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"grown-up abused children" cope with their personal and interpersonal problems. The book reports experiences resulting from the collaboration of a social service professor and a campus minister who first worked with groups of college students and then expanded their program to the community.

The four-chapter book begins with an analysis of the major personal and interpersonal problems experienced by child-abuse victims as adults. Erikson's theory of human development (*Childhood and Society*, 1963) is the theoretical base used to explain the relationship between child abuse and the current problems of the abused adult. The authors then describe how the goals and strategies of the support group help alleviate each of the problems that have resulted from abuse. The third chapter should be especially useful to practitioners because it deals with the experiences of group members, including both the advantages for them of group support techniques and the special problems former victims have in interacting with other members and group leaders and in gaining understanding of their problems.

The authors are careful to logically relate former victims' problems to group goals and strategies. They discuss implementation of group process, including the leaders' roles. Examples from their group experiences are used to illustrate major points. Finally, the last chapter is devoted to how group leaders use group structure and process and their own discussion of participants' behavior to help members gain understanding and behavioral change. They have found, for example, that it is particularly useful to have two leaders, a man and a woman, in dealing with the complexity of individual and group responses. Male and female leaders are available as role models as well as modeling interpersonal relations between men and women.

From the sociological standpoint the book has two shortcomings that are sometimes associated with the descriptive reports of practitioners. First, the authors do not directly link their work to current research on family violence or to the use of group techniques in dealing with the results of abuse and related problems. Second, there is no attempt to conduct evaluative research to subject the techniques they have developed to empirical test. We are told only that individuals have benefited and that some drop out. Follow-up reports on the participants are not provided. Thus, we do not receive information that

would be useful in conducting such programs, such as who seems to benefit and who does not.

The major strength of the work is the logical means whereby former victims' problems are related to group support processes that give participants not only greater understanding of their behavior but the opportunity to practice alternative behaviors in a supportive atmosphere. The authors show the reader how they have learned to deal with the special difficulties grown-up abused children experience in groups. The illustrations are excellent. Sociologists who are working in mental health settings or counseling programs or wherever they have the opportunity to meet the many grown-up abused children will find much in this book to help guide their efforts.

Theory

Science and the Revenge of Nature: Marcuse and Habermas, by C. FRED ALFORD. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1985. 226 pages. \$24.50 cloth.

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This work is an analysis of the way two members of the Frankfurt School of critical theory deal with the issue of science and its relationship to both society and nature. It emphasizes their concept of science as a product of the tradition from Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, with its emphasis on the innate subjective, instrumental, and technological assumptions underlying science's relationship to nature and to human beings. Both men deal with the issue that as the Enlightenment concept of rationality frees us from nature by manipulating and dominating the external environment, it also has the effect of dominating and controlling the inner nature of the human being (the playful and erotic aspects of human nature). It is over the issues of the instrumentality of science, the domination of nature, the disenchantment of the world, and the possible irrationality of Western rationality that Marcuse and Habermas frame their analysis.

Marcuse responds to the dilemma of the early Frankfurt School by developing his theory of the "new science" and the "Great Refusal," while Habermas responds by developing his theory of cognitive interests and

the split between the rationality inherent in technical and instrumental interests (in science) and communicative and practical interests (in social interaction). The major problem that develops for Alford is that Marcuse's response is too vague and impressionistic, while Habermas surrenders nature to the anthropocentric priorities of subjugation and control at the same time as he reserves emancipation for the area of intersubjective activity—communicative interaction.

Habermas through his dualistic concept of rationality completes the ideals of the Enlightenment, while Marcuse questions their very foundations. However, as Alford points out, even this perspective is too simplistic because both Marcuse's and Habermas' ideas change over time, are more complex than as stated above, and also contain irreconcilable inconsistencies that do not permit easy categorization. Alford compares the strengths and weaknesses of both authors and places their perspectives within the context of contemporary debates between the old philosophy of science and the contemporary views (Kuhn, Feyerabend, Rorty, Quine, and Hesse).

Alford emphasizes the sense of lostness, alienation (Heidegger's notion of the thrownness of *Dasein*), and homelessness in his analysis of Marcuse from the latter's doctoral dissertation, *Der deutsche Künstlerroman*, with its emphasis on the separation of the erotic and the aesthetic part of the artist from the real world; to *Hegels Ontologie*, with the drive to overcome the dualisms and separations of the Kantian antinomies—subjectivity and objectivity, existence and essence, and actuality and potentiality; to his 1933 article on Marx and labor and the desire to overcome the alienation of the capitalist system. At times Marcuse understands the role of science to "let nature be what it would like to be" and at other times it is clear that the instrumental interpretation of science is viewed as a necessary stage in the development of freedom. It appears that Marcuse's inability to reconcile the two perspectives lies in his confusion over the relationship between science and freedom, where the emphasis is on instrumental science (*Eros and Civilization*), and science and play, where the emphasis is on new science (*One-Dimensional Man*, *Essay on Liberation*, and *Counterrevolution and Revolt*).

Whether the stress is on the realization of traditional science or the creation of a new form of science, the goal is always the

same—political, economic, and psychological freedom. In both cases the critique of science is the same—science is a priori technological and instrumental and therefore irrational and ideological. Where the confusion comes from is his orientation to this view of science, that is, whether the stress is on the aesthetic and erotic or on social freedom. For Alford it is ultimately pleasure and gratification gained from the application of instrumental rationality and the freeing of the individual from the bonds of alienated labor that will in the end win out over the potential rational reconciliation between humans and nature in the new science.

Alford begins his analysis of Habermas with an examination of post-Kuhnian philosophy of science and the importance of the Duhem-Quine thesis about the nature of scientific evidence and objectivity; he then relates the intellectual openness and pluralism of their theories to the instrumental reductionism and quasitranscendentalism of Habermas' view of science. Alford reviews the critical literature on Habermas' view of science from the writings of McCarthy, Hesse, Ottmann, Whitebook, and Keat; he then turns to Habermas' response to these same critics. Alford ultimately sees the inability of Habermas' analysis to deal with the revenge of inner nature, the environmental crisis, or Habermas' limitation of the range of the abstract possibilities of science (instrumental reductionism) as the three major problems associated with the latter's study.

It is Habermas' reaction to the early Frankfurt School as it is mediated through Piaget's notions of decentering and desocialization of nature and Weber's concept of rationalization and the social differentiation of reason that provide him with the basis for his response to his critics and the realization of his Enlightenment goal of rationality. In the conclusion Alford remarks that Marcuse's project "has run into the dead-end" while Habermas' project "may have reached an impasse." It is a very interesting and challenging analysis which, however, lacks two crucial elements: first, there should have been more emphasis on contemporary philosophers of science to see if there is anything in their perspectives that could lead the reader out of the dead-end of Marcuse and the impasse of Habermas. Second, the practical and historical applications and implications of science and technology in political economy are missing, which would have been valuable for

an understanding of their implications for Western rationality. This could have been used to direct us into more efficacious avenues of investigation and to the possibility of rethinking these issues on another level entirely. The reader is left hanging without a sense of where and how Alford would turn in order to work himself out of the dialectic of the Enlightenment.

Three Sociological Traditions, by RANDALL COLLINS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 255 pp. \$8.95 paper.

Three Sociological Traditions: Selected Readings, edited by RANDALL COLLINS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 335 pp. \$9.95 paper.

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In the first of this charming pair of books, Collins joins Alexander, Ritzer, and Irving Zeitlin in defining the major paradigms within sociology and in arguing that paradigm disputes, requiring so much time and energy, are not worth the effort. It is not inevitable that about halfway between the BA and the MA all fledgling social scientists should decide whether they wish to join forces with the conflict, Durkheimian, or microsociological tradition. Rather, we should all strive to be paradigm bridgers in the style of Collins himself, whom the reader encounters among the "main points" of both the conflict tradition (48) and the Durkheimian tradition (120) and whose work of late has been micro-interactionist. We should no longer act as one another's gravediggers, as Herbert Blumer is said to have done (201) when he first defined symbolic interactionism as an alternative to functionalism. The ideal type among paradigm bridgers is Max Weber, and Weberian sociology is clearly Collins' preference.

Throughout Collins' basic argument we find assorted microbenefits: an attempt to give Friedrich Engels his due as a founder of sociology (56ff); a recognition of Durkheim's strong interest in demography and statistics (133, 136); a demonstration of the way "alliance theory" brings together minds as disparate as Lévi-Strauss and Marvin Harris; an appreciation of C. Wright Mills, the conscience of American sociology; an excellent and fair-minded treatment of ethnomethodology. And there are many more.

On several matters I found myself quarreling with Collins. At first these matters seemed highly disparate and unconnected, but I soon realized that most of Collins' peccadillos arise from a single source—a strong, pervasive, and perhaps subconscious doubt that a science of society can be created.

Item: Collins claims (41) that because Quetelet's statistical laws involve no more than "a few simple probabilities" and a strong prospect of predicting "rates of population change or crime," interest in Quetelet soon "fell away as the statistics failed to live up to the claims." This alleged failure has never been demonstrated, least of all by Collins (175). In Boorstin's *The Discoverers*, Quetelet gets the tribute he deserves.

Item: Although Collins discusses many contemporary social scientists, there is a consistent lack of attention to what Wells and Picou in *American Sociology: Theoretical and Methodological Structure* identify as the predominant paradigm, "quantitative structuralism." The suggestion that the "macro wing" (120) of the Durkheimian functionalist tradition has no major exemplars after 1960 (except for Bourdieu) is obviously untenable. Among recent presidents of the American Sociological Association one thinks of Hauser, Sewell, Blau, Hawley, Blalock, the Rossis, and Short as macrostructuralists who share Wells and Picou's conviction that paradigm integration in the social sciences must allow "guidance by methodology." If you don't have an appropriate epistemology, you don't have a science.

Item: Collins raises fundamental questions, but he never makes it clear that the major rationale for the social sciences is that they sometimes provide "publicly verifiable" ways of answering at least some of these questions. Among Collins' big inquiries:

1. Is it possible for Weberian rationality to exist for organizations but not for the individuals found within them? Or vice versa?
2. Are abstract social phenomena, such as the suicide rate, real?
3. What is the social impact of ritual and, specifically, what is the role of ritual in maintaining social organization?
4. Is God really society?
5. Is there such a thing as a universal grammar, in Chomsky's sense?
6. Is ethnomethodology correct in its presumption that society is brittle, tenuous, and forever on the brink of collapse?