and possible contexts for interpreting it. One interpretative belief makes possible a specific understanding, when a context of understanding is 'projected' or otherwise supplied (§26, p 117, §31, p 136, §44b, p 203). Projection is ontological and constitutes the ontic (§31, p 136, p 138), which means a state of ignorance concerning the bad inheritance of maintaining the lack of understanding of being (p xix).

§73 Hermeneutic revelation and rationality

Hermeneutics is fundamental in *Being and Time* and the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology.* The conclusion is that there is a commonality of hermeneutic perspective between Dilthey (1976, p 262), Husserl and Heidegger's work in 1927, in that there is both *hermeneutic revelation* and *hermeneutic rationality*. What is meant by these terms is explained below in addition to the hermeneutic circle.

Hermeneutics implies argument by comparison and contextualisation. Because _____ is important, therefore _____ means _____. Therefore, Heidegger's hermeneutics implies a certain pragmatics. Good interpretation leads to effective outcomes. Because the major explanatory device in hermeneutics is the hermeneutic circle, something needs to be contemplated about the on-going hermeneutic process that is being approved.

Hermeneutics itself is a process without a precise end. What can be aimed at are more sufficient interpretations that fit more of the phenomena in any given context. Philosophically, the first writer to think in terms of parts and wholes was Plato who recorded the debate between Socrates and Meno (Plato, 1956, p 127/ §79c). This same dialogue explores a relevant question to the hermeneutic circle though. Although Plato did not express the problem at the heart of hermeneutics as a problem of interpretation, gaining better understanding and differentiating it from poorer understanding, his example still stands.

What Socrates did with Meno was to explore the nature of virtue. Socrates did this by discussing what it plausibly might be, before arriving at his preferred answer. For instance, virtue might be knowledge, if it were teachable. It might be habit, if it were socially acquirable. What is relevant is the way in which Socrates framed the question. He began the dialogue with the idea that there is a paradox involved in any research. This paradox has become known as Meno's paradox: It is posed as a dilemma. Either one knows what one is looking for; or one does not. If one knows what one is looking for, Socrates argued that one finds only what one already knows. But if one does not know what one is looking for, then one will never find it. The conclusion he drew was that discovery is either an illusion or impossible.

For our purpose, it is possible that one does not know what one is looking for, and inquiry, interpretation, *re*-search—are still possible: It would not be exploration if one knew where one was going. Of course, not everything is known before inquiry. Of course, the object of inquiry is never fully explicated. We can be clear about research questions about which we have no idea of the answer.

What hermeneutics means for therapy and other disciplines in the light of Meno's paradox is that there should be an openness towards understanding our communications with others. Yet to some extent the attempt to be open and receive what was sent, in the manner in which it was sent, is obscured sometimes by what is already known. Any hope of always capturing new nuances of sense, as clients meant it, is to some extent inevitably caught up in some shortcomings of the ability of therapists to understand. Some understanding is provided according to habitual modes of thought. The client's own resistance to speak about some topic is impeded by the therapist's personal and professional capabilities. All people have limits to understand. Therapists are no different in that respect. Personal experience is inevitably situated, culture-bound and according to some position within the social whole.

Taking this to the realm of hermeneutics, it is true that an object makes sense in its whole context or region. Yet knowing the object and the region are ongoing affairs, that to an extent, have some specifiable current knowledge or understanding that does not preclude the possibility of a better answer. And to return to the realm of virtue, it might well be possible that a human quality is teachable, socially acquirable and part of inherited human nature. However, what this means for therapy is that a conclusion is required on the nature of psychological problems at a level of what is inherent to the individual, and not concerning social context. Although, intersubjectivity is not being ignored. The conclusion is that meta-representation is useful in understanding intentionality generally including belief. Accordingly, the nature of belief has to be explored for the purpose of making clear this assertion. What this means is that there will be a long theoretical exploration of all necessary parts before moving towards applying these ideas to understand the experiences and the meanings of clients.

Hermeneutic principles apply to new beliefs that make possible new understanding, if a new context of understanding is supplied. The specific situation to be understood is one in which specific people interact, or it concerns how people interact in general. For therapy, there is always an observable, audiovisually recordable occurrence—and a set of acceptable readings of what occurred. Interpretation occurs in supplying all psychologically presentiated senses of what something meant—these cannot be video-recorded or perceptually-observed.

In the case of rationality, the phenomena of conscious understanding are argued for intellectually. This case requires deciding between interpretations that refer to the same referent. It entails explicit argument of specific sorts. Following Maurice Merleau-Ponty on the inability to reduce away all influences (1962, p xiv) and Hans-Georg Gadamer on the domination of historical influence (1975),

it is concluded that not all the influences of history on understanding can be removed, prior to any research. Finding new understanding is a re-search and is never outside of the hermeneutic circle.

Heidegger (1996, §33, p 147–8, §34, p 153) and Gadamer (1975) have argued for the appreciation of revelation, immediate experiential understanding of inherent differences as they show themselves. Heidegger's terminology expressed the role of revelation in terms of a preference for the "existential-hermeneutic as" form of reference or intentionality (as opposed to linguistic "apophantical-as" form of conceptual intentionality expressed in language). Dilthey (1976, p 262), Betti (Palmer, 1969, pp 46–59) and Rickman (1998, p 302) have argued for the appreciation of rationality in hermeneutics. For psychological understanding, hermeneutic rationality and hermeneutic revelation co-occur.

It is agreed with Heidegger and hermeneutics, that no reduction is wholly successful at removing everyday attitudes that mis-understand the co-empathic relation between persons (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p xiv, Gadamer, 1975). For Heidegger, the higher understanding of thematised explicit thought, any understanding expressed in language, is a derivative form that follows social rules for interpretation. This is because fore-conception, that which exists as understood before a hermeneutic act is begun, "remains mostly inconspicuous because language always already contains a developed set of concepts", (Heidegger, 1996, §33, p 147).

There is a major tension between hermeneutics as revelation and rationality. It is not acceptable to prefer one at the expense of the other. Instead, both co-exist, as do poetry and philosophy, everyday psychological understanding and that of therapists. Beliefs, rules, rationality and precise definitions co-exist with the more immediate, tacit lived and situated forms of understanding. Two conclusions co-exist: (1) It is possible to argue for acceptable ways of interpreting and state why they are better than others. (2) Understanding can be wholly 'received' as in spontaneous *being there*.

On further reflection, there can be the dawning of rational understanding of what has occurred in a way that overcomes initial semblance, what was assumed to be there (§7a, p 25). In addition to revelation and rationality in the interaction of parts and wholes, there is the role of the interpreter's own individual history and contexts. However, despite inconsequential challenges that would refute their own ability to conclude, it is possible to conclude rationally how an understanding is better or worse (Rickman, 1998, p 302). Rational discrimination about what is revealed has a number of tensions. One tension is between the

immediately perceptible and what can be rationally understood about it, as opposed to less rational or irrational understanding of it.

The tension between perception, presentation and rationality is that the psychological meanings of psychological situations do not appear perceptually. This is why children, animals and people from other cultures fail to act appropriately in some situations. The psychological meaning of what is happening fails to appear because it has not been learned. Something that is common sense to one culture or society is not present in another. The psychological rationality of a psychological situation is not contained in what is perceptible. It concerns what should be interpreted and assumed.

A further tension between perception and sense is not about rationality but often about the way in which learned senses, implications and consequences—are engrained. Emotions can be an example where one feels something about someone before one can work out why. In fact, in psychological situations, it is possible to believe or think in one way and feel something entirely different.

Understanding is part of human being and its contexts. Understanding can be revelation as an imprecise receiving of what is the case for the interpreter. In revelation, the phenomenon of conscious understanding does 'pop' into consciousness. Explicit contexts for acceptable rational understanding can be determined later. Husserl's a priori rationality is not opposed to hermeneutics as revelation. Husserl argued for both an account of revealed meaning as immediately experienced and rational a priori reflection on the conscious understanding of it.

Accordingly, it is acceptable to conclude that Husserl's manner of arguing in the *Meditations* is supported by an explicit account of how it rationalises what is revealed to it. Furthermore, it is possible to extend its domain of application by making explicit how any therapy position could construe intersubjectivity by rational procedures and revelatory experiences. In this way, there could be new ways of addressing Husserl's shortcomings on the relationship between a priori rationality and revealed immediate sense, as inter-related modes in his own writing. This requires coming to a conclusion on how to interpret intentionality in others, in a variety of settings. Heidegger did not interpret intentionality generally, but he did focus on conceptual intentionality and reference in history: hence his argument by etymology and the historical comparisons with the ancient meanings of words. However, meta-representational distinctions between sense and referent were not developed in *Being and Time* (1996), the *Zollikon Seminars* (Heidegger, 2001) or any of the works of Medard Boss, Heidegger's therapy exponent. But that does not mean they were absent from Heidegger as the next section will show.

§74 The hermeneutic task

Finally, there is an attempt at some ground rules for a hermeneutically-informed approach to therapy that draws on the contributions of Dilthey, Husserl, Heidegger and Rickman. Specific references are omitted in order to conclude. The answer is that there are acceptable interpretative stances. It is acceptable to make an argument about necessities and universals that are ubiquitous. And determine how there can be credible hermeneutic perspectives on psychological events and processes. What this means is that there is intentional implication, in that consciousness creates multiple senses of a single referent, within an infinite set of perspectives, on a cohesive and recognisable object.

The point of hermeneutics in therapy is that evidence is interpreted in some way. (The same applies to the allied fields of supervision, teaching, research in therapy—and other matters in the human sciences). The aim of creating a hermeneutic pure psychology for therapy sessions, supervision or research, needs to be addressed concerning the intentional relation between observable objects and intersubjective intentionalities. If there is no hermeneutics, there is no self-reflexive position to distinguish how one is making sense of something. If assumptions are inexplicit and comprise a 'one to one' assumption of correspondence between an event and its meaning, then this is licence for dogmatism, disagreement with clients and the public and prevents clients from re-interpreting themselves. The meanings of psychological events have to be argued for, made explicit to oneself and justified to clients and society. But not in a way that is closed to dissent. Ideas of one to one correspondence in the present or past are non-hermeneutic dogmatic assertions.

Interpretation by therapists concerns the systems of belief that structure the service provided to the public. Therapists interpret clients whilst sitting with them. Therapists specify causative relationships, attitudes and name events or feelings that are cited as evidence to explain the intentionalities of clients. The meaning of the hermeneutic circle is that it is against interpretative stances that deny the relevance of the hermeneutic tradition and believe that it is possible to stay outside of the hermeneutic circle. Such a lack of self-reflexiveness about the manner of holding beliefs is not acceptable. It can give licence for mistakes to reign in the place of attention concerning how to justify and conclude. Therapy, as well as the everyday life, interprets the behaviour of other people as concerning intentionality. For the everyday life, such interpretation is incidental to some of its tasks. For the therapy profession—as in the human sciences—it is a central concern. Interpretation occurs when any relationship with other persons is

begun. Interpretation happens when one *reads others' minds* in making any immediate or more formal understanding of the perspectives of others. It also occurs when others understand ourselves, which occurs simultaneously as we understand them.

Ideas in everyday life and therapy can be understood as credible and justified—or dubious and unjustified—with respect to understanding the intentionalities of others. The lack of accurate understanding about observable sequences in the behaviour of others needs to be identified. Lack of understanding the other can be an experiential event and the topic of theoretical concern. If therapy were to mis-understand its clients on a regular basis, then there would be evidence of a poor fit between the beliefs of therapists and clients: Each would have different understanding of themselves and their actions, but no justified account of how this occurs.

In the everyday life, if there were a problem of poor understandings of the perspectives of other persons, it might end in disappointment, talking at cross-purposes or maybe trading insults and criticisms. For practising therapy, there should be some means of judging how credible, accurate and justified are various beliefs and actions. Again, with respect to everyday life and the understandings of its citizens, there are a manifold of noteworthy understandings. Therapy could go further in explaining itself to colleagues and the public. Mis-understanding should not be admitted to the realm of practising theoretical beliefs. This requires being able to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable theoretical beliefs to oneself, colleagues and society. Accountability is increased through explicit clinical reasoning.

Let us consider what a lessening in the potential to mis-understand, and hence falsely believe and act, would produce. If it is possible to identify regularly and speak about observable referents, then practice becomes clear. In the case of the ability to judge acceptable from unacceptable, intentionality is in a clear relation to the manifold of possible understandings of 'the same event'. If not, for instance, dreams, hallucinations and delusions would all be as equally credible as perception. This is not to state that there are not ambiguous situations though, such as visual illusions and trickery. This is a problem of judging clear from unclear understandings because visual perception *gives* the bodies of others as present, here and now. Recollection of others re-calls how they were. Anticipation fleetingly presents what might happen at some future time. If it is possible to show clients, supervisors and trainees what does appear, how to understand it and why, then interpreted beliefs and their phenomena are open to accountability.

Despite *Being and Time* being the major work that has been most influential in setting the tone of hermeneutic understanding in therapy, it contained little improvement over the work of Karl Jaspers in *General Psychopathology* who held that "all phenomena are open to *unlimited interpretation and reinterpretation*", (1963, p 356). Once again, because there is negligible contact with the details of Husserl's texts by Heidegger or Jaspers, the opportunity to provide a detailed critique of them was lost. There is no connection to the treatment of the doxic act of belief in relation to believed or doubted being in *Ideas I*, for instance. The conclusion is that intentionality and cognised being are interpretations of observable events. A specific perspective is presented in section 85 by using the example of the long-term effects of post-traumatic stress disorder in adults that arise in the physical and sexual abuse of children in order to think about development in terms of time and social context.

In conclusion, the hermeneutic circle is accepted as having intrinsic worth. What is taken of worth from the hermeneutic circle in *Being and Time* is that it is a necessity to *enter the circle the right way* when working towards a hermeneutic psychology for therapy. There should be an account of the relation between the phenomena-as-interpreted and the hermeneutic stance taken. More details are provided in the next chapter.

Hermeneutic rationality and revelation co-exist. The conclusion is that rationality, perception, revealed bodily sensuousness and emotion co-occur with respect to shared understanding in intersubjective spheres. Any retrieval of core themes would have to follow of some kind of a reduction, in a style somewhere between the Husserlian kind—and the kind where the manner of being conscious of one's own existence makes itself known in telling acts. Ontology is a general topic in philosophy concerning what exists and the arguments that justify such conclusions. Taken to the realm of therapy, ontology is about understanding multiple genuine psychological senses about the same objects and so interpreting the different relations to the same. A hermeneutic pure psychology believes that intentionalities of various sorts should be understood, to achieve ontological accuracy for practice.

The next chapter shows more detail of how Husserl and Heidegger agreed with Kant that temporality is most fundamental. As we shall see, Husserl and Heidegger's views on temporality are central to understanding belief.

15

Intentionality, temporality, context

Aim: This chapter prepares the ground for a hermeneutic pure psychological interpretation of temporality and belief for the theory and practice of psychotherapy: A meld between Husserl and Heidegger is forthcoming in the next chapter. This chapter weaves together the terms intentionality, temporality and context to explain that Husserl had been trying to capture the phenomenon of the overlapping, co-association or interference between, for instance, an actively sought memory and the current experience, the original temporal field. From 1907 to 1909, Husserl had concluded that a "*Double Intentionality*", (1991, §25, p 55) must be occurring when a memory of a previous original temporal field is replayed in the current one. What he was trying to analyse was how there are co-occurring types of referentiality between various contexts when consciousness is presenting something past, future or merely imagined in a non-specific time. His wordings are abstract in that they are not about specific events, but they are faithful in noting that the whole experience of recollection in the now, in that the "reproduced duration is foreground" with respect to "its shifting orientation in relation to the living now," (p 57), for instance.

In order to go forward, it is necessary to take a step back. This chapter takes a step further towards understanding belief in therapy by taking a step back to conclude on how Husserl and Heidegger interpreted temporality. The point is to show the commonalities and differences with Heidegger's approach in *Being and Time* in such a way that Husserl's method can be made more explicit and achievable. In agreement with the remark by Jitendranath Mohanty, Heidegger's reading of Husserl is found to be "never … credible", (2003, p124). Many of Heidegger's conclusions recapitulate what Husserl had written 10, 20 or more years previously. Agreeing with Kant (1993, p 54–8/B 45–53), temporality is judged to be most fundamental in understanding consciousness and human

261

being. This is for the reason that all understanding is temporally gained and temporally situated. Understanding co-occurs with time in that it is oriented from past to present and present to future. Heidegger is criticised. It is not possible to understand the different types of temporality in a phenomenological way without comparing the different givenness of objects that are past, present or future. People are aware of temporal differences. What is required is even greater clarity about how meanings are oriented in time. That human beings are on a developmental pathway between birth and death, and what is appropriate at any point, is secondary concern.

Chapter 7 noted that the initial argument put forward by Husserl was both ontological and hermeneutic. It has already been noted that Husserl was deficient in his own self-reflexivity. But his interpretation of the links between conscious senses of referents, in relation to interpreted intentionalities, had strong points. The details of this chapter support a clear understanding of the function of beliefs in interpreting experience.

§75 Horizons as contexts for intentionality

A piece of the jigsaw is missing when it comes to thinking about a commonality between Husserl and Heidegger's approaches to pure psychology. It needs to be put in place in order to have a better grasp of what Husserl did and in order to better understand Heidegger's early work. It is agreed that psychological objects are known primarily through hermeneutics whether that belongs to a culture or family or a school of therapy. Any measuring of the strength of feeling is dependent on experiencing the emotional meaning in the first place. When it comes to any psychological object intended by a psychological intentionality of any kind, what occurs is that objects appear in horizons or contexts. Some of these contexts are current, such as a family or a place. Other contexts are much more general, such as intimate relationships or in relationships at work.

In section 19 of the *Meditations*, Husserl tersely mentioned that: "Every subjective process has a process "horizon," which changes with the alteration of the nexus of consciousness to which the process belongs and with the alteration of the process itself from phase to phase of its flow—an intentional *horizon of reference* to potentialities of consciousness that belong to the process itself", (p 44). He meant that the manner of being aware of something or someone has a connection of intentionality and horizon to past, present and future contexts of meaning. I will refer to this as the "link theory of meaning". This is a very general conclusion and it needs to be given some more concrete details for it to be under-

stood sufficiently. It is necessary to gain some more details in order to explain his perspective on links of intentionality between objects and horizons.

Firstly, the remarks of section 19 are a set of topics that clearly delineate Husserl's position in a way that was constant throughout his work. But these comments serve a second function. They serve to illustrate the criteria for the failure or success of philosophical argument, based on the experiential process of understanding intentional implication (also called appresentation and associations of meaning). The theme of links of meaning appear in a number of places apart from the research of the *Time* book where they were first explored. Several themes come together in the overlap between the ability to recognise one object in many manifolds (1977b, §9c, p 58) and project objective-meaning across time (1977a, §50, p 111), and the motivation to close a sensation-gestalt in a particular way (2001, §4, p 627). The papers of the 1920s explore the intentional links between objects and horizons (1973f, §8, p 33, §22, p 105), though tantalising mentions of it were present in *Time* and *Ideas I* but were finally concluded on in *Crisis* (§45, p 158, §47, p 162, §72, p 264). What it means is that object-meanings co-appear as well as horizons, fields of sensation and associated experiences, past or future in orientation.

Intentional implication is a weakly stated theme in *Ideas I* that enables readers to grasp what Husserl did in an overall manner. Husserl related (1) the way that meanings or senses of objects are accepted before reflection to (2), the intentional references (*Verweisung*) understood in a specific attitude. This is the overall picture of the analysis of the modes of intentionality (the representing and the represented, the referring and the referred). It is one that emphasizes the decontextualisation and recontextualisation of sense. Specifically, it considers the relation between references—and meaningful "determination," (a sense or profile) as it is usually assumed to be. This insight appears briefly in Aron Gurwitsch (1964, p 406) and is acknowledged in Anthony Steinbock (1995, pp 104–109) and Donn Welton (2000, pp 16–24). The first context is the natural attitude with its horizon of other persons and the world as the ultimate horizon. A second context could be any meaningful link in the immanent, 'personal' consciousness-horizon of intersubjectivity. After noting the above, it becomes possible to understand how Heidegger modified Husserl's approach.

Another wording that Husserl was fond of using is expressed as: "What is now perceived and what is more or less clearly co-present and determinate (or at least somewhat determinate), *are penetrated and surrounded by an obscurely* intended horizon of indeterminate actuality", (1982, §27, p 52). The phrase "indetermi-

nate actuality" is his way of stating that presentation is at stake. In presentiated meaning, the possibilities are endless.

The wording that Husserl used to spot the links between different times and places are as follows. The material world "is there for me not only as a world of mere things … but also with value-characteristics, as beautiful and ugly, pleasant and unpleasant, agreeable and disagreeable … physical things stand there as Objects of use, the "table" with its "books," the "drinking glass," the "vase," the "piano" etc", (p 53). What he was arguing for was an appreciation that the meanings of physical objects in this case, far exceed their mere perceptual presence. This passage means that the values and uses that inanimate things have for us are instantaneously understood. Once an object is known, it can be recognised, again and again, with ease.

Husserl worked by comparing all forms of givenness to each other. The outer horizon involves a co-given "*halo of undetermined determinability*, which has its mode of being brought closer "explicatively" in becoming separated into a number of intendings [*Vorstellungen*—representations]", (§69, p 157). One finding is that perceptual evidence always refers to further horizons, intentional implications and apperceptions, to what appears perceptually. Accordingly, hermeneutics is compatible with understanding intentionality. The point of Husserl's approach is to understand the common forms of intentionality through which it shows itself. This is the source for Heidegger's assertions that being and modes of being are a function of temporality, at root (Heidegger, 1996, §4, p 16). There ontology is rooted in finding the proper interpretation of time.

However, what appears for psychological sense are current people, memories about being with people and their effects and anticipations about being with real, or non-specific people, in the future. In relation to such material, there are beliefs about what the nature of the past was and how the future will be. In order to make the relevance of temporality clear for the forthcoming focus on belief, two questions are stated now, along with their answers. This is for the purpose of making the roundabout approach clear. When sitting with clients, two questions are paramount. Question one: "Precisely how do you interpret the link between the client's current experience and their past?". The answer given is that a meta-representational approach should be used. Question two: "Precisely what is the necessary background that enables the links of intentionality and psychological influence to be understood?". The answer is that the ideas of co-empathy and intersubjectivity should be held in mind to interpret personal experience in relation to others and the social context around the client so that belief, intentionality and temporality are understood.

§76 Comparison of Husserl and Heidegger on temporality

In order to understand meaning, the topic of time has to be understood first. The key questions are: "Where are meanings oriented in time? Are they in the past, the present or the future?" Temporality is a way of referring to the lived experience of time. When a person is in a good mood, they are more likely to see themselves, their past and future, in a good light. Nothing has changed factually. What has changed is the manner of understanding. What enables understanding of any sort is temporality. Time exists as it is experienced. The temporality of time is not a unitary phenomenon, although facets of it are united in a specific way. Because the different forms of temporality appear in all aspects of lived experience, it would be easy to misconstrue some of them by interpreting what does appear with inappropriate ideas or to conflate their qualitative aspects. It would be possible to think of time as a mere straight line from birth to death, lasting so many years, hours and minutes. Through incorrect ideas from other people, history and culture, it might be possible to mis-understand the temporal whole as strict demarcations between past, present and future—but that is not so on closer inspection.

Temporality does not exist by itself without connection to meanings of perceptual and presentiated sorts. Nor can temporality be considered as being so all-encompassing that there is no need to mention intentionality. It is true that temporality is co-extensive with all meaning. It co-exists with how things appear through our being aware of objects in the many forms of intentionality. It is wrong to claim that what exists does so solely through the co-constitutive effects of temporality.

Let us take a concrete example to explain these distinctions. Let us take an example of a child who was the survivor of extreme physical assaults by his father. As an adult there are a number of feelings and situations to which he is particularly sensitive. The assaults took place from three months of age to three years old. As a result for the forty-year-old adult, there is an on-going expectation that death might happen any day soon. It might come in a car crash or through cancer or heart disease. Furthermore, the adult is unable took look after himself in the sense of keeping his home tidy and making friends because of the non-specific sense that something bad may happen. After looking at a number of explanations with his therapist, it seems the client has post-traumatic stress disorder. Even though he does not dissociate he does have flashbacks and has immense rage and homicidal feelings towards other road users. He is a taxi driver and he abhors bad driving in others although he does it himself. The beliefs that can be discerned

here concern how the client fails to look after himself and how he expects the world will be. The tell tale sign of the physical abuse is in the sense of immanent death. Because of the early nature of the abuse, this sense is non-verbal and difficult to change. The key topics here are the intentional links between the present and his childhood past and how these relate to the present and the future. Invariably, any psychological event happens in time in relation to some type of awareness. Let us consider the detail of how phenomenological philosophy understands time.

Kant, Husserl and Heidegger agree that temporality is the most fundamental aspect of human nature. Without entering into excessive detail, the agreement between them is that temporality is the most basic meta-representational view for understanding how humanity experiences meaning. This means that meanings are learned in the past yet they have an orientation to the future and the present. For instance, anticipations of what the future will bring shape the decisions made in the present and can also influence how the past is remembered. When a person is in a bad mood they are more likely to see their whole past and future negatively. Everyday senses appear first and these get interpreted in some way. The multifaceted nature of temporality is interpreted from the conscious whole of lived experience and the many intentional relations to what appears.

What Husserl wanted to achieve was to comment on temporality overall. How Husserl's original presentation is better than Heidegger's is that Husserl explicitly hypothesised how the links are constructed in a language that is less mysterious than Heidegger's. Husserl mentioned the links to others, which section 69 of *Being and Time* does not. Because Heidegger jumped from one metaphor to another, it is not at all clear what he interpreted and how he did so.

Husserl's view of time is the original source of Heidegger's "projection", (Husserl, 1991, §31, p 71, from 1904–5, §24, p 55, from 1914 to 1917). Husserl noted several times that an a priori or transcendental view was the one he had taken, from 1904 onwards (§2, p 10, §5, p 15, §6, p 18, §41, p 92). Husserl was the originator of the idea that the 'flow' of time is an absolute element of consciousness, in an a priori view (§36, p 79, a conclusion from between 1911 and 1913). Husserl was the first to use the metaphor of light in the phrase "stand in the light" (App XII, p 133, from 1911 to 1913) and noted that being and time co-occur in 1911 (§31, p 71, §33, p 74 in 1904 or 1905, again between 1909 and 1911 in Note 49, p 333 and Note 54, p 381–3). The idea of a temporal horizon was Husserl's (§14, p 37, from 1914 to 1917) as were numerous repetitions that the aspects of temporality form a whole, between 1904 and 1911 (§3, p 11, §31, p 70, §12, p 33, §25, p 56, App VI, p 117). This short statement is not at

all an exhaustive analysis of the *Time* book, nor a full comparison with division two of *Being and Time*.

Temporality coincides with forms of intentionality. For instance, temporality occurs in involuntary flashbacks and the presence of past understanding, in remembering something because one is trying to do so and in anticipating what is the best way to drive into the centre of town. When a temporal voluntary or involuntary experience occurs, some object of awareness occurs when something is present to consciousness. In remembering conceptual sense, that may or may not point truthfully as it occurred when the first-ever experience of the conceptual sense occurred. The referents of temporality are the duration, manner of presentation and the givenness of what appears that overlap with perception now. Actual experiences are interpreted from the standpoint of wondering what enables time to exist as it does. Time-consciousness (or the consciousness of time) is part of *all* being-conscious. For Husserl, temporality is the starting point for making fundamental distinctions of the sort that express what must be happening, in this qualitative analysis of temporal experiences. This led him to the conclusion that there are four major aspects to temporality (Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, pp. 113–4).

1. Perception and its type of time are not about the projection of higher understanding of composite sense on to what appears perceptually. The "now" or "original temporal field" is what appears in perception in the five senses, although it is not exclusively bound to perception. Husserl elucidated a constant, three-phase flow from the protention of the immediate future, into the impression of the immediate instant, in connection with the immediate past of the retention, of what has just been and still lingers on. These phases are inter-linked and although their order stays the same, the conscious content changes. Other temporal experiences can appear within the openness of the original temporal field (1991, No 12, p 171–2, written between 1893 and 1901). Thus, there is a flow of changing content and some sort of 'intentionality' that joins together all these different experiences.

2. There is an objective time that appears in recollection, the specific means of recognising what has happened, particularly in the storehouse of clear memories of readily identifiable events. In a more contemporary metaphor, the active choice of *replaying* of events in visual memory is the particular type of experience to which Husserl was referring. Visual memories mimic the original perception. During their replay, they flow forward once more. They are *played back* and are seen from a specific perspective. It is implied that anticipation of the future is the

mirror image of recollection with some alterations. (Imagination is different again, in that it occurs at a non-specific time).

3. A third, more abstract aspect of the flow of consciousness is the on-going "retention" that *keeps together* a certain linearity across the lifespan, of a full continuum of *before* and *after* ordering, in terms of recording all experience, whether it is actively remembered or not. Rather, retention, or retentional consciousness, is a passive involuntary process of chaining together all experiences as recorded, learned content. Where it is possible to identify what came before what. Most often, the automatic recording is such that the original perspective is maintained towards the original scene.

4. Finally, Husserl interpreted rather than experienced what was occurring in his last distinction, in a similar manner to Kant's foremost distinction in *Critique of Pure Reason* (1993, p 259–306/A 340–404). For Husserl, an absolute, most fundamental part of consciousness makes and co-ordinates all the higher, more dependent aspects of temporality. This time-constituting consciousness functions in the present, he argued. But it must have direct access to all other past and future experiences. What Husserl was doing was to interpret a part of consciousness that must be doing the work of holding, creating, re-creating and co-ordinating all the other aspects. Time-constituting consciousness is an interpreted condition of possibility due to a hermeneutic stance. His paradoxical conclusion was that this aspect was non-temporal itself, that it made itself into a whole and that it was not a sequence but rather a container and co-ordinating aspect that he called "absolute".

Kant had previously argued that time is a formative condition of possibility of immanent sense so that it is characteristic of the empirical self. And secondly, the imagination in the sense already explained is both temporal and rational, having an identifiable interpretable structure. The point is that there is a certain relativity of movement and time lag between the ego that is aware, can recognise, speak and interpret—and the passive processes of perception, temporality, and to some extent bodily sensation, emotion and other non-verbal experience: It may take some time to become sufficiently clear about what we are aware.

When beliefs are expressed in language, a type of decontextualisation occurs as noted by Husserl (1982, §§124–7) and Heidegger (1996, §33, p 147–8). There is an entering of objects and senses into lived experience as a temporal movement that remains in memory, the body and thought. The point is that non-verbal experience is not just a single flow from birth to death. All experience occurs

within the openness of the present moment. The present moment is a complex type of openness where the past and future appear in an interaction.

Qualitatively, it is possible to note the abilities of the ego. It is able to call up memories and create a picture of its future. In finding the words to fit to understood-sensation, there is a momentary delay between speaking and feeling, where speech and thought trail behind very slightly. Yet there are different types of memory and thoughts of the future, including those types that come unbidden. It is particularly the automatic recording ability of retention (retentional consciousness or retentional memory) that holds together the past. There is a connection between retention as an automatic recording and replaying medium (in a contemporary metaphor). Thought and speech about these non-verbal and verbal contents is a linguistic representation that occupies some stance towards what appears. So, it is potentially possible to occupy a different stance to what appears. When such a change occurs, then it can be found that the actual sense changes. Hence, there is the possibility of psychological change with respect to the same memory, emotion or thought.

With respect to temporality, what I take from page 345 of Husserl's Note 50 in the *Time* book (1991) are that speaking and non-verbal experience (emotion, bodily feeling, visual memory or anticipation) do not co-exist. Rather, there is a genuine phenomenon that non-verbal experience can exist without being influenced by language. Developmentally, it is true that infants feel before they can speak. But that by itself is insufficient to accept the distinction I am making: *To speak about one's conscious experience is to be separated from it and turned towards it in a specific way*. It requires some time for a bodily sensation, emotion, memory, anticipation or any other non-verbal experience—to become clear, in order to speak about it. What this means is that there is a lag between being aware and speech concerning the object of awareness. The number of stances towards non-verbal experience is potentially infinite: They include all helpful and unhelpful stances, all realistic and unrealistic ones, all forms of acceptance and rejection and all types of psychological style such as depressed, paranoid, anxious and denying.

Two things are certain:

• In this a priori view, the nature of time is fixed for all persons. It is concluded that understanding and belief born of the past influences the present and the future.

• Anticipatory understanding and belief about the future influence the present.

§77 Brief reminder of Husserl's stance and method

The following comments clarify what has already been stated in chapter 7, §32 above. What follows are two statements and a conclusion about Husserl's hermeneutic stance. Explicitly, Husserl held a theory of consciousness that interprets what appears in the following way.

• The meaning of an object (or region of objects) of any academic discipline exists relative to the attitude taken towards it. Husserl believed that approaches that are not transcendental phenomenology cannot escape the relativism of stance with respect to the understandings they find.

• The answer to the problem of attitudes that dictate their results is to become self-reflexive about assuming fundamental ideas and creating claims. It is now possible to understand that phenomenology for Husserl and Heidegger constrains the means for claiming understanding, through interpreting intentionality between contexts in all its forms.

• The method is to compare and contrast different types of givenness of objects and interpret their co-constituting intentionalities. The answer is that objects are intentionally implicated (or appresented) with other objects, and other contexts, through the addition of retained past learning. The terms "appresented" and "intentionally implicated" mean that senses are added to perception. The meaning of the object as a whole is that it is (most often) immediately recognised, once it has been learned. The retained learned meaning is maintained and updated across time. Such learning is co-empathised and intersubjective. It is developed and becomes automatically recognisable through prolonged, previous contact with it. These learnings form a basis for all understanding of past, present and future.

   However, Heidegger's critiques of Husserl's psychological and transcendental reductions are upheld. Husserl should have been more self-reflexive and employed hermeneutics explicitly. The point of this reminder is to see the great similarity between Husserl's analysis of intentionality and objects in horizons and understand it as a parallel to Heidegger's analysis of the being of Da-sein.

§78 References across time: What *Being and Time* means

In *Being and Time*, the business as usual of hermeneutics is maintained. Heidegger improved on Husserl's approach by increasing its self-reflexive potential.

Heidegger emphasised that there is no escape from hermeneutics and used the idea of the hermeneutic circle to express this commitment. First, a brief point is mentioned that stresses the major distinction between Husserl and Heidegger to set the scene for discussing references and hermeneutics. A more detailed argument will follow below that compares other aspects of the work of the two men. As noted in the last section, Husserl expressed himself in terms of intentional implication between objects and horizons.

• Heidegger differed in emphasising the role of the world and its interconnection with temporality. One way that this was new was to conclude that *objects appear out of the world*, which means that the whole-world is already present to understanding and action, prior to any of the parts of it coming to our awareness: "World is always already predisclosed … How is the referential totality in which circumspection "moves" to be understood more precisely? When this totality is broken, the objective presence of beings is thrust to the fore", (Heidegger, 1996, §16, p 71). Another way of stating this idea is to claim that the whole appears before any of its parts. Specifically, what he argued was that in understanding, parts make sense because of the whole-world.

After the note above, let us now go for some detail to show how Heidegger's interpretation of the meaning of being is little different than Husserl's original presentation of intentional implication and the semiotic presentation of signs. In *Being and Time* and *Basic Problems of Phenomenology,* intentionality and everyday experience are re-stated in a more obscure terminology that preferences care, practical dealing-with and historical-conceptual reference in a confused manner: Two forms of non-verbal intentionality and conceptual intentionality reappear with new names. It is not clear whether Heidegger wanted to find a historical wrong turn and expose it as false (as he proclaimed in 1996, §1, p 3) or whether he wanted to proclaim a historical understanding as more accurate than a current one (such as the presentation of care, §41). In conclusion, I argue that his claim—that the being of human beings in context (Da-sein as being-in-the-world) transcends parts of the world into the whole world—is unconvincing. It could only obfuscate Husserl's attempt at revealing the phenomena of intentionality between contexts.

Heidegger's initial presentation of the world-whole is fairly straightforward, but only introductory with respect to the conclusions made in division two of *Being and Time*. The first mention of it is that a "totality of useful things is always already discovered *before* the individual useful thing", (§15, p 64). This is a way

of stating that the whole is prior to the part, or any specific conscious object or sense. Heidegger made an example of the many types of reference and association, between objects and their uses, when he mentioned that clothing belongs to "our world," a public world (p 66). Then he commented that so far he had presupposed the world (p 67). The world is a world of understanding and senses of various sorts. Section 16 starts with the definition that Da-sein's world enables beings to be encountered, understood or known (p 67–8). A further definition of the world is provided as the totality of pre-reflexive, tacit or implicit references (p 70). He illustrated this point with the example of mentioning tools within a workshop. The point is that the obtrusiveness of a lost trowel shows the gardener's need to complete planting before the first frost of winter arrives. Section 17 begins with the definition of the essence of the world, its "worldliness," as the occurrence of specific references and the referential whole. In this section, Heidegger repeated Husserl's early analysis of signs from 1890 (1994, pp 20–51) as developed in the *First* and *Sixth Logical Investigations*, the rewriting of the *Sixth Logical Investigation* in 1914 (Husserl, 2005) and section 10 of *Ideas I* (1982). Heidegger defined reference as:

> The fact that the being of things at hand has the structure of reference means that they have in themselves the character of *being referred*. Beings are discovered with regard to the fact that they are referred, as those beings that they are, to something. They are relevant *together with* something else. The character of being of things at hand is *relevance*. To be relevant means to let something be together with something else. The relation of "together … with …" is to be indicated by the term reference.
>
> 1996, §18, p 78.

The point of the above remark is that cultural objects are relevant together, through their usage and contextuality. This is Heidegger's ontological a priorism in action. He supplied an example of hammering in carpentry. Hammering is a means towards an end—such as making something, preventing something falling down or making shelves for storage. The conclusion at the end of section 18 is relevant also. The worldliness of the world (or more simply, the world) enables the disclosure of innerworldly beings: which means that cultural objects take their sense from the everyday, unreflected, pre-ontological interpretation of them.

However, *Being and Time* comes to its philosophical answer in section 69. Here all is revealed concerning how Heidegger thought that meaning works in the early part of his career. With the previous explanations in place about Hus-

serl's stance, it should be possible to spot how close the two men were in what they concluded.

The emphasis of sections 16 to 18 is recapped when signification is taken to the authentic temporal understanding of being, in sections 69b and 69c. For instance, it is repeated that we are primarily related to the world-whole and not to specific things or meanings: For "if the being of Da-sein is completely grounded in temporality, temporality must make possible being-in-the-world and thus the transcendence of Da-sein, which in its turn supports the being together with innerworldly beings that takes care, whether theoretical or practical", (§69a, p 333). Da-sein has a pre-reflexive understanding of the world and only on that basis can it understand things in "conscious attention", (p 332). It is repeated that all being lies inside Da-sein's world (p 334). Da-sein and world are equivalent (§69b, p 333, p 335). The three "ecstases" of constitutive *Zeit*—past, present and future—open up the world through creating world-constitutive references (p 333). For temporality to be "ecstatic," it means that it is 'outside of itself' in the sense of transcending, towards other Da-sein and things. This is an extraordinary way of not mentioning intentionality and temporality in Husserl's senses.

What Heidegger meant was that remembering and anticipating, and the flow of meanings through the present, are the authentic core of human being. These are a priori in the sense that there could be no understanding and human being without them—and that temporality resides in all the experiences of being human. *Zeit* is an "originating openness", (p 334). It has completely taken the place of being aware of things through intentionality and Husserl's interpretation of the same situation.

It is implied that Heidegger believed that consciousness does not genuinely show itself but rather it is a medium through which the senses and modes of being appear. The commonality between Husserl and Heidegger is that interpreting human being is interpreting what is necessary for understanding meaning. But Husserl failed to make his position fully explicit in his publications and that has caused the similarities between the two to go unrecognised.

Some more details of Heidegger's argument are as follows. Section 69a is a repetition of the remarks of sections 17 and 18, that using tools and signs are "oriented towards a context of useful things", (§69a, p 323). This is a statement about social learning in Husserl's sense. Heidegger continued that the "context of the whole of useful things has already been discovered," (Ibid). In the light of the above, it means that the *whole comes first and the parts appear out of it*. Heidegger concluded that reality and understanding are a unitary phenomenon.

> The explicit reference to the fact that scientific behavior as a way of being-in-the-world is not only a "purely intellectual activity" might seem unnecessarily complicated and superfluous. If only it did not become clear from this triviality that it is by no means obvious where the ontological boundary between "theoretical" and "atheoretical" behavior really lies!

§69b, p 328.

What the above means is that theory and practice co-occur. To find theory from experience is a good aim but difficult to achieve. With respect to Husserl and Heidegger's analysis of the implications of sense, it is immaterial whether we call the links of sense between objects intentional implication (across horizons of time, space and person) or references that appear out of a whole-world. Overall, it seems best to use Husserl's terminology because he was first to think of this type of explanation.

Heidegger contradicted himself on the same page when he declared that understanding "is grounded primarily in the future (anticipation or awaiting)", (§68d, p 321), rather than the equiprimordial whole of all the facets of temporality: "The future is *not later* than the having-been, and the having-been is *not earlier* than the present", (Ibid). The better conclusion of their co-occurrence was repeated again, with the words: "*Like understanding and interpretation in general, the "as" is grounded in the ecstatic and horizonal unity of temporality*", (§69, p 329). What he meant was that temporality transcends and has always already gone out towards the whole of beings in the world. "*Da-sein must transcend* the beings thematized. Transcendence does not consist in objectivation, but is rather presupposed by it … a transcendence of Da-sein must already underlie "practical" being together with things at hand", (§69b, p 332). His point was that the perceptual duration of any object and its meaning require temporality for them to be as they are. Because "temporality must make possible being-in-the-world and thus the transcendence of Da-sein, which in its turn supports the being together with innerworldly beings that takes care, whether theoretical or practical," (p 333).

Temporality is the ultimate ground. The point is that the facets of temporality are a priori to the existential apriori Heidegger had mentioned so far. One way of expressing his claims in a simpler language is to state that because of retaining learned sense from the past, anticipation exists and works through the present instant and creates the future. The retention of what has been learned exists in conjunction with anticipation in the present moment. For instance, when a tool is broken, this event highlights the failure of our aims to use it. The sense of frustration, impatience and indignation at a piece of equipment that fails to work as

expected, reveals the manner of our being as relying on non-verbal, pre-reflexive temporal ties to what has been, what has been forgotten or remembered and what is adequately anticipated or not. Pragmatic relationships are the ground and concepts are a dependent view, reliant on that ground.

Section 69c begins with the most mature restatement of the point of section 18, that the world of understanding is comprised of significance in relation to the relevance and purpose of any thought or action (p 333). All manner of being exists for Da-sein who understands (p 334). (This is a re-presentation of what Husserl wrote in his *Time* book (1991). For instance, all understanding lies inside consciousness, §44, p 103, a conclusion from the years 1909 to 1911). Heidegger made further repetitions at the end of section 69c of *Being and Time*: "The world is transcendent, grounded in the horizonal unity of ecstatic temporality", (p 334). The meanings of "innerworldy" beings are so because they lie inside Da-sein's being. This is a complex way of stating that they have been socially learned and such learning moves from the past into the present—in a complex interaction with what is expected to happen—and in relation to what is happening—hence the title *Being and Time*. His conclusion is that the manner of the existence of any meaning is interpreted from out of these temporal interconnections.

Once more, the ultimate conceptual context, for all pre-reflexive and conscious experience, is the world. The "ecstatically and horizonally founding transcendence of the world will give us the answer" whose being is "the ecstatic and horizonal unity of temporality", (p 335). Therefore, temporality is the authentic ground of all understanding and Da-sein's being. But it must be approached from the proper a priori attitude in order to interpret it.

The three major aspects of time as past, present and future are tied together in opening up the world as a meaningful one. In other words, meaning is due to Da-sein's temporal structure.

> The schema in which Da-sein comes back to itself *futurally*, whether authentically or inauthentically, is the *for-the-sake-of-itself*. We call the schema in which Da-sein is disclosed to itself in attunement as thrown, that in the face of which it has been thrown and that to which it has been delivered over … Da-sein is at the same time making present as being together with … The horizonal schema of the present is determined by the *in-order-to*.
>
> The unity of the horizonal schemata of future, having-been, and present is grounded in the ecstatic unity of temporality.

> p 333–4.

The above means that temporality creates all sense and meaning within temporal contexts, within an overall temporal and historical world.

In closing this section, an explicit comparison must be made between Husserl and Heidegger. Whether the terminology of intentional implication and appresentation is used—or whether the sense of objects are better understood as appearing out of a world-whole—is a false opposition. For this work, the conclusion is that both influences occur and are not mutually exclusive interpretations. The conclusion is that any meaning has links across time, place and social context. Although one might at first believe that there is some strict demarcation between the past and the present. On closer inspection, the influence of the past on the present occurs in the present and it influences the future. So there is no such strict temporal demarcation. As we shall see below, these points have their relevance in understanding how trauma, for instance, lives on in its influence. These same remarks on temporality are put to use in later chapters to explain how people can alter their behaviour in the here and now. What they seek to avoid are things that only happened once and may never happen again, for instance.

Finally, contrary to Heidegger, the world-whole certainly does not appear. Human beings are certainly not omniscient. The pre-reflexive, tacit understanding of a world of sense is limited indeed. Frankly, it is contradictory to believe that understanding is both contextual and situated—and then to state that the world-whole appears, when the manner of the appearing of any whole or horizon is limited.

§79 Meta-representation in action

The aim of this penultimate section is to show the value of a meta-representational theory of consciousness that discerns specific sorts of relations to objects of different kinds. As a reminder, meta-representation is the "ability to represent the *representing relation* itself," (Pylyshyn, 1978, p 593). It concerns representing forms of representations. This section illustrates the ideas above by taking an example from the region of therapy. Specifically in therapy, meta-representation is representing how others are representing any cultural object and relationship of any sort. Meta-representation is: "Explicit understanding … that one and the same representation can have different interpretations" (Perner, 1991, p 102) and this is compatible with hermeneutics. Husserl's distinctions among the different forms of intentionality, in relation to different senses of the same object, can contribute to a meta-representational theory of consciousness. Meta-representation shows the differences about the manifold senses of what may or may not truly exist. Or more specifically still, it is about showing different forms of intentional-

ity in relation to different senses of the same being. It has to be noted that within the view of developmental psychopathology nothing new is being added by these remarks. The novel point is noticing that remarks by developmental researchers are meta-representational in the specific sense that comparisons between populations are the best way of comprehending the damage done: between secure and insecurely attaching, between traumatised and non-traumatised, for instance (Masten and Braswell, 1991, p 35, Cicchetti and Cohen, 1995, p 3, Wicks-Nelson and Israel, 1997, p 17).

Although the word meta-representation was not used by Husserl and Heidegger, it is nevertheless present in interpreting intentionality and understanding temporality. These concepts are useful in psychology and therapy in the following way. The central phenomena selected is the influence of beliefs. For instance, beliefs that arise as a result of early trauma or lack of secure attachment. The situation is complex and is explained across forthcoming chapters. For the moment, what is important is to make a psychological interpretation of how adults have taken from the past in construing the future and the present. It is the centrality of belief as temporal that connects with the problem of constancy.

The phenomenon of post-traumatic stress disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p 425–7) is a good example for illustrating the meta-representational view of the 'cause' of psychological problems and understanding their cure. For instance, in comparing traumatised adults who leave home to non-traumatised adults who also leave home: It is not just the case that intentionality is involved in language, chosen memories or automatic flashbacks. It is not just the case that perception for the adult is wholly influenced by trauma-related flashbacks and memories from decades ago, that create fearful anticipations and imaginings. What needs to be created for an adequate psychological interpretation of the phenomena is how to make sense of the constancy of the problem across decades of time. It is insufficient merely to pick on one phenomenon. Rather what is most advantageous is to recognise any phenomena in the context of other types of phenomena of other sorts. Thus lists of psychiatric phenomena are really condensed versions of intersubjective and temporal phenomena. A person who has flashbacks may appear as unpredictable, absent-minded or volatile to others and so the genuine meaning of the phenomenon is that it has an intersubjective context around it. In full, this is an intersubjective problem not just an individual one.

With respect to belief, meta-representation shows its worth in being able to compare and contrast what is believed to be the case as opposed to what is less credible. Empirically, it is the case that beliefs are frozen across time in the sense

that they are direct outcomes of single or multiple traumatic events in infancy, childhood or in the past. For the adult without help, they are often unable to formulate challenge, disprove or evaluate their beliefs. So problematic beliefs are maintained across decades. The fundamental temporal distinction is that whatever trauma created a belief about self, other and world—such beliefs shape the anticipation of the future of what will exist and maintain some unhappiness, inability or other repetitious problem in the present. The types of beliefs are inaccurate or false. By definition, they do not adequately portray the referent in question.

The therapeutic answer is that meta-representational understanding of psychological situations is the means of helping clients choose adequately, through a rational means with respect to their emotional and relational life. By definition, beliefs that maintain problems create false emotions, thoughts and outcomes. A meta-representational interpretation of the human situation establishes the basic differences about the meaning of referents through distinguishing the past, present and future accuracy of understanding the referent in relation to the manner of different intentionalities that portray it.

Let us be clear about what is involved in making necessary interpretations of intentionality. There are many simple and compound, or "composite," types of being aware. Husserl's work is meta-representational in that it distinguishes the forms of being aware of objects in their basic types. Primarily, there are temporal differences. Some of the types of intentionality can be listed as follows: (1) perceptual presence without identity and temporality are most basic; followed by (2), perception with identity as the next higher; then (3), the pure presentations, such as imagination, recollection and anticipation; then (4), picturing presentation, as the next most complex; leading to (5), empathic presentation of the perpetually quasi-given sense of the other and their perspective; and (6), the conceptual forms of intentionality that are non-giving perceptually, but give meaning through the social conventions of language.

Meta-representation also means being able to account for the phenomenon of appreciating that another person is turned towards specific objects in a specific way. Others have their first-hand views of cultural objects that are empathically given, second-hand, to selves. Selves have a first-hand view of cultural objects. The views of selves are second-hand to others. Intersubjectivity has been teased apart yet action and reaction remain interconnected. Meta-representation is acknowledging the difference between that which is attainable perceptually; and the types of meaning that are not currently perceptual, temporarily or permanently. Meta-representation appears in judging the following differences:

Self and other can both tell the truth about their perspective on the same object. Such perspectives are both true and different. It is a further step for the two people to be able to agree each other's perspectives as valid. Disagreement is the case where the other's perspective is not valued but dismissed or in other ways argued as being faulty or incorrect.

Imagination is not the same as perception. Both fearful anticipation and psychosis can begin, for instance, sometimes as an inability to limit imagination. Imagination can express wish, desire and possibility. Anticipation concerns future possibility. For instance, some wishes, thoughts, desires and imaginings can only be unfulfilled; whilst others can be fulfilled perceptually in experience.

It is possible to distinguish the intersubjective function of an intentional form in various ways. For instance, with respect to affect as a cultural object. Affect could be defensive, maintain an existing power balance in a relationship, prevent change or increase or decrease the security of attachment. The same object could have many teleological functions among beliefs, emotions, relationships and associated experiences.

Conceptual intentionality expressed in speech or writing could be attempts at lying, cheating, manipulation or examples of fearful or depressive interpretation of self or others. In other cases, thoughts can be due to inaccurate beliefs concerning assumptions that are incorrect, or about beings and states of affairs that are later found false. Such hindering beliefs might need to be identified and disputed, in order to provide help. Belief means that some experiences are sponsored by an adherence to a position born of the past.

Any failure to represent the other's perspective can be understood as an inadequate understanding of human being in relation to others and the world (because it does not involve meta-representation). The major phenomenon of understanding is that all persons have perspectives on an object, so theory should follow suit. If theory cannot or will not follow suit on this phenomenon, then the inter-relation of perspectives will not occur and there will never be a two-person psychology. Meta-representation is understood as crucial to psychological mindedness and emotional intelligence because it contextualises the awareness of one's own relationship to others, and the Objectivity of cultural objects in the cultural world.

A meta-representational theory of consciousness could play a wider role in therapy and the human sciences in structuring empirical work and research. Meta-representational theory enables consciousness to be understood in its intersubjective habitat. Some developmental psychologists have found a focus on the differences in perspective between self and other to be an inspiration for further

theoretical and experimental work. One focus of Josef Perner's empirical research is finding how children, during the first four years of life, gain a representational theory of mind (Wimmer and Perner, 1983, Clements and Perner, 1994, Peskin, 1992, Perner, Ruffman and Leekam, 1994). This model has been commented on and found of potential use. It is close to Husserl's position of intersubjectivity and has been presented as an explanation of psychological reality. Empirical research shows that from about three years of age, children are able to spot the difference between the forms of intentionality employed in achieving a conscious sense—which is a stage in being able to understand and represent, in thought or play, the relation to the referent (Perner, 1991, p 82).

§80 Conclusion

In conclusion about a phenomenological hermeneutics for therapy, the following omissions in the justification of practice have been overcome by hermeneutics. Therapy should attend to meaningfulness of conscious experience and the perspective of the other as priorities. Only then will it be able to pick out the salient details in clients' lives and in their current interactions. Clients understand themselves and others, in relation to the whole of humanity that they know. Therapists understand themselves and clients, with respect to the same whole, seen differently.

Firstly, it cannot be agreed with Heidegger that all aspects of temporality could just be subsumed within a consideration of being. However, agreeing with Husserl—recollection, automatic retention, anticipation and the overall influence of the past, in interpreted beliefs and the on-going presence of emotion and bodily sensation, are adequate temporal understandings.

The process of any talking or action therapy, involves interpretation for clients and therapists. If there is enough time with clients, it might be possible to discuss any situation until no new further insights are discovered. That would mark the end of therapy as a hermeneutic process.

Husserl's ideas of different sorts of intentionality are useful in that clients readily understand them. Because intentionalities relate to conscious experience, they are a vehicle for discussion and promoting different types of relation to the same object.

Husserl's ideas of 'cause,' social learning, horizon and the empathic inter-relation of self and other in intersubjectivity are a rational argument that serves to constrain belief about lived experiences.

Sometimes 'nothing is obscure' in that people have accurate 'second hand' feelings and thoughts concerning what the intentions of others are. This can be

proven accurate through discussion, the passage of time or other means. Yet sometimes such attitudes can be demonstrated as being inaccurate with respect to the overall experiences and behaviour of a person. The key distinction to grasp is that interpretative beliefs represent some part or whole, *as something* in *some way*, with respect to the lived experience of the part or whole. Senses are believed, doubted and found more or less credible (Husserl, 1982, §139). It is possible to begin to believe, reconsider and disbelieve through many different means. The official beliefs of each therapist make some map or model of the conscious psychological life. Beliefs concern consciously desired outcomes in action on things and in relationships with people. Thoughts, emotions and physiological changes follow what is believed.

The answer for theory is to consider the conditions of possibility in order to think through areas of certainty and difficulty, prior to any action in the real world. It may well be possible to state further how it is permissable to interpret intentionality in relation to observable aspects and sequences of speech and action between client and therapist. Further work is required on the details of the intersubjective phenomena. It is concluded that a hermeneutically-aware pure psychology of intentionality and objects is necessary. The major therapeutic concern is to engage clients to work on a shared task. It requires knowing how they understand their problem, in relation to how therapists understand it, and how both parties contribute to the overall relationship.

16

Towards a hermeneutic phenomenology

Aim: This chapter discusses Husserl and Heidegger with a view to retrieving the core aspects of phenomenology. It comments on the philosophical positions expressed so far in relation to practising phenomenology according to Husserl with the addition of some aspects of Heidegger's viewpoint. It identifies hermeneutic problems in Husserl's system and works to correct them. It is argued below that the only way in which phenomenology can be manifest is as hermeneutic phenomenology.

This chapter and the next concern "making phenomenology work". First, a synthesis of the perspectives of Husserl and Heidegger is sought. Many facets of Husserl's approach are preferred but his lack of a hermeneutic self-reflexivity is corrected by making hermeneutics more apparent. Phenomenology is made to work by increasing a hermeneutic awareness in the detail of attending to objects of different kinds. The next chapter puts the conclusions on a hermeneutic phenomenology to work in some in some specific applications in psychotherapy.

Below, first some general comments from the philosophical literature are made. Second, a discussion of phenomenology between Husserl and Heidegger is provided. Next, the continuity between Husserl and Heidegger is shown and the discontinuity on hermeneutics is introduced. Fourth, critical remarks about Husserl's stance are made. Fifth, a hermeneutic discussion about the givenness of meeting with another supports the previous two definitions of phenomenology (§§32, 77 above) that stress the hermeneutic character of what phenomenology does by emphasising the need to specify how to attend to appearances. Since the beginning of phenomenology, the initial interpretation was that higher, founded intentionalities are comprised of several lower, more fundamental sorts (1970a, V, §18, p 580).

§81 Some comments from the literature

Let us take some of the points mentioned by recent English language writers to set the scene for thinking about the connections between Husserl and Heidegger. Previous readings of phenomenology and its relation to philosophy are legion. Some particularly inaccurate views of Husserl are still being expressed and supported by those who continue the mistakes of the previous generation of lecturers and students who were influenced by the work of Jacques Derrida. No space is provided for arguing the case against Derrida. It is stated as a conclusion that deconstruction's views of Husserl and hermeneutics are inaccurate. Let us start with some key points from the English language literature that are in agreement with the view of phenomenology set down in this work.

David Carr is correct to define transcendental philosophy as critical reflections on how consciousness works in relation to its objects (1999, p 102). He is correct to point out that theory arises out of the pre-theoretical natural attitude for transcendental philosophy. Transcendental philosophy abhors metaphysical commitments that have no evidence and justified stance to support them (p 133–4). Arising from his study of Husserl and Heidegger, Timothy Stapleton states that self-reflexivity exists when claiming something, one should show one's working also (1983, p 114). He notes that Husserl and Heidegger accused each other of being insufficiently transcendental (p 92). Basically, intentionality involves any connection between awareness of meaning and communicative codes, the traditions and forms of semiotics of expression. Dermot Moran is another who has noticed that Husserl did give priority to meaning and phenomenology demands that the different types of signification should be understood (2000, p 51–2).

Steven Crowell (2000, p 4) has remarked that there is continuity between Husserl and Heidegger. Crowell's reading of Heidegger is that "his philosophical relevance depends largely on being able to recollect the Husserlian infrastructure of his work," insomuch that Heidegger's "decisive contribution remains within the horizon of transcendental phenomenology and does not lie in some sort of hermeneutic, pragmatic, or postmodern "break" with that horizon", (Ibid). Specifically, Husserl and Heidegger are focused on the relationship between humanity and the human world. It is agreed that Crowell correctly grasps Heidegger's "proximity to Husserlian thinking which is otherwise easy to ignore", (p 5). Transcendental philosophy for Heidegger concerns "the conditions of possibility of meaning, together with the conditions of possibility of our philosophical *grasp* of those conditions" (p 13), as it did for Husserl. But if the focus is on being then that emphasises the reification of being and the passive processes of 'intentional-

ity;' and omits the phenomena of active intentionality: will, decision, rationality and egoic effort. To omit that is unacceptable because it tilts the balance of attention away from intentionality understood as inter-relationship.

Donn Welton (2000, pp 393–401) is one who has sketched two major schools of Husserl interpretation and noted that there is an identifiable convergence between the two. The reading presented here is that whilst logic and linguistics are not the whole of philosophy; neither is the cynicism and destructiveness of deconstruction a suitable model for philosophical activity. Welton's claim of being able to spot a convergence between the two readings is not supported here. The deconstructionist and analytic readings both miss the basic points of what Husserl and Heidegger were discussing.

In Welton's favour he has noted that Husserl's transcendental propositions come from breaking up a gestalt whole, in order to analyse the assumptions (p 302). In the view of this work, Welton correctly notes that an object in its context or horizon is a central figure. The "analysis of the interrelationship between background and context provides the key to the *depth* structure of intentionality", (p 21). And "Husserl's way of unfolding the in-structure by thinking of subjectivity as *concrete* brings him much closer to Heidegger's approach than is usually thought", (p 233). Of course, bare sensation, *Empfindung* is not the same as understanding. The variety of terms used for sensation in the body and five senses include hyle, experiential givenness, mental stuff, qualia and sensa (be it perceptual, imagined, remembered or anticipated). Therefore, the general Kantian starting point is up held: Rationality and hermeneutics play a role in generating sensation-as-understood (p 185). Accordingly, Husserl did re-interpret what appeared to him (Welton, 1983, p 200). How Husserl took Kant's project forward was his claim in being able to analyse meanings of all kinds in an entirely neutral way. Specifically, "transcendental aesthetics" is Husserl's claimed acausal seeing of the co-constitution of space and time (1977a, §61, p 146). Welton has noted Husserl's two-level theory of the constitution of meaning and sense in this respect (1983, p 192–3). Welton (p 210, p 223) has emphasised that Husserl had spent many years trying to differentiate the constituent moments in meanings that are present with sensation and the conceptual intentionality of speech and thought. This becomes a major topic in the analysis below.

For this work, it is agreed with Welton that cause exists in Husserl's idea of apperception, of adding *invisible* meanings to sensual ones. For "as soon as Husserl thinks of these levels not only as presupposed but also as *productive*, not only as a "condition" but also as a "source," their interrelationship articulates an order of genesis", (Welton, 2000, p 234). Welton recognises that Husserl went beyond

what appears in understanding a horizon as a "*nexus of motivated implications*" and that Husserl made "explanatory" analyses of acts and objects that are shared within consciousness (Ms, B IV 12, p 8/9, cited in Welton, 2000, p 247). Furthermore, Welton concludes that Husserl did employ conclusions "of theoretical motivations from outside the findings of the reduction", (p 282). Therefore overall, Donn Welton has made sound comments on Husserl's stance and method that are agreeable with the view presented here.

This chapter mentions the writers above because they appraise the links between Kant, Husserl and Heidegger. This work focuses on the commonality between Husserl and Heidegger in order to retrieve the core aspects of phenomenology as the interpretation of intentionality between people and between temporal contexts of past, present and future.

§82 An encounter between Husserl and Heidegger

The order of play is to look at the points in Heidegger's favour, then those against him. Then look at those in favour of Husserl, then those against him. Allow me to present three points from Heidegger already expressed in chapter 14 above.

• Heidegger is correct to state that if an initial understanding is poor, then phenomena remain inadequately disclosed: "what is initially "there" is nothing else than self-evident … prejudice", (1996, §32, p 141, also there should be a reduction of wrong, undifferentiated and unexplored understanding, §6, p 23, §7c, p 32).

• The work of hermeneutics is that if initial understanding is accurate, then a phenomenon is properly revealed. Expressed in terms of ontology: What should happen is taking away the disguises to show the truth of being: The need is to show "something that does *not* show itself initially … in contrast to what initially and for the most part does show itself", (§7c, p 31).

• Furthermore, comparisons between readings will promote judging the accuracy of senses about the same phenomenon (§69b, p 327–8). The aim is to be theory minimal (p 328–9).

After the qualifications above, what is fully acceptable from Heidegger's comments on hermeneutics (§§72–3 above) is that intentional links to past and future senses are incapable of being entirely broken. Husserl's link theory of meaning is a key conclusion (§75 above). Yet, links to the past only quasi-appear and need to be offered as explanations. Indeed, if all intentional links were bro-

ken after a reduction, then objects would have no meaning at all. If it were the case that all intentional links were absent, then objects would have no residual meaning in themselves and would be bare sensation that could not be connected to anything present or past. It is Husserl's mature conclusion that it is by virtue of the links that meaning exists. Accordingly, it will be argued that because some sensation has been associated with emotion, mood and voluntary or involuntary memory, these need to be explained by intentionality and intersubjective accounts. But first the theory of explanation needs to be scrutinised.

The result of similar considerations for Maurice Merleau-Ponty, concerning hermeneutics in phenomenology, is that the "most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction", (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p xiv). In the context of the history of philosophy, the links of a text or a phrase are not entirely dissolved by an attempt at a reduction. In the context of a human life, any thought, feeling, relationship or event makes sense, for instance, through comparison to the lives of others, in reflecting on one's personal history and in relation to beliefs about what life should be about that arise due to shared values, memories and anticipations. Further comments will be made about hermeneutics in the next section.

At the risk of entering a lion's den without proper protection, some negative points need to be made about Heidegger's failure to acknowledge what Husserl's phenomenology is about. From the Husserlian view, it is deeply unconvincing to replace all mention of intentionality, consciousness and horizon—with non-cognised being, referentiality, (or co-referentiality) and world. The major problem with Heidegger's early work is that in trying to out-manoeuvre Husserl, by making Kantian analytic criticisms, Heidegger contorted himself into an obscure manner of expression. It is suspicious in *Being and Time* that the intentionality of consciousness disappears only to be replaced by referentiality, without any connection to understanding as the work of consciousness. Heidegger's smoke screen of obscure language hides Husserl's successes in identifying forms of intentional awareness, voluntary and involuntary memory, and anticipation.

From the Husserlian view, it is a perfectly acceptable position to interpret intentionalities in making meaning of all kinds. On the contrary to Heidegger, being and being-in-the-world are not more fundamental than intentionality and its contexts because they are merely alternative interpretations of the same situation. The problem that Heidegger's interpretation creates is an excessive focus that ignores the details of consciousness's (sic Da-sein's) inter-relationship and embeddedness in the meaningful world. Heidegger purposefully severed consciousness's ties and involvement in contexts and did not bring them to light. He

promoted a focus on philosophical contributions and preferred the ancient Greek senses to the contemporary. Heidegger preferred to attend to non-cognised being and that has the effect of reification rather than creating a clear focus on interconnection, context and perspective.

In addition to the criticisms of Heidegger's appropriation of Husserl's temporality (§§76, 78 above), contextuality (§75 above) and semiotics (§87 below), it has to be re-stated that, on the contrary to Heidegger, the meaningful worldwhole as a totality is never known so it cannot be projected. What can be known is one small aspect of the world and that might be made conscious through reflection on the senses of an object or situation (Husserl, 1989b, §§50–52). To bring in a more tangible example can be done by referring to the experience of looking at a Rorschach inkblot. The blot is black ink on white paper. It might look like a butterfly to some and an evil grinning face to others. The sensation remains the same for all concerned. The objects that appear for any audience are singly the leading phenomena for any phenomenologist in that the intersubjective collective is the genuine absolute (chapter 10). Any personal view of the object is a relative one with respect to that whole. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962, pp 47–61) and Aron Gurwitsch (1964, pp 57–154) tried to show, the example of visual illusions are paradigmatic in proving how consciousness is at work in providing two or more experiences of the same situation. It is then the task of any phenomenologist to explain how these concrete meanings are 'caused'.

Let us now consider Husserl's case.

Husserl's criticisms of Heidegger are frequently mild. The comments Husserl made in the margins of his copy of *Sein und Zeit* are noteworthy because Husserl criticised Heidegger for theorising and interpreting, when Heidegger claimed he was not (1997e, p 315). Husserl pointed out that Heidegger presupposed his own position (p 376). On the contrary to Heidegger, Husserl's view of the ego is that it is never worldless (p 402). Similarly, contrary to what Heidegger claimed, the "subject and object do not coincide with Dasein and world", (p 308). Some of Heidegger's remarks are false criticisms and these promote suspicion because he did know Husserl's system well.

For Husserl, intentionality co-exists with cognised being in the sense that intentionality enables referents to be understood-being. This is why the word "co-constitution" was chosen in chapter 6. Co-constitution reflects the inter-relations at stake. The point is to theorise how consciousness enables the meaningful world to be as it is.

But against Husserl, it can be seen that he could never achieve his own 'separation' of the everyday world from the transcendental and reduced view of it, when

he noted that essences appear: "*Seeing an essence is also precisely an intuition*, just as an eidetic object is precisely an object", (1982, §3, p 9). The problem here is how to judge the distinction between universals and variables. In other words "how do reflections and interpretations of universals escape the possibility of contamination with the vested interest of past experience?" From the first mention of adding senses to sensation, it was concluded that object-meanings are added (1970a, VI, App, §4, p 860).

Therefore, in a first conclusion on hermeneutics between Husserl and Heidegger, on the contrary to Husserl's notion of seeing and essence, what I am suggesting is that phenomenologists have to *learn to read* before they can read off the meanings that appear. To do so they need to make explicit to themselves the contexts of meaning that they imply. An explicit hermeneutic stance is required to overcome the following problem. Husserl held the following premises and conclusion that could be argued to be a transcendental or phenomenological circle.

• The natural attitude of the everyday attention must be overcome through analysing meaning of all kinds to consider experiential evidence and interpret how consciousness creates meaning.

• The pure psychological attitude is introductory in providing a first pass at how consciousness works (Husserl, 1997d, §15, p 249).

• What is explicated in the transcendental attitude is the ground of the natural attitude world that appears in glimpses to the trained eye (p 250).

The view above is that Husserl's system works when it is self-reflexively understood that the transcendental attitude is a hermeneutic stance. It is necessary to declare one's own argument to readers and oneself, in stating how to conclude on everyday experience.

But in fighting for Husserl, it is concluded that Heidegger could not obscure the fact that it is consciousness that is the bearer of cognised being and the means of presenting its forms. It is convincing to interpret intentional relations as existing with respect to what appears about any sense of an object, because that follows the experience of being aware of objects in different ways. Understood-sensation is adequately characterised when interpreted as intentional forms with respect to intersubjectivity; rather than intraworldly being with respect to the being of Da-sein. Where Husserl's view wins is in the attention to differentiating the manners of the connection between consciousness and referent, in order to

understand and explain to others (in an accessible language) how meanings are comprised and how they are best contextualised.

In this next section, some major tensions are explored. It is shown that Husserl's initial remarks on the reduction and seeing essences and the nature of the transcendental attitude do not tally with his mature findings. His findings on temporality show that the natural understanding of time as strict delineations between past, present and future are false. This finding also supports and is coherent with his link theory of the intentional and intersubjective co-constitution of meaning. It is finally concluded that hermeneutics is mandated for phenomenology to exist.

§83 Hermeneutics between Husserl and Heidegger

One conclusion about the similarities and differences between Husserl and Heidegger is that they both attempted a break with philosophical tradition, the naturalistic and natural attitudes. But contrary to those English language writers mentioned above, who note there is a clear connection and development of Husserl in Heidegger's early work in his lectures and *Being and Time*, there are others who accept Heidegger's criticisms without checking to see if they are correct. This contributes to a tendency to see all of Heidegger's work as entirely novel, when it is in the main, a reaction to and development of Husserl's position. This is not to claim that Heidegger's position is entirely due to Husserl. However, to not grasp the Husserlian influence on the early Heidegger is to be unable to appraise Husserl and Heidegger and be unable to develop phenomenology towards some useful purpose.

One writer is noted as denying there is any continuity between Husserl and Heidegger altogether. Ivo De Gennaro has stated that it is impossible to mix the work of Husserl and Heidegger because it would mean mixing "incompatible perspectives by at the same time overlooking the fact that, strictly speaking, there is no continuity of phenomenology from Husserl to Heidegger", (2001, p 108). Following Rainer Thurnher (1995), the English language literature that notes their commonality and the texts themselves, I have to disagree. Specifically, the continuity is that *intentional links between objects in contexts* is the commonality. This commonality is re-presented by Heidegger as *co-referentiality between intra-worldy beings in the world* that has been opened by temporality (Ibid). For Heidegger, being is a function of time. "The meaning of the being of that being we call Da-sein proves to be *temporality*", (Heidegger, 1996, §4, p 15). The true understanding of being is found by rejecting the vulgar understanding of human temporality. The aim is finding an "*original explication of time as the horizon of the*

understanding of being, in terms of temporality as the being of Da-sein which under-stands being", (p 15–16, cf Husserl, 1991, §2, p 9, §6, p 20). But hermeneutics is the area of discontinuity between Husserl and Heidegger.

In addition to what has been stated on the Husserl-Heidegger relation, let me clarify the continuity between them before stating how it is relevant to the appli-cation of phenomenological ideas. Intentionality is any comportment towards an object of belief and attention, understood in various contexts. It is because con-sciousness "can be methodically uncovered in such a fashion that one can directly see it in its performing, whereby sense is bestowed and is produced with modali-ties of being … every sort of intentional unity becomes a "*transcendental clue"* to guide constitutional "analyses" … of *intentional implications*", (Husserl, 1969, §97, p 245). Where Husserl fell short was in being inexplicit about how he did make sense of what appears, for his reading public. It is acceptable that in his *Nachlass* that he could assume what he liked, but when it came to taking Kant's project forward in publications, he should have been explicit about what he was assuming and doing. Husserl worked for many years on the transcendental logic of understanding the conditions of possibility of higher concepts being able to arise from experience (1969, §86, p 209). He also held a desire to find a syntax of non-verbal experience. Husserl held a two-level theory of the 'cause' of meaning and sense such that the syntactical applied to both the "pre-predicational sphere and … has its analogues in the spheres of emotion and volition and, on the other hand" there is "the syntactical that belongs to the specific sphere comprising judgments", (p 212, fn 2). This had been a long time brewing as he had written about the "surplus of meaning" in extra-verbal meaningful experience that appears in addition to that conceptualised by speech and thought, 29 years earlier (1970a, VI, §40, p 775).

Husserl had made it clear in the *Logical Investigations* that: "Very different contents are therefore experienced, though the same object is perceived. The experienced content, generally speaking, is not the perceived object. We must note, further, that the object's real being or non-being is irrelevant to the true essence of the perceptual experience", (V, §14, p 565–6). What this means is that there is a potential manifold of senses about a referent. Husserl wanted to estab-lish the overall intentional form of the inter-relation between types of egoic intentional and non-egoic passive process, and the relationship with the co-empathised views of others that adhere to any cultural object. One of the first mentions of this aim with respect to meaning was the comment that meaning is not 'in' sensation, "we must also locate *no part of the meaning in the percept itself*", (VI, §5, p 685). But this focus on meaning as primary existed in an explicit con-

text of exhortations to achieve inherent interpretation (introduction, §7, p 264–5).

This makes phenomenology close to gestalt psychology in that both attend to complex wholes of meaning. The "unity of the "*expression*" and the "*expressed*" that belongs to the essences of all comprehensive unities" was extended in asking rhetorically about meaning: "Is that what I grasp when I "see" the book, when I "read" the book …?", (Husserl, 1989b, §56h, p 248). Husserl continued that any reading of meaning "is just like reading a newspaper: the paper imprinted with sensory-intuitive marks is unified with the sense expressed and understood in the word-signs", (Supp VIII, p 333). The semiotic intentional effect needs to be understood because there are social conventions established in a number of areas about how meanings exist.

Husserl acknowledged that meaning appears primarily and believed that its origins can be captured without corruption. In 1922 he stated that the signified objects appear 'over' the signifying sensation: "it is clear that what comes first is not "I see data of sensation" but rather I see houses, trees, and so on; I hear in the distance bells, a wagon rattle, etc.", (Ms. F II 3, p 29a, the London lectures, cited in Welton, 2000, p 178). This passage means that most often what is primary is immediately revealed meaning. Bare sensation itself does not appear. But two problems arise. Firstly, the lack of detailed worked examples does not help translate generic instructions into actual analyses. Secondly, the hermeneutic problem is to work with the circularity of assumptions that influence findings. What needs to happen is judging adequate from inadequate understanding.

Section 84 tackles Husserl at an abstract level of general statements. Section 85 takes the particular case of the appearance of the other for self. Section 86 in the next chapter goes into further detail in discussing a specific example that is pertinent to everyday experience and that of therapy practice. In the final analysis Husserl's characterisation of the intentional relation to an object-referent, via its manifold of understood-senses, should have focused solely on the wholes of meaning that appeared.

§84 The 'cause' of meaning

Let us take Husserl's treatment of an object and consider the contradictions in his stance. Husserl's hermeneutic stance is the belief that it is possible to "see essences" and inter-relationships between structures of essences. What this means is to have direct revelation, and by weight of reflection on the relevant evidence and inherent interpretation, identify invariant features and relationships. In *Ideas I*, Husserl referred to this process overall as the "*eidetic necessity*" of identifying

universals and universal relationships (1982, §6, p 14). However, several contradictions arise that have so far not been addressed in the commentary above. As a potential leader of a new discipline, Husserl needed to give his troops instructions on how to practise the theorising technique. This section considers firstly the claims concerning seeing essences then the phenomenon of the motivation within the gestalt of a whole meaning of a general sort. The next section attends to the specific case of the motivations that occur in the phenomenon of meeting another person. The question is "what stance to hold?" And secondly, "how to become aware of the effects of one's own position?"

In Husserl's early writings, the phrases that he used to convey his method stressed the need to pay attention to a whole of meaning as it exists in the original temporal field and not import extraneous meanings from other regions but attend to what appears inherently, as I have put it, and treat meanings as they are. While this choice of words is laudable in presenting an ideal, it will be shown below that such an ideal is never attainable in practice and is contradictory to Husserl's mature conclusions and method.

In general terms, what the texts of *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and *Cartesian Meditations* show is how the natural understanding of the present original temporal field, and the understanding of sensation as the carrier of a large number of meanings, associations and motivating tendencies, make sensation become apprehended in specific ways. All such meanings are quasi-present temporally and linked to further implications of intersubjective presences of persons and the meanings that other people hold—all of which are *outside* the current original temporal field.

As regards seeing essences, now understood as interpreting what appears, there is no connection between the instruction to read off universals and how to contemplate a manifold of meanings about the same referent. Each meaning seen would have been grasped in a specific way in past original temporal fields. Seeing essences depends on instances of seeing them (1969, §82, p 203). The techniques of seeing essences and eidetic imaginative variation demand the judicious selection of specific parameters without going into every detail of the everyday (1977b, §9c, p 57). But there are no instructions on when to stop seeing. On one page the signified, recognised object predominates over any awareness of sensations as mere sensations (1970a, V, §14, p 565). On the next page, it is noted that the self same object appears as a constant (p 566, cf 1977b, §9c, p 58). Both are valid phenomena but there is no commentary on how to judge them.

First let us further consider the central claim of Husserl's early work to be able to read off a priori universal essences and start with considering the basic claims that accompany the reduction.

Within the published works, there is no detail about how to recognise the necessary invariance about universals that Husserl was looking for. For example, something that has a past or primally-instituted first occurrence may re-appear through voluntary or involuntary memory or the evocation of meaning in affect, smell or bodily sensation. But Husserl noted that what might be a possible conclusion could be over thrown in the light of further evidence (§9f, p 64–5).

Let us start at the beginning. The phenomenological attitude is one of interpreting intentionality in all forms of the referentiality of consciousness to all types of objects. When objects and the intentional connections to them are interpreted in this way, what appears is a flow of consciousness (1991, §10). However, the hermeneutic stance that Husserl occupied was that there is a major difference between sensual givenness prior to reflection by the seeing ego (1982, §78, p 128) and what appears of seen essence. It is the passive processes that do a good deal of the work in co-ordinating and bringing together presences that overall presentiate the meaning that quasi-appears. However, when reflection begins, seeing stops the intentionality attended to, and begins the process of identifying its variant and invariant moments. The *Empfindung* is a moment of the whole *Erlebnis,* but added to that *Empfindung* are the many quasi-appearing senses that become identifiable, such as intersubjective senses, for self and others, earlier senses, clear and vague senses, believed or not believed. These added, non-sensual senses are literally *perceptually invisible.* Yet such senses are overlapped, added or implied as co-presence, in links to past and future, to what is tangible in the five senses.

Between the early instruction on how to exercise the reduction and his mature conclusions on the link theory of meaning, Husserl contradicted himself.

Strictly, the reduced object is a "phantom" and is allegedly seen, experienced, in a non-causal manner. A phantom is a reduced appearance in any sense field. For a visual object it is: "a pure visual spatial phantom (a form filled purely by color, not only without relation to the tactual and the other data of the other senses, but also without any relation to the moments of "materiality" and thereby to any real-causal determinations)", (1989b, §10, p 23–4, also §15b, p 41). What this means is that to reduce an object is not to take away its meaning and links, but to consider the whole allegedly without naturalistic causal bias, through appreciating the moments that comprise the whole of its meaning. Any reduction should take phenomenologists back to experience its givenness and help them

compare such experiences. The evidence itself, without any contamination from outside the phenomena should sway phenomenologists, as it appears in the original temporal field. (Sic there is no connection to the link theory of the 'cause' of meaning espoused as the conclusion). The claim to see acausally is contrary to the link theory of meaning.

There is a clear statement that Husserl was researching by elucidating and overcoming the "naïve blindness to the horizons that join in determining the sense of being, and to the corresponding tasks of uncovering implicit intentionality", (1977a, §41, p 85). What "implicit intentionality" means is expressly something that does not appear alone but quasi-appears as a moment of a whole. In Husserl's terms there is an ontological and hermeneutic problem: 'cause' and 'effect,' part and whole, are unclear. For phenomenology to do what it promises, the vantage point for seeing evidence must be explained to others.

Precisely how should phenomenologists find the differences they seek? Rather than lose the plot in abstractions, let us take an example that is central to the *Meditations.* Husserl claimed that all forms of addition of meaning to perceptual objects "is not inference, not a thinking act" of conceptual reasoning or interpretation through language or thought (§50, p 111). The type of meaning he was referring to are precisely those sorts where previously occurring meanings are added to current sensation such as paring, association, retained meaning, previous socially acquired learnings and primally instituted ones. However, this process cannot be seen. This realisation leads to scrutiny of Husserl's two-level view on the creation of higher meaning and lower perceptual, temporal and bodily sensation. Therefore, Husserl's account employs higher thought to explain how sensation carries the meaning that it does.

Let us further consider the two-level theory of meaning-bestowal briefly noted above by Welton (1983, p 192–3).

The higher donation of meaning in *Deutung, Auffassung* and higher composite sense such as co-empathy follow the attributive model of the *Sixth Logical Investigation* (1970a, VI, §23, p 731, §60, p 817–8, App, §4, p 869, fn), *Ideas II* (1989b, §18a, p 61–2) and elsewhere. The point is that despite the intention to describe and reflect on what appears, there is a 'causative' perspective within the conclusions on co-constitution. So that, (1), pre-reflexive sensation, perception, *leiblichkeit* and temporality are portrayed as passive and non-intentional in that they have a different type of connection to the ego. Whilst (2), all forms of intentionality concern the attribution of higher, complex meaning in a projective way. This is a constant schema in Husserl's writings from 1907 or 1908 until his death. It is briefly expressed in *Ideas I,* for instance (1982, §85, p 203, §87, p

213, fn 2). Two citations from *Formal and Transcendental Logic* are as follows. "Mental processes appertaining to original passivity … are unable to bestow a sense," (1969, §4, p 25), which should be read as meaning they are unable to bestow a composite sense by themselves without, lower pre-reflexive presence and temporal duration. The work of non-egoic passive 'intentionalities,' the retention of retention, associations, temporality and other passive and fundamental additions of sense are stated as not belonging to the donation of meaning schema. The following remark is one that emphasises the different 'cause' of pre-reflexive co-constitution: "If we take evidences in an extremely broad sense, as the giving (conversely, the having) of something-itself, then not every evidence necessarily has the form, specific *Ego-act*: directedness from the Ego … to what is itself-given", (§107c, p 287). He was referring to all the passive processes with these words.

Support for this view comes from the following writers. Firstly, it is confirmed that the creation of the chain of retentions does not follow the higher meaning-bestowal schema (Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p 104). Robert Sokolowski also notes that Husserl gave up looking for the donation of temporal givenness according to the higher schema around the year 1909 and concluded that temporal apprehension itself provides that moment of the whole of the meaning that appears (1964, p 105). Secondly, the creation of any presentation, intentional implication and intentional modification of an object's givenness obeys a 'holographic' presentation of the original experience that is being presentiated, associated or otherwise added to what appears (Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p 145–146).

In order to make the problem clear, it is necessary to have understood the concordance between various brief asides in the published works (1977b, §16, p 86, 1969, §§4, 107c). Specifically, what appears of the signifier or cultural object is a composite of meaning, a whole or gestalt, where sensation is a carrier for other meanings that are retained, appresented, anticipated, intellectual, presentiated or associated. According to this interpretation, *composite intentionality understands the perceptual object in a horizon and the result is the signified whole of meaning*. What Husserl assumed is that the whole is the sum of component moments. Husserl concluded that before the intellect has a chance to think or speak, perception, retained associated meaning and the type of temporal givenness occur in the open space of the original temporal field of the now. This is what he was referring to by mentioning reflection turning to the pre-reflective presence. What is pre-reflective is not yet an object of attention (1982, §77, p 174). Objects

become conscious with temporal additions of meaning (§83, p 197). It is only when consciousness has properly focused on sensation that an object appears.

To repeat: these conclusions mean that Husserl had a self-contradictory position in *Time*, the *Phenomenological Psychology* lectures and *Formal and Transcendental Logic*—with respect to the rule for reductions to be acausal in the writings of *Ideas II*. On the one hand, reductions should treat what appears acausally, without thought of what might have caused it, as already noted above (1989b, §10, p 23–4). Yet on the other hand, he clearly assumed that all higher composite sense came via the ego and obeyed the meaning-bestowal "schema: apprehension-content—apprehension," (1991, §1, p 7, fn 7), whilst the pre-reflexive types were not mentioned. What this means is that object-meanings are added to bare sensation. This is although the specific footnote itself is written in the context of a discussion of how Husserl had interpreted the holding together of the flow of contemporary moments across the lifespan: From the immediate future, across the now and into the personal past. Apart from the claims about the reduction, there is no commentary on how to reflect and see essence without donating what has already been found.

Therefore, Husserl did not obey his own advice to have caution with respect to the assumption of 'cause' in the natural sense, and could not prevent the motivation to understand gestalts in specific ways that occur with respect to co-empathy and intersubjectivity (Husserl, 1989b, §56f). Contradictions ensue because within *Ideas II* the phantom is considered as both intersubjective (§21, p 100) and as only properly viewed as it appears currently. If the retained object sense of "the thing exceeds the phantom [it] would then not be given to us in actual, exhibiting, givenness", (§15b, p 39). No comments are provided about how to make sense of attending to something 'merely' as it appears now *and* as from the past *and* as intersubjective *and* as 'caused' in associative, temporal and motivational ways. Cultural objects have added to them the meanings and links to groups of persons that are known 'by everyone' in relation to these objects (1977b, §16).

The problem is one of Husserl's lack of self-awareness as to the effects of his own assumptions. Husserl knew full well that a 'theoretical sight' could be powerful enough to lead philosophers, academics and scientists away from the phenomena. "Thus a distinction arises occasionally, even for the judger, between the supposed objectivities *as supposed* … and the corresponding "*true*" or "*actual*" objectivities", (1969, §44bβ, p 122). What he was stating was that attitudes are formative and he still had faith in inherent interpretation (§29 above). But this

did not translate into making clear what the stance of interpreting intentionality and its universals should be.

In conclusion on Husserl's attention to meaning, the aim of a purposeful naïvety towards meaning does not work. Nor does it rest well with years of attention to the differences between conceptual and other forms of intentional reference within a link theory of meaning. If there is a basic hermeneutic rule for Husserl, then the way his statements "describe" what appears need further clarification because they do not mean 'describing everything' without assuming something. Rather, what Husserl's phenomenology does is *interpret specific relationships and meanings towards specific purposes*. However, the instruction to describe in the present moment what appears of meaning is unworkable as a literal instruction. Phenomenology would be ridiculous if it would not see and speak of meanings from the past and future and other persons. Husserl's practice was to consider all types of meaning carried by sensations. It was his desire to represent universals and necessities that 'appear' and work out how these meanings are formed. (Heidegger ridiculed Husserl's seeing as staring (1996, §31, p 140) and made false criticisms about Husserl under an attack on "Descartes", (§§19–21). If it had been the case that Husserl's phenomenology only considered sensation in the original temporal field without meaning of any sort, then it would be true that "our just-having-it-before-us lies before us *as a failure to understand* it anymore", (§31, p 140). For this work it is agreed that "what is encountered in the world is always already in a relevance which is disclosed in the understanding of world, a relevance that is made explicit by interpretation", (Ibid). Returning to the themes of chapter 8, if hermeneutics is accepted; inherent interpretation is impossible in practice. But ideal aims for hermeneutics cannot be achieved. The hermeneutics of inherent interpretation (§31 above) is an ideal. What is required is adequacy of understanding and making good comparisons. It was never under consideration by Husserl to make sense only of base sensation in abstraction from the whole.

In a different analysis of the phenomenon of the gestalt than in gestalt psychology, there are a number of motivational 'causes' to be considered. These will now be noted in overview before selecting a pertinent one in the next section. Contrary to Husserl's intention to avoid imposing causality and natural beliefs on transcendental considerations, it can be claimed that there most certainly is a motivational 'causation' between retained consciousness and the understood conscious experience that consciousness produces. The difficulty is that the presence of natural 'causal' assumptions are not analysed to understand their influence but are accepted and shape the results. In relation to the phenomenology of the body

as part of transcendental phenomenology of the co-constitution of the world: "For Husserl, the phenomenological problem of our experience of the other is to discern in which explicit and implicit intentional syntheses and motivations the other comes to be manifested within my (transcendentally apprehended) consciousness and to be certified as existing", (Bernet, Kern & Marbach, 1993, p 156). This critical appraisal discusses how well Husserl's own characterisation of these motivations meet the phenomena within Husserl's own construal of his research question.

A further problem ensues.

There is no connection to conclusions on how to interpret the presence of the past in the current understanding. The major conclusion is that the past re-appears in the present. This is a fatal omission and a decision needs to be made about how to identify past-givenness when it only quasi-appears with respect to the base stability of sensation. Sensations are certainly not the whole of meaning, but co-appear with other meanings that predominate in understanding and recognising identity that provide a specific character to what appears.

Husserl's problem is that the 'causality' of meaning appears in relation to the transcendental attitude itself because the presence of the past is formative and the direction of 'cause' is from the past to the present in Husserl's mature analyses: "laws of causality in the maximally broad sense—laws for an If and Then," really means following through a developmental progression or history from the earlier to the later (1977a, §37, p 75, also 1989b, §18a, p 62). But that then raises the question of how far it is possible to get away from the idea that the past shapes the present. The original temporal field is only a moment and can make no sense by itself. There are questions about how to analyse the whole of temporality. But within the answer to the central statement just cited, assumptions about temporal priority are strongly formative. Therefore, there is confusion. Husserl failed to keep separate the conclusion of the 'causality' of the intentional achievement of cognised being—from his experiential investigation of how such meanings exist.

On the contrary to what Husserl extolled others to do, it can be realised that what he did himself was to interpret and 'causally' explain in his claims of pairing by association and other interpretations concerning the past and pre-reflexive wholes of sense. Accordingly, it could be possible to argue against the *Fifth Meditation* altogether were it not that explanation of the phenomenon of psychological intentional implication and the intersubjective communalisation of intersubjectivity in families and cultures are judged to be credible. Specifically, this interpretation is judged to be a reasonable explanation because understanding and psychological senses are not co-extensive with logical ones. This topic is

discussed in more detail in the next section, in relation to the role of higher intentionality in phenomenology and with respect to sensation.

For the moment let us consider the effect that this confusion on 'causality' has in creating conclusions about a priori essences, structures of essences and the universal relationships between egoic active intentionality, passive 'intentionality' and the types of meaning considered. Basically, Husserl was guilty of a crime of omission in not attending to hermeneutic self-reflexiveness. What Husserl meant in "seeing essence" was that there should be no assumptions of any kind. Yet he clearly did assume a temporal 'causality,' that later sense is the result of earlier sense. Specifically, the great weight of Husserl's mature writings support the view that temporal-historical genetic development is crucial in understanding the maturation of meanings of all kinds (Ströker, 1993, pp 146–164). Husserl listed the progression of inquiry from the most superficial to most fundamental as "1) Universal phenomenology of the general structures of consciousness 2) Constitutive Phenomenology 3) Phenomenology of Genesis", (2001, p 629, fn 101). Genetic phenomenology is most fundamental because temporal layering or sedimentation is concluded as being most 'causative' of meaning. Indeed, the ideas of 'cause' and meaningful whole fuse into one perspective where it is difficult to judge where one ends and the other begins. The principles are abstract, so I shall state the general case first, then illustrate it by discussing the specific case of co-empathy in the next chapter.

In the concepts of retention, apperception, primal institution and pairing by association, Husserl assumed that the past plays the role of making sense of the current event or process. This is a hermeneutic position because it formally allocates importance to retained senses and contexts of sense. The intentional processes that add them together are interpreted to exist because of the overall whole of meaning. (The retained personal consciousness connects with the intersubjective world as the reduction to the own world shows). From 1911, Husserl's assumptions about temporality make the links to the past the genuine origins of current meanings: that the created simultaneity of what appears to exist is downstream of the absolute consciousness that made it. The absolute consciousness finds and adds together all the moments to make the whole, so that conscious reflection can attend to it. The simultaneity of the understood whole is therefore made passively and pre-reflexively. The absolute consciousness makes sensual givenness and the duration of the moving original temporal field, but cannot itself be classed as objectifying. It is the attention of the ego that objectifies (1991, Text 50, p 345, OWW 1909 to 1911).

On the contrary to what Husserl concluded, seeing essences means that any reduced object, considered as meaning plus sensation (in any type of temporal givenness—remembered, present, anticipated or merely imagined) demands interpretation of its sense. Any experiential object could be a polyvalent or meta-stable gestalt in connection to how it is understood, because of the attitude and perspective taken towards it and how it is contextualised. Accordingly, any object or process could be given a range of meanings according to these factors. The topic of ambiguity is discussed in the next section.

But intentionality does not appear and has to be interpreted from the types of Objective givenness that do. As already noted within the school of Kern and Marbach interpretation, Husserl's stance is the "interpreting" of "*intentional structures* of consciousness", (Marbach, 1984, p 210). For this stance, it is permissable to assume that there are invisible "*multiplicities of consciousness*" that are "*anonymously functioning*" in making meanings for consciousness (p 211). It is not in doubt that consciousness is assumed as a legitimate explanation of observable behaviour. However, it is inexplicit how this turn to consciousness focuses on the meanings that sensation carries. Tangible mental sensation carries higher composite meanings of all kinds. Through experiential and intellectual comparison of a formal hermeneutics, they indicate the work of consciousness. It is never in doubt that the end-products of intentionality appear. But because intentionality itself does not appear, *interpretations of intentionality are explanations that involve higher intentionality about all forms of sensation and meaning*. Therefore, Husserl held an inexplicit hermeneutic stance with respect to the pristine phenomena and did not sufficiently comment on his own position.

§85 The case of the other

Now that the above remarks are in place, let us reconsider the specific case of understanding the other in the *Cartesian Meditations*. One most basic addition of sense that is attested is that *Leib*, a lived perceptual sense of self, is added to the *Körper* of the other, to produce the expressive physicality of the other, the *Leib-Körper* (1977a, §51, p 113). According to Husserl, the resultant whole is a *Leib-Körper*, an extended physical body that indicates non-verbally the consciousness of the other in terms of communicating their belief, intentions and affect, at a basic level, with respect to the same cultural objects that appear for self. And vice versa, self non-verbally indicates co-empathic interest to the other. Husserl held that the sense of the other "body [*Körper*] must appropriate from mine the sense: animate organism [*Leib*]" (Ibid), which means that one's own *Leib* is the 'cause' and source of the sense that the other is a *Leib*. If Husserl's system works—this

finding has to be seen: experienced in some way or otherwise intellectually argued for from what is experienced.

Husserl's texts are the only source of his method for those who would like to replicate his claims. If there is insufficient instruction and explanation in his texts, then his conclusion of adding one's own *Leib* to the *Körper* of others (as part of a process that co-constitutes the sense of our world with participation and commonality) could not be achieved by the phenomenological community.

The problem is how to approach the other in a transcendental way that discloses what is most significant, in grasping the genuine nature of human interrelationship. The problem for Husserl was that his assumptions drove his answer. After the last section, there could never only be mere revelation to create a transcendental philosophy of consciousness in intersubjectivity. If there were, then all phenomenologists would need to do would be to sit back and receive the truth because they were in a state of grace by virtue of adopting the one and only stance for the enlightenment of seeing essence. The lack of instruction from Husserl put the claim to see the essences of intersubjective Objectivity in doubt. Particularly, there is a question about how to analyse the bodies of others as indicating their co-interest in mutual cultural objects non-verbally. The rationality and congruent expressiveness of the human body is the object being studied. The types of wholes that should be analysed are of the following sorts for a psychology:

- We are discussing this amicably.

- We are meeting each other for the first time.

- We are about to fight because I see you about to attack me.

- You are trying to get something out of me by putting pressure on me.

- We are trying to get over our differences and make agreement.

To state the meaning of this in an equivalent way but in a wholly different manner is to claim that within a cultural group there is a rationality or congruence of expression between immanence and its non-verbal and verbal aspects, so that people congruently 'say something' non-verbally as they say it verbally. Both these types of expressions should be congruent about the immanence they represent.

Because the reification of consciousness is unphenomenological, the problems mentioned above raise questions: (1) What is genuinely phenomenological? (2) What is the true understanding of the being of consciousness in relation to mean-

ing? And (3), how to approach their connection so that intentionality might show itself in the right way?

Of course, measuring, the use of statistics and other cause-effect assumptions will perform an unwanted reification because such techniques are concordant with material being. We know when consciousness is being unfolded in the right way because plausible explanations of what is sensually observable can be accounted for. In the region of transcendental phenomenology, for instance, the judging point is how, in the absence of consensually-approved explanations, that it is possible to take the qualitative evidence and create an account of the major beliefs about interpreting intentionality in cultural worlds between self and others? Whilst 'being in intersubjectivity,' phenomenologists need to occupy a clear position in order to see the whole.

Let us consider the phenomenon of meeting another person some more. There are a number of intersubjective situations where the phenomenon of the other is unclear, absent, ambiguous or incorrectly understood, so that confusion registers about others and their perspective. It is a pity that Husserl did not provide details of more complex social situations, where the other is not understandable and where conflict and ambiguity were considered in detail. There are situations in which co-empathy might not always occur with respect to humans. There is also the case of the verbal and non-verbal understanding of animals. In relation to the analogy of the non-verbal communication and expressiveness of the implicit beliefs and intentions of animals with respect to that of humans, Husserl asked rhetorically: "But where does the analogy end? … Are individual [animals] not also psycho-physical, do they not also have their lived-bodies as organs of their 'ego poles'? But here the analogy reaches its limit", (Husserl, 1973d, p 173, cited in Steinbock, 1995, p 280). With these words, Husserl showed the limits of his eidetic contemplations and confirmed the form of his reasoning.

Allow me to state five problems bluntly, concerning the phenomena of others.

1. People appear as real living others with no evident series of pairings or additions of sense as Husserl would have it in the *Meditations*. Husserl went beyond his own guidelines in arguing logically for what he wanted because all the temporal sources and processes such as pairings by association are not seen. Meeting with others ordinarily entails verbal and non-verbal conscious communication between self and other. Indeed, the other is immediately found as other with us. Intersubjectivity is that we find ourselves together and we can both accurately or inaccurately co-empathise our similarities and differences. People's clothing and

hairstyles indicate what sort of a culture people might belong to because the cultural codes of these items are part of the overall effect, of a person as cultural object, for everyone to know. How people are non-verbally is in relation to largely unspoken languages of dress, manner and appearance.

2. One's own physical body is not seen in its entirety by oneself and neither do we experience what others see of it. We could only ever co-empathise what we think they see, feel and interpret about us if we do not ask them. They could always choose to not tell us the truth.

3. Genetic and constitutive phenomenology concern how the world has come to exist developmentally though personal history (1977a, §37, p 75, §38, p 79). Families and cultural communities of all kinds build up their norms and have people who lead and provide, and those who follow.

4. Questions arise as to what are the roles of early socialisation, habit and the extent of their influence.

5. The intentional processes that allegedly traverse the past, in enabling us to understand others now, must be argued for if their action cannot be seen.

Let us return to the relation of the higher intentionality of concepts in relation to the telling case of ambiguity and unclarity within the specific context of the everyday psychological life of meeting others.

Husserl's published works mentioned ambiguity but never followed it through to create an explicit hermeneutic stance concerning how it is legitimate to interpret intentionalities from ambiguous Objective senses (1970a, V, §27, p 609, 1982, §103, p 250, 1973f, §21b). Instead, there is a complex account of how to compare and contrast Objective senses in order to distinguish their co-constituting intentionalities (Husserl, 1982, §§130–1, 150–2). The Husserlian interpretation of an ambiguous figure such as Edgar Rubin's vase is that the visual sensation, the referent, stays the same but consciousness calls up two or more different senses, so producing alternating experiences or meanings of the figure overall. One sense of Rubin's vase is a dark vase standing out against a light background. Suddenly, the sense flips to become two light faces in close proximity with a dark gap between them. In this case, consciousness is confused and is having difficulty interpreting what is visually perceived. The experiential duality of beholding Rubin's vase is one case where the experience itself is entirely outside language. *Nothing within language makes the experience occur.* The spontane-

ously altering senses are a paradigmatic type of evidence to support the belief that consciousness is an absolute—be it individually or collectively considered. To understand Rubin's vase one needs to have previously understood what vases look like and what two people look like when they face each other very closely.

The situation of ambiguity and indeterminacy of meaning is noted by Maurice Merleau-Ponty with the following words. "In the world taken in itself everything is determined. There are many unclear sights", (1962, p 6). He noted this in relation to the tendency to ignore fuzzy and polythetic experiences. For Merleau-Ponty, this indeterminacy of meaning extends because, in relation to a discussion of sexual motivations and those of other sorts, "there is in human existence a principle of indeterminacy … Existence is indeterminate in itself, by reason of its fundamental structure", (p 169). Merleau-Ponty argued that because of this indeterminacy between humanity, meaning and cognised being, it is impossible to find an absolute starting point for understanding meaning. This could also have been a call for a self-reflexive hermeneutics.

Therefore, on some occasions co-empathy can show itself immediately from the nature of everyday intersubjective life, if some conditions are met (§64 above). The manner of the conceptual referring to co-empathic and intersubjective experience itself (as revealed, recognised and being put into words) is the outcome, not just of the moment, but of an accrual of such an ability over time. Non-verbal expressiveness is part of a congruence between the individual and cultural community. But as chapter 13 explained, felt-senses between people can occur without vocalisation in the transmission of family attitudes about people, things and self, and in passing on beliefs, thoughts and feelings through psychological means. For instance, severe physical abuse of a child can reduce their ability to attach to others, so whatever their sexuality and intellectual abilities, the fearfulness due to the violence, for instance, can stop them raising a family or staying in a long-term relationship. This sort of presence of the past is very important and never explicitly taught by the realm of conceptual thought, discourse and logic. And for the damage of physical abuse to be undone, various empirical conditions have to be in place so that the hurt can be rectified. If such conditions are not met, and the survivor does not or cannot seek help from the everyday world, then the hurt will be prolonged. This is a psychological example that illustrates the presence of the non-verbal as a "surplus" in addition to conceptualisation (1970a, VI, §40, p 775).

The abundance of qualitative perspectives within social anthropology, social psychology and sociology interpret human being differently. Many writers have derived concepts from experience. The most fundamental question of the human

sciences can be simply stated as "what is it to meet a person?" The answer is inevitably complicated and the biases of social reality are many. It is easy to be misguided by physical looks and manner of dress. It is quite possible to be mistaken when one has no contact with people of a certain class or culture who are not familiar already. Then there are the cases where the evidence about personal identity is more immanent than transcendent as in the gender identity of transvestite and trans-sexual persons who feel themselves to be of the opposite gender to their physical bodiliness. There are further cases where people feel themselves to be different even in the same family for much less apparent reasons.

For instance, in pure psychology, what should have happened is that there should have been a greater focus on inter-relation within the whole because in "the sphere of the human sciences facts mean that they want to clarify motivations" of associations, meaning and sense (Husserl, 1989b, §56f, p 241). Without a deeper emphasis on mutuality and its absence, the type of thinking that the *Fifth Meditation* permits is communally 'causal' influence, driven by the intersubjective motivational influence of others, cultural objects and shared meaning. To follow this properly would mean the establishment of a hermeneutic transcendental sociology that would radically increase its theoretical complexity and bring an explicit perspective to everyday experience in a keen attention to detail. If Husserl had commented on his initial conditions, his initial assumption that he was only regarding 'normal' adult consciousness in the *Meditations,* then these limitations would have been more easily apparent.

Let us return to the overall attempt to speak about the experience of meeting with others as it occurs, for the most part. What is happening in the text of the *Meditations* is that another moment of the whole in the analysis is higher intentionality. Higher intentionality maps the meeting point of 'cause' and meaningful whole. Conceptual intentionality is particularly relevant to intersubjectivity, as the next chapter will show. For this discussion, higher intentionality is needed and legitimate, if filling in the gaps within the experienced whole of intersubjective experience itself. But without higher concepts there could be no explicit understanding. No one who believes in the ubiquitous presence of intersubjectivity, even after a reduction to an own world, could discount the influence from the forces of a shared discourse, egoic activity, cultural affiliations, approved forms of reasoning and interpretation. Therefore, it can be argued that logical argument and interpretation a priori intervene when selves speak and think about their co-empathy of the perspectives of the others in intersubjective cultures.

From the perspective of hermeneutic pure psychology, any inference concerning intentionality can only arise after attention to the object and its type of given-

ness. What is produced is explicit linguistic comparison to other objects, regions of objects and other types of givenness. It is not enough to experience these differences. Transcendental phenomenological research of the co-constitution of intersubjective worlds demands hermeneutics and explicit reasoning to achieve its aims. In order to thematize any presence adequately requires concepts to identify the type and name the extent of the influence. When individual phenomenologists can identify their own feelings and motivations in their lives, for instance, they require the agreement of colleagues to validate their conclusions before they come to trust them themselves.

For hermeneutic pure psychology, one of the rules for self-reflexively aware interpretation is to avoid reifying consciousness and treat meaning as existing within contexts. Higher intentionality as causal explanation is acceptable when the overall means of making such judgements are clear to all involved. Phenomenology needs to become an explicit hermeneutics and work to refine understanding in a self-reflexive manner. The donation of psychological meaning is similar to the donation of conceptual-linguistic meaning, in that both are added to base sensation. But primary emotion about another person is passive and pre-reflexive. (It is possible to generate secondary emotions through linguistic means, for instance, by holding frightening explicit beliefs or telling oneself that a loved one is about to die).

Husserl's treatment of meaning has been criticised because of the assertion that meaning is wholly co-extensive with language, in thought and discussion. The criticism is that Husserl's stance is at fault because meaning cannot be detached from linguistic concepts. On the contrary to that view, there are strong cases for (1) certain types of meaning not being co-extensive with language, (2) that understood-experiences can be temporarily outside of language, and (3), that the concepts chosen to refer to a meaning can vary a great deal according to the attitude and perspective taken towards it. Firstly, primary emotions about relationships are the clearest phenomena where something appears first in a wordless manner and requires speech to announce its form. Secondly, it is a genuine phenomenon that the internal dialogue of thought can be silenced and that understanding of various sorts can exist without language. Thirdly, it is certainly possible to grasp *how* oneself or others hold beliefs or perspectives that determine their conclusions that may hit or miss the phenomena altogether.

Wordless understanding can happen in everyday life outside of a Buddhist monastery and occurs momentarily in trying to put words to an experience (§76 above). So, in addition to the thesis that it is only language that refers conceptually, Husserl can be understood as asserting that many other types of experience

refer without concepts. For instance, examples include referring through the media of association, retained learning and anticipation of what might happen next (that also refers back to prior learning and associations of sense). There are also the examples of referring through primary emotion and by shared experiences of being together which are in themselves not linguistic: for instance, living in the same house, being crowded together on a commuter train, being in a football stadium are all communal experiences primarily outside of language, although not wholly without its influence.

In conclusion, in the particular case of interpreting a current object that allegedly has its meaning due to pairing by association (or any other type of pre-reflexive sense that exists prior to reflection), Husserl broke his rule of inherent interpretation. It can still be an aim of phenomenology to interpret what appears about the invariant with respect to the variable. But the invariance involves the presence of the past both *in* the present moment and *outside of it*: What the whole is understood to be comes from the past and is experienced as existent now, yet its source is not present in the sensation but most often refers back to an earlier whole that has reference to other people.

The theoretical perspective that Husserl brought to the phenomena of the other concerning the addition of the *leibliche* sensation of one's own body to the visual object of the other's *Körper*, is 'causal' in a temporal manner and, in his terms, is unseen. Hence his analysis in the *Cartesian Meditations* was close to the natural attitude. What this means is that intentional analysis is tied to the categories of body, rationality and academic discourse. Hermeneutic pure psychology refers 'causally' to self and other as does the everyday life. However, the form of this 'causality' is about meaning and contains reversible and changeable senses in relation to the same referent. Because of changeable meaning there is uncertainty and error about whether others tell the truth about their invisible immanent experiences. This is part of the reason why natural psychological science shied away from meaning in the early days of behaviourism. Since the cognitive revolution in empirical psychology there has been a gradual acceptance of meaning but it is still a long way from accepting human experiences as the bedrock of qualitative methods and theories.

17

Making phenomenology work

Aim: This chapter is about "making phenomenology work" in using theory to avoid problems and achieve tasks.

Programmatic statements are fine but the troops need detailed instruction and worked examples. In addition to the criticism of Freud in chapter 12 and the response in chapter 13, which was specifically with respect to the talking therapy approach of psychodynamics, further clarifications of the consequence of phenomenology are made below. First, the proper usage of theory is in connection with the application of ideas in doing work and achieving some effect. The second section explains the worth of the theoretical view in understanding psychotherapy practice and research. Third, comments are made about child development and psychopathology. Finally, there are some closing remarks on further developing the biopsychosocial perspective. Evidence is forwarded in support of the claim that ideas of intentionality can unite the talking and action therapies.

§86 The use of phenomenology in psychology and psychotherapy

Chapter 6 above began with the initial assertion that the proper domain for phenomenology is theorising in an ideal way in producing a "mathematics" of consciousness (Husserl, 1977b, §4, p 36) for use in various applications. The gaze is "mathematizing in the broadest sense", (Husserl, 1997e, p 279). Phenomenology elucidates the conditions for theory to point in a reliable way to what counts. What this means is that any practice or research methodology is the outcome of pure ideas in connection with actuality. In pure phenomenology the proper evidence is for the purpose of theory-making. Theory and practice fit together as two moments of the same whole. Neither half by itself is sufficient. Theory and practice need each other. At first, the theoretical aim was accepted at face value: it "neither constructs deductive theories nor falls under any", (Husserl, 1970a, introduction, §7, p 265). But as we have seen, the hermeneutic method of phe-

nomenology starts with a unity or whole of meaning and separates base sensation from the higher and lower forms of intentional reference to it. This is somewhere between Kant's transcendental deduction (Kant, 1993, p 91–2/B 117) and an attempt at gaining self-awareness about the conditions of possibility that make the whole possible. Husserl noted that theoretical interests produce truth claims because "habitual "vocational interest" … [does] create ever new rational acquisitions; and it maintains acceptance of the old ones", (Husserl, 1969, §44bγ, p 124, fn 1). It is desirable to achieve a "synthesis" between the theoretical and the practical, "such that the *theoria* (universal science), arising within a closed unity and under the epoche of all praxis, is called … to serve mankind in a new way", (1970b, App I, p 283). But this does not mean that theoretical answers should come before theoretical methods.

What theory can aspire to is being an adequate map of the intersubjective view of meaning in its various contexts. But no anthropologist could ever hold in consciousness all the permutations and combinations of how meaning exists for all cultures of the world. No philosopher could ever grasp and communicate all there is to know about the treatment of meaning across the history of the discipline. No linguistician could ever categorise all the possibilities of spoken communications in all the languages of the world. What phenomenologists can aspire to explain is intentionality in contexts, within specific regions, and show how it can help in providing understanding that promotes successful action. Any theoretical view could never be all-encompassing. Rather, it must state the limits of its scope and stay within the limits of its usefulness. In this way, theory stays fit for purpose within any region of academia.

Because phenomenology creates transcendental propositions about universal relations, then the form of argument it supports is deductive reasoning about theory that could be verified or falsified by practice and other forms of testing with actuality. Eidetic imaginative variation distinguishes what is theoretically conceivable and assumed to be "necessary" within the re-consideration of actual personal experience expanded by the addition of personally imagined experience (1977b, §9b, p 56). The aim of identifying universal relationships is achieved through the generation of premises concerning how consciousness and world are inter-related (Husserl, 1970b, §§52–54). For instance, the concepts of intentionality could lead to the generation of basic understanding about how people are connected. Basic understanding itself would not be the end of the story, but lead to new actions and experimentation in the world. The empirical results could feedback to correct the understanding of the validity of phenomenological concepts and the practices that make them. The point of theory is to order and pre-

pare action, to compare like with like and inform empirical research. What phenomenology produces are claims of a priori universal essence about the inter-relation of consciousness and meaningful world. These concepts refer through conceptual intentionality to alleged constants in everyday experience.

Let us take the case of therapy practice once more, to illustrate the connection between the pure and the applied. The theoretical activity of seeing and varying essences is an abstraction from the natural part of the biopsychosocial whole. The focus on the psychosocial is in order to create the psychosocial skills of practice towards specified ends. By way of being introductory, phenomenology only considers the most basic needs of theory for planning and thinking about practice and research. Phenomenologically-influenced practices cannot mimic natural psychological science or adapt non-qualitative approaches and methods for the reasons already stated. The natural substrate of human being is not an entirely closed-off region of being. There is a two-way causality between heritability that drives behaviour (maybe in promoting sexual orientations that are not legal) and natural cause from the effects of heritability, personal choice and society on the individual's physical being. For instance, low self-esteem and lack of the perception of danger could promote illegal forms of sexual orientation that can have serious effects on the physical and mental health of others and self.

There is the need for a psychosocial account that interprets intentionality in relation to meanings and public senses, and observable events that can be explained as the result of such acts. The conclusion here is that no matter what Husserl claimed, phenomenology does hermeneutic work in making consciousness, its egoic decisions and its passive 'intentionality' come to light by stressing the differences within and between wholes of meaning. What pure psychology shows therapy is the importance of the links in awareness to the social world, the manifold of social reality. It is possible to interpret and bring to consciousness how people's lives make sense, in a way that they can respond to what is being said to them.

For instance, psychological hermeneutics sets itself great difficulties in making sense of affect without thought, affect that is not particularly related to current relationship events and affect that seems to be about no current conscious object. These are all genuine phenomena that can be rationalised. But the manner of doing this requires clients to participate and understand what therapists are doing in order to maximise the possibility of making sense. This is because intersubjectivity cannot be escaped as the reduction to the own world shows. Indeed, in discussing psychological 'cause' with clients, it is suitable to employ them in commenting on any possible 'cause' voiced by the therapist.

Let us consider another example that shows how Husserl's ideas of intentionality, temporality and context can interpret lived experience of the on-going effect of trauma. The following shows the meta-representation of the distinctions between 'cause' and meaning, time and place. This case shows how the previous ideas can capture the meanings of clients through having the right sort of initial understanding. What is revealed is that sensations, emotions and beliefs can be 'frozen' in time past, yet still be active in the present and influence the image of the future. Therapy theory should be able to identify what is genuinely at stake for clients. The next case is one of rape. But the principles of psychological hermeneutics apply to multiple traumas and any other situation. In this specific case, the rape created a set of associations, call them intersubjective intentional implications, or links of sense, that are believed, felt and acted on.

During the rape of a teenage girl, the rapist held his hand over her mouth throughout the attack. The girl thought that she would suffocate and that she was dying at the time. What this produced was a pervasive sense of insecurity that gave rise to long-term PTSD with (1) health anxiety, (2) a pervasive social anxiety that applied to both men and women, (3), a more specific fear of death, and (4), agoraphobia and panic disorder. In terms of the beliefs that began after the attack, there was the belief "I might die, therefore I cannot go out on the street". She was very nervous about leaving her home for this reason. She could make herself go out, except that she might have panic attacks if she did. The client had been continually depressed for 25 years before entering therapy. On entering therapy, it came to light that she had not been out for 18 months because she feared that her baby daughter would be vulnerable to a paedophile. Her reasoning was expressed in a second belief that "I might die and then I would be defenceless to save my daughter from being picked up by a paedophile".

The same attack and associations of sense appeared in other areas of her life. One situation was the fear of dying prior to leaving the house. It was a dilemma. When she did go out she felt "fine," and enjoyed the freedom and ability to live her life as she wanted. When she stayed in, she felt "safe" but "frustrated," "limited" and "a prisoner". Her long-term depression narrowed her interests and she was frightened of making friends, which also reduced her general quality of life.

In terms of what broke the associations of sense, there were no new radical techniques applied. The general set of steps that were employed to help her break the links of sense began with explanation of the intentional links that had occurred. The rapist was implicated but did not appear in her thoughts and memories of the attack. What did appear in her consciousness were a series of sensations connected with asphyxiation, anxiety, headaches and such like. Expo-

sure therapy was used to break the classical conditioning involved, particularly prior to leaving home. New beliefs were encouraged and the client was asked to repeat them, to reassure herself before going outside. She was also asked to think of safe situations and imagine them, instead of frightening herself with the visual image of seeing herself lying dead in the street, a car pulling up and a paedophile taking away her defenceless baby daughter.

By way of making a general discussion of the psychological life of the other, let us consider the following situation of listening to someone who is talking about their severe depression. This adds to the analysis already expressed in chapter 13, sections 64 and 65 above, and discusses what I have called the primary emotion of being in relationship with another. Let us set the scene and say that a young male therapist meets a male client for the first time and that the client is very open about how he feels and his personal situation.

Starting from the abstract and generalising perspective of theoretical statements that explain how other people become understandable to each other, in the form already explained in chapter 13, Kern points out that "not only does the originally perceptible "outer" motivate an "inner" which is originally not perceptible, but the originally imperceptible "inner" motivates an originally perceptible "outer" as well, and, insofar as the latter becomes perceptible for me, it confirms my inaccessible, motivating "inner"", (Bernet, Kern and Marbach, 1993, p 162). What this means is that knowledge of another's immanence can be surmised through on-going cultural learning of how people look externally. This is not a one-to-one correspondence and depends on the congruence of expression of the inner by the outer. (There is also the incongruent masking of the inner by a purposeful or habitual failure to express it outwardly). Let us see how these generalities apply in the specific situation called "assessment" where therapists work out what the needs of clients are, at a first meeting, then decide how to best help them.

In discussing with the young man his feelings that he has no future, of having lost interest in hobbies and focusing on the possibility of death through suicide, there could be a range of emotions that come to consciousness including fear and hopelessness in the therapist. As the discussion continues, the feelings of the client are spoken about. Even if the therapist has been suicidally depressed himself, it does not help the therapist to understand the client. The client's words indicate something that has been building up for 10 years.

The pieces of the puzzle are as follows according to Husserl: The other is seen and heard in the current moment. One's own bodily feeling and retained experiences of the meaning of what it is or might feel like to be suicidal might come for-

ward. Associations to hearing and understanding other people who have been suicidal come back to consciousness as the discussion unfolds. The therapist remembers what needs to happen formally in judging the closeness to suicide and the amount of intent and social support available. He asks questions of the client in light of past experience. For the therapist, there is an intentional link between the current situation and specific past experiences of meeting other suicidal people. The affect of the therapist is conscious. He feels nervous about what he is hearing and wonders how to act because the client appears to have no reasons to stay alive and abandons a line of questioning around the young man's motivations because it seems to be underlining the hopelessness that he feels.

The Husserlian interpretation is that the other is the object of consciousness of self. The co-empathic work that is happening in addition the affect and rationality of the therapist is that the view of the young man comes to consciousness for the therapist. However, despite the need to act, the work of conceptual rationality is to fill in the gaps about what is happening. Each moment of listening is best characterised as becoming clearer about what is appearing of the mental state of the client. There is a time lag between hearing, feeling and looking at the client—as emotional understanding and thought within the therapist struggle to grasp accurately what the client is referring to.

In addition to Husserl's account though, there appears the necessity of intellectual understanding being formed piece by piece, in order to understand the psychological 'causes' of the suicidal depression being described. The further work is to ask about the possible context of the beginning and maintenance of what has being happening for the client over the last 10 years and to link that to the story that is being told in the here and now. In some cases it is possible to supply other contexts of intellectual understanding from other sources such as psychiatric textbooks and empirical research into the types of attachment relationship. Or otherwise an attempt is made to understand the production of the belief about personal incompetence in relation to a prolonged depressed mood. Eventually, what comes out of the two-way discussion is that ever since a relationship where the client was verbally bullied mercilessly, a sense of low self-esteem began that seems to have become generalised across all domains of the person's life. This is linked to the object of co-empathy, the feeling that the client sees himself as utterly worthless and tells himself that he will never succeed at any task. For the young man himself, his mood seemed to have no 'cause'. On further discussion, what comes to pass is that an understood-whole is produced. A link between the present mood and the originating past is established. The bullying and criticism is interpreted to have produced a belief of profound incompetence

to the extent that he believes that he will never be able to be normal and that all the people he knows are already far ahead of him in every respect. With the addition of an intellectual account of psychological processes, the mood, behaviour and desire to kill self become understood.

The point for theory is that one's own affect in this situation is one moment of the whole. The intersubjective whole in conscious communication includes higher intentionality as well as other aspects.

Let us take another therapy example where an adult client who was physically abused by her father notes in a session that she was seriously depressed by the time she was 15. Her therapist asks what she felt she was missing. She is not able to identify anything. From the therapist's viewpoint though, something has been missing and that is the basic care and attention that a child is due from its parents. So the therapist voices an interpretation: "Perhaps your depression at 15 was due to the lack of care shown to you by your father". This explanation is accepted. It is both a 'causal' hypothesis of the reason for her depression and acknowledges the meaningful whole of her life. There was no need to state the interpretation in technical terms. As a statement, it is open to discussion and correction by the client. What also appears for her is self-harm without any current need of the relief that it brings. Her mood is strong anger at herself. The only instituting event has been physical attack 40 years earlier. It becomes necessary to join these pieces together to create the 'causal' theory that the attack constituted the general tendency to be angry with self and that explains the self-harm. What advantages this has over the Freudian legacy is that it makes the meetings more accessible for clients and is ready to acknowledge that the views of therapists may not have adequately grasped the referents of the comments of clients. Therapists may have mis-understood what has been said to them for a variety of reasons.

The needs of therapy in particular are such that explanation is required that is accessible to clients and takes their views into account, even if it does not agree with them. As already noted, Sigmund Freud's practice was really about interpreting what appears. Most forms of therapy make claims about the initial causes of problems and may have a theoretical account of how such problems are maintained. On closer inspection in the realm of the psychological life, 'cause' and meaningfulness co-exist because of the inter-relationship of the whole of human existence. Because the personal past was also intersubjective, past influences are also part of the current influences. It is meaning itself that is 'causative'. It may be the case empirically that the influence of habit and the response of primary emotion in relationships are more fundamental parts of intersubjectivity than higher conceptuality. What Freud got close to understanding is how earlier patterns of

relating influence contemporary ones. This whole area needs careful consideration. There are accounts of how disorders accrue across the lifespan and theories of developmental change. Research into important intimate relationships has come to be known as attachment research and has come to be associated with intersubjectivity as a means of describing the central phenomena of the potential sensitivity and inter-responsiveness between carers and children. The ideas of co-empathy and intersubjectivity serve to keep such studies focused on the inter-activity within the whole of the relationship.

The last three sections of this chapter further illustrate the point that intentionality has explanatory value in that it bridges the gap between academic discourse, practice and everyday experience (§87). A brief critique and presentation of the core view of Husserl is made with respect to psychopathology and child development (§88). Finally, the overall view of pure psychology as a biopsychosocial frame of understanding is established, in relating psychological theory to all forms of psychological practice and research (§89).

§87 The moments of the total communication

The core definition of phenomenology is the interpretation of forms of intentionality. For instance, the signitive or referential intentionality of semiotics was first analysed in 1890 in *On the Logic of Signs (Semiotics),* (1994, pp 20–51), again in the *First*, *Fifth* and *Sixth Logical Investigations* (1970a, I, §§9, 10, V, §§14, 19, VI, §40) and thereafter. Temporality was analysed in the years before 1917 (1991, §34) and after that in relation to intersubjectivity. Accordingly, pure psychology produces an emphasis on the semiotics of the human body and the inter-relationship between aspects of the potential manifold of sense of a referent in a context. One way these distinctions can be put to work is in understanding everyday life, psychology and therapy. The case for the transcendental role of intentionality in consciousness and between other consciousness needs to be re-stated as it has been overlooked. In order to grasp the differences between bodiliness, meaning, intention and context, let us consider some more examples.

One major distinction that Husserl focused on was the physical body as a signifier of interpretable sense. Verbal and non-verbal communications form a total conscious communication and are achieved through the bodiliness of speech, action and gesture. What this form of analysis opens up is a possibility for understanding that grasps the psyche-logic of human existence by getting close to its form. This form is not straightforward like logic. For instance, through stylistic means, it is possible to indicate meta-communicative factors. In sarcasm, a phrase is given a twist and a change in tonality inverts the logical sense of the phrase to

communicate a sense opposite to its logical content. Similarly, an intersubjective action of any sort can have more than one intention, meaning or purpose. It could be understood in a variety of contexts. For instance, because there is no one-to-one correlation between an action and its meaning, there is the possibility that people can do good things for bad reasons and bad things for good reasons. Let us take some concrete examples.

For instance, actions may not always tally with intent as the law and judges know. To mis-represent purposefully one's intentions is the definition of a lie. Let us take a legal case first. If someone borrows a bicycle without permission, it only becomes theft if the borrower has the intention to keep the bicycle and does not inform the owner of their intention to give it back. If the borrower is caught with the bicycle and it is truly their intention to give it back, then they need to say so. What I am getting at is that the actions between people are observable but the intentions of others are unknown and can be disguised. Therefore, there is a grey area that includes mistaken action and mistaken intentions that may not always be purposeful mis-representation of an intention, as in the case of lying. It is possible to hide one's intentions, beliefs and views of others if one chooses.

For instance, a pivotal case is drama where the action is always an untruth. Yet if the play or film has any meaningful message for its audience, then the purposeful representation of falsehood is a convention for the purpose of telling a story. Actors and audience lay aside concerns about the truth of the action in a way that lands none of the actors in court, nor are they branded as compulsive liars. The audience lays aside the truth and is not accused of colluding with falsehoods or coming to believe in the action as real. If the story and the actors are convincing, there will be an emotional response to the story. The social conventions of writing plays, acting and attending the theatre is that the words and gestures of the actors demonstrate something that the audience can understand. So the play or film achieves its purpose of discussing some event, not as philosophical discussion, but as an intersubjective dramatic portrayal of a real, historical or merely fictional event. The degree to which the actors and script can create a credible world and portray cultural senses is the degree to which the whole event works (of fails) for the audience.

In everyday life, to be in love is not always constantly adoring the beloved. It is possible to be in love and angry with the person. There may be a tension between thoughts and feelings, but there is not a contradiction as there is in logic where any middle position is excluded. The psyche-logic of being in love is that all matter of thoughts and feelings can co-exist with love.

In the case of providing service to others and caring of various kinds, it is possible to do the right thing through intent and action, whilst having more complex feelings and not be lying or deceitful. If a caring action is motivated through maintaining a social convention or providing services for money, it does not mean that the person operates entirely out of empty duty or solely for profit. There can be a number of motivations co-existent, at any one time or sequentially, and concordance or tension between them.

Similarly, the social skills of psychotherapy are doing and saying something helpful at the right time for clients, no matter what therapists may privately think and feel. To care and serve others is to provide help to those others, setting aside how the carer feels. This includes keeping a tactful silence sometimes on various matters about the capabilities of clients and how they may have treated their therapist. It also highlights one of the skills of therapy as being able to express disagreement and present views that a client might not want to hear, without losing the client and still helping them get to a positive place. In emphasising what has already been noted at section 66 above, the skills of therapy practice concern understanding potentially contradictory or conflicting emotions. It has been the aim to demystify emotions through explaining their 'causes' and noting the context that could be supplied in understanding them and knowing how to act. Let us take a concrete example. A young woman asks for help with a phobia but her manner of expressing herself is argumentative. It is clear to the therapist that what she feels is that she would like to show the client the door. The easiest option would be to refuse treatment. Despite the feelings of being irked and unnecessarily attacked, the therapist offers further appointments on the strict understanding that there is only going to be short-term help supplied towards very specific aims. A the first meeting, the treatment plan put to the young woman is that there will be the creation of a self-help regime and that the client has two sets of beliefs about whether her fears are reasonable or not. At the first meetings these stipulations are accepted. At the first treatment session, however, the client expresses the desire for an unlimited number of meetings and complains bitterly that she feels unsupported by the mental health services. As there is only one member of the mental health services present, this seems to be some sort of complaint about the help being received. On further exploration it transpires that the client hopes for a magic cure. When the therapist re-states the nature of the agreed treatment plan, the client becomes angry and rejects the idea that she has two sets of beliefs about her phobia. What should happen is that the long-term aim of providing treatment should be carried out. It is easier to fall in with short-term needs for avoidance of conflict and to bring the sessions to an end immediately. On this

occasion the strength of the anger of the client and their argumentativeness lead the therapist to apologise that she is unable to add any new strategies to the ones that the client has already been employing, which is factually true. But what it does for the client is that she leaves the session mid-way through it. In retrospect, the professional would have done things differently at assessment. This would have included making even more explicit how the nature of the treatment would be difficult to achieve and require co-operative action between the pair. This may have been sufficient to have pre-empted the disagreement and made it more clear about what sort of help was being provided.

A focus on the semiosis of the body can throw some more light on the answer of chapter 13, on how to understand emotion in the two-person attempt at attachment in the professional setting of psychotherapy. This can be understood by re-interpreting the groundbreaking work of Una McCluskey (2005, pp 221–225). Specifically, therapy is an attempt at seeking and providing attachment, not in a fully intimate way but in a professional one. The composite communication overall can be interpreted as care-seeking from clients that is met with care-providing from therapists. This is another reason to reject the interpretation of transference, counter-transference and unconscious communication and adopt a view of therapeutic relationships as attempts at intimacy and psychological meaningfulness. Overall this leads to nine total communications that McCluskey has identified empirically, although there may well be other combinations.

Proficient care-seeking elicits proficient care-giving and security is attained in the therapeutic relationship.

The style of care-seeking is disorganised and incoherent but the care-giving is sufficient to increase coherence of communication from clients and good care is received.

Care-giving is slow at first but care-seeking is constant and proficient. The care-giving is eventually able to tune-in to the object of the client's concern and becomes sufficient in time.

Aloof care-seeking does not elicit care-giving and so the care-giving attempt is withdrawn. Either the client remains aloof or withdraws in return.

Care-seeking is begun but soon turns ambivalent and resistant before dismissing the care-giving. The provision of care stops.

Care-seeking stops and care-giving is dismissed. Both withdraw from each other.

Care-seeking is proficient at first but for a variety of reasons care-provision is halted, refused or inhibited, so the care-seeker avoids and withdraws.

Care-seeking is proficient at first but care-giving is refused so care-seeking comes to a halt.

Poor care-seeking does not elicit care-giving. The therapist may not have received any care-seeking request and none is provided in return.

What this analysis raises is understanding the psychodynamics of care-seeking and care-giving as attempts at security of attachment in therapy of all kinds. The aims of future research in this area is to identify how ruptures in therapy can be repaired and understand how to provide help to those persons who are very damaged, whilst identifying those who are very hard to help and possibly beyond the ability of therapists to provide any help at all. Whilst the analyses of McCluskey are framed in terms of care-seeking and care-giving, it is possible to identify specific moves from each half of the pair that contribute to the nature of the intersubjective dance overall.

On the client side, there is (1) the verbal expression of the object of concern, (2) the affect felt about it is shown bodily (as well as verbally) plus (3) the attitude to seeking care is expressed and forms a total communication. To use a term of Freud's, there can be a resistance at expressing the object of concern. The client co-empathises the sense of the therapist as he or she responds. There is the total ability of clients to ask for care and show themselves in an intimate way to strangers who might well be completely unknown. On the therapist side, there should be some awareness of the emotion of the client. There is an intellectual, affective and imaginative ability to co-empathise the client's predicament and verbalise empathic responses that explain what the therapist is doing and how they are responding. On the client side, there are five major moves.

There can be clear expression of the object of concern, the current affective state of the client about it and their affect about expressing themselves in the relationship. But there can be some resistance to making the object of concern clear for various reasons.

For instance, the client resists and contains the logical detail and blocks expression of the affective state.

Or there is a poor, disguised expression of the object and the current affective state.

Alternatively, there can be disorganised or angry verbal and non-verbal expressions that may be due to the help received so far, or are a commentary on being in the care-seeking role, rather than being about the object of concern.

On the therapist side, there is the possibility that the expression of care is accurate co-empathy and pitched in such a way that the client successfully receives it. Overall on these occasions, the therapist has successfully understood the verbal

and non-verbal expression of the object of concern, the emotional aspects of it and the situation of asking for help. But a number of problems can arise for therapists when they have difficulties in understanding.

But therapists could focus only on the logical detail, make poor responses, a minimal or insufficient number of responses, or fail to clarify responses through failing to ask questions and clarify the understanding that they are getting.

Due to any reason, therapists can fail to understand client affect, the manner of expression about the object of concern and their manner of asking for help.

There can be disorganised, angry and conflict-laden responses from therapists who are confused or otherwise lost in trying to help.

Or therapists cannot engage the client, have no psychological contact, fail to understand the expressions of care-seeking transmitted to them and psychologically withdraw.

In these ways the phenomenological concept of co-empathy has its worth in acting to redirect attention, away from quantitative interests, and back towards the qualitative brute fact of the simultaneity that exists in psychological life: that others co-empathise selves as selves co-empathise others. The simple duality of lie or truth does not apply to intersubjectivity because the categories of logic are too narrow to reflect all the combinations of action, emotion and intention between people. However, when co-empathy and intersubjectivity are held as theoretical ideas, psyche-logic can understand the emotional and behavioural rationality of how such situations make sense as wholes of well-known, clearly recognisable types. As we have seen, the body indicates meaning in infancy through cries and gestures, not carefully controlled speech. Husserl's semiotics of co-empathy in relation to cultural objects shows that the basic psychological categories are much broader than logic.

§88 On using intersubjectivity

This example is chosen to overcome a disconnection between self and others that is endemic in psychology and therapy that focuses on The Self of the infant or the adult. Following Husserl (1977a, §60, p 140), the self is an abstraction from the whole. The more accurate view is to start from the inter-relations in the whole, at first theoretically then practically. What this section does is to make two sets of comments with respect to the usage of the idea of intersubjectivity. Firstly, this is in relation to its deployment in child development and secondly with respect to the differences in the understanding of self and others that can capture the differences between those with psychosis as opposed to a full attention to the detail of

the intersubjective relationship. The first set of comments concern what Husserl's view was on intersubjectivity in relation to child development.

From a Husserlian theoretical perspective, the infant has an increasing openness to the world of adults, its culture and the cultures of other peoples (Allen, 1976, pp 168–173). In 1935, Husserl theoretically predicted that there are a number of stages that neonates go through, from being in the womb to the point where the primal institution of the senses self and other occur. For Husserl, co-empathy occurs when the infant self realises that they are a self for another, whilst at the same time empathising the other as an independent person who has free will: then the shared world is achieved. The developmental direction in later childhood, adolescence and adulthood, involves a widening of the ability to comprehend human worlds, so that others and cultural objects generally can be grasped as belonging to communities of different sorts (Allen, 1976, p 176, cf Husserl, 1989b, §51, p 202). A priori theory considers co-empathic and inter-subjective achievements of meaning as the best focus.

Husserl's perspective is a transcendental inquiry into the conditions of the development of the world from the womb onwards until the point that co-empathy is achieved between an infant and its carers, and the basic Objectivity of the cultural objects is achieved (Husserl, 1973d, p 605, cited in Allen, 1976, p 170). The development of intersubjectivity is that the manifold of meanings for the adults becomes progressively capable of being understood by the child along the following lines.

The most basic form of intersubjectivity, which for Husserl is prior to two months of age, is the establishment of a communion of instinctual drives between the needs of the infant and the desire of the carers to fulfil those needs (cf attachment). At this time, the mother is not yet another person but inter-dependent with the infant self. The infant self is not yet able to thematize, reflect on self and has no ego in the psychological sense. Also because co-empathy, intersubjectivity and world co-exist, what is present at this stage is not yet a full occurrence of the inter-relationship that is a world.

After this time, there is an on-going co-constitution of the senses self and other until co-empathy and the baby world are achieved, as noted above. After two months, and later during the acquisition of speech, Husserl further theorised how the entry into psychosocial culture occurs. With the establishment of speech and the internalisation of speech as thought, on-going verbal communication aids the creation of the I-you relationship (cf Husserl, 1989b, §21, p 101, fn 1). From the perspective of the carers, there is not just non-verbal gesture and the para-verbal communication of cries, gesture, mimicking and gurgles. Husserl

noted that simple speech begins about the common cultural objects between the infant and carers. The manifold senses of these cultural objects of food, clothing, people, toileting and such like, begin to fill the horizon of consciousness of the infant and establish the beginnings of the common sense of intersubjectivity, what everybody should know and be able to do. The most basic use of speech and the adoption of manners, turn-taking, co-operation, sharing toys, and saying "please" and "thank you" are all basic aspects on the way of an increasing capacity to understand the social world and be able to predict accurately what the perspectives of others are. During infancy, Husserl's account had a place for the infant beginning to engage in community activity (1973d, p 607, cited in Allen, 1976, p 172). What appears of others is their independence of self, that they are public property for everyone. It is in this way that children enter the world of communal activities, objects and beliefs. Empirically, Doris Bischof-Köhler (1988) has found that the proper acquisition of understanding of self in relation to others happens between the ages of 16 to 24 months (cited in Perner, 1991, p 133–5).

However, the senses of the first other and self are not established until co-empathy is achieved as part of intersubjectivity: in that the view of the other can be understood in relation to self, or with respect to the perspective that others have of common cultural objects of all kinds. The living body of the other is a marker for a basic indication of meaning prior to speech. For natural scientific understandings of the entry of infants into intersubjectivity, there is an inability to grasp the inter-relatedness that develops across time. A focus entirely on neurological development and physical co-ordination will miss the psychosocial development.

The point of the second commentary of this section is to add detail to the "differentiation-relatedness" scale promoted by Diana Diamond, Sydney Blatt, David Stayner and Nadine Kaslow (1993, p 14). The scale was originally produced through analyses of client discourse in relation to an overview of psychodynamic and cognitive theories of psychopathology. The scale is a measure of the types of differentiation into being a self and another that occur within psychopathology and good mental health and also records how self and other are inter-related.

1. Self/other boundary compromise …

2. Self/other confusion (intellectual, affective) …

3. Self/other mirroring …

4. Self/other idealization or denigration …

5. Semi-differentiation
(tenuous, semi-differentiated consolidation of representations achieved through splitting and/or rigid adherence to concrete part properties to achieve a tenuous cohesion).

6. Emergent, ambivalent constancy (cohesion) and an emergent sense of relatedness.

7. Consolidated, constant (stable) self and others in unilateral relationship.

8. Cohesive, individuated, empathically related self and other.

9. Reciprocally related, integrative unfolding self and other.

10. Integrative, creative constructions of self and other in empathically and reciprocally attuned relationships.

Ibid.

This can apply to the sense of the objects of attention, self and other, and includes some attention to the amount of clarity of focus and description of such senses with respect to their referents. Indeed when seen in this way, the list of 10 points can be viewed as bringing intersubjectivity into a clear focus. Without mentioning the specific intentionalities, the list above can be re-presented as 10 steps towards getting intersubjectivity in to a proper focus.

1. Gross inaccuracy with respect to intersubjectivity.

2. Extreme inaccuracy with respect to intersubjectivity.

3. Great inaccuracy with respect to intersubjectivity. Attempts to maintain the senses of object constancy attained.

4. Inaccuracy about intersubjectivity because of idealisation or denigration or both simultaneously.

5. Inability to produce object constancy of experiential senses or linguistic account of them. Oscillations between contradictory senses. Attempts to protect the amount of constancy achieved.

6. More integration of disparate senses that are inaccurate.

7. More integration of disparate senses. Linguistic descriptions are simplistic and disjointed in incomplete sentences.

8. The beginnings of contextual understanding and the expression of the specifics of an object. Linguistic descriptions are short and disjointed but more coherent and fluent.

9. Beginning of contextual understanding of intersubjectivity and unfolding temporally developing senses. The sense of self remains separate whilst empathising the perspectives of others. Linguistic descriptions specify the senses and relationships between others and to common objects of interest in an inter-related way.

10. A fully intersubjective account is achieved. It makes properly accurate descriptions of the co-empathic, contextual, temporally-developing and historically-situated senses. Self has a specific understanding of what others experience because of their perspectives towards the objects of common interest.

The theoretical stance of Husserl needs further application to a variety of empirical situations in order to prove its worth in understanding the development of mental processes that occur in the 10 steps above and in relation to maintaining specific senses of object constancy and inconstancy.

§89 Phenomenology promotes the biopsychosocial

By way of returning to the view of psychology and therapy expressed in the first chapter, the example of psychology as an empirical practice needs to be related to the theoretical view of hermeneutic pure psychology. The biopsychosocial perspective takes the current focus on the natural and expands it to include the psychosocial superstructure of meaning and values, within the scope of society and history (Kern, 1986).

Firstly, there are natural causes such as biologically inherited traits and predispositions. Heritability is one moment of the whole. Each moment is an abstraction from the inter-relation between the three moments that comprise the whole (p 29). There is a co-existence and co-relativity between each moment because the whole is a priori to the moment (p 31). The natural existence of brains and chemicals are the valid substrate for the shared life. They are not the whole, but its natural-material a priori.

The social sphere is the source of meaning. As we have seen, there are recognisable forms within this region. The type of relation between self and other is indicative of the major difference with the natural. But selves have no access to meaning by themselves. The meanings that one self has access to are only available because of other people. Accordingly, the meaningful world needs a formal hermeneutics to study how choices to act, value and feel are made manifest.

Hermeneutics is judging and justifying distinctions within the intersubjective whole. The meaningful world takes the historical store of carefully nurtured and crafted meanings, and circulates them. The effect of enculturation and being in society is the experience of being part of the human spirit.

Thus the link between the pure and the applied is maintained. Theory as hermeneutic pure psychology is 'in the world' in a "foundation for the building up of an "exact" empirical psychology … for a Nature conceivable in these terms," in an apriori form-system (Husserl, 1997c, §5, p 165–6). For applied psychological practice and research, it is permissable to use findings from "empirical research" of non-phenomenological sorts and "interpret such data as *data concerning consciousness* … it is the interpreting phenomenologist who … tries to understand the observable, measurable behavior from the point of view of conscious experiences as really instantiating, i.e., performing, one or another kind thereof", (Marbach, 1996, p 150–1). What Marbach is stating is the case for an increased attention to the role of theorising in empirical psychology, for instance.

The aim of a hermeneutic pure psychology, or a hermeneutic pure psychotherapy for that matter, is for the purpose of promoting the effectiveness of action through more accurate understanding. The aim of interpretation of the compossibilities and incompossibilities of universal essence is the pursuit of theory, but not at the expense of dealing with reality. For Husserl and Heidegger, the basic hermeneutic rule is that the overall unity of the appearing of the reduced object is primary to any kind of phenomenology.

Intentionality is the link between persons and senses about referents. From 1913 onwards: "Intentionality is the name of the problem encompassed by the whole of phenomenology", (Husserl, 1982, §146, p 349). In a passage that emphasises the beliefs of self and others, "empathy is nothing other than a special group of positional presentifications in relation to memories and expectations and that, like all positional intuitions, the ego can unite these intuitions in the way already mentioned … *all perceptions and experiences of all ego-subjects which are in mutual understanding are in connection with regard to their intentional objects*", (1973f, §38, p 165–6). What this means is that the interpretation of intentionality becomes extended to include the interpretation of belief about the social world altogether.

18

Conclusions for the theory and practice of psychotherapy

The best way of providing brief conclusions for the philosophical impact of this work is to select the region of psychotherapy and to re-state the case for attending to meaning whilst not losing sight of the influence of the natural substrate of human being. The aim has been to show the major ideas of Freud, Husserl and Heidegger in relation to providing the type of mental health care called psychotherapy that, in all its forms, employs conceptual intentionality in speaking and listening, in relation to the co-empathy of the meetings themselves. It is the paid work of the therapist to attend to the needs of clients, identify and understand those needs and work within a frame of understanding about the individual from a variety of sources including empirical findings about human development, psychopathology and the models of practice. In this context the ideas of co-empathy and intersubjectivity have their job in forcing a reminder of inter-relationship.

Co-empathising others is being able to transpose oneself into the socially learned viewpoint of them. Even if oneself has never had the experience that they have had. Co-empathy accesses the sum total of social meaning. The worth of intersubjectivity is that it is a perspective that accounts for action and reaction, call and response. Both concepts provide a genuinely two-person view, rather than concerning occurrences for one person. Therapeutic examples are used to make the abstract ideas more understandable. Specifically, co-empathy and intersubjectivity are useful in reminding academics and practitioners how there are ubiquitous phenomena concerning the inter-relation between people in the real world. What Husserl produced is a Kantian reminder concerning the limitations and centrality of understanding the perspective of others and simultaneously having one's own perspective understood by them. Whether such understanding is accurate can be found out through further discussion and action. Co-empathy and intersubjectivity have worth in reminding therapists and researchers that any

formulation of psychological motivations for one person is a decontextualisation as much as a focus only on the maintenance of problems in the present, or for that matter, a focus only on the on-set of a problem. Co-empathy and intersubjectivity are present in the comparison of all perspectives and beliefs, in all contexts and across all times.

What this work creates is the bare bones of a hermeneutic approach for interpreting intersubjectivity in complex psychological wholes. The next step would be to take such wholes of interaction, occurring between client and therapist in practice, and show how these ideas are beneficial and can be understood easily by clients. This enables separate foci within the biopsychosocial whole to be held together concerning their meanings. This book is not about discovering the truth about human being but about claiming an adequate basic understanding that fits the referent well. Or at least, better than a naturalistic view of only the biological component. It is easy to point out that natural being is not the same as meaning for consciousness. However because of the great importance addressed to the material in psychology and psychotherapy, a struggle is required to permit qualitative matters to be considered as worthwhile. Also hermeneutics is not natural science. The form of argument often employed is to state why something means what it does in the context of something else. Husserl's ideas enable the detection of non-intersubjective moments of the whole and promote a proper focus on what makes human relationships interactive: It is impossible to be outside of the intersubjective world, alive or dead. Violence, murder and war make themselves conspicuous by emphasising the connection on which they inflict damage and control. Ultimately, there is no unilateral action as any change to a part effects the social whole. The psychological region is open to interpretation. One conclusion is to urge an appreciation of the perspective of the other in a meaningful context.

Justifiable theory means being able to connect with clients, explain one's rationales and provide informed consent. Furthermore, there is a body of consensual knowledge and skills, and it is possible to engage clients in a purposeful manner on what really counts. The corollary is also true. Without reasoning and empirical consensus, there is no bad theory or practice—so clients should beware of a lack of explanation and engagement from therapists. It is legally indefensible. The importance of clinical reasoning is being better able to understand what needs to happen in therapy: how to create a focus and a means of helping clients at assessment. The aim is to be precise in knowing what will help, so that time is not lost in pulling on threads that go nowhere.

The function of theory is to point to what is important. Understanding is required before action. Psychotherapy should be accountable by the outcome it gets for its clients. It is the use of tacit understanding and social skills towards specific aims. So far, clinical reasoning is an on-going project that cannot be authoritatively answered. Therapy is encouraging clients to let go of harmful choices, short-term goals and consequences that have major drawbacks; and help them make choices that deliver long-term goals and entail a level of effort that is achievable and sustainable. I have purposefully made no claims in the above concerning which techniques or types of relating are better than others in which situations. Such decisions are part of the skill and responsibility of practice.

What is required is a way of deciding between competing forms of clinical reasoning about intentionalities in relation to conscious objects that are related to the ego's volition, its ability to choose and act. There are hundreds of competing theories in therapy and psychology: A theoretical proliferation. The professionals should make it clear what each brings to their practice and research. A concern with manners of argument is judging between understanding and mis-understanding. The malaise of mis-understanding in everyday life is the possibility of failing to understand the experiences and relations of others. For instance, an everyday occurrence is mistaking a sarcastic comment for praise or hearing boasting as someone's exciting achievements. However, if ordinary citizens were the only ones who mis-understood each other, we could conclude that mis-understanding is just part of life. But if a profession that claims to know how consciousness works, and that were to suffer the malaise of inaccurate understanding, then there would be problems for that profession and its clients.

Specifically, the talking therapies require clients to be able to express themselves and tolerate an unknown relationship. The function of talk is providing a medium so that clients can come to new decisions about the evidence they interpret. From the therapist-side, it requires an attention to types of intentionality, how matters are interpreted, and being able to compare various senses of the same referent. One medium of communication is speech concerning conscious and preconscious referents, the objects of attention.

If psychological problems are caused entirely materially, due to inherited deoxyribose nucleic acid (DNA), neurological and biochemical factors, then there is little or no possibility of changing a psychological trait born of physical material, through a psychosocial medium, in the short term. If it can be proven that there are cases where causation is wholly materially caused, then clients can only reconcile themselves to accepting and living with their inherited tendencies and aim to manage any of its negative consequences.

There is a long tradition of opposition between natural science, experimentalism and cultural-hermeneutic inquiry. Theory and self-reflexiveness focused on qualitative detail are needed. Husserl argued that qualitative experience is the ground for the theory of a psychology of intentionality to exist (Owen, 1997). Psychological objects and events are not just seeing non-verbals and hearing speech. Clients have perspectives on the meaningful world that therapists may, or may not, be able to experience and understand. Clients and their perspectives appear within an intersubjective co-empathising of people in the world. Therapists are in the business of carefully understanding the senses and perspectives of other persons. They should be able to further differentiate the immediate sense of clients that they co-empathise. The biopsychosocial perspective requires a forthcoming precision about interactions in the biological, psychological and the social—not a presumptive conflation of one aspect with another. Perhaps in the future, there can be some further rapprochement between these qualitative and quantitative traditions rather than stalemate. One aim is to offset the focus on naturalism and provide an adequate account of meaning and perspective-taking.

What passes for empirical psychology has a great deal of attention to anything but psychology in the sense of focusing on first-hand experience of oneself and the second-hand experience of others. Emotions, relationships and interactions between people are not the primary focus for a natural science of the physical substrate. The great concern for empirical psychology is the material substrate for lived meaningful experience. Hermeneutics and a meta-representational theory of mind that interpret intentionality and intentional implication between people enable a sufficient approach to psychological meaning and relationships. A therapy based on the ideas called hermeneutic pure psychology could use any intervention to initiate change.

Psychology and psychotherapy can never be wholly reliant on natural science nor pure psychology. This work has argued for an interim position, so that a forthcoming integration, the biopsychosocial perspective, can make further conclusions. The biopsychosocial perspective must amalgamate the more abstract meaning aspects of first-person and second-person lived experience—with its findings on heritability. Otherwise, the biopsychosocial perspective is not living up to its name.

As regards treatment itself, some psychological problems can be overcome, some reduced and some can only be managed and accepted. There can be degrees of improvement generally or deterioration. If it is the case that what is called personality is largely a set of inherited traits, then these cannot be changed but only managed and compensated for. Ultimately, there should be a wholistic account

of a biopsychosocial perspective and a reduction in parochialism. Until there is an overall consensus and rapprochement between the qualitative and quantitative sides of empirical psychology, psychological problems can be treated as wholly psychosocial only with caution.

The psychosocial view is argued to revolve around the public accessibility of meanings of all kinds. Intersubjectivity originally meant that what theoretically resides in all meaningful experience can be analysed in an a priori manner. Intersubjectivity can be defined as the necessity of inter-relating the contributions between self and other to produce a genuine two-person theory that does not stop at accounting for the intentionality of only one person. However, it is not possible to predict outcomes in intersubjective relationships as their type of 'cause' is due to the interpretation of meaning, and hence multifaceted and influenced by personal choice, the context of choices and biologically-inherited predispositions, as well as the taboos and permissions of culture and history.

All therapists work by interpreting clients in such a way to encourage them to accept new interpretations of themselves and others around them. Evidence that is conscious for both parties is interpreted to help clients have free choices. Similarly, clients in all types of therapy may need to remain open, honest and tolerate the comments of the therapist that are different to their own. This work opposes an excessive reliance on one-person psychology, transference, counter-transference, the unconscious and the naturalistic attitude wherever they arise in therapy and natural psychological science.

This work has argued for a realisation of how hermeneutics is relevant in that both suffering and therapy interpret situations from various perspectives. There is good reason for tempering natural psychological assumptions with psychosocial ones. Accordingly, the value of hermeneutics for a theory of consciousness is that it shows three emphases.

• A genuine focus on the other requires the inter-relation of the perspectives of self and other on the same cultural object.

• What is required is theory that focuses on conscious communication about conscious senses.

• With the bare bones of ideas in place such an attention to conscious communication and psychological objects and processes could lead to an a priori theory of consciousness that is compatible with understanding psychological life in a hermeneutic manner. For instance, interpreting intersubjective styles where two or more parties contribute.

In hermeneutics, formal argument is conducted about psychological occurrences, not natural-material occurrences. For therapists, interpreting the problems of clients occurs when what, at first, seemed nonsensical or unrelated to clients, is made clear by the hermeneutic perspective of therapy. The hermeneutic stance of this work acknowledges the importance of psychological meaningfulness in relation to what begins and maintains psychological problems in current contexts. Hermeneutics concerns attending to meaning and how to make changes in it. Hermeneutics is seen as one way forward in creating a unified account of talk and action in therapy. From this vantage point, empirical psychology as it stands, is insufficiently psychological. In the main, it is not about emotions, relating and lived experiences. The worth of a critique from the position of hermeneutics is the realisation that there cannot be an absence of interpretation. It is necessary to compare the understanding oneself makes, in connection to the readings of the same topic from others.

Psychotherapists should be better than everyday citizens in being able to explain meaning and understanding. Therefore, it is necessary to have justified interpretations of intentionality concerning conscious, publicly accessible meanings and experiences. To provide informed consent, avoid negligence and fulfil the duty of care means being able to justify one's actions and decisions concerning alternative possibilities.

Bibliography

Adler, A. (1931) *What life should mean to you.* New York: Blue Ribbon Books.

_____ (1964a) *Superiority and social interest.* Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

_____ (1964b) *Social interest: A challenge to mankind.* New York: Capricorn Books.

Aitken, K.J. & Trevarthen, C. (1997) Self/other organization in human psychological development. *Development and Psychopathology*, 9, 653–677.

Alexander, F. & French, T.M. (1946) *Psychoanalytic therapy.* New York: Ronald.

Allen, J. (1976) A Husserlian phenomenology of the child. *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology*, 6, 164–179.

American Psychiatric Association (1994) *Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (4ᵗʰ ed).* Washington: American Psychiatric Association.

Andersen, H.C. (1977) *The emperor's new clothes.* (Trans R. Belov-Gross). New York: Scholastic.

Argyris, C. & Schön, D.A. (1974) *Theory in practice: Increasing professional effectiveness.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Atwood, G.E. & Stolorow, R.D. (1984) *Structures of subjectivity: Explorations in psychoanalytic phenomenology.* Hillsdale: Analytic Press.

Basch, M.F. (1976a) The concept of affect: A re-examination. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 24, 759–777.

_____ (1976b) Theory formation in Chapter VII: *A critique. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 24, 61–100.

Bateson, G. (1972) *Steps to an ecology of mind.* New York: Ballantine.

Beres, D. & Arlow, J.A. (1974) Fantasy and identification in empathy. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 43, 4–25.

Bernet, R. (1979) Perception as a teleological process of cognition. In A.-T. Tymieniecka (Ed) *The teleologies in Husserlian phenomenology: The irreducible element in man, Part III*. (pp. 119–132). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (1982) Is the present ever present? Phenomenology and the metaphysics of presence. *Research in Phenomenology*, 12, 85–112.

_____ (1988) Husserl's theory of signs revisited. In R. Sokolowski (Ed) *Edmund Husserl and the phenomenological tradition: Essays in phenomenology*. (pp. 1–24). Washington: Catholic University Press of America.

_____ (1994) Phenomenological reduction and the double life of the subject. (Trans F. Renaud) In T.J. Kisiel & J. van Buren (Eds) *Reading Heidegger from the start: Essays in his earliest thought*. (pp 245–267). New York: SUNY Press.

_____ (1996) The unconscious between representation and drive: Freud, Husserl, and Schopenhauer. In J.J. Drummond & J.G. Hart (Eds) *The truthful and the good: Essays in honour of Robert Sokolowski*. (pp. 81–95). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Bernet, R., Kern, I. & Marbach, E. (1993) *An introduction to Husserlian phenomenology*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Bischof-Köhler, D. (1988) Uber den zusammenhang von empathie und der fahigkeit, sich in spiegel zu erkennen. *Schweizerische Zeitschift fur Psychologie*, 47, 147–159.

Bohart, A.C. & Greenberg, L.S. (1997) Empathy: Where we are and where do we go from here? In A.C. Bohert & L.S. Greenberg (Eds) *Empathy reconsidered: New directions in psychotherapy*. (pp. 419–449). Washington: American Psychological Association.

Bordin, E.S. (1979) The generalizability of the psychoanalytic concept of the working alliance. *Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice*, 16, 252–260.

Bowlby, J. (1969) *Attachment and loss: Vol 1. Attachment*. New York: Basic Books.

Breuer, J. & Freud, S. (1895d/1955) *Studies on hysteria (1893–1895).* In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud*, *Vol 2.* London: Hogarth.

Cairns, D. (1976) *Conversations with Husserl and Fink.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Cannon, W. (1957) "Voodoo" death. *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 19, 182–190.

Carr, D. (1999) *The paradox of subjectivity: The self in the transcendental tradition.* New York: OUP.

Cassidy, J. & Shaver, P.R. (Eds) (1999) *Handbook of attachment: Theory, research, and clinical applications.* New York: Guilford.

Chertok, L. (1968) The discovery of the transference: Towards an epistemological interpretation. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 49, 560–577.

Cicchetti, D. & Cohen, D.J. (1995) Perspectives on developmental psychopathology. In D. Cicchetti & D.J. Cohen (Eds) *Developmental psychopathology, volume I: Theory and methods.* (pp. 3–22). New York: John Wiley.

Clements, W. & Perner, J. (1994) Implicit understanding of belief. *Cognitive Development*, 9, 377–395.

Crowell, S. (2001) *Husserl, Heidegger, and the space of meaning: Paths towards transcendental phenomenology.* Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Cushman, P. (1995) *Constructing the self, constructing America: A cultural history of psychotherapy.* Reading: Addison-Wesley.

De Gennaro, I. (2000) Husserl, Heidegger and semiotics: A reply to I.R. Owen. *Daseinsanalyse: Jahrbuch für Phänomenologische Anthropologie und Psychotherapie*, 16, 107–113.

Diamond, D., Blatt, S.J., Stayner, D.A. & Kaslow, N. (1993) Differentiation-relatedness scale of self and object representations. Unpublished research manual. New Haven: Yale University.

Dilthey, W. (H.P. Rickman Ed) (1976) *W. Dilthey: Selected writings.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Duan, C. & Hill, C.E. (1996) The current state of empathy research. *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, 43, 261–274.

Ellenberger, H. (1970) *The discovery of the unconscious: The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry.* New York: Basic Books.

Ellis, A. (1962) *Reason and emotion in psychotherapy*. New York: Lyle Stuart.

Engel, G.L. (1980) The clinical application of the biopsychosocial model. *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 137, 535–544.

Ferenczi, S. (1913/1952) Stages in the development of the sense of reality. In *First contributions to psychoanalysis*. (Trans E. Jones). (pp. 213–239). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1928/1955) The elasticity of psychoanalytic technique. In M. Balint (Ed) *Final contributions to the problems and methods of psycho-analysis*. (Trans E. Mosbacher). (pp. 87–101). New York: Norton.

Fink, E. (1995) *Sixth Cartesian Meditation: The idea of a transcendental theory of method*. (Trans R. Bruzina). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Forrester, J. (1980) *Language and the origins of psychoanalysis*. London: McMillan.

Freud, S. (1891b/1953) *On aphasia: A critical study*. (Trans E. Stengel). London: Imago Publishing.

_____ (1893h/1962) On the psychical mechanism of hysterical phenomena: A lecture. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 3*. (pp. 27–39). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1894a/1962) The neuro-psychoses of defence. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 3*. (pp. 43–61). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1896c/1962) The aetiology of hysteria. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 3*. (pp. 191–221). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1900a/1953) *The interpretation of dreams*. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 5*. (pp. 339–625). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1901b/1960) *Psychopathology of everyday life*. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 6*. London: Hogarth.

_____ (1905c/1960) *Jokes and their relation to the unconscious*. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 8*. London: Hogarth.

_____ (1905e/1953) Fragment of an analysis of a case of hysteria. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 7*. (pp. 3–119). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1910d/1957) The future prospects of psycho-analytic therapy. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 11*. (pp. 139–152). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1912b/1958) The dynamics of the transference. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 12*. (pp. 99–108). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1912e/1958) Recommendations to physicians practising psycho-analysis. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 12*. (pp. 111–120). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1912–1913/1960) Totem and taboo. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 13*. (pp. 1–161). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1913c/1958) On beginning the treatment. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 12*. (pp. 123–144). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1913i/1958) The disposition to obsessional neurosis. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 12*. (pp. 311–326). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1914g/1958) Remembering, repeating and working-through. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 12.* (pp. 147–156). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1915a/1958) Observations on transference-love. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 12.* (pp. 159–171). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1915e/1957) The unconscious. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 14.* (pp. 159–216). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1916/1963) *Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis.* In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 15.* London: Hogarth.

_____ (1920g/1955) Beyond the pleasure principle. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 18.* (pp. 3–64). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1921c/1955) Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol 18. (pp. 67–144). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1923a/1955) Two encyclopedia articles (A) Psycho-Analysis. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 18.* (pp. 235–254). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1923b/1961) The ego and the id. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 19.* (pp. 3–69). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1925d/1959) An autobiographical study. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 20.* (pp. 3–70). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1926e/1959) The question of lay analysis. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 20.* (pp. 183–258). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1937d/1964) Constructions in analysis. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud*, *Vol 23*. (pp. 257–269). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1940a/1964) An outline of psycho-analysis. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud*, *Vol 23*. (pp. 144–207). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1950a/1966) Project for a scientific psychology. In J. Strachey (Ed & Trans) *The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, Vol 1*. (pp. 283–293). London: Hogarth.

_____ (1963a) *Psychoanalysis and faith: The letters of Sigmund Freud and Oskar Pfister*. New York: Basic Books.

Gabbard, G.O. (2000) A neurobiologically informed perspective on psychotherapy. *British Journal of Psychiatry*, 177, 117–122.

Gadamer, H.-G. (1975) *Truth and method (2nd ed)*. (Trans J. Weinsheimer & D.G. Marshall). London: Sheed & Ward.

Gardner, S. (1999) *Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason*. London: Routledge.

Gedo, J.E. (1993) *Beyond interpretation: Toward a revised theory for psychoanalysis*. Hillsdale: Analytic Press.

Gill, M. (1963) *Topography and systems in psychoanalytic theory*. New York: International Universities Press.

Gitelson, M. (1952) The emotional position of the analyst in the psycho-analytic situation, part 1. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 33, 1–10.

Glover, E. (1927) Lectures on technique in psycho-analysis (continued). *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 8, 486–520.

Greenson, R.R. (1967) *The technique and practice of psycho-analysis*. London: Hogarth.

Grubrich-Simitis, I. (1986) Six letters of Sigmund Freud and Sandor Ferenczi on the interrelationship of psychoanalytic theory and technique. *International Review of Psychoanalysis*, 13, 259–277.

Guntrip, H. (1975) My experience of analysis with Fairbairn and Winnicott (how complete a result does psychoanalytic therapy achieve?) In K.A. Frank (Ed) *The human dimension of psychoanalytic therapy*. (pp. 49–68). New York: Grune & Stratton.

Gurwitsch, A. (1964) *The field of consciousness*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

Hartmann, H., Kris, E. & Loewenstein, R. (1946) Comments on the formation of psychic structure. In *Papers on Psychoanalytic Psychology*. (pp. 27–55). New York: International Universities Press.

Heidegger, M. (1982) *The basic problems of phenomenology*. (Trans A. Hofstadter) Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

_____ (1996) *Being and time*. (Trans J. Stambaugh). New York: SUNY.

_____ (1997a) Draft B ("Attempt at a second draft"). In E. Husserl (T. Sheehan & R.E. Palmer, Eds & Trans) *Psychological and transcendental phenomenology and the confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931)*. (pp. 107–146). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (1997b) Heidegger's letter and appendices. In E. Husserl (T. Sheehan & R.E. Palmer, Eds & Trans) *Psychological and transcendental phenomenology and the confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931)*. (pp. 136–139). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (M. Boss Ed)(2001) *The Zollikon seminars: Protocols—conversations—letters*. (Trans F.K. Mayr & R.R. Askay). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Heimann, P. (1950) On counter-transference. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 30, 81–84.

Hitchcock, A. (1960) *Psycho*. Universal Pictures.

Husserl, E. (1948) *Erfahrung und urteil: Untersuchungen zur genealogie der logik*. Hamburg: Classen & Goverts.

_____ (S. Strasser Ed)(1950) *Cartesianische meditationen und pariser vorträge*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (M. Biemel Ed)(1952a) *Ideen zu einer reinen phänomenologie und phänomenologischen philosophie, zweites buch: Phänomenologische untersuchungen zur konstitution.* Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (M. Biemel Ed)(1952b) *Ideen zu einer reinen phänomenologie und phänomenologischen philosophie, drittes buch: Die phänomenologie und die fundamente der wissenschaften.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (W. Biemel Ed)(1956a) *Die krisis der europäischen wissenschaften und die transzendentale phänomenologie: Eine einleitung in die phänomenologische philosophie.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (R. Boehm Ed)(1956b) *Erste philosophie (1923/1924), erster teil: Kritische ideengeschichte.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (R. Boehm Ed)(1959) *Erste philosophie (1923/1924), zweiter teil: Theorie der phänomenologische reduktion.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (W. Biemel Ed)(1966a) *Zur phänomenologie des inneren zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917).* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (M. Fleischer Ed)(1966b) *Analysen zur passiven synthesis: Aus vorlesungs-und forschungmanuskripten (1918–1926).* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (W. Biemel Ed) (1968) *Phänomenologische psychologie: Vorlesungen sommersemester 1925.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (1974a/1969) *Formal and transcendental logic.* (Trans D. Cairns). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (1975a & 1984/1970a) *Logical investigations, 2 vols.* (Trans J.N. Findlay). London: RKP.

_____ (1956a/1970b) *The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology.* (Trans D. Carr). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

_____ (1989a/1972) Pure phenomenology, its method and its field of investigation. In L.E. Embree (Ed & Trans) *Life-world and consciousness: Essays for Aron Gurwitsch.* (pp. 4–18). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

_____ (W. Biemel Ed)(1973a) *Die idee der phänomenologie: Fünf vorlesungen.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (I. Kern Ed)(1973b) *Zur phänomenologie der intersubjektivität, texte aus dem nachlass erster teil: 1905–1920.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (I. Kern Ed)(1973c) *Zur phänomenologie der intersubjektivität, texte aus dem nachlass zweiter teil: 1921–1928.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (I. Kern Ed)(1973d) *Zur phänomenologie der intersubjektivität, texte aus dem nachlass, dritter teil: 1929–1935.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (U. Claesges Ed) (1973e) *Ding und raum: Vorlesungen 1907.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (L. Landgrebe Ed)(1948/1973f) *Experience and judgment: Investigations in a genealogy of logic.* (Trans J.S. Churchill & K. Ameriks). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

_____ (P. Janssen Ed) (1974a) *Formale und tranzendentale logik.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (1974b) Kant and the idea of transcendental philosophy. (Trans T.E. Klein & W.E. Pohl). *South Western Journal of Philosophy,* 5, 9–56.

_____ (E. Holenstein Ed)(1975a) *Logische untersuchungen, erster band: Prolegomena zur reinen logik.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (1975b) A draft of a "preface" to the *Logical Investigations* (1913). In *Introduction to the Logical Investigations.* (Trans P.J. Bossert & C.H. Peters). (pp. 16–61). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (K. Schuhmann Ed)(1976a) *Ideen zu einer reinen phänomenologie und phänomenologischen philosophie, erstes buch: Allgemeine einfhrung in die reine phänomenologie 1, halbband, texte der 1–3.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (K. Schuhmann Ed)(1976b) *Ideen zu einer reinen phänomenologie und phänomenologischen philosophie, erstes buch: Allgemeine einfhrung in die reine phänomenologie 2, halbband, ergändzende, texte (1912–1929).* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (1950/1977a) *Cartesian meditations: An introduction to phenomenology.* (Trans D. Cairns). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (1968/1977b) *Phenomenological psychology: Lectures, summer semester 1925.* (Trans. J. Scanlon). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (1952b/1980) *Phenomenology and the foundations of the sciences: Third book, ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy.* (Trans T.E. Klein & W.E. Pohl). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (1987/1981) Philosophy as rigorous science. In P. McCormick & F.A. Elliston (Eds) *Husserl: Shorter works.* (pp. 166–197). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

_____ (1976a & 1976b/1982) *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy: First book.* (Trans F. Kersten). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (U. Panzer Ed) (1984) *Logische untersuchungen, zweiter band: Untersuchungen zur phänomenologie und theorie der erkenntnis.* Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (T. Nenon & H.R. Sepp Eds)(1987) *Aufsätze und vorträge (1911–1921).* Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (T. Nenon & H.R. Sepp Eds)(1989a) *Aufsätze und vorträge (1922–1937).* Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (1952a/1989b) *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy: Second book.* (Trans R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (1966a/1991) *On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893–1917).* (Trans J.B. Brough). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (1994) *Early writings in the philosophy of logic and mathematics.* (Trans D. Willard). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (1996) Natural scientific psychology, human sciences, and metaphysics (1919). In T. Nenon & L. Embree (Eds) *Issues in Husserl's* Ideas II. (Trans U. Melle & S. Spileers). (pp. 8–13). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (1973e/1997a) *Thing and space: Lectures of 1907*. (Trans R. Rojcewicz). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (1968/1997b) "Phenomenology" The *Encyclopaedia Brittanica* article, Draft A. In E. Husserl (T. Sheehan & R.E. Palmer, Eds & Trans) *Psychological and transcendental phenomenology and the confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931)*. (pp. 83–105). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (1968/1997c) "Phenomenology" *Encyclopaedia Brittanica* article, Draft D. In E. Husserl (T. Sheehan & R.E. Palmer, Eds & Trans) *Psychological and transcendental phenomenology and the confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931)*. (pp. 159–179). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (1968/1997d) The Amsterdam lectures <on> phenomenological psychology. In E. Husserl (T. Sheehan & R.E. Palmer, Eds & Trans) *Psychological and transcendental phenomenology and the confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931)*. (pp. 213–253). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (1968/1997e) Husserl's marginal remarks in Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*. In E. Husserl (T. Sheehan & R.E. Palmer, Eds & Trans) *Psychological and transcendental phenomenology and the confrontation with Heidegger (1927–1931)*. (pp. 263–422). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (1973a/1999) *The idea of phenomenology*. (Trans L. Hardy). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (R. Breeur Ed)(2000) *Aktive synthesen: Aus der vorlesungen "tranzendentale logik" 1920/21, ergänzungsband zu "analysen zur passiven synthesis"*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (1966b, 1974a & 2000/2001) *Analyses concerning active and passive synthesis: Lectures on transcendental logic*. (Trans A.J. Steinbock). Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (U. Melle Ed)(2005) *Logische untersuchungen: Ergänzungsband, zweiter teil*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

_____ (1973b/2006) *The basic problems of phenomenology: From the lectures, winter semester, 1910–1911*. (Trans I. Farin & J.G. Hart). Dordrecht: Springer.

Jaspers, K. (1963) *General psychopathology*. (Trans J. Hoenig & M.W. Hamilton). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Jones, E. (1955) *The life and work of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 2*. New York: Basic Books.

Kant, I. (1993) *The critique of pure reason*. (Trans J.M.D. Meiklejohn & V. Politis). London: Dent.

Kern, I. (1977) The three ways to the transcendental phenomenological reduction in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. In F.A. Elliston & P. McCormick (Eds) *Husserl: Expositions and appraisals*. (pp. 126–149). Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.

_____ (1986) Trinity: Theological reflections of a phenomenologist. In S.W. Laycock & J.G. Hart (Eds) *Essays in phenomenological theology*. (pp. 23–37). Albany: SUNY Press.

Kern, I. & Marbach, E. (2001) Understanding the representational mind: A prerequisite for intersubjectivity proper. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 8, 69–82.

Kocklemans, J.J. (1977) Destructive retrieve and hermeneutic phenomenology in 'Being and Time'. *Research in Phenomenology*, 7, 106–137.

Kohut, H. (A. Goldberg & P.E. Stepansky Eds)(1984) *How does analysis cure?* Chicago University Press.

Lagache, D. (1953) Some aspects of transference. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 34, 1–10.

Laing, R.D., Phillipson, H. & Lee, A.R. (1966) *Interpersonal perception: A theory and a method of research*. London: Tavistock.

Landgrebe, L. (1981) The phenomenology of corporeality and the problem of matter. (Trans D. Welton). In *The phenomenology of Edmund Husserl: Six essays*. (pp. 33–49). London: Cornell University Press.

Laplanche, J. & Pontalis, J.-B. (1968/1985) *The language of psychoanalysis*. (Trans D. Nicholson-Smith). London: Hogarth.

Lewin, K. (D. Cartwright Ed) (1951) *Field theory in social science: Selected theoretical papers*. New York: Harper & Row.

Lewis, B.A. & Pucelik, R.F. (1982) *Magic demystified: A pragmatic guide to communication and change*. Hong Kong: Wing King Tong.

Lohser, B. & Newton, P.M. (1996) *Unorthodox Freud: The view from the couch*. New York: Guilford Press.

Marbach, E. (1982) Two directions in epistemology: Husserl and Piaget. *Revue Internationale de Philosophie,* 36, 435–469.

_____ (1984) On using intentionality in empirical phenomenology: The problem of 'mental images'. *Dialectica*, 38, 209–229.

_____ (1988) How to study consciousness phenomenologically or quite a lot comes to mind. *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 19, 252–268.

_____ (1992) What does noematic intentionality tell us about the ontological status of the noema? In J.J. Drummond & L. Embree (Eds) *The phenomenology of the noema*. (pp. 137–155). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.

_____ (1993) *Mental representation and consciousness: Towards a phenomenological theory of representation and reference*. Norwell: Kluwer Academic.

_____ (1996) Understanding the representational mind: A phenomenological perspective. *Human Studies*, 19, 137–152.

_____ (2000) The place for an ego in current research. In D. Zahavi (Ed) *Exploring the self: Philosophical and psychopathological perspectives on self-experience.* (pp. 75–94). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

_____ (2005) On bringing consciousness into the house of science—with the help of Husserlian phenomenology. *Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities*, 10, 145–162.

Masten, A. & Braswell, L. (1991) Developmental psychopathology: An integrative framework. In P.R. Martin (Ed) *Handbook of behavior therapy and psychological science: An integrative approach.* (pp. 35–56). New York: Pergammon.

McCluskey, U. (2005) *To be met as a person: The dynamics of attachment in professional encounters.* London: Karnac.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962) *Phenomenology of perception.* (Trans C. Smith). London: Routledge.

_____ (1964) *Signs.* (Trans R.C. McCleary). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Mohanty, J.N. (2003) The unity of Husserl's philosophy. *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 224, 115–132.

Moran, D. (2000) Heidegger's critique of Husserl's and Brentano's accounts of intentionality. *Inquiry*, 43, 39–66.

Oakley, S. (2002) Friday Fora reviews: Contemplating practice, 31 May 2002, Anthony Stadlen. *Hermeneutic Circular*, December 2002, 18–21.

Orr, D.W. (1954) Transference and countertransference: A historical survey. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 2, 621–670.

Owen, I.R. (1990) Re-emphasizing a person-centred approach. *Counselling*, 1, 92–94.

_____ (1997) On the status of psychological knowledge. *Changes: An international journal of psychology and psychotherapy*, 15, 100–106.

_____ (2003) What the analysis of empathy in the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation* reveals for psychotherapy. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Regent's College School of Psychotherapy and Counselling, City University, London.

_____ (2004) On existential psychotherapy: A hermeneutic and meta-representational perspective. *Existential Analysis*, 15, 333–354.

_____ (2006a) Attachment and intersubjectivity. *Existential Analysis*, 17, 14–38.

_____ (2006b) The empirical evidence base as the re-appearance of the problem of psychologism. *Existential Analysis*, 17, 371–384.

Palmer, R.E. (1969) *Hermeneutics: Interpretation theory in Schleirmacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Perner, J. (1991) *Understanding the representational mind*. Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Perner, J., Ruffman, T. & Leekam, S. (1994) Theory of mind is contagious: You catch it from your sibs. *Child Development*, 65, 1228–1238.

Peskin, J. (1992) Ruse and representations: On children's ability to conceal information. *Developmental Psychology*, 28, 84–89.

Pigman, G.W. (1995) Freud and the history of empathy. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 76, 237–256.

Plato (1956) *Protagoras and Meno*. (Trans W.K.C. Guthrie). Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics.

Plomin, R., DeFries, J.C., McClearn, G.E. & McGuffin, P. (2000) *Behavioral genetics (4th ed.)*. New York: Freeman.

Polanyi, M. (1983) *The tacit dimension*. Gloucester: Peter Smith.

Popper, K.R. (1959) *The logic of scientific discovery (3rd ed)*. London: Hutchinson.

Premack, D. & Woodruff, G. (1978) Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 1, 515–526.

Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1978) When is attribution of beliefs justified? *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 1, 592–593.

Reich, W. (1933/1970) *Character-analysis (3rd ed)*. (Trans T.P. Wolfe). New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

Rennie, D.L. (1994) Clients' deference in psychotherapy. *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, 41, 427–437.

Richters, J.E. (1997) The Hubble hypothesis and the developmentalist's dilemma. *Development and Psychopathology*, 9, 193–229.

Rickman, H.P. (1979) *Wilhelm Dilthey: Pioneer of the human studies*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

_____ (1981) Rhetoric and hermeneutics. *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, 14, 100–111.

_____ (1988) Vico and hermeneutics. *International Studies in Philosophy*, 20, 43–52.

_____ (1990) Science and hermeneutics. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 20, 295–316.

_____ (1995) From hermeneutics to deconstruction. *International Studies in Philosophy*, 27, 65–80.

_____ (1997) Dilthey's hermeneutics. *Journal of the Society for Existential Analysis*, 8, 46–55.

_____ (1998) Deconstruction: The unacceptable face of hermeneutics. *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 29, 299–313.

_____ (2004) *The riddle of the sphinx: Interpreting the human world*. Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.

Ricoeur, P. (1965/1970) *Freud and philosophy: An essay on interpretation*. (Trans D. Savage). New Haven: Yale University Press.

Rubinstein, B.B. (1974) On the role of classificatory processes in mental functioning: Aspects of psychoanalytic theoretical model. *Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Science*, 3, 101–185.

Sandler, J. (1976) Countertransference and role-responsiveness. *International Review of Psycho-Analysis*, 14, 445–463.

Schafer, R. (1976) *A new language for psychoanalysis*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Schön, D.A. (1983) *The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action*. New York: Basic Books.

Sharpe, E.F. (1947) The psycho-analyst. *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, 28, 1–6.

Shaughnessy, P. (1995) Empathy and the working alliance: The mistranslation of Freud's *Einfühlung*. *Psychoanalytic Psychology*, 12, 221–231.

Shlien, J.M. (1987) A countertheory of transference. *Person-Centred Review*, 2, 15–49.

Simons, P. (1987) *Parts: A study in ontology.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Smith, D.L. (1987) Formulating and evaluating hypotheses in psychoanalytic psychotherapy. *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 60, 313–316.

_____ (1994) Riding shotgun for Freud: A reply to Ernesto Spinelli. *Journal of the Society for Existential Analysis*, 5, 142–156.

_____ (1995) 'It sounds like an excellent idea!': Episode four of a psychological cliff-hanger. *Journal of the Society for Existential Analysis*, 6, 149–159.

Sokolowski, R. (1964) *The formation of Husserl's concept of constitution*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

_____ (1968) The logic of parts and wholes in Husserl's *Investigations. Phenomenology and Philosophical Research*, 28, 537–553.

Stapleton, T.J. (1983) *Husserl and Heidegger: The question of a phenomenological beginning*. Albany: SUNY Press.

Steinbock, A.J. (1995) *Home and beyond: Generative phenomenology after Husserl*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Sterelny, K. (1990) *The representational theory of mind: An introduction*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Stern, D.B. (1994) Empathy is interpretation (and who ever said it wasn't?): Commentary on papers by Hayes, Kiersky and Beebe, and Feiner and Kiersky. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 4, 441–471.

Stern, D.N. (1977) *The first relationship: Infant and mother*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

_____ (1985) *The interpersonal world of the infant*. New York: Basic Books.

_____ (1995) *The motherhood constellation*. London: Karnac.

_____ (1998) The process of therapeutic change involving implicit knowledge: Some implications of developmental observations for adult psychotherapy. *Infant Mental Health Journal*, 19, 300–308.

Ströker, E. (1980) Psychology: A new way into transcendental phenomenology: Some thoughts on Husserl's last part of the *Crisis*. *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 11, 67–87.

_____ (1993) *Husserl's transcendental phenomenology*. (Trans L. Hardy). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Strupp, H.H. (1973) Towards a reformulation of the psychotherapeutic influence. *International Journal of Psychiatry*, 11, 263–327.

Terence (1987) *Heauton timorumenos*. Oxford: Aris & Phillips.

Thurnher, R. (1995) Heidegger's conception of phenomenology with reference to Husserl. June, Post Graduate Seminar, London, City University.

Tower, L.E. (1956) Countertransference. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 4, 224–255.

Trevarthen, C. (1979) Communication and cooperation in early infancy: A description of primary intersubjectivity. In M. Bullowa (Ed) *Before speech*. (pp. 321–348). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Walker, S.F. (1984) *Learning theory and behaviour modification*. London: Methuen.

_____ (1987) *Animal learning theory: An introduction*. London: R & KP.

Watzlawick, P. & Weakland, J.H. (Eds) (1977) *The interactional view: Studies at the Mental Research Institute, Palo Alto, 1965–1974*. New York: Norton.

Weiss, E. (1950) *Principles of psychodynamics*. New York: Grune & Stratton.

Welton, D. (1983) *The origins of meaning: A critical study of the thresholds of Husserlian phenomenology*. The Hague: Nijhoff.

_____ (2000) *The other Husserl: The horizons of transcendental phenomenology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Wicks-Nelson, R. & Israel, A. (1997) *Behavior disorders of childhood.* New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Wimmer, H. & Perner, J. (1983) Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. *Cognition*, 13, 103–128.

Zahavi, D. (1999) *Self-awareness and alterity: A phenomenological investigation.* Evanston: Northwestern University Press.