

Studies in Continental Thought

GENERAL EDITOR
JOHN SALLIS

CONSULTING EDITORS

Robert Bernasconi	William L. McBride
Rudolf Bernet	J. N. Mohanty
John D. Caputo	Mary Rawlinson
David Carr	Tom Rockmore
Edward S. Casey	Calvin O. Schrag
Hubert L. Dreyfus	† Reiner Schürmann
Don Ihde	Charles E. Scott
David Farrell Krell	Thomas Sheehan
Lenore Langsdorf	Robert Sokolowski
Alphonso Lingis	Bruce W. Wilshire
David Wood	

Martin Heidegger

Phenomenological
Interpretation of Kant's
Critique of Pure Reason

Translated by
Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly

Indiana University Press
Bloomington & Indianapolis

Published in German as *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* ©1977 by Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main. Third edition, 1995. Publication of this work was supported by funding from Inter Nationes, Bonn.

©1997 by Indiana University Press
All rights reserved

No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. The Association of American University Presses' Resolution on Permissions constitutes the only exception to this prohibition.

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

Manufactured in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976.
[Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. English]
Phenomenological interpretation of Kant's Critique of pure reason / Martin Heidegger ; translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly.
p. cm. — (Studies in Continental thought)
"The translation of a lecture course delivered at the University of Marburg in the winter semester of 1927-28"—Foreword.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-253-33258-3 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 2. Knowledge, Theory of. 3. Causation. 4. Reason. I. Title. II. Series.
B2779.H4213 1997
121—dc21 96-44479

1 2 3 4 5 02 01 00 99 98 97

Contents

Translators' Foreword	xi
Preliminary Consideration	
<i>Introduction</i>	
<i>The Critique of Pure Reason as Laying the Foundation for Metaphysics as Science</i>	
§ 1. The Traditional Concept of Metaphysics	8
§ 2. General Meaning of Laying the Foundation of a Science	13
a) Phenomenological Interpretation of Science's Way of Being	13
α) The Existential Concept of Science. Knowledge as a Revealing Comportment to Beings, the Primary Revealing in the Practical-Technical Realm, and the Prescientific Understanding of the Being of Beings	13
β) Conversion of the Prescientific Comportment to the Scientific Comportment by the Basic Act of Objectification. Objectification as the Explicit Accomplishment of Understanding of Being	18
γ) The Process of Objectification in the Genesis of the Modern Mathematical Sciences of Nature	21
b) The Relation between the Founding of Science and Philosophy	23
α) The Limit of Science's Self-Founding	23
β) Founding of Science as Regional Ontology. Founding of Ontological Inquiry in Philosophy as Fundamental Ontology	24
§ 3. Laying the Foundation of Metaphysics as Science as the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>	27
a) Kant's Interpretation of Ontological Knowledge	27
α) Knowledge <i>a priori</i>	27
β) The Condition for the Possibility of a Science of Beings in General	29
γ) Analytic and Synthetic Judgments	33
δ) The Problem of the Possibility of Synthetic Judgments <i>a priori</i> or the Problem of an Ontological Understanding of Being	35
b) The Difference between Transcendental Philosophy or Metaphysics and Laying the Foundation of Metaphysics as the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>	39
α) Ontology as System. The <i>Critique</i> as Laying the Foundation of the System of Transcendental Philosophy	39
β) Laying the Foundation for Metaphysics as <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i> ; Its Place in the Whole of Metaphysics	40
§ 4. The Horizon of Inquiry, the Field of Investigation, and the Structural Plan of the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>	47

First Part

*The Transcendental Aesthetic**Chapter One**The Function of Intuition in Synthetic Knowledge*

§ 5. Intuition as the Primary and Essential Character of Knowledge in General	56
a) The Intuitive Character of Knowledge in General	56
b) The Significance of Intuition. Infinite and Finite Intuition. Finite Intuition and Sensibility, Affection, and Receptivity	58
c) Sensibility and Understanding as the Two Roots of Human Knowledge; the Common Origins of Both Roots	62
d) Synthetic Knowledge <i>a priori</i> and the Necessity of Pure <i>a priori</i> Intuition	65
§ 6. Demonstration of Pure Intuition <i>a priori</i>	66
a) Empirical Intuition and Empirical Sensation	66
b) Appearance as Object of Empirical Intuition Distinguished from the Thing Itself	67
c) The Togetherness of Sense-Data and Space-Time Relations in Empirical Intuition	70
d) Space and Time as Pure Forms of Intuition and the Manner of Their Investigation in the Transcendental Aesthetic	74

*Chapter Two**Phenomenological Interpretation of the Transcendental Aesthetic*

§ 7. Discussion of the Metaphysical Exposition of Space and Time	78
§ 8. Phenomenological Analysis of Space and Time as Pure Forms of Intuition	84
§ 9. The Difference between "Form of Intuition" and "Formal Intuition"	91
§ 10. Transcendental Exposition of Space and Time	96
a) Space and Time as Conditions for the Possibility of Synthetic Knowledge <i>a priori</i>	96
b) The Phenomena of Motion and Change	97
§ 11. The Priority of Time over Space as Form of Intuition	100
a) Time as Universal Form of Appearances	100
b) The Original Subjectivity of Time in Its Expression as Self-Affection	103
§ 12. Summary Characterization of Space and Time, Their "Empirical Reality" and "Transcendental Ideality"	105

Second Part

*The Analytic of Concepts in the Transcendental Logic**First Division**Exposition of the Idea of a Transcendental Logic and Analytic**Chapter One**The Significance of Transcendental Logic*

§ 13. The Analysis of Thinking as Element of Knowledge and the Unity of Thinking and Intuition as the Two Themes of Transcendental Logic	113
§ 14. Kant's Determination of Thinking	115
§ 15. Determination of General and Transcendental Logic	120
a) Determination of General and Pure Logic as Distinguished from Applied Logic	120
b) Determination of Transcendental Logic as Object-Related	124
§ 16. Division of General and Transcendental Logic into the Analytic and the Dialectic	129
a) Formal Corrections and Factual Truth of Knowledge	129
b) General Logic as Analytic and Dialectic	130
c) Ontological Truth; Transcendental Logic as Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic	131

*Chapter Two**The Significance of the Transcendental Analytic*

§ 17. Methodic and Critical Preparation for Interpreting the Transcendental Analytic	136
a) Transcendental Philosophy as Ontology of the Extant in General	136
α) Determination of General and Transcendental Logic as Science of Thinking with Respect to Objects in General	136
β) The Concept of Object in General; Foundation of Formal Logic in Formal Ontology	139
b) The Systematic Unity of the Ontological Determinations of the Extant in General and the Completeness of the Table of Categories	140
c) Division of the Transcendental Analytic	142
α) What Is Incorrect in the Division of Transcendental Analytic into an Analytic of Concepts and an Analytic of Principles	142
β) Preparatory Demonstration of the Problematic of the Metaphysical and the Transcendental Deduction of Pure Concepts of Understanding	144
§ 18. Exposition of the Essence of the Transcendental Analytic of Concepts	148
a) The Meaning of "Analytic" and of "Transcendental Analytic"	148
b) Analysis of the Essence of the Concept	149

α) General Pure Logic as the Basis for Exposition of the Concept; Presentation of Directives for the Investigation	149
β) Concept as General Representation	153
γ) The Concept as Reflective Representing; the Essence of Reflection and the Acts Belonging to It	155
δ) Reflective Representation as <i>Repraesentatio Discursiva</i>	161
ε) Foundation of the Concept in the Function of Unity, in Reflection	162
§ 19. The Task and Way of Proceeding in the Transcendental Analytic of Concepts	164
a) The Direction of the Inquiry in the Transcendental Analytic of Concepts	164
b) The <i>a priori</i> Object-Related Thinking as Possible Place of Origin for the Categories	167
c) Categories as Concepts of Reflection; the Connection between Forms of Judgment as Modes of Unification and Categories as Modes of Unity	168
d) The Necessary Relatedness of Categories to Time	171

Second Division

Phenomenological Interpretation of the Transcendental Analytic of Concepts

Chapter One

The Place of Origin of Categories and Their Connection with Judgments as Functions of Unification

§ 20. The Kantian Table of the Forms of Judgment	175
§ 21. The Synthesis Underlying the Categories	179
a) "Synthesis" as Designation for Three Forms of Unification	179
b) The Connection of Pure Thinking in General, of Pure Object-Related Thinking, and of Pure Intuition; Synthesis as a Pre-Conceptual Gathering of the Manifold	181
c) Distinguishing Synthesis as Gathering [of a Manifold] from the Unifying Function of Understanding	184
d) The Power of Imagination as the Source of the Comprehensive Synthesis	188
e) The Pure, Imaginative, Time-Related Synthesis as Source of Pure Concepts of Understanding	191
f) Ontic and Ontological Concept-Formation; the Three Elements of Ontological Knowledge	194
g) The Unity of Imaginative Synthesis and the Unity of the Logical Function of Judgment	195
§ 22. The Twofold Character of Categories as Basic Determinations of Being and of Judgment and the Impossibility of a Real Definition of Categories as Pure Concepts of Understanding	198

Chapter Two

Disclosure of the Origin of Categories as Demonstration of Their Ontological Character

§ 23. The Problem Posed by the Transcendental Deduction of Categories	207
a) Justification of Kant's View of the Transcendental Deduction as a Response to the <i>Quaestio Juris</i>	207
α) The Knowledge-Claim of Dogmatic Metaphysics as Motive for the <i>Quaestio Juris</i>	208
β) The Problem of Legitimacy of the Objective Reality of Pure Concepts of Understanding	210
γ) The Subjective Character of the <i>a priori</i> as Condition for the <i>Quaestio Juris</i> ; the Transcendence-Structure of Dasein	213
b) Transcendental Deduction in Connection with the Problem of Transcendence	214
α) The Justification for Kant's Misconstruing Transcendence	215
β) Transcendence as <i>a priori</i> Constitution of Objectness	216
γ) Characterization of Object-Related Concepts in the <i>Critique of the Faculty of Judgment</i>	220
§ 24. Elucidation of the Structure of Object-Relatedness on the Basis of Temporality as the Constitution of the Subject—"The <i>a priori</i> Grounds of the Possibility of Experience"	221
a) Clarification of the Task and Orientation of This Inquiry	221
α) The Meaning of the Expressions "Experience" and "Possibility of Experience"	221
β) The Inquiry into the <i>a priori</i> Grounds of the Possibility of Experience as Inquiry into the Transcendental Constitution of the Subject	223
γ) The Crucial Function of the Synthesis of the Power of Imagination in the Enabling of Experience	227
δ) Synthesis of Apprehension, Reproduction, and Recognition as Modes of the Pure Synthesis of the Power of Imagination. Preliminary Characterization of the Idea of "Object in General"	229
b) Enabling of the Intuition of a Manifold through Time-Related Synthesis of the Power of Imagination in the Mode of Apprehension	231
c) Enabling the Grasping of a Region of Objects through Time-Related Synthesis of the Power of Imagination in the Mode of Reproduction	236
d) Enabling the Grasping of the Unity of a Region of Objects through the Time-Related Synthesis of the Power of Imagination in the Mode of Recognition	240
α) The Problem of the Interrelationship of the Three Syntheses of Apprehension, Reproduction, and Recognition	241

β) Interpretation of the Synthesis of Recognition as Synthesis of Pre-cognition	243
e) Objectness in General as the Subject's Free Self-Binding to <i>a priori</i> Rules of Knowledge	249
f) Presentation of the Possibility of Object-Relatedness as Explication of Subjectivity; Transcendental Apperception and Understanding as the Faculty of Rules	252
g) Summary of the Interpretation of the Section "The <i>a priori</i> Grounds of the Possibility of Experience"	260
§ 25. General Character of Transcendental Subjectivity as the Original Dimension of Synthetic <i>a priori</i> Knowledge	262
a) The Three Modes of the Transcendental Synthesis and Their Interconnection	263
b) The Unity of the Transcendental Synthesis and the Transcendental Apperception as the Ground of Their Unity	263
c) The Relationship of the Three Syntheses to Time and Their Connection to the Self on the Basis of the Relation to Time	264
d) Transcendental Apperception and Its Relationship to Time	266
e) Time as Self-Affection, Transcendental Apperception as Self-Standing, and the Unity of Subjectivity	267
f) Transcendental Subjectivity and the Ontological Essence of Categories	270
§ 26. Presentation of the Possibility of Ontological Knowledge	273
a) Kant's Systematic Presentation of the Transcendental Deduction of Categories—"The Relation of the Understanding to Objects in General and the Possibility of Knowing Them <i>a priori</i> "	273
α) Kant's Point of Departure from Separate Faculties of Knowledge as Condition of His Manner of Presentation of the Transcendental Deduction and the Necessity for the Mediating Function of the Power of Imagination	273
β) The Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception in Relation to the Productive Synthesis of the Power of Imagination	276
γ) Characterization of the Productive Synthesis of the Power of Imagination as Related to Time, as Unity of Receptivity and Spontaneity, and as the Basic Constitution of the Subject as Ecstatic	280
δ) Demonstration of the <i>a priori</i> Interconnection between Transcendental Apperception and Pure Intuition as Presentation of the Objective Reality and Ontological Essence of Categories	284
b) The Possibility of Synthetic Judgments <i>a priori</i> and the Possibility of Ontological Knowledge	288
c) The Significance of Kant's Doctrine of Schematism	291
Editor's Epilogue	294
Glossary of German Terms	297

Translators' Foreword

With this publication of Heidegger's *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, the translation of a lecture course delivered at the University of Marburg in the winter semester of 1927–28 and published originally in German in 1977 as Volume 25 of Heidegger's Complete Edition (*Gesamtausgabe*), all of Heidegger's writings on Kant are now available in English.¹ The only exception is perhaps his remarks about Kant in his unpublished lecture course text *Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas Aquin bis Kant* [History of Philosophy from Thomas Aquinas to Kant], scheduled to appear in Volume 23 of the Complete Edition.

In the epilogue to this volume, Ingrid Gölrand, the editor of the original German edition, offers a detailed account of the text of the university lecture course and indicates that it met four hours a week. She points out that "the text of the lecture course was fully worked out," so that "only in a few cases" was there a need for filling out "the formulations of some key-words in marginal notes, with the help of the handwritten copy."² The editor of Heidegger's university lecture course texts is not faced with the task of reconstructing a readable text from a series of notes or a fragmentary text. Heidegger's lecture course manuscripts are fully readable texts. The virtually complete character of the original German text provides the editor with a firm basis from which to choose the headings of the sections and the titles of the various chapters. This helps to understand why the work of the editor is delimited and why Heidegger called the Complete Edition an *Ausgabe letzter Hand*—literally, an edition that comes into existence by passing from the hand of the author "directly" into a published text.

Character of the Present Text. The very first sentence of the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* holds the key to the character of this text. At the outset Heidegger states unequivocally that the "intention of this course is to achieve a philosophical understanding

1. *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. R. Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990); *What Is a Thing?* trans. W. B. Barton and V. Deutsch (Chicago: Regnery, 1970); and "Kant's Thesis about Being," trans. T. Klein and W. Pohl, in *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 4 (1973), 7–33.

2. Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, third edition (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1995), *Gesamtausgabe* Band 25, p. 433. References to the German edition (G) appear in parentheses in the text of our Foreword.

of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.³ In what way, we may ask, does this intention differ from the familiar intention of understanding a philosophical text? The response should be sought in the play of the non-subjective "free" forces that shaped and directed the text of the present university lecture course on Kant's first *Critique*. These forces are "free" in that they are bereft of compulsion and necessity. They offer themselves without the necessity of having to be taken up—they bespeak the phenomenon.

The intention to achieve a philosophical understanding of this work of Kant's takes shape within and under the mandate of these free forces, to which the philosopher is exposed at the time and which leaves its indelible mark on the text, giving it the character that it has. In view of the free play of the non-subjective forces, we can say that Heidegger's intention to deliver a university lecture course on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* involved an intense occupation and preoccupation with Kant and that a period of gestation allowed the free forces to shape the present text and to carve its present philosophical mold.

What were these free forces and what preceded the delivery of the university lecture course? We will pursue this question in two steps. The first step is Heidegger's announcement to his colleague Karl Jaspers (October 6, 1927) that in the coming semester he (Heidegger) was going to deliver a lecture course on Kant's first *Critique*. The announcement is terse and does not reveal anything about the free forces that prompted him to offer the lecture course. Almost five months after the appearance of *Being and Time* and three months after the lecture course entitled *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger informed Jaspers that

the *Kantstudien* arrived at a most opportune moment, as I [Heidegger] intend during this winter semester to hold a four-hour weekly lecture course for interpreting the *Critique of Pure Reason*.⁴

The second step is the specific mention of the free forces which gave the lecture course on Kant its direction and shape. A month after telling Jaspers the topic of his lecture course, Heidegger, in a letter to his close friend Elisabeth Blochmann, mentioned the free forces which would shape the lecture course on Kant's *Critique*:

The weeks in which I worked in my study [in Messkirch] were quite produc-

3. Most of the time references to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are set off in the German text, but not always—as, for example, in this case. Whereas one might make a distinction between the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a philosophical text and the "critique of pure reason" as a philosophical activity—and make a case for Heidegger's having had this distinction in mind in this lecture course—the two (text and activity) are so closely tied as to reduce if not cancel out the need to interpret which of the two Heidegger has in mind. In other words, somehow *both* are at work in virtually all instances where a doubt might arise.

4. Walter Biemel and Hans Saner (eds.), *Martin Heidegger—Karl Jaspers: Briefwechsel 1920–1963* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990), p. 81.

tive. I worked through Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in one stroke. In the process I found myself much amazed, having been taught much, held fast, and refined.⁵

Thus the intention of achieving a philosophical understanding of Kant's first *Critique* is correlated to and under the mandate of the free forces of *being-amazed*, *being-taught*, *being-held-fast*, and *being refined*.

The impact of Heidegger's rigorous working through of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* was of such a magnitude that he *received* these non-subjective free forces in such a way that *amazement*, *learning*, *holding fast* or *consolidating*, and *refining* actively unfolded within him. These forces left their mark on the lecture course and gave it its philosophical direction. Far from being merely a commentary on the *Critique of Pure Reason*, much less a record of a philosophical debate with Kant (through which Heidegger would "settle his account with" Kant), the text is reminiscent of those works that manifest the spirit of philosophy.

Given that this work is not a commentary, the title *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* is a modest one. Instead of taking the role of a scholar showing his students the way through a difficult masterpiece of Western philosophy by writing a commentary on it, Heidegger places the Kantian *Critique* in the domain of the question of being—a domain which nurtures him as a philosopher and ultimately allows him to fulfill his philosophical mission. To put it briefly, the direction and shape of the lecture course on Kant's *Critique* make Heidegger's text a major work of Western philosophy.

To better appreciate the character of the present text, it is useful to locate this lecture course among Heidegger's later Marburg lectures. It was delivered right after *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, a lecture course in which Heidegger presented "a new elaboration of division 3 of part 1 of *Being and Time*."⁶ This new elaboration was called for in conjunction with Heidegger's having destroyed the page proofs of the third division after a conversation with Jaspers had convinced him that this part of the work was not yet intelligible.⁷ The lecture course on the Kantian *Critique* hones in on the phenomenological space opened up by

5. Joachim W. Störck (ed.), *Martin Heidegger—Elisabeth Blochmann: Briefwechsel 1918–1969* (Marbach am Neckar, 1989), p. 21.

6. Martin Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. A. Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 1.

7. Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus: Zur erneuten Auslegung von Schelling: Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände* (1809), vol. 49 of the Complete Edition (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991), pp. 39f.: "The decision to stop [publication of division 3, part 1, of *Being and Time*, entitled 'Time and Being'] was made in late December 1926 during a visit to Jaspers in Heidelberg. At that time lively but friendly discussions [with Jaspers], with the page proofs of *Being and Time* in hand, made it clear to me that, as it had been worked out so far, this most important division (I, 3) remained unintelligible."

the new elaboration of the third division of *Being and Time*. Thus this phenomenological space is the ground from which the free forces emerge which direct and shape the lecture course on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Intending a philosophical understanding of the Kantian *Critique*, this present work keeps in view the phenomenological space that is opened up by the new elaboration of division 3 of part 1 of *Being and Time*. What is opened up there invites Heidegger to put Kant's work squarely *within* that opening. Guided by that opening, i.e., by the new inroads made into the domain of the question of being, Heidegger puts forth this text as one in which the spirit of a new turn in philosophy emerges from within a masterpiece of modern philosophy.

The Tension of Translation. Rendering Heidegger's work into English creates a tension that is not easily resolved. It will always remain a struggle, because, with the inroads that he makes into the thinking of being, a language emerges that is primarily accessible to the *phenomenological* experience and way of thinking. This language remains inaccessible as long as one is tied to and directed by lexicographical and grammatical criteria. Thus, in addition to turning to the dictionary, the translator of Heidegger's work must return to the domain of phenomenological experience and the phenomenological way of thinking. Rather than *imposing* anything on Heidegger's work, this return *exposes* it. Such a return enables the translator to realize that often there is not a one-to-one correspondence between Heidegger's German words and the words of another language. More specifically, there is often no fully *equivalent* English word for Heidegger's German word based on its *phenomenological* import.

Years of struggling with Heidegger's works show that English often cannot say and show precisely the same thing as Heidegger's German. Even the English word *being*—so central for understanding Heidegger—does not convey precisely the sense, or show adequately, what Heidegger's *Sein* means. Above all, it is difficult to carry over into English the *context* by which the word *Sein* gets much of its vibrancy. *Sein* shows, among other things, activity, dynamism, motion, possibility, unfolding, refusal, disquietude, and tranquillity. The English word *being* does not easily convey this richness in Heidegger's German word *Sein*. Typically, the English word *being* is caught within a stasis, as in "being over against becoming."

Here are some of Heidegger's words in the original German with which we as translators have struggled. We present them in the spirit of Gadamer's words from *Wahrheit und Methode*:

The demand for loyalty that is made of translation cannot cancel out the fundamental difference between languages. . . . Like every interpretation, translation is an elucidation. The translator must take the responsibility for

such elucidation. Obviously he cannot leave open whatever is unclear to him. He must show his colors. . . . He must state clearly how he understands.⁸

1. *Das Wesen, wesentlich, wesenhaft.* No word in this text is more difficult to translate—and no word demands more genuine philosophical thinking—than *Wesen* and its compounds. Whether it is used in the period in which Heidegger is engaged in thinking being from the perspective of fundamental ontology or whether it is found within the onset of being-historical-thinking (*seinsgeschichtliches Denken*)—and granting significant exceptions—*Wesen* says something different from or outside the framework of the traditional *essentia* or *essence*. To understand this clearly, we must take into account an important development in early twentieth-century phenomenology.

A careful study of Husserl's third "Logical Investigation" shows that he not only adhered to "an *a priori* necessity of essence [*Wesen*]"⁹ but also worked with increased intensity to establish a lawfulness (*Gesetzlichkeit*) of essence as "a non-empirical, universal, and unconditionally valid lawfulness."¹⁰ It goes without saying that if the lawfulness of essence is non-empirical, universal, and unconditionally valid, then the essence to which Husserl remains basically committed is also "non-empirical, universal, and unconditionally valid."

The significant development in early twentieth-century phenomenology takes place as Heidegger carefully but resolutely distances himself from this conception of essence or *Wesen*. At the crucial juncture in *Being and Time* where Heidegger lays out the fundamental hermeneutical insight into the ownmost ontological possibility of humans as *Dasein*—and says "Das 'Wesen' des *Daseins* liegt in seiner Existenz"—he alerts us to the possible misunderstanding of the word *Wesen* within the context of *Dasein*, by putting the word *Wesen* between single quotation marks and by adding: "to the extent that one may speak of the '*essentia*' of this being at all." This is a clear indication that already in 1927 Heidegger distances himself from Husserl's understanding of *Wesen* as a "non-empirical, universal, and unconditionally valid essence."

At approximately the same time as he is writing the present lectures on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger, in the text *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, explains how he understands *Wesen* and how he wants this word

8. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*, second edition (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1965), pp. 363f.

9. Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1968), II/1, 234; trans. J. N. Findlay, *Logical Investigations* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), II, 443.

10. Ibid., II/1, 240; ET, II, 246. For a discussion of an *a priori* necessity of essence, see Burt C. Hopkins, "Phenomenological Cognition of the A Priori: Husserl's Method of 'Seeing Essences' (*Wesenserschauung*)," in Burt C. Hopkins (ed.), *Husserl in Contemporary Context* (Amsterdam: Kluwer, 1996), pp. 151–178.

to be thought/understood. Focusing on the problem of *Wesen* in *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, he draws upon the fundamental ontological character and possibility of humans as *Dasein* and says: "To attribute being-in-the-world to *Dasein* as its basic constitution means to state something about its essence [*Wesen*], i.e., its ownmost inner possibility [*seine eigenste innere Möglichkeit*]." ¹¹

Since Heidegger's determination of *Wesen* as "ownmost inner possibility" belongs essentially to this period of his thinking, we have to translate the aforementioned ontological characterization of *Dasein* as follows: "The 'essence' of *Dasein*, its ownmost inner possibility, lies in its existence." This rendition is both linguistically and philosophically true to the original, in that it uses the word *essence* while at the same time delineates how his use of the word differs from Husserl's "non-empirical, universal, and unconditionally valid essence." This rendition documents the instance in which *Being and Time* leaves behind the traditional determination of the human being as ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, rational animal. For the existentiality of existence, its ownmost inner possibility that is at work in *Being and Time* stands outside the "essence" of human being defined as "rational animal."

Measured against this conception of essence, *Dasein* has no essence at all. Why? Because, although existentiality of existence and all that it implies is indeed "given," their givenness is profoundly different from the fixed, stable, constant, and permanent givenness of essence. The givenness of the existentiality of existence is such that it does not stand over against thinking (like the essence of a triangle), but at each stretch of the way is vibrant, is not extant, and needs the enactment of thinking—i.e., is *vollzugshaft*.

In a conversation that was subsequently published, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann and Parvis Emad concluded that

on the one hand, we can distinguish *Wesen* as *essentia*, and on the other hand *Wesen* in the four additional meanings that we have outlined. We could say that the first meaning of *Wesen* as *essentia* is the concept of *Wesen* that belongs to the first beginning of philosophy. . . . But the German word *Wesen* is not *a priori* limited to *essentia*, in contrast to the English word *essence*. ¹²

Setting aside the meaning of *Wesen* as *essentia*/essence, the conversants then summed up the gist of what one can say about *Wesen* by indicating

11. Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen des Grundes," in *Wegmarken*, vol. 9 of the Complete Edition (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), p. 141.

12. Parvis Emad, "A Conversation with Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann on *Beiträge zur Philosophie*," in Burt C. Hopkins (ed.), *Phenomenology: Japanese and American Perspectives* (Amsterdam: Kluwer, 1997), pp. 121–142.

that for Heidegger *Wesen* has four other meanings, in addition to *essential*/essence:

1. *Wesen* as what is ownmost to something (*das Eigenste einer Sache*)
2. *Wesen* as the way of being of something (*Seinsweise einer Sache*)—the manner of root-unfolding of something
3. *Wesen* as the holding sway (*das Walten einer Sache*)—the manner in which something emerges or happens
4. *Wesen* as the in-depth sway, or: *Wesung*—the deeper holding sway or the ownmost character of *being* (*Seyn*) that is at the core of Heidegger's thinking of being in *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (*Vom Ereignis*). ¹³

Taken as a whole and encompassing the work of thinking that is presented here in translation, this discussion makes clear that one cannot simply render *Wesen* into English as "essence" each time the word appears in Heidegger's writings. To clarify this, let us take two examples from the present text.

The first example is in section 19 b, where Heidegger says: "Wir hörten aber: Das logische Wesen des Verstandes, die bloße Funktion der Einigung, ist nicht ablösbar von seinem transzendentalen Wesen" (G246–247). One might have translated this sentence as follows: "However, we were told that the logical essence of understanding, the mere function of unification, cannot be separated from its transcendental essence." But the phenomenological context makes it quite clear that the double appearance of the word *Wesen* cannot be handled this simply. Furthermore, this rendition is misleading because it distorts Heidegger's insight into the ontological difference between the logical *Wesen* of understanding and its transcendental *Wesen*. To render the second *Wesen* in this sentence with "essence" would amount to obfuscating this difference totally. Considering this reservation, and in order to maintain in translation some of the dilemma in the word *Wesen*, we decided to translate the sentence as follows: "However, we were told that the logical essence [*Wesen*] of understanding, the mere function of unification, cannot be separated from its ownmost inner transcendental possibility [*Wesen*]."

The second example is in section 7 c β of the original German. There Heidegger writes: "Die metaphysische Erörterung von Raum und Zeit sollte das allgemeine Wesen von Raum und Zeit herausstellen . . ." (G212). Here again it might seem appropriate to translate this sentence using "essence" for *Wesen*. The sentence would then have read: "The metaphysical exposition of space and time is meant to work out the

13. Ibid.

general essence of space and time. . . ." Instead we decided to render "*das allgemeine Wesen*" as "general inner possibility" and let the sentence read: "The metaphysical exposition of space and time is meant to work out the general inner possibility of space and time. . . ." This rendition preserves the ontological difference between space and time as forms of intuition and their ownmost inner possibility.

With these crucial passages in mind, it is incumbent upon us as translators to render *Wesen* into English as carefully as possible, in order to remain faithful to the *thinking* that Heidegger is enacting. Thus in each case of *Wesen* we have deliberated (a) whether *Wesen* refers to what is common in a multiplicity of instances that share one basic characteristic and refers to a *formal* structure, i.e., taken together (conceived) in a representing conceptualization of what is general, common, or all-encompassing, or (b) whether *Wesen* refers to an unfolding possibility, i.e., showing a significant reservation about "*essentia*." In the first instance we have translated *Wesen* as "essence"; in the second, as "ownmost inner possibility." (Cf. in this regard G366, where Heidegger draws this distinction quite clearly, with regard to "concept": ". . . a correspondence shall occupy us in the following, namely the relation between the empirical and the pure concept, or more precisely the relation between the *form [essence] of the concept*—unity of a commonness—and the *transcendental and ownmost inner possibility of the concept*.") In very rare cases, where the context requires it, we have used *both*—for example, "essence and ownmost inner possibility of pure understanding" (G218), "essence and ownmost inner possibility of the concept" (G240, 367), "essence and ownmost inner possibility of time" (G389), "essence and ownmost inner possibility of transcendental apperception" (G408), and "essence and ownmost inner possibility of sensibility" (G419).

It goes without saying that the problems with *Wesen* have their repercussions when translating compounds of *Wesen*, such as *wesentlich*, *wesenhaft*, *Wesensverfassung*, and *Wesenszug*. Except in rare instances we have translated these compounds with "essential."

2. *Der Gegenstand* and *das Objekt*. Both of these words are normally and "legitimately" rendered into English with the word *object*.¹⁴ However, there is a significant difference between these two German words in Kant's usage, a distinction that Heidegger is careful to maintain. Heidegger is fully consistent in his usage of these two words throughout this text.

Gegenstand is the object of thinking as subjective representation. *Objekt*, on the other hand, is subject to the unity of transcendental apperception,

14. Cf. in this regard *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. R. Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 188.

by which the manifold of intuition becomes unified. *Gegenstand* says what is happening phenomenologically and is a phenomenological enactment. *Objekt* is an experience within subjectivity. In his usage Heidegger preserves this distinction between *Gegenstand* and *Objekt*. We have chosen to delineate and maintain this significant difference by translating *Gegenstand* as *object*, while translating *Objekt* as *ob-ject*.

3. *Bild*, *bilden*, and *Einbildungskraft*. There is an implicit assumption that *Einbildungskraft*—or, as we say in English, "imagination"—is intrinsically connected to something called *Bild*—or, as we usually say in English, "image." But this web of words is not so simple. First of all, *imagination* carries many nuances of meaning that cannot simply fit with "image." The same is true of the German *Einbildungskraft*. Thus *Einbildung* of *Einbildungskraft* is not exactly the power of "imagination," but a form of "*Einbildung*," a form of "forming"; *Einbildungskraft* is a building and forming power.

Thinking in English gets thrown off when it assumes some automatic and intrinsic connection between "imagination" and "image." (Note: The German word allows a freer play.) The difficulty lies in part in the difference between *image* as a noun and *image* as a verb. The substantive "image" is something that exists in the realm of metaphysics and is in a certain sense "extant." The verbal "image" names a process of mirroring, shaping, letting come forth.

In this text (G415) Heidegger distinguishes two meanings of the word *bilden*: (1) "to produce, to shape, to bring forth, or *producere*"; (2) "to offer an image, offer a view." Thus, Heidegger says, "*Einbildung* [we say in English: imagination] is the free production of a pure view in the sense of the *unity* of possible time-relations, even if the strict meaning of the word makes this extended interpretation inadmissible." It is this "extended interpretation" to which we want to call the reader's attention. Keeping in mind what Heidegger says here, we see that the English word *image*, especially in its nominal usage, cannot say all of that. *Bilden* is a free production—shaping, bringing forth—that is time-related, even if the word itself in its strict sense does not say that. The ecstasies of time, which are "*gebildet*," simply have no image.

One should note that the German words *bilden* and *das Bild* have central meanings that are not as connected as they might appear to one looking only etymologically. We have chosen to render the word *bilden* into English as "to form" or "forming"—and sometimes "forming an image." We hope thus not to get caught in the syndrome of thinking the substantive "image"—with all of its connotations in English—whenever we are dealing with the German words *bilden* and *das Bild*.

4. *Das Beharrliche*. Heidegger introduces a thought process that is new to Kant. For Heidegger *das Beharrliche* is distinguishable by its staying power and its endurance. It is that aspect of the thing that Heidegger

wants to stress. Whereas this is not quite the same as what we mean in English with the word *permanence*, we have nevertheless decided to render *das Beharrliche* into English as "permanence," for two reasons: (1) The word *permanence*, when thought to the roots of its Latin origins, means something like *das Beharrliche*—even though what we usually think with the word *permanence* as "ever-lasting" is somehow more absolute. (2) Because we have used the Norman Kemp Smith translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, we decided to stay with the word that he uses: *permanence*.

5. *Auf-greifen*. When Heidegger uses this word, he hyphenates it and stresses each of the two parts of the word. Heidegger says that the synthesis that is named in "*auf-greifen*" has a double character: (1) Directed at what is offered—the impressions given receptively—*aufgreifen* is a seizing of something (thus the "*auf*" of *auf-greifen*). (2) But at the same time this synthesis "takes up" (*nimmt auf*), that is, Heidegger says, "is a spontaneous *Auf-greifen*." In our translation we might have tried an English word that would do justice to this resonance that Heidegger brings to light here—one possibility that presented itself was "snatching-up." However there is a nuance of "quick and light" in the English word that we wanted to avoid. Also we wanted somehow to keep some closeness to the German cognates of the word: *greifen*, *begreifen*, and *Begriff*. Thus we have rendered *auf-greifen* into English simply as "seizing" or "to seize."

Besides the issues surrounding individual words, in German and then in English, we would like to call attention to the italics in this translation. The use of italics in the translation varies from that in the German edition. Italics in Heidegger's original text serve to emphasize certain things within the context of oral delivery and are less appropriate for the written text. Moreover, italics are part of the language and should be used according to the conventions of the particular language. Thus in some instances our use of italics varies from the original German, based on our understanding that the use of italics is not just a technical aspect that exists independently of the specific language being used, but is part and parcel of the language itself *in its saying*—that italics is one of its gestures.

Technical Aspects of the Text in Translation. All additions to the German text by the translators are within square brackets [], including information that was added in the footnotes. Significant and problematical German words that we chose to carry along in the body of the text are also in square brackets. The symbols { } are used to distinguish Heidegger's additions or comments within quotations.

Footnotes from the German edition are at the bottom of the page and are numbered consecutively from the beginning of each major section,

as they are in the German text. Translators' footnotes are also at the bottom of the page, in brackets, and are designated by asterisks. The numbers in the running heads refer to the pagination of the German edition.

References to Kant's Texts. In an attempt to clarify references to Kant's writings for the reader of this English translation, we note the following:

1. Most of Heidegger's references to Kant's text are to the Cassirer edition: Ernst Cassirer (ed.), *Werke*, 11 volumes (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1912–22). In the footnotes references to this edition are given in parentheses, including volume and page number, e.g. (Cassirer, VI, 345).

2. In some cases Heidegger refers to the "Akademie Ausgabe," edited by the Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften: *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, 29 volumes (27 published so far) (Berlin: Georg Reimer and Walter de Gruyter, 1900–68). In the footnotes references are in parentheses, including volume and page number, e.g. (Akademie, III, 245).

3. In translating from the *Critique of Pure Reason* and from the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, we have used the standard English editions. We have stayed as close as possible to Smith's translation of the first *Critique*, even in those rare cases where a deviation from its translation might be *desirable*, as, e.g., in Heidegger's use of the Kantian word *das Beharrliche*. We have made minor alterations in the translation, in places where we determined it to be necessary. References in the footnotes to the English translation (ET) of these two works refer to the following:

a. *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, unabridged edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965).

b. *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950).

4. We have translated all other quotations from Kant's texts directly from the German.

We are grateful to the National Endowment for the Humanities and to Inter Nationes for partial support of this project.

Parvis Emad
Kenneth Maly

Preliminary Consideration

The intention of this course is to achieve a philosophical understanding of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, and that means to learn how to do philosophy. In this brief, preliminary consideration we shall come to an understanding of the essential requirements needed for realizing this intention. There are two requirements: First, we must know what it means to understand a philosophy that has been handed down to us; secondly, we need a provisional knowledge of the ways and means of achieving such an understanding.

Regarding the first point: In the last years of his life, in the course of a conversation, Kant once said: "I came with my writings a hundred years too early. A hundred years from now they will understand me better and will study and accept my books anew."¹ Are we hearing here the vanity of self-importance, or even the annoyance and resignation of not being recognized? Nothing of the sort. Both are foreign to Kant's character. What gets articulated in this quotation is Kant's vivid understanding of the manner in which philosophy is realized and gets worked out.

Philosophy belongs to the most original of human endeavors. In this regard Kant remarks: "But these human endeavors turn in a constant circle, arriving again at a point where they have already been. Thereupon materials now lying in the dust can perhaps be processed into a magnificent structure."² It is precisely these original human endeavors that have their constancy in never losing their questionable character and in thus returning to the same point and finding there their sole source of energy. The constancy of these endeavors does not consist in the continued regularity of advancing, in the sense of a so-called progress. Progress exists only in the realm of what is ultimately unimportant for human existence. Philosophy does not evolve in the sense of progress. Rather, philosophy is an attempt at developing and clarifying the same few problems; philosophy is the independent, free, and thoroughgoing struggle of human existence with the darkness that can break out at any time in that existence. And every clarification opens new abysses. Thus the stagnation and decline of philosophy do not mean not-going-forward-anymore; rather they point to having forgotten the center. Therefore every philosophical renewal is an awakening in returning to the same point.

Let us learn from Kant himself about the issue of how to understand philosophy properly:

1. Varnhagen von Ense, *Tagebücher*, I, 46.

2. Vorländer (ed.), *Kants Antwort an Garve, Prolegomena*, p. 194.

No one attempts to establish a science unless he has an idea upon which to base it. But in the working out of the science, the schema, nay even the definition which he first gives to the science, is very seldom adequate to his idea. For this idea lies within reason, like a germ in which the parts are hidden, undeveloped, and barely recognizable, even under microscopic observation. Consequently, since sciences are devised from the point of view of a certain universal interest, we must not explain and determine them according to the description which their founder gives of them, but in conformity with the idea which, out of the natural unity of the parts that we have assembled, we find to be grounding in reason itself. For we shall then find that its founder and often even his most recent successors, are groping around for an idea which they have never succeeded in making clear to themselves; and consequently, they have not been able to determine the proper content, articulation (systematic unity), and limits of the science.³

Applied to Kant himself, this means that we are not supposed to hold onto the merely literal description which he, as the founder of transcendental philosophy, gives of this philosophy. Rather, we must understand this idea—i.e., the determinant parts in their entirety—from out of that which grounds the idea. We must return to the factual ground, behind what is rendered visible by the first description. Thus, in grasping a philosophy which is handed down to us, we must comport ourselves in a manner which Kant emphasizes with regard to Plato's doctrine of ideas:

I need only remark that it is by no means unusual, upon comparing the thoughts which an author has expressed with regard to his subject—whether in ordinary conversation or in writing—to find that we understand him better than he understood himself, in that he has not sufficiently determined his concept and therefore has sometimes spoken, or even thought, in opposition to his own intention.⁴

According to this, then, to understand Kant properly means to understand him better than he understood himself. This presupposes that in our interpretation we do not fall victim to the blunders for which Kant once blamed the historians of philosophy, when he said: "Some historians of philosophy cannot see beyond the etymologies of what ancient philosophers have said to what they wanted to say."⁵ Accordingly, to understand properly means to concentrate on what Kant wanted to say—that is, not to stop at his descriptions, but to go back to the foundations of what he meant.

Thus our intention and task, in properly understanding Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, necessarily includes the claim to understand Kant better

3. CPR, B 862, A 834.

4. Ibid., B 370, A 314.

5. *Kants Streitschaft gegen Eberhard*, 1790 (Cassirer, VI, 71).

than he understood himself. Is this not being presumptuous, putting down the earlier by what comes later and has presumably advanced? But we know already that there is no advancing here, in the sense of external progress. It makes no sense to say that Plato, Aristotle, or Kant is surpassed. There is no presumption or disdain in our intention to understand an author better, in that this intention expresses nothing other than our appreciation of what wants to be understood better. For when we comprehend properly what "understanding better" means, we realize from the first that such understanding is possible and meaningful only where something intelligible is already there which contains in itself the possibility of being traced back to its foundations. In saying that there is something that we intend to understand better, we are saying that it contains within it a content in which we ourselves can grow. By contrast, everything which drifts on the surface and, on the basis of its trivial and vacuous character, gives no clue to an interpretation, can also not be understood better. To be able to be understood better and to be worth being better understood is a privilege and precisely *not* an indication of something of inferior quality.

Every semblance of presumption disappears completely when we comprehend that even those who understand better are in need of a new interpretation, just when they understand appropriately and hit upon new foundations. Thus there is no reason to take oneself as absolute in the bad sense. There is a significant darkness in every philosophical endeavor, and even the most radical of these endeavors remains finite. Such an endeavor sees itself as absolute in the genuine sense only when it comprehends itself as finite.

"Understanding appropriately" as "understanding better" is no mere rejection of what is understood, but rather is giving it "validity." A philosophy truly has "validity" when its own power is released and the possibility is provided for it to deliver a shock and to make a difference. This happens only when the philosophy in question enters the possibility of saying what that philosophy wanted to say. To let Kant speak in this manner then just means precisely to come to grips with him. "Understanding better" expresses the necessity of the philosophical struggle that goes on within every real interpretation. We need to see that merely narrating and describing what is in a text does not guarantee anything like a philosophical understanding. Of course, simply being prepared for coming to grips [with Kant], while certainly necessary, is not a sufficient condition for interpretation. A second thing is needed: the ways and means for achieving such a "better understanding."

It is of little use to deal in any detail with the method of interpretation before the object of the interpretation is sufficiently known. We will limit ourselves to a few remarks. Our interpretation concerns that work of Kant which lies at the center of his philosophical labor. Because of the

Critique of Pure Reason all preceding philosophy, including ancient philosophy, is put in a new light; and for the period that comes after, this *Critique* gives rise to a new philosophical problematic.

In order to see clearly what Kant wanted to say, we must familiarize ourselves with the text, by knowing the structure of the whole work, the inner connection among the individual parts, the interpenetration of the series of proofs—knowing the concepts and the principles. It seems easy simply to state what is there in the text. However, even if we thoroughly appropriate the concepts, the question, and the conditions—by clarifying them or by determining their origin from out of the tradition and their transformation in Kant—even then we do not yet grasp what is in the text. In order to go that far, we must be able to see what Kant saw, as he determined the problems, came up with a solution, and put it into the form of the work that we now have before us as the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is of no use to repeat Kantian concepts and statements or to reformulate them. We must get so far that we speak these concepts and statements *with* Kant, from within and out of the same perspective.

Thus, to come to know what Kant means demands that we bring to life an understanding of philosophical problems in general. However, the introduction of philosophical problems will not precede the interpretation. Rather, through the act of interpretation we shall grow into the factual understanding of the philosophical problematic. It will then become clear that and how Kant took an essential step in the direction of a fundamental elucidation of the concept and method of philosophy.

But penetration into philosophical knowledge reveals at the same time the basic difference between philosophy and every science. However, the difference simultaneously makes visible how the sciences and philosophy originally belong together. In interpreting the *Critique of Pure Reason*, we do not merely take note of Kant's opinions and statements. We should grasp the main problems of his philosophical work, which means that we should learn how to do philosophy. Accordingly, several intentions come together in our lecture course: an examination of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, an introduction into the basic problems of philosophy, and an exercise in interpretation and in the actual philosophical appropriation of philosophical investigations.

When the inherent structure of the *Critique of Pure Reason* calls for it, we shall on occasion deal with Kant himself, with his philosophical and scientific development, with his relation to the tradition and to what came after him. Thus these historical considerations shall also support and complete the interpretation. To this end we must also consider other writings of Kant. However, the first and foremost goal is to understand philosophically the unified whole of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The designation of this interpretation as "phenomenological" is meant initially to indicate only that coming to grips with Kant takes place

directly within the context of the current and living philosophical problematic. What phenomenology is all about should be demonstrated in the course of the interpretation itself.

Before we begin with the actual interpretation, we need to mention briefly the most important resources: editions of Kant's works, single editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and some secondary literature.

Regarding editions of Kant's works:

I. The complete critical edition of Kant's works has been undertaken by the Prussian Academy of Science in Berlin, following W. Dilthey's recommendation. Collected works of Kant have been estimated to comprise twenty-one volumes, of which seventeen have already appeared. Kant's writings are in volumes 1-9, his letters in volumes 10-12, his handwritten literary remains in volumes 13-19, and addenda and lectures in volumes 20-21. Volume 3 contains the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781); volume 4 contains the second edition (1787) to the extent that the second edition has alterations (e.g., in the chapter on Paralogism).

II. The edition of E. Cassirer of Kant's works (1912ff.) has already been completed and contains Kant's most important works: Volumes 1-8 contain Kant's writings; volumes 9-10, the letters; and volume 3, the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

III. The edition of Kant's works published by Meiner (1904ff.)

Older editions are as follows: by G. Hartenstein in ten volumes (1838-1839), by Rosenkranz and Schubert in twelve volumes (1838-1842), and by Hartenstein in eight volumes (1867-1869).

Editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason* are as follows: by Benno Erdmann (of the second edition) (1878), with its fifth edition in 1900; by Adickes (1889), with footnotes and an introduction; by Karl Vorländer (1899 and later), of the second edition, with the text of the first edition in an appendix—and a good introduction and a subject and name index; the edition from Meiner, with the second edition and alterations in an appendix. The latest edition by R. Schmidt (1926) has both editions side by side and is therefore very useful; the edition by Kehrbach (published by Reclam) has the first edition, with alterations of the second edition in the appendix.

Biographical information is as follows: The presentation and characterization of Kant's life and his contemporaries by Borowski, by Jachmann, and by Wasianski (all appearing in 1804); by Vorländer, *Immanuel Kant: Der Mann und das Werk*, 2 volumes (1924).

Here is some important secondary literature:

H. Cohen's *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung* (1871, 1925⁴), his first scholarly work and basically epistemology; A. Riehl's *Der philosophische Kritizismus* (1908²); B. Erdmann's *Kants Kritizismus in der 1. und 2. Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1878); H. Vaihinger's *Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der*

reinen Vernunft (vol. 1, 1888; vol. 2, 1892). This commentary was intended to have five volumes and now covers the preface to the first edition, the introductions from both the first and second editions, and the Transcendental Aesthetic.

For further information, consult volume 3 of Überweg's history of philosophy. Specific secondary literature on important investigations will be mentioned in each case in the appropriate places. It is to be noted in the end, however, that we are not concerned with literature *about* the text, but rather with the text itself.

Introduction

The *Critique of Pure Reason* as Laying the Foundation for Metaphysics as Science

Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* appeared in 1781, after a period of silence that lasted more than ten years. At the time Kant was fifty-six years old. To begin with, his contemporaries were completely baffled about this work; for it went far beyond the established philosophical literature in terms of the depth of its questioning, the rigor of its conceptual formation, the novelty of its language, and the many-layered layout of its problematic. Although the essential intentions of this work were not grasped at the time, it caused some excitement and soon gave rise to writings both pro and con. In order to protect himself against misunderstandings, in order to ward off inappropriate attacks, but above all in order to enable better access to the *Critique*, in 1783 Kant wrote the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science*. But this treatise, although it looks back to the major work and is written clearly and instructively, does not present the ingenious inquiry of Kant in its originality. Kant remained in a cycle of incomparable productivity and clarity about his problems, even after the publication of the *Critique*; this benefited the revision of the *Critique* that soon became necessary. The second edition of the *Critique* appeared in 1787, revised here and there and with a new preface and a more extensive introduction. We shall base our interpretation on both of these editions. The second edition does not change anything in the general structure of the work, but attempts to rework the central doctrines and to sharpen the lines of argument.

When we begin to familiarize ourselves with the texts, the first things that we come across are the prefaces and introductions of both editions, A and B. But it is characteristic of genuine prefaces and introductions that they are written after the work has been completed and, in retrospect, provide an anticipatory view of the work. These prefaces and introductions will really be understood only from out of the understanding of the work as a whole. Accordingly, our interpretation will not dwell on the preface and introduction. Rather, we will begin immediately with the actual thematic part. Of course, we cannot avoid giving a general and preparatory characterization of the central problematic of the *Critique of Pure Reason* if we wish to avoid completely fumbling around in the dark in the initial stage of interpretation. Thus, I shall try to offer a rather free presentation of the basic problematic of the *Critique*, a presentation that sets aside an actual exegesis of, even as it is partly based upon, the preface and the introduction. This presentation will be necessarily provisional, not yet able to move along with rigorous concepts.

We ask: What does a “critique of pure reason” mean? We can answer this question only if we know what the work with this title is supposed to accomplish. If this is the central work of Kant’s philosophical labor, then it must have grown out of Kant’s most original endeavors in philosophy. We can briefly formulate Kant’s basic convictions on the nature of philosophy by saying: Philosophy is metaphysics. The *Critique of Pure Reason* is nothing but laying the foundation for metaphysics as science and thus laying the foundation for “pure philosophy” as such. “Critique of pure reason” means laying the foundation for metaphysics as science.

We ask: What does metaphysics mean? What does it mean, generally, to lay the foundation for a science? Why is laying the foundation for science a critique of pure reason? By responding to these questions, we obtain an initial summary of the problematic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. But if an interpretation is a matter of “understanding better,” a philosophical discussion, then we have already determined the problematic around which the struggle will take place: metaphysics, its being, its ground, and its form as science. Herein at the same time lies the question: To what extent does metaphysics constitute the center of philosophy and in what form can it be the center?

§1. The Traditional Concept of Metaphysics

We begin our discussion concerning the question of what metaphysics is by elucidating how the meaning of the word *metaphysics* changed from referring to the technical production of a book to designating the central science of philosophy.

Literally the word *metaphysics*—μετὰ τὰ φυσικά—means that which comes after that which deals with φύσις or nature, the world in general, and being. In the last century before Christ the writings of Aristotle were collected and arranged anew and published as philosophy in its entirety, just as the teaching of Stoicism constitutes a system divided into logic, physics, and ethics. On this occasion among the Aristotelian *corpus* a treatise was found with the title “Physics,” φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις. This treatise deals with the world as a whole (κόσμος) and with the basic determining feature of the world, i.e., motion. In addition other treatises were found which had been brought together but not given a title and in a certain sense dealt with the same subject matter as the treatise entitled “Physics.” In arranging the order of the writings, it was easy to put these untitled essays after the treatise entitled “Physics” and, from the point of view of a technical arrangement, simply to take these treatises as a collection of essays which in the sequence of writings come after the “physics,” i.e., μετὰ τὰ φυσικά.

This technical title soon took on a meaning which was meant to

characterize the content of the treatises which followed the “Physics.” People saw that these treatises dealt with the problem of the world as a whole and in a comprehensive sense, insofar as, on the one hand, these essays inquire more decisively into the ultimate ground of all beings, an inquiry which Aristotle designates as theology. On the other hand, there were essays which took as object of inquiry the totality of beings as such insofar as they are beings; and this discipline, which inquires into beings as beings and questions the meaning of the being of beings, was called πρώτη φιλοσοφία, i.e., first philosophy. The discipline of theology was taken together with the discipline of first philosophy, and together they were differentiated from “physics.” At first sight both disciplines, theology and first philosophy, have the peculiar and common characteristic of going beyond experienceable beings, in that they take up first the issue of the world as a whole and its ground, and then the issue of the being of beings, which belongs to every being in being a being, as its constitution.

What is stated here about beings and the world in some sense transcends the “physical,” i.e., what is extant and experienceable, what is sensible, the *mundus sensibilis*. The essays “transcend” unto something which lies beyond “physics”; and the meaning of the μετὰ in the technical title of “metaphysics” gets transformed. It no longer means *post*—following sequentially—but means *trans*: transcending what is considered in “physics” and its manner of treating the problematic. Metaphysics is thus the science of the super-sensible.

This is the sense in which Kant says:

The old name for this science provides an indication of the kind of knowledge to which the intention of this knowledge is directed. One would like to move beyond all the objects of possible experience (*trans physicam*) with the help of this knowledge, in order, wherever possible, to get to know that which absolutely cannot be the object of this knowledge.¹

Likewise Kant states in his lecture on metaphysics:

As far as the name *metaphysics* is concerned, one must not assume that this title originates accidentally because it fits exactly with the science. {Kant is suggesting that the title of “metaphysics” is formulated in view of the content of the treatise which was entitled “Metaphysics.”} For, since φύσις means nature and since we cannot arrive at the concepts of nature other than through experience, therefore that science which follows nature is called ‘metaphysics’ (from μετὰ, *trans*, and *physica*. This is a science which, as it were, lies outside and beyond the realm of physics.² {Cf. Kowalewski, *Die philosophischen Hauptvorlesungen Kants* (1924), p. 552; see also Pölitiz and Arnoldt.)

1. Kant, *Über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik* (Cassirer, VIII, 302).

2. Max Heinze, *Vorlesungen Kants über Metaphysik: Aus drei Semestern*, Leipzig, 1894, p. 186.

Metaphysics is the science of supersensible beings which are not accessible to experience. What is not accessible to experience includes: the world as totality (since the whole in its wholeness is not experienceable); the ground of the world, called God; then those beings within the world which are central for all questioning, i.e., humans and particularly that in them which is not experienceable: what lies beyond death, the immortality of the soul; the soul as such and its freedom. Thus metaphysics deals with the supersensible: God, the totality of the world, and the soul.

These objects correspond to three definite disciplines of metaphysics. Theology deals with God—as philosophical theology, i.e., from out of reason and not out of revelation: *theologia rationalis* or *naturalis*. Rational cosmology, *cosmologia rationalis*, deals with the “κόσμος” or the totality of the world. And rational psychology or *psychologia rationalis* deals with the soul. As disciplines of metaphysics, these are not experiential sciences, but sciences of reason—rational sciences.

We already heard that in the collection of Aristotelian treatises called “μετὰ τὰ φυσικά” there were essays which dealt with beings as beings, with ὅν ἢ ὅν or *ens inquantum ens*. They deal with being in general, which inheres in every being, whether it be God, a natural object, or something psychic. The metaphysical discipline which deals with being in general, with *ens in communi*, is called general metaphysics or *metaphysica generalis*. A distinction is made between this and the disciplines that we mentioned—rational theology, rational cosmology, and rational psychology—which make up *metaphysica specialis*. Special metaphysics and thus the entirety of metaphysics has its center in rational theology.

This concept of metaphysics and its divisions were developed in the Middle Ages and particularly in the late Scholasticism in Spain. It was passed on to modern philosophy in this systematization and remained crucial for Kant, although he reworked this conception in a major way. Kant held his lectures on metaphysics in accord with the *compendium* of Baumgarten, a student of Wolff. Baumgarten defines metaphysics as follows: “*Metaphysica est scientia prima cognitionis humanae principia continens*”³ [“Metaphysics is the science which contains the first principles of what is grasped by human knowledge”]. Metaphysics is a science of the principles of beings, not the principles of knowledge: “*Ad metaphysicam referuntur ontologia, cosmologia, psychologia, et theologia naturalis*”⁴ [“To metaphysics belong ontology, cosmology, psychology, and natural theology”].

What is essential about this conception of metaphysics is that its object is the totality of beings in general and thus, in terms of the main realms

of beings, God, the world, and human beings. Metaphysics deals with supersensible beings—ὅν—and metaphysics originates as an ontic science. This applies also to traditional *metaphysica generalis*, which deals with beings as such and, at least since Descartes, is called ontology. This traditional ontology, too, is an ontic science which considers beings in general and, in doing so, naturally comes across the determinations of the being of beings. Thus there were basic obscurities in this concept of *metaphysica generalis* and of ontology—obscurities which in fact have been there since the time of Plato and Aristotle, including Kant. Kant attempts for the first time to clarify the concept of ontology and so to conceive anew this *concept of metaphysics*. However, in spite of all of Kant’s attempts to reshape the concept of metaphysics, still for Kant—as will be shown—genuine metaphysics remains an ontic science of supersensible beings. For him “the supersensible” is “the final goal of metaphysics”⁵—supersensible in us, above us, and after us, namely: freedom, God, and immortality.

We will have to develop Kant’s concept of metaphysics more closely at that point where we will understand how he carries out the project of laying the foundation of metaphysics. To begin with, let us stay with the very general definition of metaphysics which he on one occasion presents in *Über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik*. There he says that metaphysics “is the science which enables us by means of reason to proceed from the knowledge of the sensible to that of the supersensible.”⁶ There are two essential aspects to this definition. First, metaphysical knowledge is not a knowledge gained from experience but one gained through reason. Secondly, metaphysical knowledge moves beyond the sensible, as Kant puts it, toward the supersensible—or to put it more carefully: moves toward what is not-sensible. For the theme of Kantian metaphysics is not only the supersensible, because ontology deals also with that which lies beyond the sensible which is nothing supersensible. The supersensible (beings) constitutes only one region of what belongs to what is not-sensible.

What Kant encountered as metaphysics, and wherein he operated for a long time, is a science which would determine the beings to which the mere concepts of reason—such as God and soul—refer by way of a logical analysis of these concepts on the basis of certain principles, like the principle of contradiction. We can explain Kant by asking: Does this theoretically metaphysical knowledge have a foundation? Can the concepts and propositions of this knowledge of the supersensible be proven by virtue of the supersensible itself? Can this knowledge be confirmed

3. A. G. Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, second edition, 1743, §1.

4. *Ibid.*, §2.

5. *Über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik* (Cassirer, VIII, 238).

6. *Ibid.*

by a direct intuitive experience of these beings? If not, then such propositions cannot be refuted by any experience. Because neither a confirmation nor refutation by experience is possible and because the sole principle of truth is sought in the absence of contradiction among propositions, i.e., in their formal correctness, the metaphysicians continued at all times to anticipate supposedly "enthusiastic insights."⁷ Metaphysics neglected the inquiry concerning the *possibility* of such supersensible knowledge; metaphysics was without a *critique*, i.e., was dogmatic. Hence Kant calls the traditional metaphysics "dogmatic metaphysics," or more precisely: theoretical-dogmatic metaphysics. He calls metaphysics "theoretical" because it makes the crossing over to the supersensible via mere reflection, or *θεωρία*.

Kant's attempt to lay the foundation of metaphysics as science had to come to terms with this traditional theoretical-dogmatic metaphysics. Kant saw clearly that this metaphysics is still a "battle-ground . . . quite well suited for those who desire to exercise themselves in mock combat" and "its procedure . . . has been a merely random groping . . . among mere concepts."⁸ In contrast to this, we must investigate "by what measure and from where reason may venture to pass beyond the objects of experience to those objects which are not of experience."⁹ Kant does not deny the possibility of metaphysics, but holds on to traditional metaphysics in its ultimate goal *as genuine metaphysics*. The only question is: Whither and how are we to attempt this crossing over to the supersensible?

How does Kant sketch out his justification of a genuine metaphysics? How does he accomplish the project of *laying the foundation of metaphysics as science*? In order to understand this, we must first come to an understanding of the second question¹⁰—namely, what does laying the foundation of a science mean at all? In order to gain clarity about this question, we would like to attempt to carry on an independent *phenomenological observation*, i.e., one not primarily geared to Kant. To this end we shall respond to two specific questions: What does science mean generally? And what do we mean by laying the foundation of science? The following phenomenological deliberations are of fundamental importance for grasping the interpretation of the *Critique* as well as for grasping this interpretation itself, i.e., for grasping philosophy as such. These deliberations concern problems which seem trivial but which philosophy has by no means yet thoroughly penetrated.

7. Ibid., p. 240.

8. CPR, B xv.

9. *Über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik* (Cassirer, VIII, 239).

10. Cf. G10.

§2. General Meaning of Laying the Foundation of a Science

a) Phenomenological Interpretation of Science's Way of Being

In the following we shall characterize, first in only a general way, the *idea of science as such*; and then we shall determine more precisely what is needed for a science to *arise* at all, i.e., for a science as such to ground itself. This should make visible the supporting ground of a science and accordingly should indicate where the laying of the foundation of a science must begin. (For an exposition of the logical and phenomenological-existential concept of science, cf. the lecture given in Tübingen on March 9, 1927, under the title "Phenomenology and Theology.")

α) The Existential Concept of Science. Knowledge as a Revealing Comportment to Beings, the Primary Revealing in the Practical-Technical Realm, and the Prescientific Understanding of the Being of Beings

We begin our observation with a preliminary designation of science as a kind of knowing. But we do not mean knowing in the sense of the known, but rather as a knowing comportment. This comportment is not a so-called psychic process in the interior of a so-called soul. Rather, as human comportment it is a definite, possible way for humans to be. To inhere in this way of being and of knowing means to have a relationship with beings that are knowable or known, such as nature, history, space or time. This way of being relates to beings themselves; in fact, it is a comportment which reveals the being to which it is related.

The revealing comportment toward beings which occasionally surrounds human Dasein is a free possibility of this Dasein. Generally we give the name *existence* to the way of being which is peculiar to human Dasein and to which moreover knowing belongs as a free possibility. Humans exist, whereas things in nature are extant. Accordingly we conceive knowing as a free possibility of human existence.

In attempting to explicate knowing, and particularly science as a possibility of the existence of Dasein, we are inquiring into the existential concept of science. What is science when it is taken as the possibility of existence of human Dasein? If we wanted to respond to this question at all satisfactorily, then we would first have to go back to a general, essential determination of human Dasein itself, i.e., we must return to its essential constitution. We cannot do that here. Instead we will consider only two essential determinants which belong to the existence of Dasein: being-in-the-world and freedom. These are sufficient for a preliminary designation of the essence of science.

Human Dasein is a being which has a world; or, to put it differently,

the mode of being of Dasein, existence, is essentially determined by *being-in-the-world*. “World” is that particular whole toward which we comport ourselves at all times. The personal relation of one existence to another is also not a free floating cognitive relation of an I-self to a thou-self, as if they were isolated souls; but rather each is a factual self in a world, and the being of the self is essentially determined by its comportment to this world.

By contrast, a material thing—a rock or any item for use, like a chair—has no world; its mode of being is devoid of any comportment toward a world. This kind of being is merely extant. What is extant is of course one of those beings toward which we can comport ourselves. This being may be extant within our world, it *may* belong to what we come across in the world and be an *innerworldly* being; but it does not have to be that way. When we say about a being that it is innerworldly—like nature, for example—this being still does not have the mode of being which *comports* itself *toward* a world; it does not have the mode of being of *being-in-the-world*. It has the mode of being of extantness, to which additionally the determination of innerworldliness can accrue when a Dasein exists which lets that being be encountered as innerworldly in Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Physical nature can only occur as innerworldly when world, i.e., Dasein, exists. This is not to say that nature cannot be in its own way, without occurring within a world, without the existence of a human Dasein and thus without world. It is only because nature is *by itself* extant that it can also encounter Dasein within a world.

For an initial orientation regarding the structure of Dasein and being-in-the-world, let us keep in mind the explicit difference between human beings and rocks. Rocks have no world; humans are affected by a world toward which they comport themselves. With this rough differentiation we are still far from a genuine philosophical understanding. In the course of interpretation of the *Critique*, we shall see how the very basic difficulties of the Kantian problematic are grounded in Kant’s failure to recognize the phenomenon of world and to clarify the concept of the world—something that neither he nor his successors did.

We deliberately overlooked plants and animals in our preliminary characterization of being-in-the-world. Animals are not extant like rocks, but they also do not exist in the manner of comporting themselves to a world. Nevertheless in plants and animals we find a kind of orientation toward other beings which in a certain way surround them. As distinguished from the extantness of material things and from the existence of humans, we call the mode of being of plants and animals: life. To be sure, we speak of the animal’s environment, but the question here is what “world” means and whether, strictly speaking, we can talk about “world” here. For what we mean by world is intrinsically connected to

a second essential determination of Dasein which we want briefly to mention along with being-in-the-world.

Human Dasein which has a world is a being who is concerned with its own existence, indeed in such a way so as to choose itself or give itself over to choice. The existence which always makes up our being—though not the only determinant—is a matter of our *freedom*; and only a being which can be resolved and has resolved itself in such and such a way can have a world. World and freedom as basic determinations of human existence are most closely related.

For our purposes of interpreting the essence of science from out of the mode of being of Dasein (existence), these determinations of Dasein (being-in-the-world and freedom) are sufficient.

It is not difficult to arrive at further determinations from the one mentioned in the first place. Dasein exists: It is in a world within which it encounters beings and to which the existing Dasein comports itself. However, these innerworldly beings toward which Dasein comports itself are *revealed* in, through, and for this comportment. But at the same time the comporting Dasein is also revealed to itself; the one who exists, Dasein, is manifest to itself, without being the object of a penetrating self-observation.

However, the comportment toward innerworldly beings is not first and foremost a knowing comportment, even in the sense of a scientific examination of beings. The predominant comportment whereby we generally discover innerworldly beings is application, employment of things for use, dealing with tools of transportation, tools for sewing, tools for writing, tools for working—tools in the broadest sense. We get to know tools primarily by dealing with them. It is not as if we have a prior knowledge of these things, in order then to use them. Rather it is the other way around: Employment as such is the manner in which we get to know these things primarily and appropriately, i.e., a primary and proper way of uncovering innerworldly beings. Likewise we do not reveal nature in its might and power by reflecting on it, but by struggling against it and by protecting ourselves from it and by dominating it. Thus the myths of nature contain a history of this struggle; that is, they are interpretations of an original comportment toward nature. Similarly we do not discover the daily circumstances and accidents of happenings within our world of action by merely gaping at the world; but rather it is by seizing and examining opportunities that we primarily learn of inconveniences, obstacles, dispositions, and feelings. The daily dealings with innerworldly beings is the primary—and for many the *only*—manner of discovering the world. This dealing with innerworldly beings—in terms of application, employment, accomplishment, production, and so on—is a comportment to tools and nexuses

of tools, like traffic regulations in a city and the like. We make use of them in a “self-evident manner.”

But it is in dealing with things that we understand, from the very outset, what something like a tool or things for use generally mean. We do not develop this understanding only in the course of use. On the contrary, we must already understand ahead of time something like tool and tool-character, in order to set about using a certain tool. This understanding of what a tool means opens the horizon for us in advance so that, in using a specific tool, we can comport ourselves toward it. What we learn is not an understanding of what being a tool is in general, but rather we can only learn the use of a specific tool as we anticipate and ask for it. In the same way we always already understand in advance what the power of nature means and only in the light of this “advance-understanding” of nature’s power can a specific force of nature overwhelm us.

In a certain way we understand in advance the tool-character as well as the power of the forces of nature. We understand such things—although at first and to begin with we do not pay attention to such understanding and do not even know that we understand these sorts of things. We are solely occupied with the specific way in which tools interconnect and are stupefied by specific forces. This prior understanding of the tool-character and of power, without which we could never use a specific tool and could never be taken aback by a specific force of nature, is as such hidden from us. And not only is this understanding hidden from us, although we constantly exist in it; but that *which* we understand is concealed, too: Things like tool-character and power are not specifically comprehended in this understanding; nor are they explicitly made an object of reflection, much less the theme of a conceptual knowledge. This understanding of the tool-character and of power is hidden from us, is not made thematic, remains unobjectified, and is preconceptual.

But what is it which is in some way manifest to us in our understanding of the tool-character and of the power of nature? Dealing with a tool or with nature is a comportment toward beings; and what is to some extent already accessible to us in the aforementioned understanding in question is nothing but the manner and constitution of the being of beings. We can comport ourselves toward a being, e.g., what is extant as such, only if we understand in advance what extantness means. Therefore, we must state generally and fundamentally that with the understanding of the tool-character, which from the beginning elucidates all our dealing with tools, it becomes clear that all comportment toward beings carries within it an understanding of the manner and constitution of the being of the beings in question.

We understand something like the *being* of beings, but we neither grasp

nor know *that* we understand this being in a preconceptual way or even that it is this understanding of being that primarily *enables* all our comportment to beings. Over and beyond our comportment to beings and prior to it and for the sake of it we understand something like being and the constitution of being. In this understanding we somehow grasp the being of the beings which we encounter as to what and how they generally are; and over and beyond beings (τὰ ὄντα) we already understand being. To be sure, it is not an explicit understanding of the being of beings. Understanding of being is not yet the λόγος of the ὄν, is not yet an ontological comprehension; but it is still an understanding of the being of beings. Therefore, we call this understanding of being which elucidates and guides all comportment toward beings the *pre-ontological understanding of being*, because it is preconceptual and non-objectified. There is in Dasein’s daily dealings with its world already an implicit pre-ontological understanding of being which is concealed from Dasein.

We already saw that Dasein in its comportment toward innerworldly beings is simultaneously manifest to itself as the being which exists as a self. In its comportment toward itself as a being, Dasein already understands the being of the beings which Dasein itself is, as which Dasein itself exists. Dasein *understands* [*versteht*] its own manner of being, existence; but Dasein does not *comprehend* [*begreift nicht*] this existence, i.e., Dasein does not at first conceptually differentiate between its own manner of being and the manner of being of things toward which Dasein comports itself. So little does Dasein make this differentiation that it identifies its own being with the being of things. This is the case with all mythical thinking, and it is an identification which never entirely disappears from Dasein, but comes to the fore in the moment of thrownness.

For a long time yet the conceptual difference between the mode of being of human Dasein and of the mode of being of things remains in the dark—even in philosophy. We are just now beginning to see a central problem here and to look for ways of resolving it. And we shall demonstrate how Kant, certainly within definite limits, wanders among these problems without seeing them as such.

Let us recall the first definition that we offered of the mode of being of Dasein: Dasein exists, it is in the mode of being-in-the-world. Now we can summarize the above discussion in terms of this basic definition of existence. First, if Dasein *exists* factically, i.e., *is in a world*, then beings always already lie before Dasein as somehow *revealed*. Secondly, Dasein comports itself toward the beings which lie before it primarily and from the beginning in the manner of *practical dealing*, as we have characterized it. Thirdly, the being with which Dasein deals (toward which it comports itself), but also itself as an existing being—in short *all* beings that are revealed—are *understood* in advance with respect to their *being*, though this understanding of being is *still pre-ontological*.

What we have summarized in these three points pertains essentially to Dasein *before* Dasein ever comports itself *scientifically* toward world and *without* Dasein's ever comporting itself thus. Now how is the *scientific comportment* (as possibility of existence of Dasein as just characterized) related to the *dealing* with beings which we characterized as *prescientific*? How does this scientific comportment stem from the prescientific dealing with beings?

β) Conversion of the Prescientific Comportment to the Scientific Comportment by the Basic Act of Objectification. Objectification as the Explicit Accomplishment of Understanding of Being

In the daily employment and use of things we can be specifically and explicitly directed toward them, for example, in deliberating about measures which can best be applied to the actual situation. When we, so to speak, stop in the midst of action and consider the actual situation, then *this* consideration is not yet a theoretical-scientific comportment, is not a *mere* looking-at and observing. Rather the pause in action is still wholly ensconced in the attitude of dealing with beings, is only a matter of looking about and circumspectively knowing what to do with things. Even when we distance ourselves from every practical or, put more aptly, technical comportment toward beings and dwell contemplatively on them by merely observing them and looking at them, even then our comportment is not yet a scientific one. If technical manipulation of things does not occur, if something is *missing*, this does not mean *positively* that a novel comportment or even a scientific one is taking place. The absence of *praxis*, i.e., of technical dealing with things, is not at all characteristic of science. Rather science as such demands and includes technical arrangements and manipulations. This is born out by every construction of an experimental arrangement in the natural sciences, by editorial work and philological investigations, by archeological excavations, and by the history of art. Just as little is a mere contemplative comportment already a theoretical one. What constitutes the specific, positive, and fundamental determinations of scientific comportment if the absence of praxis and mere contemplative dwelling on beings is not enough for characterizing science's way of being? We ask: What characterizes the conversion of the prescientific to the scientific comportment?

Both scientific and prescientific comportments are a knowing in the sense of uncovering what is previously concealed, of revealing what was previously covered up, of disclosing what so far was closed off. But *scientific* knowing is characterized by the fact that the existing Dasein sets before itself, as a freely chosen task, the uncovering of the beings which are already somehow accessible, *for the sake of their being uncovered*. Freely

grasping the possibility of such uncovering, as the task of existence and as grasping and uncovering of beings, is in itself a free attachment to the beings as such which are to be uncovered. In this assumption of the task as the sole authority which from now on regulates the investigative comportment, beings as such are freely taken possession of as to what and how they are. Thus all those purposes of comportment are omitted which aim at employment of what is uncovered and known; all those limits are omitted which hold the investigation within the planned technical intention. The struggle is solely aimed at beings themselves, in order to tear the beings from concealment and thereby to assist beings unto their own, i.e., of letting them be what they are.

We ask what the essential structural element is which constitutes such a comportment, i.e., the uncovering of beings solely for the sake of their being uncovered. What is the basic act which accomplishes the conversion of prescientific to the scientific comportment?

We call *objectification* that comportment whereby scientific comportment as such is constituted. What does objectification mean and what is the basic condition for its being accomplished?

Objectification means turning something into an object. Only that which already *is* in advance can become an object. But in order to be what and how they are, beings do not need necessarily to become an object. "Beings becoming objects" does not mean that through this objectification beings become beings for the first time. Rather, as the beings which they already are, beings are to respond to the knowing which is making the inquiry. By responding to the question as to what, how, and whence beings are, they stand *vis-à-vis* the inquiry which reveals them.

With objectification we face the task of demonstrating, i.e., determining, beings which encounter us from out of themselves, of their own accord as they stand over against us. Every determination, however, is a differentiation, a marking off, and, simultaneously, a rendering visible of how determinations belong together. Through such uncovering beings become circumscribed, encompassed, and grasped. But the concepts which stem from such uncovering of beings need each time to demonstrate and confirm their content in terms of beings which they mean and out of which they originate. Many and entirely different areas of beings can become an object for scientific investigation. Depending on the factual nature of each being, the accesses to it, its thorough investigation, and correspondingly its conceptualization and mode of proof differ. We cannot pursue here these various possibilities of objectification. We will stay with the basic act of objectification and ask: What is the basic condition for the realization of this act and what is its primary accomplishment?

We saw that comportment to beings is possible only on the basis of a

preliminary elucidation and guidance and by means of an understanding of being which of itself is not a grasping of being and by itself, as such a comportment, also does not have to be known. Every access to and every dealing with beings reveals them against the background of an at first preontological understanding of being. Now, in the sciences beings are to become expressly an object of uncovering and of a determination which uncovers. To bring to light beings as beings now becomes the real and sole task. The realization of this task thus depends primarily on the realization of the basic condition which pertains to all uncovering of beings, i.e., depends on the enactment [*Vollzug*] called understanding of being. Here in the sciences, where beings as beings become objects, there is obviously a need for an *explicit* development of this understanding. In other words, the core of objectification, its way of being, lies in the explicit enactment of *that* understanding of being by which the basic constitution of those beings which are to become objects becomes intelligible. For example, the task of historical objectification of beings as history thus requires in itself an explicit understanding of what belongs to history as such. All biological inquiry and investigation operates necessarily on the basis of an understanding of life, the organism, and the like. The more explicitly and originally this understanding is developed, the more appropriately do those beings become revealable which sciences in each case objectify.

The genesis of a science originates in the objectification of a *realm* of beings, that is, in the development of an understanding of the constitution of the *being* of the respective beings. In the development of this understanding of being, those concepts emerge which circumscribe what is, for instance, historical reality as such, or what basically distinguishes a being as a living being, i.e., the *basic concepts* of the respective sciences. With the development of the basic concepts the respective basis and ground of a particular science and its realm becomes circumscribed. What is determined thus through objectification as a realm can now, as object, become a *theme*. The objective context can be investigated in various aspects and be established as the object of investigation. The respective thematization is built upon objectification as such.

The development of the objectification of the field, i.e., developing the understanding of being and obtaining the basic concepts, takes place primarily and for the most part naively and without a genuine knowledge of what happens here. But the fact that the *real* process of science's genesis lies in objectification and that this process is nothing other than the development of the understanding of the ontological constitution of beings which must become a theme—this takes place unmistakably in the genesis of the modern mathematical sciences of nature. We mention this briefly because the mathematical sciences of nature are precisely what became and remained for Kant the model of science as such.

γ) The Process of Objectification in the Genesis of the Modern Mathematical Sciences of Nature

Nature is always already revealed to existing Dasein in certain ways and encounters Dasein primarily as the force and product of nature. We shall now inquire into the kind of origination of natural sciences which, as physics, objectify the entirety of physical and material nature. By inquiring philosophically into the genesis of physics as a science, we are not looking for factual motives, occasions, and stages in the course of the historical development of this science. Rather, we are inquiring into what belongs necessarily to the genesis of natural sciences in its way of being. What is the crucial event whereby physics became the science which currently persists in spite of immanent revolutions?

One often likes to find the distinguishing characteristic of modern natural science in the fact that this science is an *inductive* one, that this science proceeds from facts rather than from seemingly only speculative medieval knowledge of nature, which sought to surmise the concealed qualities of things by following uncontrolled courses. However, already the ancient sciences of nature, no less than the medieval sciences, observed facts. Moreover, a more abundant or even incalculable accumulation of facts does not in itself turn a less comprehensive knowledge of facts into a science.

However—one may say—what is central is *how* modern science considers the facts. This science works *experimentally*. But ancient and even medieval knowledge of nature also makes use of experiment. Besides, this means of experiment is already extensively used in the handicraft and in every primitive technology—and indeed so far-reaching that it is from out of such practical technique that modern natural science in part originated. Thus experiment as such can determine the scientific character of natural sciences just as little as the observation of facts can.

But, finally, one might want to point out that the modern science of nature is distinguished from the older natural sciences by the fact that it carries out the experimental observation of facts by employing *calculation and measurement*. However, to this we must respond by saying that the ancients, too, already knew the employment of number and measure in the knowledge of nature.

The moments that we mentioned—observation of facts, experiment, and calculation—even when we take them together, do not touch what is crucial in the genesis of modern natural science. What is crucial in this genesis lies rather in the fact that Galileo gave a direction to natural sciences by asking (when not literally, at least intentionally) how nature as such must be viewed and determined in advance, such that the facts of *nature* can become accessible to the observation of facts in general. How must nature be determined and be thought in advance, so that the entirety of this being as such can become accessible to calculative knowl-

edge in a fundamental way? The answer is that nature must be circumscribed as what it is in advance, in such a way as to be determinable and accessible to inquiry as a closed system of the locomotion of material bodies in time. What limits nature as such—motion, body, place, time—must be thought in such a way as to make a mathematical determinability possible. Nature must be *projected* in advance unto its mathematical constitution.

Galileo's and Kepler's basic achievement consisted in the explicit enactment of the mathematical projection of nature. But what is this other than opening up *that* constitution which constitutes the being called nature, in the sense of a physical and material being as such, i.e., what is this other than opening up the constitution of the being of nature? However, the projection or opening up of nature is disclosing in advance that in terms of which nature as nature should be understood. The mathematical opening and projection of nature renders explicit and determines as a closed realm that which until then was implicitly and always already meant in every observing, experimenting, calculating, and measuring knowledge of nature. With this projection the ontological constitution of the being we call nature obtains an initial explicit conceptual determination.

It is only when the ontological constitution is explicitly understood and elucidated that the being whose constitution of being this constitution is gets seen in its proper light. For it is only on the basis of the elucidation of the ontological constitution that the being so determined can be set over against a knowing inquiry *as* the being that it is and become an encompassable and determinable object or domain of objects and thus become thematic. It is only in light of the mathematical opening and projection of nature, i.e., by delimiting [nature] through such basic concepts as body, motion, velocity, place, and time, that certain *facts* of nature become accessible as facts of *nature*. It is only on the basis of disclosing the mathematical constitution of nature that the knowing determination of nature obtains meaning and justification according to measure, number, and weight.

The initial objectification of nature occurs in the mathematical projection of this being, and this objectification of nature constitutes the knowledge of nature as scientific knowledge. What was crucial and consequential about the achievements of Galileo and Kepler was not observation of facts and experimentation, but the insight that there is no such thing as pure facts and that facts can only be grasped and experimented with when the realm of nature as such is circumscribed. To formulate this the other way around: In each investigation of a presumably pure fact, preconceived opinions about the determination of the field within which the facts are to be found are always already lodged. And facts by themselves cannot elucidate the constitution of being as such.

From what we have said so far, it becomes clear that—and to what extent—the *essence of science*, as disclosing beings for the sake of their disclosedness, involves *objectification*. Through objectification, i.e., through opening up the ontological constitution, science first obtains a basis and a ground and circumscribes its field of investigation at the same time. Science founds itself in the manner by which it obtains its basis and its field. Thus in a certain sense we have already responded to the next question: What does the founding of a science really mean?

b) The Relation between the Founding of Science and Philosophy

A science of beings is founded in objectification, that is, by the basic act of opening up the ontological constitution of the being which is to be circumscribed as the object-realm of the particular science. Is this self-founding of the science which occurs in its beginning already a *founding* of science? Yes and no. Yes, insofar as science obtains its basis and realm by opening up the ontological constitution in general. No, insofar as precisely such an opening within the particular science pushes against a necessary limit, i.e., insofar as this self-founding of science requires a more original founding. The founding of the projection of the ontological constitution of the field of a science—a projection that science itself makes—cannot be accomplished by the sciences themselves; and it is in accord with the way in which *this founding* comes forth that science itself cannot do it. In order to clarify this, we ask: To what extent does the self-founding of science—the opening of the ontological constitution of its field as this opening is enacted by science—come up against a necessary limit? Of what kind is that founding which is demanded by science itself?

α) The Limit of Science's Self-Founding

By opening up the ontological constitution of a field—for instance, the field of nature—there is a reflection on what a being is and how it is. Understanding of being becomes explicit in certain respects, and this understanding understands how to conceptualize what it understands. To open up the ontological constitution of the region “nature” means to circumscribe the basic concepts belonging to this field, such as motion, body, place, and time. But the respective circumscription of the basic concepts of a science reaches only as far as the specific tasks of the science demand, e.g., as required by the task of investigating bodies in motion in space and time. This means that, whereas the physicist defines what he understands by motion and circumscribes what place and time mean—whereby he relies in part on ordinary concepts—still, however, he does not make motion's way of being a theme of his investigation. Rather he examines only certain movements. The physicist does not

inquire into the ownmost inner possibility of time, but rather uses time as that with respect to which he measures motion.

While the inquiries and investigations of the physicist in respect to his object—physical beings—have their own determination and certainty, he becomes insecure in his deliberations about space, time, and motion, because his methods fail him here. The result is that he turns away from further reflection on “generalities” to which basic concepts refer. The same thing is shown in other sciences in different ways. What pertains to the ontological constitution of the being called “life” is largely undetermined, and yet the biologist cannot do without this so-called general concept. Similarly, what pertains to non-historiographical historicity [*Geschichtlichkeit*] in general is unclear to historical sciences and to history. Most of this—and in its relation to the basic concepts of language itself—operates within an undefined generality. Here a certain justifiable timidity of the researchers precludes an inquiry into these so-called generalities. They are confronted with an awareness, which has not been clarified, that with respect to the basic concepts of their science the methods of this science fail. The basic concepts of philology cannot be clarified with the help of philological methods; and the basic concepts of history cannot be determined by researching the sources, let alone be grasped by such research.

On the other hand the insight is gradually emerging that the real development and history of a science cannot be accomplished with the discovery of new facts, but rather in recasting the basic concepts of that science, i.e., in the transformation of the understanding of the ontological constitution of a particular field.

All of this makes clear that the self-founding that the sciences do—which is necessary and justified within science—this self-founding falls into ambiguity and uncertainty. Suddenly there is no secure method for inquiring into what is meant by the basic concept *as such*; suddenly there is no ground for demonstrating these basic concepts *themselves*, i.e., for genuinely grounding these concepts. Put positively, what is meant by the basic concepts points to broader and narrower possibilities for a new determinability. Put differently, science’s self-founding, which occurs in opening up and projecting the ontological constitution, needs in turn a founding which this science with its methods obviously can no longer achieve. *This necessary founding of science’s self-founding is actually the laying of the foundation of science.*

β) Founding of Science as Regional Ontology.
Founding of Ontological Inquiry in Philosophy as
Fundamental Ontology

In what follows we shall try to elucidate the meaning of the founding of science’s self-founding that is required by science.

We saw that sciences of beings do not reflect on the basic concepts.

The more reflection tries to capture what is meant by the basic concepts as such, the deliberations on the so-called “generalities,” up against which the sciences come, become more unsteady and obscure. What is meant by these concepts is the ontological constitution of beings and not beings themselves in their existing context. The scientific methods have been developed precisely in order to explore beings. But they are not suited for examining the being of these beings. If this is to happen, then what we need is not to objectify a *being*, e.g., the existing nature as a whole, but the *ontological* constitution of nature or the being of that which exists as historical.

It becomes clear that what lies on the *limit* of science’s deliberations is the *thematic* reflection of the *being as such* which is meant in the projection and opening up of the ontological constitution. The founding of science’s self-founding—or the laying of its foundation—consists in transforming the preontological understanding of being into an explicit ontological understanding. The latter understanding inquires *thematically* into the concept of being and into the constitution of being as such. Laying the foundation of a science is not something externally annexed to the science. Rather, laying the foundation of the sciences of beings means developing the preontological understanding of being (which is already necessarily implied in the sciences) in an investigation into and science of being, i.e., in ontology.

Since every science always has its field and its region of beings as object, the corresponding ontological reflection always refers to the *regional constitution of being* which determines one region. Latent in every science of a realm of beings there always lies a regional ontology which belongs to this science, but which can never in principle be developed by this science.

However, the question concerning the ontological constitution of beings is not solely limited or primarily referred to a being which is just the object of a factual science. Rather, all beings, no matter how accessible in themselves, can and must be explicated with respect to their ontological constitution—e.g., the world as it is immediately accessible to practical Dasein.

All ontological inquiry objectifies being as such. All ontic investigation objectifies beings. But the ontic objectification is possible only on the basis and through the ontological, that is *preontological*, projection and opening of the ontological constitution. At the same time the ontological inquiry and the objectification of being also need an original founding. This will be carried out by the investigation which we call *fundamental ontology*. Taken in this universal and radical sense, ontology is nothing other than philosophy’s way of being. Of course, so far we have only determined this way of being in an unrefined consideration of the scope; and we do not yet know anything of the enigmas that are concealed at the center of the

philosophical problematic of fundamental ontology. It suffices to see now what we mean by *laying the foundation of the science of beings* which gets accomplished as *ontology* and as such is enacted in *philosophy*.

Now we are able to grasp more clearly what these “generalities” are all about, up against which every science comes and from which it retreats as something undetermined, or about which it babbles irresponsibly—as indeed also happens. What is presumably a vague and undetermined “generality” has its own determination, necessity, and particular comprehensibility. So far in our deliberations we continually spoke of what is to be understood in advance with respect to beings, i.e., what is already opened up and projected in advance and thus must somehow be unconcealed for a being to encounter us as a being. What in advance *determines* a being as a being, the constitution of being which first *makes possible* a being as the being that it is, is what in a certain sense is “earlier” than a being and is *a priori*.

To be sure, what is in advance of a being and understood earlier than a being is actually grasped later and latest. Certainly we can examine a being in the preliminary stages of science (like the knowledge of nature before the emergence of modern natural science) *without* developing an explicit understanding of being with regard to specific beings. On the other hand, it is a fact that it is the sciences that have developed from out of philosophy and that in antiquity individual sciences were called individual philosophies. Here a rather obscure knowledge gets manifest, according to which all reflection on beings and all science already understand being and depend on this stage of the development of this understanding of being for their possibility.

All science is potentially and in principle philosophy. But philosophy itself is contained in the ground of human Dasein as factual possibility. For, when we offered a preliminary characterization of Dasein, we saw that Dasein exists, that it is in a world, and that it exists in such a way as to comport itself toward beings in the world *and* toward itself as a being. But it has now become clear that this comportment toward beings is grounded in a prior understanding of the being of beings, which is *de facto* and for the most part a preontological understanding of being. This understanding of being makes possible for the first time the existing comportment of Dasein toward its world in each case and toward itself. Accordingly the understanding of being is the most original condition for the possibility of human *existence*. In a certain sense this understanding of being becomes explicit in the *sciences*; this understanding of being is conceptualized in relation to certain realms of being which the sciences have thematized. It is in *ontology*, i.e., *philosophy*, that being becomes explicitly and specifically a thematic object. Accordingly, philosophy becomes the freely undertaken task of elucidating and unfolding the understanding of being which belongs to the essence of human existence.

But precisely *because* understanding of being as such—either as pre-ontological or ontological—is the most original and necessary condition for the possibility of human existence, the undertaking of the task of elucidation of this understanding, i.e., philosophy, is the freest possibility of human existence. Only where the most original necessity is binding, only there is the highest freedom first possible.

The sciences of beings have inherently a factual necessity; and we can take up these sciences, study them—even work on the intentions which guide their research—without being bothered by the philosophy which necessarily lies in these sciences, although hidden, or without being bothered by philosophy as such. In some sense, one can exist in the sciences without philosophy. Things work without philosophy, and one can sneak away from philosophy. One *can* do that precisely because philosophy is a matter of the highest *freedom*. One can sneak away from philosophy, and then everything is left as it is. But one can also freely take up philosophy as the most radical necessity of human existence. Of course, this occurs only when individual existence understands itself—which always means, when the individual existence decides to understand itself.

By way of a summary we can say that *science's self-founding needs a founding in turn*, because a preontological understanding of being belongs to this founding—a preontological understanding which the sciences of beings are in principle incapable of illuminating. The *founding of self-founding* of the sciences of beings takes place in *regional ontologies*. Thus ontology is what first accomplishes the laying of the foundation of an ontic science. *Laying the foundation of a science of beings means founding and developing the ontology which underlies this science*. In turn, these ontologies are grounded in *fundamental ontology*, which constitutes the *center of philosophy*. Every science of beings necessarily contains in itself a latent, more or less developed ontology which supports that science and founds it.

After elucidating what laying the foundation of a science means, we are sufficiently prepared to move on to our next question. Why is for Kant the founding of metaphysics as science of supersensible beings a critique of pure reason?

§3. Laying the Foundation of Metaphysics as Science as the Critique of Pure Reason

a) Kant's Interpretation of Ontological Knowledge

α) Knowledge *a priori*

As *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant's laying of the foundation of metaphysics as science deals with reason. Since the possibility of science as such—the possibility of theoretical knowledge—is the problem, a more precise

formulation is needed: The problem of the *Critique* is *theoretical* reason. And, in fact, this *Critique* deals with our, *human* theoretical reason—not with an undefinable consciousness in general.

What does the term *reason* mean? That cannot be said simply and in a few words, because, whereas Kant uses this expression in a specific way in individual cases, still on the whole he uses the word in different ways. Moreover, theoretical reason is often identified with understanding, whereby the expression “understanding,” as Kant says, also represents a “general expression.”¹ In another passage Kant says: “By reason here I understand the whole higher faculty of knowledge and am therefore contrasting the rational with the empirical.”² We can say generally that “reason” or “understanding” characterizes the ability to think, i.e., to represent something by concepts. Reason as well as understanding is a *faculty of concepts*.

According to Kant, concept is “a general representation (*repraesentatio per notas communes*)”³ and, insofar as the concept contains something general, it contains in principle the rule for thinking when determining the individual cases which are subsumed under the concept. Therefore, reason or understanding can also be characterized as the *faculty of rules*.

But every rule has its ground or principle according to which the rule rules. Therefore, reason becomes the *faculty of the principles of rules*. Over against sensibility, reason is the higher faculty of knowledge, so that Kant says, in the introductions [to the A and B editions], almost identically: “For reason is the faculty which supplies the principles of a *priori* knowledge.”⁴

Now, let us see what “a *priori* knowledge” means. Later we will deal in detail with what the *Critique* means by this expression and considers a problem. In the meantime the following explanation shall suffice. A *priori* knowledge means knowledge gained from concepts; it is a knowledge which the “thinking I” achieves by itself and in advance, through rational thinking, without the assistance of experience. Everything that is obtained by and made accessible to thinking as such, in terms of knowledge, is called a *priori*. We cannot yet deal with the reasons for this designation.

We have already seen that the theoretical-dogmatic metaphysics, which Kant opposes, is a *priori*, as basically knowledge of the supersensible from “mere concepts.” Certainly, it is precisely Kant who gives the expression a *priori* a larger content and a more fundamental meaning than this expression had earlier. To belong to reason means “knowing a

priori.”⁵ Because reason is the faculty of concept or knowledge *a priori* and simultaneously the faculty of rules, i.e., of the principles of rules, reason can be defined as “the faculty of the principles of knowledge *a priori*.” In another passage Kant explicitly and directly calls reason “the faculty of principles.”⁶

Now what does “pure” reason mean? “Any knowledge is called pure if it be not mixed with anything extraneous. But knowledge is more particularly to be called absolutely pure if no experience or sensation whatsoever be mingled with it, and if it be therefore possible completely *a priori*.”⁷ A *priori* knowledge now also means a knowledge out of concepts, a knowledge *completely* free from experience. Thus Kant uses the term *a priori* both in a wide as well as in a narrow and strict sense. As an example of a *priori* knowledge, i.e., knowledge from mere concepts, theoretical-dogmatic metaphysics is mentioned. On the one hand this metaphysics does not exclude—and even considers as normal—that its concepts of the world and of the soul are to some extent determined by a knowledge from experience, i.e., these concepts are not *speculated* by a pure thinking that is free from experience. On the other hand, dogmatic metaphysics does proceed in such a way as to try to advance in knowledge purely rationally, by mere logical *analysis* of these concepts. This *a priori* knowledge is one which is not entirely pure, because, in obtaining the concepts, experience grants not only the inducement but also the content. By contrast a *completely a priori* knowledge is one which derives the *content* of its concepts from thinking and reason alone, without any contribution from experience. Thus Kant states: “Pure reason is, therefore, that which contains the principles whereby we know anything absolutely *a priori*.”⁸ Or, in the preface to the *Critique*, he designates reason as “our ability to judge according to principles *a priori*.” This last definition makes something else clear: Pure reason is a *human* faculty, and this faculty of knowledge is the ability to *judge*. For what follows, it is important to keep in mind that knowledge from concepts is a knowledge which judges—or briefly, it is judging.

β) The Condition for the Possibility of a Science of Beings in General

Laying the foundation of metaphysics as science, as the critique of pure reason, thematizes pure reason, i.e., the faculty of principles, of the grounds and rules of pure knowledge *a priori*. Occasionally Kant also calls the critique of pure reason a “critique of pure understand-

1. CPR, B 169, A 131.

2. Ibid., B 863, A 835.

3. Kant, *Logik, ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen*, G. B. Jäsche (ed.), §1 (Cassirer, VIII, 399).

4. CPR, B 24, A 11.

5. Ibid., B ix.

6. Ibid., B 356, A 299.

7. Ibid., A 11.

8. Ibid., B 24, A 11.

ing.”⁹ Let us still completely disregard what the term *critique* means here. We hold fast to the notion that the issue is laying the foundation of metaphysics as a science of beings. Accordingly, if this laying of the foundation of science is to be sufficiently radical, we must first elucidate that in which a science of beings is grounded, no matter what kind of a being this science is concerned with. Our preliminary question is thus: What are the grounds or principles of the possibility of a science of beings, of an ontic science?

We pointed out earlier that Kant considered mathematical natural science to be the ideal for a science of beings. This is no accident and does not represent the private preference of Kant; for, beginning in antiquity and up to and beyond Kant, a being is understood primarily as a being that belongs to “nature,” that is, a being is understood as extant; and the science of beings, as primarily a science of nature. Therefore, the mathematical natural sciences play a decisively exemplary role in the problem which Kant poses, namely, the question concerning the ground of the possibility of a science of beings in general. I say deliberately “an exemplary role,” because what Kant wants to examine is the *fundamental* problem of the possibility of a science of beings and *not* a so-called epistemology of the mathematical natural sciences. The question he poses is a fundamental one, which is not directed to a specific science of beings. Kant did not want to *adjust* metaphysics, as the science of a *particular* kind of being, to mathematical natural science, as another *particular* kind of the science of beings—and thus to decide the possibility of metaphysics with respect to the possibility of mathematical natural science. But because Kant considers as unshaken and self-evident the traditional science of beings as the science of what is extant, because in a way beings are taken to be identical with the beings that belong to extant nature, therefore natural science is inevitably given a priority in the fundamental discussion of the possibility of a science of beings in general. However, because Kant, following the tradition, identifies *beings* with what is *extant*—as we shall see in our interpretation of the *Critique*—his posing of the problem suffers from a significant contraction.

The fundamental question as to wherein a science of beings in general is grounded first leads back to the question: What constitutes scientific knowledge as such? We must explain what constitutes science by honing in on how *knowledge is, how it comes to the fore*; we must explain how what belongs to sciences is possible from certain exhibitable principles. But Kant does not solve the problem by presupposing the fact of mathematical natural science as an existing science and then asking subsequently how this science is possible. In view of the course taken by the *Critique*

for conducting his inquiry, Kant writes in the *Prolegomena*: “The task is difficult and requires a resolute reader to penetrate by degrees into a system based on no data except reason itself, and which therefore seeks to unfold knowledge from its original germs, without resting on any fact.”¹⁰ Kant does not presuppose the validity of *science* but rather attempts to work out, from pure reason itself as the original faculty of *knowledge*, the possibility and the necessary conditions for the possibility of a science of beings in general.

By contrast, mathematical natural science becomes significant for Kant insofar as this science points to the discovery of the fundamental and central problem of the *Critique*, i.e., laying the foundation of science. It was Kant who first saw clearly what Plato to a certain extent already discovered, namely that the science of being, especially of nature, must first determine beings in their ontological constitution in order to be able to make beings thematic. Kant articulates this as follows:

When Galileo caused balls, the weight of which he had himself previously determined, to roll down an inclined plane; when Torricelli had the air carry a weight which he had calculated beforehand to be equal to that of a definite volume of water; or in more recent times, when Stahl changed metals into oxides and oxides back into metal by withdrawing something and then restoring it, a light broke upon all students of nature. They learned that reason has insight only into that which it produces after a plan of its own, and that it must not allow itself to be kept, as it were, in nature’s leading-strings, but must itself lead the way with principles of judgment based upon fixed laws and must constrain nature to give answer to questions of reason’s own determining. Accidental observations, made in obedience to no previously thought-out plan, can never be made to yield a necessary law, which reason alone is concerned to discover. Reason must approach nature holding in one hand its principles, according to which alone concordant appearances can be admitted as equivalent to laws, while holding in the other hand the experiment which it has devised in conformity with these principles. It approaches nature in order to be taught by it, not as a pupil who listens to everything that the teacher chooses to say, but as an appointed judge who compels the witnesses to answer questions which he has himself formulated. Even physics, therefore, owes the beneficent revolution in its point of view entirely to the happy thought that, while reason must seek in nature (not attribute to it) whatever reason has to learn from nature, it does so in accord with that which it has itself put into nature and of which it (nature) of itself would know nothing. It is thus that the study of nature has entered on the secure path of a science, after having for so many centuries been nothing but a process of merely random groping.¹¹

9. Ibid., B 345, A 289.

10. Kant, *Prolegomena*, §4 (Cassirer, IV, 23) [ET, pp. 21–22].

11. CPR, B xii–xiv.

Certainly this Kantian presentation of the connection—which we have already discussed—between the preontological understanding of being and the objectification and thematization of beings is not only given in another linguistic formulation; but underlying the Kantian presentation there lies a certain conception of the problem which we shall subject to a positive critique. However, leaving this aside, Kant saw again quite clearly the Platonic problem, namely that underlying all beings are the principles of their being. This insight of Kant led him to the discovery of the central problem which has to be posed in the task of laying the foundation of a science of beings in general.

The example of mathematical natural science shows that *reason* resides in the science of beings, i.e., that in this science something *a priori* must be known.¹² In other words:¹³ In the sciences of beings something is fixed about the objects before they are given to us. This fixing which is *a priori* and free from experience—occurs prior to all experience—makes possible that these objects be given to us as what they are. These *a priori* fixings are *prior* to all experience and are valid for all experience, i.e., they make experience possible.

These *a priori* fixings state something about the objects, they let something be known about these objects, they *extend* our knowledge of the object. Thus, underlying all natural sciences from the beginning are propositions and cognitions, like, e.g., the principle of the permanence of substance: “In all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished.”¹⁴ Moreover, the principle of causality: “All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect.”¹⁵ These propositions state something *a priori* about nature. More exactly put, these propositions state what belongs to nature as nature. These propositions contain a knowledge of what nature is, while at the same time this knowledge is not grounded in experience. That every alteration is the effect of a preceding cause is accepted by us *not* because we have frequently observed it to be the case. On the basis of observation we could only say that so far it looks as if every alteration goes back to a cause. Whether this is valid of all alterations in nature everywhere and at all time cannot be determined. Rather, the principles of causality express a knowledge which, according to its meaning, means something that belongs necessarily and generally to what we call nature. In this and other principles we have a knowledge of nature and of beings which is not and cannot be grounded in experience. Rather it is a knowledge of what *a priori* and

in advance belongs to nature as such. We put it this way: *The principle of causality is a preontological, respectively an ontological, knowledge of nature.* This proposition presents a knowledge of what belongs to the being called nature as a being, what belongs to this being with respect to its ontological constitution.

γ) Analytic and Synthetic Judgments

Our inquiry is directed at the Kantian interpretation of such ontological cognitions as expressed in the principle of causality. We say that cognition is the same as *judging*. When I think the concepts “cause” and “effect,” I make it clear what I mean by this, i.e., *explain* the content of these concepts. This explanation of the content of the concept through thinking which analyzes while it *judges* Kant calls *analysis*. This explanation of the concept is an analytic judgment, e.g., “the cause is the capability to produce an effect,” or “the body is extended.” In such propositions I draw what I think out from the concept of subject, out from what is eventually meant by subject.

Wherein lies the ground of the truth of such analytic judgments? It lies in the guidance I receive from the content of the concept of the word *subject*, which keeps me from saying what is not in this concept, i.e., I do not let the predicate contradict the subject but basically state the same thing [as the predicate], only explicitly. All *analytic judgments* are *a priori*; that is, in order to make these judgments rightfully, in order for me to be sure of the ground of their *truth*, I need in the end only to consider the mere content of the concept as such; I need only to watch that in the predicate I do not contradict the concept of subject. This rule of analytic judgments is the principle of contradiction in formal logic. As such, this principle of contradiction states nothing about the content of what in each case is thought or even about the relation of the content of the concept to a being meant by the concept. Rather, this principle regulates only the form of the proposition or judgment as such—namely, that the predicate does not contradict the subject. Analytic judgments are judgments made purely logically from concepts; they are *a priori*.

On the other hand, when I judge that “the body is heavy,” then the predicate “heavy” does not lie within the concept “body.” For bodies are also geometrical objects which do not have weight. In order to determine body as heavy, in order to state this determination properly, I must return to that which provides me the basis for the rightfulness of the proposition “the body is heavy.” I do not find this *basis* in the concept “body” for the inevitability of determining the body as heavy. What is the authority for the justifiable rightfulness of the proposition “the body is heavy”? According to Kant, I must go completely beyond the concept “body” and gain access to certain physical bodies in *sensible experience*. Through experience I obtain a predicate which I cannot free from the subject as such, because

12. Ibid., B ix/x.

13. Ibid., B xii.

14. Ibid., B 224.

15. Ibid., B 232.

this predicate is not contained in the subject. I obtain a predicate that I first add to what is meant by the concept of subject, that I put together with the concept of subject, i.e., I enact a *synthesis*. Thus Kant calls synthetic judgments judgments which must go beyond the concept of subject for justifying the content of what they state. These judgments are called amplifying judgments, because they are distinguished from judgments which merely explain. The basis for adding the predicate which is not contained in the concept of the subject becomes accessible in synthetic judgments only by an experience, respectively by the intuition of the beings themselves. A knowledge gained from experience (which is not free from experiences or *a priori*) Kant calls “knowledge *a posteriori*.” The judgment “the writing board is black” is a synthetic judgment because the concept “writing board” does not include that the board is black. I can justify my statement that the board is black only by going back to the experience as such. Hence this statement is a synthetic judgment *a posteriori*.

One can say – and it has often been said – that the difference between analytic judgments *a priori* and synthetic judgments *a posteriori* is fluctuating and that one and the same judgment can be both. For instance, the judgment “the writing board is black” can in one sense be taken as a synthetic judgment *a posteriori*. But it is also possible to take this judgment as an analytic judgment *a priori*. When namely someone already has the representation “this black writing board” and somehow, in bringing the same representation to mind without perceiving the board, judges that “the writing board is black,” he needs only to analyze the concept of the subject in order to arrive at his judgment. He does not need further experience. Thus this judgment can be obtained through mere explanation.

But the Kantian differentiation of judgments into analytic and synthetic ones is not done with reference to the manner in which we in each case *factically* obtain such judgments and always appropriate them to us again. Rather, this differentiation is made in consideration of that upon which we must in each case fall back in order to make the statement as something *founded*. When I bring to mind the black writing board by mere representation and when I make this representation explicit, I do not therefore need a further experience, because this experience is already contained in representing what the subject represents. And although there lies something like an analysis in the manner by which I now reappropriate the judgment, nonetheless the statement in its *founding* and *demonstrative* enactment points to the being which is named by the statement and which is experientially accessible. The principle for differentiating analytic and synthetic judgments relates to the kind of ground which grounds these judgments with respect to the intimate connection of subject and predicate. This principle has to do with the manner of having access to the ground of judgments. Whether in spite

of this the Kantian difference between analytic and synthetic judgments is ultimately acceptable, cannot yet be discussed.

Let us return to those kinds of knowledge about which Kant states that they are present in the sciences of beings, i.e., in the natural sciences. One of these is the principle of causality. We recognize something about nature itself in this principle; our knowledge is thus enlarged through this principle and becomes synthetic knowledge. For we cannot purely analytically detect from either the concept “cause” or the concept “effect” that the being that is nature is so determined with respect to its being that in all of its alterations each alteration is preceded by a cause. On the other hand this synthetic principle is not first founded upon experience but *underlies* any *experience of beings*, as a principle which states something already in advance about nature. Hence this principle is a *synthetic*, though *a priori*, judgment, or it is an *a priori* judgment in such a way as to be synthetic.

The basic discovery of Kant consists in the realization that these peculiar kinds of knowledge – the preontological understanding of the being of beings and all ontological knowledge – are such as to signify an extension of the knowledge of beings while remaining nonetheless a knowledge which is free from experience and pure. Such kinds of knowledge are given in synthetic judgments *a priori*. But for Kant this discovery is not the result of his investigation, but its beginning. How are such judgments possible? The inquiry into the ground of the possibility of ontological knowledge constitutes the basic inquiry of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

δ) The Problem of the Possibility of Synthetic Judgments *a priori* or the Problem of an Ontological Understanding of Being

We can understand the reasoning for analytic judgments *a priori* as well as for synthetic judgments *a posteriori* by relying, on the one hand, on the principle of contradiction and, on the other hand, on experience or perception. But in what lies the ground for the legitimacy of a judgment which is synthetic and nevertheless *a priori*? How can I state something pertinent and necessary about nature as such without calling upon the authority of experience? *How are synthetic judgments possible a priori*? This is the core question within the problem of laying the foundation of a science of beings, i.e., the problem of the *First Critique*. For we saw that this kind of knowledge is the supporting ground for any empirical experience and any experiment.

For our purposes we can conceive our exposition as follows: How is the preontological, respectively explicitly ontological, understanding of the being of beings possible, an understanding which is the ground for all objectification of beings in the sciences? Or, to put this question still

more generally, *how is regional ontology of a realm of beings possible?* That means: How are those kinds of knowledge possible which make pertinent and necessary statements about a region and are nevertheless not derived from experience?

In the introduction to the second edition of the *Critique* Kant says:

Now the proper problem of pure reason is contained in the question: How are *a priori* synthetic judgments possible? That metaphysics has hitherto remained in so vacillating a state of uncertainty and contradiction, is entirely due to the fact that this problem, and perhaps even the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, has never previously been considered. Upon the solution of this problem, or upon a sufficient proof that the possibility which it desires to have explained does in fact not exist at all, depends the success or failure of metaphysics.¹⁶

We must elucidate Kant's problem a little more, in order to understand in what way he makes a fundamental problematic out of the problem that he has recognized in the question of synthetic judgments *a priori*. We shall attempt a clarification of this problem by considering the earliest stage of Kant's deliberations, almost a decade before the appearance of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

In Kant's famous letter of February 21, 1772, to his friend Markus Herz (the *Critique* appeared in 1781), the problem of this *Critique* is formulated for the first time. In this letter Kant speaks of the design of a work (meaning the subsequent *Critique*) "which could have the title of the limits of sensibility and reason" and tells his friend that so far in his investigations he has missed something important, the discovery of which could for the first time shed light on metaphysics in its way of being. What was the problem that Kant ran into?

"I asked myself the following question: What is the ground of the relationship between what is called in us representation and the object?"¹⁷ The ground of a possible *synthesis* in synthetic judgments *a priori* seems puzzling, because Kant's question does not refer to *any given representation*. Rather, he inquires into the ground of the possibility that *pure concepts of understanding*, although *a priori*, can nevertheless determine something pertinent and necessary about the *objects*. In regard to *empirical representations* which give expression to experiential determinations of ob-jects, there is no problem for Kant: The determination "black" as a representation for the writing board is brought about by the senses, by the influence of an ob-ject on the senses, by the ob-ject. Likewise, Kant says to himself, one can clarify the representation and thinking of God in his possibility. God can relate to everything, and he can relate in

knowledge to the essential determinations of things without sensibility, because in his thinking and by his thinking God first produces the ob-jects. Representations that are effected by ob-jects, representations that are produced and caused by ob-jects, as well as representations that effect and produce ob-jects are explainable with respect to their relatedness to objects. But what about the possibility of *pure thinking of objects* on the part of humans, since these *pure concepts* are plainly and essentially *not effected by the ob-jects*? On the other hand, however, human thinking as finite does not have the possibility, as merely pure thinking, of producing what it thinks. Here the kinds of explanation we mentioned fail, and it remains unclear where the ground of the possibility of the relation of pure concepts of understanding *a priori* to objects should lie.

Kant formulates this in the following way:

However, our understanding through its representations is neither the cause of objects (except in the morals of good purposes) nor is the object the cause of representations of understanding (*in sensu reali*). Pure concepts of understanding must not be abstracted from the sensations of the senses, neither must the receptivity of representations be expressed by the senses. Rather they must have their source in the nature of the soul, but still neither to the extent that they are not effected by the ob-jects nor that they produce the ob-ject. In the Dissertation I was satisfied to express only negatively the nature of intellectual representations, namely by stating that they are not modifications of the soul by the object. But I silently ignored the question of how a representation is possible which is indeed related to an object without being affected by the object in some way. I said (in the Dissertation) that the sensible representations represent things as they appear, while intellectual representations represent things as they are. But by what means are these things given to us if not in the way that they affect us? And if such intellectual representations rely on our inner activity, whence comes the correspondence which representations are supposed to have with the objects which are not produced by this correspondence? And whence do the axioms of pure reason about objects correspond to these objects without this correspondence receiving assistance from experience? This is possible in mathematics, because ob-jects before us are only magnitudes and can be represented as magnitudes insofar as we can produce their representation by taking one several times. Hence the concepts of magnitude can be made out to be independent and their principles to be *a priori*. However, when dealing with relations of qualities, how is my understanding, completely *a priori* and by itself, to make concepts of things, concepts to which things are necessarily supposed to correspond? How is understanding to design real principles of the possibility of concept with which experience must correspond accurately, but which are independent of experience? This question always leaves us with an obscurity with regard to our faculty of understanding, from where this agreement with things themselves comes.¹⁸

16. Ibid., B 19.

17. Cassirer, IX, 103.

18. Ibid., p. 103f.

Briefly the problem is the following: How can understanding open up real principles about the possibility of things, i.e., how can the subject have in advance an understanding of the ontological constitution of the being of a being? Kant sees this correlation, one which we formulate in a more basic and radical manner by saying: *Beings are in no way accessible without an antecedent understanding of being*. This is to say that beings which encounter us must already be understood in advance in their ontological constitution. This understanding of the being of beings, this synthetic knowledge *a priori*, is crucial for every experience of beings. This is the only possible meaning of Kant's thesis, which is frequently misunderstood and which is called his Copernican revolution: "Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects . . . {this, however, did not lead any further in the clarification of metaphysical knowledge}. We must therefore see whether we may not make more progress in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge."¹⁹

When Kant brings about the Copernican revolution in philosophy—when he has the objects hinging on knowledge rather than knowledge hinging on objects—this does not mean that real beings are turned upside down in interpretation and get resolved into mere subjective representation. When Kant says that objects must correspond to knowledge, then he understands by knowledge the synthetic judgments *a priori*, i.e., the preontological, respectively ontological, knowledge of the ontological constitution of beings. This issue is clearly formulated in the introduction to the "Transcendental Logic," where we are told that the principles of pure knowledge of understanding cannot be contradicted by any knowledge without the loss of all relation to an object—the *transcendental truth asserts itself here as measure*.²⁰ It is in accordance with the ontological kinds of knowledge and in accordance with what is known in advance by this knowledge that all determination of beings which are made in accord with experience must occur. The Copernican revolution states simply that *ontic knowledge of beings must be guided in advance by ontological knowledge*. Far from resolving the real beings into subjective representations, the Copernican revolution elucidates for the first time the possibility of access to objects themselves.

To be sure, there are significant obscurities in Kant which understandably give rise to misinterpretations of his Copernican revolution. However, Kant never meant that, in grasping some object that we come across, for example this chair, the thing called "chair" will correspond to what I determine about the chair in myself. That all perception corre-

sponds to beings is self-evident for Kant; and he never discusses this. However, what Kant discovers is precisely that underlying this correspondence of experience to objects, to beings, there is already an *a priori* knowledge upon which each empirical measurement depends, i.e., to which this measurement must correspond and conform.

b) The Difference between Transcendental Philosophy or Metaphysics and Laying the Foundation of Metaphysics as the *Critique of Pure Reason*

α) Ontology as System. The *Critique* as Laying the Foundation of the System of Transcendental Philosophy

Kant's fundamental problem is the following: How is synthetic knowledge possible which is at the same time *a priori*? That means: Where is the ground which precedes and makes it possible for pure concepts of understanding and principles *a priori* to make something out about things themselves, although the concepts of these things are not drawn from experience?

Accordingly, the investigation of this problem is not concerned with objects themselves. What is to be investigated with regard to its possibility and the ground of this possibility is the *a priori relation* of pure concepts of understanding and principles to objects. It is not the objects but the *a priori* possibility of the relation of pure understanding to them which is to be discerned. Hence Kant states: "I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*."²¹

The question concerning the condition for the possibility of synthetic knowledge *a priori*, i.e., the question concerning principles, is the *transcendental* question; and the philosophical investigation which works out the inner connection between pure concepts of understanding (the categories) and the principles, specifically as they relate *a priori* to objects, i.e., as they *a priori* determine and found the objects—this philosophical investigation as a whole is transcendental philosophy or *the system of transcendental philosophy*.

What Kant circumscribes as *the task and the problem of transcendental philosophy* is nothing other than the elaboration of ontological determinations of a realm, or all realms, of beings, i.e., *elaboration of regional ontologies*. Hence Kant states directly: "Ontology is that science {as the title of metaphysics} which makes out a system of all concepts of understanding and principles but only insofar as they relate to objects, to which

19. CPR, B xvi.

20. Ibid., B 87f.

21. Ibid., B 25.

a sense can be given and which thus can be confirmed by experience."²² By contrast Kant explicitly calls the traditional ontology "the transcendental philosophy of the ancients."²³ The term "transcendental philosophy" is only another designation for, and another formulation of the problem of, "ontology."

Now the *Critique of Pure Reason*, whose basic question is *the ground of the possibility* of synthetic judgments *a priori* as such, is not yet the transcendental philosophy in finished form and its system. Rather this *Critique* lays out "the entire plan {of transcendental philosophy} architectonically, i.e., from principles."²⁴ It is "for the sake" of synthetic judgments *a priori* "alone"—for the possibility of this synthesis—that "our whole Critique is undertaken."²⁵ Therefore, Kant states in the preface to the second edition, "It {the *Critique*} is a treatise on method, not a system of science itself {transcendental philosophy}";²⁶ the *Critique* deals accordingly with the manner in which ontological knowledge in general—transcendental philosophy—is possible, occurs, and is applicable to the whole field of transcendental philosophy.

We can sum up, initially and schematically, the response to the question "What does the *Critique of Pure Reason* mean?" by saying that the *Critique* lays the foundation of metaphysics as science. Herein lies the suggestion that the *Critique* lays the foundation of the science of beings in general. This means further that the *Critique* lays the foundation for the building site [*Grundstück*] of the science of beings in general, i.e., it lays the foundation for synthetic knowledge *a priori* as such. The *Critique* lays the foundation for the essence of this building site, i.e., it lays the foundation for the relation to objects. The *Critique* is a transcendental investigation as laying the foundation of transcendental philosophy or ontology; it is the *transcendental founding of ontology as such*.

β) Laying the Foundation for Metaphysics as *Critique of Pure Reason*; Its Place in the Whole of Metaphysics

Why is the treatise on method, on the interpretation and exposition of synthetic knowledge *a priori*, called "Critique"? Why must this founding of ontological knowledge, with an aim to a possible metaphysics, "keep an eye on the steps taken by metaphysics"?²⁷ Why is this founding of metaphysics an assessment of pure reason? Why is this pure reason put

on trial and to what extent will this reason be put into its place in and as a result of this trial?

Up until now metaphysics claimed to be a theoretical knowledge of the supersensible, i.e., God, freedom, and immortality. These are no ordinary objects of inquiry with which metaphysics is concerned. These objects concern the "interest of man"²⁸ as man.

All the interest of my reason, speculative as well as practical, combine in the three following questions: 1. *What can I know?* 2. *What ought I to do?* and 3. *What may I hope?*²⁹

The whole equipment of reason, in the discipline which may be entitled pure philosophy, is in fact determined with a view to the three above-mentioned problems (freedom of the will, immortality of the soul, and the existence of God). These themselves, however, in turn refer us yet further, namely, to the problem *what we ought to do*, if the will is free, if there is a God and a future world. As this concerns our attitude in conjunction with the highest goal, it is evident that the ultimate intention of nature in her wise provision for us has indeed, in the constitution of our reason, been directed to moral interests alone.³⁰

The mere speculative interest of reason with regard to those three problems is very little; and metaphysics could not claim any interest for itself, were its ultimate end not the moral, i.e., the ultimate, end of man as man.

The three questions which develop into metaphysics as knowledge of the supersensible, concern that "in which everyone necessarily has an interest";³¹ they stem "from the nature of universal human reason."³² In this sense metaphysics is a "*natural disposition*." Quite similarly Baumgarten, in the introduction to his *Metaphysica*, deals with a *metaphysica naturalis*.³³

But, since so far all propositions of metaphysics have led into contradictions, one cannot let the matter of metaphysics rest with the merely natural disposition, i.e., with the pure faculty of reason itself. Rather, we must inquire whether, for metaphysics as the science of the supersensible, that is possible which belongs to every science as science, namely the understanding of being which supports metaphysics, i.e., the synthetic knowledge *a priori* which belongs to it? Can conditions be met in the field of natural metaphysics which belong generally to the possibility

22. Vorländer (ed.), *Fortschritte der Metaphysik*, p. 84.

23. K.d.r.V., B 113.

24. Ibid., B 27, A 13.

25. Ibid., B 28, A 14.

26. Ibid., B xxii.

27. *Fortschritte der Metaphysik* (Cassirer, VIII, 298).

28. CPR, B xxxii.

29. Ibid., B 833, A 805 [emphasis by Heidegger].

30. Ibid., B 828f., A 800f.

31. Ibid., B 868, A 840, note.

32. Ibid., B 22.

33. A. G. Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, second edition, § 3.

of such knowledge *a priori*? Is that ontological knowledge of the supersensible possible which must be postulated for the accessibility of a supersensible being as such?

On the basis of a positive discussion of the transcendental problem of the possibility of synthetic knowledge *a priori* as such, it will be shown that the conditions for theoretical metaphysics cannot be met in principle, i.e., that metaphysics as the theoretical science of the supersensible is not possible. Knowledge of beings, and this means the zone of synthetic knowledge *a priori*, is limited; limits are set for pure reason. Metaphysics as an ontic science of the supersensible beings is not possible. Hence the *founding of metaphysics as science* is not only a *founding of transcendental philosophy or ontology* generally but also and at the same time a circumscription and *limiting of the possibility of knowledge a priori of pure reason*, i.e., it is “critique.”

Thus in a certain sense the task of laying the foundation ends negatively and shows that in the field of theoretical knowledge *a priori* no foundation can be achieved. Put in Copernican terms, this task shows that the ontological knowledge to which supersensible objects should correspond is not possible. This negative result fulfills, nevertheless, a positive function with respect to the development of a metaphysics which is not theoretical and dogmatic but practical and dogmatic.

This should be enough for a provisional clarification of what the title “Critique of Pure Reason” means. This characterization of the *Critique* as *laying the foundation of ontology as such*, as a *treatise on the method of metaphysics*, also makes clear the place of this *Critique* in the whole of metaphysics, in the whole of pure philosophy. Kant states his position on this matter in the third main part of the Transcendental Doctrine of Method, which is entitled “The Architectonic of Pure Reason,”³⁴ especially in passages B.869, A.841 and B.873, A.845.

In the first-mentioned passage Kant offers a division of the whole philosophy of pure reason into critique and metaphysics. Here it becomes clear that the *Critique* offers the “preliminary design” and presents the founding as a “preparation,” a propaedeutic, i.e., that the *Critique* is the *investigation of the possibility of knowledge a priori* and what can be known at all in this manner. Then *metaphysics* is the *exposition of the whole of the possible pure knowledge a priori in a systematic connection*. To be sure, Kant remarks that the title “metaphysics” can also be used to mean the same as the “philosophy of pure reason.” Then this title encompasses the critique as well as metaphysics as system. In this way we can understand the passage which reads as follows:

The philosophy of pure reason is either a *propaedeutic* (preparation) which

investigates the faculty of reason in respect to all its pure *a priori* knowledge, and is entitled *Critique*, or secondly, it is the system of pure reason (science), the whole of philosophical knowledge (true as well as apparent) arising out of pure reason in systematic connection, which is entitled *metaphysics*. The title “metaphysics” may also, however, be given to the whole of pure philosophy, inclusive of criticism, thus encompassing both the investigation of all that can ever be known *a priori* and the exposition of that which constitutes a system of the pure philosophical modes of knowledge of this type, as distinct from everything empirical, including all mathematical employment of reason.³⁵

The second passage³⁶ offers now a more precise division of metaphysics as system, without considering any further the *Critique* as laying the foundation. Here too *metaphysics* is that philosophy which is supposed to present all pure *knowledge a priori* in its *systematic unity*. It has a speculative, i.e., *theoretical*, part and a *practical* part.

The theme of the theoretical part is “everything insofar as it exists,” i.e., what is extant. This part of metaphysics is called *metaphysics of nature*, or metaphysics “in the narrow sense.” Here again we see that the science of a being “insofar as it exists” is metaphysics of nature, a being is understood as *what is extant* in the sense of *nature in general*.

The practical part of metaphysics considers a being insofar as it ought to be.

The *metaphysics of nature* or the science of beings as beings is now ranked in *two disciplines*—not classified as two coordinate disciplines—whose ranking is required by the matter itself.

To begin with, an investigation into the ontological constitution of beings in general is called for, entirely apart from a certain experiential realm of beings—the ontological constitution of beings insofar as they are beings as such or “nature” as such. This concept of nature is not identical with the physical or material nature, which is the subject matter of physics. Kant means chiefly nature in the formal sense. This term is to be considered in accord with the definition given in the preface to *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*: “When the word *nature* is taken only in a formal sense, because it means the first inner principle of everything which pertains to the existence of a thing.”³⁷ Nature in the formal sense means, e.g., “nature” of fire, “nature” of plants—the inner principle of a being as such which can change depending on the mode of being of beings. *Metaphysics of nature in the formal sense*, i.e., [metaphysical nature] of a being which is entirely in the mode of being extant, is *transcendental philosophy or ontology*. This is the point where it becomes clear that Kant places transcendental philosophy ahead of a metaphysics

34. CPR, B 860ff., A 832ff.

35. Ibid., B 869, A 841.

36. Ibid., B 873, A 845.

37. Kant, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe* (Cassirer, IV, 369).

of nature, in the sense that nature encompasses a *specific* realm of what is extant, like physical nature, which is then possibly the subject-matter of physics. Prior to the founding of physics, which relates to physical and material nature, there is the founding of knowledge or the constitution of nature as such, regardless of whether or not there is something like a physical or psychic nature. Kant expresses this unmistakably thus: The theme of transcendental philosophy or ontology is the system “of all concepts and principles which relate to objects in general but take no account of ob-jects that *may be given (ontologia)*.”³⁸ “Given” means here what is extant for the inner or outer sense. The expression “which relates to objects in general” for Kant does not mean “related to a formal something in general,” but rather “related to objects, i.e., beings we encounter in experience generally.” Kant does not know anything like the formal ontology of something in general in Husserl’s sense.

The *discipline* of the metaphysics of nature which is *founded* upon transcendental philosophy relates to “nature in a *material* sense,”³⁹ i.e., to the “quintessence of all things insofar as they can be *objects for our senses*.”⁴⁰ This metaphysics relates to the objects of outer sense (material nature) and to the objects of inner sense (the thinking nature, the soul). In the section entitled “The Architectonic of Pure Reason” Kant calls this discipline “physiology”—this word understood in its ancient meaning, as used by Aristotle in his *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, when he speaks of *φυσιολόγοι*, i.e., investigators who examined the *λόγος* of the *φύσις* or the ontological constitution of the being “nature.” Physiology is the ontology of nature in the material sense and is divided into rational physics and rational psychology. Both together belong to the *immanent* physiology, as can be seen in the following quotation:

The employment of reason in this rational study of nature . . . is either *immanent* or *transcendent*. The former is concerned with such knowledge of nature as can be applied in experience; the latter, with that connection of objects of experience which transcends all experience (for which, as Kant shows, there is no ontological knowledge). This *transcendent* physiology has as its objects either an *inner* or an *outer* connection. When dealing with an inner connection, it is the physiology of nature as a whole, that is, the *transcendental knowledge of the world* {cosmology}; when dealing with an outer connection, it is the physiology of the relation of nature as a whole to a being above nature, that is to say, it is the *transcendental knowledge of God* {theology}.⁴¹


In this division, the division of traditional metaphysics shines through:

38. CPR, B 873, A 845.

39. *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe* (Cassirer, IV, 369).

40. *Ibid.*

41. CPR, B 873f., A 845f.



Transcendental philosophy corresponds approximately to *metaphysica generalis*; and physiology, cosmology, and theology correspond approximately to *metaphysica specialis*.

As the practical part of metaphysics, metaphysics of morals is placed outside of this whole.

Apart from the survey of the whole of metaphysics in Kant’s sense, the nature and concept of transcendental philosophy is above all important for us. In terms of transcendental philosophy it is clear which basic task is assigned to the *founding*, to the treatise on the *method of transcendental philosophy*, i.e., to the *Critique of Pure Reason*. When given priority over against the entirety of metaphysics, the *Critique* is certainly not an epistemology of the natural sciences. On the contrary, the *Critique* lays the foundation for the basic discipline of metaphysics, lays the foundation for transcendental philosophy or ontology, lays the foundation for the science of the ontological constitution of beings in general, of nature in the formal sense. If the *Critique* lays the foundation for the ontology of nature, this still does not mean that the *Critique* lays the foundation of

nature in the physical sense. This point must be explicitly stressed, because the core understanding of the *Critique* depends on it and because Kant's basic aim at a universal ontology of what is extant in general has so far been thoroughly ignored.

Hence the interpretation of the *Critique* as an *epistemology of the mathematical natural sciences* fails fundamentally in two respects. First, this interpretation fails to see that the *Critique* is concerned with ontology and not with epistemology. Secondly, it fails to see that this ontology of nature is not an ontology of material nature but an ontology of what is extant in general.

Coming from the Marburg School, N. Hartmann and H. Heimsoeth have recently attempted to show that, in addition to epistemological inquiry, there are also metaphysical and ontological motives at work in Kant. This is certainly an advantageous limitation of the one-sided epistemological view. However, Kant's basic inquiry is not *also* metaphysical in the old sense of being "additionally" epistemological; this inquiry is neither one nor the other, because this inquiry presents something entirely new. Thus even when we stress the metaphysical motives of Kant, we do not reach—to use Kant's own words—what he wanted to say. But to bring this to light is the only relevant philosophical task, which presupposes a radical understanding of the philosophical problematic with whose help we can, so to speak, come to meet Kant. We let him, as it were, say more than what he said; but only when he is brought to speak in that way, has he something essential to tell us.

On the other hand, it is no accident that the *Critique* has been interpreted, by so thoroughly knowledgeable investigators as Cohen and Natorp, as epistemology of mathematical natural sciences. We already mentioned a significant reason for this interpretation: Being concerned with an ontology of the extant in general, a certain realm of the extant, namely the physical material nature, shows itself for Kant as an explicit basis. Kant himself must have explicitly seen this peculiarity soon after completing the *Critique*. For we find in *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* of 1786, as well as in an addendum to the second edition of the *Critique* (in the "General Note on the System of Principles"), almost identical remarks about it: "It is indeed quite noteworthy . . . that general metaphysics {the ontology of the extant in general} in all cases where it needs examples (intuitions) in order to provide meaning for its pure concepts of understanding, must take these examples from the general doctrine of the body and hence from the form and principles of outer intuition."⁴² Similarly we read in the "General Note on the System of Principles": "It is a very noteworthy fact that the possibility of a thing cannot be determined from

the category alone; and that in order to exhibit the objective reality of the pure concept of understanding, we must always have an intuition."⁴³ "But it is an even more noteworthy fact that, in order to understand the possibility of things in conformity with the categories, and so to demonstrate the *ob-jective reality* of the latter, we need, not merely intuitions, but intuitions that are in all cases *outer intuitions*."⁴⁴ It is a mark of the astonishing sincerity and prudence of Kantian philosophizing that here, as in other problem areas, Kant does not forcefully eradicate and smooth over the obscurities and what is unresolved—or patch them up in a clever system—but that he respectfully leaves the riddle standing. This riddle, which reaches into the innermost possibility [*Wesen*] of human existence, can be resolved. In the course of our future, more phenomenological observations, we shall deal with this riddle as the riddle of fallenness, the building site of care and temporality.

Our discussion so far must have clarified, at least provisionally, what it means to *lay the foundation of metaphysics as ontology* and why for Kant *this founding* is a *critique of pure reason*.

We move on now to a phenomenological interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself. To this end it is necessary that, guided by the above-given general characterization of the *Critique*, we briefly clarify the following: (1) the general horizon of the inquiry, (2) the field of investigation, and (3) the structural plan of the work as it is determined in advance, its "disposition."

§4. The Horizon of Inquiry, the Field of Investigation, and the Structural Plan of the Critique of Pure Reason

According to the given characterization, the *Critique of Pure Reason* lays the foundation of ontology as the fundamental discipline of metaphysics and is the treatise on the method of transcendental philosophy; or, as Kant says in a letter to Markus Herz, immediately after the *Critique* appeared, "it contains the metaphysics of metaphysics"¹—the ontological founding of the employment of reason as the knowledge of the supersensible. By posing the basic question—how are synthetic judgments possible *a priori*—the thrust of the analysis is directed at knowledge *a priori* and the conditions which make this knowledge possible. Said more exactly, the field of investigation are the concepts and principles of this knowledge, the general representations of pure thinking, and their possible relation to objects. In other words, the theme is the knowledge of reason, more specifically the

42. *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe* (Cassirer, IV, 380).

43. CPR, B 288.

44. *Ibid.*, B 291.

1. Cassirer, IX, 198.

comportment to the object with regard to this “relation to . . .,” i.e., with regard to the possibility or ground which makes this “relation to . . .” possible. As Kant writes in the preface to the second edition of the *Critique*, reason in this investigation “has to deal not only with itself, but also with ob-jects,”² although surely not with ob-jects as such.

The reason of pure knowledge *a priori*, which constitutes the problem and the theme, is our reason, *human* reason. The knowing comportment of human Dasein stands in the field of this investigation—but not primarily and actually the knowing comportment toward beings, but rather the understanding of the *ontological constitution* of beings which underlies that comportment. The *general horizon of the problematic of the Critique* is, according to our interpretation, *human Dasein with respect to its understanding of being*. We said of this understanding that it is the fundamental condition for the possibility of human existence in general.

Although Kant does not conceive the problem in such a basic manner, he still clearly sees the horizon of inquiry in which the founding of metaphysics moves. We saw that metaphysics is determined by the three questions that we already mentioned.³ And in the lectures on logic which Jaesche edited, still in Kant’s lifetime, Kant says in the introduction: “The field of philosophy in this cosmopolitan sense can be reduced to the following questions: (1) What can I know? (2) What ought I to do? (3) What may I hope? (4) What is man?”⁴

Here a fourth question emerges: What is man? This question is not an accidental appendage, for Kant himself says at this point: “Basically one can consider all this {the three first questions which are mentioned in the *Critique*} as belonging to anthropology, because the first three questions refer to the last one.”⁵ This makes clear that, as Kant noticed, the main questions of metaphysics refer back to the basic question “What is man?” However, even if Kant says that this question is the problem of anthropology, he still does not touch the original dimension of the problematic as it is launched in the *Critique*; and Kant himself never came to a clear understanding of its peculiarity. At any rate, anthropology in Kant’s sense—and anthropology in general—cannot be the kind of investigation in which the founding of metaphysics, i.e., the critique of pure reason, gets accomplished. In its methodological beginning and its problem, the *Critique* is totally different from anthropology; for anthropology is an empirical-ontic science and as such cannot afford to found ontology and philosophy in general.

The same holds for psychology, which is likewise a science of beings.

Near the end of the *Critique* Kant clearly speaks about the essence of psychology and its possible relationship to genuine philosophy. There he writes: “. . . it [psychology] belongs where the proper (empirical) doctrine of nature belongs, namely, on the side of *applied* philosophy, the *a priori* principles of which are contained in pure philosophy; it is therefore somehow connected with applied philosophy, though not to be confounded with it.”⁶ “Applied philosophy” is just any non-philosophical science, insofar as within every non-philosophical science there lies, covertly, an ontology. Every science in its foundation is philosophy.

The psychological as well as anthropological methods basically do not come into question for the manner of investigation of the *Critique*. In fact, psychology and anthropology are sciences which deal with man. But according to their scientific character they are unable to lay the foundation of metaphysics, i.e., they are ultimately unable to respond to the question of what the human being is as such. We can determine this rather easily, if only negatively. But in what does the positive character of the investigation consist which Kant carries out in the *Critique*, more or less unequivocally and firmly? We can put it briefly this way: In its basic posture the *method* of the *Critique* is what we, since Husserl, understand, carry out, and learn to ground more radically as *phenomenological method*. That is why a phenomenological interpretation of the *Critique* is the only interpretation that fits Kant’s own intentions, even if these intentions are not clearly spelled out by him. For us at first, “phenomenological method” is a mere expression. However, it is not productive to speak about the method of the *Critique* prior to a concrete knowledge of its content and its course of investigation. Only two things are significant:

(1) Laying the foundation of science as synthetic knowledge *a priori* as the center piece of any science in general has *knowledge* as its theme, i.e. a *comportment of existing Dasein*. Therefore, Dasein is what is primarily at stake.

(2) Nonetheless this investigation of human reason is neither anthropology nor psychology. Initially *the manner of investigation* remains unclear. At any rate, this manner of investigation must be such as to make possible a founding of philosophy in general. Thus this manner of investigation *cannot be the method of just any special science*, as each science in turn presupposes ontology, i.e., philosophy.

At one point, at the conclusion of its positive part, namely the doctrine of elements, Kant characterizes the *Critique* “as a study of our inner nature” and says that this study “is indeed a matter of duty for the philosopher.”⁷ It is important “to see what reason produces entirely out

2. CPR, B ix.

3. Ibid., B 833, A 805.

4. Kant, *Vorlesungen über Logik* (Cassirer, VIII, 343).

5. Ibid., p. 344.

6. CPR, B 876, A 848.

7. Ibid., B 731, A 703.

of itself,"⁸ which cannot conceal itself but will be brought to light by reason itself, as soon as we discover its common principle.⁹ This kind of knowledge is certainly "the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge."¹⁰ This clarifies the method of the *Critique*: If pure reason is to become an object to itself, i.e., to attain self-knowledge, then the manner of investigation itself is pure a priori knowledge. The problem of ontology can only be tackled ontologically. Because of this peculiarity, such an inquiry and such a manner of investigation are not made for the mob. Kant says that the philosopher "still remains the sole authority with regard to a science which benefits the public without their knowing it, namely, the critique of reason. That critique can never become popular, and indeed there is no need that it should."¹¹

The above-given rough characterization of the realm of the problem of the *Critique*—human Dasein and cognitive comportment—and the initially unsettled characterization of its method—not anthropological and not psychological—could be complemented by observing the history of various interpretations of the *Critique* and positions taken on this work from the time of Kant to the present. Instead of such an historical orientation I shall briefly mention three significant and almost inevitable misconceptions to which the *Critique* has been exposed, from the beginning and again and again, although not accidentally. Basically we have already discussed the three misconceptions in the preceding discussion. Now we need only a brief summary.

All the significant misconceptions in the interpretation of the *Critique* can be brought together in the following three misunderstandings: (1) the metaphysical misunderstanding, (2) the epistemological misunderstanding, and (3) the psychological misunderstanding. With regard to (1): The metaphysical misunderstanding, which begins right away with Fichte, consists in absolutizing what is the theme of the *Critique*—reason, specifically finite human reason—to an absolute I. The second misunderstanding, the epistemological one, which emerged in the 1860s, takes the *Critique* for a theory of knowledge of mathematical natural science—a mistake the essentials of which have already been discussed. This second misunderstanding gave rise to the third one: Because the opinion existed that the *Critique* investigated knowledge as such and because knowledge was taken to be a psychic process and because investigation of the psychic was the task of psychology and because scientific psychology was only experimental psychology, the opinion was formed that it was possible and necessary to provide the *Critique* with a scientific foundation by grounding

8. Ibid., A xx.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., A xi.

11. Ibid., B xxxiv.

it in terms of experimental psychology. A really philosophical understanding of Kant's original intentions must fundamentally avoid slipping into the lines of inquiry which are marked by these misunderstandings.

Access to the *Critique* becomes still more hopeless if one believes that, in order to eliminate one or the other misunderstanding, one includes the other two and states that the entirety of Kant is understood only when Kant's *Critique* is understood metaphysically, epistemologically, and psychologically. No—in this case the peculiarity of the Kantian inquiry is altogether lost from sight. This inquiry lies in a dimension which remains hidden from the lines of inquiry just mentioned. The problem which Kant poses will be brought to light only by coming philosophically to terms with him. And this way of coming to terms with him is the only way that we can and should approach Kant, according to his own challenge. It is a matter of indifference to Kant that he is part of the history of philosophy, and it is still more a matter of indifference what kinds of stories about him are being told. In the preface to his *Prolegomena* Kant states unequivocally how this treatise and even more the *Critique*—and that is to say philosophical investigation in general—must be understood:

There are scholarly men to whom the history of philosophy (both ancient and modern) is philosophy itself; the present *Prolegomena* are not written for them. They must wait until those who endeavor to draw from the fountain of reason itself have completed their work; it will then be their turn to inform the world of what has been done.¹²

It is important to draw from the fountain of reason and not to allow oneself to be entertained by the anecdotal history of philosophical opinions.

However, all three misunderstandings have their justifiable motives in the *Critique* itself. Regarding the first misunderstanding: Kant did not always establish clearly enough what is self-evident, namely, that the *Critique* deals with human reason. Thus it is that an undefined and unowned consciousness in general has been made the basis for interpreting Kant. Regarding the second misunderstanding: To take Kant as an epistemologist is almost self-evident, because the basic question concerns how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible. Isn't the inquiry made into knowledge and its possibility? And isn't this an investigation of knowledge? Certainly Kant's inquiry looks like this when seen from the outside. However, Kant's fundamental inquiry is concerned with what determines nature as such—extant beings as such—and with how this ontological determinability is possible. Regarding the third misunderstanding: When Kant deals with thinking and knowledge, when he says, literally,

12. *Prolegomena* (Cassirer, IV, 3) [ET, p. 3].

that “pure *a priori* knowledge resides in the nature of the soul,” what is this other than a psychological statement, albeit an imprecise one?

As long as we are able only to understand what we find already stated, we will hopelessly fail to grasp the core of the radicalization of the philosophical problematic by Kant. It is important that in coming to terms with Kant we strive to bring things themselves to light—or at least to put into a new ambiguity the problems that Kant has elucidated.

At the conclusion of the preface to the first edition¹³ of his work, Kant placed a summary table of contents, which needs a brief clarification. Setting aside the introduction, which precedes this table of contents, the whole is divided into two main parts, the transcendental *doctrine of elements* and the transcendental *doctrine of method*. This second part is disproportionately shorter in length than the first main part. As stated by its title, the doctrine of elements deals with elements which belong to pure knowledge *a priori*, because this knowledge is to be examined in view of its possibility and the ground of this possibility. The doctrine of elements is called *transcendental*, not because this doctrine deals perchance with elements of knowledge as such, but rather because it deals with the elements of the building site of all knowledge of beings, i.e., with elements of pure knowledge to the extent that this knowledge *relates a priori to objects*. At issue are the elements of knowledge insofar as these elements give rise to an inquiry into the ontological constitution of nature as a central problem—an inquiry into the ground of the possibility of ontological determination of what is ontic. The first main part of the *Critique*, the transcendental doctrine of elements, is divided into two parts: the *transcendental aesthetic* and the *transcendental logic*. Aesthetic is the science of αἰσθησις, of intuition; logic is the science of λόγος, of the concept. We shall soon see why an investigation of the elements of knowledge is divided into aesthetic and logic. As we said already, the problem of the *Critique* is not knowledge *in general*, but the building site of any knowledge of beings, *synthetic knowledge a priori* in its transcendental, i.e., ontological aim. Hence the designations “transcendental aesthetic” and “transcendental logic,” which mean the same as “ontological aesthetic” and “ontological logic.” Transcendental aesthetic is in turn divided into two sections. The first section deals with space; the second, with time. At first glance it is not clear why the treatment of precisely these two phenomena makes up the transcendental aesthetic. The second part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, transcendental logic, is divided into two divisions: transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic. In the course of our detailed interpretation we shall also find justification for this division of transcendental logic and its further division.

FIRST PART

The Transcendental Aesthetic

The first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, the transcendental aesthetic, is again disproportionately shorter in length than the transcendental logic. This part takes up forty pages (B33–B73) in the second edition, compared with 658 pages of the transcendental logic, and thirty-two pages (A17–A49) in the first edition, compared with 655 pages of the transcendental logic. But this outward appearance of being short should not delude us with respect to the fundamental significance of the content of the transcendental aesthetic—even less so when we consider that the transcendental aesthetic opens the investigation of the *Critique*. This is no accident, because we must emphasize right at the beginning and for all future observations—and indeed this must also be shown from what follows—that and to what extent the *transcendental aesthetic has an independent and central significance in the entirety of the “Critique,”* in the entirety of the problem of ontological, that means metaphysical, knowledge.

In opposition to these facts, the most penetrating and significant scientific interpretation of Kant in the nineteenth century, that of the Marburg School of Cohen and Natorp, tried to show that within the whole of the *Critique* the transcendental aesthetic is something alien and represents only the still unshaken remainder of Kant’s pre-critical period. Therefore, the Marburg interpretation of Kant attempted to dissolve the transcendental aesthetic into the transcendental logic. As Natorp puts it: “After all of this, giving priority to time and space {the transcendental aesthetic} over the laws of thinking of the object {categories} in the *Kantian* system of transcendental philosophy is a well-meant mistake—understandable and excusable, if need be, only in the sense of an anticipation. In a more rigorously built system, time and space would have doubtlessly had to find their place in modality, in the category of actuality {logic}.”¹ Transcendental logic as the center of the *Critique*? Yes, but not as logic! The fact that logic is at the center precisely because in this logic Kant discusses not only the interpretation of *thinking* but also the use of the whole of knowledge as *thinking intuition*, this indicates that neither “aesthetic” nor “logic” are appropriate titles for what Kant is basically dealing with. Even the label “transcendental” is not sufficient.

Although such an interpretation of the *Critique* runs as counter to Kant’s intentions as is at all possible, this attempt at reading the “aes-

1. Paul Natorp, *Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften* (Leipzig: Verlag Teubner, 1910), p. 276f.

thetic" into the "logic" was still guided by a genuine philosophical motive. The guiding moment of this interpretation was to obtain a *context* for the problem of transcendental philosophy. Cohen and Natorp noticed as clearly as no one else before that the *Critique* lacks an ultimate encompassing unity, in the sense namely that this unity and *the ground of this unity of the transcendental aesthetic and logic was not explicitly brought to light by Kant*, and also *could not* be brought to light. Thus what disturbed these thinkers was genuinely motivated, but they looked for the solution in the wrong direction.

Of course, it would be equally wrong, let us say, to attempt to dissolve the transcendental logic into the aesthetic. Rather the *task is to preserve both the transcendental aesthetic and logic, each in its independence, and nevertheless to unify them*. This will not happen by way of externally connecting them, but by showing how both the transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental logic reside on a common and original ground, which was still hidden from Kant. This *foundation* of the "aesthetic" and the "logic" was itself hidden from Kant. Nonetheless, wherever he advances his inquiry the furthest, he presses forward to the realm of this fundamental dimension. *The main task of our phenomenological interpretation consists in rendering this foundation visible and in determining it positively.*

With the phenomenological interpretation we oppose in principle the conception of Kant of the Marburg School. However, we must here refrain from an explicit critical debate with them. It is above all important to justify the phenomenological interpretation, positively and for itself. But we want to stress that precisely this radical onesidedness of the Marburg School has advanced Kant-interpretation more than all attempts at mediation which in the beginning do not bother with the central problematic. Here again we see that a radically mistaken course, when pursued with scientific rigor, is far more fruitful for research than a dozen so-called half-truths, in which each and everything (and that is to say nothing) comes into its own.

As we shall see, in spite of the shortness of its length, the transcendental aesthetic has a foundational function in the whole of the *Critique* that is equal to that of the transcendental logic. What the transcendental aesthetic deals with is not simply turned off in transcendental logic—which *does* actually happen to transcendental logic in the transcendental aesthetic. Rather, the transcendental logic takes up what the transcendental aesthetic deals with as necessary foundation and a central clue. From a purely external perspective this shows itself in the fact that the time which is interpreted in the transcendental aesthetic in a preliminary fashion functions in all the crucial sections of the transcendental logic—and indeed as something fundamental.

Seen externally, the transcendental aesthetic is divided into five sections: the introduction (B33 to B36, A19 to A22), section one "Space"

(B37 to B45, A22 to A30), section two "Time" (B46 to B59, A30 to A41). And then there follows the "General Observations on the Transcendental Aesthetic" (B59 to B72, A41 to A49). Subsequently and only in the second edition, there follows [a fifth section] "Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic." In the second edition Kant added an introduction in paragraphs which cover the entirety of the aesthetic and one segment of the logic (up to B169); the doctrine of elements from the beginning of the transcendental aesthetic up to this point is divided into twenty-seven paragraphs. In B169 Kant says: "I consider the division by numbered paragraphs to be necessary up to this point, because thus far we have dealt with the elementary concepts. We now have to give an account of their employment, and the exposition may therefore proceed in continuous fashion, without much numbering." According to this division into paragraphs, the transcendental aesthetic comprises paragraphs 1 through 18.

Chapter One

The Function of Intuition in Synthetic Knowledge

In his introduction to the transcendental aesthetic Kant defines its problem in a manner which does not in and of itself completely clarify its connection to the basic problem of the *Critique*. Only in the “Conclusion” that was added to the second edition is this connection explicitly determined. There Kant speaks of “the general problem of transcendental philosophy.”¹ This problem is one which we have already provisionally posed: How are synthetic judgments possible *a priori*? Kant calls the transcendental aesthetic “one of the factors required for the solution”² of this problem. To what extent does the transcendental aesthetic contribute to the solution of this problem?

§5. Intuition as the Primary and Essential Character of Knowledge in General

Synthetic knowledge *a priori* is that knowledge which is already in each case necessarily presupposed by all knowledge of beings as the ground which enables the experience of beings as well as empirical knowledge. Every knowledge of beings or ontic knowledge already contains a certain knowledge of the ontological constitution, a pre-ontological understanding of being. The problem for Kant is the possibility of *this knowledge of ontological constitution*.

In distinguishing ontic and ontological knowledge, in both cases we are dealing with *knowledge*. What belongs as such to knowledge as knowledge, ontic as well as ontological? This is the *question which precedes* further discussion of synthetic knowledge *a priori*. For this reason Kant begins the thematic examination of the doctrine of elements as such (that is to say the introduction to the transcendental aesthetic) with a general discussion of that which belongs to knowledge in general. And he carries out this discussion in terms of knowledge as it is initially and mostly familiar to us, namely in terms of ontic knowledge or experience, because pre-ontological knowledge is at first hidden from us.

a) The Intuitive Character of Knowledge in General

The first paragraph of the introduction to the transcendental aesthetic

circumscribes and determines that which necessarily belongs to human knowledge in general. In fact here the general designation of the essential core of knowledge as such is thereupon tailored to the specific problem of the aesthetic. The same general discussion of the basic structuring of knowledge as such is repeated in the introduction to the transcendental logic,³ only here the stress is put on the specific task of this logic.

What is knowledge in general and what is its originary character? The response to this question is given in the first sentence of the transcendental aesthetic and thus in the first sentence of the actual *Critique*—a response whose full import up to now has never served appropriately and thus radically enough as guideline for any interpretation of the *Critique*. That sentence reads: “In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to objects, *intuition* is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which all thought as a means is directed.”⁴ Here it is stated that knowledge as such means the relation to objects; that indeed knowledge consists in a manifold of ways of relatedness to objects, which belong together and are allied to one another; and *that* relation to objects to which all are directed is *intuition*. Kant says it even more clearly: “*All thinking*” is only a “*means*”; and all thinking stands in *service* to intuition, is based on the intuition of objects, and serves only the interpretation and determination of what is rendered accessible in intuition. This sentence must be drummed in, as it were, for all further philosophical discussions with Kant.

If *knowledge as such* is primarily intuition and if all other possible ways of relating to objects stand in service to intuition, then synthetic knowledge *a priori*, too, is primarily intuition. And then ontological, i.e., philosophical, knowledge is also originally and ultimately intuition—but intuition in a sense which is precisely the central problem of the *Critique*.

At the present time and independently of Kant, Husserl, the founder of phenomenological research, rediscovered this fundamental thrust of knowledge in general and of philosophical knowledge in particular. It is precisely this basic conception by phenomenology of the *intuitive character of knowledge* that contemporary philosophy resists. But any appeal to Kant against phenomenology basically collapses already in the first sentence of the *Critique*. That knowledge is thinking is never disputed, since antiquity. But that all thinking is based on intuition and stands in service to intuition—and in what way—this is a crucial problem which slips away again and again in the interpretation of philosophical knowledge. One basic inclination of phenomenology consists in holding on to this idea.

1. CPR, B 73.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., B 74, A 50.

4. Ibid., B 33, A 19.

The central problem of the *Critique*—how synthetic knowledge is possible *a priori*—can be formulated more definitively by asking: What is intuition, which underlies ontological knowledge and to which philosophical thinking is directed? The spirit of Kant's response to this question—a response which is highly disastrous for all Kantians—reads: *Time* is that which constitutes ontological *knowledge as intuition*. What this means and to what extent time is supposed to be an intuition, or, if we go back more than Kant did, to what extent time is even the condition for the possibility for any intuition and knowledge—this is a difficult and provocative problem. At any rate Kant's response takes this direction, even as he does not grasp the phenomenon of time in its original roots, but is rather entirely oriented to the traditional concept of time.

Without clarifying it sufficiently and without verifying it, we note: *Intuition is the original building site of all knowledge, to which all thinking is directed as a means.*

**b) The Significance of Intuition. Infinite and Finite
Intuition. Finite Intuition and Sensibility,
Affection, and Receptivity**

What does "intuition" mean? Terms such as "intuition," "perception," "sensation," "representation," or "knowledge" are ambiguous. On the one hand they indicate a comportment (comporting oneself to what is intuited, perceived) *intendere*, and on the other hand they indicate what is intuited itself, etc.—*intentum*. Kant does not make this distinction explicitly. Therein lies an essential inadequacy, which allows the central problem to be easily passed over. Therefore, we ask more precisely: *What does intuition mean?* This "takes place only insofar as the object is given to us."⁵ In intuiting something and through this intuition an object is given to us. In the same paragraph Kant also says that to intuit means "to receive . . . representations." Intuition means the manner by which something is represented to me concretely [*leibhaftig*] as something. To interpret it briefly, to intuit means to allow something to give itself as the concrete thing that it is; to intuit means to let a being be encountered in its immediacy.

In traditional terminology intuition means *intuitus*. There is an old doctrine according to which spirit which knows absolutely—in the medieval and modern philosophy: God—can only know in the manner of intuition. God does not need the means—that is, of thinking—and this intuiting is such that by means of it a being or its possibilities, the ideas, *emerge* and have their origin (*origo*). Divine infinite knowing is *intuitus*

originarius. The infinite intuition as intuition is the origin of the being of what is intuited; this being originates from intuiting itself. By contrast human knowing is finite intuiting, i.e., an intuiting which as such does not create or produce what is intuited, but just the opposite: As an intuition of what is already on hand, this intuition lets be given to itself only what is already on hand. This human intuiting is not an *intuitus originarius*, not an original intuition, but an *intuitus derivativus*. This intuition presupposes the being to be encountered via intuition as already being. Thus the finitude of human knowing does not lie in humans' knowing quantitatively less than God. Rather it consists in the fact that what is intuited must be given to the intuition from somewhere else—what is intuited is not produced by intuition. The finitude of human knowing consists in being thrown into and onto beings. "Intellectual intuition in man is an absurdity. Yes, I venture to say that no created being can know *intellectual* things except the being whose knowing causes things to be."⁶ Kant mentions this difference between *intuitus originarius* and *intuitus derivativus* in the last paragraph of the transcendental aesthetic, which was added only in the second edition.⁷

Accordingly our intuiting as letting beings be encountered in their way of being involves a being-referred-to beings which are already on hand. Intuiting does not freely originate from a knowing being in such a way that with this origin what is intuited also would be on hand. Rather this intuitable being must announce itself by itself, i.e., this being must concern the knowing being, must touch this being, must do something to it, as it were, and must make itself noticeable—this being must affect the knowing being. That the knowing being must be *affected* by the being which is to be encountered and that this being matters to the knowing being—this is what makes *human* intuition *finite*. To matter to the knowing being on the part of beings themselves can take place in manifold ways. Factually this occurs in us humans via sense organs. It is ultimately a matter of chance that there are precisely these sense organs with this certain kind of influence. Put differently and understood philosophically, it is not crucial for the essence of sensibility that the five senses function via these specific tools. Kant does not at all enter into an examination of sense organs, and rightly so, because the essence of sensibility does not lie in the sense organs, but rather in the fact that (1) sensibility *gives* intuition and (2) it is *finite* intuiting, such that it needs a *self-announcing* of a being which is itself already there ahead of time as a being to be *given*. Sensibility means finite intuition. But this does not at all mean that what is made accessible by sensibility, as possible modes

6. Heinze, *Vorlesungen Kants über Metaphysik*, p. 192.

7. CPR, B 71f.

5. Ibid.

of intuition, are only colors, sounds, smells, taste, and the quality of touch. Sense organs have a possible function only in the factual sensible knowing, because they are grounded upon the finite intuition as such. It is not the other way around, as if finite intuition (*intuitus derivativus*) originated from the collective functioning of sense organs. Intuition is not finite because it relies on the function of sense organs, but rather the opposite: Because intuition is finite, sense organs in their function are possible. It is not the factual physiological organization of man with sense organs which determines sensibility as sensibility—sensibility as the kind of intuition in space and time. Rather, sensibility is antecedently given along with finitude as such, and finitude can factually be organized now too by means of sense organs. For comparison I would like to draw upon the last paragraph of the “General Observations on Transcendental Aesthetic,” which was added only in the second edition of the *Critique*:

This mode of intuiting in space and time need not be limited to human sensibility. It may be that all finite, thinking beings necessarily agree with man in this respect. . . . But however universal this mode of sensibility may be, it does not therefore cease to be sensibility. It is derivative (*intuitus derivativus*), not original (*intuitus originarius*), and therefore not an intellectual intuition . . . which seems to belong solely to the primordial being, and can never be ascribed to a dependent being, dependent in its existence as well as in its intuition. . . .⁸

Already in his Dissertation of 1770 Kant clearly distinguished (in section 5) between *cognitio sensualis* and *repraesentatio sensitiva*, i.e., between an empirical-affective sensibility and a pure (*non sensualis*) one, whose significance must yet be determined.

The *finitude* of this intuition is factually determined by *affection*. Consequently the following sentences of Kant become intelligible:

This [i.e., that an object is given to me] again is only possible, to man at least, insofar as the mind [*Gemüt*] is affected in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects is entitled *sensibility*. Objects are *given* to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us *intuitions*. . . .⁹

It should be noted that Kant in the second edition [of the *Critique*] added “to man at least.” Moreover, here in this passage Kant speaks of mind [*Gemüt*], which corresponds to the Latin *mens sive animus* and stands for *res cogitans*.

As what allows encounter [with beings], sensibility as finite—that is,

affected and determined intuition—is in a certain manner receptive. The capacity of receptivity, intuition, *gives* the object. By contrast understanding *thinks* what is intuitively given; and this thinking, which as thinking is only a means for intuition, gives rise to concepts. Thus what is essential about knowing relatedness to objects becomes clear. Basically and primarily and in its ultimate objective, knowing is intuition and as such conceals thinking within itself as means for its determination. Therefore, in the corresponding general determination of knowledge as such in the introduction to the transcendental logic, Kant says: “Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge.” “Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”¹⁰ This is to say that what is intuitively given is understandable as such by understanding and its conceptual determination, whereas the concepts grasp something only if the concepts are made sensible, i.e., if what they mean proves to be sensible—and this always means intuitable. “Only through their union {understanding and senses} can knowledge arise.”¹¹ Without intuition an object is “merely thought” and not yet known, just as little as an object is already known when it is merely intuitable. At the same time we must note that, not only is intuition a basis for thinking, but also that thinking only has the function of determining intuition. Thus there belongs to knowledge as such *both* of the basic modes of relatedness to objects, modes which do not simply stand side by side: Intuition and thinking (concept) or sensibility and understanding, receptivity and spontaneity (which freely stem from the mind), affection and function. “Function” no longer means “encountering of” but functioning itself as understanding. By way of anticipation, let us refer to the Kantian definition of function: “All intuitions, as sensible, rest on affections, while concepts rest on functions. By function I mean the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation.”¹²

Corresponding to the two basic modes of knowledge already mentioned, the investigation of the elements of knowledge is twofold: The doctrine of elements as science of intuition is aesthetic; as science of understanding, logic.

8. Ibid., B 72.

9. Ibid., B 33.

10. Ibid., B 74f., A 50f.

11. Ibid., B 75f., A 51.

12. Ibid., B 93, A 68.

c) Sensibility and Understanding as the Two Roots of Human Knowledge; the Common Origin of Both Roots

At the conclusion of the first paragraph of the introduction to the transcendental aesthetic, Kant explicitly repeats the sentence with which the *Critique* begins. This is an indication of how basic it is to remember that "all thinking (must) . . . relate ultimately to intuitions"¹³ and must essentially stand in the service of intuition.

But are intuition and thinking completely separate? As we already interpreted them, they are modes of relatedness to objects. Kant says that intuition *and* thinking are a representing of something—representation to be taken here in an entirely broad sense as *repraesentatio*. Thus we must bear in mind that thinking too is representing, is a *repraesentatio*; thinking too presents something—in its own way, of course, as thinking, i.e., not immediately but mediately. And only because, in accordance with its own way of being, thinking also presents something can thinking stand in the service of primary presentation and be the means and servant of intuition. Kant states unequivocally that "*representation* in general (*repraesentatio*)" is "the genus" for intuition and concept.¹⁴ This agrees with the first sentence in the "General Doctrine of Elements" of his *Logic*: "All knowledge, that is, all representations with which consciousness relates to an object, are either *intuitions* or *concepts*."¹⁵ Or another formulation: "By contrast, as far as man is concerned, every knowledge [acquired by] man is made up of concept and intuition. Each of these two is indeed a representation but not yet knowledge."¹⁶

Thus we have roughly outlined the elements of knowledge. Therefore, in the introduction to transcendental logic Kant states: "Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind . . ."¹⁷ Kant introduces another designation for both "fundamental sources of the mind" in the introduction to the *Critique*. There he says that "there are two stems of human knowledge," namely sensibility and understanding; and he adds: "two stems" "which perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown, root."¹⁸ Even if Kant in his inquiry refrains from going behind these two stems in the direction of their common root, nevertheless their growing side by side disturbs him—and is not simply an ultimate given. To be sure, he is interested in the opposite direction. He wants to show what philosophy right before him and in his time failed to see, namely that

13. Ibid., B 33, A 19.

14. Ibid., B 376f., A 320f.

15. *Logik* (Cassirer, VIII, 399).

16. *Fortschritte der Metaphysik* (Cassirer, VIII, 312).

17. CPR, B 74, A 50.

18. Ibid., B 29, A 15.

both stems belong to knowledge co-originally, regardless of whence the stems may spring. In contrast [to Kant] Leibniz interprets sensibility as a confused thinking, that is, he does not see sensibility as an independent faculty. Rather Leibniz conceives sensibility from the point of view of the intellect, as a preform of intellect. Put in Kant's formulation, Leibniz intellectualizes sensibility. Locke committed the reverse mistake by taking understanding only as a subsequent form of sensibility, as it were, and hence he sensibitized understanding. Over against this double failure in the interpretation of the essence of knowledge, Kant seeks to demonstrate the *independence* of sensibility and of understanding and thus their *co-originality* from a common root. Kant emphasizes that these two modes of representation (intuition and concept) are "according to species, entirely different kinds of representation."¹⁹ The two are not only different by degree as if intuition would merely be a preliminary stage of concepts, i.e., not distinct but confused. So conceived, intuition is not given its due as an independent faculty. Leibniz recognizes only a logical and a *negative* difference between sense and understanding. By contrast, Kant sees an inherent and positive difference between the two. Still, Kant did not explicitly pose the problem of the origin of the common root, by laying free this root. Near the end of the *Critique*, in another passage, it becomes clear how Kant to some extent sees that his beginning of the problematic of the *Critique* is a limited one. There he says: "We shall content ourselves here with the completion of our task, namely, merely to outline the *architectonic* of all knowledge out of *pure reason*; and in doing so we shall begin from the point at which the common root of our faculty of knowledge divides and throws out two stems, one of which is *reason*."²⁰

Thus Kant deliberately refrains from radically inquiring into the *radix* of the two stems. But insofar as our interpretation now has to advance to the point of grasping the *unified unity* [*Einheitlichkeit*] of knowledge, that is, the unity of the two fundamental sources and stems, we shall be forced by the matter itself to inquire into the ownmost inner possibility of the "general root" which throws out "the two stems." For us this throwing out [*Auswurf*] of the stems will be the crucial problem inasmuch as we shall inquire into its ownmost inner possibility. We shall not simply impose upon Kant the problem of the common root, which he no longer poses. Rather, by interpreting the fundamental problematic of the *Critique*, we shall unequivocally demonstrate that Kant himself is forced into the direction of this common root—even that to some extent he deals with this root without recognizing it as such and thematically determining it. For it will be shown that precisely at the juncture where Kant

19. *Fortschritte der Metaphysik* (Cassirer, VIII, 259).

20. CPR, B 863, A 835.

arrives at the center of the positive problematic of the *Critique*—the transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding—he suddenly speaks of *three* fundamental sources of the mind instead of two, i.e., of another faculty, one that *mediates* between sensibility and understanding, *the power of imagination*.²¹ Moreover, we shall draw upon the following sentence for comparison: “There are three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul) which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely, *sense, imagination, and apperception*.”²² Kant frequently mentions this triune of necessary conditions for the possibility of synthetic judgments *a priori*.²³

But our interpretation will show that this *third fundamental faculty* does not grow like a third stem, as it were, next to the other two stems and also that this third faculty does not mediate between the other two as something which is placed between them. Instead our interpretation will show that this third fundamental faculty is, as it were, part of the root itself. Moreover, it will be shown that this root is nothing other than *time*, when radically conceived in its ownmost inner possibility. For us, of course, the inquiry back into the “common root” does not originate in an unfounded inclination toward radicalization, only in order simply to excel Kant in this respect. Rather by exposing the root, we shall make clear the crucial and inherent problem of *transcendence*. But at the same time it will be shown that everywhere we have actually added too much to Kant and that in fact the problem which he poses is not so explicit and original as we have presented it. Our interpretation first achieves a clarification of the whole, in order then to see sharply and in retrospect precisely what in Kant is unbalanced and questionable. This will make it possible that coming to terms [with Kant] addresses the crucial difficulties. Not only will we let Kant say what he intended to say; but we shall let him say more, even if this “more” rests only on philosophical interpretation. Then taking back later the “more” that we have added to Kant can readily be done on the basis of the philosophical understanding that we have achieved. However, it is difficult if not impossible to aim directly at what Kant wanted to say, unless we would simply repeat Kant’s sentences.

It is important initially to *isolate*—and comprehensively to clarify via interpretation—intuition and sensibility in the aesthetic and understanding in the logic, in order to investigate and to clarify the *unified togetherness* of both elements in the employment of knowledge.

d) Synthetic Knowledge *a priori* and the Necessity of Pure *a priori* Intuition

Initially Kant says only generally what constitutes knowledge *as such*, whether it is ontic or ontological knowledge. The problem, however, is *ontological* knowledge, *synthetic* knowledge *a priori*, which is totally free from experience, which nevertheless says something about the intrinsic dynamics of beings, and which expands knowledge. But adding an amplifying predicate to the concept of subject needs to be grounded. We saw that this grounding with regard to synthetic judgments *a posteriori* is given in what is accessible in empirical experience. For the *synthesis*, in which I go beyond the concept of subject, there is needed a dimension and a horizon, into which it goes (in going beyond the concept) and out of which it is able to draw and ground the predicate which does not lie in the concept of subject. That is, this synthesis needs a manner of grasping which provides me with what I do not and cannot have from thinking. But synthetic knowledge *a priori* as *a priori* cannot rely on empirical intuition, because *a priori* means being “free from experience.” On the other hand, synthetic judgment *a priori* as synthetic must be capable of referring to an intuition which grounds it. *Accordingly, an intuition is needed which makes the synthesis possible and which is nevertheless not empirical, but completely a priori*. Having clarified the concept of “pure reason,” we know that “pure” means completely *a priori*. Consequently, we need a *pure* intuition as the sole possible principle of grounding synthetic knowledge *a priori*. This is what Kant said once in his polemical treatise against the Leibnizian Eberhard:

Now I saw that extending my knowledge through experience rests on the empirical, sensible intuition. In this intuition I came across many things which corresponded to my concept, but also many more things which were not yet thought in this concept as connected to it. Now I easily understand, if only I be led to it, that, if knowledge is to be extended by means of my *a priori* concept, then, just as there is there a need for empirical intuition, so is there here a need for a pure *a priori* intuition. Now I am confused as to where I am supposed to find this *a priori* intuition and how to explain to myself the possibility of this intuition.²⁴

With this statement of Kant we have determined the main problem of the transcendental aesthetic: Where are we to come upon pure intuition and how are we to explain its possibility?

21. CPR, A 124.

22. CPR, A 94, note.

23. Cf. especially B 194, A 155; B 220, A 177.

24. *Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll* (Cassirer, VI, 59f.).

§6. *Demonstration of Pure Intuition a priori*

Thus far we have said in general that intuition belongs to *knowledge*, that this intuition is finite, and what this finitude means. But we have not yet made clear what belongs to *intuition* itself, i.e., to intuition which is always human intuition. In order to characterize intuition more closely—in a way which remains still on the level of general discussion—Kant begins with the essential moments of intuition, i.e., with sensibility, moments that are also initially pressed upon the natural consciousness.

a) Empirical Intuition and Empirical Sensation

Our intuition is a *finite* one, namely an intuition which is referred to what is already extant; and consequently this intuition is directed to the influence of the extant on us. For the encounter in and with its effect, the extant being that has this influence announces itself; and this what thus announces itself Kant calls *sensation*. Sensation means that as which the encountering object is primarily given. What is thus given, the datum in the sense of what is sensed in sensation, offers me the object which is encountered in intuition, for example this chalk in terms of color, hardness, softness, and its sound—indeed as a very definite intuition. Such an intuition to which my encountering of data of the senses belongs, Kant calls *empirical intuition*. The core of sensation in reference to what is sensed consists in the fact that it “presupposes the actual presence [Gegenwart] {presence, *Anwesenheit*} of the object.”¹

In the introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* Kant states that the term *sensation* has two senses: “*Sensation* (here the external sensation) expresses just as much the mere subjective aspect of our representation of things outside us as it does what actually constitutes the material (the real) of the same representation whereby something is given as existing.”² With this we should compare section 3 of the *Critique of Judgment* with respect to the differentiation made there between subjective and ob-jective sensation:

If determination of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is called sensation, this expression means something entirely different from when representation of something is called a sensation. For in the latter case representation refers to the ob-ject but in the former case representation refers exclusively to the subject and so leads us to no knowledge. In the above explanation the term *sensation* is understood to mean an ob-jective representation of the senses. And in order not to run the risk of being misunderstood, we wish to use the

1. CPR, B 74, A 50.

2. Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, p. xliii.

otherwise familiar title of “feeling” for what at all times must remain subjective and simply cannot constitute the representation of an object. The green color of the meadows belongs to the ob-jective sensation, as perception of an object of the senses; but the charm of the meadows belongs to *subjective* sensation, whereby no object is represented—their charm belongs to feeling.

The *Critique* deals with ob-jective sensations, with what is given as real, something inherently real, a *quale*. By contrast subjective sensation is not representation of something, but representation of this thing in its relation to the subject, the representation of *how* the subject is disposed—this representation is feeling. Through feeling we do not represent an object but rather the manner of how I feel when a sensation is given to me. In the *Critique* sensation indicates mostly the *intention*. And that intuition to which the encounter with the data of sensation belongs is empirical intuition.

b) Appearance as Object of Empirical Intuition
Distinguished from the Thing Itself

“The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is entitled *appearance* [*Erscheinung*].”³ The term *appearance*, which Kant uses quite frequently, is thus a title for objects, for what is encountered itself. Things themselves which we see and handle Kant calls “appearances.” These objects offer themselves to us in their immediacy; they are directly shown. “Appearances are the sole objects which can be given to us immediately, and that in them which relates immediately to the object is called intuition,”⁴ i.e., the approaching given as such, the real. “What is first given to us is appearance. When combined with consciousness, it is called perception.”⁵ *Perception* is the explicit *knowing* that we have regarding the encounter with objects of empirical intuition itself. What is encountered as what I encounter is *what is perceived*. The perceived object as the object we encounter in perception is called *appearance*.

To be sure, appearance not only presupposes “the relation to a consciousness that is at least possible,”⁶ not only presupposes the knowledge we have of appearances as such, the appearance, as what is encountered, not only refers to an intuiting subject; but appearance is also appearance of something—as Kant puts it: of the *thing itself*. However, in order to eliminate right away the grossest misunderstanding, we must say that appearances are not mere illusions, nor are they some kind of free-float-

3. CPR, B 34, A 20.

4. Ibid., A 108f.

5. Ibid., A 120.

6. Ibid.

ing emissions from things. Rather appearances are objects themselves, or things. Furthermore, appearances are also not other things next to or prior to the things themselves. Rather appearances are just those things themselves *that* we encounter and discover as extant within the world. However, what remains closed off to us is the thing itself insofar as it is thought as object of an absolute knowledge, i.e., as object of an intuition which does not first need the interaction with the thing and does not first let the thing be encountered, but rather lets the thing first of all become what the thing is through this intuition.

The difference between the *thing itself* and *appearance* always refers to things themselves. However, [this difference refers to] things themselves—under the title of “appearance” insofar as they are encountered by *finite* intuition, under the title “thing in itself” insofar as they stem from an *infinite* intuition which first of all produces these things. This intuition which freely produces things must necessarily and from the beginning already intuit what things are by themselves in their interior, as it were. But this “in itself” remains hidden from every finite intuition insofar as this intuition does not first produce [things] and put [them] in place, but lets something already existing [*dastehend*] be encountered. “The thing in itself (*ens per se*) is not another object but another relation (*respectus*) of representation to the same object.”⁷ Various titles express that the same thing can be the correlate of totally different modes of intuition (of *intuitus originarius* as well as of *intuitus derivativus*). What a being is for *intuitus originarius* remains completely inaccessible to us as finite beings who can intuit only derivatively.

But what is an object in appearance as opposed to just this same object as the *thing in itself*? This difference lies not in objects, but merely in the difference of relation as to how the subject which apprehends the object of the senses is affected for the sake of bringing forth a representation in the subject (in its consciousness).⁸

Along with the assumption of an absolute intuition, which first produces things, i.e., along with the assumption of a concept of being in the sense of being produced and being extant (which originates in ancient ontology), the concept of a thing in itself also dies away. But things do not thereby vanish into phantoms and images—phantoms and images which we produce for ourselves. For appearances are the things themselves, and they are the things that they are without these things having to be thought as things in themselves on the basis of an untenable concept of being and on the basis of the assumption of a representing

God, additionally as object for this God. Thus by denying things in themselves, one does not deny that they are extant and that we encounter them every day. Rather one denies only that these things are, in addition [to their being everyday extant], objects for a *deus faber*, for a demiorgos—one denies the philosophical legitimacy and usefulness of such an assumption, which not only does not contribute to our enlightenment but also confuses us, as it becomes clear in Kant. The denial of things in themselves in the conception of Kant by the Marburg School comes from a misunderstanding of what Kant understood by the thing in itself.

The concept of “thing in itself” and all the absurd problems related to it die away in the thoroughgoing critique and restriction of the realm of validity of the ancient concept of being and of the metaphysics which is determined by this concept, from the ancients up to and beyond Kant. But it is precisely this that opens the way for an ontology of the extant as such. Kant himself frequently hesitated in interpreting what is to be understood by “thing in itself” and in interpreting if and how much it is absolutely necessary to proceed from the thing in itself. But this hesitation, which makes an unequivocal interpretation almost impossible, is based on the fact that Kant is still completely entangled in the webs of ancient ontology. By contrast Kant never hesitated in his view that the beings that encounter us are as such extant. This is expressed in his statement that appearances are objects. It is this statement alone that we must keep in mind here, for understanding the concept and the term *appearance*.

The general discussions of the thing in itself and appearance should make clear that appearances mean objects or things themselves. The term *mere appearance* does not refer to mere subjective products to which nothing actual corresponds. Appearance as appearance or object does not need at all still to *correspond* to something actual, because appearance itself is the actual. The term *mere* in the expression “mere appearance” does not negate the actuality of the thing. Rather it negates the absolute intuition of objects which produces them, which [intuition] is not possible for us as finite beings. The expression “mere appearances” indicates the beings which are accessible to a finite being. This is the primary meaning of the Kantian concept of “appearance.”

In Kant’s interpretation of the concept of appearance there are, of course, a number of prejudices and inadmissible equivocations. These equivocations are not based on a superficial investigation and exposition. Rather they stem from the unbroken dominion of ancient ontology which we already mentioned—a dominion which necessarily had to put the brakes on—and still today, where this dominion is fundamentally not broken, brakes—a radical ontological interpretation of subject, of *res cogitans*, of mind, i.e., a radical ontological interpretation of man.

7. Kant, *Opus posthumum* (Akademie, XXII, 26).

8. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

According to Kant appearances are *objects themselves*. But in the introduction to the transcendental aesthetic he says: “The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is entitled *appearance*.”⁹ Here the term *undetermined* means not thought through and thus not known—indeed not known in the sense of mathematical-physical knowing, in which the existing nature in its extantness first and foremost is “sufficiently” determined. The “undetermined” object means the object which is not yet theoretically and scientifically known. Thus “undetermined” does not mean that there are still no thought-determinations in appearances. In appearances there are already thought-oriented determinations, but these appearances are not already determined in relation to the realm of being called nature; these appearances are primarily things encountered in daily life, i.e., what is perceived in the widest sense of the word. Thus we must *demarcate* the *appearance* over against a *twofold possibility of knowing*: (1) in view of the *absolute intuition* of God the maker and then (2) in view of a *determining scientific knowledge*. Appearances are beings which are encountered in prescientific experiential knowledge.

Appearances are objects that are accessible through empirical intuition. But this statement does not thereby specify what belongs essentially to *empirical intuition*. As we just said, there is already in empirical intuition a thinking, an understanding; and in this intuition there is essentially a power of imagination. Regarding this power, Kant states that “imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception.”¹⁰ But here the primary task is to work out what belongs to empirical intuition *as intuition*. However, characterization of intuition as intuition cannot be exhausted by referring to the data of sensation. These data precisely do *not* account for the essence of sensibility. This is what we must now try to understand.

c) The Togetherness of Sense-Data and Space-Time Relations in Empirical Intuition

With respect to what we discussed, let us keep in mind that, according to the Kantian interpretation, knowledge aims at intuition. Beings themselves that become accessible in an empirical intuition which is determined in accord with sensation, these beings Kant calls appearances or objects. However, the basic constitution of finite intuition is not yet completely brought to light, and particularly not in terms of its building site. To be sure, Kant makes allusions to data of the senses and to data of sensation. But these data do not exclusively and primarily constitute sensibility as what is sensitive. Sensibility is finite intuition; and, what is

more, the object of empirical intuition is the appearance, i.e., things that are encountered. We still need to specify what it is that is encountered. In view of the *content* of the objects which are encountered, it must also be determined what belongs to intuition as that which *allows* the encounter with this content to occur. By way of a general characterization of the content of objects, Kant determines that which belongs to the total way of being of intuition, i.e., that which allows the encounter with these objects.

In an appearance, in a thing that we encounter—like this piece of chalk for example—there is manifest to me certain colorfulness, hardness, smoothness, impenetrability, and upon impact a certain sound. This manifold is given to me in intuition via the senses, without my needing to pay attention to the sense organs and their function. Moreover, the specific color of the chalk, *the color of the thing*, is not differentiated from the *white as such as what is sensed in sensation*. What corresponds to sense data in the appearance, in the object itself—data to which at first we do not at all pay attention and upon which we can fix our gaze only with difficulty (the specific color of the thing called chalk, its hardness as a thing, this given manifold)—Kant calls the *matter* of appearance or object. But matter does not mean what is material [*das Materielle*]; it does not mean what has a certain color. Rather, matter here means the *what-content* [*Wasgehalt*] or the real [*das Reale*].

This matter is a manifold which, nevertheless, we encounter in the empirical intuition, not as a confused muddle but in a certain *order*. The color of the thing called chalk has a definite extension within certain boundaries—it is namely extended according to certain proportions: upward, in breadth, and in depth. The thing itself is now here, in its entirety, in certain coordination to other things—now here, now there, tomorrow smaller and over there, etc. But what about the *what-content* of the thing mentioned above? Does it pertain to this *what-content* that it now lies here beside the eraser? Are “here” and “beside” objective determinations like color? But “here,” “below,” as well as “now” are manifestly not given through sense organs. Nevertheless, I state these determinations of the thing *itself*. How are we to attribute these determinations to the thing *itself* and in what *sense* are they determinations? Proceeding from the analysis of what is initially given, Kant shows that there is more to every intuition than the manifold given in sensation. Intuition as sensibility is not characterized by the function of the sense organs nor by sense-data.

The relations known as next-to-each-other, prior-to and after, and after-each-other, these relations are not given through the organs of sense. But nevertheless the matter of appearance in such relations—indeed different and changeable in each case—is organized. Nay, even if the data in each case would be given without rules and unorganized,

9. CPR, B 34, A 20.

10. Ibid., A 120, note.

even then in this lack of organization and order something would still be presupposed which does not have the character of sense data: a possible relation of being-beside-each-other and following-each-other. Now, Kant says that the relations in which the manifold of appearance can be or are ordered cannot in turn be sensations, i.e., cannot be something which for its part would need again relations of possible order. The *relations* in which the manifold is encountered as organized, these relations are *not sensation*. The latter, however, belong to *affections*, to that which moves us, that which does something to us and comes from elsewhere. Kant concludes that what does not belong to affections must originate from I myself, from the mind [*Gemüt*], must belong to *spontaneity* and must “be ready, *a priori* in the mind.”

Let us keep in mind that the content of appearances, things with their properties, are organized in certain relations of being-beside-each-other and also being-at-the-same-time. We see things directly beside-one-another and also their being-at-the-same-time. Yet, Kant states, these relations are not only not given in accord with sensation, they cannot also be given that way. What cannot be given that way must lie ready in the mind, in the subject. At first one could say that this is a purely formal argumentation which contradicts the facts. I certainly ascertain the beside-each-other of both things and grasp this definite “beside” here, this definite relation. Were this relation in the mind, then I would have to be directed to my mind in order to confirm this relation, i.e., I would have to observe myself. But there is not the slightest indication of such a reflection on my mind in the simple statement of chalk being beside (next to) the eraser. From this, naturally it cannot follow that this reflection would be something like data of sensation. But Kant’s conclusion does not terminate in this question.

This much is clear: In the simple understanding of things we are not directed toward mind. However, if the relation of being-beside-each-other belongs to spontaneity, which is defined as thinking, then are the relations of being-beside-each-other and following-each-other added to the matter by the mind in thinking? In that case then space and time would be thought-determinations, categories: and thus the Kant-interpretation of the Marburg School would be justified.

However, Kant does *not* say that relations of being-beside-each-other and following-each-other are determinations of *thinking*. On the contrary, he says that these relations are *a priori* “ready in the mind.” But this gives rise to a new difficulty with respect to our earlier discussion of *a priori*. Elucidating the expression “pure reason” and clarifying analytic and synthetic judgments, we concluded that *a priori* indicates primarily what thinking as thinking accomplishes, for example in analyzing a concept or in representing what is given intuitively. This analytic thinking stems from the mind and is a pure accomplishment of the mind,

even though this thinking is related to what is given intuitively and is only possible on the basis of this relation. We must distinguish this broad concept of *a priori* (according to which *a priori* and *analytic thinking* mean the same) from *a priori* in the narrower sense as that which stems only from understanding and is *completely independent of experience*. But whether what is completely independent of experiences and lies already in each case ready in the mind is to be attributed solely to thinking, as it seemed thus far, or whether the other root of knowledge, namely intuition, includes an *a priori*—this is precisely the problem. Herein lies a question far more radical: How can something *a priori* belong to intuition and lie ready in the mind *and yet* be immediately met with in the objects? How is the *togetherness* of *a priori* and *transcendence* possible? For Kant *a priori* means anything that lies ready in the mind prior to experience and prior to intuition and thinking-determination. With this Kant goes back to Descartes: The knowing subject, or *res cogitans*, is what is primarily given for all knowing; and this subject is privileged with respect to the evidence of being grasped. Thus the title of the second meditation reads: *De natura mentis humanae, quod ipsa sit notior quam corpus*. The knowing subject is primarily knowable prior to any transition to objects, and this priority is the *a priori*. But this is not the only meaning of *a priori*, according to Kant. Philosophically fruitful is that meaning of *a priori* according to which *a priori* means “enabling.”

Initially Kant goes only from the character of the relation of being-after and being-beside-each-other (a character with *does not accord with sensation*) to the *a priority*, i.e., *subjectivity* of this relation. Initially he does not trace this relation back to *thinking*. Rather, now it needs to be shown plainly that already in the empirical intuition there are always and necessarily *pure forms* of intuition, which are completely independent of experience and of sensation. These forms are those in which “all the manifold of appearances is intuited in certain relations.”¹¹ This wherein, in which everything is intuited, “this pure form of sensibility may also itself be called *pure intuition*.”¹² This pure intuition “exists in the mind”¹³ and is *a priori*.

Thus is given the direction which the actual investigation of intuition as transcendental investigation will take. For the problem of the *Critique* is the possibility of the building site of all ontic knowledge or the possibility of *synthetic knowledge a priori*. But for the possibility of such knowledge (because *intuition* necessarily belongs to it), a *pure, a priori* intuition is necessary.

11. Ibid., B 34, A 20 [N. K. Smith incorrectly translates *Erscheinung* as “intuition”].

12. Ibid., B 34f., A 20.

13. Ibid., B 35, A 21.

d) Space and Time as Pure Forms of Intuition
and the Manner of Their Investigation in
the Transcendental Aesthetic

Because factually only a complete knowledge of beings, however imperfect this knowledge may be, is given to us, two things are required for the problematic of the transcendental aesthetic. (1) It is required that thinking be isolated from the full stock of a knowledge to which belong, at any given time, intuition and thinking in their unification, that is, empirical intuition as intuition must be isolated from thinking. This isolation, of course, does not mean an actual separation of pieces but rather means leaving thinking aside and only looking at empirical ontic intuition. But (2) from this intuition “also everything which belongs to sensation [matter]”¹⁴ must be isolated, so that nothing remains but the pure form of intuition, or pure intuition. There are two such pure intuitions: space and time. In terms of method these isolations are not of the same kind, as Kant does not say anything at all about the specific character of this kind of investigation. Something like a beginning to such consideration of method could perhaps be found in the appendix to the entire so-called transcendental problematic, in the section entitled “The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection.”¹⁵

The themes of the transcendental aesthetic are *space* and *time* as pure intuitions. Accordingly the aesthetic has two sections: (1) Space, (2) Time. This investigation has indeed a twofold task: (1) It should lay out what belongs *a priori* to space and time in their ownmost inner possibility. This exposition of space and time Kant calls ontological, respectively *metaphysical*, by which he means an exposition which is pure and independent of experience. (2) It must also show that and how through these pure intuitions *a priori* a synthetic knowledge *a priori* is possible, i.e., a self-relating to objects of what is *a priori*. This is, as we know, the actual ontological exposition which Kant calls *transcendental*.¹⁶ Accordingly each main part of the transcendental aesthetic has two sections, each of which contains the metaphysical and transcendental expositions of pure intuitions of space and time: Section 2 includes the metaphysical exposition of space and section 3 the transcendental exposition of space; section 4 contains the metaphysical exposition of time and section 5 again the transcendental exposition of time. In section 2, the metaphysical exposition of space, Kant again makes some introductory observations which apply to both forms of intuition (space and time) and which circumscribe

14. Ibid., B 36, A 22.

15. Ibid., B 316ff., A 260ff.

16. Ibid., B 40.

the transcendental problem by briefly contrasting this problem with the traditional discussion of space and time.

We know that in ancient science, and all the more so in modern natural science, space and time are among the basic concepts of science and that they contribute to the circumscription of the realm or region of the respective science. One could no longer ignore the question of what it is which is named in the concepts of space and time. Certainly the scientists have rightly refrained from speculating on space and time; and, in accordance with their method, they defined these concepts only to the extent that they need these concepts in their investigation and calculation. However, already here there are certain prejudices. Thus Newton states: *Tempus, spatium, locus et motus, sunt omnibus notissima*. But regarding *time* itself Newton offers the following definition: “*Tempus absolutum, verum, et mathematicum, in se et natura sua sine relatione ad externum quodvis, aequabiliter fluit, alioque nomine dicitur duratio: Relativum, apparens, et vulgare est sensibilis et externa quaevis durationis per motum mensura (seu accurata seu inaequalis) qua vulgus vice veri temporis utitur; ut hora, dies, mensis, annus.*”¹⁷ “The absolute, real and mathematical time is in itself and in its essence without any relation to anything outside itself, and as such it is constantly flowing [in itself away]. By another name it could be called duration. The relative, apparent, and ordinary time is indeed a graspable, external measure in the light of a motion, which [measure] lies outside of true time. This measure may be exact or incongruous. It is this time which people use in place of true time: hour, day, month, and year.” The truly *absolute* time is something which is *extant by itself* and thus resides completely independently next to absolute space, which *also* represents a world that is likewise extant by itself. For Leibniz space and time are “phenomena” and this means arrangements which first of all emerge from the position and relation of substances to one another. Space and time are not substances which simply exist for themselves, but attributes which are founded in substances and are subsequent to them. To be sure, Leibniz’s conception of space and time is not clear. Here we must forego dealing with exact proofs, especially with regard to Leonard Euler, Wolff, Crusius, Tetens, and Kant’s pre-critical views (cf. the rather crude survey by Gent, *Die Philosophie des Raumes und der Zeit*, 1926). With respect to space and time Kant now seeks to show (1) negatively, that space and time neither subsist in themselves as extant nor inhere in themselves as thingly properties and (2) positively, that space and time are pure intuitions, pure forms of sensibility, original kinds of representation which as such are peculiar to humans as finite beings.

By means of an interpretation of the metaphysical exposition of space

17. Newton, *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica*, Def. VIII, Scholium I.

and time we must try to clarify what is meant by expressions such as “pure intuition,” “pure forms of sensibility,” and “original representations.” At the same time we must fix the boundaries up to which Kant’s exposition is clear and from where the ambiguity and problematical issues begin.

We have pointed out in general that there are ambiguities in expressions like “intuition” or “representations,” ambiguities which could spread only because what is meant in each case by the respective meanings—of for example intuition, and what is intuited—is not itself exactly defined. This ambiguity comes especially to the fore with regard to the concept of intuition and representation in the Kantian interpretation of space and time as pure intuitions and original representations. In the exposition of *space and time* as pure intuitions, Kant without a doubt understands intuition in the sense of *intendere*, i.e., as the manner of comportment of the mind. But we must ask whether Kant understood and could understand intuition in this sense alone, or whether space and time as intuitions also mean *what is intuited*. Moreover, we must also ask whether this ambiguity is grounded in the matter itself. Finally the question becomes: How can space and time, taken as modes of intuition and as what is intuited in such intuition, mean the same phenomenon?

First let us look at only two external and unequivocal proofs for the thesis that, when Kant calls *space and time* pure intuitions, he understands intuition as *intuiting*: “. . . pure space and pure time, which are indeed something to be viewed as forms, but are not themselves objects which are intuited [*ens imaginarium*].”¹⁸ Here Kant not only says that space and time are modes of intuition, but he also rejects the possibility of grasping them as objects that are intuited. For comparison we add the following passage: “There is no absolute time or space. Pure intuition here does not mean something which is intuited but rather the pure formal condition which precedes appearance. Absolute time is empty intuition.”¹⁹ “Nothing” is being intuited. But in the Kantian division of the concept of nothing²⁰ *ens imaginarium* also appears as “empty intuition without object.” In the Dissertation of 1770 we also read about time that it is an *ens imaginarium*,²¹ an empty intuition, which has no extant being as its correlate. In the transcendental aesthetic Kant speaks explicitly of space and time as “powers to intuit *a priori*,”²² where *a priori* means pure and independent of experience.

18. CPR, B 347, A 291.

19. Kant, *Reflexionen*, II, 413.

20. CPR, B 348, A 292.

21. Kant, *De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis Forma et Principiis*, §14, Nr. 6 (Cassirer, II, 418).

22. CPR, B 65, A 48.

Initially we shall hold on to this meaning of intuition—the predominant one that comes to the fore in Kant—and attempt now to understand how he makes it clear that space and time are pure intuitions. We shall deal with the metaphysical exposition of the concept of space at the same time as we deal with the metaphysical exposition of the concept of time. This parallel treatment of both expositions is not only possible but also necessary, in order to make clear how space and time will be laid open in exactly the same manner and in fact each one through four parallel expositions. This is above all of crucial significance for understanding the Kantian concept of time. To be sure, time is in no way identified with space. On the contrary, already in the transcendental aesthetic there comes to light a peculiar priority of time over space. And in subsequent and more decisive sections of the *Critique* time emerges again and again as the center piece of the transcendental, ontological problematic. Nevertheless at the beginning time is taken to be parallel with space, i.e., time is taken as that “wherein” the extant is extant. We say that what is extant is intra-temporal, is temporal. To the extent that Kant considers time as a problem, he sees time only as the time of the intra-temporality of what is extant.

Kant arrived at the actual results of his investigations on the nature of space and time in his already mentioned Dissertation of 1770, *De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis*, and presented these results in *sectio III—De principiis formae mundi sensibilis*—where §13 makes up the introduction, §14 is entitled “De tempore,” §15 “De Spatio,” and to this is added the *Corollarium*. However tempting it would be to draw upon this short essay for preparation and comparison, we must forego it here. We shall go back only occasionally to earlier formulations in Latin, which are therefore often essentially sharper formulations. Also in addition, the following writing of Kant is significant for the problem of space in the transcendental aesthetic: *Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume*. It was published in the *Wöchentliche Königsbergische Frag- und Anzeigungsnachrichten* in 1768, Numbers 6–8 (in Cassirer’s edition of Kant’s works: volume II, pages 392–400).

We divide in six sections the following phenomenological interpretation of Kant’s transcendental aesthetic:

1. The discussion of the metaphysical exposition of space and time.
2. The analysis of space and time as pure forms of intuition.
3. The difference between “form of intuition” and “formal intuition.”
4. The transcendental discussion of space and time.
5. The priority of time as form of intuition, over against space.
6. A summary of the characteristics of space and time; their “empirical reality” and “transcendental ideality.”

Chapter Two

Phenomenological Interpretation of
the Transcendental Aesthetic

§7. Discussion of the Metaphysical Exposition of Space and Time

The expression “metaphysical exposition” means pure analysis of the essence of space and time. The metaphysical exposition of space is to be found in §2, and the metaphysical exposition of time in §4 of the transcendental aesthetic. Our interpretation will be based on the presentation in edition B, which, compared to edition A, actually does not present anything new but does differentiate more sharply between the metaphysical and the transcendental expositions. What edition A presents under number 3 regarding space is rightly taken up in §3 (the transcendental exposition) of edition B. The same should have been done with number 3 in §4, regarding the metaphysical exposition of time. But Kant neglected to do so, with the result that §4—the metaphysical exposition of time—comprises five numbers. For our part we shall take number 3 of §4 along with §5. In this regard and in order to justify the brief treatment in §5, Kant refers explicitly to number 3 in §4.

In each case the exposition of space and time is achieved in four stages, which we compare as follows: Numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 of §2 correspond to numbers 1, 2, 4, and 5 of §4. The four parallel stages in the exposition are so structured that the first stage states negatively what space and time are not, the second stage states positively, the third one again states negatively, and the fourth one positively. Of course the negative expositions must make visible a positive characteristic.

When put together, the expositions state:

1. Space and time are not empirical concepts.
2. Space and time are necessary representations *a priori*.
3. Space and time are not discursive, i.e., general concepts.
4. Space and time are infinite, given magnitudes.

We begin with the first thesis: Space is not an empirical concept. Like intuition, the concept is a *repraesentatio*, a representation. With this thesis Kant wants to say that this representation *non abstrahitur a sensationibus externis*—this representation is not abstracted from external experiences. Interpreting this, we must say that space is not something extant which among other extant things would also be extant and be found in empirical intuition. And why can space not be something like this? If space would be something extant among other extant things, then space would

necessarily be somewhere among the rest of what is extant—next to it, under it, or above it. Space could be this only if space would be in space. Whatever is extant is from the beginning already in space. Space is the basis for what is extant and therefore cannot be found within what is extant. If I look for space “under” what is extant, I have already found space. If we take space to be something extant, then we *a priori* miss its ownmost inner possibility, because space is the basis for what is extant. Space cannot be borrowed from experience; space is not an empirical concept.

The same can be said about time. Time is not something extant which would exist, for example, at the same time as, or sequential to, other things. For I can represent for myself—or have as given to me—that something is simultaneously extant in perception only if time is thereby already preliminarily represented. Simultaneity is a mode of time and means that something extant exists in that mode now. Thus time is not something extant but is at the basis of what is extant.

Thus the *first exposition states negatively* that space and time are not available as extant things. Positively, this means that space and time underlie what is extant as its “ground.” However, the sense in which this term is used is problematic, because underlying as a ground cannot mean lying behind or in the background—for this would again be something extant. This is a distinctive term for Kant and means functioning as ground, i.e., making possible that things as such show themselves and appear as extant *here, there, now, and then*.

And now the *second stage of the exposition* states: Space and time are necessary representations *a priori*, i.e., they are a *repraesentare* which emerges from the mind itself independently of experience. This means primarily that space is not only not something extant, but also does not depend on something extant. Kant illustrates this as follows: We can represent that everything extant is gone out of space, “{but} we can never represent {in relation to what is extant} that there is no space.” Space must exist and is independent of this or that object’s being extant, independent of the senses of everything. And this means simultaneously that space does not belong to the realm of the extant—as property, *accidens*, or as itself extant. Rather, space is necessarily the basis of everything that is extant and its possible properties, as its ground. We can encounter what is extant as such only when space as an *a priori* representation (i.e., interpreted as something represented in advance) is at the basis of what is extant as its ground. However, for Kant, according to his conception of *a priori*, what is represented in advance is a before [*ein Vorher*]—a representation which occurs in the mind prior to experience: “*Spatium non est aliquid obiectivi et realis, nec substantia, nec accidens, nec relatio; sed subiectivum et ideale* {idea, representation, intuitus} *et a natura mentis stabili lege proficiscens veluti schema omnia omnino externe sensa sibi coordi-*

nandi.”¹ [For space is not something objective and real—neither substance nor accident nor relation—but rather space is subjective and ideal (idea, representation, *intuitus*) and according to the nature of mind proceeding with steadfast regularity as the schema of coordinating to itself everything that is totally externally sensed.]

It is the same with time: Although one can remove appearances from time, one cannot, “considering appearances as such, remove time itself.” Time is given *a priori*. “All reality” of appearances is possible only “in time.” Time lies at the ground of everything that is extant, but in such a way that it is not something extant in what is extant.

Space and time lie at the ground of and determine what is extant; thus in a certain manner they are something universal. But in what sense are they universal? We think the relation of the universal to the particular primarily and for the most part in terms of the concept of the genus. Are space and time such concepts? This interpretation, which suggests itself from the observations that we have made so far, is rejected at the third stage, which again has a negative form. But at the same time a significant positive determination becomes visible.

The thesis of the third stage of the exposition goes like this: Space is not a discursive concept, or as we say, not a universal concept of relations of things as such, but rather a pure intuition. Clarification of this statement will also clarify what is central to the concept of pure intuition, *intuitus purus*.

Space is the *universal* with regard to everything and anything in space that is present within certain spatial relations. But in what sense is space universal? Are *individual* spaces, for example, a room, or the space which is taken up by a tree—are these instances of universal space? Do these spaces relate to space as such, in the way in which individual tables relate to “table” as such? By no means. Rather the *individual* spaces are only *parts of the one space*. But this again should not be understood as though the one space would be put together from individual spaces as *components*. The one, the unifying space is not the sum of individually extant spaces, where each exists for itself, without being in space. For grasping space, the following result ensues: If space is not something composite, then space cannot be determined by joining together attributes that are pulled together from individual spaces—*sensationibus non conflatus* [not conflated by means of sensations]. There is no need for first continuously running through individual spaces and grasping them, in order then, in summary, to grasp universal space. Such a universalization, which occurs by running through individual determinations, one calls *discursive* representation. All universal concepts are obtained and determined on the basis of

necessarily running through attributes—on the basis of *discursus*, Platonic διαπορεύεσθαι, διαλέγεσθαι. The many individual spaces from which one had initially to depart in order to obtain universal space through discursive universalization—these individual spaces are only parts of the one space. But they are parts, and not components which, as it were, could initially exist by themselves. Each determined individual space as such is only a *limitation* of the whole of space and is only possible in the whole of space. Individual spaces are not independent parts added together, which, as it were, would be segments of space which would exist outside of space. Rather (1) each segment of space is itself already space, (2) each segment is already in space, and (3) the boundaries which make each segment a segment of space run through the space and are themselves spatial. Individual spaces are basically spatially limited intra-spatiality; and as such they are *limitations* of the whole space—they are *not parts*. Space is not universal in the sense of a discursive concept, a genus, or a sum—but is “essentially one,” a whole. As this whole, space is something singular; and as something singular it is a *singulare*, which never repeats itself anywhere and can therefore be given only in intuition, in *repraesentatio singularis*. Thus because all concepts of “spaces” are basically limitations of the singular total space, this essentially *one* space must already be *given prior* to any concept of a space. As an exclusively one and single whole, space is in itself something *singular*, which can be given only through *intuition*. And because space as a singular and unifying whole is given before any *empirical* experience and is *given prior* to any such experience, space must be determined as *pure* intuition.

The same applies to time. “Different times are only parts (limitations) of precisely the same time.” Thus we read in §14 of the Dissertation: “*Duos annos si cogitas, non potes tibi repraesentare, nisi determinato erga se invicem positu, et, si immediate se non sequantur, non nisi tempore quodam intermedio sibimet iunctos.*”² [If one thinks of two years, one cannot represent them except by a placing that determines them with regard to each other, in turn; and if one does not follow the other immediately, one cannot think of them except as joined to each other by some intermediate time.]

Kant formulates this in a general way by saying: “*Idea temporis est singularis, non generalis. —Conceptus spatii est singularis repraesentatio omnia in se comprehendens, non sub se continens notio abstracta et communis.*”³ [The idea of time is singular, not general. —The concept of space is a singular representation, encompassing everything in itself—not an abstract and common notion which holds (parts) as contained *under* it.] The difference

1. *De mundi sensibilis* . . . , §15, Nr. D (Cassirer, II, 420).

2. *Ibid.*, §14, 415.

3. *Ibid.*, §14, 415 and §15, 418.

between *in se* and *sub se* means that space and time have their parts within themselves and not, like a concept, under themselves. Space and time are not *notiones*, they are thus not categories. Since concepts have the definite individual under themselves, Kant arrives at the following difficult problem. The *ontic* concept “table” indicates something general. But the categories too are concepts and, as *ontological concepts*, in a certain way also have what is ontic under themselves. In what way now do ontic-general concepts contain something under themselves and in what way do ontological concepts do so—that is the central problem of the doctrine of schematism.

The fourth and last stage of exposition is again a positive one and is intimately related to the preceding stages. In this last stage it looks as if Kant merely repeats—particularly in the exposition of time—the preceding exposition and indeed in such a way that he now states inversely that space, like time, is an intuition, a *repraesentatio singularis*, i.e., it is not a concept, *repraesentatio per notas communes*. “Thus the original representation of space is an *a priori* intuition and not a concept.”⁴ But within the exposition of space there is a new characterization of the phenomenon of space, and hence also of time—a characterization which is as important as it is difficult. In edition B Kant states that “space is represented as an infinite magnitude which is *given*.” In edition A this passage reads as follows: “Space is represented as an infinite magnitude that is given.”⁵ Let us explain this characterization step by step. Space, like time, is a *magnitude*. Ordinarily we understand this expression to mean something in such and such magnitude, for example I add two such magnitudes together. But Kant does not wish to say of space and time that they have such and such magnitudes, or that they have this definite magnitude. In Kantian terminology *magnitude* indicates something like largeness [*Großheit*]. Kant uses the Latin expression *quantum*. But this terminology is also misleading; for a *quantum* (for example a quantum of bread) indicates an amount of something. But space as *quantum*, as magnitude, does not mean some amount, i.e., infinitely more space. Kant uses *quantum* and not *quantity*. This expression [quantity] is reserved for a class of categories, namely the categories of unity, plurality, and totality. According to Kant the concept of quantity captures the moment of comparison and of modes of comparison: unity is relative to plurality and relative to totality. There is no moment of comparison in the idea of *quantum* or magnitude. “Magnitude” does not indicate so and so big in relation to something else which is so and so big. In Kant’s *Reflexionen* we read: “The *quantum* wherein all quantities can exclusively be determined is . . . space and time.”⁶ This is

4. CPR, B 40.

5. CPR, B 25.

6. *Reflexionen*, II, 1038.

to say that *quantum* or magnitude indicates largeness, i.e., that which provides the ground *in general* for whatever is specifically so and so big, as its [the specific large thing’s] possibility. Magnitude is that which makes possible anything that is determined as having a magnitude. Magnitude understood as largeness, i.e., as the condition for the possibility of anything of such and such a magnitude, itself stands outside big or small. Magnitude as largeness is itself neither big nor small.

However, does Kant not still maintain that space like time is an *infinite* magnitude? Let us bear in mind that magnitude does not mean so or so big. Thus infinite cannot mean a quantitative measure; it cannot mean something endlessly big as compared to something which is finitely big so that, in measuring largeness, I would never arrive at an end. The expression “infinite” is a determination of largeness as such which is neither big nor small—thus basically also not without end. But, then, what is this magnitude, that Kant can call it infinite? Largeness lies at the ground of anything that is so and so big, as the condition of its possibility. We heard that every determined space is a limitation of the whole of space. Space and time as wholes underlie and thus ground all individual spaces and times which are limitable. In relation to each individual segment of space, i.e., over against anything specifically so and so big—even endlessly so—space is always still the whole which underlies and grounds. Consequently even in an endless progression there is never a point where we go from an endless space over to the entirety of space, because this space as a whole already lies in the smallest as well as the biggest possible segment of space. To formulate it briefly, we may say that *every part of space is, as part of the whole* [of space] *never quantitatively different, but always essentially, i.e., infinitely different*. We discovered the same circumstance already in the definition according to which parts of space are not independent components whose sum would first result in space. Therefore, from these parts we shall never arrive at the whole, because this whole already lies in each part—a whole which is essentially not composed of components. Because it is the ground of their possibility, the whole is *in its very being* [*wesenhaft*] *different* from each of its limitations. Kant expresses this difference with the term *infinite*, to indicate the difference as different in its very being, i.e., ontologically-metaphysically different.

The phrase “space and time are infinite magnitudes” states that both are essentially a unified whole and exclusive ground for their possible limitations. As such a single and unified whole—as infinite magnitude in the sense in which we interpreted this term—space and time can only be intuitions, can be what is intuited or something somehow immediately encountered. Space and time are “represented as . . . given.” (Cf. *Über Kästners Abhandlungen*, footnote p 112f., in Cass. VI, 517f.)

Summing up these four stages of the metaphysical exposition of space and time, we see clearly, not only that *space and time* are modes of intuit-

ing—and not only modes of intuiting which occur in the mind *independent of experience*—but also that these intuitions have something which is *being intuited*. For in the third and fourth stages of the exposition it is explicitly stated that space and time are unified wholes and as such are *given*. “Given” here obviously means “intuited in a pure intuiting.” Space and time are thus each a mode of pure intuiting and at the same time something intuited. They are a pure intuiting which does not need any determination in terms of sensation. Rather this intuiting makes possible such determinations. But space and time are nevertheless an intuiting which intuits something given, not something which is to be produced by this intuiting. They imply a “letting-be-encountered,” i.e., they are derived, finite intuiting. But this “letting-be-encountered” is what is accomplished from out of the mind itself. Space and time as intuitions are not *intuitus originarius*. But they are also not only *intuitus derivativus* in the sense of letting be encountered as determined by affection. Rather, space and time are *intuitus derivativus* and nonetheless *originally* so, i.e., *stemming from the finite subject itself*, i.e., they are rooted in the transcendental power of imagination. Hence space as well as time were designated as *ens imaginarium*.

At the same time we would like to recall that Kant says explicitly that space and time are not objects, i.e., something ontically extant. Thus it becomes clear that these pure intuitions or modes of intuiting are not ontic knowledge—they are not knowledge of anything at all. What is this remarkable intuiting, an intuiting which has no object and which on the other hand again is the condition for the possibility of empirical intuition of what is spatially and temporally extant? We would like to get closer to the ownmost inner possibility of space and time—at first wholly in Kant’s sense—by way of phenomenologically interpreting what it means that space and time are pure forms of intuition. In this connection it should also be explained what it means that space and time are formal intuitions, as Kant puts it in the note to §26.⁷ It is on the basis of this note by Kant in regard to space and time (a note which is located in the transcendental logic) that the Marburg School establishes its view of the transcendental aesthetic—a viewpoint according to which the transcendental aesthetic actually belongs to the [transcendental] logic and intuitions of space and time are taken as forms of thinking, i.e., categories.

§8. Phenomenological Analysis of Space and Time
as Pure Forms of Intuition

Kant states that space and time are pure intuitions wherein what is encountered in terms of sensation can be put to order. He calls them

7. CPR, B 161.

forms of intuition. Accordingly, “forms” are the “wherein” of possible ordering or disordering.

This characterization of “form” easily leads to an irrelevant view—and the ensuing misunderstanding becomes more fatal—if one takes the concept which is opposed to “form,” i.e., matter, in such an irrelevant way as “stuff” or “dough” which is formed in the form of a cake. To be sure, one is constantly assured that this opposition is not meant so irrelevantly. However, one does not go beyond a mere warning; one does not know how to do a real phenomenological interpretation of what Kant could have meant with the talk of “form” and “matter.” Instead one uses this pair of concepts in a completely universal excessiveness and says that *everything* has a content and a form and that both belong together. To a certain extent one can also appeal to Kant in making such a use of this pair of contraries.¹ With such a schema one can indeed explain everything, and that means nothing, especially when one separates this schema from the field of investigation of Kantian philosophy or when one crudely misinterprets it. We cannot show here how exactly this schema has been raised to a principle in neo-Kantianism—to a basic principle of philosophy—and how it works there. Be that as it may, one thing is certain, namely that with these concepts of form and matter nothing is achieved in interpreting Kant and that, on the contrary, with these schemata and formulae access to what Kant wanted to say is utterly obstructed.

The distinction between matter and form is old and belongs to the best tradition of philosophy. For Aristotle ὄλη and εἶδος are basic concepts of the science of the being of beings. But these concepts function here in a different sense from that in Kant. For us the question remains whether Kant himself did not explicitly explain these concepts, so that all the difficulties and disputes would be settled by appealing to him? Kant indeed states his position on these remarkable concepts, namely in an appendix to the transcendental analytic, the first division of the transcendental logic. This appendix carries the title “The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection: Arising from the Confusion of the Empirical with the Transcendental Employment of Understanding.”² *Form and matter* belong among other things thus to *concepts of reflection*. Kant himself has become alert to the dangerous character of these concepts. He says: “the concepts of reflection, owing to a certain misinterpretation, have exercised so great an influence upon the employment of the understanding that they have misled even one of the most acute of all philosophers into a supposititious system of intellectual knowledge. . . .”³ About matter and form Kant states specifically:

1. CPR, B 322, A 266.

2. Ibid., B 316ff., A 260ff.

3. Ibid., B 336, A 280.

These two concepts underlie all other reflection, so inseparably are they bound up with all employment of the understanding. The one [matter] signifies the determinable in general, the other [form] its determination—both in the transcendental sense, abstraction being made from all differences in that which is given and from the mode in which it is determined. Logicians formerly gave the name “matter” to the universal, and the name “form” to the specific difference. In any judgment we can call the given concepts logical matter (i.e., matter for the judgment), and their relation (by means of the copula) the form of the judgment. In every being the constituent elements of it (*essentialia*) are (1) the matter and (2) the essential form, the mode in which they are combined in one thing. Also as regards things in general unlimited reality was viewed as the matter of all possibility, and its limitations (negation) as being the form by which one thing is distinguished from others according to transcendental concepts.⁴

Initially, matter is understood here positively as determinable and form as what determines. Then Kant mentions a series of applications of these concepts, where, according to the matter at issue, each time something different is introduced in a context of matter and form. This makes possible a characterization of the structure of concept, structure of judgment, and structure of being as such. However, the terms “determinable” and “determining” can be applied to all kinds of things and in various respects as characterizations of contexts. The reason for this is that this characterization, taken objectively, does not say anything at all; and when something is characterized by these concepts, still no interpretation is achieved. Kant, too, fails to inquire further into the admittedly difficult origin of these concepts and their actual categorial function. We shall take this problem up as soon as the interpretation of the *Critique* has reached the appendix, regarding the concepts of reflection.

For the time being let us keep in mind that the term *form* designates *what determines (determining)*. With this we get a certain orientation on the explication of space and time as pure forms of intuition. But we get nothing beyond such an orientation. For now the real task begins, namely the task of making phenomenologically clear *in what way* space and time are purely determining factors in intuiting, according to their specific character as pure intuitions—how indeed space and time as such determining factors are not objects and nevertheless are not nothing.

Space and time are forms of intuition. Intuition is letting a manifold be encountered, letting an ordered or disordered manifold be encountered—a manifold which is arranged in such and such a way, beside one another, above one another, behind one another. Space as *form* should *determine* this letting be encountered of a manifold thus ordered; and

indeed as *pure form*—i.e., in this letting-be-encountered—space is what determines *in advance*. But how are we to understand this determining in advance? Space is not something active; and, even more so, space is not something that affects us in terms of sensation. Pure intuition, this determining in advance, occurs “even without any actual object of the senses.”⁵ This determining also is not a thinking, because space and time are pure intuitions. Thus the problem: When an intuitive encounter with an ordered manifold occurs, how does space function as determining—a determining that determines in advance this encounter as such?

At the same time Kant maintains that space and time are “original representations” and “original intuitions.” Space, however, is not *intuitus originarius*, because such an intuition does not at all fit a finite being like human beings. This is to say that humans as such are by no means the free creators of space and time, but as finite beings they intuit in terms of *intuitus derivativus*—*letting something already given in advance be encountered*. Certainly pure intuition does not come about in terms of sensation; and yet—if space and time are “represented as infinite magnitudes that are *given*”—pure intuition is a mode of giving. “Original representation” means giving something to oneself directly, although not first creating it totally. Such a direct giving of the unified whole of space as the ground for the possibility of limitations to individual spaces—such a direct giving prior to any concept is what Kant calls “original representation” without thereby meaning *intuitus originarius*. The non-original *intuitus*—space and time—is originally as intuition, which is a giving intuition over against subsequent conceptual determinations or limitations.

Now how does space function as the determiner when an intuitive encounter with a manifold takes place, determining such that it determines the encounter as such? Let us transpose ourselves into such an encounter with certain things that are ordered in a certain way, beside one another, above one another, and behind one another. To do this, we do not need a special arranging, because things which surround us encounter in this manner. The metaphysical exposition already made clear that space exists as a ground. But how? Manifold things which are ordered beside one another do not encounter as a manifold of mere somethings. The manifold does not encounter as if every something within this manifold is distinct from the other as in each case *something*. The mutual differentiation is precisely one that is specific and determined in each case by place and situation. In other words when we only think two objects—a and b as two somethings—we cannot conclude from this, their difference, that one is not the other or vice versa, we cannot conclude that a is beside or next to b, behind or above b. These objects

4. Ibid., B 322, A 266f.

5. Ibid., B 35, A 21.

do not need to be spatially subordinated to one another; they can also be placed over one another in a non-spatial manner. But even if they are placed over one another in this way, this does not say that they differ from one another as a something and an other.

In the manifold to be encountered, as what is spatially ordered, there is thus more than an empty manifold of somethings merely formally differentiated. But of what does this given *ordered* manifold now consist? Wherever what is ordered is encountered, *what is ordered* is brought together each time in view of a certain *unity*. This becomes clear when we look more carefully at what belongs to *order*. Let us assume that we are actively ordering (what is mostly not the case, but this active ordering clarifies what ordering is essentially). Granting a manifold of balls of different color, weight, size, and material, and as regards each property there are respectively several specimens—all lying around pell-mell, chaotically and disordered. We can now order these balls with respect to their color, weight, material structure, or size. In order to be able to order these balls at all, we must look in advance at the intimate connection according to which these balls must be brought together. We must view the unity with regard to which the chaos is to be separated and brought together. Orderedness of the manifold is only possible if a unity is given in advance, in terms of which what is ordered comes together as so ordered. The manifold could not at all be encountered as a *spatially ordered manifold* if we did not already in advance have a view of *spatial relations as such*, i.e., have a view of the spatial relations in general, such as next to, above, before or in front of. Only within an advance view of spatial relations *as such*—e.g., the three dimensions—is something disclosed to us in advance *wherein*, or *in terms of which*, what is encountered can be encountered as ordered by this *definite* next-to, before or in front of, and behind.

Thus in intuitive encountering which lets a spatially ordered manifold be encountered, there necessarily lies an advance viewing of spatial relations as such. However (and this is important and must be seen phenomenologically), these spatial relations as such, which we view in advance, are nevertheless not given to us as objects to which we are directed intuitively or even comprehendingly. By simply finding what is spatially extant, we are directly oriented toward certain spatially ordered things in their *definite* way of being next to one another; but we are not directed toward spatial relations *as such*. Nevertheless we are and *must be* oriented towards these relations if we are to find as already given the definite being next to one another. This advance viewing-into is a constituent and structural moment of intuiting what is ordered or disordered—for disorder is simply a mode of ordering and what applies fundamentally to the one applies also to the other.

That which we view in advance, or more precisely that which we

have always already taken into view, is *disclosed to us* insofar as we are oriented toward it; but *having a view* of spatial relations as such is not an *objectification* of them. In advance viewing, these relations are not comprehended, but are given to us non-objectively. Insofar as we exist, we always already exist into the space without turning the space into an object or even a theme. Being oriented in space is still free from objectification of space. We need a special science, that of geometry, in order to discover the plenitude of what lies in space as such.

Let us keep in mind the following result. In the empirical intuition of certain things that are ordered and extant in certain spatial relations, there is necessarily an advance viewing of pure spatial relations of space as such which is free of objectification. This advance viewing of the non-objectively disclosed space makes possible the empirical intuition of what is spatially extant. This means that it is this “having a view of” which *guides* empirical intuition in advance, *leads it*, and *in this sense determines it*. This “having a view of space,” which occurs in advance and is non-objective, is a basic structure of that encounter which allows what is spatially extant to be encountered. As such, this “having a view” *determines* the empirical intuiting and for this reason can be called “form.” However, from the mere concept of form we cannot infer at all in what way space is supposed to be a form.

That which we view non-objectively in the characterized viewing is space itself, i.e., *what is intuited* in advance in this viewing. But now it was also shown to what extent what is intuited is neither something *extant* nor any kind of *object* comprehended in its own right. And still what is intuited is not nothing but is exactly that in terms of which alone what is ordered in a certain way can be ordered—and must be ordered as spatial. As that “in terms of which” the characterized viewing takes place, space is thus what primarily determines all empirical, spatial intuiting, in terms of structure. Space is the form of sensible intuition, i.e., of intuiting. That space and time are forms of intuiting means that they are primarily ways of determining how intuiting is to occur, namely on the basis of the non-objectifiable viewing in advance of what constitutes the purely next to one another, or purely subsequent to one another. These pure relations are in themselves a whole and are given as such.

As a process, *pure* intuiting indicates what structurally *determines* intuiting. This pure intuiting is itself not yet knowledge, but is certainly a crucial segment of synthetic knowledge *a priori*, as we shall see. So far we were only concerned with seeing the extent to which space and time are “forms,” i.e., determining factors in intuiting what is extant.

Space and time are “intuitions without things,” i.e., they are not brought about by what is extant. They do not represent what is extant, and still they are not intuitions without *what is intuited*. Kant says: “Space

and time are forms of pre-figuration [*Vorbildung*] in intuition.”⁶ The expression “pre-figuration” is not accidental; and we shall come back to the pure intuition as “imagination,” as *ens imaginarium*, when we sum up the characteristics of space and time. Here we would like only to emphasize that Kant considers pure forms of intuition as that which provides empirical intuition with something in advance of it, that which holds an image in front of empirical intuition. If we designate space and time as the “in terms of which” of an advance “having a view,” then we need of course a more radical interpretation of what belongs to such a pure “having a view”—for example of time—how the original connection of a now with what precedes and follows it is originally intuitable. Then it must become clear what is meant by such remarkable phrases as the following: “Thus time is the condition for the play of sensation, but space the condition for the play of figures [*Gestalten*].”⁷ Play distinguishes itself by the absence of constraint; it is free. And yet play is not without direction and rhythm. Space and time as pure viewing are play—i.e., they are not tied to the extant, but are a free enacting of the pure manifold of what is intuited in them. The *pure* intuition of time, the rapport and comportment with the now, just now and at once, is not tied to a *definite* extant. We may alter our comportment at random; we can comport ourselves playfully. In all this we play with time, or more accurately, time plays with itself. Space and time are forms of pre-figuration according to the way in which what is extant is encountered intra-temporally and intra-spatially. Space and time *pre-figure the space of the play* [*Spiel-Raum*] which is the dimension within which what is extant can be encountered, a dimension to and within which what is extant engages itself [*einspielt*]. We shall come to understand more originally these phenomena of free-play and of the power of imagination.

The form of intuition is that which fundamentally belongs to the intuiting of the extant. This form is the determining factor in intuition as such. At the same time this *determining factor* is itself *intuition*. But because of this, the form as determining factor is not an achievement of the *spontaneity of understanding*; and space and time are not determinations of understanding, or categories. But at a significant juncture in the *Critique* Kant speaks indeed of a “formal intuition” for which understanding is constitutive. This misled the Marburg interpreters of Kant, with a supposedly genuine appeal to Kant himself, to explicate space and time as forms of intuition in terms of the formal intuition and to dissolve the transcendental aesthetic into the (transcendental) logic. Hence we must deal with the difference between “forms of intuition” and “formal intu-

ition,” for the purpose of further clarification and for securing the original independence of space and time as pure forms of intuition. Treatment of this issue will lead over into a transcendental exposition of space and time. Let us recall that Kant called the forms of intuition “original” representations. But when he now speaks of a formal intuition in addition to a “form” of intuition, then the question arises whether formal intuition, when compared to the form of intuition (which is an *original* representation), is not a *derivative* representation.

§9. The Difference between “Form of Intuition”
and “Formal Intuition”

The questionable passage in the *Critique*, where Kant speaks of space and time as formal intuition, is to be found in the note to §26 of the transcendental logic.¹ This note, as well as §26 itself, should not be ignored, as Kant here explicitly refers back to the [transcendental] aesthetic. Natorp takes this note as “a correction to the presentations of the transcendental aesthetic.”² But this note shows the opposite: The formal intuition is not an original representation but a derived one. Thus the formal intuition presupposes the form of intuition, and the form of intuition cannot be dissolved into formal intuition or degraded to it.

For the clarification of this important differentiation Kant’s manuscript “Über Kästners Abhandlungen”³ offers important information. (Cf. A. J. Dietrich, *Kants Begriff des Ganzen in seiner Raum- und Zeitlehre und das Verhältnis zu Leibniz*, 1916, IV, pp. 95–106.)

Let us first read the passage in §26 to which the note belongs:

In the representations of space and time we have *a priori forms* of outer and inner sensible intuition; and to these the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold of appearance must always conform, because in no other way can the synthesis take place at all. But space and time are represented *a priori* not merely as *forms* of sensible intuition, but as themselves *intuitions* which contain a manifold (of their own), and therefore are represented with the determination of the *unity* of this manifold (*vide* the Transcendental Aesthetic).⁴

Now we read the note itself:

1. CPR, B 161.

2. Natorp, *Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften*, p. 276.

3. See W. Dilthey, “Aus den Rostocker Kanthandschriften,” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1890, III, 79ff.; “Kants Aufsatz über Kästner und sein Anteil an einer Rezension von Johann Schultz in der Jenaer Literatur-Zeitung,” *ibid.*, p. 275ff.

4. CPR, B 160.

6. *Reflexionen*, II, 408.

7. Heinze, *Metaphysikvorlesung*, p. 191.

Space, represented as *object* (as we are required to do in geometry), contains more than mere form of intuition; it also contains *combination* of the manifold, given according to the form of sensibility, in an *intuitive* representation, so that the *form of intuition* gives only a manifold, the *formal intuition* gives unity of representation. In the Aesthetic I have treated this unity as belonging merely to sensibility, simply in order to emphasize that it precedes any concept, although, as a matter of fact, it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. For since by its means (in that the understanding determines the sensibility) space and time are first *given* as intuitions, the unity of this *a priori* intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding.⁵

The question is: What can we infer from this text with regard to the problem of the transcendental aesthetic, because for now we can deal with this passage only in its bearing on the transcendental aesthetic? In this passage (1) there is talk of space and time as *forms* of sensible intuition, (2) space and time are *pure* intuitions, (3) as such pure intuitions, as *representationes singulares purae*, space and time contain a manifold that is determined with respect to its *unity*, and (4) this manifold of what is purely after one another or next to one another—cf. the metaphysical exposition—is *in itself* a whole and is not first put together empirically. This whole as such is one; and this oneness is a peculiar and original way of the unity of this manifold—this unity is fundamentally not an additional product of a subsequent unification. Rather this whole is a one, *by itself* and *prior* to the parts.

The note to §26 deals with this unity which already lies in the content of pure intuitions as such. And Kant states explicitly that he has already dealt with this unity—which precedes all concepts and all determinations of understanding and which lies in intuition itself—in the aesthetic and has attributed this unity to sensibility, i.e., to pure intuition as such. He says there that he attributed this unity to intuition itself—i.e., to its content, to the pure manifold—even though this unity *as unity* presupposes a “synthesis.” He further states that this synthesis does not belong to the senses. But this negative statement that the unity does not belong to the senses or to sensibility is ambiguous, since, on the one hand, unity can belong to understanding or, because Kant speaks of three fundamental sources of knowledge, to the power of imagination. With this unity of the originally one wholeness Kant associates an original synthesis, which he sometimes designates explicitly as *synthesis*, as a putting together. But now, on the other hand, the expression “synthesis” is by itself not only ambiguous but it is also often used by Kant precisely when

he does not mean a putting together and gathering together by the positing, *thetic spontaneity*, but rather when he means a *putting* together which he understands more as an *intuiting* together, i.e., as letting-be-encountered. By such a *synthesis* he actually means a *synopsis*⁶—as he admittedly says too seldom—and by that he means an original giving-together, i.e., to let the together be encountered out of a unity. This letting-be-encountered already in advance out of a unity holds together more originally than any subsequent holding together of what was previously scattered about.

Pure intuition is an advance unifying giving together of the pure manifold of space and time. There is in this intuition an original togetherness whose unity is not the connecting of what is scattered, is not a synthesis. But even the expression “synopsis” is misleading, as if the manifold of pure space and pure time is only given in their one wholeness when I intuit this manifold together sequentially. Even this would be only a synthesis. Hence we need here another expression, namely *syndosis*. The verb *συνδίδωμι* means to give along with, give together, give something along with something else. Thus *σύνδοσις* means connection. We say that space and time as pure intuitions are syndotical, meaning thereby that they give the manifold as an original togetherness from unity as wholeness. (We should compare the expression “syndotical” with the word-image *ἀνέκδοτος*, which comes from *ἐκδίδωμι* and means anecdotal.) By this syndosis, which belongs to unity as wholeness, space and time are first of all *given* as intuitions, i.e., as what is purely intuited, while the unity which belongs to the *συν* of syndosis—and thus this syndosis or synopsis itself—belongs to space and time and not to the concept of understanding. This means that the unity of syndosis is not the unity which belongs to the synthesis of understanding in concepts, i.e., categories. Rather, the synthetic unity of concepts, i.e., categories, presupposes this original, intuitive, syndotical unity.

This is to say that in geometry pure space properly becomes object of a comprehension—space as what is viewed in pure intuition initially in a non-objective way but nevertheless as *one wholeness*. On the basis of an original unity as wholeness the pure manifold of spatial relations now becomes limited, and in such limitations that manifold becomes *unified unto certain spatial figures*. Here there is a conceptual determination by understanding, or a *synthesis*, as is stated at the conclusion of §38 of the *Prolegomena*:

Space is something so uniform and as to all particular properties so indeterminate that we should certainly not seek a store of laws of nature in it. Whereas

5. Ibid., B 161.

6. Ibid., A 94, A 97.

that which determines space to assume the form of a circle, or the figure of a cone and a sphere is the understanding, insofar as it contains the ground of the unity of their constructions. The mere universal form of intuition, called space, must therefore be the substratum of all intuitions determinable to particular objects; and in it, of course, the condition of the possibility and of the variety of these intuitions lies. But the unity of the objects is entirely determined by the understanding and on conditions which lie in its own nature. . . .⁷

Here we are dealing with certain limitations to certain figures of space and spatial relations which always have their *specific* unity of having been *objectively* combined. This unity of combining, of determination according to understanding, must somehow be delineated in advance for this determination. Such advance delineation of possible unities by which spatial relations are objectively combined is pre-delineated by understanding. These synthetic unities of understanding thus presuppose the syndotical unity of the givenness of intuition. Hence Kant states in the note to §26 that “the form of intuition gives only a manifold,” i.e., intuition gives the manifold in its original one [*einig*] wholeness which is self-evident according to the transcendental aesthetic. We are not supposed to understand the expression “*only* a manifold” as if there is no unity here. On the contrary, Kant says “*only*” because the manifold as one wholeness is still unaffected by any determination of understanding and does not need these determinations, even though it allows them to occur. In this sense we are also told that “*the form of intuition* gives only a manifold, but the *formal intuition* gives unity of representation.” But this unity which is given by the formal intuition and determined by thinking is not a unity which would be added to a manifold without unity. Rather, this unity is the synthetic unity which is only possible on the basis of a syndotical unity, which is given in intuition as such.

Formal intuition makes space, as the non-objective “that in terms of which” of “having a view,” into an explicit object for the first time. The *form* of intuition, i.e., pure intuition as such, as the original one wholeness grounds this objectification. For this reason Kant begins the note to §26 as follows: “Space represented as *object* (as we are required to do in geometry) contains more than mere form of intuition, it also contains *combinations* of the manifold, given according to the form of sensibility, in an *intuitive* representation.” Space is represented in geometry as object and object. This means that, through an objectification, space as originally given is now something intuited, which presupposes the original wholeness. The geometrical representation of space is a formal intuition, i.e., a form of intuition which is determined by forms of understanding or categories. Therefore this representation as thus categorically deter-

7. *Prolegomena* (Cassirer, IV, 74) [ET, pp. 68f.].

mined according to understanding is not the original intuition of space—i.e., the form of intuition—but a derived representation.

Far from correcting or dethroning the transcendental aesthetic, the note to §26 confirms even more explicitly than before the original right of the aesthetic. That Kant held on to this view even later and that he never intended to dissolve the transcendental aesthetic into the transcendental logic is shown precisely in the review of Kästner’s *Abhandlung* of 1790:

Metaphysics must show how one can *have* the representation of space, while geometry teaches how one can *describe* such a space—not through drawing but through representing *a priori*. Through the former, space is observed as *given* prior to any determination of space; through the latter, a space is *made*. In the former the space is *original* and is only one *space*; in the latter space is *derived* and there are many *spaces*. It is in regard to many spaces that the geometrician, in agreement with the metaphysician and in accordance with the basic representation of space, must acknowledge that the many spaces can only be thought as parts of the single original space.⁸

Thus we must note the fundamental difference between having something like *space* and having *one* space, which is always a limitation put on what was originally had. This is the difference between what is given originally and what was made and derived. All making and all constructing presentation are possible only on the basis of an original giving.

What we said so far about the note to §26 does not interpret it sufficiently and in all respects, but enough for our initial purposes. Later we will have to show that here, in edition B, Kant is indeed inclined to identify the original unity of the manifold of pure intuition with the equally original unity of synthetic apperception. He is so inclined, not because this is a unity of *understanding*, but because this unity, too, is *original* and makes understanding and its synthesis possible. To put it more clearly, under the title “synthesis” Kant brings together a series of quite different phenomena without differentiating them sufficiently from one another and without allowing them to emerge from their common root. Under the title synthesis he brings together (1) the *syndotical unification*, unity as the original oneness [*Einigkeit*] of wholeness, (2) the *synthetic combination*, unity as categorical concept of possible connection in judgment, (3) the unification of *syndosis and synthesis* in knowledge as thinking intuition. To bring order into this tangle of confusing ambiguities is the main intention of our interpretation; and this is not an incidental task, because we know that it is for the sake of synthesis that the whole *Critique* exists.⁹

8. Johann Schulz’ *Rezension* . . . (Cassirer, VI, 113f.).

9. CPR, B 28.

So far we saw only that there is an original unity in pure intuition which is not the unity of an additional combination but a unity which, as *originally* unifying and as a whole, proffers the parts to me—the unity of syndosis. This unity is presupposed for unification in the sense of a synthesis according to understanding. The form of intuition as pure intuition is the presupposition, the condition for the possibility of, formal intuition. So we have clarified the original autonomy of space and time as pure intuitions, and with that the central focus of what we have to deal with in §10 is also already basically shown.

§10. Transcendental Exposition of Space and Time

a) Space and Time as Conditions for the Possibility of Synthetic Knowledge *a priori*

The metaphysical exposition has shown what space and time are, namely pure intuitions. Now the transcendental exposition is to demonstrate that as these pure intuitions space and time first make possible certain kinds of knowledge *a priori*. Insofar as the pure manifold of space and time becomes accessible in these pure intuitions—prior to all experience, i.e., *a priori*—we have been given a source of knowledge which is itself *a priori*. For this reason space and time are designated in the transcendental aesthetic as sources of knowledge.¹ For only intuitions, which give a manifold as determinable, enable an expansion of knowledge beyond empty conceptual determination—enable a factual knowledge. And in fact this knowledge is given in propositions which are certain *a priori*, although they are synthetic. They are apodictic propositions, as, for example, “Space has only three dimensions,” “Time has only one dimension,” “Various times are not simultaneous but successive.” Such propositions are neither empirical propositions nor judgments of experience; nor can they be inferred from judgments of experience. They teach us prior to and not by means of experience.²

However, the propositions on time do not ground a realm in the same way as propositions on space ground the realm of geometry. But the propositions on time are the *a priori* component of the doctrine of pure motion. For Kant motion is a certain mode of change, which to him means change of place in time: “Thus our concept of time explains the possibility of that body of *a priori* synthetic knowledge which is exhibited in the general doctrine of motion, and which is by no means unfruitful.”³

1. CPR, B 55, A 38.

2. Ibid., B 47, A 31.

3. Ibid., B 49.

In this connection and for the sake of comparison, one should consider Kant's *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*.

Only time as pure intuition of pure succession renders intelligible something like motion or change of place. For change of place means that something which is in motion occupies a place and leaves that place behind already in occupying it; what is in motion is extant in one place and simultaneously not extant in the same place. This is what Plato already noticed: Motion is determined by a contradictory predicate. That something both is and is not in the same respect is a formal contradiction; and therefore, according to Kant, motion cannot be logically graspable. Only in the horizon of successiveness can I understand something like motion. Only in the horizon of time is the transition from something to something graspable. “Only in time can two contradictorily opposed predicates meet in one and the same object, namely *one after the other*.”⁴

Here I want merely to emphasize that as pure intuitions space and time are sources of knowledge and in fact sources for ontological, *a priori* knowledge, which in turn grounds the possibility of certain ontic knowledge. In connection with the transcendental exposition of space and time there arises, however, a difficulty with respect to the transcendental aesthetic as such. Space and time provide the basis for propositions of the doctrine of pure motion as an *a priori* discipline. Accordingly, motion, too, would have to belong to the task-field assigned to the transcendental aesthetic. Kant states that the concept of motion “unites” “both elements”⁵ of space and time. Because of the intimate connection of motion with the transcendental aesthetic, Kant was for a long time uncertain and finally decided against including motion in the aesthetic and against placing motion alongside space and time: “Initially I doubted whether motion belongs to the transcendental aesthetic. Now I realize that, because motion implies something which moves in space and therefore indicates change of something with respect to relations [space and time], motion does not contain mere sensibility but an intellectual concept.”⁶

Here we must gain some approximate clarity about the phenomenon of motion in its broadest sense, because we shall come upon this phenomenon in its original dimension in Kant's subsequent expositions in the transcendental logic.

b) The Phenomena of Motion and Change

Motion is a change of place in time—does this mean that motion is a mixture of space and time? No! For a spatial and temporal relation is

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., B 58, A 41.

6. *Reflexionen*, II, 326.

not yet motion. Motion needs something which moves or is in motion. Kant states that something *empirical* is presupposed here—something determinately extant must be given. Properly considered, this argument is, of course, not effective. Basic to the issue in the ontological sense is not so much that what moves is *empirically given*, but that what moves—prior to all givenness—is *thought as something extant of itself and in a certain way as something that is permanent* [Beharrendes]. Otherwise it would be impossible to understand that what is identically and determinately in motion occupies various places. Thus the categorical determination of *substantiality* of what is in motion belongs to the phenomenon of motion. But according to Kant's systematic account substance as category or concept of understanding belongs to the transcendental logic. By contrast it is precisely the transcendental aesthetic that isolates pure intuition, rather than all determinations of understanding. Consequently, the phenomenon of motion does not fall into its domain: "Motion is something that occurs, so it belongs to the real appearances and not to the mere form of sensibility. Motion presupposes something moving, something which changes its place. This 'something' cannot be known *a priori* but presupposes empirical concepts, including concepts of understanding."⁷

But we must inquire whether all motion is only a determination of real appearances or objects, so that, as an ontic formulation [*Gebilde*], motion falls outside all ontology and transcendental philosophy. Or are there besides motion of ob-jects still other "motions"? In fact Kant is aware of a still totally different kind of motion, namely "motion as an act of the subject."⁸ This motion as act is originally connected with the kind of being that the subject is and so with time itself.

But what about the elemental phenomenon of *change*? Motion is a certain kind of change, i.e., change of place. However, not every change is a change of place. Is not time itself as the pure succession of now the purest change? But Kant maintains: "Time itself does not alter, but only something which is in time."⁹ "The existence of what is transitory passes away in time but not time itself."¹⁰ Time is "itself non-transitory and abiding."¹¹ "Thus the time in which all change of appearances has to be thought, remains and does not change."¹² Of course in Kant's sense one could gather from the thesis that time *is* what endures, that *time* changes because only what endures can change—change implies that something which as itself, the same and lasting, becomes something different.

7. Ibid., II, 325.

8. CPR, B 155, cf. note to this section and also B 250, A 204f.

9. Ibid., B 58, A 41.

10. Ibid., B 183, A 144.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., B 225.

Change as such is a change of states. However, the transitory itself does not change; rather as unchangeable it will be exchanged against others.¹³

I deliberately call attention to the phenomena of transition, change, alteration, modification, motion, and happening. When Kant in the transcendental aesthetic excludes the motion of ob-jects, the change of place, etc., this must not gloss over the fact that, according to the Kantian interpretation of these phenomena, in the end motion—understood more originally—has a far more radical function in the entirety of ontology than space and time. Certainly time as pure intuition is the presupposition for the possibility of experience of changes of place; change is only experienceable as intra-temporal. But this does not exclude the possibility that, conversely, motion in a more original sense is the presupposition for time as Kant understands time. Already in Aristotle there emerges the enigmatic reciprocal relation between time and motion, according to which on the one hand there is time only on the basis of motion, and on the other hand there is motion only on the basis of time.

However, within the transcendental exposition of space and time Kant's leading intention is to show that and how pure *a priori* knowledge of space, respectively the determination of time, is possible—namely only insofar as space and time are comprehended as pure forms of intuition.

Up to now we have dealt with space and time in an undefined equality of rank as two forms of intuition which happen to exist—space, and then time. "This peculiarity of our understanding . . . is as little capable of further explanation as to why we have just these and no other functions of judgment, or why space and time are the only forms of our possible intuition."¹⁴ Of course, in our general exposition of the problem of the possibility of ontological knowledge, of *synthetic judgments a priori*, we pointed out that it is precisely *time* that plays a foundational role in the resolution of this fundamental problem of the *Critique* and appears in all of its basic doctrines. From what we heard so far about space and time, we cannot even presume anything like a priority of time over space. On the contrary, it is the spatiality of the extant which appears far more immediately and obtrusively than its time-determination. And Kant himself frequently stresses that without the intuition of space we would not be able to represent anything extant. The question becomes whether there is not already visible in the transcendental aesthetic a *priority of time* and in what way this occurs.

13. Cf. *ibid.*, B 230, A 187.

14. *Ibid.*, B 145f.

§11. The Priority of Time over Space as Form of Intuition

a) Time as Universal Form of Appearances

How initially space and time are roughly arranged in relationship to each other in Kant can be determined more clearly by referring space as well as time each to a realm of the extant as formal conditions *a priori*. For the sake of comparison one needs to refer to sections b and c of §6 of the transcendental aesthetic. Space is the formal condition of the physical. This means that space enables in advance the encounter with the extant which becomes accessible in *that* intuition which is not directed to us but away from us. Kant calls this intuition, which allows beings other than ourselves to be encountered, *outer* intuition. Accordingly, space is the pure form of outer intuition.

What allows beings to be encountered that we ourselves are is called *inner* intuition and means encountering the states which make up our being extant: "Inner sense perceives the relations of its determinations only in time, hence a passing away where no durability of observation occurs, as is necessary for experience."¹ The *inner sense* is the empirical experience of beings that we ourselves are, understood as *extant* objects. Inner sense is the *empirical self-consciousness* or *personalitas psychologica*. It thereby becomes clear that Kant grasps both the manner of being that things in nature have as well as the manner of being that humans have ontologically as being-extant—or in his terminology, as "existence" or "reality."

But where does the inner intuition come from which allows the beings which we ourselves are to be encountered? In this intuition no spatial shapes, no spatial positions and arrangements of appearances are shown to us, but rather a sequence of states—representations, volitions, and moods. In fact these states are not shown as things that are statically extant, but rather as something changing in a sequence. What gets encountered here exists in advance with respect to the succession of time. Hence time is "the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state."² Time determines "the relation of representations in our inner state."³

Summing up, we can say: Space is the pure form of outer intuition, and time is the pure form of inner intuition. Time "cannot be a determination of outer appearances; it has to do neither with shape or position. . . ."⁴ "And just because this inner intuition yields no shape, we

endeavor to make up for this lack by analogies. We represent the time-sequence by a line progressing to infinity, in which the manifold constitutes a series of one dimension only; and we reason from the properties of this line to all the properties of time, with this one exception that while the parts of the line are simultaneous the parts of time are always successive. From this fact also, that all the relations of time allow of being expressed in an outer intuition, it is evident that the representation is itself an intuition."⁵ We must hold on to the sentence from section b of §6, which reads: "Time cannot be a determination of outer appearances." Right after this, section c begins with this sentence: "Time is the formal condition *a priori* of all appearances, whatsoever." Thus time is the formal condition *a priori* of both inner and outer appearances. Thus time is given priority over space, because space is the formal condition of the physical, while time is the formal condition of both the physical and the psychic. How are these two theses to be reconciled? How does Kant justify the priority of time over space?

First of all it is noteworthy that Kant denies that time is a determination of outer appearances, even as we say of things in nature—like stars—that they move in time. Changes in nature, such as coming to be and going out of existence, growth and decline, occur in time. The ancients directly experienced nature's as well as heaven's and heavenly bodies' being-in-time so much that they identified heaven itself with time. How can Kant dispute time-determinateness or intra-temporality of physical things?

On the other hand, we cannot flatly say that Kant would like to conceive the appearances of outer intuition as supra-temporal, because his second thesis states: "Time is the formal condition *a priori* of all appearances whatsoever." The first thesis disputes the inner-temporality of what is physically extant; the other thesis attributes inner-temporality to the physically extant. How can these opposing statements go together? Does the first thesis—according to which "time cannot be a determination of outer appearances"—exclude the legitimacy of the second thesis? Put differently, how can time have a priority over space, that is, how can the spatial be determined as intra-temporal in such a way that the first thesis can still be maintained? Or must this thesis be given up in any case, not only in order to keep the second thesis, but also because the manner in which outer appearances are given as phenomena speaks for the second thesis and against the first?

To be sure, as formal condition *a priori*, space is limited to outer appearances, only these are spatial in the sense of spatial extension, in

1. Kant, *Anthropologie*, §4 (Cassirer, VIII, 18).

2. CPR, B 49, A 33.

3. Ibid., B 50, A 33.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

the sense of taking up space thought spatially. Correspondingly, is time too limited to our own states, to representations? What does it mean when we say these are intra-temporal? It means that these representations follow one another in time as existing, emerging, and disappearing states. When we completely set aside *what* in each case we represent in representations and when we completely set aside “*that toward which*” [wozu] we comport ourselves in our ways of comportment—as existing states and as determinations of the mind, these representations fall in time. But the Kantian deliberation continues: If all representations of the one who represents, if all comportments necessarily and immediately fall in time, then *what is represented* in these representations, thus what is intuited in *outer* intuition, also falls in time. This roundabout way through the immediacy of intra-temporality of representing leads us to the intra-temporality of what is represented. Thus outer appearances are not immediately intra-temporal but are so only through mediation. Kant’s first thesis, “Time cannot be a determination of outer appearances,” only denies the *immediate* intra-temporality of physical objects. However, this thesis allows for the possibility of a time-determination of objects of outer intuition as *mediated*. Only insofar as physical things are *what is represented* and insofar as representing occurs intra-temporally, are physical things also intra-temporal.

We shall see later how Kant arrives at such a thesis and in what respect the thesis is defensible and in what respect it is not. For now we must bear in mind that already in the transcendental aesthetic Kant indeed attributes a priority to time to the extent that time is the formal condition of outer, spatial appearances, even though only mediately.

Argumentation which goes from the intra-temporality of outer intuiting as a psychic event to the intra-temporality of what is intuited in outer intuition becomes a lot easier for Kant in view of the fluctuating ambiguity of the expressions “intuition” and “representation,” which means equally what is represented. What applies to representation thus applies also to what is represented.

The thesis on time as the universal form of all representing first receives its fundamental ontological meaning and expansion in the transcendental logic. Let us initially only superficially refer to a passage with which a basic segment of the transcendental logic—that of the transcendental deduction of categories—begins:

Whatever the origin of our representations, whether they are due to the influence of outer things, or are produced through inner causes, whether they arise *a priori*, or being appearances have an empirical origin, they must all, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. All our knowledge is thus finally subject to time, the formal condition of inner sense. In it they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relation. This is a general observation

which, throughout what follows, must be borne in mind as being quite fundamental.⁶

Time is the universal form of appearances. Whenever we regard all that is extant (physical or psychic) and insofar as we allow such beings to be encountered, we see in each case, non-objectively and in advance, the pure sequence of time. But we must not fail to note something remarkable here: Time is the universal form, the determining factor for the outer and inner intuition. And yet time is emphatically assigned to inner intuition. As modes of viewing in advance, as pure intuitions, space and time are modes according to which the experiencing subject *exists*. But beyond this subjectivity, which is equally befitting both forms of intuition, time as form of inner sense is to a certain extent more subjective than space. Consequently, Kant takes time to be more originally bound to the subject, to the I, to human Dasein, than space. We find this discovery already in Aristotle, in Book IV of the Physics, chapters 10–14. In chapter 14 (223a 15ff.) we read: “It is also worth considering more closely how time is related to the soul,” since time appears in whatever is physical insofar as the whole world occurs in time. Aristotle asks whether time would cease to be if there would be no soul, and he answers: ὁδύνατον εἶναι χρόνον ψυχῆς μὴ οὐσίας [time is impossible without the existence of the soul]. Aristotle’s interpretation is, of course, still quite unclear. But this recognition is an important discovery for the philosophical situation of Aristotle.

We must focus on this *twofold* character of time, which consists in (1) its *belonging, more originally than* space, to the subject, to the I, to our *own self* and (2) notwithstanding this more original subjectivity, its being still the *form of all appearances*. Only by heeding this twofold determination can we succeed in illuminating the *specific* interpretation of time according to which for Kant time emerges in the end as *self-affection*.

b) The Original Subjectivity of Time in Its Expression as Self-Affection

In the general characterization of intuition as finite, we saw that the finitude of intuition consists in intuition’s allowing something already extant to encounter me in intuiting. We saw that intuition does not produce the extant. Because our intuiting is one which allows the encounter, what is encountered must concern us, pertain to us, and affect us from out of itself. In intuition’s way of being as finite is grounded the necessity of affection through the senses. Time like space is an “infinitely *given* magnitude,” is “represented as given.”⁷ Nevertheless the pure se-

6. Ibid., A 98f.

7. Ibid., B 40, A 25.

quence of nows, pure succession of time, is not perceived; nows as such do not affect us through some kind of sense organ. Time as such is not at all experienced as something empirically extant. Rather, only what is intra-temporally extant is empirically experienced.

But on the other hand, time is pure intuition, which allows encounter of pure succession to occur in having a view which has been characterized as in advance and non-objective. And this having a view of something is a comportment of the subject. Purely out of itself and at the same time unto itself, this intuiting allows us to encounter time. Thus the pure intuition of time is an enactment, independent of experience, in which the succession is encountered. And with this succession something encounters the self which the self from out of itself allows to come unto itself, something which the self itself is somehow and which the self shapes in advance for itself as this, giving to itself in advance. Here the self is touched and affected by time in a pure, *a priori* manner which is free of sensation, in such a way that the self itself as intuiting of time is the ground for its being affected by time. But this affection is not an empirical affection through the sense organs; rather it is an affecting through finite intuition. Sensibility as such, affection, is pure; and pure intuition of time itself allows itself to be encountered.

Hence prior to all experience time is the original pure *self-affection*: being touched, independently of experience, by something which only affects us and concerns us on the basis of the letting-be-encountered which the self has so enacted.

It is only in the second edition that Kant explicitly came upon this basic structure of time as pure self-affection and used it in the decisive segments of his *Critique*. For now it should be enough to indicate the general direction which Kant's interpretation of time as self-affection takes. With this interpretation Kant achieved the most radical understanding of time, one that was not achieved either before or after Kant. Of course, there are only preliminary openings in Kant; and a comprehensive and conceptually sufficient interpretation is lacking. Especially, we miss [in Kant] a justification in principle of why time can and indeed must be self-affection. This can be shown only on the basis of a more original explication of the concept of time. If we consider only Kant's brief statements on self-affection and if we take into account difficulties which inhere in this problematic in general, then it is no wonder that this basic piece of the Kantian conception of time has so far remained un-understood and has not been utilized for the central problematic of the *Critique*—although, as we shall show, this basic piece of the *Critique* holds the key to its core problem. However, from out of the original context of the transcendental aesthetic and in connection with the characterization of the priority of time, we must first of all make time visible as pure self-affection. We can attempt a fundamental expli-

cation of time as self-affection only when we survey the entire realm of the segments which belong to pure knowledge in general—pure intuition, pure thinking, and their possible pure unification.

What we dealt with in the five sections of the interpretation of the transcendental aesthetic presented so far was, taken by itself, relatively clear, although not intelligible and objectively satisfying in all respects. It was not predominantly satisfying because an obscurity permeated the whole discussion—an obscurity which again and again kept us from accurately and clearly grasping the phenomena of space and time. The question which came up again and again was: *Are space and time something ob-jective or something subjective?*

In view of Kant's polemical position over against Newton and Leibniz, we know that for Kant space and time are not extant within something else which is extant. But this means also that space and time are not *psychically extant*, are not subjective in the sense of *processes of the soul*. For time is not a being which is intuited in inner intuiting, but rather the form of this intuition. That is, time is the in advance having a view which makes possible such an intuiting of psychic processes. Space and time are nothing subjective in the sense of being psychic; they are nothing ob-jective in the sense of being physical. And yet they are modes of intuiting which lie ready in the mind and they are also something intuited—thus they are again “subjective” and “ob-jective.” How are we to understand these concepts? Is the Kantian analysis here no longer enough? Space and time lie ready *in the mind*; and they are still and at the same time determinations of appearances, *of objects*, of beings which are other than this mind. They are not only an intuiting, but a wholeness, one in itself, and as such “represented as given.” How are these statements to be reconciled with each other? How does Kant connect the basic determinations of space and time in a clear and intelligible way?

We shall get acquainted with this issue in the last section of our interpretation of the transcendental aesthetic. In connections with space, pages B42, A26 to B46, A30 should be brought into play; with regard to time, pages B50ff., A34ff.—moreover, in each case, the “conclusions from above concepts.” §8 (pages B62ff., A45ff.) also needs to be studied, as it contains almost word for word the same argumentation—formulated especially precisely. Our aim is to appropriate the text with one stroke, by clarifying and re-executing each individual step.

§12. Summary Characterization of Space and Time,
Their “Empirical Reality” and “Transcendental Ideality”

It looks as if, with the help of the differentiated characteristics of space and time as empirically real and at the same time transcendently ideal

intuitions, Kant could resolve all difficulties which force themselves upon us with respect to the subjectivity or objectivity of space and time. Without a doubt we understand Kant's way of posing the problem and resolving it only to the extent that we can understand this characterization of space and time. But apart from the Kantian inquiry, when we reflect on the empirical reality and transcendental ideality in their connection, the fundamental and inherent difficulties of interpretation of space and time reveal themselves. Therefore our interpretation of the transcendental aesthetic in no way concludes with a complete and unquestionable insight into the way of being of space and time. Rather we are left with a problem. And this problem is not an accidental one, but rather a problem which strikes at the roots of the Kantian question of laying the foundation of metaphysics.

As pure intuitions space and time are the advance, non-objective view taken of the pure whole of the manifold of being-beside-one-another and being-subsequent-to-one-another in general. In such a manner space and time each gives itself as a whole—intuited non-objectively in pure intuitions—in the horizon of which whole we encounter the extant which is accessible either in outer or inner experience. Right at the beginning of our interpretation of space and time as intuitions we emphasized that, although space and time as infinite given magnitudes are what is intuited (an *ens imaginarium*), Kant nevertheless understands them primarily as manners of *intuiting* in advance what is encountered, hence as *basic comportments of human Dasein*, as “determinations of our mind,” of subjectivity.

Although this subjective character emerges from the beginning, we did not inquire more closely into this character—as we postponed all questions concerning the subject, mind, and self—simply in order to work out *what* is intuited in these pure intuitions and *how* it is intuited. Up to now we were not concerned with this subjectivity of space and time. On the other hand we had to mention right at the beginning that space and time are not extant among other extant things.

However undetermined the Kantian concept of subject and of the self in particular may have remained, nevertheless right at the outset we arrived at a crucial determination, namely that of *human finitude*. It is precisely this determination that is totally misconstrued in conventional Kant-interpretation or is not grasped in the central significance which it has for Kant's inquiry and solution. Not only is human intuition finite, but also, and perhaps in a far more original way, is thinking finite. Thus it is that in the philosophical tradition God's “thinking” is an *intuition*—the original and actual νοεῖν is not διανοεῖσθαι but νοεῖν purely and simply.

A summary characterization of space and time as pure intuitions must in principle be oriented toward the finitude of intuition. Only thereby can the twofold characterization of space and time as empirically real

and transcendently ideal become intelligible. Insofar as we are, insofar as we exist, we are finite. The finitude of Dasein can be shown and radically clarified only out of Dasein itself. It does not need the idea of being created, nor the presupposition of a creator God—what traditionally occupies the background in Kant. Only then does the actual finitude become visible, otherwise we are thinking only of a superficial finitude.

As finite, Dasein is referred to an extant which is encountered. This ontic intuition of the extant is only possible on the basis of pure intuiting. Space and time as pure forms of intuitions are conditions for the finitude of intuition, and thereby they are the most acute indicators of the finitude of Dasein, precisely because they must be encountered in advance.

Therefore for finite Dasein beings thus uncovered in space and time manifest themselves. Spatial determinations belong to beings themselves so encountered, i.e., objects as appearances. Appearances as appearances, as beings so encountered, are themselves spatial and intra-temporal. Spatial and temporal determinations belong to that which the encountered being is; they belong to appearances, to things (*res*); and they are as *belonging to res*. Space and time are *real* and *belong to the factual determination of the factuality of appearances*. Kant puts it more precisely by saying that space and time have *empirical reality*. This does not mean that space and time are something real in the sense of being extant. Being real is not identical with being extant. It means rather that space and time belong to the factual character of objects. The neo-Kantian epistemological interpretation totally mistook the significance of reality and identified it with actuality, that is with what is objectively real. Correspondingly, the neo-Kantian interpretation mistook “objective” in the sense of intersubjectively objective reality. Kant's “objective reality” was interpreted as follows: By “objective reality” Kant means the constitution of objective knowledge as an inner process of thinking, so that out of this process there emerges, so to speak, a knowledge which applies objectively to what is real or what is actual. This interpretation is pure fantasy! “Objectively real” means belonging to the factuality of objects, objects, and appearances. “Empirically real” means the same: belonging to the factual character of objects insofar as they become accessible to us through empirical and finite experience.

Space and time are empirically real, but they do not have *absolute reality*, as Kant formulates it in B52, A35, with respect to time. This formulation makes it clear that with the empirical Kant means what is relative and finite. Kant expresses the thesis that space and time have only an empirical but not absolute reality as follows: They are *transcendental ideality*. *Transcendental* means a possible mode of knowledge *a priori*. *Ideal* means not real, not belonging to the factuality, to a *what* which belongs to something—not a what, a nothing. The statement “space and time are transcendently ideal” means that, if a being is understood as

intuited in an *absolute intuition* which first produces this being, then we ignore the finitude of intuiting and its conditions, i.e., pure forms of intuiting, space and time. Seen from within the horizon of *intuitus originarius*, they are *nothing*. Now this absolute intuiting is totally *a priori*, an intuiting which is accomplished purely from out of the subject, out of pure self-activity. It is a totally *a priori* mode of knowledge, i.e., it is *transcendental*. Space and time, considered transcendently, are nothing—they are thus not real, but *ideal*. To be sure, we can represent something by space and time. But as finite, this representing does not mean anything if we begin with an absolute intuition. For in an absolute intuition we do not have a thing [*Sache*] to which space and time as factual determinations could be attributed, and therefore they are nothing. Hence Kant states: "It is, therefore, solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of space, of extended things, etc. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can have outer intuition, namely, liability to be affected by objects, the representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever."¹ Kant says the same thing about time: "If we abstract from *our* mode of inwardly intuiting ourselves—the mode of intuition in terms of which we likewise take up into our faculty of representation all outward intuitions—and so take objects as they may be in themselves, then time is nothing."² Insofar as things may be thought of as correlates of an absolute intuition, space and time are "nothing"; they have no possible reality, no factual determination in an object. For the transcendental object "remains unknown to us,"³ that is, the object of a purely *a priori* intuition of things is closed off to us.

But in our actual experience, in our comportment toward beings, we never inquire into things themselves, into things as they are thought by an absolute creator. Rather we inquire into what is accessible to us who make the inquiry. As finite existing Dasein, we know beings only insofar as they are disclosed to us. And only within these limits are they a possible problem. We cannot at all say that things themselves are in space and time. We cannot say this, not because such a statement for whatever reasons would be undemonstrable, but because such a statement coming from a finite intuition has no meaning at all:

For we cannot judge in regard to the intuitions of other thinking beings, whether they are bound by the same conditions as those which limit our intuition and which for us are universally valid. If we add to the concept of the subject of a judgment the limitation under which the judgment is made, the judgment is then unconditionally valid. The proposition, that all things are side by side in space, is valid under the limitation that these things are

viewed as objects of our sensible intuition. If, now, I add the condition to the concept and say that all things, as outer appearances, are side by side in space, the rule is valid universally and without limitation.⁴

Space and time have empirical reality and transcendental ideality at the same time. Kant once said of space that, when we ignore "its mere subjective quality, space is still a constituent of the knowledge of things as appearances."⁵ However, Kant explicitly warns against a grave misunderstanding of the subjectivity of space and time, which would consist in putting their subjective character on a par with the subjective character of colors and taste. He mentions this in passages in A28f. and B62, A45. These qualities—for example, "the good taste of a wine"—do not belong to the object itself but only to the special constitution of the sense organs of the subject who enjoys this wine. Color and taste are accidental effects of a special organization of humans which is connected with the finite intuition. But these qualities are not necessary conditions for us to encounter beings as extant. These sense qualities are determinations of empirical psychophysical subjectivity, but they are not determinations of objects themselves or of appearances. By contrast space and time are modes of the finite subject as such, notwithstanding its factual psychophysical organization. And precisely for this reason they are simultaneously real determinations of objects, i.e., appearances.

Kant indicates that, when we come to know objects as such, we could easily be misled into believing that we had known things themselves. This means that we are constantly under the domination of an absolutization of our finitude "and this in spite of the fact that in the world of sense, however deeply we inquire into its objects, we have to do with nothing but appearances."⁶ Insofar as we make this mistake, we are inclined to turn *the transcendental ontological distinction between thing itself and appearance into an empirical ontic distinction*. Then we consider the rainbow as a mere appearance when it rains while sun is shining, and we consider by contrast the raindrops as things themselves which can appear differently to different observers in manifold infractions of light. But taken *ontologically*, these supposed things themselves—raindrops, their round shape, indeed the space—are appearances understood as beings that become accessible in finite intuition. Thus in the entire realm of appearances we do not come upon things themselves at all. Hence the distinction between appearance and things themselves cannot be illustrated on the basis of the difference between sense qualities and spatial determinations. As something spatially extant, rain is an appear-

1. CPR, B 42, A 26.

2. Ibid., B 51, A 34.

3. Ibid., B 63, A 46.

4. Ibid., B 43, A 27.

5. *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, p. xlii.

6. CPR, B 62f., A 45.

ance no less than the rainbow. For “appearance” simply does not mean something like a random way of conceiving on the part of the subject. The term *appearance* means beings themselves, what is extant from out of itself and what announces itself as such.

But how can determinations of space and time belong to the factuality of appearances if they are still modes of the intuiting subject? How can space and time lose their subjectivity in such a way as to become determinations of objects and without being extant as objects? Or to put the question differently, how can space and time as determinations of what is extant accommodate us from the side of the extant when it is precisely the subject that extends them to the appearances? How can space and time remain subjective and still function objectively? How is subjectivity itself ontologically structured so that, insofar as this subjectivity exists, something subjective is objectified in the subject as something objective?

These are questions for whose answers a straightforward understanding of the Kantian transcendental aesthetic must constantly insist and urge. What does “empirically real” mean? How is the affiliation of a determination of the subject with the factuality of a thing or object possible? From Kant we can only gather the negative position according to which space and time are not psychophysical forms of organization. This implies in principle that the empirical reality of space and time will not be clarified so long as we consider the human being to be a whole made up of body and soul and still set the human being up as something extant—extant among things intuited by humans. The Kantian problematic of interpretation of space and time in negative terms is on the right track. However, from out of his problematic we cannot open up the direction which questioning would take in positive terms.

Put more clearly, everything we interpreted phenomenologically with regard to space and time—namely that they are a pure, advance, non-objective having a view of a wholeness; that time is the form of inner intuition as well as a universal form and basically self-affection—all this remains without a foundation, without justification, and without an intelligible determination as long as it remains unclear what is meant by “mind,” by “self,” and by “lying ready in the self.”

We followed in isolation the one stem of knowledge, sensibility and intuiting; and in addition we did so in the direction in which this stem grows higher, not in the direction taken by its roots. Finally it becomes clear that it is an idle beginning to comprehend this one stem by climbing all over it without digging for the root and laying it free. Neither the one stem of knowledge alone nor the other stem of knowledge, thinking, should be grasped by itself, but the *original unification of intuiting and thinking*—an intuiting which understands, in fact, as *a priori*. *Synthetic knowledge a priori is to be grasped in its possibility*. But, as already indicated, the Kantian investigation is laid out in such a way that at first under-

standing of thinking is investigated in a subordinated second, isolated observation, in order then to take up the problem of the unification of both in their purified function. At first we jump, so to speak, only superficially from the stem of intuition to that of thinking, without bothering ourselves with the common root of both stems. With a huge rupture, a new reflection begins, one which seemingly leaves the transcendental aesthetic completely aside.

But even though the content of the transcendental aesthetic may look quite problematic, nevertheless we dare not fail to register a decisive consequence with reference to the basic problem—*laying the foundation of the possibility of ontological knowledge*—and to take it up in further discussion.

Pure ontological knowledge as knowledge requires a pure intuition, which is even that toward which all pure thinking aims as a means. We looked for an intuition and in fact one which, in what it intuits, determines in advance everything extant, be this psychic or physical. Time appeared as such a universal pure intuition. All thinking must aim at time as pure intuition, as means for determining time, that is, as means for a pure time-determination. *Ontological determination in its actual foundation is pure time-determination*. It is thus no accident that in the later sections of the *Critique* Kant talks about a transcendental, i.e., ontological, time-determination. Synthetic judgments *a priori* are transcendental time-determinations.

As pure intuition time must get unified with pure thinking, which, considered in its core character, is an activity of the spontaneity of the I. Pre-delineating the basic problem of the *Critique* in a very extrinsic way, we can describe this problem as follows: How is an original, *a priori* unification of time, as pure intuition, and the “I think” as pure understanding possible? How can time and the I-think, both of which are determinations of subjectivity, get unified in this subjectivity? To put the question more radically, how is this subjectivity itself in its basic constitution that it can unify something like time with I-think?

Bluntly said and without facade, this is the core problem of the *Critique*. In order to focus on this problem in its full rigor, we now attempt to interpret thinking, at first in accordance with the Kantian view, and in the same isolation as the transcendental aesthetic. Then we shall see how for Kant pure intuition and pure thinking, i.e., time and the categories, are initially totally disconnected and separated and lie disparately beside each other. We shall see that it seems hopeless to unify both and that, if both nevertheless belong to the subject in a similar manner, there is in the subject a complete break between time and thinking, which for Kant is a-temporal and completely supra-temporal. The unification we are looking for seems to lie much deeper in the realm of the impossible than the attempt to mix fire and water.

SECOND PART

The Analytic of Concepts in the Transcendental Logic

First Division

Exposition of the Idea of a Transcendental Logic and Analytic

Chapter One

The Significance of Transcendental Logic

§13. The Analysis of Thinking as Element of Knowledge and the Unity of Thinking and Intuition as the Two Themes of Transcendental Logic

In the arrangement of the *Critique* the transcendental logic is the second part of the doctrine of elements; and as already shown, compared with the transcendental aesthetic, it is disproportionately larger. We will have to inquire about the reason for this. And it will be shown that it is not the content of the logic—the theme of thinking—that requires a more comprehensive treatment than the aesthetic, but rather the fact that under the title “transcendental logic” Kant brings problems together which, alongside the aesthetic and the logic, strictly speaking require a specific kind of treatment and a corresponding discipline. If the transcendental logic had been structured entirely corresponding to the transcendental aesthetic, then the transcendental logic would have ended with B169, A130—that is, there in edition B where Kant allows the division by numbered paragraphs to end. We are introducing here a fundamental opening which does not exist in the same way in Kant—even though an opening there is also noticeable.

Kant justifies the division by numbered paragraphs, which he has used up to this point, as follows: “I consider the division by numbered paragraphs as necessary up to this point, because thus far we have had to treat of elementary concepts.”¹ This is to say that the preceding para-

1. CPR, B 169.

graphs had to do with the concepts of the elements of knowledge—sensitivity and understanding—insofar as these elements were taken in isolation and analyzed in their structure. But this *isolating* dissection into *elements* (which is the function of the aesthetic and the logic) is a preliminary stage for investigating the *whole* of knowledge as the *unification* of sensitivity and understanding with regard to the possibility of this unification. In this respect Kant himself speaks of an *employment* of elements and in the passage just mentioned he continues to say: “We have now to give an account of their employment, and the exposition may therefore proceed in continuous fashion, without such numbering.” Thus if in the following sections the employment of elements becomes a theme (of the investigation), then we are dealing neither with transcendental aesthetic nor with transcendental logic, but either with both or with neither of the two.

The important first part of the transcendental logic, namely the first book of the first division of transcendental logic, entitled *Analytic of Concepts* or the categories, ends with the passage just quoted. Corresponding to the pure intuitions of space and time in the aesthetic, the elements of pure thinking or categories are dealt with in this book—in the double consideration of a metaphysical *and* a transcendental exposition. This is followed by the *analytic of principle*, as the second book of the first division, which deals with the full range of the entire *a priori* knowledge. This book takes as its problem the *a priori* unification of the previously isolated elements in their possibility. This book no longer deals with pure thinking taken in isolation, thus is actually not a logic anymore. Rather it treats of this pure thinking insofar as thinking stands at the midpoint and in service to pure intuition, in accord with its ownmost inner possibility.

Although from the analytic of principles onward pure intuition of time and thinking’s possible unification with time becomes a problem, this theme remains within the transcendental *logic*. The fact that this second book appears within the transcendental logic itself covers over the beginning of a *new* problematic, which is no longer just a problematic of logic, as was the case with the analytic of concepts. With the inquiry into the possible *a priori* unity of pure intuition and pure thinking *ontological knowledge* emerges as a *new central issue*.

That Kant deals with the problem in the transcendental *logic* is an indication that ontology is grounded in logic. Something noteworthy emerges here, something which determines every ontological or metaphysical problematic since antiquity, especially in Aristotle and Plato. What is noteworthy is that the question of being or the inquiry into the ontological constitution of beings, ontology, is primarily guided by *Logos*, i.e., by the true statement about beings. This traditional grounding of ontology in logic reaches so far that even the traditional designations for the ontological structures of beings is taken from the field of Logos:

categories, κατηγορίαι. But Kant, under strong pressure from traditional motives, centers ontology in logic in a new way. The further consequence of this step, which on the whole is sketched out in the development of modern thinking since Descartes, is Hegel’s logic, which according to its *title* is what we usually understand by logic but according to its *subject matter* is pure ontology or metaphysics.

These remarks are meant to indicate that under Kant’s title “transcendental logic” we find significantly more than a mere, isolated analysis of understanding. But considering the factual problems and the debate with Kant, this means that initially we are supposed to pursue logic as logic only up to that point where he lets the analytic of the elements end. What follows then is the actual core content of the *Critique*; and the decisive part is pulled together in a very small section of eleven pages, in the chapter “The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding.”² It is in this chapter that we must look for the hinge upon which the entire *Critique* turns—*critique* understood as the problem of laying the foundation of metaphysics, the problem of general ontology.

That in the transcendental *logic* Kant undertakes not only the analysis of pure thinking, as the second element of knowledge, but also the problem of the unification of the two fundamental sources in the entirety of the enactment of knowledge—this misled Kant-interpretation all along and allowed it to bypass crucial problems. That is why, right at the beginning of our interpretation of the transcendental logic, we pointed out that in Kant this logic goes way beyond its rights and in so doing completely covers up the unique character of the problem of unification of sensitivity and understanding—not only for the later debate with Kant but also for Kant himself. Since this crossing of the limits of logic is not accidental but, seen from the perspective of tradition, almost self-evident, it is even more necessary here to see things clearly. Prepared in this way, we must still attempt first to follow the specific Kantian intention. Prior to any critique and radicalization we must see things and take them as Kant presents them.

§14. Kant’s Determination of Thinking

First we shall follow the introduction to the transcendental logic, which explains the “idea of a transcendental logic.”¹ This introduction to the second part of the doctrine of elements is more extensive than the introduction to the first part, the transcendental aesthetic. This introduction

2. Ibid., B 176, A 137 to B 187, A 147.

1. CPR, B 74, A 50 to B 90, A 65.

has four sections: (1) logic in general, (2) transcendental logic, (3) the division of general logic into analytic and dialectic, and (4) the division of transcendental logic into transcendental analytic and dialectic.

Already in the introduction to the transcendental aesthetic we saw how Kant proceeds from the general concept of knowledge and first characterizes the two elements of sensibility and understanding or receptivity and spontaneity, affection and function, intuition and thinking, in order then to isolate the observation of sensibility or intuition and to circumscribe the task of the transcendental aesthetic. Correspondingly, Kant now again begins with juxtaposing the two stems of knowledge, in order then to move on to a separate investigation of thinking, spontaneity, and function of understanding and to circumscribe the task of logic: “We therefore distinguish the science of the rules of sensibility in general, that is, aesthetic, from the science of the rules of the understanding in general, that is, logic.”²

Now we inquire into that which in advance regulates thinking as thinking, into that which determines thinking, into pure thinking and its original elements, the categories. The transcendental aesthetic inquires into the ownmost inner possibility of space and time; transcendental logic, into the ownmost inner possibility of the categories.

Kant now explains the idea of transcendental logic as a special logic from out of the idea of logic in general. Transcendental logic means ontological logic; it indicates an investigation of thinking and its elements of the type which reveals thinking in terms of how these elements make an *a priori* knowledge of the ontological constitution of beings possible and how they themselves are possible in this function. In connection with the following interpretation of the idea of transcendental logic, the concept of “the transcendental” in Kant becomes increasingly more clear to us.

The exposition of the idea of transcendental logic proceeds from the idea of logic in general as the science of the rules of understanding or of the general logical employment of understanding. In order to attend to this exposition, we anticipate a section which Kant presents after the introduction within the transcendental logic and which is entitled “The Logical Employment of the Understanding.”³ We shall supplement the text here with a look at Kant’s discussions of logic in his lecture courses on this subject.⁴

First we shall try to circumscribe how Kant determines understanding in general, i.e., the function of understanding, or thinking. Then it can be made clear why the science of logic deals with the *rules* of under-

2. Ibid., B 76, A 52.

3. Ibid., B 93, A 68.

4. *Logik, ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen*, G. B. Jäsche (ed.) (Cassirer, VIII, 325ff.).

standing. We know already that intuition, like thinking, is a representing, *repraesentare*. Intuition is directly allowing the extant to be encountered; it is an immediate representing. But understanding is a “non-sensuous” faculty of knowledge; it is not intuitive, although it is representing [*vorstellend*]. This means that thinking is not an immediate representing, but a *mediated one*. As finite, intuitions rest on the way in which beings announce themselves; they rely on affections. By contrast, concepts as representations do not rest on affections from beings because they are not immediately related to them. Rather, concepts rest on the *functions* of the spontaneous understanding. As mediated representations, concepts do not directly refer to beings. They do refer to beings insofar as beings are given through immediate representations, through intuitions. Hence conceptual representing is a representing that relates to representations—it is a *representation of a representation*.

Understanding *judges* by means of mediated representations or concepts. Judging is the function of “the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation.”⁵ “. . . all judgments are functions of unity among our representations.”⁶ “Function of unity” means functioning in the manner of unifying, of gathering of representations, in such a way that, instead of an immediate representation, i.e., intuition, a higher representation will be used which grasps several representations within itself. Judging, asserting, λέγειν means a gathering together, a grasping together, a *coniunctio* or *synthesis*. Thus here, too, as in the first stem of knowledge, a certain manner of unification comes to the fore. With regard to pure intuition we spoke of a *syndosis*. Here, in contrast, we are dealing with spontaneous unification by the activity of understanding; we are dealing with *synthesis* in the narrow sense. Judgment, assertion, Logos is σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις.⁷ Logos is a taking together in such a way that the determinations, the νοήματα, that are taken together are at the same time taken apart, so that what is intuitively given with regard to its determinate characteristics is articulated. In the course of such a taking together which sets apart, we come to know explicitly the determinations which are implicitly given and indistinctly shown in intuition. Although a representation, Logos is not intuition but a representation which determines and articulates by letting something be seen *as* something.

Accordingly, as faculty of thinking, understanding is “a faculty of judging.” Instead of an immediate representation, intuition of a *definite* solid matter, for example this piece of chalk, a higher representation will be used when I judge: “This piece of chalk is a solid matter.” In judging

5. CPR, B 93, A 68.

6. Ibid., B 94, A 69.

7. Aristotle, *De Anima*, 430a ff.

we grasp what is intuitively given in terms of a higher determination which in terms of its content is also valid for other things. We represent anew what is represented in intuition, the immediate representation, by determining what is represented *as* solid matter. In order to think this definite chalk-thing as solid matter, we move beyond what is immediately intuited to the representation “solid matter,” in order to come back from this representation to the chalk-thing—in such a way as to grasp this chalk-thing in terms of the representation “solid matter.” In thinking we necessarily move away from the immediate representation, the intuition, right through the determining representation back to the thing. Thus true to its inner core, thinking proceeds in a *roundabout way*; thinking moves through the determining representation; thinking is a *running through*—is *discursive*. The *finitude* of thinking gets manifested in this character of thinking as roundabout and discursive, i.e., in the fact that, as a function of understanding, judging is a representation of a representation, a mediated representation. In B71 Kant states that thinking “always involves limitations”; for, essentially, thinking is not a direct, immediate grasping, but rather is roundabout and enjoined to the mediating determination. Kant expresses the same state of affairs of the fundamental finitude of thinking by saying: “We must first learn to spell before we begin to read.”⁸ We cannot in one stroke directly intuit something in its full determinateness. Rather, we must first move through what is given in advance, articulate it, and thus bring to light its determinateness.

Human knowledge is made up of intuition and thinking. Both elements are finite: Intuiting is finite because it is enjoined to what lies before us, and thinking is finite because it spells out in a roundabout way. Human knowing is necessarily a spelling out of what is given by letting it be given as extant.

Finitude of thinking is the ground for its possible falsity, for its being in error. Thinking does not provide an object, but only determines what is given, is synthesis—*τὸ γὰρ ψεύδος ἐν συνθέσει ἔει*.⁹

Thinking is the faculty of judging. Judgment is a function of unification which in fact occurs indirectly by determining an immediate representation by means of a higher one. In his lecture on logic Kant defines judging as follows: “A judgment is representation of the unity of consciousness of various representations, or representation of their relation insofar as they constitute a concept.”¹⁰ The phrase “Judgment is the representation of unity” clarifies still further the talk of judgment as *function* of unity or unification. For this functioning is not a psychic process which

functions blindly. Rather this functioning is in itself and in accord with its essence a *representing*. That is, in its functioning as unifier, the unification is directed at what is to be unified in such a way that this unification is primarily oriented toward the unity in terms of which the manifold which is given in advance is to be unified. Hence judgment is a unifying which *represents the unity along with unifying*; and with reference to this unity of what is to be unified, the relationship of representations that are to be unified is represented. This is what is expressed in Kant's second definition.

On the basis of what we said, the following sentences of Kant should now be intelligible:

Judgment is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it. In every judgment there is a concept which holds of many representations, and among them of a given representation that is immediately related to an object. Thus in the judgment “*all bodies are divisible*,” the concept of the divisible applies to various other concepts, but is here applied in particular to the concept of body, and this concept again to certain appearances that present themselves to us. These objects, therefore, are mediately represented through the concept of divisibility.¹¹

In the characterization of thinking presented so far, we have distinguished thinking in two respects, without having explicitly highlighted them. On the one hand thinking takes up a position in service to intuition, in that through its thinking understanding makes intelligible what is intuitively given. On the other hand “we can understand only that which brings with it, in intuition, something corresponding to our words.”¹² “It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is to add the object to them in intuition, as it is necessary to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts.”¹³

In its mediating function thinking serves the task of making intelligible what is intuited and thus simultaneously relates to objects through what is intuited. As the element of knowledge, thinking is essentially distinguished by its relation to the object. But as object-related, thinking is also an activity of the subject, in fact a functioning in the sense of unifying, of a connecting of representations and at the same time a representation of relationships of representations.

Thus the *twofold character of thinking* consists in (1) its *object-relatedness*, and (2) in its *unifying function*. As unifying representations or what is represented, thinking can relate to all possible objects with quite different

8. Heinze, *Metaphysikvorlesung*, p. 222.

9. Aristotle, *De Anima*, 430b 1/2.

10. *Logik*, §17 (Cassirer, VIII, 408).

11. CPR, B 93f., A 68f.

12. *Ibid.*, B 333, A 277.

13. *Ibid.*, B 75, A 51.

factuality. Regardless to which being thinking is enjoined, as “relating-itself-to” thinking is always a unifying. On the basis of its *double structure* thinking admits of a *double investigation*. In one respect we can view thinking only as a *functioning faculty* by ignoring the fact that thinking relates to definite objects. That thinking in general is always somehow enjoined to objects is of course thought along with the distinction of thinking as mere function of unification, but it carries little weight. In another respect, and inversely, thinking *as relatedness to objects* can also become problematical, in which case the function of unifying is brought along with in thinking. Kant bases the possibility of a twofold science of thinking, *general logic and transcendental logic*, on this possible double observation of thinking.

Now we must delineate Kant’s concept of logic more fully. This is not only required by the significance which logic has for Kant in the entire ontology or metaphysics. Yet *another* fact demands a more penetrating characterization of the Kantian concept of logic: Kant proceeds summarily in his thematic presentation of his transcendental logic, especially in its first part. The penetrating analysis of the categories remains far behind the explication of pure intuitions of space and time in the transcendental aesthetic. In order to see at all where Kant is heading in these very brief discussions, we need sufficiently to clarify major sections. As a start we shall try to explain the concept of “general logic,” in order then to set it against the idea of a “transcendental logic.”

§15. Determination of General and Transcendental Logic

a) Determination of General and Pure Logic as Distinguished from Applied Logic

In his logic-lecture Kant begins his discussion of the idea of logic with a general observation about everything that is extant. He says: “Everything in nature (i.e., everything which is somehow extant), in the inanimate as well as animate world, happens *according to rules*, although we do not always know these rules.”¹ Even the exercise of human forces happens according to rules: We speak according to rules without knowing the rules—we even have difficulty thinking of rules in the abstract. “As with all our forces taken together, so—and especially—with *understanding*: In its activity it is tied in with rules which we can investigate.”² But understanding has an excellent relation to rules; for, not only is understanding

itself like other events regulated by rules, but it is also the *source of rules and the faculty for thinking something like rules in general as well*.

If in the preceding discussion we characterized understanding as the faculty of representation and unification of representations, i.e., as the faculty that brings intuitions under *determining concepts*, this characterization only means that understanding is the faculty that brings intuitions under *rules*. Kant characterizes understanding not only as the faculty of unification—as the faculty of concepts—but also and precisely as the faculty of rules and considers *this* characteristic of understanding to be its essential determination, as shown in the following passage: “We have already defined the understanding in various different ways: as a spontaneity of knowledge (in distinction from the receptivity of sensibility), as a power of thought, as a faculty of concepts, or again of judgments. All these definitions, when they are adequately understood, are identical. We may now characterize it as the *faculty of rules*. This distinguishing mark is more fruitful and comes closer to its essential nature.”³

As already explained, we can observe thinking without assuming any objects. We can observe thinking *by setting aside thinking’s reference to specific objects*, each of which is determined in view of content. Then we shall be focusing only on the function of unification as such with respect to its possible ways of unification and its rules. Then we shall be inquiring into those necessary rules of thinking which simply make thinking what it as thinking is. These rules lie *a priori* in thinking itself and regulate its *general employment*. They determine thinking, regardless of how it occurs concretely.

Such an investigation of the rules of the *general employment of understanding* is to be distinguished from establishing the rules of a specific employment of understanding. The latter cannot be achieved at all without first making grounded inquiries into the objects themselves which are to be known.

Logic as doctrine of elements is thus to be characterized in a twofold way: (1) It is a *general logic* and not a special one. That is, it sets aside all content, whatever is thought in thinking; it investigates the mere form of thinking as such. It does not anticipate the subject matter of individual sciences;⁴ thus it is not the organon of a specific science; that is, it does not provide rules by which to set up a science of a definite realm of beings. General logic is not a general doctrine of science and even less a special *doctrine of science*. For in order to be precisely a general doctrine of science, logic would have to examine thinking insofar as it relates to objects and precisely with respect to this relating.

1. *Logik*, Introduction (Cassirer, VIII, 332).

2. *Ibid.*

3. CPR, A 126.

4. *Logik* (Cassirer, VIII, 334).

(2) This general logic is as such and simultaneously *pure logic*. Pure means *a priori*, independent of experience. Thus pure logic does not draw the rules and their principles from experience:

Whereas some logicians presuppose *psychological* principles in logic, to bring such principles into logic is as inappropriate as to infer morality from life. If we take the principles from psychology, i.e., from observations of our understanding, then we would only see *how* thinking occurs and *how it is* under various subjective obstacles and conditions. This would lead us to the knowledge of *accidental* laws alone. But logic does not inquire into *accidental* rules, but rather *necessary* ones—not how we think, but how we ought to think. Hence the rules of logic must be taken, not from the accidental, but from the *necessary* employment of understanding, which one finds in oneself without any psychology. In logic we do not wish to know how understanding is and thinks and how it has gotten entangled in thinking up to now, but how it ought to proceed in thinking. Logic should teach us the correct employment of understanding, i.e., one which is in agreement with itself.⁵

Accordingly we must distinguish *pure logic* from *applied logic*, because for “applied logic” Kant does not mean the simple exercise and application of pure rules, but rather the examination of understanding *in concreto*. Applied logic examines the factual conditions of the process of thinking, what hinders or promotes it—this logic treats of attention, the origin of error, the state of doubt, scruple, conviction and the like. Applied logic deals with rules for obtaining or avoiding such states, thus with rules which can only be obtained empirically.

Incidentally, Kant here does ignore a field of research which belongs neither to general nor to applied logic in his sense of the word. For doubt, error, and conviction are not primarily objects of empirical determination; rather, as comportments of human Dasein, they are subject to a unique ontological investigation, which is not psychological and empirical. In view of Husserl’s investigations we see here a lot more clearly that, whereas logic is not to be replaced by psychology, it does presuppose an investigation of what is called thinking as such. The clarification of these modes of comportments is the task of phenomenology as Husserl presents it in the second volume of *Logical Investigations*.

Thus elementary logic is a general and not a particular science, pure and not applied science, of the mere forms of thinking as such. This general and pure logic is a canon for understanding and reason: “I understand by a canon the sum-total of the *a priori* principles of the correct employment of certain faculties of knowledge. Thus general logic, in its analytic portion, is a canon for understanding and reason in general;

but only in regard to their form; it abstracts from all content.”⁶ These principles or rules *a priori*, which do not grow from thinking’s relation to specific objects, are conditions under which understanding can and ought to be in agreement *with itself*. Because general and pure logic rest upon formal principles *a priori*, this logic can be established without the assistance of appearance. Hence it is an established theory, a doctrine. In the following we must bear in mind that general and pure logic is indeed a *canon*—a sum-total of rules for the correct employment—but not an *organon* of knowledge, not a tool with whose exclusive application we can obtain scientific knowledge.

By way of a summary characterization of the idea of general logic, we use the following quotation from the introduction to the logic lecture: “Logic is a science of reason, not with regard to the matter, but only the form. It is a science *a priori* of the necessary laws of thinking—not thinking in relation to specific objects, but thinking in relation to all objects in general. Thus it is a science of the correct employment of understanding and reason as such, not subjectively, i.e., according to empirical (psychological) principles by which understanding thinks, but rather objectively, according to principles *a priori* by which understanding ought to think.”⁷

In his lecture on logic Kant gave a brief sketch of the history of logic, which shows that in his view logic since Aristotle has not made a single step forward and also does not need to. Kant considers Wolff’s general logic very well worked out, which Baumgarten later presented in concentrated form. This view is remarkable because Kant’s own work provides an impetus for a new and radical philosophical grounding of logic. Nowadays logic has become the stepchild of philosophy, is dragged along in its old forms with occasional corrections, and is the most retarded science in that it has never yet been genuinely grounded philosophically. Here, too, in his independent researches, Kant is more advanced than in his traditional and ordinary views. It is precisely Kant who pointed out—although for many in a quite unclear way—how philosophically to bring logic to life and really to confront a task which has remained unresolved since Plato and Aristotle—a task which finally faded away, so much so that the traditional logic gave the impression that everything had been put to order.

6. CPR, B 824, A 796.

7. *Logik* (Cassirer, VIII, 336).

5. Ibid.

b) Determination of Transcendental Logic as Object-Related

What is the meaning of transcendental logic as distinguished from general and pure logic, which were just characterized? The objects of general logic were the necessary laws of thinking “with regard to all objects in general,” not with regard to specific objects. This seems to be contradicted by what Kant says in the following passage (which seems to be “Kantian” in a genuine sense): “General logic, as we have shown, abstracts from all content of knowledge, that is, from all relation of knowledge to the object, and considers only the logical form in the relation of any knowledge to other knowledge; that is, it treats of the form of thought in general.”⁸

In one respect and according to Jäsche’s idea, the theme of general logic is thinking in relation to all objects. In another respect and according to Kant the theme of general logic is thinking in such a way that all relation to objects are *set aside*. Are we dealing here with two contradictory versions of the idea of general logic? By no means. When Jäsche states that general logic is the science of necessary laws of thinking in relation to objects in general, this only means that it makes no difference which object is thus being thought and that we do not need to pay attention to thinking’s relation to objects, although this relation belongs to it. Kant also means the same thing in the passage of the *Critique* that we have just cited: The functioning of thinking as such—essentially as unification—is the theme of general logic. Granted that these forms relate to objects, the forms of thinking *as such* are the theme of general logic. Hence this logic is called formal logic. Certainly there are difficulties in Kant’s idea of a general and pure logic, difficulties which are not accidental and with which we do not yet have to deal.

But thinking is both a unification of representations and co-originally a relatedness to objects—a unification which, as we saw, has itself the character of representation and is a representation of the unity of given representations. Now this object-relatedness of thinking will shift in accordance with what becomes accessible precisely through experience of objects that are extant. But in the transcendental aesthetic a difference regarding intuitions was brought to light, a difference between empirical and pure intuitions, between that encounter that occurs between certain extant individual things and their manifold qualities in each case and pure intuition understood as that encounter which occurs with such determinations that necessarily and antecedently pertain to each and every extant.

Does this difference between empirical and pure intuitions hold also for thinking, in a corresponding manner? Is there an empirical and pure object-relatedness of thinking? Obviously Kant must say so, because the transcendental logic as well as the transcendental aesthetic are equally in service to working out the elements which belong to a pure *a priori* synthetic knowledge as such.

Is there a pure thinking? The answer seems to have already been given with the discussion of general and *pure logic*. But is *pure thinking* the object of *pure logic*? Precisely not! Here Kant’s terminology is ambiguous—an ambiguity which we must eliminate right at the outset if we are not to miss Kant’s intention. The theme of pure logic is the lawful character of thinking as a functioning faculty, setting aside any factual impurification by each factually different occurrence of thinking in individual subjects. Moreover, in this pure and formal logic no attention is paid to the relation to objects. But it is exactly this relation that we are investigating now, when we ask about the difference between empirical and pure thinking. Our problem is the following: Is any such relation of thinking to objects possible in which thinking obtains the determinations which it attributes to the objects solely on the basis of the empirical intuition of objects? Or is there also such a relation of thinking to objects such that already prior to any empirical intuition thinking determines objects in advance, in fact *for* this empirical intuition and its being possible? Thus *the question concerning pure thinking is the question concerning a relation to objects which is independent of experience*. It is the question concerning thinking’s determination of the object. Here pure thinking means a *a priori* determination of the object in advance. But as general logic *pure logic ignores precisely each and every object-relatedness*, be it empirical or *a priori*. Pure logic is not called “pure logic” because it investigates pure thinking in the sense just defined, but because its manner of investigation is not determined by empirical principles. Logic is not called “pure” in reference to its theme, but in reference to its method.

Now, Kant at first develops the idea of such a possible pure thinking hypothetically. If there were such a thinking, then the science of pure thinking would have to be developable, i.e., a logic should be developable whose theme would be this *a priori relation of thinking to objects*—a logic which would determine objects in advance, prior to and for the sake of all empirical thinking. This would be a logic which would not ignore the relation to objects, would not ignore objects themselves in their relation to thinking, but on the contrary would look directly at this relation to objects. In this logic the objects and what determines their content would also be investigated. This logic of pure thinking could not ignore the content and factuality of objects. This logic would be a logic of content, a logic of the subject-matter, a logic of the object. In any case this logic would not be a formal logic, like general and pure logic. It would not be

8. CPR, B 79, A 55.

a *formal* logic, but would still be an *a priori* logic. For its theme would not be the empirical relation of thinking to the empirical objects which appear at that moment. Rather its theme would be object-relatedness of thinking, which belongs to thinking as such, *a priori* and prior to all experience. Hence this logic of pure thinking (a thinking related *a priori* to objects) could not proceed according to empirical principles. This logic too must be a pure logic with respect to its method.

Now, if there is a pure thinking, which is independent of experience and which determines objects, then the logic appropriate to this thinking would be pure in a twofold sense: (1) This logic would not only be pure in terms of method, like general logic, which sets aside all relation to objects but proceeds purely and according to *a priori* principles, but also (2) this logic is also pure with respect to its theme, which is the non-empirical thinking in its relation to objects.

In this thinking of objects which is pure and independent of experience there is a knowledge which we do not owe to objects by first drawing the determinedness from them empirically. Accordingly the theme of a logic of this pure thinking would be the *origin* of this determinedness, which is independent of experience and not taken first from objects.

It is no accident that the Kant-interpretation of the Marburg school, when systematically formulated, speaks not only of a logic of *pure thinking* but also of a logic of *pure knowledge*, although knowledge here means primarily thinking, excluding intuition. But when Cohen speaks of a logic of pure knowledge, then in this context he is speaking directly of a logic of the *origin* and accordingly moves toward a problem which Kant develops in another context as the problem of *transcendental* logic.

General and pure logic, in contrast, do not inquire into the origin of thought-determinations of objects, because thinking's relation to objects is not their theme. Rather general and pure logic consider only the rules and laws according to which understanding employs representations in their relation to one another and not in relation to objects meant by these representations. And here it is actually all the same whether representations are "originally *a priori* in ourselves or only empirically given."⁹

The manner and method of knowledge of general and pure logic, which examines the form of thinking as a faculty as such, is not empirical but *a priori*. The manner of knowledge of logic of a thinking which is pure and related to objects would also be *a priori*, but *a priori* in a new sense: In this knowledge the possibility of a relation of thought-determinations to objects that is free of experience would be known *a priori*. We

saw earlier how Kant characterizes such a manner of knowledge in which we come to the possibility of a relation to beings that is free of experience: "I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible *a priori*."¹⁰ In another passage Kant repeats this definition of transcendental knowledge and explicitly stresses the importance of clearly understanding what he means by "transcendental": "And here I make a remark which the reader must bear in mind, as it extends its influence over all that follows. Not every kind of knowledge *a priori* should be called transcendental, but only that by which we know that—and how—certain representations (intuitions or concepts) can be employed or are possible purely *a priori*. That is to say, the term 'transcendental' signifies such knowledge as concerns the *a priori* possibility of knowledge, or its *a priori* employment."¹¹ As a characteristic mark of knowledge "transcendental" does not mean simply *a priori* knowledge—for example, geometry is also *a priori* knowledge—but means that *a priori* knowledge whose theme is the possibility of an *a priori* knowledge with *factual content*. Transcendental knowledge is a knowledge which investigates the possibility of an understanding of being, a pre-ontological understanding of being; and such an investigation is the task of ontology. *Transcendental knowledge is ontological knowledge*, i.e., *a priori* knowledge of the ontological constitution of beings. Because transcendental knowledge is ontological knowledge, Kant can equate transcendental philosophy with ontology.

Kant uses the term *transcendental* to mean "ontological" in many different ways, which we shall get to know more closely. However, the expression "transcendental" refers not only to *a priori knowledge* of the possibility of synthetic knowledge *a priori*, but also to this *possibility itself*. Transcendental possibility is ontological possibility as distinguished from the mere logical possibility, namely the possibility of that which does not contradict itself in terms of its content. What is logically possible in this way does not have to be transcendently possible. Transcendental possibility refers to the factual content of a subject matter, determines it in *what* it is, and thus circumscribes what this matter must be in order to get realized as this *what*. Therefore, in Kant *transcendental* possibility is the *real* possibility as distinguished from logical possibility. But Kant also uses the expression "transcendental" in yet a *third* sense. The employment of space as pure intuition is transcendental, precisely to the extent that space is understood as being constitutive for the enabling of pure *a priori* knowledge with respect to things themselves. In this employment

10. Ibid., B 25.

11. Ibid., B 80, A 56.

9. Ibid., B 80, A 56.

space is "transcendental," i.e., is ideal and not real. As we shall see, Kant frequently speaks of transcendental employment as distinguished from an empirical employment: "The mere transcendental employment of the categories is, therefore, really no employment at all, and has no determinate object, not even one that is determinable in its mere form."¹² Here "transcendental" employment means employment for the purpose of making synthetic knowledge *a priori* possible, but without being limited to the realm wherein alone such an employment is possible. Here Kant has in mind a transcendental-ideal, dogmatic employment, which is not guided by an ontological critique. Transcendental employment is a *supposedly* ontologically legitimate employment; it is only a logical and not an intuitive employment, a one-sided transcendental-logical employment. In point of fact Kant's terminology is remarkable and confusing.

Let us first keep in mind that "transcendental" means a manner of knowledge which in its method is *a priori* and, as far as its object is concerned, whose theme is ontological knowledge, i.e., the *a priori* knowledge of the ontological constitution of beings. According to this, a logic which recognizes the possibility of a pure relatedness of thinking to objects would be a *transcendental logic*. Correspondingly, the transcendental aesthetic investigates such intuitions which, as pure intuitions, first make possible the empirical intuition of what is spatially and temporally extant.

Regarding this hypothetical discussion of the idea of a logic of a pure thinking which relates to objects, Kant states:

In the expectation, therefore, that there may perhaps be concepts which relate *a priori* to objects, not as pure or sensible intuitions, but solely as acts of pure thought—that is, as concepts which are neither of empirical nor of aesthetic origin—we form for ourselves by anticipation the idea of a science of the knowledge which belongs to pure understanding and reason, whereby we think objects entirely *a priori*. Such a science, which should determine the origin, scope, and objective validity of such knowledge, would have to be called *transcendental logic*, because, unlike general logic, which has to deal with both empirical and pure knowledge of reason without discrimination, it concerns itself only with the laws of understanding and of reason, but only insofar as they relate *a priori* to objects.¹³

§16. Division of General and Transcendental Logic into
the Analytic and the Dialectic

a) Formal Corrections and Factual Truth of Knowledge

In accordance with the twofold character of thinking, which functions both as unifying and as related to objects, emerges a twofold science of thinking, a twofold logic: general and transcendental logic. Both are pure, *a priori* sciences. General logic is formal, whereas transcendental logic relates to contents and objects. As faculty of judgment, understanding is the faculty of concepts, which [faculty] determines the object. Generally speaking, understanding is the faculty of rules and as such a faculty understanding itself investigates these rules. Rules or laws of thinking, which regulate each and every thinking without regard for what is thought in each case, are therefore rules not primarily related to objects. That is, setting the rules for how thinking as such takes place definitely does not stem from the factuality of objects. At the same time no matter to what it is related, all thinking must abide by these general rules, regardless of what it may be related to. In other words, thinking cannot act, as it were, against its own nature—cannot oppose laws that pertain to any thinking as such.

But these rules concern merely the *form* of thinking as such. They only regulate *thinking's agreement with itself*, i.e., they are concerned with *correctness*. Following these formal rules does not yet determine whether a thinking which is correct in that manner is also suited to objects. A thinking which is in agreement with itself may very well *go against objective circumstances and be false*. Accordingly, the correctness of thinking is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for the *truth* of a thinking-intuition, i.e., of a knowledge—or as Kant says: [it is] "the merely logical criterion of truth . . . , the *conditio sine qua non*, therefore the negative condition of all truth."¹ General logic cannot deliver another criterion or touchstone of truth, other than formal *correctness*. For truth is "the agreement of knowledge with its object."²

This definition of truth is so self-evident for Kant that he does not discuss it any further. The circumscription of the meaning of the word *truth* "is here assumed and granted."³ "That knowledge is true which is in agreement with the character of objects."⁴ The only thing which is problematical for Kant is "what makes up the general and sure criterion

12. Ibid., B 304, A 247f.

13. Ibid., B 81, A 57.

1. CPR, B 84, A 59f.

2. Ibid., B 82, A 58.

3. Ibid.

4. *Reflexionen*, II, 533.

of the truth of any and every knowledge.”⁵ Prior to this we must find out whether the inquiry into such a general and certain criterion of truth of any and every knowledge is possible at all.

Now Kant shows that a *general* criterion of the truth of any and every knowledge is an absurd concept because it runs contrary to the central character of truth as *agreement with the object*. As far as the notion of criterion is concerned, we should mention briefly that it means a mark, a distinguishing sign by which, for example, I can differentiate a knowledge as true as opposed to false. A knowledge as such is always directed to a *definite* object and is tailored to this definite object. This definite object with this factuality and this kind of being is the only possible criterion for matching knowledge to the object. Each *definite object* and its content are a *sign for differentiating* truth and falsehood of a knowledge. If I inquire into the *general* criterion of the truth of knowledge, then I inquire into a *sign for differentiation* which is *not* distinguished from other signs and thus is not supposed to show any difference. Accordingly, a general criterion of truth is a wooden iron: “. . . of the truth of knowledge, so far as its matter is concerned, no general criterion can be demanded. Such a criterion would by its very nature be self-contradictory.”⁶

b) General Logic as Analytic and Dialectic

Formal rules of thinking are certainly valid for thinking of all objects. However, they do not state anything about the factual truth of knowledge—a truth to which correct thinking belongs. *General, formal logic* is only a *logic of correctness*. This logic brings into sharper focus only the rules and principles for formal judgment of all knowledge, in such a way as to dissolve the entire business of understanding into its elements and to present these elements as principles of logical judgment. This logic dissolves into elements and hence is called *analytic*. No one dares to judge *objects* with the formal laws of thinking that the analytic makes ready.

Nevertheless there is something “tempting” in these straightforwardly necessary rules for all thinking, namely the temptation to employ what is only a *canon* as an *organon*: “General logic, when thus treated as an organon, is called *dialectic*.”⁷ Kant avoids clarifying this historically loaded concept of *dialectic*. He only points out that, as a misused general logic, this organon is always a logic of *illusion* [*Schein*]. It looks as if scientific argumentation, by relying solely on formal laws of thinking, is guided

by the only possible authority of knowledge, as if scientific argumentation thus deserves our unqualified confidence, even as this argumentation precisely *does away with* factual knowledge and with arguing from matters themselves. A thinking is dialectical in the sense that, under the illusion of a clever argumentation, it pretends to possess and to communicate factual knowledge. The expression “dialectical” also means deceptive on the basis of formal and empty argumentation.

To engage in dialectic in this sense would not be “appropriate to the dignity of philosophy.” Therefore Kant uses this expression in a new and *positive* sense—not as *producing* dialectical illusion but as its critique. Dialectic in this sense therefore is what does not want to be itself dialectic, but that which critically dissolves it. The temptation is always close at hand dialectically to misuse the formal laws of thinking as an organon rather than as a canon. However, *dialectic as critique of dialectical illusion* is part of the process of securing the elements of general logical employment of genuine understanding. This means that the general and pure logic will be divided into analytic and dialectic.

c) Ontological Truth; Transcendental Logic as Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic

Corresponding to the division of general logic, Kant divides the transcendental logic, too, into transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic.

The idea of a general criterion for truth of all knowledge is by itself an impossible notion, because truth as agreement with objects is always guided by these objects; and a thinking which is conceived only as one that is not related to definite objects cannot be the criterion of truth, but rather only criterion of formal correctness. General and pure logic is the logic of correctness.

But transcendental logic considers as its primary and unique problem precisely the relation of thinking to objects, i.e., precisely that relation in which truth gets constituted. Accordingly and corresponding to the transcendental aesthetic, the transcendental logic undergoes a twofold isolation. Transcendental aesthetic, as *aesthetic*, had first isolated *intuition* over against all thinking. And then, as *transcendental* aesthetic, it isolated the isolated intuition in turn, in such a way that it cut out all empirical intuition, in order to examine only *pure* intuition. Transcendental logic works in the same way. As *logic* it isolates *thinking* from all intuition. As *transcendental* logic, it considers thinking in its *relatedness to objects*, and specifically with regard to what is *purely a priori*. But right here, where Kant determines the theme of transcendental logic, he does not fail to remind us explicitly: “The employment of this pure knowledge depends upon the condition that objects to which it can be applied be given to

5. CPR, B 82, A 58.

6. Ibid., B 83, A 59.

7. Ibid., B 85, A 61.

intuition. In the absence of intuition all our knowledge is without objects and therefore remains entirely empty.”⁸

Now insofar as transcendental logic brings out the elements of thinking purely of objects and determines the principles of their employment, transcendental logic is called transcendental *analytic*. And in fact this logic investigates and justifies those relations of thinking to objects whereby objects are determined in advance of all experience and for all particular ontic knowledge in terms of its objectivity. The transcendental analytic thus treats of knowledge and truths to which all empirical determination of objects must conform. All ontic truth must conform to ontological truth. Ontological truth is the primordial truth about beings, because it discloses in advance what is essential about the being of beings. Hence as an examination of a basic element of ontological knowledge—the element of pure thinking—is “a logic of truth.”⁹ With regard to this logic Kant writes: “For no knowledge can contradict it without at once losing all content, that is, all relation to any object, and therefore all truth.”¹⁰

It is this original truth, or as we say, this ontological truth, to which what is ontic, a being and its experience, must conform. Thus it becomes clear that the interpretation which I offered earlier regarding his remark on the Copernican turn may easily be supported by Kant’s way of posing the decisive problem.¹¹ For ontology Kant uses the title “transcendental philosophy.” And hence he calls transcendental truth (which we call ontological truth) the original truth of synthetic knowledge *a priori*. Kant explicitly returns to this transcendental truth in the short section that I take to be the central item of the *Critique*, i.e., the section entitled “Schematism”: “All our knowledge falls within the bounds of possible experience, and just in this universal relation to possible experience consists that transcendental truth which precedes all empirical truth and makes it possible.”¹²

It is no accident that precisely the chapter on schematism explicitly touches upon the fundamental phenomenon of ontological knowledge, namely ontological truth. For in the chapter on schematism *time* is shown to be that pure intuition upon which the pure thinking of objects, which as thinking is really a representation of representation, must be grounded. Only through time does this pure thinking of objects get its intuitive and direct identity, i.e., get its truth grounded. Later, in interpreting the transcendental deduction of the categories, we shall see that the concept of objective reality (which we have already discussed) is intimately tied

in with—if not entirely identical to—the concept of *transcendental* truth. As a preparatory orientation let me refer to the following passage in which Kant speaks of the categories: “Only through the fact that these concepts express *a priori* the relations of perceptions in every experience do we know their objective reality, that is, their transcendental truth.”¹³

Transcendental truths and the pure thinking of objects which is constitutive for these truths thus actually anticipate the matter of knowledge, insofar as this thinking should determine in advance what pertains to any objectivity [*Gegenständlichkeit*] as such. Pure thinking determines in advance the objectivity of the object, to such an extent that only on the basis of this determination can the object now be encountered as that to which ontic empirical knowledge fits. *The possibility of such an anticipation of determinations of objects prior to all experience, as well as the meaning and legitimacy of such an anticipation, are the basic problem of transcendental logic.*

But these anticipations of pure thinking are as such necessarily and essentially grounded upon pure intuition and can be achieved only on the basis of such a pure intuition. If, by contrast, pure thought-determinations are applied to objects without any grounding in pure intuition, then empty sophistries give way to concepts of understanding which have no truth. Thus an illusion will be produced in transcendental knowledge—an ostensibly or seemingly ontological knowledge—which dares synthetically to judge and to determine objects on the basis of pure understanding alone. In this case the employment of pure thinking would be dialectical. Thus the transcendental analytic needs likewise to be supplemented and secured by a critique of transcendental dialectical illusion. That is, it needs a *transcendental dialectic*. This transcendental dialectic must uncover the false illusion of the groundless claims of understanding. These claims are not devised in some arbitrary manner. Rather the inclination inheres in human nature to make out something about beings with mere concepts, without securing critically and in advance the necessary and sufficient grounding in intuition. Here too it becomes clear again that it is intuition that first endows truth and makes possible the confirmation of what is conceptually meant.

Thus the *positive* part of the *transcendental logic* lies in the *transcendental analytic*. We can certainly obtain a *positive* meaning from the transcendental *dialectic*, which in my opinion has never yet happened. However, this presupposes that one rightly understands the basic intention of the *Critique*, namely laying the foundation of metaphysics. It can then be shown (and we shall try to do this) that the *transcendental dialectic* is *nothing*

8. *Ibid.*, B 87, A 62.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*

11. Cf. G55f.

12. CPR, B 185, A 146.

13. *Ibid.*, B 269, A 221f.

other than an ontological interpretation of natural metaphysics, i.e., an interpretation of the basic structure of that which we call human beings' natural view of the world.

These remarks on the meaning of the transcendental dialectic are intended also to indicate again that under the title of "transcendental logic" Kant brings together things that are strikingly different and that the actual concept of the transcendental logic is to be taken more narrowly. And this must happen in such a way that the transcendental logic does not become identical with the notion of the transcendental analytic, but rather only with the notion of the *analytic of concepts*.


We can briefly summarize Kant's introductory observations on the transcendental logic in the following way. As unification and objective determination, thinking can become the theme of the general and pure logic as well as of transcendental logic. The former is the logic of correctness; the latter, the logic of truth. Both are divided into analytic and dialectic. The first analyzes thinking—that is, object-oriented thinking—as unification into its ultimate elements and thus brings out the principles of these activities of thinking. The latter (the logic of truth) is a critique of dialectical illusion—be it a formal logical illusion or a transcendental one.

The next theme of investigation—and a positive fundamental segment of the whole *Critique* as well—is the first division of the transcendental logic, namely the transcendental analytic. By discussing this section, we shall soon see that Kant's circumscription of both forms of logic is only as seemingly clear as it appears. But how Kant divides the transcendental analytic must now become intelligible by a more focused explanation of the notion of this discipline.

Chapter Two

The Significance of the Transcendental Analytic

Let us begin with a diagram of Kant's division of the *Critique*, in order to see the position of the transcendental analytic in relation to the whole of the *Critique*:



This diagram shows that the positive part of the transcendental logic is the transcendental analytic. As already indicated, the transcendental logic encompasses the basic problem of grounding the possibility of ontological knowledge, with the result that the treatment of this central problem of the *Critique* is obviously to be found in the transcendental analytic—even though the transcendental logic initially deals only with the thought-element of knowledge. Therefore, it is necessary to explain, in principle if only provisionally, the notion of transcendental analytic. This task is all the more important precisely because the Kantian division of the transcendental analytic into the analytic of concepts and the analytic of principles is misleading and totally covers up the sense in which both of these books of the transcendental analytic are inherently related.

In the following we would like to offer a methodic and critical preparation for the real study of the problems of the transcendental logic. This would enable us not to fall victim to the external arrangement of

the Kantian presentation, but rather to look behind the external architectonic, proceeding from the inherent problem which Kant grasped.

§17. Methodic and Critical Preparation for
Interpreting the Transcendental Analytic

a) Transcendental Philosophy as Ontology of
the Extant in General

Behind Kant's division of the transcendental analytic into an analytic of concepts and an analytic of principles is hidden a fundamental obscurity with regard to the crucial character and task of the transcendental analytic, thus an obscurity with regard to the task of the transcendental logic, and thus perhaps an obscurity with regard to the task of the entirety of the *Critique* as *laying the foundation of general ontology*. At this point we must explicitly recall that we interpreted the task of the *Critique* in the sense of laying of such a foundation, specifically in connection with the significant passage B873, A845. According to this passage transcendental philosophy, as ontology or *metaphysica generalis*, elaborates "a system of all concepts and principles which relate to objects in general but take no account of objects that *might have been given* (ontology)." Thus here Kant distinguishes an ontology of objects in general from the ontology of given objects. We interpreted this as the difference between an ontology of what is extant *in general* and an ontology of *specific* realms or regions of what is extant.

To be sure, the Kantian ontology of the extant is reduced to a fundamentally more radical and more universal ontology than Kant himself sees—indeed to a regional ontology. In other words, the Kantian ontology does not prove to be the ontology which ought to be equated with *metaphysica generalis*. This equation is legitimate only insofar as and as long as "being" is equated with "being extant" and its concomitant determinations—an equation which has remained self-evident for the whole philosophical tradition up to now, but fundamentally without justification.

α) Determination of General and Transcendental Logic as
Science of Thinking with Respect to Objects in General

We equated Kant's system of pure concepts and principles of objects in general with an ontology of the extant as such. In this way another obscurity and ambiguity is brought to light, one that we deliberately did not touch upon in our introductory observations, because this obscurity and ambiguity can be fully clarified only after clarifying the Kantian concepts of a general and pure logic.

In the passage just cited Kant states that transcendental philosophy or ontology deals with concepts or principles of *objects in general*.¹ Let us compare this with the definition of general and pure logic (that is, a logic which is precisely *not yet* transcendental logic) in Kant's lecture on logic: General and pure logic is "a science *a priori* of the necessary laws of thinking . . . with respect . . . to objects in general."²

Could we not say that this way of thinking identifies the general and pure logic, which Kant differentiates most sharply from transcendental logic, with transcendental philosophy? According to Jäsche's Kant-text, general and pure logic deals with thinking with respect to objects in general. And according to the quotation from Kant, so does transcendental philosophy. It might occur to us to eliminate the difficulty with a *coup de main*, by maintaining that Jäsche presents a version of Kant's logic-lecture which Kant himself no longer checked. Moreover the thesis that general and pure logic deals with thinking with regard to objects in general could be seen as non-Kantian and contrary to genuinely Kantian passages of the *Critique*. For, in explaining the task of general and pure logic, we always stressed the point that this logic is only concerned with the function of unification of representations among one another and disregards the relation to objects. Thus one cannot simply claim that this logic deals with a thinking that specifically regards objects in general! Thus Jäsche's Kant-text rests on an error.

However, resolution of the difficulty is not so simple. Only if we fail to see that behind the ambiguous designation of general logic—(1) as the science of the functions of unification, i.e., as the function of thinking in general without relation to objects and (2) as the science of thinking with regard to objects—lies one of the most fundamental problems, still unexplained from antiquity to the most recent present, only then could we assume to avoid this difficulty with the cheap, philological argument that Jäsche was a blockhead who did not understand Kant.

As far as we are concerned, there are two questions here: (1) Is this a faulty definition of the essence of general logic in Kant's sense, if this logic is characterized as science of thinking with regard to objects in general, since according to Kant's explicit statements this logic *disregards* the "relation to objects"? (2) If this is not a faulty definition, if general logic can legitimately deal with thinking "with respect to objects in general," how could one still differentiate this notion of general logic from the idea of transcendental logic as the science of purely object-related thinking, from thinking of objects in general?

Let us pursue the first question. Does the characterization of general,

1. CPR, B 873, A 845.

2. *Logik* (Cassirer, VIII, 336).

pure logic as “science of thinking with respect to objects” introduce a discrepancy into its concept, insofar as this characterization says that relation to objects is part of the theme of this logic, while, on the other hand, this relation is the exclusive theme of transcendental logic? But must the phrase “thinking with respect to objects in general” imply that relation to objects is the *theme* of general, pure logic? By no means. If thinking is considered only as unification of representations among one another, then this means that the thinking which is our *theme with respect to its function of unification* is essentially *related to objects*, insofar as unification of representations in each case represents *something*. In investigating the mere function of unification of representations, it is a matter of indifference precisely *what* they represent. The specific relation of representations to what is specifically represented is also a matter of indifference. To say that logic is “science of thinking with respect to objects” merely excludes [the possibility] that these objects themselves and the relation to them as such would be the theme of investigation. Properly understood, the concept of logic as science of thinking necessarily includes [the possibility] that this logic be the science of thinking with respect to all objects—apart from *what* these objects are and *how* thinking is related to them. But we cannot erase the fact that thinking is thinking of something, if logic is still to be a science of thinking.

So far from contradicting the authentic text of the *Critique*, this interpretation of the definition of general, pure logic in Jäsche’s Kant-text is in full agreement with the *Critique*. According to Kant, “As general logic, it abstracts from all content of the knowledge of understanding and from all differences in its objects.”³ Kant does not say that its theme is thinking without any relation to objects. He realizes, therefore, that, whereas general logic disregards differences among objects, the presupposition for not considering these differences is precisely that thinking *in general* is related to objects. This self-evident presupposition, which lies in thinking as such, comes forth in Jäsche. Not only does his formulation not contradict the view expressed in the *Critique*, but it offers a more penetrating interpretation. “As propaedeutic for all employment of understanding in general, general logic on the other hand is distinguished from transcendental logic, by which the object is represented as an object of pure understanding. By contrast general logic relates to objects in general.”⁴ Transcendental logic considers the problematic of objects *as* objects—to the extent and insofar as objects are determined by *pure* thinking. By contrast general logic does not aim at objects as such and even less at objects as objects of pure thinking. Rather, general logic examines think-

ing with respect to *all* objects, no matter of what content. General logic disregards the question of whether or not objects are those of pure thinking, of empirical thinking, or of a thinking intuition.

β) The Concept of Object in General; Foundation of Formal Logic in Formal Ontology

Now we shall take up the second question which we raised above. The definition of general and pure logic in the logic-lecture is not a faulty definition. General logic *is* the science of thinking with respect to *all* objects, even as it is not identical with transcendental philosophy, which deals with the *pure* concepts and principles of objects in general. Nevertheless one difficulty remains, and it inheres in the *concept of object* itself.

If our interpretation of the Kantian notion of *metaphysica generalis* is correct and if “ontology of *objects* in general” means “ontology of what is generally *extant*,” then *Gegenstand* [object] means the same as *Objekt* [obj-ect], i.e., what we encounter in finite experience as spatially or temporally *extant*, as physical or psychic appearances. Object [*Gegenstand*] is then whatever is extant.

But we were told that pure space is not something extant among other things that are extant. Nevertheless Kant speaks of space “represented as *object*,”⁵ space as the theme of formal intuition, i.e., the theme of the knowledge of geometry. Thus here there is something which is an object but is not extant. Moreover, in his *Critique* Kant treats of pure intuition, pure thinking, *a priori* knowledge, the principle of contradiction, and other principles—none of which is extant in the sense of spatial and temporal things. As an activity of the subject, all thinking for example is outside time and even more so non-spatial. All of this is not extant and nevertheless is not nothing. In the same way, when dealing in the table of the “concept of nothing”⁶ with nothing, Kant does not deal with nothing, but with something, namely the concept of nothing and nothing itself. We reflect on all of this in thinking; and thus it is an *object* of thinking, although nothing is extant. Thus not every something is necessarily something extant; but yet, as something, it is an object.

Hence, when we investigate objects in general with respect to their *objectness*, this investigation need *not* be an *ontology of the extant*. On the other hand, this ontology of *objects* is not identical with general logic, because general logic does not examine objects but rather the formal thinking of these objects in general. But what we have called ontology of objects in general deals with objects *as such*, with what pertains to something as something—be it something extant or of a different kind

3. CPR, B 78, A 54.

4. *Logik* (Cassirer, VIII, 336).

5. CPR, B 161, note.

6. *Ibid.*, B 348, A 291.

of being. One designates as *formal ontology* the *ontology of something in general*, in which one does not deal with thinking but with objects in general, where all content and factuality and all material determination are left out of consideration.

Kant's distinction between formal (general and pure) logic and transcendental (material) logic as ontology of the extant does not go far enough. For formal ontology is different yet. It was Husserl who first developed this idea of a formal ontology, in the *Ideas on Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, I (1913), sections 9–16. These thoughts are already prepared for in the *Logical Investigations*, I (1900), particularly in Chapter 11. Here, under the title “Idea of Pure Logic,” Husserl treats of the idea of a formal ontology.

But even with the radical differentiation between formal logic, formal ontology, and ontology of the extant, we have not yet arrived at an ultimate clarification. For when thinking is examined with respect to all objects, the theme then is *thinking of something*. Also the entire formal examination of thinking of something presupposes an examination of something in general and of its basic structure. That is, *formal logic is grounded in formal ontology*. With this we come to the central problem to which we have already referred: the clarification of the relation of logic to ontology. A closer examination is capable of showing that formal logic is in yet another respect rooted in ontology.

Thus we see that, whereas Kant's distinction between general pure logic and transcendental logic—as the logic of the extant—may be clear and unambiguous at first sight and in one respect, it becomes questionable when we examine it critically.

b) The Systematic Unity of the Ontological Determinations of the Extant in General and the Completeness of the Table of Categories

Preceding discussions make clear that transcendental philosophy as ontology of the extant in general has as its theme the ontological constitution of a closed realm of beings which are accessible to us in finite experience. These extant beings in general have their essential constitution, i.e., a *unified* stock of essential determinations which are interconnected. These determinations define and determine what belongs to a being as something extant and what constitutes a “nature” as such. In accordance with how he deals with the ontological problem, Kant formulates this as the question concerning synthetic knowledge *a priori*. He does so by speaking of a “totality of the *a priori* knowledge,”⁷ i.e., speaking

of what is knowable in advance about beings whose constitution makes up a *particular region*. For this ontological constitution that is knowable in advance Kant in the central, later chapters of the *Critique* often uses the remarkable phrase “possibility of experience” or “possible experience”: “the possibility of experience as a knowledge wherein all objects . . . must finally be capable of being given to us.”⁸ “Possibility of experience” does not mean the empty thought that something like experience is possible. Rather it means the totality of conditions of what makes experience possible *in the first place*. Experience as ontic knowledge is made possible in the first place by ontological knowledge. Hence “possibility of experience” means what makes experience possible ontologically, the ontological constitution of the extant and of nature in general. Kant also calls that which determines nature in this manner “transcendental [ontological] laws of nature.”⁹ We “anticipate experience”¹⁰ with these ontological laws of nature, which determine the shape of that which makes experience possible.

Intuition and thinking belong to ontic experience; *pure* intuition and *pure* thinking, to the *possibility* of experience. The transcendental analytic as the science of pure thinking consists in “dissection of all our *a priori* knowledge [i.e. of the possibility of experience] into the elements of knowledge that pure understanding yields.”¹¹ But insofar as what makes experience ontologically possible, that is, what makes the extant ontologically possible as something experiential, constitutes in itself a *closed regional totality*, in the same way in which pure thought-determinations, which belong to this closed regional totality, must also obviously exhibit a system which is closed within itself. The *science* of these pure thought-determinations must be oriented in advance toward this systematic unity and regional totality of the possibility of experience. Only by viewing in advance the unity of the totality of conditions which make experience possible can we divide the individual conditions and determine them separately. But we cannot pretend to bring these determinations together by chance or by a raw and rough calculation.

The table of pure thought-determinations which make up the regional totality of the extant in general must be complete in itself. In fact this table must be of such a completeness as to be regulated by the *idea of a whole*. Moreover, as *a priori* determinations of thinking, these pure thought-determinations must be *concepts* and not intuitions. Furthermore, as ontological conditions these concepts must be *pure* and not empirical. And finally it is important that we lay out those among these

7. Ibid., B 89, A 64.

8. Ibid., B 264, A 217.

9. Ibid., B 263, A 216.

10. Ibid., B 264, A 217.

11. Ibid., B 89, A 64.

pure concepts which constitute in an originary and elementary way the regional totality of the extant. Hence Kant formulates, in a somewhat different order, four conditions to which a transcendental analytic of thinking must adhere: “The following are the points of chief concern: (1) that the concepts are pure and not empirical; (2) that they belong, not to intuition and sensibility, but to thought and understanding; (3) that they be fundamental and be carefully distinguished from those which are derivative or composite; (4) that our table of concepts be complete, covering the whole field of understanding.”¹²

All of these determinations of the idea of a transcendental analytic are grounded upon the insight that pure understanding represents a closed system of pure thought-determinations: “Pure understanding distinguishes itself not merely from all that is empirical but completely also from sensibility.” That is to say that understanding is independent of space and time and “is a unity self-subsistent, self-sufficient, and not to be increased by any additions from without.”¹³ This idea of a closed system of pure understanding and of a logic subordinated to it was later taken up by Hegel in a more radical and universal manner, in his *Science of Logic*.

c) Division of the Transcendental Analytic

α) What Is Incorrect in the Division of Transcendental Analytic into an Analytic of Concepts and an Analytic of Principles

Kant concludes his general exposition of the idea of the transcendental analytic by announcing its division: “This whole part of the transcendental logic {transcendental analytic as distinguished from transcendental dialectic} requires, however, for its complete exposition, two books, the one containing the *concepts*, the other the *principles* of pure understanding.”¹⁴ The reason for this division is by no means clear. It comes like a shot from a gun and is the focus of all misunderstanding concerning the transcendental logic. Behind this seemingly harmless division is hidden the *central* question of the *genuine* task of transcendental logic as distinguished from the widely accepted non-genuine and presumptuous task set for it, even in Kant.

When one comes up against this division of the transcendental logic into the analytic of concepts and the analytic of principles, then one also immediately has an explanation at hand. It is said that, in dealing with

the transcendental logic, Kant is guided by general, pure logic, which he sees mostly in that form in which it has been traditionally dealt with, namely divided into the doctrine of concepts, the doctrine of judgment and proposition, and the doctrine of conclusion. Accordingly, transcendental logic is divided in Kant into a doctrine of concepts and principles and a doctrine of conclusions, i.e., transcendental dialectic.

There is no denying that this architectonic of traditional formal logic had influenced Kant, especially when we consider his strong inclination to architectonic, for which he had an unmistakable talent. However, philosophical understanding dare not stop with the titles of books, but must inquire into what is dealt with under these titles. When we pursue this question, then something remarkable forces itself upon us. Under the title “Analytic of Concepts” Kant also deals with pure judgment of understanding. And vice versa, under the title “Analytic of Principles” the actual theme is pure concepts of understanding. This already shows that it is hopeless to get at Kant’s actual intention if we rely on his architectonic in an artificial way, instead of breaking it down and inquiring into the problems that inhere within it. In spite of his seemingly being oriented toward traditional formal logic, Kant took significant steps beyond this logic. The manner in which Kant touches the problems of transcendental logic leaves the traditional architectonic way behind, even if this architectonic often shines through, especially in the exposition.

Considering the inherent problems, we must say that concept and judgment cannot be separated at all and that working out pure concepts of understanding as elements of pure thinking is only a radical interpretation of the pure activity of understanding as such. The division of the transcendental logic, as analytic, into an analytic of concepts and an analytic of principles is by no means paralleled in the structure of formal logic. Rather the analytic of *concepts* presents an original observation of the pure *proposition* of understanding as such and its structure, of which pure concepts of understanding represent an essential moment. But the analytic of *principles* presents ontological knowledge, which belongs necessarily to the possibility of experience. The analytic offers this knowledge with the intention of justifying the *categories* in their objective reality, in their transcendental truth. This means that *the title of mere principles no longer indicates logic alone*, or even only primarily logic, *but that it is precisely the problem of the origin of pure elements of understanding* with regard to their transcendental truth that we are dealing with here. That is, here we are dealing with the problem of the origin of categories from out of *intuition*.

If one takes the transcendental logic as *logic of the origin*, as is done in the Marburg School, then one must consider a fundamental ambiguity in the concept of “origin”: (1) On the one hand “origin” refers to the origin of pure concepts of understanding in the pure activity of understanding as such, i.e., the crucial and constitutive interconnections

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., B 89f., A 65.

14. Ibid., B 90, A 65.

between categories and the pure employment of understanding, and (2) on the other hand “origin” refers to the origin of these elements of understanding as they originate from the element of pure knowledge, which is unlike understanding—the origin of pure principles of understanding in pure intuition, the origin of categories in time. Not only did the Marburg interpretation of Kant generally misconstrue this ultimate and significant problem of the origin, but it also distorted the starting points that are clearly present, making them unrecognizable.

It is not appropriate to take the first book of the transcendental analytic, the analytic of concepts,¹⁵ as an isolated treatment of the categories as pure concept of understanding. For interpreting the categories as elements is nothing other than making visible the pure proposition of understanding as element of pure knowledge, i.e., making visible what, in itself as thinking, is essentially related to intuition. So already at this point we cannot carry out the exposition of the categories without having recourse to the structural whole of a pure knowledge *a priori* and thus in pure intuition. Transcendental logic is really in no way a logic, but something totally different.

Following this methodical and critical preparation for a factual examination of the problems of transcendental logic as an analytic, we must now attempt to find an approximate division of the first book of the transcendental analytic.

β) Preparatory Demonstration of the Problematic of the Metaphysical and the Transcendental Deduction of Pure Concepts of Understanding

Treatment of the analytic of concepts has a structure similar to the transcendental aesthetic. The latter offers an exposition of pure intuitions, first by way of a metaphysical and then by way of a transcendental exposition. Instead of an “exposition” Kant, in the analytic of concepts, speaks of a “deduction.” The metaphysical exposition of space and time is meant to work out the general and ownmost inner possibility of space and time, while the transcendental exposition is supposed to explain their function in ontological knowledge. Correspondingly, the metaphysical deduction of categories is meant to illuminate the ownmost inner possibility of pure concepts of understanding as such, while the transcendental deduction is supposed to explain the role which the categories play in ontological knowledge.

What neo-Kantianism in all its varieties has made out of both of these crucial segments of the transcendental analytic of concepts—namely of a metaphysical and then the transcendental deduction of categories—is

manifest most impressively in the fatal influence of the so-called epistemological interpretation of the *Critique*. The thoroughgoing misinterpretation of the metaphysical as well as the transcendental deduction, both individually as well as with respect to the connection between the two, shows why neo-Kantianism could so thoroughly block access to Kant. In the neo-Kantian view of the metaphysical and the transcendental deduction a peculiar method is rediscovered, a method that is to some extent still being pursued in these schools today: Just as Kant’s incidental remark of a Copernican turn is raised to the level of a misunderstood slogan, so too the two terms introduced in the transcendental analytic—in the talk or idle talk of a *quaestio juris* as distinguished from a *quaestio facti*—is raised to the level of a slogan without interpreting these terms from within the factual treatment of the problems. A web of misunderstandings of Kant and his intention is gathered around these slogans. However, we shall refrain from critically dealing in detail with these misunderstandings. Instead we shall attempt to present the positive interpretation of the transcendental analytic of concepts, which will render visible the first nucleus of Kant’s incidental remark about *quaestio juris* and *quaestio facti*.

As a matter of fact neo-Kantianism can be excused to a certain extent for its misinterpretation of the analytic of concepts and transcendental logic, because this segment of the *Critique* presents the greatest difficulty to Kant himself. The external indication of these difficulties lies in the fact that Kant completely revised the transcendental deduction of categories in the second edition, even as he did not intend thereby to render the elaboration of the first edition superfluous and wanted this elaboration to be taken equally seriously. But even this second revision did not satisfy Kant. Even though he put immense effort and kept making new starts in explaining this segment, he still did not get complete clarity about this segment. The reason is that Kant did not succeed in mastering the traditionally very powerful influence of logic on ontology. Put differently, the entire problematic of the *Critique*, in its structure and in the form of its execution, is not suited to the originality of the insight to which Kant arrives in the most decisive segment of the *Critique*, where he unhinges himself and undermines his own foundation.

That Kant was confronted with the greatest difficulties in the analytic of concepts is also manifest in the external fact that in the preface to both the first as well as the second edition of the *Critique* he returns precisely to this segment: “I know no enquiries which are more important for exploring the faculty which we entitle understanding, and for determining the rules and limits of its employments, than those which I have instituted in the second chapter of the Transcendental Analytic under the title ‘Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding.’ They are also those which have cost me the greatest labor—labor, as I hope,

15. Ibid., B 90, A 65 to B 169, A 130.

not unrewarded. This inquiry, which is somewhat deeply grounded, has two sides."¹⁶ Once again in A98 Kant emphasizes the "difficulty" and "obscurity" of the deduction of categories; and then he writes in the preface to edition B: "Now, as regards this second edition, I have, as is fitting, endeavored to profit by the opportunity, in order to remove, wherever possible, difficulties and obscurity which, not perhaps without my fault, may have given rise to the many misunderstandings into which even acute thinkers have fallen in passing judgment upon my book. . . . As to the mode of *exposition*, on the other hand, much still remains to be done; and in this edition I have sought to make improvements which should help in removing, first the misunderstanding with regard to the aesthetic, especially concerning the concept of time; secondly, the obscurity of deduction of the concepts of understanding. . . ."¹⁷

Kant not only *says* that he was confronted with difficulties in the deduction of categories, but the twofold elaboration of this theme *shows* that he did not gain clarity about it. But we are not only dealing with a twofold elaboration of one and the same task; but the task of the deduction, its specific goal, *itself vacillates*. The notion of a transcendental deduction is by no means so clear as it would seem, when one says that there the *quaestio juris* is raised and answered. One acts as if the *quaestio juris* is as clear as the sun. The obscurity of the notion of the deduction as such and of the transcendental deduction is, of course, not accidental. This obscurity rests on the fact that Kant, under the title of transcendental logic and analytic, treats—according to the pattern of traditional formal logic—problems that do not admit of such treatment. Certainly Kant sees a significant ontological problematic. But he entangles this problem within the issues of logic. However, that this problematic becomes something else when connected with ontology is manifest in the designation "transcendental" logic.

First of all we must explain what "deduction" means. Obviously this expression is meant to distinguish the character of the kind of investigation of the transcendental analytic or of a portion thereof. Beginning with A87, Kant *does* speak of a "transcendental deduction" in a sense which refers to the method of the transcendental aesthetic, while in the first edition this distinction between a metaphysical and a transcendental exposition does not appear in the aesthetic. This means unequivocally that "transcendental deduction" is the title for the method of ontological examination of the elements of pure knowledge—pure intuition and pure concepts. Hence we must try to determine the notion of transcendental deduction in connection with the notion of transcendental ana-

lytic, which in reference to its method Kant characterizes in more detail than he does the transcendental aesthetic. Only by having this general and fundamental orientation (according to which the transcendental deduction indicates the method of transcendental ontological knowledge) can we deal with that which Kant himself explicitly states about the notion of "deduction" and "transcendental deduction."

Something else emerges simultaneously: After having penetrated into the main area of the Kantian problematic with the help of our interpretation up to this point—particularly with the interpretation of the transcendental aesthetic—we must now let go of the more schematic resources and become engaged in the indeterminations and vacillations of various elaborations of the first and second editions. In our introductory interpretation of the transcendental aesthetic we deliberately followed the more detailed division of edition B. It could therefore appear as though edition A is inherently less perfect. But this first edition is only more difficult, while at the same time more genuine and more radical in its inquiry. Hence we must now put aside our primary orientation toward edition B and focus only on the first elaboration [edition A]. According to that elaboration there is no difference between a metaphysical and a transcendental exposition in the transcendental aesthetic. Rather pure intuitions of space and time are simply examined in view of their "sources" and "objective validity."

In the following interpretation of the transcendental analytic of concepts we shall proceed in such a way as first to focus on the elaboration of edition A and only then to treat edition B, in a corresponding manner. From this point on we shall look more sharply at the peculiarities of the transcendental aesthetic vis-à-vis transcendental logic. And, by following the elaborations of the transcendental deduction in both edition A and edition B, we shall bring to light just how much Kant hesitated with regard to the most crucial phenomena and foundations of his philosophy. It is just this hesitation by Kant *in this central dimension* that is productive and instructive—and is by no means a deficiency of his philosophical research. On the contrary, only second-rate individuals perch comfortably and self-satisfied and conceited in their own opinion or jump irresponsibly from one opinion to another, depending on the prospect, collecting haphazardly whatever happens to come their way. Only Kant and, by way of comparison, Aristotle—who both aimed so clearly at a fundamental and radical goal—could have and had to hesitate in this clumsy manner—or, as Kant said of himself, could experience so many upsets.

16. Ibid., A xvi.

17. Ibid., B xxxvii f.

§18. Exposition of the Essence of the
Transcendental Analytic of Concepts

First we must explicate the essence of the transcendental analytic of concepts, in order against this background to explain what is meant by "transcendental deduction." We must discuss three issues: (1) What is "analytic"? (2) What is "transcendental analytic"? and (3) What is a "concept"? By responding to these three questions, we shall be able to see the *real* theme of the transcendental logic (the categories); and from this vantage point we shall be able to explain how Kant determines and carries out the task of deduction of the categories, what he means by deduction, what in Kant's mind the deduction should accomplish, what it actually does accomplish, and what it leaves unexplained.

a) The Meaning of "Analytic" and of
"Transcendental Analytic"

"Analytic" means dissolution and dissection. Dissolution of concepts means isolating the moments which constitute the contents of a given concept. In this context it is of no concern whatsoever what the concept is a concept of, what kind of being the concept indicates, and in what way the concept indicates a being. It is also all the same in what course of thinking the concept is obtained. The analytic of concepts and representations in this general sense serves to clarify thinking and what is thought. It is the formal logical treatment of concepts which is possible in all cases in the same way.

Kant distinguishes this general analytic from the transcendental analytic, about which he states: "By analytic of concepts I do not understand their analysis, or the procedure usual in philosophical investigations, that of dissecting the content of such concepts as may present themselves, and so of rendering them more distinct; but the hitherto rarely attempted *dissection of the faculty of the understanding itself*, in order to investigate the possibility of concepts *a priori* by looking for them in the understanding alone, as their birthplace, and by analyzing the pure use of this faculty. This is the proper task of a transcendental philosophy; anything beyond this belongs to the logical treatment of concepts in philosophy in general."¹

The transcendental analytic, too, is an analysis and thus a clarification. But this analytic is not concerned with whatever concepts that are somehow given. Rather this analytic presents a clarification of the faculty of understanding itself, clarification of the comportment of thinking, with the intention of rendering visible this comportment of thinking as the

birthplace of those concepts which determine *a priori* the objectivity of objects. This analytic pursues these concepts back to their first "sprouts and outlines in understanding." "Analytic" now means clarification of the origin of *a priori* pure concepts of understanding. The analytic investigates the "possibility" of these concepts, that is, what enables them to be what they are. This analytic brings to light what belongs to them necessarily and as what these concepts essentially function in pure knowledge. Accordingly, the analytic is clarification of the essence and ownmost inner possibility of pure understanding in its role in pure knowledge. Clarification in this sense is what the expression "deduction" means.

As far as its methodical character is concerned, the analytic clarifies thoroughly and demonstrates and brings to light. We must bear this task of the analytic in mind if we want to understand what is meant by *quaestio juris* and if, on the other hand, we do not want to misconstrue what is stated in a *quaestio facti* in the transcendental analytic. As clarification of the origin of pure concepts of understanding, analytic is not identical with the story of how we in fact come upon these concepts and how we become conscious of them. Rather the analytic means demonstration of how these concepts are possible—and necessarily emerge—from out of the essential structure of understanding itself, regardless of whether and why and how we factually know about these concepts. Here Kant takes a first step toward eliminating the obscurity of the *idea innata*, whose meaning is unclear in Descartes as well as in Leibniz. When we are told that these concepts "lie ready for use" in the faculty of understanding, this does not mean that these concepts are developed *as* concepts. It is true that they do not first originate through experience; thus they are "ready for use." But we first become conscious of them on the occasion of experience. Experience is the instigation for us to come upon them. Our comportment toward beings within which we as existing beings factually move is the instigation for us to become conscious of them. That is, there is something like an understanding of being in this comportment to beings. With that, Dasein—as object of ontological interpretation—is central to the thematic of transcendental logic, whose theme is thus the ontology of Dasein's transcendence.

b) Analysis of the Essence of the Concept

α) General Pure Logic as the Basis for Exposition of the
Concept; Presentation of Directives for the Investigation

Our next question is: What does "concept" mean? In order to explain this phenomenon, we must go further back and return to Kant's lectures on logic. In a certain sense we are already prepared for this discussion through the general characterization of understanding as the faculty of

1. CPR, B 90, A 65.

judgment and of rules. Kant calls understanding also the faculty of concepts. Thus characterized as a faculty, understanding cannot accomplish a multiplicity. Rather, if understanding as function of unity and unification is also called “faculty of concepts,” then we find herein only a more precise interpretation of this unification; and inversely the meaning of understanding as the faculty of concepts gets clarified from out of the ownmost inner possibility of understanding as the faculty of judgments, of the functions of unity. The ownmost inner possibility of the concept can be explained only with respect to the analysis of the general structure of understanding as what *enacts* the understanding: “Concepts of understanding {enable us} to *understand* (perceptions).”² The manner in which understanding functions as enacting the understanding is *judging*. Thus it is stated: “Thought is knowledge by means of *concepts*.”³ Therefore, when logic traditionally deals first with the concept and then with judgment, this is a scholastic division which covers over the inner connection which is inherent between concept and judgment—assuming that we take this division as the only crucial one. Nevertheless, we would like first to consider the traditional exposition of the doctrine of concept as Kant offers it in his lectures on logic. This is all the more feasible, as Kant thoroughly modifies the traditional logic in its crucial parts (not only the doctrine of concepts) in terms of the newly uncovered ground of the transcendental logic.

By means of the analysis of the essence of the concept and in keeping with the connection between concept and judgment as fundamental facts of thought, we gain a clear insight into the structure of thinking. Thus we are prepared for understanding the specific and proper task of transcendental logic as an analytic of pure thinking and of pure concepts, the categories. Our earlier fundamental and critical discussions of Kant’s notion of general and pure logic—as distinguished from transcendental logic—left the question open of how both kinds of logic relate to each other. We said only that in principle logic as such must be grounded in ontology. In this sense perhaps we can interpret Kant’s statement about a fundamental phenomenon which grounds all object-oriented thinking and thus transcendental logic, namely the transcendental apperception: “The synthetic unity of apperception is therefore that highest point, to which we must ascribe all employment of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and conformably therewith, transcendental philosophy. Indeed this faculty is the understanding itself.”⁴ This statement makes clear that Kant’s task is to ground the general and pure logic in the phenomenon of transcendental apperception. We must emphasize again

2. Ibid., B 367, A 311.

3. Ibid., B 94, A 69 [emphasis by Heidegger].

4. Ibid., B 134, note.

and again the manner in which for Kant general and pure logic plays into transcendental logic and ontology, the manner in which their boundaries permeate each other. This must be emphasized, not in order to point out a deficiency, but in order to make clear the principle of an inherent and factual interpretation, according to which we dare not take our orientation from a superficial schema, but rather must go behind this schema to the proper and inherent discussion.

However, let us first attempt to understand the essence of the concept as it is expounded upon in the general formal logic. As we know, general pure logic investigates thinking as the *faculty of spontaneity* of understanding, which is essentially different from intuition, merely in terms of its most general structure, without considering the particular relatedness of thinking to determined objects in each particular case. The theme is not representations in their relation to objects, but their relation among themselves. While not considering the “relation-to,” this relation is not crossed out. Thinking is not curtailed around this structure, for it remains fundamentally attached to thinking, without being thematically focused upon.

Thinking and intuition share the common characteristic of representing (*repraesentare*), of relating-to-something, in such a way that this something is focused upon on the basis of this relation and its *coram intuitu* [in the presence of intuition]. Representing renders present; it lets something be encountered as what is present. To this should be added that, as re-presenting of something, representing is *conscious* of itself as that which renders present—a representing “gets enacted in consciousness.”

Earlier we circumscribed the difference between intuition as representing and thinking as representing, by indicating that intuition is receptive and a rendering present that depends upon the fact that what presents itself to intuition presses itself in advance and by itself upon intuition. Affection belongs to representing as intuiting, whereas representing as thinking is a function which originates spontaneously from the activity of thinking itself; it represents something from out of itself and in its specific manner.

We also saw that representing as thinking always *mediates*—that, unlike intuition, thinking cannot relate to an extant object directly, but only through the detour of representing a representation as intuition. Clarification of the ownmost inner possibility of thinking through concepts and thus clarification of the concept itself consists in making clear what is meant by this *representing of a representation*.

In this connection we shall deal more precisely with a different characterization of intuition and thinking, one that we have also already mentioned. In explaining space and time as pure intuitions, we indicated that what space and time relate to as intuitions is something that is unified in itself, a whole and as such something unique and undivided.

Intuition is a *singular* representation, a *repraesentatio singularis*. This does not mean that intuition is something individualized or occurs in isolation. Intuition is a representation of single things. That to which an intuitive representing relates is in each case something singular. This is also true of the intuition which is not possible for us humans, i.e., *intuitus originarius*, wherein the totality of the world in its unique and whole determination is intuited in one fell swoop. Only intuition can represent something in the totality of its determinateness: "Because only singular things or individuals are generally determined, there can be only generally certain knowledge as *intuitions* but not as *concepts*."⁵ Here too the priority of intuition in all knowledge is revealed in a definite form. Hence, if thinking has a fundamental position of serving and mediating and as such aims at intuition and if intuition primarily and exclusively makes the total determination of a being accessible, then thinking aims at the full determination of each individual thing, of the interconnection of things, and of their totality. Thinking's necessary groundedness in and relatedness to intuition is what makes thinking what it is: a *determining*. But insofar as thinking is not directly related to objects—as is intuition—thinking by means of concepts cannot be a single representation, or a representation of individual things. Rather, the concept is "a *general . . . or a reflected* representation,"⁶ a representation of something general, a *repraesentatio per notas communes*. The concept is a representing, not on the basis of affection, but as spontaneous *reflection*. The concept is a *repraesentatio discursiva*, a discursive representation.⁷ The concept or the grasping by means of concept is a representing of the general which is enacted in the manner of reflection.

How does this characterization of thinking fit with another characterization of it, namely that thinking is not an immediate representation but a representation of a representation? A closer interpretation of what is meant by "representing something general" and by "reflection" will make clear the extent to which *reflecting representing* of the general is essentially a *representation of a representation*, i.e., a judging, a grasping by means of concepts, and an understanding. Incidentally, Kant distinguishes grasping by means of concepts from understanding: "Concepts of reason enable us to *conceive*, concepts of understanding to *understand* [as employed in reference to] (perception)."⁸ However, both conceiving and understanding are a thinking by means of concepts, a conceptual representing. Now, different kinds of concepts correspond to this difference: concepts of reason and concepts of understanding. But here and

for now we are concerned only with the concept as such; and from a purely terminological point of view, we may grasp all representing by means of concepts as a conceiving. By contrast we take representing in a broader sense and conceiving as conceptual knowing in a narrower sense. Every understanding is not automatically a conceiving; for there is also a preconceptual understanding, which is not identical with intuition, even though intuition belongs to it as its basis.

For a more refined exposition of the essence of the concept, we ask four questions: (1) What does "concept" as a *general representation*, or as representing what is general, mean? (2) What is "concept" as a *reflective representing*? What is the ownmost inner possibility of reflection and the acts which belong to it? (3) To what extent is reflective representing of the general identical with thinking as judging in the sense of representing a representation—identical with the discursive character of thinking? To what extent is concept as *reflective* representation a *repraesentatio discursiva*? (4) Upon what does the concept as such rest, as distinguished from intuition? But keep in mind that even in responding to these questions we shall not yet have explained what is meant by "pure concept" or "category."

β) Concept as General Representation

What does "general representation," *repraesentatio per notas communes*, mean? The concept "is a general representation or a representation of what is common to several objects."⁹ Thus when we represent such a common thing, there is, explicitly or not, a relation here to *several* objects, that is, correspondingly, to several related intuitions or representations of individual things. But in a conceptual representing as *repraesentatio per notas communes* we do not simply represent a plurality of objects, but rather what is *common* to this plurality—common in spite of other differences in the objects. What is common to them—and must be capable of being common to them—must be such that in it individual objects agree with one another, in spite of their differences; it must be something with reference to which these objects are unified. This something wherein several objects become *one*, this one [*dieses Eine*], is thus the determination of any one of several objects. What is represented in conceptual representation is "a representation *insofar as it can be contained in several different things*."¹⁰ We must take the term "insofar as" seriously. It is not as if something is simply being represented which in the end can be attributed to other objects and about which we do not need to have a knowledge now. Rather the concept represents something pre-

5. *Logik*, §15, note (Cassirer, VIII, 406).

6. *Ibid.*, §1 (Cassirer, VIII, 399).

7. *Ibid.*, §4 (Cassirer, VIII, 401).

8. CPR, B 367, A 311.

9. *Logik*, §1, note 1 (Cassirer, VIII, 399).

10. *Ibid.*

cisely *insofar as* this something is contained in others. To-be-able-to-be-contained in others, to be able to be attributed to a plurality of things is thus the basic character of any representation that is conceptual. From the beginning the concept is a *general* representation, i.e., is representing something in the sense of a one which is *common* to a plurality of things. That is why Kant can say, justifiably: “It is a mere tautology to speak of general or common concepts.”¹¹ Every concept as concept is distinguished by the peculiarity of possibly being “common to many”—a many which is represented in the concept. Admittedly, terms like *generality* and *general* are misleading; for they do not explain clearly that with them we must think of that *in which* several things become one, the *one* which *at the same time* is *common* to many. Hence it is more accurate to speak of the character of *commonness* [*Gemeinheit*] of the concept—this in spite of the possibility of an obvious misinterpretation of another sort.* This “commonness” is what *makes up* a concept in general as a specific representation or as a concept. Kant calls this that determines: form. This “commonness” is the form of the concept.

But what is common to several objects that in each case are determined in terms of having a factual content is itself a definite what, itself has a factual content. To commonness as *form* of the concept there always belongs a *content* or a matter. Therefore, we are told in §2 of the lectures on logic: “We must distinguish in each concept between *matter* and *form*. The matter of the concept is the *object*, while its form is *generality*.” This corresponds to the following statement [in the *Critique*]: “We demand in every concept, first, the logical form of a concept (of thought) in general, and secondly, the possibility of giving it an object to which it may be applied.”¹² This possibility requires that the concept should *have a content* on the basis of which the concept has a possible relation to a definite thing. However talk of the matter of the concept is ambiguous. First, over against the form of the concept, matter means what in the one applies to the several and is thought—i.e., the *content* of the concept. However, often or mostly Kant understands “matter” as *objects* of the concept, to which the concept is referable in terms of its definite content. Matter of the concept then means the object which is determinable by a concept with this definite content. Kant’s failure to make this differentiation leads to difficulties, for example with respect to the question of the objective reality of the categories.

That this view of the essence of the concept just now presented also

11. Ibid., §1, note 2.

12. CPR, B 298, A 239.

*[Heidegger uses the word *Gemeinheit*, which ordinarily means “meanness,” “lowliness,” and the like. It is in reference to this ordinary meaning that he speaks of another misinterpretation.]

plays a significant role in the *Critique* becomes clear in the following statement: “A representation which is to be thought as common to *different* representations is regarded as belonging to such as have, in addition to it, also something *different*.”¹³ With representation so characterized, what is circumscribed is nothing other than “general representation,” representation of something general. The concept is something represented which must be thought as common to different things. Here it is said clearly that the character of “commonness” is explicitly thought along in the concept. What is common can only be what it is as the unifying one of an agreement; and as such a unifying one—and although it is in agreement in the one and common thing—it is taken to belong to such that has “something different in it.” This passage is important for our later discussions. For now let me only indicate that this passage expresses how the unifying one as the common holds within it the relation to the many—a peculiar and initially obscure belonging together of unity and multiplicity. Once in the logic-lectures (§110) Kant says: “Every concept contains *in* itself a multiplicity, to the extent that it agrees but also to the extent that it is different.” In the multiplicity contained in a concept there lies the unity of a unanimous agreement *and* at the same time the manifold as different. The concept is in charge of *conceiving* a manifold. We must hear this *active* character of the concept, as opposed to a receptivity. First, there is in the concept the active spontaneous reaching out [*zu-greifen*]. Secondly, concept encompasses [*um-greifen*] a manifold. Thirdly, the concept is in charge of the grasping [*unter-sich-begreifen*]. We must distinguish this relation of unity as “commonness” with respect to several things from the relation of unity as a whole over against the parts, with which we dealt in regard to space and time. The many which is brought under the concept is not part of the unity of a whole.

Having clarified the essence of the concept as a general representation, we shall now attempt to respond to the second question.

γ) The Concept as Reflective Representing; the Essence of Reflection and the Acts Belonging to It

What determines the essence of the concept as concept is its *form*, i.e., *commonness*. For now we leave open the question whether this peculiarity of the concept primarily determines it, i.e., the most original form of the concept.

The concept as a kind of representing is distinguished from intuiting as representing. Receptivity, affection, belongs to our intuition as a finite intuition. [On the other hand] whereas conceptual representing as activity of thinking is grounded upon intuition, in and of itself it is spon-

13. Ibid., B 134, note.

taneous. That is, the peculiarity of the concept as concept—its commonness—originates from the spontaneity of thinking. “The form of a concept as a discursive representation is brought about [*gemacht*] at all times.”¹⁴ “Brought about” in the sense of *gemacht* means: made, shaped, engendered, produced. [*“Gemacht” meint: gebildet, erzeugt.*] According to Kant what is it that belongs to this making or shaping of a concept?

Free activity of thinking as knowing by means of concepts shows itself in the acts in which a concept originates “according to mere form,”¹⁵ i.e., with respect to its “commonness.” These acts must make intelligible how the concept as a common representation “can be related to several objects.” The question of the relatedness to the many which belongs to the essence of the concept completely disregards *what* is common to the many, what factuality and what sort of being objects themselves are. We have only inquired into the *origin of the form of the concept as such*, into the concept as a *product* of thinking. The problem is the logical origin of the concept: “And here the question arises: *Which activities of understanding constitute a concept or—the same thing—belong to production of a concept from given representations?*”¹⁶ Kant’s response is brief: “This *logical* origin of concepts—original only according to their form—consists in reflection, whereby a representation common to many objects (*conceptus communis*) emerges as that form which is required by the power of judgment.”¹⁷ Hence reflection is that act which constitutes the “commonness” of a concept, according to its essential form.

What is now the structure of reflection itself as a comportment? What connection to comportments or acts does reflection necessarily have, according to its ownmost inner possibility?

If the factor of the commonness of a concept is constituted primarily in reflection, then we must be guided by this factor, which we have already explained; and we must inquire how the comportment of representing as thinking is to be structured, such that thinking is capable of unfolding something like the commonness just mentioned. At one and the same time this question forces us to look into the structure of this very commonness more penetratingly than we have done so far.

We have pointed out repeatedly that this commonness with regard to the many rests on the fact that the many is in agreement with *something*. That *wherein* the many objects agree is a *unifying one* [*Einiges*] and selfsame. And only as this one, as this definite *unity*, can it encompass a many and contain many within itself—only thus can it be common to the many and be contained in them. Accordingly commonness is grounded

in this unity; and this unity is original and contains the form of the concept as commonness. The *primary* form of the concept is the unity which is common and contains commonness in itself.

Regardless of its differences, the many must be considered with reference to that with which the many are in agreement. Thus this unity in which the many are in agreement must also and above all *primarily be focused upon* as the *original* form. That is to say, conceptual and concept-producing representing is primarily a look into a unity which contains commonness. This unity as such does not already exist in the individuals who make up the many of the objects. Rather this unity, as containing commonness, must, so to speak, be made transparent in individual objects and first be brought into view and held therein. *This primary making transparent and bringing into view of the unity which contains commonness* as the form of the concept is the *ownmost inner possibility of the act* which Kant calls *reflection*. He describes it as follows: Reflection is “the deliberation of how various representations can be contained in one consciousness,”¹⁸ i.e., reflection is meditation on that which can unify various things, it is making transparent a possible unity which contains a commonness. Accordingly, reflection is the decisive act of concept-formation. However, in an essential sense, certain acts precede reflection, while others follow it.

In the logic-lectures Kant states: “I see, for example, a fir tree, a willow tree, or a linden tree. By comparing these objects well in advance I notice that they differ from one another with regard to trunk, branches, leaves, and the like. After this I reflect on what is common among these trees, i.e., trunk, branches, and leaves; and I abstract from their size, shape, etc. Thus I develop a concept of tree.”¹⁹ This is certainly a naive and rough description of how a concept is formed; it is in fact a description more of the setting up of the actual enactment of concept-construction than of the conditions of its interconnectedness and its inner structure as such. But such a description calls attention to something very fundamental: We certainly see objects which we quickly call “trees.” But well in advance of that we compare them and notice their difference, for example *with regard to* the trunk. In order to take note of the difference, we must *take a look* in advance at the several objects given in advance *with respect to* their trunk and branches. That is, we must take a look at these objects within a definite direction. For we can also look at several trees with respect to their location, peculiarity of the soil, and the like. Looking at the trunk and branches is thus a *definite bringing into view*, done freely and spontaneously, so much so that it *obtains* that unto which

14. *Logik*, §4, note.15. *Ibid.*, §5.16. *Ibid.*17. *Ibid.*, §5, note 1.18. *Ibid.*, §6.19. *Ibid.*, §6, note 1.

it *freely* looks from out of what is *already given* intuitively. Thus only when we look at objects in advance and in a definite manner can we *compare* them—and only then can we notice that they differ from one another *in this respect*.

Any comparison, however immediate and rough it may be, presupposes a prior bringing into view of that with respect to which we compare. Hence we need not be at all explicitly conscious of the occurrence of this bringing into view, nor are we conscious of it, because we constantly and always already reside in such prior viewpoints.

But we do not want simply to state the *difference* among objects as we compare them. Rather, “as the next step, we want to reflect on what they have in *common*.” And here we see again that what they have in common is noticeable only when we keep the objects in view according to certain respects. Put more precisely, we primarily see that wherein the objects are in agreement, wherein they are unified; and this unity is the ground for their having something, namely this one, in common. Noticing the difference already presupposes the leading regard, in whose range and in view of which we can take a look at many objects in advance and grasp the definite unity wherein the objects agree. Only by keeping in view this [unifying] one can we disregard everything in the objects which in terms of this unifying one, e.g., the trunk, is different in a certain way. Kant calls this disregarding: *abstracting*. And thus he can say: “In order to make concepts out of representations, one must be able to *compare*, *reflect*, and *abstract*. For these three logical operations of understanding are central and general conditions for the production of each and every concept.”²⁰

It is of course worthy of note that through these three logical acts of understanding *those* activities are described by which concepts are produced *according to form*, i.e., as concepts, regardless of specific content.

A closer clarification of these acts also makes clear that comparison, reflection, and abstraction are not simply lined up alongside and follow one another, but that these acts reside in a structural context. Of these three acts, reflection has a crucial and leading role; and comparison and abstraction are at the service of reflection. For prior to everything else there is an advance bringing into view that in reference to which an intuitively extant many is to be noted as different. What is different in its possible difference gets determined only on the basis of this unifying one of agreement, so that on the basis of reflection we can now explicitly disregard “the respect in which given representations are different.”²¹ In the structure of the activity of concept-formation, as Kant characterizes

it, *reflection is the supporting and determining act*. Comparison prepares for reflection, though never without reflection; abstraction brings reflection to completion and concludes it.

Our interpretation so far makes clear the spontaneity of these acts and particularly the spontaneity of the crucial act of reflection. Reflection is situated in the anticipatory bringing into view that with regard to which the many should be compared. Put more precisely, this anticipatory bringing into view is prepared for by comparing and by rendering the unity transparent wherein the many as different agree with one another.

It is remarkable that Kant calls the basic act of concept-formation—namely antecedent rendering transparent of a unity which contains a possible commonness—by the name *reflection*. For reflection literally means: bending back. Upon what does reflective representing bend back? Obviously upon the representing comportment itself. Reflection “does not concern itself with objects themselves with a view to deriving concept from them directly.”²² It is only intuiting which is directly related to objects. But although thinking is different from intuiting, it is questionable whether one can call thinking reflection in the sense that conceptual thinking necessarily bends back upon representing comportment as comportment. This certainly does not apply to concept-formation as it is done in the positive sciences. That nevertheless thinking is called reflection is only to be understood historically. Here we partly see the influence of British empiricism and partly—and mainly—the beginning of modern philosophy in Descartes, for whom all “I think” is a *cogito me cogitare*, i.e., a comportment which is conscious of itself.

Certainly on the basis of the word *reflection* alone we cannot know how the basic act of concept-formation is to be understood. If, however, we go the other way and explain this act from out of the structure of thinking, then we can justify the terminology to some extent. We can say that this terminology emphasizes the spontaneity or the specifically active character of this representing. In discussing the following points, we shall see to what extent the expression “reflection” deliberately reminds us that the representing is never “directly” related to objects.

Still more strange and more deviating from linguistic usage is the Kantian use of the terms “abstraction” and “abstracting.” Traditionally, before Kant and again after Kant and still today, one uses the word *abstracting* to mean: abstracting from *something*, to put something aside, to remove something and to pull something out. When according to this meaning one says that concept-formation relies on abstraction from the general, then this means that abstraction is just taking out from the different many the commonness which contains unity. Thus *abstraction*

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., §6.

22. CPR, B 316, A 260.

is mostly a term for the act which Kant designates as *reflection*. It is customary to understand abstraction in this sense. In the second volume of his *Logical Investigations*, in the chapter "Ideal Unity of Species and the More Recent Theories of Abstraction,"²³ in a penetrating and concrete phenomenological examination, Husserl obtained a philosophical understanding of the essence of concept-formation for the first time. Regarding our present topic, chapter 6 of this section should be brought into play, which is entitled "Separating Various Concepts of Abstraction and the Abstract."²⁴

By contrast Kant alters the usual meaning of the expression "abstract" and says: "The term *abstraction* is not always used correctly in logic. We are not supposed to say: abstracting *something* (*abstrahere aliquid*) but abstracting *from something* (*abstrahere ab aliquo*)."²⁵ Thus abstraction for Kant is not making the unity transparent, but rather is disregarding the difference. For him abstraction is not the basic act in concept-formation, but is an act in which reflection is completed and unfolded, so to speak: "By making abstraction we *do not arrive at* a concept."²⁶ "Abstraction is only the *negative* condition under which representations can be produced which are generally valid."²⁷ Therefore, an *abstract* concept is not a concept that is *abstracted*, but a concept that *abstracts*. The more a concept disregards determinations and distinctions, the more abstract a concept is: "Hence one should actually call abstract concepts *abstracting* concepts (*conceptus abstrahentes*), i.e., ones in which several abstractions occur. The most abstract concept is the one which has nothing in common with what differs from it. This is the concept of *something*. For what is different from this concept is *nothing* and has nothing in common with something."²⁸ Kant deals with this remarkable and most abstract concept in the *Critique*, in an appendix to the transcendental analytic, under the title "Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection."²⁹ Here Kant expounds on the idea of a transcendental reflection as distinct from a logical reflection; that is, he expounds on what we have so far called the basic act of concept-formation. Elucidation of this idea of a transcendental reflection will later provide us an opportunity to characterize philosophical-ontological concept-formation and, in connection with describing the concepts of reflection, to determine their relation to pure concepts of understanding in the sense of categories.

Thus (1) abstraction in the positive sense means rendering transparent

23. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, II/1, 106ff.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 216ff.

25. *Logik*, §6, note 2 (Cassirer, VIII, 402).

26. *Ibid.*, §6, note 3.

27. *Ibid.*

28. *Ibid.*, §6, note 2.

29. CPR, B 316ff., A 260ff.; cf. especially B 346ff., A 290ff.

the generality and, in keeping with the Kantian terminology, is identical in meaning with *reflection*. (2) In the negative sense it means to disregard, to look away from [something], the meaning which corresponds to Kant's conception. Some logicians use abstraction in both senses and take this expression as a designation for the acts of concept-formation in general.

We mentioned earlier that Kant thought highly of Wolff's logic: "Wolff's general logic is the best we have."³⁰ In his *Philosophia rationalis sive logica* (§716ff.) Wolff understands *abstractio* in the sense of *abstrahere communia* and still calls an act of concept-formation *reflexio* and *determination*. He determines them in a way other than Kant, so that we also see here that, by pushing ahead into transcendental logic, into the ontological dimension, Kant was able to uncover the traditional manner of treatment of phenomena and to ground it more originally.

By way of repetition, let me say once again that for Kant the basic act of concept-formation is reflection, rendering transparent the unity which contains commonness in itself and *thus* is related to the many.

δ) Reflective Representation as *Repraesentatio Discursiva*

To what extent is reflective representation of the general identical with thinking as representing representations? To what extent is reflective representation a *repraesentatio discursiva*?

In reflection we see the one with which several intuitively given objects (in Kant's language, several intuitions, i.e., representations) agree. These individually given representations or objects can be determined by this one—by the content of the concept—regardless of their difference. Here we see a determination of objects which is not formed immediately—directly in simple intuitive view of objects—but through the indirect rendering transparent of a conceptual unity which is common to many. This *indirect representation*, which needs the generality of the concept as its tool, *characterizes* thinking, i.e., knowing by means of concepts, or *reflection*, as a *mediated representing*. This representing *goes through* conceptual unity, which in each case must be *run through*. Hence, as we showed earlier, thinking as reflection is *discursive*.

We can now grasp more completely this idea of discursivity. Not only does the reflecting representing go through the unity which contains commonness within it. More than that, *comparison*, as we heard, stands in service of reflection—namely, a *running through* individual pre-given objects in the mode of *comparing*. We are used to defining the essence of the discursive with regard to that comparison which belongs to concept-formation, but *not* with regard to the primarily constitutive comparison.

30. *Logik*, Introduction (Cassirer, VIII, 340).

But the discursive character of thinking consists in being constituted by a reflection which precedes the comparison.

The result is the following: Because the determining factor, the *form of the concept*, resides in its commonness, that is, is grounded in unity as characterized and because this unity must in advance and initially be rendered transparent primarily on the basis of reflection and because this advance rendering transparent is co-determined by comparison, by running through, therefore the concept as reflective representation is *eo ipso* also a *repraesentatio discursiva*, a discursive representation.

When we said earlier that the mediated discursive representing, the representing of representations, describes the ownmost inner possibility of thinking—and that means its finitude—then along with showing the connection between the *discursive character of representation* and *reflection* we also showed how *conceptual representation belongs to the ownmost inner possibility of thinking*. Thinking is knowing by means of concepts—more precisely, thinking is constitution of knowledge from the side of the concept.

Thus in a certain sense we have given an answer to the last question: On what is the concept, as distinguished from intuition, based? Nevertheless we must clarify the connection between thinking and concept in yet another way, thus making obvious that our discussions so far on the basic character of the concept have been one-sided and merely formal, i.e., have relied one-sidedly on the form of the concept and the origin of this form.

e) Foundation of the Concept in the Function of Unity, in Reflection

On what does the difference between concept and intuition depend? Intuition is founded in *affection*; concept depends on a *function*. What is function? How can we explain the meaning of function by considering what we discussed under the preceding points?

If according to its form the concept is constituted in reflection and on the other hand depends on function, then reflection and function must be interconnected, if not meaning the same. Reflection is rendering transparent a unity wherein the pre-given many agree. Thus reflection is a kind of unification of the many with a view toward this unity, or with a view from this unity. Accordingly reflection functions in the manner of *unifying*; it reveals the one as possible basis for the agreement of the many, so that with the aid of the unity so obtained a *relation* to the many is explicitly constituted. But this *unity of the concept* which contains commonness within itself and which is founded upon the aforesaid unification is what determines many representations, indeed all of them. In other words, this determining factor can be *predicated* from individual objects; it is a possible predicate in relation to objects as subjects. The function in

which the concept is grounded according to its form also makes possible, as the function of unification, the predication of the concept from individual objects.

Reflection or the function of unification is nothing other than judgment, that is, the same understanding again, which is characterized sometimes as the faculty of concepts and sometimes as the faculty of judgments. The concept is a possible predicate in a judgment. Inversely, there is in each judgment a concept which applies to many representations—i.e., there is a representation whose character is “applicability to the many” [*Vielgiltigkeit*]³¹—a concept which grasps from this many a given representation. The latter relates *immediately* to the object; it is an intuition.³¹

However, the function upon which the concept depends according to its form and which constitutes judgment as judgment is “the unity of the act of bringing various representations under one common representation.”³² The unity of the act is a unification as act, in such a way that the unity in this unification stands out—the unity which is the ground for the possibility of the commonness of the concept, of its applicability to many and its predictability. “Thus all judgments are functions of unity,” i.e., *functions of reflection*.

This explanation of judgment in the *Critique* corresponds to the view which is expressed in the logic-lecture: “Judgment is the representation of the unity of consciousness of various representations, or representation of their relation insofar as they constitute a concept.”³³ That is, judgment is the representation of a unity which contains a commonness, with which (unity) many representations agree. With this the content of judgments is entirely left out of consideration and merely a formal characterization given, as was done correspondingly with the concept.

“Form and matter belong to every judgment, as basic constituents. The matter of a judgment consists in the given knowledge which is bound up with the unity of consciousness in judgment. The form of a judgment consists in determining how various representations as such {as various} belong to one consciousness.”³⁴ Here it is pointed out that there are a variety of ways by which the unity of a unification may be determined. According to its form a judgment may vary in various forms as modes of unification, i.e., modes of function in reflection. It is of crucial importance to bear in mind the connection between reflection as the basic act of concept-formation and the function of unity as the basic act of judgment. Both are identical.

The essence and ownmost inner possibility of the concept, discussed

31. CPR, B 93, A 68.

32. Ibid.

33. *Logik*, §17.

34. Ibid., §18.

in general and formal terms, offers a knowledge of the immediate structural connection between concept and judgment. The concept, whose form is grounded in unity, owes its genesis to judgment as function of unification. As will be shown, working out this connection is of crucial significance for the task and method of the transcendental analytic of concepts.

§19. *The Task and Way of Proceeding in the
Transcendental Analytic of Concepts*

Clarification of the character of the concept in general terms followed a brief discussion of the idea of the transcendental analytic, which in turn was preceded by specifying the formal concept of the analytic. All this serves as preparation for the question concerning the task and manner of proceeding in the *transcendental analytic of concepts* as an *investigation of thinking*—an investigation which *is to correspond* to the examination of intuition in the *transcendental aesthetic*.

a) The Direction of the Inquiry in the Transcendental
Analytic of Concepts

Transcendental analytic means revealing the origin of pure concepts of understanding from out of the pure faculty of understanding itself. We must take into account that we are now dealing with the issue of the *entire* origin of concepts as such—and no longer, as in the preceding observation, with the purely logical origin of the *form* of concepts. We are concerned with the origin of pure concept of understanding from out of the pure faculty of understanding, not only according to form but also according to *content*. Content of the concept is that on the basis of which the concept has a definite relation to the factual content of objects. *Content* of the concept is the *reality* of the concept. For this reality does not mean how a concept is found but its what-content [*Wasgehalt*]. On the basis of this reality the concept has a possible relation to the object, to the ob-ject; and on the basis of this relation concepts may have ob-jective reality and belong to an ob-ject, as a factual determination.

The question concerning the origin of pure, *a priori* concepts of understanding, which are independent of experience, deals with the origin of the content of the concept which is not obtained by experientially going through definite intuitive objects, but rather with the content of the concept which originates prior to all experience, and for all experience, from out of pure thinking as such and which also determines the objects, or beings. It became clear that the form of each concept as such,

the character of commonness and unity, is constituted in purely logical acts of comparison, reflection, and abstraction. But how should concepts with even definite content originate in pure acts of thinking—concepts in fact which necessarily and completely determine objects of experience? The question is: Are there such concepts which according to their content originate *a priori* and relate *a priori* to objects as their determination? To relate *a priori* to objects means [to be] *transcendental* or *ontological*. Are there then concepts which have transcendental or ontological content? And how are these concepts to be made manifest in their *a priori* origin? How can concepts have a transcendental content?

In order to keep this question present before us in its full and fundamental significance, it is well to repeat anew what we have often said: The problem of the *Critique* concerns the possibility and grounding of ontological knowledge, that is, a knowledge which knows beings' constitution of being prior to and for all experience of beings. The problem is a synthetic knowledge which is *a priori* and which has a factual content. Knowledge with a factual content depends upon the interconnection of intuition and thinking. Thinking is knowledge by means of concepts, in fact in such a way that these concepts determine intuition itself and render it intelligible as the underlying ground [*Zugrundeliegende*]. Pure knowledge which has a factual content depends on the togetherness of pure intuition and pure thinking by means of concepts. Thus the question concerning the origin of concepts, which have a transcendental content, is the question concerning the second basic element of synthetic knowledge *a priori*.

How can concepts have a transcendental content? How are concepts possible whose content is given *a priori*? *How can we reveal such concepts themselves and their origin?* Since a concept's content, its factual content, is also designated as reality, the question becomes: How can concepts have a reality which does not depend on the empirical intuition of objects which are constituted in such and such a way? Regarding the notion of a "transcendental content," we must add that as content of the concept, i.e., the thought-content, this notion makes possible a relation of knowledge to objects—a relation that accords with an *a priori* thinking—and has to do with this relation-to.

Obviously general formal logic does not suffice for meeting the task which is required here, that of unveiling the origin, because this logic leaves out of consideration the basic constitution of thinking to relate itself to objects in such a way as to determine them conceptually. If now the question concerns the origin of concepts with a transcendental content, this means that concepts are to be made intelligible which relate *a priori* to objects—which determine objects *a priori*.

Formal logic cannot reveal the origin of pure *a priori* concepts in terms

of content. Therefore, in his lecture on formal and general logic Kant refers only incidentally to these pure concepts of understanding and states explicitly and frequently that the problem of the origin of these concepts belongs to metaphysics, i.e., to ontology—or as we would say, to fundamental ontology. In section 3 of *Logik* we read: “Concept is either an *empirical* or a *pure* concept (*vel empiricus vel intellectus*). A *pure* concept is one which stems from understanding.” “The reality of these {empirical} concepts depends on the actual experience {experience of a determined actual thing} out of which these concepts are obtained in terms of their content.”¹ “But whether there are *pure concepts of understanding* (*conceptus puri*), which as such stem exclusively from understanding and independent of all experience, must be investigated by metaphysics.”² “In terms of matter all concepts are either *given* (*conceptus dati*) or they are *made* (*conceptus factitii*). The former are given either *a priori* or *a posteriori*. All concepts that are *empirical* or given *a posteriori* are *concepts of experience*, all concepts that are given *a priori* are called *notions*.”³ Kant offers the same characterization in the *Critique*: “The concept is either an *empirical* or a *pure* concept. The pure concept, insofar as it has its origin in the understanding alone (not in the pure image of sensibility), is called a *notion*.”⁴

The origin of the notions as *conceptus dati a priori* is the problem of the transcendental analytic. But where is the place of origin of these pure concepts? In the faculty of understanding itself. But then this faculty is to deliver not only the form for each concept but also the content with regard to pure concepts. Hence, if these concepts of understanding originate from the faculty of understanding, beyond what we said about this faculty, it will be necessary to grasp it more originally, so that by revealing the faculty of understanding more radically, the origin of notions [*Notionen*] becomes manifest.

We are dealing with a *multiplicity* of such pure concepts, not with this or that concept. Thus it is not simply enough to pick such concepts out at random and to collect them. For we know that pure understanding is a closed self-sufficient unity. Accordingly, pure concepts of understanding constitute a closed system with its own articulation. How can the origin of these notions not only be revealed in general, but also be revealed such that we proceed according to a principle and are sure that the notions and their systematic interconnection are complete? *How does the task of the transcendental analytic of concepts get guidance that is reliable and methodic, an analytic which is the systematic transcendental disclosure of the origin of all pure concepts of understanding?* Or in Kant’s formulation, what is “the

clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of understanding?” The response to this question, the working out of the clue for the disclosure of the origin of notions, is the theme of the first main part of the transcendental analytic of concepts.⁵

This first main part is divided into three sections: (1) the logical employment of understanding,⁶ (2) the logical function of the understanding in judgments,⁷ and (3) the pure concepts of understanding, or categories.⁸ In the second edition of the *Critique* Kant expanded this last section from B109 on, to include §11 and §12. Of these three sections of the first main part, the third section is the crucial one. The first section essentially deals with what we just discussed—more fully than Kant himself does—by way of clarifying the ownmost inner possibility of thinking as knowledge by means of concepts and by describing the logical form of the concept. That the first section evades the real problem of the transcendental origin of concepts can be seen in the fact that with the second edition Kant introduces divisions according to paragraphs from the second section onward.

First we must survey the problematic of the first main part, while at the same time working out the way in which—and the structuration by which—the second part joins the first. Only after this general survey of the transcendental analytic of concepts shall we attempt a more precise interpretation of the crucial parts.

b) The *a priori* Object-Related Thinking as Possible Place of Origin for the Categories

The problem of the first part of the transcendental analytic of concepts is to work out the “clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of understanding.” We already know several things about this plan: (1) Because we are concerned with the origin of pure concepts from out of the *pure faculty of understanding*, disclosure of the origin must obviously be guided by this *faculty of understanding*. (2) Because we are dealing with the origin of definite concepts, namely those whose *content* is to be given *a priori*, we cannot be guided by the faculty of understanding as in formal logic, which disregards the relation to objects—because the content of concepts, whether *a priori* or *a posteriori*, is always relation to the object. In order to disclose the origin of pure concepts of understanding as concept with a determined content, it is necessary not only to go back to the pure faculty of understanding but also to go back to the *pure faculty of under-*

1. *Logik*, §3, note 1.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*, §4.

4. CPR, B 377, A 320.

5. *Ibid.*, B 91–116, A 66–83.

6. *Ibid.*, B 92, A 67.

7. *Ibid.*, B 95, A 67.

8. *Ibid.*, B 102, A 76.

standing as related to objects. (3) But if understanding's relation to objects is not meant in the sense of and within the framework of empirical knowledge, then we are inquiring into *that relation of thinking to objects* which conceptually determines *these objects a priori as objects* and not as definite objects of experience. *Pure faculty of understanding as a faculty related a priori* to objects is the place of origin for the concepts with a transcendental content.

However, we were told that the logical essence of understanding, the mere function of unification, cannot be separated from its ownmost, inner, *transcendental* possibility, i.e., from object-relatedness. One and the same activity of understanding is *representation of a connection among representations* and at the same time *representations related to objects*. To be sure, *formal* logic methodically disregards the investigation of thinking's object-relatedness. However, this object-relatedness stays with thinking factually, in spite of its not being considered methodically. Conversely, if in the *transcendental* analytic we now inquire into the *a priori* origin of pure concepts of understanding from out of the faculty of understanding in terms of form and content, then obviously this faculty must be examined in its *object-relatedness*. For it is only from out of this object-relatedness that a content can emerge. As an object-related faculty, understanding is at the same time a *representation of a connection among representations*. It is indeed remarkable that, from a purely logical point of view, Kant sees understanding as, so to speak, primarily the more original understanding. That for Kant pure logical understanding is an *a priori* understanding in its object-relatedness has its reasons in a traditional motive of philosophy. The *cogito*, considered purely by itself, is what is more originally and primarily given. And by thematizing object-relatedness, I already go beyond what is originally given. Although Kant sees the crucial place served by thinking and its object-relatedness, he nevertheless conceives thinking as more originally *a priori* than intuition, instead of taking intuition—time—as *a priori* over against thinking. This means misconstruing the primary transcendence.

c) Categories as Concepts of Reflection; the Connection between Forms of Judgment as Modes of Unification and Categories as Modes of Unity

The content of pure concepts of understanding must somehow originate from the faculty of pure understanding. Therefore, we must grasp this faculty as originally as possible; and we must ask whether this faculty essentially delivers *various*, pure *a priori* concepts from out of itself. Should this be possible, then the faculty of pure understanding must obviously be *manifold*, in accord with its ownmost inner possibility.

What is the ownmost inner possibility of this activity of understanding,

of judgment, so as to give rise to concepts as such, initially according to form? The essence of the concept itself is, in its ownmost inner possibility, unity. The essence of the activity of understanding, in its ownmost inner possibility, functions as unification. Thus if it could be shown that understanding as activity of unification *can unify in various ways*, and if these various functions of unity can be displayed *systematically*, then we will have a systematic overview of the whole of pure understanding and what it can accomplish *a priori*. And with regard to the *systematic whole of possible functions of unification*, we will have to ask whether this manifold of the various ways of unification does not *give rise to a variety of various concepts*. We already heard that the *logical* function of unification is only the original source of the *form* of the concept. But if there are various ways of *unification* in judgment, then in this variety of ways of unification there is still at least an indication of a variety of different *unities* which constitute concepts. Perhaps these various unities in their determinateness are exactly that which in each case lie at the basis of the various empirical concepts as definite manner of unity, so that in the end precisely these various ways of unity constitute the content of pure concepts. Thus an important horizon opens up: From the various functions of unification as possible modes of the activity of understanding we will have to derive a corresponding variety of unities. Determination of these *a priori* unities themselves as a pure conceptual determination would then yield pure concepts of understanding. Thus they have *a priori* possible modes of unity for their content—modes of unity which stem from the activity of understanding as possible *a priori* forms of empirical concepts. Thus judgments are the basis from which the systematic table of categories is to be obtained—table of judgments is the place of origin for the table of categories. Thus we initially demonstrate the inner connection between the second and third sections of the first main part of the transcendental analytic. But because thinking is object-related, this disclosure of the origin of categories cannot be the whole and primary disclosure.

Among Kant's reflections there is one in his unpublished manuscripts which keenly highlights the connections just characterized. Of course we understand these reflections only when we do what we have just done, i.e., show concretely the connection between transcendental logic and formal logic and make clear the effect of formal logic upon transcendental logic. This reflection reads as follows: "All concepts in general, no matter from where they may take their matter [*Stoff*], are reflected representations, i.e., reflected into the logical relation of their applicability to the many. However, there are concepts whose whole meaning is to be capable of being subordinated, as one or the other reflection, to any representation that occurs. They can be called concepts of reflection (*conceptus reflectentes*). And because any kind of reflection occurs in judgment, these concepts will comprehend absolutely the mere activity of

understanding, which in judgment applies to relation as the grounds for the possibility of judging.”⁹

We shall attempt to explain these sentences on the basis of what we said earlier. “All concepts in general . . . are reflected representations.” That is, all concepts are represented and have the character of commonness with reference to the many, insofar as the unity of such commonness will be rendered transparent by reflection. All concepts are constituted by *reflection*, so that, constituted by *commonness*, they carry within themselves “the logical relation of applicability to the many.”

“However, there are concepts. . . .” With this statement we now move from the concept in general to a special class of concepts, to those which have a definite content. Kant says that there are concepts whose entire content is nothing other than “this or that reflection.” Reflection is the rendering transparent of the unity which occurs in unification. Thus there are concepts whose content is the unity that belongs to a manner of reflection, to unification. On the other hand, there are totally different contents—empirical intuitions—that belong to such unities of the various ways of reflection. Kant calls these concepts “concepts of reflection,” i.e., concepts whose content is solely a unity that belongs in each case to a possible way of reflection. We do not find this terminology in the *Critique*. There “concept of reflection” says something different, even though not at all disparate from what is meant here, as we shall see.

These concepts of reflection are *reflecting* [*reflektierende*] concepts. We were told earlier that each concept as concept is a *reflected representation* which is constituted in and by means of reflection. Now a special kind of concepts is also called “*reflecting concepts*,” an expression which means *reflective representations* such that *they themselves represent a reflection* and have for content such reflection—that is, concepts which in themselves not only come to exist through reflection but also grasp a reflection as such and, as such a grasping of the activity of reflecting, accomplish this reflecting *a priori*. Accordingly, “reflected representations” are all concepts *as* concept, whereas “reflecting concepts” are definite reflective representations which represent a reflection and which in each case have the unity which belongs to this reflection for their content.

All reflection takes place in judgment. This means that the possible modes of judgment as functions of unification are possible modes of reflection and of the unity which belongs to this reflection. These reflecting concepts will “comprehend absolutely” the mere activity of understanding, unification, i.e., the unity which belongs to this unification. These ways of unity which correspond to the ways of unification—of reflection—are what is “comprehended” by these reflecting concepts and

is their content. The contents of these concepts are “the grounds for the possibility of judging.” For as unifying the pre-given manifold representations, judging indeed needs a regard toward a unity in terms of which unification occurs. These unities are the ground which carries and determines the possibility of the functions of unification, i.e., of judgments.

Thus this incredibly precise reflection of Kant’s makes clear the outstanding character of definite concepts which have the form of reflection, or unities as such, as their content. These concepts, which Kant here quite formatively calls “*reflecting concepts*,” are nothing but *pure concepts of understanding*, that is, those concepts which obtain their content *a priori* from the activity of pure understanding and its possible variations. Now we see the very central possibility of *obtaining*, from the *logical* function of the activities of understanding, from their multiplicity, *pure a priori contents* prior to all experience. For content, these pure concepts of understanding each have a unity which, as the ground of possibility for unification, is subordinated to a possible manner of unification, of reflection, of judgment. As many *ways of unification* there are—that is, as many *ways of judging*—there are that many *modes of unity*, that many concepts with such content—that many *pure concepts of understanding*.

d) The Necessary Relatedness of Categories to Time

An essential part is still missing for the clarification of these concepts; and thus there is still something missing which is necessary for completely laying bare the *origin* of these pure concepts of understanding, corresponding to their full and ownmost inner possibility and thus for securing the clue for the discovery of these concepts, for their adequate determination and grounding.

On the basis of the possible variations of judgment as function of unification we need to read off the unities that belong to these variations as the content of pure concepts of understanding. However, on the basis of their *content* concepts are *related to objects*. Now if the *function of unification* is to deliver the unity each time as the *content* of a pure concept of understanding, then this function of unification itself must somehow be *related to objects*. Methodologically, this means that we must investigate whether and to what extent the function of unification, the activity of thinking, is related to objects.

But if thinking, the function of unification, is to be able to be *related to objects*, this can only be in such a way that thinking is a mediated representing which is *grounded in intuition* and is at its service, i.e., only when thinking is primarily determined by intuition. Thus the pure *a priori* object-relatedness of the functions of unification as such can be grounded only in that these functions as functions of *thinking* necessarily carry within themselves a *reference to intuition*, from which they *primarily*

obtain their *content*. Accordingly the content of pure concepts of understanding can have its origin primarily only in an intuition, although the unities which belong to the functions of unification, to modes of judgment, contain in themselves a certain formal anticipatory indication [*Vorzeichnung*] of this content. And in fact the *concept of understanding*, which originates *purely* from out of an object or intuition-related *pure* thinking independent of experience, must *originate from out of an intuition* which is not empirical but is in turn likewise *pure*. Moreover, because we are dealing with pure concepts of understanding which should determine *each object as such a priori* (not as this or that object), then pure intuition, to which objects originally owe their content, must be the horizon wherein *all* empirical objects, *all* appearances are viewed in advance. However, *this pure intuition*, in whose horizon all extant beings—physical or psychic—are encountered and manifest, *is time*. The functions of unification as modes of activity of pure thinking as such, which is *a priori* related to *intuition*—these functions must be related to and grounded in time, in accord with their way of being.

Only when we succeed both in disclosing the faculty of pure understanding in its *original function* (the activity of unification and reflection) as well as in displaying this faculty with respect to the *systematic totality* of possible variations of this function and if, moreover, we succeed in bringing to light these functions of unification in their central *relatedness to the pure intuition of time*, only then do we obtain the basis for uncovering the origin of pure concepts of understanding in terms of their content from out of pure thinking so comprehensively explained in its full import. The place of origin of concepts cannot only and primarily reside in understanding as such, but in an understanding which is grounded in and guided by intuition. Put differently, precisely because concepts have their origin in the faculty of understanding, in view of the mediacy of understanding, they originate primarily in intuition. Categories have a twofold origin: As notions, they originate in functions of unification; as γέννη τοῦ ὄντος, in the pure image of sensibility, in time.

Thus the transcendental analytic of pure concepts of understanding initially has a twofold task: (1) It must show what the *functions of unification*, of reflection, are, i.e., the possible forms of judgment to which belongs in each case a specific unity as ground of its possibility, and what these *unities* as possible content of *pure concepts of understanding* themselves are. (2) It must show that, insofar as these concepts are to be *pure concepts of understanding*, they are as such necessary determinations which circumscribe *a priori* that which belongs to every object of an empirical intuition as *object*. Presentation of this second demonstration is nothing other than elucidation of the *ontological* essence of categories, i.e., the ontological or *transcendental exposition* of categories, their *transcendental deduction*.

Kant presents this deduction as the second main part of the transcendental analytic of concepts: “The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding.”¹⁰ In the first edition this second main part of the transcendental analytic of concepts is divided into three sections: (1) The Principles of Any Transcendental Deduction,¹¹ (2) The *a priori* Ground of Possibility of Experience,¹² and (3) Relation of Understanding to Objects in General and the Possibility of Knowing These *a priori*.¹³ The conclusion presents a “Summary Presentation of Correctness and of Exclusive Possibility of Deduction of Pure Concepts of Understanding.”¹⁴ In the second edition we find only two sections, the first one of which is identical with section one in edition A, slightly supplemented,¹⁵ and the second one of which (Transcendental Deduction of Pure Concepts of Understanding)¹⁶ sums up sections 2 and 3 of edition A and presents their content in an other direction and with a new point of departure.

The first part, whose division is already characterized as a survey, expounds upon the system of possible functions of unification and develops therefrom the system of unities and the content of pure concepts of understanding included therein.

In the preceding interpretation of the task of the transcendental analytic of concepts, what is essential to its inner connection became much more clear than it ever emerges in any place in Kant. In any case, the fact that Kant, in the *presentation* of the transcendental analytic of concepts, takes on unusually complicated and crisscrossing roads and deals with the last things first and with the first things last is not carelessness. Rather it is based on the fact that Kant failed to provide and prepare as foundation—for the whole problematic of the transcendental analytic and transcendental logic—a systematic and radical interpretation of intuition and thinking (of ontological as well as ontic knowledge) from the vantage point of Dasein itself. We must indeed follow Kant precisely in his crisscrossing pathways and dare not make things more comfortable and easier for ourselves. But, on the other hand, we must constantly attempt to hold onto and secure anew the essential and central division of the problem. Besides, we shall see that Kant arrives at junctures where he suddenly seems to grasp the entire problematic in a straightforward simplicity.

10. CPR, B 116, A 84.

11. Ibid., A 84–94.

12. Ibid., A 95–114.

13. Ibid., A 115–128.

14. Ibid., A 128–130.

15. Ibid., B 116–129.

16. Ibid., B 129–169.

Second Division

Phenomenological Interpretation of the Transcendental Analytic of Concepts

Chapter One

The Place of Origin of Categories and Their Connection with Judgments as Functions of Unification

§20. *The Kantian Table of the Forms of Judgment*

The whole problem before us consists in uncovering the origin of pure concepts of understanding in the pure faculty of understanding, i.e., in functions of unification which are pure, *a priori*, and related to objects. But first we must present these concepts in their systematic unity by bringing to light their connection with the systematic unity of functions of pure understanding. We must first gain some knowledge about these functions.

This is to suggest that we must first present the multiplicity of the possible modes of function of unification. In view of the essence of judgment as function of unification in general, we must explain the possibility of the inflection of this function of unification in various though interconnected ways. The multiplicity of these ways of unification, the forms of judgment, can be arranged schematically in a table: "The functions of the understanding can, therefore, be discovered completely if we can give an exhaustive statement of the functions of unity in judgment. That this can quite easily be done will be shown in the next section."¹ But what do we find in section 2 of the main part of the transcendental analytic of concepts, with which the actual investigation begins? This section is entitled "The Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgments."² What does this section reveal? Does Kant develop the possible forms of judgment from out of the essence of judgment in general as function of unification? By no means. Rather Kant simply confronts us with the finished table of the forms of judgment.

The entire table is divided into four groups: quantity, quality, relation,

1. CPR, B 94, A 69.

2. Ibid., B 95, A 70.

and modality. Each of these groups is again divided into threes, so that the table contains twelve different forms of judgment, i.e., inflections of the essence of judgment as function of unification. Kant offers no information whatsoever as to why possible inflections of the function of judgment as such are to be presented from four points of view and why precisely from these four. Thus he leaves us entirely in the dark as to how these four principles of division of the totality of the forms of judgment (quantity, quality, relation, modality) are all co-originally intertwined with the essence of judgment as such and how they are connected with one another. He only states: "If we abstract from all content of a judgment and consider only the mere form of understanding, we find that the function of thought in judgment can be brought under four heads, each of which contains three moments. They may be conveniently represented in the following table."³ This is then followed by the table of the forms of judgment. It is not clear at all that, if we "consider" the mere form of judgment as such, we will "find" something like that table.

But now Kant offers an extensive discussion which follows the table; and this discussion is divided into four paragraphs, each of which deals with one of the four groups. But it is useful to note that no group is discussed with regard to the character of that group. Nothing at all is said here about quantity, quality, relation, and modality. In these discussions Kant is preoccupied with the attempt to justify why he introduces a threefold division of each group, in contrast to the traditional division of judgment into mostly two divisions in each of the groups mentioned. Without dealing with his justification in detail, this much is clear: This justification is motivated and supported by the later considerations concerning the transcendental philosophical problematic. But this shows that the entire table cannot at all be justified and developed in terms of formal logic and that this table cannot be obtained by way of an inflection of the "logical function of understanding," as is indicated in the title. Hence it is no accident that in these discussions Kant speaks of transcendental logic⁴ and identifies the table as the "transcendental table of all moments of thinking in judgments."⁵ These moments of thinking in judgments are those four characteristics just mentioned, which provide the table with the principles of division. According to its title this section deals with inflections of the *logical* function of understanding; but the text speaks of a "*transcendental* table"—even as §21 of the *Prolegomena* again speaks of a "*logical* table of judgments."

This hesitation indicates lack of clarity. Are the four named characteristics of judgment obtained purely *logically*—regardless of the *object-*

relatedness of thinking—or are they to be obtained first *transcendentally*, by relying upon judgment as an *object-related* function of unification? This crucial question is neither posed explicitly nor unequivocally decided. We could, of course, settle this question indirectly, by calling upon later statements of Kant in the *Critique of Judgment*, and say that, because the division of the four groups is in each case trichotomical and not dichotomical, this division is therefore not a formal-logical-analytical division, but is a transcendental-logical-synthetic division.⁶ However, this is only an indirect reconciliation.

Perhaps there is a simple way out of this question, whether the table of judgment is a formal-logical or a transcendental table. If the four groups of forms of judgment, that is, the four moments of judgment (quantity, quality, relation, and modality) are gotten in general-formal logic, then they must obviously be viewed as formal-logical characteristics of judgment, even if it is not understandable why Kant calls such a table of the forms of judgment a "transcendental" table. In fact the same division of the forms of judgment according to the four moments is to be found in Kant's lecture on general-formal logic.⁷ There, in section 20, Kant states clearly: "Differences of judgments with regard to their form may be traced back to four major moments of *quantity, quality, relation, and modality*, with respect to which many kinds of judgment are determined."⁸ But here too Kant proceeds immediately to an exposition of individual members of the four groups. Thus he even fails to *demonstrate* these four characteristics in formal logic, as the essential and necessary four main moments of the *form* of judgment as such.

We have clarified only one thing: Kant here clearly states that he wants these four moments to be understood as characteristics of the *form* of judgment. But this does not yet settle the question whether or not these are indeed characteristics of *all* fundamental moments of the form of judgment as such. The fact that in the tradition of logic these four characteristics are considered to be formal characteristics is not yet a coherent argument if we recall that precisely this traditional general-formal logic is saturated with all kinds of questions, has never ever been grounded as a radical and pure formal logic, and still today is unclear about its own essence. On the contrary, since its inception in Plato and Aristotle logic is permeated by more or less ontological questions. And the thesis which I expressed earlier is confirmed anew: Contrary to Kant's own opinion, logic is that philosophical discipline which is the least grounded and the least rigorously developed—a discipline which has not once been grasped and secured in its central problematic.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., B 97, A 71.

5. Ibid., B 98, A 75.

6. Cf. *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, p. lvii.

7. *Logik*, §§20–30.

8. *Logik*, §20 (Cassirer, VIII, 408).

By taking over the four moments of judgment as principles of division, Kant uncritically followed a doctrine of traditional logic which has as a matter of fact become taken for granted but which is profoundly questionable. On the other hand, on the basis of transcendental logic, which he has just established, Kant could not fundamentally reform the traditional formal logic in this respect.

It seems as if one is silently and quickly to slide over this table of judgment of Kant, like sliding over a creation of a baroque and pedantic passion of construction and schematization. Indeed since Lotze's critique of the Kantian table of judgment, it has become customary to find fault with this table. If we take all the critical objections together, then nothing will be left of this table. Even neo-Kantianism was enthusiastic in this critique. The result of this critique is that the origin of this table is unclear and questionable, as is the deduction of categories from this table. If one takes things as superficially as they are expressed in these kinds of argumentation, then this is such a clear argumentation that one can hardly resist it. Even if one admits that much or even everything is wrong with this table, nevertheless this does not support what one had wanted to conclude from the insufficiency of this table. Put more clearly, if we consider the table of judgment simply superficially and put the table of categories next to it—and then criticize the table of judgment, in terms of formal logic alone or in any other terms, in order *subsequently* to reject the *deduced categories*—then we fail to see something very crucial, namely, that *this table of judgment* as such, however isolated it may be as a partial doctrine of formal logic, *is not at all the clue for discovering the origin of pure concepts of understanding*.

Put differently, we must ask in a fundamental way how Kant wants the faculty of pure understanding to be understood and to serve as a clue. This does not yet follow directly from the table of judgment. We have also already pointed out that Kant designates this table as a “transcendental” table, thus that he understands the logical function of judgments, in their inflections, *transcendentally*. But this means that Kant *grasps the function of unification as object-related*—and rightly so, because all thinking is basically object-related. Let us recall what was said about Jäsche's formulation regarding the Kantian concept of formal, general logic. There formal logic, too, does not disregard the relation to objects but only the relation to *certain extant objects*. The same is true here: From the beginning we must bear in mind (1) how in every transcendental discussion judgment is supposed to be taken as function of unification and (2) prior to any critical fault-finding, from what perspective the table of judgment is to be understood.

Kant does not allow any doubt about this. He does not just simply put the table of pure concepts of understanding next to the table of judgment. Rather, between the two there is yet something else—some-

thing quite crucial—in terms of which the table of judgment as well as categories must be understood. Further, what stands between the presentation of both tables is what is most crucial in heeding the positive and fundamental problem of the *Critique*. We will not belabor the usual and all too hurried critique of the table of judgment. Rather we shall be concerned with avoiding a basic error of interpretation, to which everyone so far has fallen victim.

Formulated concisely, our question is the following: What stands between the table of judgment and the table of categories? What must be taken into account in order sufficiently to understand in its entirety the problem of the origin of categories from out of the table of judgment?

The text to which we shall refer in the following is the third section of the first main part and is entitled “The Pure Concepts of Understanding or Categories.” This section does not begin with a schematic enumeration of categories which corresponds to the forms of judgment. Rather, this section first engages in a basic discussion.⁹ Already the first sentences make this clear. As always in Kant, as soon as he begins to discuss something crucial, he opens the essential horizon of the problem in a concise outline. We do not need to have a great feel for style in order to take the pages that lead up to the table of categories in this sense.

If it is only in this third section that Kant gives an explanation as to the *sense in which we must take the logical functions of understanding, the functions of unification*, then these discussions must make clear what “*unification*” means here and in what essential structural connection with other compartments the specific functions of unification and their appertaining unities can first be properly grasped. Whether Kant, then, in execution actually expounded *individually* upon the nature of judgments and categories—that is a second question. What is crucial is the elaboration on the singly decisive *fundament* of the problem.

We shall see that the theme of the following discussions is *synthesis*, the *putting-together*, i.e., such a unifying that by itself has the character of a free activity.

§21. The Synthesis Underlying the Categories

a) “Synthesis” as Designation for Three Forms of Unification

In keeping with the significance of the third section of the first main part of the “Analytic of Concepts,” we would like to proceed with our

9. CPR, B 102, A 76 to B 105, A 79.

interpretation by a close reading of the text. We are concerned with that segment of this section which precedes the presentation of the table of categories. Already externally, this segment of the third section is divided into six paragraphs, the fifth of which is the most important one for the entire problem of the *Critique*. But it is the sixth paragraph that is especially important for the problem of deduction of categories. However, all these paragraphs expound upon what is crucial; and if one understands these paragraphs, one is on the right track to the innermost problematic of the *Critique*. However, one must understand these paragraphs as concretely as possible, that is by making the entire richness of the *Critique* present. One must later and frequently return to the passage now under discussion, after one has gone through the major parts of the whole *Critique*. Generally no other scientific study requires so much repeated reading forward and backward as the study of philosophy.

Roughly speaking, the part of section 3 which is divided into six paragraphs deals on the whole with *synthesis*. We have already come upon this term in interpreting the transcendental aesthetic. There we were concerned with identifying and presenting the *wholeness* which belongs essentially to space and time. We were concerned with showing that space and time are not in any way a one by way of putting individual spaces and times together. Rather these definite individual spaces and times are limitations of the *whole* space or the *whole* time. Thus spaces and times are a one *in themselves* in specific ways; and insofar as they are given as *purely intuited*, their specific unity, their *wholeness*, is given *a priori*. The one with them—the “syn”—is not first produced afterward, but this one is *given* with space and time and characterizes what they are essentially. That is why we call the onefold [*Einigkeit*] which is especially peculiar to space and time: “*syndosis*.” In introducing this term, we at the same time referred to and differentiated “syn-thesis” and characterized it as the spontaneous unification which is accomplished by understanding. Moreover, we already pointed out in a preliminary way that syndosis and synthesis must obviously be unified—in a manner of unifying that was not defined—in the whole of knowledge which is a unification of intuition and thinking. At the same time we pointed out that the term *synthesis* designates all these ways of unification and has an ominous ambiguity.

Now we are concerned with disclosing the origin of pure concepts of understanding in the pure faculty of understanding. The *function of unification* of this faculty, which depends on the *spontaneity* of understanding, is syn-thesis. When I said that the general theme of the section under consideration is synthesis, then it could appear as if our theme is only this *logical* function of understanding. But now we know that, in order to disclose the origin of the pure concept of understanding, we must take as a clue the faculty of pure understanding as a unifying faculty, but one that is *at the same time related to objects* and, that is, to

intuition. Thus we now have synthesis as a theme, not only as logical function of unification of understanding (not only the apophantic and predicative synthesis), but rather and also in its relatedness to objects—that is, this synthesis in its unification with syndosis of intuition, the gnoseological synthesis. It is precisely the manner of unification of intuition and thinking that is now the issue, under the title of object-relatedness or intuition-relatedness.

When we claim that “synthesis” is the theme of this third section, then we mean synthesis as *logical activity of understanding*, synthesis as the still unclear *unification of intuition and thinking itself*. And because intuition itself comes into view on the basis of object-relatedness, the specific *unity of intuition, syndosis*, also becomes a theme. Thus under the title of “synthesis” there are three essential forms of unification indicated.

We shall see in precisely this section just how, whereas Kant notes differences, he does not succeed in arriving at a radical differentiation of the basic forms of unification, of synthesis. However often it may appear that the present section is concerned only with synthesis in terms of the logical function of judgment, this section is also concerned with syndosis and above all with the unification of synthesis and syndosis, with object-relatedness, with relatedness of thinking to intuition, which we deliberately leave nameless.

b) The Connection of Pure Thinking in General, of Pure Object-Related Thinking, and of Pure Intuition; Synthesis as a Pre-Conceptual Gathering of the Manifold

In the following we shall interpret the individual paragraphs of the third section of the first part of the “Analytic of Concepts.” The first paragraph reads: “General logic . . . abstracts from all content of knowledge, and looks to some other source . . . for the representations which it is to transform into concepts by process of analysis. Transcendental logic, on the other hand, has lying before it a manifold of *a priori* sensibility, presented by the transcendental aesthetic, as material for the pure concepts of understanding. In the absence of this material, those concepts would be without any content, therefore entirely empty. Space and time contain a manifold of pure *a priori* intuition, but at the same time are conditions of the receptivity of our mind—conditions under which alone it can receive representations of objects, and which therefore must also always affect the concept of these objects. But if this manifold is to be known, the spontaneity of our thought requires that it be gone through in a certain way, taken up, and connected. This act I name *synthesis*.”¹

1. CPR, B 102, A 76f.

We already pointed out that in the entire third section Kant deals with what is fundamental and therefore proceeds with a general perspective. He begins by differentiating general formal logic from transcendental logic, in order to differentiate the latter from the transcendental aesthetic. Put more precisely, this section is concerned less with the difference between these disciplines as with their *necessary interconnection*. To put it even more precisely, this section is not actually concerned with the interconnection of these *disciplines*, but with their *theme*, i.e., with the connection among thinking in general, pure object-related thinking, and pure intuition.

Already the manner of differentiation of general logic from transcendental logic is typical. For Kant does not simply say that general logic utterly leaves out “all content of knowledge” and, as it were, erases from thinking any relation to objects. Rather he says that, whereas general logic abstracts from all content, it “looks to some other source” for representations to be given to it. That is, general *logic* does not actually “look to an other source”; rather it is *thinking* that it is essentially related to something determinable. *Thinking* “looks to an other source” because it is essential that thinking awaits something somehow determinable, to determine it conceptually. Here it is totally unimportant from where [things] are given, how they are given, and with what content and what objects we are dealing.

This passage is an important confirmation of our earlier interpretation of the theme of general logic. That is, even a thinking which is concerned with formal considerations is fundamentally related to objects. This thinking leaves out of consideration only the relation to particular objects and realms of objects.

The representations which are somehow given can now be transformed into concepts “by process of analysis.” We have already mentioned the meaning of “analysis,” for example when we introduced the difference between analytic and synthetic judgments. It is this sense in which, in this and in the following paragraphs, analysis is differentiated from synthesis. Analysis is the formal dissection and arrangement of given representations, which does not add anything to them in terms of content, but only gives them a new form, namely the form of the concept which in dissection brings the many together with respect to what is common [to them]. “Analytical” means the same as reflective or discursive; and “analysis” here means—as well as more often in the following paragraphs—reflection in the logical sense.

Taken formally and generally, thinking is not directed to a definite realm of objects but is directed without any differentiation to *all* possible objects. By contrast—as Kant expresses himself graphically—“transcendental logic has lying before it a manifold of *a priori* sensibility,” namely what is given in advance by pure intuitions of space and time and what

is worked out by the transcendental aesthetic. Here again we come upon Kant’s confusing way of speaking, when he says that the transcendental *aesthetic* presents this manifold. This cannot be taken to mean that a transcendental aesthetic has first to be developed in order that space and time can function as pure intuitions and present their manifold purely. These pure intuitions present something like this by themselves, such that it is a possible theme of a transcendental aesthetic. Likewise “transcendental *logic*” does not have a “manifold . . . lying before it.” Rather, as a definite thinking, thinking which is pure, *a priori*, and related to objects has “lying before it” [a manifold]. That is, this thinking does not “look to some other source,” but has *a priori* lying before it [a manifold], is in a certain way already directed to . . . [a manifold].

Transcendental *logic* deals with a definite thinking which is *a priori* and is related to objects and which essentially (and not only factually) must be related to pure intuition, to pure manifoldness of space and time—a manifoldness which is represented as a given infinite [magnitude].² Thus transcendental logic is not as detached in relation to the realm of the objective as formal logic is but is essentially bound, as it were, to a definite sphere of objects.

In keeping with the problem for transcendental logic, we up until now have always specified thinking in terms of thinking’s relation to intuition. But because here Kant is concerned with a fundamental discussion, he does not fail to mention the reversed relation, which is basically the primary relation, namely that space and time must affect at all times the concept of objects. Space and time as pure intuitions are pure and not empirical affections. As pure affections which are concerned with thinking, they affect the “concept,” i.e., are what makes objects to be objects at all. Here we are dealing with a *pure* affection, i.e., one which concerns the self, the mind, and which does not proceed from empirical objects but from such a concept as is itself *a priori* and belongs to the mind. Thus *pure* affection means *self-affection*. Already in an earlier passage we have referred to this phenomenon, without dealing with it in detail.³ Therefore, Kant’s reference to self-affection in this section is of special importance, because this reference not only occurs in a basic connection but is already found in the first edition of the *Critique*.

Along with self-affection, which is supplementation [*Beistellung*] by the subject of what it *a priori* receives, Kant mentions *spontaneity*, the free activity of the mind. And in fact he speaks of the spontaneity of our human, finite thinking. He states something about thinking which up to

2. Cf. CPR, A 25.

3. Cf. above, §11, b.

now seems not to have been touched upon: The spontaneity of our thinking requires that the manifold, which thinking is supposed to determine as given to thinking, be prepared in certain ways and, as it were, be preformed for the actual act of determination. Thinking is conceptual determination. *Prior to* conceptual unification the manifold must be “gone through, taken up, and connected.” Obviously, here we are talking about a special taking up and gathering of the manifold, i.e., an activity which is neither intuition nor thinking but lies, as it were, *between* both and thus brings about the *connection between intuition and thinking*, their *unification*, to full knowledge.

Kant concludes this paragraph with the lapidary remark: “This act I name synthesis.”

c) Distinguishing Synthesis as Gathering [of a Manifold] from the Unifying Function of Understanding

Before we interpret the second paragraph of the third section, let us read the text in context:

By *synthesis* in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge. Such a synthesis is *pure*, if the manifold is not empirical but is given *a priori*, as is the manifold of space and time. Before we can analyze our representations, the representations must themselves be given in advance; and therefore as regards *content* no concepts can first arise by way of analysis. Synthesis of a manifold (be it given empirically or *a priori*) is what first gives rise to knowledge. This knowledge may, indeed, at first, be crude and confused, and therefore in need of analysis. Still the synthesis is that which gathers the elements for knowledge and unites them to [form] a certain content. It is to synthesis, therefore, that we must first direct our attention, if we would determine the first origin of our knowledge.⁴

Here Kant explains synthesis in its connection with analysis and determines the concept of *pure* synthesis. Generally analysis means dissection, and here it is taken as a formal-logical function which by itself *arranges* given representations. For analysis as dissection of representations in the sense of *clarification* is not simply a progressive differentiation. Rather, differentiation provides clarification and is itself executable only when we differentiate *with a view toward an overriding unity*. Thus Kant can employ the term *analysis* as a title for the *logical acts of comparison, reflection, and abstraction*, which constitute the *form* of the concept.

4. CPR, B 103, A 77f.

But this is to say at the same time that analysis cannot provide a *content* for knowledge, cannot *expand* its content. Analysis does not offer anything additional, is not *synthetic*. Analysis can only give another form to a content which is already given: “as regards *content* no concepts can first arise by way of analysis.” By contrast, synthesis is “that which gathers the elements for knowledge and unites them to [form] a certain content.” Thus synthesis of a manifold (of the elements) is what “first gives rise to knowledge {according to content}.”

But what does “synthesis” mean here? At first sight this is not clear and, as far as I can see, is also never made clear. For Kant, as we pointed out, synthesis is a designation for *various* items. In neo-Kantianism this title is simply a designation for the accomplishment of thinking, of judgment. But we do not get anywhere with such a clumsy reading. On the contrary, in light of what we discussed earlier, already there we have a twofold difficulty. *On the one hand* we said that the form of the concept depends on the logical act of reflection and that the content must come from somewhere else—in the end from *intuition*. But now Kant emphasizes that *synthesis* first brings forth the content of knowledge and that here “synthesis” does *not* mean the unification belonging to the unity of pure intuition of space and time, which we have designated as *syndosis*. The synthesis of which Kant speaks here is, in any case, not directly the *syndosis* of pure intuition.

But *on the other hand* we came to the conclusion that precisely the act of reflection in which the *form* of the concept is constituted has the character of a *unification*, of a *synthesis*. Accordingly, when in the present paragraph the synthesis which *procures a content* is explicitly opposed to analysis which *constitutes the form* and if analysis means the same as logical reflection, then synthesis can also not mean the formal-logical act which constitutes concepts through unification. *The synthesis which is now under discussion is neither the syndosis of pure intuition nor the synthesis of pure thinking.*

But what then is synthesis, in positive terms, if it belongs neither to intuition nor to thinking? If Kant’s point of departure is justifiable—namely that intuition and thinking are the two fundamental sources and stems of knowledge—then synthesis must belong to one of the two sources. One could also be tempted simply to leave this synthesis, about which we can only be sure that it belongs neither to intuition nor to thinking, out of the structure of knowledge. This is the simplest procedure and the one that has been adopted by neo-Kantianism of all persuasions. But that is called: wiping away the problems. But Kant states here: “To this synthesis {namely, the one in question here} we must first direct our attention, if we would determine the first origin of our knowledge.” Accordingly, far from being something parenthetical, this synthesis is what is most crucial and primary. And it is precisely with regard to

this primary and foundational issue that there is a fundamental lack of clarity: This synthesis belongs *neither* to intuition *nor* to thinking. Does not Kant then say anything positive about this synthesis, so that one can finally get closer to it? Yes, he says something positive about this synthesis; but whatever he says is so ambiguous that not only the interpreters but also Kant himself fell victim to this ambiguity, which remained radically unclear.

Why do we inquire so intricately into the ownmost inner possibility of this synthesis, when Kant begins the second paragraph in question here with a seemingly unambiguous, almost comfortable explanation of the synthesis: “By *synthesis*, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge.” Does not all this sound quite familiar—synthesis is an act which puts different things together and grasps them in *one*? But this is simply a description of the act of reflection. Thus *this synthesis* is the very *function of unification* as the logical act of judgment. That would work if only it were not the case that this synthesis provides the *content* and precisely *not the form* of knowledge. Furthermore, this would work if only Kant had not said in this paragraph that *this synthesis* (which one would like straightaway to identify with function of judgment, with the act of reflection) is supposed to be the presupposition and *condition for the possibility of reflection*, i.e., for *analysis*: “Before we can analyze our representations [prior to the act of reflection], the representations must themselves be given in advance. . . . Synthesis of a manifold (be it given empirically or *a priori*) is what first gives rise to knowledge.” It is just the questionable synthesis which *gives in advance* the several representations, which must already be given in advance for each analytical act of concept-formation.

We would like to try to differentiate the logical act of concept-formation from the questionable synthesis, about which Kant says that it is the act of putting together various representations and of grasping them in one. In this regard we once again take the example from the logic-lecture: “I see for example a pine tree, a willow tree, or a lime tree. By comparing these objects well in advance, I notice that they differ from one another with regard to trunk . . . etc. After this I reflect on what is in common among these trees, i.e., in trunk, branches . . . etc., and I set aside their size, shape, etc. Thus I develop a concept of tree.”⁵ In order that I begin the logical act of concept-formation, I must already see a pine tree, a willow tree, and a lime tree. What does it mean and how is it possible that I intuit a pine, a willow, and a lime tree, this *manifold* of given objects? Here we are concerned with the *primary intuitive giving* of

the manifold objects; and if synthesis is to be constitutive for this *giving*, then synthesis cannot mean the act of logical reflection. Synthesis is indeed an act, is spontaneity. But in view of what we just said, it is clear that this spontaneity is not identical with the spontaneity of the logical function of thinking. That is why, when Kant states that “synthesis is an act,” he does not state that “synthesis is an act of thinking.”

Synthesis is “an act of putting different representations together.” In view of what we said, it is clear that this “putting together” is not identical with the comparative juxtaposition of several given representations in the sense of comparison. Rather, this “putting together” is an act which *gives in advance* (antecedently and at first) this *many* as a *given many*. In the act of putting together, in synthesis, the givenness in advance of the many is formed as *an* objective givenness of many. Consequently, this putting together is prior to all comparative juxtaposition in the manner of a formal-logical synthesis of comparison.

We are told further about this questionable synthesis, that it is “the act of putting different representations together and of grasping what is manifold in them in *one* [act of] knowledge.” This “grasping in *one* [act of knowledge] cannot at all be identical with bringing pre-given representations together by viewing the “unity of the concept.” This “grasping in *one*” is by no means the logical act of concept-forming reflection, but rather is the act of the same synthesis on the basis of which a many is pre-given as *a* many for a thinking seeing. I see a pine tree *and* a willow tree *and* a lime tree. I do not see them successively by losing sight of the one seen before. Rather this many must be given to me *in one* so that I have a dimension within which I can move while comparing. What encounters [me] must in a certain way belong *to me*, must lie before me in a surveyable *zone* [*Umkreis*]. The unity of this zone, which, so to speak, antecedently holds the manifold together in advance, is what is ultimately meant by “grasping in one.”

Thus this synthesis is indeed an *act*, but it is precisely that which is capable of first giving the manifold in one act. The questionable synthesis is an act, is spontaneous, and is still in a certain way an intuitive giving. This synthesis is something like a *spontaneous thinking* and something like *giving of an intuition*, while being neither the one nor the other. However unclear this phenomenon may be, this much is clear: This synthesis is not identical with the formal-logical synthesis of judgment as mere activity of understanding.

The questionable synthesis is a “*pure* synthesis, if the manifold is not empirical but is given *a priori*, as is the manifold in space and time.” Thus pure synthesis is that synthesis in which pure space-manifoldness or pure time-manifoldness, as determined in each case, gets unified and given *a priori*. This synthesis is “*pure*” with regard to the character of the purity of the manifold which this synthesis in its own way unifies. But then is

5. *Logik*, §6, note 1.

not this pure synthesis exactly what we characterized as *syndosis* of the pure intuitions of space and time, in accord with which space and time are pure, unified, pre-given totalities? Is this *syndosis* perhaps a mode of the synthesis in question? Is this synthesis perhaps identical with *syndosis*, if we grasp *syndosis* radically enough with regard to time as the most original—because universal—pure intuition? But this is already an area of phenomena which we can clearly bring before our eyes, but which is still hidden from us, and of which Kant had only a faint notion.

At first this synthesis is *neither* intuition *nor* thinking, although it *simultaneously* gives and acts. This synthesis cannot be traced back to either of the two stems of knowledge, while it has something from the one as well as the other. So what is this synthesis, in positive terms? The following third paragraph has the answer.

d) The Power of Imagination as the Source of the Comprehensive Synthesis

“Synthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see, is the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious. To bring this synthesis *to concepts* is a function which belongs to the understanding, and it is through this function of the understanding that we first obtain knowledge properly so called.”⁶

Designation of this synthesis as *mere* effect of the *power of imagination* means that this synthesis is the *pure* effect of that power, that this synthesis comes purely from the power of imagination, and that the power of imagination is a “blind but indispensable function of the soul,” which is most originally the condition for the possibility of knowledge. Here it is unequivocally stated that, besides intuition and thinking, there is yet a third fundamental source of the mind, out of which a phenomenon such as synthesis, which is so crucially necessary for knowledge, purely emerges. As though the division of the basic parts of knowledge into intuition and thinking, clearly made at the beginning of the *Critique*, is forgotten; indeed as if Kant had not written the first paragraphs of our section, contrasting transcendental aesthetic and transcendental logic; as if the specification of the two stems of knowledge did not even exist—so carelessly does Kant here introduce a new fundamental source, the power of imagination. However, he does not simply arbitrarily introduce this third fundamental faculty, as a hypothesis, but rather [it emerges] under the pressure of the phenomenon that up to now he has identified

as synthesis and that is quite certainly neither intuition nor thinking. Initially, in dealing with this synthesis, Kant is not at all interested in explaining it away because this synthesis does not fit into the theory of two stems of knowledge. Rather he introduces a third one from out of which this synthesis emerges purely as such. This shows that right in the midst of his most fundamental considerations Kant had to throw out his theory of the two stems and add a third one, consideration of which he explicitly refers to by saying “as we shall hereafter see.” Earlier we pointed out that Kant is not only forced to introduce a third “fundamental source,” but that, even where he speaks exclusively of the two stems of intuition and thinking, he emphasizes that these stems “perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown, root.”⁷ This corresponds in the present passage to what Kant says about the power of imagination, “of which we are scarcely ever conscious.”

To traditional psychology the power of imagination, *imaginatio*, meant a faculty between sensibility and understanding. This is already the case in Aristotle’s *De Anima*: αἰσθησις (B5 and Γ1), φαντασία (Γ3), νόησις (Γ4ff.). But Aristotle’s interpretation goes in a different direction. In his *Anthropology* (§§28–36) Kant deals with the power of imagination, with the sensible-poetic faculty in its various kinds, and with the faculty for representing past and future events through the power of imagination. Generally the power of imagination (*facultas imaginandi*) means “a faculty of intuitions even without the presence of the object.”⁸ In the first place, power of imagination has the character of intuition, of giving to oneself, of letting-be-given. In the second place, this power has the character of intuition without the present, i.e., without the presence of the object. By contrast, to intuition there belongs the “actual presence of the object”;⁹ its presence belongs to finite intuition and means affection. Consequently, the power of imagination is an intuition without *affection*—it is an intuition, but also a *function*, i.e., neither only the one nor only the other but in a way intuition as well as thinking. Thus a very rough explication of the structure of the power of imagination makes its twofold character clear.

When one reads the *Critique* under the pressure of tradition and so comes upon the power of imagination, this power appears at first as a suspicious faculty of the soul, i.e., fantasy. Because one thinks that one has to purify Kant from psychology, one crosses out all these phenomena. Doing so, one is stuck with the words and is blind to the dimension of human Dasein, into which Kant in fact looked, only to be scared away from it. If, on the other hand, we radically and without prejudice submit

6. CPR, B 103, A 78.

7. Ibid., B 29.

8. *Anthropologie*, §28 (Cassirer, VIII, 54).

9. CPR, B 74, A 50.

to the matters at stake and inquire into Dasein, then we shall see that it is completely erroneous to think that one must avoid as quickly as possible the power of imagination and the like. Whoever erases the power of imagination from the significant context of the problem of the *Critique* (as Kant himself was inclined to do), shall remove Kant from the abyss on whose edges every genuine philosophy must constantly move. We are for Kant against Kantianism. And we are for Kant only in order to give him the possibility to live with us anew in a lively debate.

In this paragraph Kant not only introduces the power of imagination as a peculiar function of the soul, of the mind; but he also explicitly distinguishes this power from understanding, so that at first there is not the slightest suspicion that in the end the spontaneous activity of synthesis springs from what Kant identifies as the exclusive faculty of spontaneity in knowledge, i.e., springs from understanding. Synthesis springs purely from the power of imagination. But this power can be brought to concept; and this “bringing to concept” of synthesis, which springs from the power of imagination, is a function of understanding. And by way of this “bringing to concept” of synthesis, understanding obtains “knowledge properly so called.” This can only mean that knowledge, which is primarily intuition and imaginative synthesis, is enacted only with this “bringing to concept.” However, what does it mean to bring a synthesis to concept? Kant tells us nothing about this. But following what we just discussed, this could only mean that the logical reflection of understanding co-determines what is formed in synthesis as the effect of the *power of imagination*. Somehow the logical function of understanding co-determines what the power of imagination builds in this formation [*Gebilde*]. For the moment this should suffice as explanation of the term. The actual interpretation of the question as to what we mean by “bringing a synthesis to concepts” will be offered when we deal with pure synthesis of the power of imagination.

But first an important remark on Kant’s position on the third basic source [of knowledge] which he now introduces, i.e., the power of imagination, in its relation to the two sources which he mentions initially and for the most part. Differentiation of these two sources was determined exclusively by the development of the problematic in the [transcendental] aesthetic and the [transcendental] logic. Had Kant secured the three basic sources in the beginning—worked out and grounded these sources in an *antecedent fundamental ontology* of Dasein—then he would have to completely recast the setting and development above all of the positive part of the *Critique*, of that which now encompasses the transcendental aesthetic and logic. Kant came upon the central function of the power of imagination. However, he did not come to terms with an interpretation of this power in terms of fundamental ontology; for this he was much too strongly tied to the traditional doctrine of the

faculties of the soul and even more so to the division—still prevalent today—of the basic faculty of knowledge into intuition and thinking, which begins already in antiquity, with the distinction between αἴσθησις and νόησις.

The present passage, where the power of imagination is introduced for the first time in the course of [unfolding] the problematic of the *Critique*, betrays how much Kant hesitates in the interpretation of the power of imagination as a basic source of the mind and how disturbing he found it, even as on the other hand he had to attribute to it fundamental accomplishments in the development and context of knowledge. Here Kant calls this power a function of the soul, thus lining this power up at least on the same level with understanding and intuition—and in the text explicitly differentiates this power from understanding. And nevertheless he subsequently introduces a change in his own copy [of the *Critique*] by writing “understanding” in place of “soul”: the power of imagination is a “function of understanding.” This made the power of imagination dispensable, and everything operates on the basis of intuition and thinking as the point of departure. However, whereas Kant changes this fundamental statement on the power of imagination, he leaves everything else unchanged, so that, here as well as in later paragraphs, all clarity in these crucial realms of transcendental discussion disappears.

The reference to the change from “soul” to “understanding” is meant to show how fundamentally uncertain Kant was, not only with regard to the power of imagination but also with respect to the basic relationship between intuition and thinking. However, we shall set this change aside for now and be guided by the first elaboration, which is not yet disturbed by subsequent reflections and remarks. We shall then see that Kant’s exposition remains unintelligible without laying the power of imagination at its foundation as a specific and pure source of the questionable synthesis.

The three paragraphs up to this point deal with this synthesis as such, insofar as this synthesis provides content for a knowledge which is not determined either empirically or *a priori*. However, we do know that, in keeping with the guiding problem of the *Critique*, we are dealing with *pure* knowledge and thereby with the special question of *how pure concepts of understanding receive a content*. Accordingly, the problem of this synthesis must now focus on the question of this synthesis as *pure* synthesis.

e) The Pure, Imaginative, Time-Related Synthesis as Source of Pure Concepts of Understanding

“Pure synthesis, represented in its most general aspect, gives us the pure concepts of understanding. By this pure synthesis I understand that

which rests upon a basis of *a priori* synthetic unity. Thus our counting, as is easily seen in the case of larger numbers, is a *synthesis according to concepts*, because it is executed according to a common ground of unity, as for instance, the decade. In terms of this concept, the unity of the synthesis of the manifold is rendered necessary."¹⁰

Our theme now is pure synthesis. The second paragraph gives an essential and primary definition of this synthesis: It is called "pure" because what this synthesis unifies is pure, namely the pure manifold of the pure intuitions of space and time. But this pure intuition-related and time-related synthesis occurs *imaginatively* as pure effect of the power of imagination. Pure synthesis is the *imaginative unification* of pure manifoldness of time, and such a synthesis "represented in its most general aspect" gives us pure concepts of understanding. What does "represented in its most general aspect" mean?

We know that "general representation," *repraesentatio communis*, is a designation for the formal essence of the concept. Hence "represented in its most general aspect" means as much as "brought to concept." Thus with regard to pure synthesis, we come back to the question we already touched: What does it mean to bring pure synthesis into a concept? It means representing that which determines the ownmost inner possibility of synthesis as unification of the pure manifold in general; it means representing that whereby this synthesis is what it is as unification. *Taken in its general sense, unification* is constituted by a *unity* which unifies the manifold as this *definite* manifold. To represent *pure synthesis* in its most general aspect means to specify this synthesis with a view to that which always gives *unity* to this synthesis. But now, this pure synthesis, when enacted imaginatively, relates to the pure *manifoldness of time in intuition*. Consequently, the unity and its possible content must be primarily determined in terms of what overall is always unified there in such pure imaginative synthesis. Hence a *pure synthesis* is essentially such that, as a supporting and guiding *unity*, it requires such [a thing] which is primarily determined by the pure intuitive content of what is unified — i.e., by *time*. In other words, this unity of pure synthesis is not simply the empty unity of a concept in general, but is a unity which springs from synthesis itself, from the manifold of time. Using an abridged and misleading expression, Kant calls this synthesis "*synthetic unity a priori*," meaning the unity which is determined by the *what-content of what-is-to-be-unified*, i.e., the unity which springs from and simultaneously guides the pure synthesis which is imaginative and intuition-related.

The *content* of a concept, which Kant calls concept of understanding, is constituted by this pure synthesis, i.e., *imaginatively unified time*. That

is why Kant can characterize the pure synthesis also as "that which rests upon a basis of an *a priori* synthetic unity." This synthesis is the unification which has as a necessary ground a unity which, contentwise, is determined by the pure imaginative synthesis of time.

We shall bypass the example of counting, because we shall return to this example in our interpretation of the doctrine of schematism of pure concepts of understanding.

The fourth paragraph concludes with what is at first an obscure thought: "In terms of this concept, the unity of the synthesis of the manifold is rendered necessary." In our interpretation we must proceed from this necessity. What kind of necessity is it? It is a necessity in the synthesis of the manifold. But Kant does not speak here of a *pure* synthesis of the *pure* manifold. Rather now the focus of thinking is on the *empirical* synthesis of the *empirical* manifold *given intuitively*. This empirical synthesis of the empirically given intra-temporal manifold is guided *a priori* by an *a priori* time-determined synthesis, which requires such a supporting unity which, when conceived conceptually, results in the pure concept of understanding. Hence this concept of understanding introduces an *a priori* necessity into every empirical synthesis. That is, the empirical synthesis, being in each case intra-temporal, is not simply arbitrary but already in advance tied to the imaginative synthesis of pure time-manifoldness, which in turn is the condition for the possibility of encountering what is given empirically and intuitively. This context, which Kant explains in the "Analytic of Principles," is at first somewhat unclear. But that I must be able to keep the many in view "particularly" and "at the same time" already attests in a superficial way to what extent time-relatedness plays a role in gathering pre-given objects.

One thing that is crucial in this paragraph is that Kant here completes the characterization of the full structure of pure synthesis, that he shows how a certain unity belongs to synthesis, a unity which is defined by the content inhering in what the synthesis unifies. But what is even more and above all crucial is that, now clearly, *the pure concept of understanding is not given at all through a pure formal-logical function of judgment. Rather, this concept springs from the imaginative synthesis which is related to intuition and that means to time*. The birthplace of pure concepts of understanding is not the faculty of understanding, which is pure, isolated, and functions logically. Put differently, *as pure concepts of understanding categories cannot be simply read off the table of judgment*. But we cannot let the problem of disclosure of the origin of pure concepts of understanding go with this negative position regarding the logical table of judgment. Only in the sixth paragraph does it get shown in what sense the logical table of judgment is to be taken and what can and dare be meant by the talk of a "clue for the discovery of all pure concepts of understanding."

First we must explain the fifth paragraph, about which I already said

10. Ibid., B 104, A 78.

that it works out in an elementary way the central horizon of the guiding problem of the *Critique*.

f) Ontic and Ontological Concept-Formation; the Three Elements of Ontological Knowledge

“By means of analysis different representations are brought under one concept—a procedure treated of in general logic. What transcendental logic, on the other hand, teaches, is how we bring *to* concepts, not representations, but the *pure synthesis* of representations. What must first be given—with a view to the *a priori* knowledge of all objects—is the *manifold* of pure intuition; the second factor involved is the *synthesis* of this manifold by means of imagination. But even this does not yet yield knowledge. The concepts which give *unity* to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in representation of this necessary synthetic unity, furnish the third requisite for the knowledge of an object; and they rest on the understanding.”¹¹

These introductory sentences touch again on the difference between analysis and synthesis—in such a way that at this point a fundamental distinction between ontic and ontological concept-formation emerges. Concept-formation in *ontic* terms proceeds in such a way that, by comparison, reflection, and abstraction, it brings the manifold which is given in advance (the appearance) into a unity. According to this process this concept is applicable to other possible empirical objects. By contrast, concept-formation in *ontological* terms does not bring objects given in advance “under” concepts, but rather brings pure synthesis of the pure manifold “to concepts.” This means that the task here is to work out, with reference to the full essential structure of pure imaginative time-related synthesis, the unity which structurally belongs to this synthesis and which is designated as a pure concept of understanding. To bring pure synthesis to its concept means phenomenologically and ontologically to interpret a basic phenomenon of knowledge unto its essential structure. To bring representations under concepts means to think and to determine objects ontically. To “bring pure synthesis to concepts” is to work out and grasp the categories and categorical connections in ontology. To “bring under concepts” is the ontic knowing of the positive sciences. Put differently, the distinction we just made makes clear that categories cannot be obtained by way of *empirical-ontic* abstraction and generalization, much less by purely *logical* ways. We can neither pose nor resolve the problem of categories in a positive science. The entire *ontological* problematic is one of *a priori essential knowledge*. With what I just said, I point to connections

11. Ibid., B 104, A 78f.

which presumably are no longer explicitly in Kant’s intentions, but still present themselves when we grasp the Kantian differentiation at its root.

Furthermore, Kant systematically enumerates what belongs necessarily to the fundamental stock of a pure, i.e., ontological, knowledge. They are three elements: (1) the manifold of pure intuition—or to put it briefly, time. For Kant explicitly speaks of knowledge of *all* objects, physical as well as psychic; and the *universal a priori* of intuition is time. (2) Pure synthesis through the power of imagination, i.e., imaginative synthesis related *a priori* to the manifoldness of time. (3) Concepts which always have as their content the unity which always underlies such a time-related imaginative synthesis.

We are paying attention here to several things. First, pure intuition is mentioned. This intuition is that to which synthesis as well as concepts are related. The pure synthesis of the power of imagination stands in the middle; and finally, pure thinking is placed in the third place. But perhaps the power of imagination is not just the mid-point “between” pure intuition and pure thinking, but rather the mid-point in the sense of center and root. However this may be, it is clear that Kant here, in a fundamental reflection on the constitutive elements of pure knowledge, explicitly enumerates *three* elements. And whoever in the end surveys the entire problematic of the *Critique* cannot fail to see that the fifth and sixth paragraphs anticipate the problematic which we shall come to know as the doctrine of the schematism of pure concepts of understanding and which we shall claim as the central core of the entire *Critique*. In view of the inner, necessary, direct connection of the schematism to the paragraph which we are now interpreting, it is completely unintelligible how one could make the “discovery” that the schematism presents a doctrine which has nothing to do with the actual content of the *Critique* and which Kant supposedly inserted only afterward. Furthermore, another significant passage¹² explicitly mentions these three elements as the “three sources” of pure synthetic *a priori* knowledge.

But now we must make these insights fruitful for the special problem of the origin of the pure concepts of understanding, while at the same time we must determine what role the logical table of judgment plays in disclosing the origin of categories.

g) The Unity of Imaginative Synthesis and the Unity of the Logical Function of Judgment

At the beginning of our interpretation of the sixth paragraph we place the text:

12. Ibid., B 194, A 155.

The same function which gives unity to the various representations *in a judgment* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations *in an intuition*; and this unity in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of understanding. The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general. On this account we are entitled to call these representations pure concepts of the understanding, and to regard them as applying *a priori* to objects—a conclusion which general logic is not in a position to establish.¹³

The main intention of the interpretation of the preceding paragraphs was to distinguish the logical function of unification, the function of judgment, from the specific and proper synthesis of the pure power of imagination—and thus to show that it is primarily the synthesis of the power of imagination, as imaginative and time-related, that produces the content of pure concepts of understanding.

However, this last paragraph seems to destroy everything. Obviously Kant here explicitly takes back what he expounded earlier. Nevertheless in the second sentence of the present paragraph it is stated that *understanding* brings a transcendental content to its representations. Moreover, this content-giving understanding is supposed to be the same as the understanding which functions as *logical reflection*. And as we proceed further, we are told that understanding brings content into the concepts of understanding *by these very activities of logical reflection*. Thus it is the logical function of understanding as logical, i.e., table of judgment, which is claimed as the source of the categories; thus their derivation *does* depend exclusively on the sufficient securing and justifying of the table of judgment; thus the questionable character of the table of judgment is carried over to the categories.

However, even if we know that the context of the problem at stake here is quite complex and that Kant never in fact mastered it (at least not in exposition), even if as a consequence a hesitation in Kant were possible, still we must first examine whether Kant actually retracts everything that he said in the preceding paragraphs.

This sixth paragraph consists of two sentences which say basically the same thing, the second one being more detailed and more clear. In our interpretation we begin with the second sentence. Does Kant state flatly that the logical functions of the activity of understanding *as such* produce the content of pure concepts of understanding? By no means. He states that understanding introduces into its representations a transcendental content—indeed “by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in

intuition in general,” i.e., *by means of* the imaginative, time-related pure *synthesis of the power of imagination*. This “by no means” is decisive. Understanding is referred to pure intuition, and to an intuition which is prepared by synthesis. This synthesis of the power of imagination is that which makes possible for understanding in its turn to contribute something to the content of pure concepts of understanding, namely the specific unities. But these are *synthetic* unities; that is, they are determined by time in their unifying character.

Thus it is not at all the case that Kant wanted to say that pure understanding is the original and indeed exclusive source of pure concepts of understanding. Rather he wanted to say that these concepts have for content a manifold to whose unity understanding contributes a unity whose content the manifold provides. Put differently, the same unity which belongs in each case to individual logical functions of unification as their *form* belongs at the same time to the *content* of concepts whose import is primarily determined by the synthesis of the power of imagination.

It is in view of this that we must understand the first sentence, which can easily be misunderstood. The same function of understanding which gives unity to various representations, *in one judgment*, also gives unity to pure synthesis *in one intuition*. But “unity” and “giving unity” do not have the same meaning in each case. To *give unity* to representations in *one judgment* means to constitute the form of judgment as *form*. To *give unity* to pure *synthesis* of various representations means to contribute to the content which corresponds to this synthesis a *further content-factor* [*Inhaltsmoment*] *belonging to it*. Earlier we inferred from a handwritten deliberation of Kant that the content of pure concepts of understanding is one or the other reflection, one or the other logical function of unification, or the unity which belongs to it. But *this* content is not the only determining factor, nor even the primary one. However precise the earlier mentioned consideration is in distinguishing the structure of concept in general from special concepts, this consideration turns out to be inadequate when we inquire into the full and primary content of the pure concepts of understanding.

Thus we agree that the logical function of judgment, of understanding, is not the primary and exclusive source of the origin of concept of understanding. Rather this source lies in the pure synthesis of the time-related power of imagination. And insofar as this power, as synthesis, produces the content, there belongs to the manifold of this synthesis which it unifies also a unity, in fact a unity as content of concepts which generally represent such a pure synthesis. Because the unity of the operation of understanding belongs to the content of pure concepts of understanding, the logical function of the activity of understanding may well be a possible clue for securing a survey of the possible number and

13. Ibid., B 104f., A 79.

completeness of categories. *The table of judgment contains the indices for the number and system of categories, but this table is not the source of their origin.* We must clearly grasp this as the outcome of these six paragraphs which precede the table of categories. And only when we proceed from this point, in order to interpret the problem of the categories, can we assess the extent to which understanding and function of understanding in the problem of categories claim priority for Kant.

This priority shows itself already in the fact that Kant still calls the concepts with such a content pure concepts of *understanding*, even though the content of categories is not primarily and exclusively determined by the unity which pertains to logical functions. Here is manifest a primacy of understanding, of the logical—a primacy which runs through the entire history of Western philosophy since the beginning of the problem of categories in antiquity and which receives a new impetus in Kant.

The guiding problem is that logical unities of functions belong to the content of categories and that hence the same understanding functions in *formal thinking* and in the categories, i.e., in the *a priori determination of objects*. With regard to this problem we must above all keep in mind that Kant at this point offers something like a survey of the framework without justifying at all *why* this unity of function of understanding belongs to the content of categories and *how* this is possible—why precisely understanding has a leading function for all problems of the *unity* in various unifications. On the one hand the unity as a *factor of content* of pure concepts of understanding is *determined* primarily *out of the pure synthesis* of the power of imagination and its *manifold*. On the other hand, this unity of *understanding*—as *unifying* the manifold—is again the ultimate *determining factor*, so that, put crudely, in all of Kant's subsequent discussions the power of imagination and understanding battle with each other for priority as the basic source of knowledge. The battle surges back and forth, without a clear outcome. This makes the task of interpretation more difficult. Before [deciding for one or the other], it is important to survey the fundamental direction of the problematic. It was to this end that an explicit emphasis was placed on the six paragraphs which we interpreted and discussed.

§22. *The Twofold Character of Categories as Basic Determinations of Being and of Judgment and the Impossibility of a Real Definition of Categories as Pure Concepts of Understanding*

We can briefly summarize the result of our interpretation of the six preceding paragraphs by saying that Kant wants to show where the place of pure concepts of understanding as such is. Insofar as *understanding* fulfills a functional service for pure intuition, pure *concepts* too fulfill such

a service. But in order for concepts to perform such a service, *pure intuition*—as regards the manifold which this intuition gives—must be *formed in advance* for the concepts, in such a way that these concepts can be of service to the determination of this pure manifold. This brings us to the point where we must show how, in accord with their functional service, pure concepts of understanding are built into the *pure synthesis of the power of imagination*. Put differently, if we are to circumscribe the *content* of these pure concepts, we must necessarily go back to this *pure synthesis of the power of imagination*. The earlier mentioned deliberations of Kant, according to which the content of pure concepts of understanding “is one or the other *reflection*,” must now be reformulated in a clearer version (which is supported by the given interpretation). The content of pure concepts of understanding is one or the other *pure synthesis*. But now, insofar as according to Kant's claim (for initially he demonstrates nothing of it) the unity belonging to synthesis is identical with the unifying function of the forms of judgment, these forms in their totality and articulation can be an *index* for *completeness and division* of pure concepts of understanding. This is the only legitimate sense of speaking of the table of judgment as a clue for the discovery of pure concepts of understanding. By contrast, their *origin* occurs in pure time-related synthesis of the power of imagination. That is why Kant concludes the exposition of the six paragraphs which we interpreted by saying:

In this manner there arise precisely the same number of pure concepts of understanding which apply *a priori* to objects of intuition in general, as, in the preceding table, there have been found to be logical functions in all possible judgments. For these functions specify the understanding completely, and yield an exhaustive inventory of its powers.¹

This makes clear the function of the given table of judgment. As the following remarks on the table of categories show, Kant is concerned with two things: (1) He wants to *make visible* the actual *source of origin* of *pure concepts of understanding as such*, i.e., pure synthesis; and (2) he wants to *be assured of the completeness and division of the concepts of understanding as they spring from* [synthesis].

By contrast, it is precisely *not* his intention to *derive* explicitly individual concepts of understanding from the designated *place of origin*. Considering the single, central task of his investigation—to demonstrate the *foundations* of ontology in general—Kant is only interested in working out the guiding perspectives of the ontological problematic.² He speaks with a certain disdain about *elaboration* of an ontology grounded in that way;

1. CPR, B 105, A 79.

2. Cf. Introduction, A 13/14, A 27/28.

and he certainly underestimates its difficulties when he states that such an elaboration is “a useful and not unpleasant task, but it is a task from which we can here be absolved.”³ Furthermore, Kant believes that it is easy to carry out the intention of such an elaboration of ontology, on the basis that he has newly achieved, “with the aid of the ontology manuals.”⁴ “The compartments are provided; all that is required is to fill them”⁵—through his work.

We see that this elaboration of the system of pure concepts of understanding in the *Critique* is not what is central for Kant. At the same time we see how strong and unwavering his trust is in the traditional work of ontology, when he says that we must simply take over the material. Hegel speaks in much the same way in his *Logic*, which is meant to give nothing but an ontology worked out on the basis of a presumably radicalized Kantian position:

To exhibit the realm of thought philosophically, that is, in its own immanent activity or—what is the same thing—in its necessary development, had therefore to be a fresh undertaking, one that had to be started right from the beginning; but the material already acquired, the familiar forms of thought, must be regarded as an extremely important source, indeed as a necessary condition and as a gratefully acknowledged presupposition, even though what it offers is only here and there a meager thread or a lifeless and disordered heap of dead bones.⁶

When Kant himself moves quickly beyond the system of pure concepts of understanding, then it behooves us, too, to dwell here as little as on the table of judgment. However, one remark is in order. *Pure concepts of understanding*, whose place of origin and connection with the functions of judgment has become clear now, Kant identifies as categories: “These concepts we shall, with Aristotle, call *categories*, for our primary purpose is the same as his, although widely diverging from it in manner of execution.”⁷ Here Kant explicitly emphasizes how his intention agrees with that of Aristotle. It is tempting to show how far this is indeed the case and what can be learned from this for an understanding of Aristotle and, the other way around, for interpreting Kant. However, here we must refrain from such observations, not only because they take us too far afield, but also because the interpretation of Aristotle that we have up until now is not enough to appreciate Kant’s remark. In particular, Aristotle’s conception of categories is not transparent and hence is also

3. CPR, B 108, A 82.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., B 109, A 83.

6. Hegel, *Logic*, Preface to the second edition (Lasson, p. 9).

7. CPR, B 105, A 79f.

controversial. For our purposes a few remarks of a terminological nature must suffice.

Kant takes from Aristotle—and in fact explicitly on the basis of an original inherent agreement—the title of “categories” as a designation for what he means by pure concepts of understanding. According to Kant these concepts relate to objects of pure intuition as *a priori* determinations; they determine *a priori* that which makes objects into objects and constitutes their object-character. But appearances are objects, i.e., the extant as we encounter it in experience. Hence pure concepts of understanding are determinations which determine *a priori* what is extant in its extant character. Or to put it more generally, since extant means the same as a being, *these concepts are determinations which co-constitute the being of beings* and are thus the theme of *ontology*. But these determinations are also again connected in a certain way with the functions of understanding, with *judgments*. And judgments are propositions. And “proposition” means the same as λόγος. Λέγειν means stating something about something. Now, in all his ontological investigations, in fact in various areas, Aristotle comes back again and again to certain *determinations of the being of beings*, which he calls κοινά, or γένη τοῦ ὄντος, the stems of beings. These determinations of beings are the most general and the highest; they indicate how a being as a being is naturally manifold and, in keeping with this manifold nature as something extant, can be in multiple ways. These manifold determinations, which manifest the full structure of beings overall, Aristotle calls also κατηγορίαι; and κατηγορεῖν means negotiating about and discussing. These general determinations of beings, as γένη τοῦ ὄντος, are at the same time *basic forms of the proposition*. In Kant’s language, as constitutive determinations of the *object-character* of objects they are connected to the proposition, to *judgment*, and to *understanding*. This is immediately clear in a passage (one of many which could be cited) where Aristotle states: καθ’ αὐτὰ δὲ εἶναι λέγεται ὅσα περ σημαίνει τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας· ὅσα ἄλλως γὰρ λέγεται, τοσαυτὰ ἄλλως τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει.⁸

The being, or the extant as such, is claimed with regard to its being; the variations of this claim, of these categories, indicate how manifold this being is. As manifold as the manner of being-claimed is, so manifold are the ways of being.

This should be enough to indicate that already in Aristotle, just as in Kant, there is a *connection* between the most general *determinations of the being of beings* and the proposition, *judgment*, or *understanding*. But why these determinations exist and whether they are legitimate—neither Aristotle nor Kant dealt with these questions. That is, it is questionable

8. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, A, 1017 a 22.

and moot whether these determinations of *being* are concepts of *understanding* and whether concepts of understanding are “categories.” Perhaps the fact that, from antiquity and throughout the entire tradition until now, the *ontological* problem is dealt with as a problem of *categories* shows a fundamental misconception of the genuine philosophical problematic.

Let us explicitly emphasize once again that in the first part of the transcendental analytic of concepts Kant deems it unimportant to carry out a disclosure of the origin of the categories, and indeed he makes no such attempt with regard to any single category. He even says: “In this treatise I purposely omit the definitions of the categories, although I may be in possession of them.”⁹ Is Kant actually distancing himself from an explicit disclosure of the origin of categories merely because this disclosure is a lengthy and not absolutely necessary business? Or does this sliding over an explicit disclosure of the origin [of the categories] at the present juncture have other, deeper reasons? Precisely with regard to what we worked out as the actual place of the origin of categories, we must ask: *Could* Kant carry out such a disclosure of the origin [of categories] even if he had *wanted* to? No! For Kant brought to the fore only the general dimension of the place of origin [of the categories]; he did not yet show (1) how the pure synthesis of pure power of imagination relates to the manifoldness of time and (2) why this synthesis can be at all related to this manifoldness. Just as little did he show wherein the specific function of unification of synthesis consists and where the ultimate ground for the possibility for *a many to be given to an I* is to be found. And furthermore, he did not show how this *manifold's belonging to an I* is closely tied to the pure intuition of *time*. All this is unclear and shown only programmatically. But all this must first be brought to light, so that the place of the origin of categories becomes clear to such an extent that the origin of categories can be accomplished from out of that place.

Thus Kant distances himself from deducing and fully determining, i.e., defining, the categories, not because it is a boring business, but rather because basically *he cannot offer a definition of categories at all* so long as he *does not draw into the problematic pure intuition of time together with the power of imagination*. With the outstanding sincerity of his thinking, Kant later admitted that the reason for leaving out the explicit derivation of categories was not the worthlessness of the task, but rather a fundamental embarrassment in the face of the possible resolution of the problem. This admission is to be found in the third part of the second book of the transcendental analytic, in the concluding segment of the analytic of principles, which rounds out the positive portion of the *Critique*. This remark is, of course, crossed out in the second edition. Here Kant states:

In the above presentation of the table of categories, we relieved ourselves of the task of defining each of them as our purpose, which concerns only their synthetic employment, did not require such definition; and we are not called upon to incur any responsibility through unnecessary undertakings from which we can be relieved. It was no evasion but an important prudential maxim, not to embark upon the task of definition, attempting or professing to attain completeness and precision in the determination of a concept, so long as we can achieve our end with one or other of its properties, without requiring a complete enumeration of all those that constitute the complete concept. But we now perceive that the ground of this precaution lies still deeper. We realize that we are unable to define them, even if we wished.¹⁰

It was not an “evasion” but a “precaution” which prompted Kant to leave out the exposition of individual categories. And the deeper reason for this precaution lay in the fact that Kant was not able to [offer an exposition of individual categories], even if he had wished. Kant clarifies this reason right before the remark that we just quoted, when he emphasizes that “we cannot define any one of them in any real fashion, that is, make the possibility of their object understandable, without at once descending to the conditions of sensibility, and so to the form of appearance.”¹¹ When Kant says that “But we now” first “perceive” . . . the ground, this is an illusion. Precisely that which Kant immediately mentions as a fundamental discussion of the exhibition of the table of categories already distinguishes the basic character of the categories to the effect that they have for their content the pure time-related synthesis of the power of imagination. In other words, as concepts categories have a content which cannot be provided for by the logical function of understanding as such. But all genuine definition must be “an explanation in real fashion” and cannot be limited to an elucidation of words. However, the real concerns the inherent content of something. Thus a definition of categories in real fashion requires that we concern ourselves with what these categories mean according to their content, insofar as this content is attributed to objects, to objects, as *realitas*, as inherent determination: “Real explanation would be that which makes clear not only the concept but also its *ob-jective reality*.”¹²

Thus once again from new perspectives we arrive at what we anticipated earlier, as the essential result of the first part of the Analytic of Concepts: *Pure concepts of understanding, the categories, are grasped in their necessary structural moment when they are taken as concepts which spring from pure imaginative relation to time*. Accordingly, the second section, entitled “The Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgment,” is not the

10. Ibid., A 241.

11. Ibid., A 240, B 300.

12. Ibid., A 242, note.

crucial section in the entirety of this first part, but rather the third section, entitled “The Pure Concepts of the Understanding or Categories.”

In the second edition [of the *Critique*] Kant added §§11 and 12 to this section. These paragraphs relate Kant’s table of categories more directly to traditional ontology, especially to the most general basic concepts of medieval ontology—the transcendentals *unum, verum, bonum*. We shall skip these two paragraphs because it has become clear that a systematic presentation of the categories is no longer crucial and, in addition, that the relation of categories to transcendentals, i.e., the relation of material and formal categories, will be dealt with later, in an appendix to the Concepts of Reflection.

From §11, in which Kant explains his own table of categories, we shall focus only on the separation of the categories into two classes: “mathematical” and “dynamic” categories. We shall encounter this distinction later and often. Now only this much for explanation: At first the designation of both classes is strange, but will become clear if we recall that in modern times (as well as already in Plato) the mathematical qualified as an excellent example of the *a priori*, of that which did not in each case concern the factual extantness of this or that thing, but that which pertained to the essence of the thing, its whatness, whether the thing is extant or not. On the contrary, what is extant in its extantness, the actual, is found within an effective connection or in a relation of forces. Hence “dynamic” is another term for what occurs in an actual or causal connection. Dynamic categories are those of existence in the Kantian sense, those of extantness. Categories of quantity and quality are categories of essence and concern the whatness or *essentia*. Categories of relation and modality are dynamic categories and concern *existentia*. “Nature” is that which characterizes the existence or *existentia* of things. Thus Kant can say: “Relation and modality pertain to observation of nature of beings; quantity and quality, to the doctrine of existence.”¹³

As little as Kant concerns himself with an explicit derivation of individual categories from the genuine place of origin and treats the table of categories only roughly, still he returns to them frequently—in fact this table is for him the table of orientation in articulating and setting up the problems. For Kant the table of categories has a far-reaching architectonic function—a fact that is of some significance for the matter-of-fact way of posing a problem and for the course of its treatment.

The first part of the *Analytic of Concepts*, what we thereby have brought to a close here, has a remarkable result. The notion of pure concepts of understanding and an outline of their system should be obtained. And yet it is precisely the notion of concepts of understanding

that is ambiguous. Even more, in the end this notion is not at all sufficiently determined. Terminologically, we can grasp the ambiguity of the notion of pure concepts of understanding for what will follow by saying that *for Kant pure concepts of understanding are in one sense notions and in another sense categories*. On the one hand they are viewed from *the logical form of the activity of understanding*. But at the same time they are grasped as *primal concepts whose content springs from the pure imaginative, time-related synthesis*.

The more Kant perceives these just-mentioned connections, the less he can free himself from taking these concepts again and again primarily from understanding. This comes to the fore in the fact that for Kant categories are “pure concepts of understanding” and are called so. The distinction between notions and categories is by no means clearly worked out by Kant. On the contrary, Kant takes the category in the sense of notion, as concepts that are guided only by the logical function of understanding. He very often uses the distinction between categories in their transcendental sense and categories in empirical employment—a distinction, however, which is not identical with the aforementioned distinction. All these terminological hesitations are indications of a thoroughgoing and ultimate uncertainty in understanding the matter itself.

The same happens with regard to judgment—and what has not been noted. We shall see how precisely in the *Critique*, where Kant seemingly simply renews the conception of judgment of formal and general logic, he pushes forth in interpreting judgment in terms of transcendental logic, i.e., ontologically. But even here he does not succeed in thoroughly recasting the doctrine of judgment, much less the doctrine of concept. We thus return again to what had to be said on the occasion of the first exposition of the task of the transcendental analytic: Kant does not succeed in radically and unequivocally clarifying the relation between formal and transcendental logic. He did not succeed in securing and developing transcendental logic as the foundation of formal general logic—a task which imposed itself on him more or less clearly and again and again.

When the first main part of the “*Analytic of Concepts*” is brought to a close with such a fundamental ambiguity, then there is at first little hope of clarifying the task of the second main part, which should have been prepared for in that first part—precisely with regard to the task set for this [second] part.

Chapter Two

Disclosure of the Origin of Categories as
Demonstration of Their Ontological Character

In the following we shall interpret the second main part of the “Analytic of Concepts,” which is entitled “The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding.” Doing so, we shall deal with the most obscure portions of the *Critique*, with those portions that neo-Kantianism has exploited in clichés and with an astonishing naiveté. “Transcendental Deduction” and “*quaestio juris*,” like talk of a “Copernican act,” are battle cries with which one not only scares the enemy but also provides oneself with courage in the face of the inner helplessness which one occasionally feels over against what Kant may have basically understood by these terms.

In what follows it seems that we are dealing with a deduction of pure concepts of understanding. Does Kant also want to offer a *derivation* of the categories—even though we know that he considers such a derivation to be insignificant for his intention? Or does “deduction” mean something else?

In our general characterization of the task of the transcendental analytic, we already emphasized that what Kant understands by the term *deduction* and what he in principle intends to do with deduction—and the only thing that he intends to do with it—must be grasped from out of an appropriate understanding of the transcendental analytic as such. But we saw in the first part that the place of origin of pure concepts of understanding is pure imaginative time-related synthesis and hence that pure concepts of understanding must spring from this synthesis. What does it mean to say “concepts *springing from*”? They have their *content* in accord with a definite origin [*Herkunft*]. That these concepts spring from pure synthesis means, therefore, that we can only make out what these concepts are according to content only in terms of pure synthesis. In fact, regarding this task of disclosure of the ownmost inner possibility of pure concepts of understanding, we must distinguish between *delimiting* [*Umgrenzung*] the place of origin in general (i.e., determination of that which constitutes a category as category) and *elucidation of individual categories*. Kant deals with only the first question. Thus, however ambiguous the outcome of the first part may be in other respects, still the structure of that which belongs to a category is clear, namely the three elements of pure knowledge mentioned above: time, the power of imagination, and logical function of understanding.

When now a “deduction of the pure concepts of understanding” is to be undertaken anew, *deduction* can only mean *disclosure of the origin of categories*, i.e., clarification of their ownmost inner possibility by a regress to what pertains to them. But when compared to the first part, Kant

strives with this “deduction” for a *further* disclosure of their ownmost inner possibility, then this means that the first part perhaps did not at all accomplish such a disclosure, that the disclosure attempted in that part was perhaps only preparatory for the actual transcendental, i.e., ontological, interpretation of the essence of categories. We can easily explain why the clarification of the essence of categories as offered by Kant in the first part is incomplete by returning to the Aristotelian concept of category, according to which categories are simultaneously *σχήματα* of λέγειν and γένη τοῦ ὄντος. Thus the crucial element itself, categories as *fundamental determinations of the being* of beings, as objectness of objects, is still obscure. Up to now Kant *has* shown that categories are not only and exclusively interconnected with the logical function of understanding but have as content the pure imaginative time-related synthesis. However, Kant still does not show what these categories are with respect to beings or objects, what their complete and actual content is, which resides in beings themselves—that is, their objective reality. In spite of all the delimiting of their true place of origin, the essence of categories in reference to beings as beings, the ownmost inner possibility of pure concepts of understanding, is not yet sufficiently worked out ontologically. We do not yet have the full ontological concept of categories. Therefore I claim that *the task of “deduction of pure concepts of understanding” consists in disclosing the original ontological essence of categories as such*, i.e., in disclosing the inner possibility of the essence of pure synthesis seen in its pure predicative structural element.

First we must confront this conception of deduction with what Kant himself says about the deduction. Thereby I refrain from directly and polemically rejecting even the crudest misinterpretation of the deduction in neo-Kantianism. But at the same time it must be emphasized that Kant himself necessarily hesitates when it comes to determining the task of deduction and the manner of its execution. We must explain the grounds for this hesitation. A central reason is Kant’s conception of the *a priori*. Earlier we presented the division of the second main part, which has three sections in the first edition [of the *Critique*] but only two sections in the second edition. In both editions the first section is entitled “The Principles of Any Transcendental Deduction.”

§23. The Problem Posed by the Transcendental Deduction of Categories

a) Justification of Kant’s View of the Transcendental
Deduction as a Response to the *Quaestio Juris*

Kant begins the section entitled “The Principles of Any Transcendental Deduction” by explaining the word *deduction*. What is striking in this

context is that he does not employ this term in its philosophical, logical meaning—like perhaps Descartes, who in the *Regulae* distinguishes *intuitus* from *deductio*, axioms from conclusions. Rather, in employing this term Kant relies on the terminology of a science which lies completely outside Kant's discipline. He employs the term *deduction* as jurists do and explains the juridical meaning of deduction by delineating briefly what constitutes a discussion of a "legal action." A legal action validates "warrants," that is, rejects "presumptions." To do this, two things are needed: (1) Facts as well as objects of dispute must be confirmed—*quid facti*—but (2) the legal situation must be presented in order to be able to arrive at a justified decision with respect to this particular case in dispute. That is, it must be shown what is legally valid and justified and what claims can be really validated—*quid juris*. What the jurists call "deduction" is the response to this question, i.e., the question concerning demonstration of legal claims as justified, demonstration of the legal possibility of warrants. In a certain way this term *deduction* contains the idea of a derivation, but *derivation of a claim* with reference to its legal ground.

Now why does Kant lapse into this *juridical* usage of the term in his transcendental-philosophical-ontological discussions? How can he carry over methodical considerations from a specific individual science into an investigation whose theme is the possibility of that which is *a priori* at the foundation of any particular science?

α) The Knowledge-Claim of Dogmatic Metaphysics as Motive for the *Quaestio Juris*

For Kant there is a certain similarity between his inquiry regarding ontological knowledge and the inquiries of jurists. How? By briefly recalling what was said in general at the beginning of this lecture about Kant's stance on the problem of metaphysics, we shall understand the juridical usage of the term. Kant's task of laying the foundation of metaphysics as ontic science of the supersensible focuses on laying the foundation of the possibility of ontological knowledge as the necessary foundation of all ontic knowledge. However independent Kant's inquiry is, he still remains strongly polemical, even where he is not polemicizing—polemical, not in the sense of a predilection for faultfinding in matters of secondary importance, but in the sense of a fundamental debate. But this was a debate with theoretical dogmatic metaphysics, which we have sufficiently outlined.

Theoretical dogmatic metaphysics attempts to determine something about the supersensible being itself from out of the most general concepts of understanding, i.e., using the categories as supposedly pure logical creations. This metaphysics presumes knowledge of beings without being able to *demonstrate* the concepts employed on these beings themselves as *legimately employed*. Consequently theoretical dogmatic metaphysics (to

which Kant is opposed) deals indeed with certain *presumptions*, i.e., with objects of a possible *legal action*. Accordingly the critique of these presumptions requires *clarification of the legal ground for the assumed authority*. Thus the question concerning the possibility of theoretical metaphysics is a legal act. Kant's *polemical orientation toward theoretical metaphysics* is the motivation for the *juridical approach to the problem of the possibility of ontological knowledge*.

Thus a juridical formulation of his problem of metaphysics was quite obvious to Kant; and he gladly uses the image of a tribunal¹ for the debate with this dogmatic metaphysics: Reason must be brought to trial, and witnesses must be heard. Thus the employment of juridical terms is not surprising. However, this is not simply carrying over words where matters are completely different. Rather, *Kant's ownmost ontological inquiry becomes, to a certain extent, a juridical inquiry*, as we shall see. We will have to see how this is possible and to what extent this distorts the actual problem. Purely externally, we can notice already at the beginning of the second part of the "Analytic of Concepts" that the problem of ontological knowledge now takes on the direction of a legal action against dogmatic metaphysics. Kant, so to speak, leaves the course of an integrated exposition of the ontological problem and makes room for an inquiry which has a primarily polemical direction. Of course, the main reason for this is that he himself does not have an unequivocal course for his problem, because he is missing the foundation.

Already the title "transcendental *deduction*" indicates the problem, namely that Kant's own inquiry is dictated polemically by the inquiry of the opposition. In other words, in seeking a resolution to the problem, Kant is guided in the last analysis by an inquiry which already in itself is impossible. From now on this inquiry takes over, even as the horizon of the problem marked by the words "time," "power of imagination," and "transcendental analytic" is sustained. Most of the time both inquiries are inextricably entangled, sometimes the genuine one gets clearly expressed, sometimes the ungenuine one dominates in the extreme, everything thus revolving in the most hopeless confusion. However impartially one may regard Kant's problem and resolution of the transcendental deduction, one thing is absolutely certain: Viewed as a *quaestio juris*, the transcendental deduction is the most disastrous segment of teaching in Kantian philosophy to which one can refer. The transcendental deduction is almost without exception untenable. Nevertheless in the course of this deduction Kant offers philosophical initiatives which have to be taken in the right way and given proper direction. What I have just said is intended to make the point, again and emphatically,

1. CPR, B 779, A 751.

that with Kant it is always worth our while actually to pursue even and precisely his labyrinths and to protect Kant from the Kantians.

β) The Problem of Legitimacy of the Ob-jective Reality of Pure Concepts of Understanding

The transcendental deduction is concerned with a legal action; and because the issue in this deduction is pure concepts of understanding, categories are the disputed object. In what sense?

As already mentioned, after explaining the title “deduction,” Kant goes on to outline in a general way our usage of concepts. Among concepts which we use without any particular deduction are “many *empirical* concepts.” We do not specifically justify the warrant of their use. We do not justify this usage because, with regard to these concepts of experience, we are always capable of checking the claim of these concepts to state something about what is given experientially, by examining the statement against what is thus given, because, as Kant puts it, “experience is always available for the proof of their ob-jective reality.”² It becomes clear that it is an issue of proof, i.e., of the *demonstration of legitimacy, the justification of the ob-jective reality* of empirical concepts.

We have repeatedly explained the expression “ob-jective reality”; and we return to it once again, because this expression has crucial importance for the problem of the transcendental deduction. The reality of the concept is its inherent content [*Sachgehalt*], which obviously entails a relation to real, or possible, things or ob-jects which have such inherent character. The ob-jective reality of a concept is that which is justified by ob-jects themselves, in the objects or extant beings, and which is *demonstrable* with these ob-jects, as derived from them and hence as legitimately belonging to them. Consequently, we can always confirm and substantiate the ob-jective reality of empirical concepts via experience.

However, next to empirical concepts—which according to their content are tailored to certain, familiar, daily, and assuredly accessible objects—there are “also usurpatory concepts such as *fortune* and *fate*.” As Kant dramatically puts it, such concepts are in circulation with almost universal indulgence; we continually use them in our existence as if they are self-evident. Each of us admits to the other that we know what we mean by these concepts; and nevertheless a great embarrassment ensures when one is to justify the ob-jective reality of such concepts, when one only needs to demonstrate what is meant by these concepts, when one has to answer the question whether we are *legitimately* using such concepts and whether anything at all corresponds to them. Here deduction does not have it so easy; demonstration of a ground for the justification

2. Ibid., B 116f., A 84.

of use of such concepts is confronted with difficulties. But with regard to these concepts, whose demonstration Kant does not discuss, one could see a possible justification of them (although illegitimately) in a certain general and average experience of human Dasein of itself which delivers the reason for justification of these concepts.

Besides, there are concepts which are essentially not derived from experience and nevertheless claim to be constitutive of objects or ob-jects, i.e., pure concepts of understanding. It is obvious that such concepts require a fundamental demonstration of their claim to legitimacy, a demonstration which cannot go back to experience as the authority for legitimation. Essentially, these concepts can never be empirically demonstrated from experience; “their warrant to be employed always demands a deduction.” This task then includes an *a priori, transcendental deduction of pure concepts of understanding*, a deduction which does not go back to experience. The proof for their warrant to predicate something about objects—even though these concepts are not obtained empirically through reflection on the objects—must above all respond to this fundamental question: How can pure concepts of understanding “relate to ob-jects” at all? How are they possible as ontological concepts? In what does their ontological essence consist? It is obvious that only an ontological, *a priori* clarification of the ownmost inner possibility of these concepts can justify their ob-jective reality. “The explanation of the *manner* in which *concepts can thus relate a priori to objects* I call transcendental deduction.”³ Interpreting this, we must ask the question more acutely: What *kind of concepts* are these concepts that they can have a *a priori* ob-jective reality? Here we are dealing with the problem of the inner possibility of pure predicative synthesis, i.e., the *veritative* synthesis. In other words the issue which is to be dealt with in transcendental deduction presupposes the radical inquiry into the original ontological essence of these concepts on the basis of which they can carry such an authority. This is the question which lies at the heart of the problem of transcendental deduction. Kant does not ask this question in such a pure form for the simple reason that he is polemically oriented and thus gives the problem a juristic form.

That is why we must recall again the guiding problem of laying the foundation of ontological knowledge. To be sure, Kant speaks of both stems of pure knowledge—pure intuition and pure thinking—but, as we have shown in the preceding discussion, thinking is *in itself* related to intuition and hence *related to the object*; and pure concepts are in themselves grounded in the pure imaginative synthesis of time. Now proceeding with his observations, Kant ought to discuss the relation of pure

3. Ibid., B 117, A 85 [emphasis by Heidegger].

concepts to objects—a relation that was considered in principle—and to inquire into the inner possibility of the ontological essence of categories. He ought to expound on the question of the possibility of the *a priori* relation of thinking to objects, in accord with the ownmost inner possibility of thinking developed so far. This does not happen. In the course of the transcendental deduction Kant must certainly and necessarily come upon these connections. However, *he gives a form to the exposition of the problem which does not do justice to what he has achieved so far in his discussions.*

Pure concepts of understanding speak of objects through predicates of pure thinking.⁴ Kant indeed maintains that they relate to objects generally, *without* any condition of sensibility. They cannot exhibit an *a priori* object in intuition which “prior to all experience would serve as the ground for their synthesis.”⁵ Hence Kant poses the problem of clarification of the inner possibility of categories in such a way as precisely *not* to make use of the central insight that pure concepts of understanding *as concepts of thinking are fundamentally grounded in the pure intuition of time.* Instead he now takes pure concepts of understanding as *pure notions*, as belonging exclusively to thinking, and asks: How can these pure thought contents have an *a priori* relation to objects? How can “*subjective conditions of thinking . . . have ob-jective validity*, that is can furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects”?⁶ Kant now conceives the concepts, so to speak, as cut off from any relation to time.

We can also explain Kant's inquiry into the transcendental deduction in its relation to the guiding problem by saying that the transcendental aesthetic inquires into the essence of pure intuition and its ontological possibility. Now the question is directed toward the essence of pure concepts and their inner possibility. Initially Kant asks this question in isolation; that is, he attempts to demonstrate the ob-jective reality of pure concepts of understanding in such a way as *to consider* these concepts *in their relation to objects as a problem purely by themselves.* This inquiry, which *runs counter* to the ownmost inner possibility of thinking and its *being in service* [to intuition] and which Kant then *de facto* again takes up, suggests itself to him even more when he says that intuitions by themselves already yield objects and thus that it is unintelligible why nevertheless determinations of thinking should still be related *a priori* to objects. If intuitions by themselves yield objects, then a *separate* deduction must be carried out for the concepts—in case these concepts for their part and moreover claim a relation to objects.

4. Ibid., B 120, A 88.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., B 122, A 89f.

γ) The Subjective Character of the *a priori* as Condition for the *Quaestio Juris*; the Transcendence-Structure of Dasein

What makes the inquiry of the transcendental deduction difficult in the end is Kant's conception of the *a priori*, which already in the transcendental aesthetic left behind a crucial obscurity.

A priori is that which belongs to the subject, lies in the mind, and is accessible therein prior to any move to the ob-jects. *A priori* is that which is initially accessible in the sphere of the pure subject. *This fundamental comprehension of the a priori now covers pure concepts of understanding.* They belong to the activities of the subject; they are, so to speak extant in the subject and only in it. Such a comprehension of the *a priori* character of pure concepts of understanding *leads necessarily to the juridical form of inquiry.* If these pure concepts of understanding, *as belonging to the subject*, are to be determinations of objects, then as purely subjective they claim a single “validity” for ob-jects. But this gives rise to the question: What constitutes the *legitimacy of the claim* of subjective categories, in view of the fact that this subjective element has a value, so to speak, for what is ob-jective? What justifies taking this subjective element for something ob-jective, which basically it is not?

The inherent presupposition for the possibility of carrying the juridical form of inquiry over to the problem of clarification of the ontological essence of categories is also the characteristic of these concepts as something which exists in the mind. Although they are not present in the ob-ject, still they are supposed to determine ob-jects, to be “applicable” to ob-jects; they raise a claim to ob-jective validity.

Thus there are basically three moments which confuse the inquiry of the transcendental deduction: (1) cutting off the categories from their crucial relation to pure intuition, (2) the opinion that pure intuition alone can yield objects (an opinion which otherwise opposes the stated thesis that intuitions without concepts are blind), and (3) the comprehension of the *a priori* as what resides in the isolated subject, which (subject) thus is given initially and prior to any relation to an ob-ject. Put briefly, what confuses the inquiry of the transcendental deduction is the comprehension of an *a priori* freed from transcendence [*transzendenzfrei*].

All three moments are ultimately grounded in the *fundamental and crucial deficiency in Kant's posing of the problem of categories* in general, in *misconstruing the problem of transcendence*—or better said, in failing to see transcendence as an original and essential determination of the ontological constitution of Dasein. Insofar as it factually exists, Dasein is precisely *not* an isolated subject, but a being which is fundamentally outside itself [*außer sich*]. And because Dasein is fundamentally outside itself, it can return to itself and in a certain way remain with and in itself. Transcendence is the presupposition for the possibility of Dasein's being itself.

Kant failed to direct his central problem toward the fundamental phenomenon of transcendence. He never attempted to offer a fundamental ontology of Dasein and did not realize the tasks and methodical peculiarity of such an ontology.

The emphasis placed on the original transcendence of Dasein is also significant for Kant's practical philosophy. Only because Dasein can be with itself on the basis of transcendence can Dasein be with another self as a thou [*Du*] in the world. The I-thou relation is not itself already the relation of transcendence. Rather the I-thou relation is grounded in the transcendence of Dasein. It is a mistake to assume that the I-thou relation as such primarily constitutes the possible discovery of the world. This relation may just make the discovery of the world impossible. For example, the I-thou relation of *ressentiment* may hinder me from seeing the world of the other. The much discussed psychological and psychoanalytical problems of the I-thou relation are without philosophical foundation if they are not grounded in the fundamental ontology of Dasein.

b) Transcendental Deduction in Connection with the Problem of Transcendence

All of Kant's deliberations in the transcendental deduction, beginning again and again from new perspectives and referring to the same problem, circle, so to speak, around the problem of transcendence. Occasionally it seems as if Kant *had* a hold on the phenomenon, but then the section which follows shows that everything is in confusion. Thus only the two preparatory sections of the transcendental deduction (§§13 and 14) offer a wholly different picture, although they too intend to elaborate the same problem. While §13 ("The Principles of Any Transcendental Deduction") offers a one-sided development of the problem of the deduction—in terms of the purely logical character of the categories—§14 ("Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of Categories") relates the problem in its vital connection to the original dimension of the ontological and fundamental problem. This comes to the fore superficially in that the last paragraph, beginning immediately before the thematic discussion of the transcendental deduction, explicitly renders visible once again the original dimension of the ontological and fundamental problem, in such an elementary fashion that now Kant says explicitly: "There are three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul) which contain the condition of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely *sense, imagination, and apperception*"⁷ and emphatically points out in conclusion

7. Ibid., A 94.

that now the power of imagination enters into consideration as a fundamental source. However, Kant *omitted* this paragraph from the second edition [of the *Critique*], a paragraph which would directly place the inquiry once again into the actual dimension of the discussion. This omission completely corresponds to the correction to which we referred earlier, in which Kant comprehends the power of imagination, not as a function of the *soul*, but as a function of *understanding* and so again expunges the power of imagination as the *third* fundamental source.

α) The Justification for Kant's Misconstruing Transcendence

We explained earlier, in the general discussion of the task of the transcendental analysis,⁸ that the transcendental question concerning the *origin of pure concepts of understanding* is fundamentally different from a psychological inquiry concerning the *origination of consciousness of these concepts*. This question has to do only with a psychological-empirical function.

Now Kant explicitly returns to this difference between transcendental analytic and psychological inquiry.⁹ Here he quite clearly and sharply distinguishes the "investigation" directed at the "first strivings" of our faculty of knowledge (which is of a purely psychological kind) from the task of the deduction, which "can never be obtained in this manner." He refers explicitly to Locke, who carries out a descriptive psychology of the empirical, developmental history of human knowledge, while supposing that he was offering a philosophical explication of knowledge. Locke succeeds only in explaining how we *de facto* come to possess certain knowledge. But he does not inquire into the grounds for the inner possibility of knowledge as such, however this knowledge may originate psychologically.

That a clear distinction between his transcendental inquiry and psychological investigation had a fundamental significance for Kant can be seen in the fact that he added several paragraphs to the second edition [of the *Critique*] on British empiricism, in order to differentiate "empirical derivation" of concepts from their transcendental justification. It is striking that this paragraph on British empiricism, a refutation of psychology, is added precisely as a substitute for the paragraph from the first edition [of the *Critique*] which is omitted [in the second edition] and which refers to the power of imagination as the third fundamental source.¹⁰ This indicates that, *by strongly drawing upon these three faculties and especially upon the power of imagination, Kant still believed to have discovered in himself some-*

8. Ibid., B 90f., A 65f.

9. Ibid., B 118, A 86.

10. Ibid., B 127, A 94f.

thing like psychology. And this is again a sign that Kant was basically not clear about the real and necessary character of his investigation. He realized that discussion of pure intuition, pure thinking, and the pure power of imagination is not psychology or, to put it more precisely, cannot and should not be psychology. He realized that a discussion of these faculties and thus this manner of investigating the mind and the human being is *not an empirical* discussion. As opposite, he knew only the *rational* discussion. But rational discussion is a *logical* one. Hence, if this discussion of the subject, the mind, the faculties and fundamental sources cannot be a psychological one, then it must be shifted to a transcendental *logic*.

Kant did not yet see the essential task of a purely *phenomenological* interpretation of Dasein in the sense of a *fundamental ontological explication of its basic structures*. This fundamental lack of clarity with regard to method also corresponds to a fundamental lack of clarity with regard to the subject matter, that is, with regard to the theme of such a fundamental ontology. As already indicated, Kant failed to see the fundamental constitution of Dasein, i.e., transcendence. Hence the notion of the transcendental and of the transcendental method—and thereby the notion of transcendental philosophy and transcendental ontology—remains in confusion.

β) Transcendence as *a priori* Constitution of Objectness

Paragraph §14, which was just mentioned and is entitled “Transition to Transcendental Deduction of Categories,” has an unusual proximity at least to the *problem* of transcendence, if not to the phenomenon itself. This requires that we briefly deal with it, given the fact that in the preceding section the problem of the deduction is geared one-sidedly toward pure concepts of understanding as notions.

The problem of transcendence is usually—and also in Kant—initiated as a problem by putting the subject at one side and the ob-ject on the other side as two extant beings. But the subject is such a thing [*res*] which has representations in itself and in addition knows about this having representations and their having been had. The problem now is the following: How can representations in the subject “come together” with their ob-jects? And given the fact that we are dealing with representations that, as far as content is concerned, are supposed to contain a content-oriented, expanding, thus synthetic knowledge of ob-jects, how can “synthetic representations and their objects . . . meet one another, as it were”?¹¹ In order to enable such an encounter between subject and ob-ject, “there are only two possible ways.” Either the object alone makes

the representation in the subject possible, or representation in the subject alone makes the object possible.

If ob-ject makes representation possible, that is, if the object provides from out of itself a content for representing, then the relation between subject and ob-ject is always *empirical*; for the ob-ject as this definite this [*Dieses*] must indeed *affect* the subject. Therefore, a representation which is thus brought about by affection is never possible *a priori*, that is, is never purely out of the subject.

By contrast, in the second case, representation as residing in the subject is supposed to make the object possible. Here Kant clearly rejects that this enabling of the ob-ject by representation in the subject has to do with a causality of representation “by means of the will.” Enabling the ob-ject by representation cannot in any fundamental sense mean a producing of the ob-ject by the representing act as such. Expressing himself very clearly in negative terms, Kant insists accordingly that representation is not to be taken as a representing comportment which has a causality, but rather as what is represented in a representing. Thus enabling the ob-ject has nothing to do with producing the ob-ject “according to existence.” Thus it can only have to do with a representing which enables *the standing-over-against* [*Gegenstehen*] as ob-ject [*Gegen-stand*], based on what is represented in representing this content, based on the manner of representing this content. This enabling has nothing to do with first of all endowing with existence what stands-over-against.

In what situation does a subject’s representing, so conceived, enable the object by itself alone? Obviously when the content which resides in the subject itself and springs from the subject alone is such that what it, as it were, thinks from out of itself toward [*Zu-denken*] the object exhibits a determination which first of all enables *knowing something as object* [as something *standing over against*—a *Gegenstand*]: “The representation {is} *a priori* determinative of the object, if it be the case that only through the representation it is possible to *know* anything *as an object*.”¹²

Hence if there is to be a *pure knowledge*, that is, a knowledge which is *determined a priori purely from out of the subject* and which enables the *encounter of subject and ob-ject*, then besides pure intuitions there must be *pure concepts*, i.e., representations which obviously do not contain empirical determinations of objects as this or that object as just what pertains to this or that object. Obviously these concepts must be such as to think a determination toward what is intuitively given *purely from out of the subject*—a determination which first enables that which gives itself intuitively as object and stands over against [the object].

Hence pure thinking is a thinking of determinations which thinks toward and

11. Ibid., B 124, A 92.

12. Ibid., B 125, A 92.

anticipates them in such a way that this thinking-toward as such constitutes first of all the standing over against of what is intuitively encountered. Determinations which endow in advance what is intuitively encountered with such an *a priori* thinking-toward are not empirical, accidental properties but determinations of the object as object. This thinking toward enables standing over against something as *standing-over-against*. This is to say that these *a priori* representations constitute the objectness of something as object. Kant offers the following formulation of the problem: "The question now arises whether *a priori* concepts do not also serve as antecedent conditions under which alone anything can be, if not intuited, yet thought as object in general. In that case all empirical knowledge of objects would necessarily conform to such concepts, because only as thus presupposing them is anything possible as *ob-jects of experience*."¹³ Here the concept of transcendental truth is also clearly intimated. The adequacy [*Gemäßheit*]—*adaequatio*—of empirical knowledge with regard to pure ontological knowledge is the presupposition of empirical truth. We can specify this connection by saying that what is encountered must be thought in advance with regard to its objectness as such, in order to be able to be encountered; that is, in order to be encountered as objects, objects that are encountered must be directed in advance toward objectness, i.e., toward *a priori* determinations that are thought toward [objects] according to pure concepts. *Only when objects as objects are directed toward objectness can empirical knowledge be directed to objects*. Ontic truth presupposes ontological truth.

Hence pure knowledge is concerned with a transcendence which is constituted exclusively in the subject. But if such a transcendence is to be possible, then obviously only such that precisely those concepts about which we already know generally that *according to their content they spring from the subject*—precisely these concepts *according to their content think something a priori toward what is intuitively given*. In other words, in order to show the possibility of pure knowledge *a priori*, it must be shown that the *ontological essence of the categories* consists precisely in *constituting in advance what is encountered in its objectness*. Briefly put, the task of the transcendental deduction is to disclose the ontological essence of the categories, i.e., to show what makes up the actual content of these concepts.

While in §13 Kant takes the categories entirely in the direction of logical function of understanding, in §14 he stresses only the problem of the relations to the object and to intuition of categories. We shall not deal any further with the addenda to §14 in the second edition [of the *Critique*]. We shall only point out one remarkable thing.

13. Ibid., B 125f., A 93.

Earlier we saw that in the first main part Kant declines to define the categories, because this would be a complicated business. Later he admits that, at the level just mentioned, such a definition would be basically impossible. By this time, at the conclusion of §14, Kant states: "But first I shall introduce a word of *explanation* with regard to *categories*. They are concept of an object in general, by means of which the intuition of an object is regarded as determined with respect to one of the *logical functions of judgment*."¹⁴ This explanation is indeed the explanation of categories in real fashion and touches their ontological essence and is inherently related to §10, "The Pure Concepts of the Understanding or Categories." This is an explanation in real fashion of categories in general and not an explanation of individual categories as such. But we must still keep in mind that this explanation in real fashion of categories in general is "given in advance." This looks as if this explanation is already settled and established, whereas it is still the task of the transcendental deduction first to carry out concretely this explanation of categories in real fashion, that is, first to open the ground upon which this explanation can be grounded. Here Kant clearly takes what comes last as the first. There are no rigorous stages of development in the deduction because the direction of the course and goal [of the deduction] are not clearly laid out. The only way to get clarity is to take as preparatory and anticipatory exposition whatever we have so far discussed in Kant's transcendental analytic—then to be followed by concretely establishing and examining what is now programmatically stated.

But because in Kant the notion of the *pure concept of understanding* vacillates, meaning *sometimes only notions and something categories*, for him the execution of the task of deduction, that is *illumination of the inner possibility of categories from out of the genuine original dimension*, turns out to be simultaneously a *response to the juridical question concerning the legitimacy of a priori relatedness of a purely logical concept to objects*. Briefly put, the problem of ob-jective reality of categories as the disclosure of the inner possibility of their content becomes the problem of ob-jective validity as juridical justification of the validity of something subjective for something ob-jective.

Kant's insecurity with the content is essentially conditioned by his insecurity with the method. Kant vacillates between psychology and logic. To be sure, he realizes that with empirical psychology he will not get anywhere, but also that the problem cannot even be seen therewith. He also realizes that a formal logical consideration is not enough. But instead of an unclear combination of psychology and logic, what is needed is a clear insight that we are dealing here with a purely phenomenological interpre-

14. Ibid., B 128 [emphasis by Heidegger].

tation of human knowing Dasein—with a phenomenology which supports psychology and logic. But fortunately Kant's actual procedure is far better than his own knowledge of it. And this remains necessarily the same in every productive thinker: Even where a greater transparency in the knowledge of method is alive, even there this knowledge does not know the actual driving concerns of the inquiry. The less these concerns are troubled and hampered by reflections on method, the more instinctively secure they are. Complete clarity of method can be gained only when the inhering problems are settled. But then the method is reduced to a technique which is accessible to everyone, and the moment arrives where one leads philosophy back to the darkness of phenomena. From this point on we must realize that the elaboration of the transcendental deduction in the first edition shows far more unclarity of direction and animation and a far more concrete proximity to phenomena than the elaboration in the second edition. The latter elaboration often achieves very sharp formulations, but it equally often loses the really crucial direction. Therefore, for the time being we place the major emphasis on the elaboration of the first edition, which is a sample of the force of Kant's phenomenological seeing.

γ) Characterization of Object-Related Concepts in the
Critique of the Faculty of Judgment

Before we begin with a concrete interpretation of the transcendental deduction in the first edition [of the *Critique*], we want to make reference to a characterization of concepts in general which is part of the scope of the transcendental investigation of concepts and concerns their object-relatedness. This important characterization is to be found in the introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, in the second section, "The Realm of Philosophy in General." Kant distinguishes four elements in concepts "insofar as they relate to objects": (1) their field, (2) their territory, (3) their region, and (4) their domicile.

The *field* of concepts that relate to objects is determined by the relation which their object has to our faculty of knowledge, where we in fact entirely disregard whether a knowledge of objects is possible, so that the supersensible is an unlimited but also inaccessible field for our faculty of knowledge. Correspondingly the sensible—what is encountered affectively—is a determined and indeed accessible field.

The *territory* of a concept, insofar as it relates to objects, is the part of the field where knowledge is possible for us, the *territorium*. Thus nature is the territory for empirical concepts.

The *region* of a concept is that part of the territory in which the concept is legislative. Empirical concepts *have* their territory in nature, but they are not legislative in this territory. They do not prescribe *a priori* what pertains to this territory as such. They merely reside in this territory as what "legally" belongs to them.

The *domicile* (*domicilium*) of a concept is thus the territory in which concepts legally reside without being legislative. Empirical concepts cannot simply and judiciously be made intelligible in their necessity. We as well as Kant are interested here in the *region* of concepts. "Our entire faculty of knowledge has two regions, that of concepts of nature and that of the concept of freedom; for through both, this faculty prescribes laws *a priori*."¹⁵ Nature as such is what is extant, whereas *concepts of nature* prescribe in advance what pertains to a nature in general, what defines the objectness of this interconnection of objects called nature. They are categories which are legislative in the sense that they prescribe in advance the structure of objectness in general, according to which structure the empirical, concrete determination of objects may occur.

§24. Elucidation of the Structure of Object-Relatedness on
the Basis of Temporality as the Constitution of the Subject—
"The *a priori* Grounds of the Possibility of Experience"

a) Clarification of the Task and
Orientation of This Inquiry

Even this second section of the deduction of the pure concepts of understanding in edition A of the *Critique*, which is entitled "The *a priori* Grounds of the Possibility of Experience," is still preparatory, but in a way which differs from that of the first section. It is the third section which explicitly presents the deduction, under the title "The Relation of the Understanding to Objects in General, and the Possibility of Knowing Them *a priori*." The second section, which we are about to interpret, is no longer a preparatory section in the sense of a marginal observation on the entire task of the deduction, but is a concrete working out of the original dimension, marked out in §§10 and 14 of the *Critique*. Thus it is necessary right at the outset to understand the heading of this section properly.

α) The Meaning of the Expressions "Experience" and
"Possibility of Experience"

The second section, which we now interpret, is headed "The *a priori* Grounds for the Possibility of Experience." Note should be taken that from now on the term *experience* emerges in the discussion, never to disappear. To be sure, the expression *experience* is already mentioned in §§13 and 14 of the *Critique*. But it is only now that this concept is explicitly

15. *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, p. xvii.

dealt with. And yet at this point the term *experience* is not introduced in any explicit manner—contrary to Kant’s usual custom of always introducing a concept with the phrase “but I understand by the concept . . . such and such.” In a later passage Kant once briefly defines experience by saying: “Experience is an empirical knowledge . . . which determines an ob-ject through perceptions.”¹ This is to say that experience as knowledge means a determining of an object. Such determining, however, is the function of thinking which always needs a given, a determinable. If this is given through intuition, to which being affected by the senses belongs, then *experience is the determination according to thinking of what is so given*. Thus experience is not identical with perception or with a rhapsody of perceptions. Rather perception is only a core part of experience, while experience always primarily means a mode of determining thinking. Experience is determining, according to thinking, something which is given in the way of perception, unto a determined objectness, i.e., nature.

It is more important and at the same time more difficult to define the concept and the term *possibility of experience*, which Kant often repeats in the following discussions. Regarding this concept, Kant states: “The *possibility of experience* is, then, what gives ob-jective reality to all our *a priori* modes of knowledge.”² In a later passage he says: “the possibility of experience as a knowledge wherein all objects—if their representation is to have ob-jective reality for us must finally be capable of being given to us.”³ From these quotations there emerges a connection between the possibility of experience and ob-jective reality. But little is gained with this statement because its thinking is not only and primarily focused on the fact that experience as determined by perception and affection establishes a relation between ob-jects and representations in the subject. Instead the statement deals primarily with *the ob-jective reality of all our knowledge a priori*—this ob-jective reality is to be established through the possibility of experience. Negatively, the result is this: “Possibility of experience” does not indicate a faculty for sustaining affections and accomplishing perceptions. In this context “possibility” means the same as “enabling”; and “possibility of experience” means the range of the conditions which belong to the essence of the experience of a finite knower as such. Possibility, *possibilitas*, and *essentia* mean here the same; thus possibility of experience means the core part of what makes up the inner possibility of experience. Correspondingly, the phrase “*a priori* grounds of possibility” does not mean motives and causes which deter-

mine the faculty of experiencing, but rather it means ground, basis, and foundation. Accordingly, the title of the second section says: On the *a priori* foundations, residing in the subject as such, for the essential structure of experience as a unique mode of determinative thinking.

β) The Inquiry into the *a priori* Grounds of the Possibility
of Experience as Inquiry into the Transcendental
Constitution of the Subject

According to our clarification of the Kantian concepts, the title of the second section attests to the *a priori foundations, residing in the subject, for the essential structure of experience as a unique mode of determinative thinking*. In this way Kant already in the title indicates that now the *problem of the deduction of pure concepts of understanding will be placed in the basic context of knowledge as a whole*, to which *intuition* belongs primarily.

We maintained that the task of the deduction is to disclose the inner possibility of categories as *a priori* concepts which relate to objects. Kant states at this point: “If we can prove that by their means alone (the categories) an object can be thought, this will be a sufficient deduction of them (the categories) and will justify their ob-jective validity.”⁴ Here again we must note the entanglement of a genuine phenomenological inquiry with a juridical one. That exactly here, where Kant first speaks about a *justification* of the ob-jective *validity* of the categories, he primarily has in mind the phenomenological task of disclosing the essence of the categories from out of the *original dimension*—this is shown in the following: “But since in such a thought more than simply the faculty of thought, the understanding, is brought into play, and since this faculty itself, as a faculty of knowledge that is meant to relate to ob-jects, calls for explanation in regard to the possibility of such relation, thus we must first of all consider the subjective sources which form the *a priori* foundation of the possibility of experience, not in their empirical but in their transcendental constitution.”⁵

Kant also states here that the *a priori* thinking of objects is not to be taken merely as a logical operation of thought. Rather, besides understanding, other faculties are involved in that *a priori* thinking, namely intuition and the power of imagination. It is precisely the *entirety* of these faculties and their inner connection that must be disclosed in advance as the “*subjective sources*” which form the foundations for the ownmost inner possibility of experience. “Subjective sources” are modes of comportment which lie in the subject as such and which should be investigated, not

1. CPR, B 218.

2. Ibid., B 195, A 156.

3. Ibid., B 264, A 217.

4. Ibid., A 96f.

5. Ibid., A 97.

in their empirical but in their *transcendental constitution* as well as in their original transcendental *context*. It is not a question of investigating psychic processes in the sense of a science of facts, but rather a question of giving an ontological interpretation of the *modes of comportment of the subject* in their inner *context of function*, for the purpose of showing *that* and *how* these form the *foundations for the ownmost inner possibility of experience*.

Such a determination of the task again abolishes completely the juridical inquiry. If we were to remain with the Kantian terminology, then we would have to say that precisely *not* a *quaestio juris* but a *quaestio facti* lies at the center of the problem of the transcendental deduction. At stake here, of course, is not a *factum* in the sense of empirically determinable data and properties, but a *fact* in the sense of the *ontological and essential structure [Wesensbestand] of Dasein*, the transcendental constitution of the subject. This constitution, the basic constitution of Dasein, cannot be brought to light by a juridical mode of inquiry, one concerned with the issue of validity; rather at stake here is a demonstration of ontological facts.

Such a determination is not concerned with psychology, much less with logic. One should not approach the Kantian problem with these rigid disciplines by using them as chips for handing over to psychology what does not fit into logic, and vice versa. In both cases what is central will not be grasped.

It is clear from the preceding account how completely cut off from the actual meaning of the transcendental deduction neo-Kantianism is when it conceives the problem of this deduction as one of *validity*. For in the second edition of the *Critique*, where Kant apparently gives more room to the juridical mode of inquiry, the basic determining factor of the deduction remains the ontological disclosure of the *transcendental constitution of the subject*. A *problem of validity* is absurd in such an inquiry and in this form has never been Kant's goal.

In the preface to the first edition [of the *Critique*] Kant says:

I know no inquiries which are more important for exploring the faculty which we entitle understanding, and for determining the rules and limits of its employment, than those which I have instituted in the second chapter of the Transcendental Analytic under the title *Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding*. They are also those which have cost me the greatest labor—labor, as I hope, not unrewarded. This inquiry, which is somewhat deeply grounded, has two sides. The one refers to the objects of pure understanding and is intended to expound and render intelligible the ob-jective validity of its *a priori* concepts. It is therefore essential to my purposes. The other seeks to investigate the pure understanding itself, its possibility and the cognitive faculties upon which it rests—and so deals with it in its subjective aspect. Although this latter exposition is of great importance for my chief purpose, it does not form an essential part of it. For the chief question is always simply this: What and how

much can the understanding and reason know apart from all experience? not: How is the faculty of thought itself possible?⁶

Kant speaks of two sides of the transcendental deduction, a subjective one and an ob-jective one. The main goal consists in the ob-jective deduction, to which Kant gives the juridical form and thereby *precisely misconstrues the intrinsic connection of the ob-jective side of the deduction with the subjective side*. Moreover, he fails to see that, by *radically carrying out the subjective side of the task of deduction, the ob-jective task is taken care of*. Put more precisely, by carrying out the subjective side of the task, the ob-jective side does not appear at all in this form. Kant does not go this radical road.

What is important for Kant now is to give an *a priori* phenomenology of the transcendental constitution of the subject. This phenomenology should make understandable how the categories, in their structural and functional connections, are essentially caught between pure intuition, pure power of imagination, and pure thinking and how these three basic sources are centered in the pure power of imagination insofar as precisely this power renders intuition as well as understanding possible.

As *a priori* concepts, categories must be grasped in their object-relatedness, that is, in their relatedness to intuition, which in turn means in their connection with the synthesis of the power of imagination. “An *a priori* concept which did not relate to experience would be only the logical form of a concept, not the concept itself through which something is thought.”⁷ Here Kant quite clearly rejects the concept of the category as a mere notion and in addition says the following: “A concept which universally and adequately expresses such a formal and ob-jective condition of experience would be entitled a pure concept of understanding.”⁸ This passage simply reformulates what Kant stated in §10, namely, that the time-related pure synthesis of the power of imagination, represented generally, yields the pure concept of undersanding.

Hence what is the task of the second section with regard to the problem of deduction? This problem consists in illuminating the ontological essence of categories, that is, the *a priori* determinations which, as thought-determinations grounded in intuition, constitute generally something like an object, so that what is empirically given is first of all something objective. Going to extremes, we can say that categories, or pure thinking which belongs to them, first of all provide an object for what is intuitively given. We know that this does not mean that the activity of thinking produces ontic objects according to

6. Ibid., A xvi f.

7. Ibid., A 95.

8. Ibid., A 96.

their extantness. But this also does not mean that representations will be labeled with a voucher so that later on they may be valid as objective determinations. What is meant is this: *It is on the basis of a thinking which is in itself related to intuition that what is intuitively given first of all receives the possibility of standing over against what it is.* What is intuited *stands over against*. This means also that intuition is related to what is intuited as what is *standing over against* [*Gegen-stand*, ob-ject]. To speak about “standing over against” from the side of the object is the same as speaking about “relation to the ob-ject” when seen from the viewpoint of an intuitive comportment.

Experience is a thought-oriented determination of what is given in terms of perception to a definite objectness. *What renders this ontic experience possible is a self-enclosed whole of pure ontological knowledge*, in which something like a possible object of experience is constituted in advance. *This whole of a priori enabling of experience—as a priori*, i.e., occurring in the subject—*must itself be founded upon the basic comportments of the subject.* Hence these comportments first render possible something like the “standing over against” of an object, or the relation of intuiting to what is intuited *as object*.

Accordingly, the title of the second section indicates that this section deals with primordial activities of the subject which are related to pure intuition, that is, to time and in which the “standing over against” of the object as well as the relation to an object of what is intuitively given is first of all constituted.

Thus if categories first of all make up what belongs to an object as object, then, before *individual* categories are disclosed in their object-constituting function, it must be shown how something like relation to the object or the “standing over against” of an object is constituted *in general* and wherein something like this is grounded and has its inner possibility.

The question is not how categories are referable to objects and how they, as it were, are to be brought to the track which relates subject to object. Rather the question concerns the very possibility of this track; it concerns how something like relation to something is constituted at all. Here we are dealing again with the *problem of transcendence* (which is hidden from Kant)—and certainly *not* with the problem of ontic transcendence as a certain factual relation of a factual subject to a definite, extant thing. We are dealing with the *relation of subject or Dasein to beings in general, with Dasein's relation to being*. We are not dealing with ontic transcendence but with *ontological transcendence* which first of all makes ontic transcendence possible.

Without making too much a fuss and without talking too much about it, Kant knew very clearly that with the problem of the deduction he set out to penetrate into the most hidden and primordial depths of human Dasein. Nevertheless, the reader “must see in advance the unavoidable

difficulty {of such a transcendental deduction} if he is not to lament over obscurity in matters which are by their very nature deeply veiled.”⁹

Thus the guiding question of this second section is the following: *What are the primordial activities of the subject which provide a foundation for, carry, and make possible something like the object's “standing over against”?* What belongs to pure thinking, which is centrally related to intuition, in order that this thinking provide intuition, *in a priori manner*, with something like an object and a relation to objects? Briefly put, what are the components of understanding that make up understanding as a whole in such a way as to constitute the possibility of experience?

γ) The Crucial Function of the Synthesis of the Power of Imagination in the Enabling of Experience

In view of what was interpreted earlier by way of anticipation from §10 of the *Critique*, we know that, in order to be determinable in thinking, the manifold of intuition must, so to speak, be first prepared and rendered accessible. This comportment, by which the subject relates to what is intuitive, first of all imparts to itself what is intuited, and brings to itself what is intuited as determinable for thinking—this comportment is the synthesis of the power of imagination. Thus the power of imagination has the function of explicitly bringing what is intuitive *to* [the subject]. But following what we just said, this means that *bringing the manifold to* [the subject] is obviously the *fundamental act* which enables that something—as what is brought to [me]—can stand opposed to me. Thus it must be shown that, in *providing a foundation for the possibility of the object's standing over against [me]*, *the synthesis of the power of imagination fulfills a crucial function.*

This makes it clear that the four parts under which Kant provisionally lays out this constituting of the enabling of the relation to objects in general must deal with *synthesis*, that is, (1) The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition, (2) The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination, (3) The Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept, and (4) Preliminary Explanation of the Possibility of Categories as Knowledge *a priori*. By merely looking at these titles, it becomes clear that the theme is synthesis in its connection to intuition, the power of imagination, and apperception. The first three parts present the attempt at thematically explicating the original dimension and bringing this dimension to light in relation to the problem of the deduction, which (problem) is provisionally answered in number four. The unity and totality of the three basic sources of the mind—intuition, the power of imagination, and apperception—are supposed to be brought to light. These four parts present what Kant only

9. Ibid., B 121, A 88.

programmatically predelineates in §10 of the *Critique*, although here he does not say anything at all about this relationship.

But even now, when we are supposed to grasp the original dimension, much is still unclear. The following four parts are anything but a report “as clear as sunshine” about the original dimension. Now we know only that the phenomena of pure time-related imaginative synthesis should be worked out as foundations upon which something like a relation to objects in general can be based. The next thing to do in this respect would be to lay out what is meant by “object in general” and then what is meant by “relation to the object.” Following this, the individual functional interconnections of pure synthesis would have to be characterized in terms of how they render this relation to the object and this objectness of objects possible. However, there is no mention at all of even a cursory exposition of the essence of the object. Without any systematic direction Kant simply begins with the interpretation of the syntheses as such of apprehension, of reproduction, and of recognition. Without direction, the reader wanders helplessly around in this explication of synthesis (which seeks to bring entirely new and difficult phenomena to light) until in part 3, after characterization of the synthesis of recognition, Kant suddenly says: “At this point we must make clear to ourselves what we mean by the expression of an object of representations.” Briefly put, everything is again turned upside down with regard to the external course of explication of pure synthesis and its exhibition. But there is still another difficulty in each of the three parts.

The theme for investigation is *pure ontological synthesis*. But Kant proceeds so as to describe first the empirical *ontic* synthesis and then to carry the results over to the pure synthesis. As it were, Kant provides the result of the analysis of the empirical synthesis with the preliminary designation of “pure”: There is neither an explicit characterization of this approach nor a justification of the possibility of this simple move from observation of ontic synthesis to observation of the ontological one. Here again the fundamental deficiency of the Kantian inquiry comes to the fore. Kant did not secure in advance the dimension of the ontological *a priori* basic constitution of Dasein; rather, without any central direction and starting from psychological phenomena, he tried to jump over into the phenomenological-ontological analytic of Dasein, as the case may be. Without an explicit insight into this twofold difficulty of the analysis of the three, respectively four parts (the upside down character of the exhibition and the move from the ontic to ontological synthesis), it is hopeless to find one’s way through and constantly and above all to keep a hold on the inner connection with the guiding problem of the deduction.

On the other hand, precisely this section is especially charming in that we see Kant immediately at work, oblivious of any regard for the reader. But as we saw, Kant presupposed a resolute reader. He had that inner

peace which a great effort spreads through Dasein. On the basis of this inner peace he could wait, not for readers of his books, but for those who would struggle with the matters of thinking—for those to whom Kant’s existence was committed.

δ) Synthesis of Apprehension, Reproduction, and
Recognition as Modes of the Pure Synthesis of the Power
of Imagination. Preliminary Characterization of the Idea
of “Object in General”

Kant speaks of a “threefold synthesis,”¹⁰ which we shall now interpret. It must be said more precisely: We are dealing with the three modes of pure imaginative ontological synthesis, that is, with this synthesis in the mode of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition. This interpretation, which takes the three syntheses as activities of pure imaginative synthesis, that is, of the synthesis of pure time-related power of imagination—this interpretation seems inevitably to contradict the fact that Kant refers only *one* of these syntheses—that of the reproduction—to the power of imagination, by speaking of a “Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination.”

However, we do know that here Kant is dealing in each case with empirical synthesis at first, in order then to move on to pure synthesis. What is remarkable and also the key for understanding the three parts is that empirical syntheses *in* intuition, *in* imagination, and *in* the concept are grounded upon pure syntheses which are rooted in the pure synthesis of the pure time-related power of imagination. In other words, taken empirically and psychologically, perception, the power of imagination, and thinking are three faculties of the soul. But when we take the subject in its transcendental and basic ontological constitution, then we see that all three faculties just mentioned are grounded in pure time-related synthesis, that is, in the synthesis of the power of imagination. As a precaution, Kant also does not speak of synthesis *of* intuition, *of* the power of imagination, but of synthesis *in* intuition, *in* the power of imagination, namely of the empirical synthesis. This does not address the fact that this synthesis itself springs from the power of imagination.

The main goal of the interpretation of the three parts will have to consist in *displaying the basic structure of time-related synthesis of the transcendental power of imagination as in fact the foundation of the enabling of a priori relation to objects in general*. It is with regard to this crucial task that we must relentlessly strive more than ever for what Kant wanted to say—or for what Kant should have said.

We would like to anticipate a preliminary characterization of the idea

10. *Ibid.*, A 97.

of “object in general.”¹¹ So far the concept of the object emerged in the discussion of “appearance,” which is the title for things themselves as they manifest to us for our representing, intuiting, and intuitive thinking. The appearances are the objects. The concept of appearance is quite clear in this respect, and we would like to call this concept the “ob-jective concept of appearance”: It indicates the extant as such. However, Kant takes the concepts of appearance in an other way. We know that the problem of transcendence of the subject to the ob-jects remained unclear for Kant. The most clear indication of this is the second, or subjective, concept of appearance. This subjective concept indicates representations, as psychic states of the subject, as states of representing which as representing states have indeed what they represent, but which Kant pulls into the subject. Appearances are psychic states of the subject itself. Kant vacillates between these two concepts of appearance.

When we say that appearances are objects, what do we mean then by the expression “object in general”? According to Kant, object in general, or the object character of objects in each case, is not something extant in itself and is not something ob-jective or subjective. It is rather the mere “x” toward which all determinations converge in thinking determining what is intuitively given. The fundamental characteristic of the object in general is that it is the unity of a manifold of determinations. The idea of “object in general” is geared toward unification and synthesis:

All our representations are, it is true, referred by the understanding to some ob-ject; and since appearances are nothing but representations, the understanding refers them to *something*, as the object of sensible intuition. But this something thus conceived is only the transcendental ob-ject; and by that is meant a something = x, of which we know, and with the present constitution of our understanding can know, nothing whatsoever, but which, as a correlate of the unity of apperception, can serve only the unity of the manifold in sensible intuition. By means of this unity the understanding combines the manifold into the concept of an object.¹²

“The ob-ject to which I relate appearance in general is the transcendental object, that is, the completely indeterminate thought of something in general.”¹³ We must raise the question: What is it upon which the possibility of a thought of something in general is grounded, indeed grounded such that this something is in itself the possible unity for a manifold of given determinations? We shall return to this question in our discussion of the synthesis of recognition.

11. Cf. A 104ff., A 250, A 253, A 290.

12. Ibid., A 250.

13. Ibid., A 253.

b) Enabling of the Intuition of a Manifold through Time-Related Synthesis of the Power of Imagination in the Mode of Apprehension

We stated in the preceding that the “Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition”¹⁴ is a mode or manner of activity of the synthesis of the pure time-related power of imagination. Now if the guiding task consists in disclosing this transcendental synthesis of the power of imagination, then we must render visible the synthesis of apprehension as one of its essential structural moments. By way of anticipation, we would like to verify this thesis purely externally with a significant passage which Kant introduces only twenty pages later: “There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I give the title, imagination. Its action, when immediately directed upon perception, I entitle apprehension.”¹⁵ Apprehension is thus an activity of imaginative synthesis. Accordingly, “synthesis of apprehension” means “synthesis *in the mode of apprehension*.” According to its basic character all apprehensive synthesis is an essential imaginative synthesis.

We are dealing with an apprehending synthesis “in intuition,” an apprehending synthesis in relation to what is given in intuition. However, this explanation is not enough. Had Kant meant only this, then it would have been sufficient to say apprehending synthesis “*in relation to intuition*” or apprehending synthesis “*at the point of intuition*.” Nonetheless Kant states deliberately that this mode of synthesis is “*in intuition*.” Apprehension and along with it the power of imagination belong to intuition as what constitutes this synthesis precisely when we take this intuition in its primary function in the whole of knowledge.

Under part one and before all other discussions which relate to this as well as to the following parts—and which indeed relate to the second and third sections of the transcendental deduction—Kant starts with a “general observation which, throughout what follows, must be borne in mind as being quite fundamental.”¹⁶ Here Kant says something that must be borne in mind with respect to all thematic discussions regarding every interpretation of imaginative synthesis of the transcendental power of imagination. That is: All our representations, i.e., intuitions and concepts and thus the core ingredients of any knowledge, however they may be accomplished and actually originate, are “subject to time.” In other words, imaginative synthesis of the transcendental power of imagination, if it is to remain an indispensable function of the soul, “without which

14. Ibid., A 98.

15. Ibid., A 120.

16. Ibid., A 99.

we should have no knowledge whatsoever,”¹⁷ is in itself time-related. Going beyond Kant, we must say something else, namely that the *power of imagination* is possible only as related to time; or put more clearly, this power *itself* is time understood as original time, which we call *temporality*.

Although he interprets time as pure intuition, Kant still takes time in the ordinary sense. To go over it again briefly, for Kant time is the pure succession of the sequence of nows given in pure intuition: now, and now, and now—that is, a constant sequence of nows. The stretch of a now—its duration—in this sequence is arbitrary. Whether a now takes an hour or a second, every now has in its immediate and constant neighborhood a no-longer now, a just now, and a not-yet now. *Time as this pure flowing of a multiplicity of nows is the universal form of representing*, that is, time determines in advance all representing as a sequence of occurrences in the subject—now this representation, now that one, afterward that one, and then that one. On the basis of this relatedness of all states of the subject, and phases thereof, to the sequence of nows, we call the interconnection of representations *intra-temporal*, that is, something which flows “in time.” This term *in* indicates that every state of the subject is directed to a now, respectively to a just-now or right-now; and because of this directedness of all the states of the subject, they are “ordered, connected, and brought into relation”¹⁸ in terms of time [*zeithaft*].

In what follows we must render visible the pure synthesis of the transcendental power of imagination in its original relatedness to time. But Kant’s next objective is to show that everywhere in knowledge of objects, that is, in relation to objects, this pure imaginative synthesis functions in its various modes. Kant considers primarily the synthesis of *reproduction* as the synthesis of the power of imagination. But our interpretation goes further and tries to take all three syntheses back into the originally conceived transcendental power of imagination. Even here Kant hesitates again, whether to follow the tradition of psychology or the crucial necessities of the basic problems of transcendental philosophy, i.e., the problem of transcendence.

First we must show, under part one, the extent to which being *in* intuition is constitutive for the synthesis in the mode of apprehension.

Following our preceding methodical preparation, we know that in analyzing the three syntheses Kant takes his departure at first from empirical synthesis in each case, and then moves to the corresponding transcendental synthesis. Hence the title reads: “The Synthesis of Apprehension *in Intuition*,” because at first the talk is that of an empirical intuition but intending the pure intuition.

17. Ibid., B 103, A 78.

18. Ibid., A 99.

The presentation begins with the statement: “Every intuition contains a manifold.” Kant here has in mind the manifold of impressions which are given through sensible affection. “Every intuition” indicates here also every *empirical* intuition.

However, that intuition contains a manifold does not yet mean that what is intuited is intuited “as a manifold.” What is contained in intuition as undifferentiated possession, as it were, must first of all be articulated as a manifold of impressions. To be sure, we factually intuit a manifold in every intuiting, without further ado. That is, what is contained in intuition gives itself to us *as* manifold without any ado. However, the problem is just this: What sustains this “without any ado”? What is the ground for the possibility that what is offered by intuition is offered *as manifold*? The question, when geared more generally toward our guiding problem, is this: Where is the ground for the possibility that what is non-objective can offer itself intuitively as *somehow objectively* intuited? On what basis can intuition offer something objective? It is by no means self-evident that we are offered something like a manifold.

The offering of the manifold as such would not be possible at all “if the mind did not distinguish the time in the sequence of one impression upon another.” While intuiting, mind must distinguish time in the sequence of impressions, that is, the mind must be oriented to time as the succession of nows. The mind must always already, whether explicitly or not, say now—now—now. Kant describes the factual case as follows. In the sequence of impressions the mind must distinguish time and thus always already relate every impression to a now which must always be *said*: now this, now this. Phenomenologically we must formulate this more precisely, by saying that only on the background of a now which is *always already said*—only in an advance view of the differentiated succession of nows—can the offer of impressions as a sequence of impressions be made. We are not supposed to interpret Kant to be saying that the mind arrives as succession of nows only by *following* the sequence of impressions, as if the sequence of impressions would come first. Rather it is the other way around: It is only on the basis of an advance orientation to the pure succession of nows that the horizon opens up in which a sequence of something like succession *as sequence* can first of all be offered.

Kant’s expression is ambiguous. We could interpret him to mean that the sequence of impressions is the presupposition for differentiation of time. But the inverse is the case. For each impression, each representation, is initially precisely *this* unmistakable “idea” which the impression or representation is regardless of their content, *only through relation to time*. Even when the same impression with the same content returns, this second impression is necessarily another impression and different from the preceding one, insofar as it originates in a new now.

As contained in each case in one now, in one “moment,” each representation is only an in-itself simply unique, isolated, for-itself dissociated, absolute this [*Dieses*]; “for each representation, *insofar as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity.*”¹⁹ Thus Kant perceives the phenomenological states of affairs in relation to the offering of what is intuitive as follows: At first there are lots of such absolute and unique impressions; no manifold of impressions insofar as we are limited only to a “now this” and then, as it were, come across another now. Now if this offering of isolated unities is to turn into a multiplicity, that is, into the unity of an empirical intuition, then a unification is needed. What is at first absolutely separated and is always only isolated at a now, precisely now *turns into a multiplicity, on the basis of an already operative regard for a now*. Precisely what seemingly isolates each impression, namely the now, is what offers simultaneously the possibility of seeing the many as many. For every now is also already a no-longer-now, a just-now, and was earlier a right-now [*Sogleich*]—that is, now this impression is in itself also already a just-now-that and was before a next-this.

Thus we see that orientation to a now which in itself is a just-now and a right-now, offers the possibility of originally comprehending, in the unity of a now, a just-now-no-longer and a right-now-not-yet—in such a way that right-now and just-now are always related to an actual now. Right-now and just-now still reside in the light of the actual now. Both still have the character of the immediate now, so that the now contains in itself the possibility of an articulation of a plurality. The now has a span and is related to the many which can occupy the span. In the unity of a now we obtain the horizon in which the manifold *as such* can be offered. This kind of unification, in which the many can be traversed and taken together on the basis of directedness to a now, Kant calls *apprehension*, or seizing [*Auf-greifen*].

This unification or synthesis has a twofold character. (1) Seizing is directed at nothing short of the offering; it allows the impressions to be given receptively—this seizing is a seizing *of* something. (2) But this unification at the same time *takes up* what is offered here; it is a spontaneous *seizing*. This seizing belongs to intuiting itself, initially to empirical intuiting; it is not an additional act of thinking. Rather, intuition is rooted in this “synthesis” as what offers the manifold. The term *synthesis* is misleading because it expresses only what is free, active, and spontaneous, whereas for apprehension precisely what allows the self-offering of the offering to occur is what is primary. Even the spontaneity of putting and taking together goes only so far as to be a having-the-offering-there [*ein Da-haben des Dargebots*].

19. Ibid.

This analysis of apprehension belonging to the empirical intuition makes it clear that unification is directed to the now and its horizon—the synthesis is related to time. However, this synthesis, this seizing, is *empirical*. It is directed to what is offered affectively in sensation. But Kant is looking for *pure* time-related synthesis, that is, pure time-related apprehension. A pure synthesis is that which *a priori* unifies a manifold. A pure apprehension is such a seizing which takes together an offering of *a priori* individuals together to the unity of a pure manifold. Is such a pure apprehension demonstrable? We do not have to look too far, for it is precisely such a pure apprehension that underlies and grounds the empirical intuition and its apprehension. We saw that a sequence of impressions can be offered to us as a sequence as such only when we first understand something like succession. Were we not to understand something like succession, were we not to comport ourselves toward a sequence of nows, then we would never be able to grasp something which is offered as following or preceding something else.

But what about this advance understanding of succession to which the *empirical* apprehension is essentially referred? Kant characterizes this original givenness of time, of pure succession of nows, as pure intuition. And we said that the pure manifoldness of the unifying whole of time is given *a priori* in the pure syndotical intuition. We spoke of syndosis in order not to say syn-thesis, because the issue in intuition is not a pure spontaneity, but precisely a letting-givenness-to-occur. Time as intuition contains a manifold; and time as pure intuition contains the pure manifold of the pure succession of nows. Therefore, in this pure intuition of time there must *already be a pure apprehension*. Pure intuition of time is not simply an isolated grasping of a whole lot of nows that simply have no relation to one another. Rather each now as now, in order to be intuited as what it is, requires to be taken together with other nows. This taking together has the character of a unification and in fact in each case unifies the just-now as no-longer-now and right-now as not-yet-now unto a now [*auf ein Jetzt*]. This is to say that the phenomenon of time called “now” is as such never an absolute, isolated, simple element, but is in itself a manifold. The *pure intuition of time carries in itself* an original seizing of the manifold which already belongs to the “now.” This pure intuition of time carries in itself *the original pure synthesis in the sense of pure apprehension which we just characterized*. This synthesis of apprehension is pure *syndosis*, that is, spontaneity of reception. In this synthesis of apprehension, there is nothing like a conceptual determination in the sense of comparison, reflection, and abstraction—nothing like the logical function of understanding.

As seizing of a manifold, apprehension can only be what it is at all *in an intuition of time*. Pure intuition of time is fundamentally *co-determined* by this mode of “synthesis” called *apprehension*. However, this is a *mode of*

the pure power of imagination. Therefore, when observed at first from the side of pure apprehension, the power of imagination is in itself *related to time*. More precisely, the power of imagination only now *develops* [*ausbilden*] time as a pure succession of nows. Accordingly, empirical apprehension is only possible on the basis of a pure apprehension; and this is nothing other than a function in which pure intuition of time is constituted *a priori*.

But the first stage of *objectification* [*Vergegenständlichung*] resides in empirical apprehension—what offers itself does so *as a manifold*. But this original union of unity and manifoldness is grounded in the essence of the now, that is, in the ownmost inner possibility of time. The now as now must be capable of being smoothly taken in in its full strength. *On the basis of the now itself the original unity and manifoldness becomes detachable*. This *a priori* detaching and this intuitive self-orienting is a forming of images [*Abbilden*]; and this forming of images is a mode of the power of imagination.

Therefore, this first stage of objectification, this standing over against what is intuited, is grounded in time in the sense of a pure apprehending intuition of time—is grounded in the pure time-related imaginative synthesis. As rendering relations to objects possible, this power of imagination is a transcendental one.

By contrast, when characterizing pure apprehension, Kant proceeds summarily and crudely. He speaks again of an “original receptivity” and means thereby pure *a priori* self-affection. The manifold of pure self-affection, in order to offer itself *as manifold*, must be offered through a synthesis, that is, here through pure apprehension. Kant does not say what this is and how it functions as a mode of the power of imagination. The transition in Kant from empirical to transcendental synthesis of apprehension is violent and can only be demonstrated through an analysis of the now.

c) Enabling the Grasping of a Region of Objects through Time-Related Synthesis of the Power of Imagination in the Mode of Reproduction

In part 2, “The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination,” Kant proceeds from an empirical reproductive synthesis and works out the corresponding pure synthesis. He does so in such a way that the pure synthesis again proves to be time-related and to belong to the transcendental power of imagination. Like apprehending synthesis, this pure imaginative reproductive synthesis must co-found the relation to objects, must be transcendental. Considering the title of the whole section, we know that the problem to be investigated is the enabling of pure experience, that is, relation to the object in its *a priori* foundations in accord with experience.

The object of experience is nature, and relation to the object in general means relation to nature as such. But what determines nature as such is not itself again something extant behind appearances, behind objects of experience, but is their unifying unity, which is to be constituted in the synthesis of apprehension, of reproduction, and of recognition.

Kant begins again by referring to the empirical *reproduction*. We do best to translate this term quite literally. In this synthesis we are concerned with a synthesis whose character is reproduction, that is, *it brings forth again* [*Wieder-vor-führen*]. What is meant here is bringing-forth again of something which was already once brought-forward, that is, was offered—in the apprehending unity of a manifold. The empirical fact from which Kant now proceeds is no longer the isolated impressions in their sequence, but the fact that such often successive representations which often appear together (for example, this eraser and chalk) “accompany” and are associated with one another. The originality of this connection consists in the fact that one representation brings about from out of itself and without the presence of the object, “a transition of the mind to the other representations.” Here we are confronted with a peculiar intuiting which does not immediately go back to an affection. Rather this intuiting of a manifold offers something by itself from out of itself. However, what is offered is not something freely invented, but something which directly corresponds to the being-extant-together of objects. By itself the mind can move from one represented thing to another without in each case having to rely on a direct intuition of objects. But the mind must nevertheless rely on something, namely on the announced accompaniment [of representations], which has a certain necessity.

It is obvious that this representing could not function in this way; that is, in passing from one representation to another, it could not bring forth a manifold as related to the object, if there were not in objects themselves such a being-extant-together and such a following one another. Appearances as such must already be subject to a rule of succession. Appearances as such, that is, objects as objects, must be so balanced against one another that such a free calling forth of their connection is at all possible. Reproduction could not at all come into play if what this reproductive synthesis refers to were not determined by the possibility of transition from one [representation] to another. What Kant means is this: Disregarding *which* objects are offered on *what* occasion in the making-present, the fact that this making-present enables the bringing forth of something which is not actually perceived must already lie in the relation to the object as such. Mind must be capable of retaining what is represented.

The problem for Kant here is the enabling of the object called nature in its regional totality. The relation to this object called nature is possible only when the mind already has the aptitude of retaining and bringing

forth again what mind intuits directly. Kant argues indirectly: If what is empirically offered in each case in a now would simply slip away with the passing away of the now, then the mind would never have the possibility of reaching out and back for something which has existed already, except when mind intuits the same again. But then in fact mind would intuit the respective thing for the second time but not *as the same* thing. Mind would be tied firmly to each phase of the now. If the whole range of the manifold of a region of objects is to be made accessible generally, then a possibility is needed for freely connecting what is offered beyond each phase of the perceived. The horizon of possible unification dare not be limited to the wideness or narrowness of a now which is always isolated in itself. Then the mind would constantly fall from one phase of the now into another totally unconnected phase, in such a way that the earlier would simply be lost. Mind would be delivered over to such a sequence of isolated states of perception. One cannot even speak of a sequence of such states as a many because in each phase all earlier ones would be lost, and each would be merely absolute in itself in complete isolation from others. Hereby the grasping of an objective inter-connection would be impossible beyond the temporary narrowness of a phase of an empirical intuition; that is, an experience in the sense of a progressive retaining determination of the region of objects would remain impossible. Thus the possibility must first be provided in each case for a thorough retainability and a repeated bringing forth of what is offered empirically.

The question is this: What does this indirect demonstration of the necessity of a retaining mean for the elucidation of the relation to an object? To what extent is it manifest that, beyond empirical reproduction, a pure reproduction is necessary? Empirically, the mind must have the possibility to retain, to go back empirically in the dimension of the no-longer-now. This possibility of *empirically retaining* presupposes the possibility of an *a priori retaining*. I can bring back from the past what I have empirically perceived only when I have the overall possibility of going back into the past. I must have an open horizon of the past at my disposal. Prior to repeating what is always ontically past, i.e., is *related* to a now, there must be the possibility of bringing forth again the now which *as such* has flowed away.

The capability of freely bringing back again the now which has flowed away is as such not dependent upon this now's *now* being still offerable as a now. Rather retaining is capable of a bringing forth without the presence of the nows. It makes possible that the inter-connection of no-longer-nows as such, as what has been [*Gewesenes*], be offered. This *offering* of what purely has been in the sequence of nows is the *unification of each of them with each actual now*; it is the *pure reproductive synthesis* in which time *as past* offers itself immediately—not as the present but

immediately as it itself, as past. This synthesis of the pure retaining of the no-longer-now is an immediate offering as well as a free and constant, possible reaching back.

This pure reaching back keeps open the *horizon of alreadyness*. Only thus is time as such disclosed for a pure intuiting, not only as now but also as no-longer-now; that is, this pure synthesis of retaining constitutes the mind's being able to *distinguish* something like time. This open horizon of alreadyness as such first provides the possibility of an unhampered, *in principle* renewed bringing forth of the past—a renewed bringing forth in principles because we are *factually* incapable of bringing about everything from out of this horizon of alreadyness in a clear, unclouded and unbroken manner. But this factual impossibility does not disprove the existence [*Bestehen*] of a pure reproduction of a now as such which has already been. This impossibility is just a confirmation of the existence [*Bestand*] of the pure horizon of time in the direction of the past. Precisely in the realization of the impossibility of bringing it back, we realize that we can move at any time in the horizon of alreadyness. We can place ourselves quite freely at any given point in time. That is why for Kant pure intuition is a pure *play* of the power of imagination.

Thus the unification of the pure now which reaches back, this *pure reproduction* which is *related to time*, makes possible the relatedness to the intuitive thing which is no longer present. Thus this reproduction *constitutes the possibility of a relation to objects* which is needed if the self-enclosed inter-connection of appearances is to be accessible beyond each particular phase of a now of an empirical givenness. *Apprehension itself is not possible without reproduction*. Already *in seizing* what is immediately given as intuitive there occurs a *reaching beyond and reaching back* to something which from out of the moment-phase of a now each time necessarily flows or is about to flow into the very next no-longer-now.

But just as apprehension is necessarily open toward what has already been retainable [*des behaltbaren Gewesenen*], in the same way and inversely everything retainable as something which can be brought forth must be capable of being displayed in each actual phase of the now of apprehension. Hence Kant states correctly: "The synthesis of apprehension is thus inseparably bound up with the synthesis of reproduction."²⁰ The analysis of pure apprehension shows that this apprehension constitutes the first stage of objectification (which amounts to letting an intuitive offer be offered); that is, apprehension is "the transcendental ground for the possibility of all modes of knowledge whatsoever,"²¹ because knowledge is primarily intuition. But this transcendental ground also

20. Ibid., A 102.

21. Ibid.

necessarily includes the pure synthesis of retaining, so that this reproductive synthesis belongs likewise to the transcendental acts of the mind which are supposed to build the foundation for all possibility for something to stand over against as object. The synthesis of pure reproduction is the synthesis of the transcendental power of imagination. Kant's opinion is not totally clear here. It is unclear whether this synthesis of pure reproduction is to be the only accomplishment of the power of imagination, or only one mode [of it]. If Kant means the former, then the power of imagination here is not yet grasped in its originality.

The characterization presented so far of the two modes of synthesis discloses them as two primordial acts which belong to each other and which are nothing other than the manner in which pure time is disclosed a priori in its now and no-longer-now, as present and past. They are what time constitutes as pure intuition. These modes of synthesis are related to time, and this not accidentally but essentially. Their relational character, their character of unification, is dictated by the essence of the now and by time as such. To say "synthesis is related to time" is already actually a tautology.

d) Enabling the Grasping of the Unity of a Region of Objects through the Time-Related Synthesis of the Power of Imagination in the Mode of Recognition

We move on to the interpretation of part three, "The Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept." The outcome of part two was that the phenomenon which was worked out under part one, the synthesis of apprehension, is not possible without a fundamental connection with the synthesis of reproduction. Now it will be shown that the synthesis of reproduction, too, in turn will not be possible without the synthesis of recognition. Thus this synthesis too necessarily belongs to apprehension. The inner connection of the three syntheses is radically established in terms of the problem of enabling something like the object's "standing over against"—that is, in terms of the problem of how far and in what way pure thinking in its relatedness to pure intuition constitutes pure knowledge. But this discussion basically offers the foundations which reside in the subject as transcendental activities and upon which the ontological essence of categories is possible—that is, the ownmost inner possibility of pure *a priori* concepts, which *a priori* and necessarily have objective reality and constitute something like objectness as such.

In the preceding two parts we noticed that intuition in particular was given an original explication beyond the transcendental aesthetic. Besides intuition Kant acknowledges only the concept as the second stem of knowledge. Now the doctrine of the concept will also be explained in a more original manner and obviously in the direction of bringing to light not only the formal and logical character of the concept but also

and primarily precisely its transcendental character. Put more precisely, it is only now that we arrive at a point of actually establishing phenomenologically the crucial relationship between concept and knowledge.

In the two preceding parts we noticed further how both modes of pure synthesis, which we discussed so far, are related to time in themselves and not by way of an additional application. Even Kant's interpretation, although rough, presses toward these connections. By way of a general methodical consideration one will have to say that, if the three syntheses are interconnected and indeed as subjective conditions for the enabling of the relation to the object as such, if so far two of these syntheses are explicitly related to time, if besides time must basically be presupposed according to the "general remark," then obviously the third synthesis of recognition cannot be without an essential relation to time.

However, precisely this relation to time is not brought to light in the Kantian interpretation of the synthesis of recognition. On the contrary, this relation is even explicitly covered up by a wrong interpretation which is already announced in calling this third synthesis "recognition." Perhaps it is no accident, but rooted in Kant's concept of time, that he must fail in working out the synthesis in concept in its relation to time. Precisely in this part Kant struggles with special difficulties, which can be seen in the fact that this part is disproportionately more extensive than the preceding parts and that at this point Kant's customary procedure from empirical synthesis to pure synthesis does not clearly come to light.

However, by contrast the guiding problem of the relation to objects as well as the concept of object now come thematically to the fore. Put differently, Kant not only deals with the synthesis of recognition but also with another basic phenomenon which becomes visible at this point, namely with transcendental apperception. Are we dealing here with a fourth phenomenon added to the other three? We shall see that not only are the three syntheses unified with one another, but also that transcendental apperception is connected to them as the original ground of their unity.

α) The Problem of the Interrelationship of the Three Syntheses of Apprehension, Reproduction, and Recognition

If the essence of objectness of the object lies in unity and if the three mentioned modes of unification are all constitutive for enabling the relation to the object, then the three modes of synthesis must be inter-related regardless of what each is factually capable of doing. And this gives rise to the question: How and where is the interrelationship of the three syntheses organized? What is the transcendental ontological ground of this *necessary* interrelationship? This is to say that the three

syntheses are not simply placed side by side, that the third one in particular is not simply added onto the other two but in the end has a priority *over* the other two. This is to say that transcendental apperception is not a fourth faculty, but rather precisely sustains in an originary way the entirety of the three names [syntheses]—whereby it is still an open question in which fundamental source the transcendental apperception is finally to be placed. Thus in part three we have to pay attention, not only to the analysis of the third mode of synthesis, but also to the question concerning the ground of the unity of the three modes.

The problem of the original interrelationship of the three syntheses in terms of enabling the relation to the object as such can be explained in a different way. The title of the second section, which contains the four parts, reads "The *a priori* Ground of the Possibility of Experience," that is, "foundations which lie in the subject and which make possible *a priori* a determination of objects, a relation to them." The term *experience* here indicates simultaneously "object of experience." The object of experience in general, object of a possible knowledge which is based on sense perception is nature in the sense of a closed region of beings, namely the realm of the extant. Hence object of experience is this whole in its wholeness. And this leads to the question concerning *that unity* of the manifold *which encompasses in advance this wholeness of the region nature*. This has nothing to do with an isolated object of an isolated perception but with the possibility of the relation to the object, to nature in general. The three syntheses in their interrelationship must be the foundation for the total span of this whole of nature in its ontological unity. That is why in part two Kant demonstrates that we must necessarily go beyond the isolated empirical intuition and must be able to operate in the *averageness of experience*. It should now be shown that a still more original condition for unification is needed, if the relation to the object in the sense of regional totality "nature" is to be vouched for.

We now see that Kant notices the *unity* of the three syntheses and goes back to the transcendental *ground of this unity*, but that in the end he again places intuition on one side and concept on the other. In fact all three syntheses are comportments of the subject, but only the first two are syntheses of intuition, respectively of the power of imagination. Kant subordinates the third one to understanding. The understanding itself has its primordial capability in transcendental apperception. To this extent only the first two syntheses are expressly related to time. *Here the inner rupture in the foundation of Kant's problem becomes clear: the lack of connection between time and the transcendental apperception*. But both pertain to the subject and the unification of pure intuition, i.e., time; and the I-think is now what Kant constantly strives for. But the unity of time and the I-think is only intimated in the expression "synthesis." And it is not *shown* how these syntheses spring from a common root. However,

we must make inquiries in this direction; and that means that we must take seriously the relation to time of the third synthesis. Only then do we have the possibility of rendering all three syntheses visible in their unified ground with respect to relatedness to time. But then we will also be able to bring the transcendental apperception into an inner relationship with time. We must explicitly emphasize that *in interpreting the third synthesis we go way beyond Kant*, because now the problem of the common root of both stems of knowledge becomes acute. We are concerned with understanding time and the I-think more radically and in the direction which is certainly visible in Kant, but which is not taken by him, i.e., in the direction of the synthesis of the power of imagination.

β) Interpretation of the Synthesis of Recognition as Synthesis of Pre-cognition

How does Kant now characterize the synthesis in "concept," that is, the synthesis that lies in conceiving, as a synthesis of recognition? Here we are talking about a synthesis "in concept"; and earlier we dealt extensively with a unification which is constitutive for concept as concept; we dealt with a unification in the sense of taking the manifold together reflectively unto a unity which conceals a commonality in itself and constitutes the form of this concept. With an explicit reference to the word *concept* Kant recalls: "The word *concept* might of itself suggest this remark. For this unitary consciousness is what combines the manifold, successively intuited, and also reproduced, into one representation."²² Here concept is called "*unitary consciousness*." This expression does not mean that the concept is a mode of knowing* *vis-à-vis* other modes. Rather, this expression is constructed analogous to the expression "general representation," by which we mean representation of something in general. Likewise, a "unitary consciousness" means knowledge of unity as such. Here as well as later Kant uses the word *consciousness* in this specific sense. It is not simply the opposite of unconscious, but a known knowledge of unity. Kant expressly remarks that it is irrelevant how clearly and distinctly we have this knowledge of unity; and it is primarily the actual act of this knowledge in which this unity is constituted that can remain hidden from us.

This sounds almost like an excuse for Kant's not having actually and sufficiently and clearly analyzed this act of "consciousness," this particular knowledge unto unity—at least with regard to the synthesis of recognition. Obviously this act must be interrelated to the modes of

22. Ibid., A 103.

*[The connection that exists between the German words *Wissen* and *Bewußtsein* cannot be kept in English, not with the words *concept* and *consciousness* nor with any other proper words.]

synthesis as apprehension and reproduction, and as pure act of recognition this act must constitute the knowledge of unity which is fundamental for enabling the relation to the object in general. Moreover, the synthesis of recognition must obviously be a necessary synthesis for enabling the relation to the object; and we shall see that Kant immediately relates just this synthesis to the concept of object more than the others. But first we must make quite clear the extent to which, in addition to the other two syntheses, a third synthesis is inevitable for enabling experience in general, that is for enabling the grasping of a closed realm of being.

We can explain the necessary interrelation of the three syntheses with respect to the relation to the object schematically as follows: Synthesis of apprehension is needed so that the intuitive offer [*Angebot*] becomes an offer [*Dar-gebot*] as such and stands over against in the most elementary manner. But apprehension would be incapable of making accessible a relation to the object as such and in its totality, if each apprehension and what it seizes, necessarily isolated in a now, would irretrievably sink back into the past. To be sure, in each now we would have each time something offered, but only this, of which we could not even say that it was connected with the previous one or differed from it. For the previous now is past, such that we could not even say "past" if we did not already have a horizon of the past. What is previously offered must thus be capable of being brought forth again; it must be retainable. However, granted the possibility that we can retain all what we previously intuited, what do we gain by this possibility? We could, so to speak, run again and again through the sequence of offers, in the direction of what is past and back to what is just now present. This would only widen the span of the accessible offer, would only increase the possibility of surveyability of the whole. But does this mean that we could return to what we previously intuited in the sense of intuiting it *again*? We can do this only if we can recognize what we previously intuited *as the same* as what we intuit now. There is actually already too much indicated with the concept of bringing-forth-again. Re-production is impossible if I cannot reproduce what flows away in the past as the same by recognizing it again [as the same]. Thus apprehension leads necessarily to reproduction and reproduction to recognition as its complement. However, the designation "*recognition*" is quite misleading. The fundamental act which enables that we take what we retain as what we have already intuited and grasp it as the same is the act of *identification*. Without the synthesis of identification it would be impossible to grasp *any* objective interrelation.

Let us use an ordinary example. Let us say that I am supposed to give a total and complete description of this auditorium. At first I seize

in apprehension the objects that are present and render them concretely and intuitively accessible to myself: chalkboard, lamp, chalk, etc. The further I go and the further I press on in describing [these things], the further removed [from me] is what is seen at first. But we have the possibility of reproduction—we can retain lamp or piece of chalk *as seen*. But what about this piece of chalk that I saw here? I just saw a piece of chalk and only this belongs to the stock of what belongs to this auditorium. But how can I now say this, because now I am describing the hard seats and do not see the chalk but only visualize it? For who tells me that the chalk that I visualize now belongs to the auditorium? I can return to the place of the chalk and confirm that. But what do I confirm here? That here there is a piece of chalk. And previously I perceived a piece of chalk. Hence there would be two pieces of chalk which belong to the auditorium. This will be denied, and we will be told that it is self-evident that there is only one piece of chalk. That piece of chalk which I offer to myself again in visualization in the final bringing together of the presentation of the extant is not a second piece of chalk but one and the same piece of chalk. But is this so self-evident? Assuming that we could accomplish the apprehension and we could likewise retain, then we retain merely the objects we perceived, in fact as often as they were perceived. But the fact that the piece of chalk is manifest in all the various apprehensions and reproductions as *one and the same* [piece of chalk] is not sufficiently accounted for by the simple apprehending and reproducing. Thus in order to grasp something as what maintains itself as one and the same in the sequence of what is apprehended and what is reproduced, we must possess precisely the possibility of maintaining [*Durchhalten*] beyond the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction. As Kant says, we need a synthesis of *recognition, of knowing-again*. But this expression is misleading, because it cannot refer to a special and complete act of *knowledge*, because it is precisely the three syntheses that constitute knowledge. The act which makes possible the relation to the object in apprehension and reproduction is the act of *identification*. Bringing-forth-again what is previously perceived does not help if we cannot identify it as the same. The possibility of the synthesis of bringing again would precisely run counter to the goal of enabling a complete experience. This possibility would constantly introduce anew an endless and boundless manifold within which "the same" perhaps returns without our being able to grasp it as the same, if we would reside outside the possibility of identification.

How are we to define the synthesis of identification? Is the issue such that we first take up and apprehend, then reproduce, and then identify what we perceived with what is brought again? Does this synthesis build

upon the first two and, as it were, unify them? Kant's presentation intimates such a conception, although he would contradict it even as he would not come to complete clarity about the synthesis.

We cannot identify what is brought forth again with what is offered at first, if we do not hold on to this from the beginning already as one and the same. And what is offered in apprehension shows itself each time already against the background of that which is present to us in advance. Factically and essentially, we never begin with the simple grasping of something present as though prior to this grasping nothing had been given. We never begin with a now. Rather in beginning, that is, in apprehending, there is already present to us an interrelation of beings which is somehow unified without its unity's being conceptually clear to us. The identification which first enables apprehension—and this in unison with reproduction itself—is not the original act which endows unity. Identification always already makes use of what is given beforehand and what it identifies. All identification presupposes already having a unified interrelation of beings. *In identifying—and that means apprehending and reproducing—we are always already awaiting a unity of beings.* Essentially and in the order or structure of the syntheses, the synthesis mentioned in the third place is the primary one. This synthesis is primarily neither a re-cognition [*Wiedererkennen*] nor an identification but opens up and projects in advance a whole—a whole which is in fact in one way or another disclosable and appropriatable in apprehension and reproduction.

If the third synthesis which Kant presents is understood in terms of this *advance awaiting* of a regional unity of offerable beings, then not only the crucial meaning of this synthesis but also simultaneously its *relatedness to time* become clear. By contrast, for Kant this synthesis has no relation to time. And if we wanted to pinpoint such a relation by following his analysis of this synthesis, then we would even have to say that the synthesis of remembering again is related to the past. This synthesis allows us to remember what is brought forth again as the same. By tracing recognition back to identification and this again back to an advance taking [*Vorwegnahme*] of a regional totality, it becomes clear by contrast that the moment of time (the temporal moment), to which the synthesis of re-cognition relates, is precisely the future, having in advance [*Vorweghabe*]. Thus it would be appropriate to the matter at issue to designate this synthesis as a synthesis of *pre-cognition*.

The synthesis of *apprehension* is related to the *present*, the synthesis of *reproduction* is related to the *past*, and the synthesis of *pre-cognition* is related to the *future*. *Insofar as all three modes of synthesis are related to time and insofar as these moments of time make up the unity of time itself, the three syntheses maintain their unified ground in the unity of time.*

However, the insight into the time-relatedness of this most fundamental synthesis is of crucial significance. It so happens that this synthesis, too, which as a synthesis “in concept” Kant classifies with the synthesis of *understanding*, belongs to an activity of the subject and is fundamentally *related to time*. This means that *understanding too* is basically a *time-related activity* and is not, as Kant thought, a spontaneity independent of time, ever against pure intuition of time as the faculty of receptivity. To put it more sharply and in view of what follows, we may say that what Kant works out in the direction of the third synthesis under the title of transcendental apperception is essentially related to time and is temporal—even as Kant himself bluntly opposes transcendental apperception to time. Transcendental apperception and time are next to each other, unconnected; and he says only that both lie in the subject. *But if the synthesis of understanding, as synthesis of recognition in the concept, is related to time and if categories emerge from just this synthesis as activity of understanding, that is, if the three syntheses are interrelated on the basis of time, then the origin of the categories is time itself.*

Therefore, the task of the transcendental deduction as disclosure of the ontological essence of categories has to be geared primarily toward the phenomenon of time. Only time will open up the possibility, not only of disclosing the ontological essence of the categories as such, but also of establishing it. But Kant establishes the ontological essence of categories in his doctrine of schematism of pure concepts of understanding. The core of this doctrine consists in time-relatedness of the categories. Thus it becomes indirectly clear that Kant, in a fumbling and rough sort of way, indeed seeks the core of transcendental deduction in time. Therefore the present interpretation, which appears to be violent, can be justified only in view of the doctrine of the schematism.

This interpretation will remain violent when in the following we attempt to demonstrate the phenomenon of transcendental apperception as being originally temporal—the one which Kant in connection with the characterization of the third synthesis wants to place outside of time and opposed to it. The actual task of part three is to explicate the transcendental apperception, and the synthesis of recognition is a transition to this explication. By interpreting the transcendental apperception Kant attempts to press forward toward the sustaining ground of all syntheses; and it is crucial that the interpretation of the transcendental apperception be guided precisely by the phenomenon of identification. Here we shall not deal with the significance of the insight into the primary *determination* of knowledge by the *future*. We shall only recall that the entire tradition starts from intuition as the fundamental act of knowledge, i.e., from intuition which indicates the temporal factor primarily of the *present*. Precisely because Kant grounds thinking in intuition


and places thinking at the service of intuition, therefore he must necessarily also limit the comportment of understanding to the present and must see the basic function of understanding and of the faculty of understanding—transcendental apperception—precisely in the identification which renders [things] present.

Not only does Kant describe the character of the synthesis of recognition in a rough sort of way, but he also fails to differentiate an *empirical* from a possible *transcendental synthesis of recognition*, in correspondence with the analysis of both preceding syntheses. Nevertheless there is in another respect a correspondence which shall occupy us in the following, namely the relation between the empirical and the pure concept, or more precisely the relation between the *form of the concept* (unity of a commonness) and the *transcendental and ownmost inner possibility of the concept*—recognizing that these two relations are not quite the same. In general, what is needed is a seizing in advance [*Vorgreifen*], in order to accomplish an act in which I take what offers itself together with just what has been taken in advance. Obviously we begin with what is offered in a present. However, all such beginnings are basically and fundamentally a returning from what is taken more or less explicitly in an explicit manner. The formal unity of the concept—respectively, the acts of comparison, reflection, and abstraction—are possible only if something like a relation to objects already exists. But this relation depends primarily on taking in advance a sphere of totality of ontological interrelations which is more or less determined. This taking-in-advance of a regional totality makes possible for the first time the identification of individual objects of this region.


But this *pure-taking-in-advance*, this *pure synthesis of recognition*, is simultaneously the sustaining ground of the unity of the pure synthesis of apprehension and reproduction. Here again Kant sees this unified transcendental ground of the unity of the three syntheses relatively clearly. But because the specific relatedness to time, namely relatedness to the future of what he calls synthesis of recognition, remains unclear for Kant, he also fails to disclose this sustaining ground of transcendental unity (transcendental apperception) originally, i.e., in its time-relatedness. Moreover, it does not become clear to what extent the transcendental apperception should be tied more closely with the synthesis of recognition in concept than with other syntheses. It also remains unclear whether the transcendental apperception is something that is added to these three syntheses, as a unifying link, or whether the transcendental apperception is grounded precisely in the fact that all three modes are in themselves related to time, are in themselves unified and interrelated, and thereby are grounded in time itself.

The following diagram is intended to contrast the three syntheses according to Kant, along with their interpretation according to us:

1. Kant



2. Interpretation

e) Objectness in General as the Subject's Free Self-Binding to *a priori* Rules of Knowledge

We have already emphasized that in fact all three syntheses are fundamental for enabling the relation to the object, but that Kant assigns an eminent role precisely to the third synthesis. For this reason Kant expounds on the essence of the transcendental apperception in connection with a discussion on the essence of the object.

Confronted with the earlier and approximate characterization of the concept of object, we must now ask: From where does Kant get the idea of standing over against [*Gegenstehen*] and of object [*Gegenstand*]?* This seems a totally superfluous question, because we always have objects before our eyes and in closest proximity. But there are *certain* objects which do not tell us at all of their object character and how this character is graspable—least of all when they are immediately extant and hold us captive. Obviously we cannot obtain the concept of object in general

*[It is not possible to preserve in English the relation between *Gegenstehen* and *Gegenstand*.]

through empirical reflection and abstraction. For if we wish to distinguish through generalization what in a multiplicity of objects is common to all of them as objects, then upon closer examination we would have to admit that we must already understand something like an object in general, in order to let certain individual objects stand over against us for purposes of generalization. Therefore, Kant concludes that what we mean by “object in general” cannot be empirically extant, as if there were extant objects and behind them still again something extant, which makes them into objects at all.

Thus if the idea of “object in general” is not to be gotten through observation of objects but is instead already presupposed in every observation, then this idea must be sought in what precedes every *ontic* grasping of definite objects. This is to say that *ontological knowledge in Kant's sense aims precisely at this objectness itself*.

But what do we understand and mean when we speak of objects in general? What do we see this as, that which we call “object”? Let us consider Kant's response to this question: object in general is “that which prevents our mode of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them *a priori* in some definite fashion.”²³ “Object” means what is to the contrary—contrary to an arbitrary, unattached, chaotic way of taking representations together. “Object” means what offers an advance *a priori* regulating of all empirical knowledge. This *a priori* binding of all empirical determinations to *a priori* rules of determinedness as such is in itself simultaneously an *a priori* unification of all possible empirical knowledge of certain rules. Thus these rules of synthesis *a priori* guide all knowledge with the unity of an advance determinedness. And this unity, which prevents any arbitrariness and regulates empirical knowledge in advance, is the concept of object in general.

In order to present the meaning of objectness, Kant appeals to what is contrary, what shows a peculiar character of resistance. But in fact Kant does not think of an ontic resistance which emanates from a definite, extant object. Rather this resistance has to do with an *a priori* resistance, with a resistance which is in the subject—a resistance which the subject gives to itself.

This resistance, which is in the subject itself, does not mean something against which the subject comes up or into which the subject runs. Rather, this ability to resist manifests itself in a regulating and a binding. Thus in and for the subject itself and for its *a priori* activities as such, there is a binding which has nothing to do with physical coercion but instead is rooted in the very core of the subject, in its spontaneity—a binding which is essentially freedom. This freedom in itself is the presupposition for the

possibility of all *a priori* necessity of unifications of pure syntheses of time: “All necessity, without exception, is grounded in a transcendental condition,”²⁴ that is, in a condition which belongs to the subject.

All our activities and those of other beings are necessitated. However, only understanding (and the will insofar as it can be determined by understanding) is free and is pure self-activity which is determined by nothing other than by itself. Without this original and unchangeable spontaneity we would not know anything *a priori*, for we would be determined in everything and even our thoughts would be subject to empirical laws. The faculty to think and to act *a priori* is the sole condition for the possibility of the origin of all other appearances. [Otherwise] even “ought” would have no meaning.²⁵

German Idealism understood these thoughts; and they find their most extreme expression in Hegel, in the third book of his *Logic*, where he works out *freedom as the essence of the concept*. Kant's inquiry into the origin of categories must be pursued all the way to this central problem; and this inquiry in turn is to be clarified by way of a fundamental *explanation of the phenomenon of transcendence as such on the basis of time, which is temporality, properly understood*.

If the problem of the elucidation of the relation to objects and its inner possibility are not considered within this perspective, then sentences like the following remain completely enigmatic: “Now we find that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity.”²⁶ This “we find” does not rely on a psychological observation of the self in the succession of the psychic processes. The words “we find, that our thought” are stated in view of the central constitution of transcendental subjectivity, however little this is expressed directly at this point. Transcendental subjectivity as transcendental *ap*-perception is the advance, independent knowledge of unity to which everything must be geared in advance that is to have a relation to the objects. All “standing over against” an I needs a dimension within which something definite is encountered. The sheer intuitive extant character of something cannot call forth this dimension if this dimension does not already exist with the existence of the I. In his language Kant expresses this thus:

It is only when we have thus produced synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition that we are in a position to say that we know the object.²⁷ But it is clear that . . . the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing

23. Ibid., A 104.

24. Ibid., A 106.

25. *Reflexionen*, II, 286.

26. CPR, A 104.

27. Ibid., A 105.

other than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations.²⁸

The formal unity of consciousness means the conscious knowledge of a unity which is determinative *a priori* for everything which is offerable.

**f) Presentation of the Possibility of Object-Relatedness as
Explication of Subjectivity; Transcendental Apperception
and Understanding as the Faculty of Rules**

In the background of the inquiry into the object and object-relatedness there is the unresolved problem of transcendence. Since Kant does not succeed in grasping this phenomenon in an original manner, he obtains the solution by taking a strange road. The direction in which his solution moves can be seen in the titles which now emerge: "Understanding as Faculty of Rules" and "Subject as Constant and Permanent I" — transcendental apperception.

This says that the task of elucidating the inner possibility of the relation to objects, that is, disclosure of the unified ground which supports the interrelation of the three syntheses, necessarily pushes toward an explication of the structure of the subject. The seemingly harmless designation of the three syntheses pushes of itself toward the problem of the original unity of time and transcendental apperception in the subject, that is, toward the inquiry into the ontologically primordial structure of subject as subject. As we shall see, *the problem of the transcendental deduction as elucidation of the ontological essence of categories is by no means a juridical question of validity. Rather, this problem is basically what we call a fundamental ontological interpretation of Dasein.*

That the problem of categories (which we may seem to have lost sight of because of our dealing with the issue of the unity of the three syntheses) is nothing other than just the question concerning the ground of the unity of these syntheses in the subject—this can be extrinsically identified with reference to the fact that in what follows Kant characterizes the categories as transcendental "grounds of the recognition of the manifold."²⁹ This interpretation of the categories initially shows again that Kant refers categories primarily to the synthesis of understanding. But when recognition is basically precognition and fundamentally related to time and when it is precisely recognition as this time-related precognition that primarily sustains the unity of the three syntheses, then this announces anew the *interpenetration of the categories as such with time, that is, simultaneously with subjectivity.* Thus elucidation of the *a priori* grounds

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., A 125.

for the possibility of experience concentrates on the subjectivity of the subject, that is, for Kant it concentrates on the transcendental, ontological discussion of transcendental apperception.

The question arises: What is the subjectivity of the subject itself, that this subject as such makes possible something like a regulating, binding resistance, indeed in such a way that this resistance constitutes "*standing over against something*"? What makes this resistance possible, a resistance that, seen from the point of view of the subject, constitutes *what always stands over against me as belonging to me*? Now of course it is impossible within the scope of this lecture to discuss even approximately the whole range and the crucial problems of the Kantian conception of "subject" and of "transcendental apperception." (For comparison, see presentations of the summer semester on *personalitas moralis, transcendentalis*, and *psychologica*³⁰ and also *Being and Time*, I, §64ff.)

In correspondence with the guiding problem of the transcendental deduction of categories, we shall now characterize transcendental apperception in connection with the three syntheses and the concept of categories as such. Kant relates transcendental apperception directly to the three syntheses; that is, he relates this apperception to the anticipation of unity, in whose horizon the identification is made possible and, according to this identification, the re-cognition [*Wiedererkennen*] is likewise made possible. This anticipation [of unity] is a *consciousness*, that is, an original *knowing of unity*; and as such this consciousness is more than mere intuiting. Insofar as all intuition belongs to receptivity, the pre-receptive [*vorrezeptive*] knowledge of unity is a faculty of spontaneity. But the activity of the subject in the field of knowledge is judgment, unification, "reflection."

According to §7 of Kant's *Anthropology*, the term *apperception* is supposed "to indicate a logical (pure) consciousness,"³¹ that is, a knowledge not of what is empirical but of what is pure, i.e., a knowledge of what is merely subjective, a knowledge of activity itself. This corresponds to the following passage [from the *Critique*]:

Man, however, who knows all the rest of nature solely through the senses, knows himself also through pure apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and inner determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses. He is thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon [appearance—object of empirical sense] and on the other hand, with respect to certain faculties the

30. Cf. Heidegger-Gesamtausgabe, vol. 24: *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), pp. 177-194 [trans. A. Hofstadter, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982)].

31. *Anthropologie* (Cassirer, VIII, 27).

action of which cannot be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility, a purely intelligible object.³²

Percipere means grasping, and *ad-percipere* means grasping along with. But this “grasping along with” does not mean intuiting something extant but a grasping of activities, indeed a grasping of *oneself* [*Sich-erfassen*] in activities. It means grasping of oneself with respect to abilities; taking oneself in the sense of “I am able to” and “I can.” This grasping of abilities is the proper possessing of the I of itself in the sense of “I am able to.” Apperception means self-possession. The “ad” in *ad-percipere* (“apperception”) is not saying that something still *will be added*. Rather “ad” is meant in the sense of “toward myself”; “ad” emphasizes “taking-onself” in “I can”; it emphasizes transposing oneself into oneself. This talk of transposing oneself into oneself as an active being sounds as if we were simply outside ourselves before. However, to “transpose oneself into oneself” bespeaks understanding that one is always already transposed into one’s own ability. This being transposed into oneself is not a state [*Zustand*]. Rather this *being* transposed into one’s own ability is the acting I can. The being of the comportment lies exactly in its “I can.” Hence thinking as acting is what it is fundamentally in the manner of “I think.” Thinking as such at all times starts “from itself,” from the self *as* itself. Therefore, transcendental apperception means the same as *I think*. “I can,” i.e. the ability-character of my actions, primarily determines the mode of being of the subject. This corresponds in the moral sphere [*Sittlichen*] to the fact that being equipped with a quality does not determine existence as a good one, but rather moral disposition [*Gesinnung*], “the practical moral disposition of good intentions.” This shows primarily the character of ability. Moral disposition of a human being is a basic position toward a realm of possibilities which the human being controls on the basis of this moral disposition. But to what extent is this apperception transcendental? To what extent is this apperception even the most original transcendental, that is, that which makes relation to objects possible on the most intrinsic basis, that which is “the radical faculty of all our knowledge”?³³ To what extent is transcendental apperception closely interrelated especially to the third synthesis, the synthesis of precognition as an activity of understanding? What is the relation of transcendental apperception to the concepts of understanding? In a later passage of the *Critique* Kant provides information about this:

We now come to a concept which was not included in the general list of transcendental concepts but which must yet be counted as belonging to that

32. CPR, B 574f., A 546f.

33. Ibid., A 114.

list, without, however, in the least altering it or declaring it defective. This is the concept or, if the term be preferred, the judgment, “I think.” As is easily seen, this is the vehicle of all concepts, and therefore also of transcendental concepts, and so is always included in the conceiving of these latter, and is itself transcendental. But it can have no special designation, because it serves only to introduce all our thought, as belonging to consciousness.³⁴

The “I think” or transcendental apperception is, as it were, itself a category, a primordial category; for this category does not need to be explicitly listed, nor does it add to or increase the table of categories, because this category is presupposed by each category as such. Kant calls transcendental apperception a “vehicle” of all concepts as such and hence also of transcendental concepts or categories. But transcendental concepts are those which determine an object as object; they constitute objectness, for which we can not also say that they co-constitute that which pertains to the resistance to which all unification is tied. Categories cannot move forward without the “vehicle” of transcendental apperception; that is, they only function on the basis of transcendental apperception. Strictly speaking, categories are not substance, causality, etc.; but rather they are “I think substance” and “I think causality”—they belong to the original activity of understanding itself. All regulation of a synthesis as a regulation which is always related to a unity is possible only when the unifying *subject as such* can offer to itself in advance a horizon of possible unity in general. Hence at this juncture Kant states, with regard to transcendental apperception, that this apperception *guides* all thinking *as belonging to consciousness*, that is, as belonging to original *knowledge of unity*. Hence all synthesis in all possible variations is taken within an original horizon of unity in general. This horizon indeed must be *a priori*, i.e., must reside in the subject, because it makes possible objectness—and this is nothing empirical. Then the subject, in its most inner being as activity, must accomplish this primordial activity of giving the horizon of unity in advance. But this primordial activity as *giving the horizon of unity in advance* is again nothing other than *a priori* enabling *something belonging to an I*. When “I think” is the primordial category, then herein lies a central clue for the ontological understanding of categories as such. *All categories* essentially go back to the free self-binding which characterizes the subject as such. They are *grounded in a project which anticipates the unified horizon of resistance a priori*. But insofar as this project pertains to the unity of the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction and insofar as all three are rooted in time, the origin of categories is an origin in time.

But the outcome of the interpretation was that the three basic forms of pure *a priori* syntheses (apprehension, reproduction, and recognition)

34. Ibid., B 399f., A 341.

are interrelated to one another. We even saw that they are unified among themselves on the basis of each one's being originally related to a mode of time. Time itself in the original unity of these modes is the ground of unity of three syntheses. Moreover, we saw that the third synthesis of precognition is the one which is primary and which precedes the other two. This synthesis has the function of identification; it makes possible that something be offered in advance as the same and be taken again as the same in any return. But for such a synthesis of identification to be possible, the "I" which carries out this synthesis must be able to "become conscious of the identity of the function."³⁵ The mind must "have before its eyes the identity of its acts."³⁶ The "I" must *by itself be capable of belonging to itself as itself the same*. This is to say that transposing oneself into self-possession constitutes the original acting *self-identification of the "I" with itself*, upon whose basis the synthesis of identification and with it the syntheses of reproduction and apprehension first become possible.

However, this original acting self-identification makes possible for the first time that what is supposed to be able to belong to me as an interrelation of objects can belong to me at any time; that is, it does not belong in every moment to a completely different "I" which no longer knows of itself and of its previous moment. There must be a "*fixed and abiding self*,"³⁷ and this must be the "I think" of transcendental apperception. But this "fixedness" obviously cannot mean the being extant of a thing which "stands over against." Rather, this "fixedness" means the stance [*Stand*] which has its own way of standing, namely that of a self. This self-standing, which possesses itself in acting, belongs to the subject. And this self must be a fixed one in the second sense that it is "abiding" and continues and is *constantly* itself, indeed in the manner of "I can," of "moral disposition." In the field of subjectivity, where freedom primarily determines the mode of being of the subject and this mode of being is characterized by the "I can," the faculty, i.e., possibility, is higher than actuality. Here it is not actuality that constitutes existence but rather the "I can" as "I am able to."

Without explicitly pursuing these ontological interrelations, Kant nevertheless looks at them in their crucial significance:

But it must not be forgotten that the bare representation "I" in relation to all other representations (the collective unity of which it makes possible) is transcendental consciousness. Whether this representation is clear (empirical consciousness) or obscure, or even whether it ever actually occurs, does not

35. Ibid., A 108.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., A 107.

here concern us. But the possibility of the logical form of all knowledge is necessarily conditioned by relation to this apperception as a *faculty*.³⁸

The transcendental knowledge of unity as identical self-possession is the "mere representation I"; and it is not important for this I-hood and selfhood [*Ichheit und Selbstheit*] how far we clearly or obscurely represent the I, what always empirically occurs. My grasping of the "I" is not receptive or empirical. Rather this grasping of the "I" is only possible as a free transposition into one's "I can." The same note (at A117) which we just quoted is supplemented in the second edition to read: "The 'I think' expresses the act of determining my existence"³⁹; that is, this grasping of the "I" is always spontaneous.

Existence is already given thereby, but the mode in which I am to determine this existence that is the manifold belonging to it, is not thereby given. In order that it be given, self-intuition is required; and such intuition is conditioned by a given *a priori* form, namely, time, which is sensible and belongs to the receptivity of the determinable [in me]. Now since I do not have another self-intuition which gives the *determining* in me (I am conscious only of the spontaneity of it) prior to the act of *determination*, as time does in the case of the determinable, I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being; all that I can do is to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is, of the determination; and my existence is still only determinable sensibly, that is, as the existence of an appearance. But it is owing to this spontaneity that I entitle myself an *intelligence*.⁴⁰

This means that through intuition the self in its actual selfhood does not become accessible. The self is what is grasped as freedom only insofar as I am free in this possibility to be myself the determining factor for all intuiting. This spontaneity of which I thus apprehend brings it about that I entitle myself "intelligence" and that freedom is an intelligible object. To prevent a misunderstanding, let us point out that granting the "I's" *intelligence* precisely on the ground of the "I's" freedom does not mean that the "I" is only a *theoretical* grasping. The expression "Intelligence" indicates what is non-empirical and non-receptive—the "I" is not empirical but intelligible, is intelligent, i.e., is free.

Let us once again take up the note in the first edition. There we read: "This representation 'I' . . . whether representation is clear . . . or obscure, or even whether it ever actually occurs, does not here concern us. But the possibility of the logical form of all knowledge is necessarily conditioned by relation to this apperception as a *faculty*." The possibility

38. Ibid., A 117, note.

39. Ibid., B 158, note.

40. Ibid.

of all syntheses necessarily depends on the relation to transcendental apperception as a faculty. That is, experience and object-relatedness is only possible when the resistance of a binding regulation of all syntheses springs from that which is fundamentally pure possibility, i.e., from the free "I can." *Thus the "I" in its actuality is pure possibility; this "I can" is just the existing existence.*

It would be totally erroneous to interpret this and other passages as though here Kant were saying that transcendental consciousness is nothing actual but merely something logical and that *vis-à-vis* individual, empirical, factual consciousness, transcendental consciousness is the general consciousness as such, as a class. To be sure Kant maintains that transcendental consciousness is nothing actual; to be sure he maintains that this consciousness is possibility. But "nothing actual" does not mean "not existing at all" but only not existing in the sense of nature, and rather existing in the sense of freedom. And "possibility" here does not mean the logical freedom from contradiction; but rather it means faculty understood as *actus*, as "I can." However, misunderstanding is encouraged in that Kant indeed fails clearly to differentiate ontologically the concepts of actuality and possibility in relation to Dasein, the "I," and nature. Ontologically, Kant depends entirely on the traditional ontology of what is extant. He clearly grasps the mode of being of the subject only when he grasps this being in an ontic and not ontological manner, so that he could inquire as to how the being of the "I" comports itself to the being of nature. Nevertheless his position is so clear that we can say: According to Kant's characterization of the subject's acting freely, possibility is higher than actuality.

It has now become clear why it is the third synthesis of identification that has a special, explicit relation to transcendental apperception. According to its specific function of primordial action of the "I think" as acting self-possession, this synthesis expresses immediately the self-standing of the self. With this, at least for Kant, the most profound zone of the dimension of the origin is reached.

As clearly as the traits of self-hood, freedom, action, and sameness with respect to the transcendental subject come to light for Kant, so obscure remain the most crucial phenomena of transcendence as well as the basic relation to time and the "I think," both to each other and in relation to transcendence. And seen in an ontologically radical manner, Kant retains the ontologically unclarified point of departure from the subject as inaugurated by Descartes.

But because "I" as "I think" is essentially independence and freedom, every activity of understanding has the character of being carried out by itself. By itself understanding is free, and only because of this freedom can understanding be open to the binding and regulation. That is why Kant can designate understanding as the faculty of rules

and can find the original mode of being of understanding characterized in this designation.

But what does "rule" mean? A rule is "the representation of a universal condition according to which a certain manifold can be posited in uniform fashion."⁴¹ Rule is a *represented* condition, that is, rule is what conditions and exercises its conditioning function through being represented, i.e. on the basis of *being anticipated by way of something which is free for such a being-conditioned*. Hence regulation occurs only in a being which in itself is open to . . . and to whose essence transcendence—that is at the same time freedom—belongs.

These rules of positing "in uniform fashion," that is, the indications of the synthesis of the manifold, which are understood in advance and accepted as binding—these rules are nothing but unities which lie in the possible free forms of synthesis as such. As the faculty of rules, understanding presents these rules to itself. By holding these rules before itself, understanding keeps open the horizon of the unity of these rules, a unity closed within itself.

The inner connection of these rules constitutes an agreement which enables an *a priori* congruity and association of the syntheses. The *a priori* balancing of the rules of synthesis constitutes the affinity of all those determinations which *a priori* circumscribe the whole region of beings, of nature. The *a priori* affinity of that which prior to all empirical occupation structures, as it were, the horizon of *a priori* resistance Kant calls *transcendental affinity*. *This affinity is the content of those determinations which circumscribe the ontological structure of nature as such.*

That nature should direct itself according to our subjective ground of apperception, and should indeed depend upon it with respect to its conformity to law, sounds very strange and absurd. But when we consider that this nature is not a thing in itself but is merely an aggregate of appearances, so many representations of the mind, we shall not be surprised that we can discover it only in the radical faculty of all our knowledge, namely, in transcendental apperception, in that unity on account of which alone it can be entitled object of all possible experience, that is, nature.⁴²

Transcendental affinity is only possible on the basis of belonging "to the totality of a possible self-consciousness";⁴³ that is, *it is possible only on the basis of the dimension of co-belongingness which is constituted by transcendental apperception*. The radical identity of selfhood, of the "I's" free self-standing, must "enter into the synthesis of all the manifold."⁴⁴ Or put more aptly,

41. Ibid., A 115.

42. Ibid., A 114.

43. Ibid., A 113.

44. Ibid.

this radical identity must already lie there *a priori*. "All relation of being or not being"⁴⁵ occurs in this dimension of co-belongingness with the horizon of transcendental affinity—a dimension constituted by the freedom of transcendental apperception.

g) Summary of the Interpretation of the Section "The *a priori* Grounds of the Possibility of Experience"

In our interpretation of the second section of the transcendental deduction in edition A [of the *Critique*], we worked out three modes of transcendental synthesis, which necessarily refer to one another in a unique way. The interpretation resulted in the centrality of the time-relatedness of all three modes. Moreover, the third mode of the synthesis, which enjoys a privileged position among the three, brings about the transition to transcendental apperception as that radical faculty of the subject in which objectness as such is primarily constituted. A more precise discussion of transcendental apperception and its characteristic freedom made possible an elucidation of understanding as the faculty of rules. These rules themselves circumscribe the regional constitution of nature as such, the transcendental affinity. This affinity determines that which belongs *a priori* to the resistance which the subject places before itself from out of itself.

Thus we have disclosed the transcendental time-related synthesis, not only in its essential possibilities but also in its radical ability. We have worked out the dimension which, as an original dimension so far was only the title for a problem. But the task of transcendental deduction should get resolved, that is, the basic ontological essence of the categories should be worked out, by going back to this original dimension. But if this disclosure of the original dimension is sufficient (for now in the context of the Kantian inquiry), if consequently elucidation of subjectivity shows this original dimension to the extent that it makes relation to objects possible *a priori*, then with the working out of the original dimension the ontological essence of categories must *eo ipso* already be established, provided that categories belong to the constitution of the *a priori* relation to objects.

From this we infer that a juridical inquiry makes no sense and that one can no longer ask how a pure concept of understanding is to have objective validity, once it belongs to informed subjectivity. *For belonging to subjectivity sufficiently disclosed is just the elucidation of the manner and possibility of the objective reality of categories.* Occasionally Kant gets quite close to this state of affairs, for example when we read: "The *a priori*

conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience."⁴⁶ But he does not quite see clearly the positive function of the interpretation of the sources of knowledge that are in the subject; he does not see the subjectivity of the subject as the dimension of origin. Above all, he does not see that precisely this *analysis of subjectivity step by step undermines the possibility of a juridical inquiry*. Rather, in Kant it often looks as though he tries to resolve the juridically conceived transcendental deduction with the help of the disclosed dimension of origin, while he already has the solution to the problem and with it the impossibility of the juridical problem. Hence the confusion which permeates the work, above all through the revision of the transcendental deduction in the second edition. Instead of a clear exposition of the structure of subjectivity with an aim at object-relatedness as such, Kant presents no less than five deductions; and still he is not satisfied.

But if what we said is correct, then it is also true that *with the disclosure of the dimension of origin which we just now considered, the transcendental deduction is simultaneously and in principle already carried out*. Thus it is no accident that Kant begins the third section of the deduction of pure concepts of understanding, which actually should deal with this deduction, with the following words: "What we have expounded separately and singly in the preceding section, we shall now present in systematic interconnection."⁴⁷ As far as our interpretation is concerned, this means that we basically do not learn anything new in the third section, because the genuine transcendental deduction is already carried out. This deduction is identical with the disclosure of the dimension of origin, that is, with the ontological explication of the subjectivity of the subject. Therefore, we must briefly indicate in what way Kant lays out the systematic presentation of the transcendental deduction in the third section. In order to measure the entirety of the structural interconnection of subjectivity, Kant proceeds in two directions—one from below to above and the other from above to below. Thereby [in this third section] he introduces in detail important explanations not dealt with in the second section, especially with regard to the transcendental power of imagination and apperception.

But before we peruse the third section in a general survey, we need to characterize the general dimension of origin, i.e., the whole structure of transcendental subjectivity, by way of a primarily systematic presentation of the results of the second section. Through this characterization we gain insight into the central difficulties of Kant's point of departure

45. *Ibid.*, A 110.

46. *Ibid.*, A 111; cf. A 158.

47. *Ibid.*, A 115.

for the problem on the one hand, while on the other hand we gain insight into a comprehensive orientation for the further question: How is the informed, ontological essence of categories grounded in its inner possibility? The response to this question is given in the short doctrine of schematism of pure concepts of understanding, which we already at the beginning have designated the positive part of the *Critique*. Our lecture course will conclude with the interpretation of this doctrine and its function for the explication of transcendental principles which is connected to it.

*§25. General Character of Transcendental Subjectivity
as the Original Dimension of Synthetic a priori Knowledge*

Before considering the third section of the transcendental deduction in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, let us briefly describe the entirety of the original dimension and problems associated with it, emphasizing not so much the analysis of individual phenomena as their inner connection. For the purposes of a general outline of transcendental subjectivity as the original dimension, we shall briefly discuss the following six points:

1. The three modes of transcendental synthesis and their interconnection.
2. The unity of the transcendental synthesis and the transcendental apperception as the ground of their unity.
3. The relationship of the three syntheses to time and their connection to self on the basis of the relation to time.
4. Transcendental apperception and its relationship to time.
5. Time as self-affection, transcendental apperception as self-standing [in its independence], and the unity of subjectivity.
6. Transcendental subjectivity and the ontological essence of the categories and response to the problem of the transcendental deduction.

The following discussion not only serves the specific purpose of bringing the observations made so far to focus on the fundamental problems, but also serves the general and broader purpose of demonstrating to you the exemplary character of Kant's philosophizing, which—entirely disregarding its content—is contrary to today's increasingly widespread barbarism. To be sure, one should not speak as broadly of one's own time and its fashions, if for no other reason than to deny support to the mistaken view that modern time is central because it is what is interesting—for whatever is interesting is not central. Enough. The following considerations should lend support to the insight, which you should have

already gained from this lecture course, that to study Kant means also to strive for the inner purity of scientific work.

**a) The Three Modes of the Transcendental
Synthesis and Their Interconnection**

The three modes of the transcendental synthesis—transcendental apprehension (seizing), transcendental reproduction (reaching back), and transcendental precognition (reaching ahead)—are connected to one another. Only by anticipating something beforehand is a foothold gained with reference to which what is to be seized and is seizable, or what is reproduced, can be grasped and comprehended as one and the same thing. Insofar as we are concerned here with pure synthesis, they are the basic forms in accordance with which the subject in general must reach out, in order to be able to unify and encompass in advance a horizon. The subject offers this horizon to itself as that unity which makes up the original resistance, the binding, and the regulating. But the wide-ranging encompassing of the horizon of unity is nothing other than its being given in advance. The unity of the three syntheses is thus determined.

**b) The Unity of the Transcendental Synthesis
and the Transcendental Apperception as
the Ground of Their Unity**

The wide-ranging encompassing of the horizon of unity presents an *a priori* binding of the self. That is, in proffering the *a priori* resistance, a dimension is constituted in which everything encountered within the horizon pertains to me in possibility. Kant expresses this formally by saying: "The 'I think' must be able to accompany all my representations." The representations are not and cannot be what they are, namely something represented, unless they are already sustained by a primal activity which has always already opened the very dimension which first constitutes the being-in-advance character [*ein Vor-haftes*]. Transcendental apperception is not something standing next to or behind the three transcendental syntheses, but is the unity of that wide-ranging encompassing which as such generally constitutes a dimension of resistance or of what is representable. The unity of the three syntheses is not a composite or sum of a series of acts. Rather, this unity *is* the subject as it is originally articulated and as it co-originally acts as subject in this articulation, in its self-possessing and self-standing. The primal faculty already decides in advance what each synthesis by itself or in unity with other syntheses can accomplish. We must now try to see more clearly the original unity of synthesis, the transcendental apperception.

c) The Relationship of the Three Syntheses
to Time and Their Connection to the Self on
the Basis of the Relation to Time

We have already shown that the three modes of the transcendental synthesis each relates to a mode of time: The synthesis called apprehension is related to the now, the one called reproduction is related to the no-longer-now, and the synthesis called precognition is related to the not-yet-now. But this relatedness to time is not accidental. As ways of unifying reaching out, the three syntheses do not reach into the present, into the past, or into the future—as though they could also grasp something else. Rather, reaching out, reaching back, and reaching ahead are each as such themselves centrally related to the present, the past as having been, and the future. More precisely stated, these ways of reaching are precisely nothing other than relations in which what is present, what has been (the past), and what will be become manifest. However, the whither of these ways of reaching out are the basic modes of time, which belong to one another in accord with the essence and ownmost possibility of time. That point whereunto the three modes of synthesis reach out is by itself something originally unified/unifying—and what thus as a unifying also already encompasses and presents the horizon of the unifying time in its three dimensions as an open horizon.

However, if these three ways of reaching out and encompassing are nothing but the originally unified articulation of the primal activity of the “I” as “I think”—which Kant also calls “I synthesize”—then, as this unity of the primal activity, the subject is itself something that in reaching out essentially emerges out of itself, without simply leaving itself behind. Rather precisely its emergence (out of itself) constitutes the dimension which guarantees the possibility that something belongs to me. We call this emergence of the subject as it reaches out “the *ecstasis* of the subject,” its fundamental ecstatic character. The word *ecstasis* here should be taken quite literally and without the tinge of rapture or ecstasy associated with emotions. In the unity of the ecstases, as the basic modes of emergence, the subject encompasses the horizon just opened in the ecstases, a horizon in which the unifying time and its pure moments belong together.

But this unity of time—which Kant is incapable of bringing to light, as it requires quite different investigations—is in principle that unity which constitutes what Kant calls objectness or the object in general. This is not something extant, but something that binds *a priori*, a binding unto which and around which all of the empirical syntheses, and the pure transcendental synthesis before this, run together.

According to our interpretation, the unity as pure time makes up the horizon which the “I” as transcendental ecstatic apperception holds before itself in advance as open. But at the same time we pointed out

through this interpretation that this horizon of unity must have the character of resistance, and a resistance which comes from the subject, from the self itself, toward the self, and binds it in its actions. *Can this resistance which stems from the self and simultaneously comes toward the self be attributed to pure time insofar as pure time is claimed properly as the unified horizon of objectness in general?* In fact Kant gives such a designation to time, although the explication of this designation is in many ways obscure and isolated.

Kant conceives time in terms of pure *self-affection*, i.e., as that which, stemming *a priori* from the self, affects the self, has to do with the self, and in this connection offers *a priori* resistance and binding. The time into which the basic activities of the synthesis of the subject reach out is simultaneously the time which *a priori* affects the subject. This means that the subject as such gives itself a resistance *a priori*—time. Time, taken as a pure sequence of nows, is what the self as self holds before itself as that which resists, purely and simply. Peculiar to the *finite* subject is that it relates to other beings insofar as these are *given* to the subject. The finite subject has no originary intuition, no *intuitus originarius*. Rather its finitude consists precisely in the referential dependence on the givenness [of objects]. This is to say that *the central element of givenness and the a priori having-to-do-with the self is constitutive of the idea of objectness as such*—not only of the idea of individual objects. Thus *time* proves to be constitutive of the concept of the object in general. It is in this vein that Kant states: “Space and time contain a manifold of pure *a priori* intuition, but at the same time are conditions of the receptivity of our mind—conditions under which alone it can receive representations of objects, and which (i.e., the conditions, thus time) therefore must also always affect the concept of these objects,”¹ which is to say that the structure of resistance represented by pure time pertains to the *a priori* character of object as such.

Earlier, during the interpretation of section 10 of the *Critique*, we pointed to the issue of self-affection.² Now we see clearly what transcendental function self-affection has. To have to do with itself belongs *a priori* to the subject, and it is this concern that determines in advance every possible way in which empirical objects in general can stand over against a subject. Thus time is the *form which constitutes and determines* objectness. Time is the form of every empirical having-to-do-with-oneself; it is the *a priori* pure concern of the subject with *itself*.

In interpreting the structural connection between pure apprehension and pure reproduction, we saw that only *these* modes of synthesis prop-

1. CPR, A 77.

2. Cf. above, G269f.

erly explain the character of intuition, which was only roughly described in the transcendental aesthetic. *Intuition* implies *givenness*. The modes of pure synthesis reach out and encompass and thus ecstatically *give* pure time, i.e., pure relations to time—regardless of what shows itself in time as empirically extant. Pure intuition of time—the unity of primal activities of pure ecstatic synthesis—is nothing other than the manner in which the subject has to do with itself through its own activity, i.e., through *advance givenness* of pure relations to time.

If we keep an eye on all that we now discussed, then light will immediately be cast on the passage on pure self-affection which Kant added only in the second edition—a discussion which has either been passed over or not understood:

Now that which, as representation, can be antecedent to any and every act of thinking anything, is intuition; and if it contains nothing but relations, it is in the form of intuition. Since this form does not represent anything save insofar as something is posited in the mind, it can be nothing but the mode in which the mind is affected through its own activity (namely, through this positing of its representation), and so is affected by itself; in other words, it is nothing but an inner sense in respect of the form of that sense.³

Here Kant states clearly that, as pure intuition, time is pure transcendental self-affection. Time affects *a priori* and in this manner constitutes *a priori* objectness for a finite subject in general. Time determines in advance the how of “standing over against”; thus time belongs to the structure of objectness in general.

But if the relation to the object in general is *likewise originally grounded in transcendental apperception, which in turn constitutes selfhood, and if self proffers time to itself, then self cannot be thought without an original relationship to this time*.

d) Transcendental Apperception and Its Relationship to Time

Strangely enough, Kant never engages in a deliberation such as we have just done. He does not incorporate time as pure *self-affection* belonging to the subject into *self*, into the primal activity of freely transposing oneself into the self which as such should constitute the unity of syntheses, that is, objectness. Therefore, to the extent that it can be done briefly, I shall attempt now to show that interpretation of time as pure self-affection necessarily includes an *a priori* relationship of the subject to time. That

3. CPR, B 67f.

is, this interpretation includes the crucial temporal factor of this transcendental apperception, which Kant thought to be free from time.

If self as such should proffer to itself the primal resistance as time—and *a priori*—then this means that this resistance cannot be grabbed up from the empirical realm as something empirical. Resistance, that is, pure time, must come from the self through the self itself. But self is only as ability, as the *I can*—the primal activity of the articulated three syntheses is to be accomplished only as ways of reaching out and encompassing. In and through these primal activities, that is, in and through the peculiar way of *being* as self, self must derive pure time from out of itself. As a self-possessing freedom, the self must be *a priori* laden with time. Only thus can the self proffer time as primal resistance “any time” out of itself and for itself. The articulated primal activity of the transcendental apperception must as such be the origin of pure time as pure sequence of the relations of nows. This time as pure sequence of nows must spring from the three primal activities themselves. Pure time springs from the three ecstases which determine the selfhood of the self in its free self-possessing.

But whatever is thus originally laden with time and as such releases time from itself while simultaneously comporting itself to time, whatever deals with time and simultaneously binds itself to time, *that must itself* be temporal in an entirely original sense. In its original selfhood the subject is temporality itself, and only as ecstatic temporality does the subject release (in fact necessarily for itself as a self) time in the sense of the pure sequence of nows. I have shown this to be the case in my book *Being and Time*, Division Two, Chapter 3, §61ff. and Chapter 6, §78ff., by setting out from a point which is initially far removed from that of Kant and is not determined by him. It was only on the basis of that investigation that the possibility arose for me to understand what Kant is actually seeking, respectively must seek. Only from out of that [investigation] can we grasp the unity of receptivity and spontaneity, of time and the transcendental apperception, as a possible problem.

With this we have already addressed the following point in principle.

e) Time as Self-Affection, Transcendental Apperception as Self-Standing, and the Unity of Subjectivity

Time is *a priori* having-to-do-with the self and simultaneously self-standing. Time is pure original receptivity and original spontaneity. Original temporality is that in which the primal activity of the self and its *concern with the self* is grounded. And it is the same temporality which at any time makes possible a *self-identification* of the self. Only time offers the possibility of an “any time,” and only temporality properly understood has the full extension from the future via the past (alreadyness) into the

present in each case. It is true that Kant understands the identification of the self primarily and exclusively from the present in the sense that the “I” can identify itself as the same in each now. But we are dealing with something far more radical—we are not concerned with the momentary now [*das momentane Jetzt*] but with the identity and sameness of the genuine self insofar as it is free and determined by the “I can.” As existing the self must be able to identify itself. *In the unity of resolve to a possibility, along with a commitment to the past, the self must be able to understand itself in each concrete moment as the same futural self which has already been.*

It is this transposition of the self into itself as stretched in all dimensions of temporality which constitutes the genuine existential concept of identification of the self. By contrast in Kant this self-identification happens to be dubiously close to an objective identification with itself of something extant. The only difference is that in the case of the “I” this extant being identifies itself by itself out of itself, as it were something extant which is equipped with the apparatus of a self-consciousness. However clearly Kant sees in certain respects the freedom of the self as the basic character of its existence, he still does not succeed in grasping the *self-identification as an originally historical phenomenon*; that is, he fails to see in it precisely the primal history on whose basis alone the public world history of communities becomes possible. In dealing with the problematic of self-identification, Kant comes dangerously close to Descartes’s *res cogitans*. In spite of all the difference from Descartes in conceiving the spontaneity of the “I,” Kant here takes the “I” as something that thinks and thus can come upon itself any time as this thinking thing. The selfhood of the self is not understood in terms of the full temporal extension of Dasein.

Just when the existence of the subject is determined in its core as *being ahead of itself* and thus *is stretched out into the future as ability to be*, as “I can,” just then this character of the self must also be appropriated along with the genuine identification as a self-possessing self. Otherwise, not only are we dealing with an “I” which exists free from time and point for point, but also this “I” is, as it were, extant *beside* (next to) time. As much as the *togetherness* of receptivity and spontaneity is again and again important for Kant, he still does not succeed in demonstrating a ground wherein both can be together. At one point in the *Critique* Kant directly speaks of time’s “belonging to the unity of myself.”⁴ But the manner of this belonging remains unclear, and time is simply something present in the subject.

Certainly Kant did not resolve the problem of unity of concrete subjectivity. In the end he never once posed this problem adequately. However, aside from all results and open questions, we must note again that

he left the problems where he brought them with the means at his disposal—he did not force a solution upon the problems, or polish them. And it would be wrong to want to talk Kant into such a solution, because the doubling of principles like spontaneity and receptivity, self-standing and self-affection, is perhaps inadequate. However, we do not want to deal further with this issues here (cf. the phenomenon of care). We would like only to point to one issue that is of fundamental significance. However much Kant succeeds in recognizing the receptivity, sensibility, and empirical character of human beings, so little is he inclined to interpret these issues away—and all of Kant’s philosophical explication is anchored in the intelligible character, in transcendental apperception, and in freedom. Although in a certain way Kant emphasizes the independence of sensibility, nevertheless he does not center the methodical development on the problem in sensibility.

Nowadays one is easily inclined to attribute to Kant’s *Weltanschauung*—and to that of his successors—this predominant superiority of the mind over the body. Such a *Weltanschauung* exists in every scientific philosophy—in Plato and Aristotle as well as in Hegel—and it would be a wretched dunce of a philosopher who would not share such a *Weltanschauung*. However, here we are not concerned with a *Weltanschauung* but with a fundamental methodical question which decides the possibility of philosophy in general, namely whether it is possible to ground philosophy as such by laying the foundation of the problematic in sensibility. Philosophy is the conceptual knowledge of a fundamental realm of phenomena—indeed a conceptual knowledge which must necessarily be grounded in and guided by a self-knowledge of human Dasein. But therein lies the fact that all conceptual disclosure and conceptual enlightenment must necessarily and primarily establish itself in a realm wherein the conceptual as such lives, i.e., in the rational in the widest sense, in transcendental apperception, in the sphere of freedom of reason—or in what we call the existence of Dasein. Therefore, all philosophical conceptual knowledge of Dasein, even when this knowledge is not directly related to the phenomena of existence, are necessarily *existentials* [*Existentialien*]. Existence, mind, and reason have a necessary priority in philosophy, not because of a preference for the mind or because one likes to ignore other elements, and not because a philosopher has a seemingly peculiar and private position on death, which is determined by his *Weltanschauung*, but because the fundamental principle of all conceptually genuine knowledge is clear and can thus be grounded. This is the principle of interpretation which Plato already presented in his allegory of the cave. From the lightness of the concept and with the help of the concept all conceptually genuine knowledge aims at what is pre-conceptual. I can only interpret and understand by returning from light into darkness. I cannot get to the light by means of the dark; if I try to do this, I will be blinded. The opposite is

4. Ibid., A 362.

true: The cave of Dasein and even what is shadowy and transitory in that cave is only graspable in the light. With this Plato showed all of philosophy the way. Plato's allegory of the cave thus allows us to understand the legitimate priority of the transcendental apperception in the explication of subjectivity in Kant.

Being and Time has been misunderstood the most in this respect. When someone is of the opinion that death plays no role in his Dasein and does not need to play any role there, this opinion is nonetheless no proof against the possibility or even necessity of methodically grounding the relation to one's own death which exists in Dasein itself (be it by turning away from death or turning toward it) on a phenomenal basis for an ontological interpretation of the wholeness of Dasein. And opinions expressed in terms of a *Weltanschauung* with regard to death are an authority neither for nor against the existential analytic of Dasein. As such these opinions are only factual possibilities or special cases for concrete insight into these relations.

And as far as the opinion in the *Weltanschauung* that one can manage without death, this opinion may be right when one argues psychologically in terms of one's factual states and lived experiences. But as far as the fundamental question of the *fact* [*Faktum*] of death in Dasein is concerned, it is all the same whether someone sooner or later factually gets involved in this thought.

However far one is willing to allow corporeality [*Leiblichkeit*] to have influence upon the factual possibilities of the mind, a philosophical knowledge of the human being, as a *conceptual* knowledge, will always have to have its center in the mind—at least, to be quite cautious, as long as no one has yet succeeded in putting forth the functioning, for example of stomach juices, as an interpretation of being human.

Although the interconnection of time and apperception, of receptivity and spontaneity, is ontologically unclear and not established in the *Critique*, nevertheless there is a legitimate kernel in the methodical priority which is given to the transcendental apperception. Now, if the connection between time and apperception becomes visible on the basis of temporality, then the methodical priority must inevitably be placed on temporality itself, which is now no longer on the side of sensibility and receptivity. What we have discussed fundamentally here applies especially to the categories.

f) Transcendental Subjectivity and the Ontological Essence of Categories

Even the word itself refers the categories to statement and to judgment. And thus we see that for Kant categories are pure concepts of understanding. Because Kant understands knowledge as the unity of intuition

and concept and takes the concept as related to intuition, the essence of the categories must become ambiguous. There is in the categories a necessary relatedness to intuition, indeed an *a priori* relatedness to the pure intuition of time. Categories are transcendental grounds of the synthesis of recognition. But this synthesis is one with the other two modes of synthesis. And they are all unified on the ground of relatedness to time. But if categories are transcendental ground of pure synthesis, as transcendental they belong to the realm which enables a relation to objects—therefore, to the realm which is constituted precisely by pure synthesis. As transcendental grounds, categories do not exist outside transcendental synthesis, but are identical with it. Their essence and ownmost inner possibility requires that they belong to the constitution of objectness, that is, to transcendental affinity.

Disclosure of what relation to objects generally means on the basis of transcendental subjectivity and bringing into sharper focus the functional connection between the three syntheses in the unity of time-related transcendental apperception—this disclosure of transcendental subjectivity as uncovering of the pure possibility of objectness as such is itself an elucidation of categories. The essence of categories resides precisely in the fact that they are nothing other than determinations which constitute the object in general. Transcendental affinity as *a priori* regional grasping of nature in general is itself nothing other than the inner interconnection of categories. However, this means that it is absurd to begin with categories and then to inquire into their valid application to objects. For this application “to objects,” this general relation to objects is constituted precisely by means of the categories. Their objective reality consists in constituting objectness in general as a presupposition for empirical determinations to be able to relate to an object. Categories are not concepts about whose essence we decide only subsequently, by bringing to the fore what belongs to the grounds of the enabling of an experience in general. Rather, categories are themselves the co-grounds for enabling the experience of objects. The essence of categories is not deduced from the conditions for the possibility of experience. Rather, insofar as categories constitute the object of experience in general, they themselves are a crucial segment of the possibility of experience. That is why Kant states: “The *a priori* conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience.”⁵ Categories are “fundamental concepts by which we think objects in general for appearances and have therefore *a priori* objective validity. This is exactly what we desired to prove.”⁶ Here, in the expression “objective

5. Ibid., A 111.

6. Ibid.

validity *a priori*,” both inquiries into the transcendental deduction and the respective responses [to them] are side by side in their immediacy. Basically the notion of an “*a priori* ob-jective validity” is self-contradictory; for it states that categories are valid in relation to ob-jects and at the same time that ob-jectness in general is first constituted by categories. In this way the question of “ob-jective validity of . . .” has meaning only on the basis of the constitution of the relation to ob-jects in general which is grounded in categories—in fact the meaning of this question is that it is meaningless. By genuinely carrying out the disclosure of the dimension of origin in the sense of an ontological interpretation of subjectivity in general, we render a *quaestio juris* meaningless.

Kant expresses the same connection between “possibility of experience” and “objectness of experience” in another passage [of the *Critique*] as follows:

Synthetic *a priori* judgments are thus possible when we relate the formal conditions of *a priori* intuitions, the synthesis of imagination, and the necessary unity of this synthesis in a transcendental apperception, to a possible empirical knowledge in general. We then assert that the conditions of the *possibility of experience* in general are likewise conditions of the *possibility of the objects of experience*, and that for this reason they have objective validity in a synthetic *a priori* judgment.⁷

Here it becomes clear that categories are necessarily referred to the pure time-related synthesis. Because categories are nothing but constitutive characters of objectness in general and because this objectness is constituted on the basis of the time-related pure synthesis, therefore categories have their necessary origin in time itself. And this means that categories in general cannot be considered as mere notions when and if the necessary interconnection of time and apperception, of pure intuition and pure thinking, is brought to light. Categories are precisely *not* the pure concepts of understanding. Rather, they are concepts which result only when the original pure time-related synthesis in the unity of its modes is brought to concept on the basis of time-related apperception, as Kant correctly states in §10 of the *Critique*. Categories are primal concepts which spring up explicitly only when the pure time-related synthesis grasps itself, grasps itself in that which makes this synthesis possible.

These primal concepts necessarily lie at the basis of each intrinsically determined concept of nature. They are not the highest ontic concepts of a class, but they are basic ontological concepts which enable a regional class-unity. Insofar as categories belong to the unity of both stems of knowledge, that is, insofar as they co-constitute the *a priori* foundation

7. Ibid., B 197, A 158.

of ontic knowledge, Kant calls them root-concepts [*Stamm-begriffe*]. They are called thus, not only because all concepts are derived from them in a certain manner, but also because they themselves belong essentially to the stem of knowledge.

Kant first gains insight into the essence of categories which we have just discussed through his doctrine of schematism, even as he was not entirely clear and consistent. In view of the transcendental deduction, the “schematism of pure concepts of understanding” basically means nothing other than elimination of the previously assumed essence of categories as notions. It even means a fundamental retracting of their initially assumed character as pure concepts of understanding, i.e., means negating the idea of pure concepts of understanding.

§26. Presentation of the Possibility of Ontological Knowledge

a) Kant's Systematic Presentation of the Transcendental Deduction of Categories—“The Relation of the Understanding to Objects in General and the Possibility of Knowing Them *a priori*”

Before we delineate the structure of the chapter on schematism and its overall significance, we would like briefly to run through the systematic presentation of the transcendental deduction in the third section of the second part of “Analytic of Concepts.”

The transcendental deduction is the first task of the transcendental analytic and aims at a detailed breakdown of the faculty of understanding itself, for the explicit purpose of seeking the birthplace of pure concepts of understanding. Breaking down the faculty of understanding in detail must lead back to the subject and its subjectivity as transcendental apperception. But insofar as understanding is necessarily grounded in intuition, the breakdown of the faculty of understanding is simultaneously a breakdown of the faculty of intuition—or put more precisely, a breakdown of the possible relation between the two. The task consists in disclosing transcendental subjectivity as the original dimension of synthetic knowledge *a priori*.

α) Kant's Point of Departure from Separate Faculties of Knowledge as Condition of His Manner of Presentation of the Transcendental Deduction and the Necessity for the Mediating Function of the Power of Imagination

More than Kant, we attempted to render visible the unitary character of the original dimension, in order to let the essence of the categories spring from it. Now, even if Kant not infrequently strives toward this original

dimension, i.e., toward the boundaries of subjectivity as the unity of time and the I-think, of receptivity and spontaneity, nevertheless Kant does not proceed from this dimension of the origin disclosed in advance in its unity. Kant does not presuppose this dimension, in order then from out of it as a unified ground to render visible the *full* essence of the categories. Instead of this crucial unfolding of the essence of the categories from out of the dimension of origin, presupposed as ground, a linear and artificial inquiry predominates in Kant and now also becomes manifest in the systematic presentation of the transcendental deduction. The real question, the one that goes in the same direction as the Kantian problem, would read as follows: What are the categories when grounded in full transcendental subjectivity, grounded in the original and closed unity of sensibility and understanding? Instead of asking the question from out of the center, Kant asks in linear fashion: In the series of faculties of the subject as lined up, what is the necessary interconnection between understanding and appearances? Or the other way around: To what extent does sensibility have a necessary relation to understanding? In this vein, the ontological essence of the categories should manifest itself as precisely what mediates this interconnection and so joins together the series of the faculties.

In accord with the passage in A124 we can formulate the Kantian question still more artificially, as follows: How can both extreme ends, namely sensibility and understanding, be necessarily interconnected? What is the link which joins them together *a priori*, the link upon which the category, as it were, is mounted as something which as pure concept belongs to understanding but in this belonging must nevertheless be *a priori* related to intuition? Thus the presentation of the essence of categories turns into a discussion of the necessary interconnection between the two faculties which at first are posed as external and separate, without their common root's being thereby visible in advance, as well as the manner of this being commonly rooted.

In spite of penetrating observations which we have made together with Kant ever since the beginning of the *Critique*, in the course of which we came upon the rigid positioning of sensibility and understanding beside each other, we have not gotten beyond this artificial positioning, because this positioning directs the presentation of the transcendental deduction in its third section.

In accordance with this general point of departure, elucidation of the essence of the categories in the sense of presentation of an *a priori* necessary interconnection between sensibility and understanding can go in two directions. One way is to start with understanding, with transcendental apperception, with original unity of consciousness, and to end with sensibility, with time, with the manifold—this is the way from the “highest point” downward—in Plato, the ὁδὸς κάτω—κάθοδος. The

second way is to go up “from below,”¹ beginning with appearances—ὁδὸς ἄνω, ἄνοδος. Kant goes both ways, and the gaps in presentation are quite obvious. The first way—κάτω—comprises the text from A116 to A119. This first way begins with the statement: “If, now, we desire to follow up the inner ground of this connection of the representations to the point upon which they have all to converge in order that they may therein for the first time acquire the unity of knowledge necessary for a possible experience, we must begin with pure apperception,” i.e., must begin from above. The second way—ἄνω—is taken up in section A120 to A129 and begins with the following statement: “We will now, starting from below, namely, with the empirical, strive to make clear the necessary connection in which understanding, by means of the categories, stands to appearances.”

The first way is retained in the second edition of the *Critique* as the only and exclusive way, at least as far as the intention is concerned, and is worked out more radically and more systematically. This happens simply because between the two editions Kant subscribed again more strongly and resolutely to the traditional predominance of logic. Already the titles of the sections in this second edition render visible the course of the transcendental deduction as a course specifically geared toward transcendental logic. While the first way is most extremely elaborated upon for the first time here [in the third section], the second way is traversed in the first edition already in the earlier, second section, “The *a priori* Grounds of the Possibility of Experience”—traversed much more concretely than in the summary third section.

The presentation of both ways is preceded by a brief and general reminder, which sets the tone for the entirety of the third section. Here Kant repeats the same plan that he offered when moving to the second section of the discussion of the transcendental deduction² and then crossed out in the second edition: “There are three subjective sources of knowledge upon which rests the possibility of experience in general and of knowledge and its objects—*sense, imagination, and apperception*.”³ Here, like there, Kant points out that all these faculties have a twofold employment, an empirical and a transcendental one—the latter's being the only one with which we are now concerned.

Moreover, characteristic of the present passage is that here the transcendental apperception becomes visible in its basic function of a thorough identification. I have frequently pointed out the schism which exists in Kant's doctrine of the fundamental sources of the mind. As a rule he speaks of two, occasionally of three sources. But he does not mention

1. CPR, A 119.

2. Ibid., A 94f.

3. Ibid., A 115.

the three sources in random places, but only there where he necessarily has to move in the dimension of the origin. Naming of the three sources is an indication that here Kant pays heed to the unity of faculties and would like to use the original dimension as a whole as a point of departure. When this problem does not force itself into the open, the usual presentation of the two stems of knowledge is enough for Kant.

Thus the presentation of both ways, from above to below and from below to above, peruses the interconnection among these faculties as transcendental faculties; that is, this presentation moves within the whole of the original interconnection of the three modes of synthesis, each referring to the other. And because this depends on the interconnection and coupling of the two extreme poles of sensibility and understanding, the faculty in between, i.e., the power of imagination, plays a significant role as the connecting link. But even here there remains an imbalance, because in Kant's interpretation the power of imagination cannot absorb the two poles of sensibility and understanding as in themselves two stems of knowledge, cannot serve as the root of these two stems. Understanding and transcendental apperception oppose this, whereas pure intuition can more easily be taken into the power of imagination, as we saw in the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction. Therefore, it sometimes seems as though we have only two fundamental faculties, but not that of sensibility and understanding, but rather the power of imagination and understanding. Power of imagination increasingly extends its realm of domination; and in this section Kant even manages to take back, point by point, everything into the power of imagination.

I shall now characterize the starting point of the first way *up to the* emergence of the power of imagination and shall insert a summary observation on this power before perusing completely the first and second ways.

β) The Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception in
Relation to the Productive Synthesis of
the Power of Imagination

We now peruse with Kant the first way, which starts with the transcendental apperception. The individual steps of the presentation are so methodically laid out that Kant shows how a necessary interconnection between the power of imagination and sensibility results from out of the essence and ownmost possibility of transcendental apperception, if experience in general, i.e., synthetic knowledge, is to be possible *a priori*. This possibility of ontological understanding, the possibility of a nature in general, the possibility of synthetic knowledge *a priori*, is the guiding ontological problem overall of the *Critique*.

First Kant establishes the transcendental principle of the *unity* of all

manifold of our representations. This principle is derived from the concept of transcendental apperception itself and says that all representations as such must be capable of being taken up into one consciousness. Thus this is the principle of the necessary possibility of all representations' belonging to *one* consciousness, which for its part is always conscious of the general identity with itself.

What Kant formulates with this principle is basically nothing other than the thesis that representing something—or representedness [*Vorstellungtheit*] of something—or standing over against as such, is not possible unless the representing subject is *in itself transcendent* and unless "comportment toward," "openness for," and "standing out" or *ecstasis* belong to its *existence*.

The following second aspect is a very crucial one; but it is just this aspect that is hidden by Kant, hidden behind an almost insignificant, transitional statement. After designating the transcendental principle and without any further explanation, Kant says: "Since this unity of the manifold in one subject is synthetic, pure apperception supplies a principle of the synthetic unity of the manifold in all possible intuition."⁴ What is important here is the first part of this statement. What does Kant mean by stating that the unity of the manifold in a subject is synthetic? Nothing more than that a stroke of magic will not give and has not given the horizon of unity in its full totality. It belongs to this unity of apperception *a priori* that it stretch itself in the dimension of time. There is in this unity of apperception the original synthesis of the three syntheses; that is, the unity of consciousness is in itself such a unity of pure time-related imaginative synthesis. The above statement, which is often easily by-passed, is the most crucial statement of the entire issue of the transcendental deduction and schematism, because with this statement we come to know the genuine meaning of the finitude of the subject for the first time; we get an insight into the essence of finite knowledge over against *intuitus originarius*.

Right at the beginning of the interpretation of the *Critique* we pointed in general to the finitude of human knowledge. Put more precisely, we pointed out that from the beginning Kant poses the problem of ontological knowledge with respect to the finitude of knowing. We showed that finitude consists in the referential dependence on something extant which is given in advance and is not produced [by us]. The transcendental possibility of this giving in advance [*Vorgabe*] is the transcendental apperception. But transcendental apperception is simultaneously referred to other syntheses *and* on the basis of time. The finitude of human knowledge consists in that subjectivity as such is temporal and ecstatic.

4. Ibid., A 116.

The above statement, which at first is completely unclear, wants to say that the unity of consciousness, transcendental apperception, is essentially synthetic. The horizon of unity, unto and within which whatever is representable must be able to be encountered, is a horizon of synthetic unity, that is, a unity which is *a priori* grounded in synthesis. Kant does not clearly bring to light the reason for the necessity of the synthetic character of this unity of transcendental apperception, because he does not develop the finitude of the subject on principle from out of the subjectivity itself. Finitude is still primarily determined superficially as being created.

But if the original transcendental unity of apperception is synthetic—Kant continues with his deliberations—then this unity of apperception as such must include a synthesis, indeed an *a priori* synthesis:

This synthetic unity presupposes or includes a synthesis, and if the former is to be *a priori* necessary, the synthesis must also be *a priori*. The transcendental unit of apperception thus relates to the pure synthesis of imagination as an *a priori* condition of the possibility of all combination of the manifold in one knowledge. But only the *productive* synthesis of the *imagination* can take place *a priori*; the reproductive rests upon empirical conditions. Thus the principle of the necessary unity of pure (productive) synthesis of imagination, prior to apperception, is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience.⁵

This is the crucial passage in the whole consideration of the first way. (In the second way the passage at A124 corresponds to this consideration.)

Here we see that the synthesis on the basis of which the unity of transcendental apperception is a synthetic unity is represented by the productive synthesis of the transcendental power of imagination. Put differently, the synthetic unity of transcendental apperception is the transcendental unity of the pure productive synthesis of the power of imagination. This original synthesis of the pure power of imagination is “the ground of the possibility of all knowledge” and “prior to apperception.” What does it mean that the synthesis of the productive power of imagination is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge “prior to” [*vor*] apperception? When considered in context, this “prior” obviously means that in the order of grounds this synthesis still has a priority over transcendental apperception. The latter is not what is original; rather, it is grounded, like sensibility, in the common root of pure time-related synthesis of the productive power of imagination.

However, Kant occasionally uses the term *before* [*vor*] in its spatial or

intentional sense. “Synthesis of the power of imagination is ‘before’ [*vor*] apperception” means then that synthesis to a certain extent occurs “before the eyes” of apperception, of the “I-think.” The word *before* has this meaning, e.g., in the phrase “before intellectual intuition” (*coram intuitu intellectuali*).⁶ And in another passage Kant speaks explicitly of the object “before . . . intuition” (*vor einer . . . Anschauung*),⁷ that is, of that which intuition as such holds before itself and represents. Up to now I have not found anywhere that anyone pays attention to the difficulty of determining this “before apperception” [*vor der Apperzeption*]. However, the intentional meaning of the term *before* as well as its meaning in ranking [prior to] both have a useful sense here.* In the second way⁸ the passage which corresponds to the present passage speaks in favor of the latter meaning, according to which Kant wants to say that the pure time-related imaginative synthesis is placed *prior to* transcendental apperception as a more original synthesis. Here Kant says that only by means of this transcendental function of the power of imagination does the affinity of appearances—that is, objectness in general and the “I-think”—become possible. And already here Kant states: “This synthetic unity {of transcendental apperception} presupposes a . . . synthesis {namely, the transcendental power of imagination}.”⁹ However, right here we have the typical hesitation which is manifest in Kant whenever he is to express himself clearly about the position of the power of imagination among the faculties. First he clearly states that the unity of transcendental apperception presupposes the synthesis of the power of imagination and is grounded in it. But at the same time he adds “or includes a synthesis.” The first possibility is clear, but how the power of imagination is to be “included” in transcendental apperception cannot be demonstrated phenomenologically. At any rate, Kant did not show it. But this immediately added limitation means that Kant retreats before the consequence of eliminating the priority of transcendental apperception, of understanding, that is, of the traditional, unfounded privileged position of logic. Kant is afraid of sacrificing the transcendental apperception to the transcendental power of imagination. In the second edition of the *Critique* transcendental apperception is again elevated to its old

6. *Ibid.*, A 249.

7. *Ibid.*, A 287.

8. *Ibid.*, A 123f.

9. *Ibid.*, A 118.

*[The ambiguity that exists in the German word *vor* is the same as the ambiguity that exists in the English word *before*. Both the German *vor* and the English *before* are used in both senses: “before apperception” means both “in front of apperception” (spatial determination) and “prior to apperception” (temporal determination). As the reader sees in the sentences that follow here in the text, Heidegger’s very point is that this double meaning of *vor* (*before*) is left unresolved in Kant.]

position of supremacy as the ultimate apex to which the whole of transcendental philosophy and ontology must be attached.

γ) Characterization of the Productive Synthesis of the
Power of Imagination as Related to Time, as Unity of
Receptivity and Spontaneity, and as the Basic
Constitution of the Subject as Ecstatic

In order to see clearly the mediating function of the power of imagination in terms of both ways, before going over these paths we would like to offer a summary discussion of what is meant by “pure power of imagination” and of how far Kant interprets it. From his interpretation we gather how in his opinion the unity of pure intuition and pure apperception is to be brought about and to what extent the basic ontological essence of categories is thereby manifest.

First we take our bearings from the definition of the power of imagination which we already mentioned, i.e., *facultas imaginandi* in §28 of the *Anthropology*. There, imagination was determined as “a faculty of intuitions without the presence of the object.” Here we are talking about the empirical power of imagination. And earlier we considered this definition, in order to render visible in a general way the twofold character of the power of imagination: (1) It is an intuition, but not primarily and directly a receptive intuition but just one without the presence of the object. (2) It is a certain, free proffering to oneself of what is intuitive but still is not a full and free spontaneity. The power of imagination is simultaneously receptive and spontaneous.

Now we are concerned with a transcendental reflection, with the pure power of imagination. And this cannot be related “to an empirical intuition that we previously had in mind”¹⁰—as somehow a power of imagination which brings things back to us. The pure power of imagination is not an *exhibitio derivativa*, is not a presentation of something whereby the course of representation depends upon something’s being given empirically in advance. The pure power of imagination is *a priori*; my presentation of the object, “which thus precedes prior to experience,” is an “original presentation,”¹¹ an *exhibitio originaria*. The pure power of imagination is a *productive* power; that is, it consequently brings forth what is to be presented, completely freely from out of the acting faculty of the subject.

In the exposition of the transcendental deduction in both ways, Kant speaks now of the pure productive power of imagination: “But only the *productive synthesis* of the imagination can take place *a priori*; the reproduc-

tive rests upon empirical conditions.”¹² But what does “pure productive synthesis” mean? Unfortunately Kant does not offer a penetrating analysis of this synthesis. But from what he says about its function, especially in the schematism, we can gather directives for generally and essentially constructing this phenomenon in a freer way. Above all Kant’s statement in §28 of the *Anthropology* is important, namely that pure intuitions of time have the character of productive synthesis. Without further ado it is clear that this productive synthesis has the character of spontaneity. Kant calls it expressly “an active [*tätiges*] faculty”¹³ in us. But as imagination this active faculty is nevertheless in a certain way intuitive; that is, there is the *intuitable* without being referentially dependent on the presence of something to be intuited. Obviously in this case what is intuitable must be *a priori intuitable*; and for the transcendental power of imagination this *a priori intuitable* must be such as to be *through and through intuitable*, universal. It is only time which is through and through and purely givable [*gebbar*]. The past succession of no-longer-nows as such can be called back at any time by way of a free and non-empirical calling, without relation to what was empirically present then [*damals*] in those nows. Similarly it is possible to anticipate freely the series of not-yet-nows. Hence *productive synthesis* is nothing other than the unity of the three *syntheses insofar as they can be considered purely in terms of their ecstatic character*.

In the *Critique* Kant specifies the function of the power of imagination as follows: “. . . imagination has to bring the manifold of intuition into the form of an *image*.”¹⁴ Thus *pure* power of imagination must bring the *pure manifold* of time into the form of a *pure image*. Productive synthesis forms into “an image”; it offers productively a *figura*. Hence Kant also calls productive synthesis “*figurative synthesis*.”¹⁵ The expression *Bild* (image) means *Anblick* (view, aspect). Forming into an image, this productive synthesis offers a view of what is visible, a *species*; and this synthesis will be designated as *synthesis speciosa*.

When we are told that the power of imagination “forms,” then we must take this expression in a twofold sense, in accord with the phenomenon of imagination: (1) “To form” means to produce, to shape, to bring forth, or *producere*. (2) “To form” means offering an image, offering a view. Thus productive synthesis of imagination is the free production of a pure view. Imagination, *Ein-bildung*, is the free production of a pure view in the sense of the *unity* of possible time-relations, even if the strict meaning of the word makes this extended interpretation inadmissible.

The power of imagination is a building and forming power in the

10. *Anthropologie*, §28 (Cassirer, VIII, 54).

11. *Ibid.*

12. CPR, A 118.

13. *Ibid.*, A 120; cf. A 78.

14. *Ibid.*, A 120.

15. *Ibid.*, B 151.

sense just presented. But the pure power of imagination is a building and forming power in relation to time according to all three dimensions. That is, only by freely taking together the three horizons of time as one is the unified horizon of objectness as such formed. Every empirical knowledge of specific objects must already presuppose an advance, free formation of the overall horizon of time, indeed in such a way that each empirical object can be placed in this horizon. Only in this manner can an overall character of experience be constituted, only in this manner can the region of nature as a whole be controlled. But Kant calls the wholeness of the objectness of the region nature “transcendental affinity” and says that it is “a necessary consequence of a synthesis in imagination,”¹⁶ which is the productive function of pure forming—is the free encompassing offering of the whole of time in all stretches at all times, as what is intuitable prior to all empirical receptivity.

Thus this productive function of forming must be divided in three ways, corresponding to the modes of time. Thereby we must bear in mind that this productive synthesis protects and conceals in itself the relation to the three stretches of time. Having a clear insight into the crucial time-relatedness of the synthesis of the power of imagination, Kant once speaks of a *forming and re-forming* [*Nachbilden*], that is, of making visible again the nows which have been; of an *in-advance forming* [*Vorbilden*], that is, of letting the now which is not yet present be sighted; and of forming an image [*Abbilden*], which brings the now which is present directly before or in front of us [*Vorbilden*]. As productive, the power of imagination freely reaches out into the future, into alreadyness (the past), and into the present; and throughout this reaching the power of imagination is originally unifying.

The productive power of imagination is not limited to the past, like the reproductive empirical faculty. Rather, freely and without referential dependency on the empirical, the power of imagination as a productive faculty can image or form an image of the entirety of time and can at all times proffer time-relations *a priori*, “in which” empirical objects can then be encountered. Thus the reaching out of the original unification of pure time-relations is an original exhibition of pure time—it is *exhibitio originaria temporis*. With this expression we recall *intuitus originarius*, of which we know that it cannot indeed be attributed to the finite being but that as this creative intuition it is the idea of knowledge by which Kant measures finite knowledge. Kant measures the region of nature by the transcendental ideal, i.e., by the possibility, thought absolutely, namely the possibility of interconnection of all that can exist in general.

Finitude of knowledge consists in referential dependence on some-

thing extant, which is already given in advance empirically. By contrast, absolute intuition creates for the first time what is intuitable in intuiting. Now we see that, if the productive power of imagination plays a leading role in the structure of human finite knowledge, nay, if the power of imagination is the very unifying root of intuition and thinking, then in finite knowledge too there is something original in the sense of *originarium*. But this original faculty does not concern beings themselves, as does *intuitus originarius*, which is *ontically creative* and brings things as such into extantness. By contrast the *exhibitio originaria* of the productive synthesis of the power of imagination is only *ontologically creative*, in that it freely forms the universal horizon of time as the horizon of *a priori* resistance, i.e., of objectness. This synthesis constitutes the possibility of freely perusing the entire region “nature.”

Thus the productive power of imagination is *original*; that is, in its enactment it *gives freely*, it is a free power of creating [*Dichtungsvermögen*]. It is the ontologically radical ability as the faculty of synthesis which is transcendental and has a threefold articulation. And only because the ontologically fundamental faculty is the free ecstatic unity of original temporality, only because the ontological faculty has the character of a free possibility of creating as synthesis *speciosa*, only thus is something like the ontic attachment of empirical knowledge through appearances possible. Here the primordial relation of freedom and necessity manifests itself more concretely within the transcendental ontological problematic I have already indicated: The grasping of what is ontic as a being which exists by itself, that is this attachment to the ontic is possible only on the basis of a space for the free and creative play of the time-relations.

But if the productive power of imagination is in this way nothing but the most original unity of the three modes of synthesis, then this power has essentially already unified in itself pure intuition and pure thinking, pure receptivity and pure spontaneity—or put more precisely, this power is the root which releases both from out of itself. The productive power of imagination is the root of the faculties of subjectivity; it is the basic ecstatic constitution of the subject, of Dasein itself. Insofar as the power of imagination releases pure time from out of itself, as we have shown (and this means that the power of imagination contains pure time as a possibility), it is original temporality and therefore the radical faculty of ontological knowledge.

Nevertheless we must bear in mind that Kant neither sees the original, unified character of the productive power of imagination with reference to receptivity and spontaneity (time and transcendental apperception), nor does he undertake the further radical step of getting to know this productive power of imagination as the original ecstatic temporality. However, if one goes so far, then the productive pure power of imagination proves to be the root of both stems of knowledge, of intuition and thinking, but *not* the link between the two poles of sensibility and

16. Ibid., A 123.

understanding. The ambiguous starting point of the Kantian problem is documented in the formula which reads “productive power of imagination as a root and as a link.”

In the analysis of the twofold presentation of the transcendental deduction in the third section, that is, in taking up both ways which should traverse the interconnection between sensibility and understanding, the productive power of imagination is always perused as what is in the middle and what mediates—from transcendental apperception in the first way and from appearances and sensibility in the second way. In this fashion the transcendental power of imagination is each time given a different character, which in spite of this difference expresses the unity of the twofold character of the phenomenon.

On the first way, when we come from the unity of transcendental apperception, this unity turns out to be the unity of a synthesis, in such a way that this synthesis itself is an articulated synthesis, in the sense of the three modes. But this threefold articulated synthesis, so to speak, belongs to transcendental apperception and is a productive, *a priori*, and spontaneous synthesis. On the second way and proceeding from the manifold, the necessity for an articulated synthesis also emerges, in order to be able to survey the manifold as a whole. Therefore, in view of the relatedness of this synthesis to the intuitive manifold, the synthesis itself must have the character of intuition. To this extent it is not so much the spontaneity that is stressed on this way but rather the function of forming into an image. Kant even says here: “For . . . the synthesis of imagination . . . though exercised *a priori* {that is, carried out spontaneously} is always in itself sensible {finite}.”¹⁷ But we know that the essence and ownmost possibility of sensibility does not consist in the functioning of the sense organs. Rather, sensibility means an intuitive giving and letting-be-given-to-itself. “The power of imagination belongs to sensibility” means that the power of imagination is precisely the faculty of *spontaneous* giving of images—is *exhibitio originaria*. It means that, over against understanding and intuition, the power of imagination is original, because it is in unity first and above all *both*. Because the power of imagination is finite in the true sense of the word, understanding too is “sensible,” i.e., is *finite*.

δ) Demonstration of the *a priori* Interconnection between
Transcendental Apperception and Pure Intuition as
Presentation of the Ob-jective Reality and Ontological
Essence of Categories

Now let us take up again the movement of the first way, in order to focus on the guiding problem, that of the transcendental deduction, that is,

disclosure of the basic ontological essence of the categories. In representing a necessary interconnection between transcendental apperception and appearance, we will have to pay attention to how the ontological essence of the categories comes to light. According to his point of departure Kant must show that understanding has a necessary *a priori* relation to appearances. If this relation exists, then as pure concepts of understanding the categories necessarily and *a priori* determine appearances, objects, then they are constitutive determinations of objectness in general.

Now, how does Kant demonstrate this necessary *a priori* interconnection between pure understanding, i.e., transcendental apperception, and appearances? Proceeding from the unity of transcendental apperception as the necessary dimension needed for representations’ possibly belonging to me, Kant states that this unity is a synthetic one. As a synthetic unity, it presupposes a synthesis, and an *a priori* synthesis. The synthetic unity presupposes such a synthesis which thoroughly dominates the entire dimension of what is giveable [*des Gebbaren*] and which can freely give all three horizons of time at any time *a priori*. This synthesis must be the productive synthesis of the power of imagination, because only this productive synthesis stretches itself in these three dimensions. Insofar as the power of imagination, which is essentially time-related, relates *a priori* to the pure temporal relations of the manifold,¹⁸ and is the synthesis which underlies the synthetic unity of transcendental apperception, it is simultaneously the synthesis of time as pure form of all appearances. *Consequently the pure synthesis of the productive time-related power of imagination contains the transcendental unity of the synthesis of apperception as the synthesis of pure time as the form of appearances.* Consequently, pure time-related imaginative synthesis originally connects the unity of transcendental apperception, as a necessary synthetic unity, with the pure manifold of time as the condition for the possibility of the appearing of objects of empirical intuition. “Transcendental unity of the synthesis of imagination (is) the pure form of all possible knowledge; and by means of it all objects of possible experience must be represented *a priori*.”¹⁹

Thus as *rules* of synthesis the *unities* which belong to pure imaginative synthesis and their *a priori* possible changes determine every object in an *a priori* manner. Thus these unities—these categories—are essentially those determinations which, on the basis of productive synthesis of the power of imagination, relate to that which this synthesis forms into an image and lets be seen—they relate to time, which in turn *a priori* determines the appearances as empirical objects. Thus we see to what extent an ob-jective reality necessarily and *a priori* belongs to categories

17. *Ibid.*, A 124.

18. Cf. A 118.

19. *Ibid.*

(as pure concepts of understanding) with reference to empirical objects. Categories are *a priori* objectively real, because they pertain to what is objective in the object as such.

Now we see that, if transcendental apperception as a radical faculty of understanding presupposes *a priori* the productive, time-related synthesis of the power of imagination, then pure understanding itself has a necessary relation to the pure power of imagination. Precisely here Kant fails to be sufficiently clear. On the one hand he says that pure understanding presupposes the productive power of imagination, but then he states that understanding includes the power of imagination. And even more vague is the formulation that understanding has a necessary relation to the power of imagination. From a purely technical point of view, ever since the interpretation of the pure synthesis of recognition, we have seen more than once that understanding itself is rooted in the unity of the three syntheses, that is, understanding is grounded in the threefold division of the productive power of imagination. But this means that the functions of the unity of understanding, that is, the notions, belong to the productive power of imagination as the unities of the synthesis of pure understanding. But because the power of imagination constitutes the pure form of all knowledge, “we have, therefore, to recognize that pure understanding, by means of the categories, is a formal and synthetic principle of all experiences, and that appearances have a necessary relation to the understanding.”²⁰ This statement is important insofar as in its expression it justifies the new knowledge that pure understanding is not an analytic principle of knowledge, but a synthetic principle, since it is essentially subordinated and belongs to the original pure time-related synthesis of the power of imagination. With this insight Kant takes a stand against the entire tradition and above all against Leibniz.

After descending in this fashion from transcendental apperception to appearances, descending indeed so that now the productive power of imagination becomes the actual vehicle, on the second way Kant now ascends in the opposite direction, from appearances to the summit of the transcendental apperception. This is the course already taken in the preparatory second section of the transcendental deduction in the first edition [of the *Critique*]. However, systematic traversing of the second way in the third section makes the total context and the guiding problem more clear. The second section ran into the difficulty that Kant simply began with the characterization of the three modes of synthesis and only in describing the synthesis of recognition suddenly says what he understands by “object” and also here mentions that the *relation* to the object itself poses a transcendental problem. Now Kant begins immediately with

this problematic. He does not begin with the tumult of sensations and the mass of appearances. Instead he inquires immediately into their possible objective reality, into their objectness. He stresses that they cannot have any objectness without the unity of consciousness, without transcendental apperception. Thus the goal of this path is determined in advance.

If appearance is taken in terms of the psychic state of representing, then appearances have no objectness. However, if we understand appearances as what is represented, then the “relation to something,” the relation to the object in general, enters the game. But this relation is constituted in the pure original time-related synthesis of the power of imagination, that is, in pure knowledge *a priori*. Therefore Kant states that appearances as objects exist “only in knowledge.”²¹ But this does not mean that they are something psychic and subjective. On the contrary, it means that they have their transcendence as object only on the basis of pure productive synthesis. Appearances as what shows itself as such as ontic shows itself only on the basis of ontological knowledge, that is, on the basis of original transcendence.

Thus Kant shows that the manifoldness of appearances must be gone through, be taken up, and be repeatable and identifiable, if this manifoldness is to constitute in its manifoldness the whole of the region of “nature.” But this seizing, this taking together and identifying, presupposes the abiding and unchanging “I” of the pure apperception, for the

abiding and unchanging “I” (of pure apperception) forms the correlate of all our representations, insofar as it is at all possible that we should become conscious of them. All consciousness as truly belongs to an all-comprehensive pure apperception, as all sensible intuition, as representation, does to a pure inner intuition, namely, to time.²²

But what links *a priori* transcendental apperception to time is the productive power of imagination. Unlike in the second section, Kant now makes visible the productive power of imagination in its transcendental function, whereas in the second section this power was taken as a reproductive one. Synthesis requires unity. Unity requires synthesis. Here there is an original correlation which indicates that neither factor is to be derived from the other, but rather that both have a common root, neither only intuition nor only thinking but both, in terms of possibility.

As pure concepts, categories belong to pure understanding; that is, they belong to the transcendental apperception. As elements of understanding, categories are simultaneously and necessarily related to intu-

20. Ibid., A 119.

21. Ibid., A 120.

22. Ibid., A 123f.

ition, that is, to the pure intuition of time. This essence of the categories, to stretch in the directions of pure understanding *and* pure time, gets shown when the necessary *a priori* interconnection between transcendental apperception and pure sensibility is demonstrated. Kant presents this demonstration in both ways. But this means that categories are such determinations as to constitute pure time as *a priori* ability to resist, as objectness. Put differently, if these pure concepts are employed in pure judgments and if these judgments are to be true—that is, to agree with or correspond to objects—then the measure and ground for employment of these pure concepts in pure judgments must reside in pure time. As pure intuition, pure time enables a pure *a priori* field for identifying such propositions, which are pure categorical propositions, that is, propositions which do not employ empirical concepts and nonetheless state something about objects themselves, namely, their objectness.

b) The Possibility of Synthetic Judgments *a priori* and the Possibility of Ontological Knowledge

We would like to hold onto what we just said, as the outcome of the transcendental deduction and as elucidation of the ontological essence of categories; and we would like to see what we have gained by responding to the problem of the transcendental deduction in view of the guiding problem of the *Critique*. We are inquiring into the possibility of traditional metaphysics as an ontic science of the supersensible. But ontic science is grounded primarily in the ontological knowledge of the being-structure of each region of objects [*Gegenstandsregion*] of the respective ontic science. What does ontological knowledge mean? Ontological knowledge is an inherent but non-experiential knowledge. In what is the intrinsic possibility of such a pure *a priori* knowledge grounded? How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?

We have obtained the answer to these questions from the transcendental deduction, even if this doctrine in the end is not founded. The transcendental deduction shows that pure intuition of time and pure thinking are *a priori* and necessarily related. But the relation of intuition and thinking is an inherent knowledge. The pure *a priori* relation between pure intuition and thinking is pure, inherent, synthetic knowledge. Time as pure intuition and in *a priori* unity with transcendental apperception is the dimension from which all *a priori* thought-determinations of pure intuition receive their legitimacy. Synthetic knowledge *a priori* is possible on the basis of the original synthetic unity of the pure productive power of imagination, that is, on the basis of temporality. But temporality is the basic constitution of human Dasein. On the basis of Dasein's original constitution it is possible for Dasein to

have pure understanding of being and of determinations of being. Understanding of being in general is constituted on the basis of the temporality of Dasein. And only because something like this is possible can Dasein as an existing being comport itself toward beings that are not Dasein and simultaneously toward a being that Dasein itself is.

Although Kant did not unfold the problem of ontological knowledge in such a fundamental way and did not push the possibility of a radical resolution this far, nevertheless he offers a hint at the problem. We must value this hint even more, the more we realize that the phenomenon of time to which Kant must necessarily come is not conceived as original temporality. But because he does realize that time is pure self-affection and is necessarily and intrinsically interconnected with the productive power of imagination, Kant has taken essential steps beyond this understanding, in spite of his firm attachment to the traditional and ordinary understanding of time. If we want to understand the function which Kant attributes to time in his doctrine of the schematism of pure concepts of understanding, we must by all means rely on the concept of time which is articulated in terms of the idea of pure self-affection and the productive power of imagination.

But because the synthesis is rooted in the pure time-related power of imagination and because a more radical interpretation of time reveals the power of imagination to be temporality, it becomes clear that synthesis in general is rooted in time and pure synthesis in pure time. This means that the roots of the ontologically fundamental problem of the inner possibility of synthetic knowledge *a priori* reach back into temporality. If we radicalize the Kantian problem of ontological knowledge in the sense that we do not limit this problem to the ontological foundation of the positive sciences and if we do not take this problem as a problem of judgment but as the radical and fundamental question concerning the possibility of understanding being in general, then we shall arrive at the philosophically fundamental problematic of *Being and Time*. Time will then no longer be understood in terms of the ordinary concept of time, but in terms of temporality as the original unity of the ecstatic constitution of Dasein. Being will then no longer be understood in terms of nature's being extant, but rather in that universal sense which encompasses in itself all possibilities of regional variation. *Universality of being and radicality of time are the two titles which together denote the tasks which a further thinking of the possibility of metaphysics calls for.*

Let us return to the Kantian problem. As synthetic determinations, synthetic judgments *a priori* are related to time. These pure time-determinations articulate time in terms of the ability to resist, in terms of *a priori* objectness, which in turn determines each empirical object *a priori*. In these synthetic judgments *a priori*, as pure time-determinations, is

constituted the relation to objectness in general, the objectivity of objects.²³ But Kant calls “transcendental” everything which functions in the sense of enabling the pure relation to objects as such. Therefore, synthetic judgments *a priori*, as articulation of *a priori* rules of affinity and as pure temporal propositions, are transcendental time-determinations.

To illustrate this, let us take the first group of dynamic-ontological principles, those which state *a priori* [something] about the existence of nature. Kant calls these principles analogies of experience (a term which we shall not pursue here) and mentions three of them. The first analogy is the principle of permanence of substance: “All appearances contain the permanent (substance) as the object itself, and the transitory as its mere determination, that is, as a way in which the object exists.”²⁴ In all changes of appearances, substance is permanent. The second analogy is the principle of succession in time according to the law of causality: “Everything that happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes something upon which it follows *according to a rule*.”²⁵ The third analogy, the principle of coexistence, existence at the same time [*Zugleichsein*] according to the law of interaction or community, reads as follows: “All substances, so far as they coexist, stand in thoroughgoing community, that is, in mutual interaction.”²⁶

Permanence, succession in time, succession and co-existence are obviously temporal relations. These relations are articulated in these ontological propositions as constitutive for the objectness of nature as such. These and other ontological principles are concretely and definitely present to Kant’s mind under the title of synthetic judgments *a priori*. But in order to understand what these principles as such are and what they are supposed to be, we need the careful observations which we have carried out in this semester. If one begins to understand the decisive, basic problem of metaphysics as ontology, then it is more appropriate to begin dealing with the problematic right away by dealing with these concrete synthetic judgments *a priori*. Kant basically saw this himself. In a letter to his student Sigismund Beck, who wanted to present Kant’s main doctrine in an accessible form, Kant, as it were, offers him the arrangement of his book and, before giving this arrangement, writes the following with regard to the positive part of the *Critique*:

In a word, I consider it advisable to get on with doing the work as quickly as possible, since this entire analysis has as its sole aim to show that experience itself is possible only by means of certain synthetic *a priori* propositions, but

23. Cf. B 218ff., A 176ff.

24. Ibid., A 182.

25. Ibid., A 189.

26. Ibid., A 211.

that experience will be made intelligible for the first time when these principles are really presented.²⁷

Thus it is crucial that the ontological principles be concretely presented.

c) The Significance of Kant’s Doctrine of Schematism

The above presentation makes clear that the possibility of synthetic judgments *a priori* becomes intelligible on the basis of the ontological essence of categories. Thus the fundamental problem is resolved, and now we have only to be concerned with presenting concretely precisely these synthetic principles *a priori* in their system.

Accordingly, understood properly as disclosure of the origin, the transcendental deduction would assume the central function in the positive part of the *Critique*. But now, between transcendental deduction and systematic presentation of all principles we find the piece entitled “The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding.” This is the first major part of the “Analytic of Principles,” respectively of the transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment. We have frequently stated that this piece is the central piece of the *Critique*. It is difficult to gain insight into the significance of this piece because of the Kantian architectonic of the presentation, which, as we have repeatedly pointed out, is determined by clues that are foreign to the subject matter. In comparison with general logic transcendental logic is a special logic; nevertheless the division of the transcendental logic is carried out in terms of the division of formal logic into the doctrine of concept, proposition or judgment, and conclusion. It is relative to this division that Kant sets up a transcendental analytic of concepts and principles. But between the two there is the schematism of pure concepts of understanding.

However, a major result of our interpretation consists in the fact that categories *cannot* be taken as isolated concepts of understanding; they are essentially related to time. In a renewed summary of the results of the transcendental deduction Kant himself states that “we have seen . . . that pure *a priori* concepts, in addition to the function of understanding expressed in the category, must contain *a priori* certain formal conditions of sensibility, namely, those of inner sense (i.e., time).”²⁸

More precisely, categories belong essentially to the original whole of the pure time-related imaginative synthesis. Thus it would not do at all to set up an isolated analytic of concepts and then to inquire into their employment in a subsequent part. The question is the following: What

27. Letter of 20 January 1772 (Cassirer, X, Nr. 275, 116).

28. CPR, B 178f., A 139f.

belongs to pure synthesis as such and how do its concrete variations look as regional principles of nature?

By contrast, Kant succumbs to the external schema of the division of logic and thus deprives himself of a clear and radical result. However, this claim cannot be readily sustained: The segment devoted to schematism, which stands between the analytic of concept and principles and which cannot have any correspondence to formal logic, is Kant's elementary self-defence against violation by the external architectonic of formal logic, i.e., concept, judgment, and conclusion.

In the schematism Kant attempts to grasp the synthesis *a priori* of the productive power of imagination in a unified and original manner. He makes this attempt in such a way that he no longer tries to work out more clearly the pure essence of categories, but rather [to work out] the basis of this essence, the inner possibility of categories, that is, the pure transcendental propositions of time. Now Kant tries to show that pure concepts of understanding as categories function only on the basis of a procedure of understanding according to which understanding obtains a pure image for its concepts in pure time. Understanding is closely tied into the original unity of the three time-related modes of synthesis, as we have basically worked it out already. Precisely as understanding it can function in no other way than as essentially related to time. For Kant schematism is understanding's character as necessarily an enactment by which understanding presents itself in time, that is, working with schemata, shapes, images or views, working with what is purely intuitable, that is, working with pure temporal relations. The schemata of pure concepts of understanding, the categories, are *a priori* time-determinations and as such they are a transcendental product of the pure power of imagination.²⁹

In the way in which we set out to interpret the transcendental aesthetic and analytic, especially the transcendental deduction, we fundamentally dealt with the problem of the schematism. Viewed in terms of the arrangement of the Kantian presentation, the schematism grounds the transcendental deduction, although Kant does not understand schematism in this way. Viewed in terms of our interpretation, the schematism is a reference to the original sphere of the radical grounding of the possibility of ontological knowledge.

When some years ago I studied the *Critique of Pure Reason* anew and read it, as it were, against the background of Husserl's phenomenology, it opened my eyes; and Kant became for me a crucial confirmation of the accuracy of the path which I took in my search. Certainly an authority as such is never a justification, and something is not true just

because Kant has said it. Nevertheless Kant has *the* immense significance in education for scientific, philosophical work; and one can trust him fully. In Kant as in no other thinker one has the immediate certainty that he does not cheat. And the most monstrous danger in philosophy consists in cheating, because all efforts do not have the massive character of a natural scientific experiment or that of an historical source. But where the greatest danger of cheating is, there is also the ultimate possibility for the genuineness of thinking and questioning. The meaning of doing philosophy consists in awakening the need for this genuineness and in keeping it awake.

29. Ibid., B 185.

Editor's Epilogue

Martin Heidegger's university lecture course "Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*" was given in Marburg in the winter semester 1927/28, meeting four hours a week. The present text is based on Heidegger's own manuscript (which had to be transcribed) as well as on the handwritten copy of the lecture course by Hermann Mörchén.

In comparison with the manuscript text of the lecture course, the handwritten copy proved to be largely a rough reproduction of the lecture course as delivered, according to the manuscript text. However, in some cases the handwritten copy reproduced statements which exist in the manuscript itself only as notes on the right side of the manuscript page, in the space reserved for insertions. In keeping with the editorial guidelines, these statements, as well as insertions and additions by Heidegger, have been inserted into the text of the lecture course. Because Heidegger's reference marks are not uniform, I was unable to determine with any accuracy the point at which Heidegger meant the insertions to go. Rather, I could arrange these insertions in the text only by keeping in mind the genuine intention.

The text of the lecture course was fully worked out by Heidegger. Only in a few cases did I have to fill out the formulations of some key-words in marginal notes, with the help of the handwritten copy. However, the text of the lecture course was not divided into chapters and paragraphs that matched its own content. The few titles which exist in the manuscript refer to the main sections of the *Critique* that are being interpreted. On the other hand, in preparing the table of contents, my intention was to sum up each stage of the interpretation as completely as possible and to reproduce it in its content, in order to offer a precise overview of the course of interpretation. As can also be seen in the text, the present formulations of the titles resulted in part from questions which came to Heidegger in the course of analyzing the text and became thematic for further interpretation and in part from such statements which precisely sum up the content of a segment of interpretation.

In its introduction, which lays out the direction of the interpretation, the lecture course ties into the end of the lecture course entitled "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" (vol. 24 of the *Complete Edition* of Heidegger's works). More extensively than in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, this lecture course offers a determination of the relation between positive science, scientific philosophy or ontology, and fundamental ontology. The introduction presents the relation of the pre-ontological understanding of the being of Dasein to the project of the

ontological constitution of specific realms of beings which Dasein objectifies. Formation of objectification is exemplified by the genesis of the modern mathematical sciences. Such an objectification—e.g., that of the being called "nature"—is to be established by an ontology as an objectification of the being of this being. The problem of the *Critique of Pure Reason* appears to be the problem of laying the foundation of *metaphysica specialis* as a science of supersensible beings and, closely connected with this, the question concerning the conditions for the possibility of a science of beings in general. All founding ontological knowledge contains an expansion of knowledge of beings, but as a knowledge which is independent of experience and is pure—as synthetic judgments *a priori*. How is this ontological understanding of beings, this synthetic knowledge *a priori*, this ontological transcendental philosophical knowledge possible? These questions constitute the fundamental problem of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Laying the foundation of metaphysics as science is for Kant not only a laying of the foundation of ontology. Executing such a laying of foundation proves to be at the same time a limiting of possible knowledge *a priori* of pure reason, that is, this laying of the foundation proves to be a critique.

The later work *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, in its very compressed presentation, does not consider both of the sections of the introduction, "The Significance of Laying the Foundation of a Science" and "Relation between Founding a Science and Philosophy," so that the present lecture course offers a broader access to the intention of Heidegger's Kant-interpretation.

When compared with *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, the phenomenological interpretation of the transcendental aesthetic and the first book of the transcendental analytic is less a detached presentation than a working out of a Kant-interpretation by way of a precise and detailed analysis of the text. This interpretation takes up the text section by section and explains to the last detail the significance of each concept in terms of its content. It also considers parallel passages and other corresponding texts of Kant, in order to set off the lack of clarity and to develop continuing inquiries.

Because it stays so close to the text and because of limitations of time, the lecture course does not explicitly interpret the "Analytic of Principles" and "The Schematism of Pure Concepts of Understanding." But in the manner in which the interpretation is set, especially the interpretation of the transcendental deduction, the problem of the schematism is dealt with in principle. A summary of his interpretation of the schematism is given in §26 "Presentation of the Possibility of Ontological Knowledge":

Synthetic knowledge *a priori* is possible on the basis of the original synthetic unity of the pure productive power of imagination, that is, on the basis of

temporality. But temporality is the basic constitution of human Dasein. On the basis of Dasein's original constitution it is possible for Dasein to have pure understanding of being and of determinations of being. Understanding of being in general is constituted on the basis of the temporality of Dasein. And only because something like this is possible can Dasein as an existing being comport itself toward beings that are not Dasein and simultaneously toward a being that Dasein itself is.

The assistance that I have received in preparing the manuscript for print obliges me to offer many thanks—especially to Dr. Hermann Mörchen, who put the very legible original of his handwritten copy of the lecture course at my disposal for the present work. I am also grateful to Professor von Herrmann, whose constant willingness to offer useful advice and whose expertise in deciphering the most minute gaps in the text has benefited this volume. I am grateful to Mr. Volker Biedorf, Cand. Phil., to Mr. Matthias Schmidt, Cand. Phil., from the *Philosophisches Seminar* of the University of Kiel, to Mr. Harald Trede, and to Mr. Klaus Neugebauer (Freiburg), for their careful work in reading the proofs.

Ingtraud Görland

Glossary of German Terms

This glossary intends to list those German expressions in Heidegger's text which are philosophically the most significant and/or the most difficult to render into English.

<i>abbilden</i> : to form an image	<i>der Körper</i> : solid matter
<i>die Abbildung</i> : forming an image	<i>die Leiblichkeit</i> : corporeality
<i>ad-percipere</i> : grasp along with	<i>die Nachbildung</i> : re-forming
<i>auf-greifen</i> : to seize (see Translators' Foreword)	<i>das Objekt</i> : ob-ject (see Translators' Foreword)
<i>die Ausbildung</i> : development, unfolding	<i>percipere</i> : grasp
<i>die Auseinandersetzung</i> : coming to grips with	<i>die Sache</i> : thing, subject matter
<i>begreifen</i> : to comprehend, to grasp	<i>die Sachhaltigkeit</i> : dynamics
<i>die Begründung</i> : justification	<i>die Sachlage</i> : situation
<i>beharrlich</i> : permanent (see Translators' Foreword)	<i>sachlich</i> : factual
<i>bergen</i> : to protect, to shelter	<i>die Seinsverfassung</i> : ontological constitution
<i>bilden</i> : form (see Translators' Foreword)	<i>die Umstellung</i> : conversion
<i>Dichtungsvermögen</i> : power of creating	<i>der Vollzug</i> : enactment, accomplishment
<i>durchgehen</i> : to run through	<i>die Vor-gabe</i> : giving in advance
<i>durchhalten</i> : to maintain	<i>vor-haft</i> : being-in-advance
<i>die Einigkeit</i> : unity, onefold	<i>vor</i> : before (spatial), prior to (temporal)
<i>entwerfen</i> : to open up	<i>vor-bilden</i> : to form in advance
<i>der Entwurf</i> : opening up, projection	<i>die Vorbildung</i> : forming in advance
<i>der Gegenstand</i> : object (see Translators' Foreword)	<i>vorhanden</i> : extant
<i>die Gegenstandsbezogenheit</i> : object-relatedness	<i>Wesen</i> : essence, ownmost inner possibility, essence and ownmost inner possibility, way of being (see Translators' Foreword)
<i>gegenstehen</i> : to stand over against	<i>wesenhaft, wesentlich</i> : essential
<i>gemein</i> : shared, common	<i>Wesenszug</i> : fundamental thrust
<i>das Gemüt</i> : mind	<i>zugrundeliegen</i> : to be at the basis of
<i>die Geschichtlichkeit</i> : non-historiographical historicity	
<i>die Gestalt</i> : figure	